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Venezia
Aug. 1943 - MA

10000/132/156

385.04

Venezia Julia

Aug. 1943 - MAR. 1945

*Chief Comm
(Maj. Stewart)*

SECRET

Ref: P/385.Q.

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Reports of Enemy Anti-Italian Activities

TO : Regional Commissioner,
Venetia Region,

With reference to my letter dated 1 January 1945 (Reference: No. 504/110/COS) on the above subject, I attach an additional report regarding conditions in Alto-Adige which was received by the Chief Commissioner from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: SCAG EIGHTH Army

1 encl: Report: Situation in Alto-Adige.

5311

SECRET

Mrs Stewart

Translation

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

16/02705/a

Paris, 3 March 1945

Dear Admiral,

After my letter of December 28th, 1944, and 05929/19, I enclose further news which I received about the situation in the Alto Adige.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

very truly yours,

E. D. Casper

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Admiral Ellery A. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
A O M e

REC 11.57 7 MAR 45
Action: OFFICE, Political
ADVISERS
INFO: CHIEF Comm R.
EXEC. Comm R.

After my letter of December 28th, 1944,
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 cent the situation in the Alto Adige.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Very truly yours,

S. De Basteri

5510

Admiral Henry H. Stone
 Chief Commissioner
 Allied Commission

R O M E

REC 11.54 - 4 MAR 45

Re: mon: OFFICE POLITICAL
 ADVISERS

INFO: CHIEF COMM.
 EXEC. COMM.

C.C.

MAR 6 RECD

16/02/05 / 8

Il Ministro degli Affari Ri

Roma, li 3 MAR 1945

Signor Ammiraglio,

facendo seguito alla mia lettera
del 28 dicembre 1944, n° 05988/15, Le invio qui al-
legate in copia ulteriori notizie che mi sono perve-
nute circa la situazione in Alto Adige.

Voglia gradire, Signor Ammiraglio,
gli atti della mia alta considerazione

Aganuy

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Regency

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Ammiraglio Ellery H. Stone
"Chief Commissioner"
Commissione Alleata

R o m a

OGGETTO: Situazione in Alto Adige

Le notizie contenute nella presente esposizione sono state raccolte tra elementi dell'Alto Adige, attualmente residenti a Roma ed emigrati da quelle regioni dopo l'occupazione tedesca. Tali notizie sono da considerarsi attendibili poichè confermate da più fonti meritevoli di fiducia.

1) SITUAZIONE GENERALE ED ORGANIZZAZIONE NAZISTA

Quando al 9 settembre 1943 i tedeschi occuparono l'Alto Adige non procedettero, come erroneamente si afferma alla formale annessione del territorio ma gli dettero uno statuto "sui generis" che ha molte analogie con quello instaurato nel 1939 nel "protettorato di Boemia e Moravia". I cittadini di sangue tedesco furono cioè dichiarati sudditi del "Reich" ma il territorio in se stesso fu lasciato sotto ai segni esteriori della sovranità italiana per quanto retto da norme molto diverse da quelle instaurate nel resto dell'Italia occupata.

Tutti i provvedimenti vessatori contro gli italiani non furono presi direttamente dalle autorità di occupazione ma fatti prendere dagli enti locali appositamente costituiti e formati esclusivamente da allogeni dimodochè alle proteste degli italiani si poteva rispondere che le autorità del "Reich" non intendevano sindacare l'operato di tali enti.

Il Alto Adige, viceversa e vige quindi tuttora, il diritto Germanico per i cittadini di sangue germanico mentre per gli italiani (pur soggetti al diritto di guerra tedesco) vige, formalmente quello italiano. In pratica gli italiani sono solamente dei tollerati senza diritto o difesa alcuna.

I tedeschi che nell'opzione del 1939 avevano optato per l'Italia furono e sono considerati alla stessa stregua dei cittadini del "Reich" politicamente sospetti". Quelli fra di loro che, durante le operazioni inerenti all'opzione stessa avevano svolto opera di propaganda antinazista furono imputati di alto tradimento.

Infinite furono, specie nel primo periodo dell'occupazione, le angherie a danno degli italiani. Le uccisioni, gli svaligiamenti di case e negozi, le deportazioni, i provvedimenti restrittivi della libertà personale non si contano.

In fine ultimo di tutte le dette angherie è, come ben si comprende quello di tedeschizzare completamente la zona eliminando o costringendo ad emigrare le popolazioni italiane.

Se tale fine non si è potuto fino ad ora conseguire, lo si deve al fatto che la popolazione italiana dell'Alto Adige è molto più numericamente consistente di quanto non si creda. La leggenda che gli abitanti della regione siano in grande maggioranza tedeschi si radicò in Italia ed all'estero in seguito ai risultati dell'opzione del 1939.

Non si è però tenuto conto nè del modo con cui fu organizzata ed attuata

quelle regioni dopo l'occupazione tedesca. I tedeschi confermarono da più fonti meritevoli di fiducia.

1) SITUAZIONE GENERALE ED ORGANIZZAZIONE NAZISTA

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Non si è però tenuto conto nè del modo con cui fu organizzata ed attuata l'opzione (inutile ricordare che tanto il governo tedesco che quello fascista svolsero attivissima propaganda affinché gli allogeni di sangue tedesco optassero per la Germania nonchè gli infiniti inganni e violenze cui si ricorse) nè soprattutto il fatto che non si trattò di un plebiscito, come

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Costengono ora i tedeschi, inquantochè il diritto al voto fu riservato esclusivamente ai cittadini di sangue tedesco. La opzione attuata nel cosiddetto "territorio dell'accordo" (che comprendeva la provincia di Bolzano ed alcune isole etniche tedesche esistenti nelle provincie di Trento, Udine e Belluno) dette i seguenti risultati:

Province	Aventi diritto al voto	per il traf. nel Reich	%	per l'Italia	%
Bolzano	229.500	166.488	72.5%	63.012	27.5%
Trento	24.453	13.015	53.2%	11.438	46.8%
Udine	5.553	4.576	81.7%	977	18.3%
Belluno	7.429	1.006	13.5%	6.423	86.5%

Se però si considera la popolazione italiana residente in Alto Adige e che fu esclusa dalla votazione, riservata ai cittadini di razza tedesca, vediamo che le percentuali cambiano notevolmente e, mentre danno un'infima minoranza tedesca per le provincie di Trento, Udine e Belluno, la percentuale in parola si riduce per Bolzano a poco più del 50%. Per convincersene basta confrontare la cifra di coloro che hanno votato con il totale della popolazione residente in Alto Adige, sia all'origine che italiana.

Il seguente prospetto è chiaramente dimostrativo al riguardo:

Popolazione optante

Province	Popol. residente	per transf. in Germania	%
Bolzano	313/989	166.488	53.02
Trento	391.309	13.015	3.30
Udine	721.670	4.576	0.63
Belluno	210.333	1.006	0.47

E perciò che i tedeschi non poterono attuare il loro desiderio di sbarazzarsi degli italiani residenti in Alto Adige poichè così facendo avrebbero dato un colpo mortale all'economia della regione.

Ricapitolando, in Alto Adige l'organizzazione della popolazione di razza tedesca è eguale a quella esistente nel "Reich". Le varie organizzazioni italiane sono state conservate mettendo alle loro teste dei commissari tedeschi. Tali commissari furono scelti fra i membri delle cosiddette "commissioni dirimpettaie". (Dopo l'opzione del '39 i tedeschi avevano istituito delle "commissioni per gli optanti germanici". Ad es. vi era un sindacato dei lavoratori dell'agricoltura italiano ed una "commissione" analoga tedesca che tutelava i lavoratori optanti per la Germania nelle loro del trasferimento). Negli Istituti di Credito, aziende importanti ecc. i commissari furono scelti fra impiegati tedeschi delle aziende stesse.

Talune di tali organizzazioni sono ancora importanti per il numero degli organizzati. Ad es. i sindacati dei lavoratori dell'industria (tutti gli operai erano e sono italiani). In esso giungono ancora le disposizioni sindacali dell'epoca fascista, sia pure sotto il controllo del commissario germanico.

Province	Aventi diritto al voto	nel Reich	%	per i tedeschi
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2) FORZE DI POLIZIA NAZISTA

Poco dopo l'occupazione germanica gli abitanti di sangue tedesco furono chiamati alle armi come nel "Reich" (naturale conseguenza di quanto detto più sopra). Coloro che da tempo si erano distinti per zelo nazista (ed il locale partito nazista costituito ufficialmente fra gli optanti dopo il '39 ne aveva da tempo curato un elenco) furono incorporati nelle "SS" o nelle forze di polizia. Costoro furono per lo più inviati nelle altre provincie del-

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l'Italia occupata dove la loro conoscenza della lingua italiana poteva essere utile. (a Roma si è reso tristemente famoso il btg. di polizia "Bozen").

Per la polizia nella zona si si servi bensì di elementi locali ma inquadrati e diretti da persone del "Reich".

Coloro che hanno vissuto in Alto Adige durante l'occupazione nazista affermano che le forze di polizia vi sono inferiori a quelle del restante territorio italiano occupato ma superiori a quelle esistenti in analoghe zone in Germania.

3) ELEMENTI COLLABORAZIONISTI

Grosso modo si possono considerare collaboratori dei nazisti tutti quelli allogeni che a suo tempo avevano optato per la Germania.

Tutti coloro che sono emigrati dall'Alto Adige ed ora si trovano nella Italia liberata, sono unanimi nel descrivere le calorose accoglienze fatte dagli allogeni alle truppe tedesche, il loro accanimento contro l'elemento italiano e l'aiuto fanatico da loro dato ai nazisti durante l'attuale conflitto.

Questo inoppugnabile dato di fatto non va forse nascosto o diminuito perché qualora la questione Alto-atesina dovesse domani essere posta sul tappeto, noi certamente sentiremo parlare degli allogeni come di miti "austriaci" mentre sarà allora opportuno far notare che sarebbe sommamente ingiusto e pericoloso favorire ai nostri danni proprio quella parte della popolazione che si dimostrò accanitamente nazista. Gioverà pure ricordare che fin dall'epoca in cui la regione apparteneva alla Monarchia Asburgica, i bolzanesi di razza tedesca (contrariamente ai fedeli tirolese del nord) erano pengermanisti. Non sarebbe quindi conveniente aggregare una popolazione tradizionalmente favorevole alla "anschluss" alla risorgenda Austria inquantochè anziché rafforzarne ne indebolirebbe l'organismo.

Gli italiani dell'Alto Adige nella loro grande maggioranza si comportarono e si comportano ottimamente opponendo all'invasore sia una resistenza passiva che attiva. Anche moltissimi fascisti aderirono alle idee liberatrici.

4) QUESTIONE FINANZIARIA

La moneta in Alto Adige continua ad essere quella italiana.

Come è noto mediante gli accordi del 1939 lo Stato Italiano si era impegnato ad acquistare attraverso un ente (Ente delle tre Venezie) le proprietà degli allogeni che, a norma degli stessi accordi, dovevano trasferirsi nel "Reich". All'atto dell'occupazione le proprietà degli allogeni si trovarono in una delle seguenti posizioni:

- a) - beni che erano già stati acquistati dall'Ente e da questo rivenduti ad italiani;
- b) - beni già acquistati dall'Ente stesso ma non ancora venduti;

quadretti e diretti da persone del "Reich".

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- a) - beni che erano già stati acquistati dall'Ente e da questo rivenduti ad italiani;
- b) - beni già acquistati dall'Ente stesso ma non ancora venduti;
- c) - beni per i quali le operazioni di stima erano in corso.

Per quanto riguarda la prima categoria degli italiani acquirenti furono estromessi dalle proprietà acquistate senza indennizzo alcuno ed i beni riconsegnati agli antichi proprietari che ne fecero richiesta dietro pagamento di una somma alla Commissione Finanziaria Germanica. Per la seconda, e per

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le proprietà della prima non reclamate, si passò all'amministrazione provvisoria dei beni alla detta Commissione che ne alienò pure qualcuno a tedeschi. Per la terza si interruppero le operazioni di stima e si ritornò alla "statu quo ante".

A liberazione avvenuta converrà occuparsi immediatamente della questione perchè molte delle proprietà abusivamente detenute da nazisti potranno costituire una delle poche fonti delle riparazioni di guerra dovute.

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COPY

SECRET

TEL: 478730

Ref: 504/110/COS

1 January 1945

SUBJECT: Reports of Enemy Anti-Italian Activities

TO : Regional Commissioner
VENEZIA REGION

I forward copy of a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs for your information. You probably receive much information of this sort from other sources but I think that seeing that this comes from the Minister himself and appears to be a summary of various reports which he has received, and in view of the importance which the Italians attach to this area, I would be grateful for your comments on the matter.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: SCAO EIGHTH Army.

Incl:
16/05988/15 dtd 28 Dec 44.

5004

Ref: P/385.04

31 December 1944

SUBJECT: Anti-Italian Activity in the
Trento and Bolzano Provinces.

TO : Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. Reference letter No. 16/05988/15 dated 28 December 1944,
from His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the
Chief Commissioner, A. C.
2. The receipt of the information contained in this communication
is acknowledged with appreciation and it is being for-
warded to the appropriate Allied Authorities for their informa-
tion.

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice President, Political Section

Copies to:
COB
CC

5803

385.04

Pol Sec ✓

TranslationDepartment of State
16/05988/15

Rome, 28 December 1944

Dear Admiral,

I want to draw your attention on some very serious news which we recently received, through the Committee of Liberation of North Italy, about the anti-Italian activity which is being exercised by the nazis in the Trento and Bolzano Provinces.

This activity and the ferocity and acts of intimidation which go with it, have the unavowed but obvious aim of trying to change the character of these provinces to include them in the Reich, by making them appear as German and not Italian provinces.

The said regions have been included in a 'zone of operation of the Pre-Alps' officially created with exclusively military aims and with a purely military character, and meaning to eliminate all that is 'Italian'.

Neither a single Carabinieri, nor a single agent of the Italian Police have been left in the Alto-Adige; the Italian authorities have been turned out from every office and every organization, and substituted by German commissioners whose activity consists in sending away the greatest possible number of Italians.

Arbitrary acts, acts of violence are too numerous to be counted; arrests and murders take place more and more frequently. The Italian schools have been closed and Italian newspapers abolished. The Italian names of the villages, streets and squares have been replaced by German names. Decrees dismissing the Italian employees have been issued; while continuous drafts and deportation of the Italians of the 1894-1926 for compulsory work take away large masses of the population.

The elements belonging to the minorities, and which according to the Italo-German agreements of 1939 had chosen Italy, are now being bullied into forswearing their choice, and those who refuse to are sent away.

These acts of violence have already caused 30-40 thousand people to be sent away from these regions, but this figure is destined to increase with an accelerated rhythm as long as the nazis will occupy this region.

I have deemed it necessary to inform you about all this, my dear Admiral, so that the Allied organs which will have to govern these regions as soon as they will be liberated, get timely information, about the anti Italian action taken by the enemy; I will forward to you all the informations which I will receive.

I remain,

Truly yours,

S. De Gasperi

To Admiral Stone
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

LIST
Action: Political Sec
INFO: CHIEF COMMR
C of S

S.V.

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

16/03955/15

Roma,

Caro Ammiraglio,

desidero vivamente attirare la Sua autorevole e benevola attenzione su alcune gravi notizie che ci sono recentemente giunte, per tramite dei Comitati di Liberazione dell'Italia Settentrionale, e che riguardano l'attività antitaliana svolta e in via di svolgimento da parte dei nazisti nelle provincie di Trento e di Bolzano.

Tale attività, e gli atti di intimidazione e di ferocia che la accompagnano, hanno lo scopo non dichiarato, ma evidente, di cercare di snaturare la fisionomia di quelle provincie al fine di incorporarle nel Reich facendole apparire come regioni non italiane, ma tedesche.

Le regioni suddette sono state infatti comprese in una "zona di operazione delle Prealpi", creata ufficialmente con carattere e finalità esclusivamente militari e tuttavia diretta ad eliminare tutto ciò che è "italiano".

Né un Carabiniere, né un agente della Polizia italiana è rimasto nell'Alto Adige; le autorità italiane sono state estromesse da ogni ufficio e da ogni ente, e sostituite da Commissari germanici la cui attività si esercita nell'allontanare quanti più italiani è possibile.

Arbitri, sopraffazioni e violenze non si contano più; arresti e anche uccisioni vengono compiuti sempre più frequentemente. Le scuole italiane sono state chiuse e i giornali italiani sono stati aboliti. I nomi italiani dei villaggi, delle vie e delle piazze sono stati sostituiti con nomi tedeschi. Decreti appositamente emanati dispongono l'allontanamento degli impiegati italiani.

Ammiraglio Ellery W. STONE

"Chief Commissioner"

Commissione Alleata

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liani, mentre continue chiamate alle armi e deportazioni di italiani delle classi dal 1894 al 1926 per lavoro obbligatorio provvedono ad allontanare notevoli masse di connazionali.

Anche gli elementi appartenenti alle minoranze allogene, che in base agli accordi italo-tedeschi del 1939 avevano optato per l'Italia vengono ora a mezzo di intimidazioni costretti a rinnegare l'opzione allora fatta, e coloro che si rifiutano vengono allontanati.

Quest'opera di violenza ha provocato già l'allontanamento da quelle regioni di 30-40 mila persone, ma questa cifra è destinata ad aumentare con ritmo crescente quanto più durerà l'occupazione nazista della regione.

Ho ritenuto opportuno segnalare quanto precede, caro Ammiraglio, affinché gli organi Alleati che saranno in un primo tempo chiamati al governo di quelle regioni, subito dopo la loro liberazione, siano messi tempestivamente al corrente, per loro orientamento, dell'azione antitaliana spiegata colà dal nemico, e mi riservo di inviarle, caro Ammiraglio, quelle ulteriori informazioni che, al riguardo, mi dovessero pervenire.

Mi creda con i più cordiali saluti

Leggiamo

ECCO

7-33726
MEB 261158

D/3367
MEB 261337

PRIORITY

ATTN: SIGNED SACRED
ALCOM FOR ACTION

TOP SECRET.

Suggestion made to place civil governmental machinery of Marshal TITO
now functioning in Venezia Giulia under Allied Military Government.

Please comment urgently on feasibility.

ALCOM DIST:

ACTION: Exec. Commr. (Copies No. 1 & 2)

INFO: A/President	Copy No. 3
Chief Commr.	" " 4
Pol. Sec.	" " 5
CA Sec.	" " 6

385.04

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G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section, G.M.N.)
c/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 794, U. S. Army

14 February 1945

INTELLIGENCE REPORT R-160

Political and Military Situation in VENETIA, CHINA

1. The attached report was received from Ufficio Informazioni, Stato Maggiore Generale.
2. It is passed on as representing an ITALIAN point of view.

IM/M.O.

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JPR, 04

Political and Military Situation in VIENTIANE

1. The attached report was received from Ufficio Informazioni, Stato Maggiore Generale.
2. It is passed on as representing an Italian point of view.

1/18/54
 A.S. HED,
 Major, C.S.,
 C-2 (I.O. S-S.)

LC/M.S.

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(Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) CIP
c/o Base Area Allied Command
APO 794, U.S. Army.

APPENDIX 1
Intro B-160

Political and Military Situation in VENEZIA GIULIA

1. Reactions of population after Italian armistice.

After 6 September 43, which saw the withdrawal of ITALIAN troops from CROAZIA, the political situation in VENEZIA GIULIA underwent a considerable change.

The hatred and aversion against the ITALIANS, which had been stirred up amongst the population by the iniquitous policies of the Fascists, gave way to a sense of pity for the bitter fate, which had befallen ITALY. They considered that the ITALIANS had become involved in a war, which they had neither wanted nor supported. The chaos, which existed amongst the ITALIAN armed forces in VENEZIA GIULIA, was considered the logical conclusion of the exhaustion of the ITALIANS and of their long moral fight.

However, it must not be thought that, after this first wavering of political opinions, an atmosphere of cordiality and fraternity existed such as would have facilitated a settlement of the old political and territorial questions between ITALY and the new YUGOSLAVIA.

After the ITALIAN troops had withdrawn, the CROAT population tried their best to stamp out every trace of ITALIANISM. This was done, not only in the territory which had been annexed to ITALY by the Fascists, but also in those parts, which had been joined to ITALY by VITTORIO VENETO. It was done with the tacit assent of the GERMAN.

2. Results of Fascist rule.

One thing which is quite apparent is that Fascism has not helped the ITALY of VITTORIO VENETO. Fascism has consistently neglected the interests of ITALY in VENEZIA GIULIA and its rule caused a worsening of relations between the ITALIANS and the residents of SLAV origin.

Thus it was that, even after many years of ITALIAN rule, the situation had not improved. On the contrary, the long period of Fascism has only increased the hatred of the ITALIANS amongst the civilian population and made the position even more difficult.

3. Fascism and ITALY.

Certain possibilities are presented if Fascism and ITALY are regarded as two completely separate ideas.

The YUGOSLAVIANS have come to think of Fascism and ITALY as separate things and now have different ideas of the ITALIANS. Memories of the ITALIAN occupation in 1922 are recalled. The ITALIAN authorities at that time had known how to create a more friendly atmosphere.

1. Reactions of population after Italian unification.

After 6 September 13, which saw the withdrawal of Italian troops from GROSSETO, the political situation in GROSSETO underwent a considerable change.

The hatred and aversion against the ITALIANS, which had been stirred up amongst the population by the iniquitous politics of the Fascists, gave way to a sense of pity for the bitter fate, which had befallen ITALY. They considered that the ITALIANS had become involved in a war, which they had neither wanted nor supported. The chaos, which existed amongst the ITALIAN armed forces in VERONA, GROSSETO, was considered the logical conclusion of the extermination of the ITALIANS and of their long moral fight.

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This opens to the ITALIANS possibilities for prudent diplomatic work, the full effects of which cannot be foreseen, but which cannot be neglected.

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4. Political situation created by the GERMANS in VENETIAN GERMANY.

The GERMANS created a situation in VENETIAN GERMANY quite different to that in any other part of ITALY. By the creation of the "ADRIATIC COASTLAND" the GERMANS intended to place the coastal area between LITOMYSLA and CROATIA, i.e. the border country between the ITALIANS and SLOVENES and CROATS under special jurisdiction.

The various legislative measures as well as the proclamations, which the GERMANS had made to the YUGOSLAVIANS prior to the military occupation, were to the disadvantage of the ITALIANS. In fact the CROATS were made to appear as the neo-conquerors of a territory which had been longing to join Mother CROATIA for a long time.

The GERMAN promises helped the regime of PAVELIC, and ~~GERMAN ASSISTANCE~~ the Yugoslavization of the territory, which had been started by the YUGOSLAVIANS immediately after the ITALIAN armistice.

5. GERMAN future intentions.

In the event of a GERMAN victory, the intention of the GERMANS had been to annex VENETIAN GERMANY.

The following was evidence of this intention:

- a. The installation of civilian organizations similar to those which in other countries have preceded the incorporation of territory into the Reich.
- b. The complicated and severe legislature, similar to that adopted by Nazi GERMANY.
- c. The creation of military formations of a private character.

Naturally, at the moment, the installation of a purely Nazi regime in this area would be too dangerous a step for the GERMANS, in view of their critical military situation. The GERMANS have therefore followed a more ambiguous form of politics supporting at times the Fascists and at times the Ustaschi.

The GERMANS have favoured Ante PAVELIC by giving the CROAT population free access to ITALIAN territory (within the old borders). They have greatly benefited the population, politically in the manner described above, and economically:

- a. By the circulation of ITALIAN Lira as well as the already inflated Kuna.
- b. By the importation from ITALY of foodstuffs and other goods.
- c. By the creation of a monopoly for the sale of the

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- b. By the importation from ITALY of foodstuffs and other goods.
- c. By the creation of a monopoly for the sale of the products to the ITALIAN population themselves and the control of black market prices.

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It must, however, be borne in mind that the GERIANS were obliged to introduce into the SLAV and CROAT territories elements which were very favourably disposed towards the YUGOSLAV patriots and in whom the GERIANS can have had little confidence, i.e. the military organization of the DOMBRANCI, which was responsible for the policing of certain zones.

The Public Administration is now completely in the hands of the CROATS. The higher officials are subject to GERMAN military control.

6. Management of VIENNA-TRIESTE Railway.
The railway VIENNA-TRIESTE is still managed by the ITALIAN Railways. The personnel on the stations and the drivers and guards are ITALIANS.

The passenger control along practically the whole stretch of line is carried out by Fascist Police and also by CROAT officials. The latter are arrogant in their dealings with ITALIANS.

The ITALIAN police are not allowed to leave the precincts of the stations. If they do so, they risk being shot.

LEW/H.C.

-3-

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File
Lead

Ref: P/385.04

28 January 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Intentions Regarding Trieste.

MEMORANDUM TO: U. S. Embassy.

1. There is attached hereto a memorandum entitled, "Italian Intentions Regarding Trieste", dated November 30, 1944 which Political Section received from British Naval Intelligence sources.
2. Despite the fact that this memorandum is rather old, although it has just been received by Political Section, it is felt that perhaps its contents would be of interest to the Department as indicative of a possible operation, the idea of conducting which originating in the Italian Ministry of Marine, and it is not known that the idea has been dropped.

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice President, Political Section

1 Encl: As above.

385.04

5495

30th November 1944

ITALIAN INTENTIONS REGARDING TRIESTE

1. The somewhat natural apprehension with which the Italians regard the ultimate fate of Trieste, appears to reach its peak in the Royal Italian Navy. Apart from fighting for Trieste in the last war and its use as a Naval Base, the reason why the R.I.N. is especially interested politically is still obscure. A possible explanation is that the R.I.N., having remained more homogeneous than any other Service or political party in Italy, can express more consolidated views.

2. There is ample evidence to show that the direction of the effort to save Trieste for Italy, not only seems to be confined to the Ministry of Marine but to have been definitely delegated, not to any Planning or Operational Staff but to the Servizio Informazioni Segreta (S.I.S.), the Secret Intelligence Service of the R.I.N. It is for that reason that the matter has become the concern of the Department.

3. The first indication that the R.I.N. were taking an active interest in Trieste was a verbal proposal by the Minister of Marine to FOULI that the two battalions of the San Marco Regiment and troops of the "Pattaglione Azzurra Duca D'Aosta" at present attached to Allied Forces, should be employed in an amphibious operation against the Istrian Peninsula with the capture of Trieste as its objective. The operation to be carried out independently or in co-operation with Allied troops.

The points stressed were the desire of the R.I.N. to co-operate more fully in the prosecution of the war; to make the best use of the San Marco troops, who were originally under the R.I.N. and trained in amphibious operations and the traditions of the Regiment itself.

Matters apparently moving too slowly for the Minister's liking, the head of the Counter-Espionage Section of the S.I.S. was sent to Bari to expound the plan to S.O. (Sy) Adriatic Coast. It is not clear why a Counter-Intelligence Officer should be sent to discuss an operational matter with another Counter-Intelligence Officer when it did not concern.

Finally, the head of the S.I.S. practically forced S.S.O. (Sy) Med. into an interview with the Minister. The Minister repeated the details of the proposed operation and expressed his concern at having received no indication that his plan was acceptable or not to the Allied.

The S.I.S. personnel were more honest than the Minister and admitted quite frankly that the main object of Italian participation in the capture of Trieste was to have a greater claim to its retention after the war and also to prevent a possible massacre of Italian civilians should the Yugoslavs arrive at the same time.

Evidence, believed to be genuine, was produced from various sources, including the Bishop of Trieste, pointing to definite fear - probably more personal than patriotic - that Tito's forces might indeed massacre a large proportion of the Italian population on the grounds that they were Republican Fascists, in order that, in the event of a plebiscite, Trieste would go to Yugoslavia.

It is practically certain that the operation was planned, if not conceived by, the S.I.S. Its conception by them is probable but lacking in proof. 94

4. While the events outlined above were taking place, the head of the S.I.S. despatched an agent, an Italian Naval Officer, to Northern Italy.

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4. While the events outlined above were taking place, the head of the S.I.S. despatched an agent, an Italian Naval Officer, to Northern Italy. Contrary to the Amistice terms, the Allies were not informed and it is believed that, had he not been picked up by Allied Controls on his return, the Allies would never have known of his mission.

The brief given to this officer was apparently to contact Republican Naval personalities and prominent industrialists and urge them to do all in their power to save Italian ships, industrial plants and port installations (particularly Trieste) from German sabotage during the retreat.

The two most important contacts were to be the Fascist Republican Minister of Marine, Admiral Sparsani, who was to deal with the prevention of sabotage to ships and port installations, and Captain Buttazoni, C.O. of the San Marco Regiment in Northern Italy, who was to harry the German retreat from Trieste, occupy the town and hold it against the Yugoslavs.

BUTTAZONI does not appear to have been contacted. SPARZANI declared himself to be anti-British but also anti-German and would do all he could to save Italian

- 2 -

shipping. He stated that he would nominally take command in Istria but that he would delegate his command to a Commander ROCCA, whom he trusted implicitly.

Prince MORGHESE, CO.O. of the 10th MAS Flotilla was also contacted. It is stated that this was on the agent's own initiative. This may be true but in view of the close connection between the 10th MAS and the San Marco Regiment, it is possible that this was included in his briefing. MORGHESE, however, refused to have anything to do with the project, declaring that he would fight against the British to the end.

5. During the early part of October and before the activities detailed above came to light, the Minister of Marine submitted for approval, a list of proposed Captains of the Port for the Northern Adriatic Ports. It was found that the proposed senior Captain of the Port of Trieste was a certain ROCCIA LERO. This officer, was in 1943, Assistant Naval Attache in Ankara where he directed the activities of the S.I.S. in Turkey. He is described as a very active intelligence officer. The reason why he is not being employed in Rome at the present time is that he is probably being reserved for a more important post. As even a senior Captain of the Port is only a glorified harbour master at the best of times, and still less important in an Allied controlled port, there is no doubt that this officer, with his S.I.S. background and previous experience in running agents, was intended to perform duties other than those for which he was proposed.

Further, the Commander ROCCA, to whom Admiral SPARZANI proposed delegating his command in Istria after the German withdrawal, is believed to be identical with a Marchese della ROCCA who was a member of the S.I.S. in Turin in 1943.

6. The position may be briefly summarised. First a proposed operation against Trieste involving the R.I.N. and the San Marco Regiment, originating in, or at least planned by, the S.I.S. Secondly, the attempt on the part of the S.I.S. to induce those battalions of the San Marco Regiment fighting against the Allies in Northern Italy to move on Trieste when the time came, thus uniting a Regiment which has always been, to a certain extent, under S.I.S. control. Thirdly the proposed Captain of the Port at Trieste would be a member of the S.I.S. as would be the R.I.N. Commander in Istria.

These items fit together so well that they appear to be a co-ordinated whole which, had everything succeeded, would have placed the S.I.S. in virtual control of Trieste.

A plan such as this could only have been worked out on a very high level and the broad details at least, must have been known to the Minister. It is not within the competence of this Department to decide in how far the Italian Government is involved but it is considered that all available information on this subject should be correlated by the authorities concerned.

5403

SECRET

RWS/dfm

CC 1014

28 December 1944

Subject: Political Developments in Trieste.

To: G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters, AFHQ 512.

There is enclosed herewith copy of a report received
from IALD dealing with recent political developments in Trieste.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Incls.

cc: U.S. Polad
British Remain
Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk

Political Section
Chief of Staff
CC Files

5492

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SECRET

To: B.G.S.(I), 15 Army Group
Admiral Stone, A.C.

No. 0730

From: T.S.L.D. (Major Page),
c/o R.A.A.C.

23 December 1944.

The enclosed reports are from SAND/C, who is in TRIESTE, and who is reported to have presided at the meetings in question.

It is suggested that these reports should be considered together with recent information on the formation of new units of the 10th MAS Flotilla and their departure to the TRIESTE area in order eventually to oppose any attempted coup d'etat by Jugoslavs in the city.

/s/ M Page

Major, R.A.

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Report 1

- I. Three recent meetings of TRIESTE's National Committee of Liberation culminated in the passing of the following resolution:

Re, the VENEZIA GIULIA representatives of the PARTITO D'AZIONE, PARTITO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO, PARTITO LIBERALE DEMOCRATICO and PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO, all members of the VENEZIA GIULIA C.I.N. which at this moment is responsible for the direction and organization of the struggle against the Germans and Fascist in VENEZIA GIULIA, have met in this month of December 1944, at TRIESTE, to discuss the urgent national and economic problems of the region, and have reached complete agreement on the following points:-

1. We are unanimous in our belief in the sacred and inextinguishable principle of Italian unity, a unity which has been achieved in VENEZIA GIULIA by the highest sacrifices and the rightful necessity of which was recognized by the western democracies in the 1914-1918 war of liberation, which closed the cycle of our wars of unification. We consider, therefore, the adherence of VENEZIA GIULIA to ITALY as a definite, basic principle of the well-being of the European comity of nations.
2. We are resolved to remove every obstacle standing in the way of friendly and complete collaboration between Italian and Slav by proposing an arrangement which will dispose of any valid reason for the existence of nationalist movements between the Italian and Slav peoples and enable them to live in a just and equitable harmony, while fully respecting their separate nationalities. This will be a true and concrete application of the four Freedoms proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, drawn up for the New Europe which is arising.
3. We are in favour of the granting of the widest possible autonomy to VENEZIA GIULIA, within the post-war Italian Constitution, for we believe that such an autonomy can be the only solution to the nationalist and economic problems affecting the commercial future of TRIESTE and PORE. This autonomy must be established in accordance with democratic principles and the economic and political requirements peculiar to VENEZIA GIULIA.
4. We propose, therefore:-
 - (a) The administrative autonomy of VENEZIA GIULIA and of its various local communities (Italian, 'comuni'), in the interest of the VENEZIA GIULIA people, who will benefit directly from such measures. This, however, without compromising Italian national unity.
 - (b) The establishment of juridical, cultural and economic equality amongst the citizens of the two different nationalities, with at the same time, the guarantee of the preservation of their respective cultural and language characteristics, thus recognizing the sacred right of peoples to the use of their own language, to the following of their own ideology and to the founding of their

SECRET

- 2 -

own cultural, religious, recreational and economic institutes.

- (c) The co-operation and consorting to the races on a basis which will eliminate all question of minorities and thus enable each people to regard the other as an equal and not as an inferior.

5. It is our conviction that, in the New Europe - freed from all national and imperialistic prejudices which have brought the world to disaster and sealed off nations one from the other behind the absurd and unbenificial barriers of self-sufficient economics and falsely proclaimed rights to Lebensraum - its peoples will overcome all obstacles in the way of the establishment of Free Trade. We consider it, therefore, our especial duty to promote the highest economic and financial development of TRIESTE, which is the natural centre of the VERENA GIULIA region, and whose prosperity is essential to the life and well-being not only of the town's inhabitants but also of those in the whole of an area so poor in natural resources. TRIESTE must become a truly free port, that is a trading centre open to the ships of every nation and governed in administrative and commercial matters by a Port Committee, with proportionate numbers of representatives from the TRIESTE Municipality, the appropriate civil authorities and the industrial and commercial firms of all nationalities concerned in the functioning of the port. In this way all nations using the port of TRIESTE will be sure of every facility for navigation and all possibilities for industrial and commercial enterprise within the TRIESTE area. Merchants of all nations will thus find in an enlightened and democratic ITALY a generous hospitality and complete freedom to participate industrially and commercially in the rapid post-war recovery of Central EUROPE.

6. We urge the people of VERENA GIULIA, and in particular those of TRIESTE, to take the most active interest in their national and economic future. Only by the courageous and generous contribution of all concerned will it be possible to achieve those principles of justice and democracy to which they have the good right to aspire after so many cruel sufferings and so much bitterness and subjugation.

II.

1. At these three meetings of the TRIESTE C.L.N. the Communists were absent, although a seat was kept for them.

2. Amongst other matters the possibilities of organising Italian units to counter-balance existing Slav formations were examined, but the proposal was rejected as impracticable. Instead a motion recommending the organisation of groups of TRIESTE youth was passed unanimously. These groups were to be ready to act at the opportune moment, putting themselves at the disposal of the nuclei of Italian soldiers landing at TRIESTE together with, or before, Allied troops.

3. The members of the C.L.N. beg that such a proposal be ^{Event 3} favourable consideration since they believe it might well alter the situation radically.

4. It was decided to place the organisation of these groups in the hands of a regular army officer and not of a political leader.

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SECRET

Report 3.

1. The position of Italian nationals in the VENEZIA GIULIA region is undoubtedly serious. The conviction is general that the United Nations have agreed to a request from Tito that territories in that area should pass into the Yugoslav sphere of influence. The result is that the majority of Italians in TRIESTE await events in an attitude of complete apathy.
2. Attempts to organize Italian units in the CARSTO area have been opposed by the Slav partisans who have even, on occasions, disarmed units thus formed. Moreover, the lack of food supplies and the co-operation of the people has been a great problem.
3. It is believed certain that the Slav partisans will descend upon the towns in VENEZIA GIULIA the moment the Germans begin to withdraw from the area.

5408

SECRET

Ref: 385.04

13 December 1944

SUBJECT: Studies on Political Situation of Trieste.

TO : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Monsignor Fogar, Archbishop of Trieste, has offered to supply Political Section with a series of studies on the political situation of Trieste with regard to its nationality at the end of the War.

2. The first of these studies, which presupposes that Trieste remain Italian, is transmitted herewith in duplicate.

For the Chief Commissioner:

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice President, Political Section

385.04

5-287

"If Trieste remains Italian, one solution is this:"

THE FREE ZONE OF TRIESTE

When the boundaries of Italy were extended to the Eastern Alps the country beyond Trieste, the Hinterland, found itself without its natural outlet to the sea. The international treaties that followed one another from 1918 until to-day between Italy and the Nations of Central Europe were dictated by the need of a solution of this problem, but the nationalistic antagonisms and the distrust produced by the errors of Versailles made all these praiseworthy efforts useless.

The goal of to-day's victors is to eradicate the errors of Versailles and to instill sincere collaboration among the Peoples.

Only with a loyal, spontaneous, sincere collaboration of peoples can there be the birth of a new Europe capable of fulfilling its continental mission; but the nationalistic organizations, the real causes of the European crisis, will have to sacrifice on their part so that the new political structure may be able to acquire new life in the renovated Continent. If the Nations do not accept such a spirit of sacrifice this immense disaster, cause of infinite suffering, will have scourged in vain so much of Humanity!

If the hopes of to-day will become reality tomorrow, in the great picture of European reconstruction, the problem of Trieste will be if not easy at least less difficult to solve; eminently a European problem, it will reflect, in a positive or negative way, the effects of its solution on the other problems of continental importance.

This brief treatise is meant to remain within its prefixed limits but it must remind of the fact that political aims, however disguised, overcome the historical and technical reasons of the necessary solutions and produce new and imperfect political structures incapable of fulfilling their tasks and that the consequences of these unhappy results will be by far more serious and irremediable than those that came out of the superb salons of Versailles! And neither is out of place to remember the old saying that "man never knew the effects of Novelty", which means that to a new and uncertain thing is preferable an old and sure thing, even if in the novelty one may foresee a better system!

The European problem "TRIESTE" consists in conciliating the rights of a people of 45 million on a territory which belongs to them geographically and historically and which they had acquired at so great a prize (and from whose heroic effort the United Nations of to-day had benefited yesterday as Allied Nations) with the interests of peoples that, for geographic position as well as for necessity of life and breathing space, weighed on Trieste; and in eliminating the frictions produced by the living together of two peoples different from one another and fomented by political situations which in the new European atmosphere must disappear.

A possible solution can be found in the institution of a Free Zone of Trieste, which, for its vast "extraterritoriality" and for the rapidity of its communications, allowed the interested States to progress freely in their trades without harming the interests and, especially, the rights of Italy.

5-26
Necessary prerequisites of the problem present the fixing the boundaries of the

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Necessary prerequisites of the problem present the fixing of the boundaries of the Hinterland and the alliance between Trieste and Fiume.

The boundaries of the Hinterland must arise from the natural geographic and economic gravitation of the peoples on Trieste and be corrected by international conventions only when necessary. They contain roughly the territories of Bavaria, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia (not counting the spheres of influence in Poland and in Rumania).

5-2-46

No expert or student of commercial problems can deny that the commercial destinies of Trieste and Vienna are bound together by the defence that both have to put up against the competition of the ports of Northern Europe and especially of Hamburg. If we divide these forces and, much worse, if we compel them to fight each other, we would succeed only in strengthening the commercial potentialities of the Nordic ports with loss not only to the two Northern Adriatic ports but also to the indispensable commercial balance of trade derived from this very competition between Northern and Southern Europe.

In determining the boundaries of the Free Zone of Trieste it is necessary to bear in mind, as any other international port, all the needs that are necessary for a true and profitable commercial life (and port commerce).

Modern technique has overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable before and has given men new means of speeding his commercial and industrial progress so that a great international port must not suffer any impediment in its complex organization and must have at its service all the modern technical means; thus the necessity for the institution of a vast "extraterritoriality".

The Free Zone of Trieste should start from the region of Monfalcone and go to the region of Muggia as far as Gradisca, S. Pietro del Carso and Krpello. With such boundaries the commercial and industrial life of the great port would enjoy "ample" breathing space: the warehouses would be able to spread out not only over the whole city but also over the high plain near the railroad; the railroad marshalling yards which join the Main Railways would be at the disposal of the internal movement and would make Trieste what it really is: a most important communication center of the international railways which join Bordeaux and Calais with Odessa, Constanta and Constantinople; Hamburg and Odjnia with the East; the shipyards and the industries at the service of an international fleet would give a tremendous increment to aviation which, as subsidiary of the other communications, would have an airframe at Zeule and an airport at the Vallone di Muggia, if new technical improvements could eliminate the inconveniences of the "bora" (wind) which is a little too strong there, because otherwise the place should be chosen in the region of Monfalcone; if the blue-printed navigable canals are built Trieste would be included in the important canal network which disemboque in the vicinity of Monfalcone; Trieste would be joined with the world by the Radio Station and by the underwater telegraphic line already in existence; banking and insurance initiatives would find a terrain favorable for their activities and, united in a solid bloc and supported by the trust of foreign nations, they would see new ways open to their augacity.

The administration of the Free Zone of Trieste should be entrusted to two bodies which, although connected to each other, would maintain their spheres of action free and autonomous; and precisely from the joining of these two freedoms would result the guaranty of loyal observance of the rights and the relative duties. As a maximum guaranty: the League of Nations which could pass final judgements.

Of the two administrative bodies of the Free Zone of Trieste, one would be territorial and the other commercial.

The territorial administration would be assumed by the Commune of Trieste with complete independence on the basis of the historic Free Commune; the international commercial administration by an International Council of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Free Zone of Trieste.

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The Common would be represented by its "Podesta" whose principal tasks would be:

- 1) to maintain observance of the statutory laws of the Free Zone;
- 2) to grant Residence according to regulations and to explain eventual refusals to the International Council;
- 3) to deprive of the right of Residence according to regulations notifying the Council beforehand;
- 4) to accept or to make own reservations in regard to proposals concerning No.3 made by the Council;

5405

- 5) to grant the right of "appurtenance" (pertinenza) to all those born in Trieste at the time of the constitution of the Free Zone, to their parents and to their relatives up to the fourth grade in Trieste on the same date; to those resident there for ten years or more who filed application for it;
- 6) to deprive of the right of "appurtenance" the violators of the law, informing the Council of the action or to take the measures upon suggestion of the Council with own reservations;
- 7) to participate with consultative vote to meetings of the International Council.

Those who held the right of "appurtenance", although maintaining their non-Italian citizenship, would have the right of holding municipal and public offices with the exception of that of "Podesta" for which the Italian citizenship should be required in homage to Italy's sovereignty.

The International Council of the Free Zone of Trieste, besides the specific tasks of the old Chamber, adequate to the new exigencies in the modern statute, would be composed of Representatives of Italy, Switzerland, Bavaria, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and, with consultative vote, of the "Podesta" of the Free Zone of Trieste.

The functions of the Council would be:

- 1) reconstruction of the city, of the port and of the industrial zone with financial participation of the States in proportion to future revenues;
- 2) decisions on commercial and industrial matters and relative investments (always proportional to the income);
- 3) proposals of new projects or suggestions to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the direction of the respective projects;
- 4) objections to the motivations of the "Podesta" in regard to denial or cancellation of Residence and of "Appurtenance" and other similar proposals which it would present to the "Podesta".

The Council would have a president holding office for one year on rotation basis in turn among its members. The "Podesta" and the President, whenever not in agreement, would have the right to appeal to the executive branch of the new League of Nations for a final decision.

A similar organization in Fiume would unite the forces of the two "emporiums" on the basis of a treaty of the States of the Hinterland. The nearby territories which were traditionally the producers for the markets of the two cities would remain the free markets of the two Free Zones.

The peace treaty would provide for the definition of the boundaries of the Free Zones, for the regulation of relations between the Italian sovereignty and the franchise of the Free Zone, for the formality of control, for the necessary freedom of communication in transit for the Hinterland, for the definition of the States of the Hinterland, for the share of participation of the States to the reconstruction of the zone, for the aid and protection of the future League of Nations.

Even in its general lines this project tends to bring about a situation of political and economic reality doing away with all the antagonisms of the

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Even in its general lines this project tends to bring about a situation of political and economic reality going away with all the antagonisms or at least satisfying the rightful and reasonable aspirations. In fact Italy would not loose the boundaries of its unity acquired at so dear a price. Yugoslavia would corrected to her favor the most delicate boundary zone, and, with the recognition of the minorities on the part of Italy, result favorably the position of the Slavs in the "Venezia Giulia"; the States of Central Europe would have again the long waited for outlet to the sea.

5484

H.E. Mons. FOVAR
Archbishop of Trieste

dio della indagine esigibile per la bilancia commerciale di transito derivata proprio dalla concorrenza tra il Sud ed il Nord Europeo.

Nella della situazione la o uffici della Zona Francese di Trieste bisogna, come per qualsiasi altro porto internazionale, tener presenti la necessità che si imponga ad una vera e propria vita portuale e commerciale.

La moderna potenza delle tecniche ha messo ostacoli che prima sembravano insormontabili ed ha fatto muovere mezzi all'uomo per esaltarli in suo lavoro commerciale ed industriale per un grande porto internazionale non deve subire nessun imbalzo nella sua complessa organizzazione e a deve avere al suo servizio tutti i moderni mezzi tecnici; ecco dunque che si impone la costituzione di un'ampia area portuale.

La Zona Francese di Trieste dovrebbe partire dal Montelicone per giungere al Montebello ed attraversare sino a Trieste, e S. Eustachio del Carso ed a Spilimbergo. Con tutti questi uffici la vita commerciale e industriale del grande porto dovrebbe di un unico respiro: i magazzini potrebbero allargarsi non solo per tutte le città ma anche agli stabilimenti nella vicinanza della ferrovia; i servizi ferroviari si cui si innestano le grandi strade terrestri sarebbero a disposizione del movimento interno e farebbero di Trieste, in forza di comunicazioni internazionali, quello che veramente è: un centro di primissima comunicazione ferroviaria internazionale che congiunge Montebello e Trieste, e Trieste, Costanza e Costantinopoli; Anversa e Lilla allo Scivito; i Cantieri e le Industrie, e servizio di una flotta internazionale dovrebbe grande incremento all'aviazione che, quando si parla di le altre comunicazioni, verrebbe a godere di un servizio aeree che si unirebbe al Vallone di Muggia, se più moderni e convenienti tecnici potessero eliminare gli inconvenienti causati dalla troppo forte "borsa", e quindi al rilancio la zona da scagliarsi sarebbe nel Montebello; i servizi e i portuali canali navigabili Trieste verrebbe ad essere insediata nella importanza nuova rete che si farebbe nel suo territorio nei pressi di Montebello; sarebbe collegata col mondo della Stazione Radio e della linea telegrafica subacquea già esistente; l'iniziativa bancaria ad assicurativa, tanto necessaria ad imprese rischiose, troverebbe terreno favorevole alla sua ben nota attività e, giunta in un forte blocco, sostenuta dalla fiducia estera, verrebbe aperte nuove vie alla sua audacia.

L'amministrazione della Zona Francese di Trieste dovrebbe essere esente da due organi che, appena collegati tra loro, manterrebbero libera ed autonoma la loro azione d'azione ed appunto del collegamento di queste due libertà risulterebbe la garanzia della leale osservanza dei diritti e dei relativi doveri. A garanzia massima la società delle Nazioni che regerebbe con giudizio inappellabile.

La burocrazia dell'amministrazione della Zona Francese di Trieste sarebbe una territoriale per la sua competenza inerente al territorio, l'altra commerciale per la sua competenza su tutte le questioni commerciali ed internazionali.

L'amministrazione territoriale verrebbe esente dal Comune di Trieste in piena autonomia sulla base dello storico Comune libero; l'amministrazione commerciale internazionale da un Consiglio internazionale della Zona di Commercio ed Industria della Zona Francese di Trieste.

Il Comune verrebbe rappresentato dal suo antico Podestà i cui compiti principali sarebbero:

- 1) di provvedere all'osservanza delle leggi statutarie della Zona Francese;
- 2) di concedere la Residenza ai richiedenti secondo le stesse norme e modalità di un eventuale ricorso al Consiglio Internazionale;

[illegible]

77 gms. lily:

- la sanzionano:
- 1) di provvedere all'osservanza della legge statutaria della Zona Francese;
- 2) di concedere la residenza ai richiedenti secondo le stesse norme e modalità;
- 3) di togliere la concessione di Residenza secondo la norma statutaria previa motivazione al Consiglio Provinciale;
- 4) di accogliere od opporre le proposte circa le proprietà rinverne citate al n° 3)
- 5) di accordare la Partinensa alla Zona Francese, per diritto, a tutti i natii in Trieste al momento della costituzione della Zona Francese, ed loro ascendenti ed ai loro parenti sino ad 4° grado residenti alla stessa data in Triestesi ed ai loro parenti sino ad 4° grado che ne facciano domanda;
- 6) di togliere la Partinensa ai violatori della legge attivando il provvedimento al Consiglio, o di eseguire tale facoltà su proposta del Consiglio stesso salva la propria riserva;

Two points deserve

7 November 1944

Memo to : Chief Commissioner, A.C.

From : Political Section

1. Colonel Mitchell telephoned from G-5 Section, A.P.H.Q. at 1610 hrs today to say that a paper which you were bringing back from Caserta (No. DG(44) 130 dated November 5), and which should have been brought before the Political Committee today, has been put aside for consideration for another week to permit of a staff study. It concerns Venezia Giulia. AG's recommendations regarding this subject, and the staff study, are to be co-ordinated. In the meantime, it is desired to obtain any information possible concerning negotiations between the two parties mentioned in the paper, (Committee of Liberation and Yugoslavs) and this information is to be sent to AFHQ not later than a day after tomorrow.

2. Colonel Mitchell requested me to confer with Mr. Hopkinson and to attempt to get whatever information I could on developments in this situation, of which, however, until now, I know nothing about.

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT

5480

385.04

Le Frigate rimane
sotto l'Alghero;

una soluzione è
guarita!

Architettura Fogari

H.C.

Jury

Does the house go back
to Embassy or can we keep?

Returned ~~Back to Embassy~~
To C ABC 6/10

Confidential

TOP SECRET

To be returnedHEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION

16 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner, Hq ACC.

I attach two Foreign Office prints (1) about the Italo-Yugoslav frontier (2) about the problem of Trieste. They have been prepared by the research department of the Foreign Office, which as you know is a temporary wartime section staffed by academic authorities on international problems such as ~~Haunt~~, Chatham House, etc.

These memoranda seem to me to contain a lot of material which would be of great interest to Brig. Dunlop for his own confidential information and return. If you agree I will take them to him when I go to Chinciano which I hope will be in a day or two. Would you like to read them through now or have them on return from Brig. Dunlop for more leisured reading?

While these memoranda show what might be done if international problems were in fact approached in a spirit of sweet reasonableness, you will recall that the British Liaison Officer in the Udine area reported in August that "the position is that as long as the war lasts all parties concerned acknowledge Tito's undisputed control of the area east of Gorizia. Absit omen."

HAC

HAC

Thank you. I should like to read these memoranda again after R.C. Reg XII has been returned. The memoranda contain a host of useful data but no workable solution!

Political Section

M8/1715

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Istria
 HEADQUARTERS,
 ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
 C. M. F.

Office of the Chief of Staff
 ++++++

Ref: 210/3/COS.

6th October 1944.

MINUTES OF CHIEF OF STAFF'S MEETING - 6 OCTOBER 1944.

PRESENT:

Brigadier H.S. Lush, Chief of Staff - Chairman.
 Brigadier G.R. Upjohn, DCOS, Civil Affairs Section.
 Mr. A. Antolini, A/DCOS, Economic Section.
 Mr. H. Caccia, Jt V.P., Political Section.
 Mr. Schott, Jt. V.P., Political Section.
 Colonel L.D. Densmore, CSO, Economic Section.
 Colonel Parkin, Ex.Off(A), Establishment Section.
 Colonel R.R. Cripps, CSO, Civil Affairs Section.
 Lt. Colonel G.W.I. Shipp, CSO, Chief of Staff's Section.
 Colonel Wilmer, RLO, Venezia Region.

1. The meeting discussed a letter from Brigadier Dunlop on the administration of the four Eastern Provinces of ISTRIA. The problem before the meeting was whether to use existing machinery of law and order or to impose AMG. This was particularly relevant to the latest speech of Marshal Tito which implied he had every intention of occupying this territory with Yugoslav forces. The Chief of Staff said he proposed to write to AFHQ asking for full information on the area from all sources: he would also draft a questionnaire to be sent to other agencies (SMA, etc). He would also submit to AFHQ proposals of action to be taken, giving Regional Commissioners full discretion to act in the light of conditions found. It was also agreed that Italian officials or Carabinieri should be imported from the mainland. We should set up our own police force, using such suitable personnel as we found there, either Italian or Yugoslav, based on a nucleus of Military Police companies.

Brigadier Upjohn raised the question of printing Proclamations in Slovene. It was decided that this should also be referred to AFHQ, as there might be objections from the point of view of security. It was also open to question whether Serb, Croat and Hungarian translations might not also have to be made, once Italian was departed from. The meeting was in favour of printing the Proclamations only in Italian which was the official and legal language of the country.

Mr. Caccia reported that the civilian population of Pola was said to be in the process of total evacuation.

-2-

The Chief of Staff said that Brigadier Dunlop had asked for an increase of staff. He wanted 12 Legal Officers for the area and 30 Civil Affairs Officers for the 4 Provinces.

2. The Chief of Staff asked Mr. Antolini to restrict demands of returns from the understaffed Regions. The Regional Commissioner, Southern Region had reported that one demand from Transportation Sub-Commission would entail the making of 1000 documents.

3. The final form of Channels of Communication was produced and passed subject to any comment from V.P. Economic Section who would give it further study.

4. A meeting of the Personnel and Organisation Committee was fixed for Tuesday, October 10th at 1500 hours. Establishment Section were asked to obtain final proposals from Sections as to their establishment.

L. W. Shipp
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

<u>DISTRIBUTION:</u>	Chief of Staff	-	1
	Political Section	-	2
	Civil Affairs Section	-	1
	Establishment Section	-	1
	Economic Section	-	1
	File	-	1

5477

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

Ref #385.04

7 October 1944

Dear Office,

We are getting down to serious work on the Istrian situation which I discussed briefly today with General Spofford. He says that you have some current information on that region and I should be delighted if you could afford me what information you have regarding it, particularly with reference to administrative courts and so forth.

All the best to you.

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice-President, Political Section

C. Office, Esquire,
Office of the U. S. Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512.

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HQ AGC APO 394

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10 Sept

JS


DRAFT

Letter to Marchese Venosta from Captain Stone

My dear Marchese Venosta:

With reference to your letter of August 15 I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.


Drafted by Mr. Schott
Political Section
10 Sept 44

5-75

CONFIDENTIAL ?*Political Section*CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY
AUTHORITY OF SACMEDALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

2nd September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy
which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement.

TO : Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

Your memorandum ACC/321 of 19th August 1944.

1. As regards liberated areas on the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy, I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum communicated by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tito on August 13th. This memorandum was subsequently communicated to the Yugoslav Prime Minister as well.
2. You will observe from this document that it is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose and maintain direct military government on all those frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the peace settlement. You should make your plans accordingly.
3. As regards the communication dated August 15th which you received from the Italian Government, it is requested that you should reply in the following sense:-
4. "In view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement".

By command of General WILSON :

/s/ J. A. H. Gammell
/t/ J. A. H. GAMMELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - United States Political Adviser
- 1 - British Resident Minister
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - Addressee

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**C O P Y****TOP SECRET****ANNEXURE TO SAC (44) SPECIAL (5)**
MEMORANDUM

1. In the event of Allied forces occupying Northern ITALY, AUSTRIA or HUNGARY it is the Supreme Allied Commander's intention to impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. This automatically suspends Italian Sovereignty. The Military Governor will be the General Officer Commanding the Allied armies in the area. It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned.
2. This direct Allied Military Government is necessary in order to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central EUROPE.
3. As the Allied forces of occupation will have to be supplied through the Port of TRIESTE, it will be necessary for them to have secure lines of communication protected by British troops on the route through LJUBLJANA - MARIBOR - GRAZ.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander looks to the Yugoslav authorities to co-operate with him in carrying out this policy, and he intends to maintain the closest liaison with them.

5-13

13th August 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: A/CC 321.
808/13/CA.

9th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. I have taken note of your unnumbered direction dated 2nd September with regard to the administration of the compartimento of Venezia Giulia. I should be glad if you would give further direction on the following points:

- (a) Is it the intention that the Italian personnel who now form the bulk of the machinery of local government should be retained and employed by AMG? If not, by whom should they be replaced? You will realise that the numbers will be considerable.
- (b) Is it the intention to open Italian Courts (as well as AMG Courts)? You will realise that failure to do so will increase very materially the number of officers required for AMG courts.
- (c) Is it the intention to employ Italian Carabinieri for purposes of public safety? If not, by whom should they be replaced?

2. It will be, of course, appreciated that unless use is made of existing Italian Government machinery found in these provinces the local government will be extremely difficult to maintain. It will also be appreciated that the retention of Italian officials will be deeply resented by the Yugoslavs who will see in AMG a continuance of Italian rule.

3. I should be glad of an immediate reply.

4. Meanwhile I have notified the Italian Government as requested in paragraph 3, of your direction.

5472

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
/t/ ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5, AFHQ

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

7 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner
Political Section

1. I enclose for your information copy of a letter dated 2nd September from General Gammell, dealing with Military Government of the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy. The copy of the memorandum from SACMED to Marshal Tito dated August 13th was not enclosed as stated and we have telegraphed for it.

2. In the meantime, the Executive Commissioner will please implement paragraph 2 by necessary instructions to Brigadier Dunlop.

3. The Political Section ^{will} kindly draft for my signature a letter to implement paragraph 4 of the enclosed.



ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
as per para 1 above

TOP SECRET

5471
FILES A-B


TOP SECRETCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY
AUTHORITY OF SACMED**C O P Y**ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

2nd September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy
which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement.

TO : Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

Your memorandum ACC/321 of 19th August 1944.

1. As regards liberated areas on the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy, I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum communicated by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tito on August 13th. This memorandum was subsequently communicated to the Yugoslav Prime Minister as well.
2. You will observe from this document that it is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose and maintain direct military government on all those frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the peace settlement. You should make your plans accordingly.
3. As regards the communication dated August 15th which you received from the Italian Government, it is requested that you should reply in the following sense :-
4. "In view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement".

By command of General WILSON :

/s/ J. A. H. Gambrell
/t/ J. A. H. GAMBRELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

5470

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - United States Political Advisor
- 1 - British Resident Minister
- 1 - G-5
- 2 - Addressee

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY
AUTHORITY OF SACMED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Chief of Staff

2nd September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy
which may be in dispute at the time of the French Settlement.

TO : Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

Your memorandum ACC/321 of 19th August 1944.

1. As regards liberated areas on the norther and north-eastern frontiers of Italy, I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum communicated by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tito on August 13th. This memorandum was subsequently communicated to the Yugoslav Prime Minister as well.
2. You will observe from this document that it is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose and maintain direct military government on all those frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the peace settlement. You should make your plans accordingly.
3. As regards the communication dated August 15th which you received from the Italian Government, it is requested that you should reply in the following sense:
4. "In view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement".

By command of General WILSON:

DISTRIBUTION

1 - United States Political Adviser
1 - British Resident
1 - G-5
2 - Addressee

/s/ J.A.H. Gammell
/t/ J.A.H. GAMMELL
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

5463

TOP SECRET

Office of the Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean.

26th August, 1944.

TOP SECRET
9/150/1

My dear Harold,

Your file A/CC 321 deals with the administration of provinces on the boundaries of Italy and Ellery Stone has requested a ruling on this matter from A.P.H.Q.

Going to the demands of the tourist season it will not be possible for the Political Committee formally to settle this question until the middle of next week but I can give you advance information to the effect that Tito has been told that it is the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose Allied Military Government in all those areas which were under Italian rule at the outbreak of war, i.e. up to the 1939 frontiers of Italy, and to maintain under direct Allied administration all areas which may be in dispute until their disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned. The State Department have expressed their full agreement with this policy.

Pending the arrival of the formal communication to Stone, I hope this may be of some use as unofficial guidance to your planners.

Yours ever

Rybak

Roger Makins.

Bryghurst

What do you think we should

Suggest to A.P.H.Q. this area is - the

area between the 1918 & 39 frontiers?

H. A. Gaccio, Esq.,
Political Section,
Allied Control Commission.

✓ or even further west?

HA 3118

HCB/cfe

19 August 1944

A/C 321

MEMORANDUM TO: D-5, Allied Force Headquarters, AF 512
 British Resident Minister
 U. S. Political Advisor

1. In my memorandum A/C 321 of the 26th July I requested a ruling as regards the policy to be pursued over the administration of provinces on the boundaries of Italy, and I pointed out the danger that unfortunate incidents were most likely to occur in those provinces which lie towards the Italy-Yugoslav frontier of 1939.

2. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has now sent me a letter, of which I enclose a copy, drawing attention to this danger in Venezia Giulia. I shall be glad, therefore, if the ruling requested in my previous memorandum may be expedited and if at the same time I may be authorized to make such communication to the Italian Government regarding Allied intentions in this matter. Meanwhile I have acknowledged H.B.'s letter and said that he may rest assured that this is a matter of which the Allied authorities will not lose sight.

3. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to H.B.S.(Ops), AAF advanced as well as to Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Alexander Kirk.

W. H. Stue
 W. H. STUE
 Captain, USMC
 Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Enc: Copy of translation of
 letter no. 1/236 of 15 Aug 44
 from Under-Sec'y for Foreign Affairs

cc: H.B.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Adv
 Mr. Alexander Kirk
 Sir Noel Charles
 Political Section
 Files A - B

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
 Date - Time 20 Aug 1015
 Via 14 9 Mgr.
 Initials RRR

5467

HWS/dfo

A/CC 321

19 August 1944

My dear Marchese Venosta:

I am writing to acknowledge your letter L/236 of the 15th August in which you draw attention to the possibility of unfortunate incidents when Venezia Giulia is liberated. I have not failed to pass on what you said to the proper quarter but in the meantime you may be sure that this is a matter of which the Allied authorities concerned have not lost sight.

Yours very truly,

ELIJAH W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government

cc: Political Sec.

54 328

Hq ACC	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date Time 20 Aug 1944	
Via Hq	
Initials JCR	

5466

56858
He

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Public Order -"Venezia Giulia"

FILE No. A/CC 250.1

18 August 1944

TO: 1. Political Section)
: IN TURN
2. RC & MG Section)

1. Reference attached letter No. 1/236 from Visconti Venosta, dated 15 Aug 44 relative to the possibility that at the moment when the "Venezia Giulia" is liberated conflicts may break out *with Yugo Slav forces.*

2. Request your comments as to appropriate action and reply to be made.

3. Since reference has not been acknowledged, may this matter be expedited?

Incl-
as in para 1 above.

Stone

Euy

5465

C O P Y

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Rome, August 15th, 1944

No. 1/235

Dear Admiral,

The present military achievements, so glorious for the Nations that together are fighting against Germany, lead to believe that the day, when all the invaded lands will finally be liberated, is not too far away.

The Italian Government is very concerned regarding the possibility that at the moment when the "Fenestella Giulia" will be liberated, conflicts may break out between armed bands and peaceful citizens, causing bloodshed in the towns and villages of a region that already has been sorely tried.

In order to avoid the possibility of violence and slaughter we consider it our duty to draw the attention of the Allied Governments on such painful eventuality, so that whatever measures may be deemed suitable shall be taken in useful time.

The Italian Government is inspired by a sense of high human solidarity, by the desire to avoid violence and disorder as well as to prevent fresh reasons of antagonism and grievance amongst populations which in future should, in their own interest and in that of European peace, forget ancient strife and knit ties of fruitful cooperation.

etc. etc. etc.

/s/ VIACCINI VENEZIA

Admiral Hilary E. Stone, U.S.N.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
ITALY

5464

C O P Y

COPY

EWS/afe

A/CC 324

28 July 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
British Resident Minister
U. S. Political Adviser

1. In order that A.C.C. may issue the appropriate instructions to the A.M.G. officers concerned we shall be grateful for guidance on what provinces should be included within ACC/AMG administration on the boundaries of Italy.

2. In the case of those areas which abut on France, Switzerland and Austria, we should be glad to know whether the provinces which ACC/AMG must be prepared to administer should include all those territories up to the frontier of Italy as drawn in 1939.

3. Those provinces which lie towards the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939 present what seems likely to be a more immediate and more difficult problem. There is already indication that Yugoslav forces under the control of General Tito are preparing to make a bid at the earliest possible moment to take over certain areas to the West of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939. In such circumstances various possibilities are open:

a. Allied authorities might insist that until a peace treaty has been drawn up, it is the duty of Allied military government to function in all those territories which were under Italian sovereignty at the time of the Italian declaration of war.

b. At the other extreme Allied authorities might be prepared to accept as a purely temporary and provisional arrangement Yugoslav military government over those Italian territories which Yugoslav forces had already occupied and were controlling at the time that contact was made between Allied forces and Marshal Tito's forces.

c. Various other courses could be followed, such as de facto acceptance of the Italian Eastern boundary as it existed before 1918 or negotiation with the Yugoslavian Government, or Marshal Tito as its military commander in the field, of some other arbitrary line accepted for reasons of practical convenience but without any commitment insofar as the future boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy was concerned.

4. It will be appreciated that unless some clear ruling is given on the policy to be pursued, unfortunate incidents and complications between

5463

A/CC 321, 28 Jul 44, to G-5 AFHQ (continued):

Allied authorities and the Yugoslav forces are likely to occur. We should therefore be grateful for the earliest possible instructions on this point so that the appropriate orders can be issued to all Allied officers concerned.

5. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to B.G.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Advanced, as well as to Mr. Alexander Kirk and Sir Noel Charles.

EMERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: B.G.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Adv
Mr. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles

in P. L. file

COPY

5462

COPY

Magistrati's Telegram No. 102 dated April 13 for
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

The Royal Charge d'Affaires to the Holy See has communicated that he has been approached by outstanding personages from Venezia Giulia with the request that their strong concern regarding the situation which might arise in the case of the withdrawal of the Germans be communicated to you. They desire to inform Your Excellency that, since they fear actions by Slav partisans against Italian population, the timely arrival of Anglo-American units on the Adriatic littoral could possibly give the necessary protection, especially in the ports of Trieste and Piuma.

5461

H.C.W.S. - This man wanted an interview & I suggested an interview first & in case anybody interested we would make an appointment

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

appointment

RIC

*Nothing was.
Suggest files was*

28 August 1944

Many thanks but

NOT ME JAC 29/18

Miss Ruth Keller, Political Section.

Dear Miss Keller,

With reference to our conversation a few days ago, I am sending you the document on Fiume &c. which Dott. Frigessi has sent to me for transmission.

On the merits of the subject, or of his paper, I am not competent to say anything. I can say, however, that Dott. Frigessi is not a crank. He, and his father, the late Adolfo de Frygessy, have been described by Washington as the "brain-trusters" of Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà, the second largest insurance corporation in Italy; and certainly the most respected. The present Frigessi was President of the Company until 1938 and has since been General Manager.

From what we know of Frigessi (and it is not a little) I feel that if an Italian opinion on the subject in question is needed, it would be difficult to find a better qualified man to give one.

We have as yet no Security report on him (one has been asked for) but our own opinion is that he is safe. If further information on his credentials is needed, perhaps you will let me know.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

8-60

304
H. M. SEVERN
MAJOR R. A.

*? of possible interest to
Capt. Stone
Sir Noel Charles
Mr. Kelt*

DOTT. ARNOLDO FRIGESSI DI RATTAL
DIRETTORE GENERALE
DELLA RIUNIONE ADRIATICA DI SICURTÀ

Rome August the 26th 1944

To : Headquarter Allied Control Commission

In these days, being very near the end of the war, any problem connected with peace become of preminent interest.

So I take the liberty to present, by the attached Memorandum, a contribute to the solution of the special problem that in the italian side will be of peculiar importance and of more difficult solution, that is italian-yugoslavian relationship in reference to the ports of Trieste and Fiume.

Born in Trieste and having always followed political and economic life of the italian and yugoslavian frontier's regions, I think that my proposal's scheme may be useful to the requested pacification between Italy and Yugoslavia.

I beg to will consider, at present, my contribution to the solution of the problem, as confidential.

Please accept my best regards

Yours sincerely



5459

One of the most important problems to be settled at the end of present war, in the interest of a general European pacification and of an indispensable international collaboration, will be the delimitation of frontiers between States. More difficult will be, said settlement, in those zones where population of different nationalities is living mixed.

For which concerns Italy abovesaid problem assumes a special importance for the oriental boundaries; that is frontier of Venezia Giulia. In that zone Italy's national, economic and cultural interests have to be settled with a spirit of conciliation and pacification with the neighbour Yugoslaves. So it would be necessary to find a concrete settlement of Italian and Yugoslave interests in aforesaid zone, in concert with the general peace directives.

The central problem is constituted by the necessity to delimit, in one side, sovereignty of Italy and Yugoslavia on that territory, and on the other side by the presence in both territories, under Italian and Yugoslavian sovereignty, of minorities; and by the commercial traffic connected with the two important ports of Trieste and Fiume and their interland.

The following solution, traced in general lines, will be not only in the mutual interest of both States - Italy and Yugoslavia, but also in the interest of the States of European and Balkanic interland, interested to the abovesaid ports.

1) Being inevitable some rectification of present frontiers, it would be necessary to establish two zones or frontier regions ("marche di frontiera") strictly connected with the interests of the two ports - Trieste and Fiume -. Aforesaid regions will be free zones ("zone franche") but at the same time put under full sovereignty respectively of Italy and Yugoslavia, with special guarantees in the political and economic and perhaps also in the military fields, explained as follows.

Frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia would be fixed (in a very general way) as follows: a line that leaving Fiume to Yugoslavia and Abruzzo to

2.

Italy, leaving the rail road Fiume-Pietro del Cargo to Yugoslavia, follows the northern side of the Vipacco valley, with Idria, Selva di Tarnovq, Monte Santo and Gorizia to Italy, reaches the Isonzo river north of Gorizia, and finally follows the western side of the Isonzo valley that with its population entirely slave on the north of Gorizia, will be put under yugoslavian sovereignty.

Italian free frontier region will comprehend what remains to Italy southern of said line Abbazia-Gorizia, to the west about till the old italo-austrian frontier (that is the line GORMONS=CERVIGNANO=GRADO) and the island of Lussino, that is the zone of provinces of Istria, Trieste and Gorizia, ~~where~~ where slave minorities are living.

Yugoslavian frontier region will comprehend besides Fiume and Sussak, the yugoslavian coast-line east of Fiume along the Quarnero with the Quarnero islands and the surrounding zones including all the important railroads and roads communications between Trieste and Fiume.

2) - Notwithstanding the full sovereignty of both States on the two frontier regions, the Administration of the two ports, Trieste and Fiume, would be put under two different administrations, but connected one with the other. In each of these administrations have to be represented besides the representatives of the sovereign State, ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{local} government of the frontier region, ^{and} the representatives of the towns and of the economic and trade boards respectively of Trieste and Fiume, the representatives of the other sovereign State and the other frontier region together with the representatives of all the States of the interland of both ports (that is representatives of Austria, Hungary, Cecoslovakia, Bayern and of other independent States that will have interest on the two ports).

3.

The two distinct Administrations will have in common a liaison Committee and the same chairman, a British, with a vice president, for each Administration, representative of the sovereign state. The British chairman will reside in Trieste.

The parallelism, the common chairman of a great nation equally friend to the two peoples, and the liaison of the Administrations of the two ports, surrounded by two free regions, will avoid any concurrence between the two ports beyond the normal and useful limits, and convey, through the influence of all interested parties the most possible traffic to the two ports, making easier the growing up of the commercial fleets and the railroad traffic of the two countries, contributing also in the economic field to the Italian-Yugoslavian collaboration and pacification. The structure of these frontier regions as free zones with free and easy communications between their inhabitants and their trade will also facilitate all problems connected with the settlement of frontiers between the two States.

Powers, tasks and duties of these special ports' Administrations and their liaison Committee have to be studied in full details.

3) - With the creation of abovesaid two free frontier regions put in a juridical parallelism, it would be possible to reach also a settlement of the grave and menacing problem of the minorities living in both territories under respectively, Italian and Yugoslavian sovereignty, because it will be automatically created, by free and easy communications between the two zones, parallelism of conditions and of guarantees for the respective minorities living in each territory.

Guarantees of said minorities (including minorities in Dalmatia) would be established in a special agreement and put under the control of a high British commissioner, resident on the spot in Trieste

4.

or Fiume.

Aforesaid ^{of} guarantees will assure, in the future the maintaining of good relationship between Italy and Yugoslavia, and at the meantime the special characteristics connected with the two frontier regions will give the possibility to their population of free movement inside both zones, being familiar, cultural and commercial interests of said population connected with both zones.

This settlement although maintaining the sovereignty of two countries, but putting administration of the two ports under an institution of international character, with a British chairman, and connecting all the interests of the interband's States, granting to the two regions the privilege of free zones with a serious guarantee to the minority of both people living under the sovereignty of the other State, may contribute in the best way to the durable pacification and friendship between Italy and Yugoslavia.

In order to avoid that possible conflicts, amongst the two populations of frontier regions, will produce, at the last moment, difficulties to the pacific solution of abovesaid problem, it would be necessary that the two regions will be occupied ^{by} allied troops till the peace conclusion.

5-15

SECRET

ECS/bd

A/OC 321-1

22 September 1944

Subject: Administration of Areas Which May be in Dispute at the Time of the Peace Settlement

To: Allied Force Headquarters
(Attn: Lieut. General J.A.H. Gansell, Chief of Staff)

I attach for your information copies of correspondence relative to the above subject and subsequent to your directive to this headquarters dated 2 September 1944.

- (1) Letter written in the light of your directive to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (A/OC 321 of 11 Sept 44).
- (2) Translation of reply received from the President of the Council of Ministers (M. 1/555 of 16 Sept 44).
- (3) Acknowledgment of (2) above (A/OC 321-1 of 22 Sept 44).

385.04

ELBERT R. STONE
Captain, USAF
Acting Chief Commissioner

3 Incls:
as listed above

cc: British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
G-5 Section, AFHQ
British High Commissioner
U.S. Representative to Advisory Council
Political Section ←

A 311

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.	
DISPATCHED	
Date-Time	23 SEP 1944
Via	AK 1130
Initials	W

5454

SECRET

EWS/hjp

A/GC 301

11 September 1944

My dear Marchese Venosta:

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.

Yours very truly,

ELLEN W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta,
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Italian Government.

5453

C O P YROUGH TRANSLATION

Il Presidente del Consiglio
dei Ministri

Rome, 16 September, 1944

N. 1/555

Dear Admiral,

I have taken due notice of your letter dated 11th inst. (A/CC 321), addressed to the under Secretary of State, Marchese Visconti Venosta, wherein you state that, owing the military necessities, it is the intention of the Allied High Command to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

I earnestly hope that at the moment of the withdrawal of the enemy troops from Venetia Julia all measures planned by the Allied High Command will be applied with all the necessary speed in order to avoid that to the many disasters already experienced by the Italian people, others might be added, just in the hour of total liberation of the Country and of ultimate victory, in the form of fresh acts of violence and destruction, which would give rise not only to renewed sufferings but also to feelings of rancour and disaffection.

As you have mentioned frontier questions, I am glad of this opportunity to inform you that the Government I have the honour to Preside, inspiring their foreign policy as well as their internal policy to those principles of freedom and democracy that are the very reason of the common fight, consider that only a direct understanding between the Italian and Yugoslav people can ensure the re-establishment of a veritable atmosphere of peace between the two Nations, eliminating for all times any reason of disagreement.

Believe me, dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

sgd IVANOK BUDONI

Admiral Ellery T. Stone
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

R C M A

5452

HHS/MS

A/CG 322-1

22 September 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I thank you for your letter N 1/555 of 16 September.

The point you make, stressing the need for such measures as will ensure stability and peacefulness in Venezia Giulia on the withdrawal of the enemy, is being brought to the notice of the Supreme Allied Commander--as is also the contents of your last paragraph referring to the re-establishment of a peaceful atmosphere between your own country and that of Yugoslavia.

Yours very truly,

WILEY V. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government

cc: G/S AFHQ
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Advisor
G-5 Section, AFHQ
British High Commissioner
U.S. Representative, Advisory Council
Political Section

A 31 L

Hq. A.C.G. Sec'y Genl.	
DISPATCHED	
Date-Time	23 SEP 1944
Via	my 1130
Initials	cr

551

*Yugoslav Frontier**Re: return to RK**HC*

April 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

You may recall that at the April 8 meeting of the Advisory Council the Yugoslav delegate spoke of the claims which his Government had put forward concerning territorial re-adjustments along the Yugoslav frontier.

He has given me a copy of the formal communication made by his Government to the Governments of the U. S., Great Britain, and U.S.S.R., together with a copy of the reply of the British Government. You may wish to have a look at these papers. Could I please have them back when you have finished.

SR
*S.R.**W. R. Rhee**Thank you**Wm. R. Rhee*

5450

COPY

FOREIGN OFFICE

S.W. I

13th August 1943

N) R.6770/2191/92

My dear Chargé d'Affaires

I thank you for your letter P. 4192 of the 23rd July in which you were good enough to put forward on behalf of the Yugoslav Government certain territorial claims against the Kingdom of Italy.

His Majesty's Government have taken note of these claims and will certainly bear them in mind when the time comes for the future settlement of Europe at the Peace Conference. They remain of the opinion, however, that it is premature to discuss frontier questions at present when the war is still going on.

With regard to the concluding paragraph of your letter, I can assure you that when the war with Italy is over, every effort will be made by His Majesty's Government to safeguard the welfare and interests of the Yugoslav population of Italy.

Yours sincerely,

Antony Eden.

Monsieur Vladimir Milanovitch.

26 July 1943

P. No. 4192

My dear Ambassador:

I should be very grateful to you if you would kindly bring the following to the notice of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, (of His Britannic Majesty, and the United States of America.)

The Royal Government have the deep conviction that the victory of the United Nations will result not only in the full restoration of the independence and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia but also in the liberation and reunion of all the Yugoslavs within the boundary of their national state.

When the opportunity arises, the Yugoslav Government will have the honor to submit for the consideration of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics their views concerning

396

I thank you for your letter of 4 July 1943 in which you were good enough to put forward on behalf of the Yugoslav Government certain territorial claims against the Kingdom of Italy.

His Majesty's Government have taken note of these claims and will certainly bear them in mind when the time comes for the future settlement of Europe at the Peace Conference. They remain of the opinion, however, that it is premature to discuss frontier questions at present when the war is still going on.

With regard to the concluding paragraph of your letter, I can assure you that when the war with Italy is over, every effort will be made by His Majesty's Government to safeguard the welfare and interests of the Yugoslav population of Italy.

Yours sincerely,

Antony Eden.

Monsieur Vladimir Milanovitch.

26 July 1943

P. No. 4192

My dear Ambassador:

I should be very grateful to you if you would kindly bring the following to the notice of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, (of His Britannic Majesty, and the United States of America.)

The Royal Government have the deep conviction that the victory of the United Nations will result not only in the full restoration of the independence and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia but also in the liberation and reunion of all the Yugoslavs within the boundary of their national state.

When the opportunity arises, the Yugoslav Government will have the honor to submit for the consideration of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics their views concerning those territorial questions in which vital Yugoslav interests are involved. For the time being, in view of present developments in the Mediterranean, they feel obliged to present their just claims against the Kingdom of Italy.

It is well known that after the last war no equitable frontiers could be established between Yugoslavia, then the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Italy.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came to the Peace Conference with the natural claim that all territories inhabited by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes should be free from foreign rule and reunited in one national state. Unfortunately, it was impossible for the Kingdom to secure support to this end

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from all the Allied and friendly Great Powers, as some of them had incurred certain obligations towards Italy by the Treaty of London of the 26th April, 1915 - which was concluded without the knowledge either of the Government of Allied Serbia or of the Yugoslav Committee, and also without consideration for the feelings of the Yugoslav people as a whole, still less for the right of self-determination of the population concerned.

Finding itself in such a position and desiring at the same time to contribute to the settlement of European affairs, the Yugoslav State agreed to sacrifice some of its most legitimate rights and most vital interests. By the treaties concluded between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Italy, on the 12th November, 1920, at Rapallo and on the 27th January, 1924, in Rome, Italian rule was established over more than 600,000 Slovenes and Croats, living in compact masses on a territory which forms a single ethnic economic and geographical unit with the rest of the Yugoslav territory - in addition to more than 60,000 Resian (Venetian) Slovenes handed over to Italy by Austria in 1867.

Thus a large part of the Yugoslav people (besides a small number of Serbs and a very large number of Croats, about a fourth part of the whole Slovene population) inhabiting those regions since the 19th century came under Italian domination. It was expected that Italy would secure to the Yugoslav population a free and equal national, cultural and economic development; all the more so as Italy had assumed definite moral and juridical obligations both in solemn public statements by the King of Italy and his responsible ministers, and in the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations, dated the 21st September, 1922 "that the States which are not bound in regard to the League of Nations by any legal obligations towards minorities will nevertheless in the treatment of their racial, religious, or linguistic minorities observe at least the same degree of justice as that demanded by the Treaties and in the permanent action of the Council." Italy, however, has even before the advent of Fascism started a systematic policy of the most brutal Italianization of the Yugoslav minority. The sad results of such a policy are the entire destruction of the Yugoslav minority in Italy. As a matter of example, it is worth mentioning that, of the more than 500 Slovene and Croat schools existing on their territory in 1913, the last was closed down many years ago, and that the Yugoslav population has been prevented, by extremely violent methods, from using their own language, even in the churches.

The part of the Kingdom of Italy which is inhabited by a Yugoslav population never fulfilled the conditions necessary to form one economic whole with the Appennine Peninsula, that is, the Italian ethnic area.

Despite all the efforts made in this respect, Italy did not succeed in overcoming the difficulties necessarily resulting from such a geographical position. Both Trieste (Trieste) and Rijeka (Fiume) remain the natural economic outlets of, firstly, their purely Yugoslav hinterland, and secondly, their wider Central-European hinterland. Zadar (Zara) and the islands of the Adriatic

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Italy claimed these Yugoslav territories also for reasons of strategy and defence, probably with Germany in mind. It has,

however, been demonstrated that Italy used these very territories in order, in collusion with Germany, to enlarge her territories and her political influence in the Balkans and in the Danubian Basin. These intentions of hers clearly manifested themselves whenever she concluded political and economic agreements with States in the Danubian Basin and in the Balkans. Her aims became quite obvious when, by the occupation of Albania, she established a further foothold in the Balcan Peninsula.

An exclusive military and economic mastery of the Adriatic represented, in the eyes of those directing the destinies of Italy, an indispensable preliminary condition for the realization of her ultimate imperialistic aims which, as were so often publicly declared, even by members of the Italian Government, were directed at the entire domination of the whole of the Mediterranean. Yugoslavia, standing in the way of both the German and the Italian expansion, was an obstacle which had to be removed at any price.

All this, in the opinion of the Royal Yugoslav Government, clearly demonstrates that every trace of Italian domination should be entirely and finally eliminated from the western coast of the Balkan Peninsula, including all the islands, which ethnically belong exclusively to Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, and Italian rule restricted to the purely Italian ethnic area.

The necessary conditions for the establishment of a truly lasting peace in this part of Europe can only materialize if Italy is not permitted to retain under her control even the smallest piece of territory in the Balkans, as this would inevitably be used only as a base for her further expansion.

The Royal Hellenic Government are in full agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government that Italy must be made to withdraw entirely from the Balkans.

The natural geographical and economic frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia coincides almost entirely with ethnical frontiers existing for centuries between these two neighboring peoples.

The Royal Yugoslav Government therefore desires to define where the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia should be established.

This boundary line ought to run from Pontafel (Pontebba) towards the south, along the former Austro-Italian frontier to Mount Kanin, where it would turn towards the west in order to include the region inhabited by the Resian (Venetian) Slovenes. North of Krmin (Cormons) this new boundary would again reach the former Austro-Italian frontier and, in general, follow it down to the coast. Wherever it should prove necessary to resort to local corrections of the proposed line for economic, communicational or topographic reasons, the Royal Yugoslav Government trusts that these corrections would not be made at the expense of Yugoslav interests.

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On the territory which would, after the frontiers have thus been established, become a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the majority of the population is of Yugoslav, i.e., of Slovene and Croat race and speech. The Yugoslav character of these regions is obvious, especially outside the towns, as the rural communities in the provinces of Trieste and Gorica (Gorizia) are, as a rule, wholly and exclusively Yugoslav. In the province of Istra

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(Istria) the situation is analogous, with very slight exceptions. The Italian element lives almost entirely in the towns, mixed with the Yugoslav element, and represents small ethnic islets without a natural link with the Italian ethnic area. If the fact is considered that a great part of the present Italian element is of Yugoslav origin - one of the proofs of this being their actual slavonic names - which has in the course of generations gradually been denationalized in the towns, where both the local administration and the economic power were in the hands of Italians; and if it is further remembered that e.g. in Trieste there lived in Austrian times about 60,000 Italian citizens, immigrants from the Appennine Peninsula, that this number is today at least twice as great, and that tens of thousands of Slovenes and Croats were compelled by the Italian terror to take refuge in Yugoslavia or else to emigrate overseas - only then can the justified ethnical claims of Yugoslavia to all those regions inseparably linked together be fully appreciated.

The Royal Yugoslav Government feel themselves obliged to explain at this juncture to the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics what the Yugoslav nation expects from the common victory over Italy. These claims are justified, as has been set out above, both from the geographical and economic and particularly from the ethnic point of view. It would be all the more equitable to satisfy these claims of the Yugoslavs, and the entry of Yugoslavia into the war on the side of the Allies and against Italy was not the result of bargaining, as was the entry of Italy into the last World War, but was the result of her spontaneous decision to contribute her share to the establishment of a better order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and security. The Yugoslav people have already made enormous sacrifices and are still suffering unheard-of ordeals. It would be difficult to conceive that the common victory should not bring to all the Yugoslavs deliverance from the foreign yoke.

The determined wish of all the Yugoslavs living at present under Italian rule to revert to their national State, Yugoslavia, manifested itself in a whole series of acts committed in the period between the two wars, and has become self-evident now that the guerilla warfare, waged by the Yugoslavs regardless of all sacrifices has spread also to these regions, resulting in the wholesale destruction of entire communities and in the deportation of many thousands of Yugoslavs, Italian citizens, into Italy proper. Those Yugoslavs who, as Italian soldiers, have been made prisoners of war in Africa, in volunteering to join the Yugoslav forces, express most eloquently the will of this people to liberate themselves from Italian servitude.

The Royal Yugoslav Government consider it of the highest importance that the future Treaty of Armistice with Italy should contain a clause providing for the immediate evacuation by all the Italian military and civil authorities of all the territories east of the proposed boundary line and that these should without delay be handed over to Yugoslav or, in their absence, provisionally to allied authorities, as the Italian authorities have done in the past.

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I have the honor to remain,
Yours sincerely,

Milan Grol c.p.

