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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Political, Internal - Fascist Republican Government

Oct. - Dec. 1943

F-32

12/24/43

In reply refer to:
CXL-512

16 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR Military Government Section, Allied Force Headquarters

FROM : Political Section, Allied Central Organization

There is attached as of possible interest a copy of a memorandum from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to a circular of the Fascist Republican Government, which deals with measures to be taken against officials who have remained loyal to the Italian Government. The measure of publicity to be given such documents has been discussed with appropriate officials of the Staff Unit of the Psychological Warfare Branch, A.P.W.B., who agree that it would be advisable to publicize the existence of this circular through the action of Allied radio stations.

For the Army President, Allied Central Organization:

Political Section

2 Incls.

Incl. 1 - Memo No. 525

Incl. 2 - Copy to some Ministries

cc: Office of the American Ambassador
Office of the British Resident Minister

4503

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation ACC - Pol - 5 - 292

Date 9/18/44

From ACC Italy, Patriot Bn.

To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: S/1/2

☒ Security-Classified Information☐ Otherwise Restricted InformationArmy
Authority10/16/79
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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Date _____
From _____
To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☐ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Authority

Date

APPENDIX A TO REPORT
ON PATRIOT ACTIVITIES
IN ELIDIA REGION 9

STELLA ROSSA EDE

3. Command. The Bde. is commanded by Mario MUSOLESI known as "LUPO" He is an ex-sjt of the Italian army. Other officers are:

ALFONSO VENTURI	Coy. Comd.
OTELLO MUSOLESI	" "
BERTO MENINI	" "
CELSO MENINI	" "
GIOVANNI ROSSI	Lieut.

4. Strength. 800-1000 men organised in companies of 100 each.
5. Arms. The Bde. is adequately armed with allied weapons and arms taken from the enemy but lacks ammunition for the latter.
6. Zone of Operations. The Bde. operates mainly in the triangle BOLOGNA - FUTA. (L8305) - PORETTA (L5812).
7. Present Locations. Owing to enemy action the Bde. has been on the move and was last heard of (18th August 1944) at PIETRAMALA (L8713).
8. Other Bands. There are believed to be other bands operating in the province but strength and locations are NOT known.

G. A. P.

9. The GAP have been active in the city of BOLOGNA but their strength is NOT known. The commander of the GAP is Dott. NANNETTI.
10. After a successful attack on the prison which liberated over 100 political prisoners; reprisals were so severe that the CLN ordered a temporary cessation of

STELLA ROSSA BDE

1. This Bde was the first to be formed in the Tuscan
Emilian Alps.
2. Politics. Mainly communist.
3. Command. The Bde. is commanded by Mario MUSOLESI
known as "LUPO" He is an ex-sjt of the Italian army.
Other officers are:

Alfonso VENTURI	Coy. Comd.
Otello MUSOLESI	" "
Berto MENINI	" "
Celso MENINI	" "
Giovanni ROSSI	Lieut.

4. Strength. 800-1000 men organised in companies
of 100 each.
5. Arms. The Bde. is adequately armed with allied
weapons and arms taken from the enemy but lacks am-
munition for the latter.
6. Zone of Operations. The Bde. operates mainly in
the triangle BOLOGNA - RUTA. (I8305) - PORETTEA (I5812)
7. Present Locations. Owing to enemy action the
Bde. has been on the move and was last heard of (18th
August 1944) at PIETRAMALA (I8713).
8. Other Bands. There are believed to be other
bands operating in the province but strength and loca-
tions are NOT known.

G.A.P.

9. The GAP have been active in the city of BOLOGNA but
their strength is NOT known. The commander of the GAP
is Dott. NANNETTI.
10. After a successful attack on the prison which libe-
rated over 100 political prisoners; reprisals were so
severe that the CIN ordered a temporary cessation of
activities.
11. The above information was received from two patriots
who left the STELLA ROSSA BDE on 18 August 1944.

4054

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
UNIT NO. 12.

18th August, 1944.

To: Harold Caccia, Esq.,

From: D. Guddi, Italian Documents Section, P.W.B.

SUBJECT: THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE.

The Ministry of Popular Culture was divided into ten departments:

1. Gabinetto del Ministro.
2. Ufficio del Personale e negli Affari Generali.
3. Ufficio Amministrativo.
4. Direzione Generale per la Stampa Italiana.
5. Direzione Generale per la Stampa Estera.
6. Direzione Generale per gli Scambi Culturali.
7. Direzione Generale per la Cinematografia.
8. Direzione Generale per il Teatro.
9. Direzione Generale per la Radiodiffusione e la Televisione.
10. Ispettorato per la Radiodiffusione e la Televisione.

with 550 permanent civil servants and 524 temporary employees. 251 of the permanent employees and 141 of the temporary employees are now in the North (Silo) with the Fascist Government.

Other organizations were under the direct or indirect control of the Ministry of Popular Culture. Under the direct control were the following:

1. Istituto nazionale "I.T.C.".
2. Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche (E.N.I.T.).
3. Istituto nazionale del cinema antico in Siracusa;
4. Enti provinciali per il turismo;
5. Ente stampa.

and under indirect control:

1. Ente italiano esecuzioni telefoniche (E.I.E.T.).
2. Reale automobile circolo d'Italia (R.A.C.I.);
3. Aziende autonome per le stazioni di soggiorno, cura e turismo.
4. Ente turistico ariano;

To: Harold Cecilia, Secy.,

From: B. Gual, Italian Document Section, State.

SUBJECT: THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE

The Ministry of Popular Culture was divided into ten departments:

1. Gabinetto del Ministro.
2. Ufficio del Personale e degli Affari Generali.
3. Ufficio Amministrativo.
4. Direzione Generale per le Stampe Italiane.
5. Direzione Generale per le Stampe Strane.
6. Direzione Generale per gli scambi Culturali.
7. Direzione Generale per la Cinematografia.
8. Direzione Generale per il Teatro e per la Musica.
9. Direzione Generale per la Radiodiffusione e la Televisione.
10. Reparto per la Radiodiffusione e la Televisione.

With 550 permanent civil servants and 524 temporary employees, 251 of the permanent employees and 141 of the temporary employees are now in the North (Sole) with the Fascist Government.

Other organizations were under the direct or indirect control of the Ministry of Popular Culture. Under the direct control were the following:

1. Istituto nazionale "L.U.C.I."
2. Ente nazionale per la industria turistica (E.N.I.T.)
3. Istituto nazionale del cinema antico in Birmania;
4. Enti provinciali per il turismo;
5. Ente stampa.

and under indirect control:

1. Ente Italiano audizioni radiofoniche (A.I.R.A.)
2. Reale Automobile circolo d'Italia (A.A.C.I.);
3. Aziende autonome per le stazioni di soggiorno, cura e turismo.
4. Ente turistico siliario;

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PTO

Reprints in Cassia

-2-

6. Ente livornese;
7. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale dell'Opera di Roma;
8. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale di Genova;
9. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale "Vittorio Emanuele II" di Firenze;
10. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale "G. Verdi" di Trieste;
11. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale "La Fenice" di Venezia;
12. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale "San Carlo" di Napoli;
13. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale "Scalini" di Milano;
14. Ente autonomo del Teatro regio-ale "Vittorio Emanuele II" di Palermo;
15. Ente autonomo per gli spettacoli all'"Arena" di Verona;
16. Ente italiano per il diritto d'autore (S.I.D.A.);
17. Ente italiano per gli scambi teatrali (S.I.S.T.);
18. Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche ed alberghiere (S.N.I.T.A.);
19. Ente nazionale acquisti importazioni pellicole estere (S.N.I.I.P.);
20. Società "Amici del Giappone";
21. Ente teatrale italiano per la cultura popolare (E.T.I.);
22. Centro sperimentale per la cinematografia.

The new Under-Secretary of Press in Bonomi's Government is trying now to reorganize his office on a more simple basis, and as far as I know he will limit himself to:

1. Italian Press;
2. The theatre;
3. Movies;
4. Tourism.

The selection of personnel by the new Under-Secretary is made slowly, slowly, among the former employees of the Ministry of Popular Culture. The Under-Secretary of Press now employs 200 permanent former employees and with regard to the temporary employees, he is still awaiting instructions. Thirty former permanent employees have been discharged and the investigation of the 200 now working is still going on.

P.W.B. used to employ 101 former permanent and temporary employees of the Ministry of Popular Culture, 33 have been dropped as a result of our epuration and 6 or 10 cases are under scrutiny.

As far as I can say in the epuration we are following the same procedure as other Allied organizations.

Copy to Mr. Hayner.

Mr. Hayner.

OFFICIAL WARRIOR

J. J. J. J.

4003

7. Ente autonomo del Teatro Reale dell'Opera di Roma;
8. Ente autonomo del Teatro Carlo Felice di Genova;
9. Ente autonomo del Teatro comunale "Vittorio Emanuele II" di Firenze;
10. Ente autonomo del Teatro comunale "G. Verdi" di Trieste;
11. Ente autonomo del Teatro "La Fenice" di Venezia;
12. Ente autonomo del Teatro "San Carlo" di Napoli;
13. Ente autonomo del Teatro della "Scala" di Milano;
14. Ente autonomo del Teatro "Massimo Vittorio Emanuele III" di Palermo;
15. Ente autonomo per gli spettacoli all'"Arena" di Verona;
16. Ente italiano per il diritto d'autore (S.I.D.A.);
17. Ente italiano per gli scambi teatrali (S.I.S.T.);
18. Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche ed alberghiere (N.I.T.I.A.);
19. Ente nazionale acquisti importazioni politiche estere (N.A.I.P.E.);
20. Società "Caroli del Giappone";
21. Ente teatrale italiano per la cultura popolare (I.T.I.);
22. Centro sperimentale per la cinematografia.

The new Under-Secretary of Press in Benoni's Government is trying now to reorganize his office on a more simple basis, and as far as I know he will limit himself to:

1. Italian Press;
2. The theatre;
3. Movies;
4. Tourism.

The selection of personnel by the new Under-Secretary is made slowly, slowly, among the former employees of the Ministry of Popular Culture. The Under-Secretary of Press now employs 200 permanent former employees and with regard to the temporary employees, he is still awaiting instructions. Thirty former permanent employees have been discharged and the investigation of the 200 now working is still going on.

P.M.B. used to employ 151 former permanent and temporary employees of the Ministry of Popular Culture, 62 have been dropped as a result of our epuration and 6 or 10 cases are under scrutiny.

As far as I can say in the epuration we are following the same procedure as other allied organisations.

Copy to: Mr. Royner.
Mr. Suman.
Mr. Minifre.
File.



ITALIAN AFFAIRS (Unit 9)
- Unit No. 12.

4002

CONFIDENTIAL

CSDIC/CIE/SIL/CE/6

This report contains information on the composition of the Republican Ministry of Popular Culture.

Translation of extracts from detailed interrogation by SIL/CSDIC of an Italian.

Source No 197 SIL ref 5 0B

REMARKS

Source 197 - is an intelligent civil servant, in politics a liberal Democrat. At the time he worked for the Ministry of Popular Culture. Reliability good.

REPUBLICAN MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE (10 Jun 44)

1. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Minister: Bernardo BERNARDINI
Location: Villa MARINI at SAIO on Lake SARDA.

a) Cabinet

Chief of Cabinet: Giorgio AMBROSINI who in May replaced BERNARDINI after the latter's resignation.
Location: Villa MARINI and Villa SPERANZA at SAIO.

b) Radio Interception Service

Head of Department: CAVALIERE
Location: Town Hall (Municipality) at SAIO.
Functions: Interception is done by operators who take down the information in shorthand. The News Bulletin is then made up from the shorthand manuscript, the morning bulletin from the news intercepted during the night and the evening one from the news intercepted during the day. A copy of the bulletin is sent to:-
The Minister of Popular Culture.
All other Ministries.
The leading Government personalities.
MUSSSOLINI's Personal Secretariat.
The German Embassy.

c) Italian Press and Home Broadcasting Section

Head of Department: Dr. MICHAELI (who up to May 44 used to represent the Ministry in ROME).
Location: Villa SPERANZA at SAIO.
Functions: This office issues instructions on the preventive censorship of newspapers, directly through the Press Officials in the various Prefectures. It also gives special instructions to the Chief Editors of newspapers. All newspapers have to send a copy of their paper to this office which can if necessary make observations.

4001

4. PERSONNEL

Source 197 - is an intelligent civil servant, in politics a liberal Democrat. At one time he worked for the Ministry of Popular Culture. Reliability good.

B. REPUBLICAN MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE (15 Jun 44)1. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Minister: Fernando DE LA ROSA
Location: Villa SERRANA at SMO on Lake SMO.

a) Cabinet

Chief of Cabinet: Giuseppe AMERIGHI who in May replaced BERNARDINI after the latter's resignation.
Location: Villa SERRANA and Villa SERRANA at SMO.

b) Radio Interception Service

Head of Department: GIULIO GENTILE
Location: Tom Hall (Audiob.) at SMO.

Functions: Interception is done by operators who take down the information in shorthand. The News Bulletin is then made up from the shorthand manuscript, the morning bulletin from the news intercepted during the night and the evening one from the news intercepted during the day. A copy of the Bulletin is sent to:-

The Minister of Popular Culture.
All other Ministries.
The leading Government personalities.
MUSCONE's Personal Secretariat.
The German Embassy.

c) Italian Press and Radio Propaganda Section

Head of Department: Dr. MORGANTI (was up to May 44 used to represent the Ministry in Rome).

Location: Villa SERRANA at SMO.
Functions: This office issues instructions on the preventive censorship of newspapers, directly or through the Press Officials in the various Prefectures. It also gives special instructions to the Chief Editors of newspapers. All newspapers have to send a copy of their paper to this office which can if necessary make observations thereon to the responsible Editors.

2. OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONa) Propaganda Control Office

Director: Prof. SERRAVALLO

Location: Palazzo VENEZIA



- 2 -

CSDIC/CAT/SIA/CD 6

VENICE
JOHN DEAN
G 59605684

Location: Palazzo Volpi, Venice.
Functions: Gives instructions for the preparation of pamphlets, notices, posters and postcards and sees that these are distributed in the provinces among workers, troops, etc.

b) Propaganda Section

Head of Section: Dr Cristoforo MERCATI (who writes under the name of "Gazzetta").

Location: Villa Altieri in S. Polo.
Functions: Formerly directly under the Fascist Party Secretariat, but when the Government was transferred to the NORTH, was attached to the Ministry of Popular Culture. It collaborates with the Propaganda Control Office.

c) General Control of Entertainments (Cinemas - Theatres)

Director: Dr VENTUREMI

Location: Probably at Palazzo Volpi, Venice.

Functions: It promotes theatrical and cinematographic activities for propaganda purposes. Besides depending directly or indirectly from this office are:

(i) ANATEA: National Corporation for the import and export of films.

Director: Dr. LOBACCINI

Location: Probably at Palazzo Volpi, Venice.

(ii) UNICE: A Corporation depending directly from the Minister and indirectly from the Controller of Entertainments, President: Viro D'AMICA.

Location: Palazzo Volpi, Venice.

Functions: Production of films and photographs of current events.

d) Book Section

Director: Dr. DEL PRATO

Location: Probably at Palazzo Volpi, Venice.

Functions: The reading of all books (including those by foreign authors translated into Italian) before publication.

e) Liaison Office between the Ministry of Popular Culture and the Army

Director: Col. ALEXIO

Location: Elementary Schools, S. Polo.

Functions: Propaganda for the armed forces, military communications, control of War correspondents and censorship of their articles.

f) Foreign Broadcasting Branch

Director: Prof. MANI

Location: Castello Sforzesco, Milan.

Functions: Broadcasts in foreign languages. The German command has

MILAN
JOHN DEAN
X 23006665

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b) Propaganda Section

Head of Section: Dr. Cristoforo MERCATI (who writes under the name of "CRISTOFORO").

Location: Villa ARMANI in SILE.

Functions: Formerly directly under the Fascist Party Secretariat, but when the Government was transferred to the NORTH, was attached to the Ministry of Popular Culture. It collaborates with the Propaganda Central Office.

c) General Control of Entertainments (Cinemas - Theatres)

Director: Dr. VENTURINI

Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.

Functions: It promotes theatrical and cinematographic activities for propaganda purposes. Bodies depending directly or indirectly from this office are:

(1) EMATE: National Corporation for the import and export of films.

Director: Dr. LORENZINI

Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.

(11) ANCE: A Corporation depending directly from the Minister and indirectly from the Controller of Entertainments.

President: Mario P. R. ...

Location: Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.

Functions: Production of films and photographs of current events.

d) Book Section

Director: Dr. DEL PRATO

Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.

Functions: The reading of all books (including those by foreign authors translated into Italian) before publication.

e) Liaison Office between the Ministry of Popular Culture and the Army

Director: Col. ARZUFFO

Location: Elementary Schools, SALO.

Functions: Propaganda for the armed forces, military communications, control of war correspondents and censorship of their articles.

f) Foreign Broadcasting Branch

MILAN
10787 PLAS
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Director: Prof. NORTI

Location: Castello Sforzesco, MILAN.

Functions: Broadcasts in foreign languages. The German command has reduced these broadcasts to one hour per day. Personnel has been reduced to about 30 translators and editors.

g) Foreign Press Section

Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.

Functions: The procuring of foreign newspapers, the extracting of particularly important news, which is sent to the Ministry.

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CSDIC/STP/SP/CD 6

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES

The Ministry is almost completely under the control of the German Embassy, which is at PASARO (P. 3376): it comes under the Secretary of the Embassy, Dr. HANS KOLBE as regards the Press, and under the Consul, RUSZIN, as regards propaganda.

MILAN
STON STAN
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The Ministry also has frequent contacts with the Italian Section of the Reich Economic Ministry, directed by General LEWIS and located in Via MASCHERONI No 3, MILAN, from whom it obtains paper for the daily newspapers. Such transactions are entrusted to the Press official at the Milan Prefecture, Dr. FRANCO RUSSA.

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In normal times the Ministry of Popular Culture obtained information direct from the Press attaches to the various Embassies abroad, who collected information from the local press. At present such attaches are to be found only in BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST and SOFIA, but their information is of little value because of the great delay in transmission by post. AFTERO, the Republican Ambassador in BERLIN, is supposed to have said that he had no use for a Press attaché.

5. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND OTHER MINISTRIES.

Liaison with the Service Ministries is maintained by an officer from each of the three services. Liaison with other Ministries consists merely of sending communications for publication.

6. TREND OF PROPAGANDA

- Great stress is laid on the fact that it is a point of honour that ITALY should maintain her claims with GERMANY.
- The Ministry is constantly attacked and accused of cowardice.
- A theme often repeated in the newspapers and on the wireless is that even if the Allies bring food to the Italians of Southern Italy, in their haste they despise them.

7. METHOD OF ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPAGANDA.

Meetings are held weekly at the Villa Mellini, SALO, or in Palazzo Venezia, VIENNA, at which the Minister himself is sometimes present. The following are always present:

The Head of the Propaganda Section.

The German Consul, RUSZIN.

Col. ARZILLI, Head of the Liaison Office, and the liaison officers from the three Forces.

A number of newspaper editors.

At these meetings problems regarding the publication of current affairs are discussed and suggestions approved regarding the printing of notices, posters, pamphlets and propaganda booklets.

C. NEWSPAPERS

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In normal times the Ministry of Popular Culture obtained information direct from the Press attached to the various Embassies abroad, who collected information from the local press. At present such attaching are to be found only in Milan, from whom it obtains paper for the daily newspapers. Such transactions are entrusted to the Press official at the Milan Prefecture, Dr. Franco FUSCA.

5. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND OTHER MINISTRIES

Liaison with the Service Ministries is maintained by an officer from each of the three services. Liaison with other Ministries consists merely of sending communications for publication.

6. FIELD OF PROPAGANDA

- Great stress is laid on the fact that it is a point of honour that Italy should maintain her alliance with Germany.
- The Rerarchy is constantly attacked and accused of cowardice.
- A theme often repeated in the newspapers and on the wireless is that even if the Allies bring food to the Italians of Southern Italy, in their hearts they despise them.

7. METHODS OF ISSUING INFORMATION FOR PROPAGANDA

Meetings are held weekly at the Villa Arona, SMO, or in Palazzo Volpi, Venice, at which the Minister himself is sometimes present. The following are always present:

The Head of the Propaganda Section.
The German Consul, MURRAY.
Col. ALILO, Head of the Liaison Office, and the liaison officers from the three Forces.
A number of newspaper editors.

At these meetings problems regarding the publication of current news are discussed and suggestions approved regarding the printing of notices, posters, pamphlets and propaganda booklets.

C. NEWSPAPERS

MILAN	Corriere della Sera	Chief Editor	Emmiano AUGUSTI
	Repubblica Francista	"	Carlo BORSANI
TURIN	Gazzetta del Popolo	"	Enio M. GRAY
	La Stampa	"	Giacinto PENTECOSTO

/VENICE

OSD/CIT/ST/OP 6

VENICE Il Gazzettino

Chief Editor: GILIO MARONI

BRESCIA Brescia Repubblica

" " CONRADO ROYCHI

The journalist Telesio INTERLANDI, formerly editor of the Roman newspaper "Governo", is now at INTERLANDI on leave from, in charge of publications on racial problems.

18 Aug 44

for Anthony W. Mayor
 for R. P. E. EDWARDS,
 Lt. Col.,
 Comdt OSDIC, GME.

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2005年5月10日 星期四

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2019年12月15日

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DATE	
AUTHOR	
SUBJECT	
ABSTRACT	

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1294

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

12/11/12/12/12

Page 5
Petitioner
H.R.

1295

Area Major Command 21/8

7682

Pal. Sec.

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ
c/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 700, U. S. Army

S 204

29 August, 1944.

SUBJECT: Future "G" Force Activities.

TO : See overleaf.

1. All agencies are requested to prepare and submit to G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ their list of intelligence objectives in the following zones:-

Zone I

TURIN
MILAN

Zone II

VERONA
BRESCIA
VENICE
TRIESTE

2. It is particularly requested that all information already available be given on each objective submitted. This should include, whenever possible:-

- a. Full Italian name of objective.
- b. Location with map reference to town plan.
- c. Physical description of the building.
- d. Suggested number of troops required to seize and guard.
- e. Any other intelligence data available, including names of leading personalities connected with the objective.

This unit will then endeavour to complete and amplify the information submitted and prepare it in operational form.

3. Agencies are further requested to indicate the categories which they consider applicable to their own list of submitted objectives. This is to facilitate calculations as to the number of troops necessary for the operation.

Category I : Seize and guard with troops.

Category II : Seize, clear and lock.

Category III : Agency assumes responsibility for seizing.

4546

520.2

1. All Agencies are requested to prepare and submit to G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) their list of intelligence objectives in the following zones:-

Zone I

TURIN
MILAN

Zone II

VERONA
INTESCIA
VENICE
TRIESTE

2. It is particularly requested that all information already available be given on each objective submitted. This should include, whenever possible:-

- a. Full Italian name of objective.
- b. Location with map reference to town plan.
- c. Physical description of the building.
- d. Suggested number of troops required to seize and guard.
- e. Any other intelligence data available, including names of leading personalities connected with the objective.

This unit will then endeavour to complete and amplify the information submitted and prepare it in operational form.

3. Agencies are further requested to indicate the categories which they consider applicable to their own list of submitted objectives. This is to facilitate calculations as to the number of troops necessary for the operation.

Category I : Seize and guard with troops.

Category II : Seize, clear and lock.

Category III : Agency assumes responsibility for seizing.

4. Returns will be rendered by 9 September, 1944. MIL returns will be made.

[Signature]
A. J. COVENTRY,
Major, G.S.,
for B.G.S. (I),
H.Q., A.A.I.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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A.A.I., D.B.G.S.(I)
 G.S.I.(a)
 G.S.I.(b)
 G.S.I.(s)
 C.S.O.

Survey

Engineers

Tao "A" Force

K.A.A.F. (Advanced Intelligence)
 A.C.C., (Information Division)

Political Section

Civil Censorship Group

Monuments and Fine Arts

Sub-Commission

"D" Section.

R.N., (Advanced Intelligence)
 U.S.M., H.I.U. (Advanced Intelligence)

I.S.L.D.

S.C.I.

O.S.S.

B.C.S.

C.I.C.

A.L.S.O.S.

JICA, R.A.A.C.

S.I.L.O.

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G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ
c/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 794, U. S. Army

18 July, 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT G-21

SUBJECT: Locations of ITALIAN Ministries.

TO : See Distribution below.

The GERMAN document found in ROME, and which is reproduced exactly over-
leaf, is a copy (abschrift) showing the location of ITALIAN ministries in
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Captain, G.S.,
Commanding.

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SUBJECT: Locations of ITALIAN Ministries.

TO : See Distribution below.

The GERMAN document found in ROME, and which is reproduced exactly overleaf, is a copy (abschrift) showing the location of ITALIAN ministries in NORTHERN ITALY. In the last column appears the name of the minister or some other prominent ITALIAN official.

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Absehnist.

Kaiser-Güte r ital. Aristokratien

Reichsamtliche Consiglio dei Ministri	Desammas-Dojliaco	Barracu
Antoni Rateri	Salb, Valla-Schönfeld	Mazzolini
Interimso Cabimetto	Kaiserin, Alvaro Kaiserin	Buffarini
" Ministerio	Ernesti, Alvaro Ernesti	
Alteia Italiana	Oronona	
Cabimetto	Oronona	
Ernesti	Ernesti, Alvaro Ernesti	Pellegrini
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Trevino	Barbara
" " " " " " " "	Belluno Ernesti	Verini
" " " " " " " "	Ernesti del Orone	Volla
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Padova	Diagini
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Venezia	Romano
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Trevino	Moroni
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Tarone	Livovand
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Padova	Ory
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Salb (Valla Amidei)	Bioncescuma
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Venezia	
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Ernesti	Kicci
Reichs Nationale Exorcisto	Venezia	Gay

Reichs Nationale Exorcisto, Kaiserin, Alvaro Ernesti (Alvaro Ernesti), Genua, Trieste, Livorno, Turin, Venezia, Bora, Livorno, I. Bono, Milano, Laibach

Montebello (Rom, Nettuno, Maseri (Abwicklungsstelle Bogen), Genoa, Trieste,
Verona, Turin, Venezia, Bogen, Livorno, S. Remo, Milano, Lathach

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CENTRAL D SECTION
PAB UNIT 12 AFHQ
APC 512

SECRET

17 JULY 1944

Subject Former Grand Council Member's Report of Last Meeting, July 24, 1943

TO
Mr. Minifie
Caccia & Reber, A.C.C.
PWE, London
OWI, Washington
PWB Unit 1, Attention Mr. Radford
Allied Advisory Council
Sir Noel Charles
Alexander Kirk

Attached is a copy of an eye witness report of the final meeting of the Grand Council July 24, 1943. It is believed to have been written by a member of the Grand Council, possibly Bottai.

(on Spencer's report)
for IVOR MANLEY
Major
Chief D Section Italy

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45044

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Security Section
Psychological Warfare Branch
AO 512 Unit 12 H.C. Army

Central "D" Section, Italy (Altered) July 15, 1944

JULY 24, 1943 - A FASCIST GRAND COUNCILOR LISTED AS VALL

(The following account of the last sitting of the Fascist Grand Council had reached A.F.S. D Section from a reliable Italian informant, who guarantees that it is from the son of a Fascist Grand Councilor now in hiding in liberated Italy. A request has been made that, for the moment, neither the identity of the informant nor that of the Fascist Grand Councilor or should be revealed.)

At about five p.m. on Saturday, July 24, the members of the Grand Council began to gather at the Palazzo Venezia. There is no apparent nervousness; the new members on each their tension in a lukewarm sense of curiosity. At 17:15 Mussolini wearing the militia uniform, came out of his room. It was heard afterwards that on his way he is supposed to have said to someone (Scorza and De Cesare were with him) "are we walking into a trap?" Everyone taken his place, the face goes toward his while Scorza gives the final salute. After the roll call Mussolini opens a thick folder containing documents which from the standpoint of discussion, tolerance, answers and confidence he handles with the customary expertise of an experienced journalist, and one who, having all the information in his possession, has the power hand.

He begins his speech (17). Says that the meeting of the Grand Council was called in accordance with the wishes of the Regional Fascist members who accompanied him on Friday July 16 and who had explained that their visit was a manifestation of their awareness of their responsibility.

"First of all let us talk about the Command"; reads long extracts from a letter addressed to him by Marshal Badoglio, dated May 3, 1940. In previous conversations the two men had discussed the problem concerning the war command. In that letter Badoglio, having examined the various solutions given to him by other countries, proposed the one later adopted, by which the King conferred on the Duke Military powers; on the other hand, Badoglio stated, this measure did not violate the prerogatives of the King, whose command even during the war 1915-1918 had a truly symbolic character. A circular by Badoglio himself, dated June (only a few days before the short campaign on the eastern front) confirmed with specific orders the organization of the Superior Command.

The original of the Superior Command having been made clear.

(The following account of the last sitting of the Fascist Grand Council had reached U.S. D Section from a reliable Italian informant, who guarantees that it is from the son of a Fascist agent confidant now in hiding in liberated Italy. A request has been made that, for the moment, neither the identity of the informant nor that of the Fascist Grand Council or should be revealed.)

It about five o'clock on Saturday, July 24, the members of the Grand Council began to gather at the Palazzo Venezia, where is no apparent nervousness; the new members of each their position in a lukewarm series of exercises. At 17:15 Mussolini wearing the militia uniform, comes out of his room. It was learned afterwards that on his way he is supposed to have said to someone (Gorras had he himself were with him) "are we walking into a trap? Everyone takes his place, the three men cover him while Gorras gives the final salute. After the roll call Mussolini opens a thick folder containing documents which from the excitement of discussion, collected, answers and consultation he handles with the customary expertise of an experienced journalist, and one who, having all the information in his possession, has the necessary hand.

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"First of all let us talk about the demand"; reads long extract from a letter addressed to him by Marshal Badoglio, dated May 3, 1944. In previous conversations the two men had discussed the problem concerning the war command. In that letter Badoglio, having examined the various relations given to him by other countries, proposed the one later adopted, by which the King conferred on the Fascist military powers; on the other hand, Badoglio stated, this measure did not violate the prerogatives of the King, whose command even during the war 1915-1918 had a truly symbolic character. A circular by Badoglio himself, dated 3 June (only a few days before the short campaign on the eastern front) confirmed with specific orders the organization of the Superior Command.

The origin of the Superior Command having been made clear, 4383 the political value of this point - a clear to all who knew Mussolini's tactics in such matters (compromise Badoglio before the King and the Army). The King describes the initial operations of the Superior Command, which even been as known for its reluctance, ambiguity, falterhood. He said: "I discussed this war" partly because it was impossible to give on news and

SECRET

and reports coming from various fronts, all across the sea. Actually, the strategic decision to operate in such far-away theatres could have been made by none other than the commanders, on whose initiative one had to rely, while the action of the supreme command was limited, and reduced to strictly technical tasks, such as aiming, logistics and supplies. "Personally," he affirmed with a slight tone of pride (the only time in the entire meeting) "I directed only the naval battle of Pantelleria, which took place while Cavallaro was absent. I vindicated him in full." The war, he continued, has taken a turn decidedly unfavorable to us, since September 1942, when we were at El Alamein in the El Matruh decision. It was then that some of Rommel's mental deliberations were discovered. He is a magnificent soldier and leader on the tactical field, always in the front lines with the soldiers, unlike Marshal Triantafyllidis, who kept himself chained 450 km. from the battle front."

In this regard he notes that when he, Mussolini, wanted to move 50 km. forward, his vice-commander seemed rash, so deeply was the idea of a rear-front rooted in the mind of the command. "Not so quick nor so unhesitating," said Rommel reveal himself in strategic concepts".

When Mussolini was down there, on his useless trip to Libya, he sensed that that position was too far ahead of the enemy lines, and that in the long run it would have become "useless, or dangerous. He advised Rommel, through Cavallaro, to retreat to Birba, Matruh, or even farther back, where with the back well protected, it would have been possible to create a strong basis for launching a new offensive. But in vain. He even gave orders to begin work for a new line, but Rommel grew obstinate on the theme of the defensibility of the positions in El Alamein.

With the English attack on El Alamein on 23 October, the initiative passed over to the enemy. He took advantage of our technical inferiority which was proven about by the extraordinary operations of his submarine against our convoys. In Russia, too, the enemy took the initiative. In the Middle East, he even knew the date of attack, October 22, knowing he could take advantage of the XX anniversary. Rommel's situation was very difficult. He was ordered all too lightly, due to his position in the conflicting orders from the German and from British. Meanwhile the landing in Sicily took place. "Historic fact of capital importance", the result of the error of not following his judgment, and thereby all of France including "masses in North Africa. An attempt also could have been made to reach the matter. On this occasion the behavior of the troops on the whole was good.

Next he talks of Pantelleria. "It was I who invented..." 45423

and was limited, and refused to strictly technical tasks, such as aiming, logistics and supplies. "Personally," he affirms with a slight tone of pride (the only place in the entire meeting) "I directed only the novel battle of entrenchment, which took place while Javaliero was absent. I vindicated him in full." The war, he continues, has taken a turn decidedly unfavorable to us, since September 1943, when we were at El Alamein in the El Alamein defense. It was then that some of Rommel's tactical deficiencies were discovered. As in a magnificent soldier and leader in the tactical field, always in the front lines with the soldiers, unlike most generals, and kept himself within 450 km. from the battle front.

In the 1943 defense he notes that after us, Rommel, went to move 50 km. forward, his movement seemed rash, so clearly was the idea of a frontal attack in the hands of the command. "Not so quick nor so successful, did Rommel reveal himself in strategic concepts".

When Rommel was down there, on his own side to Libya, he sensed that the situation was too far ahead of the enemy lines, and that in the long run it would have become precarious, or dangerous. He advised Rommel, through Javaliero, to retreat to a safe place, or even farther back, where with the back well protected, it would have been possible to create a strong basis for launching a new offensive. But in vain. He even gave orders to begin work for a new line, but Rommel grew obstinate on the thesis of the defensibility of the position in El Alamein.

With the English attack on El Alamein on 23 October, the initiative passed over to the enemy. He took advantage of our technical inferiority which was shown in 1941 by the extraordinary operations of his submarines against our convoys. In Libya, too, the enemy took the initiative. For this, he even knew the date of attack, October 23, during the period of the security of the XX anniversary. Rommel's situation was very bad. He was abandoned all too lightly due to his position and the conflicting orders from the German and French High Commands. Meanwhile the landing in Tunisia took place, "historic fact of tactical importance", the result of the error of not following his judgment, and Germany all of France including possessions in North Africa. An attack also could have been made to secure the situation. On this occasion the behavior of the troops on the whole was good.

Next he talks of entrenchment. "It was I who invented entrenchment. Until 1943 only the police knew about it. Having given orders to defend it, against the opposition of Undersecretary Valle and his technicians, who called it difficult from difficulty, the military soon declared that it could not be taken. There were only two beaches where landing was considered the airfields were all underground. The validity of these defenses is proved by

to form a line from Brindisi to Bronte Mendicino, Cireale to Bronte, with the Isonzo division, and what's left of the Asseletta, the Asseletta and the German divisions and armored units which are moving from Calabria.

He comes back to the facts of the battle. "It was taken intact," Admiral Muscolini had the stronghold blown up at the first indication of landing danger. What does the General Staff predict for the imminent future? Perhaps an attack on Calabria, where there are 150,000 men, or on the Euboean and other islands, which the General Staff believes is probable, but a long range maneuver, or on France or the Balkans. In Calabria there are only two places suitable for a landing: Reggio and Crotone. Maybe they are thinking of a combined attack on a landing in Corsica, Golfo degli Aranci.

With figures having no relation to the needs, he shows that the Germans are sending materials, but the manner in which the figures are given does not give a basis for comparisons, nor for judgment. How many German units are there in Italy? One assault brigade which is being transferred from the Arunzio zone to Calabria. One armored division in Corsica; another in the Orvieto Chiusi zone. Another region. One on the Salento. (These figures are inaccurate) I'm talking from the total he talks of nine motorized armored German divisions. And everybody has the feeling that there is something that cannot be grasped. He adds, but slightly, that our allies are disposed to send us "more divisions" but ordinary ones, that is not armored, and he goes over a letter from the Fuehrer on the subject.

He refers to the defense of Rome, to the German defenses, to the new fortification system "under way", to the Gran Cassio, Cassubio, Ariete divisions and to a little division all of which are already gathering in Rome territory. He mentions four, but concludes that the divisions around Rome are six. He talks of two divisions which are being moved from France occupied territory to Puglia.

The military review is over: It leaves a sense of imprecision, of reticence, of deliberate misrepresentation, or of more or less conscious falsification, of incapacity to grasp so complex a reality. (20)

Then Muscolini comes to the point. Until now he has talked with his eyes closed on the documents; (and his features against the cold clarity of the bulb seem disharmonized in a contrast of violent clarity and dark shadows. Now, then, but the transfiguration of man: already viewed from the life beyond, in that grimling struggle to fix himself in history which alienates him from himself and from his own, out of all sympathetic contact with the

Admiral Leonardi had the strongest blow up at the time of the imminent danger. What does the General Staff predict for the imminent future? Perhaps an attack on Gardia, where there are 160,000 men, or on the Salsomaggi and other Italian islands, to prevent the landing on the peninsula, which the General Staff believes is probable, but a long range maneuver, or on France or the Balkans. In Gardia there are only two places suitable for a landing: Capri and Ischia. Maybe they are thinking of a combined attack on a landing in Corsica, Golfo degli Aranci.

His figures having no relation to the needs, he shows that the Germans did send new materials, but the manner in which the figures are given does not give a basis for comparisons, nor for judgment. How many German units are there in Italy? The assault brigade which is being transferred from the Anzio sector to Gardia. One armored division in Corsica; another is the Orvieto Chini (ante Armata) region. One in the Salento. (These figures are inaccurate) I am leaving from them to the total he talks of nine motorized armored German divisions. And everybody has the feeling that there is something that cannot be guessed. He adds, but lightly, that our allies are expected to send us "more divisions" but ordinary ones, that is not armored, and he goes over a letter from the Fuehrer on the subject.

He refers to the defense of Rome, to the Coastal defenses, to the new fortification system "under way", to the Gran Sasso, to the Ubio, to the divisions and to a little division all of which are gradually gathering in Rome territory. He mentions four, but concludes that the divisions around Rome are six. He talks of two divisions which are being moved from French occupied territory to Sicily.

The military review is over; it leaves a sense of imprecision, of reticence, of deliberate misrepresentation, or of more or less conscious falsification, or incapacity to grasp so complex a reality. (2°)

Then Mussolini comes to the point. Until now he has talked with his eyes glued on the documents; (and his features against the cold clear light of the bulb seem dishumanized in a contrast of violent clarity and dark shadows. Not man, but the transfiguration of man; already viewed from the life beyond, in that grimacing struggle to fix himself in history which alienates him from himself and from his own, out of all sympathetic contact with the incisive crudeness of his mask.)

Now he raises his head against the light which envelops all of us; his mask drops and on his face all the signs of a will now resigned to the grim reckoning, are revealed. Even his voice lacks the provoking deriding tremor of assault; he stumbles in that silent "s", which has always been cause of inner rages; of uncontrolled anger; "massimo" he whistles at the "s" of his

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volent error, and it seemed even then that in this pronunciation the idea of his brain had been sealed. Now he is strangely calm, his customary phraseology sounds inert, without emotion he says: "Now the problem is posed, not or rather unconditional and under or resistance to the end."

The dilemma is presented to us that in certain classes, particularly the upper classes, much less among the people it is certain that the people are not enthusiastic about the war and it is also certain that "no war is ever popular". An anthology could be made of the anti-war literature or otherwise, made in the war 1915-1918 to prove this uncertainty. Even the Ethiopian campaign which seemed to swell with no other fear, suffered in December 1935, after the Ethiopian ambuscade, a defeatist wave. The war of our times, he continues, demands such sacrifices from the civilian population that outside of enthusiasm cannot be expected. "Is there the will to fight?" This is the point, arms have been given; and to prove this he reads a letter from Adelino Rocca, of Ansaldo, stating that Italian industry has supplied 5000 "Boche di fuoco" and this figure, in comparison with the entire British fleet was on the eve of the war. In 1933 when the entire British fleet was written to me enthusiastically, the will to win surfaced. He dis- the editor-in-chief, the will to win surfaced. He dis- to him at that time that they must give in the end against the ad- agreed and was vindicated against the British and against the ad- versaries at home. Among them was Del Croix. He stated daily: England is not making war on fascism but on Italy. England wants to occur Italy and has her occurred."

The book finished his speech, which did not stir a soul; ver- here he is aware of this. He took the floor and makes a warm defense of the army. Yes, we must resist, but with a clear, attainable purpose. Have we the means? That is our situation with regard to air force and the fleet? Mussolini replies promptly that at Addis Ababa, certainly the air force were hit. He had tried in vain to win the technicians over to his thesis against large ships, battle- ships. Even without reaching naval power, he says that they should have increased the air force, which is exactly what we lack. De Bono concludes with a reference to the Germans, giving particular occasion to interrupt to insert the widespread confidence against them. And he relates an episode which took place the day before at Preseati. Still on his intervention, he insisted that the technical discussion is not possible without calling to the Grand Council the head of the General Staff, General Ambrosio.

De Vecchi talks mostly of the army problems, with frequent interruptions from Mussolini. But the discussion fails to reach the technical point.

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the technical and

The dilemma is presented to us that in certain classes, particularly the upper classes, much less among the people it is certain that the people are not enthusiastic about the war and it is also certain that "no war is ever popular". An anthology could be made of the speeches in England or otherwise, made in the war 1915 to 1918 to prove this unpopularity. Even the "The Times" campaign seemed to swell with no-day fear, suffered in December 1915, after the Dardanelles campaign, a defeatist wave. The wars of our times, he continues, demand such sacrifices from the civilian population that enthusiasts of enthusiasm cannot be expected. His theme will be to fight. This is the point, arms have been given; and to prove this he takes a lecture from Goethe's "Faust" of 1808, stating that Italian industry has supplied 5000 "Boches" and this figure, in comparison with the other war, seems to be satisfactory. In 1935 when the British English fleet was on the Mediterranean, the will to win sufficed. Mussolini had written to him at that time that they must live in the entertainment; he disagreed and was vindicated against the English and against the adventures at home. Among them was Benito. He stated that England is not making war on Fascism but on Italy. England wants a century before her to be a sure of her five years. She wants to occupy Italy and cover her occupied.

The book finished his speech, which did not stir a soul; nevertheless he is aware of this. He says takes the floor and makes a warm defense of the army. Yes, we must resist, but with a clear, attainable purpose. Have we the means? That is our situation with regard to air force and the fleet? Mussolini replies promptly that at Addalena, certainly the war the work of sides, we lost three cruisers. At Brescia two ships were hit. He had tried in vain to win the technicians over to his thesis against large ships, battle-ships. Even without reaching naval power, he says that they should have increased the light craft, which is exactly what we lack. De Beno concludes with a reference to the Germans, giving Perinacci occasion to interrupt to lament the widespread diffidence against them. And he relates an episode which took place the day before at Prasca. Still on his interruption, Perinacci says that the technical assistance is not possible without calling to the Grand Council the head of the General Staff, General Ambrosio.

De Vecchi talks mostly of the army problems, with frequent interruptions from Mussolini. But the discussion fails to reach the essential point.

4000
Bottai takes the floor. He will not discuss the technical and military problems in which he is not competent (30). Certainly the presence here of General Ambrosio, who could be sent here the same as other technicians on other occasions, would be of invaluable service. Above all, in order to overcome the sense of uneasiness resulting from the evident discrepancies between the figures given

- 5 -

by the Luce and I see that I am out from the general staff. "But I," he said, "will defer the question to the time when, if we so wish, General Marshall will call me. For the present, a politician, I shall talk of nothing; that I regret, and not I alone, that this meeting has been called only now, after a vacation of three years".

Politics suggest to him three different proposals or statements:

1) The thesis of the General staff according to which the enemy would move from occupied Italy to the peninsula, does not convince him. The enemy will have to choose between a long range strategic directive, which would bring him to southern France or to the heart of the Balkans, and a directive of a tactical nature which would lead him to the occupation of Italy. Undoubtedly the former would be more profitable strategically, but on longer term; the latter, on a shorter term would be more profitable tactically. Will the enemy be able to resist the temptation of immediate gain in prestige resulting from the latter, when not even Hitler himself, once on the Channel front, hesitated with his victorious army, could resist the lure of Paris? Italy means Rome, and this in a war which, according to him, is defined as a war of "religion" will offer England the possibility of occupying simultaneously the seat of two religions, the two thousand year old Catholic religion, and the twenty year old "political" religion of Fascism.

2) This conviction that the enemy is interested in occupying the peninsula, leads me to consider the possibilities for defense which you have summarily described "the Italy prepared for the impact?" This question alone gives an accurate sense of the importance of the Luce's war or peace. All then having come here, all of us believe and are firmly convinced of the necessity of resistance, and we must confess, anyway I must, that your report gives us the impression that a technically effective defense of the peninsula is not possible. You, yourself, gave a negative answer to the question you put before us. Your report was a hard blow to our last illusions, of hopes, or certainties.

3) The Luce on the one hand has listed a series of difficulties which affect the structure of the Supreme Command; on the other he has listed his suggestions or orders for plans, or for building or operational projects, which the Germans in the Supreme Command did not take into consideration, or did not need. This means that between the two lobes of the brains of a nation at war there is no equilibrium, no accord, no harmony; and that the political side of the command lacks or lacks the influence necessary to impose its decisions upon the technical side. Everywhere, a worn groove at the very fibres of our command system.

Grandi non ha mai visto...

three years".

Politics suggest to him three different processes or states:

1) The thesis of the General Staff according to which the enemy would move from occupied Sicily to the peninsula, does not convince him. The enemy will have to choose between a long range strategic direction, which would bring him to southern France, or to the heart of the Balkans, and a directive of a tactical nature which would lead him to the occupation of Italy. Undoubtedly the former would be more profitable strategically, but on longer term; the latter, on a shorter term would be more profitable tactically. Will the enemy be able to assist the creation of immediate gain in prestige resulting from the latter, when not even Hitler himself, once on the Channel facing England with his victorious army, could resist the lure of a quick Italy seems home. And this in a war which Mussolini has defined as a war of "religion" would offer him the possibility of outwitting simultaneously the most of two religions, the two thousand year old Catholic religion, and the twenty year old political religion of Fascism.

2) This conviction that the enemy is interested in occupying the peninsula, leads us to consider the possibilities for defense which you have summarily described "an Italy prepared for the instant". This question alone gives an accurate sense of the illusion posed by the lines: War or peace? Will then having come here, all of us believe and are firmly convinced of the necessity of resistance, and we must confess, anyway I must, that your report gives us the impression that a technically effective defense of the peninsula is not possible. You, yourself, gave a negative answer to the question you put before us. Your report was a hard blow to our last illusions, or hopes, or certainties.

3) The Luce on the one hand has listed a series of difficulties which affect the structure of the supreme command; on the other he has listed his suggestions or orders for plans, or for building or operational projects, which the Germans in the supreme command did not take into consideration, or did not heed. This means that between the two lobes of the brain of a nation at war there is no equilibrium, no accord, no harmony; and that the political side of the command lacks or lacks the influence necessary to impose its decisions upon the technical side. Everywhere, a warm snows at the very fibres of our command system.

Grandi now gets up and reads forthwith the Order of the Day which he and the others propose for a vote of the Grand Council. The Order of the Day is the following: 5) The Grand Council of Fascism having met in this hour of supreme crisis, first of all turns its thoughts to the heroic fighters who side by side with the strong men of Sicily, etc.; having examined the international situation

- 7 -

ation and the political and military conduct of the war, proclaims the sacred right of all Italians to defend it, to cost the unity, independence, liberty of the mother country, fruits of the sacrifices and efforts of four generations, from the Risorgimento to the present, life and future of the Italian people -- affirms the necessity for the moral and physical union of all Italians in this grave hour, declares for the destiny of the nation; declares that for this purpose immediate reconstruction of all state functions is necessary, assigning to the Crown, the Government, Parliament, the Corporations, those tasks and responsibilities established by our statutory and constitutional laws. It invites the Government to see the majesty of the King, to whom the loyal and confident heart of the entire nation turns, that he assume for the honor and safety of the entire other country, together with the effective command of the armed land, sea and air forces, according to Article 5 of the Statute, also the supreme initiative and decision which our institutions have conferred upon him and which in all our national history have always been the glorious heritage of our August Savoie Dynasty".

Grimal describes him with high fervor, with all detail, with expressive rhetorical assonances. He regrets the same regret as Bottai for failure to call the Grand Council meeting in the last three years. He too interprets the King's report as implying the inevitability of defeat. Then he takes up the vast theme of the politico-moral situation of Fascism in the country. His attack mounts in tone, grows bitter, aims implacably. He takes to task dictatorship, in its duration and in its degradations which changed the face of our head. Our head is not the same as Achille Starace's. He just abandons the narrow, stupid slogan "fascist war". In this question he is at protest against the insult launched by the Minister of Popular Culture -- it may seem a mere detail but it is not -- to our history from the Risorgimento to the present, when he intimated to the journalists not to refer to them in writing about the Sicilian events. He comes back to the criticism of the "historically immoral dictatorship". "It is dictatorship which has lost the war". This poses the question of responsibility which leads him to reopen the "discorso del risorgimento". And he exclaims, "it is not enough that you take the responsibility we are in it too. The country is in it. And remember that we have not been set aside, powerless to act, simply because the Grand Council has been closed. What have you done in the 17 years in which you have kept the three ministries of the armed forces? The Crown was smothered and could not act, prerogatives were taken away from it. He so sured the effects of dictatorship to 1942, after 10 years of government. The same organ now was beyond the grasp of the 1929/1932 government when beside himself there were Rooco, Balbo, Bottai, and Ciano. Going back to the Government of

the present, life and future of the Italian people. It affirms the necessity for the moral and physical union of all Italians in this grave hour, decisive for the destiny of the nation; declares that for this purpose immediate reorganization of all state functions is necessary, assigning to the Crown, the Government, Parliament, the Corporations, those tasks and responsibilities established by our statutory and constitutional laws. It invites the Government to ask His Majesty the King, to whom the loyal and confident heart of the entire nation turns, that he assume for the honor and safety of the entire Italian country, together with the effective command of the armed land, sea and air forces, according to Article 5 of the Statute, also the supreme initiative and decision which our institutions have conferred upon him and which in all our national history have always been the glory and heritage of our August Savoia Dynasty".

Grandi described him with high fervor, with eloquence, with expressive rhetorical passion. Expresses the same regret as Bottai for failure to call the Grand Council meeting in the last three years. He too interprets the King's report as implying the inevitability of defeat. When he takes up the vast theme of the politico-moral situation of Fascism in the country. His attack mounts in tone, grows bitter, aims irresistibly. He takes to task dictatorship, its duration and in its degradations which changed the face of our Regime. Our Regime is not the same as "Chilla Ste- race's. We just abandon the narrow, stupid slogan "Fascist war". A this question he just protest against the insult launched by the Minister of Popular Culture -- it may seem a mere detail but it is not -- to our history from the disorganized to the above, when he intimated to the journalists not to refer to them in writing about the Sicilian episode. He comes back to the criticism of the "historically immoral dictatorship". "It is dictatorship which has lost the war". This raises the question of responsibility which leads him to beseech the "disgraced delinquents", and he exclaims, "it is not enough that you take the responsibility we are in it too. The country is in it. And remember that we have not been set aside, powerless to act, simply because the Grand Council has been closed. But have you done in the 17 years in which you have kept the three ministries of the armed forces? The Crown was seattered and could not act, prerogatives were taken away from it. He assured the effects of dictatorship up to 1942, after 10 years of Government. The same organ now was beyond the grasp of the 1929/1933 Government when beside himself there were Mussolini, Salvi, and Ciano. Going back to the Government, after ten years I became frightened. It is not true, he affirms, that the Council of Ministers is a purely administrative organ. He raises some parts of Scorza's last speech which attempted to pierce the crust of dictatorship, appealing to all Italians. He concludes that at this point all must be said, if we want to "obey in purity". He recalls one of his conversations with Gombosi:

in Germany, on the principles predominating there, of mutual loyalty between the rulers and his followers. "We swore fidelity to the head, the head faithful to the followers." He recalls the same speech from the balcony of Palazzo Chigi, in 1924 which culminated in the country's cry of "Fate, of faith of loyalty; verify the Nation, verify all factions, live the country!"

Grandi's speech blew over like a stray wind. Mussolini listened with but butting an eyelid, absorbed in his speech, his hand before his eyes to protect them against the strong light.

Molaveid who under the blow had turned white and lips, intervenes for "personal reasons" "Hello" and complaining.

It is now Ciano's turn and says that the necessity to resist "all possible limits" is evident. He wants to make clear the Mussolinian position of loyalty to the ruler. Naturally he means those with Germany. How did the alliance arise? It was twice requested by the Germans. Hitler wrote of it to Mussolini the first time at the moment of the review in Berlin in 1936. Mussolini tried to evade the question. Until 1939 he thought that with such an alliance Germany's race toward war might be slowed. "It was in 1939 that you agreed to sign the alliance, when Hitler committed himself not to stir up questions that might lead to war". It can be clearly seen from documents now that while we were signing this implicit alliance commitment, the German General Staff had already set the date for the attack on Poland. They neither advised nor consulted us. At Salzburg, in 1938 Ciano brought Hitler a letter from the Luce describing the conditions of the Italian army. They were such that an outbreak of hostilities before 1941-42 was inadvisable. You never concealed anything from the ally but our loyal warnings were thrown to the wind. The Germans set the powder on fire ahead of us, against every law and agreement with us. And they followed this method throughout the war. All attacks following that on Poland were communicated to us at the last moment: from Belgium to France, "acknowledged" with which Ciano had stayed until after the attack announced this at four o'clock that same morning. Precisely while German troops were crossing the borders; the attack against Russia was announced in the style of Prince Bismarck. This last fact was all the more serious since Mussolini had insisted with the allies upon the advisability of converting the non-aggression pact with the Russians into an alliance. "In other words our loyalty was never retracted. Very accusation of betrayal made by the Germans against us could be incontrovertibly reversed. In any case we would not be betrayers, but betrayed".

After Ciano, Farinacci, who presents and reads his order of the day, the first paragraph of which reviews the necessity for assistance, the duty to keep faith with the German alliance, and his own independence and judgment? Against Ciano's thesis, he makes an impassioned attack.

44386

Grand's speech blew over like a stormy wind. Mussolini listened without batting an eyelash, absorbed in his bench, his hands before his eyes to protect them against the strong light.

Mussolini who under the blow had turned white and limp, intervened for personal reasons "Hello" had complained.

It is now clear's turn who says that the necessity to resist "the all terrible" is evident. He wants to make clear the Mussolinian affirmation of loyalty to "us". Naturally he wants those with Germany. How did the alliance arise? It was twice requested by the Germans. Hitler spoke of it to Mussolini the first time at the naval review in Naples in 1936. Mussolini tried to evade the question. Until 1939 he thought that with such an alliance Germany's race toward war might be stopped. "It was in 1939 that you agreed to sign the alliance, when Hitler committed himself not to stir up questions that might lead to war". It can be clearly seen from documents now that while we were signing this implicit alliance commitment, the German General Staff had already set the date for the attack on Poland. They neither advised nor consulted us. At Salzburg, in 1939, Ciano brought Hitler a letter from the Duce deprecating the conditions of the Italian army. They were such that an outbreak of hostilities before 1941-42 was inadvisable. You never conceal anything from the ally but our loyal warnings were thrown to the wind. The Germans set the powder on fire ahead of time, against every track and agreement with us. And they followed this method throughout the war. All attacks following that on Poland were communicated to us at the last moment: from Belgium to France, Ackermann, with whom Ciano had stayed until after midnight announced this at four o'clock that same morning. Precisely while German troops were crossing the borders; the attack against Russia was announced in the style of Prince Bismarck. This last fact was all the more serious since Mussolini had insisted with the allies upon the advisability of converting the non-aggression pact with the Russians into an alliance. "In other words our loyalty was never retroceded. Every accusation of betrayal made by the Germans against us could be incontrovertibly reversed. In any case we would not be betrayers, but betrayed".

After Ciano, Farinacci, who presents and reads his Order of the day, the first paragraph of which reviews the necessity for resistance, the duty to keep faith with the German alliance, and... 785016 433

He too touches on the theme of criticism of the party, raising his own independence and judgment? Against Ciano's thesis, he makes an impassioned defense of the Germans. His deep voice, his massive frame, the technical gesture of his artificial forearm, lend his speech a grave tone, like an assault machine launched for a breakthrough. But the arguments are weak, loosely knit. (about the self-conviction necessary to convince.

Mussolini, before giving the floor to others, intervenes to denigrate the erroneous criticism of Federici as of the party. What does this return to the statute mean? Let all remember that we are fighting against three enemies; and that there we are not faced with such criticisms or internal reorganization. He advises immediately, and that is not surprising, the fact that our relation is of a moral not formal character; the necessity to return to the spirit not to the letter of the statute, since it represents the political national conscience.

De Araico takes advantage of this argument to twist it around, showing with subtle insinuation that the Italian statute is going through a crisis, and that the present circumstances of war make it necessary to set a light on situations which culminated in the power of the party to use initiative and make decisions.

Between De Araico and Federici now, discussing what powers are to be guaranteed, while they discuss this, Federici attempts to adjourn the meeting to the next day. Mussolini rules the suggestion before the Council in the form of a question and Grandi bounding no demands that the meeting be not adjourned until discussions are closed. Mussolini agrees.

Federici follows, agrees with Grandi's order of the day. He takes the accusation of offensive criticism of the party. Throws back the clever Mussolinian invention that there have always been unconditional, a sitting the totality of the first Libyan war, the Libyan war, and above all the war of 1914/15/16. The unpopularity of the present war is largely due to the slogan "Fascist war", which divided the Italians even more than did the party with it organizing politics? He defends the bourgeoisie. Talks around the "return to the statute" which must be considered as recognition and respect for its vital parts with relation to the new laws and needs.

Signorini talks next: explains why he subscribed to the order of the day.

Recess is called. The room next to the assembly hall, known as "salone dei reati redenti" does not arouse, except in a few, the suspicion that that is about to happen is irreparable. Some say that after all he has not yet lied to the orders of the day, to the criticism and attacks against his deeds and the party. Grandi collects, without need for measure, the signatures for the order of the day, as many as twenty, while only about one dozen are expected. The signatures of Federici, Signorini and Signorini were procured. The meeting comes to order. First to talk is Signorini.

He insists upon the earlier affirmation to the effect that there has been a break between party and nation. The nation is practically on strike against the regime, "be it even a white strike". Today there are only two alternatives: either resistance in the fascist

Today 4553

tion is of a moral not formal character; the necessity to return to the spirit not to the letter of the Statute, since it represents the political national conscience.

De Grassi takes advantage of his argument to twist it around, showing with subtle dialectics that the Italian Statute is going through a crisis, and that the present circumstances of war make it necessary to set a light to the structure which culminates in the power of the line to use initiative and make decisions.

Between De Grassi and Federzoni now, discussing what towers are to be surrounded. While they discuss this, Morza attempts to adjourn the meeting to the next day. Mussolini puts the suggestion before the Council in the form of a question and Grandi bounding up demands that the meeting be not adjourned until discussions are closed. Mussolini agrees.

Federzoni follows, agrees with Grandi's order of the Day. He forces the recognition of offensive capabilities of the party. Throws back the clever Mussolinian invention that wars have always been unpopular, stating the popularity of the first world war, the Libyan war, and above all the war of 1914/15. The unpopularity of the present war is largely due to the slogan "fascist war", which divided the Italians even more than did the party with its organizing politics? He defends the bourgeoisie. Talks around the "return to the statute" which must be considered as recognition and respect for its vital parts with relation to the new laws and needs.

Signorini talks next; explains why he subscribed to the order of the Day.

Fascism is called. The room next to the assembly hall, known as "salone dei grandi veduti" does not arouse, except in a few, the suspicion that what is about to happen is irreparable. Some say that after all he has not yet lied yet to the Order of the Day, to the officialism and attacks against his deeds and the party. Grandi collects, without need for pressure, the signatures for the Order of the Day, as many as twenty, while only about one dozen are expected. The signatures of Volpardi, Cerretti and Signorini were unexpected. The meeting comes to order. First to talk is Signorini.

He insists upon the earlier affirmation to the effect that there has been a break between party and nation. The nation is practically on strike against the regime, "be it even a white strike". Today there are only two alternatives: "either resistance in the fascist circles" or a careful revision of - in other words, to change the face and soul of fascism. So much for the interior; for the exterior only one political solution is possible, if it is not too late; we must re-establish those conditions which we wrongly failed to keep alive

Mussolini says a few words again, Grandi's order of the day is frightened, makes some reserve, jumps on the "return to the statute" and finally declares himself against Grandi's Order of the day, and calls attention to the fact that the word "Duce" does not appear.

Mussolini intervenes with an impassioned cry, with a stentorian voice, talking slowly, holding his eyes in indication of the leader, tries to be calm and makes himself ridiculous. In fact there is no break between the party and the king at that time, there may be some between us and the nation, but "we" refers exactly to us who are there around him. He makes some remarks about the "will to fight" and concludes with a story taken from his memories from Albania, to prove that there will always exist in the lower orders, but never or almost never in the higher ones.

Mussolini intervenes again. It is a magnificent thing for the first time that night, he gives us the feeling that he, beaten by the slightest unexpected attack, trying to add some arguments. He takes up the theme of the break, and in a heavy tone says that he believes the word to be out of all proportion. There is a break, possibly between fascists and fascists, and in this particular case, between hierarchs and hierarchs, we must ask the our conscience: if there is a break, it must be admitted that it was caused by the economic conditions of Italy, hierarchy, whose level has risen too high. His very economic wealth has been created which is not justified, then the king, who must tighten their belts to the last hole, which is called "fascism", "fascism". Hence the feeling of a break between the king and fascists. He goes on to say that at any rate, when the balance is taken, there is more on the credit than on the debit side of fascism. However, this order of the day poses problems whose burden is a question of personal dignity. That does the king's expression mean? The government asks the king's majesty? And again what will the king answer? Let us assume that he will accept the restoration of military powers. The question now is whether I accept the condition of being beheaded. I am now sixty years old and know what these things mean. It would be better, then, to agree to us cheerfully". He alludes to his faithful and proven devotion to the king during the last twenty years. The king, moreover, has given clear proof of his affection only a few days ago when he assured him that, deciding the star from him, Mussolini would always have enjoyed the royal friendship. Finally and it will be his last part in this dramatic setting, he utters a mysterious sentence, "and when I pronounce a key for the solution of the war situation. But I will not tell you what it is". An incredible statement. Even at the last minute, while the fate of the whole regime is being decided along with his own and ours, he is either hiding the truth, or wanting to hide it; in fact, he is telling his last lie.

The threat has an immediate effect. One can feel those pres-

Gasbini intervenes with an impressive air, with a stentorian voice, talking eloquently, telling his own in indication of the leader, tries to be solemn and makes himself ridiculous. As that there is no break between the "city" and the "countryside", there may be one between us and the nation. That "one" refers exactly to us who are there around him. He makes some remarks about the "will to fight" and concludes with a story taken from his memories from Albania, to prove that that will always exist in a lower sphere, but never or almost never in the highest ones.

Gasbini again intervenes. It is a remarkable fact for the first time that night, he loses us the feeling that he, elected by the almost unanimous attack, turns to and romances moments. He takes us the theme of the break, and in a very long way that he believes the word to be out of all proportion. There is a break, possibly between democracy and fascism, but in this particular case, between hierarchy and hierarchy, we must use the our conscience; if there is a break, it must be placed that it was caused by the economic conditions of any hierarchy, whose level has risen too high. As any economic wealth creates which is not justified when the economic wealth creates which is not justified, which is called "fascism", protest. Hence the feeling of a break between the people and fascism. He looks on to say that at any rate, when the balance is taken, there is more on the credit than on the debit side of fascism. However, this order of the day, raises problems whose burden is a question of personal dignity. But how the this expression means: "the government was the king's property?" And again "what will the king answer?" But we assume that he will accept the institution of military powers. The question now is whether I accept the condition of being betrayed. I am now sixty years old and know what these things mean. It would be better, then, to swear to us silently". He alludes to his intimate and proven devotion to the king during the past twenty years. The king, moreover, has given clear proof of his affection only a few days ago when he assured him that, deciding the star from him, Gasbini would always have enjoyed the royal friendship. Finally and it will be his last word in this dramatic meeting, he utters a mysterious sentence, "And that I possess a key for the solution of the war situation. But I will not tell you what it is". In the credible statement. Even at the last minute, while the face of the whole regime is being decided along with his own and ours, he is either hiding the truth, or wanting to hide it; in fact, he is telling his ingratia.

The threat has an immediate effect. One can feel those present never under the blow. And Gasbini, getting us to break, at once exhorts to the ends of one of his unexpected utterances. The man who had put himself at the head of the movement or clarification, who had gathered us together, listened tensely, encouraged us to take

the first story who after this, had reserved us for the sitting of the Grand Council, leaving our intention, and when our proposals embodied in the Order of the Day, this was, seeing the way the wind is blowing, changes his course. That day happened in the interval of the meeting. Durruti has been in with the leaders when we return he has with him, besides the two orders of the Day, which he will proceed to read with some in red and some in white, and someone sitting next him noticed that while he was sitting at the general table he had only an ordinary pencil like the rest of us. In these matters, that he has in front of him while making his statement, were made while he was in conversation with the leader. We were aware of the danger of a rebellion as a story of the party, which might have confirmed us to a certain amount of reserve and reticence. But what he not to have warned us of? For orders of the Day already prepared. From the day was questioned. Just a question, which today cannot be any red.

There in the midst of it is to be observed that Durruti, in the atmosphere will be very with the declarations of the leader, attacks the Order of the Day, Grandt and its alternatives. In a violent tone he defends the party and its work, praises the young people educated by the party, and accuses Mussolini of having ruined dictatorship. "You have been a dictator," he says, "red in the face his cheeks almost purple and his forehead livid, 'you have been, according to your own definition, the least obeyed man of the party.'" And he reads the Order of the Day: first, resistance to the utmost, proclaimed from the air. Hold of the party with an eye to the revolution, the party and the force; secondly, expressing the hope that there will be immediate treachery of the revolutionary organs and the military command. After he has spoken in defense of the General Staff and the army, and he has differentiated more clearly between regime and country, with some minor details the most vital decision, announced that forward his Order of the Day they reiterated their contributions to the discussion, which now reached a point of raised voices and heightened enthusiasm; we were already in the middle of the night of the 25th which moved up quickly toward the ending of the vote.

Prattieri crossed Grandt's Order of the Day. Prattieri, supporting it with force and data regarding the irreversibility of Durruti's being able to give us sufficient aid, as was in favour of it. Durruti, because he says he was born and will die a supporter of Mussolini, crosses it. He raised reaffirming his support. Durruti announces his. Guards, smoking and travelling, withdrawn his signature and expresses hope for agreement on Durruti's order of the Day. The same goes for Minetti, with less certainty. Even Durruti, quicker to carry out maintaining the position he has already taken, agrees against Mussolini, saying that Durruti had not given the line merely a defeat by giving him back the military power, because it had already given him the crown of the empire and that of Albania.

he has with him, besides the two orders of the Day, which he will proceed to read with notes in red and blue pencil, and someone sitting near him noticed that while he was sitting at the external table he had only an ordinary pencil like the rest of us. In these notes, that he has in front of him while making his statement, were made while he was in conversation with the leader. The words of the declaration of the constitution are not at all in the party, which might have inspired us to a certain amount of reserve and modesty. But ought he not to have asked us a whole order of the day already prepared for the day? Was this not a just question, which today cannot be answered.

There is in the situation a lot to be observed that, perhaps, in the atmosphere will have with the celebrations of the leader, although the order of the day, Gramsci and his signatories. In a violent tone he defends the party and its work, against the young people neglected by the state, and against Gramsci or having received distant and distant help. You have a lot of a number of a dictator," he says, and in the face his cheeks almost purple and his forehead livid, "you have been, according to your own definition, the leader, obeyed men of the century." And he reads the order of the day: first, resistance to the utmost, - proclaimed from the air - hold of the party with an order to the nation, the day and the hour: and only, expressing the party that there will be a complete reform of the constitutional organs and the military command. After he had read the order in defense of the General Staff and the day, and he Gramsci differentiated more clearly between regime and country, which alone must insure the most vital decisions, proclaimed - puts forward his order of the day: they reiterated their contributions to the discussion, which now reached a point of raised voices and interrupted discussion; we are already in the middle of the right of the day which moved on quickly towards the closing of the vote.

Gramsci overtook Gramsci's order of the day. After, supporting it with notes and data the day was responsibility of Gramsci's being able to give an sufficient aid, as was in favor of it. Gramsci, because he says he was born and will die a supporter of Gramsci, proposes it. He then reaffirms his support. Gramsci announces his. Gramsci, smiling and trembling, withdraws his signature and expresses hope for agreement on Gramsci's order of the day. The same day for Gramsci, with less certainty. Even Gramsci, quicker to hurry but maintaining the position he had already taken, a guest against Gramsci, saying that Gramsci had given the king merely a defeat by giving him back the military power, because it had already given him the crown of the empire and that of Albania.

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Gramsci to me out "that Gramsci" order of the day falls into three parts: the first, consisting of three paragraphs, is a broad statement of the will to resist. On this we do not admit any speculation. With diverse tasks, motives and words, we all, from Gramsci and Gramsci in their orders of the day, and the rest, went to

resist. Everyone has a complicity. No day and he uses the word in the school-like sense. It says that day is not that of general Valletti nor that of our Compt de Scorge. He referred to it before, therefore, everyone was at the same time more human than. But in the "pro-gram" for 1941-42, we are in agreement with all the members of the Council. And this only must be authorized as a fundamental measure of our meeting. He then goes on to show that the war was not part of the order of the day, consisting of the fourth paragraph, is literally the same as Grandi's order of the day, and differs from Scorge's order of the day only in that we have a "renewal" and not a "reform" of the constitutional organs.

This, he says, is serious and very dangerous. "No announce further reform at this juncture would mean increasing and not decreasing the already psychological state of the country. I shall not be surprised, I who are a student of the country, I believe in reform; but today it is not a question of reform but of applying the laws already in existence. The syndicate which we have before us is not that provided for by our laws. It is the corruption. It is the Council of Ministers itself as it functions. It is the Council of Ministers itself as it reforms. It is the Council of Ministers itself as it reforms, but to reform the laws." And he adds on this point, pointing out that on this point too, Grandi and Scorge's situation is identical. The Council is in agreement: the functions of the constitutional organs in another of the indications of the unity of our institutions.

"And I come to the third part of our Order of the Day. Concerning it to that of Marinacci: both agreed in the day, the first as is fitting unreservedly, the second with an understanding of the military field, this basis of difference, however, would seem to be an allusion to the consideration that when one turns to the day, even a partial agreement becomes a total one, endorsing the unity of his responsibilities. Here, too, there is fundamental unity between the responsibilities of the first part of the day and Marinacci with his. And this weighs against Scorge's order of the day, which shows that he considers possible the solution by the party and the regime a crisis which, involving the whole nation, cannot be attributed in its entirety to the responsibility of the Crown. He wishes to see in this grave and visible concrete proof of that unity of decision between the day and the condition and the unity of decision between the day and the nation and the regime;)

Grandi speaks after this, and perhaps some others, but here the record notes taken throughout the sitting cease, giving way to the anxiety of the moment. It is 7 o'clock in the morning; without another word or gesture, and with a somewhat air, unresolvingly puts Grandi's order of the day to the vote.

never again to England, America, France, Italy, Greece, Africa, Australia, the continent who voted for his own Order of the Eagle. (7)

1330

No. 2074
Madrid, Spain, February 18, 1944.
Subject: Italian Republican Fascist Representation
to Spain.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to previous correspondence concern-
ing the activities in Spain of agents of the Mussolini
regime, I have the honor to enclose a list of the members
of the staff of the so-called "Agency of the Government
of Mussolini" in Madrid. The present quarters of this
agency are at Calle Marques de Valdeaguias, 8, but it
is understood that the military offices will be moved in
the near future to separate quarters at Calle General
Pardines, 74.

There is also enclosed a copy of a circular letter,
in Italian, which was addressed in December, 1943, by
the "Agent of the Government of Mussolini", Signor
Eugenio Morreale, to Italian nationals residing in
Spain encouraging their adherence to the Mussolini re-
gime. It will be recalled that in my Note No. 1902 of
January 21, 1944, a copy of which was transmitted to
the Department under cover of my confidential despatch
No. 1334 of January 24, 1944, I addressed to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs a protest against the Italian and
terroristic activities of Signor Morreale in Spain and
a request for his expulsion from the country.

Respectfully yours,

Carlson J. I. Hayes.

Enclosures:

1. List, as stated
2. Circular letter, as stated.

File No. 201
WAB:jf
Originated in Department
Copies to Algiers and Lisbon

520.2

1330

Subject: Italian Republican Fascist Representation
in Spain.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to previous correspondence concern-
ing the activities in Spain of agents of the Mussolini
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gime. It will be recalled that in my Note No. 1902 of
January 21, 1944, a copy of which was transmitted to
the Department under cover of my confidential despatch
No. 1274 of January 24, 1944, I addressed to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs a protest against the illegal and
terroristic activities of Signor Morreale in Spain and
a request for his expulsion from the country.

Respectfully yours,

Carlton F. H. Hayes.

Enclosures:

1. List, as stated
2. Circular letter, as stated.

File No. 801

NWP:lf

Original to Department

Copies to Aleters and Lisbon

520.2

4.10

Enclosure No 1 to despatch No. 2074 dated February 18, 1944.
from Carlton J. V. Hayes, American Ambassador at Madrid, Spain,
on subject of Italian Republican Fascist Representation in
Spain.

AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MUSSOLINI IN MADRID

Comm. Eugenio MORREALE, Agent, formerly Consul at Malaga
Capt. Antonio ROGERMAN, Counselor, formerly serving in Air Office
Accountant Cavallio CRIVIANI, Secretary, formerly clerk in
Consulate at Malaga.

Master Sergeant WWSM Emilio ROSSI, Clerk, formerly of the
Military Mission
RUMANO, Clerk.

Press Office

Dr. Giorgio BROTTI, Head of Office, formerly Stefani Agency
correspondent
Bruno BARZONI, Secretary, Sergeant Major, formerly of the
Military Mission
Giovanni Battista BERNARDI, Clerk

Military Office

Lt. Col. Michele SCOPA, Chief, formerly of the Military Mission
Lt. WWSM Francesco SCALA, Secretary, formerly of the Military
Mission
Lt. WWSM Giuseppe M'ARELLIO, formerly of the Military Mission
Warrant Officer Diego ARDINI, formerly of the Military Mission
" " Vincenzo SAVAI, formerly of the Military Mission
" " Antonio SIMONTE, formerly of the Military Mission
" " Natale RANERI, formerly of the Military Mission
Master Sergeant WWSM Vasco VALICENTI, formerly of the Mil. Mission
Warrant Officer Giovanni SCOTA, formerly of the Military Mission
(The latter two stationed at the Franco-Spanish frontier)

Naval Office

Captain Antonio MURVONE, Chief, formerly Naval Attaché
M.C.O. MOSTARDI, formerly of the Naval Office
M.C.O. RAYTA, formerly of the Naval Office
Radiotelegrapher Lgeo PIERONI, formerly of the Air Office
Seaman Luciano CERRI, formerly of the Naval Office
Chauffeur MORELLI, formerly of the Naval Office
" " ALBERTI, formerly of the Naval Office
" " FONTIROLI, formerly of the Naval Office.

Air Office

Captain Marino BELLONI, formerly of the Air Office

Administrative Office

Lt. Armando CARDUCCI, Chief, formerly of the Air Office
Warrant Officer Gaetano VALENTI, formerly of the Military Mission

Comm. Eugenio MORREALE, Agent, formerly Consul at Málaga
Capt. Antonio BOSEMAN, Counselor, formerly serving in Air Office
Accountant Cavaliere CRIVIANI, Secretary, formerly clerk in
Consulate at Málaga.
Master Sergeant MVSN Emilio ROSSI, Clerk, formerly of the
Military Mission
DOMINGO, Clerk.

Press Office

Dr. Giorgio CRIVIANI, Head of Office, formerly Stefani Agency
Correspondent
Bruno BATTISTI, Secretary, Sergeant Major, formerly of the
Military Mission
Giovanni Battista BERNARDI, Clerk

Military Office

Lt. Col. Michele SCOPA, Chief, formerly of the Military Mission
Lt. MVSN Francesco SCALA, Secretary, formerly of the Military
Mission
Lt. MVSN Giuseppe D'AMICO, formerly of the Military Mission
Warrant Officer Diego ARDINI, formerly of the Military Mission
" " Vincenzo SAVIERI, formerly of the Military Mission
" " Antonio BELLONNI, formerly of the Military Mission
" " Natale CAMERI, formerly of the Military Mission
Master Sergeant MVSN Vasco CARLONETTI, formerly of the Mil. Mission
Warrant Officer Giovanni SCALIA, formerly of the Military Mission
(The latter two stationed at the Franco-Spanish frontier)

Naval Office

Captain Antonio RUSSONE, Chief, formerly Naval Attaché
N.C.O. MOSTARDI, formerly of the Naval Office
N.C.O. RAFFA, formerly of the Naval Office
Radiotelegrapher Iago PIZZONI, formerly of the Air Office
Seaman Luciano CARVI, formerly of the Naval Office
Cheuiffeur MORELLI, formerly of the Naval Office
" ALBERTI, formerly of the Naval Office
" PONTIROLI, formerly of the Naval Office.

Air Office

Captain Marino BELLONI, formerly of the Air Office

Administrative Office

Lt. Armando CAMBUCCI, Chief, formerly of the Air Office
Warrant Officer Gaetano VALENTI, formerly of the Military Mission

Commercial Office

Adolfo MARINO, formerly clerk in the Consulate at San Sebastian

Stefani ...

4529

-2-

Stefani Agency

Dr. Giorgio SPOTTI, Representative, formerly correspondent of this Agency

Arturo CATTINI, Editorial Secretary, formerly clerk in the Press Office

Sergeant Major Bruno RAZZANI, formerly of the Military Mission N.B. There are also other personnel of Spanish nationality.

Liaison Office with Spanish authorities

Marquis PAVIA, Major in the Spanish Army, Spanish nationality, formerly liaison officer attached to the Italian Military Mission

Lt. Paolo DEMI, formerly of the Naval Information Office
Sergeant José ARCS

Republican Fascio in Madrid

Arturo CATTINI, Secretary

Italian Recreation Club

..... CASALI, Director.

C O P Y

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 2074 dat February 13, 1944,
from Carlton J. H. Hayes, American Ambassador, Madrid, Spain,
on subject of Republican Fascist Representation in Spain.

REPUBBLICA SOCIALE ITALIANA

L'Agente
Del Governo di Mussolini
Per la Tutela degli
Interessi Italiani in Spagna

Madrid, 12 dicembre 1943. XXII

Egregio connazionale,

Il DUCE ha voluto affidare a me - che altro vanto non ho
se non quello di essere stato sempre un suo fedele e leale
collaboratore - il compito di prendere contatto col Governo
spagnolo affinché anche in questa dura fase della storia della
patria nostra siano convenientemente tutelati i nostri
interessi in Spagna e siano assicurati tutti quei connazionali
che non hanno perduta la fede nella resurrezione del paese.

La nuova forma statale repubblicana, destinata a mettere
più saldamente nelle mani di tutto il popolo i destini d'Italia,
la volontà incommutabile di Benito Mussolini di raccogliere e
riordinare tutte le sane forze italiane che oggi già si
risvegliano, l'aiuto leale della Germania che sacrifica i propri
figli su suolo italiano per darci il tempo di rifarci dai duri
colpi assestati all'Italia dall'insipienza e dal tradimento di
chi credette di trovare la sua salvezza nella resa e nella fuga,
ci confermano oggi nella certezza che la patria risorgerà e che
sarà merito degli italiani di fede e d'onore d'averla fatta
risorgere.

Ed è appunto questa certezza che io, attenendomi al compito
affidatomi, desidero innanzi tutto portare a voi; assieme al
saluto del Duce - che ne avuta la fortuna di rivedere come
sempre intento al suo immune lavoro - ed assieme al saluto dei
connazionali di buona volontà che dalle necessità della città
nostre colpite da un nemico senza scrupoli e dalla nuova trincea
in costruzione ci gridano a noi italiani all'estero: fate il
vostro dovere!

E noi il nostro dovere lo faremo, senza letargia ma senza
incertezze, come finora lo abbiamo fatto, come ottimamente l'ha
fatto quel gruppo di fedeli ardimentosi che, sotto la guida del
Capitano della nostra aeronautica Antonio Rossetti, al quale mi
è caro rivolgere qui un particolare ringraziamento, ha superato
il primo periodo organizzativo.

Compiamo il nostro dovere in silenzio ma con assoluta
fede, confortati dall'alto senso di comprensione che il popolo
spagnolo fedele alle sue nobili tradizioni di onore e di
cavalleria, ci ha dimostrato nelle ore più tragiche.

1336
Madrid, 22 dicembre 1943. XIII

Egregio connazionale,

Il DUCÉ ha voluto affidare a me - che altro vanto non ho se non quello di essere stato sempre un suo fedele e leale collaboratore - il compito di prendere contatto col governo spagnolo affinché anche in questa dura fase dello sforzo della patria nostra siano convenientemente tutelati i nostri interessi: in Spagna e siano assistiti tutti quei connazionali che non hanno perduto la fede nella resurrezione del paese.

La nuova forma statale repubblicana, destinata a mettere più saldamente nelle mani di tutto il popolo i destini d'Italia, la volontà indomabile di Benito Mussolini di raccogliere e riordinare tutte le forze della nazione che oggi già si risvegliano, l'aiuto leale della Germania che sacrifica i propri figli su suolo italiano per darci il tempo di ciferar dal duro colpi assestati all'Italia dall'insidia e dal dradimento di chi credette di trovare la sua sicurezza nella resa e nella fuga, ci confermano ogni nostra certezza che la patria risorgerà e che sarà merito degli italiani di fede e d'onore d'averla fatta risorgere.

Ed è appunto questa certezza che io, attenendomi al compito affidatomi, desidero innanzi tutto portare a Voi: assieme al saluto del DUCÉ - che ha avuto la fortuna di rivedere come sempre intento al suo immenso lavoro - ed assieme al saluto dei connazionali di buona volontà che delle tappe della città nostre colpite da un nemico senza scrupoli e dalle nuove trincee in costruzione ci gridano e noi italiani all'estero: fate il vostro dovere!

E noi il nostro dovere lo faremo, senza lontananza ma senza incertezze, come finora lo abbiamo fatto, come ottimamente l'ha fatto quel gruppo di degni ardimentosi che, sotto la guida del Capitano della nostra Aeronautica Antonio Boserian, al quale mi è caro rivolgere qui un particolare ringraziamento, ha superato il primo periodo organizzativo.

Compiamo il nostro dovere in silenzio ma con assoluta fede, confortati dall'alto senso di comprensione che il popolo spagnolo fedele alla sue nobili tradizioni di onore e di cavalleria, ci ha dimostrato nelle ore più tragiche, e soprattutto tenendo presente che sono pure italiani coloro che, travolti nel momento della migliore incertezza, non si sono ancora riuniti a noi.

Vi saluto

L'AGENTE

(Dott. Eugenio Morreale)
(siegel) Dr. EUGENIO MORREALE

1 3 3 7

Copy for Mr. Helford.

(Handwritten signature)

POLITICAL SECTION

No. 82

1st May, 1944.

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have drawn our attention to the fact that, according to a broadcast of the Rome radio on April 27th, the following officials of the Ministry of Popular Culture have been dismissed by the fascist republican authorities:

Ferdinando Stendero	-	Press Attache in Budapest.
Raffaele Petrucci	-	" " " Athens
Amor Dava	-	" " " Bucharest.
Guido Cabalzar	-	" " " Madrid
Vincenzo Bolasso	-	" " " Lisbon

Augusto Fracanzani	)	
Ronato Lafeyre	)	Counsellors.
Angelo Russo	)	

Ronato Martucci	)	
Antonio Soffiatti	)	First Secretaries.
Antonio Oliva	)	

Adolfo de Nicola	-	Vice Secretary
Alfredo Stecchini	-	employee

2. The Italian Foreign Office have requested that the above information should be brought to the attention of the Allied security authorities. You will note that Cabalzar is amongst those who have been dismissed.

2.

3. I enclose copies of this letter for the Office of the American Political Adviser and G-2.

Sir Anthony Rumbold, Bart.

4324

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

N° 2500

Salerno, 29th April, 1944

Dear Caccia,

According to a broadcast of Rome Radio, on April 27th, the following officials of the Ministry of Popular Culture have been dismissed by the fascist republican authorities :

Ferdinando Stendardo	-	Press Attache in Budapest
Raffaele Patuelli	-	" " " Athens
Amor Bava	-	" " " Bucarest
Guido Cabalzar	-	" " " Madrid
Vincenzo Bolasco	-	" " " Lisbon

Augusto Traccacreta ; Renato Lefebvre ; Angelo Russo :
Counsellors;

Renato Martucci; Antonio Soffiatti and Antonio Oliva :
First Secretaries ;

Adolfo De Nicola, Vice Secretary; and Alfredo Stecchini,
employee.

I believe that the foregoing information might interest the Allied Security Officers and therefore I would be grateful should you be so kind as to bring it to their attention.

Sincerely yours

R. Bolasco

Harold A. Caccia Esq.,
Vice President
Allied Control Commission
Political Section
N A P L E S.

4523

Memorandum to: Office of the British Resident Minister
at Allied Force Headquarters,
ALGERIA.

From: Political Section,
H.Q. Allied Control Commission,
APO 394

No. 44.

20th March, 1944.

Copy is attached of a memorandum received from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of measures taken by the Fascist Republican Government against State officials who have refused to cooperate with them.

2. Translation of the previous memorandum referred to in this note is also attached.

3. A copy of this memorandum and enclosures is attached for Civil Affairs.

WMS

5202

4524

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

1265
MEMORANDUM
for the
POLITICAL SECTION (A.C.C.)

In December last this Ministry sent to the Political Section (A.C.C.) a copy of a circular of the Undersecretary of the "Presidenza del Consiglio" of the self styled Fascist Republican Government concerning the methods decided upon by the Fascists against all State Officials that have refused to cooperate with them.

A copy of same is hereby enclosed.

Only recently however it has been possible to gather information as to some of the measures actually taken by the Fascists in the case of a certain number of Officials of this Ministry that remained loyal to the Royal Government.

Their names and the measures taken against them are the following:

Ambassadors: De Vecchi, Grandi, Bastianini e Alfieri, dismissed from service;

Ambassadors: Taliani, Indelli, Rocco, De Rossi; Ministers: Petrucci, Quaroni, Magistrati, Prunas, Berardi, Babuscio; Counsellors: Berio, Perrone di San Martino, Fracassi, Paolo Cortese, Gerbaccio, Lanza d'Ajeta and a certain number of other officials of lower rank are placed on the retired list with loss of pension;

Ambassadors: Guariglia, Colonna, Paulucci; Ministers: Mameli, Marchetti di Muriaglio, Bova Scoppa, Guarnaschelli and Del Drago, formerly placed on retired list, are now also deprived of pension;

Ministers: Cicconardi, Emanuele Grazzi, Rochira; Consuls 4523
General: Ferrante di Ruffino, Delich are placed on the retired list.

Encl.

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

-2-

Minister Cortese; Counsellors : Ottaviani, Mosca, Guglielminotti, Della Porta; Consuls General: Biondalli, Meloni, Gloria, Lupis, Montesi, Tasco, Bianconi, Nobili Vitelleschi, Monbelli and other 119 officials of lower rank who are not named, have been suspended from office.

Ministers: Chigi, Pietromarchi, Zoppi; First Secretaries: Venturini, Casardi, Francesco Macchi di Cellere, Grillo; Consuls: Della Chiesa, Ducci, Farace Alessandro, Pierantoni; Vice Consuls: Dainelli and Stampa, formerly suspended from office, have been dismissed.

It appears that numerous other officials are being sought after in order to decide which measures have to be taken against them.

Salerno, March 16, 1944.



4522

"Copy"

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

-Cabinet-

N.25393/25047-1.10/1.2

Rome, 14 October 1943.

To all Ministries - Cabinet - ADM

.....

It will be opportune to inform the responsible service chiefs and the members of the various offices that those who, after having received orders, cannot be located, before or at the moment of departure, will be subject, in addition to punishments provided under prevailing laws for civilian mobilization, to the following provisions:

- Immediate arrest;
- Dismissal from employment without right to pension;
- Report to German Police Authorities for arrest after departure of the Government or for reprisals

on belongings and against the family, in case of persistent absence of the deserter.-

Finally, it having been found that in various agencies those having received orders to leave, reported themselves ill or outright became patients in clinics or hospitals, it is advisable that the Ministries and responsible heads provide explanatory visits through physicians in whom they have absolute confidence.

The Undersecretary of State

Signed BASTONI

(E.N.)

"Copia"

MINISTERO DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI
- Gabinetto -

n. 25391/20047-1.10/1/1.2

Roma, 14 ottobre 1943.

A tutti i Ministri - Gabinetto - ROMA

.....
Sarà opportuno rendere esenti i capi servizio in carica e i dipendenti dei vari uffici che sono o sono stati comandati, al momento di essere in servizio, prima o al momento della partenza, saranno esenti dalle sanzioni previste dalle leggi vigenti per i reati civili, delle seguenti nature:

- reato immediato;
- dimissioni d'ufficio o di fatto senza diritto a pensione;
- reclusione nelle carceri dello Stato o per l'arresto dopo la partenza del servizio per la permanenza negli averi e nella famiglia, in caso di esilio o di espatrio.

Infine, essendo constatato che in diversi enti sono comandati e partecipi di loro attività o si fanno attività rilevanti in ordine a loro attività, si consiglia che i Ministri e capi responsabili predispongano visite di controllo e a mezzo di uffici di loro assoluta fiducia.

Il Segretario di Stato
Piero BARRACI

1 3 4 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

091.112 - DIP. (GERMAN/ISTANBUL)

1345

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

520.2

POLITICAL, INTERNAL - FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOV'T.

