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Political, Internal - General  
Dec. 1943 - Feb. 1945

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*fla*  
*[Signature]*

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
\*\*\*\*\*

Tel: 451

Ref: 3405/CO3

12 February 1945

SUBJECT: Financial (Cost of Living) Considerations of  
Italian State Officials.

TO : DCO3, Economic Section.

1. Transmitted herewith is letter from Regional Commissioner, ABRUZZI-MARCHE Region, with attachments representing a cross-section study of the various parts of this Region: part AD and part AC (liberated) territory.
2. This is passed to you for information and consideration of your various Sub-Commissions concerned.
3. True, they look to us to bring them an honest economy, - an organized plan, and they are willing on the whole to work for themselves to work out their own livelihood as good public servants.
4. May this please be discussed with Civil Affairs Section for intelligent discussion at some future CO3 meeting to be chosen later.

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*Joseph C. Realy, major*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
To the Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Y.P. Political Section.  
DCO3, Civil Affairs Section.

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COPY

TO: HQ AC (Civil Affairs Section) (For attention of Brig. Lush)

FROM: HQ AMG/AC Abruzzi Marche Region.

SUBJECT: Public Employees - Salaries.

REF: R5/519/17

DATE: 8 February 1945

1. I have been considering for some time the disastrous financial position of certain state officials; particularly those in AMG territory.
2. I view the problem with so much concern that I ask that you will give special consideration to it yourself so that a satisfactory solution may put an end to the present impossible situation.
3. I attach details of a series of cases of which I confirm the genuineness. I have chosen these from a large collection in order to illustrate a cross section through the levels of society - the picture, indeed, is a very sorry one, and one which reflects no credit except on the unfortunate officials who are somehow still carrying on.
4. We are here to tidy up the aftermaths of battle and to prepare the Italian authorities to take over from us as soon as possible. But it is not fair when officials on whom we must rely to help us are reduced to penury, and are, in fact, often half-starved.
5. Honest officials - there are some - are now reduced to selling their few remaining personal possessions in order to live, as all their savings have gone. The not-so-honest ones are forced to implement their income by the very means that we claim we are here to abolish. How can they do otherwise?
6. I repeat: The present situation is impossible! Surely in AMG Territory, anyhow, it is up to us to look after the civil servants working for us. If by granting them additional salaries or allowances there we can force the Italian Government to do the same for their dependents outside AMG territory, so much the better.
7. I have received many deputations from these people and have felt humiliated by being unable to do anything for them. They go on working mostly in the hope that we shall see that they are treated fairly at last.
8. The payment of such bonuses as "Bonbardamento" indemnity, or "Disagiata-issima Residenza" neither of which is adequate to the situation, and to which, anyhow, the state employees in the two provinces of Ancona and Pesaro are not entitled, only boggles the situation.
9. State officials in AMG areas are forced by the conditions of their present service to live separated from their families and away from their homes, and should, I think, be given a special bonus to enable them to meet the additional expenses forced upon them.

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10. State officials in AMG areas should certainly be given the same cost-of-living bonus as we give A.F. employees.

11. I consider that the same officials in AMG area should be given a ration scale equivalent to that for heavy workers.

12. Even with these concessions I cannot see that they will be in a position to make both ends meet, and the concessions I have suggested are only a small bite out of a large, and at present, very indigestible cherry.

CHAF/rgy.

/s/ C.H.FRENCH  
/t/ C.H.A.FRENCH  
Colonel.  
Regional Commissioner.

DRAFT

15 February 1945

V. F. O. A. Section

1. The "Momento" of today's date reports that Signor Borlinguer disclosed to journalists during an interval in the Roatta trial on February 13th that the Presidency of the Council had decided to invite the local Committees of Liberation, Prefects, Quastori and Carabinieri Commands to denounce persons of Fascist antecedents with a view to suspending their electoral rights. This decision is, of course, in harmony with the purge legislation, but I personally cannot but view it with some concern. It means, in short, that only the left-wingers will be left to vote.

2. You may be aware of the above-mentioned decision already, but I thought it worth bringing to your notice, particularly as the Marchese Inghiere (of the Royal household) today informed the Chief Commissioner that the Communists were about to launch a big drive to create Committees of Liberation in towns and communes where none existed before. Members of the Communist Party in these districts are to be told off to join the Liberal, Christian Democrat and other parties and secure places in the Committees, two bringing the Committees eventually under the complete control of the Communist Party. I am checking this report from other sources.

A. S. HANFORD  
Asst. Political Adviser  
Political Section

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V.P. CA Section

The "Memento" of today's date <sup>reports</sup> ~~discusses~~ <sup>discusses</sup> the  
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 commands to denounce persons of Fascist antecedents  
 with a view to <sup>suspending</sup> ~~depriving~~ their electoral rights.  
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 decision already, but I thought it worth bringing to your  
 notice, particularly as the Member Kucifero (of the Royal  
 household) today informed the C.C. that the Communists  
 were about to launch a big drive to create Committees  
 of Winkler in towns & communes where there were  
 no such before. Members of the Communist Party in these  
 districts are to be told off to join the Winkler, Division

Committee of Winkler, Pupalis, Quastri & Rashidini  
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 with a view to <sup>insisting</sup> ~~defining~~ their declared rights.  
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 Committees, thus bringing the Committees entirely under  
 the complete control of the Communist Party. I am  
 checking this report from other sources.

18/10/45

*[Signature]*  
 (A. S. HALFORD)  
 Asst. Political Adviser

Mr. Schett.

Gov. Cambarevic  
asked this to be presented  
to you. So me it looks  
like a proposed step  
of the Government.

Would you like for  
Sandra (interpreter + trans. beta)  
to translate this for you  
or don't you think it be  
worth while.

Yes  
Might be of interest but  
has no claim of security  
MS

*Proposal for Ital Govt*  
*1 Dec 34*

- 1 PRESIDENZA E AFFARI INTERNI ..... On.Prof.Alfredo Misuri
- 2 AFFARI ESTERI ..... Dr. Augusto Rosso
- 3 ASSISTENZA PROFUGHI (da elevare a Ministero  
Pacificazione ed Assi-  
stenza)..... On.Tito Zaniboni
- 4 FINANZE ..... Sen.Prof.Luigi Finaudi
- 5 GUERRA (con Sottosegretariato Partigiani)... Gen.C.A. Quirino Armaellini
- 6 MARINA ..... Amm.Da Zara
- 7 ECON.NAZ. ( AGE .IND.COMM) ..... Giuseppe Cambarelli ✓
- 8 AERONAUTICA ..... Scialoja
- 9 COMUNICAZIONI ..... Gen.Angelo Odone
- 10 TESORO ..... Palmiro Togliatti
- 11 GIUSTIZIA ..... On.Alcide De Gasperi
- 12, PUBBLICA ISTRUZIONE ..... Prof.Alberto Mancuso
- 13 LAVORI PUBBLICI ..... Silone

S. Segretario alla Presidenza

Avv. Umberto Gazzoni

I tentativi di orientamento politico e di combinazioni ministeriali capaci di sostituire l'esiziale Governo Bonomi che sono andati svolgendosi nella settimana scorsa, autorizzano le seguenti conclusioni:

- 1° -Gli uomini attorno ai quali, più o meno infondatamente, si era creata la speranza o l'illusione che potessero salvare l'Italia in questo tragico momento storico, si sono rapidamente logorati nell'azione di governo ed esautorati nella pubblica estimazione; Badoglio è un astro spento; Croce ha rischiato di compromettere anche il suo prestigio di filosofo con i suoi errori di politica che cerca invano correggere modificando il suo primitivo atteggiamento repubblicano; Sforza ha mostrato di essere un buon odiatore e l'odio non fa che invelenire le sciagure nazionali; Orlando è troppo debole e vecchio per osare e si orienta verso i vecchi quanto lui, ma infinitamente meno considerati (Bergamini e C.)
- 2°- I troppo vecchi sono liquidati o in via di liquidazione; i troppo giovani inadatti: occorre un Governo di uomini maturi, ma validi e prestanti dal punto di vista fisico e intellettuale, moralmente inattaccabili, di varie tendenze, partecipanti al Governo stesso senza rappresentarvi ufficialmente il proprio partito per evitare interferenze extraministeriali.
- 3° -Il nuovo Governo presenta una coesione interna notevole tra uomini di spirito alieni da settarismi, provati quasi tutti da durissime esperienze e desiderosi di porle a profitto della pacificazione e della ricostruzione mondiale.
- 4° -La liquidazione dei relitti del fascismo deve avvenire in forma obiettiva e legale. Pertanto occorre smobilitare la "bardatura dell'odio": l'Alto Commissariato di Sforza e compagni che hanno acuito il disordine materiale e morale della Nazione.

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Pertanto il Commissariato Aggiunto per l'Epurazione sarà assorbito dal Ministero degli Affari Interni, affinché l'epurazione stessa raggiunga

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i suoi scopi di dare serietà, onestà, competenza, obiettività alla burocrazia senza turbarne le funzioni;

Il Commissariato Aggiunto per la punizione dei delitti fascisti, sarà assorbito dal Ministero per la Giustizia e quelli che furono indicati come delitti saranno perseguiti se risulteranno essere stati veri e propri reati comuni e non resistenza ad illegalismi altrui, ed in ogni caso, dovranno essere giudicati dai Tribunali Ordinari, ed i processi, su denuncia delle parti lese, dovranno essere istruiti entro un termine fisso, a partire dalla data della liberazione dal nemico di ciascun territorio, giacchè non può protrarsi indefinitamente questo stato di animosità collettiva che finirebbe col distruggere la Nazione;

Il Commissariato Aggiunto per l'Avocazione allo Stato dei profitti del fascismo sarà assorbito dal Ministero delle Finanze o del Tesoro, a seconda che si consideri prevalente la funzione di confisca e di avocazione o quella di conservazione e di distribuzione) e funzionerà con la burocrazia specializzata invece che con elementi di parte e in ogni caso dovrà essere esaurita rapidamente questa funzione per permettere la normalizzazione delle aziende e la ripresa delle iniziative private tanto necessarie in questo momento decisivo per la nostra rinascita;

- 5° - Ma l'opera punitrice che deve prevenire gli sfoghi del rancore degli offesi e deve riaffermare il diritto imprescrittibile d'ogni società civile di reprimere l'abuso e il delitto, deve essere temperata da un'azione di emenda e di recupero dei puniti e di oblio degli offesi, in guisa che si ricostituisca la concordia di intenti della Nazione. Inoltre il conflitto mondiale e la guerra civile hanno prodotto tante sciagure agli individui e alle famiglie che non si può non proporsi la più vasta e profonda opera assistenziale affinché profughi e sfollati ritornino ai luoghi di origine o vengano avviati verso sedi più adatte di quelle ove si rifugiarono alla ventura ed ivi trovino da ricostituirsi un focolare e da assicurarsi un'esistenza degna d'essere vissuta.
- A tal uopo verrà affidata ad un uomo del gran cuore, che le sofferenze

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non sono riuscite ad inasprire, quest'opera immensa e d'immensa portata sociale, morale e di stabilizzazione politica.

In conseguenza, dopo essere stato il nuovo Gabinetto, l'Alto Commissariato per i profughi sarà trasformato in Ministero per la Pacificazione e per l'Assistenza e sarà elevato al rango di Ministro l'attuale Alto Commissario, Onorevole Tito Zaniboni.

6° - Con queste premesse la politica interna deve svolgersi attorno a questi temi:

a) ripresa normale dei contatti del Governo con le provincie in modo che la partigianeria unitaria del fascismo e quella espartita del Governo attuale siano cancellate per sempre. Lo Stato sarà così sollecito degli interessi di tutti i cittadini e non soltanto di quelli della propria fazione o del proprio gruppo di fazioni. In conseguenza occorre una revisione delle nomine di tutti i Capi delle Provincie, dei Comuni e degli altri organi locali affinché, pure rinviando a miglior tempo le elezioni amministrative, coloro che amministrano la cosa pubblica godano della fiducia pubblica come se, per quanto è possibile, fossero stati effettivamente eletti dal popolo anziché, per necessità contingenti, designati da uffici superiori.

b) Senza valutare le benemerite acquisizioni dei Comitati di Liberazione, il nuovo Governo terrà conto delle designazioni da loro espresse per il conferimento di cariche pubbliche e della loro interpretazione delle necessità generali e locali ma con semplice valore indicativo e in quanto non contraddicano e non ostacolino il presente programma.

c) Ricostruzione e rafforzamento degli organi di polizia epurati da ogni inquinamento fascista, nazista e post-nazista, affidando ogni funzione di polizia ai Reali Carabinieri riportati alla dignità della loro tradizione centenaria ed al Corpo di Pubblica Sicurezza (comunque si voglia chiamarlo definitivamente) lasciando alla R. Guardia di Finanza le sole funzioni di polizia finanziaria.

Carabinieri e Pubblica Sicurezza tornati ad essere circondati dai

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prestigio della fiducia dei cittadini, dovranno obiettivamente ma inesorabilmente, fare osservare le leggi da chicchessia e contro chicchessia, ridando la normalità a tutti i rapporti tra i cittadini e stroncando le degenerazioni delittuose che il conflitto in corso e la guerra civile hanno lasciato dietro di se.

d) In considerazione dello stato in cui si trovano le varie forze di polizia, sulle quali hanno agito negativamente influenze fasciste del cessato dispotismo e dei partiti partecipanti all'attuale Governo, la soggezione alle forze militari tedesche ed il turbamento morale nonché le strette economiche fautrici della corruttibilità, il nuovo Governo prenderà accordi coi Governi Inglese ed Americano per inviare apposite missioni di ufficiali di polizia e studiare sui luoghi le rispettive organizzazioni per la sicurezza pubblica.

7° - Una Nazione controllata non può avere una politica estera autonoma: la sua politica estera dovrà essere affidata ad un diplomatico di carriera il quale si renda interprete presso gli Alleati della risultante della politica dei vari Ministeri.

Occorrerà insistere presso gli Alleati affinché la posizione del popolo italiano, ai loro occhi, venga del tutto modificata in quanto esso non è mai venuto meno alla simpatia per loro, anche quando è stato forzato a combatterli.

E' urgente che l'Italia ottenga le seguenti rettifiche in politica estera:

a) che il nuovo Governo dopo aver dichiarati nulli i trattati d'alleanza stipulati dal Governo fascista con la Germania e coi suoi satelliti perché i poteri costituzionali per stipularli mancavano a quel Governo dal colpo di Stato del 3 Gennaio 1925, riceva, come contropartita, l'onore di sottoscrivere un trattato d'alleanza con l'Inghilterra e l'America;

b) che l'amichevole mediazione dell'Inghilterra e dell'America conduca alla conciliazione e alla restaurazione di veri rapporti di amicizia

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con la Francia, la Jugoslavia e la Grecia;

c) che vengano integralmente estesi all'Italia i benefici della legge affitti e prestiti e della Carta Atlantica;

d) che vengano fissate le condizioni della collaborazione militare dell'Italia allo sforzo bellico contro il nazismo, e che inoltre vengano usati contro il Giappone reparti volontari italiani;

e) che sia intensificato l'intervento Alleanza alla ricostruzione delle rovine della guerra ed alla fornitura delle cose necessarie alla ripresa della normalità e della vita italiana.

8° - I tre Ministeri militari coordineranno il loro sforzo per adeguarsi alle necessità degli impegni di carattere militare inerenti alla richiesta alleanza con l'Inghilterra e con l'America.

9° - Il problema più urgente da risolvere integralmente e sollecitamente, anche con mezzi di fortuna, è quello delle comunicazioni.

Sino a tanto, che il trasporto delle cose e delle persone non avrà ripreso il suo normale ritmo, la vita nazionale non potrà tornare ad avere nemmeno la parvenza della normalità e lo stesso rifornimento dei mercati locali, commerci locali, sarà reso difficile e favorirà gli alti costi dei generi necessari alla vita.

Le concessioni di pubblici servizi di comunicazioni nazionali e locali urbane e interurbane, potrà essere offerto a Società finanziarie inglesi od americane che ne costituiscano l'efficienza, mentre coi ~~eseri~~ corrispettivi delle varie concessioni potrà, ad esempio, essere ridotto l'ammontare del debito pubblico, ricostituite le riserve degli istituti finanziari e di previdenza statale, eseguite opere di pubblica utilità.

10° - Oltre il restauro delle opere pubbliche danneggiate dalla guerra, occorrerà porre mano alla riparazione ed all'incremento del <sup>5091</sup> patrimonio edilizio nazionale, applicando nelle zone distrutte, i piani regolatori già approvati od approntandone nuovi. Qualora gli studi tecnici non fossero maturi per una metodica ricostruzione, od i materiali per costruzioni stabili difettassero o vi fossero in contestazione espropri o

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indennizzi, o qualsiasi altra causa di ritardo ostacolasse il definitivo rifacimento, in tutto o in parte, dei centri abitati, si renderebbe necessario procedere alla costruzione immediata di baraccamenti per alloggiare tutti i profughi, gli sfollati, i prigionieri, gli internati che, tornando al luogo d'origine non trovino più la casa e non abbiano più i mezzi per procurarsela.

11°- I Ministeri finanziari procederanno subito ad un inventario di ciò che resta in beni mobili ed immobili, privati e pubblici, di tutte le attività e le passività della Nazione, attuali e prevedibili, affinché ci si possa rendere conto delle proprie possibilità e dei propri oneri presenti e futuri.

In tema di ricostruzione ricorrere ai prestiti garantiti dallo Stato. Dovranno essere posti all'attivo tutti gli espropri dei profitti del fascismo e gli incameramenti dei beni nemici, e, da ultimo, per quanto l'economia nazionale lo consenta, dovranno essere studiate le seguenti provvidenze finanziarie di restaurazione dell'erario:

a) prelevamento di una quota del capitale pari al 20% sul plusvalore che gli immobili hanno raggiunto nel periodo bellico, calcolabile all'ingrosso almeno al decuplo della valutazione catastale di essi, da ratizzare in un decennio o da riscattare in una sola volta secondo le norme usate in altre operazioni del genere;

b) dopo accertato lo stato di consistenza delle proprietà immobiliari danneggiate, nell'attesa del risarcimento dei danni nel campo internazionale, rendere obbligatoria una quota di mutualità immobiliare per sottoporre a contributo le proprietà incolte a vantaggio delle proprietà danneggiate;

c) forte tassazione dei profitti di congiuntura e di avocazione allo Stato degli utili di borsa nera o degli altri profitti illeciti <sup>596</sup> in quanto siano rintracciabili.

12° - Industria, Commercio e Agricoltura dovrebbero essere fusi in un solo Ministero (Economia Nazionale) con due distinti Sottosegretariati e

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dovrebbero tener re alla ripresa economica in tutti i campi.

C'è un problema di scambi e di trasporti particolarmente legato alla funzionalità di questo dicastero il quale collegherà la rinascita di tutte le attività nazionali con la ripresa degli scambi con l'Inghilterra e, soprattutto con le Americhe.

Quanto prima i mercati avranno viveri da sopperire alla lunga denutrizione del popolo italiano, indumenti e calzature per ripararlo dall'inclinanza invernale, medicinali e generi di conforto, saponi e disinfettanti per preservarne la sanità, tanto prima il lavoro degli italiani sarà efficiente e lo spirito ne sarà elevato.

Quanto prima i fertilizzanti giungeranno alla terra e gli anticrittogamici alle piantagioni, come le materie prime ed i combustibili alle officine ed i prodotti semilavorati all'artigianato, tanto prima l'Italia avrà prodotti per consumare e per vendere, uscendo dalla stasi mortale che l'angustia.

Varie categorie di persone condannate all'inerzia forzata, alla demoralizzazione ed al vizio, riprenderanno la propria dignità di lavoratori e di produttori; combattenti la lotta civile di tutti i giorni, forza efficiente nel supremo sforzo di liberazione del mondo dalla tirannide

13° - L'istruzione pubblica, riformata tante volte, dovrà essere riformata ancora ma per tornare in gran parte all'antico e riparare le devastazioni culturali e morali dovute ai riformatori fascisti. Occorrerà premettere l'immediato sgombero di tutti gli edifici scolastici da parte degli attuali occupanti spesso abusivi, come le organizzazioni dei partiti estremi, eccezion fatta soltanto per gli ospedali territoriali, ove questi non possano essere sistemati altrove.

I locali scolastici debbono essere portati ad un livello di salubrità e di decoro da allietare lo spirito, gli insegnanti d'ogni grado debbono essere meglio selezionati e remunerati.

Lo spirito sportivo non deve sopraffare la scuola: la palestra deve essere un utile e sano complemento dell'aula: non deve svuotare l'aula.

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14° - La giustizia dovrà essere posta in onore con la reale soppressione di tutte le Magistrature Speciali comprese quelle costituite dal Conte Sforza per la punizione dei delitti fascisti, nonché le speciali commissioni per il confino di polizia ereditate dal fascismo e conservate dal cosiddetto Governo democratico di Bonomi.

La Magistratura ben selezionata, ben pagata e ben protetta dalla influenza di partito, dovrà tornare ad offrire tutte le garanzie per la libertà individuale e collettiva, per la incolumità delle persone e delle cose, per l'inviolabilità del domicilio e del pensiero, per la santità dei rapporti familiari.

Il nuovo Governo ammira la costruzione mirabile dello Stato Sovietico che ha resistito all'urto del più potente stato militare d'Europa e nutre sensi di gratitudine per il suo apporto allo schiacciamento della potenza sopraffattrice nazista, mentre è solidale nell'amicizia che tributano al popolo russo i grandi Alleati Inglese ed Americano.

Non ritiene, però, che convenga al popolo italiano di imitare il popolo russo nei suoi ornamenti politici essendone tanto difforme per razza, per temperamento, per tradizioni, per aspirazioni, per interessi, per funzioni storiche, per attitudini, per sentimenti, per struttura mentale e per conformazione culturale. Pertanto, il nuovo Governo, pure essendo fedele ai principi democratici ed assicurando a tutti la più ampia libertà di pensiero, di propaganda e di stampa, non permetterà che alcun partito millantando credito e rappresentando in Italia una esigua minoranza, pretenda di avere il sopravvento sugli altri partiti, vantandosi di essere l'interprete ed il continuatore, in Italia, d'una rivoluzione per la quale mancano i presupposti storici, politici ed etnici, che aspirerebbero a violentare la coscienza nazionale.

Abbattuta la tirannide, l'Italia aspira, secondo il nuovo Governo a reggersi a libera democrazia, nella quale sia compenetrato lo spirito riform-

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mature delle due grandi democrazie anglosassone con le quali si propone di collaborare strettamente in ogni campo, con la fiducia di riportarne, per ora, l'aiuto necessario a risorgere e poi di collaborare insieme al trionfo delle civiltà occidentali.

Il nuovo Governo si propone di prestare il giuramento tradizionale nelle mani del Luogotenente Generale del Regno e di rispettare e far rispettare lo Statuto sino a quando il popolo italiano non abbia deciso la forma per procedere alla sua modificazione.

Il nuovo Governo non si arroga il diritto di considerarsi un normale governo democratico, in quanto manca ad esso la prova elettorale: crede, tuttavia, di essere il più aderente alla realtà di quelli che lo hanno preceduto dal 28 ottobre 1922 ad oggi, e di interpretare la coscienza collettiva piuttosto che uno spirito di parte che non vi ha espressione ufficiale, pur essendo i suoi componenti delle più varie provenienze: si propone di interpretare le idealità diffuse nella coscienza democratica dei popoli più progrediti e di applicarne i dettami, in guisa che, anche in circostanze anormali, come le presenti sia quanto più possibile conforme alla normalità costituzionale delle grandi democrazie.

A dimostrazione di tale tendenza, sarà necessario creare, con decreto Luogotenenziale, una Consulta composta da elementi di tutte le provenienze politiche che abbiano lottato e sofferto sotto la tirannide e che possono documentare inoppugnabilmente il loro valido contributo alla lotta contro il nazi-fascismo.

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NOV 291310A  
PALERMO

C/2489  
DEC 011953A  
ROUTINE

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMIORGO STONE CAPO COMMISSIONE ALLIATA ROMA.

IN CLEAR.

National Union of Antifascists composed of 100 sections in all liberated ITALY calls for intervention of Allied Commission so that new Italian Govt might be constituted in conformity with Armistice and composed of qualified men never inscribed in the Fascist Party.

THE PRESIDE OF THE COMMITTEE.

OLE LOGIUDICE

List

- Action - CA Sec
- Info - SO to Chief Commissioner  
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Chief Commissioner  
Political Section  
File (2)  
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British Ambassador  
American Ambassador

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M/C/Note

This is the translation of cable received through Italian Signal Section.

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WMS  
~~TOP SECRET~~

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DEC 011933A  
ROUTINE

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

NOV 251310A

PALENSC

COMUNICAZIONE CON LA COMMISSIONE ITALIANA ROMA.

IN CLEAR.

National Union of Antifascists composed of 100 sections in all liberated ITALY calls for intervention of Allied Commission so that new Italian Govt might be constituted in conformity with armistice and composed of qualified men, never inscribed in the Fascist Party.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMITTE,  
ALL LOGIUDICE

Dist

- action - GA Sec
- info - SO to Chief Commissioner
- CO S
- Chief Commissioner
- Political Section
- File (2)
- Floet

M/C/Note.

This is translation of cable received through Italian Signal Section.

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Euler  
Lords

25 NOV 44

A Personal Analysis of the Current Italian  
Political Situation.

The present Italian political situation is nothing short of chaotic and confused, particularly so to the foreigner who is unacquainted with the past and present history of the nation and with the psychology of the nation's inhabitants after twenty odd years of fascist dictatorship.

Without attempting a review of said history, which undoubtedly has had an influence of no small mole on the Italian people, I would like to pass on to a short analysis of the frame of mind of the Italian people today in regard to politics. For twenty odd years, the Italian people have been thoroughly gagged and every attempt at mental expansion has been suppressed. As a result, the older men have grown tired and skeptical and the younger men have had no political education except that relative to Fascism. It can therefore be sincerely stated that extremely few people today, in Italy, know the true meaning of a political party, the structure and function of a democratic government, the individual responsibility of a self-governed people and their political ignorance goes so far that they do not really know, at present, exactly what they want in the way of politics.

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Aside from being totally unprepared for democratic political activity, the war has depauperized the nation so severely that the foremost thought in the Italian's mind today is to find the means of subsistence for himself and his immediate family and with the economic balance so completely upset, this activity of self-maintenance more than takes up the individual's complete time.

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Consequently, he has no time for such luxuries as politics or political thought.

Realizing that this ignorance and these deprivations are a direct result firstly, of the weakness of the order men of the pre-fascist government, then of the highway robbers that made up the fascist government, the Italian individual is distrustful of all political men. He does not see anyone whom he can respect as a leader.

Fundamentally however, the Italian people are peace-loving and philosophical despite the imperialistic manifestations of the past regime? They desire no more than peace and order and the possibility to work and earn enough to live. Nor does he see a good solution to his problems in the regimentation of a fascist or communist order. Intimately, the Italian is an individual and greatly attached to his family and private property. By heredity, he is a lover of freedom and not of limitations and restrictions. Nor has he great worldly ambitions.

As a result of these intrinsic and extrinsic conditions  
what has happened here in Italy since the liberation  
of this part of the nation? There has arisen a number  
of parties which do not represent the masses divided  
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As a result of these intrinsic and extrinsic conditions, what has happened here in Italy since the liberation of this part of the nation? There has arisen a number of parties which do not represent the masses divided according to political ideas, but instead it is the subdivision of a small group of politically active and ambitious men, each anxious to establish himself in an authoritative position in a government most adapted to his personal ideas and desires. The masses look on these parties diffidently as men fighting amongst themselves with but one purpose in mind, domination.

These parties, considering the population, are all minority parties and no one two or three of them represent

the will of the people. These parties can so be divided into a Right Wing, the Center, and the Left Wing. The Left Wing appears strongest due to its popular appeal of "share the wealth" and for the undoubted support by the Russian authorities. However, there is a genuine fear that Communism will usurp all individual freedom as Fascism did and that it will abolish all private property to which the individual is affectionately attached. On the other hand, this wing can ~~definitely~~ profit by the chaotic conditions now reigning to establish themselves definitely, with the promise of establishing law and order.

The political group that can really guarantee a democratic regime is the Center which is made up of the greater part of all the political parties but who do not succeed in creating a united front for minor platforms and personal jealousies.

In what conditions do we find the present Bonomi government. This government is an oligarchy of six political parties, no one or two or three of which represent the will of the people who for one reason or another, for the present, no political will. There are six factions each pulling the cart to his own mill, trying to strengthen its political status at the expense of the other parties. What happens in the government is only too evident. But to

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each pulling the cart to his own mill, trying to strengthen its political status at the expense of the other parties. What happens in the government is only too evident. But to give a poor analogy, let us imagine that the Minister of Public Works decides to repair the roads. He plans the work and sets about putting it in practice. However he needs funds for his project which can only come from the Ministry of Finance whose minister is of another party. The Minister of Finance decides to boycott his fellow minister and refuses the allotment. And this goes on in all phases of governmental life. The result is a

complete status is public affairs with the people becoming more and more disillusioned and discouraged with politics and look to the Allies, particularly to the U.S., which is more trusted and respected by the people, for the solution of their troubles.

Wherein lies the answer? The U.S. must take an active part in Italian politics, to set their political house in order, to avoid disorder and revolution which means the creation of a Communist dictatorship in Italy. What interest has the U.S. in interfering with foreign politics? With Germany defeated, the greatest threat to world balance of power is a Communist Europe. With Italy a Communist nation, the Balkans follow suit. Spain is already in the throes of a popular revolution. Who can guarantee the rest of Europe a democracy? Certainly not England who was unable even to protect her own dominions. Is there any need to explain the consequences of a Europe completely under Russian influence? Need I also say that this war is the second proof that the U.S. can no longer maintain an isolationist attitude?

Therefore, the U.S. must use all her influence to arbitrarily create a one-party government here in Italy; one which will guarantee the governmental institutions now existing, or at least those existing prior to the advent of the fascist regime. This one party can operate much

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Therefore, the U.S. must use all her influence to arbitrarily create a one-party government here in Italy; one which will guarantee the governmental institutions now existing, or at least those existing prior to the advent of the fascist regime. This one party can operate much more efficiently, assuming more directly the various responsibilities involved and can be easily controlled by Allied authorities who must actively direct Italian governmental functions. There will thus be less hawking and hawing as of the present government and its problems will be solved more decisively. In the meantime, the population will go on creating in itself a political mind. With material

needs becoming less imperative, the people will find more time for political thought. Time will also remove from the Italian mind the petty hatreds and momentary emotions created by the destructions and degradations of the war and the people will have clearer minds with which to reason and to decide the true course of Italian politics.

Disorders will so have been avoided and only an active participation on the part of the U.S. in Italian politics will prevent a proletarian revolution with its drastic yet possible consequences on the well-being of the citizens of the U.S. and other democratic people.

*Edward Giardinis*

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*Edward Gardner*

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- 1. PRESIDENZA E AFFARI INTERNI..... On.Prof'.Alfredo Misuri
- 2. AFFARI ESTERI ..... Dott. Augusto Rosso
- 3. ASSISTENZA PROFUGHI (da elevare a Ministero Pacificazione ed Assistenza)..... On. Tito Zaniboni
- 4. FINANZE ..... Sen.Prof. LUIGI Einaudi
- 5. GUERRA (con sottosegretariato partigiani) Gen.C.A.Quirino Armellini
- 6. MARINA ..... Amm. Da Zara
- 7. ECON.NAZIONALE (AGR.IND.COMM.)..... Giuseppe Cambarelli
- 8. AERONAUTICA ..... Scialoja
- 9. COMUNICAZIONI ..... Gen.Angelo Odone
- 10. TESORO ..... Dott. Palmiro Togliatti
- 11. GIUSTIZIA ..... On. Alcide De Gasperi
- 12. PUBBLICA ISTRUZIONE ..... Prof. Umberto Mancuso
- 13. LAVORI PUBBLICI ..... Silone

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Sottosegretariato Presidenza

Avv. Umberto Gazzoni

I tentativi di orientamento politico e di combinazioni ministeriali capaci di sostituire l'esiziale Governo Bonomi che sono andati svolgendosi nella settimana scorsa, autorizzano le seguenti conclusioni:

- 1 -Gli uomini attorno ai quali piu' o meno infondatamente, si era creata la speranza o l'illusione che potessero salvare l'Italia in questo tragico momento storico, si sono rapidamente logorati nell'azione di Governo ed esautorati nella pubblica estimazione; Badoglio e' un astro spento; Croce ha rischiato di compromettere anche il suo prestigio di filosofo con i suoi errori di politica che cerca invano di correggere, modificando il suo primitivo atteggiamento repubblicano; Sforza ha mostrato di essere un buon odiatore e l'odio non fa che invelenire le sciagure nazionali; Orlando e' troppo debole e vecchio per osare e si orienta verso i vecchi quasi quanto lui, ma infinitamente meno considerati (Bergamini e C.)
  - 2 -I vecchi sono liquidati o in via di liquidazione; i troppo giovani inadatti: occorre un Governo di uomini maturi, ma validi e prestanti dal punto di vista fisico e intellettuale moralmente inattaccabili, di varie tendenze, partecipanti al Governo stesso senza rappresentarvi ufficialmente il proprio partito per evitare interferenze extraministeriali.
  - 3 -Il nuovo Governo presenta una coesione interna notevole tra uomini di spirito alieni da settarismi, provati quasi tutti da durissime esperienze e desiderosi di porre a profitto della pacificazione e della ricostruzione nazionale.
  - 4 -La liquidazione dei relitti del fascismo deve avvenire in forma obiettiva e legale. Pertanto occorre smobilitare la "bardatura dell'odio": L'Alto Commissariato di Sforza e compagni che hanno acuito il disordine materiale e morale della Nazione. Pertanto il Commissariato Aggiunto per l'Epurazione sara' assorbito dal Ministero degli Affari Interni, affinche' l'epurazione stessa raggiunga i suoi scopi di ridare serietà, onesta', competenza, obiettivita' alla burocrazia senza turbarne le funzioni.
- Il Commissariato Aggiunto per la Punizione dei Delitti Fascisti sara' assorbito dal Ministero per la Giustizia e quelli che furono indicati come delitti saranno perseguiti se risulteranno essere stati veri e propri reati comuni e non resistenza ed illegalismi altrui, ed in ogni caso dovranno essere giudicati dai Tribunali Ordinari, ed i processi, su denuncia delle parti lese, dovranno essere istruiti entro un termine fisso; a partire dalla data della liberazione dal nemico di ciascun territorio, giacche' non puo' prostrarsi indefinitamente questo stato di animosita' collettiva che finirebbe col distruggere la nazione.

Il Commissariato per l'Avocazione allo Stato dei Profitti del Fascismo sara' assorbito dal Ministero delle Finanze o del Tesoro, a seconda che si consideri prevalente la funzione di confisca e di avocazione o quella di conservazione e di distribuzione che funzionera' con la burocrazia specializzata invece che con elementi di parte e, in ogni caso dovra' essere esaurita rapidamente questa funzione per permettere la normalizzazione delle aziende e la ripresa delle iniziative private tanto necessarie in questo momento decisivo per la nostra rinascita.

- 5 -Ma l'opera punitrice che deve prevenire gli sfoghi del rancore degli offesi e deve riaffermare il diritto imprescrittibile d'ogni societa' civile di reprimere l'abuso e il delitto, deve essere contemperata da un'azione di emenda e di recupero dei puniti e di oblio degli offesi, in guisa che si ricostituisca la concordia di intenti della Nazione.

Inoltre il conflitto mondiale e la guerra civile hanno prodotto tante sciagure agli individui e alle famiglie che non si puo' non proporsi la piu' vasta e profonda opera assistenziale affinche' profughi e sfollati ritornino ai luoghi di origine o vengano avviati verso sedi piu' adatte di quelle ove si rifugiarono alla ventura ed ivi trovino da ricostruirsi un focolare e, da assicurarsi un'esistenza degna d'essere vissuta.

A tale uopo verra' affidata ad un uomo dal gran cuore, che le sofferenze non sono riuscite ad inasprire, quest'opera immensa e d'immensa portata sociale, morale e di stabilizzazione politica.

In conseguenza, dopo costituito il nuovo Gabinetto, l'Alto Commissariato per i Profughi sara' trasformato in Ministero per la Pacificazione e l'Assistenza e sara' elevato al rango di Ministro l'attuale Alto Commissario Onorevole Tito Zaniboni.

- 6 -Con queste premesse la politica interna deve svolgersi attorno a questi temi:

a) ripresa normale dei contatti del Governo con le Province in modo che la partigianeria unitaria del fascismo e quella esapartita del Governo attuale siano cancellate per sempre. Lo Stato sara' cosi' sollecito degli interessi di tutti i cittadini e non soltanto di quelli della propria fazione o del proprio gruppo di fazioni. In conseguenza occorre una revisione delle nomine di tutti i Capi delle Province, dei Comuni e degli altri organi locali affinche', pure rinviando a miglior tempo le elezioni amministrative, coloro che amministrano la cosa pubblica godano della fiducia pubblica come se, per quanto e' possibile, fossero stati effettivamente eletti dal popolo anziche', per necessita' contingenti, designati da uffici superiori.

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b) Senza sottovalutare le benemerienze acquisite dai Comitati di Liberazione, il nuovo Governo terra' conto delle designazioni da loro espresse per il conferimento di cariche pubbliche e della loro interpretazione delle necessita' generali e locali, ma con semplice valore indicativo, in quanto non contraddicano e non ostacolino il presente programma.

e) Ricostruzione e rafforzamento degli organi di polizia epurati da ogni inquinamento fascista, nazista e post-nazista, affidando ogni funzione di polizia ai Reali Carabinieri riportati alla dignita' della loro tradizione centenaria ed al Corpo di Pubblica Sicurezza (come si voglia chiamarlo definitivamente) lasciando alla R.Guardia di Finanza le sole funzioni di polizia finanziaria.

Carabinieri e Pubblica Sicurezza tornati ad essere circondati dal prestigio della fiducia dei cittadini, dovranno obiettivamente, ma inesorabilmente, fare osservare la legge da chicchessia e contro chicchessia, ridando la normalita' a tutti i rapporti tra i cittadini, stroncando le degenerazioni delittuose che il conflitto in corso e la guerra civile hanno lasciato dietro di se.

d) In considerazione dello stato in cui si trovano le varie forze di polizia, sulle quali hanno agito negativamente influenze fasciste del cessato dispotismo e dei partiti partecipanti all'attuale Governo, la soggezione alle forze militari tedesche ed il turbamento morale nonche' le strettezze economiche fautrici della corruttibilita', il nuovo Governo prendera' accordi coi Governi Inglese ed Americano per inviare apposite missioni di ufficiali di polizia a studiare sui luoghi le rispettive organizzazioni per la sicurezza pubblica.

7 -Una nazione controllata non puo' avere una politica estera autonoma: la sua politica estera dovra' essere affidata ad un diplomatico di carriera il quale si renda interprete presso gli Alleati della risultante della politica dei vari Ministeri.

Occorrera' insistere presso gli Alleati affinche' la posizione del popolo italiano, ai loro occhi, venga del tutto modificata in quanto esso non e' mai venuto meno alla simpatia per loro, anche quando e' stato forzato a combatterli. E' urgente che l'Italia ottenga le seguenti rettifiche in politica estera:

a) che il nuovo Governom dopo aver dichiarati nulli i trattati d'alleanza stipulati dal Governo fascista con la Germania e con i suoi satelliti, perche' i poteri costituzionali per stipularli mancavano a quel Governo dal colpo di Stato del 3 Gennaio 1925, riceva, come contro-partita, l'onore di sottoscrivere un trattato d'alleanza con l'Inghilterra e l'America;

4)

- b) che l'amichevole mediazione dell'Inghilterra e dell'America conduca alla conciliazione ed alla restaurazione di veri rapporti di amicizia con la Francia, la Jugoslavia e la Grecia;
- c) che vengano integralmente estesi all'Italia i benefici della legge affitti e prestiti e della Carta Atlantica;
- d) che vengano fissate le condizioni della collaborazione militare dell'Italia allo sforzo bellico contro il nazismo e che inoltre vengano usati, contro il Giappone reparti italiani volontari;
- e) che sia intensificato l'intervento Alleato alla ricostruzione delle rovine della guerra e alla fornitura delle cose necessaria alla ripresa della normalita' della vita italiana.

- 8 -I tre Ministeri militari coordineranno il loro sforzo per adeguarsi alle necessita' degli impegni di carattere militare inerenti alla richiesta alleanza con l'Inghilterra e con l'America.
- 9 -Il problema piu' urgente da risolvere integralmente e sollecitamente, anche con mezzo di fortuna e' quello delle comunicazioni.

Sino a tanto che il trasporto delle cose e delle persone non avra' ripreso il suo normale ritmo, la vita nazionale non potra' tornare ad avere nemmeno la parvenza della normalita' e lo stesso rifornimento dei mercati locali, con merci locali, sara' reso difficile e favorira' gli alti costi dei generi necessari alla vita.

Le concessioni di pubblici servizi di comunicazioni nazionali e locali, urbane ed interurbane, potra' essere offerto a societa' finanziarie inglesi od americane che ne costituiscano l'efficienza, mentre coi corrispettivi delle varie concessioni potra' ad esempio, essere ridotto l'ammontare del debito pubblico, ricostituite le riserve degli istituti finanziari e di previdenza statale, eseguite opere di pubblica utilita'.

- 10 -Oltre il restauro delle opere pubbliche danneggiate dalla guerra occorrera' porre mano alla riparazione ed all'incremento del patrimonio edilizio nazionale, applicando nelle zone distrutte, i piani regolatori gia' approvati od approntandone dei nuovi. Qualora gli studi tecnici non fossero maturi per una metodica ricostruzione; od i materiali per costruzioni stabili difettassero o vi fossero in contestazione espropri o indennizzi, o qualsiasi altra causa di ritardo ostacolasse il definitivo rifacimento, in tutto o in parte, dei centri abitati, si renderebbe necessario procedere alla costruzione immediata di baraccamenti per alloggiare tutti i profughi, gli sfollati, i prigionieri, gli internati che, tornando al luogo di origine, non trovino piu' la casa e non abbiano piu' i mezzi per procurarsela.

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11 -I Ministeri finanziari procederanno subito ad un inventario di cio' che resta in beni mobili ed immobili, privati e pubblici, di tutte le attivita' e le passivita' della nazione, attuali e prevedibili, affinche' ci si possa rendere conto delle proprie possibilita' e dei propri oneri, presenti e futuri.

In tema di ricostruzione ricorre ai prestiti garantiti dallo Stato.

Dovranno essere posti all'attivo tutti gli espropri dei profitti del fascismo e gli incameramenti dei beni nemici, e da ultimo, per quanto l'economia nazionale lo consenta, dovranno essere studiate le seguenti provvidenze finanziarie di restaurazione dell'erario:

- a) prelievamento di una quota del capitale pari al 20% sul plusvalore che gli immobili hanno raggiunto nel periodo bellico, calcolabile all'ingrosso almeno al decuplo della valutazione catastale di essi, da ratizzare in un decennio o da riscattare in una sola volta, secondo le norme usate in altre operazioni del genere;
- b) dopo accertato lo stato di consistenza delle proprieta' immobiliari danneggiate, nell'attesa del risarcimento dei danni nel campo internazionale, rendere obbligatoria una quota di mutualita' immobiliare per sottoporre a contributo le proprieta' incolumi a vantaggio delle proprieta' danneggiate;
- c) forte tassazione dei profitti di congiuntura e di avocazione allo Stato degli utili di borsa nera o degli altri profitti illeciti, in quanto siano rintracciabili.

12 -Industria, Commercio e Agricoltura dovrebbero essere fusi in un solo Ministero (Economia Nazionale) con due distinti Sottosegretariati e dovrebbero tendere alla ripresa economica in tutti i campi. C'e' un problema di scambi e di trasporti particolarmente legato alla funzionalita' di questo dicastero il quale colleghera' la rinascita di tutte le attivita' nazionali con la ripresa degli scambi con l'Inghilterra e, soprattutto con le Americhe.

Quanto prima i mercati avranno i viveri da sopperire alla lunga denutrizione del popolo italiano, indumenti e calzature per ripararlo dall'inclemenza invernale, medicinali e generi di conforto, saponi e disinfettanti per preservarne la sanita', tanto prima il lavoro degli italiani sara' efficiente e lo spirito ne sara' elevato.

Quanto prima i fertilizzanti giungeranno alla terra e gli anticrittogamici alle piantagioni, come le materie prime ed i combustibili alle officine ed i prodotti semilavorati all'artigianato, tanto prima l'Italia avra' prodotti per consumare e per vendere, uscendo dalla <sup>5</sup> crisi mortale che l'angustia.

Varie categorie di persone condannate all'inerzia forzata, alla demoralizzazione ed al vizio, riprenderanno la propria dignita' di lavoratori e di produttori, combattenti la lotta civile di tutti i giorni, forza efficiente nel supremo sforzo di liberazione del mondo dalla tirannide.

- 13 -L'Istruzione pubblica, riformata tante volte, dovra' essere riformata ancora ma per tornare in gran parte all'antico e riparare le devastazioni culturali e morali dovute ai riformatori fascisti.

Occorrera' premettere l'immediato sgombero di tutti gli edifici scolastici da parte degli attuali occupanti, spesso abusivi, come le organizzazioni dei partiti estremi, eccezion fatta soltanto per gli ospedali territoriali, ove questi non possano essere sistemati altrove.

I locali scolastici debbono essere portati ad un livello di salubrita' e di decoro da allietare lo spirito, gli insegnanti d'ogni grado debbono essere meglio selezionati e remunerati.

Lo spirito sportivo non deve sopraffare la scuola: la palestra deve essere un utile e sano complemento dell'aula; non deve svuotare l'aula.

- 14 -La giustizia dovra' essere posta in onore con la reale soppressione di tutte le Magistrature Speciali comprese quelle costituite dal Conte Sforza per la punizione dei delitti fascisti, nonche' le speciali commissioni per il confino di polizia, ereditate dal fascismo e conservate dal cosiddetto Governo democratico di Bonomi.

La Magistratura ben selezionata, ben pagata e ben protetta dalle influenze di partito, dovra' tornare ad offrire tutte le garanzie per la liberta' individuale e collettiva, per la incolumita' delle persone e delle cose, per l'inviolabilita' del domicilio e del pensiero, per la santita' dei rapporti familiari.

Il nuovo Governo ammira la costruzione mirabile dello Stato Sovietico che ha resistito all'urto del piu' potente stato militare d'Europa e nutre sensi di gratitudine per il suo apporto allo schiacciamento della potenza sopraffattrice nazista, mentre e' solidale nell'amicitia che tributano al popolo russo i grandi Alleati Inglese e Americano.

Non ritiene, pero', che convenga al popolo italiano di imitare il popolo russo nei suoi ordinamenti politici, essendone tanto differenziati per razza, per temperamento, per tradizioni, per aspirazioni, per interessi, per funzioni storiche, per attitudini, per sentimenti, per

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struttura mentale e per conformazione culturale. Pertanto, il nuovo Governo pure essendo fedele ai principi democratici ed assicurando a tutti la piu' ampia liberta' di pensiero, di propaganda e di stampa, non permettera' che alcun partito, millantando credito e rappresentando in Italia una esigua minoranza, pretenda di avere il sopravvento sugli altri partiti vantandosi di essere l'interprete ed il continuatore in Italia, d'una rivoluzione per la quale mancano i presupposti storici, politici ed etnici che aspirerebbero a violentare la coscienza nazionale.

Abbattuta la tirannide, l'Italia aspira, secondo il nuovo Governo a reggersi a libera democrazia nella quale sia compenetrato lo spirito informato delle due grandi democrazie anglosassoni con le quali si propone di collaborare strettamente in ogni campo, con la fiducia di riportarne, per ora, l'aiuto necessario a risorgere e poi di collaborare insieme al trionfo delle civiltà occidentali.

Il nuovo Governo si propone di prestare il giuramento tradizionale nelle mani del Luogotenente Generale del Regno e di rispettare e fare rispettare lo Statuto sino a quando il popolo italiano non abbia deciso la forma per procedere alla sua modificazione.

Il nuovo governo non si arroga il diritto di considerarsi un normale Governo democratico, in quanto manca ad esso la prova elettorale: crede, tuttavia, di essere il piu' aderente alla realta' di quelli che l'hanno preceduto dal 28 ottobre 1922 ad oggi, e di interpretare la coscienza collettiva piuttosto che uno spirito di parte che non vi ha espressione ufficiale, pur essendo i suoi componenti delle piu' varie provenienze: si propone di interpretare le idealita' diffuse nella coscienza democratica dei popoli piu' progrediti e di applicarne i dettami, in guisa che, anche in circostanze anormali come le presenti, sia quanto piu' possibile conforme alla normalita' costituzionale delle grandi democrazie.

A dimostrazione di tale tendenza sara' necessario creare con decreto Luogotenenziale una Consulta composta da elementi di tutte le provenienze politiche che abbiano lottato e sofferto sotto la tirannide e che possano documentare inoppugnabilmente il loro valido contributo alla lotta contro il nazi-fascismo.

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*Political*  
6/791

RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE AGENT OF ALLIED COMMISSION

TERRAVECCHIA

IN CLEAR

ROUTINE

NOV 12

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Christian Democrats incited riots against myself and my own domicile as the Prefect dismissed the actual member of Committee for his incapacity to fulfil his job and appointed myself at his place. I apply for intervention of competent authority as these demonstrators by their manifestation have pointed out to popular scorn the Communist Party.

GUAGLIANONE LUIGI



Alcom Dist

- action - CA Section ✓
- Info - Chief Commissioner
- Political Sec ✓
- File (2)
- Float

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File  
6445

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
POLITICAL SECTION  
APO 394

Ref 570

12 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: U. S. Representative, Advisory Council for Italy.

SUBJECT : Freemasonry in Italy.

1. The attached copy of a report entitled, "Present State and Policy of Italian Freemasonry" was provided Political Section, A.C., by the British Inter-Service Liaison Division. It has been checked by the political section of C.I.C. and verified as to substance and fact.

2. The Democrat Liberal Party which was formed in Southern Italy after the Armistice, had a number of Masons amongst its most prominent members. When this Party fused with the Liberal Party, some observers considered that the latter would become the Party of the Masons. This does not appear to be the case as they show a tendency to encourage the adhesion of members to all Parties which incline towards the centre or the Right.

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WILLIAM W. SCOTT  
Vice-President, Political Section

Encl:  
as stated

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COPY

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27th October, 1944

ITALY : POLITICAL

Present State and Policy of Italian Freemasonry.

1. The Masons appear to be likely to play an increasingly important part in Italian politics, and have recently settled the differences dividing the various groups. The following details obtained from sources who are Masons and on intimate terms with the leaders, give an up-to-date picture of the movement.

2. At the end of July there were three main groups:

- a) Led by Professor RACH, PALERMI, known for its monarchist sympathies. PALERMI was the only Italian Mason officially known to foreign Lodges:
- b) Led by Professor DURANTE CANCELLIERI (Grand Master of the Supreme Council of 33), and Doctor DOMENICO MAIOLINO. This group is anti-monarchist:
- c) Led by Avv. GIPOLLONE, which was considered without standing and was not recognised by the other two.

3. About the middle of August when the Left-wing Parties had apparently made their respective positions quite clear, the Masons realizing the danger from them, and the precarious state of Italy generally, decided that the time had come to sink their political differences and to make an effort to consolidate the various groups. The first step was to nominate some prominent figure, acceptable to all the leaders of all groups.

4. At the end of August no agreement had been reached, the main cause of this being the reluctance of the CANCELLIERI-MAIOLINO group to accept PALERMI,

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  2. At the end of July there were three main groups:
    - a) Led by Professor RACHEL ZILBERMAN, known for its monarchist sympathies. PALMIERI was the only Italian Mason officially known to foreign lodges.
    - b) Led by Professor DOMENICO CANNILLIERI (Grand Master of the Supreme Council of 33), and Doctor DOMENICO LAIOCCO. This group is anti-monarchist.
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  3. About the middle of August when the Left-wing Parties had apparently made their respective positions quite clear, the Masons realizing the danger from them, and the precarious state of Italy generally, decided that the time had come to sink their political differences and to make an effort to consolidate the various groups. The first step was to nominate some prominent figure, acceptable to all the leaders of all groups.
    4. At the end of August no agreement had been reached, the main cause of this being the reluctance of the CANNILLIERI-LAIOCCO group to accept PALMIERI, who they considered to be activated by personal ambition and to be compromised by his association firstly with the Rescists and, after the liberation of Rome, with the House of Savoy.
 

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    5. At this point, the name of General HENRIKSEN was suggested as leader, and from this moment the Masons became very active. They succeeded in getting Prince DANIELLO to accept a nomination to one of the highest ranks in Masonry, and led the Prime Minister, DONOMI, to ask for a secret meeting with General

BENVINGA.

6. At the beginning of October, PALMERI was persuaded to relinquish active participation in Masonry and to accept the position as Honorary Grand Master. This left the field clear for the amalgamation of the three groups, which was concluded on October 4th, the only dissentient voices being a few elements in the CIPOLLONE group.

7. At a meeting held a few days after the amalgamation, General BENVINGA's contention that no permanent appointments to Masonic offices should be made until all Italy had been liberated was upheld. He stated that he could not accept the appointment of leader until he knew the opinion of Masons in the North. At a temporary measure BENVINGA agreed to accept the office of Chief of a Lodge which would have a political character only; other officials to be Com. SCERVINI (representing PALMERI's group) and Cass. MAIOTTO.

POLICY OF PRESENTATION:

8. Politically, the Masons are expected to adopt a policy towards the centre, although the majority support the Right-wing, but certain concessions have had to be made in this connection to the republican feelings of the CAMERLIERI-MAIOTTO group.

9. While due recognition is given by the Masons to the CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATS for having done much to weaken the power of the extremists by not throwing in their lot with the Left-wing parties, they are apprehensive of the power the Christian-Democrats now wield, particularly in the banking and industrial world, where they have succeeded in placing a number of their members in key positions. It is the intention of the Masons to infiltrate as many trustworthy members as they can into the industrial and banking worlds in order to curb the growing power of the Christian-Democrats who they fear will, when they feel sufficiently powerful, give full view to their traditional dislike of the Masons.

10. The Masons are endeavouring to procure an official organ, but as

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VENNA'S contention that no permanent appointments to Masonic offices should be made until all Italy had been liberated was upheld. He stated that he could not accept the appointment of Leader until he knew the opinion of Masons in the North. As a temporary measure BELIVIERA agreed to accept the office of Chief of a Lodge which could have a political character only; other officials to be Com. SCERVINI (representing PALOMBI's group) and Com. MAIOTTO.

POLICY OF THE MASONS:

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10. The Masons are endeavouring to procure an official organ, but as <sup>5968</sup> they have so far been unable to obtain authorisation to publish a new paper, they are proposing to subsidise one already authorised, IL TEMPO (independent) has been mentioned.

MEMBERSHIP:

11. The ranks of the Masons are increasing rapidly. Prominent politicians including CERAFONA (Minister of Communications) and high ranking naval officers have recently joined.

COPIA

27th October, 1944.

ITALY : POLITICAL

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HEINZ BARTEIN  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
AGC 324

Ref:- W/32.2/OA

25 Oct 44

SUBJECT:- Devastated Areas.

TO:-

A/CC

Copy to CMB

VP Econ. Sec.

VP Pol. Sec. ✓

1. I attach hereto notes of a meeting held on 24 Oct at the Ministry of the Interior and presided over by the Under-Secretary of the Interior to consider the situation in the devastated areas and action to be taken thereon. You will observe that the Prefects of Grosseto and Livorno did not speak, but Col. Gripps informs me that they may have been present as there were a very large number of Italian representatives present.

2. The meeting came to no decision except to appoint a Committee of experienced men to consider the action to be taken. You will observe that AGC are invited to send 5 representatives and I presume that you will accept such an invitation and will send representatives. Col. Gripps suggests that it would be better to send 2 officers only, one from the Civil Affairs Section and one from the Economic Section, and I agree with him.

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3. I propose as a matter of policy to raise at the VP's meeting tomorrow the question as to how far AGC should interest itself in this matter of the devastated areas. There appear to be two alternatives:-

- a) AGC can be satisfied with representation on the committee supplemented by such work in the field as is possible by the Regional staffs of Regions IV & V., or
- b) In view of the great importance of this matter you may consider it possible in the present circumstances and very desirable, to withdraw say 2 provincial teams from Northern Regions and put them under one officer who will be responsible for assisting the Italian Government in work in the field and to supplement the work of sub-commissions in providing glass, cement and other materials.

4. No doubt you will desire that Region IV & V should be consulted before any plan is worked out in detail, but it seems essential that a decision on policy should first be made. AMER have expressed an interest in our treatment of Devastated Areas by reconstr.

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of the fact that an indent for a large number of tents was put in by  
Region IV and they are willing to assist us as far as possible in the  
provision of materials. The appointment of a senior officer to  
control provincial teams is suggested in para. 2(b) above and no doubt  
facilitate also the coordination of indents on AMIR.

*G. R. Johnson*  
G. R. JOHNSON, Brig.  
VI CA Sec.  
Dep. C.O.S.

GRJ/pdb.

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REPORT ON MEETING HELD IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 24 Oct '44.

Present: E. B. Cazzurri, Under-Secretary of State Ministry of Interior (Chair).

ITALIANS

- L. E. Collinera, Director of Public Health
- Marius Theodilo (I. P. O).
- Under-Secretary of State Finance.
- Chief Medical Officer Ministry of Interior.
- Representatives of Ministry of War.
- Representatives of Ministry of Public Works.
- Prefects of Chieti, Pescara, Aquila, Teramo, Viterbo, Rieti.

ALIENS

- Representative Admin. Sec.
- Food sub-commission (2)
- Public Health (5)
- Medical supplies, hospital, Welfare.
- Public Works sub-commission
- Region 5
- Region 4
- Italian Refugees & displaced persons sub-commission.
- Mr. Derr (A. P. O)
- Mr. Crowley (A. P. O).

1. The Chairman opened the meeting by welcoming the representatives from the Allied Control Commission, and stated that he proposed to call upon the various Prefects present to explain the situation in their various Provinces. He proposed to examine the whole matter at this meeting with a view to deciding what action should be taken. The Prefects then proceeded to describe conditions in their various Provinces. This speech was not translated, but the following remarks were translated in short by the Marquis Theodilo.

2. The Prefect of PERUGIA made an impassioned speech impressing the gravity and size of the problem in his Province. He is extremely short of every type of material for rehousing, and in particular glass and cement. He asked for the bread ration to be raised from 200 to 300 grams. There existed a high proportion of communicable disease. Public safety was satisfactory but he felt that it might not remain so.

3. The Prefect of PERUGIA gave a somewhat similar picture to that of the previous speaker. He also demanded higher ration scales and mentioned the urgent need for soap and fats and enquired whether it was possible to transport glass from Leodi where he understood there exists considerable quantities. He asked that more attention be paid to the opening of industrial works, particularly those making cement. The Chairman intervened and stated that he had recently visited this region and that he had seen women collecting grass to eat for which they had no fate. He felt there was a crying need to open the cement works at Borna which is apparently idle through lack of coal. He appealed to the Allies to assist in this matter and suggested that we might bring coal from Sardinia for this purpose.

4. The Prefect of AQUILA stated that the destitution in his Province was extremely great. He stated that the position of food, and the destruction of communications particularly bridges was similar to that described by his colleagues who had spoken previously. He found that the inhabitants would not leave their land and were living under deplorable conditions, in fact some were living under ground. Bombings are causing considerable casualties. This report is 9/6/44. Mountains and he expects snow within the next two weeks. A hitting plan for homeless persons had been conceived but it had been stopped; he was not clear

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The Prefect of CHIETI made an impassioned speech impressing the gravity and size of the problem in his Province. He is extremely short of every type of material for rebuilding, and in particular glass and cement. He asked for the bread ration to be raised from 200 to 300 grams. There existed a high proportion of communicable disease. Public Safety was satisfactory but he felt that it might not remain so.

The Prefect of PERUGIA gave a somewhat similar picture to that of the previous speaker. He also demanded higher ration scales and emphasized the urgent need for soap and fats and enquired whether it was possible to transport glass from local sources he understood there exists considerable quantities. He asked that more attention be paid to the opening of industrial works, particularly those making cement. The Chairman intervened and stated that he had recently visited this region and that he had seen women collecting grass to eat for which they had no fats. He felt there was a crying need to open the cement works at Roma which is apparently idle through lack of coal. He appealed to the Allies to assist in this matter and suggested that we might bring coal from Sardinia for this purpose.

The Prefect of AVULIA stated that the destruction in his Province was extremely great. He stated that the position of food, and the destruction of communications particularly bridges was similar to that described by his colleagues who had spoken previously. He found that the inhabitants would not leave their land and were living under deplorable conditions, in fact some were living underground. Landmines are causing considerable casualties. This region 96/47 maintains and he expects snow within the next two weeks. A hitting plan for homeless persons had been commenced but it had been stopped; he was not clear of the reasons but believed it was financial. He also stressed the need for window-glass and cement.

The Prefect of TURIN said that the position in his Province was not as bad as those previously described. His big problem was the rebuilding of bridges. A plan for this had been submitted but had not yet been approved by the Ministry of Public Works. His main difficulty with transportation was lack of tyres and petrol. There was also a lack of fuel, particularly charcoal, and he asked that supplies now frozen in Chieti be unfrozen. On miscellaneous, a special squad had been working and very satisfactory progress had been made. He did not consider the 200 gram ration was sufficient, there was also at the present moment an insufficiency of olive oil, but he considered that this would be remedied to some degree when the new crop is harvested, his Province being a good olive oil producing area. He anticipated difficulties with this, however,

Representatives Ministry of Public Works,  
Prefects of Chieti, Pescara, Aquila, Teramo, V  
Trento, Trieste,  
Public Works sub-commission  
Region 5  
Region 4  
Italian Refugees & displaced  
persons sub-commission.  
Mr. Barr (A.R.C.)  
Mr. Crowley (A.R.C.).

as many of the crushing mills had been irremediably destroyed by the Germans; furthermore his peasant population were extremely short of clothing and in dire need of shoes.

6. The Prefect of VIMINARO stated his Province was not as bad as any of the others previously described. 28 towns out of 58 in his Province were badly damaged and he had a housing scheme under consideration. There was great shortage of glass and he inquired whether it would be possible to requisition this material from Florence where he understood there existed large quantities. He inquired about the possibility of returning refugees to their homes, particularly to the area of Civitavecchia whence many of them had come originally. (The Chairman interposed had he seen Civitavecchia, whereupon a great outburst of talking took place which it was quite impossible to follow).

7. The Prefect of RIBBI gave quite a reasonable picture of his Province which appeared to be in very much better condition than any of the others. He stated that rebuilding was proceeding and that he only had a 1,000 homeless families. He considered that if the railway through his Province could be opened it would solve many of his problems. Refugees were being returned.

8. The Prefect of CHIETI again spoke and stated that he had a very large number of homeless in Chieti town itself, 19,000 was the figure mentioned. He stated that there were 1,000 rooms at present requisitioned by the military, but not occupied, could the Allies derequisition?

9. Representatives of the Ministry of War spoke at length on the question of mine clearance describing the work done since the original landings in Calabria, giving an outline of their plans for the future, discoursing at length on the rates of pay and insurance scheme which they stated was at present under consideration by the Ministry of Finance. They pointed out the necessity for Prefects to be placed at the disposal of local mineclearance squads in order that they may be on the same rates of pay as the men working in his service. They then made the point that in view of the difficulty of transportation of glass the Allied authorities should consider the importation of a substitute of glass which could be more easily packed or rolled (e.g. presumably water-refering to what is known in England as blitz glass). They further considered that the matter of derequisitioning buildings not in use by the Allied authorities should be given immediate consideration and asked whether there was no possibility of transport being imported for the civilian population.

10. Col. E. H. Cripps pointed out that the requests upon the Allies were numerous and would require a good deal of investigation in many cases. Various Ministries of the Italian Government were aware of the situation in connection with food, transportation, re-building and fuel. He considered that the matters being discussed this morning divided themselves into two parts:-  
a) The immediate problem of dealing with the population at present in the really badly devastated areas of Chieti, Pescara and Aquila.  
b) The more long-term rehabilitation of the whole of the war devastated areas. He suggested that a very much smaller committee be formed, or if that had already been done by the Italian Government it could deal with this matter and Allied Control Commission would be prepared to be represented.

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The Italian representative of the Ministry of Public Works then spoke. He stated that they were tackling the problem in two parts:-

- a) that of dealing with repairable houses, and
- b) the building of new small houses.

His main difficulty was the lack of cement of which large quantities, together with other building materials were at present frozen by the Allies. He suggested that the quantities of cement at present in the south might be freed as he felt that now the theatre of operations was so far in the North the problem of their transportation might resolve their use by the Army.

He felt that there was some red tape which caused delays in small building projects due to the fact that those costing over 5 million lire, or requiring the use of certain war material, needed to be authorized by the Allied military authorities before they could be proceeded with,

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- 12. Col. Thompson stated that he did not agree with the last speaker in that projects up to 5 million lire could be sanctioned by the Genli Civile and that Allied military Government regional engineers were authorised to sanction projects up to 1 million lire. There was no restriction on the number of projects costing up to this amount that can be carried out in a province. That all engineering officers had been instructed to give their assistance in the matter of housing and bridge building, furthermore their bridge building programme was not entirely being confined to military highways, and he stressed the case of Highway 76 on which 25 bridges were at present under construction, this highway not being of military importance. He considered that very much more could be done locally both by Sindaco and Prefetti. The housing decree of the devastated areas was still under consideration by the Italian Government and was not held up in Allied Control Commission Headquarters.
- 13. The Chairman then announced that he proposed a committee to be formed of the Ministry of Interior with representatives from Finance, Public Works, Ministry of War, others whose names are unknown at present. He asked that Allied Control Commission be represented in the Public Works, Transportation, Relief, Finance and Wood.
- 14. Col. Gripps replied that he agreed with the formation of the Committee and would inform H.A. of the exact representation of the Commission by Thursday.
- 15. Food sub-commission gave an outline of the whole feeding position in Italy and stressed the importance of the Italian Government realising that we have a shipping problem and that local resources must be used to the utmost. The rest of the remarks were made in Italian and not translated.
- 16. H.R. Canavari concluded by thanking Allied officers for attending the meeting, and he stated that he realised from what they had said during the morning that the ACC was sympathetic to the needs of the devastated areas.

R. B. GRIPPS. Col.  
CSO CA Sec.

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ville and that Allied Military Government regional engineers were authorized to sanction projects up to 1 million lire. There was no restriction on the number of projects costing up to this amount that can be carried out in a province. That all engineering officers had been instructed to give their assistance in the matter of housing and bridge building, furthermore their bridge building programme was not entirely being confined to military highways, and he stressed the case of Highway 76 on which 25 bridges were at present under construction, this highway not being of military importance. He considered that very much more could be done locally both by Sindaco and Prefetti. The housing decree of the devastated areas was still under consideration by the Italian Government and was not held up in Allied Control Commission Headquarters.

13. The Chairman then announced that he proposed a committee to be formed of the Ministry of Interior with representatives from Finance, Public Works, Ministry of War, others whose names are unknown at present. He asked that Allied Control Commission be represented in the Public Works, Transportation, Relief, Finance and Food.
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15. Food sub-commission gave an outline of the whole feeding position in Italy and stressed the importance of the Italian Government realising that we have a shipping problem and that local resources must be used to the utmost. The rest of the remarks were made in Italian and not translated.
16. R.D. Canavari concluded by thanking Allied officers for attending the meeting, and he stated that he realised from what they had said during the morning that the ACC was sympathetic to the needs of the devastated areas.

R.D. CRIPPS. Col.  
C90 CA Sec.

25.10.44.

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THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION.

To give a clear picture of the actual political situation presents a series of difficulties not only in relation to the character of the various parties and their programmes but above all regarding the attitude of the people towards the Allies and the Italian Government.

One thing is, however, certain: The Communism which, during the twenty-two years of fascist regime, was able to continue its underground activities, has come to light today vigorous, tenacious and aggressive.

Before separately analyzing the programmes and activities of the parties let us briefly review the clandestine political front which existed between the dates of Sept. 8th. 1943 and June 5th. 1944. The free expressions of the political tendencies which did not have sufficient time to reveal themselves during the forty-five Badoglio days were better defined and manifested through the united activities of the six parties which later formed a coalition known as "Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale and which today has its exponents in the Government. (This "Comitato" was created with the object of providing an anti-fascist block and in order to fight against the German oppression and the Republicans.) That "Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale" played an important role during the clandestine period cannot be denied; and this in spite of continual internal disagreement -- Bonomi was at the point of resigning several times-- it remained effective until June 4th. 1944.

It would, however, be a mistake to believe that the "Comitato", transformed into a government, can continue its unifying function and, above all, that the parties which represent the masses -- particularly the Extremists -- will tolerate the weight of a collegiate organ thus pledging the autonomy. This is proved by the fact that such terms as "tripartite" or "quadripartito" etc. have, in reality, no consistence, and the parties we

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mention have already, through their propaganda organs (see for example L'Unità) disavowed that system which, if wisely applied, would inevitably lead to reciprocal compromises and concessions.

The last act carried out by the Comitato was that of presenting themselves, <sup>united</sup> for the intransigent fight against Badoglio. For when Bonomi made the demand for the Marshal's exclusion from the new government he did it in the name of the six parties who had given him full power. That, however, is not generally known is that had insistence been brought to bear they would have accepted Badoglio in the Government.

It was at this time that Nenni, head of the Socialist Party, made his clever manoeuvre, for, Badoglio eliminated from the scene, he, Nenni, succeeded, through evading his own inclusion in the Government, in avoiding his own share of the responsibility of governing. Thus he remained in the position of being able to criticize both Allies and Government alike through the channels of his newspaper L'Avanti. It is clear that had Bonomi acted with more energy regarding the Socialists and obliged them to share, as previously, the responsibility of governing, and had he had accused them of creating a crisis in the Comitato and thus the Government, by their attitude, neither Nenni or the other socialist leaders would lightly have assumed such responsibility before the people. It is, of course, true that Nenni, preparing an eventual strategical retreat for himself, spoke in his articles of a government of the people and attached the Comitato; but this attitude was quickly abandoned when he discovered the pliability of Bonomi.

From then on Moscow, whilst allotting to the Communists the role of mild collaboration, not only with the middle classes but also with the capitalists, assigned to Socialism -- and Nenni in particular -- the part of violent agitator and intransigent opposition.

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It is supposed that Socialism gives less cause for preoccupation than Communism; that it is more accessible not only to the masses in general

① later introduction by author on further evidence

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but also to the middle-classes and to modern capitalism. Nothing could be further from the truth. Today, socialism is nothing more or less than one of the numerous Trojan horses which are used by the Comintern as a means to an end.

Follows a brief summary of the six parties of which is comprised "Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale":

1) Partito Liberale.  
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This is the party which gathers the conservative elements of the country. Its programme has, undoubtedly, attempted to adapt itself to present conditions; nevertheless, it is considered by the masses -- influenced more than anything by the propaganda of the Extremists -- to be an expression of conservative capitalism. The Liberal Party, which contains the historical Risorgimento Cavouriano in its traditions, is accused, not only of aiding, but of soliciting fascism and being the means of it coming to power. Comprised of property owners; of intellectuals; of professionals; it has no following amongst the masses and its function is in the heart of the Comitato.

As far as the Leftists are concerned it merely plays the part of a co-belligerent in the war against the fascists. It is the Rightest Party par excellence and its function as a balance is of undeniable importance, but, as has been said, it has no following amongst the masses, by which is meant amongst the workers and the peasants. The leader of the party is Benedetto Croce amongst the younger members one of the most active is the General Secretary, Avv. Brosio. Its press organ is the quotidian "Risorgimento Liberale" .

2) Partito Democratico del Lavoro.  
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This party is generally considered to be the party of Bonomi, an impression which is erroneous. Bonomi merely follows with interest its activities of ~~the party~~ and one of his reasons for this is his very close friendship with its actual leader, Meuccio Ruini. It was created through the combining of

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various democratic tendencies ( the leaders of which were Nitti, and Amendola in the South), and the schismatic tendencies which entered the official Socialist Party under the names of Socialist Reform and Radical Socialism. The putative paternity of Bonomi and his personal friendship with many members of the party has caused it to be liberally represented in the actual government; and thus, should a ministerial crisis occur, it is doubtful whether the position of the Labour Democrats would be maintained. Its programme tends, above all, to draw the middle classes, and in fact it has neither the pungency of the Leftist Parties or the consistency of the interests which the Liberal Party represent. It is a central movement which is designed to be the fulcrum of the biggest democratic party with labourist tendencies and it because of this that the Extreme Parties look upon it with diffidence and fight against its activities. Although it does not draw the masses it has many sympathizers amongst the democrats who, although not liberal, <sup>are</sup> neither ~~are they~~ extreme Leftists or confessionists as <sup>is</sup> required by the Christian Democratic Party. Until such time as the Partito Democratico del Lavoro is able to make known its programme and its labour plan both for the workers of the North as well as the South its existence appears un-precise and inconsistent. And while it is possible that tomorrow this party may truly represent the fundamental nucleus of the high <sup>and</sup> Centre parties and also absorb those moderate socialistic elements which are at present fighting the extreme tendencies of Pietro Nenni, should it not be able to consolidate its structure -- above all in the North -- it might easily be compelled to dissolve or fuse itself into some other party.

3) Partito d'Azione.

A party which first sorged forth in 1938/1939 and which had as its first financial backer Mattioli, General Director of the Banca Commerciale Italiana. After the fall of fascism on July 25th. 1943, it had a certain success at a time when all the anti-fascists were in search of an outlet. It is a

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Party whose programme is exhausted in its title, for programme it has not. Composed of elements ranging from such extremes as liberals to Communists, it is obvious that with the passing of time it is destined either to become absorbed in some other Party or to dissolve restoring the heterogeneous elements of which it is comprised to their original sources. That is to say, the Liberals would return to the Liberal Party; the Socialists to the Socialist Party; and the Communists to the Communist Party. Today, Count Sforza is the honorary head of the Partito d'Azione. Sforza is, and was, a Liberal and it would not be difficult for him to return to his old party. The other leaders of this Party are: La Malfa, little known and unheard of in political life before the advent of fascism. The followers of the Party are found above all amongst the intellectuals and in some student circles. To this Party has adhered also Lusso with his Sardo Autonomist Movement.

4) Democrazia Cristiana.

The first of the three Parties for the masses. Founded on the traditions of the former "Partito Popolare Italiano", it is the instrument which is used by the Vatican in order to participate in Italian political life. The Church does not officially recognise the party but it is from the universal organ of the Catholic Church that the Democrazia Cristiana Partito draws most of its force. De Gasperi, <sup>its</sup> leader, represents the rigidly confessional side of it, in the midst of which, however, is found considerable dissidence, democratic in substance, but independent and anti-confessional. These elements could mean the splitting up of the Party, above all because the progressive side contains the youngest and most combative elements. One of the principal reasons for the existing dissidence is represented by the clashing between the royalist and the republican tendencies; and De Gasperi himself, in his last speech, was most agnostic concerning the problem of the Constitution, and this is being taken full advantage of by the Extremists -- in particular the Socialists -- in order to aggravate the situation.

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5) Partito Socialista.  
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Which owes much to Pietro Nenni. During the clandestine period this Party existed chiefly on its old traditions. The masses were in general oriented more towards Communism than towards Socialism. It has been Nenni with his articles in the newspaper L'Avanti who has most decidedly drawn to his party a great number of those who, after the arrival of the Allies in Rome, were still undecided between Socialism and Communism. And it has been the articles of Nenni that, whilst reinvigorating the propaganda activities of the old socialist leaders, have almost compelled many of the masses who were disappointed in the tactics of compromise and waiting of the Communist Party to line up with him. It appears somewhat strange that Nenni, leader of one of the most important parties in "Il Comitato del Liberazione Nazionale", a Party which supports and maintains men in the government that have been chosen from the heart of the Comitato, is proving to be one of the most open-minded and free-voiced critics of the situation. His plan of campaign is, however clear: Nenni is simultaneously playing a role of primary importance both with the Government as well as with the opposition, controlling as much one as the other. And the reason for this is said to be a pact of alliance between him and Togliatti. (and before long time will tell us whether such a pact has already been concluded.) In this event it can only mean that the Communists are merely using Nenni as their tool and causing to adopt an attitude of intransigence and criticism, both with regards to the internal situation and to the foreign policy, which they themselves do not intend to adopt for the present. Briefly, the Communist Party is making use of the leader of the Socialist Party as a means of reaching their goal. It is also significant that Nenni has published an article in defense of the German people -- significant because there is no doubt that ~~he~~ <sup>5956</sup> intends to play an important part not only in the future of Germany but also in the future of the whole of Europe. And it is also significant that whilst

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the communists are apparently carrying out a programme of amicable collaboration concerning the monarchy and the Catholics, Nenni, on the contrary, exasperated with the situation, attacks both.

One of the principal obstacles against the merging of the two Parties represents itself in the guise of the opinion of many eminent old Socialists who do not share Nenni's opinion about a united front with the Communists. It is most probably due to this that events have not been precipitated and the fusion is not already an established fact; for most assuredly the schism would cause stormy reaction in the internal life of the Socialist Party. Most difficult it is to say how much longer the situation will remain in a state of procrastination; and the deciding factor will be the masses of workers as yet unliberated in the North of Italy.

6) Partito Comunista.

if the Communist Party was merely <sup>an Italian</sup> the Communist Party Italian it is clear that it would be more or less of relative importance. But the Communist Party of this country acquires an added importance not only because it represents an emanation directed by the Comintern but also because the geographical situation of this peninsular is ideal for the progressive conquest by the Communists of the entire European-African system. The actual programme of the Communist Party, carried out on the express orders of Stalin can be summed up thus:

- 1) Not to come into conflict with the Allies.
- 2) To prepare a communist programme for the solving of the problem of Southern Italy.
- 3) To organize Italy as a stepping stone which is necessary to the expansion of Communism in the East as well as in the West.

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Comment on the first point of the programme is superfluous, for, naturally, it enters into Stalin's plan of international policy. Contd.

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And particularly in the accord reached at Teheran, specific assurances were given to guarantee this point. This explains the arrival of Togliatti in Italy as a bearer of an invitation to all anti-fascists parties to collaborate with the Monarchy and Badoglio, in addition to the expressed order conveyed to all Communists "not to cause incidents".

The problem which is the second point Togliatti intends to approach by a duplicate compromise with the Church and the Monarchy. We are well aware that the process of unification between the South and the North has, so far, been uncompleted; and not withstanding the fact that Italy presents a geographical unity many are the differences which separate Southern from Northern Italy. The South is decidedly less progressive, and, above all, considerably poorer than the North, and consequently <sup>in the South</sup> there are still in existence customs, habits and mentalities which have long since been overcome by the Northerners. The political maturity of the South is still most primitive and it is due this lack of progress that the spirit of independence is limited by certain traditions, particularly by those of the Church and the Monarchy. Therefore, the unique manner in which the Communists can hope to woo the South is either by open fighting or by compromise.

Togliatti has chosen the latter. Instead of coming out in open combat and facing all its unknown he has preferred a plan of truce and collaboration in order to disarm, at the outset, the reactions of the Christian-Democrats and the Royalists; in order to be able to tranquilly continue on a legal basis, his communistic propaganda. Thus he can arrive first at the peasant masses of the South; and thus will he draw these masses, first to the outskirts and then into the heart of the Communist Party.

Under cover of affable collaboration he is able to destroy, or at least minimise the diffidence which he is well aware is in existence for his Party. Once a truce is called, it is evident that neither the Royalists <sup>5954</sup> or the Christian Democrats will be able to attack him, for otherwise he would

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be in a position to accuse them of disloyalty. That he is carrying out this systematic campaign is proved by the fact that he has succeeded in installing a Communist as Minister of Agriculture; and this is the only Ministry (and it is, without a doubt, the most important one at this time) the the Communist Party asked for and obtained in Bonomi's Government. The identical thing occurred in Badoglio's Government and we are already seeing the fruits of it in such preoccupying phenomenon as the seizing and expropriation of land in many parts of the country; and when we pause to think that Italy is eminently agricultural and tomorrow can only rehabilitate herself economically through her agriculture the situation that such phenomenon create must give cause for serious alarm.

There are also several minor parties which have their existence outside "Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale". Amongst the more important feature:

- 1) Partito Repubblicano which has a considerable following in Tuscany, in the Marches and in Emilia.
- 2) Partito Democratico Italiano which has monarchist tendencies.
- 3) Partito dei Comunisti Cristiani, disavowed by the Church, but which acts as observer for the real Communist Party.
- 4) L'Unione Proletaria, which also has communistic tendencies.

This shows the political situation as it is today in Italy. It is clear, however, that with the progressive liberation of the country the situation will undergo profound and radical changes.

The problem of the North is most complex for the reason that in that part of the country are found the large masses of workers and of peasants (including the labourers of the Padana Plains) and also the large financial interests of Italy. Also, it is in the North that the major phase of the Marxist struggle can and will take place. Up to now all that has been done has been work of observation; of waiting; of preparation. Contd.

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To come to conclusions now would be both difficult and premature. It is, however, essential that we follow the development of events with great attention in order that the present situation does not resolve itself into a Kerenskian passage.

Lack of labour, transport difficulties, and the confusion of ideas which exist today can, tomorrow, open the way to the rapid consolidation of these Extremist forces.

*Please return to:  
Eitan Bata  
84377b  
[via Panama] via Panama 77*

Aug. 1st. 1944.

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HA

1. Nel prossimo settembre cade l'anniversario del primo anno di guerra dell'Italia a fianco delle Nazioni Unite. Il processo evolutivo subito in quest'anno dalla situazione italiana, sia interna che esterna, è innegabile. Sicché lo scandalo dell'armistizio del settembre 1943 non rappresentano certamente ormai che una situazione di fatto storicamente e politicamente superata. Sarebbe atto di giustizia e di saggezza politica adeguare la situazione di diritto fatta all'Italia nello scorso settembre alla situazione di fatto oggi esistente. Il periodo armistiziale deve cioè considerarsi concluso e finalmente risolto l'equivoco fra resa senza condizioni, armistizio, cobe lliberanza. Il perdurare della situazione attuale è politicamente sterile e pregiudizievole per noi e per tutti.

2. Le promesse e gli impegni assunti dalle Nazioni Unite verso il popolo italiano sono del resto espliciti: esse hanno solennemente promesso che l'alleggerimento delle condizioni armistiziali dipende dalla entità del concorso italiano allo sforzo bellico comune. Ora è perfettamente chiaro che se si astocola e si impedisce, com'è sino a ieri avvenuto, l'adeguata partecipazione militare dell'Italia alla liberazione del suo territorio non si fa che perpetuare uno sterile circolo vizioso da cui è necessario uscire. Il Corpo Italiano di Liberazione deve dunque essere portato a numeri ed organi di molto più vasti. Gli uomini ci sono e vogliono battersi: si tratta di armarli e di nutrirli.

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3. Il popolo italiano si sente tuttora in quarantena, chiuso com'è in un isolamento ermetico. Occorre rinsertirlo in quella libera circolazione delle idee e degli avvenimenti internazionali che è una delle condizioni fondamentali per

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la ripresa e il progressivo sviluppo delle libere istituzioni democratiche.

Qualunque iniziativa in questo senso ci è stata invece finora preclusa. Se ne ricordano le principali:

a) - richiesta di adesione italiana alle Carte Atlantica rimasta senza risposta;

b) - richiesta di partecipazione italiana all'Ufficio Internazionale del lavoro rimandata a tempo indeterminato;

c) - richiesta di partecipazione alla Conferenza Monetaria, non accolta.

4. Le spese di occupazione; l'enorme e sconosciuta massa di circolante emessa dagli Alleati; l'alto livello del cambio fissato tra sterlina-dollaro-lira incidono gravissimamente sulle esatte risorse italiane. Ci si parla dell'"IMBROGLIO" del Comitato di soccorso per l'Italia, ecc. Sono iniziative ottime, ma di là da venire. Il popolo italiano nel frattempo si dissangua. Occorre, nell'attesa, che le predette iniziative possano diventare attive ed operanti, alleggerire i gravami economici che l'aristocrazia ha posto su un paese già povero e già stremato e che ne impediscono qualunque possibilità di ripresa.

L'Italia deve andarci in essere poste in condizioni di gravare il meno possibile sulle risorse alleate, soprattutto in questo periodo cruciale della guerra. Il suo risparmio economico è per conseguenza interesse nostro e comune.

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L'Italia deve andarci ad essere posta in condizioni di gravare il meno possibile sulle risorse alleate, soprattutto in questo periodo cruciale della guerra. Il suo risparmio economico è per conseguenza interesse nostro e comune. Esperti e tecnici italiani dovrebbero essere autorizzati a discutere altrettanto a Londra e a Washington, con gli ambienti interessati, i problemi più urgenti e più gravi.

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Si tratta di problemi tecnici e non politici. L'inclusione dell'Italia nelle leggi "prestiti e affitti" potrebbe indubbiamente costituire un passo innanzi nella direzione giusta.

6. La Commissione di controllo dovrebbe progressivamente essere allargata di almeno tre quarti dei suoi compiti e avviata verso forme meno sperimentali e meno psicopedagogiche di interferenza e intervento in tutti i settori della vita italiana. Vi sono già in Italia organismi pronti a ricevere l'eredità, ad es. gli Alti Commissari, che potrebbero a loro volta evolvere verso quelle esperienze degli ambasciatori che hanno già dato in passato prova di capacità e di efficienza. La situazione attuale dovrebbe comunque essere congelata. Non è possibile che un paese possa a lungo andare senza gravi pericoli essere amministrato da due governi. Né è parimenti possibile che un popolo di alta civiltà come l'Italia sia mantenuto indefinidamente in stato di tutela e di minorità.

7. Quasi dappertutto le vaste, operose, industrie collettive italiane nel mondo sono sottoposte a un regime che, in alcuni paesi, è addirittura comparabile alle persecuzioni antisemitiche. I capi famiglia sono da anni in campi di concentramento, le donne votate alla prostituzione e alla miseria; i loro interessi, frutto di pazienza e duri sforzi, preiudicati e compromessi. Si citano ad esempio i casi degli

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che a questa crociata antitaliana, che può essere documentata in modo incontrovertibile, sia posto finalmente termine. Essa non giova a nulla, salvo a scavare nuovi abissi di sofferenze e a porre germi di futuri contrasti.

7 - La nuova Italia democratica intende fermissimamente porre il paese sulla vecchia strada della piena, intera, fiduciosa collaborazione con le potenze occidentali. Nella gravissima crisi, materiale e spirituale, che sconvolgerà l'Europa alla cessazione delle ostilità, vuole rappresentare ed essere un elemento di stabilità e di ordine. Il suo popolo è sobrio, operoso, laborioso. La forza di lavoro italiano costituisce uno degli elementi fondamentali per la ricostruzione europea. Occorre fargli, dunque, credito. Risolversi ad iniziare in Italia una politica veramente ricostruttiva. Persuadersi che 45 milioni di Italiani non possono non essere uno degli elementi fondamentali per la pacificazione mediterranea ed europea ed operare ed agire in conseguenza. Ciò che del resto corrisponde al generoso proposito espresso in molte occasioni dal Presidente Roosevelt ed alla generosa umanità del popolo nord americano.

Roma, 22 Luglio 1944

*No further action*  
*used*  
May 5, 1944. *file*

## MEMORANDUM

Principal Political Developments in Italy  
since the April 21 Meeting of the  
Advisory Council for Italy

1. On April 21 the formation of the new Italian Government to include representatives of the Six anti-Fascist Parties was announced. A list of the new Ministers is attached for possible communication to the Council.

2. The Government was sworn in on April 24, and took an oath to the King, it being understood that they agreed to serve for the period of the war without prejudice to their eventual choice of the form of Government which they would support upon the termination of hostilities.

3. The first formal meeting of the Cabinet was held April 27th, and the Government issued a statement of policy to the effect that it was a war Government whose primary object would be the prosecution of the war with the maximum force to liberate Italy from the enemy. It was further agreed that the institutional form of the state could not be decided until the country was fully liberated when the Italian people should be called together in free public meetings to elect a constituent legislative assembly. The purge of Fascists would be continued with increased vigor and pressed energetically to its accomplishment.

Revival of industry and development of the agricultural production to the maximum to insure an equitable distribution of food is promised, as well as a general reconstruction giving priority to communications and public buildings.

In addition, it was agreed that a small Consultative Body symbolic of Parliament should be created and maintain contact with the Committees of Liberation.

4. In agreement with the Allied authorities, May Day Labor celebrations were held in the principal centers on Sunday, April 30th, in order that there should be no interruption in the regular working day schedules. Meetings were held in many towns, largely under the auspices of the Socialist, Communist and Action Parties and workers' organizations. Communist speakers at these rallies emphasized the necessity of further developing the war effort of the Italian people in cooperation with the Allies.

5. The second meeting of the new Cabinet was held on May 4, at which time the new decree regulating the collection and amassing

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of the grain harvests in order to insure adequate food supply under Governmental control was announced. It was further stated that the wheat price would be established on the basis of the actual costs of production and worked out by the Government and the Allied Control Commission.

The Cabinet likewise appointed Dr. Omodeo, Minister of Education, as President of the Committee appointed by virtue of a decree dated April 14, 1944, to direct the preparation of adequate de-Fascistization decrees. It is understood that much of the preparatory work has been already concluded under the direction of the former Minister of Justice, the general lines of whose proposals will be utilized in putting the new program into effect. The former Minister's program was under preparation in consultation with the Legal Section of the Allied Control Commission. It is further understood that it is the intention of the Government to proceed forthwith to eliminate and take action against a small group only, leaving the less urgent and more difficult cases which constitute the majority for more careful study. Two former Fascist Ministries, those of Popular Culture and Foreign Trade and Exchange, were abolished and their functions absorbed by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance respectively.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

APO 394

U.S. ARMY

SECRET

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April 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Office of United States Member, Advisory Council for Italy.

SUBJECT: Transmission of Political Summary No. 3.

There are enclosed five copies of Political Summary No. 3, three copies of which are for transmission to the Department of State.

Samuel Reber  
Vice President Allied Control Commission  
Political Section

Enclosures

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HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

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Regional Control & Military Government Section

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Ref/59/6/C4.

4 April 1944.

POLITICAL SUMMARY NO.3.

4 March - 11 March 1944.

1. On March 4, it was locally reported that President Roosevelt had stated at a press conference in Washington that one-third of the Italian fleet which had surrendered to the United Nations would be made available to the Soviet Government. Press accounts of the President's statement were confused and gave rise to the interpretation in liberated Italy that the United States and Great Britain intended to hand over a number of Italian vessels to the Soviets. The Badoglio Government and Italian public opinion as a whole were deeply disturbed by the implications of such a proposal and the Government threatened to resign. This political crisis was, however, averted since both the President and Mr. Churchill made further statements on the subject showing that there was no present intention to make delivery of any Italian ships but only that they or their equivalent might be utilized by the Soviets. It is generally believed that Badoglio's position was reinforced by the strong stand he had taken against a transfer.

2. As a result of the agreement with the Allied authorities cancelling the strike on March 4, the Party of Action, Socialist and Communist Parties and the Confederation of Labor held a mass meeting in Naples on March 12. The meeting took place without incident or disturbance to public order, and an estimated attendance varied between six and ten thousand, of which the Communists were the most prominent and best organized. The meeting approved a resolution to intensify Italy's war effort requiring as the essential condition therefor that the national administration be purged beginning with the supporters of the monarchy, and that a democratic Government composed of all political parties be created. It is noteworthy that this was the first proclamation of any of the Parties concerning the Monarchy as an institution.

3. It will be recalled that the mass meeting was to be followed by the preparation of a petition to demonstrate the extent of popular support for the opposition. Immediately following the meeting there was strong support for the petition particularly from the Communist Party, and the Giunta agreed the petition might be circulated in the name of all six parties. Enthusiasm therefor has markedly waned since that time. It would appear that the Communists have now become indifferent and it seems likely that the whole plan will be dropped. This change of attitude of the Communists has no doubt been influenced by the agreement that the Soviet and Italian Governments had agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives.

4. Following conversations between the Soviet representative, M. Bogomolov, and the Italian Government issued a statement on March 14 to the

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4. Following conversations between the Soviet representative, M. Bogomolov, and Marshal Badoglio the Italian Government issued a statement on March 14 to the effect that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Government to exchange diplomatic representatives. No prior consultation with the British and American Governments had taken place, and following Anglo-American inquiries at Moscow it appeared that the intention of the Soviet Government was not to derogate from the authority either of the Allied Control Commission or of the Advisory Council for Italy. In fact, the Soviet appointment of the diplomatic representative

carries only the rank of Counsellor or Minister and he will be under the orders of the Soviet representative on the Advisory Council for Italy. Regardless of the form that these relations may take, however, there is no doubt that the Soviet move has had a marked influence throughout liberated Italy. Various interpretations have been given to it. Some consider that it will strengthen the hand of the Badoglio Government and others believe that it will increase the influence of the Communist Party throughout Italy. There is no question that since the announcement was made the tone of the Communist press and Communist declarations has altered. Many rumours are current that this will lead to changes in the Government and possibly even in the King's position in the near future. So far, no positive steps in this direction appear to have been taken.

5. The leader of the Communist Party in Italy, Mario Tagliatti, otherwise known as Treoli, arrived in Italy on the 26th March from Moscow after eighteen years of exile. Immediately following his arrival the leaders of the Communist Party were convoked in Naples. Indications are that his leadership will be undisputed. A statement of Communist policy is expected in the first days of April.

6. Marshal Badoglio paid a short visit to Sicily at the end of the month to be present for the induction into office of Francesco Musotto the newly appointed High Commissioner for Sicily.

M.S. LUSH,  
 Brigadier,  
 Executive Commissioner.

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I.S.L.D., 126 Via Alessandro Mazzini	(1)

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Authority

10/16/89  
Date

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394 U. S. ARMY

*Handwritten initials and a checkmark.*

March 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier M. S. Lush  
Executive Commissioner.

The P. W. B. Liaison Officer; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Section: P. B. S.; and Experimental Detachment, G-2, Room 41, Bank of Naples Building, have requested copies of the fortnightly Political Summary. With the General's consent, I have given them copies of the first two, but would appreciate it if they could be put on the regular distribution list.

Harold also suggests that two copies be sent to I. S. L. D., 126 via Alessandro Mazzonei.

*Samuel Reber*  
Samuel Reber  
Vice President, Allied Control Commission  
Political Section

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*I agree*

*Handwritten signature and date 14/3*

*Pol. Sect*

*I have arranged for the above to be placed on the distribution list.*

*Handwritten signature*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394

Regional Control & Military Government Section.  
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Ref: 59/3/CA.

6th March 1944.

POLITICAL SUMMARY No. 2.

15th February - 4th March, 1944.

1. More complete reports from the provinces received since the last political summary indicate that the transfer of administration to the Italian Government created relatively little interest. Some regret has been expressed that this transfer seemed to show the Allies' intention to strengthen the Badoglio Government.

2. As stated in the previous summary, the Executive Giunta set to work to prepare an agreed programme of action for presentation to the Allied Governments. No reply to their communication calling upon the King to abdicate had been forthcoming. The Giunta's programme must remain a secret document pending consideration by the Allies. As might be assumed it includes a proposal that the King should abdicate.

3. Other proposals now under consideration envisage the King's withdrawal from the political scene without actual abdication.

4. It had been agreed with the Giunta that, pending the consideration of its proposal, no action would be taken by any of its members to aggravate the political situation and that the programme should be considered confidential and not communicated to the press.

5. On 22 February the British Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that the "policy which His Majesty's Government have agreed to provisionally with the Government of the United States was to win the battle of Rome and take a new view when we are there." This statement was received with satisfaction in Royal and Governmental circles, but was taken by the opposition as a negative reply to their proposals. The Party of Action and the Socialist and Communist Parties in Naples decided to call a ten minute strike for eleven a.m. Saturday, 4th March, as a protest. But in order to emphasize that they did not intend any damage to the Allied war effort they called upon workers to do fifteen minutes overtime during the luncheon period on the same day. It was made clear to the three parties and the Union leaders that the Commander-in-Chief would not tolerate any strike under any circumstances in this area. Further announcement was therefore made at the last moment by the parties and the Confederation of Labour cancelling the strike and announcing agreement with Allied authorities, that a public meeting should take place on Sunday, 12th March, in Naples and that a petition should be drawn up to demonstrate the extent of popular support of the opposition. No suspension of work in Naples area occurred on 4th March.

6. The Badoglio Government has announced the appointment of Signor

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6. The Badoglio Government has announced the appointment of Signor Zaniboni as High Commissioner for the Purging of Fascism from public life. Zaniboni was elected a Socialist Deputy in 1919, continued in active opposition to Fascism after the advent of Mussolini and was involved in an attempt on his life in 1925. Since that date, he has been in prison and only reached the mainland of Italy from the island of Ponza with the arrival of Allied troops. He has expressed his intention of working in the closest possible collaboration with Allied authorities and his determination to carry out his duties with thoroughness and method. On accepting this post, he was expelled from the Socialist Party of Naples which continues to refuse to permit any of its members to collaborate with the Badoglio Government.

IL S. LUSH,  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

Distribution overleaf.



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Military Government Section

MGS: 319.1

5 February 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Italy, Number 2.

TO : The Chief of Section, MGS, AFHQ.

Political

1. The outstanding political event of the period covered by this report was the Congress of the Provincial Committees of Liberation which was held at Bari on the 28th and 29th of January. A brief description of certain political events may be useful in appreciating the nature and purpose of the Congress.

2. The six political parties which were officially represented at the Congress were the following:

1. Partito Liberale Italiano
2. Democrazia Cristiana
3. Partito D'Azione
4. Partito Socialista
5. Partito Comunista
6. Democrazia del Lavoro

Before the Armistice of September 8th, these parties operating as underground movements, had come together in the Fronte Nazionale D'Azione with two principal aims: 1, to effect the cessation of Italian participation in the war on the side of Hitler, and 2, to reestablish essential democratic liberties in Italy. At the fall of Mussolini, the parties began to exercise their activities openly and in spite of wide differences in doctrines and programs, they continued to maintain a common front before the Badoglio Government on the one hand and the Germans on the other.

3. On the 16th of October, 1943, the Central Committee of the National Front met secretly in Rome and decided to change its name to the Committee of National Liberation. Other Committees of the National Front in liberated Italy followed the example. By the beginning of December, a sufficient number of Committees of Liberation had been organized on a provincial basis in liberated Italy to justify a Congress of their representatives. Naples was chosen as the place and December 20th as the date on which the Congress would be held. Permission, however, was refused by Allied Military Authorities for military reasons. It was subsequently agreed that the Congress should be held in Bari on January 28th and 29th. Reference is made to Report Number 1 of this series paragraphs 8-11 for a more detailed description of these events.

4. On January 22nd the Bari Committee which was in charge of local arrangements made a declaration which was published in the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno. It stated categorically that there would be no public demonstrations, urged rigorous obedience of all regulations on the part of all citizens and emphasized that the first democratic assembly of the Italian people would increase the importance of its deliberations if they were made in an atmosphere of calm and order. This declaration was noted with satisfaction by Brigadier Palmer, O.C. 6th Base Sub Area, in a statement published in the Gazzetta on the following

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5. Security regulations concerning the Congress were established between Brigadier Palmer and General Gazzera who arrived in Bari on January 20th with full powers over Bari Province. At the same time the Demo-Liberal Party was making plans to hold a counter Congress of 90 representatives in Bari on the day the Liberation Congress was scheduled to open. At its Congress on January 5th, this Party had resolved that the Monarch should not be discussed for the present and had pledged its support to the Badoglio Government. The Demo-Liberals were informed by the Sub Area Command that considerations of public order made it impossible for the two rival Congresses to be held at the same place and time and that they (the Demo-Liberals) would have to hold their Congress at a later date.

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6. In making their original request for permission to hold the Congress, the organizers of the Congress had stipulated that the number of persons attending would be 90. In the minds of the organizers, this number referred to the delegates alone and not to guests including Correspondents. The number 90, however, was interpreted by the Italian authorities as referring to all persons who would attend the meeting regardless of function or capacity. At the last moment, owing to the intervention of Allied Authorities, the interpretation of the organizers prevailed and guests who had been duly accredited were admitted to the Session. Members of the Allied Forces were forbidden to attend.

7. On January 25th, the Prefect of Bari issued an order that travellers from Naples would not be allowed to enter the Province of Bari unless they had a health certificate in their possession. Those not in possession of such a certificate would be subject to prophylactic treatment followed by a detention of 12 days for observation. It was feared that some of the Neapolitan delegates might be prevented from attending the Congress by this sanitary measure. The fear proved groundless.

8. The Congress was held in the Teatro Comunale Piccinni. Present were delegates, guests and representatives of the Italian and foreign press. The first session was called to order at 1000 hours on January 28th by Michele Cifarelli, Secretary of the local committee. After greeting the delegates, Cifarelli reminded them of the interest with which their deliberations were being watched throughout the world and expressed his gratitude to the United Nations. He expressed the hope that the meeting would soon be able to reconvene in Rome.

9. Professor Arangio-Ruiz, President of the Neapolitan Committee of Liberation, next read a message of sympathy from 76 members of the British Parliament and other messages of support from various Communes of Liberated Italy. He then invited the Congress to choose its president. Zaniboni and Cianca were chosen joint presidents after Arangio-Ruiz had declared that he could not accept the presidency inasmuch as he was scheduled to report on the political situation.

10. The first formal address was made by Benedetto Croce. Croce began by describing the sympathy which Non Fascist Italians had felt toward the democratic peoples who had suffered under totalitarian aggression. He spoke of the day of mourning and shame when Mussolini declared war on Great Britain and France. He dwelt upon the inner struggle between the loyalty which a citizen owes his country in time of war and the devotion which he felt for the liberal ways which his country's victory would be certain to destroy. He described the increasing recognition in Italy of the Allied cause as the cause of liberty and civilization.

11. After speaking of Allied generosity and good will which he had witnessed in Naples, Croce turned to the problem presented by the King. While criticizing a noticeable tendency on the part of some of the Allies to seek a solution of the problem in a conservatism which kept Fascist elements in power, he stated the argument, which he attributed to the Allies, that disturbing changes in Italian political life should await the military victory on which the salvation of all depended. In answer to this, Croce stated categorically that so long as the present king remained at the head of the State, the liberal citizen would feel that Fascism was not ended, that it was continuing its work of corruption and that it would arise again in a more or less

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12. Croce then undertook to criticise the present government. He asserted that it lacked strength because men of experience and reputation would not take the oath of loyalty to the present king. He pointed out the need of an honest and competent administration under the present difficult circumstances in order that disorder might be avoided and the Allies receive true and loyal support.

13. Croce ended his address with references to the Italian liberal tradition, the guilt of all peoples in permitting the rise and propagation of Fascism, and the elements in Italy who opposed it. As the first nation of Europe to be liberated from the Nazi-Fascist yoke, Italy was being watched by

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other peoples for indications of what their own future might be. In the restoration of a liberal Italy and Europe and in a renewed faith in liberal institutions in those countries which had never formally lost them, Croce saw the fulfillment of a universal need and the world's salvation.

14. Croce was hailed by Rodino as an interpreter of the thoughts of the Congress and of all Italians. He recalled some outstanding Anti-Fascist leaders, spoke of the sentiments entertained by the Italian people toward the Allies as liberators and made particular mention of the Italian Navy which had joined the Allies in spite of Fascist orders to the contrary.

15. Count Sforza continued Rodino's eulogy of Croce. He then denounced the manoeuvres of those who had attempted to impede the Congress and ended by reading a series of proposed messages to the Congress of the United States, the House of Commons, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Marshal Chiang Kai Shek, General De Gaulle, the Yugoslav people and the Greek people.

16. The Socialist Lericchhuta then read a communication which had been approved by the National Council of the Italian Socialist Party. It was addressed to the Labor Party in England, the Trade Unions, the American Federation of Labor and the Labor associations of Soviet Russia. The morning session ended shortly after noon.

17. The afternoon session opened at 1500 hours with a political report by Arangio-Ruiz. The speaker recalled the rejoicing with which the fall of Fascism had been greeted and the subsequent disappointment at the attitude and actions of an administration which he accused of having attempted to establish an ambiguous continuity between the Fascist regime and the resumption of the national life. The chief aim of this administration, he claimed, was to save the person of the King.

18. Arangio-Ruiz continued by enumerating some of the King's unconstitutional acts which made his abdication imperative. This abdication alone would allow the Italian people to stand before the bar of History as innocent of theascalities which would have made of Italy the garden of the German Empire. It was necessary, he continued, that a government of moral and economic reconstruction should not be impeded by subversive activity calculated to protect those most guilty of the past. The contract between King and people had become invalid and the principle now prevailed that power which came from the people returned to the people. The speaker concluded by urging the parties to continue their profitable collaboration which guaranteed the achievement of their common ends.

19. The report of Professor Tommaso Fiore began with a long indictment on many charges of the Monarchy which he termed Fascist and the Badoglio Government. The speaker denounced their inability to resolve the most important problems confronting the country, especially those of the rehabilitation of the Army and defascistization. The King had remained a Fascist and found himself without army or honor. Italy by expelling Fascism had earned the right to reacquire liberty through the honor of her arms. The Congress was reconstructing for the future, for civilization, liberty and life.

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20. Doctor Longobardi who had come from Rome as a representative of the Roman Committee of National Liberation read a message from that body addressed to the Congress. This message concerned the violent struggle by the Committees of National Liberation against the Germans and their Fascist puppets, in the areas still occupied by the enemy. The contention was made that the present government had neither been able to assist such resistance nor to organize the nation for effective participation in the war. The present government must therefore give way to an extraordinary government which would be a government of National Liberation. Such a government would assume all constitutional powers without prejudicing the right of free expression of the will of the people with respect to the institutional question. National unity would thus, he, not endangered, but buttressed, and Italy would be enabled to wage effective war and to insure its future as a free nation.

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21. After a break of a few minutes, the various parties presented their proposals for action to the Congress through their chosen representatives. Professor Omedeo spoke for the Party of Action, Venuti for the Christian Democrats, Sansonetti for the Liberal Party and Dr. Longobardi for the Socialists, Communists and Party of Action.

22. Longobardi's speech may be summarized as follows:

"Blame for the failure to form a national democratic government was assigned to the KING and the BADOGLIO governments, and it was maintained that the three parties were merely interpreting the unanimous will of the people of Italy when they made the following proposals:

- (a) Since the KING had not abdicated, that a bill of indictment should be drawn based on his violation of the statutes.
- (b) This body, i.e., the Congress, should proclaim itself to be the representative assembly of free Italy. Representatives from other provinces should be admitted when those provinces were liberated. This assembly would reconvene at Rome as soon as possible, and would sit until a constituent assembly could be formed. It would be the function of this interim assembly to form an extraordinary government on a wide base, in which the powers of the crown and of the dissolved Parliament would be united. It would also be the duty of this assembly to intensify the war effort and to protect the newly-won liberties.

- (c) Until such time as Rome should be liberated, an Executive Committee for free Italy should be constituted to prosecute the war and to guard the liberties of the people. Such an Executive Committee would also (1) act for the Italian people in relations with the United Nations and (2) determine the forms for promoting mass action to establish the legal foundation of the Congress and the verification of its powers; (3) necessary measures to make up for the ineffectiveness of the BADOGLIO government in dealing with the food situation, the Black Market, and unemployment should be taken by the Executive Committee through the local and provincial organizations and trade unions set up by anti-Fascists in areas freed from the enemy.

23. It was decided that before the Congress took any action on the proposal above, two representatives from each party should confer and draw up a definite program which could then be accepted unanimously. This was to be done during the night of the 28th. The agreed program was to be submitted to the Congress for approval on the 29th. Before adjourning the Congress approved the messages to the United Nations which had been previously read by Count Sforza.

24. The meeting of the 29th convened at 1030 hours under the presidency of Cianca. Cianca announced that the representatives of the different parties had agreed upon a program during the preceding night and that the delegates would be called to vote on it individually. The program was read to the Congress. Zaniboni then read a communication from the Camera del Lavoro of Naples. It contained besides a cordial and warm expression of the confidence of the Neapolitan

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25. Before proceeding to the individual voting each party was invited to express its views on the principal motion through a representative. The following spoke: Belli for the Liberal Party, Sansonetti for the Christian Democrats, Onodco for the Party of Action, Fioritto for the Socialists, Massari for the Democracy of Labor and Pleschi for the Communists. The speakers emphasized

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the importance of the Congress as a free expression of the will of the Italian people and the unity of purpose and action which had been attained throughout its deliberations. Each speaker concluded by pledging his party's support to the program.

26. With the exception of two Sardinian delegates who abstained from voting, having been instructed to take no action on questions involving the monarchy, the program was approved unanimously by the delegates voting individually. The program embraced the following points:

- a. It was agreed that prevailing conditions did not permit an immediate solution of the constitutional question (future form of government).
- b. It was agreed that the immediate abdication of the King, responsible for the country's misfortunes, was an essential condition of the moral and economic reconstruction of Italy.
- c. It was agreed that the Congress was the true expression of the will and forces of the nation.
- d. It was declared that it was necessary to arrive at the composition of a government with full emergency powers and the participation of the parties represented at the Congress. Its aims would be to intensify the Italian war effort to the maximum, to undertake a solution of the most urgent problems of Italian life with the support of the masses for whose welfare it would work, and to make preparations for a constituent assembly to be convoked upon cessation of hostilities.
- e. It was voted that a permanent Executive Committee should be established composed of representatives from all parties constituting the Committee of Liberation. This Committee in agreement with the Central Committee and in consultation with political personalities who represented Anti-Fascism should take the necessary measures to achieve the aims outlined above.

27. The concluding formal speech of the Congress was an address by Count Sforza. Having congratulated the Congress upon its deliberations and its demonstration that the spirit of liberalism had never been crushed in Italy, Sforza spoke of the contribution which a new Italy could make to the world by finding new, just and liberal solutions to prevailing social and economic problems. Pointing out that there are certain things on which Italians cannot compromise as matters of supreme necessity, he placed the abdication of the King among them when he blamed for submitting to the corrupting influence of Mussolini in order to frustrate and oppress the Italian people. He criticized the Badoglio Government for not having established a consultative assembly on the model of the one sitting in Algiers which would have been composed of persons who had always opposed Fascism.

28. Speaking of the removal of Fascists from office, Sforza insisted that the inefficacy of the measure taken by the Government. Fascists at the top were being protected while scapegoats were made of those at the bottom. The latter deserved to be pardoned but not those including the King with whom the

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29. Sforza then mentioned a letter which he had written to the King on May 30th 1940, ten days before Italy's declaration of war on France and Great Britain. In it he had foretold the disaster which the war would bring to the Italian people and their armed forces. Would it not be more difficult, he asked, for the Italians to make just claims at the Peace Conference if the country still had at its head the person who was responsible for past disasters? Would the reproach not be made to the Italians that they had been incapable of getting rid of their King? To those who saw in the King a conservative element Sforza replied that his record made him the essential cause of an inevitable revolution.

30. Sforza next dwelt on the aspect of the post-war world and Italy's place in it. He proposed an internationalism in which Italy would collaborate patriotically for the common good. Guided by this concept, Italy could undertake her reconstruction within the framework established by Cavour and Mazzini. Instead of Fascist conquests, there would be a patriotism placed at the service of humanity. The address was concluded with reference to the Anti-Fascist martyrs who had suffered for Italy.

31. Cifarelli, Secretary of the local Committee, then read messages of sympathy and support from the following groups: The Libera Italia of Cairo, the Committee of Liberation of Foggia, and the University Associations De Palma and Corda Frates.

32. The President followed him with an announcement of the individuals chosen by the various parties to represent them on the new Executive Committee. They were:

Arangio-Ruiz  
Calace  
Gerabona  
Jervolino  
Longobardi  
Tedeschi

Liberal Party  
Party of Action  
Democracy of Labor  
Christian Democracy  
Socialist Party  
Communist Party

33. Dr. Longobardi, speaking on behalf of the delegates thanked President Cianca for his energetic leadership. As the delegates left the hall after adjournment, they sang the hymn of Maneli and directed enthusiastic ovations toward Croce, Sforza and other outstanding personalities.

34. From its proceedings and resolutions, it is clear that the Congress was overwhelmingly in favor of the King's immediate abdication. It is not clear, however, whom the Congress would like to see take the King's place in the event of the latter's abdication. The normal constitutional succession would place Crown Prince Umberto on the throne, but it is far from certain that he would be persona grata with some of the political groups. On the other hand, since it was agreed that the constitutional question of the future form of government should be deferred to a more appropriate time, a continuation of the monarchy under Umberto or a Regency acting for the Prince of Naples are the only two possibilities which can be reasonably envisaged in view of the Congress' own declarations.

35. Presumably the "political" government which the Congress desired to have established, would function constitutionally under Umberto or the Regency. But in view of the repeated claims of the Bari Congress that it represented the will of the Italian people and the desire of certain parties that the Congress should proclaim itself to be the representative assembly of free Italy, it appears that Italians who did not agree with the views of the Congress or belonged to one of its parties would find small place in the kind of "political" government which the Congress envisaged.

36. The King, at any rate, has given no indication of a willingness to abdicate under the pressure of self-appointed political groups, regardless of the extent to which they may represent the popular will. The situation is now at a deadlock. Possibly the Rome leaders will make a compromise possible when they can speak and act. A fundamental solution on a democratic basis will not be achieved until the Italian people have had the opportunity to express their

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37. The Congress took place in an orderly fashion. The seats reserved for guests were all filled and the speakers were frequently applauded. A number of stupid rumors circulated in Bari as the time for the Congress approached. There was dark talk of conspiracy and violence, all of which proved to be entirely groundless. It is however, a sad commentary on some 20 years of Fascism that a meeting in which citizens gathered to express their views and aspirations without constraint should seem a dangerous thing to so many people.

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ADMINISTRATION OF LIBERATED ITALY

23. The following changes in administration are to be noted:

- (a) General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C. while serving as C.C.C. in C Allied Central Mediterranean Force has been designated from 24 January 1944 the Representative in Italy of the President of the Allied Control Commission and is to act for, and on his behalf carry out, the functions of the President of the Allied Control Commission in respect of such matters as may be delegated to him. General Alexander continues to be the Military Governor of such occupied territory in Italy and Sicily as remains under AMG.
- (b) Lt. General Sir Frank M. Mason MacFarlane K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., took over on January 17 from Major General Kenyon A. Joyce and officially became Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission on that date. In that capacity he is the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission and also serves as Chief Civil Affairs Officer of occupied territory under AMG.
- (c) Effective 24 January AMG 15 Army Group (now Allied Central Mediterranean Force) was disbanded. HQ. AMG Fifth and Eighth Armies now operate under the operational command of Commanders Fifth and Eighth Armies and are under the technical control of HQ. ACC.
- (d) With effect from 31 January 1944 HQ. ACC, and not AFHQ, was made directly responsible for Civil Affairs in SARDINIA and as a result the Allied Regional Commissioner (SARDINIA) came under control of HQ. ACC on that date.
- (e) It has been determined that the executive control of food distribution in Italy should now be exercised by HQ. ACC and not by the Central Economic Committee. The Central Economic Committee will however remain in being to co-ordinate Civil and Military requirements in Italy and to advise on diversion of Military resources.

- (f) In order to co-ordinate policies and executive action to implement the rehabilitation of the Electrical Power System in Italy it has been decided to create a special body to be known as the ACME Central Electricity Board, the Chairman being appointed by CINC AFM. This body is necessary in order that the work of rehabilitating the electrical power system may be best allocated between ACC and the Military Engineering Agency. The Electricity produced will be allotted by a sub-committee of the Local Resources Board (Italy)

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RESTORATION OF ITALIAN TERRITORY

39. The detailed working out of the hand over to Italian administration of the Italian peninsula South of the Northern boundaries of the provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, together with Sicily and Sardinia has proceeded and efforts are being made for the handover to take place on the 10th of February. A draft of the press announcement to this effect has been sent to C.C.S. for approval.

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LABOR

40. The Labor unions are developing along democratic lines. Leaders are elected and the unions organized by Trades rather than skills (railroad workers, dock workers, etc.). The unions of a particular locality belong to the local Camera di Lavoro which in turn sends representatives to the Confederation of Labor. Employers have been slower to organize but a few associations have already been constituted. There is as yet no association corresponding to the Confederation of Labor for employers.

EDUCATION

41. Arrangements have been made for the re-opening of elementary schools in twenty communities in the province of Naples. In Naples itself some schools were scheduled to re-open on the 27th January and others on 1st February. Schools in the province of BENEVENTO and AVELLINO re-opened 10 January.

42. It is claimed that all teachers of Fascist conviction have been eliminated from the school system and all text books of Fascist doctrines or methods have been withdrawn from curriculum. New appointments, which have been approved, include that of Dr. Francesco Scaglione as superintendent of studies for the province of Naples, who has under him teaching personnel of some 10,000. Other new appointments are those of C. M. Albanese and Gerardo Albano as Superintendents of Studies in BENEVENTO and AVELLINO respectively.

EXPORTS

43. The chief limitations are Shipping facilities, internal transportation, lack of coal to provide industrial power, packing material, and essential materials which have to be imported. But in spite of these many difficulties more than 14,000 tons total have actually been exported up to mid-January, mostly to the United Kingdom. Items include Lemons, Nuts, Sulphur, Pumice, Wine, Citric Acid, Tartaric Acid, Essential Oils, Mustard Seed. Of these the chief item to date is Lemons and it is expected that 30,000 tons of Lemons alone will have been shipped by the end of March to the United Kingdom. This is approximately 225 million lemons or nearly 1 1/2 lbs. for every man, woman and child.

44. An emergency demand for specially quarried Talc required for manufacture of radio tubes has been met. A trial shipment of wine has already been made to the United Kingdom. A similar shipment is being made to the United States and if reports are favourable, which is anticipated, substantial shipments are expected to result.

45. Good progress has been made in developing production to U.S. and U.K. standards of Citrus Fruit Juices (orders already placed for 75,000 gallons), Lemon Oil (orders placed for 85,000 lbs) and substantially increased export will be possible when conditions permit supply of adequate containers, packing materials, industrial power, and transportation. Many other items are being developed including Hemp and Silk - which will eventually provide Exports much needed for the war effort.

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#### HEALTH

46. The typhus rate in Naples has fallen to an average of 10 to 15 new cases a day.

MONEY MATTERS

47. Negotiations have been continued with the Italian Under Secretary of Finance concerning the discontinuance of the use of Allied Military Lire and substitution of Italian Government Lire. The Deputy Chief Finance Officer went to the U.S.A. to discuss this matter with the C.C.S. A scheme to permit the resumption of remittances from Great Britain and the United States to dependents in Italy has been worked out and agreed. Negotiations are under way to extend the privilege to the Argentine and other countries.

48. The request of the Italian Government to increase passenger fare rates by 100% has been considered, but no decision has been taken because of inadequacy of information produced in support of the proposal.

*Henry T. Rowell*  
HENRY T. ROWELL,  
Major, C.M.P.

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PAGE

Giunto il 22 gennaio 1944 Ore 2120

MESSAGGIO IN ARRIVO DA RUDDER

- NR. 248 (NT. 555) - DA ARMELLINI ALT SEGUITO DUCENTOQUARANTASEI  
ALT SEMBRA UTILE RADIO ALLEATE RACCOMANDINO POPOLAZIONE ROMANA  
ORDINE DISCIPLINA ET OBEDIENZA ESCLUSIVAMENTE AUTORITA' LEGALMEN-  
TE COSTITUTE ALT

~~Doc No. 13 to Naples.~~

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*All return sent to Naples per nos 3/7*  
Giunti il 21 gennaio 1944 - ore 2130

MESSAGGI IN ARRIVO DA RODDEK

- NR/ 246 (NT.410) - DA ARMELLINI ALT HO COMUNICATO NOMI VOSTRO 28 MODIFICATO COME DA 145 ALT BONOMI RI TENENDO PRIMO PERIODO 28 AVREBBE SUSCITATO REAZIONI SINISTRE CON ACCUSE GOVERNO CERCARE AP- POGGIO STRANIERO PER DARE ORDINI LO HA COSI' MODIFICATO ALT SEGUE ALT
- NR. 246 (NT.411) - SEGUITO - SECONDA PARTE - ALT PER NORMA COMANDO CAPO ALLEATO CI HA CHIESTO NON VI SIA IN ROMA ALCUNA APERTA ATTIVI- TA' POLITICA ERA USCITA TEDESCHI ET ENTRATA TRUPPE ALLIATE ALT CO- NOSCENDO PRETSE SINISTRE VERSO MUNICIPIO BONOMI CONEVA OTTENERE CONSENSO SU DI ME COMANDANTE MOTTA PREFETTO ET BENCIVENGA CAPO GIUN- TA MUNICIPALE DESIGNATA DAI PARTITI ET NOMINATA DA MOTTA ALT SEGUE ALT
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- NR. 246 (NT.413) - SEGUITO - PARTE QUARTA - ALT TALE BINE DELIBERA <sup>28/51</sup> CHE MUNICIPIO ROMA SIA RETTO DA RAPPRESENTANTI PARTITI CON CAPO <sup>51/70</sup> UOMO FROVATA SEDE ANTIFASCISTA ALT NEL COMPITO TUTELA ORDINE PUB- BLICO ET RIATTIVAZIONE SERVIZI COMUNE PROVVEDERA' COORDINAMENTO FOR- ZE POPOLARI CHE HANNO CONDOTTO BATTAGLIA CONTRO TEDESCHI CON LE FOR- ZE MILITARI CON LE QUALI STABILIRA' QUEI RAPPORTI CHE SI DIMOSTRE- RANNO OPPORTUNI ALT FINISCE ALT CAPO MUNICIPIO SAREBBE BENCIVENGA ALT SEGUE ALT
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- NR. 246 (NT.415) - SEGUITO - PARTE SESTA - ALT POSSIBILE MANTENERE VOSTRI ORDINI CON RISCHIO CONFLITTO CH OCCORREREBBE COMUQUE EVI- TARE OVVERO FARE GIUNGERE PARTITI ORDINE ALLEATI DIRETTAMENTE PERCHE' NON DUBITINO SUA AUTENTICITA' OVVERO AMMETTERE PUNTO VISTA PARTITI PRECISANDO RAPPORTI TRA FORZE MILITARI ET MUNICIPIO ALT SEGUE ALT
- NR. 246 (NT.416) - SEGUITO - PARTE SETTIMA - ALT PERSONALMENTE NON VEDO POSSIBILITA' ASSUMERE COMANDO SE NON NELLA NETTA POSIZIONE DI INVESTITO INCARICO DA GOVERNO ET COMPLETA AUTORITA' SU OGNI KLEMAN-

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VE PASSARE AD ALLEATI TANTO VALE QUESTI INVIO PREVENTIVAMENTE U'  
LORO COMANDANTE ALT FINE ALT

0880

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS  
APO 334

25/11/43

File: RPC 336

SUBJECT: C.I.I. and Depolavoro.

TO : Senior Civil Affairs Officers.

1. Gioventu Italian del Littorio and Opera Nazionale Depolavoro have been officially abolished.

2. By the enclosed order, such of these assets which have not already been allocated or used by Allied Military Government are transferred to the control of the Prefect of the particular Province where the property is situated.

3. In all cases of difficulty, reference should be made to the Provincial Public Welfare Officer, MG.

4. The attention of all Prefects should be drawn to the order so that the necessary instructions may be given forthwith in order to conserve the property in question.

570

*Charles P. Little*

CHARLES POLINOTTI  
Lt. Colonel,  
Regional Civil Affairs Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

B

Stamps 05

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SUBJECT: C.I.L. and Depolavoro.

TO : Senior Civil Affairs Officers.

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570

*Charles F. ...*

CHARLES FOLMERT  
Lt. Colonel,  
Regional Civil Affairs Officer.

Distribution

B

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*copy in above file No. 386*

# SECRET

240440A

N 3595

RAF 0

1544

SECRET URGENT TELEGRAM

RECEIVED AT

PBS SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

24 JANUARY 1944

SECRET

URGENT

TO.....ACTION.....FREEDOM RPTD CG PBS FOR FARGO RPTD  
FILPOT PERSONAL

INFO.....NONE

FROM.....MACFARLANE FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE

DATE TIME SIGNED.....231131L

DATE TIME RECEIVED.....240440A

REFERENCE NR.....219

CITE.....NONE

ARMELLINI REPORTS FROM ROME THAT BONOMI HAD MODIFIED THE TERMS OF BADGLIO'S INSTRUCTIONS IN A COMMUNICATION TO THE 6 PARTIES OF ROME WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS. "FOR INFORMATION, ALLIED HEADQUARTERS HAS REQUESTED US THAT THERE BE NO OPEN POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN ROME BETWEEN DEPARTURE OF GERMANS AND ENTRY OF ALLIED TROOP." ARMELLINI ALSO REPORTS THAT THE PARTY OF ACTION HAS VOTED THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF THE DAY. "IT AFFIRMS DECIDED INTENTION OF EXPRESSING ALSO IN ROME IN THE MOMENTO EVACUATION BY THE ENEMY THROUGH ITS OWN MEN THE WILL OF NATIONAL RESURGENCE." ARMELLINI HAS REQUESTED BADGLIO FOR VERY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS WHICH CAN BE COMMUNICATED TO THE POLITICAL LEADERS. I GAVE BADGLIO THE FOLLOWING DRAFT TELEGRAM FOR BADGLIO TO SEND TO ARMELLINI. "MY TELEGRAM 128 CONTAINS A PRECISE ORDER I RECEIVED FROM ALLIED HEADQUARTERS. I REPEAT THAT ALLIED HEADQUARTERS WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY OPEN POLITICAL ACTIVITY AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE GERMANS UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE ALLIED MILITARY COMMANDER IN ROME. ROME WILL BE CONSIDERED AS IN THE ZONE OF OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE UNDER ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF ALLIED MILITARY COMMAND."

*570/505 - Armellini*

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**SECRET**

N 3595 (PAGE 2)

BADGGLIC AGREED TO THE TEXT OF THIS DRAFT BUT SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT BY THE ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF RATHER THAN BY HIMSELF. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD HAVE TO REFER THIS QUESTION. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT IN GENERAL WILSON'S NAME OR IF I SHOULD TELL BADGGLIC THAT IT MUST GO IN HIS OWN NAME. I TOLD BADGGLIC THAT I MUCH PREFERRED THE LATTER COURSE FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW BUT HE WAS MOST INSISTENT THAT I SHOULD REFER THE MATTER. GRATEFUL FOR VERY EARLY REPLY.

PBS DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION...AMG HQ  
 INFO.....G-2  
           SECY  
           C.G.

AMG DISTRIBUTION:

(Orig) Mr.Reber(2)  
 (Info) DCCAO (2)

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**SECRET**

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SECRET.

*File*

Count Sforza has succeeded in stopping a series of "demonstrations" which had been planned in Calabria.

He has also sent to his friends in other provinces following message: "Only order helps victory against neo-fascism."

No demonstrations of any kind in Bari.

But organizers of Congress know that General Piece, commander of the Carabinieri, has expressed hope that his men may help in putting down the "revolutionaries".

Piece is only defending his personal position because, having been an ardent fascist propagandist, he knows that any new honest Government would dismiss him at once. Many Carabinieri officers are revolted by Piece's orders and talks.

Same is with high fascist and corrupt officials like Innocenti, etc.

That is why they want disorders. They want to play old tricks of "red danger", a trick which brought Italy to ruin.

Their two leaders are:

1) Undersecretary Vito Roale who gave to the Naples press on August 16th a letter to him from former pro-German Prime Minister Nitti stating: "Italy must keep its alliances, otherwise she loses her honor."

2) Filippo Naldi, one of the most criminal agents of the Grindisi Government, who has been Mussolini's agent with the French pro-German minister de Monzie in 1938.

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Added terror, now, for the similarity of the Rome resolutions with the Sforza-Croce ideas in Naples.

From Naples and other places smart young men in the pay of Prince of Piedmont and of Savoie have left for Bari. At dinner parties for their departure toasts have been given for the suppression of "la camaglia".

Type of these fellows: young Scalera, the son of the corrupt fascist milliardaire.

It may be that nothing happens.

But if anything happens the Allies must know where to look for responsibilities.

505 - Roale  
505 - Pieve  
505 - Innocenti  
505 - Roale, Vito  
505 - Nitti  
505 - Naldi, Filippo  
505 - Scalera

0-891

HAC/dnd

5 February 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: General MacFarlane

The following are comments on the telegram by paragraphs.

Paragraph 1. The difficulty about the "reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis" is that the six parties are themselves reluctant to take over until Rome and have not yet agreed upon a program. The diffidence of the six parties in Southern Italy is understandable. First, the political men available are all at best secondary figures except for Croce, Sforza and possibly Fedelechi. Secondly, there is no obvious prime minister among them. Every government has to be formed by somebody upon some authority. The six parties are not yet agreed upon either the person or the authority.

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Paragraph 2. I agree that under the present king it will not be possible to achieve any political reconstruction. I am not so sure that the King would never abdicate voluntarily if he could make a deal which he thought would give the House of Savoy a sporting chance of survival; i.e., if Humbert succeeded. I do not agree that the longer his abdication is postponed the more difficult it will become to facilitate it. On the contrary, in my opinion the longer the abdication is postponed the more violent and radical will be the ultimate solution.

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Paragraphs 3 and 4. I doubt that a visit by the King to Rome would determine him to remain. On the contrary, it might convince him that it was no good procrastinating.

Paragraph 5. I agree that our object should be to try not to prejudice the free choice of the whole Italian people to resolve the institutional question when the time comes. But although we must try, we cannot hope to succeed completely. Any solution, whether the succession of Umberto, or a regency in favor of the Prince of Naples or the establishment of an extraordinary government to act as lieutenants for the Monarchy, will in fact prejudice the final issue by creating vested interests. The ultimate solution will also be influenced by the attitude of the Allied Governments. A reconstructed government on the broad basis will be discredited if there is starvation or if, the colonies apart, certain sections of the mainland are taken away from Italy, e.g., Trieste, or if the present administration of the Armistice is made harsher.

To sum up. The present position is awkward for all parties concerned. It is awkward for Badoglio because he knows that he cannot form a representative government so long as the King remains and that he cannot, as a loyal servant, kick the King out himself. It is embarrassing for the six parties: for they realize that unless they take some action upon the Bari resolution, they will make themselves ridiculous. Yet they do not want to form a government at present. It is unsatisfactory for the Allies for so long as things

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proceed as at present they are exposed to unjustified criticism.

In face of this I should not myself recommend an immediate Allied intervention. I should be still inclined to postpone a radical solution until Rome on the understanding that that is not too long postponed and that in the meantime the six parties in the south of Italy do not reach a new agreement amongst themselves which will enable them to form a government. On the other hand, I think that the Allied Governments should agree now that the King should be thrown out when Rome is taken if that is the price which the Rome leaders demand for forming a broad based government.

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Political Report -- February 1-14, 1944

The Congress of the Six Parties of National Liberation, which met in Bari on January 25 and 27, adopted a resolution calling for (1) the immediate abdication of the King, (2) the formation of an extraordinary government with full powers and with the participation of all parties, and (3) the constitution of a permanent Executive Committee of the Six Parties to prepare conditions necessary to give effect to the foregoing. The resolution further signaled the agreement of the Congress to postpone settlement of the institutional question until a Constituent Assembly could be convened as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

The above inability was reflected in respect of the foregoing program, it nevertheless represents a compromise designed to conceal the lack of agreement with regard to how the proposed extraordinary government should function. The one delegate, Signor Longobardi, indicated that the desire of the six parties in the capital was that the government should assume all powers for the interim before the Constituent Assembly, surviving the monarchy for this period, but it was not clear whether this in fact represented the considered view of the Parties there or merely his interpretation and that of his party, the Socialists. Three of the parties at Bari, the Liberals, the Labor-Associates, and the Christian Democrats refused categorically to accept proposals put forward by the Action Party, the Socialists and the Communists which would have led to an installment of the King and the immediate creation of a self-styled government to rival the authority of the King. The unwillingness of the three first mentioned parties to accept such a radical program brought about the compromise which leaves the way open for the succession of the Prince of Piedmont if agreement can be reached upon the extent of powers to be delegated to the government for the interim period.

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Upon the return to Bari of the delegates the Executive Junta was forced to include Vincenzo Arancio-Dir, Liberal; Francesco Carotone, Labor-Associate; Eugenio Raffaele Jervolino, Christian Democrat; Vincenzo Jolano, Action Party; Oreste Longobardi, Socialist; and Paolo Tassinari, Communist. The Junta has met several times in Naples, one of its first acts being the dispatch of a communication to the King, which recited the decisions of the Bari Congress and invited him to abdicate forthwith. This communication was made on February 6, but has up to the present elicited no apparent action from the monarch or his government. Pending further developments in this respect, which are however not anticipated, the Junta is endeavoring to reach a greater degree of agreement in respect of the points not clarified at Bari. Count Foras and Senator Croce, with whom the Junta's terms of reference require it to maintain close association,

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are likewise attempting to bring about a compromise, which will enable the opposition to present a united program of action to the Badoglio Government and the Allies.

In the meanwhile as previously scheduled the transfer of administration of the southern mainland provinces, Sicily and Sardinia to the Italian Government took place as of 00:05 a.m. February 11 and the Badoglio Government with the exception of the defense ministries began to operate from its new temporary capital of Salerno. No incidents or demonstrations have been reported to ACC Headquarters in this connection, although various rumors had been current that the transfer would not be welcomed by the people in many sections.

At Taranto two manifestations of labor disturbances occurred during the first week in February which resulted in the removal of the Prefect and Questore but did not take the form of the threatened strike among the dock workers. Although the alleged cause had been lack of food and dissatisfaction with working conditions, investigation indicates that the underlying reason was political in order to discredit the government.

To MAKINS  
Moral Conditions Italy  
Political attitude

RAC/rmk

16 January 1944

I enclose a copy of a paper entitled 'Moral Conditions of the Southern Italy Populations' which forms appendix 'I' of 'D' section, report No. 14 of 5 January from PMS Bari. It was written by Prince Rospiroglioni who is a relation of Captain Howard of the PMS staff. His father the first Lord Howard of Lezith having, I believe, married a Rospiroglioni.

Although you will get this paper through other channels, I think that it is worth bringing it especially to your notice. It does not say anything new and it is not literature. But it is in large measure the truth, so far as Southern Italy and Sicily are concerned.

There is one aspect of it which I should like to emphasize from my own observations here during the last three months or more. Prince Rospiroglioni says that 'the Italian people has no liking for politics'. That in Southern Italy is the fact and the contrast between Magn Grecia and Helles just across the Adriatic is in this as in much else arresting. Aristotle's statement in the Funeral Oration may be as valid for the modern as for the ancient Athenians: 'as regard the man who keeps aloof from public affairs as not merely harmless but good for nothing.' It could be inapprehensible here; for Southern Italians seek a full life in other ways, in their family life, in their religion, in standing in the sunshine and passing the time of day. They do not for the most part demand a share in government. Indeed they regard government as something outside of their normal lives and imposed upon them, no matter what its label. This is of course a broad simplification and it does not mean that the political parties have no importance, but when the parties become clamorous and complaints numerous, it is sometimes well to remember that the vast majority here are thinking of other things, that is bread, work and the lesser incidents of domestic life.

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One other point. You will note what Prince Rospiroglioni says about emigration. So far as I can judge his last paragraph is no exaggeration.

Roger Makins, Esq.

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To MAKI'S  
Political Items

HAC/and

In reply refer to:  
000.1

4 January 1944

During the last week there have been several political items of more than passing notice.

On 30 December the Gazzetta del Messogiorno published the text of the defascistization Decree announced in a press communique on 12 December (Fatima telegram No. 1103). I will be sending to you separately in a few days a translation of this Decree with some comments which I shall coordinate with the Legal Sub-Commission. In the meantime suffice it to say that the Decree does do all the things stated in the communique. The further Decree mentioned in the last sentence of the communique has not yet been published; i. e. the measure to restore to public office individuals who were dismissed under the Fascist regime for political activities.

After the cabinet meetings on 27 and 28 December a communique was issued to the press containing a long section on food and the price of wheat. I enclose a translation. It shows what Corbino, who was put in charge of this question, has done in an attempt to stimulate self-help and hope. This well-intentioned action was however taken without prior consultation with C.S.C. and there is trouble about that which is being suggested. Further it is more than doubtful whether the bribe of an increase of price will be effective. When food shortage is as acute as it is now here, grain collection depends not on the administrative ability and authority of government. These are at present low and it would suit us in other fields as well as this if they were higher.

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Spate of messages appear to herald the new year and I attach copies of Gazzetta del Messogiorno of 2 and 3 January. The first contains messages from the King, the Minister of the Interior as well as from the Bari section of the Christian Democrat and Communist Parties. The second messages from the Bari sections of the Party of Action as well as the Liberal and Socialist Parties. It is noticeable that all these messages emphasize the need for united effort to free the country and the Communist leader goes so far as to say: "We in freed Italy like you in occupied Italy have only a single duty at this moment in which

all bear heavy responsibility : To fight Nazi-Fascism and drive the Germans out of Italy. This is our duty and transcends all differences in political ideas and conviction about the institutional problem." Indeed the Communist message has other bits of sound sense in it including the admission that "the storm of 20 years cannot be wiped out by 20 days of political demonstrations nor by 20 days of struggle."

Roger Makins, Esq.  
Office of the British Resident Minister  
at Allied Force Headquarters,  
5 Rue Professor Cartillet,  
Algiers

- 3 Incls:  
Incl 1 - Transl press comm (in dup)  
Incl 2 - Gazz del Mess; 2 Jan 44  
Incl 3 - Gazz del Mess; 3 Jan 44

6 February 1944

The delegates of the Bari congress have returned during the course of the last week and the executive junta has set itself up and had its first informal meeting. It might therefore be helpful if I attempt to summarize the present political position. To epitomize, we are faced with an awkward period for all concerned. The first moves in the bargaining between the monarchy and the opposition have been made; but they are only the first moves and there is much hard bargaining ahead. So far neither side has done anything to make an agreed compromise impossible. The two overt moves so far have only been the unanimous resolution of the Bari congress on the one side demanding the King's immediate abdication and on the other the firm intimation by the King through various channels that he will not abdicate. These are the classical opening gambits in any bargaining of this kind. What is the next move?

To answer this I would revert to the point which Vyshinski reportedly made to the representatives of the Peoples Committee of Liberation: a government has to be formed on some recognized authority by someone. In what authority?

The Bari congress only agreed on the negative, not on the authority of Victor Emmanuel III. Discussion of the positive side of the question brought out a real cleavage between those who inclined towards monarchy and evolutionary methods and those who in the last analysis favor a republic and revolutionary methods. The latter, represented by the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties, desired that on the King's abdication the six parties should as an absolute act and on their own authority form a government and endowing it with sufficient constitutional powers for such an extraordinary government to carry on until a constituent assembly could be elected to decide the institutional question. Their attitude has recently been put to me in its least extreme form in a letter from Count Marre, who is affiliated to the Action Party and is well known to many members of the Foreign Office. We do not think that we can come out of Fascism without a revolutionary step, meaning by revolutionary something which is

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not, either in essence or in form strictly legal. In our view an illegal period of government is already in process and even if there were ways by which one could give a legal appearance to the solution of the problem, I do not think that anybody would be concerned about that in Italy." In this sense at least the three parties' proposal at Bari is revolutionary. But the ostensible intention was that the institutional question should not thereby be prejudiced. Indeed the extraordinary government would possibly act as a lieutenant (luogotenente) for the monarchy and an article in the Naples Risorgimento of 2 February (translation enclosed) by Alberto Cianca, the president of the Bari congress, showed that he and some of his friends in the Action Party were still toying with this possibility.

The three other parties, the Liberal, Labour Democrat and Christian Democrat Parties, would have none of this and Sforza and others have freely admitted that it was impossible to get the Christian Democrats, who are the most numerous party of this trio, to agree to the Crown Prince being forced to renounce his rights. In the opinion of these parties the proper procedure would be that after the King's abdication the Crown Prince should automatically succeed and thereupon delegate such powers to an extraordinary government as would enable it to function until a constituent assembly could determine the institutional question at the end of the war. In short, they favoured revolutionary methods both for their own sake and because they thought such methods could in practice give the monarchy a better chance of ultimate survival.

If there is therefore no agreement upon the authority by which the government should be formed, there is equally no agreement upon any person at present in South Italy who could be entrusted with the task of collecting a cabinet. The reason is not far to seek. The political men available are all at best secondary figures except for Croce, Sforza and possibly Tedeschi. Croce is old and does not choose to run. Sforza is in effect only the nominee of himself and certain members of the Action Party. To the others he is an embarrassment. He can scarcely be welcome to the monarchist parties. In his speech at Bari he said that as the King "did not love Italy.....no monarch loves his country.....he felt he had found (in Mussolini) a marvellous remedy to keep Italians in subjection." Indeed Sforza loses no opportunity to make vulgar attacks on the persons of the Royal Family. The latest story that he is telling even to members of the Allied Control Commission is meant to nail down the Crown Prince as a pervert. Sforza claims that

the Crown Princess told him that she was still a virgin eleven months after her marriage. As for the other parties, the Communists have the lowest opinion of Deform as a political trigger out for his own ends. They are also influenced by their knowledge that Deform has already stood out publically against Yugoslav territorial claims on Italy and they will scarcely wish themselves to be involved in a quarrel with any Yugoslav government such as Tito's which is labelled Communist. Nevertheless in South Italy he is the outstanding figure, especially as the Communists do not apparently want to take any prominent part in the government, far less I imagine, hold the position of prime minister. Deform has qualities of personal courage, conviction and education but he is not the nominal leader of his party and his present intention seems to be to keep himself in the background and goad on others. In general the representatives of the other parties have equally expressed a preference that a party government should not be forced before time is reached.

As a consequence of these unresolved difficulties, the executive junta was set up to study the steps necessary for the formation of a party government and to attain the abdication of the King. Although appearances may belie, the junta do not inspire confidence at first sight. Vincenzo Arancio-Min, the Liberal, is an elderly professor of Roman law and although he, unlike the others, is the nominal head of his party in Naples, the Liberals are few in number and he is not himself a forceful personality. Francesco Carabona, the Labour Democrat, is a lawyer by profession and looks to be in the middle fifties. His party is almost non-existent in the south of Italy and he can scarcely claim to play a great part. Angelo Raffaele Jervolino of the Christian Democrat Party is a lawyer from the Naples area of about 50. Nothing much is known against, for or of him. Vincenzo Galace of the Party of Action is an engineer of about 35 who comes from the Bari region. He was prosecuted by the Fascists in 1938 and has been in prison ever since. Cresto Longobardi, the Socialist, is in the early forties. His real name is Lizzardi and he has the prestige of being the delegate sent by the Home Committee of Liberation to the Bari congress. He is said to have worked in a bank for a living and to have been and exile in France. Paolo Tedeschi, alias Spanno, is the youngest of the junta being about 37 or 38. In addition Caracciolo of the Party of Action has agreed to act informally as secretary. He was a diplomat de carrière and is about 40.

While the junta may be all men of good will, they lack administrative experience and, in many cases, authority in their own parties. What is worse they are in a quandary. There is no real agreement on fundamental questions among the parties. Yet if the junta and the

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parties do nothing to carry out the Bari resolution, they will make themselves ridiculous. The longer the capture of Rome is postponed the greater will be the pressure for immediate action. It is therefore final that an Allied policy should be agreed before the next moves in the bargaining by the monarchy and opposition take place. I do not suggest that the stage has yet been reached when Allied intervention would help. Exactly the contrary. But the next moves in the bargaining may come quickly and at a given moment we shall probably not be able to avoid intervention. We are not completely in control of the moment and although the parties may wait until Rome, it is by no means excluded that they will press for a solution before the capture of Rome. In consequence the Allied Commission should have clear instructions as soon as possible of the line to adopt.

On what those instructions should be I would only express the following personal opinions:

1. The King will not be able to persuade the parties to form a government while he remains in his present position.
2. The present Badoglio Government of "technicians" may be able to last until Rome, but not longer. Meanwhile with our help they can get about the ordinary business of administration and build up a governmental machine. They should if possible be restricted from political blunders such as the appointment of Salvi. They are getting rid of him now but there may be a proposal to bring a Socialist called Casiboni into the government in order to give it political colour. Casiboni tried to shoot Mussolini twenty years ago, but has suffered much in the interval and his appointment would bring the government no kudos.
3. The longer the King's abdication is postponed the more violent and radical the ultimate solution is likely to be and the more difficult it will be to preserve the monarchy.
4. A political government may be possible if the Crown Prince became King provided he agreed to grant that government special powers. But he is a weak character; he has no outstanding advisors and the conversation that he recently had with Prince Hospignesi of which I enclose a copy shows that his feet are not firmly on the ground. For these reasons some monarchists still feel that a regency would give the monarchy the best chance of ultimate survival; for a boy prince would have a sentimental appeal which the Crown Prince will never gain.

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5. A republic will at best lead to a period of weak government with strong emphasis on regionalism. At worst it will bring chaos. Already there are those who say that if what goes on now is a sample of democracy, they would prefer authoritative government. Already several youths of university age have been caught for espionage and before being shot have declared their faith in the Fascist Republic which to them offered some ideal, some leadership and something other than the squabbling of sickerly mediocrities. This need not be taken too seriously yet and we are by no means back to the atmosphere of 1922 which gave rise to Fascism. But weak government would within measurable time play towards neo-Fascism or towards Communism which will equally offer an appeal to youth and determined leadership.

6. If therefore there is a chance of getting a moderate political government, under Humbert, we should remember the alternatives. We should also bear in mind that if so disastrous it in Italy after it comes to ~~power~~, we shall be leading straight to more violent solutions of which neo-Fascism and Communism are already in the field.

*The first gambits have been played; they have been slow and cautious. But the bargaining may quicken at any time and the need of guidance is urgent.*

*Hal.*

0904

9 November 1944

Memorandum to: Office of the Chief of Staff  
Allied Commission

From: Political Section, Allied Commission

In accordance with the instructions of the Acting Chief Commissioner, a representative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed verbally today that in the opinion of the Political Section the Decree for the desquestration of British and American assets in Italy should be issued with a clause extending it to all the United Nations. It was pointed out that France was not technically one of the United Nations and that if the French authorities enquired whether the Decree was applicable to French property their attention might be drawn to the action of the French Provisional Government in regard to Italian property in French territory with the suggestion that informal negotiations should be entered into with a view to reciprocal treatment being accorded in the two countries.

H. L. d'A. Hopkinson  
Acting Vice President, Political Section

*Sil  
Answer*

*File attached:  
Ltr 62988/8 for VK... to Staw; 20 Oct  
Ltr ACC/1716/CA for V... to COS; 28 Oct  
memo TB 2466/6/cos for London to Pol Sec; 1 Nov*

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The present declared policy of Marshal Badoglio is to continue until Rome, and once there, place the resignation of his Government in the King's hands. This decision was taken early in November last at a time when the King and the Marshal thought that the capture of Rome would not be a matter of more than a few weeks. At that time it was accepted by the Allied Commandants and not seriously challenged by the opposites. If the capture of Rome were close, there would be little advantage to the Allies in any divergence from Badoglio's decision; but on the assumption that the city will not fall for a month or more, the question will have to be reconsidered if for no other reason because there are clearly signs that the opposition will not acquiesce quietly in an indefinite continuance in power of the present Government. After the last meeting their issue is at stake. It is, therefore, necessary to strike a balance for and against change from the point of view of Allied interests.

Against change, it should first be said that the Fascist Government have lived up to their armistice obligations and have done what is required of them, except in one case, the prisoners of war agreement. Marshal Badoglio knows that though now a collaborator, Italy is a beaten enemy and the internal weakness of his Government makes it less able to withstand Allied pressure. Secondly, the Government has been willing to postpone any institutional question and thereby does nothing to jeopardize the loyal cooperation of the armed services, especially the navy who responded to the King's call to join the Allies. Loyalty to the Crown does not

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hands. This decision was taken early in November 1941 at a time when the King and the Marshal thought that the capture of Rome would not be a matter of more than a few weeks. At that time it was expected by the Allied Commandants and not seriously challenged by the opposition. If the capture of Rome were close, there would be little advantage to the Allies in any divergence from Badoglio's decision; but on the assumption that the city would not fall for a month or more, the question will have to be reconsidered if for no other reason because there are clearly signs that the opposition will not acquiesce quietly in an indefinite continuance in power of the present Government. After the long existing Italian form is at stake, it is, therefore, necessary to strike a balance for and against change from the point of view of Allied interest.

Against change, it should first be said that the *Regio Esercito* have lived up to their armistice obligations and have done what is required of them, except in one case, the prisoners of war agreement. Marshal Badoglio knows that though now a rebellious, Italy is a beaten enemy and the internal weakness of his Government makes it less able to withstand Allied pressure. Secondly, the Government has been willing to cooperate in any institutional question and thereby does nothing to jeopardize the loyal cooperation of the armed services, especially the Army and the Navy to the King's call to join the Allies. Loyalty to the Crown does not mean anything in the armed services, particularly in the higher ranks, and it is impossible to tell how much this is loyalty to the present King or to the institution of monarchy. The same is true of the attitude of the Italian diplomatic missions abroad, and there is evidence of it in the attitude of our troops in the United States. Thirdly, there is something a little ridiculous in any change if it must be on the condition laid down at Bari, the abdication of the King, when so little of Italy can directly participate. The Badoglio Government may be weak, but the opposition can not

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provide any better or more experienced team of administrators. Also there can be no absolute guarantee that any 'solution' reached in South Italy will be accepted without question by the local leaders. <sup>Locally</sup> ~~Internally~~, there is the fact that an opposition Government will regard themselves as liberated friends rather than defeated enemies and hence in his speech at Bari has already come out with a claim for the retention of the 'sacred' frontiers of Metropolitan Italy and the 'ancient and venerable' pre-Fascist colonies. This shows the sort of difficulties with which we shall certainly be faced by an opposition Government whenever it comes into power. Badoglio may have his own aspirations, but he intends to resign as soon as he will sincerely be likely to raise such contentious issues in the intervening period.

Before giving arguments in favor of a change, it should be said that such a change would involve, from the Allied point of view, there are at least three prerequisites. The new Government must specifically recognize that it is bound by the Armistice and all other engagements into which the Badoglio Government has entered and must prefer a solution of the institutional question which does not pre-judge the freedom of the whole Italian people to choose between Monarchy and Republic at the end of the war. In addition, the 'solution' must be put forward as an agreed and representative programme.

Granted these prerequisites, the main argument in favor of change is that we shall be dealing with a Government which will have some authority over and influence on the Italian people. We have already twice been threatened with labor difficulties in the discussions at Turin; the conceivable causes were wages and food, the real reasons, political. So

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Granted these prerequisites, the main argument in favor of change is that we shall be dealing with a Government which will have some authority over and influence on the Italian people. We have already twice been threatened with labor difficulties in the discussions at Ferraris; the conceivable causes were wages and food, the real reasons, political. So long as the middle and left parties are all in opposition, there will be a constant threat of trouble and it will not look well in Europe and elsewhere if our "quiescent" Government, as it will unfairly be dubbed, has to resort to force. Even if only force contained over forms of Government, the Badoglio Government cannot offer any promise of good administration and

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although an opposition, Government may not be more talented, it can certainly not be less so. Next, in view of the fact that Badoglio signed the Armistice, it will be a convenience for us if he has a prominent place in Italy while the Armistice lasts. He still has a considerable standing in the country, even with members of the opposition. But the longer he is associated with the present Government, the more difficult it will be for the opposition to put him in a place of authority if they form a Government. For much the same reasons, the longer a solution is postponed, the more radical it is likely to be when it comes. Finally, all recent evidence from Rome shows that the Rome leaders are already tending toward more extreme courses and the obvious way of spiking their guns is to have a Government of their friends already in office by the time that Rome is taken, on the understanding that there shall be a reconstruction of that Government directly Rome is free.

So much for the material advantages for and against a change. There is another consideration which cannot be excluded. "His best serves the state", Epictetus observed, "who raises not the roofs of its houses, but the souls of its citizens." It is doubtful whether the Badoglio Government can do either; it certainly cannot inspire and is biased for not having overcome many of the present economic difficulties. These will remain whoever is in power; but it is the fate of unpopular governments to be as often biased unjustly as justly. If the life of the Badoglio Government is, therefore, unnaturally prolonged, the question is bound to arise in the press and elsewhere whether it is in fact the purpose of the Allies to use their armed forces to prevent the expulsion of a Government which is against the wishes and interest of the Italian people. This question may be unfairly put and based largely on ignorance of the facts; but

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the present Government, the more difficult it will be for the opposition to put him in a place of authority if they form a Government. For much the same reasons, the longer a solution is postponed, the more radical it is likely to be when it comes. Finally, all recent evidence from Rome shows that the Rome leaders are already tending toward more extreme courses and the obvious way of spiking their guns is to have a Government of their friends already in office by the time that Rome is taken, on the understanding that there shall be a reconstruction of that Government directly Rome is free.

So much for the material advantages for and against a change. There is another consideration which cannot be excluded. "His best serves the state", Cicero observed, "who raises not the roofs of its houses, but the souls of its citizens." It is doubtful whether the Badoglio Government can do either; it certainly cannot inspire and is blamed for not having overcome many of the present economic difficulties. These will remain whoever is in power; but it is the fate of unpopular governments to be as often blamed unjustly as justly. If the life of the Badoglio Government is, therefore, unacceptably prolonged, the question is bound to arise in the press and elsewhere whether it is in fact the purpose of the Allies to use their armed forces to prevent the expulsion of a Government which is against the wishes and interest of the Italian people. This question may be more fairly put and based largely on ignorance of the facts; but it will be put and will be a continual source of embarrassment, if no more.

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TO: MACMILLAN  
Anglo-Italian Relations

50/221

27 December 1945

I enclose a report on Anglo-Italian relations by a British officer which has reached us from S.M.A. It is already a month old and some of the suggestions in it are not feasible, but I think there is much accurate observation in the analysis with which the report begins.

The fact is that the Italians are going through a period of disillusionment and the still greater of their plight is being now becoming apparent to the British Government and people in South Italy. It is not far short of the truth to say that they swallowed the propaganda whole and ~~was~~ internalized it in a sense entirely favorable to themselves. As a result they believed, or at least hoped, that we only held Mussolini responsible for what had happened; that once he had gone, our war in Italy would be a joint enterprise for the liberation of the country from Nazi domination and that this phase of the war was of paramount importance in Allied strategy, namely that the resources of the United Nations would turn shortages into plenty.

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The contrast between those high expectations and present facts is brutal. In the few months since we first landed in Italy several important factors have been realized. The Allies have treated the Italian people as responsible for their part in Mussolini's adventure. To the vast majority of our forces the Italians are clearly a defeated enemy and the abdication of Italy to the position of subservience has not been welcomed by our troops with whom the Italians are in contact. It is becoming as clear to the Italian people as it is to their Government that the Allied war in Italy is of secondary importance. Even in Italy itself our primary concern has naturally been to defeat Germany rather than to install a democratic government. What is worse the advent of the Allies coincided with a disastrous deterioration of supplies, particularly of food.

There is little wonder then that the Italian Government lack drive and inspiration. These things in the existing emergency could only come from Marshal Badoglio himself and he is

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becoming steadily more discouraged. Our methods are largely the cause of this. The terms of the original short truce were not excessively harsh and in the first weeks there was little to belie the impression which the Italian had placed upon our propaganda. It is true that the short truce was followed by the Long truce; but these were accepted in deference to Badoglio's request and the Marshal desired added satisfaction from our encouragement for him to declare war on the Germans, & the firm was undertaken that the terms of the Armistice would be applied rigidly or leniently according to results. Since then we have agreed to the Marshal to be guided by other lights. In November we suggested the conditions of the Naval Agreement by the addition of a clause giving us the power to dictate as well as to discuss and control. In December by requests for arms and for specified ~~units~~ ~~units~~ we in effect nullified the decision announced in October on the part of the Italian Army and in the eyes of the Italian Government have thus gone far to deny them the chance of working their own way. As for Germany the Marshal has already been forewarned that the surrender of territory from 48 to the Italians will be accompanied by certain conditions to make up for what Badoglio himself has described as deficiencies in the long truce.

The present state of things is therefore unhappy. We have promised or wanted to provide and not fulfilled. This results in neither the desire nor the policy of the British Government or people; it has nevertheless happened. There is <sup>something</sup> intervention. Russia is dead, but has not been replaced by liberal government. There is little opportunity to alleviate the situation since by re-formation. This the year 1943 and in places and many Italians in South Italy are asking themselves what they have gained by the Armistice, not alone by capitulation. In fact for reasons of military necessity there is little difference between what can be done in East or Central in the way of requisitioning, etc. than there would be if the Italians had resisted us to the last. But I am not so much concerned at the Italian aspect of all this. At least I hope it that we intend to maintain a sufficiency of supplies to prevent disorder in the post-war and that we should the proper amount the free will of the Italian people <sup>that</sup> that free expression.

I fear more the effort outside Italy and as we are now preparing for a general assault on Europe, I may perhaps be accused for withdrawing from our Italian experience. First, in our future dealings with our present enemies it would be better if we began by an earlier and severity, provided it were just and provided that initial decisions in our hands were not rectified by later conditions. This is a procedure with which the Germans have some degree of familiarity and in dealing with Europeans we are faced with peoples in their potential and capacities are developed, however limited their fighting spirit or political capacity. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden may be able to present your views on our enemies and such as we are not expected of their high sense. Secondly, we should be scrupulous in interpreting our commitments as lied or exaggerated. One of the freedoms is freedom from want and it is greatly demanded on our side. There should therefore be very good reasons which can be readily understood of the people before we ever our central approach reservation.

Thirdly, we should not overlook the effect on the European attitude toward European commitments of finding themselves involved in liberal positions. Their natural reaction is to wish to withdraw from the scene and I have heard that more than once my country that the British better be left to sort out the Italian case because they will have to live with the aftermath. They would rather be allowed for "restoration" as such as being held responsible for happen. And to let declaration of independence was genuine and in the best sense American, the free European association in a real way the promise of America to the world and delay in their fulfillment even for good military reasons has a demoralizing effect.

In our anxiety to take care that those that our enemies remain themselves that they have been beaten, we should also remember our reputation for just and liberal dealing. If we were to overlook these things, it would be tragic indeed; for we should be looking ourselves and our past.

Mr. Hon. Harold Macmillan  
British Resident Minister  
5 rue Croix des Boves  
Algiers

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TO MACMILLAN  
SITUATION OF PRESENT SUGGESTIONS  
ITALIAN GOVT. 20% FAR FUTURE  
Italy

HAG/and

TO Rt. Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN  
BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER  
5 RUE PROFESSOR CARTILLET  
ALGIERA

5 December 1943

The Eighth Army offensive has started well and once again there is talk of the possibility of our capturing Rome in a few weeks and of the Germans withdrawing to a Seghena/Thauri line. So a letter on political matters may not come amiss even though you have only just left Brindisi.

The most interesting recent development has been the visit of Coracciola from Naples, where as you know he is in with the Sforza-Crossa group. He came to see Gen.ober and myself after he had finished his round of visits which included Badoglio, Acquarone and Lesece. His visit, he explained, was purely personal. He had been struck by the fact that the gap between the Government and the Naples group seemed to be growing. He thought this highly undesirable at the present time and even dangerous, especially if Rome fell without any understanding having been reached between the two sides. He had accordingly come to Brindisi to find out what were the chances of building some bridge between the Government and Naples. As a result of his conversations he was turning over in his mind the possibility of the King being persuaded to make some public declaration which might enable the representatives of the Six Parties to join in a coalition government. In such a declaration the King might undertake that the constitutional question should be put to and decided by the Italian people at the proper time; that the assent should not be now, but when all Italy could express itself; that as an earnest of his good intention he would not in the meanwhile require any Minister on accepting office to take an oath of personal allegiance to himself; but that he would call on all Italians of whatever party to join together to help to rid the country of the Germans and until that was done to leave the constitutional question in abeyance.

Coracciola said he would go to Naples in the next few days and discuss matters with Sforza. He fully understood that if any such initiative was to be made, it would have to be done by the Italians. On this he held strong views and considered that Allied intervention in these things could only do harm. Indeed even if the Allies had agreed entirely with Sforza's solution of the constitutional issue and insisted on its execution; he for

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*Summary*

The Eighth Army offensive has started well and once again there is talk of the possibility of our capturing Rome in a few weeks and of the Germans withdrawing to a Lohorn/Alinari line. This is a letter on political matters:

Caracciola came to Brindisi from the Sforza-Croce group at Naples to see if a bridge could be built between latter group and the Badoglio-King Government before the fall of Rome. He suggested that the King make a public declaration which would enable representatives of the Six Parties to form a coalition government, joining together to help rid the country of the Germans, and after that letting the people decide on the constitutional question.

Caracciola thought any such initiative should be done by the Italians without Allied intervention. He said that if no understanding was reached between the Government and the Parties before the fall of Rome, representatives of the latter might set up a Comune and refuse to recognize the King's authority in any way. This would be embarrassing to all concerned.

We do not know what line the Party leaders in Rome might take, nor do we know how the Vatican will react. We hope for an unwillingness to accept the Badoglio Government of Technicians and a move for the creation of a political Government. Badoglio has agreed to resign when Rome falls.

The Government of Technicians is not in fact nonpolitical but experienced administrators, as its name implies. It is composed partly of experts (Jung, Fano), partly of service representatives (Raimondo Barone, Orlando) and partly of elderly liberal professors (Reali, Siciliani, Corbino). Prunas advised me that Corbino is the best of the new appointments. We met Corbino and Reali, were impressed by their desire to cooperate, but are sure they are not future leaders of Italy.

Jung, who strikes me as above the rest despite his age, has started to reconstitute an Italian administrative machine. Others will follow his lead and it would be well if the whole political future was put in the melting pot several weeks before Rome falls, since senior officials of most ministries will not be available and the archives will be removed by the Germans.

Another role which the Government of Technicians can fulfill is to clear the ground of Fascist debris, through original decrees and following Amnesty requirements.

The King is determined that popular elections for a representative chamber should be held four months after the Armistice. The chamber will decide the constitutional issue by a vote (whether the Monarchy or a new Bill shall be established). The King will accept their verdict, and the representatives of the Six Parties will be satisfied to postpone the issue until dealt with in this way.

The King is not prepared to abdicate before then. He would prefer that the House of Savoy should withdraw altogether before the Crown Prince should have to waive his rights; and his grandson must not mount the throne under present circumstances.

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The King refused Count Sforza's solution because such a question was for the Italian people and not for 20 politicians in Naples. Internal disorders might result from Sforza's solution; this would be disastrous to Italy at the present time.

There are certain things which may facilitate the handling of events:

1. No long time lag between the freeing of Rome and the first contact between the King-Badoglio Government and the Rome Party leaders. The Rome representatives should be urged to go to the King-Badoglio Govt, as no political activity should be allowed in Rome at first. This can be enforced by military authority.
2. Upon the fall of Rome the Allied Advisory Council should be in Italy and easily available to the ACC, so that the controlling of events will not be impaired.
3. In case the King or Badoglio should make some liberal and reasonable public declaration, Allied propaganda could do a great deal, especially by repeating it on the BBC.

These three suggestions may be dubbed as intervention. To a certain extent they are. The first two are also elementary precautions, which should be taken for purely military reasons. Furthermore, non-intervention if carried to the extreme suggests that all solutions are equally acceptable and therefore is itself a positive set of policy. The present tendency is to make the issue clear-cut between a left wing republic (Sforza's overplaying of his hand) and the monarchy. Sforza's remedy secures him a little support. Civil war is most unlikely, but they will probably result in an increasing number of disorders and incidents.

Our intervention is necessary for military and other reasons, but it must be discreet and reduced to the minimum.

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one would have been against it. This though he personally thought Sporn was right in considering his solution as moderate. For instance Sporn recently had been greeted by shouts of "No, no," when he had said in a speech in Naples University that the institution of monarchy should remain. This incident had worried him and had given him the working that if the situation in Naples were allowed to develop without any steadying hand it might go far further than Sporn or Croce wished. He was also worried by what might happen in Rome after the German withdrawal if before then no understanding had been reached between the Government and the Parties. The representatives of the latter might well form an administration amongst their members, try to set themselves up as a *Governo* and refuse to recognize the King's authority in any way. (Judging by what *ASAC* officials tell me of the interval of one or more days that often occurs between German withdrawal and Allied occupation of Italian cities, there might well be time for such a development.) He realized that any such attempt would be highly embarrassing to us. It would admittedly only be an aggravation of the present position in Naples, where strictly speaking no political activity is allowed but where *ASAC* in fact permits political meetings to be held and free access to foreign correspondents. Nevertheless it would be an aggravation of so blatant a kind that it could not be overlooked and the outcome could only be unfortunate for all concerned. For these and other reasons he greatly hoped that something on the lines which he had in mind or on other lines might prove practicable so that some working arrangement between the Government and the Parties could be reached before Rome.

(Our own information about what is happening in Rome is at present worth little or nothing. The operator of the Rome link of the secret *W/S* which works with *Brindisi* has not been in touch with the Party leaders recently and his only news of interest has been to express doubt whether the programme contained in the message of October 22 and November 4 still in fact represents the views of the Party leaders. In short we do not know what to expect from them. Nor do we know what line the Vatican is likely to take. All we can confidently await is an unwillingness to accept the present Badoglio Government of Technicians and a strong move for the creation of a political Government.

This is as it should be. Badoglio has publicly undertaken to resign when Rome has been completely freed and he should do so. The Government of Technicians is not what its name should imply, i. e. nonpolitical but experienced administrators. It is in fact

composed partly of experts, e. g. Jugo for Finance, Pano for Communications, partly of service representatives, e. g. General Padoa-Schioppa for Railways, Admiral Barone for Merchant Marine, General Orlando for War and partly of a flowering of elderly liberal professors with no executive experience, e. g. Professor Reali for Interior, Professor Siciliani for Agriculture, Professor Corbino for Industry and Commerce. Of these Pano advised Ben Heber and me that we should see Professors Reali and Corbino and the general consensus of opinion is that Corbino is the ablest of the new appointments. Witness the fact that he has been made responsible by his colleagues for the question of food supplies. We have accordingly met both and, though I was impressed by their good will and desire to cooperate with us, I am quite clear that these men are not the future leaders of Italy.

This is not to say that they serve no purpose. On the contrary they can do valuable work. The first requirement is to recreate an Italian administrative machine. Jugo, who strikes me as head and shoulders above the rest despite his 68 years, has already started. He of course has had experience of what being a Minister of a Government should be and it is not surprising therefore that his colleagues refer a great many of their departmental problems to him, even if they have no Treasury interest whatever. Necessity will drive others to follow Jugo's lead, especially when the handover of further territory takes place. For this reason it would be well if the handover happened at best a few weeks before Rome fell and the whole political fixture was put in the melting pot. For from what little information that does come through, it seems certain that the senior officials of most Ministries will not be available, that the archives will either have been destroyed or removed by the Germans with the officials, even that office equipment will be missing or that the offices may be blown up. It is of course easier to build up some ministries from personnel and material available in Sicily and Southern Italy than others. For instance the Finance Ministry can call on a number of trained officials in excise and account departments who were normally employed in the provinces. Archives too can be gradually collected and can be supplemented through Allied channels as regards world prices and such published economic and financial data. The same applies to the Ministry of Justice. In other ministries there are greater difficulties, for instance labour questions were dealt with in Rome and I understand the provincial staff are less competent. But in all ministries the effort of organising an administrative machine is essential. As said, it

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will of course be stimulated when more territory is handed over and when the Italian Government can be located in a single area.

A further useful role which the present Government of Technicians can fulfil is to carry forward the work begun by the Badoglio Government after 25 July of clearing the ground of Fascist debris. This has two sides. The one is the promulgation of such decrees as that recently announced abolishing the Fascist Militia. The other is the less spectacular of doing what is required under the Armistice regime. For instance the signature of the amendment to the Naval agreement and the decree whereby the King of Italy gave up the titles of Emperor of Abyssinia and King of Albania. If there are any further such requirements that the Allies have to make, there is a great deal to be said for putting them forward now and asking this Government set their nose to them.

For they cannot hope for any political future. Apart from Badoglio's personal and public undertaking to resign when Rome is completely freed, I understand from the Duke d'Acquarone that the King of Italy is determined that they shall do so. According to the Duke the King's intentions are clear, simple and constitutional. On the 27 July a law was published by the then Badoglio Government laying down that popular elections for a representative chamber would be held four months after the peace. In the King's view it will be up to that chamber to decide the constitutional issue. By a vote they can determine whether the monarchy shall remain or whether a republic shall be established. The King will accept their verdict without question and according to the Duke the King's representatives of the Six Parties are fully aware of this and will be satisfied to postpone the issue until it can be dealt with in this way.

What, however, the King is not prepared to do is to abdicate before them; the more especially if the Crown Prince should also be required to waive his rights. Rather than that, His Majesty would prefer that the House of Savoy as a whole should withdraw from the scene and he would never agree to his grandson mounting the throne in the present circumstances. The Duke implied that His Majesty's reasons for this decision were partly loyalty to the House of Savoy, but equally in part duty to the Italian people. The solution proposed by Count Sforza was in His Majesty's opinion merely a step which would inevitably lead to the overthrow of the Monarchy and his loyalty to his House precluded him from accepting

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it. Further such a question was for the whole Italian people to decide not "for a group of 20 politicians in Naples". Indeed any attempt to settle it from Naples could only lead to internal disorders which would be disastrous to Italy at the present time. In conclusion the Duke opined that Sforza had overplayed his hand and in consequence found himself in an awkward position. He was not sufficiently left to please the left portion and his ventilation of the constitutional question had alienated some moderate elements, especially in the fighting services. This much is undoubtedly true. The visit of Carnedola is a symptom. His anxiety to assure us that Sforza did not hold in any way to his proposal that Badoglio should be Regent is another; he repeated several times that it was only "a suggestion". But whether the Duke is right in his belief that the King leaders will be prepared to postpone these controversial issues until after the war is wholly a different matter. It would of course suit us if they were, but it predicates a reasonableness and readiness to compromise which it would be unreasonable to expect if events are left entirely to themselves. Much may therefore hang upon the attitude of the Allies. When so many factors are so much a matter of speculation, it is impossible and undesirable to lay down any hard and fast plan in advance. But there are certain things which may facilitate the handling of events however they may turn.

In the first place it would be helpful if there was no long-time lag between the freeing of Rome and the first contact between the King and Badoglio and the Fasc Party leaders. This can either be done by the Military authorities allowing His Majesty or the Marshal or their representatives to go into Rome immediately after Allied occupation or by facilitating the journey of the Party leaders to wherever the King and the Marshal may then be. I presume that the military would prefer the latter. Certainly it would be politically more advantageous. But to effect it, the military authorities might have to explain firmly and at once that for the time being no political activity would be allowed in Rome and that the Party leaders could not be permitted any such political license as Sforza and Croce had received in Naples should they refuse to make the journey. Secondly as political decisions may have to be taken rapidly it would be highly desirable that at that time the Allied Advisory Council should be resident in Italy and easily available to the Allied Control Commission. Unless this is the case the possibility of controlling events will obviously be gravely impaired and it may well be impossible to hold the position while every decision is referred to Algiers.

On the propaganda side something may be achieved if the King or Marshal Badoglio on his behalf were ready to make some public declaration of where His Majesty stood in these matters, that is provided the declaration was sufficiently liberal and reasonable lines. In such a case Allied propaganda could do a great deal, if they merely gave the declaration full publicity by repeating it on the B.B.C. For it is a fact that the B.B.C. Italian Service has by far wider public in Italy than any other single organ and is taken by a large section of the Italian public to express the policy and wishes of the British Government and those of the Allies. Consequently publicity for Sforza's speeches has been taken to be a confirmation of British backing; equal publicity for a declaration by the King would be interpreted as British approval. This is partly due to Italian character, partly to Fascist experience. It is a fact and can, if we wish, be used for our purposes.

These three suggestions may be dubbed as intervention. To a certain extent they are. But the first two are also elementary precautions, which we should take for purely military reasons. Further non-intervention if carried to an extreme form, suggests that all solutions are equally acceptable and therefore is itself a positive act of policy. As things are in Italy, I doubt whether all solutions can be viewed with equal indifference. Sforza's anxieties are no doubt in part caused by a feeling that he has overplayed his hand. They are due too, I suspect, to a realization that he has found or called forth forces more violent and more to the left than anything which he personally approves. These manifestations of the left have in turn led to a realisation among the supporters of the Monarchy, especially in the armed services, that they will have to organize themselves for action by votes or otherwise unless their desires are to go by default. In short the present tendency is to make the issue clear out between a left wing republic and the Monarchy. Sforza's regency compromise finds little support and, if things are left to themselves, sharp clashes may occur. These are most unlikely to develop into civil war at present; they will probably only amount to an increasing number of disorders and incidents. But so long as we are fighting in Italy or using it as a base, even such incidents would handicap our military effort and for this reason I doubt whether absolute non-intervention in Italian internal politics is possible, let alone to our military interest. Without question intervention should be discreet and should be reduced to the minimum; but we should not be reluctant to exert pressure from time to time to facilitate results which will suit us. It is in this spirit that the above three suggestions are made.

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