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United States of America
Nov. 1943 - Jan. 1945

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Nov. 1943 - Jan. 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/jw

G-5: 311.23-1

12 March 1945

SUBJECT: Rome-New York Radio Telephone.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394.

This HQ, under date of 10 March, has cabled CCS:

- a. recommending that this service be extended to His Holiness, the Pope, and to his Cardinal Secretary of State.
- b. approving suggestion of CCS that this service be extended to Turkish Government.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

JB
JULIUS BYLES
Major, FA

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4297

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS FROM
WASHINGTON FROM FORMER ITALIAN
AMBASSADOR.

24 January 1945

Your Excellency:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter to. 3/268 dated 19 February 1945 in which were enclosed a certain number of excerpts from reports sent from Washington by the former Italian Ambassador, Sig. Savich. At the request of both the defending and prosecuting councils, these excerpts are to be sent to the President of the High Court of Justice as evidence in the Roatta trial, should the Commission agree to this procedure.

I am pleased to inform you that after consulting the British and the U.S. embassies, the Commission approves the indicated employment of this testimony and the excerpts found suitable for use are returned herewith.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief CommissionerHis Excellency Alcide De Gasperi
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government
Rome

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365/385

Extract from Washington report of Ambassador Sir h, 14 January 1938.
Continued:

- 3 -

Evidently, in the interplay of industrial politics the USA represents for Italy a secondary sector or at least a sector not having outstanding actuality. However I believe that the reverberations of the present American policy on Italian interest deserve the following special considerations: the reaction arising in America against what is here denominated the aggression policy of the totalitarian states may press America to drop its strict neutrality and take sides with the democratic nations. This is what is happening here now, however, with limitations in width and time. Saying that today America is ready to wage war at the side of the democratic powers against the Fascist states it would be beyond the truth, but if we say that from many sides and even from official circles a preparation for such a possibility is made, we probably state an actual fact. There is no doubt that the pacifist and anti-intervention inertia of the American people is paramount, but on the other hand it must be considered that in this country a state of excitement such as to overturn with some facility the most cautious forecasts may be created.

The symptom to be considered at present, according to my opinion, are the following: 1) a much slighter reaction to the one foreseen after the warlike excitement originated by the Ranay case; 2) the general approval met by the measures taken by the government to boost the national defence. On this point, the effort that can be made by America should not be minimized. Here the billions needed to raise the armaments to an hyperbolic level, may be collected with some facility. Among other things there is a proposal of Walter Lipman to launch a public contribution of one billion dollars with the aim to hasten rearmament; on the current Budget a billion dollars is already appropriated for the same purpose.

I do not deny that today in America may prevail this impression: that the effort made by the Fascist states in the field of rearmament has reached almost the limits of the possibilities, whereas the great democratic plutocracies still have some considerable resources, and therefore the intention should be of taking advantage of such an unquestionable superiority in the field of financial possibilities in order to menace and eventually to start an armament rush of such proportions as to leave far behind those states which now, according to the opinion prevailing here, have already accomplished the maximum effort. However, I repeat, the country will raise no obstacles to the government's armament policy.

Keeping all these elements in mind, I believe that we cannot and must not expect that the situation should undergo any considerable improvement in our favor under the present circumstances; in the American people's views, we have now joined the enemy field. Unless some new element should come to alter the general situation, we should have no illusions that anything we might do here in the field of propaganda and clarification may bring about noteworthy results.

But there is another observation I want to make in concluding this report: and that is that our intervention at Japan's side has been like the ~~chance~~ ^{chance} which causes a chemical precipitation: all hostilities spread and bred against us on account of the Ethiopian question, the Spanish question and all other attitudes of ours which have not pleased Americans, are now concentrated in the hostility against our action in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Under a certain point of view, this constitutes an advantage for our policy and gives us some

take sides with the democratic nations. However, with limitations in width and time. Saying that today America is ready to wage war at the side of the democratic powers against the Fascist states it would be beyond the truth, but if we say that from many sides and even from official circles a preparation for such a possibility is made, we probably state an actual fact. There is no doubt that the pacifist and anti-intervention inertia of the American people is paramount, but on the other hand it must be considered that in this country a state of excitement such as to overturn with some facility the most cautious forecasts may be created.

The symptom to be considered at present, according to my opinion, are the following: 1) a much slighter reaction to the one foreseen after the warlike excitement originated by the Panay case; 2) the general approval met by the measures taken by the government to boost the national defense. On this point, the effort that can be made by America should not be minimized. Here the billions needed to raise the armaments to an hyperbolic level, may be collected with some facility. Among other things there is a proposal of Walter Lippman to launch a public contribution of one billion dollars with the aim to hasten rearmament; or the current Budget a billion dollars is already appropriated for the same purpose.

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Signed: CUVIONI

3/268

Translation

MINISTRY OF STATE

Rome, 19 February 1945

Most Urgent

Dear Admiral,

I have your note n.3021 A concerning the documents to be produced as evidence in the Roatta trial.

At the request both of the defending and of the prosecuting counsels, this Ministry have collected a certain number of excerpts from reports sent from Washington by the former Italian Ambassador, Signor Buvich. These excerpts, copy of which I herewith enclose, could be forwarded, if you agree, to the President of the High Court of Justice.

It is needless for me to add that this Ministry have already pointed out to the Italian Authorities concerned the impossibility of furnishing informations or documents which might directly affect the United States or any other United Nation, or members of their respective Governments.

I will be very grateful if you will kindly let me know, at your earliest convenience, if the enclosed passages can be quoted in the trial.

Believe me, dear Admiral, cordially

yours

(Signed) DE GASPERI

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TRANSLATION

Excerpt from a report dated 4 February 1937 forwarded by Ambassador
 SWVICH from Washington

The Italian "propaganda" in the U.S. cannot be considered simply as a technical problem -- that is, of means to adopt and plans to be carried out. It has to be considered as an essentially political problem and as such forced against the broader background of the Italian foreign policy.

This political part is to be considered from two sides. From one side the possibility to establish an atmosphere of sympathy for Italy which might form a background apt to favor the development of the political, cultural, economical and financial relations, from the other side the possibility of an attitude favourable to us in an international crisis which may come up tomorrow.

Surely it would be better to succeed in attaining both aims, but this is not the problem. The problem is: is it worth the while to make the efforts needed to attain these aims? And, on the other hand, may these aims be attained even making every possible effort?

For what refers to an atmosphere of good feeling, according my opinion, the answer is the following: it is possible to obtain some results, but let's not nurse the illusion they could be easily obtained. It is a matter of proportions; more or less results according the general policy we will adopt, according to the details of our relations with the U.S. in all fields, according to the means of our disposal. It is true that fascist Italy has had until 4 years ago a favourable consideration by a part of this people, but the situation is now fundamentally changed. What has set American public opinion against fascist Italy, has been the rise of national-socialism with its manifestations in America, and the Abyssinian war.

The Abyssinian crisis has been overcome, and the work of civilization and peace that Italy is developing in Africa, if conveniently brought to the American public's understanding, cannot fail to meet with its sympathies. The question of nazism concerns the general lines of our foreign policy. Nazism has caused us harm especially for the fact that the two movements have been identified up to a certain point by American public opinion, and fascism has been blamed for certain typical Nazi manifestations that meet here with general disapproval. However, one thing is certain; it is convenient that whatever we intend to display of fascist action in this country should remain independent from Nazi action, because otherwise the thing would be interpreted over there as an alliance among fascist nations as opposed to American democracy, and it would look like an interference with the sovereignty of this country (America). This does not effect whatsoever the relations between the two embassies, that are and must be very friendly.

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The second question, i.e., America's attitude in case of an international crisis, concerns fully all our foreign policy directives. It is therefore difficult to make any forecasts now, without knowing by which elements such a crisis might be determined, and what shape it should be likely to take. There are however some definite points that can be stated even at this stage.

TRANSLATION: (cont'd)

As things stand today, i.e. with a division between fascist powers on one side and democratic powers on the other, there is no doubt that America's sympathies are in favour of the latter group, even if Russia should join this group, and above all if Japan should join the former group. The present sympathy might develop into assistance in the case of a conflict, in spite of all neutrality acts the Congress might vote. Also before her intervention in the world war, USA had an attitude of neutrality and this attitude changed completely within a few months.

Another certain point is that America will always tend to help Great Britain when this nation is in danger, and this she will do for two motives. First the common blood and tradition that unites the two nations, second America's conviction that England is an indispensable element of world equilibrium, and a necessary one in order to maintain peace.

There is no doubt that if America should help a group of powers engaged in a war against us, even should she do so without directly joining the war, the Italian minorities, and eventually the German ones if they found themselves in a similar position, would cause serious troubles. However, their efficiency must not be over-estimated. During the world war, America intervened at the side of the Allies in spite of the fact that the German minorities in USA were much stronger than they are today.

On this subject I think it is difficult to go any further.

There is only this to be said, that what we shall obtain in clearing the atmosphere between the two countries may have a certain influence also on America's attitude in case of a crisis.

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Translation

EXCERPT FROM A REPORT FORWARDED BY THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON,
DATED 7 MAY 1937

I have already summarized to Your Excellencies the principles which constitute the basis of the new American law on neutrality in its form definitely amended and approved by the two Chambers in their meetings of 29 April last.

The importance of the question induces me to go back over it again in order to furnish Your Excellencies more details. In fact, it is a question of the law that should automatically regulate the non-participation, or to be more exact, the manner of participation of the United States in future world conflicts.

I herewith enclose the text of the above law, taken from the New York Times, but, for a better understanding of it, I think it advisable to go back briefly to the precedents.

The first issue of the present law is of 31 August 1935. The second one is of 29 February 1936. The first was approved during the preparation of the Ethiopian war; the second during the war itself.

Although, in the intention of the lawmakers and in the wishes of the public opinion, they were both aiming to settle automatically the American neutrality in all theoretically possible cases, such laws, as a matter of fact, were deeply affected by the influence of the particular case for which they should have been put into effect, so that they turned out to be actually conceived and brought into being above all in view of the Ethiopian conflict.

In other words, such laws, in the first as well as in the second issue, were the expression of the U.S. Government's policy toward the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, to the extent to which such policy could be brought into effect as a compromise between the opposite tendencies into which the American public opinion was then divided.

The three main tendencies were:

- (a) that of "collaborationists"; i.e., the mass of pacifists and those favoring the Geneva policy, who wanted the action of U.S. Government to be put at the service of peace. They were sponsoring an "embargo" on all raw materials, aiming to impair the aggressor.
- (b) that of "isolationists", who, on the grounds that the participation of the U.S. in the last World War had been a consequence of the commerce with the belligerents, were supporting the suspension of any trade relations with the nations at war. Although their point of view was different from that of the collaborationists, they aimed as a matter of fact at the same result.

- (c) that of "neutralists"; i.e., the most sensible part of the country, who wished the U.S. to be faithful of the old principle of freedom of the

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(c) that of "neutralists"; i.e., the most sensible part of the country, who wished the U.S. to be faithful of the old principle of freedom of the seas (commerce of the neutrals with the belligerent countries), limiting themselves to sponsoring the "embargo" on arms and ammunition, so as to relieve the U.S. only from the responsibility of contraband of war (classical conception of neutrality).

Amongst these opposite tendencies, all of which aimed to have their point of view translated into instructions to the executive power, Roosevelt's Government stubbornly maintained, until the futility of such efforts was realized, that the Administration should be given by the Chambers "discretionary powers" to settle the neutrality policy in the best way, in the interest of

the country and peace, on account of the complexity and difficulty of the matter and the theoretical variety of cases which might occur.

Considering the moral and material pressure exerted on the American exporters with the purpose of opposing Italy, accused of aggression, and then the efforts to bring about the "embargo" on raw materials, there were no doubts left that the Roosevelt Administration, in the Ethiopian question as well as in other probable cases, should have made use of the powers entrusted to it by the Senate.

(..... Here follows a detailed analysis on the new Neutrality Bill and a summary of the press attitude.....)

The whole article by Lipman deals with the anti-German and anti-Italian spirit of the Neutrality Bill, which should be intended to hamper the Fascist powers in waging war against the democratic ones.

it contains periods as the following

"Theoretically, insofar as applied to any possible war, it is possible to show that the bill may turn out to work in many undesirable ways. But, of course, although he does not say that, the bill is intended to serve only for the important war that might break out in the next two years; i.e., a war in which Germany and Italy would face Great Britain and France. Now the act helps to make this war slightly less probable.

"In fact, it enables the peace-loving countries to reinforce their defences against aggressions, using their ships and their gold to get raw materials from America. Any observer of the situation realizes that the more powerful England and France become, the less probable shall be the war."

For anyone who has followed the debates on neutrality since the Abyssinian war, this satisfied attitude of the American press - that is traditionally so jealous of its country's isolationism and so touchy whenever there is a chance of its becoming entangled with Europe in one way or the other - is the most typical side of the evolution in American public opinion in the last year, and has therefore to be carefully studied and examined.

The reasons are known to Your Excellencies.

I am continually stressing them in my wires and in my reports. The main ones are: the consequences of the Abyssinian war, the rearmament of Germany, the Spanish question.

To these reasons must be added the consequences of President Roosevelt's great electoral victory on the internal policy of the U.S.A.; this victory is considered over here as a great victory of world democracy and, as such, it is being exploited by many internal and external forces in order to bring America more and more at the side of the other democratic nations.

After the tripartite monetary agreement of last August, the voting of the present American neutrality act is the most important step taken by America towards what has been called the "Three Democracies' Agreement".

(..... Here follows a detailed analysis on the new neutrality bill and a summary of the press attitude.....)

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(Signed) RUVICH 6800

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

TRANSLATION

Extract from the report from Washington of Ambassador Duvich, dated
3 December 1937

It must not be thought that because of this the hard feelings have been softened, nor that the antipathy and the hostility for Japan have been diminished.

It must also be recognized that, at Japan's side, the State which is today the greatest target of the aversion and of the criticism of this country (America), is Italy.

Even if it is admitted that the basis on which America left for the Brussels Conference was a mistaken one, because guns cannot be quieted by talking, the blame is nevertheless Italy's for having aggravated the situation by breaking the solidarity between the powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty.

Here, where there is still a residue of faith in the efficacy of declarations of principle and moral condemnations, it is considered that if Japan were found to be against the solidarity of all the great powers she would have been lead more easily to enter into some form of peace negotiations acceptable to China.

There is also much insistence here on the difference in attitude between Italy and Germany, with the observation that while the former has burned all her bridges behind her, placing herself decisively against China, the latter has wished to maintain all her doors open in order to protect her own economic and expansionist interests, thereby bringing forth some malignant deductions on the functioning of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

The recognition of Manchukuo, then, made at the present time, has been considered above all an act of hostility toward America, who has been the exponent of a tendency against recognition.

While until now the feud with Italy was limited more than anything else to the ideological field, it is now considered, as I have already observed in a previous report, that after our taking sides with Japan, Italy has passed definitely to the side of interests contrary to American political policies.

I consider these particulars necessary to explain the form of rancor against Italy that is today diffused throughout governmental, political, and journalistic circles here, and of which I have a direct and precise intimation.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Translation

EXCERPT FROM A REPORT FORWARDED BY THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON
DATED 14 JANUARY 1936.

Although the critical period of excitement is over, a deep animosity against Japan has remained, and has even grown stronger. As I have already previously advised you, this animosity affects us also, almost with the same intensity, in the sense that we are accused of having encouraged Japan in her action against China. I will not dwell on all the absurd inferences that have been drawn from our pro-Japanese attitude, such as that of a military alliance of ours with Japan, which would bring about Japan's military help in the Mediterranean against Great Britain, and that of a combined military action of the fascist states against democratic powers, among which is America, etc.; such rumours, even though rather widely spread, find but little belief in more serious and responsible circles, especially at the State Department.

I rather refer to the opinion, widely spread and believed, I dare say, by all Americans, according to which Japan, unless she had been supported by the Fascist states, would not have dared to carry through with her action in China, defying the interests of the nations most interested in that country. Even those Americans who are warmly disposed towards Italy - and there are many of them - and who had supported us in the Abyssinian and Spanish affairs, do not approve of our rapprochement with Japan at the present moment and are therefore no longer disposed to raise their voices in our favour against the mounting tide of hostility.

All this has not come unexpectedly and cannot surprise anybody, since our rapprochement with Japan in general, but particularly at the time when Japan started the invasion of China, could not have failed to lead to these consequences.

The Italian Embassy and the consulates subordinate to it are trying to stem this tide of hostility, as far as it affects Italy, but it is obvious that their chances are extremely limited. I have agreed to speak on the 23rd of this month to the members of the Chamber of Representatives, who will meet in the same seat as the Congress, forming a special "forum" to discuss foreign policy. As I imagine that the main questions I shall be asked, apart from Abyssinia and Spain, will be those related to Japan, I intend to keep to the following lines, apart from changes or additions that may reach me as an answer to my wire No. 5 dated 8th inst.): (1) considering that an anti-Communist pact exists, it is obvious that Italy could not have failed to join it, in view of her ideology and of her policy, which have undergone no alterations; (2) in the Chinese-Japanese question, the Fascist Government follows a line of absolute neutrality, and aims at the speediest re-establishment of peace; (3) recognition of the fact that Communism was increasingly spreading in China, with an obvious menace to Western civilization, to which America also belongs; (4) the so-called pro-Japanese declarations are nothing else than the recognition of Japan's military superiority and consequently of China's interest to reach an early accord so as to be spared more severe peace terms; (5) the attitude in Brussels has been dictated by a realistic consideration, confirmed by facts; i.e., not to encourage China in a desperate resistance, but rather to advise her to find as soon as possible a direct agreement with Japan.

absurd inferences that have been drawn from our pro-Japanese attitude, such as that of a military alliance of ours with Japan, which would bring about Japan's military help in the Mediterranean against Great Britain, and that of a combined military action of the fascist states against democratic powers, among which is America, etc.; such rumours, even though rather widely spread, find but little belief in more serious and responsible circles, especially at the State Department.

I rather refer to the opinion, widely spread and believed, I dare say, by all Americans, according to which Japan, unless she had been supported by the Fascist states, would not have dared to carry through with her action in China, defying the interests of the nations most interested in that country. Even those Americans who are warmly disposed towards Italy - and there are many of them - and who had supported us in the Abyssinian and Spanish affairs, do not approve of our rapprochement with Japan at the present moment and are therefore no longer disposed to raise their voices in our favour against the mounting tide of hostility.

All this has not come unexpectedly and cannot surprise anybody, since our rapprochement with Japan in general, but particularly at the time when Japan started the invasion of China, could not have failed to lead to these consequences.

The Italian Embassy and the consulates subordinate to it are trying to stem this tide of hostility, as far as it affects Italy, but it is obvious that their chances are extremely limited. I have agreed to speak on the 23rd of this month to the members of the Chamber of Representatives, who will meet in the same seat as the Congress, forming a special "forum" to discuss foreign policy. As I imagine that the main questions I shall be asked, apart from Abyssinia and Spain, will be those related to Japan, I intend to keep to the following lines, apart from changes or additions that may reach me as an answer to my wire No. 5 dated 8th inst.: (1) considering that an anti-Communist pact exists, it is obvious that Italy could not have failed to join it, in view of her ideology and of her policy, which have undergone no alterations; (2) in the Chinese-Japanese question, the Fascist Government follows a line of absolute neutrality, and aims at the speediest re-establishment of peace; (3) recognition of the fact that Communism was increasingly spreading in China, with an obvious menace to Western civilization, to which America also belongs; (4) the so-called pro-Japanese declarations are nothing else than the recognition of Japan's military superiority and consequently of China's interest to reach an early accord so as to be spared more severe peace terms; (5) the attitude in Brussels has been dictated by a realistic consideration, confirmed by facts; i.e., not to encourage China in a desperate resistance, but rather to advise her to find as soon as possible a direct agreement with Japan.

4288

Coming back to our situation in America, one more thing must be kept in mind: over here a distinction is being drawn between the position of Italy and that of Germany, a heavier responsibility being charged against us rather than against Germany on the question of Japan's campaign against China. Though Hitlerite Germany meets in this country with a more radical hostility than does Fascist Italy - and a hostility hard to overcome - in the present moment the situation is reversed. Germany, it is thought over here, needs the solidarity of the other Fascist countries in order to accomplish

its own.....

- 2 -

its own national programme, but has not taken a definite stand of hostility against the democratic powers (particularly Great Britain and America); on the other hand, Italy is considered to have intentions of fighting against these countries. Also in the Japanese question, a certain German reserve is stressed in these circles as confronted with a sharply outlined position on Italy's part.

4287

TRANSLATION

Excerpt from the report from Washington of Ambassador Suwich, dated
1 February 1938

I do not think that the Americans intend to extend post imso
facto recognition to Japan as well for her actions now in progress in
China, if they ever really wish to arrive in time to halt these Japanese
undertakings before Japan can make them accomplished facts. But in
order to try this with any certain hope of success, the Federal Govern-
ment probably wishes to eliminate the opposition that might come in the
first place from Italy and in the second place from Germany, whose aid,
according to the opinion prevailing here, gave the necessary encouragement
to Japan to carry through with her undertaking, challenging the Powers
who are largely interested in the Pacific.

The possibility of the recognition of the conquest of Ethiopia
is therefore disclosed to Italy, and to Germany there is disclosed the
possibility of a solution of the question of raw materials, and of the
colonial question, in order to have them as Allies rather than enemies in
any eventual American undertaking and thus to isolate Japan.

I must point out that in the course of the conversation the
Undersecretary of State also reaffirmed to me that America has informed
the two governments in conflict that she is ready always to place at their
disposal her good offices for a settlement of differences.

The indications given to me by the Undersecretary of State
hinting at eventual Italian participation in a plan of regulation were
altogether made so cautiously and in so discreet a form that I can very
well let the matter drop and not follow it up at all.

Whereas on the other hand, above all because of the hint of an
eventual regularization of the Ethiopian question, one should consider
picking up and following up these "advances", even though they were only
vaguely hinted at by Mr. W., I should appreciate your letting me have
something concrete on which to base a reply, in such a way as to allow
me to get away from the generalities in which the conversation was
maintained on both sides.

Williams

I do not think that the Americans intend to extend post facto recognition to Japan as well for her actions now in progress in China, if they ever really wish to arrive in time to halt these Japanese undertakings before Japan can make them accomplished facts. But in order to try this with any certain hope of success, the Federal Government probably wishes to eliminate the opposition that might come in the first place from Italy and in the second place from Germany, whose aid, according to the opinion prevailing here, gave the necessary encouragement to Japan to carry through with her undertaking, challenging the Powers who are largely interested in the Pacific.

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Whereas on the other hand, above all because of the hint of an eventual regularization of the Ethiopian question, one should consider picking up and following up these 'advances', even though they were only vaguely hinted at by Mr. W., I should appreciate your letting me have something concrete on which to base a reply, in such a way as to allow me to get away from the generalities in which the conversation was maintained on both sides.

With kindest regards,
LWS

Trans - LWS

4206

TRANSMISSION

Excerpt from a report from Washington by Ambassador Surich, dated
1 July 1938

Some time ago I accepted an invitation from the National Italian Civic League to be present and speak at the National Convention that this year is taking place between July 1st and 3rd at Kansas City.

This "League" is an association of some importance diffused through the various states of the Middle West that pursues commendable aims such as that of promoting in general our culture, and of awarding scholarships to students of Italian origin to encourage the elevation of our national groups.

In practice, however, the Association is in the hands of some clever Italo-American politicians who use it for electoral ends.

This year, according to what I was assured, several Governors, Senators, and state deputies would have taken part in the Convention, among whom the presence of the Italian ambassador would have had a certain prominence.

I was nevertheless informed some days ago that the Convention at Kansas City was taking on a definite appearance of political and electoral manifestation. The leaders of the convention refused to invite the Governor of Missouri, notwithstanding that he may be considered as the land-lord, Kansas City being in Missouri. Subsequently the Consul General informed me that it is likely that the same day in the same town a manifestation of the Governor's party may take place.

Confronted by such a situation I had to decline the invitation, although I realized that my refusal, arriving at the last moment, would greatly upset the organization of the Convention. However all efforts made by H.M.'s Vice Consul at St. Louis to have the leaders of the Convention change their partisan attitude, have been in vain and I had to insist on my refusal.

I must add that the majority of the Italian organizers realized that the Convention was showing such a form that the ambassador could not take any part in it without running the risk of being accused (and with some reason) of meddling with the internal politics of the country to which he is accredited.

TRANSLATION

Excerpt from the report from Washington of Ambassador Surich, dated
1 February 1938

+++++

I do not think that the Americans intend to extend post ipso facto recognition to Japan as well for her actions now in progress in China, if they ever really wish to arrive in time to halt these Japanese undertakings before Japan can make them accomplished facts. But in order to try this with any certain hope of success, the Federal Government probably wishes to eliminate the opposition that might come in the first place from Italy and in the second place from Germany, whose aid, according to the opinion prevailing here, gave the necessary encouragement to Japan to carry through with her undertaking, challenging the Powers who are largely interested in the Pacific.

I must point out that in the course of the conversation the Undersecretary of State also reaffirmed to me that America has informed the two governments in conflict that she is ready always to place at their disposal her good offices for a settlement of differences.

The indications given to me by the Undersecretary of State hinting at eventual Italian participation in a plan of regulation were altogether made so cautiously and in so discreet a form that I can very well let the matter drop and not follow it up at all.

Trans - LBS

FROM: Cypher Security Mission
DATE: 17th February 1945

SUBJECT: Deposited Code and Cypher for Italian Embassy
WASHINGTON.

DISTRIBUTION: Political Section. (Mr Halford).
Communications Sub Commission (Col. Henderson).

A. On 14th February Italian Ministry deposited with us the cypher and code systems to be used by their Ambassador about to proceed to Washington.

B. These systems (consisting actually of two secret cyphers and the usual non-secret code) had been previously approved by us - the former considerably modified in discussion with us and after reference to AFHQ.

C. The copies to be taken to Washington by the Ambassador were, after being seen by us, returned to the Ministry on 16th February .

FR L.

Pol Sec

WWS/ht.

WWS

WWS

28 October 1944.

The Hon. Alexander Kirk,
United States Ambassador,
R o m e.

Dear Mr. Kirk,

Reference is made to your letter of 27 October 1944 concerning the payments of the Swiss Legation in Washington for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the representation of Italian interests in the United States.

As was originally requested by means of a message from U.S.S. received by us on 10 August 1944 to authorize the release of an amount not to exceed \$5,000 per month for this purpose. This was discussed with the Italian Government which verbally authorized the payment of \$3,000 per month and stated that a request would be made of the Swiss Government for information as to the reason for a need of \$5,000 per month. The payment of \$3,000 per month was authorized on 25 August 1944.

On 5 September 1944 the Political Section A.C.C. delivered to Finance Sub-Commission the paraphrase of the telegram received from the Department of State Washington stating that \$5,000 is needed asking the Department to be informed urgently why \$5,000 had not been authorized.

On 10 September 1944 Finance Sub-Commission notified Political Section that the Italian Government was waiting information from the Swiss Government before authorizing advances of \$5,000 premium.

Two other messages from the Department of State requesting the Italian Government to increase the amount available were delivered by the Political Section to the Finance Sub-Commission on 20 and 27 September. This matter was again discussed with the Italian Government who stated it was still waiting information from the Swiss Government. The Italian Government also requested that the Department of State be asked to inform the Swiss Legation that the Italian Government would appreciate receiving information supporting the need of \$5,000 per month. The Finance Sub-Commission notified the Political Section of this reply on 30 September 1944 and at the same time informed Political Section that the payments for August, September and October had been remitted.

4282

Discussed with L. H. ...

4405

- 2 -

The Italian Government had not paid the lire counter value of the \$9,000 already remitted although frequent requests were made for repayment by the Finance Sub-Commission.

On 20 October 1944 Mr. Ortona of the Foreign Office delivered to Finance Sub-Commission a letter from the Minister of Treasury dated 13 October 1944 authorizing payment of \$5,000 per month beginning from 1 July 1944. This letter, two copies of which were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instructed that the Ministry should immediately repay the equivalent amount in lire. The Political Section was notified of this communication on 20 October 1944.

Requests have been daily of the Foreign Office for payment of the lire counter value of the dollars; as yet no payment has been received and no payment order on dollars has been sent.

Very truly yours,

ELMER W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner.

CC-COS

Pol Sec ✓

Fin Sec

"A" files

4281

C O P I A

6/777/344

UFFICIO COLLEGAMENTO A.A.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ALLIED COMMISSION. POLITICAL SECTION.

Reference is made to the two telegrams from the State Department dated respectively 27th September ult. and October 4th concerning payments in dollars to the Swiss Legation in Washington.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes leave to inform the Political Section, A.C., that the Minister of Treasury has informed the Finance Sub-Commission, A.C. that the Ministry of Treasury consents that, as from 1st July 1944 until further notice, Five thousand dollars (5000) may be drawn monthly from the accounts in dollars accredited to the Bank of Italy, payable to the Swiss Legation at Washington for expenses incurred and to be incurred for the protection of Italian interests in the United States.

ROME, 18 October, 1944

Copia del presente foglio inviata all'ufficio D.G.A.E. IV.

4280

6/5/344

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394.

13081/P.

20 October 1944.

SUBJECT : Payment to Swiss Legation, Washington.

TO : Political Section, ABC.

1. Reference is made to paraphrases of messages concerning the payment of dollars to the Swiss Legation Washington to meet obligations incurred in representing Italian interests forwarded to this Sub-Commission by your section on 8 and 27 September 1944 and our replies of 10 and 30 September 1944.

2. We have today been informed by the Minister of Treasury that the Italian Government is willing to authorize the monthly payment of 5,000 dollars beginning from 1 July 1944 until the receipt of further instructions.

3. 9,000 Dollars has already been paid for the months of August, September and October. Amounts in arrear under the new instructions will be ordered immediately and in the future the regular monthly payment will be ordered at the beginning of each month.

J. J. Lawler
acting Joint Director,
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION.

Shut to Dinsbury
Oct. 23, 1944
m4.

4279

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

nr. 6/777/344

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSIGNED COMMISSION, POLITICAL SECTION.

Reference is made to the two telegrams from the State Department dated respectively 27th September ult. and October 4th concerning payments in dollars to the Swiss Legation in Washington.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes leave to inform the Political Section, A.C., that the Minister of Treasury has informed the Finance Sub-Commission, A.C. that the Ministry of Treasury consents that, as from 1st July 1944 until further notice, five thousand dollars (\$ 5000) may be drawn monthly from the accounts in dollars accredited to the Bank of Italy, payable to the Swiss Legation at Washington for expenses incurred and to be incurred for the protection of Italian interests in the United States.

ROME, 18th October, 1944.



4218

365/385

0 8 2 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, POLITICAL SECTION.

Reference is made to the two telegrams from the State Department dated respectively 27th September ult. and October 4th concerning payments in dollars to the Swiss Legation in Washington.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes leave to inform the Political Section, A.C., that the Minister of Treasury has informed the Finance Sub-Commission, A.C., that the Ministry of Treasury consents that, as from 1st July 1944 until further notice, five thousand dollars (\$5000) may be drawn monthly from the accounts in dollars accredited to the Bank of Italy, payable to the Swiss Legation at Washington for expenses incurred and to be incurred for the protection of Italian interests in the United States.

ROME, 28th October, 1944.



4213

Copies to:

U.S. Rep., A.C.I.

Finance S.C. (for info.)

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram Received from Secstate Washington
at AMDEL Rome, October 4, 1944.

Protection of Hal Jato in USA by Swiss

The Department has been informed by the Swiss Legation that the \$3,000 second remittance has been received and spent, and there are more than \$2,000 obligations pending. It is requested that October payment of \$3000 be expedited and also \$6,000 additional, in order that the difference between the amount of \$3,000 monthly which was authorized for October, September and August and the \$5,000 monthly necessary in order that commitments may be met by the Swiss Legation, be made up.

HULL

365/365

EXPEDITO
16 OCT 1944

des

4273

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394.

30 September 1944.

13081/F

SUBJECT : Payments to Swiss Legation, Washington.

TO : Political Section,
Allied Control Commission. ✓

1. Reference is made to a paraphrase of a message on the subject of payments of dollars to the Swiss Legation Washington to meet obligations incurred in representing Italian interests forwarded to this Sub-Commission by your Section on 27 September 1944. All of the August payment and the September payment have been remitted; the October payment is being remitted forthwith.

2. With reference to an earlier message on this subject, which you forwarded to us on 8 September 1944, strongly recommending the increase of the monthly payment from 3,000 to 5,000 dollars you were notified on 10 September that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had asked the Swiss Government for information supporting the need of 5,000 dollars a month. No reply has been received from the Swiss. The Italian Ministry of Treasury suggests that it would be helpful if the Department of State in Washington would inform the Swiss Legation that the Italian Government would appreciate receiving this information.

J. J. Lawrence
Joint Dir.
Colonel,
acting Joint Director,
FINANCE SUB-Commission.

4276

To Robert

Paraphrase of Telegram Received
from Department of State,
Washington.

URGENT

It is urgently desired by the Department that ACC request the Italian Government to increase (repeat increase) the amount available for representation in the United States of Italian interest to \$5,000 (repeat \$5,000) a month. The appropriate Italian authorities should allocate retroactive through August installment the monthly payment of \$5,000, as the amount of \$3,000 is inadequate to defray the necessary expenses.

HULL

4276

des

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram Received from Secstate

Washington

URGENT

The Department has been informed that the \$3000 received by the Swiss Legation was paid out immediately to meet obligations which were past due and that, as of September 19, the Legation still owed \$5800 dollars on Italian interests. In order to make its account for Italian interests solvent, the Legation has requested urgently that the Department present its request for the immediate remittance of the September payment, the balance of the August payment, and the prompt remittance of the payment for October.

Letters complaining about non-payment of bills are now beginning to be received by the Department from commercial storage firms where the effects of Italian officials are held. At Shenvalee, the group there is in desperate straits as they have not received funds from the Swiss for two months.

HULL

4274

des

DRAFT TELEGRAM

Secstate - Washington

Sept 15 1944

File RK 5 pm -

Reference TAM 245 from War Department to Wilson dated August 3, 1944, Sum requested was not to exceed five thousand dollars per month. Italian Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs agreed upon provision of three thousand dollars per month and ordered release of payments for August, September and October. If this amount is deemed insufficient the question at your request will be discussed again by ACC with the Italian Government.

+29

Sept 15 1.3 pm.

4273

TO - POLITICAL SECT *ms*
 ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
 INCOMING MESSAGE

MSG Center No : 52/25
 Classification : _____
 Precedence : _____
 From : MADRID
 To : ESTERI NAPLES

B1511C

Date Time Rec'd : _____
 Date Time Sent : _____
 Reference NR : _____
 Cite : _____
 FGV131B4 45 242340

739 DA BERNA : ((700 21 . MIO TELEGRAMMA 500 42. GOVERNO SVIZZERA INFORM-ando-are-
 arsi-(che) DIPARTIMENT DI STATO AMERICAN , GIA DIRETTAMENTE INTERESSAT SE V.E.

(V.S.I.) NON AVRA REGIO GOVERNO, HA(verbo) VERBALMENTE PROMESS A LEGAZIONE DI SVIZZERA
 A WASHINGTON VERBAMENT MENSIL-MENTE E 5000 DOLLAR PER LA LOCAL-MENTE PROTEZION-ism-
 ist INTERESS ITALIAN . ALESSANDRINI)) . PAULUCCI

FROM: Madrid
 DATE: 24 Aug 44
 No. 739 from Bern: 700 21. My telegram 500 42. Swiss Government informing
~~area-arsi~~ that American Department of State already directly interested
 itself V.E. will not have Royal Government, has literally promised to
 Swiss Legation at Washington payment monthly 5000 Dollars for local
 protection Italian interests.

Alessandrini

Paulucci

AMERICAN CIPHER

252420B

4272

365/385

St. L. America

FROM: AGWAR FROM CCS
TO: AFHQ TO WILSON TO ETOUSA INFORMATION BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
REF NO THIS MESSAGE WX-74935, 3 Aug 1944
TAM 245

Release of funds to Swiss Legation for representation
Italian interests in UNITED STATES.

Swiss Legation in charge of Italian interest in United states has exhausted funds for Italian representation made available to it by Italian Government some time ago. United States Department of State proposes that in future funds be made available to Swiss Legation for representation Italian interests out of post-liberation blocked dollar accounts, reference TAM 136. State Department requests ACC authorize release of amount not to exceed 5,000 dollars per month to Swiss Legation for this purpose, and that necessary payment orders be issued to appropriate correspondent bank in UNITED STATES of BANK OF SICILY. Early action requested since funds needed for month of August.

State Department is informed by Swiss Legation that Italian Government has taken up matter also with interested American representation in ROME.

365/385

4251

Major Penick
Chief - Allis. Fair. Agem

Copied to Col. Snodgrass - Laminated
Aug 17

6005

Paraphrase of Telegram Received
from Dept. of State, Washington.

With regard to release of funds to the Swiss Legation for representation in United States of Italian interests, (Reference TAM 245 from War Department to Wilson dated August 3, 1944.) The Allied Control Commission was requested by the Department to authorize the release from post-liberation blocked dollar accounts an amount of not more than \$5,000 a month to the Swiss Legation to be used for this purpose.

In a reply dated August 29 received through War Department MAT 293, it was stated the Bank of Sicily, Palermo, was notified by the Allied Financial Agency to effect payment to Swiss Legation of \$3,000 by debiting with Irving Trust Company, New York, the post-liberation blocked dollar account. At least \$5,000 a month is needed for representation purposes by the Swiss Legation in Washington, it is stated.

Department should be informed urgently whether five thousand dollars will be released and why \$5,000 (repeat \$5,000) was not authorized monthly.

4270

Copy to Col. Gaffey-Smith

Sept. 7.

WMS

des

Paraphrase of Telegram Received
from Dept. of State, Washington.

With regard to release of funds to the Swiss Legation for representation in United States of Italian interests. (Reference TAM 245 from War Department to Wilson dated August 3, 1944.) The Allied Control Commission was requested by the Department to authorize the release from post-liberation blocked dollar accounts an amount of not more than \$5,000 a month to the Swiss Legation to be used for this purpose.

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Department should be informed urgently whether five thousand dollars will be released and why \$5,000 (repeat \$5,000) was not authorized monthly.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Civil Affairs Office

HEADQUARTERS

23 JAN 1944

AMG.

January 19, 1944

To: Political Section,
c/o Brigadier GUETTERBOCK,
Headquarters, Allied Military Government,
Naples.

Subject: U. S. State Department Telegram for Reber (Allied
Control Commission)

1. Reference is made to the response of the Italian Cabinet to the "U. S. Congress Statement Regarding the Italian People" (see Fatima message 1202, November 29, 1943, to Freedom). This message was transmitted by Civil Affairs to the U. S. Department of State.

2. State Department telegram No. 158, January 15, 1944, for Reber is in reply to this message.

3. It is requested that the following paraphrase of the above indicated telegram be transmitted to Reber for his information and action:

"It is believed that the message to the U. S. Congress from the Italian Cabinet is in reply to a concurrent resolution introduced by Representative Ludlow into the House. At present this resolution is being considered by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and has not been reported out. Therefore, at this stage, the resolution is not a message to the Italian people.

"The Department understands that on October 19 an OWI Italian broadcast announced that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American Congress was studying a resolution which Representative Ludlow had presented. During this broadcast the text of the resolution was read. It is assumed that being unfamiliar with the procedure of American legislature the Italian Government regarded the resolution as an approved Act of Congress. This is an unfortunate misunderstanding. For background information, please transmit the above to Reber.

"The acknowledgment question is left to Reber's discretion."

H. J. D'Heureux
H. J. D'Heureux
Acting Chief Civil Administrator

4268

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365/365

SECRET

AGC MAIN

F46956
F46956

MAY 17 1422

SECRET
ROUTINE

CITE..F46956

83/17

INFLUENTIAL PETITION RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON FOR RETURN TO ITALY OF PERSONS STATED TO BE ANTI FASCIST ITALIAN REFUGEES. NAMES AFTER STRIKING OUT THOSE OPPOSED BY OTHER SOURCES AND PREVIOUSLY TURNED DOWN ARE AS FOLLOWS: CARLO A. PRATO, DR AND MRS SUCCIO TABET, BALDINA DI VITTORIO, FERRER MARCHINI, DR BRUNO ERBER, RUDOLFO FRANCHINI, GIOVANNI MENNELLA, DR ROBERT PIANI, PROFESSOR FRANCISCO PROLA AND DR LEONE OLPER. ALL ABOVE ARE IN UNITED STATES SAVE LAST 2 IN MEXICO. HAVE YOU ANY OBJECTION TO ANY OF THESE IF SECURITY SCREENING PROVES SATISFACTORY AND TRANSPORTATION CAN BE ASSIGNED.

MAY 17 1422

SECRET

Get copy
Info - see memo
D. C.
Security 4267
Pol Sec
Adm Sec
Take float



MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

N. 375

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Mayer la Guardia, speaking through New York Radio, has recently announced that the Allied High Command has approved a plan by which workers of Italian extraction living in America shall be able to resume in the near future the forwarding of remittances to their families residing in Italy.

All details and information the Allied Control Commission shall be in a position to gather on the matter will be gratefully received by this Ministry.

Brindisi, November 24, 1943.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Real

365/385

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

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All details and information the Allied Control Commission shall be in a position to gather on the matter will be gratefully received by this Ministry.

Brindisi, November 24, 1943.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Red

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