

ACC

10000/132/94

253.1  
Italian  
Sept. 1943 - Oct.

10000/132/94

253.1

Italian Armistice

Sept. 1943 - Oct. 1944

SECRET

Political Section

WJS  
HIS/113

/CC CCG.1-2

1 October 1944

SUBJECT: Request by Italian Government for permission to participate in armistice to be imposed on Germany

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Force Headquarters

1. There is forwarded herewith copy of a letter received today from Prime Minister Bonomi requesting on behalf of his Government that Italy be permitted to participate actively in the armistice to be imposed on Germany in the name of the United Nations.

2. It is requested that I be given instructions on which to base a reply to this request.

3. Receipt of the Prime Minister's letter has been acknowledged with the statement that the matter has been referred to higher authorities.

1 Incl:  
ltr from P.M. Bonomi  
d. 1/646, 30 Sept 44

HENRY W. STONE  
Captain, USA  
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: D.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Hon. Alexander Kirk  
Sir Noel Sharkey  
Political Section, HQ AFM ✓

3517

SECRET



SECRET

Italy, I should consider it absolutely necessary to give to the masses in the North the clear sensation that the United Nations are acting in a spirit of equity and justice. This would undoubtedly contribute to strengthen the elements of stability and order throughout the country.

Believe me, dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

Adm. I. DUBOVI

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.,  
Acting Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Commission,  
R.O.C.E.

3513

SECRET  
-2-

Zee

Ref 2133

18th September, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: G-3 Section, A.F.H.Q.,  
British Resident Minister  
U.S. Political Advisor

In an article of the 10th August signed by Mr. C. G. FRANKS, the DAILY TELEGRAPH published a summary of the long Armistice terms. There were certain minor inaccuracies over dates etc., but it seemed clear from the article that Mr. FRANKS must have seen a copy of the long Armistice. Enquiries on this score have already been made by the British High Commissioner from the Foreign Office.

In the meantime, a copy of the article had apparently reached the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for in the last number of their review "Politica Estera" an Italian translation of this article was published. Allied Military Censorship are making enquiries why this article was not shown to them before publication since the Ministry are under an obligation to submit all articles of a military character and armistice terms clearly come within this category.

Unfortunately, the GEB newspaper, CORRIERE DI ROMA, in their edition of 15th September also reproduced this Italian translation of the DAILY TELEGRAPH article. It was done by an oversight: and was handled by junior staff as a routine matter in view of the fact that it was a simple re-publication of a London article.

These publications have not as yet had any general repercussions in the Roman Press.

H. A. CACCIA  
Vice President, Political Section

Copies to:-  
British High Commissioner  
U.S. Representative, A.F.H.Q.  
Lt. Col. J. Moore, P.M.S.

3514

EWS/dfc

A/CC 387.4

15 August 1944

My dear Sir Noel:


I am enclosing for your information copies of the following correspondence:

- (1) A translation of Prime Minister Bonomi's letter, 10 August, re publication of Armistice terms and extension of Lend-Lease to Italy.
- (2) My answer of 14 August, and
- (3) My report of 14 August to the Supreme Allied Commander

Yours very truly,

HILARY W. STONE  
Captain, USAR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Sir Noel Charles, St., K.C.M.G.  
British High Commissioner in Italy  
British Embassy  
84, Via Venti Settembre  
Rome



3513

SECRET

SAC/afg

14 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Supreme Allied Commander  
Mediterranean Theater

1. With reference to your telegram No. 1-72755 dated 16 July 1944 about the question of the publication of the Terms of the Italian Armistice, I now forward a translation of a letter which I have received from the Italian Prime Minister in which he states that the Italian Government today considers it necessary that such publication should take place at a not too distant date.
2. There are certain points about the Prime Minister's letter to which I should like to draw your attention. In paragraph 2, Signor Bonomi implies that he had understood that the question of publication had been decided by the Allies and that in fact publication was imminent. If this was Bonomi's understanding of the position, he has misunderstood the representations which I made to him; for I was careful to explain that I was inquiring what the Italian attitude might be if, and only if, the Allied Governments on their side decided in favor of publication.
3. As this is it may, the situation is now altered by the present Italian initiative. It should in fairness be said that both the Secretary General of the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister himself have informed the Political Section that the main reason for the Italian initiative has been the expectation that the war with Germany was shortly come to an end within a few months, and the conviction that the publication of the Italian Armistice Terms more or less simultaneously with the publication of a German armistice would have a deplorable effect in Italy. It would emphasize the association of Germany and Italy at the very moment at which the present Italian Government was trying its best to turn back to older and better ways.
4. While there is undoubtedly substance in this argument, so far as the stability and standing of the Italian Government in Italy is concerned, it is also obvious from the enclosed letter that the Italian Government greatly hopes that it will be the Allied intention to sweeten the pill by making some simultaneous concession such as the granting of land-leave. The fact that some time has passed since our approach to the Italian Government in June without publication of the Armistice Terms may not unnaturally have led them to the conclusion that for some reason concerning Allied interests, we ourselves had some reluctance in publishing. They may, therefore, have hoped that pressure on their part for publication would dispose us all the more to make some concession of the kind suggested.

SECRET

SECRET

5. Nevertheless even if there may be an element of surprise in their initiative, it seems to all of us concerned here, and I have consulted Mr. Alexander Kirk and Sir Noel Charles, that it will be difficult to refuse the Italian request for publication except on the basis of countervailing and compelling considerations of a military character.

6. I shall be grateful if I may be informed as soon as possible what reply I should send to Signor Bonai; in the meantime I have merely acknowledged his letter and impressed upon him the importance of no publicity being given to his initiative. A copy of my letter is enclosed.

7. In the event of the decision being to authorize publication, the Italian Government would no doubt wish, if possible, to coordinate the date and terms of the announcement to be made before action is taken either in the Allied capitals or in Rome.

CLAUDE A. STONE  
Captain, USMC  
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Mr. Alexander Kirk  
Sir Noel Charles

|                       |
|-----------------------|
| Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.   |
| DISPATCHED            |
| Date-Time 15 Aug 1946 |
| Via <i>AS</i>         |
| Initials <i>OPR</i>   |

3511

SECRET

SECRETROUGH TRANSLATION

IL MINISTRO DEL MESTIERE  
DEI MINISTRI

Rome, August 10, 1944.

N. 17383

Dear Sir,

Some time ago you asked me whether the Italian Government had any objection to the publication of the Armistice of 29th September 1943 and I have replied, officially, that, on our part, we could see no objections to it. This I actually had occasion to confirm publicly in my statement on foreign policy of a few days ago to the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Several weeks have passed since then but no publication, which seemed at the time to have been quite decided by the Allies, and imminent, has been made, nor does it seem likely to be forthcoming.

We are aware that this non-publication has given rise to such press controversy and also to many indiscretions, either mischievous or erroneous.

I therefore would ask you kindly to inform the Governments of the United Nations, on behalf of the Italian Government, that today we consider necessary that such publication should take place at a not too distant date.

It is superfluous for me to give you a list of the reasons for which we consider such publication necessary. One of the most valid is certainly that the Italian people must know the real facts, however hard they may be and the sooner, the better. This applies not only to the Italians in liberated territory but, above all, to those who are still fighting against the German oppressor.

Furthermore, I personally consider that the truth is always salutary and that the Italian people cannot, today, continue to be kept in the dark concerning matters essential to its existence as it was kept in ignorance by the former regime: a fact which was certainly not one of the minor reasons responsible for our present position.

I should, however, like to add that today's factual situation is certainly no longer consistent with that inaccurately represented by the Armistice. So that if the publication could be made to coincide with the signing of some international event favorable to Italy, it would undoubtedly serve to emphasize that the Armistice itself represents today, in a large measure, a phase historically and politically overblown. It could also serve to register definitely

3510

the distance covered since September 1943, if only by reason of our co-belligerency; of the declaration of war against Germany; of the war fought now for ten months alongside the United Nations; of the constitution of a Government genuinely democratic, etc. etc.

I should also like to add that if the Lend-Lease act could be extended to us speedily, as all Italy earnestly hopes, this would be an excellent occasion for the simultaneous publication of the two events, which would then be placed in their right light and perspective, in the interest of truth and everybody.

I shall be deeply grateful if you will kindly convey to the Allied Governments also this my last suggestion which I feel sure you will illustrate and support with your unfailing courtesy and understanding.

Believe me, dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Ivanoe Bonasi

Admiral Henry S. Stone, D.S.N.,  
Acting Chief Commissioner  
Allied Control Commission  
ROME

3509

SECRET

SAS/URR

4/CC 387.4

14 August 1944

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your communication 1/283 of August 12, 1944, requesting me to inform the Governments of the United Nations, on behalf of the Italian Government, that the latter consider necessary the publication of the terms of the armistice of September 29, 1943, and suggest the speedy application of lend-lease arrangements to Italy.

In advising you of my compliance with your request, I have to ask that no official public statement regarding these two questions be made until such time as I have received from the interested Governments a reply which content I shall communicate to you immediately it is received.

Yours very truly,

WILSON W. WICK  
Captain, USN  
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi  
The President of the Council of Ministers.  
Italian Government

3508

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.  
DISPATCHED  
Date-Time 12 Aug 1944  
Via By hand Capt. Slaughter  
URR

SECRET

SECRET

AFHQ RPTD AFHQ ADV

HQ ACC

S-291

17 JUL

SECRET

ROUTINE

ACTING CHIEF COMM.

F72705

YOUR FOUR SEVEN TWO SEVEN ZERO FIVE OF SIXTEEN JULY IS PARH TO AFHQ FOR SACRED RPTD  
 TO AFHQ ADV FROM HQ ACC FROM STONE PERSONAL PARH MY VIEWS ARE STILL UNCHANGED FROM  
 THOSE SET FORTH IN MY ADV FIVE SEVEN OF JUNE TWENTY FOUR BUT FELT THAT YOU SHOULD  
 BE APPRISED OF THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS CONTAINED IN MY FOUR SEVEN ONE OF FOURTEEN  
 JULY

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY W. STONE  
 Captain, USNR  
 Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: The Honorable Alexander Kirk  
 Sir Noel Charles  
 Political Section

*Subject: Armistice terms*

3507

**SECRET**

POL Sec

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
INCOMING MESSAGE

964

TO: ACTION ACC MAIN

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACHED  
REFERENCE No: F72705  
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: JULY 160958

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 62/16  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET  
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE  
OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE...FHCEG

ARMISTICE TERMS. YOUR 471.

PARA. SACHED HAD ALREADY REPLIED TO CCS THAT HE AS NOT IN FAVOR OF PUBLICATION AT PRESENT STAGE OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, CONSIDERING POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCE AT TIME WHEN THEIR ASSISTANCE OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE.

PARA. YOUR VIEWS WILL BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION AT NEXT MEETING POLITICAL COUNCIL.

**ACTION**ACC DISTN

Action..Pol Sec  
Info....Secy Gen  
A/CC  
File.....2



3506

DATE and Time of RECEIPT JULY 161625

Distribution:

**SECRET**

AFHQ RPTD AFHQ ADV

AOC ADV

472

JULY 14

SECRET

PRIORITY

POLITICAL

SINCE MY AOC ADVANCE FIVE SEVEN JUNE TWO FOUR WITH RESPECT TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE ARMISTICE TERMS THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS SPECULATION BOTH IN THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND AMONG THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS REGARDING THE REASONS WHY THE LONG TERMS ARMISTICE HAD NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC PD TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND UNCLE SUGAR POLITICAL ADVISOR RPTD TO AFHQ ADVANCED FROM AOC ADVANCED PERSONAL FROM STONE PD I FEEL YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMS ARE TO BE PUBLISHED PD PARA THE FOREIGN PRESS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY CURIOUS FOLLOWING A REUTERS DESPATCH ON THE SUBJECT WHICH WAS PUBLISHED OVER A WEEK AGO AND SUCH LOCAL PAPERS AS AVANTI ARE ASKING WHY THE ITALIAN PEOPLE CAN NOT BE INFORMED PD THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS ALLEGED THAT SIGNOR BONOMI HAS STATED TO A CORRESPONDENT THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION OF THE TERMS PD THE ALLIED FAILURE TO PUBLISH THE TERMS IS THUS BEING INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCE THAT THEY CONTAIN SUCH HARSH PROVISIONS THAT THE ALLIES ARE UNWILLING TO PUBLISH FOR FEAR OF THE UNFAVORABLE REACTION OF THE PUBLIC AND EFFECT UPON THE GOVERNMENT PD PARA THIS SPECULATION APPEARS TO CREATE INCREASING CONCERN AS TO THE SEVERITY OF THE TERMS WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE DISSIPATED IF PUBLISHED PD ONE UNITED STATES CORRESPONDENT HAS REPORTED THAT QUOTE A NEW POLITICAL CRISIS IS BREWING OVER THE PUBLICATION OF THE ARMISTICE TERMS PD AS THE SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BONOMI GOVERNMENT NOT TO PUBLISH THE TERMS AND THE RESULTANT STORM WILL BLOW THE GOVERNMENT AWAY UNQUOTE

cc: The Honorable Alexander Kirk  
Sir Noel Charles  
Political Section

ELLERY W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

~~SECRET~~

Pol Sec

2747  
14

ACTION ACC MAIN INFO AFM ADV CP

AFM SIGNED SACRED

EX 6717

JULY 2/1518

N 12/03

SECRET

PRIORITY

CITE: FORM

PUBLICATION OF LONG TERM ARMISTICE RESERVED FOR RECONSIDERATION. OUR EX66746  
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.

MAIN ACC DIST

ACTION - C.S.O.

INFO - DEP CE

CA BR

POL SEC

FILE

FLOAT (2)

SECRET

3504

JULY 3/

SECRET

POL SEC

2673

FOR ACTION ACC MAIN FOR INFO AFHQ ADV CP

AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED

62952 AND FX66746

JULY 010915

107/01

SECRET

ROUTINE

CITE..PHOTO

FURTHER ON PUBLICATION LONG TERM AMBISTICE, ORDERED BY OUR FX62952.  
 SIGNED IS RECOMMENDING TO CGS THAT PUBLICATION WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS  
 AND SHOULD BE DEFERRED FOR CONSIDERATION AT LATER TIME.

ACC MAIN DISC

ACTION - SECY GEN

INFO - DEPC

CAPR

POL SEC

FILE

FLOAT (2)



3103

SECRET

JULY 011550

SECRET

*Pol. Sec*  
*2055*

ACC MAIN INFO AMHQ ADV GP

APHQ SEC SACHED

PX62952 *111*

JUN221819B

37/23

SECRET

ROUTINE

CITE/PAGE3

PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE THAT LONG TERMS OF ARMISTICE BE PUBLISHED,  
MILITARY OBJECTIONS NOW BEING LESSERED. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS BY 26  
JUNE

ACC DIST

ACTION/ SECY GEN

INFO/ DCC

CA BR

POL SEC

FILE

FLOAT

*253*

3502

SECRET

JUN230642B

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ACC ADV

471

SECRET

PRIORITY

JULY 13

POLITICAL

SINCE MY ACC ADVANCE FIVE SEVEN JUNE TWO FOUR WITH RESPECT TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE ARMISTICE TERMS THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS SPECULATION BOTH IN THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND AMONG THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS REGARDING THE REASONS WHY THE ARMISTICE HAS NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ PAREN TO ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS FROM ACC ADVANCE FROM STONE CITE ACC ADV FOUR SEVEN ONE PAREN I FEEL YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMS ARE TO BE PUBLISHED. PD PARA THE FOREIGN PRESS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY CURIOUS FOLLOWING A REUTERS DESPATCH ON THE SUBJECT WHICH WAS PUBLISHED OVER A WEEK AGO AND SUCH LOCAL PAPERS AS AVANTI ARE ASKING WHY THE ITALIAN PEOPLE CAN NOT BE INFORMED. PD THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS ALLEGED THAT SIGNOR BONOMI HAS STATED TO A CORRESPONDENT THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION OF THE TERMS. PD THE ALLIED FAILURE TO PUBLISH THE TERMS IS TRUE BEING INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCE THAT THEY CONTAIN SUCH HARSH PROVISIONS THAT THE ALLIES ARE UNWILLING TO PUBLISH FOR FEAR OF THE UNFAVORABLE REACTION OF THE PUBLIC AND EFFECT UPON THE GOVERNMENT. PD PARA THIS SPECULATION TENDS TO CREATE INCREASING APPREHENSION AS TO THE SEVERITY OF THE TERMS WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE DISSIPATED IF PUBLISHED. PD ONE UNITED STATES CORRESPONDENT REPORTS THAT A POLITICAL CRISIS IS BREWING OVER THE

253

3501

-2-

TERMS AND HE ADDS THAT AS THE SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BONOMI GOVERNMENT NOT TO PUBLISH THE TERMS AND THAT THE RESULTANT STORM WILL BLOW THE GOVERNMENT AWAY

Authenticated by:

Originator:

3500

## Advanced Headquarters Allied Control Commission

APO 394

July 10, 1944.

Dear Alexander:

I enclose a copy of a Memorandum on the subject of the Armistice Terms which I am today sending to Captain Stone. There is likewise enclosed a letter from the Wicked Count to Mr. Berle. Could this be put in the next pouch?

It looks to me as if you have given Sforza the run-around because he arrived here Sunday morning saying that you had sent him to Rome to see Stimson. I was delighted to be able to inform him that the Secretary of War had left for England. This somewhat dampened the Count's enthusiasm so he wrote the letter to Berle instead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable  
Alexander Kirk,  
United States Representative,  
Advisory Council for Italy.

210

S.R.  
Draft  
5-0

Advanced Headquarters Allied Control Commission

July 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

As you are aware, there has been considerable speculation both in the Rome press and among the foreign correspondents regarding the reasons why the Armistice with Italy has not been made public. The foreign press has been particularly curious following a Reuter's despatch on the subject which was published a few days ago, and such papers as 'AVANTI' and others in Rome are asking whether the Italian people can not be informed. In fact, both are making quite an issue of it.

I recall our discussions on this subject when the question was first raised, but in view of the publicity which has now been attached to the subject, I am wondering whether it might not be wise to reconsider this decision especially since many correspondents are bending their best efforts to find out what the Armistice contained and may publish garbled versions.

In a conversation with Count Sforza this morning, he told me that he had recommended to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Berle, that the Supreme Allied Commander be authorized to publish the terms. Sforza said that the Cabinet had agreed with the exception of Croce, who was just being Crocresque and difficult, and that they all felt that the Italian people should know the whole truth on the subject.

*Samuel Reber*

Samuel Reber  
Vice President Allied Control Commission  
Political Section

c.c. U. S. Representative, Advisory Council for Italy  
British High Commissioner in Italy

3488

C O P YUNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE  
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALYMEMORANDUM

Concerning the publication of the long Armistice terms, the Department of State concurs with the views of Admiral Stone and those expressed by the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy. The internal Italian reaction to publication at the present time, as well as the military implications of such Italian reaction must be considered. While there is no way of ascertaining the effect upon the activities of the Italian patriots in German-occupied Italy, it seems safe to assume that they will be unfavorable and may even result in considerable military disadvantage. Furthermore, publication at this stage of the war might be psychologically inept as publicity for the harsh political and economic terms imposed upon the Italians would reveal to the Germans and the satellite nations the nature of unconditional surrender terms.

The Department now has under consideration the British proposal that the Allies substitute the present Armistice terms with a preliminary peace treaty and it would seem advisable to postpone publication until announcement could be made simultaneously of a substitute for the present Armistice regime.

*Mr. Reber -  
Capt. Stone thought this  
would be useful to you.*

Naples, July 7, 1944.

*Reb*

3497

NOTE

SR's word

Experience with the Italian Arbitration has shown that, apart from the obvious drawback of the two overlapping Arbitration organizations, there are other difficulties which should be avoided if possible in the preparation of any future Arbitration.

The most important of these is because the Italian Arbitration was prepared so long in advance that it bore little relation to the conditions which it is now dealing with and which would result in its being obsolete. The annex to this Note shows the present position. The existence of these difficulties brings out that in the drafting of any Arbitration there need to be two main points:

1. To set out in detail, in the Arbitration terms themselves and in any and every order which handles all points which are likely to arise. This document has two drawbacks:

- a. It will produce a document of enormous length and
- b. Since the lengthy document must be prepared long in advance, the conditions which it is to meet will probably have altered substantially. Consequently some of its clauses may no longer be applicable. Similarly not exactly cover the requirements of the Arbitration and may have to be interpreted to do so; similarly that which is not covered for which no precise provision has been made. In the Italian case it was necessary subsequently to include the right to remission and extra-curricularity in the documents of transfer.

2. To retain under each heading in the Arbitration terms general powers susceptible of wide construction so that terms can always be interpreted in the sense desired by the Arbitration at the time without appearing to be doing an injury

to

253

3496

to the defeated enemy. This has not always proved easy in the case of the Italian terms. In this connection it should be pointed out that in the Polish terms, the expression frequently occurs that "the Italian Government will comply, etc." This is not satisfactory as the defeated Government may frequently be unable to comply, even with the best will in the world, and orders for the Allies to do things themselves even in unoccupied territory should always be reserved as under Article 13 of the Short Terms.

As the above three general clauses should be made very clear and not, for instance, like Article 13 or 16 of the Italian Armistice regarding financial terms and treatment of enemy personnel and property.

The document should result in a document of reasonable dimensions which must, however be of such a nature that it can be made generally known to all to enemy officials and public to all Allies as the Allies are responsible for its execution. The secret nature of the Italian terms has proven a hindrance.

Further, the document should be accompanied by an Administrative Directive to the Commission or body concerned with the execution of the Armistice stating what policy there should be adopted in regard to the terms, and this document should deal with the Armistice terms clause by clause. Periodic meetings of the various Allied groups which may be charged with administration of territory and the execution of the Armistice with the responsible officials of the enemy Government should be arranged to insure even application of the terms and coordination of activity whether the Allies are acting jointly or in regions. Records of these meetings should be kept.

In order to avoid the necessity of subsequently imposing

harsher

3455

-3-

harsher conditions of application for any other reasons than intransigence on the part of the enemy, This directive should insist upon a severe interpretation of the terms in the initial stages. The directive can later be revised from time to time as the burden progressively lightened if the terms are executed in a reasonable manner.

3494

## ANNEX

SHORT TERMS OF AMISTICE

All the clauses of this have either been executed by the Italian Government so far as they are able and bound to do so or are in the course of being executed in the same manner.

LONG TERMS OF AMISTICE

The following Articles have been or are being executed by the Italian Government so far as they are able and bound to do so. Many of them can not however be fully executed so long as any part of Italian territory is in enemy occupation. Those articles which can not be fully implemented in present circumstances are marked with an asterisk.

1(A), \* 1(B), \* 1(C) (?), \* 2, \* 3, \* 4, 5, 6, \* 7, \* 8, \* 9, \* 10, \* 11, \* 12, \* 13, \* 14(A), \* 14(B), \* 15 (superseded) \* 17, \* 18, \* 19, \* 20, \* 21(A), \* 21(B), \* 22, \* 23, \* 24, \* 25(B) \* 26, \* 27, \* 28(D), \* 31, \* 32(A), \* 32(B), \* 32(C), \* 35, \* 36, 37.

The following Articles have not been so far executed or only partially executed. Those partially executed are marked with a #:

16 #, 25(A) (In present circumstances this is almost wholly impossible but the Italian Government are keeping in touch with the A.C.C.)

28(A) #, 28(B) #, 28(C) #, 29, 30 #, 33(A), 33(B) # (?), 34 #.

Articles 38, 39, 40 and 41 are 'definition' Articles.  
Article 42 has not been used in practice - at least fully.  
Article 43 is the entry into force and duration provision.  
Article 44 is the penal and sanctions provision.

SECRET

FARGO 745

FARGO

SECRET

PRIORITY

5 FEB 44

10050 MACFARLANE

AJP

FREEDOM

CABLE FIBBS FOUR SIX NINE FOUR THREE REFERS TO PURCHASE PAREN  
 FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ FOR MIS FOR CINC FOR MACMILLAN PD CITE  
 FARGO SEVEN FOUR FIVE PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE MOVE PD DOUBTFUL IF I CAN GET FINAL  
 AGREEMENT BEFORE EIGHT FEBRUARY AT EARLIEST PD YOUR TELEGRAM QUITE CLEAR AND UNDERSTOOD  
 EXCEPT FOR DOCUMENT ABLE ARTICLE ONE PD ITALIANS MADE NO REQUEST FOR THIS ARTICLE TO  
 BE REDRAFTED PD THEY ASKED ONLY FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THEIR FINANCIAL LIABILITIES UNDER  
 ARTICLE TWO ONE PAREN BAKER PAREN OF THE LONG TERMS WERE LIMITED TO THE PROVISION OF  
 FREE TRANSPORT AND THAT ARTICLE ONE OF DOCUMENT ABLE DID NOT INCREASE THEIR FINANCIAL  
 LIABILITY PD PLEASE GIVE ME CLEAR ANSWER ON THIS POINT

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

Pol. Section  
 Finance Sub-Comm.  
 Econ. V.P.  
 Legal Sub-Comm.  
 Admin V.P.  
 Brig. Lush.

3492

L.F. NICKEL,  
 Lt. Col., AGO,  
 Adjutant General.

C O P Y

ACTION ACC MAIN INFO AFHQ ADV CP

N12/03

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED  
FX67317SECRET  
PRIORITY  
CITE: FOMEG

JULY 2/1518

PUBLICATION OF LONG TERMS ARMISTICE RESERVED FOR RECONSIDERATION. OUR FX66748  
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.

253

3497

C O P Y  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO : 107/01

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 62952 AND  
FX 66546

PREC : ROUTINE

FILED : JUL 010915

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG

REC'D : JUL 01

TO : ACC MAIN FOR ACTION AND AFHQ ADV CP FOR INFO

FURTHER ON PUBLICATION LONG TERMS ARMISTICE, OPENED BY OUR FX62952. SACMED  
IS RECOMMENDING TO CCS THAT PUBLICATION WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS AND SHOULD BE  
DEFERRED FOR CONSIDERATION AT LATER TIME.

SECRET

FARGO 655

FARGO

1 FEB 44

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

TRANSFER OF TERRITORY PD PERMASE PAREN FARGO FOR MACFARLANE  
 PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CINC FOR MACMILLAN AND MURPHY PD CITE FARGO SIX FIVE FIVE PD  
 COLONEL JUNG ACCOMPANIED BY CASARDI AND PHILLIPSON SUBMITTED AT DISCUSSIONS LAST NIGHT  
 AND THIS MORNING VIEWS OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING DOCUMENTS ABLE AND CHARLIE PD  
 PARA TWO PD DOCUMENT ABLE ARTICLE ONE PD THEY ASK FOR ASSURANCE THAT NOTHING THEREIN  
 INCREASES THEIR FINANCIAL LIABILITY IMPLIED IN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF ARMISTICE TERMS  
 PD THEIR VIEW IS THAT FINANCIAL LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE TWO ONE PAREN CHARLIE PAREN IS  
 LIMITED TO PROVISION OF FREE TRANSPORT FACILITIES PD COMMENT PD I SUGGEST THAT IF  
 POSSIBLE THIS ASSURANCE BE GIVEN PD PARA THREE PD ARTICLE NINE PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT  
 DESIRE FOLLOWING REWRIT PD QUOTE THE RIGHT TO IMPORT AND TO CONTROL AND SUPERVISE THE  
 DISTRIBUTION TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SUCH CIVILIAN SUPPLIES AS THE ALLIED FORCES  
 MAY DETERMINE WITHOUT PAYMENT CMA AS LONG AS SUCH SUPPLIES ARE AND REMAIN IN ALLIED  
 HANDS CMA OF ANY IMPOST CMA TAX CMA CHARGE OR DUTY OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER EITHER TO THE  
 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OR TO ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUB DIVISIONS OR AGENCIES PD FROM  
 TIME TO TIME THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIDER WHETHER AND TO  
 WHAT EXTENT CIVILIAN SUPPLIES FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION SHOULD CMA  
 WHEN TRANSFERRED TO DISTRIBUTORS CMA PAY ANY IMPOST CMA TAX OR CHARGE OR DUTY HAVING  
 IN MIND THAT SALE PRICES TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION SHOULD BE FIXED ON A BASIS CONSISTENT  
 WITH THE GENERAL ECONOMIC FINANCIAL POLICY AND SITUATION BUT THAT ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES  
 SHOULD BE FREE OF TAX PD THE ALLIED FORCES MAY ALSO EXPORT PRODUCTS OR COMMODITIES FREE

3489

OF ANY IMPOSTS CMA TAXES CMA CHARGE OR DUTY PD UNQUOTE PD COMMENT PD I RECOMMEND  
ACCEPTANCE OF THIS REDRAFT PD PARA FOUR PD ARTICLE ELEVEN PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WISH  
THIS ARTICLE TO COMMENCE AS FOLLOWS PD QUOTE ANY MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS LAND CMA  
SEA OR AIR FORCES OR THEIR OFFICIALS OR ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES MAY ENTER AND REMAIN  
CMA ETC PD UNQUOTE PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM AND BY INCLUSION  
OF THE WORD AGENTS THE ARTICLE INCREASE INCIDENCE OF SMUGGLING AND OTHER IRRESPONSIBLE  
ACTS PD COMMENT PD I RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE ITALIAN REDRAFT PD PARA FIVE PD ARTICLE ONE  
THREE PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT APPARENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO LIMIT FINANCIAL LIABILITY  
REQUEST THAT THE WORDS QUOTE ENLARGED IN DUTIES CONNECTED WITH THE OCCUPATION OF THE  
COUNTRY UNQUOTE BE ADDED AFTER THE WORDS QUOTE OR OTHER PERSONNEL UNQUOTE PD COMMENT PD  
I RECOMMEND THAT THIS ARTICLE BE OMITTED ALTOGETHER IN ORDER TO POSTPONE MAJOR QUESTION  
OF INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL LIABILITY UNDER ARMISTICE TERMS UNLESS IT IS DESIRED TO  
BRING THE MATTER TO A HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE DOCUMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION PD PARA  
SIX PD I CONSIDER THAT ON THE WHOLE THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN  
CONNECTION WITH THIS DOCUMENT APPEAR GENERALLY REASONABLE PD PARA SEVEN PD DOCUMENT  
CHARLES PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS WISH TO SEPARATE LEGISLATION  
PART OF PROCLAMATION FROM THAT PART WHICH APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE AND SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING  
PROCEDURE PD FIRSTLY PD ARTICLES ONE TO FOUR AS PROCLAMATION PD SECONDLY PD ARTICLES  
FIVE AND SEVEN AS MESSAGES BY BADOGLIO OF WHICH ACCEPTABLE DRAFT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO  
ME PD THIRDLY PD CONTENTS OF ARTICLE SIX TO BE ENACTED IMMEDIATELY BUT IN NORMAL  
MANNER UNOBTUSIVELY AS LEGISLATION IN GAZETTE PD COMMENT PD I RECOMMEND THAT THIS  
PROCEDURE BE ACCEPTED PD END OF COMMENT PD IN ADDITION ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DESIRE OMISSION I  
LAST SENTENCE ARTICLE THREE FROM QUOTE EXCEPT UNQUOTE TO END PD THEY ARE WILLING  
LOYALTY TO CONSULT ALLIED NATIONS BUT WISH FINAL DECISION TO REST WITH THEM PD COMMENT  
PD I CONSIDER THAT WE MUST BE FIRM ON THIS POINT BUT I SUGGEST THAT THESE WORDS COULD  
BE OMITTED FROM THE PROCLAMATION AND THAT A CLAUSE BE ADDED TO DOCUMENT ABLE TO COVER

3488

CONTINUED

-3-

THE POINT PD PARA EIGHT PD DOCUMENT DOG PD AGREEMENT WAS ARRIVED AT ON THIS  
DOCUMENT PD PARA NINE PD I AM FORWARDING FULLER DETAILS BY AIR SOONEST POSSIBLE  
PD I HOPE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON THE DOCUMENTS ABLE AND CHARLIE  
IN TIME TO CARRY OUT THE TRANSFER OF TERRITORY OF ONE ZERO FEBRUARY AS PROVISIONALLY  
AGREED.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

Political Section  
Finance Sub-Commission  
Econ V.P.  
Legal Sub-Commission  
Admin V.P.  
Brig Lush

L. F. NICKAL  
Lt. Col., AGO  
Adjutant General

3487

## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Italy

March 31, 1944.

SECRET

Dear Jimmy:

In recent days the subject of the Italian Armistice has been under discussion here, with particular reference whether such procedure or its like could or should be applied in other areas. The attached Memorandum which was prepared by Harold Caccia and myself, in consultation with our legal pundits, has emerged as a result of our discussions. I submit it as of possible interest and for whatever use you may care to make of it. Its conclusions are based upon the results of our experience after six months of occupation. Caccia is also sending a copy to London.

The Memorandum should, of course, be read in the light of the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the application of the Italian Armistice and its subsequent implementation which has not always coincided with the theories of co-belligerency. This is particularly apparent as regards the Naval Agreement, transfer of territory, prisoner of war status and control of relations with other United Nations.

Mistakes have, of course, been made in this first Allied occupation, but I am hopeful that the lessons we have learned here will serve to guide our future policy toward other countries. In this area our mistakes can possibly be minimized because the military situation has not kept pace with our political conceptions, but this will not always be the case. Those of us who have been associated with this experiment all feel very strongly that our directives and aspirations must be clear so that we do not by accident rather than by design embark on a course which is not in harmony with the basic principles either of our own policy or of that expressed in the Atlantic Charter. If by accident or fortuitous circumstance our treatment of a conquered people grows severer, the result is the same as if this had been a considered policy.

253

3456

The Honorable  
James Clement Dunn,  
Director, Office of European Affairs,  
Department of State.

-2-

Recently our Note with respect to Italian dealings with the United Nations and our refusal after six months of co-belligerency to concede this status as regards prisoners of war have taken on a particular significance in the light of the Soviet move. Unfortunately that move is being interpreted as a definite indication that Russia is entering Italian internal affairs as a positive factor. Should the changed attitude of the Communist Party under a Moscow directive result in a Left Wing collaboration with the present Italian Government, the other Parties will probably no longer hold out. Such a solution can not fail to diminish Anglo-American influence in the ultimate political solution. We were handed the ball nearly two months ago and through our apparent failure to adopt a constructive policy have let it drop. The Russians have now picked it up and are running down the field with it.

I assume you received copies of O.S.S. reports from here, but in case you missed R & A Report No. 2, dated March 28, I enclose a Memorandum which accompanied the Report. It was prepared by Captain Piccardi who, as you will recall, resigned from the Badoglio Government in November. Although lengthy, it gives such a good summary of the political situation as of early March that I thought it worth risking duplication, and am sending it along.

I am hoping to have the latest news from Washington through Bob within a very few days.

With all best wishes,

Yours,

Enclosures

3485

## NOTE

Experience with the Italian Armistice has shown that, apart from the obvious drawback of the two overlapping Armistice arrangements, there are certain difficulties which should be avoided if possible in the preparation of any future Armistice.

The most important of these arose because the Italian Armistice was prepared so long in advance that it bore little relation to the conditions of the Italian capitulation and allied requirements thereafter. The answer to this defect shows the present position. The existence of these difficulties points out that in the drafting of Armistice terms there must be the following of a program:

1. To go into great detail in the Armistice terms themselves and to try and cover under each heading all points which are likely to arise. This method has two drawbacks:
  - a. It will produce a document of enormous length and
  - b. Since the lengthy document must be prepared long in advance, the conditions which it is to meet will probably have altered substantially. Consequently some of its clauses may no longer be applicable. Some may not exactly cover the requirements of the Allies and would have to be interpreted to do so; usually other questions will arise for which no precise provision has been made. In the Italian case it was necessary subsequently to include the right to requisition and extrajurisdictionality in the documents of transfer.
2. To retain under each heading in the Armistice terms general powers susceptible of wide construction so that the terms can always be interpreted in the sense desired by the Allies at the time without appearing to be doing an injury

to

3484

-2-

to the defeated enemy. This has not always proved easy in the case of the Italian terms. In this connection it should be pointed out that in the Italian terms, the expression frequently arises that "the Italian Government will comply, etc." This is not satisfactory as the defeated Government may frequently be unable to comply, even with the best will in the world, and powers for the Allies to do things themselves even in unoccupied territory should always be reserved as under Article 10 of the Short Terms.

At the same time these general clauses should be made very clear and not, for instance, like clauses 23 or 28 of the Italian Armistice regarding financial terms and treatment of other enemy personnel and property.

This second method should result in a document of reasonable dimensions which must, however be of such a nature that it can be made generally known as well to enemy officials and published to all Allied authorities responsible for its execution. The secret nature of the Italian terms has proven a handicap.

Further, the document should be accompanied by an administrative directive to the commission or body concerned with the execution of the Armistice stating what policy there should be adopted in regard to the terms, and this document should deal with the Armistice terms clause by clause. Periodic meetings of the various Allied groups which may be charged with administration of territory and the execution of the Armistice with the responsible officials of the enemy Government should be arranged to insure even application of the terms and coordination of activity whether the Allies are acting jointly or in regions. Records of these meetings should be kept.

In order to avoid the necessity of subsequently imposing

harsh

-3-

harsher conditions of application for any other reasons than intransigence on the part of the enemy, This directive should insist upon a severe interpretation of the terms in the initial stages. The directive can later be revised from time to time and the burden progressively lightened if the terms are executed in a reasonable manner.

3482

## ANNEX

SHORT TERMS OF ARMISTICE

All the clauses of this have either been executed by the Italian Government so far as they are able and bound to do so or are in the course of being executed in the same manner.

LONG TERMS OF ARMISTICE

The following Articles have been or are being executed by the Italian Government so far as they are able and bound to do so. Many of them can not however be fully executed so long as any part of Italian territory is in enemy occupation. Those Articles which can not be fully implemented in present circumstances are marked with an asterisk.

1(A), \* 1(B), \* 1(C) (?), \* 2, \* 3, \* 4, 5, 6, \* 7, \* 8, \* 9, \* 10, \* 11, \* 12, \* 13, \* 14(A), \* 14(B), \* 15 (superseded) \* 17, \* 18, \* 19, \* 20, \* 21(A), \* 21(B), \* 22, \* 23, \* 24, \* 25(B) \* 26, \* 27, \* 28(D), \* 31, \* 32(A), \* 32(B), \* 32(C), \* 35, \* 36, 37.

The following Articles have not been so far executed or only partially executed. Those partially executed are marked with a #:

16 #, 25(A) (In present circumstances this is almost wholly impossible but the Italian Government are keeping in touch with the A.C.C.)

28(A) #, 28(B) #, 28(C) #, 29, 30 #, 33(A), 33(B) # (?), 34 #.

Articles 32, 39, 40 and 41 are 'definition' Articles.  
Article 42 has not been used in practice - at least fully.  
Article 43 is the entry into force and duration provision.  
Article 44 is the penal and sanctions provision.

(Note: The following report was prepared by Captain Leopoldo Piccardi, formerly Minister of Corporations in the Badoglio Government from July 25 until his resignation in November 1943. He is now on active duty with the Italian army. For this reason Captain Piccardi's name must not be used in connection with any of the information or opinions appearing in this report. The report was written early in March 1944.)

#### Notes on the present political situation in Italy

This report is not a thorough examination of the present Italian political situation and of its possible developments, but it contains the thoughts and impressions drawn from the personal experiences of one who has, in a responsible position, engaged in recent Italian political events.

The notion that intervention on the part of the King could succeed in liberating Italy from Fascism and extricate it from a war, disastrous to and unwanted by the Italian people, developed in certain anti-Fascist circles in the course of the past two years. This thought originated with the belief that it would be impossible for a popular movement to overthrow the Fascist government. The progressive weakening of the people's mental energy, resulting from two decades of political oppression and abuse all from the all-powerful sense of the disposal of the modern totalitarian state, made it impossible to expect any measure of success in a movement originated by the people. On the other hand, our army, traditionally opposed to uprisings and partly corrupted by Fascism, would never have found the determination or the energy to effect on its own initiative a coup d'etat. The Crown alone, by putting to use that prestige which it still enjoyed in certain circles, particularly military ones, could have surrounded itself with sufficient power to bring about a change in regime.

Certain restricted anti-Fascist groups, especially the liberals, had hoped that the Crown would intervene in the Italian political situation. At any rate, practically all the anti-Fascist groups, whether more or less confident in an initiative by the Crown, seemed to be willing to accept liberation from Fascism regardless of where it came from. They would have been willing to collaborate with the Crown eventually had it acted at the appropriate time. Most of the resistance came from the Action Party which was becoming increasingly republican in outlook; however, this resistance was brought about more from lack of faith in the King's initiative than from a resolution to refuse collaboration with the Crown in achieving a downfall of Fascism.

This idea became more and more concrete in the course of the first six months of 1944 in face of the rapid succession of military events. It should be noted that in the course of the past year the Princess of Piedmont, through her numerous contacts among the anti-Fascists, greatly contributed toward making the monarchy appear in a favorable light. Eventually, certain important political and military figures succeeded in breaking the barriers which the King had built around himself during the last two decades; he was approached and shown how necessary and urgent his intervention was. The fact that he listened to them at all seemed to be a good sign, since he was unapproachable and it was impossible to know his views. It is hard to say to what extent these talks influenced the King's policies. It is certain, however, that his attitude made collaboration with the political groups, in the preparation of the coup d'etat and in deciding upon methods of procedure, impossible.

In this connection, those persons who were seeking the King's intervention

impressions drawn from the personal experience of one who has, in a responsible position, engaged in recent Italian political events.

The notion that intervention on the part of the King could succeed in liberating Italy from Fascism and extricate it from a war, disastrous to and unwanted by the Italian people, developed in certain anti-fascist circles in the course of the past two years. This thought originated with the belief that it would be impossible for a popular movement to overthrow the fascist government. The progressive awakening of the people's mental energy, resulting from two decades of political oppression and above all from the all-powerful menace at the disposal of the modern totalitarian state, made it impossible to expect any measure of success in a movement originated by the people. On the other hand, our army, traditionally exposed to hardships and partly corrupted by Fascism, could never have found the determination or the energy to effect on its own initiative a coup d'etat. The Crown alone, by putting to use that prestige which it still enjoyed in certain circles, particularly military ones, could have surmounted itself with sufficient power to bring about a change in regime.

Certain restricted anti-fascist groups, especially the liberals, had hopes that the Crown would intervene in the Italian political situation. At any rate, practically all the anti-fascist groups, whether more or less confident in an initiative by the Crown, seemed to be willing to accept liberation from Fascism regardless of where it came from. They could have been willing to collaborate with the Crown eventually had it acted at the appropriate time. Most of the resistance came from the action party which was becoming increasingly republican in outlook; however, this resistance was brought about more from lack of faith in the King's initiative than from a resolution to refuse collaboration with the Crown in achieving a downfall of Fascism.

This idea became more and more concrete in the course of the first six months of 1943 in face of the rapid succession of military events. It should be noted that in the course of the past year the Princess of Piedmont, through her numerous contacts among the anti-fascists, greatly contributed toward making the monarchy appear in a favorable light. Eventually, certain important political and military figures succeeded in breaking the barriers which the King had built around himself during the last two decades; he was approached and shown how necessary and urgent his intervention was. The fact that he listened to them at all seemed to be a good sign, since he was unapproachable and it was impossible to know his views. It is hard to say to what extent these talks influenced the King's policies. It is certain, however, that his attitude made collaboration with the political groups, in the preparation of the coup d'etat and in deciding upon methods of procedure, impossible.

In this connection, those persons who were seeking the King's intervention naturally had innumerable discussions and conjectures. Thus they discussed whether, after Mussolini's fall, the government should be entrusted to a political or to a military leader; whether a political government should be formed immediately or whether a purely functional government should first be formed, consisting of both military personnel and civilian officials; whether we should immediately withdraw from fighting at the side of Germany or whether we should make the break after a short period of diplomatic preparation. The writer has always maintained the absolute necessity for the immediate formation of a political government, broadly based upon collaboration between the various anti-fascist groups, and for an immediate break with Germany independent of any previous agreement with the allies. Only in this manner would it have been possible to establish rapidly a new political orientation for the country, only thus could we avoid the danger of German reprisals. Unfortunately, a couple of weeks

SECRET

COPY

Before July 25th, there were rumors from Court circles saying that a different solution had been decided upon, inasmuch as a gradual change was preferred. A practical government consisting of military personnel and civil servants was going to be formed right away, and the break with Germany was to be postponed to a later date. The writer opposed this plan with all his might, pointing out the dangers that would result; the bewilderment of the country in face of a government devoid of any clear political policies; the resistance by fascism which could arise from within; the time which Germany would have to prepare for the inevitable counter-measure. Following events, unfortunately, demonstrated the correctness of these prophecies.

Now, given the impossibility of influencing the King's decision, it was felt that an openly hostile attitude toward a movement for the liberation of the country from Fascism could not be maintained. Consequently, the anti-fascist parties adopted an expectant attitude; they were prepared to favor the experiment as long as they were not held responsible for seeing it executed, since they had been absolutely against it from the start. Proof of this spirit of collaboration is the fact that the writer was designated to participate, in his capacity as civil servant, in the government which was about to be formed.

When Mussolini fell, following an internal crisis in the Fascist party towards which the Crown undoubtedly contributed, a government, composed of military personnel and civil servants under the presidency of Badoglio, was formed. Certain serious compromises with Fascism made it evident that this new governing body was weak and devoid of definite policies. It was slow in breaking down the fascist structure of the country, and its attitude was equivocal and uncertain in its dealings with Germany. No serious attempt was made to collect and coordinate the sound forces of the country in preparation for the problem which Italy would undoubtedly be called upon to cope with. I would go further and say that the attitude of the government, determined by a personal point of view of the King, was such as to reject collaboration with the public opinion upon which the new Italian political system should have been based. Demonstrations of delight over the fall of Fascism broke out throughout Italy on July 3. They were immediately repressed, not without force. The activities of the government were reduced to policing functions, undertaken with unprecedented severity. Public opinion was abandoned to itself; the newspapers were left in uncertain hands, and strict censorship of the press made life difficult for those members of the press who were decidedly anti-fascist in their views. The writer was the only one who attempted a policy of collaboration, by placing members of the various anti-fascist parties, particularly the popular ones (Socialists, Communists, and Christian Democrats), in positions of authority in the syndical organization.

I have said that the policies of the government were influenced by the personal attitude of the King, who, as a matter of fact, opposed all definite anti-fascist measures; he showed himself to be definitely against collaboration with the current popular opinion of the country; he did not attempt to disguise his annoyance, and even his scorn, at public demonstrations. Even the Crown should have attempted to justify its actions in the eyes of the public. One could say that the King, accustomed for twenty years to the fascist methods of government and ignorant because of his self-imposed ill confinement of all current Italian public opinion, was under the illusion that he could substitute his personal authority for that of Mussolini, monarchy for fascism. A very serious and dangerous illusion because, after such a tragic failure, the experiment with absolute government could not be renewed on a different basis. If Fascism is able to gain full power over the country, it was thanks to its leader's histrionic

felt that an openly hostile attitude toward a movement for the liberation of the country from fascism could not be maintained. Consequently, the anti-fascist parties adopted an expectant attitude; they were prepared to favor the experiment as long as they were not held responsible for seeing it executed, since they had been absolutely against it from the start. Proof of this spirit of collaboration is the fact that the writer was designated to participate, in his capacity as civil servant, in the government which was about to be formed.

When Mussolini fell, following an internal crisis in the fascist party towards which the Crown undoubtedly contributed, a government, composed of military personnel and civil servants under the presidency of Badoglio, was formed. Certain serious compromises with fascism made it evident that this new governing body was weak and devoid of definite policies. It was slow in breaking down the fascist structure of the country, and its attitude was equivocal and uncertain in its dealings with Germany. No serious attempt was made to collect and coordinate the sound forces of the country in preparation for the problem which Italy could undoubtedly be called upon to cope with. I would go further and say that the attitude of the government, determined by a personal point of view of the King, was such as to reject collaboration with the public opinion upon which the new Italian political system should have been based. Demonstrations of delight over the fall of fascism broke out throughout Italy on July 25. They were immediately repressed, not without force. The activities of the government were reduced to policing functions, undertaken with unprecedented severity. Public opinion was abandoned to itself; the newspapers were left in uncertain heads, and strict censorship of the press made life difficult for those members of the press who were decidedly anti-fascist in their views. The writer was the only one who attacked a policy of collaboration, by placing members of the various anti-fascist parties, particularly the popular ones (Socialists, Communists, and Christian Democrats), in positions of authority in the syndical organization.

I have said that the policies of the government were influenced by the personal attitude of the King, who, as a matter of fact, opposed all definite anti-fascist measures; he showed himself to be definitely against collaboration with the current popular opinion of the country; he did not attempt to disguise his annoyance, and even his scorn, at public demonstrations. Even the Crown should have attempted to justify its actions in the eyes of the public. One could say that the King, accustomed for twenty years to the fascist methods of government and ignorant because of his self-imposed ill confinement of all current Italian public opinion, was under the illusion that he could substitute his personal authority for that of Mussolini, monarchy for fascism. A very serious and dangerous illusion because, after such a tragic failure, the experiment with absolute government could not be renewed on a different basis. If fascism is able to gain full power over the country, it was thanks to its leader's histrionic abilities, to his knowledge of mass psychology, and to his able and unrepudiated manipulation and corruption of public opinion, all elements which the monarchy did not possess and could not acquire.

The consequences of such a profoundly faulty system of government were not slow in revealing themselves; public opinion disabused and anxious; the structure of the state shattered by a revolt which had defeated fascism without, however, substituting anything for it, and what is even more serious, those same consequences would reflect upon Italy's international position, because world public opinion, and in particular that of the Allies, was beginning to realize the true character and the true intentions of the new Italian government. This

SECRET

COPY

natural and understandable diffidence tended to make negotiations between Italy and the allies rather difficult; it justified serious belligerent acts against Italy (such as the disastrous bombing of Milan), which aimed at breaking the morale of a nation already spiritually prepared not only for the ending of hostilities with the allies but also, in part at least, to join them in their battle.

The negotiations with the allied governments were conducted by Badoglio personally, with the collaboration of persons trusted by him. The Cabinet was not informed; the Minister for Foreign Affairs was only partly cognizant with the facts. The writer, anxious to know whether the political policies of the government were the same as those desired by the people and expressed with the legitimate insistence by the representatives of the various parties, did not fail to make inquiries on the subject and was able, after repeated attempts, to obtain from the head of the government some vague information with regard to the negotiations which were being carried on with the allies.

The Armistice was suddenly and unexpectedly made public on September 8. The deficiencies of the government and the weakness of its activities then became apparent. Whereas the German plan for the attack on Italy had been prepared in every detail so as to be put into effect upon the given signal, we had made no preparations whatsoever. No instructions had been given to the military command; the energy of the civilian population had not been coordinated so as to attempt resistance; ports of command were still held by men of doubtful faith or by fascists. The army crumbled and within a few hours or days practically the entire peninsula fell into German hands. The head of the government and the King hastily abandoned Rome without calling a Cabinet meeting and without even informing the other members of the government of their escape.

This succession of events brought about a surge of true indignation throughout the country. The writer, upon the request of the party representatives, made a written declaration whereby he associated himself with the general criticism of the government's faulty actions. He announced that he would send in his own resignation as soon as the presence of the King and the head of the government would make it possible. Then, by order of the Germans, the ministers were replaced by commissioners, the writer, hoping to do something constructive for his country and in order to escape the inevitable German reprisals, decided to escape to southern Italy which had been liberated by the allies. He succeeded in doing this after a first unsuccessful attempt. He reached Brindisi around the middle of October, where, after expressing his views on the behaviour of the government to Badoglio, he offered once again to collaborate with him until the retaking of Rome, which at that time seemed in the near future.

The position of the government at Brindisi immediately revealed itself as unsustainable. Three ministers alone were present, two of whom were soldiers. The administration of the State was placed in the hands of a civil affairs officer, an act outside of all constitutional limits; the most serious decisions of the government were reduced to being subjects of private conversation between the King and Badoglio. Thus, the declaration of war against Germany, which was strongly favored by Badoglio and the writer, occurred only after the head of the government, in a series of dramatic conversations with the King, succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the latter and his entourage. Conditions in the provinces under the administration of the Italian government were chaotic. Facists were in power everywhere; anti-fascists were persecuted; freedom of the press and the other freedoms did not exist. Since the taking of Rome seemed more distant as time went on, the necessity for the formation of a government soon became apparent. To this end, first the writer and then Badoglio had conversations

fail to make inquiries on the subject and was able, after repeated attempts, to obtain from the head of the government some vague information with regard to the negotiations which were being carried on with the allies.

The armistice was suddenly and unexpectedly made public on September 8, the day of the fall of the government and the weakness of its activities then became apparent. Whereas the German plan for the attack on Italy had been prepared in every detail so as to be set into effect upon the given signal, we had made no preparations whatsoever. No instructions had been given to the military command; the energy of the civilian population had not been coordinated so as to attempt resistance; ports of command were still held by men of doubtful faith or by fascists. The army crumbled and within a few hours or days practically the entire peninsula fell into German hands. The head of the government and the king hastily abandoned Rome without calling a Cabinet meeting and without even informing the other members of the government of their escape.

This succession of events brought about a surge of true indignation throughout the country. The writer, upon the request of the party representatives, made a written declaration whereby he associated himself with the general criticism of the government's faulty actions. He announced that he would send in his own resignation as soon as the presence of the king and the head of the government would make it possible. Then, by order of the Germans, the ministers were recalled by commissars, the writer, hoping to do something constructive for his country and in order to escape the inevitable German reprisals, decided to escape to southern Italy which had been liberated by the Allies. He succeeded in doing this after a first unsuccessful attempt. He reached Brindisi around the middle of October, where, after expressing his views on the behaviour of the government to Badoglio, he offered once again to collaborate with him until the retaking of Rome, which at that time seemed in the near future.

The position of the government at Brindisi immediately revealed itself as unsustainable. Three ministers alone were present, two of whom were soldiers. The administration of the state was placed in the hands of a civil affairs officer, an outcast of all constitutional limits; the most serious decisions of the government were reduced to being subjects of private conversation between the king and Badoglio. Thus, the declaration of war against Germany, which was strongly favored by Badoglio and the writer, occurred only after the head of the government, in a series of dramatic conversations with the king, succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the latter and his entourage. Conditions in the provinces under the administration of the Italian government were chaotic. Fascists were in power everywhere; anti-fascists were persecuted; freedom of the press and the other freedoms did not exist. Since the taking of Rome seemed more distant as time went on, the necessity for the formation of a government soon became apparent. To this end, first the writer and then Badoglio had conversations with the principal exponents of anti-fascism, notably Croce and Alfano. The conditions set by these persons for their participation in the government were: the abdication of the king; the renunciation by the heir apparent of his rights to the throne; a regency in the name of the minor prince of Naples under a person not belonging to the royal family. The king turned down these demands and went about forming a government composed of undersecretaries of state, selected partly from the old southern political world, lacking any real political basis, and partly of civil servants and technicians. At this point, the writer thought it was best to hand in his own resignation. In view of the fact that a great gap was in the process of developing between the government and the nation, because the solution under consideration by the government was one opposed to the desires of Italian popular feeling.

SECRET

COPY

From that time on the controversy began to assume larger and larger proportions. The anti-fascist parties unanimously took a stand against the King and his government. All the best energies of the nation were banded from political life by a government which, transformed into a tool for low intrigue, tried to obtain support from those elements existing on the margins of the more vigorous Italian political currents. The only foundation which such a government can boast of is to be found in that grey zone which includes certain conservative elements, narrowly concerned with the defence of their own interests against the spectre of the entry into the government of the parties of the left, and also all those who, implicated by fascism or opposed to a free political life, dream of the resurrection of a totalitarian regime under another form.

On the other hand, the requests of the anti-fascist parties, now confronted with the monarchy, are assuming more serious proportions every day. The last Congress, in accordance with the policies of the National Committee of Liberation, has demanded, no longer a regency, but a suspension of the powers of the Crown until the Italian people by means of a constituent assembly, can decide upon the institutional form to give to the country. It must also be foreseen that with the progress of the allies toward the northern part of Italy, the opposition to the monarchy will become increasingly strong. Moreover if the King had been able enough to take into consideration the active political currents of the country, the change from fascism to a new governmental system could have taken place easily and peacefully. Instead of which a serious constitutional crisis is facing the country at a time when the people are politically ignorant and incapable of facing the problem, because for 20 years they have been under fascist domination and have suffered the consequences of war.

Meanwhile, when Italy has the greatest need to use its various energy for the moral and material reconstruction of the country, there is no government worthy of the name in existence. The sound groups are waiting time in anxious discussions about the person to be sovereign and about the institutional form of the State, discussions which have no vital importance for the revival of Italy. On the other hand, all the negative elements, which are represented by the remnants of fascism, are uniting under the banner of the monarchy and are preparing conflicts for the country which could easily have been avoided.

That conditions are necessary to bring Italy's political problems to a rapid solution?

The first is undoubtedly that of overcoming the monarchial issue. The necessity of the withdrawal of the King has been well demonstrated, and it should be clear to anyone who has the slightest knowledge of history and the slightest knowledge of the Italian political situation. No sovereign has ever succeeded in riding through a crisis as serious as that through which Italy is passing. A King who has betrayed his constitutional obligations and who has made himself subservient to a faction cannot redeem himself by having his prime minister arrested. A King who has dragged his country into a ruinous war cannot redeem himself by suddenly moving into the enemy camp when the tunes of war appear unfavourable. Those who advocate that the Italian people keep quiet on personal matters and rally around the King until the conclusion

On the other hand, the remnants of the anti-fascist parties, now confronted with the monarchy, are assuming more serious proportions every day. The Grand Congress, in accordance with the policies of the National Committee of Liberation, has demanded, no longer a regency, but a suspension of the power of the Crown until the Italian people by means of a constituent assembly, can decide upon the institutional form to give to the country. It must also be foreseen that with the progress of the Allies toward the northern part of Italy, the opposition to the monarchy will become increasingly strong. Moreover if the King had been wise enough to take into consideration the active political current of the country, the change from monarchy to a new governmental system could have taken place easily and peacefully. Instead of which a serious constitutional crisis is facing the country at a time when the people are politically ignorant and incapable of facing the problem, because for 20 years they have been under fascist domination and have suffered the consequences of war.

Meanwhile, when Italy has the greatest need to use its maximum energy for the moral and material reconstruction of the country, there is no government worthy of the name in existence. The sound groups are wasting time in serious discussions about the person to be sovereign and about the institutional form of the State, discussions which have no vital importance for the revival of Italy. On the other hand, all the negative elements, which are represented by the remnants of Fascism, are uniting under the banner of the monarchy and are preparing conflicts for the country which could easily have been avoided.

That conditions are necessary to bring Italy's political problems to a rapid solution:

The first is undoubtedly that of overcoming the monarchical issue. The necessity of the withdrawal of the King has been well demonstrated, and it should be clear to anyone who has the slightest knowledge of history and the slightest knowledge of the Italian political situation. No sovereign has ever succeeded in riding through a crisis as serious as that through which Italy is passing. A King who has betrayed his constitutional obligations and who has made himself subservient to a faction cannot redeem himself by having his prime minister arrested. A King who has dragged his country into a ruinous war cannot redeem himself by suddenly moving into the enemy camp when the fortunes of war appear unfavorable. Those who advocate that the Italian people keep quiet on personal matters and rally around the King until the conclusion of the war against Germany demonstrate that they are unaware of the necessity for moral cleanness and intrinsigence which are necessary conditions for a sound resumption of our political life. The Italian people have had to live under conditions of humiliating compromise for too many years for them, now that fascism has fallen, to be asked to silence the voice of their conscience and of their opinions. It is useless to say that on a matter of such importance one part of Italy alone cannot make the decision. The demand for the King's abdication arises from the logic of the situation itself. Furthermore, we know that in occupied Italy the feelings against the King are even more pronounced than in liberated Italy. It must not be forgotten that occupied Italy is going to make the King and his government responsible for the terrible sufferings which it is now enduring. That coup d'état which could have re-

COPY

conciled the people to the monarchy has become, because of the inaptitude with which it was carried out and because of the lack of understanding demonstrated by the King toward Italian public opinion, a new subject for attack against the monarchy. The delay of the abdication, therefore, while paralyzing the resumption of our political life, does nothing but prejudice even more the future of the sovereign and the monarchy.

If the King had abdicated more promptly, it could perhaps have facilitated the Prince Umberto's peaceful succession to the throne. Now, however, this hypothesis seems unlikely because of the bitter controversies concerning the monarchy. The Prince of Piedmont, as a person is of little consequence. His father always kept him away from public affairs, and he had little popularity in Italy. Consequently, he could only have succeeded to the throne if no discussion had arisen. Now that the parties have objected to him and the press has largely discredited him, his accession to the throne seems neither possible nor desirable in the interests of the monarchy as an institution.

The writer believes that the retention of the monarchy in Italy would be beneficial, both because this type of government corresponds to the traditions and temperament of the Italian people and because a change in the institutional form of the State could inevitably bring about a discussion about the foundations themselves of our constitutional system for which the country is not prepared.

In any case, it is necessary to come out of the crisis as soon as possible. The conditions made by the parties regarding the formation of a representative government offer a basis for negotiation. But even if these conditions are to be basically accepted, there is not time to lose, as every passing day causes irreparable harm to the country and to the monarchy itself.

Once the crisis is overcome and a government based on broad collaboration is formed, it is to be hoped that the parties will have the wisdom to solve the institutional problem among themselves, presending the country with an agreed upon solution, in this manner avoiding the division of the country over a question which is not of essential importance to the political rebirth of Italy.

\* \* \* \* \*

What forces can the country depend upon for its moral and material reconstruction?

The most serious and irreparable damage which Italy has suffered at the hands of Fascism, even worse than the military defeats and the material destruction caused by the war, is the fact that it has made the Italian people morally and politically illiterate. The greater part of the Italian people, particularly the younger generation, do not understand and do not feel, we must confess, the significance and value of liberty. Twenty years of oppression have accustomed the Italian people to a certain mental and spiritual laziness, which leads them to flee from the torments of research, from the fatigue of decisions, from the travail of struggle, all of which inevitably accompany liberty. If we want to bring Italy back to the heights of its tradition and make it capable once again of becoming a factor of civil progress in the field of collaboration between nations, the first task which we must confront is that of re-educating the Italian people.

346

This is going to be the task of the anti-fascist forces, which are the only ones capable of accomplishing it. As often happens, the period of tyranny.

arity in Italy. Consequently, he could only have succeeded to the throne if no discussion had arisen. Now that the partition has objected to him and the press has largely discredited him, his accession to the throne seems neither possible nor desirable in the interests of the monarchy as an institution.

The writer believes that the retention of the monarchy in Italy would be beneficial, both because this type of government corresponds to the traditional temperament of the Italian people and because a change in the institutional form of the State could inevitably bring about a discussion about the foundations themselves of our constitutional system for which the country is not prepared.

In any case, it is necessary to come out of the crisis as soon as possible. The conditions made by the parties regarding the formation of a representative government offer a basis for negotiation. But even if these conditions are to be basically accepted, there is not time to lose, as every passing day causes irreparable harm to the country and to the monarchy itself.

Once the crisis is overcome and a government based on broad collaboration is formed, it is to be hoped that the parties will have the wisdom to solve the institutional problem among themselves, presending the country with an agreed upon solution, in this manner avoiding the division of the country over a question which is not of essential importance to the political rebirth of Italy.

\* \* \* \* \*

What forces can the country depend upon for its moral and material reconstruction?

The most serious and irreparable damage which Italy has suffered at the hands of Fascism, even worse than the military defeats and the material destruction caused by the war, is the fact that it has made the Italian people morally and politically illiterate. The greater part of the Italian people, particularly the younger generation, do not understand and do not feel, we must confess, the significance and value of liberty. Twenty years of oppression have accustomed the Italian people to a certain mental and spiritual laziness, which leads them to flee from the torments of research, from the fatigue of decisions, from the travail of struggle, all of which inevitably accompany liberty. If we want to bring Italy back to the heights of its tradition and make it capable once again of becoming a factor of civil progress in the field of collaboration between nations, the first task which we must confront is that of re-educating the Italian people.

This is going to be the task of the anti-fascist forces, which are the only ones capable of accomplishing it. As often in pens, the period of tyranny, while degrading most of the country, has created a particularly astute and conscious minority, which, by enduring struggles and sacrifices, has acquired the capacity for taking over the governing of the country. Politically speaking, today in Italy there is absolutely nothing outside the anti-fascist groups. There is merely an amorphous mass, accustomed to servitude and which, if abandoned to itself, would inevitably fall back onto a new form of totalitarianism, either of the right or the left. Whoever claims that the anti-fascist are a mere minority, and that the anti-fascist leaders are neither known nor loved by the country, makes a sterile statement as there is nothing to set against it. He shows ignorance of the fact that the reconstruction of a country after such a serious crisis can only be the work of a conscious minority. He shows furthermore that he has remained, perhaps unconsciously, attached to the fascist point of view.

SECRET

SECRET

The division of the anti-fascist forces into various parties is a proof of their vitality rather than of their weakness or their political immaturity. As has been noted, there are today in Italy six anti-fascist parties; the Liberal party, the Christian Democratic party, the Labor Democratic party, the Action party, the Socialist party, and the Communist party. This array of Italian political forces, with certain modifications which will undoubtedly occur as the situation develops, ensures the needs of our country.

The Liberal party, probably destined to remain a small one based upon ideological views, can nevertheless have the worthy function of defending the principles of liberty and of counteracting the various tendencies toward collectivism coming from various directions. The party is personified by Benedetto Croce, for whom all cultured Italians have a profound feeling of reverence. Also members of the party are men of the old political world, who are still capable of useful action; Einaudi, Casati, Soleri. The more cultured and astute members of the younger generation are followers of this party.

The Christian Democratic party, founded primarily on a confessional base, naturally presents little unity of tendencies and programs. However, in a country with as much religious unity as Italy, such a party cannot fail to have a useful function. The most intelligent Catholic circles are moving toward a liberation from clerical ties and favor a social program more or less advanced. If these tendencies prevail, and it seems likely that they shall, then the Christian Democratic party can quite suitably fit into the role of center party, which, according to the opinion of the writer, is likely to direct Italian politics. Among the members of this party are men who are not new to politics, namely De Gasperi, Gronchi, Rodino, and some young men of merit, such as Conelli.

The Labor Democratic party, founded under the auspices of Bonomi who is not, however, a member, is headed at present by Faenzi and has a rather uncertain basis. It is a party which probably does not have an independent raison d'être and which is destined to be absorbed by the center party.

The Action party is perhaps the most interesting and most promising organization in the present political picture. The purest anti-fascist traditions are contained within this party; it has a large following in the intellectual world; and it is the party which can enumerate the largest number of first class representatives. It is sufficient to mention Eforze, Glance, Marchiani, Mattioli, De Bugliaro, Gelandri, Salvemini, and Amadeo. Should this party, through active experience with concrete politics, succeed in ridding itself of the ideology which envelops it and the revolutionary tendency which is somewhat artificial, it could constitute the principal nucleus of a center party to which I have referred several times. With regard to this the writer should define his own point of view. He is decidedly opposed to a Communist regime, because he does not believe that Communism is compatible with the preservation of democratic liberty and because he believes that Communism is absolutely incompatible with profoundly individualistic temperaments of the Italian people and with the characteristics of a poor and divided country such as Italy's. On the other hand, the political evolution of all countries, the ineradicable impression which twenty years of fascism has left on Italy, the poverty of our economy in which the development of large enterprises inevitably gives rise to intolerable economic and political monopolies, all these make a return to economic liberalism impossible. The problem, therefore, is one of reconciling the preservation of liberty with a regulated economy based on the principle of social liberty. The goal in the economic field should be the formation of a mixed economy, characterized by a division and diffusion of little holdings, backed by cooperative institutions and the socialization of large enterprises.

ivals coming from various directions. The party is personified by Benito Mussolini. For whom all cultured Italians have a profound feeling of reverence. Also members of the party are men of the old political world, who are still capable of useful action; Ambedi, Debuti, Soleri. The more cultured and mature members of the younger generation are followers of this party.

The Christian Democratic Party, founded primarily on a confessional base, naturally presents little unity of tendencies and programs. However, in a country with an such religious unity as Italy, such a party cannot fail to have a useful function. The most intelligent Catholic circles are moving toward a liberation from clerical ties and favor a social program more or less advanced. If these tendencies prevail, one it seems likely that they shall, then the Christian Democratic Party can quite suitably fit into the role of center party, which, according to the opinion of the writer, is likely to direct Italian politics. Among the members of this party are men who are not new to politics, namely Be Gasperi, Gronchi, Rodino, and some young men of merit, such as Gonella.

The Labor Democratic Party, founded under the auspices of Bonomi this is not, however, a member. It is headed at present by Palmi and has a rather uncertain basis. It is a party which probably does not have an independent raison d'être and which is destined to be absorbed by the center party.

The active party is perhaps the most interesting and most promising organization in the present political picture. The present anti-fascist traditions are contained within this party; it has a large following in the intellectual world; and it is the party which can concentrate the largest number of first class representatives. It is sufficient to mention Spadolini, Bianco, Tarchiani, Martelli, De Ruggiero, Calamandrei, Salvemini, and others. Should this party, through active experience with concrete politics, succeed in ridding itself of the ideology which envelops it and the revolutionary tendency which is somewhat artificial, it could constitute the principal nucleus of a center party to which I have referred several times. With regard to this the writer should define his own point of view. He is decidedly opposed to a Communist regime, because he does not believe that Communism is compatible with the preservation of democratic liberty and because he believes that Communism is absolutely incompatible with profoundly individualistic temperament of the Italian people and with the characteristics of a poor and divided economy such as Italy's. On the other hand, the political evolution of all countries, the ineradicable impression which twenty years of fascism has left on Italy, the poverty of our economy in which the development of large enterprises inevitably gives rise to intolerable economic and political monopolies, all these make a return to economic liberalism impossible. The problem, therefore, is one of reconciling the preservation of liberty with a regulated economy based on the principle of social solidarity. The goal in the economic field should be the formation of a mixed economy, characterized by a division and diffusion of little holdings, backed by cooperative institutions and the socialization of large enterprises. This is a solution best suited to the present needs of the Italian people and the role which they seem destined to play. Italy will find itself tomorrow in between the western world, dominated by Anglo-Saxon hegemony, and the Russian world; consequently it will have to assume the function characteristic of its frontier position, that is, the defense of western civilization and mediation between it and eastern Europe.

A program inspired by the principles of a non-carxist socialism, such as the one I have defined, would best suit the needs of such a mission. For the most part, this is the program of the party of action. If, therefore, it were combined with elements from the Democratic Labor Party and with the less marxist elements of the Socialist Party, it could assume an important position in the new political life of Italy.

COPY

The Socialist Party depends mainly upon the traditions of the former, pre-fascist, socialist movement in Italy, which, having missed the opportunity of peace war, will not easily reestablish itself after such a defeat. On the other hand, the Socialist Party appears to be outdated by more recent political developments. Consequently, it may be destined to be absorbed, partly by Communism, partly by a new non-fascist socialist which will be the banner of the center party. The Socialist Party also lacks men; some of its members, men such as Berni, Lombi, and Bonai, will have difficulty relating the attractions of the Communist movement.

The Communist Party, finally, represents a theory and a political system which can not be accepted in the political set-up of a European country. However, even for those who are opposed to a communist regime, the Communist Party can have a useful propellant function, analogous to that which was exercised at the end of the last century and during the first two decades of this by socialism. As has been noted, in this party the organization prevails over the personality of its leader; men like Brioli, Tedeschi, and Acciari, have no authority other than that derived from their position in the party. In certain respects, moved to an exception as he enjoys a certain amount of popularity as a syndicate organizer.

From this brief examination it is clear that there exists in Italy the possibility of forming a representative government, a government which, for some length of time, should be characterized by collaboration between the various parties. These have a great task to achieve in common; the liberation of Italy from the scourge of fascism, the re-education of the Italian people for liberty, the creation of the essential foundations for the resumption of free and civil political activity. The prerequisites for such collaboration are here. The fact that the six anti-fascist parties operate together with a relative unity of aims and intentions in a national front is the guarantee of the possibility of a coalition government. In any case, the writer in his brief experiences with government has observed the spirit of collaboration existing in the various parties with which he was in constant contact.

The fears of those who see in the multiplicity of parties and in their possible conflicts the danger of a return to the conditions of disorder and administrative impotence which make possible the advent of fascism, do not take into account the new spirit which prevails in current Italian politics. The experience of fascism has been salutary for all. On the other hand, the parties of the left, having learned from the Russian lesson, have become freed from that international and anti-state preconception which prejudiced their position in the years after the first world war. Furthermore, they have abandoned the abstract and impotent revolutionary spirit which characterized them at that time and have acquired a realization of their aims and concrete possibilities. Their participation in the government will give the parties, together with a sense of their responsibilities, more realization as to policy and program.

It is said that in Italy there are no men. This statement is false and sterile. False because every party has a certain number of well-known and experienced men who will undoubtedly be joined by young men inspired by this new situation which is maturing. Sterile, because everyone must make a fire and what need be his. He cannot, because of the preconception that capable men do not exist, idly watch our country go adrift.

What can the Allies do to help Italy return to its right path?

3484



SECRET

being the case, the Allies ought to make an objective examination of the situation and force themselves to interpret in the best possible manner the requirements, and favor that development of the crisis which best conforms with the ideals of the war they are fighting and with the interests of the Italians.

Actually, beneath the official declaration of "non-intervention" in Italian internal affairs, there undoubtedly exist other more substantial reasons which determine the Allied attitude.

In the first place, there is the anxiety lest the formation of a new government in Italy create difficulties for the Italian armed forces which are fighting on Italian soil and compromise Italy's war effort. This preoccupation has been made manifest to the writer by Allied persons and besides it was publicly announced by Prime Minister Churchill, with his usual frankness. However, those who thoroughly understand the Italian situation know that this anxiety is unfounded. A new government consisting of the representatives of the various political currents would be in a position to gather in a short period of time all the energies of Italy. There is no reason to believe that the military circles would offer resistance. The Italy army, as has already been said, has never taken sides in political controversies, and it would once again be disposed to support the evolution dictated by public opinion. One could even hope that the formation of a new government on a wide basis would increase the war effort which Italy can still be called upon to provide.

In any event, the Allies should realize that the difficulties of the situation become more serious every day and they should not deceive themselves into believing that a postponement of the decision could free them from the responsibilities which are accumulating upon their shoulders. The presence in Italy of a government which has not support in public opinion and which, whether right or wrong, appears to have been imposed by the Allies, will appear to be increasingly in contrast to those democratic principles for which they are fighting. It is therefore necessary to make a quick decision before the schism becomes deeper and irreparable. If, as we hope, Rome will soon be freed, so much the better; otherwise we shall have to face the problem even without Rome. The objection that a part of Italy cannot determine the fate of the whole is futile. When a portion of the national territory is occupied by the enemy, the liberated portion should assume the responsibilities of the entire country. Has not France formed a government in a colony notwithstanding the total occupation of the national territory? Anyway, is not a government such as Badoglio's equally responsible to all the Italian people with regard to the decisions it ought to make?

The solution of the Italian crisis will make it possible for the Allies to see again the principles to which the administration of Italian territory occupied by them aspires. It is necessary to say frankly that the Allied policy of occupation, regardless of the good intentions which inspire it, has turned out in practice to be erroneous. The Allies undoubtedly started out with a profound and justifiable mistrust of the fascist administration and have therefore thought it necessary to replace the organs of this administration. Now it is true that 20 years of fascism have profoundly polluted our bureaucracy which had at one time a reputation for honesty and competence. However, they did not bear in mind that the administration of a country is an inalienable task for strangers, who do not possess thorough knowledge of the language, traditions and customs of the country itself. We have admired the efforts made by the Allies to give us competent administrators in every branch of public service possessed with a certain knowledge of Italian affairs. Yet, in spite of these efforts, it is impossible to administer, without

on Italian soil and compromise Italy's war effort. This preoccupation has been made manifest to the writer by Allied persons and besides it was publicly announced by Prime Minister Churchill, with his usual frankness. However, those who thoroughly understand the Italian situation know that this anxiety is unfounded. A new government consisting of the representatives of the various political currents would be in a position to gather in a short period of time all the energies of Italy. There is no reason to believe that the military circles would offer resistance. The Italian army, as has already been said, has never taken sides in political controversies, and it would once again be disposed to support the solution desired by public opinion. One could even hope that the formation of a new government on a wide basis would increase the war effort which Italy can still be called upon to provide.

In any event, the Allies should realize that the difficulties of the situation become more serious every day and they should not deceive themselves into believing that a postponement of the decision could free them from the responsibilities which are accumulating upon their shoulders. The presence in Italy of a government which has not support in public opinion and which, whether right or wrong, appears to have been imposed by the Allies, will appear to be increasingly in contrast to those democratic principles for which they are fighting. It is therefore necessary to make a quick decision before the schism becomes deeper and irreparable. If, as we hope, Rome will soon be freed, so much the better; otherwise we shall have to face the problem even without Rome. The objection that a part of Italy cannot determine the fate of the whole is futile. When a portion of the national territory is occupied by the enemy, the liberated portion should assume the responsibilities of the entire country. Has not France formed a Government in a colony notwithstanding the total occupation of the national territory? Anyway, is not a Government such as De Gasperi's equally responsible to all the Italian people with regard to the decisions it ought to make?

The solution of the Italian crisis will make it possible for the Allies to see again the principles to which the administration of Italian territory occupied by them aspires. It is necessary to say frankly that the Allied policy of occupation, regardless of the good intentions which inspire it, has turned out in practice to be erroneous. The Allies undoubtedly started out with a profound and justifiable mistrust of the fascist administration and have therefore thought it necessary to replace the organs of this administration. Now it is true that 20 years of fascism have profoundly related our bureaucracy which had at one time a reputation for honesty and competence. However, they did not bear in mind that the administration of a country is an inalienable task for strangers, who do not <sup>3</sup> have thorough knowledge of the language, traditions and customs of the country itself. We have admired the efforts made by the Allies to give us competent administrators in every branch of public service possessed with a certain knowledge of Italian affairs. Yet, in spite of these efforts, it is impossible to administer, without serious difficulties, a foreign country. One can go so far as to say that often a dishonest and incompetent local administration is preferable to a competent and well-intentioned foreign administration. The Allies, by replacing the Italian administration in every detail of public affairs, have assumed an unnecessary responsibility. The inevitable misunderstandings which occur between the people and a foreign administration have sometimes diminished the enthusiasm and sympathy which greeted the arrival of the Allies. The Allied administration is held responsible for the inconveniences which the present situation cannot eliminate. On the other hand, the Allied administration serves as an anti-educative force for the Italians; the latter, accustomed by fascism to passively expect everything from above, continue to expect everything from AMG instead of getting into the habit of providing for themselves.

SECRET

161-5

In the writer's opinion, the Allies, instead of forcing themselves to solve the Italian political problem, should have favored the formation of a truly democratic government which would have every guarantee of undertaking a useful function both for the Italians and for the Allies, thus leaving the Italians to their work, with whatever controls the present situation requires and which every Italian with common sense accepts as a useful form of collaboration.

Before the Allied occupation extends itself to other Italian territories, in particular the Capital, it would be desirable that these problems be re-examined. No better basis for such a re-examination could there be than the formation of an Italian government which is truly representative of the most vital political currents of the nation.

1616

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

2473

-9-

SECRET

SECRET

note: The following article was written by Marshal Badoglio and appeared in the first issue of the pro-government paper, Il Corriere, March 14, 1941.

Let us make a rapid summary of events in Italy from 13 July 1943 to today. As a result of His Majesty the King's dismissal of Mussolini, in consequence of the vote of the Grand Council of Fascism, I resumed authority on July 25.

In the month and a half of activity in Rome, the government presided over by me took the following measures:

- 1) Disarmament of the Fascist party, the Grand Council, and the Chamber of Deputies and corporations.
- 2) Formulation of laws against unauthorized profits.
- 3) Removal of fifty Fascist prefects and substitution by civil servants.
- 4) Elimination of Fascists from the principal posts in state or semi-state agencies.
- 5) Arrest of the principal and most dangerous supporters of the party.
- 6) Absorption of the militia by the army.

These actions, vigorously opposed by the German government, immediately provoked the descent into Italy of numerous German divisions, which we had no means of opposing, since Mussolini, commander in chief of all our armed forces, had sent our divisions outside of Italy. Some 30 divisions were outside of our country, and only 12 - reduced and badly armed - garrisoned the homeland.

In the meantime, it no longer being possible because of lack of means and the decided aversion of the people to continue the war, we sought to put ourselves in contact with the Anglo-Americans to establish the conditions of an armistice.

To accuse us of having delayed too long in concluding the armistice is perverse, since it is obvious that to reach an agreement it is necessary that the other party acquiesce, and up to September 3 we had not received the consent of the Allied Supreme Command. A simple declaration of armistice or of unilateral surrender, that is, solely on our part, would have consigned us to complete control by the Germans, with no hope of aid from the Anglo-Americans.

Our military authorities had concentrated some six divisions for the protection of Rome. But with the proclamation of the armistice on the evening of September 8, the German divisions stationed near Rome moved suddenly against the city, and for reasons which will be clarified in due time, after several hours of energetic resistance, our defense collapsed completely. It was no longer possible to remain in Rome without falling into the hands of the Germans; therefore, all the royal family, I, and the ministers whom I had been able to warn made our way to Brindisi via Livorno and Pescara.

In this stay of a month and half at Pescara, all the true heads of the political parties gave full support to the government presided over by me. A proof of this is the following fact: through the inducements of German agents a general strike for September 1 was announced. But in the newspapers of August 30 and 31, there appeared a declaration drawn up by all the party heads in which they renounced the workers to abstain from any kind of strike

3471

**Chamber of Peasants and Corporations.**

- 2) Formulation of laws against unearned profits.
- 3) Removal of fifty peasant prefects and substitution by civil servants.
- 4) Elimination of peasants from the principal posts in state or semi-state agencies.
- 5) Arrest of the principal and most dangerous supporters of the party.
- 6) Absorption of the militia by the army.

These actions, vigorously approved by the German Government, immediately provoked the descent into Italy of numerous German divisions, which we had no means of opposing, since Mussolini, Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, had sent our divisions outside of Italy. Some 30 divisions were on the side of our country, and only 12 - reduced and badly armed - remained the homeland.

In the meantime, it no longer being possible because of lack of means and the decided aversion of the people to continue the war, we sought to put ourselves in contact with the Anglo-Americans to establish the conditions of an armistice.

To rescue us of having delayed too long in concluding the armistice is futile, since it is obvious that to reach an agreement it is necessary that the other party acquiesce, and up to September 3 we had not received the consent of the Allied Supreme Command. A simple declaration of armistice or of unilateral surrender, that is, solely on our part, could have consigned us to complete control by the Germans, with no hope of aid from the Anglo-Americans.

Our military authorities had concentrated some six divisions for the protection of Rome. But with the proclamation of the armistice on the evening of September 8, the German divisions stationed near Rome moved suddenly against the city, and for reasons which will be clarified in due time, after several hours of energetic resistance, our defense collapsed completely. It was no longer possible to remain in Rome without falling into the hands of the Germans; therefore, all the Royal family, I, and the ministers whom I had been able to warn made our way to Brindisi via Fivoli and Pescara.

In this stay of a month and half at Brindisi, all the true heads of the political parties gave full support to the Government presided over by me. A proof of this is the following fact: through the inducements of German agents a general strike for September 1 was announced. But in the newspapers of August 30 and 31, there appeared a declaration drawn up by all the party leaders in which they admonished the workers to abstain from any kind of strike or act against the Government.

Shortly after my arrival in Brindisi, a telegram from America reached us from Count Sforza, in which it was said that he considered criminal any opposition to my Government until I enjoyed the confidence of the Allies and that all our internal questions should be resolved at the end of the war. Delighted by this declaration, I continued in the course marked out and proceeded to declare war on Germany, obtaining the status of co-belligerency from the Allies. Now the declaration of Count Sforza was later realized is known to all, and it is not necessary to repeat it.

SECRET

- 1 -

SECRET

3471

SECRET

Having recon- sidered the government with men of absolutely good faith, who held as I held that above all one should work to cooperate in the greatest degree for the war and the reconstruction of the country, we put ourselves to work, holding true to the following principles:

1) To break down decisively the complete and intricate fascist structure which in 22 years had like an octopus permeated the whole structure and activity of the state, and at the same time to remove from every post of command and responsibility all those who were supporters of the fascist party. For this purpose were established the decree of defascistization and the creation of the Commissariat for "Extractions" under Tito Zaniboni.

2) To collaborate with the best will and the most complete loyalty with the United Nations to win the war. This action by the government and our armed forces has been fully recognized by the Allied governments. Proof of this is the cession of the provinces to the government and the speech made by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons.

3) To improve as much as possible, given our limited finances, the condition of the salary and wage earners. Promulgated for this purpose were the decrees for the increase of salaries for civil servants, wages of industrial and agricultural workers, and increase of allowances to pensioners.

4) To organize the territory for a more just and equal distribution of foodstuffs. The difficulties in this field, given the shortage of means of communication, are great, but we hope to be able to improve the situation considerably. Truly notable aid has been generously given us in this field by the Allies, and I wish to express again to them my deepest thanks.

5) To put in order our industries, highways, railroads, telephone and telegraph, and notwithstanding the enormous destruction and the scarcity of available means, a start has been made along the way to reconstruction.

6) To permit freedom of action to the press, provided this is compatible with the requirements of the war. Although this liberty, to which the Italians were no longer accustomed, has produced excesses in every sense, it is my conviction that good sense will prevail; and that a calm, dignified discussion of our most urgent problems will be achieved, based on solid arguments.

7) To postpone until the end of the war, and that is until all the Italian people can freely manifest their own will, every discussion and every measure regarding the future organization of our state.

For much for our internal problems.

As for those relating to our foreign contacts, it had been my concern to resume amicable relations with those states with whom no disputes have divided us and to reestablish relations of cordiality and complete reciprocity with those with whom we have been in conflict during this unfortunate war.

And the results of this intensive work will be made known.

It will be possible to make criticisms of all kinds, since only he who works can commit errors, but no one will be able to put in doubt our great love for this tortured Italy and our unshakable determination to make every effort which will serve to restore it.

the session of the provinces to the government and the speech made by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons.

3) To improve as much as possible, given our limited finances, the condition of the salary and wage earners. Franchised for this purpose were the decrees for the increase of salaries for civil servants, wages of industrial and agricultural workers, and increase of allowances to pensioners.

4) To organize the territory for a more just and equal distribution of foodstuffs. The difficulties in this field, given the shortage of means of communication, are great, but we hope to be able to improve the situation considerably. Truly notable aid has been generously given us in this field by the allies, and I wish to express again to them my deepest thanks.

5) To put in order our industries, highways, railroads, telephones and telegraph, and notwithstanding the enormous destruction and the scarcity of available means, a start has been made along the way to reconstruction.

6) To permit freedom of action to the press, provided this is compatible with the requirements of the war. Although this liberty, to which the Italians were no longer accustomed, has produced excesses in every sense, it is my conviction that good sense will prevail; and that a calm, dignified discussion of our most urgent problems will be achieved, based on solid arguments.

7) To postpone until the end of the war, and that is until all the Italian people can freely manifest their own will, every discussion and every measure regarding the future organization of our state.

For much for our internal problems.

As for those relating to our foreign contacts, it had been my concern to resume amicable relations with those states with whom no disputes have divided us and to reestablish relations of cordiality and complete reciprocity with those with whom we have been in conflict during this unfortunate war.

And the results of this intensive work will be made known.

It will be possible to make criticisms of all kinds, since only he who works can commit errors, but no one will be able to put in doubt our great love for this tortured Italy and our unshakable determination to make every effort which will serve to restore it.

3470

SECRET

U. S. SECRET  
 Equals British SECRET

INCOMING

F

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

FATIMA

14/8

7324

071902A

080645

347, +  
 ADMIRALTY

A protocol in revision of the "Terms of Surrender" as approved by Great Britain, United States and Soviets has been received. (To Fatima for MacFarlane signed Eisenhower site 11/10/43) Its text follows:

"Protocol. It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, should be changed to quote additional conditions of Armistice with Italy." The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

"In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words 'acting in the interests of all the United Nations' are inserted between the words 'governments' and 'on the other hand'. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows: 'Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3rd, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a Kiligny nature.'"

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words 'and Soviet' are inserted

3469

RL

U. S. SECRET  
 Equals British SECRET

U. S. SECRET  
Equals British SECRET

between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows: "The following, together with their terms of the Armistice of September 3rd, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows: "and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows: "The Italian land, sea and air forces where-ever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows: "Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascists associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by

U. S. SECRET  
Equals British SECRET

3468

U. S. SECRET  
Equals British SECRET

the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with." Signatures and date to follow. The foregoing instrument is only acceptable on condition that the Cunningham agreement with respect to the employment of the Italian Navy is amended as follows: 1. The following phrase to be added to the Preamble: "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time." 2. Final sentence of last paragraph to be amended to read "will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag." If you do not have complete text of Cunningham agreement it is in hands of Admiral McGregor. You should have Admirals McGrigor and De Courten come to Brindisi and the protocol and the amendments to the Cunningham agreement to be signed simultaneously. Authority is hereby given you to sign the protocol for the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces and for Admiral McGrigor to sign the amendments to the Cunningham agreement. C-in-C Mediterranean concurs.

It is considered essential that these documents be signed with the least possible delay especially in the light of the political situation and the possibility that Badoglio may not long remain as Prime Minister. It should be pointed out to him that the early signature of these instruments will enhance his personal situation as his signature is already affixed to a document which in his opinion is less favorable. In the event that Badoglio asks for any alternative he should be told that these amendments are final.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG  
1 - Diary  
1 - M/C

U. S. SECRET  
Equals British SECRET

3467

DRAFT

Ital. Govt.

The terms of the armistice to which we have just appended our signatures are supplementary to the short military armistice signed by your representative and mine on September 3, 1943. They are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also recognize that it is not at this time in the power of the Italian Government to carry out certain of the terms. Failure to do so because of existing conditions will not be regarded as a breach of good faith on the part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so.

It is to be understood that the terms both of this document and of the short military armistice of September 3 may be modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of cooperation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable.

357.4-

Armistice

PR

3466

MEMORANDUM

Professor Pazzi and Signor Agnino arrived in Lisbon some days ago with the intention of proceeding to London to make contact with various political leaders in England in the hope of being of some use in the present situation. We understood that they claimed that their mission was undertaken with the good will and knowledge of Marshal Badoglio.

It was decided not to allow these gentlemen to proceed to London, but to bring them to North Africa, where they now are.

It was agreed at today's conference that these gentlemen should be sent forthwith to Brindisi to get into direct touch with the Marshal. These gentlemen claimed to speak for the five parties, but Marshal Badoglio said he was not acquainted with these individuals and had no cognizance of their mission. It was, nevertheless, thought best that they should come to Brindisi.

(Signed): HAROLD MACMILLAN.

Harold Macmillan.

Brindisi, September 27, 1943.

HM/RDM/jgh

Copy to General Macfarlane, General Smith and Mr. Murphy.

3465

MEMORANDUM

The question of sending civilian representatives to serve under General Macfarlane was discussed with the General and Chief of Staff today. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan suggested that they would be able to send an official of the State Department and the Foreign Office respectively who might be of service to General Macfarlane in dealing with a number of questions which fall within the sphere of political and civilian problems. It was agreed by General Macfarlane that this would be helpful to him and we understood it was approved by him. We proposed to send him in the first place Messrs. Rober and Caccia.

(Signed): HAROLD MACMILLAN.

Harold Macmillan.

Brindisi, September 27, 1943.

Copy to General Macfarlane, General Smith and Mr. Murphy.

RM/DEM/jgh

3464

MEMORANDUM

I mentioned to Marshal Badoglio this afternoon the broadcast made by Professor Sforza recently in the United States, approving the action taken by the Badoglio administration in breaking with Fascism and waging war against Germany. He said that he was aware of the broadcast which had gratified him.

It was suggested to Marshal Badoglio that there might be a practical political advantage in his receiving Sforza for the dual purpose of acquainting himself with current public opinion in the United States, as well as affording an opportunity to Sforza to acquaint himself with current Italian problems.

Marshal Badoglio said that he would discuss this question with the King this evening and give us an answer tomorrow morning.

(Signed): ROBERT D. MURPHY.

Robert D. Murphy.

Brindisi, September 27, 1943.

Copy to Generals Macfarlane and Smith and Mr. Macmillan.

RDH/jgh

3463

## MEMORANDUM

Macmillan and I accompanied General Smith and General Macfarlane on a visit to Marshal Badoglio at 5 p.m. today. By agreement with and under direction of the Commander-in-Chief, General Macfarlane presented to Marshal Badoglio two copies of the long armistice terms. He recalled to the Marshal that the military armistice referred, in article 12, to the political, economic and financial conditions which will be imposed and said that the signature of the present long terms, which included all these conditions, was the principal item on the agenda of the Malta meeting scheduled for September 29.

Macfarlane called the Marshal's attention to the amended preamble and said that signature to the present document was required by the Allies for two reasons: (1) to satisfy Allied public opinion; and (2) to avoid the possibility of misunderstandings about points of detail at some later date. It was, however, to be understood that General Eisenhower had authority to make such modifications in the application of the terms as he thought fit. Moreover, some of the terms had already been rendered out of date by the process of events and the application as a whole would be carried out in the spirit of the declaration by the President and the Prime Minister.

Marshal Badoglio agreed to discuss the text immediately with the King and to meet with General Macfarlane and General Smith, as well as ourselves, at 10:30 a.m., September 28.

There followed a discussion of the other points on the agenda of the Malta meeting. Particular reference was made to the question of an Italian declaration of war against Germany. General Smith emphasized a military feature, namely, that Italian personnel who might be captured by German forces risked treatment as francs-tireurs and the danger of being shot instead of being accorded privileges customarily granted prisoners of war.

We emphasized the importance of a declaration of war if our public opinions were to support the considerable concessions from the strict armistice terms which it was proposed to make, such as the modification of the Allied Military Government, the return to the Badoglio administration of Sicily, and the decision to support the King and his Government. Both of these points were understood by the Marshal.

Badoglio seemed to be content with the status of a co-belligerent, if that could be obtainable. He did not emphasize unduly a desire to be regarded strictly as an ally.

A suggestion was made by General Smith that, for propaganda purposes and for the purpose of inciting the Italians to the maximum war effort, the Italian Government might blur the edges of co-belligerency in speaking to their own people of the promised last of alliance, but that the technical, legal status must remain that of co-belligerency. He mentioned that there was no indignity in

this . . .

- 2 -

this because that was the technical relationship between the United States and Great Britain and France and Italy during the last war. He also pointed out that, for example, today the United States had no military alliance with Great Britain or the Soviet Union.

Here again Badoglio said that he would discuss the matter with the King and be prepared tomorrow morning to give us an answer. Our strong impression was that there was no need to make any concession on this point. We have the distinct feeling that the status of co-belligerency will be acceptable to the Italians.

The Marshal indicated that the other desiderata of the Allied Governments, such as the broadening of the basis of his government and similar matters, could only be effectively dealt with after the King and his Government returned to Rome. He accepted it, in principle, as desirable.

With regard to the expression: "It is understood that the right of the Italian people to choose their own system of government after the war", mentioned in the text of the armistice terms, Marshal Badoglio wished to see this altered to: "It should be understood that free elections will be held after the war." In other words, he did not wish to pledge the King and the Government to throw open the question of the Monarchy by their own act. We must consider whether the form of words can be interpreted to mean merely that the Allies do not in any way by their actions now commit themselves to maintain the Monarchy. Marshal Badoglio ventured the opinion also that the Italian people are not adapted to a Republican form of government and feels that the retention of the Monarchy is essential to stability and unity of the country.

It was obvious throughout our conversation with the Marshal that in his own mind, and apparently in the minds of his associates, and this is confirmed by General Macfarlane, almost everything hinged on the return of the administration to Rome.

After the conclusion of the main discussion, General Macfarlane asked whether the King would assent to the introduction of certain words into the text of the broadcast speech already registered by him on a disc which would introduce the name of the Soviet Union by the side of those of Great Britain and the United States. Badoglio said that he would mention this to the King and obtain his consent. It was understood that it would not be necessary to have the King repeat the whole broadcast but merely to assent to the introduction of the desired phrase by the necessary mechanical means. Personally, Badoglio seemed to find no objection to the idea.

The meeting ended by the Marshal observing that tomorrow would be his 72nd birthday.

Robert D. Murphy.  
Brindisi, September 27, 1943.

3461

Copy to Mr. Macmillan, Generals Macfarlane and Smith.

i 6 3 0