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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Food Rationing In Italy - General
Oct. 1944 - Feb. 1945

TOP SECRET

SAC (P) (44) 155
17th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

W 542

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33
COPY NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The Supreme Allied Commander has directed (Conclusion 3(c) of PC (44) 35th Meeting) that G-5 prepare for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local amassment.
2. On 13th December the Chief Administrative Officer held a meeting, a record of which is contained in paper No. PC (44) 152. It will be observed that at Conclusion (a) of the record of this meeting G-5 were directed to prepare a telegram to the Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY. A draft telegram has been prepared and coordinated with the appropriate authorities. A copy of this draft telegram is attached.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested :
 - (a) To authorize the despatch of the attached draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
 - (b) To direct that in the event of an unfavourable reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff G-5, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, prepare for his approval a further telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending,
 - (i) the introduction of a reduced uniform bread ration throughout ITALY,
 - (ii) the terms of a statement for issue jointly by the United States and British Governments explaining the reasons which necessitated the introduction of the reduced uniform scale.
 - (c) To endorse Conclusion (b) of the meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on 13th December to the effect that the Allied Commission be directed to draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945, but to defer any action to implement such plans for the present.

to General
J.H. LASCELLES,

1. The Supreme Allied Commander has directed (Conclusion 3(a) of PS (44) 35th Meeting) that G-5 prepare for his or reveal a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local amassment.

2. On 13th December the Chief Administrative Officer held a meeting, a record of which is contained in paper No. PC (44) 158. It will be observed that at Conclusion (a) of the record of this meeting G-5 were directed to prepare a telegram to the Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 grammar ration throughout liberated Italy. A draft telegram has been prepared and coordinated with the appropriate authorities. A copy of this draft telegram is attached.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested:

(a) To authorise the despatch of the attached draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) To direct that in the event of an unfavorable reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff G-5, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, prepare for his approval a further telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending,

(ii) the introduction of a reduced uniform bread ration throughout ITALY,

(ii) the terms of a statement for issue jointly by the United States and British Governments explaining the reasons which necessitated the introduction of the reduced uniform scale.

(c) To endorse Conclusion (b) of the meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on 13th December to the effect that the Allied Commission be directed to draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 16th January 1945, but to defer any action to implement such plans for the present.

W. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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 : BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :

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DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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British Resident Minister
Director, F/B
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & FS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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3-4
5-12
13-14
15
16
17
18-20
21-24
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27-29
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31-33
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36-37
38-39
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42
43-45
46-50

1538

Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, P&B
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Spares

13-14
15
16
17
18-20
21-24
25
26
27-29
30
31-33
34
35
36-37
38-39
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41
42
43-45
46-50

390

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DRAFT CABLE

R 542

TO: CGS personal from Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander (repeated to the President and the Prime Minister respectively through State Department and Foreign Office channels).

1. This is a personal and urgent request to you for a firm and final statement of the policy of our two Governments on the provision of bread for the population of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA, supported by a firm and final guarantee of the means to implement that policy month by month over minimum periods of not less than six months. This request has the complete support of my political and economic advisers.
2. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has always been to allot sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in ITALY a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognised as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in FRANCE and GREECE; it is lower than that in N.W. Europe as a whole. The matter is, therefore, not one of preferential treatment for ITALY; it is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in ITALY necessary for the continuance of military operations.
3. As you have been advised, it has been our constant endeavour to raise the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of ITALY. We have proved that there is always a discrepancy between what it is theoretically possible to amass for controlled distribution, and what is in fact, amassed and available for this purpose. This is no new problem and is always most acute in peasant-populated countries with weak local administration. We cannot hope within measurable time to correct it. It is therefore idle to discuss further the use of grain which for controlled distribution in support of

tion of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA, supported by a firm and final guarantee of the means to implement that policy month by month over minimum periods of not less than six months. This request has the complete support of my political and economic advisers.

2. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has always been to allot sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in ITALY a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognised as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in FRANCE and GREECE; it is lower than that in N.W. Europe as a whole. The matter is, therefore, not one of preferential treatment for ITALY; it is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in ITALY necessary for the continuance of military operations.

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possible to amass for controlled distribution, and what is in fact, amassed and available for this purpose. This is no new problem and is always most acute in peasant-populated countries with weak local administration. We cannot hope within measurable time to correct it. It is therefore idle to discuss further the use of grain which for controlled distribution in support of a ration scale is non-existent. Nor is it more useful to press the responsibility to the Italian Government for a problem which they cannot solve. **389**

4. Hitherto we have been able to establish a ration of 300 grams south of the Garigliano. It has not been possible to do so north of this line, where a 200 gram bread ration obtains. The disparity between the two zones is causing resentment and distress which have already led to disorders and this fact has again been brought to my notice by my Army Commanders. In the combat zone and in

TOP SECRET

K 542

newly liberated areas the combination of undernourishment and the winter operational conditions is causing the greatest hardship; and the necessity for preventing militarily serious disorders in and near the combat zone is as imperative as the political and military necessity for preventing them in the south.

5. There is no doubt that the Italian people regard the statement made by the President and the Prime Minister as constituting a pledge which will not be broken; and in this connection I wish to quote the following statements on which they base their hopes.

a. "The first objective in improving the lot of the Italian people is to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and famine". (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26 September 1944).

b. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in ITALY where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency". (The President on 29 October 1944).

c. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of ITALY that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required, to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people". (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31 October 1944).

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to implement these premises. Of late weeks the cuts which have been imposed make it impossible for me to plan consistently for any uniform ration. It will be superfluous for me to emphasize the administrative and political objections to an unstable ration scale for such a basic foodstuff as bread. It has, for

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b. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in ITALY where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency". (The President on 29 October 1944).

c. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams through out all of ITALY that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required, to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people". (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31 October 1944).

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to implement these promises. Of late weeks the cuts which have been imposed make it impossible for me to plan consistently for any uniform ration. It will be superfluous for me to emphasize the administrative and political objections to an unstable ration scale for such a basic foodstuff as bread. It has, for example, been brought to my notice that some fifty to sixty thousand tons or **388** are expected to arrive in this country in January, as against previously planned and advised shipments of ninety thousand tons of wheat equivalent. It is impossible to plan the feeding of a population of 25 million people (and later 45 million) with a plan which, as past experience has shown, may be upset from week to week. Further, the shipping allotted to me for operational maintenance

has already been so cut that it will not permit of any further reduction if

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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operations are to continue as planned. I would also draw your attention to the fact that whatever difficulties confront us now they may be counted as small compared with those which we must meet in the densely populated areas of Northern ITALY.

7. In order to provide for a uniform 300 gram bread ration throughout ITALY and SARDINIA (including the provision for future commitments in North ITALY), I estimate that I shall require an average import of 185,000 tons monthly for the 5 months February to June. For each month during which the portion of ITALY north of our present line does NOT become a commitment, an average of 91,000 tons can be deducted, provided forward stockpiling is eliminated.

8. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation, and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theatres of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot continue to administer those parts of ITALY under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians, unless I am regularly and continuously provided with the means to do so. I believe that, both for our immediate war effort and for the final achievement of peace, an ITALY which does not nurse the perpetual grievances of broken promises, hunger and apathy and a growing physical weakness of her people, will be the best testimony to the justice of Allied dealing. I do not think that firm and generous treatment will be without its effect as an example to other countries.

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387

TOP SECRET

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The following memorandum on Food Ration Scales in Italy has been prepared at the request of Mr. Sydney Mitchell and Mr. A. D. Morris of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
OF

Ref: 4807/003

21 October 1944.

MEMORANDUMFOOD RATION SCALES IN ITALY

1. The 300 gram bread ration is in the opinion of this Commission the irreducible minimum and any scale below that figure, except for short periods in operational areas, is contrary to Allied military and political interests and announced aims. Indeed as recently as September 26 President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in a joint declaration laid down that "first and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear".

2. In stating our reasons for this opinion it must be remembered that Italy is fundamentally a bread-eating country and that flour, in one form and another must always be the basic ration together with sugar, and that other commodities are ancillary thereto. These reasons are four (a) medical, (b) control of Black Market, (c) maintenance of law and order and (d) grain collection campaign.

3. Medical. If the ration is not maintained at a minimum of a 300 gram bread ration the health of the nation will in our opinion be permanently impaired. The present scale of 300 grams of bread and 4.15 grams of sugar which is the ration in the south of Italy produces only a calorific content of 763 calories. This is supplemented in urban districts of over 50,000 inhabitants by meat and vegetables producing an additional calorific value of 143 calories, making a total of 906 calories. The Health Committee of the League of Nations in 1936 advised that the daily average calorific intake for a man or woman living in a temperate climate and not engaged in manual labour should be 2400 calories per day, and if engaged on moderate muscular work an additional 600 calories per day should be allowed. Furthermore a medical manual of the U. S. Army states that the calorific requirement of a soldier is approximately 3000 calories per day. As an interesting example of the inadequacy of this ration it may be mentioned that although inmates of prisons receive double the sugar ration (6.3 grams per day), many cases of malnutrition have occurred and are occurring. If the 300 gram ration is not established and maintained, the Commission is of the opinion that the calorific intake would be so low that even a prevention of diseases standard would not be achieved. In view of the joint declaration of 26 September, quoted above, it is clear that failure to achieve this standard would be contrary to announced policy.

4. Control of Black Market. A large section of the populace in fact make up its rations by purchases on the Black Market. Every effort is made by law enforcement, by road blocks and other measures to reduce the Black Market to a minimum, but there can be no doubt that the Black Market at the present is of very large dimensions and it will so remain. All that can be done is to limit its extent and from experience an increase in the ration to 300 grams

FOOD RATION SCALES IN ITALY

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2. In stating our reasons for this opinion it must be remembered that Italy is fundamentally a bread-eating country and that flour, in one form and another must always be the basic ration together with sugar, and that other commodities are ancillary thereto. These reasons are four (a) medical, (b) control of Black Market, (c) maintenance of law and order and (d) grain collection campaign.
3. Medical. If the ration is not maintained at a minimum of a 300 gram bread ration the health of the nation will in our opinion be permanently impaired. The present scale of 300 grams of bread and 4.15 grams of sugar which is the ration in the south of Italy produces only a caloric content of 763 calories. This is supplemented in urban districts of over 50,000 inhabitants by meat and vegetables producing an additional caloric value of 143 calories, making a total of 906 calories. The Health Committee of the League of Nations in 1936 advised that the daily average caloric intake for a man or woman living in a temperate climate and not engaged in manual labour should be 2,400 calories per day, and if engaged on moderate muscular work an additional 600 calories per day should be allowed. Furthermore a medical manual of the U. S. Army states that the caloric requirement of a soldier is approximately 3000 calories per day. As an interesting example of the inadequacy of this ration it may be mentioned that although inmates of prisons receive double the sugar ration (3.3 grams per day), many cases of malnutrition have occurred and are occurring. If the 300 gram ration is not established and maintained, the Commission is of the opinion that the caloric intake would be so low that even a "prevention of diseases" standard would not be achieved. In view of the joint declaration of 26 September, quoted above, it is clear that failure to achieve this standard would be contrary to announced policy.
4. Control of Black Market. A large section of the populace in fact make up its rations by purchases on the Black Market. Every effort is made by law enforcement, by food blocks and other measures to reduce the Black Market to a minimum, but there can be no doubt that the Black Market at the present is of very large dimensions and it will so remain. All that can be done is to limit its extent and from experience an increase in the ration to 300 grams throughout Italy will have this effect. By way of example it may be mentioned that in June when the ration was increased to 300 grams in Naples there was a very substantial fall in Black Market prices. Moreover such action will force down prices in such Black Market as is not eliminated. This will have the subsidiary benefit of enabling a larger section of the population to supply their ration beyond a "prevention of diseases" standard.

- 2 -

It must not be overlooked that one of the serious effects of a large Black Market is that the poorer elements of many of the civil servants are forced to sell their furniture and possessions and to lend their daughters to prostitution in order to pay for food on the Black Market. Apart from its effect on law and order (see below) its effect on the V.E. rate amongst Allied troops is considerable.

5. Maintenance of Law and Order. It is the opinion of this Commission that the maintenance of law and order cannot be assured unless a minimum ration of 500 grams is maintained throughout liberated Italy. With an uncontrolled Black Market and a wholly inadequate bread ration, disaffection, riots and industrial unrest generally are to be expected in many of the more important centres this winter. Such a situation must seriously affect the Allied war effort in Italy. A copy of a signal dated 18 October to General Alexander from General Mark Clark on the food situation in the Fifth Army area is attached.

6. For ever the political effect be overlooked. Rightly or wrongly the government is blamed at present for the failure to produce food and if it cannot be established on a uniform basis at a level of (about) 500 grams it is to be feared that the consequential social unrest may well affect the stability of the Government. In present circumstances this would be undesirable not only for the country as a whole but in particular for the Allied war effort in Italy. In considering this aspect it should not be overlooked that it would now be impossible through lack of personnel to re-establish Military Government and the situation in the country might indeed become precarious.

7. Grain Collection Campaign. The question of rationing plays an extremely important part in the programme of managing, with say a 250 gram bread ration a tendency to reduce to a minimum in order to hoard grain and later to sell it in the Black Market at fantastic prices is such that it becomes an important factor in the amount consumed. It is thought that, if the ration can be established throughout at 500 grams, the incentive to reduce to a minimum though not extinguished will be substantially reduced. This in turn will reduce import requirements and save shipping.

8. It will be seen from the foregoing that the results of a failure to fix a uniform minimum ration of 500 grams throughout liberated Italy may affect not only the whole economy of the country, but also the military and political aims of the Allied Governments. It is also apparent from what has been stated above and cannot be emphasized too strongly, that this Commission does not regard the ration of 500 grams satisfactory or sufficient. It is merely put forward as a minimum which if established will probably avert the worst effects of inadequate rations which have been outlined above.

ration of 300 grams is maintained throughout liberated Italy. With an uncontrolled Black Market and a wholly inadequate bread ration, dissatisfied, riots and industrial unrest generally are to be expected in any of the more important centers this winter. Such a situation must seriously affect the Allied war effort in Italy. A copy of a signal dated 12 October to General Alexander from General Mark Clark on the food situation in the Sixth Army area is attached.

6. Nor can the political effect be overlooked. Slightly or wrongly the government is blamed at present for the failure to produce food and if it cannot be established on a uniform basis at a level of (about) 300 grams it is to be feared that the consequential social unrest may well affect the stability of the government. In present circumstances this would be undesirable not only for the country as a whole but in particular for the Allied war effort in Italy. In considering this aspect it should not be overlooked that it would now be impossible through lack of personnel to re-establish Military Government and the situation in the country might indeed become precarious.

7. Grain Collection Campaign. The question of rationing plays an extremely important part in the programme of amassing. With say a 250 gram bread ration a tendency to refuse to amass in order to hoard grain and later to sell it in the Black Market at fantastic prices is such that it becomes an important factor in the amount amassed. It is thought that, if the ration can be established throughout at 300 grams, the incentive to refuse to amass, though not extinguished will be substantially reduced. This in turn will reduce import requirements and save shipping.

8. It will be seen from the foregoing that the results of a failure to fix a uniform minimum ration of 300 grams throughout liberated Italy may affect not only the whole economy of the country, but also the military and political aims of the Allied Governments. It is also apparent from what has been stated above and cannot be emphasized too strongly, that this Commission does not regard the ration of 300 grams satisfactory or sufficient. It is surely put forward as a minimum which if established will probably avert the worst effects of inadequate rations which have been outlined above.

MILITARY ATTACHE
Commanders, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

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C O P YS E C R E T

2487

TO: PERSONAL TO ASSISTANT AGC AND AMBQ FOR INFO C IN C AAI

FROM: STARK

072/19

PRIORITY

Oct 19 1435

SECRET. Civilian food situation throughout 8th Army area is critical and will become increasingly so as we advance. The 200 grams of bread distributed daily are inadequate. Widespread unrest is manifest in LUCCA and PISA while actual public demonstrations have occurred in FLORENCE and FERRARA. Unofficial sources of information indicate that more serious incidents may develop. If such occur combat troops might have to be diverted to maintain law and order. I am informed that enough imported food supplies are not in sight to permit adoption of a ration sufficient for health and efficiency in accordance with assurances recently given in WASHINGTON. An inseparable part of the food problem is the provision of sufficient road transport for the movement of imported or local supplies to the centers of consumption. Recommend that the urgent matter of providing adequate food and transport be given immediate consideration.

DIST

Info-Action: C o S Sect (7)
 Info: A/CC
 Soon Sec (2)
 CA Sect
 File

382

Date and Time of Receipt October 19 1530

Mrs. Schott

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER'S MEETING
IN FOOD RATIONS.

1. For months the Allied Commission with the help of the Supreme Allied Commander and backed by assurances of assistance from the heads of the United States and United Kingdom Governments, has been trying to establish a 300 gram ration throughout Italy. The issue of this ration, which is considered by the Commission to be the minimum subsistence ration for normal adults, was accepted, unwillingly, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May at the initiation of the Supreme Allied Commander and has since that date remained the basic ration in SARDINIA, SICILY and the mainland of ITALY south of the GARIBOLDI. It has not been established north of that line in spite of every effort made by the Commission backed by the strongest recommendations of the SOLO's Armies, the Regional Commissioners and by the Commanding General, Fifth Army, and direct evidence that (a) the 200 gram ration is inadequate; (b) the disparity between North and South is strongly resented. At a recent meeting the Regional Commissioners of LIGURIA, LOMBARDY and PIEMONTE urged that planning should continue on the basis of the 300 gram ration in Northern Italy.

2. The statements made by the President and Prime Minister, and the President's message to the War Department, have raised hopes in the Allied Commission and have been regarded as assurances by the Italian Government and population that a 300 gram ration will be instituted throughout Italy and that what will be allotted in sufficient quantities to make this possible - always taking into account the employment of local resources.

3. The Director of the Food Sub-Commission has reported that in his recent visit to U.S.A. and U.K. "agreement was reached with respect to the establishment of a 300 gram bread ration for presently occupied Italy south of ROME-PISA line."

It is noted that the only letter of procedure". In fact the only or

ration throughout Italy. The issue of this ration, which is considered by the Commission to be the minimum subsistence ration for normal adults, was accepted, unwillingly, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May at the initiation of the Supreme Allied Commander and has since that date remained the basic ration in SARDINIA, SICILY and the mainland of ITALY south of the GARIBOLDI. It has not been established North or that time in spite of every effort made by the Commission, backed by the strongest recommendations of the SCAG's Allies, the Regional Commissioners and by the Commanding General, British Army, and direct evidence that (a) the 200 gram ration is inadequate; (b) the disparity between North and South is strongly resented. At a recent meeting the Regional Commissioners of LIGURIA, LOMBARDY and PIEMONTE agreed that planning should continue on the basis of the 300 gram ration in Northern Italy.

2. The statements made by the President and Prime Minister, and the President's message to the War Department, have raised hopes in the Allied Commission and have been regarded as assurances by the Italian Government and population that a 300 gram ration will be instituted throughout Italy and that wheat will be imported in sufficient quantities to make this possible - always taking into account the employment of local resources.

3. The Director of the Food Sub-Commission has reported that in his recent visit to U.S.A. and U.K. "agreement was reached with respect to the establishment of a 300 gram bread ration for presently occupied Italy south of ROME-PIA line and that formal approval was only a matter of procedure". In fact the Italy of 107,000 tons (January through June 1945) for this area was approved ^{subject to} **381** shipping - and Colonel Legg makes the comment that such a programme would have to accept deficits in the light of shipping difficulties. The seriousness of the shipping situation has been experienced recently and is fully confirmed by a telegram from Combined Chiefs of Staff which, while marking appreciation of the problems in Italy including that of the bread ration, calls attention to the acute shipping situation which is compelling all theatres to accept deficits both as regards

-2-

operational needs and civilian supplies. The message continues that while this matter is under urgent consideration by both Governments, the bread ration in Italy should be established or maintained only at such a standard as can be supported within shipping allotted to the theatre.

This telegram was received simultaneously with advice that the shipping programme for January had been considerably reduced.

4. In view of past experience, of the telegram quoted above, and of other current advice, it appears extremely doubtful whether, even if the supplies necessary to maintain a 300 gram ration were approved, the shipping will ever be made available.

5. The present situation is as follows:

- (a) SARDINIA: is on a 300 gram ration.
- (b) SICILY as from today will be 200 grams (SACRED's decision).
- (c) S. ITALY (up to GARDOLFO) is on 300 grams.
- (d) CENTRAL ITALY (between GARDOLFO and ANCONA-RISA Line is on 200 grams).
- (e) Planning for KASSELING's Italy is on 200 grams.

N.B. 300 gram ration = 200 grams bread daily plus 550 grams pasta weekly.
 200 " " = 200 " " 150 " "

As regards (b) we await the Combined Chiefs of Staff's decision to import wheat from January through June - otherwise the ration may have to be further reduced and depend entirely on wheat raised.

As regards (e) it is very doubtful if transportation can be made available to maintain 200 grams, even if that is reached, for many months after liberation.

6. It is clear that if shipping is to be cut then the ration will have to be cut. We cannot continue to ask the Italian Government for A.A.C. to live from hand to mouth without reserves and without sufficient stockpiles for future operations.

(In view of what the Supreme Allied Commander has recommended on the Allied Commission's behalf, in view of the opinion of the Allied Commission expressed

-5-

8. The disadvantages of such a reduction are obvious: we must expect disorder; resentment towards the Allies and the new Italian Government; adverse criticisms in the U.S.A. and U.K.; reduction in output; increase in disease.

We cannot prevent the last two consequences: wise publicity may help to minimise the first three.

9. The advantages of establishing parity in feeding throughout Italy are considerable and will be more so as we liberate the Northern territories.

10. (a) DGOS Economic Section will advise as to the basic ration which should be established in all ITALY and the ISLANDS.

(b) Civil Affairs Section will advise on the ^{required} medical and public safety repercussions to such a decision.

(c) Political Section will advise on the position of the new Government if such an announcement was made at the outset of its term of office.

(d) Public Relations Officer will advise on the best presentation of the reduction (and increase) to the public both Italian and Allied.

(e) Chief of Staff will advise on the presentation of the Allied Commission's

case to SACRED.

778 Lick

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

11 Dec. 1944.
JBL/JG.

We cannot prevent the last time consequences: wise publicity may help to minimize the first three.

9. The advantages of establishing parity in feeding throughout Italy are considerable and will be more so as we liberate the Northern territories.

10. (a) DCS Economic Section will advise us to the basic ration which should be established in all ITALY and the ISLANDS.

(b) Civil Affairs Section will advise on the ^{evacuated} medical and public safety repercussions to such a decision.

(c) Political Section will advise on the position of the new Government if such an announcement was made at the outset of its term of office.

(d) Public Relations Officer will advise on the best presentation of the reduction (and increase) to the public both Italian and Allied.

(e) Chief of Staff will advise on the presentation of the Allied Commission's case to SACRED.

MS L

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

11 Dec. 1944.
MBL/SG.

379

Copy No. 20.

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO

394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

12 December 1944.

REF: 1407/79/005.

SUBJECT: Food ration - RUSSIA.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander,
Allied Force Headquarters.

1. On receipt of copy of COS telegram 441465 and in the notification of the instructions which I should shortly receive with regard to the food situation in Russia, I called a meeting of my Vice Presidents and the French and Russian members of the Council in order to consider the overall food situation in this country. General Patterson recommended that we also present.

2. The meeting was unanimous in deciding that this Commission should provide immediate recommendations. Since I am sure that the basis of the feeding of this population should be a 3000 calorie ration. This is the minimum subsistence ration in no way to prevent disease and unrest. Indeed it has been recommended to the War Department as such by the President of the United States. A recommendation which is regarded as a privilege in this country. I realize that you have suggested this when in the strongest possible manner and I am most grateful for the support which you have given in this matter.

3. I would like that General de Gaulle, the French representative, should support this policy and urge that every step should be taken to produce more shipping with the suggestion that neutral ships and even Russian shipping should be used to carry the food to Russia. The Russian representative, General Guelagorov, supported his colleague in this statement. The working plan was discussed by the fact that the ration in Russia was based on approximately 400 grams per 85% of the population. That in Russia, according to General de Gaulle, it is now 350 and may rise to 400 grams. These facts, it was felt, could not be long hidden from the Russian Government and the Russian people and must inevitably cause resentment against the Allies owing to the great differences in the treatment accorded to this country.

4. My advisers also stressed the urgent necessity in any case of establishing parity all over presently liberated Russia. The present disparity in having ration effects in a territory and 5000, and the introduction of a 500 gram ration in Central Russia is regarded as a serious step. The correct.

5. It was agreed, however, that whatever ration scale was approved by the COS it was vital that shipping should be guaranteed to implement the policy. It is impossible to plan the feeding of a population of 25 million people (over 378

7. I directed, therefore, the attention of the various plans which had been prepared by my economic section and I in fact, with their unanimous concurrence, to be concerned to you that it is impossible to implement throughout Togo, including eventually presently occupied areas, a basic ration of 300 grams, necessary for local resources known and anticipated, as would be, as an unhappy alternative, a basic ration which should be supplied throughout the territory.
8. During the period the economic program was being worked out, in order to establish parity of ration throughout the territory, the plan was drawn for a ration of 300 grams for the northern Togo and the resources in the northern Togo, as our proposal, it would be necessary to make a ration of 300 grams for the northern Togo and 250 grams for the southern Togo. The 250 grams would be established as a ration of 250 grams in the northern Togo and 250 grams in the southern Togo. The 250 grams in the northern Togo could be increased by my local resources being available, on the other hand, the 250 grams in the southern Togo would be impossible.
9. I therefore recommend that if the 300 gram ration cannot be implemented, that the alternative be adopted as the best solution.
10. I cannot conceal from you the serious situation which must be created even by the recommendation which I am about to make. The political conditions against the newly formed Government and against the ability in southern Togo where the ration must be cut, are in fact, that when the ration will not attain to that level, as provided by the United Government, must be given. The United Government and people undoubtedly argued the fulfillment of the 300 gram ration by the message of the President and Prime Minister in a place which will not be broken. We must expect violence arising from starvation, a decrease in morale leading to an increase in crime and prostitution, an acceleration in inflation and the deterioration of the black market, disorders and the food riots which the Prime Minister, during his visit here, directed that be avoided. I would, however, rather face these admittedly serious difficulties with the knowledge that such a plan for feeding the population could be guaranteed and that the present difficulty between North and South would disappear. The present uncertainty makes it virtually impossible to carry out a proper distribution of food and is most deleterious to the morale of the people.
11. Since my decision which is a not implement the 300 gram ration is a reversal of the President's expressed wish and the implication of the Prime Minister of the President on the Prime Minister's 14 October, I recommend that if decision is made to establish the ration at 250, the reasons therefor should be communicated to the United Government in a form acceptable to be made by the United Government. Such a situation could be based on purely military reasons. It is imperative that it should be made without delay.
12. I received a letter from the United States and was able to send to the US together with a draft statement which might be recommended to the Italian Government and published in the press.
13. I have included in my report a summary of the situation that the United States is involved in a parity with the rest of Togo. I need not reiterate the arguments against the current position of the United States ration which is not be and I would only say that the various difficulties described above should not be increased by a definitely more serious position which must arise in 1960, if the were not to be solved. Similar treatment to the rest of the country.

INFORMED BY: STATION
COMMUNICATOR: USMC
CHIEF COMMANDER:

Copy to: Air mail Charles.
Mr. Commissioner Henry
HQ 441
C-5 Sec, AFHQ
DOCS, Econ sec
DOCS, Ch Sec
DOCS, Int Sec
VP, Pol sec (2) -
Mr. Phil.

DRAWN TELEGRAM.

TOP SECRET

TO: CCS

FROM: SACRED

Your RMN 465 noted.

Whatever decision may be reached regarding the bread ration for ITALY,

I must ask that a firm shipping programme be laid down to implement this ration. I cannot ask the Italian Government nor the Allied Commission to work on a plan which will almost certainly be upset from month to month by cuts in shipping.

If such a guarantee cannot be given for the 300 gram ration, then I would rather work on a basic ration for all ITALY which can be met by shipping at the theatre disposal with a reasonable degree of certainty. From the shipping programme now before me, taking into account the necessity of stockpiling for the North, I can see no prospect of establishing an equalised ration at more than 250 grams of bread. Such a decision would entail reducing the present basic ration in Southern ITALY, SARDINIA and SICILY (see also my), and of producing an impact ration for Northern ITALY on liberation of 115 grams January 1st which would rise to 250 as distribution became possible.

Disorder and unrest would increase; we should have repercussions among the population and possible disorder for there is no doubt that the Italian Government and people regard the implementation of the 300 gram ration as a promise. But I would rather face reactions to a firm if unpopular decision than the growing discontent which is arising now owing to lack of certainty and lack of parity between the areas North and South of the GARIBOLDI.

However, since the decision to reduce the overall ration is a reversal of the President's expressed wish and the implications of the President's and Prime

Minister's joint declaration as well as the Prime Minister's instructions when

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However, since the decision to reduce the overall ration is a reversal of the President's expressed wish and the implications of the President's and Prime Minister's joint declaration as well as the Prime Minister's instructions when here that food disorders were at all costs to be prevented, I recommend that the decision to reduce pursuant to your 211 465 and the reasons therefor be communicated to the Italian Government in a joint statement to be made by the Allied Governments. This should be done without delay. It should be published and should be so worded as to show that decision has had to be taken for operational reasons only.

JOINT STATEMENTS ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

The mounting intensity and approaching climax of the war against Germany on the Western Front and against Japan in the Pacific are now making the utmost demand upon the United Nations' shipping reserves. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, in view of the considerations of global military necessity, have drastically curtailed all shipping allocations other than operational to all theatres of war, including the Italian.

As a direct consequence thereof, and in order to use to the fullest extent all the available local resources of Italy in furtherance of the common fight against the enemy and for the liberation of the remainder of Italy in the North, the Allied Governments have an equalization of the basic bread ration throughout liberated Italy at 250 grams per head, effective January 1.

The reduction in shipping means, that, until hostilities cease in Europe, imported wheat from Allied countries must be used most carefully not only to provide a basic ration for liberated Italy but to build up adequate stockpiles of food for the North, whose inhabitants will thus be dependent upon the sacrifices and foresight of their brothers in liberated Italy that they do not go hungry when the Allied and Italian Armies finally drive the German invaders beyond the Alps.

The new ration, in effect, is an increase for the inhabitants of liberated Italy above the Garigliano River, who have been receiving only 200 grams since liberation, while it reduces to 250 grams the 300 gram ration of Southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, territories untouched by war for more than a year, whose countryside has enjoyed a bumper harvest, even in comparison with pre-war years.

The Allied Governments have imported into Italy more than 1,000,000 tons of foodstuffs for the civilian population since the liberation of Italy began on July 10, 1943, at a high cost in ships and men from every action on the seas. The policy of the Allied Governments has been steadily to promote a 300 gram ration universally throughout Italy as soon as possible. The policy now has to be set temporarily aside for military reasons of the most urgent nature; namely, that the war against Germany is fast approaching its decisive climax and will require every ship that can be spared from the Western Hemisphere to bring guns and ammunition to the great ports only recently freed and being prepared for operation in North-Western Europe. Likewise, the battle against Japan has called forth an unprecedented strain on even the vast resources of the United States in the area of the Pacific where the distances that ships must travel from their loading bases are still immense.

The Allied Governments are marshalling their utmost strength for the approaching decisive battles of the struggle against Germany and Japan. High battle committees have formed the Government of the United States to call men for the army who hitherto have not been needed, and every resource is being applied to the common task. In Britain, nearly two thirds of the whole population has been consciously engaged in the war effort for more than five years under conditions of bombardment, privation and sacrifice. The Italian people are now asked to contribute their share to the United Nations' coming victory by utilizing every ounce of locally grown food, and by remembering that every ton saved in the South of Italy will be that much of a life-saving help to their fellow Italian citizens in the North.

DRAFT

TO: ACTAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff

INFO: UK BASE SECTION for British Chiefs of Staff
HQ COM ZONE MAIN
SHARE

This is MAP

Subject is bread ration for Italy. Reference LAC 453, LAD 471.

1. In authorizing the temporary increase, effective 1 July last, of

the bread ration in Italy from 200 to 300 grams, I directed the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission to submit a study of the problem of the basic food supply through the next harvest year on the basis of early experience in the collection of the crop. This was with a view to assessing the total requirements and any proposed import program, on the basis of which I would make my recommendation on the ration to apply during the balance of the harvest year. Such a study has been submitted and has been the subject of extensive discussion between my staff and the officers of the Allied Control Commission.

2. It is apparent that the purpose for which the temporary increase was granted has been, in large measure, achieved. The assessment is, on the whole, proceeding successfully, particularly in the areas where the larger ration has been actually distributed. While it is impossible to measure the effects of this factor with accuracy, I believe that there has been collected substantially more of the current harvest than would have been the case had the lower ration remained in effect. Moreover, the anti-inflationary effect of the increase has been definitely felt. In Naples the black market dropped rapidly upon the increase of the ration, and the cost of living has since resisted upward pressure, due largely to the availability of a subsistence ration without recourse to illegal channels. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the action which I felt compelled to take in June has proven well advised.

1. The Chief Commissioner, based on the latest

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3. The study submitted by the Chief Commissioner, based on the latest information available, indicates a prospective total assessment of wheat in the amount of 2,000,000 metric tons. This is to be compared with the slightly smaller estimate of 1,900,000 tons submitted by this headquarters in L43 607 of 17 August. Both of these estimates are based on limited intelligence and on a number of assumptions as to conditions which will be found North of the

Pisa-Pimini Line. The local production, without any imports, will be sufficient to provide a basic ration of 160 grams of bread per day per person for all of Italy for the harvest year ending 30 June 1945. This is on the basis of 76% of the population holding ration cards, a figure which the Chief Commissioner states is the minimum which can be safely contemplated. Within this figure an allowance of 12 1/2% is made for supplementary rations and feeding of institutions and other non-producing consumers.

4. On the basis of the same figures as to the harvest, the percentage of ration card holders, and the allowance for supplementary rations the following table shows imports required to provide the respective rations indicated:

BASIC RATION (grams of bread per person per day)	IMPORTS OF WHEAT REQUIRED (in metric tons)	
	200	510,000
250		1,140,000
300		1,536,000

5. In considering what the ration should be, I have had regard to the following factors:

- It is the objective of the Allies in planning for liberated areas that basic ration be fixed at a point which will permit the target figure of 2,000 calories per day to be attained. Unless rations from local sources are heavy in colonies, which is not the case in Italy, this objective requires the maintenance of a high bread ration. This is recognized by the fact that the target figure for the bread ration in other liberated territories is 300 grams per day.
- Supplementary feeding of the urban population will continue to present great difficulties over the next year. Transportation is the key to this problem. However, in view of the continuing military demand which must be met in the North without decrease

and other non-producing consumers.

4. On the basis of the same figures as to the harvest, the percentage of ration card holders, and the allowance for supplementary rations the following table shows imports required to provide the respective rations indicated:

BASIC RATION (grams of bread per person per day)	IMPORTS OF WHEAT REQUIRED (in metric tons)	
	200	510,000
	250	1,140,000
	300	1,556,000

5. In considering what the ration should be, I have had regard to the

following factors:

a. It is the objective of the Allies in planning for liberated areas that basic ration be fixed at a point which will permit the target figure of 2,000 calories per day to be attained. Unless rations from local sources are heavy in calories, which is not the case in Italy, this objective requires the maintenance of a high bread ration. This is recognized by the fact that the target figure for the bread ration in other liberated territories is 300 grams per day.

b. Supplementary feeding of the urban population will continue to present great difficulties over the next year. Transportation is the key to this problem. However, in view of the continuing military demand which must be met in the North without decrease for the immediately foreseeable future, the high degree of destruction of other than automotive transportation facilities, and the extreme shortage of automotive transport available for civilian supply, it is not likely that the cities can be supplied with locally produced commodities in quantities sufficient to make up basic deficiencies to any great extent below the 300 gram figure.

373

- c. Bread ration in Italy will, to the extent available on the legal market or otherwise, be not less than 500 grams per person per day. This means that in rough proportion to the amount that the legal ration is fixed below this point resort will be had to the black market. This in turn will raise the family cost of living by the swollen black market prices. If this condition exists generally the pressure for wage increase cannot be resisted. The end result will be a serious inflationary factor.
- d. There is among sections of the urban population, I am advised, a condition of under-nourishment which is the cumulative result of the war years, the mis-management of the Fascist government and oppression by the Germans. While we are in no way responsible for this condition, and have, in fact, in some measure arrested its growth during the year in which we have had responsibility, we cannot on that account overlook the consequences of prolonging the condition.
- e. No objective observer would support the statements made in some quarters that conditions are now worse than under German occupation, but there is much to be said for the proposition that they should be a great deal better. At any rate it is important that the population in the first of the liberated territories, and the one which has been under our administration the longest, should feel that progress is steadily being made. I consider this something more than a morale factor.
6. The foregoing considerations impell me to recommend a ration of 300 grams of bread for the current harvest year. This amounts to an increase of 60 grams of bread over the amount presently authorized by you. This will ~~300~~ ³³⁰ quire, as indicated above, estimated imports of approximately 1,500,000 metric tons during the coming harvest year. In appraising this substantial figure

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- e. No objective observer would support the statements made in some quarters that conditions are now worse than under German occupation, but there is much to be said for the proposition that they should be a great deal better. At any rate it is important that the population in the first of the liberated territories, and the one which has been under our administration the longest, should feel that progress is steadily being made. I consider this something more than a morale factor.
6. The foregoing considerations impell me to recommend a ration of 300 grams of bread for the current harvest year. This amounts to an increase of 60 grams of bread over the amount presently authorized by you. This will ~~will~~ ^{be} ~~be~~ ^{be} quire, as indicated above, estimated imports of approximately 1,500,000 metric tons during the coming harvest year. In appraising this substantial figure several facts should be borne in mind:
- (a) Under the proposed program there will be involved a lower per capita import of wheat than was the case during the first year of the occupation. The comparable figures are calculated at 125 lbs per person for the year July 1943-1944 and 75 lbs per

per year for the coming year.

(b) It should not be lost sight of that Italy normally imported substantial quantities of wheat in peace years when conditions in respect of cultivation, fertilizer, agricultural equipment, labor, and transport, were not subject to present difficulties. The average importation in the pre-war years has been stated to be upwards of 500,000 tons annually. I feel that the excess only should be measured as the contribution to Italian economy necessitated by the dislocation caused by combat in Italian territory.

(c) In the estimates agreed by ACO and my staff there is substantial allowance for scorning of the territory north of the Pisa-Rimini line. If by reason of a rapid advance or the failure of the enemy to destroy or remove the stocks which are now on hand a less serious condition is found, the requirements will be proportionately lessened. The amounts involved could range up to 500,000 tons.

7. In considering these large demands I have of course taken into account the administrative factor. Without question the administration of the Italian rationing and distribution system is and will be a continuing problem. Given the total demoralization of the governmental structure from which Italy is just beginning to emerge, against a background of normally low administrative standards it could hardly be otherwise. I am confident, though, that progress is being made through the efforts of ACO to improve the food administration and to enforce strict control of grain supplies, domestic and imported. In most localities I do not believe that weak administration is itself the major factor in supply. In Sicily it may be. There the management is not going well. We know, however, that the current crop is sufficient to feed the island. We therefore propose to withhold imports of flour from Sicily and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution

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should be measured as the contribution to Italian economy necessitated by the dislocation caused by combat in Italian territory.

(c) In the estimate agreed by ACC and my staff there is substantial allowance for searching of the territory north of the Pien-Rimini line. If by reason of a rapid advance or the failure of the enemy to destroy or remove the obstacles which are now on hand a less serious condition is found, the requirements will be proportionately lessened. The amounts involved could range up to 500,000 tons.

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8. I am conscious of the fact that supply availabilities in the light of other demands and shipping factors, may make it impossible or impracticable for you to meet the suggested program in spite of the consideration which underlie my recommendations. If this should be the case as I stated in L40 471 I will of course endeavor to meet the situation with whatever resources are placed at my disposal.

9. I request your early advice and instructions.

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ASST FOR ASST

1777

U. February 1945

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY

ENCL 10

SUBJECT IS SUBJECT OF INTEREST IN THE AREA OF THE BROAD RATION TO ALL DOMESTIC
FOOD (P)

WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE BROAD RATION TO ALL DOMESTIC FOOD

IT IS THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE THE BROAD RATION TO ALL DOMESTIC FOOD

IN THE AREA OF THE BROAD RATION TO ALL DOMESTIC FOOD

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IT IS THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE THE BROAD RATION TO ALL DOMESTIC FOOD

IN THE AREA OF THE BROAD RATION TO ALL DOMESTIC FOOD

Int. Dist.

- PM to Acting President
- PM to Chief Commissioner
- Political Section
- Executive Section (2)
- Chief of Staff Section

392

Major E. Talbot

Office of the Chief of Staff

300

For Distribution

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Food Sub-Commission
A.P.O. 394

W.S. GEL/al

10 October 1944

Tel: 206

ACC/21-2/FOOD

SUBJECT: Wheat Requirements

TO : Economic Section

1. Supplementing the memorandum of 5 October 1944, there is presented herein estimates of wheat requirements for all of Italy assuming basic daily bread rations of 200, 250 and 300 grams respectively for the period 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945.

2. Consistent with previous estimates, the following factors are assumed:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| a. Population to be fed (ration card holders) | 35.2 million |
| b. Wheat consumption 1 July--31 Oct. 1944 | 996,000 metric tons |
| c. Wheat assessment 1 July '44 to 30 June '45 | 2,053,000 metric tons |
| d. Exports of wheat or equivalent 1 July-31 Oct. '44 | 184,000 metric tons |
| e. Ratio of supplementary ration to basic ration | 12 1/2 % |

The sources or bases from which the above factors were obtained have been explained in earlier memoranda on this same subject.

3. Imports of wheat required to maintain basic daily bread ration of 200 grams for period 1 November '44 - 30 June '45.

	(Metric Tons)	(Metric Tons)
Wheat or equivalent required:		
1 July - 31 October '44	996,000	
1 Nov. '44 - 30 June '45	<u>1,704,000</u>	2,700,000
Wheat or equivalent provided:		
Estimated assessment	2,053,000	
Imports 1 July-31 Oct. '44	<u>184,000</u>	2,237,000
Imports needed during period 1 Nov. '44--30 June '45		<u>463,000</u>

4. Imports of wheat required to maintain basic daily bread ration of 250 grams for period 1 Nov. '44 - 30 June '45.

	(Metric Tons)	(Metric Tons)
Wheat or equivalent required:		
1 July--31 Oct. '44	996,000	
1 Nov. '44-30 June '45	<u>2,130,000</u>	3,126,000

WHEAT REQUIREMENTS: Cont'd.

	(Metric Tons)	(Metric Tons)
Wheat or equivalent provided:		
Estimated requirement	2,053,000	
Imports 1 July - 31 Oct. '44	<u>184,000</u>	<u>2,237,000</u>
Imports needed during period 1 Nov. '44-30 June '45		889,000
5. <u>Imports of wheat required to maintain basic daily bread ration of 300 grams for period 1 Nov. '44 - 30 June '45</u>		

	(Metric Tons)	(Metric Tons)
Wheat or equivalent required:		
1 July - 31 Oct. '44	996,000	
1 Nov. '44-30 June '45	<u>2,555,000</u>	<u>3,551,000</u>
Wheat or equivalent provided:		
Estimated requirement	2,053,000	
Imports 1 July - 31 Oct. '44	<u>184,000</u>	<u>2,237,000</u>
Imports needed during period 1 Nov. '44-30 June '45		<u>1,314,000</u>

6. In comparing the above estimates with the previous estimates submitted in memoranda dated 7 August and 6 September '44, it must be borne in mind that the first estimate was based upon indicated imports for the year of 500,000 metric tons and assumed consumption on a uniform ration scale throughout all Italy beginning 1 July 1944. The second estimate was predicated upon indicated imports of 1,120,000 metric tons and also assumed a uniform ration scale throughout all Italy during the entire year. The estimates now submitted give effect to the actual basic ration scales in effect since 1 July 1944.

7. It should be mentioned that the required imports indicated in the above estimates allow for no margin of safety other than the quantity of locally grown supplementary grains such as rye and barley which may be used to implement the available quantities of wheat.

W. J. LEOG
Colonel
Director, Food Sub-Commission

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED OFFICE, COMBIBEN
ECONOMIC SECTION
6.11.44 PM

10 October 1944

Ref: 48951 Ext. 200

400/21.2/7000

SUBJECT: Wheat Requirements

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section

1. In response to request dated 8 July 1944, AFHQ was informed by letter dated 7 August that on the basis of proposed imports of wheat for the year beginning 1 July 1944, totaling 560,000 metric tons, it would be possible to provide a uniform ration for all Italy of 200 grams of bread per day. It was pointed out that a basic ration of 300 grams per day had been in effect since 1 July for a large section of northern Italy which would cause a monthly deficit of 35,000 tons.

2. On the basis of a revised proposal of wheat imports totaling 1,120,000 metric tons for the year reported by Col. Butterworth on 5 September, AFHQ was notified by memorandum that a basic bread ration for all Italy could be provided at the rate of 200 grams per day.

3. Wheat import requirements are estimated for the period 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945 on the basis of a uniform bread ration of 200, 250 and 300 grams per day as follows:

Wheat or equivalent required:

For period 1 July--31 Oct. '44
For period 1 Nov. '44--30 June '45

Wheat or equivalent provided:

Estimated maximum
Imports 1 July--31 Oct. '44

Imports required for period
1 Nov. '44 - 30 June '45

Wheat Import Requirements (000 Metric Tons)	
200	250
300	300
400	400
500	500
600	600
700	700
800	800
900	900
1,000	1,000
1,100	1,100
1,200	1,200
1,300	1,300
1,400	1,400
1,500	1,500
1,600	1,600
1,700	1,700
1,800	1,800
1,900	1,900
2,000	2,000
2,100	2,100
2,200	2,200
2,300	2,300
2,400	2,400
2,500	2,500
2,600	2,600
2,700	2,700
2,800	2,800
2,900	2,900
3,000	3,000
3,100	3,100
3,200	3,200
3,300	3,300
3,400	3,400
3,500	3,500
3,600	3,600
3,700	3,700
3,800	3,800
3,900	3,900
4,000	4,000
4,100	4,100
4,200	4,200
4,300	4,300
4,400	4,400
4,500	4,500
4,600	4,600
4,700	4,700
4,800	4,800
4,900	4,900
5,000	5,000
5,100	5,100
5,200	5,200
5,300	5,300
5,400	5,400
5,500	5,500
5,600	5,600
5,700	5,700
5,800	5,800
5,900	5,900
6,000	6,000
6,100	6,100
6,200	6,200
6,300	6,300
6,400	6,400
6,500	6,500
6,600	6,600
6,700	6,700
6,800	6,800
6,900	6,900
7,000	7,000
7,100	7,100
7,200	7,200
7,300	7,300
7,400	7,400
7,500	7,500
7,600	7,600
7,700	7,700
7,800	7,800
7,900	7,900
8,000	8,000
8,100	8,100
8,200	8,200
8,300	8,300
8,400	8,400
8,500	8,500
8,600	8,600
8,700	8,700
8,800	8,800
8,900	8,900
9,000	9,000
9,100	9,100
9,200	9,200
9,300	9,300
9,400	9,400
9,500	9,500
9,600	9,600
9,700	9,700
9,800	9,800
9,900	9,900
10,000	10,000

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section

1. In response to request dated 8 July 1944, AFHQ was informed by letter dated 7 August that on the basis of proposed imports of wheat for the year beginning 1 July 1944, totaling 560,000 metric tons, it would be possible to provide a uniform ration for all Italy of 200 grams of bread per day. It was pointed out that a basic ration of 300 grams per day had been in effect since 1 July for a large section of southern Italy which would cause a monthly deficit of 35,000 tons.

2. On the basis of a revised proposal of wheat imports totaling 1,120,000 metric tons for the year reported by Col. Butterworth on 5 September, AFHQ was notified by memorandum that a basic bread ration for all Italy could be provided at the rate of 200 grams per day.

3. Wheat import requirements are estimated for the period November 1944 to 30 June 1945 on the basis of a uniform bread ration of 200, 250 and 300 grams per day as follows:

Wheat or equivalent required:

For period 1 July--31 Oct. '44
For period 1 Nov. '44--30 June '45

Wheat or equivalent provided:

Estimated minimum
Imports 1 July--31 Oct. '44

Imports required for period
1 Nov. '44 - 30 June '45

Wheat Import Requirements (000 Metric Tons)		
200	250	300
U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
996	996	996
1,704	2,130	2,555
2,700	3,126	3,551
1,053	2,053	2,053
184	184	184
463	889	1,314
2,700	3,126	3,551
		267

4. The estimate of wheat import requirements presented to AFHQ by Colonel J. J. Lusk, late in September for the period 1 January to 30 June 1945 totals 1,302,000 metric tons based upon an assumed ration scale for all Italy of 300 grams per day beginning 1 November 1944. That estimate also assumes consumption north of the Pisa-Rimini line at a basic ration scale of 100 grams of bread per day. The estimate in the preceding paragraph assumes consumption in that area up to 1 November at the basic rate of 200 grams per day which is the minimum that may be anticipated.

1570

WHEAT AND WHEAT FLOUR: Con't'd.

5. The latest available indications are that the wheat (or equivalent) imports for the year will be 932,000 metric tons of which 748,000 tons are scheduled for the period 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945. Reference to the table in paragraph 3 will show that this is insufficient by 141,000 tons to permit a basic ration scale of 250 grams per day.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

A. G. AMUNDINI
Acting Head
Economic Section

260

1577