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Local Gove

Dec. 1944 -

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523.1

Local Government Elections

Dec. 1944 - Jan. 1945

523.1

TO: Hq AC, Chief of Staff.

FROM: Hq AMB/AC Abruzzi Marche Region.

SUBJECT: Local Government elections in Italy.

REF: 25/507/22.

DATE: 3 Jan 45.

SECRET.

Ref your P/523 dated 14 Dec 44.

1. After consultation with the Provincial Commissioners in this Region, it is considered that the time is not ripe for the holding of Local Government elections, particularly in the provinces still under AMG control.

As against this view it would appear that the new Italian Cabinet on Wednesday 20 Dec 44 decided that electoral lists should be prepared so that municipal elections could be held next spring. (PMB Supplement to Consolidated Report on Liberated Italy, No. 47).

2. The Chief points against the holding of elections at the present time are as follows:-

(a) To date, with possibly the exception of one party, there is little evidence of any organised political activity, and those people returned to power under a premature election would not necessarily represent the majority of the people. After 20 years of Fascism the country should not be stampeded into elections on the clamouring of any one particular party; or the Allies aim to make Italy a democratic nation will have failed.

(b) Public disturbances would almost certainly occur in many places, and it is considered that the police will have to be much stronger than has hitherto been the case in the control of such disturbances. Any political disturbances occurring in Territory used by military formations would doubtless impede the Allied effort, as forces may have to be diverted from military operations to ensure the maintenance of law and order amongst the civilian population.

(c) Communications on the few open highways in this Region are difficult, and no extra strain should be put on the roads by the needless movement of civilians, when military traffic is likely to continue heavy for several months to come.

(d) The compilation of even approximately correct electoral lists at this stage of the war, and of the year, is impossible owing to the following reasons:-

- (i) Lack of communications and shortage of transportation.
- (ii) Large numbers of refugees temporarily residing away from their homes.
- (iii) Many thousands of Italian soldiers originally shipped abroad as POWs, and also the thousands who are reported to have been sent to Germany for forced labour.

Whilst recognizing that elections are desirable as soon as possible,

is against this view it would appear that the new Italian Cabinet on Wednesday 20 Dec 44 decided that electoral lists should be prepared so that municipal elections could be held next spring. (PWB Supplement to Consolidated Report on Liberated Italy, No. 47).

2. The Chief points against the holding of elections at the present time are as follows:-

(a) To date, with possibly the exception of one party, there is little evidence of any organised political activity, and those people returned to power under a premature election would not necessarily represent the majority of the people. After 20 years of Fascism the country should not be stampeded into elections on the clamouring of any one particular party; or the allies aim to make Italy a Democratic nation will have failed.

(b) Public disturbances would almost certainly occur in many places, and it is considered that the police will have to be much stronger than has hitherto been the case in the control of such disturbances. Any political disturbances occurring in Territory used by military formations would doubtless impede the Allied effort, as forces may have to be diverted from military operations to ensure the maintenance of law and order amongst the civilian population.

(c) Communications on the few open highways in this Region are difficult, and no extra strain should be put on the roads by the needless movement of civilians, when military traffic is likely to continue heavy for several months to come.

(d) The compilation of even approximately correct electoral lists at this stage of the war, and of the year, is impossible owing to the following reasons:-

(i) Lack of communications and shortage of transportation.
(ii) Large numbers of refugees temporarily residing away from their homes.

(iii) Many thousands of Italian soldiers originally shipped abroad as POWs, and also the thousands who are reported to have been sent to Germany for forced labour.

3. Whilst agreeing that elections are desirable as soon as possible, it is considered that the people are far more interested in obtaining sufficient food and better housing than in indulging in any forms of local or general elections at a time when their country is still one of the world's battlefronts. Any civilian activity that serves in any way to interfere with the prosecution of the war in Italy to its fullest extent should be discouraged. Only when the last of the enemy has been cleared from Italian soil can the building of a truly democratic Italy be accomplished.

C.H.A. FRENCH.

Colonel.

Regional Commissioner.

TC/REV

523.1

SECRET

To: Mr. At, Chief of Staff.

From: Mr. Hall/AC, Armed Forces Region.

Subject: Local Government Elections in Italy.

Date: 25/10/46.

Date: 1 Jan. 46.

Ref your 2/10. Letter 14 Dec 46.

2. After consultation with the Provincial Command, it is considered that the time is not ripe for the holding of Local Government elections, particularly in the provinces still under law control.

As against this view it must appear that the new Italian Cabinet on becoming, as has been said, that electoral lists should be prepared for that municipal elections could be held next spring. (See Supplement to Consolidated Report on liberated Italy, No. 17).

The Chief points against the holding of elections at the present time are as follows:-

(a) To date, with possibly the exception of one party, there is little evidence of any organized political activity, and those who returned to power under a premature election could not necessarily represent the majority of the people. After 18 years of leaving the country should not be steeped into elections on the assumption of any one particular party; or the Allies will make Italy a democratic nation will have failed.

(b) Public disturbances would almost certainly occur in any place, and it is considered that the police will have to be such a strength that it is hitherto seen the case in the control of such disturbances. Any political disturbances occurring in territory used by military formations would constitute a lapse of the Allied effort, as forces may have to be diverted from military operations to ensure the maintenance of law and order amongst the civilian population.

(c) Communications on the few open highways in this region are difficult, and no extra strain should be put on the roads by the movement of civilians, when military traffic is likely to continue heavy for several months to come.

(d) The completion of even approximately correct electoral lists at this stage of the war, and if the year, is impossible owing to the following reasons:-

- (i) Lack of communications and shortage of transport.
- (ii) Large numbers of refugees temporarily residing away from their homes.
- (iii) Many thousands of Italian soldiers originally shipped abroad as POWs, and also the thousands who are reported to have been sent to Germany for forced labour.

3. Whilst agreeing that elections are desirable as soon as possible,

is against this view it could be said that the new Italian Constitution, promulgated on 12 January 1948, is a direct result of the pressure exerted by the Allied forces. (see Supplement to Consolidated Report on Information Italy, No. 27).

The final points against the holding of elections at the present time are as follows:-

(a) To date, with possible exception of the party, there is little evidence of any organized political activity, and there is no return to power under a pressure election could not necessarily represent the majority of the people. After 45 years of Fascism the country should not be plunged into elections on the assumption of any one party-leader party, or the allies are to use Italy a democratic nation will have failed.

(b) Public disturbances and almost certainly occur in many places, and it is considered that the police will have to be such a great deal as to leave the police in the control of the disturbances. Any political disturbances occurring in Italy are likely to be diverted to the military operations in the effort, as far as may have to be diverted from military operations to ensure the maintenance of law and order against the civilian population.

(c) Communications in the last few days signify in this Italian are difficult, and no extra strain should be put on the roads by the movement of civilians, when military traffic is likely to continue heavy for several months to come.

(d) The compilation of even approximately correct electoral lists at this stage of the war, and in the year, is impossible owing to the following reasons:-

(i) Lack of communications and shortage of transport facilities.
(ii) Lack of records of refugees temporarily residing away from their homes.

(iii) Lack of Italian statistics originally compiled at the end of 1945, and also the shortage of men reported to have been sent to Germany for forced labour.

3. While agreeing that elections are desirable as soon as possible, it is considered that the people are not yet prepared to participate in obtaining sufficient force and power to bring about a change in the form of local or general elections in a time when their country is still one of the world's battlefronts. Any civilian activity that involves in any way to interfere with the prosecution of the war in Italy to its fullest extent should be discouraged. Only when the limit of the enemy has been cleared from Italian soil can the holding of a truly democratic Italy be accomplished.

Colonel.

Regional Commissioner.

TC/PCY

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Political

HEADQUARTERS EMILIA REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APR 394

REX/RC

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy.

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission.
(Attention Chief of Staff.)

1. Your L/523 of 14 December 1944, above subject, did not reach me until December 23rd.
2. It was noted that my comments were requested only "as far as my region is concerned". As you know, none of the territory of Emilia Region as yet has reverted to regional control. However, due to the arrangement with AMB 8th Army whereby my officers have assumed primary responsibility for the administration of the area, the Region is operational, de facto at least, in two provinces--Forli and Ravenna.
3. A report prepared by one of my officers delegated by me to ascertain the views of the Provincial Commissioners of these two provinces is attached.
4. First reading of the report may seem to indicate that Col. Petter of Forli and Major Nucera of Ravenna disagree. This discrepancy, however, is not so great as may appear, if due consideration is given to the facts:
 - a. That the questions propounded were whether it is desirable or possible to hold local government elections at present;
 - b. That Major Nucera's province is more recently liberated than Col. Petter's; and,
 - c. That Col. Petter has attached certain conditions to his affirmative answer (including three months delay after announcement of elections) which deprive it of much of its force.
5. If it is possible to synthesize and reconcile at all the views of these two of my officers who should be best advised at the present time as to the practical difficulties involved, I think that this has been fairly well done in Par. 10 of the report in which it is recommended:

S E C R E T

a. That no announcement of an election be made in any province until it is entirely under regional (as distinguished from Army) control;

b. That elections be announced as soon as possible after the transfer of control of a province;

c. That the elections be held not less than three months after the announcement; and,

d. That during such interval free circulation be permitted for accredited party representatives.

6. It will be noted that the recommendations relate largely to the practical objections referred to in Par. 9 of the memorandum attached to your letter, and imply that these objections can, at least in the regional military government phase, be overcome. I concur in this conclusion and, subject to the following remarks, in the recommendations.

7. The more serious objections which I might have to the holding of elections in Italia after the Region had been turned over to me for administration, would be based less on these practical difficulties than on my own uncertainty as to the willingness of the high-level policy makers to agree unequivocally by the results.

8. I quote from the first sentence of the memorandum:

"It has always been understood to be a part of the functions of the Allied Commission not only to secure the abolition of the fascist local government structure, but to substitute for it a system distinctively democratic."

With this statement as a major premise, and dismissing the practical difficulties as not insuperable, it seems to me that the Commission has no choice but to provide for as nearly as possible a complete expression of the popular will as soon as military exigencies in a theater of operations will permit.

9. For the objections voiced in Pars. 10 and 11 of the memorandum I have very little respect; "It is uncertain whether . . . elections would produce a real expression of the popular will"; "the victory . . . would go to the best organized party or body and not necessarily to the most representative one"; "the appearance of popular spirit thus created in favor of particular parties . . . will influence and advance the eventual settlement of the new Italian constitution"; "there is a

SECRET

possibility that local government elections will be accompanied by a measure of disorder." These objections are objections not to elections in Italy but to any elections anywhere at any time and, pro tanto, to democracy itself of which elections are the principal tool. All of them can and have been made to elections in the United States and Great Britain, and let it be admitted, with truth in some cases.

10. If we are to adhere to our major premise it is our responsibility to see that the elections are fairly conducted, that there is no disorder or undue influence based on force. Beyond that we can, in good conscience, only "let the chips fall where they may."

11. This leads me to my final observation, which is less an objection than an interrogatory: "Is the Commission, and are the British and American governments, prepared to abide unequivocally by the results of an election, and to accept and collaborate with the officials elected, regardless of their political complexion?" It is on this point that my uncertainty, approaching skepticism, is most pronounced.

12. I note that all comments in the memorandum under the heading "Political Aspects" (Para. 13, 14, and 15) are favorable to elections as a means of, among other things, (1) raising the prestige of Italy, (2) "providing an outlet for the Italian feeling—a useful safety valve", and (3) giving some sort of basis to Italian political parties in that it could not then be said . . . that they were "not imbued or having been elected by anyone" (4) raising the prestige of the Allies as concrete proof of the character of our intentions toward Italy.

13. I entirely agree with these arguments and feel that they should be given the greatest possible weight. They are, however, deprived of all force unless supported and backed up by willingness and determination at all levels on the Allied side to accept the result as the will of the people of Italy and to abide by and support the officials elected. Better have no elections at all than to permit them with our tongues in our cheeks or with mental reservations: "after all, if the Fascist is elected we can remove him"; "naturally the people must know that we won't put up with a communist"; "Signor ——— has always been unco-operative and if they should show such poor judgment as to elect him they must know we should have to do something about it".

14. Without wishing to make invidious comparisons between two situations which are not perfectly analogous, I might illustrate my

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point by stating that in my opinion even a single "Eden-Sforza incident" on the provincial level would deprive of all force the cogent arguments set forth in Pairs. 15 and 16, and would create tendencies completely the reverse.

15. Democracy is in the nature of a religion. It cannot be proved to be, under all circumstances, the best and most desirable form of government, but if it is to work at all those who profess to espouse it must not only believe and have faith in it but must act accordingly. If our statesmen are prepared to give Italy democracy regardless of immediate consequences, the proposed elections are clearly in order and I say let's start planning for them now. To quote another Regional Commissioner for whose opinion I have the greatest respect: "Be Bold":

16. If, however, the policy-makers are not prepared to accept the results, pleasant or not, let's forget it. Half measures or hedging will only weaken our position and delay attainment of our objectives.

Sincerely,



Regional Commissioner,
Emilia Region.

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HEADQUARTERS EMILIA REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

27 December 1944

RHX/RC

SUBJECT: Desirability and Possibility of Holding Local
Government Elections in Italy at Present.

TO : Lt. Col. Alfred C. Bowman, Regional Commissioner,
Emilia Region.

1. At your request I interviewed Lt. Col. Pether, P.C. Forli Province, on 24 Dec. 44; and Major Nucera, P.C. Ravenna Province, on 26 Dec. 44, and obtained their views on the above subject.

2. The "secret" memorandum of Brig. Lush dated 14 Dec. 44 (received at this HQ on 22 Dec. 44) and its enclosure are attached hereto. ("Par." references below are to this enclosure).

3. The views of Lt. Col. Pether and Major Nucera differ widely. Each expressed opinions limited to the situation in his own province. This may account for the difference. Their views are summarized below.

4. Local Government bodies to be elected. (Par. 8).

Forli: Giunta comunali, Sindaci, Deputazioni Provinciali and Presidenti.

Ravenna: Same; plus delegati of fractions.

5. Practical Factors affecting the Proposal. (Par. 9)

Forli: All practical difficulties could be overcome.

- (a) Electoral lists are out of date but could easily be compiled from information at the Anagrafa office.
- (b) Enough of the population is back to make an election representative.
- (c) In the city of Forli four-fifths of the people are back.
- (d) The political parties would find transport and means of communication if army restrictions were relaxed to permit free circulation by accredited representatives of political parties.
- (e) The necessary material could be obtained.
- (f) There are sufficient civil servants to conduct elections in 50 communes over a period of 3 days.

Ravenna: It is not practical to hold an election at this time.

- (a) It would not be possible to compile electoral lists from available sources.

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(b) Only half of the population of the city of Ravenna has returned; in the rural districts maybe less than half. The army has tried to discourage people from returning. There are not enough to make an election representative.

(c) There is no civilian transport. Circulation is limited to three kilometers because of military factor.

(d) Perhaps materials could be found.

(e) There is no qualified staff available to conduct the elections.

6. Possible consequences of the proposal. (Par. 10/12)

Forli: The Communist Party is the only one now organized. It would sweep an immediate election. It may anyway but that is not certain. If adequate time is not given for the other parties to organize the communists will win without opposition. At least three months notice of the election should be given in order to give time for organizational work by the other parties.

Ravenna: The Communist Party is the most active. The province is traditionally anti-monarchy. The Italian-Republic Party was formerly strong but is not now organized because of confusion of name with the Fascist Republicans. It is hard to guess what the result of an election would be.

7. Possibility of Disorder. (Par. 11 (c) and (d))

Forli: Feeling will run high and may precipitate clashes. However, if normal police precautions are taken, there is little danger. The danger is not so great as to outweigh the advantages of holding an election.

Ravenna: Hard to predict.

8. Political Aspects of the Proposal

Forli: Immediate announcement of an election to be held in the spring or summer would have beneficial results. If sufficient time was given for organization by all parties the elections should reasonably reflect the popular will.

Ravenna: There can be no representative election until the army gives the entire province back to the Region. Then a period of 30 days should be enough notice to permit the several parties to organize.

9. Partial Elections. (Par. 17/18)

Forli: Elections could be held in any part of the province not actually in a combat zone. Elected officials would be more independent and would assume

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more responsibility. There is no great danger that they would act against the interests of the Allies.

Ravenna: Elections should not be held until the entire province is free of army control. An election would weaken the authority of Allied officers. Elected officials would feel that they had "a mandate from the people" and it would be harder to deal with them.

10. Recommendations.

On the basis of the above, plus my own limited observations and experience, the following recommendations are submitted:

- (a) That no announcement of an election be made in any province until it is entirely under Regional (as distinguished from Army) control;
- (b) That elections be announced as soon as possible after the transfer of control of a province;
- (c) That the elections be held not less than three months after the announcement; and
- (d) That during such interval free circulation be permitted for accredited party representatives.

George S. Parkin
 GEORGE S. PARKIN
 Major, C.F.

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HEADQUARTERS
PIEMONTE REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APC 3946758
POLITICAL
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File 014.1

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy

TO : Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Commission

1. Ref. P/523 of 14th December 1944.
2. Whilst in principle it is undoubtedly desirable that elections of the nature indicated in your a/o communication should be held as soon as these can be conducted on a basis that will ensure full and free expression of opinion, it is not possible at this juncture to make any definite proposals in regard to Piemonte Region.
3. Any views that may be expressed in this connection must be regarded as purely academic by reason of non-entry into the Region and lack of adequate and reliable information to enable one to form a competent opinion.
4. Such information as can be gathered from the various intelligence and Duster Sitrep reports, however, would tend to suggest that the political situation in that area is somewhat nebulous and extremely delicate. It is suggested, therefore, that it is too premature seriously to consider the question at this juncture.

Robert P. Marshall

ROBERT P. MARSHALL
Colonel, FA
Regional Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS
PIEMONTE REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

AMW/Pjm

File 016.1

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy

TO : Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Commission

1. Ref. P/523 of 14th December 1944.
2. Whilst in principle it is undoubtedly desirable that elections of the nature indicated in your a/m communication should be held as soon as these can be conducted on a basis that will ensure full and free expression of opinion, it is not possible at this juncture to make any definite proposals in regard to Piemonte Region.
3. Any views that may be expressed in this connection must be regarded as purely academic by reason of non-entry into the Region and lack of adequate and reliable information to enable one to form a competent opinion.
4. Such information as can be gathered from the various intelligence and Muster Sitrep reports, however, would tend to suggest that the political situation in that area is somewhat nebulous and extremely delicate. It is suggested, therefore, that it is too premature seriously to consider the question at this juncture.

ROBERT F. MARSHALL
Colonel, FA
Regional Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
APO 394

(4)

R/1352

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Elections in Italy.

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission, ✓
(Chief of Staff).

1. With further reference to our letter R/1338, I have now had an opportunity of discussing this question with Lt. Col. ORPROOD and Lt. Col. TURNER-COLES on the occasion of a recent visit to Bari. Both these officers confirmed my own opinion. Both agreed on the desirability of holding test elections and both thought that elections to cover all the communes of the Zone could be carried through in a period of from one month to six weeks.

J. K. Dunlop
J. K. DUNLOP,
Brigadier,
Regional Commissioner.

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Col. Polenta

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
APO 394

W/1338

26 December 1944

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy.

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission,
(For the attention of the CHIEF OF STAFF). ✓

1. Reference your P/583 of 14 December.
2. Your letter has asked for an urgent reply and I am therefore sending you, now, what must, at best, be only an expression of personal opinion for I have not had an opportunity of consulting, specially, my Zone Commissioners.
3. I have, however, on the occasion of recent tours and conferences, discussed with them the general problems of Italian Local Government and I know their views. I know particularly that Lt. Col. SIMSON, the Zone Commissioner of Naples, is anxious that municipal elections be held in this city. The electoral lists are now being prepared and I am assured that they should be ready for use early in the New Year.
4. I am persuaded that there are great psychological values in the holding of municipal and other local government elections. The main disadvantages are, the possibilities of disorder, faulty machinery, and possibly, misleading results.
5. The most satisfactory way in which to avoid such difficulties would be to hold test elections in certain areas. It should be made clear that a return to democratic elections and democratic governmental system would be dependant on the ability of the countryside to record its vote efficiently and without breaking heads.
6. Publicity in this respect should be carefully prepared. I believe that the presence of a couple of Allied Journalists, in a town, during election time, would be as valuable a preventive of disorder as fifty Carabinieri.

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7. For that very reason I feel that the early test elections should be few in number. In Southern Region they might well be confined to the fifteen provincial capitals (Lucera taking the place of Foggia). This policy would allow of the use of all the available trained Italian staff at a limited number of localities.

8. A month after the first test elections, provided no disorders or other disadvantages had arisen, further municipal elections could be held in, for example, all communes of over 40,000 inhabitants, which had, by that time, completed their electoral rolls.



J. K. DUNLOP,
Brigadier,
Regional Commissioner.

JKD/jh

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ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

OFFICE: REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
PHONE: 15335 EXT 1

FILE:RG/040

2 Jan 1945

SUBJECT: Local government elections in Italy

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission
R O M E

1. With reference to your R/523 of 14 DEC 44 in my view it would not be desirable to hold local government elections in existing circumstances. I consider that, once the electoral lists or registers have been compiled, it would be possible to hold elections but they would not be conducted on proper lines.

2. I feel that the answer to the problem is given in the memorandum forwarded with your letter and in which the arguments against far outweigh those in support of holding local government elections and I have only the following observations to make.

Looking at the problem in its widest aspect ITALY has in my opinion been given a measure of liberty before it was in a fit state to absorb or make use of such liberty though it is not suggested that matters could have evolved otherwise. To give further liberty in the form of local elections would not at this stage be in the best interests of the people themselves or of the war effort.

To hold local government elections before national elections and before the whole country has been liberated seems to be unsound in principle.

3. So far as purely local conditions are concerned I have the following remarks to make.

Under existing circumstances elections would in no sense express the will of the Sicilian people and therefore no good purpose would presumably be served by holding elections.

SICILY is burdened with a separatist movement. The separatists are not a recognised party but are stated to have organised groups within the recognised parties. The separatists are opposed to any government based on

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ROME and state what they require first as a "plebiscite" so that SICILY can freely express its will in regard to separation from ITALY. They claim to have 500,000 followers in the Island.

It seems probable that the separatists would campaign heavily against the populace taking part in local government elections. Intense local feeling would almost certainly be aroused with consequent disorders. Elections might, however, have the effect of clearing the air as regards separatism and might reveal to what extent this movement has support in the Island.

Corruption is rife in SICILY and there would appear to be no prospect of elections being moderately well conducted. The local government is weak and has not the ability and means to enforce the laws and maintain order or to deal with disorders which elections would provoke.

The war has been mainly forgotten in SICILY and elections would tend to foster the feeling that no further effort or sacrifice is necessary on the part of the Island.

4. I therefore consider that beyond the preparation of electoral lists or registers no definite action should be taken at this stage as regards holding local government elections.

If, however, it is decided that such elections are to be held in liberated territory I consider that they should be held in SICILY and should apply to all provinces and communes.

5. The delay in replying to your letter under reference is regretted but, although dated 14 DEC 44, it did not reach this Headquarters until 25 DEC.

McAnn Brigadier

M. C. BR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS LIGURIA REGION
ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

31 December 1944

Ref: Lig/RC/22-1

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission, ~~Intelligence~~ Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to your P/523 of 14 December 1944, although this question is not one of immediate importance to Liguria Region, my observations are as follows:

a. It is considered that it would be in the interest not only of Liberated Italy, but also the Allied Nations, for local government elections to be held as soon as possible.

b. The present system is not representative of the people, and lacks the democratic background about which so much has been said and written. It is not conducive to united action, and it is breeding discontent and suspicion in the minds of many people, particularly certain political parties, and might conceivably delay for a very considerable period the rehabilitation of the country.

2. The current position is detrimental to the Allies because, after having freed part of the country, they have not fulfilled their promises of insuring representative government to the Italian people. Failure to take immediate action is retarding the political adjustments essential to the proper control which must be established before the Allied Commission can leave the country. Furthermore, when the war in Europe is finished, there might be a rapid withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy, and grave disorders might occur unless some more established democratic institution than the present government were in being.

3. The Allies also, by delaying, have created doubts as to their intention of carrying out the preliminary promises made, and this has resulted in some loss of prestige.

4. So much for the reasons for holding elections; suggestions on the method and extent are set out in the subsequent paragraphs.

5. Elections should be confined to territory under the control of the Italian Government. To extend them into Army areas

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might well be embarrassing for the authorities, and in any case, conditions are not sufficiently settled in those areas to insure a fair or representative vote.

6. Each commune should compile a Voters' list on the registration system, all old lists being destroyed. There should be provision for the inclusion or deletion of names by petition to the central provincial or higher authority. Definite consideration should be given to the inclusion of women as voters. Their interest and votes might well prove a safety valve, deter rowdy demonstrators, and go far toward insuring an unprejudiced choice. Finally, all elections should be held simultaneously to prevent the possibility of interference by detrimental influences. Residents in army occupied territory should be prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in the elections to be held in communes other than the ones in which they reside.

C. C. Peasey

C. C. PEASEY
Colonel
Regional Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
LAZIO-UMBRIA REGION
APO - 394

R/2771

27 December 1944

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy
REF: P/523, 14 December 1944

TO : Chief of Staff
Headquarters, Allied Commission

HEADQUARTERS
27 DEC 1944
A C

1. This Headquarters is of the opinion that local elections for the Lazio-Umbria Region would be feasible and desirable once the electoral lists are completed. Italians need the experience of free local elections before any National elections are held.

John D. Ames
JOHN D. AMES
Lt. Colonel
Regional Commissioner

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Political Staff

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
LAZIO-UMBRIA REGION
APO - 394

R/2771

27 December 1944

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy
REF: P/523, 14 December 1944

TO: Chief of Staff
Headquarters, Allied Commission

1. This Headquarters is of the opinion that local elections for the Lazio-Umbria Region would be feasible and desirable once the electoral lists are completed. Italians need the experience of free local elections before any National elections are held.

JOHN D. AMES
Lt. Colonel
Regional Commissioner

*Text of the communiqué
on the government's decisions on electoral reform*

The President of the Council then said that he is giving the instructions to all the Council for the formation of the electoral lists.

The provisions issued leave the problem of the extension of the electoral right for women (to which the government says it is favorable in principle) unprejudiced, as well as all other questions regarding the right to ballot and passive electorate and with regard to electoral regulations, all questions that will be presently proposed and rapidly solved as soon as all the Italians will be liberated and will be able to express their own will. Records of the process by which to form the lists, judge the electoral rights, receive the eventual appeals, etc. It is foreseen that in the springtime a first electoral consultation can be held. In the meantime the formation of the Fascist electoral lists will be carried out in a more or less normal way. In Italy, the only possible electoral consultation will be through the administrative divisions for the appointment of communal councils etc. or their term will appoint the mayors.

21 Dec 1944

(1) ITALY

1. In the case of Italy, the Government is not aware of any functions of the Italian Government in the field of the administration of the Italian Republic. The Italian Government is not aware of any functions of the Italian Republic in the field of the administration of the Italian Republic.
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9. The Italian Government is not aware of any functions of the Italian Republic in the field of the administration of the Italian Republic.

(iii) The restrictive nature of the political system, for example, prohibition of party registration, there is no election of the President, members of the cabinet are appointed by the President. (iv) Lack of separation of powers and no independence of the judiciary. (v) Lack of freedom of the press and other civil liberties.

(vi) Lack of economic and social development. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress.

(vii) Lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress.

(viii) Lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress.

(iv) POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

1. It is evident that the present situation in the country is a result of the lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress.

2. In the present situation, it is evident that the country is a result of the lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress. In countries where there is no development, there is no progress. In countries where there is development, there is progress.

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(1) Political, economic, social, and cultural development.

(2) Lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development.

(3) Lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development.

(4) Lack of political, economic, social, and cultural development.

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(IV) DISSENTING OPINIONS OF THE JUDGES

1. It is stated that the dissenting opinions mentioned above could have been avoided by a more complete analysis of the facts, and that the dissenting opinions could have been avoided by a more complete analysis of the facts.

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12. The dissenting opinions mentioned above could have been avoided by a more complete analysis of the facts, and that the dissenting opinions could have been avoided by a more complete analysis of the facts.

19. These objections have not got to the very form in Military Government territory with regional control though they are still undoubtedly present. On the other hand, in this territory, where all military and governing directly, it is to be found the best chance of the discussions can really free and independent. In all military government territory, however -- whether under regional or any control -- it has to be considered whether it is possible to have local authorities would prove satisfactory arrangements. In the Indian territories it is to be authorized by some elective assembly or there might be something in this; but it is only a small and provincial council or similar bodies are envisaged, these as local action to believe that their election basis would create any serious tendency to go contrary to Allied wishes. Moreover, the Indian territories are to be considered in common and Presidential

(VI) $\frac{d}{dt} \int_{\Omega} u^2 dx + \int_{\partial\Omega} u^2 dS = 0$.

APPENDIX

Local Government Status as of 10/10/44

Type of Local Municipality

Primary Government

Italian Government

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total Population

2

11

30

51

Total Government

157

177

2,081

5,224

Communities of 50,000 pop. and over

7

6

16

29

Communities of 20,000 pop. and over

and

33

29

122

153

Provincial capitals of local population

NOTE (1) For the purposes of this table it has been assumed that

(2) the whole of the Province of Pavia was in our hands :-

PARMA
PIACENZA

(3) no part of the following provinces was in our hands :-

MODENA
PARMA

NOTE (2) The city of BOLOGNA is included under the appropriate figures in col. (1).

HEADQUARTERS
TOOLANA DIVISION
ARMED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

POL-SEC.

DATE: 7/25/56.

23 Jan 45.

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections in Italy.

TO : HQ, AG.

1. Reference your 2/523 dated 14 Dec 44, and TTM No 702 dated 19 Jan 45.

2. The question of the desirability of holding local government elections in Italy at the present time has been carefully considered, and the opinion of the A.M.G. has been sought.

3. It would seem desirable that Italy should be given something in lieu of her discarded political system. If success is to be achieved however, it is my opinion that this something should be with an eye to the future, and not as a temporary arrangement.

4. The uncurrent of Italian opinion seems to favour the continuance of occupational government, but at the same time it would not be safe to assume that such opinion includes an hostility toward the proposed elections. It is my opinion that the present feelings of the Italian people as a whole are occasioned by a lack of reason rather than because of a reason.

5. This point is worthy of consideration. The beneficiaries of the proposal are the Italian people, and whilst the Allied Nations may be ready and willing to do what is proposed and to act in good faith, the final issue in the future of the Italian people. A native intuition which rebels against experiment may be the answer to the present air of Italian indifference. Such indifference is not hostility but neither is it desire. In considering the question therefore, this premise must be recognised with.

6. It can be said that the people of liberated Italy appreciate that a change from the old order is inevitable. I do not consider however that they are prepared to accept a formula of elections as a solution to their present plight. The most charitable, I fear, would be reluctant to give to the formula anything like the cloak of virtue so enthusiastically bestowed by the democracies.

7. As stated in para 4, it would be wrong to assume that Allied elections, which are renowned for their virtues, are not wanted, and here may be the reason why Allied Government is not too objectionable to the Italian people, who doubtless appreciate that somewhere, such administration had as its origin the democratic nature of the Allied elections.

8. The proposed elections are something which have never previously been experienced. That such an experiment must be made sooner or later cannot be seriously denied. Not without misgivings and perhaps with much reluctance may it be said that the balance of opinion lies with the reasons advanced against the experiment rather than in its favour.

9. I recommend that no elections be held in A.M.G. territory.

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9. I recommend that no elections be held in A.M.G. territory.

4881

22/ao.

RECEIVED
75 MAR 1946

Robert Kirkwood
ROBT. G. KIRKWOOD,
Colonel, FA, US Army.
Regional Commissioner.

1764

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

File

AND TOSCANA REGION

131

19 JAN 45

PRIORITY

SECRET ID

PAPER TO AND TOSCANA REGION FIVE DE ALGER PAPER

YOUR VIEWS ON PROPOSED CHANGING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DIVISIONS REFERRED TO IN
OUR LATTER NUMBER FIVE DE FIVE TWO THREE OF JAN FOUR DECEMBER ARE URGENTLY
REQUESTED

5-23-1

Copy to: Office of Chief of Staff

Political Section

279

H. L. S'A. HOPKINSON
A/Vice President

4790

TO : Chief of Staff

For approval please.

18.1.45

H. L. d'A. Hopkinson
H. L. d'A. HOPKINSON
A/Vice President, Political Section

Pol Sec

With exception of Toscana Region addresses ~~is~~ names
in your draft signal received copies of letter of 14 Dec
'for info'. Elections may not be held in army
areas & the other two regions are thought still to be
nebulous. Signal should go, as drafted, to Toscana.

18 Jan 45

G. Gordon
Office of Col ^{left}

4783

(copy)

C.O.S.

Do you wish us to keep these or will you do so? I believe you already have a copy from 8th Army.

H.H.

Dec 30

Pol Sec

All papers on this subject should be kept on your file and submitted to COS. These letters (from Brig. Dunlop and others) have not been copied to this office. I shall be grateful if you will submit them on a file as soon as possible to COS.

E Talbot/Major
for Chief Staff Officer
COS

2/1/45

Handwritten: 2/1/45

Handwritten:
 1. 1st Army
 2. 2nd Army
 3. 3rd Army
 4. 4th Army
 5. 5th Army
 6. 6th Army
 7. 7th Army
 8. 8th Army
 9. 9th Army
 10. 10th Army

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
SARDINIA REGION

15 January 1945

REFERENCE: L/1431SUBJECT: Local Government Elections - Italy.TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission

1. With reference to P/523 of the 14th December 1944, it is regretted that the Memorandum which was delayed reaching this Headquarters and required detailed consideration, has not been replied to sooner.

2. I am in favour of holding elections for the:

Consiglio Provinciale
and Consiglio Comunale

throughout SARDINIA, and recommend that these elections be held in about three months' time, i.e. in April or May next.

3. At the moment Prefects are having a difficult time trying to administer Communes which have Sindaci and Giunta appointed by the Prefects themselves. Choice is guided by what is learnt of appointees from the Carabinieri, the Committee of Liberation, local priests, etc. but this is not satisfactory and gives rise to jealousies. Prefects are also hampered in their choice by being obliged to include representatives of political parties whose views are held by only a minority of the community. Elections would put an end to any suggestion that the Giunta are specially selected people chosen to support the views of those in authority or because of their local influence. It is most probable, therefore, that Prefects would welcome elections.

4. I submit for your consideration that the possibility of holding these local Government elections in this Island may be considered even though the time may not yet be ripe for elections on the mainland of Italy because I think they will raise morale. Quite frankly, apart from the above reasons, unless and until Italy can evolve some kind of two party system, where power will be faced by responsible opposition, I do not consider that elections, even local Government elections, will go far towards producing more vigorous Government.

Morale and interest in their own affairs are, however, of supreme importance and I attach notes giving comments in detail on the paragraphs of the Memorandum attached to your letter under reference.



J. A. C. PENNYQUICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

1768

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John Pennington
4828
17 JAN 1945

J. A. C. PENNYQUICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

JACP/ech

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
SARDINIA REGION

15 January 1945

REFERENCE: L/1451SUBJECT: Local Government Elections - Italy.TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission

1. With reference to P/523 of the 14th December 1944, it is regretted that the Memorandum which was delayed reaching this Headquarters and required detailed consideration, has not been replied to sooner.

2. I am in favour of holding elections for the:

Consiglio Provinciale
and Consiglio Comunale

throughout SARDINIA, and recommend that these elections be held in about three months' time, i.e. in April or May next.

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J. A. C. PERRYCHICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections - Italy.

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John F. G. ...

J. A. C. PERRYCHICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

JACP/ach

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION SARDINIA
REGIONNOTES DEALING IN FULL WITH THE SUB-COMMISSION MEMORANDUM
ATTACHED TO P/523 OF 14 DECEMBER 1944 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS

15th January 1945

The following points are suggested:-

Paras. (I) and (II) noted. A clear statement of the powers which the Consiglio Provinciale and Consiglio Comunale, if elected, will be able to wield would be appreciated.

Para. (III) 9. (a) The compiling of electoral lists and registers will not be a very lengthy procedure providing the necessary forms are made speedily available.

(b) The scattered state of the population does not materially affect SARDINIA since the number of prisoners of war, refugees and members of the Italian Forces are not sufficiently large to affect the final figures in any Commune.

(c) It is agreed that the elections should not be held in the winter but ⁱⁿ April or May when weather conditions would be most favourable, and in consequence transportation and communications more satisfactory.

(d) Ballot boxes etc could be prepared now in readiness for an election in three months time. Paper alone is the only difficulty at the moment.

(e) As far as qualified staff is concerned it is submitted that a school for training electoral staffs be formed at each Prefettura to be held as soon as possible so that the system of voting could be thoroughly explained and also that the advice and experience of Allied personnel could be placed at the disposal of these schools.

Para. IV 10. As far as SARDINIA is concerned the consequences of an immediate election would be beneficial. Anything which can make each individual member of each Commune over the age of 21 feel that he has a say in the Government of his Commune is going to be a step towards a liberty dreamed of but never considered seriously to be possible. It will satisfy the cravings of those who feel their particular lives do not count for anything in the life of their Commune. It will awaken the interest of the individual in the well being of his Commune.

Para. II. (a) It is felt at the moment in SARDINIA that the victory would not necessarily go to the best organised party, i.e. the Communist, whereas if the elections are delayed, the Communists, because of their organisation, would get more votes. They are really doing propaganda work, but the main bulk of the people so far are not much influenced by them. They will undoubtedly obtain full representation in the industrial towns of CAGLIARI, IGLESIAS and VILLACIDRO but elsewhere they are unlikely to have anything to compare with the representation they have at present.

(b) The influence of local elections on national elections is not likely to make any real difference in SARDINIA.

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(b) The influence of local elections on national elections is not likely to make any real difference in SARDINIA.

(c) If elections are held throughout the island on the same day, disturbances are unlikely. Disturbances are likely only when agitators from outside the Communes enter the Communes.

(d) Again it is felt that the argument covered in "c" above holds good. Once the public have been able to express their will, disorders will be less and not more prevalent than they are at the present time. They are nearly all in the industrial areas.

(i) Political passions will run high at whatever time the elections are held, but in SARDINIA the effect of such passions will only be felt in the industrial areas where there has been Communist activity.

/Continued(ii)

(ii) If the elections are held in April and May the food position should be favourable, Crude oil will then be available to add to the rations.

(iii) If Italian functionaries are schooled and rehearsed in the conducting of an election and can rely on Allied advice, lack of confidence in them will then be lessened.

(iv) The morale is probably better now than it may be in nine months to a years' time, and the number of troops and Carabinieri available are not likely to be increased on the island. The tendency appears to be to decrease their strength.

Para 12. Here again the position of SARDINIA, owing to its isolation from the Mainland, makes it possible to risk minor disorders without affecting the general welfare of the fighting forces on the battlefield or their supply lines.

Para V. 13. Agreed it is felt that the elections will have a very much more beneficial effect if they are held at the latest by May. The Prefects are at the moment working under difficulties because the people say their Giunta do not represent their views. The sooner this argument is removed the better it will be for all concerned.

Para 14. The elections would undoubtedly satisfy the political feelings, such as they are, of the average Italian.

Para 15. The elections should certainly be a pointer to the position of the parties and their relative strength.

Para 16. This is one of the most important points of the whole Memorandum. It will show that the Allies are open and ready to implement the freedom of Italy.

Para VI. 17. If these elections are to take place they should cover the whole of SARDINIA, and it is noted that the suggestion is that they should be held simultaneously which is essential.

Parae 18 and 19 noted.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION SARDINIA
REGION

SECRET

15th January 1945

NOTES DIALING IN MAIL WITH THE SUB-COMMISSION MEMORANDUM
ATTACHED TO P/523 OF 14 DECEMBER 1944 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS

The following points are suggested:-

Paras. (I) and (II) noted. A clear statement of the powers which the Consiglio Provinciale and Consiglio Comunale, if elected, will be able to wield would be appreciated.

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(e) As far as qualified staff is concerned it is submitted that a school for training electoral staffs be formed at each Prefettura to be held as soon as possible so that the system of voting could be thoroughly explained and also that the advice and experience of Allied personnel could be placed at the disposal of these schools.

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Para. II. (a) It is felt at the moment in SARDINIA that the victory would not necessarily go to the best organized party, i.e. the Communist, whereas if the elections are delayed, the Communists, because of their organization, would get more votes. They are really doing propaganda work, but the main bulk of the people so far are not much influenced by them. They will undoubtedly obtain full representation in the industrial towns of CAGLIARI, IGLESIA and VILLACIDRO but elsewhere they are unlikely to have anything to compare with the representation they have at present.

(b) The influence of local elections on national elections is not likely to make any real difference in SARDINIA.

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Para. (III) 9. (a) The compiling of electoral lists and registers will not be a very lengthy procedure providing the necessary forms are made speedily available.

(b) The scattered state of the population does not materially affect SAMBIVIA since the number of prisoners of war, refugees and members of the Italian Forces are not sufficiently large to affect the final figures in any Commune.

(b) It is agreed that the elections should not be held in the winter but April or May when weather conditions would be most favourable, and in consequence transportation and communications more satisfactory.

(d) Ballot boxes etc could be prepared now in readiness for an election in three months time. Paper alone is the only difficulty at the moment.

(e) As far as qualified staff is concerned it is submitted that a school for training electoral staffs be formed at each Prefettura to be held as soon as possible so that the system of voting could be thoroughly explained and also that the advice and experience of Allied Personnel could be placed at the disposal of these schools.

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(b) The influence of local elections on national elections is not likely to make any real difference in SAMBIVIA.

(c) If elections are held throughout the island on the same day, disturbances are unlikely. Disturbances are likely only when agitators from outside the Communes enter the Communes.

(d) Again it is felt that the argument covered in "c" above holds good. Once the public have been able to express their will, disorders will be less and not more prevalent than they are at the present time. They are nearly all in the industrial areas.

(i) Political passions will run high at whatever time the elections are held, but in SAMBIVIA the effect of such passions will only be felt in the industrial areas where there has been Communist activity.

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(ii) If the elections are held in April and by the food position should be favourable, Oil will then be available to add to the rations.

(iii) If Italian functionaries are schooled and rehearsed in the conducting of an election and can rely on Allied advice, lack of confidence in them will then be lessened.

(iv) The morale is probably better now than it may be in nine months to a year's time, and the number of troops and Carabinieri available are not likely to be increased on the island. The tendency appears to be to decrease their strength.

Para 12. Here again the position of SARDINIA, owing to its isolation from the Mainland, makes it possible to risk minor disorders without affecting the general welfare of the fighting forces on the battlefield or their supply lines.

Para V. 13. Agreed it is felt that the elections will have a very much more beneficial effect if they are held at the latest by May. The Prefects are at the moment working under difficulties because the people say their Giunta do not represent their views. The sooner this argument is removed the better it will be for all concerned.

Para 14. The elections would undoubtedly satisfy the political feelings, such as they are, of the average Italian.

Para 15. The elections should certainly be a pointer to the position of the parties and their relative strength.

Para 16. This is one of the most important points of the whole Memorandum. It will show that the Allies are open and ready to implement the freedom of Italy.

Para VI. 17. If these elections are to take place they should cover the whole of SARDINIA, and it is noted that the suggestion is that they should be held simultaneously which is essential.

Paras 18 and 19 noted.

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M. S. Luick

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION

AC/45/LG

Tel: 620

SUBJECT: Local Government Elections.

13 December 1944

TO : Henry Hopkins, Esq.,
VP Political Section.

1. I re-submit the paper prepared by this Local Government Sub Commission, which we now feel represents our combined views.
2. I suggest that, subject to any amendments you may have, that it should be circulated at your discretion to Regional and Provincial Commissioners for their views. I take it that you will arrange such circulation should you decide to that effect. I am strongly of the opinion, however, that the views of (a) Legal Sub Commission and (b) Public Safety Sub Commission should be sought before a decision is taken at a higher level.

R. G. B. Spicer
Colonel

R. G. B. SPICER
Colonel
Director
Local Government Sub Commission

RGBS/pec

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S E C R E T

M E M O R A N D U M

AS TO THE DESIRABILITY AND POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS IN ITALY AT PRESENT

(I) PRELIMINARY

1. It has always been understood to be a part of the functions of the Allied Commission not only to secure the abolition of the Fascist local government structure, but to substitute for it a system distinctively democratic. Considerable experience along these lines was gained from the operations of AMCOT in Sicily. On the basis of what was done there, Orders were issued last January for the establishment by Allied Military Government of local authorities in occupied provinces and communes. With the transfer of Southern Italy to the control of the Italian Government, that Government continued the AMG system by a Decree of April 1944.
2. The Orders and Decree provided for the re-establishment in part of the local government system contemplated by the pre-Fascist law of 1915. In the absence of any possibility of elections at that time, the elective communal and provincial councils were not re-established. The standing executive committees and the executive and presiding heads of the local authorities were re-introduced on the basis of appointment by the Prefect.
3. It was made clear in both Orders and Decree that this legislation was purely temporary.
4. The temporary local government structure thus contemplated has been established almost in its entirety throughout Italy behind the battle line.
5. The next development was the promulgation by the Italian Government of a Decree of 28 September 1944 for the compilation of electoral lists, which Decree revived the law of 1919 on the subject.

(II) POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN THE ABOVE.

6. It is obvious that the Decree of April last contemplated a further step in the democratization of Italian local government; i.e. the establishment of elective local authorities and the holding of elections for them. The 1915 system was partially adopted as being the readiest democratic system to hand; but its adoption did not imply that the elective local authorities provided by it were the particular ones ultimately contemplated.
7. In fact, the Italian Government have this autumn established a commission of experts to study and make recommendations on the whole administrative system of the Italian State, including local government.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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7. In fact, the Italian Government have this autumn established a commission of experts to study and make recommendations on the whole administrative system of the Italian State, including local government.
8. If, therefore, local government elections are to be contemplated in the near future, it is necessary first to decide what local government bodies are to be elected. The final and permanent form of Italian local government must obviously rest on the will of the Italian people freely expressed. Presumably, this can only be expressed through some form of national legislature or constituent assembly.
9. On the other hand, (subject to advice on their status) it can be argued that the present Government could produce a pattern of elective local authorities which would be acceptable as a temporary measure, by continuing the process implicit in the Decree of April, i.e. by re-constituting and re-establishing the Communal and Provincial Councils for which provision is

made in the law of 1915. Such a course may give an air of permanence to a system which is not intended so to be, and inevitably to some extent pre-judge or affect the subsequent action of the Italian people through their legislature (whatever form the latter may eventually take). Neither is it to be assumed that a system enacted 29 years ago is necessarily going to meet even the temporary needs of the country in the vastly changed circumstances of today. For instance, a considerable body of informed Italian opinion is interested in the development of a system of regional autonomy, the repercussions of which upon the existing system of provinces and the 1915 system of Provincial Councils cannot be foreseen.

10. It is also not to be overlooked that the Italians may wish to apply the elective system to the selection of public individual functionaries, and/or to the corporate councilary bodies so familiar in the United States and the British Empire. They may regard the American practice of electing the Mayor directly as a good model and even desire to reform the institution of the Prefect on some such lines, if not abolish it.

11. The foregoing indicates that 'local' government cannot be entirely divorced from the National "structure" and suggests the extent of the high political principles involved. The need for serious and careful study of the problem by the Italians and the vital necessity of avoiding hastily improvised schemes is obvious. It is to be borne in mind, however, that with the adoption of the Decree of April 1944, it was understood that the Italian people would be entirely free at some future date to carry out such radical reforms in their local government system as they thought fit.

(III) PRACTICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROPOSAL

12. If the foregoing observations are held not to influence the present problem or that such problem is capable of solution, it would be necessary to give consideration to the following points :

- (1) Electoral lists or registers must first be compiled. As stated above, a Decree for this purpose has been issued. It appears however, that the compilation of the lists will take many months, in some provinces considerably longer than in others.
- (2) The scattered state of the population, for example, prisoners of war, refugees, those bombed or shelled out of their homes, members of the Italian armed forces. (The Decree of September makes provision for the registration of such people but ~~that~~ there is no provision for absentee voting).
- (3) Transport and communications. If communal elections are to be held, these difficulties will be great, especially if elections are held in the winter. *be certain voting facilities are made available*
- (4) Lack of material, e.g. paper, printing services, ballot boxes or urns, etc.
- (5) The lack of qualified staff. There have been no true elections in Italy since 1926 at the latest. Trained State and local civil

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(4) Lack of material, e.g. paper, printing services, ballot boxes or urns, etc..

(5) The lack of qualified staff. There have been no true elections in Italy since 1926 at the latest. Trained State and local civil servants are in extremely short supply.

(IV) POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSAL

13. Assuming that the practical difficulties enumerated above could likewise be overcome or at least overlooked, consideration should be given to what the ~~possible~~ results of the holding of local government elections in Italy now would be.

14. In the first place, it is uncertain whether those elections would produce a real expression of the popular will. The practical difficulties above-mentioned in themselves would militate against this. A more serious

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factor however, is the state of politics in the country generally:

- (1) The victory at the election would go to the best organized party or body and not necessarily to the most representative one.
- (2) The appearance of popular support thus created in favour of ~~any~~ particular parties or organisations will influence in advance the eventual settlement of the new Italian constitution. Whether this is done by constituent assembly or by referendum, all taking part in the process cannot fail to be affected by the results of the preceding local elections.
- (3) Parties may therefore feel it of vital importance to win the clearest possible victory at the local elections so that such elections might precipitate just those disorders that they are intended to avoid.
- (4) There is a possibility that local government elections will be accompanied by a measure of disorder which may possibly even continue afterwards. Many factors suggest this including the following :

- (a) Political passions are running high.
- (b) Hunger and lack of necessities of life strengthen the tendency.
- (c) Little confidence is felt in the ability of the Italian functionaries who will be in charge of the elections either to conduct them independently or properly.
- (d) Subject to the opinion of the Public Safety Sub-Commission who are of course better able to judge, the morale and numbers of the forces of public order may not prove adequate to control the situation.

15. 12/ It is, of course, one of the primary functions of the Allied Commission to maintain order in the rear of the Armies: and -- again subject to the views of the Public Safety Sub-Commission -- it does not appear that either the Italian Government or the Allied Commission could guarantee that order if local government elections were held.

16. 13/ The disorders consequent on an election might be looked upon with a lenient eye as having at least a constructive object. Rioters would at least be rioting in order to obtain the local government they desire and not in order to force the authorities to provide food or boots from some unspecified but presumably existent source. There appears to be a military and a political comment on this. From the military standpoint all disorder in a country which is a theatre of operations and a source and base of supply is objectionable, no matter what its purpose. Politically, all attempts to apply force to the settlement of questions of government are the negation of democracy, no matter how laudable the object. The example of Greece adds point to this observation.

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(V) POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL

17. The holding of local government elections should raise the prestige of Italy by making it the first European country to get back to the basis of modern democracy. Even if the elections cannot be held till next Summer (see para. 12 (1) above) an announcement now that they were to be held would have an immediate effect. (As to being the first in the field, however, an indication has been observed in the press that the French are considering local elections in February.)

18. The elections would provide an outlet for the political feeling of the average Italian and may be a useful safety valve and a preventative of disorder.

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19. They would give some sort of basis to Italian political parties, in that it could not then be said with absolute truth that they were "not hampered by having been elected by anyone". It is not suggested that the elections would prove anything as to the extent to which a political party represents Italian opinion. On the contrary there is sound reason to believe that the elections would not express the popular will, -- see para. 14 above. But the results would at least provide a measure of sorts which could be treated as a gauge of the relative strength of parties. At present there is none.

20. The announcement that local elections were to be conceded should raise the prestige of the Allies as a concrete proof of the character of their intentions towards Italy. The announcement would stand out in relief against the present situation in Greece and illustrate what could be done there - and in other countries - were it not for the forces of disorder.

(VI) PARTIAL ELECTIONS

21. The foregoing observations are based on the assumption that the elections contemplated would be held (a) throughout liberated Italy and (b) simultaneously in all communes, provinces or such other local government areas as may be determined. It might be thought desirable however to limit elections either to a part only of the country or to a certain class of local authority.

22. As to territorial limitation, it is fairly obvious that elections could not be held in the areas under the control of AMG 5th and 8th Armies. Not only would the practical difficulties enumerated in section III be at their highest but the C-in-C could be expected to take strong objection to the diversion of the energies of AMG officers, Italian functionaries and the population generally away from tasks of military importance.

23. These objections have not quite the same force in Military Government Territory under Regional Control though they are still undoubtedly present. On the other hand, in this Territory, where Allied officers are governing directly, it is to be found the best chance of the elections being really free and independent. In all Military Government Territory however -- whether under Regional or Army control -- it has to be considered whether elected local authorities would prove satisfactory instruments. If the Prefectures were to be substituted by some elective institutions, there might be something in this; but if only communal and provincial councils or similar bodies are envisaged, there is little reason to believe that their elective basis would create any serious tendency to go contrary to Allied wishes. Moreover, if the 1915 law is adhered to, the executive heads (Sindaci in communes and Presidenti in provinces) and the standing executive committees (Giunte Comunali and Deputazioni Provinciali) would continue; and the law gives to these institutions such a wide measure of authority independently of their councils as would be sufficient for Allied purposes.

24. As to Italian Government Territory, a suggestion has been made that in the first place elections should be limited to certain selected areas,

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24. As to Italian Government Territory, a suggestion has been made that in the first place elections should be limited to certain selected areas, the advantages being that such an experiment would show how elections would work in the rest of Italy and that police reinforcements could be brought into the experimental area sufficient to cope with any disorder. One difficulty is to find a suitable area. Sicily or Sardinia are open to the objection that the elections would turn upon the issues of Separation or Autonomy. Calabria and Lucania are too backward; Apulia never had military government and its fascist complexion is still believed to exist. Lazio and the Abruzzi are too much influenced from the capital to be fair specimens. The four Campanian provinces would seem to offer the best field.

25. The overriding objection however is that none of the political advantages enumerated in section V could result from such a minor and apparently grudging concession. On the contrary, so open a declaration of mistrust in the capacity of the Italians to work democratic machinery might

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do untold harm all round.

26. As to limiting the elections to a certain class of local authority, it has been suggested that they might be held in (a) cities of 50,000 population or more or (b) towns of 20,000 population or over and those of less population that are provincial capitals. Statistics are given in the Appendix.

27. It is true that this suggestion would also enable a concentration of the forces of public order and that it is in the larger towns that the practical difficulties enumerated in section III are likely to be most easily overcome. On the other hand, the probable objectionable consequences described in section IV are most likely to result in just such centres of population. Moreover, the political dangers alluded to above in para. 25 are as real in the case of a limitation to a class of authority as they are in the case of limitation to a given area.

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APPENDIX

Local Government areas in liberated Italy as at 10/10/44.

Type of local authority. (1)	Military Government Territory under		Italian Government Territory (4)	Total (5)
	Army Control (2)	Regional Control. (3)		
Total Provinces	4	11	36	51
Total Communes.	155	474	2,595	3,224
Communes of 50,000 pop. and over }	7	6	16	29
Communes of 20,000 pop. and over }				
and }	13	29	111	153
Provincial capitals if of less population }				

NOTE (1) For the purposes of this table it has been assumed that

(a) the whole of the following provinces is in our hands :-

LUCCA
PISTOIA

(b) no part of the following provinces are in our hands :-

BOLOGNA
RAVENNA

NOTE (2) The city of ROME is included among the appropriate figures in col. (4).

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

(I) ITALY

1. It has always been intended to be a part of the functions of the Allied Civil Control Commission to study the Italian local government structure, in the knowledge that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system. On the basis of the information received from the Italian government, the Commission has been able to determine that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system. The Commission has been able to determine that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system.
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4. The temporary local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system. The Commission has been able to determine that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system.
5. The next development in the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system. The Commission has been able to determine that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system.

(II) POLICE INFORMATION IN THE ABOVE

6. It is obvious that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system. The Commission has been able to determine that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system.
7. In fact, the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system. The Commission has been able to determine that the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system.
8. If, therefore, local government elections are to be contemplated in the near future, it is necessary first to decide what local government bodies are to be elected. The final and important factor in the Italian local government structure is a very important factor in the Italian political system.

(1) The Government of the Republic of Italy, for example, pursuant to the law of 1948, which established the system of the Italian Republic, the Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

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(IV) POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSAL

10. Assuming that the proposed amendments would be adopted, it would be necessary to revise the law of 1948, which established the system of the Italian Republic, the Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

11. In the first place, it is necessary to consider the possible consequences of the proposed amendments. The proposed amendments would be adopted, it would be necessary to revise the law of 1948, which established the system of the Italian Republic, the Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

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(d) The Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

(1) The Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

(2) The Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

(3) The Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

(4) The Government of Italy, in the exercise of its powers, has the duty to ensure the free expression of the will of the Italian people in the elections.

in 1941, since 1941, the United States has been the only country in the world to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

(14) THE UNITED STATES AND THE PACIFIC

14. The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

15. The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

16. The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

17. The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

18. The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

19. The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

(1) The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

(2) The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

(3) The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

(4) The United States has been the only country in the Pacific to have a permanent military presence in the Pacific.

20. The diagram contains an illustration of the United States and its territories in the Pacific. The diagram shows the United States and its territories in the Pacific, including Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific Islands. The diagram also shows the United States and its territories in the Pacific, including Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific Islands.

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(VT) PATIENTS' CLINICAL FINDINGS

19. There objections have not quite the same force in Military Government Territory under Regional Control though they are still undoubtedly present. On the other hand, in this territory, where Allied officers are governing directly, it is found the best chance of the absorption of the fully free and independent, in all Military Government Territory, however -- whether under regional or army control -- it has to be considered whether a local authorized would prove satisfactory instruments. In the Prefecture were to be substituted by some elective institutions there might be something in this; and if only communal and provincial councils or similar bodies are envisaged, there is little reason to believe that their elective basis would create any serious tendency to go contrary to Allied wishes. Moreover, the Committee and President

ALBANIA

Local Government Code is in effect as of 10/10/44.

Type of local authority	Administrative Territory	Italian Territory	Total
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total Province	4	56	51
Total County	205	2,395	3,224
Counties of 50,000 pop. and over	7	16	29
Counties of 20,000 pop. and over	13	111	153
Provincial capitals is of 1/2 population			

NOTE (1) For the purpose of this work, the area shown within the
(2) the area of the following provinces are in our hands :-

BARRE
PESTOLA

(3) no part of the following provinces are in our hands :-

COLONIA
NAVERIA

NOTE (2) The city of POE is included under the appropriate figures in col. (4)

14 December 1944

TO : Chief of Staff

FROM : Political Section

Forwarded for approval and signature please.

The memorandum it is intended to enclose is at X

H. L. D'A. HOPKINSON
Acting Vice President, Political SectionPOL SEC.2I have amended the memorandum slightly. I should like to see it abridged if possible. ~~the~~

HLS (14/12/44)

3

I have cut out three paras. in (II) which I do not see in and which to me are superfluous. You might also eliminate paras. 21 to 24 inclusive. I do not see in the proposals contained in them are practical politics.

C.O.S.

HLS Dec. 18

Issue as amended. Agree

to exclusion 21-24.

HLS (17/12/44)

47721

H.L. Hopkinson

1799

E. L. d'A. HOBKINSON
Acting Vice President, Political Section

POL SEC.
2

I have amended the memorandum slightly. I should like to see it abridged if possible. ~~the~~

MS (14/12/11)

3

I have cut out three paras. in (II) which I do not wish add much to the argument. You might also like to cut paras. 21 to 24 inclusive. I do not wish the proposals contained in them are practical points.

C.O.S.

MS Dec. 18

Issue as amended, 2 agree

MS (17/12/11)

to exclusion 21-24.

Mr. Spelman:

With your approval this can now be despatched.

Cpl. W. Lin

6/1/12

