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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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385  
Italy  
Feb. 1944 - Feb. 1



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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385  
Italy  
Feb. 1944 - Feb. 1945



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
 APO 324  
 Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 6518/11/CCS.

3 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Coordination of Political, Administrative,  
 Economic and Social Intelligence in Italy.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.  
 Attn: G-5 Section.

1. At present reports on the political, administrative, economic and social situation in Italy reach AFHQ and the various Departments of the Governments in WASHINGTON and LONDON from many varying sources. There is practically no coordination in compilation of these reports and many of them are at times contradictory. Sources known to the writer are:

Allied Commission (Monthly report and Weekly Bulletin)

FWB ("D" Intelligence Reports)

SOE and OSS (chiefly concerned with Kesselring's Italy)

C.I.S.D.I.C.

I.S.L.D.

U.S. and British Embassies

U.S. and British Naval Intelligence

G-2 Reports from Armies, 15th Army Group, Administrative Districts, PBS, RAAC, etc.

It must be admitted that, if anybody in the Allied Governments or at AFHQ read all the reports issued, he would have a most confused idea of what is happening in the country.

2. While it may be necessary for each of the above reporting agencies to continue their special reports to the Headquarters of their own organizations, it is submitted that the distribution of such reports should be drastically restricted and that the wider distribution should be covered by a coordinated report compiled from all the sources mentioned above and any others which I may have omitted to mention. This would enable anyone in AFHQ or in this country or in the Allied countries who wishes to have a comprehensive picture month by month, or even at shorter intervals, of the situation in this country, to obtain such information from one document issued from one Headquarters and within which the mass of information available could be concisely summarized in a balanced manner.



-2-

3. The machinery for this coordination should, it is submitted, consist of a committee comprising representatives of some of the reporting agencies under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the Allied Commission, the body responsible for and most interested in the political, administrative, and economic situation in Italy. This chairman would have a small secretariat drawn either from the reporting agencies (or some of them) or from the Allied Commission itself.

4. The committee would meet frequently, perhaps once a week, and would pool all available information. This would enable agencies to cross-check their own information before forwarding their particular reports to their higher Headquarters. It would also enable the secretariat to compile a comprehensive report for wider distribution.

5. There are many precedents for this procedure. MEIC, JIC on the operational side, PIC in the Middle East, and there is no doubt that the time has come for such coordination in this country.

6. It is requested that this proposal be given careful consideration.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: CA Sec  
Econ Sec  
Pol Sec  
PIC  
"A" File

5228



Mr. Hopkins

Tel: 867

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION'S  
125 394  
ECONOMIC SECTION

HC/bia

Ref: 82/13.03

1 February 1945

SUBJECT: Trade between Italy and Neutral Countries.

TO : Chief Vice-President, Political Section  
 Economic Counselor, American Embassy  
 Commercial Counselor, British Embassy  
 Joint Director, Finance Sub-Commission  
 Director, Finance Sub-Commission  
 Supply & Resources Division, Economic Section

1. It is a meeting between representatives of the Allied governments and members of the I. L. M. Government's Interministerial Committee for Foreign Relations, held on 20 January 1945, for the reopening of trade between Italy and neutral countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Rumania), and informally discussed, as well as other lines of procedure are developed.

2. The attached document, "Trade between Italy and Neutral Countries", is proposed to be placed in the file for information to the I. L. M. Government's Committee of the Allied Commission, as informally discussed at the meeting referred to above.

3. A meeting will be held, at the I. L. M. Government's office, at 1500 hours on Monday, 2 February 1945, in Room 45, 4th Floor, Ministry of Commerce, Subdivisions. It is hoped that you can arrange to attend this meeting, and that your comments can be reached as the points dealt with in the memorandum.

For the Chief Commissioners:

Harley Cleveland

President, Finance  
 Economic Section

5223

cc: Chief of Staff



MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION  
 DATE 1944  
 ECONOMIC SECTION

MEMO 4 E T

TRADE BETWEEN ITALY AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

1. The Commission has discussed the procedure through which trade will be resumed between Italy and neutral countries. It results from a meeting held at London by 14 Italian representatives of the IC, of the European Economic Community's International Committee for Reconstruction.

2. It is suggested that a law on "the return of trade" be enacted. In general, trade between Italy and neutral countries can best be effected by means of neutral bilateral agreements on trade and finance, or financial assistance -- six months to a year at the most. This is not to be confused with an acceptance of the principle of bilateral trade in international law -- on the contrary, the latter law would be applied to the removal of multilateral agreements in the national code. "On the duration of the present agreement, however, it will be necessary to make certain special arrangements which need not continue in force when the war is over.

3. The Italian Government should also consider a restriction of trade with respect to such as the removal of supplies, etc.

- a) that Italy will not be treated as a neutral country;
- b) that Italy is treated as a neutral country; and
- c) that Italy will be a Government in the

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trade will be allowed between Italy and neutral countries. It results from a meeting held at Rome of 1943 between representatives of the EC, of the Italian Government, and the International Committee for Reconstruction.

5. The Italian Government is to be the primary responsibility for the revival of trade between Italy and neutral countries on the basis of reciprocity. It is to be the responsibility of the Italian Government, at various intervals -- six months to a year at the most. This is to be done through the organization of the principle of bilateral trade in international trade -- on the contrary, the principle of bilateral trade is to be the responsibility of the Italian Government in international trade. For the duration of the present emergency, however, it will be necessary to make certain special arrangements which need not continue in force when the war is over.

6. The Italian Government should, after the war, be able to give  
5220  
program of trade with regard to relations with the neutral countries, especially:

- a) On a bilateral basis for the duration of the war;
- b) On a bilateral basis for the duration of the war;
- c) On a bilateral basis for the duration of the war.

7. The Italian Government, through the International Committee for Reconstruction, will have the responsibility of the program of trade with the EC. This will enable the Committee to:

- a) Advise the Government with respect to the possibility (in terms of supply, demand, or financing) of the program drafted by the Italian Government; and



4) Refer to Washington and/or London, for immediate policy consideration, any points on which formal clearance will eventually be required from the US or UK Governments.

5. After this informal discussion, the Italian Government will proceed to discussions with the neutral country concerned, using as a basis the views of the US and the UK. These discussions will cover fully the views between representatives of the Italian Government and the delegation or diplomatic representatives of the neutral countries as stated above. These negotiations will not at this stage result in a formal agreement or understanding between the neutral Government and the Italian Government.

6. After preliminary agreement with the neutral Government on the terms of a covered or open bi-lateral trade and financial agreement, developed through the negotiators in articles 4 and 5 above, the Italian Government will proceed to such direct agreement to the US for formal clearance. The AC, after having correspondence is necessary with Washington and/or London, will agree with the Italian Government on a conceivable draft of the appropriate trade and financial agreement, and will indicate the necessary letter to the Italian Government.

7. The following sub-paragraphs are in annex form 5223 of the considerations in which the Allied Government, on behalf of the Allied Government will be particularly interested with respect to Italian trade with neutral countries:

8) AC will need to verify that specified materials of







of AC will aid the maintenance of freedom and outgoing passage from and to neutral countries at military ports in Italy, and will also serve an interest in cooperation at non-military ports.

d) AC will supervise the actual shipments by the Italian Government of its capital exchange resources in neutral countries.

e) AC will aid to ensure that the trade with neutral countries will be conducted on a Government-to-Government basis, prohibiting any trade for the private sector.

f) AC will require that the Italian Government certify periodically of the state of trade and exchange relationships between Italy and the neutral countries. The above points are valid with respect to Italy's trade with any country other than U.S., or the British Commonwealth of Nations. The following point is reserved to neutral countries only:

g) The Allied Government will wish to make sure that the trade between Italy and neutral countries does not interfere either with

(1) cooperation by the Allies in such countries

(2) the Allied blockade (economic warfare) policy

toward such countries, decided to take into account the views of neutral countries to the German war effort.

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Control in such of these resources is exercised by the Allies through control of the "movements" system which limits the movement of neutral ships in waters controlled by the Allies.



Tel: 267

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
ECONOMIC SECTION

Mr. Selkott

HC/bih

Ref: IS/13.03

1 February 1945

SUBJECT: Trade between Italy and Neutral Countries.

TO : Joint Vice-Presidents, Political Section  
 Economic Counselor, American Embassy  
 Commercial Counselor, British Embassy  
 Joint Directors, Finance Sub-Commission  
 Director, Commerce Sub-Commission  
 Supply & Resources Division, Economic Section

1. At a meeting between representatives of the Allied Commission and members of the Italian Government's Interministerial Committee for Reconstruction, held on 25 January 1945, the reopening of trade between Italy and neutral countries (principally Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Argentina), was informally discussed, and some general lines of procedure were developed.

2. The attached draft paper, "Trade Between Italy and Neutral Countries", is proposed to be used as the basis for informing the Italian Government of the views of the Allied Commission, as informally expressed at the meeting referred to above.

3. A meeting will be held, with this memorandum as agenda, at 1530 hours on Monday, 5 February 1945, in Room 48, 5th Floor, Ministry of Corporations building. It is hoped that you can arrange to attend this meeting, and that general agreement can be reached on the points dealt with in the memorandum.

For the Chief Commissioner:

*Harley Cleveland*  
 HARLEY CLEVELAND,  
 Executive Director,  
 Economic Section

5223

cc: Chief of Staff



D R A F TTRADE BETWEEN ITALY AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

1. This memorandum summarizes the procedure through which trade will be reopened between Italy and neutral countries. It results from a meeting held 25 January 1945 between representatives of the AC, and the Italian Government's Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction.

2. It is considered that as long as the present emergency conditions prevail, trade between Italy and neutral countries can best be arranged by a series of special bi-lateral agreements on trade and finance, of limited duration -- six months to a year at the most. This is not to be construed as an acceptance of the principle of bi-lateral dealings in international trade -- on the contrary, the Allied Governments are committed to the promotion of multi-lateral arrangements in international trade. For the duration of the present emergency, however, it will be necessary to make certain special arrangements which need not continue in force when the war is over.

3. The Italian Government should first work up a tentative program of trade with respect to each of the neutral countries, covering:

- a) What Italy wants from the neutral country,
- b) What Italy is prepared to supply to that country; and
- c) What assets the Italian Government believes it has available in that country.



trade will be reopened between Italy and neutral countries. It results from a meeting held 25 January 1945 between representatives of the AC, and the Italian Government's Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction.

2. It is considered that as long as the present emergency conditions prevail, trade between Italy and neutral countries can best be arranged by a series of special bi-lateral agreements on trade and finance, of limited duration -- six months to a year at the most. This is not to be construed as an acceptance of the principle of bi-lateral dealings in international trade -- on the contrary, the Allied Governments are committed to the promotion of multi-lateral arrangements in international trade. For the duration of the present emergency, however, it will be necessary to make certain special arrangements which need not continue in force when the war is over.

3. The Italian Government should first work up a tentative program of trade with respect to each of the neutral countries, 6222 covering:

- a) What Italy wants from the neutral country;
- b) What Italy is prepared to supply to that country; and
- c) What assets the Italian Government believes it has available in that country.

4. The Italian Government, through the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction, will then discuss this outline plan in general terms with the AC. This will enable the Commission to:

- a) Advise the Government with respect to the practicality (in terms of supply, shipping, or finance) of the program drafted by the Italian Government; and



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b) Refer to Washington and/or London, for immediate policy consideration, any points on which formal clearance will eventually be required from the US or UK Governments.

5. After this informal discussion, the Italian Government will proceed to negotiate with the neutral country concerned, using as a basis the program discussed with the AC. These discussions will generally take place between representatives of the Italian Government and the delegations or diplomatic representatives of the neutral countries stationed at Rome. These negotiations will not at this stage result in any formal agreement or arrangement between the neutral Government and the Italian Government.

6. After preliminary agreement with the neutral Government on the terms of a proposed short-term bi-lateral trade and financial agreement, developed through the procedure in paras 3, 4 and 5 above, the Italian Government will present such draft agreement to the AC for formal clearance. The AC, after whatever correspondence is necessary with Washington and/or London, will agree with the Italian Government on an acceptable draft of the short-term trade and financial agreement, and will indicate its approval in a letter to the Italian Government.

7. The following sub-paragraphs present in summary form a list of the considerations in which the Allied Commission, on behalf of the Allied Government will be particularly interested with respect to Italian trade with neutral countries:

a) AC will need to certify that specified quantities of specified commodities are available in Italy to be

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will proceed to negotiate with the neutral country concerned, using as a basis the program discussed with the AC. These discussions will generally take place between representatives of the Italian Government and the delegations or diplomatic representatives of the neutral countries stationed at Rome. These negotiations will not at this stage result in any formal agreement or arrangement between the neutral Government and the Italian Government.

6. After preliminary agreement with the neutral Government on the terms of a proposed short-term bi-lateral trade and financial agreement, developed through the procedure in paras 3, 4 and 5 above, the Italian Government will present such draft agreement to the AC for formal clearance. The AC, after whatever correspondence is necessary with Washington and/or London, will agree with the Italian Government on an acceptable draft of the short-term trade and financial agreement, and will indicate its approval in a letter to the Italian Government.

7. The following sub-paragraphs present in summary form a list of the considerations in which the Allied Commission, on behalf of the Allied Government will be particularly interested with respect to Italian trade with neutral countries:

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- a) AC will need to certify that specified quantities of specified commodities are available in Italy to be exported to a neutral country.
- b) Where commodities available for export from Italy are required by several nations, AC may refer availabilities to the combined supply authorities for allocation as to destination.



-2-

c) AC will bid for acceptance of incoming and outgoing cargoes from and to neutral countries at military ports in Italy, and will also have an interest in acceptance at non-military ports.

d) AC will supervise the actual disbursements by the Italian Government of its foreign exchange resources in neutral countries.

e) AC will wish to ensure that the trade with neutral countries will be conducted on a Government-to-Government basis, prohibiting private trade for the time being.

f) AC will require from the Italian Government certain periodic reports of the status of trade and exchange relationships between Italy and the neutral countries.

The above points are valid with respect to Italian trade with any country other than U.S. or the British Commonwealth of Nations. The following point has regard to neutral countries only:

g) The Allied Government will wish to make sure that the trade between Italy and neutral countries does not interfere either with

(1) purchases by the Allies in such countries

(2) the Allied blockade (economic warfare) policy

toward such countries, designed to limit the aid given by neutrals to the German war effort.

Control in both of these respects is exercised by the Allies through control of the "navicert" system which limits the movement of neutral ships in waters controlled by the Allies.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Mr. Schott - Political Section -

Herewith copy of minutes of meeting  
with Ministers of Italian Government  
and members of HQ AC, 25 January, 1945,  
for you to look over, as you requested.

*E.M. Gigliano*  
Miss Gigliano  
Room 29 - 6th Floor.



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MINUTES OF MEETING WITH THE MINISTERS OF  
THE ITALIAN GOV. WITH THE MEMBERS OF  
THE ALLIED COMMISSION, 15 JAN. 1945

PRESENT:

Col. Denamore, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic  
Section, AC  
Mr. Cleveland, Executive Director, Economic Section, AC  
Major Tooby, Chief, Supply & Resources Division, Economic  
Section, AC  
Col. Griffiths-Smith, Director of Finance Sub-Commission  
Col. Evans, Director of Commerce Sub-Commission  
Mr. William Schett, Political Section  
Mr. Garavaglia, Economic Section Staff, AC  
M. E. Rinaldi, Minister of Public Works  
M. E. Soleri, Minister of the Treasury  
M. E. Casati, Minister of Finance  
M. F. Garabona, Minister of Transportation  
M. E. Bergami, Under-Secretary and General Commissioner of  
Alimentation  
Sig. DiNola, General Director of Commercial Matters of  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Dott. Yaschi, Ministry of the Treasury  
Dott. Bacci, General Secretary of the Inter-Ministerial  
Reconstruction Committee.  
M. T. Gronchi, Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor.

SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION: Foreign Trade between Italy and  
Neutral Countries.

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The question by the Ministers was whether Italy should  
not be allowed to import from neutral countries, using Italy's  
frozen assets in those countries, and for Italy to export any  
available commodities to those countries. Mr. Cleveland asks  
if each problem should be discussed separately or all together.  
It was agreed to discuss each problem separately.

CLEVELAND: With respect to trade with neutral countries, first  
of all, we should consider this discussion as a preliminary  
exchange of views on the subject, but nothing as definitely  
set. Our general feeling is this, that it is now time for the  
Italian Government, subject to a number of necessary controls  
which we exercise through the AC, to begin discussion with  
neutral countries on exports to them and imports from them,  
with accompanying arrangements.

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MINISTERS: If we have the authorization to trade with neutral countries, is the supervision of the AC sufficient without having another supervision that has to come from Washington?

CLEVELAND: I think the AC, after all, is a part of the machinery of the Allied Nations. There is no distinction to be drawn between Combined Chiefs of Staff, the AC and Washington. The AC is the United Nations.

MINISTERS: Has the AC full power to allow import or export?

CLEVELAND: If it is a question of high policy on which the AC has not yet been instructed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, then reference is made to Washington and London. It is a question that cannot be answered in general. The first necessary thing, however, is to obtain an opening to initiate this trade and then work within that frame.

GRONCHI: Calls attention to the letter of 27 December from Col. Donatore and reads paragraph 8 thereof, stating on the basis of that letter, the authorization is already here.

GRAFFIY-SMITH: The thing is approved in principle in the letter.

BREGAZI: We have to prospect for the future.

GRAFFIY-SMITH: The principle has been approved that Italy should trade with foreign countries. Your contact is with AC.

CLEVELAND: There are certain things on which they will consult with the AC, or Economic Section, or Sub-Commissions, and before the Economic Section or the Sub-Commission accepts on a point it may have to ask advice from Washington before acting on a part of the question. We can ask in each case that the Italian Government prepare for the future a long distance program.

MINISTERS: Whether they could not obtain a permit to trade with neutral countries broad enough in order that their plan would be put in operation without AC supervision needed in each case.



CLEVELAND: Each country represents a different problem within the trade program, each commodity involves a different problem. Some of the materials are war short supply and some are not. With that background, we suggest informally this type of procedure for getting into business: (1) That the Italian Government work out on paper or plan what they want from each country; what they are prepared to supply in exchange and what the Italian Government believes to be its available assets in that country. (2) When that plan is worked out, before starting negotiations with the countries involved, that the Italian Government discuss with us this draft program embodying those three points so that immediately we can say, "well, the proposal regarding this commodity raises this kind of problem" and can immediately start giving some advance information which is likely to come up.

GRAHAM-SMITH: The reason for that being, if you want something that already goes to the United States from the neutral countries.

GRONCHI: It is necessary to find out what the neutral countries have to export, otherwise it will be a theoretical plan.

CLEVELAND: Once this theoretical program and rough program has been done, and once we have had a preliminary discussion about it, the three steps for the Italian Government to take would be to get into contact with the neutral country through their local representative to develop a firm program, with definite commodities and definite quantities, with definite financial arrangements that are desired. When that has been done, it will be possible for the Italian Government to come to the AC and say "here is what we want to do" and for us to examine it in terms of the type of considerations we mentioned and which I will mention specifically later.

GRONCHI: Why do we need first a rough program which may be only theoretical?

CLEVELAND: To save time.

MINISTERS: We would like to start with Switzerland because Switzerland is near and the problem of transportation is easier, and it has Italian frozen assets.



GRAFFLEY-SMITH: R. E. Soleri has asked permission to go to Switzerland, which was approved by the Economic Section and the Political Section that such visit should be permitted. (The point was brought out that Switzerland is one of the most difficult countries, due to the number of Fascists who are there.) The question of getting wood pulp and ball bearings - if you were to tell us that you wanted wood pulp and ball bearings from Switzerland, the procedure would be to get in touch with the Charge D'Affaires here and find out whether they are willing to let you have these, and what do they want in exchange.

MINISTERS: We are preparing plans for three countries - Spain, Switzerland and Portugal.

CLEVELAND: Ask the Ministers if it would be of some interest for us to simply outline the field, or the points on which the Allies, through the AC, would be interested in checking these programs. We could give you six or seven indications of the type we would be looking for.

MINISTERS: Yes.

CLEVELAND: First we will be interested in making sure that certain quantities of certain commodities are actually available for export from here without interfering with civilian economy or the war program. Second: That where commodities available for export from Italy are required by the Allied Nations themselves, that we would be interested in generally, we would have to refer them to Washington for a determination as to where the commodities should be exported; whether needed in one country more than in another because of the war. Third: That we are naturally concerned with what we call the acceptance of commodities at the ports coming and going out, where commodities compete with some other country. Fourth: As stated in Col. Densmore's letter to the Ministers, 27 December, the AC is responsible for supervising the use of Italy's foreign exchange resources in neutral countries. Fifth: That for the time being, for the moment, it will be necessary for trade to be conducted on a government to government basis, not between private firms. Sixth: With respect to neutral countries, all the points that I mentioned so far would apply generally speaking to any country. Now, there are two points which apply specifically to neutral countries - one is the point that Minister Soleri read out of the letter, that in some cases we are interested in terms of the war effort, the import for our own use, and we would not want that program interfered with



by outside operation. Seventh: Applies specifically to the neutral countries - is what we call economic warfare, that is to say, relations between the Allied countries and the neutral countries in respect with their relation to Germany. In the case of Sweden, there are a number of policies which the Allied Nations have set out to limit the trade between those two countries, and would not want interference with those programs. You might send something to Sweden which might be used to make something to send to Germany. They are all the points, do you have anything to discuss?

GRONCHI: The important point is that we have a copy of these points.

CLEVELAND: Bear in mind that this is an informal meeting - but we will prepare something. There is one other thing which ties in with the economic warfare, the ships of these countries move around in waters controlled by the Allies, which is called the navicert - which is permission for a neutral country to move. A navicert is or is not granted.

GRONCHI: We have come to a critical point because of the impossibility to carry on commerce. It is necessary to know what are the possibilities of the Italian Government and what are the limits.

GRAFFETY-SMITH: Find out to what extent the neutral countries are prepared to trade.

CLEVELAND: It might be emphasized that one of the things which will help in this situation is to finish this job which has been going for several months, a joint program on which there is still considerable work to be done in the Ministry of Industry.

RUSSI: How can we deal with the eventual trade with Libya and Eritrea, where there are Italians and it is very easy to export without money because they maintain the credit in Italy?

GRAFFETY-SMITH: We could write to the body which controls those parts. I don't think you have a great deal to get out of Libya, you have much more from Eritrea. Leather has been taken for the war effort. Shoes, for example, are under contract. Boots are being made for the Allied Forces. I don't know what you have in mind to export from these countries. I doubt if there is anything you want to send them.

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MINISTERS: In Eritrea there is a large quantity of Tunna which was not used by walis or sairs. In Eritrea there are no more Americans and there is a large quantity of leather for shoe making that nobody buys.

MEMORAND: Day before yesterday the Agriculture Sub-Commission sent in a request to the Economic Section asking for permission and transportation for one of the AG officers and one of the Italian experts to go there and make arrangements with respect to the tunna. Economic Section has approved and has to clear through AFHQ. I will ask them to clear through AFHQ right away.

GRANTLEY-SMITH: Regarding shoes, I should personally be delighted if your facts are right, but we have had a visit from the Finance Officer of the administration in Eritrea and he was saying how anxious he would be to send shoes if they were not selling those shoes to army contractors. I think the Economic Section would pass the information to AFHQ.

MEMORAND: Give us a memorandum as to what you think is there, and we will pursue it further.

MINISTERS: What about the control of export to France?

CLEVELAND: The position is this, first we definitely agreed that these unauthorized purchases ought to stop and that the trade with France ought to be on a program basis, and, secondly, that we have taken up with the highest level in the theatre the question of these unauthorized French purchases and we expect they will be stopped by the military. There has been correspondence between here and Paris and we will be able to talk specifically on that within the next few days.

RUINI: The problem is not only in relation to France, but to all types of exports not controlled. In Avellino the Yugoslavians are buying all the potatoes and machinery without authorization from the local authority.

CLEVELAND: What instructions do the Prefects have. Regional authority?

RUINI: Around Lucca the French have an organization to go into Bologna and purchase everything there.

CLEVELAND: Do you have specific proof of any other country? We know about France.

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MINISTERS: Yugoslavians say frankly that they buy food and send it to Yugoslavia - wheat, vegetables.

(The question of signing contracts was discussed)

CLEVELAND: I.C.E. is signing contracts for export. We, too, have been signing on behalf of the Italian Government, we propose that the Italian Government sign them now.

GRONCHI: Agreed to get together with the Minister of the Treasury and work out a system whereby they will sign these contracts.

(A discussion was had regarding the types of contracts and the risk of the Italian Government. The Ministers suggested that they should have a representative at the port of arrival. Also, another point of finance was brought out, - if the price of labor should increase, etc.)

GRANTLEY-SMITH: When we give a statement and you see that you are suffering a loss, come to us.

CLEVELAND: As long as there is a war still going on and complete control of the economy is in the United States and United Kingdom, you can't expect to set up a condition of free trade.

DENSMORE: Up to the present time you have not been hurt, why not let it go until you do get hurt, then you can come and say, "this is what is happening to us."

RUINI: Is the merchandise insured?

CLEVELAND: It is government operation in war time and there is no insurance.

DENSMORE: The transportation people have informed me that there is a railroad control committee set up, which consists of representatives from the Director General of the railroad, AGRA, AC and Gen. DiRaimondo. He has the same representation on the committee as anyone else. This committee was formed because of the control the military have over the railroad; to bring the AC around the table to discuss the problems. It is our thought that in that place Gen. DiRaimondo will be able to iron out a lot of things with the military which heretofore he has had to look to the Transportation Sub-Commission to help him, particularly where the military are



in control. If he can't get anywhere with them, if they try to push him out, then he can come to us. He has the same voice as anyone else. The reason DiReimondo is called in this committee and not the Minister is because it is all railroad.

(The question of control and rationing of gasoline was briefly and very informally discussed. Col. Densmore asked whether gasoline ought to be divided so much for the military and the other for civilian use and should be rationed through one office. It was stated that the control of gasoline for liberated Italy is now under one office - The Provincial offices, under G. E. Gronchi, but the AC authorities distribute gasoline. In Naples, for example, 17,000 liters a month are allocated to the Fire Department, and since that much gasoline is not needed for fires, it finds its way in the black market. Col. Densmore stated that a conference would be held and would set together on some system.)

The meeting adjourned at 1345.

Above minutes reported by: Miss Giugliano - Economic Section.



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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*Pol. Sec*

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AFHQ SIGNED SECRET

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NOV 16 1948

PRIORITY

CRIS FBREG

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

SECRET.

Urgently require reply letter 85: 814.3-62 November 5. Disposal Italians in

DEFEATERS.



*388.06*

DIST

ACTION C A SEC (2)  
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
COS  
WFO & POW  
POL SEC ✓  
FILE

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
+++++

Ref: 2212/3/COS

8 November 1944

SUBJECT: Disposal of Italians in the Dodecanese.  
TO : Civil Affairs Section, A.C.

1. Attached letter G-5: 014.33 62 dated 5 November 1944 from G-5, AFHQ, subject as above, and accompanying copy letter from GHQ MEF is passed for appropriate action and reply, with copy to us.

2. A copy of attached correspondence is being sent to W.M.D. & I.P.O.W. Sub-Commission for information and liaison with you.

*E. T. Allen*  
Chief Staff officer,  
To the Chief of Staff.

Encls: 2.

Copy to: SO to A/CC.  
W.M.D. & I.P.O.W. Sub-Commission (for action as in para 2 above)  
Political Section

5210



COPY

: C R E T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G 5 Section  
APO 512

WD-W/seb

5 November 1944.

G-5 014.33-62.

SUBJECT: Disposal of Italians in the Dodecanese.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission  
APO 394.1. Attached is copy of letter received from  
GHQ, MEET dated 27 (?) October 44.2. Before decision is taken and reply sent  
your views are requested on the desirability of  
repatriating the categories listed in para 2.

3. Please treat as urgent.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5,

/s/ W. DRIFFIELD WHITE, Major.  
/t/ W. DRIFFIELD WHITE, Major.Incl:  
as ab ve.

5203



COPY

SUBJECT: Disposal of Italians in the DODECANESE.SECRET  
CHQ REF  
01/3454  
27(?) Oct. 44AFHQCopy to: MGA  
GSI  
AG(C)  
AG(PS)  
Mov & Tn  
SILE  
CCAO

1. It is our policy that Italians are to be given no part in our administration of the DODECANESE when we occupy these Islands. While the future of the DODECANESE is not yet decided, it can safely be assumed that they will not be returned to Italian sovereignty.

2. There will be certain categories of Italians whom it will be most desirable to repatriate to ITALY as soon after the occupation of the islands as possible. An estimate of these is given below, but the accuracy of the figures can only be verified after occupation.

|                                                                                              |   |              |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|--------------|
| (a) Discharged Civil Servants who would be a focus for political intrigue                    | - | 200          |
| (b) Discharged Carabinieri etc., who have military status and are subject to treatment as PW | - | 400          |
| (c) Italians on Security Black lists not sufficiently dangerous to justify internment        | - | 430          |
| (d) Wives and families of persons in (a), (b) and (c) above                                  | - | 250          |
|                                                                                              |   | <u>1,280</u> |

A certain number of persons of various nationalities who are on the Security Black Lists will have to be interned as being dangerous to security. These are not thought likely to exceed 20, in the first instance and it is intended to intern them in the DODECANESE since their removal to another part of the MIDDLE EAST would involve political complications.

3. In the early stages of the occupation there will be a number of PW in the islands who will be concentrated and imprisoned in a central cage at RHODES. These PW will be evacuated to the mainland in the MIDDLE EAST as shipping is available, but this may take some time. It is desired to avoid a further commitment of keeping the Italians in para 2 above under restraint, and as they will ultimately have to be repatriated to ITALY, it is suggested that they should be moved by direct shipment from RHODES to ITALY as soon after occupation of the islands as possible.

4. Will you please say whether you agree to this proposal for the disposal of

5208



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5208

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4. Will you please say whether you agree to this proposal for the disposal of Italians in the DODECANESE?

/s/ ? ? ? ? ? Brigadier  
(Sgd) W. P. OLIVER  
for General,  
Commander in Chief  
MIDDLE EAST FORCE

G(Ops) 1  
JB



0734

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

4 July 44

Mr. K. W.

For your information

W. L. K. W.  
at Col. H. H.



0735

C O P Y

*Japanese  
Emb*

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Vatican City.

To Major General Harry H. Johnson,  
Commander, Rome Area.

Subject: Referring to my letter of June 15, 1944 relative to  
the disposition of the keys of the Japanese Embassy,  
and transmitting a further Note from the Holy See regard-  
ing the designation of a protecting Power for Japanese  
interests in the regions of Italy occupied by Allied  
armies.

Vatican City, June 30, 1944.

Signed:

Harold H. Tittmann.

*325/328*

5203



C O P Y

TRANSLATION

SECRETARIAT OF STATE  
OF HIS HOLINESS

No. 80550/s

From the Vatican, June 28, 1944.

Further to its Note addressed to the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America under the same number, dated the 14th of this month, the Secretariat of State of His Holiness has the honor to inform him, at the request of the Special Delegation for Japan to the Holy See, that steps are being taken at Tokyo for the designation of a protecting Power for Japanese interests in the regions of Italy occupied by Allied armies.

The Secretariat of State takes this opportunity of renewing to the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America the assurance of his distinguished consideration.

(Seal of the Secretariat of  
State of His Holiness ).

To the Chargé d'Affaires  
of the United States of  
America to the Holy See.

5206



TOP SECRET

FATIMA M151

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

15th. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET

v16

URGENT

GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

I SAW BADOGLIO IN PRIVATE THIS MORNING PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR EYES ONLY OF GENERAL WILSON  
CMA MACMILLAN AND MURPHY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I ASKED HIM IF THERE  
WAS ANY TRUTH IN THE REPORT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED THAT THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES HAD  
HAD APPROACHED HIM ON THE QUESTION OF GRANTING ITALY ALLIED STATUS PD HE ASSURED ME ON  
HIS WORD OF HONOUR THAT THERE WAS NO VESTIGE OF TRUTH IN THE REPORT AND PROMISED ME  
AGAIN CATEGORICALLY THAT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE TO ME AT ONCE ANY PROPOSAL OF ANY SORT  
MADE TO HIM BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTING ME

385/1025

5205

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant-General  
Chief Commissioner



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Civil Affairs Office

April 1, 1944.

Dear Sam:

Enclosed is a long telegram from Moscow, giving the text of an extremely interesting article from IZVESTIA on the Italian question. It is sent along for the information of yourself and Reinhardt. Roger Makins also asks if you will be good enough to show it to Mr. Macmillan and Harold Caccia.



Sincerely,

*Samuel H. Horn*

*365/395*  
*Samuel H. Horn*

5204



ACTION COPY TO **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

16-72902-1

From: Moscow

Date: March 31, 1944

DUPLICATE

No.: Unnumbered

Code: Clear

Received: ~~Max~~ April 1, 0915

Izvestiya for March 30th carried a three column leader entitled "Italian question", which reads in translation as follows: The War has entered a phase in which as a result of the victorious offensive of the Red Army the position on the Soviet-Germans front is becoming increasingly catastrophic for Nazi Germany and the German Fascist war machine. In their desperate efforts to postpone the hour of their downfall and to protract the war the Germans do not stop at measures which even more than in the past reveal the essence of their bandit like policy not only with regard to conquered countries but also with regard to their vassal Allies. Impelled by fear of the impending catastrophe the Hitlerites are forced to disperse their already battered forces and reserves. Hungary and Rumania are evidence of this. At the same time the date of the joint operations of the Allied powers against Nazi Germany which were proclaimed at the Tehran Conference and which are to be undertaken not only from the East but also from the West and South are drawing near. In these circumstances the Italian question has acquired considerable political importance for the Allies.

5203

At the present time the political situation in



Italy is as follows: The Southern districts of Italy have been liberated by the Anglo-American troops from Fascists control and now represent an important jumping-off point for the Armed forces of our Allies whose task is to deal a blow from the south at Hitler's "European Fortress". Nevertheless about two thirds of the territory of Italy is still under the heel of the Germans and their accomplices in Mussolini's hands of the Germans and its liberation is still a task awaiting solution. It cannot be disputed that in the accomplishment of this task an important role will be played by Southern Italy which has already been liberated from Fascist German imprisonment.

In the liberated portion of Italy there exists the Government of Marshal Badoglio which is supported by German sections of the Italian population and which has repeatedly declared its readiness to take part together with the Allies in the struggle against the Nazi forces of occupation and their Italian accomplices. On the other hand immediately after the overthrow of Fascism many anti-fascists and democratic parties and groups based on fairly wide sections of the Italian people and aiming at active struggle against Hitler and Mussolini reappeared and developed their activity in Southern Italy. Until January of this year these groups had few and poor connections with each other and restricted their activity to individual towns and provinces. But already at that time these groups showed a tendency to unite



and this tendency resulted in the formation in a number of provinces of local united organizations acting under the title of committees of national liberation. At the end of January there was held in Bari a congress of representatives of the provincial committees for the liberation of Italy. Representatives of the following parties took part in this congress: the liberals, the Christian Democrats, the Action party, the party of the Democracy of Labor, the Socialist party and the Communist party. The congress elected a permanent executive junta the purpose of which was to unite the anti-Fascist and democratic forces for the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini.

In this way both the Badoglio government and the permanent executive junta have expressed their readiness to join with the Allies in the struggle for the expulsion of the Germans and their accomplices from Italy. In spite of this, however, the forces of the Badoglio government and the permanent executive junta far from being united are uselessly wearing themselves out in fighting against each other. Meanwhile the political and economic position of Italy is growing steadily worse. Italian affairs have clearly reached an impasse. One of the chief causes for this is the 5201 difference between the above mentioned groups of the anti-Fascist and democratic forces in Italy. This in



its turn cannot but fail to have an adverse effect on the common cause of the Allies on the cause of the struggle against Nazi Germany on the cause of the hastening by every possible means of Germany's defeat.

Such is the position in the liberated part of Italy. It cannot be ignored if we are to be led by the interests already referred to of the struggle of the United Nations against Nazi Germany. The whole experience of recent months shows that such a state of affairs will inevitably lead to the exhaustion of Italy and threatens it with disaster. But are the Allies interested in allowing events to develop in a way which will lead to the ruin of Italy? Certainly not. The Soviet Union and the Allies in general are not interested in seeing Italy on the verge of destruction. It is clear that this is the position not only from the point of view of the Soviet Union but also from the point of view of Great Britain and the United States. What then is the way out of the position which has arisen? The way out consists in giving to the political development of Italy a turn corresponding to the requirements of the Allies' fight against their common enemy Hitlerite Germany by means of the joint efforts of the Allied powers. For this purpose the policy of the Allies with regard to the Italian question should be based on a jointly elaborated point of view with regard to the most important questions of the political situation in Italy.

5200



It must, however, be noted that the questions connected with the present political situation in Italy have not yet been the subject of joint discussion and joint decisions by the Allied powers. Both England and the United States have, of course, taken certain political action with regard to Italy and there have been certain statements by official representatives of Great Britain and the United States but as is well known these activities and these statements were not the result of the joint decisions of all the three Allied powers. Thus for instance official representatives of our Allies have made statements to the effect that the present Italian government cannot be replaced by any other government and the political situation in Italy cannot be reviewed until Rome has been taken by the Allied forces. It is, however, easy to establish that this question was not the subject of joint discussions by the three Allied powers: it was discussed neither at the Moscow conference nor in the Advisory Council for Italian questions nor by means of normal diplomatic exchange of views. At the same time attention must be paid to the statement made by Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, who on February 22 in the House of Commons expressed the opinion that an Italian government on a broader base could only be properly set up in Rome an opinion which, however, was not the result of joint discussion and decision by the three Allied powers. Furthermore both English and

3109



American statesmen have stated that the time is not yet ripe for raising the question of the existence of the monarchy in Italy or the question of the abdication of Victor Emmanuel the King of Italy. But it cannot be denied that this question as well has not been jointly discussed by the three Allied Powers: it was not discussed either at the Moscow conference nor in the Consultative Council for Italian questions or by means of the normal diplomatic exchange of views.

In view of the fact that such fundamental questions affecting the internal life of Italy will be settled later when the Italian people is able freely to elect its own form of government it would be possible to agree for a certain length of time on this attitude towards the question of the Italian government. But does this mean that it is permissible to postpone the already fully mature question of the unification of the anti-Fascist and democratic forces of the Italian people which are ready to participate in the common fight against the Germans? To postpone this urgent question of the present political situation in Italy would be to harm the common interests of the Allies and the interests of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany.

It is easy to understand that the democratic parties in Italy which have repeatedly expressed themselves in <sup>5138</sup> favor of the immediate abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and of the replacement of the Badoglio government by a



different government will certainly not be satisfied by the policy which has found expression in the above mentioned statements of British and American representatives. But the greatest significance attaches to this but first and foremost to the interests of the intensification of the struggle against the common enemy which demand that nothing should be permitted which would lead to a further protraction of the war. If we approach the political situation in Italy at the present time from the point of view of this fundamental task it is necessary in the first place to find effective means for the unification of all the anti-Fascist and democratic forces of the Italian people which are able and willing to participate in the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini. It is this task which is of prime importance and it must be solved without delay in the common interests both of the Allied powers and of the democratic forces in Italy itself.

It must, however, be borne in mind that in its present form the Badoglio government is not in a position to unite around itself the anti-Fascist and democratic elements in Italy for the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini. Moreover the Badoglio government itself has repeatedly stated through its most prominent representatives that it is prepared to incorporate in its membership new elements capable of playing an effective part in the unification of the progressive forces of the Italian people. On the road to the adoption of such measures which would lead to an



improvement in the composition of the Badoglio government there can be no insuperable obstacles if we are led by the common interests of the Allied powers and the interests of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany.

The task which cannot be postponed is that of improving the composition of the Badoglio government broadening its base with a view to making it more democratic. It is understood that when this condition is fulfilled the present negative attitude of the permanent executive committee to the government of Marshal Badoglio would no longer be justified. The adoption of such measures would enable the broad anti-Fascist and democratic strata in Italy to take an active measure in the struggle of the Allied powers against the Nazi troops and the Otalo Fascist bands thereby contributing to the common cause of the freedom loving peoples.

In this connection it is impossible not to comment on the position adopted in the House of Commons on March 22 made by Mr. Eden the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Thomas a member of the House of Commons asked the question "Is Mr. Eden aware that the Moscow declaration spoke of the necessity of making the Italian government more democratic?" Mr. Eden replies "Perhaps Mr. Thomas will address that question to the Soviet government." Attention must be paid to the fact that for some reason Mr. Eden could think of nothing better than evading a reply to a direct and completely rightful question. Yet is it not natural that democratic circles in England and



in the other Allied powers should show interest in the question of making the Italian Government more democratic in accordance with the principles laid down in the declaration concerning Italy at the Moscow conference? Has this question not matured since the summer of last year when the liberation of Italy from the Nazi bands and from the power of Mussolini was begun? Has this question no connection with British policy? Or do the English politicians perhaps stand for the democratisation of the Badoglio Government and encounter interference on the part of the Soviet Government?

It is impossible not to comment on the fact that part of the English and American press instead of concentrating its attention on the mature and urgent questions of improving the political situation in Italy from the point of view of the fundamental interest of the Allies in the War against Hitler have recently been artificially framing up another question - the question of the establishment of direct relations between the Soviet Union and Italy and the exchange of representatives between these two countries. Certain organs of the press in England and America express in every possible way their "perplexity" "Amazement" and even "anxiety" in connection with this fact. Yet it is clear that for such "fears" there is no basis whatsoever. 5135



As is well known the Soviet Government hitherto had no direct contact with the Italian Government while our Allies have had contact of this sort from the very beginning of the Armistice. In Southern Italy England and the USA have a large number of military and civilian organizations with numerous representatives who maintain contact not only with the Italian Government but also with various state institutions in Italy both at the center and in the provinces. The AMGOT organizations alone (the Allied military Governmental Administration in occupied territory) functioning in Italy include several thousand representatives of the British and American authorities. Furthermore the military authorities of England and America which play a most important part in the de facto administration of the country are functioning in Italy. Of the three Allied powers only the Soviet Union has not yet had direct relations with the Italian Government. In Italy it only has a small number of representatives who are connected solely with the Advisory Council for Italian questions. In this way the Soviet Union found itself in an unequal position as compared with Great Britain and the USA. This inequality is now being liquidated to a certain extent inasmuch as the Soviet Union will be able to maintain direct relations with the Italian Government such as have already been maintained for a long time by our Allies. It is understood that this does not yet constitute the establishment of diplomatic relations between the

5184



two states and only represents the establishment of actual relations. This circumstance makes all the more transparent the true purpose of the uproar which has arisen around this question in part of the Allied press.

Certain organs of the English and American press even attempt to distort the action of the Soviet Union by representing it as neither more nor less than the support by the Soviet Union of the undemocratic elements in Italy. It is necessary to state that attempts of this nature lay their authors bare and betray them completely. It is known to everyone that in the given instance it is not the attitude of the Soviet Union which is impeding the democratisation of the Badoglio Government. It is moreover well known that the Soviet Union is prepared in every way to facilitate the successful achievement of this task in the immediate future in order that it should not be postponed for example until the capture of Rome.

In this connection attention must be paid to another reply made by Mr. Eden, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the same session ~~in~~ in the House of Commons on March 22nd. In reply to the question whether the Soviet Government had adhered to the temporary agreement between England and the USA on the question of a change in their future attitude with regard to the Government of Italy after the capture of Rome. Mr. Eden stated that in this connection the Soviet Government "had not expressed any dissatisfaction with the agreed line of action". In reply to this question, however,



Mr. Eden could have recalled that the British and American Governments had already received from the Soviet Government special representations regarding the necessity of an immediate improvement in the composition of the Italian Government for Marshal Badoglio with a view to the unification of the Italian forces prepared to fight against Hitler and Mussolini.

It is indisputable that at the present time the Italian question has acquired great importance. This question awaits settlement. It must be settled from the point of view of clearing the way for the defeat of the Nazi troops and the fascists bands of Mussolini in Italy from the point of view of the fundamental interests of the Allied powers which demand the adoption of all the measures necessary to hasten victory over the common enemy.

Repeated to London and to Algiers for Reinhardt.

HARRIMAN

jc







11











It seems there are obstacles for that as each nation has been in certain periods of the allied front which went so far as to require that they submerge themselves in the Soviet Union in the name of the non-Communist elements of Italy. We have for many years in the position of the Soviet Union in the world at all to the inauguration of the Soviet Union government and in general have clear that the Soviet Union is quite ready to contribute with all the means at its service in order that this task be solved with success in the shortest of times. One should therefore remember the answer given by Stalin in 1941 in the Union of Comrades on the 2nd March to a question as to whether the USSR be prepared to the formation of the Soviet Union. Since the fall of Rome the Minister's answer was as follows: "The Soviet Government should not be dissuaded by the line of conduct to follow in this respect." It is hereby stressed that the present scope of the Soviet Union efforts is to make it possible for all Italian anti-fascist forces to unite around the Soviet Government in the fight against Hitlerite Germany. The Italian question has acquired a very great importance and this question awaits its solution, and it cannot be delayed until the fall of Rome; it must be solved with in mind, the present point of view which is to show if every obstacle the road which leads to victory against Hitlerite Germany.



FATIMA M126

TOP SECRET

*Bogor*

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COM)

23th. March. 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

DOGOMOLOV ASKED TO SEE ME YESTERDAY EVENING AND TALKED FOR NEARLY AN HOUR PD FAREN TO  
AMHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND MR REDWARDS' EYES ONLY FROM  
FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FAREN HE WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO BE FRIENDLY PD HE GAVE  
 THE IMPRESSION OF A PENITENT COMRA BEING MATEY PD  
PARA TWO PD HE CONTENDED THAT WE HAD ATTACHED MUCH TOO GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE RECENT  
 AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE REPRESENTATIVES BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS PD HE  
 ASSURED ME THAT THIS DID NOT INVOLVE REOPENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY PD THE SOLE  
 OBJECT WAS TO ENSURE CLOSER LIAISON PD HE STATED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED TO DO ANY  
 ABNORMAL BUSINESS WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO STUPID AS TO  
 EXCHANGE REPRESENTATIVES PD THEY HAD QUITE DIFFERENT AND MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS OF DOING  
 THAT SORT OF THING PD  
PARA THREE PD HE TOLD ME AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF THE MEMORANDUM WHICH THE RUSSIAN  
 GOVERNMENT HAS JUST PRESENTED TO HMG AND USG PD HE HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO MACMILLAN PD HE  
 EXPLAINED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE POLITICAL PROBLEM IN ITALY PD  
 I UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ATTACH LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO WHETHER THE KING

545/575

5188



FATIMA 1126 - 2.

REMAINS OR NOT AND THAT THEY WISH THE BAROCCIO GOVERNMENT TO BROADEN ITS STRUCTURE BY INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT PD DOGOMOLOV SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH ON THE NECESSITY FOR PRODUCING A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING MORE EFFECTIVE HELP FROM ITALY FOR THE ALLIED OPERATIONS PD I AM REASONABLY SATISFIED THAT THE RUSSIANS INTEND TO TAKE A STRONG LINE WITH THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT IN ITALY AND THAT THEY INTEND TO ENSURE THAT THESE PARTIES DO NOTHING TO UPSET THE WAR EFFORT BY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT DISLOCATE THE ADMINISTRATION PD

PARA FOUR PD DOGOMOLOV FREQUENTLY STRESSED THE FACT THAT IN SPITE OF THE GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND RUSSIAN IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND IN SPITE OF INEVITABLE OCCASIONAL MINOR FRICTION SUCH AS THE RECENT CASE OF THE EXCHANGE OF REPRESENTATIVES WITH ITALY IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE THREE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD COLLABORATE FULLY AND THAT SUCH COLLABORATION SHOULD CONTINUE FOR MANY YEARS PD

PARA FIVE PD DOGOMOLOV EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT REMARKS IN THE HOUSE ABOUT THE ITALIAN OPPOSITION HAD BEEN POLITICALLY MOST INEPT PD HE ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT UEG WAS PROPOSING TO ESTABLISH CONSULAR REPRESENTATION IN NAPLES

PD

5113



FATIMA M126 - 3

I BIT HIM HEAVILY ON BOTH POINTS PD

PARA SIX PD BOGOMOLOV CONCLUDED THE INTERVIEW BY INVITING ME TO DINE SHORTLY TO  
DISCUSS LOCAL POLITICS AND PARTICULARLY OPPOSITION PERSONALITIES IN QUOTE MORE INTIMATE  
SURROUNDINGS UNQUOTE

5100  
NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,  
Lieutenant-General,  
Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

RATINA N 125

RATINA (CEN NAUT-EL-DE C COMM)

26 MARCH 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

FIRST ONE PD REFERENCE BY N ONE TWO FOUR MARCH TWO SIX PD PARIS TO  
 AFHQ FOR GENERAL WELSON CEA CIVIL AFFAIRS AND OFFICE OF BRITISH  
 ASSISTANT MINISTER FROM MACEDONIA PD TWO FOUR PARIS WHEN WHICH LAW  
 EMPLOYED THE MORNING THE LATTER SAID THAT BOGOROLOV HAD APPROACHED  
 HIM YESTERDAY TO INFORM HIM THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS APPOINTING  
 AS ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN ITALY KOSTILEV AT PRESENT THE SENIOR  
 MEMBER OF AMBASSADOR BOGOROLOV'S STAFF PD IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO BALOGHIO  
 WHAT GRADE KOSTILEV WOULD HAVE CM. BUT HE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT  
 KOSTILEV WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE APPOINTED MINISTER PD WHEN BOGOROLOV  
 ASKED FOR THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE CM. BALOGHIO HAD  
 TOLD HIM THAT SIGNOR BARONI WOULD BE THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE PD  
 BARONI IS AT PRESENT ITALIAN MINISTER AT RABAT PD BOGOROLOV INDICATED  
 THAT SUCH AN APPOINTMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PD  
 BALOGHIO SAID THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THESE APPOINTMENTS WOULD BE MADE  
 SHORTLY PAPA BOGOROLOV HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

5228



Latuna # 125 -

PAGE TWO

TOP SECRET

RELEASE THOSE DIVISIONS OF SOVIET ARMY WHO ARE AT PRESENT SERVING IN THE ITALIAN ARMY IN ORDER THAT THEY MIGHT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE PARTISAN FORCES PD BADOCCHI SAID THAT HE HAD REALIZED THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD PRESENT EXTREME DIFFICULTIES INASMUCH AS IT WOULD INVOLVE THE RELEASE TO A FOREIGN ARMY OF PERSONS OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY PD BADOCCHI SAID HE MADE NO COMMITMENTS ON THE SUBJECT PART TWO MACMILLAN SAW BOGOMOLOV THIS EVENING WHO GAVE A SIMILAR ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION EXCEPT THAT KRYALLEV WOULD HAVE THE RANK OF COUNSELLOR PD BOGOMOLOV AGAIN SAID RUSSIAN ACTION DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS PD HE ADDED THAT A MEMORANDUM SETTING FORTH THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW ON THIS AND OTHER ITALIAN QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS

5284

NOEL MASON MACPHERLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief Commissioner



0761

RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN ITALY

BOGOMOLOV -- Soviet Member, Advisory Council for Italy

KOSTYLEV -- Soviet Representative to the Italian Government

335/395

5183



Following the wish officially expressed some time ago on the part of Italy, the Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Royal Government have agreed to establish direct relations between the two countries.

In compliance with this decision, the two countries will proceed without delay to the exchange of representatives enjoying the diplomatic status.

Official Communique to be Released for Publication and Broadcast on March 14.

585/395



# BADOLIO ARRIVES IN SICILY TO INAUGURATE HIGH COMMISSIONERSHIP

PALERMO, March 31 --- Marshal Badoglio arrived here by air Friday accompanied by Minister of the Interior, Vito Reale.

The Italian Prime Minister's visit, it was officially stated, is in connection with the setting up of the new high commissionership for Sicily. Under the terms of the decree law setting up this new position, large administrative and executive powers are vested in the high commissioner, who will represent the central government directly on the island. (UNN)

## FUNERAL OF SALERNO ARCHBISHOP TO BE HELD SATURDAY

SALERNO, March 31. ---Funeral services for Msgr. Nicola Monterisi, Archbishop of Salerno, who died here Thursday night, will be held Saturday morning at 10:30, with burial in the Cathedral.

The churchman was born at Barletto on May 22, 1867. He was a graduate of the University of Rome and was consecrated to the ministry by the Archbishop of Bari in 1893.

Since 1929 he has been Archbishop of Salerno. (UNN)

## MAN CAUGHT ENTERING NAPLES STORE GIVEN PRISON SENTENCES

NAPLES, March 31. ---Five civilians caught red-handed by Allied Military Police while attempting to break into a store on Piazza Dante last January 20 were sentenced Thursday in Allied Military Government Superior Court to terms in jail.

A 16-year old boy who was duped by the gang was let off lightly by the court, who gave him a sentence of only one day in jail. (UNN)

## POLITICAL SCIENCE LECTURES HELD IN SASSARI

SASSARI, SARDINIA, March 31. --- A four day course of special lectures on political theory, with emphasis on modern democratic forms has just been concluded here by the Catholic Study Club. (UNN)

## DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME DECREED FOR ALC TERRITORY AS WELL

NAPLES, March 31. --- Following announcement by the Italian Government that daylight-saving time will be inaugurated at 02:00 hours Sunday, April 2, throughout the 22 provinces and islands administered by it, Allied Control Commission authorities here, Friday announced that the same advance in time will be made in the four provinces still under ALC administration.

The announcement thus provides uniformity of time scheduled throughout all of liberated Italy. At 02:00 hours on Sunday April 2, all timepieces in this territory will be advanced one hour.

The Italian Government also announced that with the advance of clocks and watches by one hour, the nightly black-out will be changed to 0600 hours. (UNN)



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The Italian Government also announced that with the advance of clocks and watches by one hour, the nightly black-out will be changed to from 2000 hours until 0600 hours. (UHN)

NAPLES BAR ASSOCIATION REVIVED

NAPLES, March 31.---The Free Association of Naples Lawyers and Councillors-at-law held its first assembly here Wednesday, when the problems of organization and other matters of professional interest were discussed.

Direction of the bar association was entrusted to its Professional Council which will soon be established.



LIBERATED AREAS

U.S. ANNOUNCES NEW PROVISIONS FOR REMITTANCES TO ITALY

WASHINGTON, March 31 - The U.S. Treasury Department announced Wednesday that facilities have been established to send cost-of-living expense remittances to Sardinia and parts of Italy liberated by Allies. Previously such arrangements were in effect for Sicily.

Non-U.S. citizens living in the provinces affected may receive up to \$100 per household per month. If the recipient is a U.S. citizen he may receive up to \$75 a month, plus \$25 for each member of his family, but no more than \$150 per family.

Other mainland provinces to which money may be sent are Cosenza, Reggio Calabria, Potenza, Lecce, Naples, Salerno, and Benevento.

Remittances will be channeled through the Bank of Naples under the same procedure now being used in Sicily, where the cash is being moved through the Bank of Sicily.

The Bank of Naples is establishing correspondent relationships with certain Boston, Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco banks. Correspondents in the U.S. will forward payment instructions to the Bank of Naples and payments to beneficiaries will be made in lire.

The Treasury again stressed that regulations do not authorize the sending of checks, drafts, securities, or currency, to Italy. (UPI)

IZVESTIA COMMENT ON ITALY

MOSCOW, March 31 - The Moscow Radio Thursday broadcast extracts from an article in IZVESTIA, which said: "Relations between the Italian government and the Executive Junta of the National Liberation Committee have not yet achieved unity.... This state of affairs is bound to affect the Allied cause, and the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. Where, then, lies the way out of the present situation?"

"The obvious way out is for the Allied powers by their joint efforts to direct developments in Italy in such a way as to conform with the task of the struggle of the Allies against the common enemy Hitlerite Germany."

IZVESTIA also explained why the Soviet Union had agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Badoglio government. It said that the Soviet Union had no direct contact with the Italian government, as Britain and America have had since the Armistice. The exchange of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Badoglio government, "IZVESTIA" explains, is practical rather than diplomatic. (UPI-REX-Reuters)

SICILIANS WISHING ANPATRIATION ASKED TO COMMUNICATE WITH GOVERNMENT

STATE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, March 31 - The Ministry of the Interior Friday asked all citizens of Sicily who have been evacuated

385/395



385/395

to \$100 per month per month, if the recipient is a U.S. citizen he may receive up to \$75 a month, plus \$25 for each member of his family, but no more than \$150 per family.

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SICILIANS WISHING REPATRIATION ASKED TO COMMUNICATE WITH GOVERNMENT

HEAT 9, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, March 31 - The Ministry of the Interior Friday asked all citizens of Sicily who have been evacuated from the island during the war and who are desirous of returning home to communicate with the Office of Aid to War Refugees, which is located at Salerno. (UHN)



PARAPHRASE

TELEGRAM No. 1168, dated APRIL 4, 1944, from  
AMERICAN EMBASSY, MADRID, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A personal letter from Count Jordane regarding a report that in connection with the recent agreement for exchange of representatives between Russia and Italy, the Italian Government agreed to grant the Soviets facilities for certain organizations to operate in Italian territory for the purpose of endeavoring to overthrow the present Spanish Government, has been received by the Italian Ambassador who plans to explain to Jordane that there is no foundation for the report.

385/395

5180

18 APR. 1944

SPER



April 8, 1944.

TO: Samuel Reber, Esquire,  
Vice President, Political Section,  
Allied Control Commission,  
Naples.

SUBJECT: Telegrams from American Embassy Madrid  
to Department of State.

There are enclosed paraphrases of two telegrams  
sent by the American Embassy at Madrid to the Depart-  
ment of State on April 4, repeated here, and which  
appear to be of interest to you.

H. J. J. Heurenx  
Acting Chief Civil Administrator

Enclosures:  
2 paraphrases

Copies to: MGS, AFHQ  
ORNM

5179



TRANSLATION No. 63.

Rough Copy.

~~121~~ 12150104

I RECEIVED TODAY THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER FROM THE (Spanish) FOREIGN MINISTER : " WITH REFERENCE TO OUR DEAR AMBASSADOR AND FRIEND VIR NEWS HAVE REACHED ME THAT DURING CONVERSATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BY THE KING OF ITALY THE LATTER HAS AGREED TO ALLOW SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS TO FUNCTION IN THE TERRITORY UNDER HIS CONTROL ; ~~TO-HIM~~ THIS AMOUNTS TO AN ATTEMPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMUNIST PARTY AIMS TO UNDERMINE THE PRESENT SPANISH REGIME STOP THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS AND I WISH TO ATTRACT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE EXTRAORDINARY GRAVITY WHICH IT ATTACHES TO THIS MOVE WHICH IN NO WAY ALLOWS FOR THE PURSUANCE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRY AND ONE WHO PERMITS THE FUNCTIONING OF ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE OPENLY HOSTILE TOWARDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT STOP I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ETC." (End of letter) STOP I IMMEDIATELY ASKED TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO IS PRIMERO IN ORDER TO EXPRESS MY INDIGNATION AND PROFOUND SURPRISE REGARDING THIS COMMUNICATION STOP I WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN TO INFORM YOU OF THE OUTCOME

Received 3 April 1944.

---

Translators' Pool: L.E.Z.

7/4/44.

5178



101 12150104

SEGRETO ALT RECEVUTA OGGI SEGUENTE LETTERA PERSONALE RISERVATA DA  
 QUESTO MINISTRO ESTENI DUE PUNTUACIRGCARO AMBASCIATORE E AMICO VIR  
 MI SONO GIUNTE NOTIZIE CHE NEL CORSO CONVERSAZIONI CONNESSE VONRICO NOS  
 CIMENTO/GOVERNO URSS DA PARTE REDITALIA QUESTI HAACCETTATO CHE POSSANO  
 FUNZIONARE IN TERRITORIO ITALIANO SOTTO SUO CONTROLLO DETERMINATE  
 ORGANIZZAZIONI PAR SEGUE CON NUMERO PROTOCOLLO SUCCESSI VO PARCO

Received 3 April 1944

Secret. Have received today the following personal letter from the  
 Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"Ambassador and Friend--Word has reached me that in the course  
 of conversations with Nessevonri knowledge is made that the Soviet  
 Government on behalf of King of Italy who has accepted that definite  
 organizations may function in Italian territory under its control  
 through which it can seek to overthrow the present Spanish regime in  
 conformity with the aims of the Communist Party.

"I should like to call your attention to the extraordinary serious-  
 ness which the Spanish Government attributes to this event which can  
 in no way reconcile itself to friendly relations between our country  
 and one which permits the functioning of organizations striving toward  
 open hostility against the Spanish State which cannot remain indifferent.

".....quickly.....Minister....you are the first.....my indig-  
 nation....."

51.3



102 13150104

PARSEGUITO A UNO ZERUNO PARCUI VERA FINALI A SAREBBE TENTARE DAB  
BATTERE ATTUALE REGIME SPAGNOLO IN CONFORMITA ASPIRAZIONI PARTITO  
COMUNISTA ALT ED O MI NEL CASO A DIRE CHIAMARE SUA ATTENZIONE SU  
STRAORDINARI AGRAVITA CHE GOVERNO SPAGNOLO ATTRIBUISCE A QUESTO  
FATTO CHE NON POTREBBE IN ALCUN MODO CONDILIARSI CON RELAZIONI  
AMICHEVOLI TRA NOSTRO PAESE E QUELLO CHE PERMETTESSE FUNZIONAMENTO  
PAR SEGUE CON UNO ZER TRE PAR

Received 3 April 1944

5176



0 7 7 2

103 15200104

PARSEGUITO A UNO ZERDUE PARTA LI ORGANIZZAZIONI ALLA CUI APERTA  
OSTILITA CONTRO STATO SPAGNOLO NON SI POTREBBE RIMANERE INDEFFERENTI  
ALT COLGO OCCASIONE ET CETCCBHRG ALT SO SUBITO CHI EST ODIVERERE  
MINISTRO EST ERICUES PRIMERO MIA INDIDNAZIONE EPRO FONDASOR PRES  
APERT ALR COMUNICAZIONE ALT RITE LEGRAFFRO ACCLO QUI OAVVENUTO

Received 3 April 1944

5173



*To Pol Sec. Naples  
For Info* *See 104 to Madrid  
attached*

C O P Y

TRANSLATION.

From Madrid.

12150104

13150104

15200104

Nos. 101, 102, and 103

I have received today the following personal and confidential letter from the Spanish Foreign Minister:

"With Reference to our dear ambassador and friend VIR news have reached me that during conversations in connection with the recognition of the Soviet Government by the King Of Italy the latter has agreed to allow specific organizations to function in the territory under his control; this amounts to an attempt in accordance with Communist Party aims to undermine the present Spanish Regime. The Spanish Government cannot remain indifferent to this state of affairs and I wish to attract your attention to the extraordinary gravity which it attaches to this move which in no way allows for the pursuance of friendly relations between our country and one who permits the functioning of organizations who are openly hostile towards the Spanish Government. I take this opportunity to, etc." (End of letter).

"I immediately asked to see the Foreign Minister who is Primero in order to express my indignation and profound surprise regarding this communications. I will telegraph again to inform you of the outcome."

Received 3 April 1944



REAR HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

Reference #385/396

15 May 1944

SUBJECT: Release of Yugoslav Prisoners from Italian Prisons

TO : Mr. H.A. Caccia, Political Section, Hq ACC, Naples.

1. The VP Administrative Section has asked for the views of the Political Section on the following matter.

2. At the special request of the Royal Yugoslav Military Mission the Deputy Director, Displaced Persons Sub Commission, at Bari forwarded the names of four convicts of Yugoslav nationality for the intervention of the ACC for their release. They are:-

- (a) VUKCEVIC Nikola, who got ten years for attempting to kill while committing a robbery;
- (b) BULUB Savo, who was a Brigadier of Carabinieri who received seven years for "failing in his duty" and being suspected of receiving a bribe of sugar;
- (c) ERCEGOVAC George, his accomplice; and
- (d) KALCIC Ivan, of whose arrest there seems to be no record.

3. Lord Stansgate suggests that these prisoners should complete their sentences and sees no reason for intervention, since none of them is incarcerated on political grounds. Furthermore, he thinks it would raise the question of the release of all United Nations nationals.

4. My own view is that in the course of time AMG Officers with the expert assistance of a local legal adviser should be able to enquire into all sentences and have a good delivery. Of these specific cases I suggest that VUKCEVIC Nikola is just a criminal and should serve his sentence, but I think investigation should be made regarding the other three, the description of whose crimes is at present vague. I doubt if the number of Allied nationals apart from Yugoslavs is considerable, and I am inclined to the opinion that it would be a graceful gesture to the Yugoslav Military Mission if further enquiry were made into their cases.

5. I should be grateful to have your views however to submit to VP Admin's Meeting on Friday morning.

*Could we have some more details?*

*D. How is a man of Yugoslav nationality? Is he a Brig. in Carabinieri? If he was of Italian nationality but Yugoslav descent*

J. M. PEARSON 5113  
Captain  
Political Section

*The Yugo Military Mission have no right to intervene. P.T.C.*



REAR HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

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J. M. PEARSON  
Captain  
Political Section

338/396

5112



2) If he is a genuine Yugoslav national & after  
that the charge of "failing in his duty" is v.  
value and that this is a prima facie case  
for investigation - especially if he is in AMG  
Country -

3) As to what charge is he held?

4) Is it necessary to raise the General question?  
Can't we just deal with this one on its  
merits - if any - ?

1415  
JW



TO: CBO, Admin Directorate

1. It is assumed that these convicted persons are genuinely of Yugoslav nationality and not of Italian nationality though of Yugoslav descent (in which case the Yugoslav Military Mission would have no right to intervene).

2. With the exception of VUKCHEVIC Nikola (6372) who would appear to be just a criminal, the others are held on charges so vaguely described as to warrant investigation by Regional administration.

3. The VP Political Section would prefer these cases to be dealt with on their merits, if any, rather than by reference to the national representatives of the detained persons. They wish to avoid raising any such points of policy for the moment, but consider that an ASI enquiry into these specific instances of alleged miscarriage of justice would be regarded by the Yugoslav Government as a gracious gesture.

  
J. M. PEARSON  
Captain  
Political Section

17 May 1944



(8)

GSC, Admin Directorate:

These persons were discovered in AMZ territory. Among the points on which AMZ might usefully ask the Italians to report are:-

- (1) How a Yugoslav, PULUP Savo, became a brigadier of Carabinieri;
- (2) Was the duty which he failed to perform his lawful duty, and what was the cause of his failure;
- (3) Was the bribery charge substantiated, and was the "report" taken into consideration in assessing the sentence of seven years penal servitude;
- (4) Was the sentence exceptional for the crime charged and is it now regarded as excessive;
- (5) With regard to KOSTOVAC Gogo, was he charged with BULUB Savo or was his criminal crime committed at the same time;
- (6) Was he also charged with receiving a bribe;
- (7) What was his sentence, and did it conform in severity with that given to BULUB Savo;
- (8) In the circumstances of his part in the case was the sentence exceptional and is it now regarded as excessive;
- (9) With regard to KALIC Ivan, in what circumstances is he staying away from prison;
- (10) Was he ever been charged and of what crime;
- (11) Was he ever appeared before a judicial officer;
- (12) Who authorized his commitment and who the circumstances of his temporary release;
- (13) Why he has been selected for execution, since he is ill and no longer detained.

8. In this record no hardship is alleged: but if further investigation proves that there has been a miscarriage or delay of justice, the Yugoslavs would appreciate its correction by the release of some of the persons named as an act of clemency.

J. B. PEARSON  
Captain  
Political Section

18 May 1944

5170



THE GREAT BRITISH ITALIAN DISSENT

This true, minute-by-minute account of how the Italian government snatched out of the exile roads like the most incredible fiction. Nevertheless, these are the facts--all of them--told for the first time!

By Clark Lee

The complete factual story of Italy's sudden secret surrender to the Allied Nations can now be told from the accounts of the participants themselves. Hitherto, important portions of the story have been kept secret because some of the principal actors involved were in German-controlled territory, or their families were in danger of Nazi reprisals. At the present time, all of them are safely behind our lines in Italy or elsewhere.

The story begins with a brief flashback to February, 1943, when General Maresio succeeded General Ugo Cavallero as chief of staff of the Italian armed forces.

Maresio had seen the handwriting on the wall of North Africa, where Italy's empire had been engulfed in a surge of Allied power. Across the Mediterranean, the Germans were enjoying a momentary advantage, but it would soon be overturned and Italy itself would be invaded.

To go on with Germany could mean only further disaster for Italy. The entire Italian nation hated the Germans, who had treated the people not as allies but as slaves. The Italian army, navy and air force were smarting under the constant insults and humiliations of the German officers. Even if Germany should by some miracle win the war, Italy would still be the loser.

It was clear that there was only one way out of the dilemma: Italy must seek a separate peace and trust to the Allies for alleviating her postwar suffering. That meant deposing Mussolini, because the United Nations had already made it plain that to rid Italy of fascism was one of their war aims. But the time was not yet ripe for Maresio to act.

The time finally came late in July, when American and British forces were pushing forward swiftly on all fronts in Sicily. Italian cities were reeling under the destructive weight of our air attacks; the bombing of Rome had increased the people's desire to get out of the war, which they plainly understood was being fought for the benefit of Germany alone.

Maresio called together the four or five men who controlled the Italian armed forces. They decided not only that Mussolini go, but that fascism must be wiped out in one swift stroke, so suddenly and decisively that the Germans would not have time to intervene. They laid their plans carefully.

The ideal solution would be to have Mussolini seized by the fascist party itself, thus completely repudiating the Black Shirt leader. Someone whispered in the ear of Dino Grandi, former fascist ambassador to London, that if he took the lead in urging the fascist Grand Council to force Il Duce's resignation, Grandi might find himself at the head of the Italian government.



By Clark Lee

The complete actual story of Italy's sudden secret surrender to the Allied Nations can be told from the accounts of the participants themselves. However, important portions of the story have been kept secret because some of the principal actors involved were in German-controlled territory, or their families were in danger of anti-Communists. At the present time, all of them are safely behind our lines in Italy or elsewhere.

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The time finally came late in July, when American and British forces were pushing forward swiftly on all fronts in Italy. Italian cities were reeling under the destructive weight of our air attacks; the bombing of Rome had increased the people's desire to get out of the war, which they daily understood was being fought for the benefit of Germany alone.

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The ideal solution would be to have Mussolini deposed by the fascist party itself, thus completely repudiating the black shirt leader. However, whispered in the ear of Benito Mussolini, former fascist commander in London, that if he took the lead in urging the fascist Grand Council to force Il Duce's resignation, Grandi might find himself at the head of the Italian government thus in position to approach the United Nations for a peace settlement, which would assure Grandi of preferential treatment.

(It might be noted here that the Italian military leaders never had the slightest intention of allowing Grandi to seize power.)

At the time the coup was carried out, everyone in Italy was thinking and talking peace. Even Mussolini himself, as Marshal Maresio declared later, had been seriously considering approaching the Allies. He had finally been convinced that Hitler had "betrayed" him. After the conference of the two dictators in the spring, Mussolini had seen the light that his countrymen had seen months before. Hitler, he told his closest collaborators, was working for Hitler alone, and would gladly sacrifice millions of Italian lives to postpone the final day of reckoning for Germany. Mussolini told his fascist advisers that he intended to break with Germany by September fifteenth.



but it does waited too long. Grandi agreed with General Ambrosio that the Allies would never listen to Mussolini's peace proposals and that the founder of Fascism would have to go. Grandi played his part well at the climactic final session of the Fascist Grand Council, which met in the Palazzo Venezia on July twenty-fourth, and finally, at 3:30 on Sunday morning, voted twenty-four to seven, with one not voting, to depose Il Duce.

That same night, the army stepped in swiftly. Mussolini was arrested as he left the Royal Palace. Marshal Badoglio, who had not been informed of the conspiracy until the day before, found himself head of the government. As a reward for his services, Grandi was given the control of Italy, but a tip that enabled him to escape to Lisbon while many of the other Fascist leaders were fleeing or being taken into custody.

There were the preliminaries that set the stage.

The military men behind Badoglio had determined to approach the Allies. Their problem was to establish contact in the face of redoubled Gestapo vigilance in Rome and in all the neutral capitals of the world. The Germans watched all departures from Rome, and it was not until more than two weeks after Mussolini had been overthrown that a way was found to send an envoy out of Italy.

The second week in August a foreign office delegation left Rome en route to Lisbon to greet the Italian ambassador to Chile on his return from South America. With the delegation went the two men whom the Italian government had selected for the difficult and dangerous mission of contacting the Allied nations and arranging to get Italy out of the war.

The chief negotiator was General Giuseppe Castellano, senior officer on General Ambrosio's staff. His interpreter and adviser was Franco Montanari, thirty-six-year-old Harvard graduate, whose mother is an American and who for three years was Italian consul in Honolulu.

As a foreign office official, Montanari was a legitimate member of the delegation. It was not difficult for him to obtain a false passport for Castellano, who traveled as a civilian accompanying the delegation. Castellano is a Sicilian, short and swarthy, and most of his experience has been as a staff officer.

At Madrid, Castellano and Montanari dropped off the diplomatic train on the pretense of visiting friends and immediately got in touch with the British ambassador. General Castellano informed the ambassador that he had been instructed by the Badoglio government to see an armistice.

The London and Washington governments were promptly informed. Their first concern was to establish that Castellano and Montanari were accredited representatives of the home government. That was done by Marshal Badoglio depositing a signed statement with the British authorities attesting forth that Castellano was his representative.

Castellano and Montanari were told to proceed to Lisbon, where they took rooms in a hotel and lived as members of the Italian diplomatic mission. The Gestapo agents in Lisbon focused their attention on other members of the diplomatic group and took only casual notice of Castellano and Montanari.

Meanwhile, General Ambrosio had been instructed to run delegates to Lisbon to meet the Italians. He selected as his representatives Major General Walter B. Smith, his chief of staff, and Brigadier K. W. D. Strong, assistant chief of staff (G-2).

Smith's middle name is Beedle, and his associates always call him "Beedle". He is five feet ten inches tall, with brownish hair turning gray. He wears a sash on a black ribbon and usually looks preoccupied. He had had long experience in staff work, including duty on the general staff in England and as secretary to the combined British-American chiefs of staff.

Smith is a six-footer who wears tortoise-shell glasses. He is re-



fleeing or being taken into custody.

There were the preliminaries that set the stage.

The military men behind Badoglio had determined to approach the Allies. Their problem was to establish contact in the face of redoubled Gestapo vigilance in Rome and in all the neutral capitals of the world. The Germans watched all departures from Rome, and it was not until more than two weeks after Mussolini had been overthrown that a way was found to send an envoy out of Italy.

The second week in August a foreign office delegation left Rome en route to Lisbon to greet the Italian ambassador to guide on his return from South America. With the delegation went the two men whom the Italian government had selected for the difficult and dangerous mission of contacting the Allied nations and arranging to get Italy out of the war.

The chief negotiator was General Giuseppe Castellano, senior officer on General Badoglio's staff. His interpreter and adviser was Franco Montanari, thirty-six-year-old Harvard graduate, whose father is an American and who for three years was Italian consul in Honolulu.

As a foreign office official, Montanari was a legitimate member of the delegation. It was not difficult for him to obtain a false passport for Castellano, who traveled as a civilian accompanying the delegation. Castellano is a Sicilian, smart and swarthy, and east of his experience has become a staff officer.

At Madrid, Castellano and Montanari dropped off the diplomatic train on the pretense of visiting friends and immediately got in touch with the British ambassador. General Badoglio informed the ambassador that he had been instructed by the Badoglio government to seek an armistice.

The London and Washington governments were promptly informed. Their first concern was to establish that Castellano and Montanari were accredited representatives of the Rome government. That was done by Marshal Badoglio depositing a signed statement with the British authorities setting forth that Castellano was his representative.

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Meanwhile, General Eisenhower had been instructed to rush delegates to Lisbon to meet the Italians. He selected as his representatives Major General Walter B. Dill, his chief of staff, and Brigadier N. M. D. Strong, assistant chief of staff (G-2).

Dill's middle name is Beckett, and his associates always call him "Beedle". He is five feet ten inches tall, with brownish hair turning gray. He wears a pipe-bag on a black ribbon and usually looks preoccupied. He had had long experience in staff work, including duty on the general staff in England and as secretary to the combined British-American chiefs of staff.

Strong is a six-footer who wears tortoise-shell glasses. He is reputed to be one of the brainiest officers in the British army. Of him, Eisenhower says, "I have never known a more brilliant intelligence officer". His part in planning for the forthcoming Italian invasion had been large, and he was chosen to meet the Italians in the hope that he could get valuable military information from them.

The two Allied envoys left North Africa two afternoons of yesterday, August eighteenth. Civilian passports were prepared for them. Dill took the identity of a businessman; Strong of a commercial traveler.

Next day they climbed aboard a small passenger plane, named, in accordance with international conventions, and took off from one of Gibraltar's landing fields. An hour and a half later they cut down in Lisbon.

Their passports were examined and checked without question, and customs officers found nothing detectable in their suitcases.



They were met unobtrusively by an American official, who recognized them by a prearranged signal, and were driven in an inconspicuous automobile to the home of Mr. George F. Korman, the American "charge d'affaires", where they waited for darkness.

Their first meeting with the Italians took place at 10:30 on the night of August nineteenth in the private residence of the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, where General Smith and Brigadier Strong were driven from Korman's home.

Castellano and Montanari dined in their hotel, then took a taxi to a restaurant, where they had coffee. In a proved detective-story fashion, they took another taxi to a distant part of the city, walked into a building by the entrance and out another, and found a blind taxi to drive them to the ambassador's home.

The Italians were ushered into the ambassador's study where, behind closed shutters and drawn curtains, Sir Ronald introduced Castellano and Montanari to the Allied representatives and to Mr. Korman. There were no handshakes or other amenities as the men sat down at a small round table. Everything was formal.

General Smith, acting as spokesman, said to Castellano, "I understand you have come to ask for armistice terms. Here are the terms."

He read out the articles one by one: Italy to surrender unconditionally and to avoid giving any assistance to our enemies; the Allies to have full use of Italian bases; the fleet and air force to surrender themselves; Italian divisions overseas to be called home; political and economic terms to be imposed later.

"There can be no discussion of those terms," General Smith concluded. "They must be accepted unconditionally."

"My purpose in coming was not actually to request an armistice," Castellano stated, "but to see how Italy could cooperate with the Allies."

It was obvious that the Italians had hoped to come in on the winning side without formally surrendering.

General Smith cut those hopes short. "We are not prepared to discuss anything but an armistice. You have just heard the terms. They will not be altered; you can accept or reject them."

Castellano signified that he understood, and Montanari put a copy of the terms in an inside pocket.

That concluded the formal meeting, and the talk turned to military matters. Brigadier Strong took over. Castellano urged that Allied parachute troops be dropped at some strategically with the landings he assumed would be made in other parts of Italy. He said that the German forces around the capital were not large and that the Italian divisions would assist our parachute troops.

From time to time Strong went into the next room, where a number of technical and communications experts were assembled. A system of communication was agreed on, and Montanari was provided with a code and given a battered-looking suitcase, which contained a compactly built radio transmitter and receiver.

The talks continued throughout the night without a break. Just before daylight, and just before the taxi was always waiting the ambassador's residence had taken up his post across the street. Castellano and Montanari were sent back to their hotel by automobile. As they left, Smith and Strong shook hands with them.

The Allied representatives returned immediately to North Africa by plane, meeting through Gibraltar, and reported at headquarters to General Eisenhower.

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The Allied representatives returned immediately to North Africa by plane, passing through Gibraltar, and reported at headquarters to General Eisenhower.

The two Italians, however, were delayed in their departure homeward by the late arrival of the boat bringing the ambassador from Chile. On the twenty-third of August, the ambassador arrived and with the welcoming delegation set off for Italy by special train.

There the armistice terms were submitted to the Italian government, and immediately accepted. Castellano and Montanari prepared to convey that information to Acheson's headquarters by radio on the twenty-sixth, the day agreed on for the first signal.

Meanwhile, no sooner had Montanari and Castellano left Lisbon than a serious complication developed in the persons of a strangely assorted pair of generals who turned up in the British ambassador's office one morning.

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The two officers were Major General Carton de Marat of the British Army, and General Giacomo Lamsusi, of the staff of General Roatta, who was chief of staff of the Italian Army (in distinction to General Ambrosio, who headed all the Italian military services).

Lamsusi explained that he had been sent from Rome when Castellano failed to return on schedule. He said he had been commissioned to negotiate an armistice by Marshal Badoglio in the event that Castellano had not met with any success.

The American and British officials were immediately suspicious. General Roatta, Lamsusi's superior, had been Italian military attache in Berlin and was reputed to be pro-Nazi. There was a possibility that the Germans had learned of the armistice negotiations and had sent Lamsusi to get the details. Lamsusi was asked for his credentials. He pointed to General Carton de Marat: "Here are my credentials. I have no others."

From the point of view of secrecy, Lamsusi could not have made a more unfortunate choice. Carton de Marat was a well-known man in Europe, and a most conspicuous figure because he had lost one arm and one eye in the course of many years of distinguished service in the British Army. Any one of a dozen Nazi agents in Lisbon might recognize him.

He forgot all this possibility, he was not aboard a plane and hurried to England. Word was given out that the Italians had released him because of poor health.

Lamsusi was flown to Gibraltar and then to Algiers, where Eisenhower, Smith, Strong and the few others who had been let in on the secret were waiting for the first word from Castellano in Rome. The suspense was nerve-racking.

He had placed all our bets on Castellano--and almost anything might have happened to him. There was a serious chance that the Nazis had spotted him in Lisbon and could capture him or assassinate him on the way back to Rome. And there was always the possibility that the whole approach was a frame-up engineered by the Germans, with Badoglio as a tool.

The transmission plan arranged in Lisbon called for Castellano to send the first message from Rome on the twenty-seventh of August. From noon on the twenty-sixth, radio operators in AFHQ began listening on the agreed wave length. Then, promptly at noon the following day, the first faint signal came through. It was just a signal in the ether, but it electrified headquarters.

By three P.M. a complete message had been received.

The message said that Badoglio accepted the armistice terms. General Eisenhower dispatched a prompt arrival, arranging for a further meeting in Sicily on August thirty-first. That was as soon as Castellano dared to risk leaving Rome again.

In the morning of that day Castellano and Montanari drove out to a Rome airfield which had not yet been taken over by the Germans. Castellano's trimmer Savoia-Marchetti bomber was waiting for them. It took off in the direction of Cervinia and then swung south towards Sicily. The other pilot had been taken into Castellano's confidence, but the co-pilot, navigator and radio operator were locked up during all landings in the next few days to prevent their talking.

American anti-aircraft gunners at the Termini Imerese airport, about twenty miles east of Palermo, had been warned not to fire on the Italian plane which was coming in at dusk. The plane set down without incident five minutes early. Brigadier Strong escorted Castellano and Montanari to a Douglas C-47 which flew them across Sicily to the Cassibile airbase, outside Catania. Then the men drove to advance Allied headquarters.

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American anti-aircraft gunners at the Termini Imerese airport, about twenty miles west of Palermo, had been warned not to fire on the Italian plane which was coming in at nine P.M. The plane sat down without incident fifty minutes early. Brigadier Strong escorted Castellano and Santamari to a Douglas C-47 which flew them across Sicily to the Cassibile airbase, outside Catania. Then the men drove to advance Allied headquarters.

Headquarters was a tent camp in an olive grove. The Italians were given a tent for living quarters. A half-hour after Castellano arrived, General Smith and his party came in by plane from North Africa, and the men met in a big conference tent at eleven P.M.

Castellano brought a discouraging report. He said conditions in Italy had altered considerably since the first conversation in Lisbon. German troops were pouring into the country. Italy had become an occupied nation, and its government was not free. If the government signed the armistice immediately, it would require some guarantees that its members would not be left at the mercy of the Nazis.

General Smith's reply was unequivocal: The Allies had plans which they would carry out under any circumstances. Castellano had left Lisbon to get the terms accepted in Rome. Now he was telling a different story. The allies could not continue to negotiate. They would proceed with their plans regardless of whether the armistice was signed or not.



At the end of the discussions, Castellano agreed to return to Rome that night and inform his government of the Allies' position. He was given until midnight of September first-second to send a reply. It must be a firm acceptance or rejection of the armistice.

With him aboard the Savoia sent General Lussini, who meanwhile had satisfied Eisenhower of his good faith. Among other things, he had sent a radio message to Rome strongly urging that the armistice be accepted.

Again came a period of anxious waiting at the radio. Castellano's reply was finally whispered through the air at 7:30 PM on Wednesday night, nineteen hours behind the fixed time. It said: Italy accepted the terms, and Castellano was returning by plane the next morning.

Castellano made the trip undetected by the same route he had followed on his first journey. He was met at Termini Imerese airfield by General Smith, who escorted him to Cassibile and to the conference tent at eleven AM.

Smith and Strong had expected that the armistice would be signed immediately. But Castellano said that, although his government accepted, he was not empowered to sign the papers.

If Castellano had tossed a hand grenade onto the table, he could not have caused a stronger reaction. "Q" day for our landings near Naples was only seven days off. This was the second of September, and the invasion was set for the ninth. If Italian troops were going to offer even limited resistance, it would make a big difference in the disposition of our own strength.

Very strong messages were drafted to be sent back to Rome by radio. They stated that unless Castellano were empowered to sign the armistice immediately, the whole negotiations would break down. Badoglio was asked to deposit a written document accrediting Castellano to sign as his representative.

There was another long, worrying delay over communicating with Rome. Atmospheric conditions were unfavorable, and it was not until eight o'clock on the morning of the third that the message got through and was acknowledged by the secret station in Rome.

The general spent the time at Cassibile working out details of the parachute landings to be made at Rome. General Alexander had approved the plan, which Castellano had urged partly as a measure of safety for the Italians involved in the armistice negotiations. He said the Italians had sufficient armed strength around Rome to assist the American paratroopers in holding the capital until our main body drove up from southern Italy.

The Germans had poured some fourteen divisions into Italy since the fall of Mussolini, making a total of nineteen, but their forces around Rome were small.

The conference also discussed the problem of announcing the armistice--if it should be signed. It was decided that General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio would make simultaneous broadcasts at 6:30 on the evening of the eighth.

But still there was no word from Rome.

It finally came at 4:30 the afternoon of September third, Badoglio had produced the required statement empowering Castellano to sign. No time was lost.

Castellano and Lombardi were summoned to the conference tent, where General Smith and Brigadier Strong were waiting. Messages notified General Eisenhower, General MacArthur, chief of staff to Admiral Cunningham, General Leavelle, assistant chief of staff to Eisenhower (3-3); Robert Murphy, President Roosevelt's representative in North Africa, and Harold Macmillan, British representative.

reply was finally whispered through the air at 7:30 p.m. on the night of September 7, 1943, and the conference was over.

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Two American officers left the car and quickly climbed aboard a waiting British PT boat. The youthful English skipper immediately headed out of the harbor.

Brigadier General Maxwell Taylor and Colonel William Taylor Gardner of the American Army were starting on one of the most dangerous and fateful secret missions in history. They were headed for Rome, in the heart of German-occupied Italy, and as a result of their activities in the next forty hours the whole course of current history was to be affected.

The mission to Rome had developed as a result of the secret Italian-Allied negotiations which had culminated in the signing of the armistice. General MacArthur had been interested in Castellano's plan of landing an American air-borne division in Rome. It was the kind of daring move that appealed to the Allied Commander in Chief as a short cut to victory. If it succeeded, it would drive important German forces away from the south and make our capture of Naples relatively easy. It might galvanize the Italian Army into active fighting against the Germans everywhere in Italy.

An American division was chosen for the attack on Rome. The divisional commander and General Taylor, his chief of staff, were summoned on September fourth to work out details with General Castellano and determine whether the plan was feasible.

The two Americans met with Castellano in Sicily on September fifth. They had to work fast. The original plan for our invasion of Italy had called for the division to land in Volturno valley, in the Naples area, a few hours before our main invasion forces attacked at Salerno. But many hours were left to get ready for the new mission. That meant studying an entirely new set of maps; intensive briefing of the officers and men and loading different equipment. It required a perfect understanding with the Italians on the disposition of Italian and German troops. The Italians would have to provide motor transport and fuel.

The American officers conferred with Castellano the entire day and night of the fifth. They worked out a tentative plan for the paratroops to capture one airfield on the night of the eighth and hold it. Then two other airfields near Rome would be seized, and with the help of the Italians, a ring of troops would be thrown around the capital.

But as they got into details, the divisional commander and General Taylor became less and less satisfied that they could depend on the Italians for the assistance necessary to the success of such an ambitious and hazardous attack. After many hours of discussion, they suddenly got the same idea.

"It's no good," said the divisional commander. "We don't have enough information. Unless we can get it at first hand, we'll have to call the operation off."

Taylor didn't hesitate. "I'll go to Rome," he offered.

There was another volunteer. Colonel Gardner, who used to be governor of Maine—a handsome, athletic man with graying black hair.

Through a secret radio station that had been set up in Rome during the negotiations, a message was flashed to the Italian capital. The Italians were told that the American officers were coming, and to make arrangements.

Taylor and Gardner wore uniform shirt and trousers of summer tan, with neckties and fatigue caps, when they went aboard the PT boat at Palermo. They carried branch coats.

The PT cruised northward over the smooth Tyrrhenian sea all night, and at dawn it was within sight of the Island of Ostia. At an agreed rendezvous

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Taylor and Gardiner wore uniform shirt and trousers of darker tan, with neckties and fatigue caps; when they went aboard the PT boat at Salerno. They carried trench coats.

The PT slipped northward over the smooth Tyrrhenian Sea all night, and at dawn it was within sight of the island of Sicily. At an agreed rendezvous point, an Italian corvette was waiting. It went over a small boat, and the two Americans went aboard.

Admiral Hanger, head of the Italian naval intelligence, greeted them as guests of the Royal Navy. "We will put you ashore at the port of Gaeta, seventy-five miles south of Rome," the admiral said. "To avoid suspicion, we will pretend you are if you were captured aviators we picked up at sea after a plane crash."

At 0830 in the evening the corvette eased up to the dock at Gaeta. As it was being made fast, the admiral whispered to the Americans, "At exactly this time tomorrow night, if everything goes well, most of the Italian fleet will leave port and head out to sea. We will meet the British at prearranged points and surrender. The signal to sail will be the announcement of the armistice."

To complete the illusion that they had been picked up from the sea, Taylor and Gardiner rumpled their clothes, massed their hair and took off their



neckties. They jammed their fatigue caps in their pockets and hid their pistols and cartridge belts under their trench coats. The Italians carried out their part realistically. The two Americans were shoved unceremoniously down the gangplank and into a waiting navy limousine.

An Italian officer, carrying two suitcases, got in after them. The suitcases contained radio sets equipped for both transmission and reception.

Italian sailors on the dock stared with interest as the car drove out of the navy yard. A few miles beyond Genoa it turned sharply into a lane and pulled up. A car was parked across the roadway, facing in the opposite direction. The motor was running, and its rear doors were open. The Americans jumped in, and they turned out onto the ancient Roman way and headed north toward Rome.

The side windows of the vehicle were frosted, but looking through the windshield, Taylor and Gardiner took note of frequent signs pointing them nice roads to German military establishments. The primitive approach to Rome from the south seemed to be almost undefended. There were only four road-blocks along its entire length.

Beside one of the road-blocks, four German soldiers were standing.

Taylor's finger brightened on the trigger of the pistol in his coat pocket. Gardiner clicked off the safety catch on his automatic. But the German paid no attention as the car brushed by.

The last light had just faded when they drove into Rome's blacked-out streets. The car swung into the courtyard of the Palazzo Capare, which houses a number of overgrown military offices from the Ministry of War just across the street. The car backed up to a portico, and Taylor and Gardiner stopped swiftly in the wing of the palace which had been blocked off for their use. Sentries patrolled the corridors.

An excellent dinner was waiting, but the Germans were in no mood to be wined and dined. All during the day the sense of urgency had been growing on them. Now the time of the parachute landings was less than twenty-four hours away. They had just sat down when the chief of staff of General Carboni, commander of troops in the Rome area, came in to make a formal call.

"We must see General Carboni immediately," Taylor said.

The Italian officer, not knowing the date of the invasion, was amazed. "But my dear sir, we have arranged only courtesy calls for this evening."

Taylor made it clear that he had no time for formalities. A few minutes later General Carboni came in.

His first sentences shocked the Americans: he was most pessimistic about the military situation. The arrangements which had been discussed for assisting the parachute landings could not be carried out. German reinforcements had arrived in the Rome district in the past few days and the Italians were outnumbered. Further, the Germans had cut off all the Italians' supplies. They had ammunition for only two hours of fighting and no gasoline. The entire American division would be annihilated if it landed.

That was bad enough. But then came the bombshell. Carboni said flatly, "The armistice announcement must be postponed. It would be highly undesirable in view of the changed conditions. It would bring about immediate occupation of Rome and the establishment of a new fascist government."

Taylor and Gardiner went into a quiet hallway. If the situation was as bad as Carboni described it, the air-borne operation would have to be canceled. On the other hand, perhaps Carboni was exaggerating. The Americans would have to confirm his statements. And they would have to do what they could to prevent the postponement of the armistice.

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Taylor's finger lightened on the trigger of the pistol in his coat pocket. Gardiner clicked off the safety catch on his automatic. But the Germans paid no attention as the car brushed by.

The last light had just faded when they drove into Rome's blacked-out streets. The car swung into the courtyard of the Palazzo Caprari, which houses a number of overflown military offices from the Ministry of War just across the street. The car backed up to a portico, and Taylor and Gardiner stepped swiftly into a wing of the palace which had been blocked off for their use. Sentries controlled the corridors.

An excellent dinner was waiting, but the Americans were in no mood to be wined and dined. All during the day the sense of urgency had been growing in them. Now the time of the parachute landing was less than twenty-four hours away. They had just set down when the chief of staff of General Carboni, commander of troops in the Rome area, came in to make a formal call.

"We must see General Carboni immediately," Taylor said.

The Italian officer, not knowing the date of the invasion, was amazed. "But my dear sir, we have arranged only courtesy calls for this evening."

Taylor made it clear that he had no time for formalities. A few minutes later General Carboni came in.

His first sentence shocked the Americans: he was most pessimistic about the military situation. The arrangements which had been discussed for assisting the parachute landings could not be carried out. German reinforcements had arrived in the same district in the past few days and the Italians were outnumbered. Further, the Germans had cut off all the Italians' supplies. They had ammunition for only two hours of fighting and no gasoline. The entire American division would be annihilated if it landed.

That was bad enough. But then came the bombshell. Carboni said flatly, "The armistice announcement must be postponed. It would be highly undesirable in view of the present conditions. It would bring about immediate occupation of Rome and the establishment of a new Fascist government."

Taylor and Gardiner went into a spin. If the situation was as bad as Carboni described it, the air-borne operation would have to be canceled. On the other hand, perhaps Carboni was exaggerating. The Americans would have to confirm his statements. And they would have to do what they could to prevent postponement of the armistice.

"It is imperative," Taylor said, "that we see Marshal Badoglio at once."

The Italian said that was impossible. The Marshal was an old man. It was after midnight, and he had been asleep for hours. Taylor's insistence won. Carboni phoned to Badoglio's aide and told him the Americans were coming.

With the driver and an aide in the front seat, Carboni, Taylor and Gardiner got into the General's black limousine shortly after midnight. They had gone only a few hundred yards through the dark streets when a command rang out.

"Halt!"

The figure of a sentry, carrying a short carbine, leaned out of the darkness. He flashed his light over the faces of the men in the rear seat.

Taylor and Gardiner had turned up the collars of their trench coats and again put their caps in their pockets.

Even the General's headquarters pass didn't satisfy the sentry. He walked up to the front of the car and examined the secret identification which



the Italians, unknown to the Germans, used as a "laissez-passer". Right upon time they were challenged and halted. The Italians in the car were jumpy, knowing that defection by the Germans would mean death. Taylor and Hardiner were too preoccupied to worry about their own safety. Not only their own lives were at stake now, but the fate of the entire air-borne division and even, perhaps, the armistice itself.

After a twenty-minute drive they were escorted into Badoglio's private villa. Most of the Marshal's aides were in pajamas and dressing gowns. They had been awake even before Carbone's telephone call, because an air alarm was on.

The visitors were taken to an upper floor by elevator, and Garbani went along into Badoglio's study. Fifteen minutes later he took the Americans inside.

Badoglio understated some French and Taylor addressed him in that language. He expressed alarm at Garbani's view of the military situation and his belief that the armistice must be postponed. He asked if the Marshal agreed.

"Qui. Absolutely!" Badoglio replied in halting French. "The armistice announcement will have to be postponed," he continued. "If I announce it tomorrow night, the Germans will cut my throat the following morning."

Taylor and Hardiner had come to some strictly on military business. Now they found themselves confronted with a far bigger issue than the air-borne operation. They were involved in questions of international policy, and on their actions might depend the whole outcome of our invasion. If the armistice plan collapsed, the Italian army might fight us instead of helping us; the first night war came out to surrender.

Taylor spoke without hesitation. "Does the Marshal realize," he asked, "how deeply Italy has committed itself by signing the armistice? Is he prepared to face the consequences of failing to live up to his word? Does he realize Allied reaction will be very strong? Does he fear the Germans more than the Allies?"

Tears came to the old man's eyes. "I do not believe," he said, "that the Allies will wreak vengeance against their friends who are waiting only a propitious moment to join them in fighting against the Germans."

Coldly and courteously, Taylor explained that it was not a question of vengeance, but of many thousands of lives and of the immediate future of the war. There could be no waiting for a propitious moment. This was the moment. Plans already made must be carried out, and we were counting on the armistice announcement to assist us in an operation which was highly dangerous, in which many Allied lives would be lost and which would eventually bring about the liberation of Italy.

Badoglio sat in silence behind his desk.

"How do you propose to deal with the situation?" Taylor asked.

The Marshal suggested that Taylor return at once to General Kinnear, explain that the announcement of the armistice would bring immediate German retaliation against Rome and against Badoglio personally, and tell him that it was impossible to go through with the agreement.

Taylor pointed out that he could not undertake any such mission. He urged Badoglio to prepare a message for radio transmission to Eisenhower, setting forth his position. After strong insistence Badoglio agreed.

The first message drawn up by Badoglio stated that owing to changes in the situation, it was no longer possible to announce the armistice on schedule, as that would bring about immediate occupation of Rome by the Nazis and violent seizure of the government.

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"Now do you propose to deal with the situation?" Taylor asked.

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Into the next, Badoglio wrote, "as General Taylor agrees."

Gardiner spotted this sentence, and Taylor told the Marshal that he would not be put in the position of endorsing postponement of the armistice. Badoglio redrafted the message, but again he included the implication that Taylor agreed with him. The third draft was satisfactory.

Taylor quickly wrote a message of his own, having established to his own satisfaction that the air-borne attack could not succeed. He informed his General that the operation must be called off. To make doubly sure, he inserted a code word in Badoglio's message which meant: "NO HOT ATTACK BY PARACHUTES."

UNDER THE OPERATIONS.

With their eyes on their wrist watches, Taylor and Gardiner rose to leave. The interview had lasted only fifteen minutes, but it was already 1:30 in the morning.



Bedoglio got up and took Taylor's hand. Again tears filled his eyes. "I swear by my honor of fifty-five years as a soldier my loyalty to the Allied cause." Then he repeated the pledge in Italian.

Carboni himself took the messages to the secret radio station, after dropping the Americans at the Palazzo Caprara. When the Italian General returned, the Americans questioned him anxiously. "Have the messages gone?"

Carboni made a grimace as he answered, "Not yet. The ending will take a long time. The operator is trying to establish contact, but atmospheric conditions are bad. He hopes to raise Allied Forces Headquarters soon."

The rest of the night and well into the morning, Taylor and Cardiner paced about their quarters. They ate some breakfast and slept fitfully. Mostly they eyed their watches, counting the minutes.

Once Taylor thought he heard the sound of planes. He thought of the men of his division getting ready to step into their big-bellied transport ships. He imagined the planes roaring off into the night and speeding towards Rome.

Then the noise of motors grew louder. It was planes—but not paratroopers, because the time was only ten A.M. The building shook for a long time to the rumble of heavy bombs. A sentry came in. "Four bombers are attacking German headquarters at Frascati, outside the capital." The bombing stopped, and the long waiting began again.

At 11:35 in the morning General Carboni came hurriedly into the room. "Your messages have just been cleared!"

The Americans were tremendously relieved. They had done all they could for the present.

Both Taylor and Cardiner were asleep at 3:30 in the afternoon when an officer came in to hand them a radio message: "You will return to Allied headquarters. Passage by air has been arranged. Your plane will not be fired upon by Allied aircraft or anti-aircraft guns."

Taylor took this last opportunity to re-emphasize what he had told Marshal Bedoglio. He sent for General Carboni and repeated to him that the Allied reaction would most certainly be very strong if the Italians failed to announce the armistice as scheduled at 6:30 P.M., now only three hours away.

"Will you not explain our situation to General Macdonald?" Carboni asked.

Once more, Taylor pointed out that he could not do so. "Any don't you send an Italian general back with us," he said.

The Italians approved. It was decided that General Francesco Rossi, deputy chief of the Imperial General Staff, would make a good envoy. He was sent for, and at 4:30 P.M. the three officers, together with an Italian interpreter, Lieutenant Tagliavia, walked out into the courtyard and into a waiting car.

Cardiner described their trip through the city. "Like the other car, this one had frosted-glass windows, but we could see ahead. There weren't any signs of bomb damage except along the railroad tracks, which had been pummeled hard. Several places we had to take long detours on our way to the Centocelle airbase. Traffic appeared fairly normal, with street cars and buses running."

A quarter-mile from the airport, the Americans spotted a squad of German infantry. They were marching along the road in the same direction. They paid no attention as the car overtook and passed them. "They were so close," Taylor said, "that I could have reached out my hand and touched them on the shoulder."

There were no Germans at the airport itself. The car drove out onto the runway where a Lavioia-Marchetti bomber was waiting, its motors already warmed. It was a beautiful afternoon, and as the Lavioia climbed to 13,000 feet



paced about their quarters. They also were very busy and sleepily. Finally, they eyed their watches, counting the minutes.

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Taylor took this last opportunity to re-emphasize what he had told Marshal Badoglio. He sent for General Garbini and repeated to him that the Allied reaction would most certainly be very strong if the Italians failed to announce the armistice as scheduled at 5:30 P.M., now only three hours away.

"Will you not explain our situation to General Eisenhower?" Garbini asked.

Once more, Taylor pointed out that he could not do so. "May I don't you send an Italian general back with us?" he said.

The Italians approved. It was decided that General Francesco Rossi, deputy chief of the Imperial General Staff, would make a good envoy. He was sent for, and at 4:30 P.M. the three officers, together with an Italian interpreter, Sublieutenant Tagliavia, walked out into the courtyard and into a waiting car.

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There were no Germans at the airport itself. The car drove out onto the runway where a Savoia-Marchetti bomber was waiting, its rotors already warmed.

It was a beautiful afternoon, and as the plane climbed to 12,000 feet and headed out over the sea, Taylor and Cardini looked back at the door of it. Peter's and the massed building of Rome in the distance. The city looked calm and peaceful. . .

Back at Allied headquarters, things were far from peaceful.

The messages from Badoglio and Taylor had spurred the staff to swift action. Word was flashed to the air-arms division that the attack was not to be made. The message did not reach the divisional general until 4:36 in the afternoon, fifteen hours after Taylor had written it in Rome. The paratroopers were already on the field, set for the take-off.

Eisenhower didn't hesitate in taking action on Badoglio's request for postponement of the armistice announcement. A startling reply was rushed back to Rome. It informed Badoglio that Eisenhower would announce the armistice as planned at 5:30 in the evening.

That left Medaglio with no alternative. Once the armistice was announced, Medaglio knew he would be regarded by the Germans as their enemy regardless of whether he himself made the announcement or not. If he did make the announcement, the Allies would have faith in him. If he did not, he would be betraying us.

While their plane sped steadily eastward, Taylor and Gardiner saw their watches touch 6:30. They had no way of knowing what had happened as a result of their messages; whether the armistice announcement had been postponed and the entire invasion plan changed, or whether it had gone off as scheduled.

The didn't have much time to worry about the armistice. As they approached the African coast, an American A-20 spotted them and got into attacking position behind the Savoia. For the first time, Taylor and Gardiner were worried about themselves.

The A-20 came straight at them. Then, at the last minute, it pulled up and swung away without firing.

Half an hour later, at seven o'clock, the Savoia sat down at Al Merina Airfield outside Tunis. An excited Air Corps sergeant ran over and opened the door. He spotted Taylor.

"Have you heard the news, sir?" he shouted. "The Allies have surrendered. General Eisenhower has just announced an armistice over the radio."

The Savoia never got an opportunity to cut Medaglio's throat or otherwise avenge themselves on him. At eight P.M. on the night of the eighth--an hour and a half after the scheduled time--he went on the air over radio Rome and announced that the armistice had been signed. He instructed Italian troops not to oppose us. Then he disappeared.

Next morning before daylight, and before the Germans had recovered from their shock, a big limousine sped out of Rome. It carried not only Marshal Medaglio, but King Victor Emmanuel.

The car drove straight past across Italy to the Adriatic port of Pescara. The King and the Marshal went aboard an Italian cruiser. Next morning they were safe in the port of Taranto, behind the British lines.

--From the February, 1944, issue  
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