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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Executive GIUNTA

Feb. - Apr. 1944

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M165

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C. COME)

21st. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET

v16

HONORARY

GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

BADGOLIO SENT ME SITUATION REPORT LATE LAST NIGHT PD PAREN TO APHQ FOR GENERAL
WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE
PERSONAL PAREN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PARTY OF ACTION ALL THE SIX BARI PARTIES
 HAVE AGREED TO ENTER HIS GOVERNMENT PD IN ADDITION CMA ONE POST IN THE CABINET WILL
 BE GIVEN TO THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS AND ONE UNDERSECRETARYSHIP TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
 PD THE FORMER WILL BE A NOMINKEE OF DE NICOLA'S PD PARA TWO PD BADGOLIO IS MAKING A
 LAST ATTEMPT THIS MORNING TO INDUCE THE PARTY OF ACTION TO CHANGE ITS MIND PD IF HE
 FAILS HE INTENDS TO CARRY ON AND FORM HIS CABINET WITHOUT IT PD PARA THREE PD
 BADGOLIO HAS PROMISED TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF PROGRESS TODAY AND TELLS ME THAT SO FAR
 HE HAS MADE NO COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESS

541.1

5617

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General,
 Chief Commissioner

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M164

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COM1)

20th. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET

V16

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

TOGLIATTI ALIAS ERCOLI CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON PD PARA TWO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON
SEA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL
PARA ONE WE WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE ALL
 THE POLITICAL PARTIES WAS A MOST URGENT NECESSITY PD PARA TWO PD TOGLIATTI STATED
 DEFINITELY THAT HIS PARTY WERE VERY READY TO SERVE UNDER BADOGLIO AS PRIME MINISTER PD
 IN HIS OPINION BADOGLIO HAD A PERFECTLY CLEAN RECORD PD PARA THREE PD TOGLIATTI SAID
 THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PARTY OF ACTION WOULD DEFINITELY NOT REPEAT NOT AGREE TO JOIN
 THE NEW GOVERNMENT PD HE ASKED ME HOW I WOULD VIEW THEIR DEFECTION PD I SAID THAT
 PROVIDED THE OTHER FIVE OPPOSITION PARTIES AGREED TO COLLABORATE WITH BADOGLIO THE
 DEFECTION OF ONE RELATIVELY SMALL PARTY COULD BE REGARDED WITH EQUANIMITY PD PARA FOUR
 PD TOGLIATTI SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN BADOGLIO THIS MORNING AND WAS SEEING HIM AGAIN
 LATER TODAY PD HE CONSIDERED THAT FAVOURABLE PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE WITH THE FORMATION
 OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT PD PARA FIVE PD TOGLIATTI CLAIMED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS
 BY FAR THE BEST ORGANISED IN ITALY BUT REPEATED HIS RECENT THESIS THAT ALL EFFORTS MUST
 IN THE MEANTIME BE DEVOTED TO ENSURING MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HELP THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST
 GERMANY AND THAT POLITICAL DISPUTES MUST BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE WAR HAS BEEN WON

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General 5616
 Chief Commissioner

TOP SECRET

Fatima 142

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COM)

7 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

RESULTING FROM THE SORRENTO MEETING YESTERDAY THE GIUNTA PUBLISHED A RESOLUTION RECORDING THE URGENT NECESSITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE LIBERATION OF ROME PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE FIVE APRIL FOUR PAREN IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MEANS THAT THE GIUNTA ACCEPTED THE DE NICOLA PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO A SINGLE MODIFICATION PD THEY DESIRE THAT THE KING SHOULD NOT ONLY ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING AND CREATING A LIEUTENANCY IN FAVOR OF THE CROWN PRINCE BUT SHOULD PUT THIS INTO EFFECT FORTHWITH WITHOUT WAITING ~~FOR~~ ARRIVAL IN ROME PD DE NICOLA IS TO BE ASKED TO COMMUNICATE THIS DECISION TO THE KING PARA PENDING THE RESULTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WILL BE ANY CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT PARA THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNIST DECISION TO ENTER

5615

-2-

THE GOVERNMENT REGARDLESS OF THE KINGS POSITION WAS NOT ACCEPTED
WITHOUT RESERVE IS A SOURCE OF SATISFACTION TO THE OTHER PARTIES PD
IT IS DOUBTFUL HOWEVER THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT IF
VICTOR EMANUEL PERSISTS IN HIS WISH TO ENTER ROME AS KING

Content & Classification
authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General 5614
Chief Commissioner

SECRET

FATIMA MI35

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

4th. April, 1944.

SECRET

VAPOUR 16

PRIORITY

MAJOR DOE

FREEDOM

REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE ZERO OF SECOND APRIL PD FAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL
WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE
PERSONAL FAREN THE JUNIA MET YESTERDAY FOR TWO HOURS AND AFTER AN INTERVAL WERE
JOINED BY THE LOCAL NAPLES COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR A FURTHER SESSION OF
THREE HOURS TO DISCUSS THE COMMUNIST PROPOSALS WHICH WERE EXPOUNDED BY EPCOLI PD NO
DECISION WAS REACHED AND DISCUSSION WAS ADJOURNED UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL SIXTH
CMA WHEN A FURTHER MEETING WILL BE HELD AT SORRENTO IN CROCE'S PRESENCE PD SFORZA WILL
ALSO ATTEND PD TWO PD MAIN OPPOSITION TO COMMUNIST LINE HAS SO FAR COME FROM THE
LIBERALS AND THE PARTY OF ACTION

5613

ROBERT E. DOE,
Major, AGD,
Secretary General

SECRET

SECRET

FATIMA M 134

FATIMA (SEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

3 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

REBER SAW SPORZA THIS MORNING AND FOUND HIM VERY DISTURBED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY DECISION PD PAREN AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE ZERO APRIL TWO PAREN HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PARTY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN UNDER ORDERS FROM MOSCOW AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT WOULD DESTROY THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ITALY BY PROLONGING THE NEO FASCIST ROLE OF THE KING AND THAT IT WOULD MERELY SERVE TO INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET RUSSIA NOT ONLY AS REGARDS ITALY BUT IN OTHER LIBERATED AREAS OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL PD HE DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD LOST THE OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING ABOUT A MORE DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE LOCAL ITALIAN QUESTION PARA SPORZA CONFIRMED THAT THE GIUNTA WAS TO MEET TODAY TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM PUT BY THE COMMUNIST PROPOSAL TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT PD HE SAID HE

HIMSELF HAD

5612

FATIMA 134 PAGE TWO

REFUSED TO ATTEND SINCE HE CONSIDERED THAT THE GIUNTA HAD ONLY THE AUTHORITY CONFERRED UPON IT BY THE BARI RESOLUTION WHICH REQUIRED THE KING'S ABDICATION AS THE CONDITION FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT PD ALTHOUGH THE WEAK SOCIALIST PARTY OF THE SOUTH WAS COMMITTED TO FOLLOW THE COMMUNIST LEAD AND ALTHOUGH THE CHRISTIAN AND LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PARTIES WOULD JOIN THE GOVERNMENT IN THE QUOTE'S MISTAKEN IDEA UNQUOTE'S OF FORTIFYING THE MONARCHY SFORZA INSISTED THAT THE ACTION AND LIBERAL PARTIES WOULD HOLD OUT FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE BARI COMMITMENT PARA HE THEN SAID THAT HE CROCE AND DE NICOLA WHO WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE KING WERE TO MEET APRIL FOUR TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SALVAGE SOMETHING OF THE DE NICOLA PROPOSAL PD SFORZA IMPLIED THAT ALL THREE WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER TO SERVE IN A CABINET UNDER THE LIEUTENANCY OF HUMBERT PARA THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WHEREAS SFORZA WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SAVE WHAT HE CAN OF HIS POSITION HE IS NOT PREPARED TO STAND ALONE IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO PD HIS ATTITUDE WAS PROBABLY REFLECTING THAT OF THE ACTION AND LIBERAL PARTIES

Content and classification
authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACPARKANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

5611

5611

SECRET

FATIMA M 130

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

2 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF ERCOLI ON MARCH TWO
SIX A MEETING OF THE PROVINCIAL LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN
SOUTH ITALY WAS ARRANGED FOR MARCH THREE ONE AND SUBSEQUENT DAYS PD
PARA TO APO FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND
CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA
MIKE ONE TWO ONE MARCH TWO THREEPARA DURING YESTERDAYS MEETING A
RESOLUTION WAS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY CALLING FOR A RAPID SOLUTION OF
THE PRESENT POLITICAL IMPASSE ON THE FOLLOWING FOUR BASES COLON
PARA ONE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNITED FRONT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND
ANTIFASCIST FORCES PD PARA TWO ASSURANCE THAT THE INSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEM WOULD BE FREELY DECIDED BY THE WHOLE COUNTRY THROUGH THE
MEANS OF A NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL
SUFFRAGE AFTER THE WAR PARA THREE THE CREATION OF A NEW STRONG
GOVERNMENT OF TEMPORARY CHARACTER SUPPORTED BY THE POPULAR PARTIES
ONE CAPABLE OF ORGANIZING A PROPER WAR EFFORT IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY

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PAGE TWO

FATIMA M 130

AND OF CREATING A STRONG ITALIAN ARMY TO FIGHT AGAINST THE GERMANS
PARA FOUR ASSURANCE TO ALL ITALIANS WHATEVER THEIR CONVICTIONS THAT
THE STRUGGLE THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS ENGAGED UPON IS DIRECTED TOWARDS
FREEING THE COUNTRY FROM THE INVADER AND FROM THE TRAITORS WHO WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL CATASTROPHE SEMICOLON AND THAT IN THE
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT THERE IS ROOM FOR ALL PARA THIS RESOLUTION
WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE PRESS IN THE AFTERNOON WHEN SPICOLI MADE A
STATEMENT ALONG THE SAME LINES CMA EMPHASIZING THROUGHOUT THE NEED
OF INTENSIFYING ITALY'S WAR EFFORT PD FROM IT AND SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS
TWO MAIN POINTS EMERGED PARA FIRST THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST PARTY
THOUGHT THAT THE FORMATION OF A BROADBASED GOVERNMENT WOULD BE
FACILITATED BY THE ABDICATION OR REMOVAL OF THE KING CMA THEY DID
NOT INSIST UPON THIS AS A CONDITION PD SECONDLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY
HAD NO OBJECTION TO SERVING IN A GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO PD THEY
INTENDED TO MAKE THEIR POINT OF VIEW CLEAR TO THE GIUNTA PD FROM

5609

PAGE THREE

FATIMA M 130

OTHER SOURCES IT APPEARS THAT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE GIUNTA HAS BEEN CALLED FOR APRIL THREE PARA IT IS STATED IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES THAT BAIKOGLI WOULD BE PREPARED AT LEAST TO OFFER THE PORTFOLIO OF LABOR TO THE COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVE

NOEL MARION MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General 55608
Chief Commissioner

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M121

Soviet Diplomacy

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMH)

23rd. March, 1954.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREELON

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS HAVING A DIRECT EFFECT UPON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH ITALY PD PAREN TO AING FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN. PAPA TWO PD PRIOR TO THE SIXTEENTH MARCH THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD NOT ONLY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE RUSSIAN DECISION HAD MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO THEIR POLICY BUT HAD CONTINUED TO BE THE PRIME MOVERS IN DEMANDING THAT THE THREE PARTY PETITION SHOULD GO FORWARD ON A JUNTA BASIS PD THEY HAD EVEN OFFERED PRIVATELY TO PAY A THIRD OF THE EXPENSES CMA OR CMA IF NECESSARY CMA THE ENTIRE AMOUNT PD AT THE MEETING OF THE JUNTA ON THE SIXTEENTH MARCH CMA HOWEVER CMA THEY COMPLETELY CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE AND THE SECRETARY NOW TELLS US THAT IN HIS OPINION THE PROPOSAL FOR A PETITION IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING SHELVED PD MOREOVER CMA IN A SPEECH AT PARI ON THE NINETEENTH MARCH PERSCHI COMPLETELY ALTERED THE LINE OF ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN HIS PREVIOUS SPEECHES CMA PARTICULARLY AT THE NAPLES MEETING PD AT BARI HE REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING THE KING AND MAIOGLIO AND ARGUED THAT THE ONLY NECESSITY WAS THAT ITALY SHOULD HAVE A STRONG GOVERNMENT PD FURTHER A MEMBER OF THE JUNTA CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH PERSCHI HAS STATED THAT CMA WHILE THE COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD JOIN ANY GOVERNMENT ON THE ABOLITION OF THE

5607

- - 2 - -

KING CMA THEY NO LONGER INSISTED ON THIS AS A CONDITION PD THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE KING'S PLAN OR EVEN IF THE KING MADE NO CONCESSION THEY MIGHT NOW EVEN BE WILLING TO SERVE UNDER BATOGLIO PD PARA THREE PD IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT NO FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE YET BEGUN PD BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AS WELL AS THE COMMUNIST PARTY MAY NOW BE DISPOSED TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT PD IF BOTH THESE PARTIES TAKE SUCH A DECISION ONLY THE PARTY OF ACTION IS LIKELY TO HOLD OUT AND EVEN THEY MAY WITHDRAW THEIR OBJECTIONS IF THE KING MAKES SOME GESTURE PD PARA FOUR PD ALTHOUGH THE JUNEA IS STILL ENDEAVOURING TO MAINTAIN SOME FORM OF UNITY CMA THE CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND PRESUMABLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW WOULD APPEAR DEFINITELY TO HAVE LOOSENED THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUNEA PD THE FACT THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE NO REPLY TO THE JUNEA MEMORANDUM HAS CLEARLY AFFECTED THEIR ABILITY TO WITHSTAND ANY SUCH RUSSIAN ACTIVITY PD THE OTHER PARTIES AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS POTENTIALITIES OF SUCH A COMMUNIST GAME BUT FEEL THAT THEY ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO STAND OUT IF ANY SUCH MOVE IS MADE PD PARA FIVE PD WE ARE INFORMED THAT ERGOLI CMA TITULAR HEAD OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY CMA HAS ALREADY REACHED

5606

- - 3 - -

ALGIERS AND IS EXPECTED SHORTLY IN NAPLES PD AS HE COMES DIRECT FROM RUSSIA CMA WE SHOULD
SOON KNOW WHETHER THESE INDICATIONS OF A CHANGE OF POLICY IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY ARE
CONFIRMED

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

5605

TOP SECRET

PATIMA M 152

PATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COME)

16 APRIL 1944

SECRET

25

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

AFTER YESTERDAY'S MEETING JUNTA ISSUED COMMUNIQUE SHOWING UNANIMOUS
DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO ACCEPT KING'S PLAN AND TO ENTER A NEW
GOVERNMENT TO BE COMPOSED MAINLY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIX
PARTIES PROVIDED THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT REITERATES THE PLEDGE THAT
THE ITALIAN PEOPLE SHALL DETERMINE THE FUTURE FORM OF THE STATE
BY MEANS OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON THE TERMINATION OF HOSTIL-
ITIES PARA PAREN TO THE FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINI-
STER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM PATIMAFROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL
REFERENCE PATIMA MIKE ONE FOUR SEVEN APRIL ONE THREE PAREN WE
LEARN THAT THE SIX PARTIES ARE ALL READY TO SERVE UNDER BADOGGIO
ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF FORME A NEW GOVERNMENT PD NO FORMAL
DECISION WAS TAKEN WHETHER THE PARTIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE
MARSHAL INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY BUT IT APPEARS THAT CROCE IS
ACTING AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE MAJORITY AND WILL MEET WITH BADOGGIO
ON APRIL ONE SEVEN OR ONE EIGHT PD ONLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS
LIKELY TO INSIST ON DEALING DIRECT PARA NO DETAILED PROGRAM FOR A

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5604

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NEW GOVERNMENT RESULTED BUT ALL STRESS THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY BETTER QUALIFIED TO CARRY ON THE WAR AND ELIMINATE ALL TRACES OF THE FASCIST REGIME PD PARA IT IS OBVIOUS THAT DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS THERE WILL BE MUCH HARD BARGAINING PD AT PRESENT IT IS LIKELY THAT CROCE AND SPORZA AND POSSIBLY DE NICOLA WILL BE MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO

Content & Classification authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE .
Lt. General,
Chief Commissioner.

5603

0331

SECRET

FATIMA M 147

FATIMA (CEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

13 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

AFTER KINGS ANNOUNCEMENT GIUNTA HELD MEETING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED TO HOLD A FURTHER MEETING AT THREE PETER MIKE ON APRIL ONE FIVE TO CONSIDER FOLLOWING FOUR MAIN QUESTIONS PARA PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE FOUR FIVE APRIL ONE TWO PAREN FIRST WHETHER THE GIUNTA SHOULD ACCEPT THE KINGS PROPOSAL AS A SOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM SEMICLN SECOND WHETHER THEY SHOULD ENTER A REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOCILIO SEMICLN THIRD WHETHER THE PARTIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY THROUGH THE GIUNTA CONCERNING PARTICIPATION IN A REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT SEMICLN ^{FOURTH} ANY SUGGESTIONS BY THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES FOR THE POLITICAL PROGRAM FOR ANY REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT PARA GROCE AND SPORZA AS WELL AS ERCOLI AND RODINO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT LEADER ARE TO BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE MEETING ON APRIL ONE FIVE

5602
5603

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

Junta Declaration

file

La Giunta Esecutiva dell'Italia liberata, preso atto della decisione del Re di istituire una luogotenenza generale del Regno, richiama le precedenti ripetute dichiarazioni della Corona e dei suoi ministri nel senso che, cessate le ostilità, il popolo italiano dovrà liberamente decidere la futura forma dello Stato e mezzo di una Assemblea Costituente;

e' convinta che tale dichiarazione verrà rinnovata dal nuovo governo all'atto della sua formazione;

considera rimossi gli ostacoli che fino ad ora hanno impedito la formazione di un governo democratico di guerra;

chiede, nel supremo interesse del paese, che si proceda con sollecitudine alla formazione di questo nuovo governo, risultante essenzialmente dalla collaborazione dei sei partiti rappresentati nei Comitati di liberazione;

delibera di seguire le trattative per la formazione del governo allo scopo di ottenere che esso sia veramente democratico, antifascista e di unità nazionale, capace di condurre la guerra per la liberazione d'Italia, e di agire con energia per la eliminazione di tutti i residui del regime fascista e per soddisfare i bisogni vitali del popolo.

541.1

Text of Junta resolution of April 14

5601

SECRET

FATIMA 1120

In Reber

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

23rd. March, 1944.

SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

PART ONE PD I HAVE RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE JUNTA POINTING OUT THAT MORE THAN A MONTH HAS NOW ELAPSED SINCE THEY SUBMITTED THE MEMORANDUM WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I HAVE REPLIED THAT I AM ASKING THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO EXPEDITE AN EXPRESSION OF OPINION PD

PART TWO PD IT WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO ME HERE IF I COULD BE GIVEN EVEN SOME INTERIM REPLY AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE

541.1

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

5600

SECRET

C O P Y

2/20

TELEGRAM TO: CCS FOR PRESIDENT AND STATE DEPARTMENT, TO JCS FOR
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN OFFICE TO FREEDOM FOR
INFORMATION CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER

FROM: WILSON

After consultation with Levers, McFarlane, Caccia and Reber, my comments on opposition program forwarded in Fargo #1112 February 19, are as follows:

1. This program is as moderate as anything with which we are likely to be faced. If Allied answer is long delayed or insists upon a status quo till Roman Parties will no doubt turn towards more positive action to gain their ends. Some of them might even welcome arrest and consequent "martyrdom."

2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this program as a basis of discussion between the Parties and the Crown there are several points needing clarification and possible negotiation in which we may well have to intervene.

(a) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by the new King. There are, however, indications that the Parties might be prepared to accept the retention by the Crown of some nominal powers. It might be possible to persuade Humbert to take a command in the field in which case there would be ample precedent for a Lieutenantcy.

(b) Present proposal for Lieutenantcy excludes appointment of a soldier. This is aimed amongst others at Badoglio; but provided that there were not a single Lieutenant, it might be possible for him to be included. The advantage of a collective Lieutenantcy of say three are obvious. We should, of course, require to be informed who the Parties propose as candidates for Lieutenantcy.

(c) Present program does not indicate who would be Parties' candidates.

5599

on opposition program forwarded in Fargo #1112 February 19, are as follows:

1. This program is as moderate as anything with which we are likely to be faced. If Allied answer is long delayed or insists upon a status quo till Romanties will no doubt turn towards more positive action to gain their ends. Some of them might even welcome arrest and consequent "martyrdom."

2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this program as a basis of discussion between the Parties and the Crown there are several points needing clarification and possible negotiation in which we may well have to intervene.

(a) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by the new King. There are, however, indications that the Parties might be prepared to accept the retention by the Crown of some nominal powers. It might be possible to persuade Humbert to take a command in the field in which case there would be ample precedent for a Lieutenancy.

(b) Present proposal for Lieutenancy excludes appointment of a soldier. This is aimed amongst others at Badoglio; but provided that there were not a single Lieutenant, it might be possible for him to be included. The advent of a collective Lieutenancy of say three are obvious. We should, of course, require to be informed who the Parties propose as candidates for Lieutenancy.

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(c) Present program does not indicate who would be Parties' candidate for post of Prime Minister.

(d) It is noteworthy that this program contains no specific mention of any envisaged change in the composition of the Government on reaching Rome.

(e) As program does not indicate period for which it should run, it would be necessary that explicit guarantees be given both by Crown and Parties that they will not attempt to revise the basic principles of any settlement now reached until Constituent Assembly has decided future regime and that that

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will abide by its decisions.

3. As the opposition is not able to effect a change in the present Government without Allied assistance and has requested Allied intervention, we are at the moment in a particularly advantageous position to obtain anything deemed in our interest including naturally the reaffirmation of all Badoglio's commitments. This would not necessarily be the case to the same degree in other circumstances or in Rome.

4. It will be seen, therefore, that if it is decided to support program of opposition, the following action by the representatives of the Allied Governments will be necessary (a) ascertain from the opposition their candidate for the Premiership. (b) Obtain through him a guarantee from all parties of opposition that they subscribe to all engagements entered into by the Badoglio Government with the Allies. (c) Ascertain the nominees of the opposition for the Lieutenantcy.

5. If and only if these three points are all settled satisfactorily from the Allied point of view should we proceed with following steps: (a) inform the King that the Allied Governments insist upon his bowing to the will of the people and abdicating. (b) Inform the Crown Prince that he must call upon the opposition candidate for the Premiership to form a Government. (c) Assist if necessary in persuading Humbert to delegate such of his powers as the opposition requires and the Allies deem advisable to the Lieutenantcy.

WILSON.

COPY

2/20

TELEGRAM TO: CCS FOR PRESIDENT AND STATE DEPARTMENT, TO JCS FOR
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN OFFICE TO FREEDOM FOR
INFORMATION CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER

FROM: WILSON

After consultation with Ievers, MacFarlane, Caccia and Reber, my comments
on opposition program forwarded in Fargo #1112 February 19, are as follows:

1. This program is as moderate as anything with which we are likely to be
faced. If Allied answer is long delayed or insists upon a status quo till Rome,
Parties will no doubt turn towards more positive action to gain their ends.

Some of them might even welcome arrest and consequent "martyrdom."

2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this program as a
basis of discussion between the Parties and the Crown there are several points
needing clarification and possible negotiation in which we may well have to
intervene.

(a) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by the new Kings.
There are, however, indications that the Parties might be prepared to accept
the retention by the Crown of some nominal powers. It might be possible to
persuade Humbert to take a command in the field in which case there would be
ample precedent for a Lieutenantcy.

(b) Present proposal for Lieutenantcy excludes appointment of a soldier.

This is aimed amongst others at Badoglio; but provided that there were not a
single Lieutenant, it might be possible for him to be included. The advantages
of a collective Lieutenantcy of say three are obvious. We should, of course,

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require to be informed who the Parties propose as candidates for Lieutenantcy.

(c) Present program does not indicate who would be Parties' candidate

After consultation with Deans, Meofarians, Caccia and Peter, my comments

on opposition program forwarded in Fargo #1112 February 19, are as follows:

1. This program is as moderate as anything with which we are likely to be faced. If Allied answer is long delayed or insists upon a status quo till Rome, Parties will no doubt turn towards more positive action to gain their ends. Some of them might even welcome arrest and consequent "martyrdom."

2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this program as a basis of discussion between the Parties and the Crown there are several points needing clarification and possible negotiation in which we may well have to intervene.

(a) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by the new King. There are, however, indications that the Parties might be prepared to accept the retention by the Crown of some nominal powers. It might be possible to persuade Humbert to take a command in the field in which case there would be ample precedent for a Lieutenantcy.

(b) Present proposal for Lieutenantcy excludes appointment of a soldier. This is aimed amongst others at MacGoglio; but provided that there were not a single Lieutenant, it might be possible for him to be included. The advantages of a collective Lieutenantcy of say three are obvious. We should, of course, require to be informed who the Parties propose as candidates for Lieutenantcy.

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(c) Present program does not indicate who would be Parties' candidate for post of Prime Minister.

(d) It is noteworthy that this program contains no specific mention of any envisaged change in the composition of the Government on reaching Rome.

(e) As program does not indicate period for which it should run, it would be necessary that explicit guarantees be given both by Crown and Parties that they will not attempt to revise the basic principles of any settlement now reached until Constituent Assembly has decided future regime and that they

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will abide by its decisions.

3. As the opposition is not able to effect a change in the present Government without Allied assistance and has requested Allied intervention, we are at the moment in a particularly advantageous position to obtain anything deemed in our interest including naturally the reaffirmation of all Badoglio's commitments. This could not necessarily be the case to the same degree in other circumstances or in Rome.

4. It will be seen, therefore, that if it is decided to support program of opposition, the following action by the representatives of the Allied Governments will be necessary (a) ascertain from the opposition their candidate for the Premiership. (b) Obtain through him a guarantee from all parties of opposition that they subscribe to all engagements entered into by the Badoglio Government with the Allies. (c) Ascertain the nominees of the opposition for the Lieutenantcy.

5. If and only if these three points are all settled satisfactorily from the Allied point of view should we proceed with following steps: (a) Inform the King that the Allied Governments insist upon his bowing to the will of the people and abdicating. (b) Inform the Crown Prince that he must call upon the opposition candidate for the Premiership to form a Government. (c) Assist if necessary in persuading Rumbert to delegate such of his powers as the opposition requires and the Allies deem advisable to the Lieutenantcy.

WILSON.

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TELEGRAM TO: FREED PASS FOLLOWING TO CCS FOR RESIDENT AND STATE
DEPARTMENT AND TO LONDON FOR PRIME MINISTER AND
FOREIGN OFFICE INFORMATION CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH
RESIDENT MINISTER

NO AND DATE: 1112 February 19

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

The opposition's program of action is contained in a Memorandum addressed to me for submission to the Allied Governments. Copies in translation are being forwarded by air to Algiers to be communicated to the members of the Advisory Council.

In submitting its proposals the Executive Giunta states that its object is to permit within the framework of the constitution a postponement of the Institutional problem until the end of hostilities, and the creation of an anti-Fascist Government representative of the Italian nation.

The Six Parties agree that the present King should abdicate forthwith to be succeeded by the Prince of Piedmont who, however, must agree to delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers to a single or collective Lieutenancy which would not include either a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier but would have powers enabling it to proceed at once to the immediate constitution of an anti-Fascist representative Government. This delegation of powers would remain in effect until war conditions would permit the convocation of an Assembly regularly elected by the Italian people. In agreeing to the accession of Humbert, the Giunta nevertheless points out that his adherence to Fascism and his responsibility for the attack on France can not be forgotten.

Inasmuch as not only had royal powers been previously delegated under the constitution to a Lieutenant, but the present King also ceded certain of his royal prerogatives in permitting the es-

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establishment of the Fascist Grand Council and granting to Mussolini the supreme command of the armed forces, there is no juridical reason why in the opinion of the Giunta the Crown should not at present accept for a limited period the foregoing procedure the object of which is clearly defined.

The expressed policy of the Allies is to guarantee to the Italian people the free choice of their own Government and institutions and to maintain strict neutrality in all internal Italian political matters. But since this neutrality does in fact constitute support for the King who has stubbornly refused to give way the Giunta considers that it becomes necessary if the Allies approve the Giunta's program for the Allies themselves to make it clear to the King and Humbert that they must follow the proposed course of action. Only by taking such action can the Allies avoid blocking the will of the Italian people and maintain their expressed principles.

According to the Giunta, action is required immediately for two reasons, first, because the situation is steadily worsening and the moderate solution now advanced might not later prove possible either because of the state of public opinion or because of more serious events; and second, the Parties and patriots of Northern Italy, faced by the prolongation of this unsatisfactory situation, might decide to have recourse to more radical solutions of their own. Such action might in turn force the Giunta to review its present attitude. In submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments the Giunta further states that it would not be fulfilling its duty if it did not point out the gravity of the Italian situation **5594** cites several examples of alleged reactionary tactics of the King

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of causes of friction.

I have informed the Giunta that in agreeing to forward the above program to the Allied Governments I must insist that pending a reply, no action be taken to interfere with the Badoglio Government or to aggravate the present situation and likewise that the program should be considered confidential and should not be communicated to the press. To forestall possible indiscreet announcements on the part of the Giunta or any of its members I am, however, informing the press that I have received a program and am forwarding it to the said Governments for their consideration.

Our comments follow.

33.3

CONFIDENTIAL

FATIMA M110

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

12th. March, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF RESOLUTION READ AND ADOPTED AT NAPLES MEETING TODAY PD PAREN
TO AFHQ FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED
HEADQUARTERS ACMT FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN
BEGINNING PD THE PEOPLE OF NAPLES CMA IN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE ANTI-FASCIST PARTIES CMA
 IE CMA THE PARTY OF ACTION CMA THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY CMA AND WITH
 THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR IN THE MASS MEETING OF TWELFTH MARCH CMA ONE NINE
 FOUR FOUR CMA PROCLAIM THE WILL OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE TO INTENSIFY THEIR WAR EFFORT
 THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY BY THE SIDE OF THE ALLIED FORCES AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY
 CMA NAZI-FASCISM PD

IT IS FURTHER DECLARED THAT THE CREATION OF A TRULY ITALIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IS LINKED WITH
 THE SOLUTION OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL LIFE CMA FOOD CMA TRANSPORT CMA
 INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION CMA AGRICULTURAL REORGANISATION AND CMA AS AN ESSENTIAL
 PRELIMINARY TO THESE CMA THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION MUST BE PURGED CMA BEGINNING WITH
 THE SUPPORTERS OF THE MONARCHY AND THEIR COLLABORATORS CMA THE ACCOMPLICES OF FASCISM CMA
 AND A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT COMPOSED OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES MUST BE FORMED PD SIGNED

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE PARTY OF ACTION CMA THE SOCIALIST CMA COMMUNIST AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES PD ENISNOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General
Chief Commissioner5592
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FATIMA M109

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FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

12TH. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

PUBLIC MEETING TOOK PLACE BETWEEN TEN AND TWELVE THIRTY TODAY AND WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT OR ANY DISTURBANCE TO PUBLIC ORDER PD PARAN TO AFHQ FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACMT FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARAN ATTENDANCE IS ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN SIX AND TEN THOUSAND CMA OF WHICH COMMUNISTS WERE MOST PROMINENT AND BEST ORGANISED PD HEAVY RAIN BEGAN HALF WAY THROUGH THE MEETING BUT EVEN BEFORE THIS THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ROWDYISM CMA THOUGH ANY MENTION OF THE KING OR BADOLLO WAS GREETED WITH PROLONGED CATCALLS PD THE CROWD DISPERSED FOR LUNCH QUICKLY AND QUIETLY AND MADE NO ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE IN THE STREETS PD

PART TWO PD TRANSLATION OF RESOLUTION PASSED BY ACCLAMATION IS CONTAINED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM PD IT IS SIGNED BY THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AS WELL AS THE PARTY OF ACTION CMA THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES PD THE REPUBLICAN PARTY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN JOINED TO ACTION PARTY BUT APPARENTLY WISHED FOR SEPARATE REPRESENTATION AT LEAST AT THIS MEETING

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FARGO 1442

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

29th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

PART ONE PD POLITICAL SECTION HAVE INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY OF JUNTA THAT LEADERS OF SOCIALIST, COMMUNIST AND ACTION PARTIES PROPOSE TO CALL TEN MINUTES STRIKE IN NAPLES AREA ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH AS PROTEST AGAINST PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT PD FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON, MAKING AND REBER PD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR FOUR TWO PD APPARENTLY THEY INTEND TO INSTRUCT WORKERS TO WORK FIFTEEN MINUTES OVERTIME DURING LUNCH INTERVAL TO COMPENSATE PD

PART TWO PD I HAVE ARRANGED TO RECEIVE THE LEADERS OF THE ~~THREE PARTIES~~ *JUNTA PG* AT ONE ONE ZERO ZERO HOURS TOMORROW FIRST MARCH AND PROPOSE TO INFORM THEM THAT NO SUCH ACTION CAN BE PERMITTED PD I HAVE ALSO PUT COMPLETE STOP ON PUBLICITY IN ITALY AS REGARDS INTENTION OF THE THREE PARTIES BUT PRESS MESSAGES ON THE SUBJECT HAVE BY NOW ALMOST CERTAINLY REACHED UK AND USA PD

PART THREE PD JUNTA HAVE SUBMITTED A SHORT COMMENT ON PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT WHICH I HAVE REFUSED TO FORWARD UNLESS THEY GIVE DEFINITE UNDERTAKING TO CEASE ALL ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH WAR EFFORT PD

PART FOUR PD PLEASE REPLY URGENT WHETHER YOU APPROVE ACTION I PROPOSE TO TAKE

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TOMORROW PD

PART FIVE PD WE ARE BEING ASKED CONTINUALLY WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE OFFICIAL ANSWER TO THE MEMORANDUM OF THE JUNCA TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD IT WILL HELP ME VERY GREATLY IF I COULD BE INFORMED BEFORE TOMORROW'S MEETING WHETHER THIS IS THE CASE OR WHETHER THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS INTEND TO PRODUCE A SPECIFIC AGREED REPLY

L.T. MONTANT JR
2 Lt AGD
Actg Adjutant.

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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394 U.S. Army

C O P Y

February 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting United States Member, Advisory Council for
Italy

SUBJECT: Political Program of the Executive Giunta of Committees of
Liberation.

By direction of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission, there are transmitted herewith copies of a Memorandum received from the Executive Giunta of the Italian Committees of Liberation setting forth their agreed program of action. They have requested that this Memorandum be submitted to the Allied Governments and have agreed that their program shall be regarded as a confidential proposal until the Allied Governments have had an opportunity to consider it and to reply.

The Chief Commissioner requests that this Memorandum be communicated to the Office of the British Resident Minister and to such other members of the Advisory Council as the American and British members deem advisable. General Solodovnik has been informed of the contents of the Memorandum.

By command of Lt. General Mason MacFarlane;

Samuel Reber
Political Section

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C O P Y

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM OF THE EXECUTIVE JUNTA
FOR GENERAL MACFARIANE

I. PREMISE:

The Executive Junta has received a mandate from the Congress of Bari to prepare the way for a strong Government which reflects the anti-Fascist spirit of the Italian people. The Executive Junta believes, therefore, that it is its duty to submit to the Allied Governments a plan of solution of the Italian crisis which, while remaining within the limits of our constitutional law, would postpone to the end of hostilities the institutional problem, would reduce to a minimum the harshness of the present political strife, would allow the formation of a truly anti-Fascist Government representative of the Italian nation, and would create that harmony of the people as necessary to the war effort, as it is to the effort of reconstruction.

II. PROPOSAL OF SOLUTION:

For well known reasons the anti-Fascist parties do not under any condition intend to collaborate with the present King of Italy. Victor Emmanuel III ought, therefore, to abdicate.

The present Prince of Piedmont would succeed. It cannot be forgotten that the Prince was personally in command of the group of armies that attacked France, and that as "Inspector of the Infantry" he has his share of responsibility in the dark page written by the Italian army on the 8th of September. Nor can his numerous acts of friendly support of fascism and its puce be forgotten. It may, however, be admitted that his responsibilities are less great than those of his Father.

The Parties would, therefore, accept his presence with the express reservation that he should delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers by a specific act of his own and for a definite period of time.

This reservation is essential because all of the most dangerous elements of fascism, in alliance with those military gangs which, afraid of being called to account and intending to defend their untenable positions at any cost, are regrouping themselves automatically around the Monarchy and the surviving Monarchical forces.

By accepting the Government under different conditions, Italian anti-Fascism would expose itself to three most serious dangers:

(1) to see the reforming and re-organization of Fascist military and reactionary groups in the heart of the state administration and around the person and prerogatives of the King. By an act of force or by a simple gesture of the Sovereign these groups might return to power and at an opportune moment nullify the will of the people. Sooner or later this would mean revolution; 5587

(2) To see unconscious or open sabotage of the war effort as is happening today;

(3) To see itself disavowed by the Italian people as a whole and by its supporters in that part of Italy which is still occupied. These supporters have already made it explicitly known that they do not accept any other solution.

In summary, it is today necessary that the King abdicate and that upon ascending the Throne, Humbert cede his constitutional powers to an individual or collective Lieutenancy which can inspire the trust of the country and which in any event does not include a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier. The Lieutenancy should then proceed to the immediate constitution of an anti-Fascist government. All of the foregoing should last to the time when war conditions will permit the convocation of an Assembly regularly elected by the Italian people.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL:

The proposal as outlined above is consistent with the practice of our constitutional law. In fact, Victor Emmanuel II as well as Humbert I and Victor Emmanuel III have in the past ceded some of the powers granted them by the "Statuto Albertino" in favor of Lieutenants.

Moreover the present King approved the law which created the Fascist Grand Council and which even permitted that body to intervene to determine the order of succession to the Throne. He has also divested himself of the most specifically royal of the powers granted him by the constitution when he yielded the supreme command of the armed forces to Mussolini.

Therefore, on juridical grounds, it cannot be seen why the Crown should hesitate to adopt a procedure the duration of which would be strictly limited and the purpose of which would be clearly defined more particularly so since now this procedure would correspond to the desires and to the requirements of the country.

IV. MEANS OF ACHIEVING THE DETERMINED GOAL:

The Allies have always declared that they desire the Italian people to be free to choose their own government and the institutions which will in the future govern their political life. Consequently they are affirming their strict neutrality in Italian political strife on the condition that this strife not be harmful to their war effort against Germany.

The Executive Junta deeply appreciates this view and is grateful for the sincerity of the effort to put it in practice.

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It must nevertheless point out that in spite of everything Allied action in Italy takes the form of a support given to the personal Government of the King and of Badoglio. A clear indication has been given to the King in every way possible in existing circumstances that his person stands as an obstacle to national unity. No one who is political or morally responsible has agreed to collaborate with him and the unanimous vote of the pari congress has disqualified him. He, however, stubbornly refuses to give way and poses the question of using force which for the present the Parties refuse to use because of their sense of responsibility to the Allies.

Therefore should the Allies approve the moderate and transactional formula posed by the Executive Junta they must make this clearly understood by Victor Emmanuel III and the House of Savoy.

Only in this way will it be possible without violence and disturbance to achieve the result for which all true Italians are longing. Whereas the present status quo is guaranteed through the weight of Allied strength and through the respect which the anti-Fascist Parties have for the Allies, they unwillingly find themselves in the position of blocking the will of the Italian people and acting not only against the principles which they themselves have affirmed but even against their most obvious interests.

V. WHEN ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN:

It is necessary to act immediately first because the situation is tense and is worsening every day. The solution now presented is valid today but may be superseded tomorrow by the state of public opinion or by more serious events; secondly because the Parties and the patriots of occupied Italy see that this equivocal situation is being prolonged, depriving them of any organic direction and help and preventing free Italians from fighting. Should the occasion arise they might therefore decide to have recourse to their own solutions far more radical than those put forward by the Junta. Such initiatives would not only make the already tense political situation even more grave, but they would in all probability force the Junta radically to review its attitude toward the people responsible for further Italian suffering.

VI. CONCLUSION:

The Executive Junta believes that it is fulfilling its duty by submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments. Its duty would not be fulfilled entirely until the Junta did not also call the attention of the Allied Governments to the extreme gravity of the Italian situation and to the urgency of a solution. The Allies know that the King and his Government, conscious of their faults which are perhaps even greater than we think, do not hesitate to use the worst scoundrels who may become efficacious instruments of the reaction and of the civil war that is being prepared. A few of these have apparently been eliminated, only after direct Allied intervention.

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The Allies know that an absolutely unjustifiable increase of the "Arma dei carabinieri" and of the "Guardie di Finanza" is in the course of development. EX-Fascists, ex-members of the Fascist militia are being shamelessly recruited even for the highest ranks.

The Allies know that except in the large towns and in places directly controlled by them freedom of press, freedom of meeting and even personal freedom are nothing but verbal expressions. The Allies also know that the blood of the anti-Fascists has already been spilled as a result of royal reaction. As an example, the sanguinary incidents which took place in Montesano on the 12th of December may be cited.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the leaders of the Parties of the masses to restrain the understandable impatience of the population. The recent events occurring in Puglia (riots at Taranto, Canosa and in other communes) are of significance in this respect.

The Executive Junta therefore requests the Allied Governments to consider that its proposals are not the fruit of animosity or of party passions. They are the result of an examination developed with full knowledge of the causes and with the most serene objectivity. They represent the strict minimum by which a solution of the Italian situation can still be achieved.

Should this situation develop for the worse, it should be clear that the responsibility for it must neither be ascribed to the Italian people nor to their legitimate representatives.

Signed for the Executive Committee
The Secretary

Filippo Caracciolo

Naples 16th of February 1944

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MEMORANDUM DELLA GIUNTA ESECUTIVA

IL GENERALE MACFARLANE .

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- 1) **PREMESSA.** La Giunta Esecutiva ha ricevuto per mandato del Congresso di Bari, di preparare l'avvento di un governo forte, che rispecchi l'anima antifascista del popolo italiano. La Giunta Esecutiva perciò ritiene suo dovere sottoporre ai Governi Alleati un progetto di soluzione della crisi italiana, che rimanendo nel quadro del nostro diritto costituzionale, rimandi fino al termine delle ostilità il problema istituzionale, riduca al minimo l'asprezza della lotta politica attuale, permetta la costituzione di un governo veramente antifascista rappresentativo della nazione italiana e crei quella concordia popolare necessaria tanto allo sforzo di guerra quanto a quello della ricostruzione.
- 2) **PROPOSTA DI SOLUZIONE.** Per ragioni note i partiti antifascisti non intendono collaborare a nessun patto con l'attuale re d'Italia. Vittorio Emanuele III dovrebbe quindi abdicare.
- Gli succederebbe l'attuale Principe di Piemonte. Non si può dimenticare che il Principe comandava in persona il gruppo di Armate che aggredirono la Francia né che, in qualità d'Ispettore della Fanteria ha la sua parte di responsabilità nella tristissima pagina scritta dall'esercito italiano l'8 Settembre; come non si possono dimenticare i numerosi atti di amichevole adesione nei riguardi del fascismo e del suo duce. Si può tuttavia riconoscere che le sue responsabilità sono meno marcate di quelle attribuite a suo padre.
- I partiti potrebbero quindi accettarne la presenza sotto la riserva espressa che con un suo atto esplicito e per un periodo di tempo ben definito egli deleghi l'esercizio dei suoi poteri costituzionali.
- Questa riserva è imperativa perché automaticamente atteso alla monarchia, si raggruppano con alcune superstiti forze monarchiche, tutti i più pericolosi residui del fascismo in alleanza con quelle cricche militari che temono i conti da rendere e intendono difendere ad ogni costo posizioni ormai insostenibili.
- Accettando il governo in altre condizioni l'antifascismo italiano si esporrebbe a tre pericoli gravissimi:
- 1) Di vedere riformarsi e riorganizzarsi nel seno stesso dell'amministrazione dello stato ed attorno alla persona ed alle prerogative del Re, quei gruppi fascisti militari e reazionari che potrebbero con un atto di forza o mediante un semplice gesto del sovrano ritornare al potere e falsare al momento opportuno la volontà del popolo. Il che significherebbe poi una rivoluzione a più o meno breve scadenza.
 - 2) Di vedere inconsapevolmente o palesemente sabotato lo sforzo di guerra come oggi avviene.
 - 3) Di vedersi sconfessare e dal popolo italiano nel suo insieme e dai propri stessi aderenti dell'Italia ancora occupata, che hanno già fatto esplicitamente sapere di non accettare una soluzione diversa.
- Riassumendo è oggi necessario che il Re abdichi e che nell'atto di abdicare il trono Umberto II ceda i suoi poteri costituzionali ad una luogotenenza individuale o collegiale che riscuota la fiducia del paese, che non comprenda comunque un membro di casa Savoia né un militare, e che provveda all'immediata costituzione del governo antifascista. Ciò fino al giorno in cui le condizioni della guerra permettano la convocazione di un'assemblea regolarmente eletta dal popolo italiano.

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- 3) **PROPOSTA DAL PUNTO DI VISTA COSTITUZIONALE.** La proposta accennata nel paragrafo precedente è conforme alla pratica del nostro diritto costituzionale. Difatti sia Vittorio Emanuele II che Umberto I e Vittorio Emanuele III si sono spogliati di taluno dei poteri loro attribuiti dallo Statuto albertino a favore di Luogotenenti.

L'attuale Re ha poi sanzionato la legge costitutiva del Gran Consiglio fascista che contemplava l'ingerenza di quell'organo perfino nella determinazione della successione al trono. Egli inoltre si è spogliato del più schiettamente sovrano dei poteri attribuitigli dalla costituzione, cedendo a Mussolini il comando supremo delle forze armate.

Non si vede quindi come sopra un terreno giuridico la Corona potrebbe esitare di fronte ad un provvedimento che è strettamente limitato nel tempo e condizionato da un obiettivo ben definito; tanto più che questa volta il provvedimento risponderebbe alla volontà ed alle esigenze del paese.

- 4) **MODO DI RAGGIUNGERE LO SCOPO PREFISSO.** Gli Alleati hanno sempre dichiarato di volere che il popolo italiano possa scegliere liberamente i suoi governi e le forme istituzionali che dovranno regolare in futuro la sua vita politica. Essi affermano quindi la più stretta neutralità nei confronti della lotta politica italiana a patto che essa non turbi il loro sforzo di guerra contro la Germania.

La Giunta Esecutiva apprezza profondamente questo punto di vista ed è grata per la sincerità con la quale si cerca di tradurlo in atto. Deve tuttavia osservare, che malgrado tutto, l'azione degli Alleati in Italia si traduce in un appoggio al governo personale del re e di Badoglio. Al re è stato indicato in ogni forma consentita dalle circostanze attuali che la sua persona è d'ostacolo alla unione nazionale. Nessun uomo politicamente e moralmente responsabile ha voluto collaborare con lui, il Congresso di Bari lo ha squalificato con votazione unanime. Egli tuttavia si ostina a non cedere e pone il problema sopra un piano di forza dove i partiti rifiutano per ora di scendere solo per il senso di responsabilità che provano verso gli Alleati. Occorre quindi che, se gli Alleati approvano la formula transattiva e moderata proposta dalla Giunta Esecutiva, essi la facciano chiaramente intendere a Vittorio Emanuele III e ad Umberto di Savoia. Solo così potrà raggiungersi, senza violenze e senza scosse, quel risultato che auspicano tutti i veri italiani. Mentre garantendo col peso della loro forza e del rispetto che per loro hanno i partiti antifascisti l'attuale stato di cose, gli Alleati finiscono involontariamente per coartare la volontà del popolo italiano e per agire non solo contro i principi da loro affermati, ma anche contro il loro più evidente interesse immediato.

- () **QUANDO BISOGNEREBBE AGIRE.** Bisogna agire immediatamente. Innanzi tutto perchè la situazione è grave e si va ogni giorno aggravando: la soluzione proposta oggi vale per oggi e può essere superata domani dallo stato dell'opinione pubblica o da avvenimenti più seri.

In secondo luogo perchè partiti e patrioti dell'Italia occupata vedendo perpetuarsi questo equivoco che priva loro di ogni organica direzione e soccorso e che impedisce agli Italiani liberi di combattere, possono decidere, ove se ne presenti l'occasione, di ricorrere a soluzioni autonome e ben più radicali di quelle proposte dalla Giunta.

Simili iniziative non solo aggraverebbero la nostra situazione politica già così tesa, ma costringerebbero con ogni probabilità la Giunta a rive-

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dere radicalmente il proprio atteggiamento verso i responsabili di ulteriore sofferenza italiana.

- 6) CONCLUSIONE. Nel sottoporre ai Governi Alleati queste sue proposte, la Giunta Esecutiva ritiene di compiere il suo dovere. Non lo compirebbe però tutto se non richiamasse anche la loro attenzione sulla estrema gravità della situazione italiana e sulla urgenza della sua soluzione.
- Gli Alleati sanno che, consci delle loro colpe che sono forse anche più gravi di quanto noi non pensiamo, il re ed il suo governo non esitano a ricorrere ai più tristi individui che possono diventare efficaci strumenti della reazione e della guerra civile che si prepara. Molti fra questi sono stati apparentemente eliminati solo in seguito del diretto intervento alleato.
- Gli Alleati sanno che è in corso un'inflazione assolutamente ingiustificata dell'Arma dei Carabinieri e della Guardia di Finanza. Si assoldano senza più ombra di ritegno ex-fascisti, ex-componenti della Milizia anche nei più alti gradi.
- Gli Alleati sanno che fuori delle grandi città e dei luoghi direttamente controllati da loro, la libertà di stampa, di riunione, la stessa libertà personale non sono che espressioni verbali.
- Gli Alleati sanno anche come ad opera della reazione regna il sangue degli antifascisti abbia già cominciato ad essere versato. Ricorderemo a titolo di esempio i sanguinosi incidenti di Montesano il 12 Dicembre scorso.
- Per i dirigenti dei partiti di masse diventa sempre più difficile calmare le comprensibili impazienze delle popolazioni. Sono significativi al riguardo i recentissimi avvenimenti accaduti in Puglia (moti di Taranto, di Canosa e di altri comuni).
- La Giunta Esecutiva prega quindi i Governi Alleati di considerare che le sue proposte non sono frutto di animosità né di passioni di partito. Esse sono il risultato di un esame svolto con piena conoscenza di causa e con la più serena obiettività. Rappresentano lo stretto minimo sul quale può ancora operarsi un raddrizzamento della situazione italiana.
- Se questa situazione dovesse volgere al peggio, sia ben chiaro che ciò non dovrà attribuirsi né al popolo italiano, né ai suoi legittimi rappresentanti.

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Napoli 13 Febbraio 1944

per la G. U. 5581
il segretario
Dr. di Piero Lorenzini

Memorandum of the Executive Junta
for General MacFarlane

I°) PREMISE. The Executive Junta has received as a mandate from the Congress of Bari to prepare the advent of a strong government that would reflect the anti-fascist soul of the Italian people. The Executive Junta believes therefore, that it is its duty to submit to the Allied governments a plan of solution of the Italian crisis, that, remaining within the limits of our constitutional law, would put off to the end of hostilities the institutional problem, reduce to a minimum the harshness of the present political strife, allow the formation of a truly antifascist government representative of the Italian nation and create that harmony of the people necessary as much to the war effort, as to the effort of reconstruction.

II°) PROPOSAL OF SOLUTION. For well known reasons the antifascist parties do not intend to collaborate under any condition with the actual King of Italy. Victor Emmanuel III ought therefore to abdicate.

The present prince of Piedmont would succeed to him. It cannot be forgotten that the prince was personally in command of the group of armies that assailed France, nor that as "Inspector of the Infantry" he has his share of responsibility in the dark page written by the Italian army the 8th of September. His numerous acts of friendly adhesion to fascism and its duce can neither be forgotten. One may however admit that his responsibilities are less marked than those attributed to his father.

The parties might therefore accept his presence under the express reserve that with an explicit act of his own and for a well defined lapse of time, he should delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers.

This reserve is imperative, because all the most dangerous fascist residues in alliance with those military gangs that are afraid of a calling off of accounts and mean to defend at any cost untenable positions, are regrouping themselves automatically around the monarchy with the surviving monarchical forces. By accepting the government under different conditions, Italian antifascism would expose itself to three most serious dangers:

1) to see fascist, military and reactionary groups be re-formed and reorganized in the midst of the administration of the State and around the person and the prerogatives of the King. These groups might by an act of sheer force, or simply through a move of the sovereign, go back to power and falsify at the right moment the will of the people. Which would mean a revolution sooner or later;

2) to see the war effort being unconsciously or openly sabotaged, as it is today;

3) to see itself disavowed by the Italian people as a whole and by its own adherents in the part of Italy still occupied, who have already made it explicitly known that they do not accept any different solution.

Summing up, it is necessary today that the King abdicate, and that in the act of ascending the throne Umberto II cede his constitutional powers to **5580** individual or collegial Regency trustworthy for the country, not comprehending anyhow a member of the House of Savoy or a military man, and that should see to the immediate constitution of the antifascist government. All of this up to the day in which the conditions of war will allow the convocation of an assembly regularly elected by the Italian people.

- 2 -

III°) THE PROPOSAL FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL POINT OF VIEW. The proposal as outlined above is consistent with the practice of our constitutional law. Indeed Victor Emmanuel II as well as Humbert I and Victor Emmanuel III have parted with some of the powers granted them by the "Statuto albertino", in favor of lieutenants. The present King, moreover, has sanctioned the law which constituted the fascist Grand Council and which admitted the intervention of that body even in determining the order of succession to the throne. He has divested himself also of the most specifically regal of the powers granted him by the constitution, yielding to Mussolini the supreme command of the armed forces. One cannot see, therefore, how on juridical ground, the Crown could hesitate before taking a step strictly limited in time and conditioned by a well defined objective; all the more that this time the measure would answer to the will and to the exigencies of the country.

IV°) HOW TO REACH THE ESTABLISHED GOAL. The Allies have always declared that they want the Italian people to be free to choose their own government and the institutions that will in the future rule their political life. They are therefore affirming their strictest neutrality in the Italian political strife at the one condition that it be not harmful to their war effort against Germany.

The Executive Junta deeply appreciates this view and is grateful for the sincerity of the efforts with which one tries to actuate it. It must nevertheless point out that in spite of everything the allied action in Italy takes the form of a support given to the personal government of the King and of Badoglio.

A clear indication has been given to the King, in every way permitted by the present circumstances, that his person stands as an obstacle against national union. No man politically or morally responsible has accepted to collaborate with him and the Bari Congress has disqualified him with a unanimous vote. He stubbornly refuses to yield, though, and puts the problem on a ground of force where the parties refuse, for the time being, to follow him only because of their sense of responsibility toward the Allies.

It is therefore necessary that, should the Allies approve the moderate and transitory formula proposed by the Executive Junta, they make it clearly understood to Victor Emmanuel III and to Humbert of Savoy.

Only thus will it be possible to reach without violence and commotions the result that all true Italians are longing for. While by guaranteeing the present state of things with the weight of their strength and of the respect that antifascist parties have for them, the Allies unwillingly find themselves thwarting the will of the Italian people and acting not only against the principles they themselves have affirmed, but even against their most evident immediate interest.

V°) WHEN ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. It is necessary to act immediately. Firstly because the situation is tense and it is getting worse every day: the solution now presented is valid today, but might be superseded tomorrow by the state of public opinion or by more serious events.

Secondly because parties and patriots of occupied Italy see this equivocal situation prolong itself, which deprives them of any organic direction and help, and which prevents the free Italians from fighting. They can therefore decide, the occasion arising, to have recourse to autonomous solutions, far more radical than those put forth by the Junta.

Initiatives like the above would not only make graver our already so tense political situation, but they would in all probability force the Junta to review radically its attitude towards the people responsible for further

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italian sufferings.

VI^o) CONCLUSION. The Executive Junta believes it is fulfilling its duty in submitting these proposals to the Allied governments. It would not fulfill it entirely, however, if it did not also call their attention on the extreme gravity of the Italian situation and on the urgency of its solution.

The Allies know that the King and his government, conscious of their faults that are perhaps even heavier than we think, do not hesitate to use the worst scoundrels that may become efficacious instruments of the reaction and of the civil war that is being prepared. A few among these have been apparently eliminated only following direct Allied intervention.

The Allies know that an absolutely unjustified inflation of the "Arma dei carabinieri" and of the "Guardie di Finanza" is in course of development. Ex-fascist, ex-members of the fascist militia are being shamelessly recruited even for the highest ranks.

The Allies know that except in the big towns and in the places directly controlled by them, freedom of press, freedom of reunion, even personal freedom are nothing but verbal expressions.

The Allies also know that the blood of the antifascists has already been spilled by the royal reaction. We shall quote as an example the bloody incidents that happened in Montezano on the 12th of December.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the leaders of the mass parties to calm the understandable impatiences of the populations. The recent events that happened in Puglia (riots of Taranto, Canosa and other communes) are significant in this respect.

The Executive Junta begs therefore the Allied governments to consider that its proposals are not the fruit of animosity nor of party passions. They are the result of an examination developed with full cognizance of cause and with the most serene objectivity. They represent the strict minimum on which the straightening out of the Italian situation can still take place.

Should this situation develop for the worst, let it be clear that the responsibility for it must not be ascribed either to the Italian people or to their legitimate representatives.

Naples 18th of February 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

APO 394

U.S. Army

February 18, 1944.

Refer: 520.1

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM TO: Civil Affairs Section, Allied Force Headquarters

SUBJECT: Communication to the King of Italy by the Executive
Giunta of the Committees of Liberation.

Reference is made to Fargo telegram no. 812 of February 8, 1944, concerning the communication which the Executive Giunta of the Committees of Liberation proposed to send to the King of Italy inviting him to abdicate.

There are enclosed copies in translation of the communication as sent to the King.

No attempt has been made to suggest what should follow the King's abdication and it does not appear at present that he intends to make any reply. In fact there is some doubt whether it has been laid before him, since in his recent conversation with General MacFarlane he discussed only the question of a possible reply to the resolution of the Bari Congress (Fargo telegram no. 1037, February 17). It has however subsequently been published in the unauthorized Naples newspapers, *Unita* (Communist) and *Avanti* (Socialist).

Please make a copy of this memorandum and the enclosure available to the Office of the British Resident Minister.

Samuel Reber
Director, Political Section

Enclosures

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First Session of Communication
 Addressed by the
 Permanent Executive Committee of the Committees of Liberation
 to the
 King of Italy

TO VICTOR EMANUEL III - KING OF ITALY

The permanent Executive Committee, appointed by the Congress of the Committees of Liberation which was held at Bari on January 28 - 29, 1944 and which accomplished its labors in an atmosphere charged with a spirit of human and Italian suffering, inspired by the message of sadness but of hope which came from Rome in the name of our brothers still oppressed by Your Ally of yesterday, the faithful interpreter of the solemn, austere and unanimous condemnation by the Italian people of Your responsibility in the fact of the unbridgeable moral and political gulf which divides the people from the Monarchy, considers that it is its specific duty to inform You of the following decision of the Congress:

"THE CONGRESS

"Having heard and approved the reports presented by Arancio-Ruiz upon the internal situation;

"Considering that the present state of the country does not permit the immediate solution of the institutional question and that the unquestionable premise for the moral and material reconstruction of Italy is the immediate abdication of the King who is responsible for the country's misfortunes;

"Believing that this Congress which is the true and sole expression of the will and strength of the nation, has, therefore, the right and the duty of proclaiming this necessity on behalf of the Italian people;

"DECLARES:

"That it is necessary to proceed to the formation of a Government with the full powers which this exceptional time requires, and with the participation of all parties represented in the Congress; and that this Government should have the task of intensifying the war to the utmost, of resolving the most urgent problems of Italian life with the support of the mass of the people for whose welfare it intends to work, and of preparing with the guarantee of impartiality and freedom the holding of a Constituent Assembly as soon as hostilities cease;

"DECIDES:

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"Upon the constitution of a permanent Executive Committee to which must be appointed representatives designated by the Parties; members of the Committees of National Liberation, which, in agreement with the Central Committee of National Liberation and in consultation with the political personalities who are recognized as high exponents of anti-Fascism, will prepare the necessary conditions for the attainment of the aforesaid aims.

"THE LIBERAL PARTY
"THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY
"THE LABOR DEMOCRACY

THE SOCIALIST PARTY
THE COMMUNIST PARTY
THE ACTION PARTY"

Please consider the significance of this action which expresses the unanimous feeling of the Italian people who from their anguish require prompt action to wash away the shame of the past and to begin to the extent possible the repair of the country's ruin.

Finally may Your patriotism prevail and make clear to Your conscience Your duty to abdicate immediately so that in this supreme hour power can be assumed by men who have not been compromised by twenty years of violence, shame and crime.

Any further hesitation can only aggravate the situation of the country and render more fearful Your responsibilities which can in no respect be sheltered under cover of a tattered constitution.

Naples, February 6, 1944.

THE PERMANENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Vincenzo Arangio Ruiz
A. Raffaele Jervolino
Francesco Carabona
Giovanni Lombardi
Paolo Tassinari
Vincenzo Calace

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A VITTORIO EMANUELE III RE D'ITALIA

La Giunta Esecutiva Permanente, nominata dal Congresso dei Comitati di Liberazione tenutosi a Bari nei giorni 28 e 29 gennaio 1944, e che ha svolto i suoi lavori in un'ardente atmosfera di passione italiana e umana, trascinata dal messaggio di dolore e di speranza pervenuto da Roma a nome dei fratelli oppressi ancora dal Vostro alleato di ieri, fedele interprete della solenne, nuova, unanime condanna del Popolo Italiano a carico Vostro, di fronte all'incalcolabile abisso morale e politico, che divide il Popolo del Monarca, reputa suo preciso dovere notificarVi il seguente deliberato del Congresso stesso:

" Il Congresso dei Comitati di Liberazione;

- udita ed approvata la relazione Arancio Ruiz sulla politica interna;
- ritenuto che le condizioni attuali del Paese non consentono la soluzione della questione istituzionale;
- che, però, presupposto innegabile della ricostruzione morale e materiale italiana è l'abdicazione immediata del Re, responsabile delle sciagure del Paese;
- che questo Congresso, espressione vera e unica della

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nei giorni 28 e 29 gennaio 1944, e che ha svolto i suoi lavori in un'ardente atmosfera di passione italiana e umana, francesca data del messaggio di dolore e di speranza pervenuto da Roma e nome dei fratelli oppressi ancora dal Vostro alleato di ieri, fedele interprete della solenne, austera, unanime condanna del Popolo Italiano a carico Vostro, di fronte all'incolabile abisso morale e politico, che divide il Popolo del Monarca, reputa suo preciso dovere notificarvi il seguente deliberato del Congresso stesso:

" Il Congresso dei Comitati di Liberazione;

-udita ed approvata la relazione Arancio Ruiz sulla politica interne;

-ritenuto che le condizioni attuali del Paese non consentono la soluzione della questione istituzionale;

-che, però, presupposto innegabile della ricostruzione morale e materiale italiana è l'abdicazione immediata del Re, responsabile delle sciagure del Paese;

-che questo Congresso, espressione vera e unica della volontà e delle forze della Nazione, ha il diritto e il dovere, in rappresentanza del Popolo Italiano, di proclamare tale esigenza;

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DICHIARA

la necessità di pervenire alla composizione di un Governo con i pieni poteri nel momento d'eccezione e con la partecipazione di tutti i partiti rappresentati al Congresso, che abbia i compiti di intensificare al massimo lo sforzo bellico, di avviare e soluzione i più urgenti problemi della vita italiana con l'appoggio delle masse popolari, al cui benessere intende lavorare, e di predisporre con garanzia d'imparzialità e libertà la convocazione dell'Assemblea Costituente, da indirsi appena cessate le ostilità;

DILIBERA

la costituzione di una Giunta Esecutiva Permanente, alla quale siano chiamati i rappresentanti designati dai Partiti componenti i Comitati di Liberazione e che, in accordo col Comitato Centrale ed in contatto con le personalità politiche riconosciute come alta espressione dell'antifascismo, predisponga le condizioni necessarie al raggiungimento degli scopi suddetti.

PARTITO LIBERALE

PARTITO SOCIALISTA

DEMOCRAZIA CRISTIANA

PARTITO COMUNISTA

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DELIBERA

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PARTITO LIBERALE	PARTITO SOCIALISTA
DEMOCRAZIA CRISTIANA	PARTITO COMUNISTA
DEMOCRAZIA DEL LAVORO	PARTITO D'AZIONE

Vogliamte bene meditare il significato di tale

voto, che esprime il sentimento unanime degli Italiani, i quali angosciosamente domandano una pronta azione, che levi le vergogne del passato e ponga i possibili ripari alla rovina del Paese.

Prevalga finalmente la carità di Patria e si faccia chiaro alla Vostra coscienza il dovere dell'immediata abdicazione, sì che il potere venga assunto in quest'ora suprema da uomini non compromessi con un ventennio di violenze, di turpitudini e di delitti.

Ogni ulteriore indugio aggravava la situazione del Paese e rende più paurose le Vostre responsabilità, che non possono essere in alcun modo coperte da una costituzione lacerata.

Napoli 6 febbraio 1944

LA GIUNTA ESECUTIVA FIRMANTE

Vincenzo Arancio Ruiz

A. Raffaele Jervolino

Francesco Cerabona

Oreste Longobardi

Paolo Tedeschi

Vincenzo Calace

SECRET

FARGO 812

FARGO

8 FEB 44

SECRET

10050 Mr. Reber

PRIORITY

FRENCH

_____ ACCORDING TO SPORZA CMA THE EXECUTIVE JUNTA NOW INTENDS TO SEND
A LETTER TO THE KING PD PRINCE PAREN FARGO SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN TO APPEAL FOR CIVIL
AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER PD CITE FARGO REHUT ONE TWO PD COUGHED IN MOST
RESPECTFUL TERMS CMA BUT CALLING HIS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
UNITE THE COUNTRY AS LONG AS HE REMAINS ON THE THRONE AND INVITING HIM TO ABDICATE

L.F. NICKEL,
Lt. Col., AGO, 5572
Adjutant General.

SECRET

Political Section

Handed me by

Badoglio

Wm. B. B.

file
SR

Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale ha creduto opportuno diramare un comunicato di commento al messaggio diretto dal Maresciallo Badoglio al Paese in occasione del trapasso alla amministrazione italiana delle Province meridionali e delle Isole.

Il Comitato di Liberazione afferma in sostanza che la decisione dei Governi Alleati non puo' essere accettata senza riserva soprattutto perche' nell'annunziarla al Paese il Capo del Governo ha fra l'altro affermato che "chiunque compia atti che ostacolano le Forze Armate nostre e Alleate o ne intralcino lo sforzo bellico o comunque giovino al nemico, sara' senz'altro giudicato ed esemplarmente punito".

Da una di tali frasi, per giunta inesattamente riportata, il Comitato di Liberazione trae delle illazioni su cui non mette conto soffermarsi. Sta comunque di fatto che la predetta frase e' stata inserita dietro precisa indicazione dei Governi Alleati.

Tale indicazione era concepita esattamente in questi termini: "Any person doing any act hostile to the Allied or Italian Forces or Army member thereof or doing any act which in any way impedes the war effort or aids the enemies of Italy, will be subject to punishment ecc."

Dopo di che resta dimostrato che le illazioni tratte da tale periodo, qualificato come tipica fraseologia fascista dal Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale, sono davvero completamente arbitrarie.

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travels from Africa.
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Naples, February 16, 1944.

CIRCULAR NO. 1

To officials and Personnel of all State Administrations, Corps, and Civil and Military Agencies:

In October, 1922, the King handed the power and Italy over to a band of adventurers, thus breaking the sacred pact of the plebiscites between the People and the Crown. In 1924, after the assassination of the Parliamentary Deputy, Giacomo Matteotti, all attempts made by the true representatives of the Nation to obtain peace and justice and the return to the violated constitution have turned out to be fruitless and in vain.

The Dictatorship, under the aegis of the Crown, developed and perfected its rule and subsequently led the country into a series of foreign and domestic undertakings and adventures which culminated in military defeat, shame, ruin, overthrow of every civilian, social and juridical relationship. With the constitution violated and tattered, with Italy reduced to hunger and left to the mercy of frenzied enemies, with the King in an inglorious flight from Rome, more than five months after the Armistice, the Country has not succeeded in obtaining a Government which has energetically and correctly undertaken the tremendous task of reorganizing and purifying the life of the Nation. And the Nation, now tired of the guilty inertia and resistance of the Supreme Powers of the State, has demanded, through its representatives meeting in Congress at Bari on January 23 and 29, 1944, the immediate abdication of Victor Emmanuel III.

The Permanent Executive Giunta, elected by the Congress, notified Victor Emmanuel III of the decisions of the Congress on 9 February 1944, who, in not abdicating openly rebelled against the Nation. In view of this situation, the Executive Giunta invited the officials and personnel of all State Administrations, Corps, Civil and Military Agencies not to participate in the rebellion of the King and his accomplices. No one should lend himself to the intimidating maneuvers of the monarchical Neo-Fascism, but all should remain faithful to their own work to the scrupulous fulfillment of their duties to the exclusive service of the Nation which has resumed the exercise of its sovereign powers. Those who permit this sacred right of the Nation to be taken away and who go beyond the legal limits of their power for the purpose of intimidating and of obtaining consent and complicity by methods so unfortunately used during the twenty years of Fascism, should know that upon a day not too distant, they will be called upon to answer for their actions and possible abuses of power to a Tribunal.

The Committees for National Liberation of the Provinces and Individual Communities, true and sole representatives of the restored sovereignty of the People, are entrusted with notification of this circular to the Administrations, Bodies, etc., as above. 5571

Naples, February 16, 1944.

CIRCULAR NO. 1

To officials and Personnel of all State Administrations, Corps, and Civil and Military Agencies:

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In October, 1922, the King handed the power and Italy over to a band of adventurers, thus breaking the sacred pact of the plebiscites between the People and the Crown. In 1924, after the assassination of the Parliamentary Deputy, Giacomo Matteotti, all attempts made by the true representatives of the Nation to obtain peace and justice and the return to the violated constitution have turned out to be fruitless and in vain.

The Dictatorship, under the aegis of the Crown, developed and perfected its rule and subsequently led the country into a series of foreign and domestic undertakings and adventures which culminated in military defeat, shame, ruin, overthrow of every civilian, social and juridical relationship. With the constitution violated and tattered, with Italy reduced to hunger and left to the mercy of frenzied enemies, with the King in an inglorious flight from Rome, more than five months after the Armistice, the Country has not succeeded in obtaining a Government which has energetically and correctly undertaken the tremendous task of reorganizing and purifying the life of the Nation. And the Nation, now tired of the guilty inertia and resistance of the Supreme Powers of the State, has demanded, through its representatives meeting in Congress at Bari on January 23 and 27, 1944, the immediate abdication of Victor Emmanuel III.

The Permanent Executive Giunta, elected by the Congress, notified Victor Emmanuel III of the decisions of the Congress on 9 February 1944, who, in not abdicating openly rebelled against the Nation. In view of this situation, the Executive Giunta invited the officials and personnel of all State Administrations, Corps, Civil and Military Agencies not to participate in the rebellion of the King and his accomplices. No one should lend himself to the intimidating maneuvers of the monarchial Neo-Fascism, but all should remain faithful to their own work to the scrupulous fulfillment of their duties to the exclusive service of the Nation which has resumed the exercise of its sovereign powers. Those who permit this sacred right of the Nation to be taken away and who go beyond the legal limits of their power for the purpose of intimidating and of obtaining consent and complicity by methods so unfortunately used during the twenty years of Fascism, should know that upon a day not too distant, they will be called upon to answer for their actions and possible abuses of power to a Tribunal.

The Committees for National Liberation of the Provinces and individual Communities, true and sole representatives of the restored sovereignty of the People, are entrusted with notification of this circular to the Administrations, Bodies, etc., as above.

5568

2197
Naples, 16/2/1944

CIRCULAR NO.1

^{Officials}
To the Executives and Personnel of all State Administrations, Corps and Civil and Military Agencies.

^{the} In October 1922, the King handed the power and Italy over to a ^{band} Gang of adventurers, breaking thus the sacred pact of plebiscites between the People and the Crown. In 1924, after the assassination of the Parliamentary Deputy, Giacomo Matteotti, all attempts made by the true representatives of the Nation to obtain peace and justice and the return to the violated constitution turned out fruitless and in vain.

The Dictatorship, under the ^{auspices} auspices of the crown, developed and perfected its rule and ^{lead} led the country subsequently into a series of foreign and domestic undertakings and adventures which culminated in military defeat, shame, ruin, overthrow of every civilian, social and juridical relationship. ^{with} The Constitution violated and torn, Italy reduced to hunger and left ^{to} the mercy of frenzied enemies, the King in an inglorious flight from Rome, more than five months after the Armistice, the Country did not succeed in having a Government which, ^{with} undertook with ^{unrighteousness} unrighteousness and energy the tremendous task of the reorganisation and purification of the life of the Nation. And the Nation, now tired of the guilty inertia and resistance of the Supreme Powers of the State, ^{has} demanded, through its representatives meeting in Congress at Bari on January 28 and 29, 1944, the immediate abdication of Victor Emanuel III.

The Permanent Executive Giunta (Council), elected by the Congress, notified Victor Emanuel III of the decisions of the Congress on 9 February 1944, who, in not abdicating openly rebelled against the Nation. In view of this situation, the Executive Giunta (Council) invited the executives ^{Officials} and personnel of all State Administrations, Corps, Civil and Military Agencies not to ^{participate} take part in the rebellion of the King and his accomplices. No one, ^{must} lend himself to the intimidating manoeuvres of the monarchical Neo-Fascism, but all ^{must} remain faithful to their own work, ^{the} the scrupulous fulfillment of their duties, ^{the} the exclusive service of the Nation returned into the possession of its sovereign powers. Those who permit themselves to have this sacred right of the Nation taken away and ^{go} go outside the legal limits of their power to intimidate and obtain consent and complicity by methods so unfortunately used during the ^{last} last years of the Fascist Ventennium, should know that upon a day not too distant, they will be called upon to answer for their actions and possible abuses of power to a Tribunal. ^{for the purpose of} The Committees for National Liberation of the Provinces and individual Communities, true and sole representatives of the restored sovereignty of the People, are entrusted with notification of this circular to the Administrations, Bodies, etc., as above.

5567

FROM THE EXECUTIVE

PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

The Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission has received from the Executive Junta of the Committees of Liberation, that is to say the Six Political Parties who took part in the recent Congress at Bari, a memorandum setting forth the agreed political proposals of the Six Parties.

The Deputy President of the A.C.C. is forwarding copies of this memorandum to the Allied Governments.

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5566

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

VIA PAOLO EMILIO IMBRIANI, 53

NAPOLI

Prot. N. 10

Napoli, li 12/2/1944

Al Generale Mac Farlane

Capo della Commissione Alleata di Controllo

N A P O L I

Generale,

A seguito del colloquio che abbiamo avuto con Voi sabato scorso 5 febbraio allo scopo di tenere informata l'opinione pubblica della attività della Giunta, abbiamo inviato alla stampa, locale un comunicato che riferiva obiettivamente l'essenziale del colloquio stesso.

Stupiti che tale comunicato non sia stato pubblicato, e convinti che le Autorità Alleate non intendono negare pubblicità all'attività della Giunta, il che costituirebbe una presa di posizione implicita nel conflitto attuale tra il re e la Nazione, siamo sicuri che Voi vorrete compiacervi dare disposizioni affinché il comunicato, di cui accludiamo copia, venga pubblicato, e sia dato per l'avvenire ampia libertà e pubblicità alle nostre iniziative che saranno sempre conformi agli interessi del paese e alla causa degli alleati.

p. LA GIUNTA ESECUTIVA PERMANENTE

TE

Vincenzo Calace

Napoli 10/2/1944

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATACOMUNICATO

Riunitasi per studiare le misure da prendersi immediatamente per assolvere la missione affidata dal Congresso di Bari, la Giunta Esecutiva dell'Italia Liberata ha preso contatto, sabato mattina 5 febbraio, con il Generale Mac Farlane, capo della Commissione Alleata di controllo in Italia.

La Giunta Esecutiva ha notificato al Generale Mac Farlane il suo mandato che consiste essenzialmente nel prendere tutte le misure adatte a provocare l'abdicazione del re Vittorio Emanuele ed a preparare le condizioni nelle quali possa costituirsi un vero governo nazionale e democratico che dia impulso allo sforzo di guerra e inizi la ricostruzione della vita del paese.

La Giunta Esecutiva ha fatto presente al Gen. MAC FARLANE l'urgente necessità che si addivenga al più presto alla chiarificazione e regolarizzazione della vita del paese.

Alla fine del colloquio, che si è svolto in un'atmosfera di perfetta cordialità, il Gen. Mac Farlane ha assicurato che trasmetterà immediatamente ai Governi Alleati le comunicazioni della Giunta sottolineandone il carattere di estrema urgenza.

Per Copia conforme -

La Giunta Esecutiva
Impegno

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SECRET

FARGO 812

FARGO(Mr. Reber, Pol. Sect.)

8 FEB 44

SECRET

10050 Mr. Reber

PRIORITY

AFFAIRS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER

According to Sforza, the Executive Junta now intends to send a letter to the King couched in most respectful terms, but calling his attention to the fact that it is impossible to unite the country as long as he remains on the Throne and inviting him to abdicate.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
Mr. Reber (Pol Sect) ✓

541.1
505 - Sforza, Grant
505 - King Victor Emmanuel III

556

L.F. NICKEL,
Lt. Col., AGO,
Adjutant General.

5563

SECRET

*Political Rev*SECRETFARGO 746 *Stz**Barin Congress*

FARGO

5 FEB 44

SECRET

10050 MATFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM H. AGENT (INFO)

PARA ONE PD PERHAPS FARGO FARGO FROM MATFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO
 APPL FOR LOS FOR CINC CMA MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS RPTD H. AGENT FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER
 PD CITE FARGO SEVEN FOUR SIX PD THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE ^{OF} THE SIX PARTIES REPRESENTED
 AT THE RECENT BARI CONFERENCE CAME TO SEE ME THIS MORNING PD THEY CONFIRMED THEMSELVES TO
 COMMUNICATING TO ME THE IMMEDIATE TASKS WHICH HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED TO THEM BY THE PARTIES
 WHICH THEY REPRESENTED PD THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS PD ONE PD TO SECURE THE ABOLITION OF
 THE KING PD TWO PD TO PREPARE THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT WITH FULL POWERS INCLUDING
 SOME OF THOSE EXERCISED BY THE HEAD OF THE STATE PD SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE IN
 OFFICE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS PROPER ELECTIONS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE LIBERATION ^{OF}
 ALL ITALY PD PARA TWO PD SEVERAL SPEAKERS STRESSED THE FACT THAT THEY REPRESENTED A
 LARGE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION OF LIBERATED ITALY PD ^{that} THEY REPRESENTED THOSE
 ELEMENTS OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WHO HAD ALWAYS BEEN ANTI DASH FASCIST PD THAT IT WAS
 ONLY DASH EVIDENT THAT THE KING WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO FORM A BROAD DASH BASED
 GOVERNMENT AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS AND INEVITABLY MUST REMAIN WEAK AND WITHOUT
 INFLUENCE PD THAT AN UNFORTUNATE SITUATION WAS NOW BEING CREATED IN ITALY BY WHAT

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CONTINUEDSECRET

FARGO 746

AMOUNTED TO A COMPLETE POLITICAL DEADLOCK SO THEY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR DEALING WITH THE SITUATION WITH URGENCY AS THE SPEEDY SUBSTITUTION FOR THE KING'S GOVERNMENT OF GOVERNMENT BY THE PARTIES WHICH THEY REPRESENTED WOULD ENABLE ITALY TO PULL ITS WEIGHT IN THE COMMON FIGHT AGAINST THE GERMANS MUCH MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN AT PRESENT SO PARA THREE SO I MADE NO COMMENT ON THEIR STATEMENT BESIDE SAYING THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WERE BEING KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY SO I UNDERTOOK TO FORWARD TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THE PROGRAMME OF WHICH THEY HAD JUST INFORMED ME AND TOGETHER WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE URGENCY OF DEALING WITH THE SITUATION SO I MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE TRANQUILITY OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS ADMINISTRATION MUST BE PRESERVED SO PARA FOUR SO IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE EXECUTIVE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE CONSIDERING TAKING ACTIVE STEPS TO ENDEAVOUR TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PROGRAMME SO IT SEEMS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE TACTICS THEY SHOULD ADOPT SO THEY WOULD APPARE ALSO TO BE ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN SOME IDEA OF THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GENERAL AND ON THE TACTICS THEY MIGHT SAFELY ADOPT SO THAT THE SITUATION REGARDING THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN THESE RESPECTS REQUIRES CLARIFYING WITH SOME DEGREE OF URGENCY IS BECOMING DAILY MORE APPARENT

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

Pol. Section
Legal Sub Comm.
Brig. Lush

L. F. NICKEL,
Lt. Col., AGO,
Adjutant General.

(2)

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SECRET

EXECUTIVE JUNTA

<u>Member</u>	<u>Party</u>
Arengio-Tuiz	Liberal
Gervolino	Christian Democrat
Galasso	Action
Carabona	Labour Democrat (Democrazia del Lavoro)
Fasich	Communist
Losgolardi	Socialist

Lib. Democrat

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7.4.1

Bari Jan 29

The new Executive Committee of the Liberation Front Parties created by the Bari Congress, tonight appointed Count Carlo Sforza and Benedetto Croce to prepare a statement to the Allied authorities on what they termed "a ~~psychological~~ series of psychological errors" made by the authorities in connection with the Bari congress. Count Sforza said that he referred specifically to the cancellation of previously made plans to broadcast the full proceedings of the Congress over Radio Bari. He said he and Senator Croce would prepare the statement on their return to Naples.

(We did not put this
on the wires as it
contributed nothing
to the fact mentioned
in para 2 of the
next story)

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