

1163

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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10000/132/336

It

Nov. 19

1164

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

10000/132/336

723.1

Italian Government Telegrams To MISSIONS ABROAD

NOV. 1943 - MARCH 1945

45233/SI.

12th March 1945.

TO: Major Quayle.FROM: Mr J. Wyndham.

It would be appreciated if you would take steps to secure cancellation of letter No.IT.242.54.03 of the 7th March from the Communications Sub-Commission, in which Colonel Henderson asks R.C.A. Rome, Cable and Wireless and Italcables Rome, to note that messages for the Italian Government in clear or in cypher should from now be delivered direct to the addressee and not to this Commission.

The original procedure should stand for the time being as the Acting President, who is away at present, would like to go further into the matter on his return.

11032

Copy to:-

Chief Staff Officer to the Ex-Commissioner,
Colonel Henderson.
Mr H. Hopkinson.

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Communications Sub-Commission

JLH/eye

IT.242.54.CS

7th March, 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Government Communications

TO : R.C.A., Rome.
Cable and Wireless,
Italcables, Rome.

1. Please note that messages for the Italian Government in clear or in cipher should from now be delivered direct to the addressee and not to this Commission.
2. No copy is required by this Commission of such messages.

For the Chief Commissioner:

11041

/s/ J. L. Henderson

J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel,
Director.Copy to: Signal Officer, R.A.A.C.
Civil Censorship
Adjutant's Office, Alcom.
Signal Officer, Alcom.
Message Center, R.A.A.C.

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Office of the Executive Commissioner

SUBJECT: Italian Government Telegrams to
Missions Abroad
TO : Communications Sub-Commission

FILE No. P/723.1

6 March 1945

Request is made that your office submit a draft letter
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explaining the
position with regard to telegrams in the Italian language.

1167

11040

Major,

for Brigadier
Executive CommissionerEncls

SECRET

File

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 381.4-1

22 February 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Government Communications

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 8(a) of the minutes of Secmed's Conference (Political) of 20 February.
2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been notified of the decision reached in MAT 348. which has been repeated to you.
3. Attached for your information is a copy of memo 3/150/6 of 16 February from Mr. MacMillan to the Chief of Staff this Headquarters together with a copy of a memo of 21 February sent by the Chief of Staff in reply.

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Incl: as above

Copies to:
G-2
Sigs
Brit. Res. Min.
U.S. Polad

110.39

*original returned
to Comms S/C 24 Feb 45
S.E.M.*

COPY

Office of the Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean,

3/150/6.

To: Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q.

From: Mr. Macmillan.

Your minute of the 14th February, CS/104.

I understand the position is as follows.

(1) You will not permit outgoing cypher messages to be sent by the Italian Government to its representatives abroad.

(2) You are prepared to agree to bag facilities both inwards and outwards. I am most grateful for this concession, which I think will have a very good effect, and I am glad that you are able to accept the limited risk involved.

2. There is one further point. At present the Italian Ambassador in London, who holds a cypher approved by us, takes his cyphered messages to the Foreign Office to be despatched. This naturally somewhat cramps his style on reporting interviews etc. I am informed that A.F.H.Q. have no objection to his sending them direct to the Italian Foreign Office in Rome through the normal telegraphic channel. It has been the practice to give a copy of the cyphered telegrams to the Allied Commission so that it may check incoming messages. I take it that you see no reason for insisting upon this on security grounds, and I propose to abandon it on political grounds. Outgoing telegrams will, however, be shown to the Allied Commission as before.

/s/ B.M.

16th February 1945

COPY

SECRET

CS/114

21st February, 1945

To: Mr. Macmillan

From: Chief of Staff

1. There is no objection on military security grounds to what you propose in para 2 of your minute, 3/150/6 of 16th February.
2. The newly appointed Ambassador to Washington is taking with him a cipher approved by us, and there is no objection from our point of view to his being given the same privileges as the Italian Ambassador in London.

/s/ I.H.

C.ofS.

110.7

SECRET *PosSec 549*ALLIED FOR HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/geb

G-5: 387.4-1

17 February 1945

SUBJECT: Italian diplomatic communications

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394

1. Reference is made to your signal 1822 of 16 February.

2. Attached for your information is copy of a memorandum which has to-day been submitted to IS&PS as a basis for an item for consideration at the forthcoming Sacmed's political meeting.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. Jackman
T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. ColonelIncl:
as above.*cc: Chief Com.*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

17 February 1945

G-5: 387.4-1

SUBJECT: Cable and Bag Facilities for Italian Representatives abroad.
TO : IS & PS.

In a cable dated 16 February Allied Commission suggested that the policy laid down in PAN 487 of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy and other Nations can only be implemented on the basis of far reaching relaxation of the restrictions on Italian diplomatic communications and the cable requested review of the position without delay. The restrictions referred to have in the past precluded the Italian Government from communicating in cipher undeposited with the Allied Authorities and have made them disclose the contents of their diplomatic bags to the Allied Authorities before despatch.

In fact the possibility of relaxing the above restrictions has very recently been the subject of detailed study at this HQ arising out of representations made by Mr. MacMillan. On the 14 February the Chief of Staff informed Mr. MacMillan by letter that for reasons of military security it was still not considered possible to recommend that the Italian Government should be allowed undeposited cipher facilities but that if considered politically desirable objection would not be taken to allowing the Italian Government secret bag facilities with their representatives abroad.

Mr. MacMillan's reply has not yet been received, but as it is known that he was in favour of relaxation of such restrictions as were possible, permission pending his reply has in fact been given for TAMERIANI, the Ambassador designate to the United States, to carry a sealed diplomatic pouch with him when he leaves Italy to take up his post.

It is suggested that a final decision might be obtained at the meeting on Tuesday.

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. 11036

CC: CC FILES

SECRET

723.1

4.

M: Halford

PR Sec.

Please see minute 3. Chief Commission
has decided that the Signal should

be. Excluded from process
1572.

Be up.

Halford
11-7-50

11005

Excluded from per. con.
1573

See spec.

Handwritten signature
11-1-10

~~Comm. S/C.~~ (1)
C.O.S. (2)

(1)

The C.C. has directed that a cable be sent to AFHQ, urging that the present restrictions on telegraphic & bag communications between the U.S. Gov. & their diplomatic missions should be relaxed in harmony with the policy of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy & the United Nations & neutrals.

A HC is submitted for your urgent consideration.

Comm. S/C. pl. pass to C.O.S.

12/10/45

Halford
(A. S. HALFORD),
Asst. Political Adviser
Political Section

(2)

C. 7 S.

Passes. This item has no objection to the proposed report.

Lin — Comm S/C.

For

11026

consideration.

3. Com. S/C. pl. pres to COS.

12/10/45

Healy
(A. S. HALLFORD),
Asst. Political Adviser
Political Section

(21)

C. 9 S. Passes. This office has no objection to
the proposed staff. C. 10 Passes S/C.

14 Feb.

110334

Chief Commission.

I submit that we should deal with PAN
487 in one or possibly ^{three} comprehensive documents

that piece meal.

- (1) General Policy Statement, including commonwealth
will be submitted tomorrow
 - (2) Finance. Already covered
 - (3) IPORD. Has submitted tomorrow.
- But no more.

Healy
Asst. Com. S/C

FOR ACTION TO AFHQ FOR SACRED RTD FOR INFO TO BRITISH RESMEX CMA US POLAD

1822

15 FEB 45

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS CIPHER AND BAG FACILITIES FOR ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES
ABROAD PD REFERENCE GEORGE DASH FIVE SECTION LTR TO THIS HQ GEORGE DASH FIVE
CLM THREE EIGHT SEVEN POINT FOUR DASH ONE OF TWO FIVE JANUARY PD
PARA FOR ACTION TO AFHQ FOR SACRED RTD FOR INFO TO BRITISH RESMEX CMA
US POLAD FROM HQ ALCON CITE ACSCC PARA

PARA TWO PD ITEM SUGGEST AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION THAT POLICY LAID DOWN IN
PAR FOUR EIGHT SEVEN OF PERMITTING DIRECT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
ITALY AND UNITED NATIONS AND NEUTRALS CAN ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED ON BASIS OF
PAR DASH REACHING RELAXATION OF PRESENT RESTRICTIONS PD CENSORSHIP OF
ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC CABLES AND MAIL CAN BE ~~XXX~~ SATISFACTORILY CARRIED OUT
ONLY BY MY POLITICAL SECTION AND IF SUCH CENSORSHIP IS TO CONTINUE PROPOSED
ABOLITION OF POLITICAL SECTION WILL BE A CHANGE IN NAME ONLY PD ITEM
THEREFORE TRUST THAT POSITION WILL BE FAVORABLY REVIEWED WITHOUT DELAY

725.1

Copies to:

British Embassy.

Chief of Staff.

U. S. Embassy.

Communications Sub-Commission.

Political Section.

1003

Political Section

279

A.S. HALFORD
Asst Political
Advisor.

Draft Cable

SECRET

TO : AFHQ for Sacred

FROM: ALCON CITE ACSCC

Copies to: ~~British Resident Minister~~
~~U.S. Political Adviser~~
Chief of Staff
Communications Sub-Commission
British Embassy
U.S. Embassy

Poi Sec

Subject is cipher and bag facilities for Italian Representatives abroad. Reference G-5 Section Letter to this HQ G-5: 387.4-1 of 25 January. I suggest after due consideration that policy laid down in PAN 487 of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy and United Nations and Neutrals can only be implemented on basis of far-reaching relaxation of present restrictions. Censorship of Italian diplomatic cables and mail can be satisfactorily carried out only by my Political Section and if such censorship is to continue proposed abolition of Political Section will be a change in name only. I therefore trust that position will be favorably reviewed without delay.

3

*OP
Emg*

11032

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TRH/TBJ/as

G-5: 387.4-1

25 January 1945

SUBJECT: Communications for diplomatic representatives.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Concurrence has now been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the proposals contained in MAT 469 (a copy of which was sent to you under reference G-5: 387.4-1 of 19 December) namely that it is not yet advisable to allow the Italian Government to communicate with their representatives abroad in cipher undeposited with and not approved by the Allied Authorities and that the Italians can only be allowed bag facilities subject to their contents being disclosed to the Allied Authorities before despatch.

2. In the same cable COS give adherence to the principle that bag and cipher facilities are not to be allowed at the present time to neutrals represented in Italy with the exception of the Swiss who are allowed facilities for a diplomatic bag. Subject to this there is no objection to neutrals in Italy having direct relations with the Italian Government providing the Allied Commission is kept informed as they are in the case of the relations of governments of the United Nations with the Italian Government.

3. It is requested that you act in accordance with the above and issue such instructions as may be necessary. For your information it may be stated that the possibility of relaxing or doing away with the restrictions on the Italian Government communications is being reviewed at the direction of the Chief of Staff this HQ and you will be kept informed of the position.

T.R. Henn

T. R. HENN, Colonel
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

11031

*Original & previous
published
220-Rome*

*RECEIVED
JAN 26 1945*

SECRET

COPYALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 Section
AFHQ

G-3: 387.4-1

17 February 1945

SUBJECT: Cable and Bag Facilities for Italian Representatives abroad.

TO : IS & IM.

In a cable dated 16 February Allied Commission suggested that the policy laid down in FAR 487 of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy and other Nations can only be implemented on the basis of far reaching relaxation of the restrictions on Italian diplomatic communications and the cable requested review of the position without delay. The restrictions referred to have in the past precluded the Italian Government from communicating in cipher undeposited with the Allied Authorities and have made them disclose the contents of their diplomatic bags to the Allied Authorities before despatch.

In fact the possibility of relaxing the above restrictions has very recently been the subject of detailed study at this HQ arising out of representations made by Mr. MacMillan. On the 14 February the Chief of Staff informed Mr. MacMillan by letter that for reasons of military security it was still not considered possible to recommend that the Italian Government should be allowed undeposited cipher facilities but that if considered politically desirable objection would not be taken to allowing the Italian Government secret bag facilities with their representatives abroad.

Mr. MacMillan's reply has not yet been received, but as it is known that he was in favour of relaxation of such restrictions as were possible, permission pending his reply has in fact been given for MacMillan, the Ambassador designate to the United States, to carry a sealed diplomatic pouch with him when he leaves Italy to take up his post.

It is suggested that a final decision might be obtained at the meeting on Tuesday.

11030

CHARLES V. SPURDIN,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

SECRET

*Will Commission
will return
to our file on
this. FWT, 2 Feb 45*

SECRET

SECRETALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO SF 9

O-3: 337.4-1

17 February 1946

SUBJECT: Cable and Bag Facilities for Italian Representatives abroad.

TO : IS & WH.

In a cable dated 16 February Allied Commission suggested that the policy laid down in WH 487 of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy and other Nations can only be implemented on the basis of far reaching relaxation of the restrictions on Italian diplomatic communications and the cable requested review of the position without delay. The restrictions referred to have in the past precluded the Italian Government from communicating in cipher undecoded with the Allied Authorities and have made them disclose the contents of their diplomatic bags to the Allied Authorities before despatch.

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Mr. Macmillan's reply has not yet been received, but as it is known that he was in favour of relaxation of such restrictions as were possible, permission pending his reply has in fact been given for WH 487. The Ambassador designate to the United States, to carry a sealed diplomatic pouch with him when he leaves Italy to take up his post.

It is suggested that a final decision might be obtained at the meeting on Tuesday.

14030

CHARLES H. SPURFORD,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

SECRET

Chief Commission
will not be
own file on

this. HST 12 Jul 45

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: P/723.1

3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Government Messages

TO : Italoable Office
Via Calabria 46-48
Rome, Italy

1. Your letter 1519 of 23 February 1945 is hereby acknowledged.
2. The four telegrams referred to therein have been returned to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and no further correspondence regarding them has been received.
3. Regarding the last paragraph of your letter, it is regretted that it is not understood.

Major,
for
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

722

11029

Major Stewart.

I suggest you
inform Italcable that (1)
the 4 fols. have been
returned to the ^{US} A.
& nothing has been heard
of them since & (2) the
last sentence is
unintelligible to us.

[Signature]
1/2/48

Cpl. Decker.

I regret you
 lost your set of
 papers & the cds.
 Mr. H. Cittadini took
 them away.

The last para.
 seems to me to be
 quite inaccurate.

Mr. Halford:

[Signature]
 26/10

Cittadini returned the tds
 to the Ministry explaining
 that they must not be
 sent direct to Stal Radio,
 but thru Pol Sec. MLD.

27 Feb 47

Mr. Helford:

25 Feb 45

Reference attached letter from ITALRADIO, the four messages in question were delivered direct to ITALRADIO for transmission by the new Rome/Moscow radio link, as Italian Gov't messages.

The military censor returned them to me, and I in turn passed them back to Cittadini, explaining that all such telegrams should be passed in the normal way through Political Section, and not be presented direct to ITALRADIO.

How may I answer the attached letter, and particularly the last paragraph.

Mail 1945

ITALCABLE

SERVIZI CABLOGRAFICI RADIOTELEGRAFICI E RADIOELETTICI

SCA PER AZIONI CAPITALE L. 175.000.000

SEDE IN ROMA

DIREZIONE GENERALE

REPARTO Esercizio

1549

ROMA, February 23rd 1945

VIA CALABRIA 44-46 CASELLA POSTALE 0-1340

THE ALLIED COMMISSION
Political Section

R O M A

MESSAGES IN ABRAYANCE

Gentlemen,

We beg to advise that the following messages :

N° 05 Feb/3 Govt 15 wds. Rome to Ambasciata Soviettica
Moscow transferred to A.C. Feb/5

N° 04 " " 19 wds. Rome to Hil⁷ Moscow transferred
to A.C. Feb/5

N° 9 Feb/11 " 36 wds. Rome to Ambasciata Italiana Moscow
transferred to A.C. Feb/11

N° 3 Feb/18 ord. 35 wds. Rome to Ambasciata Italia Moscow
transferred to A.C. Feb/18

transferred to you for controlling purposes on the dates respectively indicated, as yet neither were returned to our operating office for their handling, nor notice was given upon the reason they were held.

For our guidance we shall greatly appreciate to be informed how they were disposed of and to know if we may expect them in return in due course.

We take the occasion to advise that according to our instructions we are authorised to handle govt traffic on our circuit Rome-Moscow, excepting messages redacted in code.

Very truly yours,

ITALCABLE

PER INFORMAZIONI E PER INFORMAZIONI 3

ADDEBITO TELEGRAFICO ITALCABLE

Gentlemen,

We beg to advise that the following messages :

- N° 05 Feb/3 govt 15 wds. Rome to Ambasciata Soviettica
Moscow transferred to A.C. Feb/5
- N° 04 " " 19 wds. Rome to Lily Moscow transferred
to A.C. Feb/5
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transferred to A.C. Feb/18

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For our guidance we shall greatly appreciate to be informed how they were disposed of and to know if we may expect them in return in due course.

We take the occasion to advise that according to our instructions we are authorised to handle govt traffic on our circuit Rome-Moscow, excepting messages redacted in code.

Very truly yours,

ITALIA
DIREZIONE GENERALE
DIREZIONE GENERALE

Handwritten signature

11023

Handwritten mark

Executive Commissioner: AC.

My views on the attached letter No. 3/355 of March 3rd from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Chief Commissioner, are as follows.

2. Bag Facilities. There is no objection to the carriage of sealed diplomatic bags by officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs who occasionally proceed abroad. As the Minister suggests, such officials should carry a form of Courier Passport which would protect their bags from investigation by the Allied military authorities at the place of departure and subsequent ports of call and at their destination. It would be advisable to settle the form that this document should take and advise Allied Force Headquarters of its existence.

Cypher Facilities. There is no question of granting the Italians undeposited cypher facilities.

Allied Force Headquarters have been consistently opposed to any relaxation of this control on strictly military security grounds and I do not feel that any further arguments have been produced on the Italian side to justify undertaking the matter up again with Caserta. We can however inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that since the objection to the grant of undeposited cypher facilities is based exclusively on grounds of military security this Commission will not in future exercise any control from the political angle. Incoming telegrams from Italian diplomatic missions abroad will in future be delivered direct to the Ministry and I had hoped that we should have been able to tell the Ministry that there would be no check on these telegrams either on political, military or cryptographical grounds. I have however just learnt that the British Government consider it desirable that incoming telegrams also must continue to be checked from the point of view of cryptographical security. I am not surprised at this decision since I have recently seen telegrams from the Italian Minister at Bern dealing with matters of military importance in North Italy at the present time which were transmitted in cyphers of very doubtful security and even in one cypher known to be held by the Germans. As regards outgoing telegrams, there will be no political censorship but there must be military censorship and for the same reasons which I have just mentioned a check on the use of Italian cryptographical methods of communication. Although the Italian Government claim that their cypher systems are perfectly secure, it must be placed on record that their lax system of using cyphers is a permanent source of danger to Allied military security and therefore, while not wishing in any way to teach the Italians better for their own good, we must, so long as military operations continue in this theatre, insist on their observing the same standards of cypher security which we ourselves observe.

File 8/223.1
passed to
Case Com
20.10.45

723.1

627

Translation.

3/355

Rome, March 3rd, 1945

My dear Admiral,

I thank you for your kind letter of February 27th with which you acquaint me with the results of the detailed study made by the Allied Force Headquarters on the question of communications between the Italian Government and their diplomatic Missions abroad.

I notice with the greatest satisfaction that the Allied Authorities, pursuant to Mr. Mc Millan's Aide-Memoire of February 25th, have decided to allow the Italian Government secret bag facilities for use in correspondence with their representatives abroad.

As the difficulties of transport do not consent, for the time being, the establishment of a regular Italian courier - service it is understood that as a rule the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will directly forward the sealed pouches to the British and United States Embassies and that the Italian Missions abroad will do likewise.

However, similarly to the procedure followed on occasion of the departure of Ambassador TARCHIANI for Washington, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whenever they consider it necessary, will entrust sealed pouches to the officials provided with diplomatic passports, who are leaving to take up their appointments abroad or who are undertaking a whatsoever journey duly authorized by the competent Allied Authorities.

The aforesaid officials will be furnished with special papers stating their quality as diplomatic couriers.

As regards cable communications in undeposited cypher I cannot refrain repeating to you, my dear Admiral, our deepest disappointment for the deferment of a favourable decision on the matter - I am sure you will agree with me that the direct diplomatic relations between Italy and other States will remain partly unfruitful and devoid of practical contents until the Italian Government and their Representatives will be accorded free cypher facilities.

I must emphasize, on the other hand, that the new code systems prepared by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs offer, according to our competent Authorities, full security guarantees, nor does a presumption to the contrary appear to us to be altogether warranted.

I am therefore again compelled to resort to your courtesy begging you to inform the Allied Force Headquarters of the above considerations and to renew the earnest request that undeposited cypher facilities be granted the Italian Government as soon as possible.

p.t.o.

With a subsequent Memorandum the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will answer the observation and suggestions contained in your letter concerning cable communications with Moscow.

In thanking you for the interest you will deem fit to take in the matter and in which I place full confidence, I convey to you, my dear Admiral, the expression of my high consideration.

I have been in your office for some time and have had the opportunity to study the material which you have submitted to me. I am sure that the material is of great value to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and I am sure that it will be of great value to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I am sure that the material is of great value to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and I am sure that it will be of great value to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I am sure that the material is of great value to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and I am sure that it will be of great value to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

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JLH/eps

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Communications Sub-Commission
Tel: 489031 Ext: 400

26th January, 1945

In reply
refer to: C.119.27.CS

Subject : Rome - Moscow Radio Telegraph Circuit

To : The Under-Secretary of State for P.T.

1. Further to our letter of 20th December, 1944 (C.119.101 CS) and with reference to your Prot. S/13/4017 of 23 November, the release of equipment and assignment of frequencies have been completed and satisfactory exchange of test signals has taken place.
2. Copies of censorship regulations for this circuit are enclosed. It will be observed that ciphered communications of the Italian Government are required to follow present authorised channels. The regulations for the public should be made public by your office at the earliest opportunity.
3. The circuit may be opened on 27th January. This Commission will notify the Russian Embassy to this effect. It is suggested that it be opened to the public on 1st Feb. 1945, so as to allow time for the notices to be circulated.

J.L.HENDERSON
Colonel,
Director.

11025

*See File
700*

Incl: Censorship Regulations
Regulations for the Public.

Copy to: Chief of Staff
Political Section

Ref: P/723.1

20th January 1945

The Political Section of the Allied Commission presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to them herewith a copy of telegram No. 58 from the Italian Minister at Bern.

2. The appropriate authorities of the Allied Commission suggest that the Ministry should telegraph instructions to Signor Berio, through the Allied Commission to cancel their telegram No. 24 to him and not to send it on to the Italian Legation at Bucharest. Should the Ministry still desire to send this telegram, or any other Government message to Bucharest, it is pointed out that a safe Allied channel already exists, namely through the Political Section of this Commission.

The Italian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
Palazzo Chigi,
ROME.

Enclosure: copy of telegram No. 58
from Italian Minister at
Bern.

S 39/385-9

1:024

Cipher Security Mission:

AN
O

1. Please see attached copies in clear and in code of message 58 from Bern.
2. This message has not been transmitted to I.M.F.A.
3. Do you see any objection to our passing this message on, and do you have any comments to make in its regard?

J.M. Decker
Political Section

18 Jan 45

J.P. K
1/18/45

~~4. This~~ This should be passed on to Ministers by you
2. Ministers should be told ^{by you} to wire to Bern through AC telling BERNE to cancel Minister's NO 24 and not repeat not send it on to Bucharest. 17023

3. Ministers should be told ^{by you} if they still want to send P.T.O.

This on any other confidential
message that Allied Channel
already exists & only requires
their handing the message to
Political Section.

Sample

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

23 November 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: U. S. Representative, Advisory Council for Italy.
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Italian Government Telegrams.

It would be appreciated if the attached message, which has been approved for transmission by the Political Section, might be despatched as indicated in confidential code.

WILLIAM F. SCHOTT
Vice-President, Political Section

Encl

11022

Secstate

Washington

_____, November 21, _____

For Danish Legation, ~~XXXX~~ from Danish Legation, Rome

Quote:

Unquote

Kirk

American Legation

Bern

WWS:dd

_____, Nov^{ember} 21 _____

For Italian Legation from Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs *signed Toffi*

"Reference shipments of rice by train to Germany via Switzerland:

Ministry approves steps which you have taken with the Federal

Government. This office is awaiting further information. (Above

refers to your 506 of November 4)"

Kirk

approved for trans

a/ ERS

11021

SECRET

Political Section
6/1139
HL

ACWAP FOR CCS AND CENTRAL DISTRICT UK BASE SEC (LONDON) FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, SHAPE, ALCOM FOR INFORMATION.

65/17

APR 1 SIGNED *Wilson*

PX 53734

NOV 17 1937A

PRIORITY

CITE PHOEN

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

SECRET.

Paragraph three of MAP 796 requested specific guidance on whether in connection with the naming of direct representatives by ITALY such representatives are to be allowed secret communication with their Govt. Imminence of such representatives taking up their posts makes guidance necessary at once and it is requested that a reply be given on this point alone if not possible yet to reply fully to the whole cable.

AC DIST
 Action - S.O. to Chief Commissioner

Info C o S
 Political Sent
 File

723

HEADQUARTERS

18 NOV 1944

SECRET.

Paragraph three of MAP 796 requested specific guidance on whether in connection with the naming of direct representatives by ITALY such representatives are to be allowed secret communication with their Govt. Imminence of such representatives taking up their posts makes guidance necessary at once and it is requested that a reply be given on this point alone if not possible yet to reply fully to the whole cable.

AC DIST
Action - S.O. to Chief Commissioner
Info C o S
Political Sect
File

723



Nov 17 1820A

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS TBJ/seb
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 311.5-6

20 December 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Government communications
with its mission in Argentina.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your memo of 13,
December.

2. Information has been received that the State
Department approves direct code communication between
the Italian Government and its mission in Buenos Aires,
providing the procedure involving submission to
Political Section, Allied Commission, of all such
communications be maintained

For the Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5: *W*
W

T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel.

11019

FROM: MR GATTY

CAPT. DUKE

Annex. Floor 2. Room 52. Tel. Ext. 515

TO: Political Sec.

DATE: 30 Oct 1944

Thank you for letting us see this 11018
I will let ~~DELL~~ ROBA know that
this has been taken up

F.R. Catty

723

File

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

Ref : 723

29 October 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

SUBJECT : Italian Communication

1. It has been noted from your Memorandum G-5: JLI.5-6 of the 24th October that the State Department has been asked to reconsider its decision on the subject of Italian Government Communications with its Embassy in the Argentine. Meanwhile, a memorandum has been received from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs giving additional reasons from their own point of view for the re-establishment of direct communications with Buenos Aires instead of the present system of routing traffic through Madrid.

2. We should be glad to know as soon as possible what decision is reached on this subject?

H. A. CACOLA
Vice President, Political Section

11017



6/845/381

Citazione 7/10/25/2

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

of 24 Oct.

pp

the 24/10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE POLITICAL SECTION A.C.

The competent Allied Authorities have restricted direct cable communications with the Italian Missions abroad to the Embassies in Ankara and in Madrid, to the Legations in Bern, Dublin, Lisbon and Stockholm and finally to the Consulate General Tangiers, excluding the Embassy in Buenos Aires with which it is necessary to communicate through Madrid. As regards this latter exclusion, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs wish to point out:

- 1) - the control of the telegrams in arrival and in departure always takes place in Rome;
- 2) - the complicated system of communications through Madrid causes often delays and repetitions;
- 3) - the transmission of telegrams through Madrid is doubtlessly more expensive.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be therefore grateful should the Allied Commission authorize the re-establishment of direct cable communications with Buenos Aires.

14613

Rome, October 27th, 1944.

SECRET

Pol Sec

*W.S.
1411*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

FJS/mls

G-5: 311.5-6

24 October 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Communication.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Political Section).

1. In connection with your memo 723 of 16 September 1944, the State Department has been asked to reconsider its decision in regards to Italian Government Communications to its Embassy in Argentine.

2. You will be informed of its decision when received.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

HEADQUARTERS
25 OCT 1944
A. C. C.

F. J. Slaughter
F. J. SLAUGHTER,
Captain, U.S. G.D.

Communication Section

to Secy

*MAC
266*

11015

SECRET

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

FJ3/als

G-5: 311.5-6

24 October 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Communication.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Political Section).

1. In connection with your memo 723 of 16 September 1944, the State Department has been asked to reconsider its decision in regards to Italian Government Communications to its Embassy in Argentine.

2. You will be informed of its decision when received.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

F. J. SLAUGHTER,
Captain, A.G.D.

11014

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

Ref : 723

30 September 1944

SUBJECT: Communications - Italian Government
Cablegrams to Embassies Abroad

TO : G-5 Section, A.P.H.Q.

1. Reference is made to your G-5: 311.5-6 dated 24 Sep 44.
2. Messages are addressed to the offices of Embassies, etc.
3. No rules have been laid down by us as to individuals authorized as signers; the normal rules exist within the Italian Government offices, and we are satisfied that messages are duly authenticated by the appropriate official.
4. In any case messages are passed by this office before transmission, and we are thus the authority responsible for the texts.

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice President, Political Section

723

1.013

JLH/epc

WS
AC

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 594
Telephone 439081 Ext. 400

29th September, 1944

In reply
refer to: CS/31/1/18

Subject : Memo

To : Political Section

1. I think the answer had better be made from your office, as I do not make the rules, if any exist. The appended draft is suggested as a basis for reply:

"Subject: Italian Government Cablegrams

To: A.F.H.Q.
Att: G-5

Reference your 311.5-6 dated 24th Sept.

1. Messages are addressed to the offices of Embassies etc.
2. No rules have been laid down by us as to individuals authorised as signers; the normal rules exist within the Italian Government offices, and we are satisfied that messages are duly authenticated by the appropriate official.
3. In any case messages are passed by this office before transmission, and we are thus the authority responsible for the texts.

Political Section

J. L. Henderson
J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel

Director, Communications Sub-Commission

11012

TO: Communications Sub-Commission

FROM: Political Section

Could you supply the answer?

HAC

HAROLD A. GACCIA

29 September 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/as

AC
W/S

G-5: 311.5-6

24 September 1944

SUBJECT: Communications - Italian Government Cablegrams to Embassies Abroad.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to this Section's 311.5-6 of 6 Sep and to your reply CG/31/1/7 of 15 Sep.

2. Communications Censorship, G-2, have asked who will be the individuals authorized as addressees or signer (see paragraph 2 of our 311.5-6 of 6 Sep referred to above). Request you submit this information here soonest.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

1011


T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section,
APO 512

TRJ/laco

6.2

G-5: 311.5-6

6 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Communications - Italian Government Cablegrams to
Embassies abroad.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
A. C. C. 394


1. Reference G-5: 311.5-6 of 4 August.

2. This H.Q. has now no objection to the extension of the facilities requested with the exception of Argentina where the privilege must be withheld. The concession granted on the distinct understanding that all cables in cipher will be handed to you in clear, and cipher, and that the cipher books are deposited with you.

3. It is necessary for this H.Q. to be provided with a list of the approved missions, cable addressees and individuals authorized as addressees or signers. It is requested that this be supplied to this H.Q. in quadruplicate to ensure adequate distribution.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. JACKMAN
T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel.



11019

CONFIDENTIAL

JLH/tjj

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Tel. 489051 : Extn. 400

15 September, 1944.

In reply
refer to: CG/31/1/7

Subject: Italian Government Cablegrams.

To: Allied Force Headquarters (attention G-5).

Reference your letter No. G-5: 311.5-6 dated
6th September, 1944.

1. The list of Italian Embassies abroad with which
communications will be resumed are:-

ANKARA, BERNE, STOCKHOLM, DUBLIN,

In addition to those already authorized, viz:

MADRID, LISBON, TANGIERS.

2. The cable address is either:-

ITAL DIPL or ITALCONSUL

(according to whether it is a Diplomatic or
Consular Office),

followed by the name of the town.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner.

J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel,
Director, Communications Sub-Commission.

11009

JLH/epc

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Telephone 489081 Ext.400

26th September, 1944

In reply
refer to: CS/31/1/14

Subject : Italian Government Message Traffic.

To : Political Section. ✓
Adjutant's Office A.C.C.HQS.
A.C.C., Signals.
A.C.C., Cipher Office.

Herewith final draft of the proposed new issue
of Executive Memorandum No. 46 now in the hands of the
R.C. and M.C. Section for publication.



J.L. HENDERSON
Colonel
Director, Communications Sub-Commission

Incl: Draft Memo.

1.003

JLH/epc

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM NUMBER 46ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MESSAGE TRAFFIC1. INTERNAL

(a) Italian Government messages within Government territory, except Sardinia, are not subject to censorship; messages may be in clear or in cipher. They may be subject to inspection, if required, to check the official nature of the message.

(b) Italian Government messages to or from Sardinia are liable to censorship; ciphers will therefore only be used on this channel that have been approved by Allied authorities and of which copies are held. The censorship exercised will be laid down by the Communications Sub-Commission from time to time, in accordance with instructions from the military authorities concerned.

2. EXTERNAL

(a) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated submarine cables from Naples to Malta or from Brindisi to Malta for Italian Missions, etc., abroad. Messages are subject to the approval of the Political Section, A.C.C.; they may be in clear or in the codes and or ciphers approved by Allied Force Headquarters. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Attachment "A".

(b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Italy to the United States or the United Kingdom for any addresses dealt with by the operating companies.

On these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the Political Section and also to Field Press Censorship in case of Press messages: they may only be in clear and will be of an entirely non-secret nature. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Attachment "B".

3. GENERAL

Italian Government messages may be passed over Allied operated circuits, telegraph, cable or radio, as arranged with the military authorities concerned from time to time. These arrangements will be made the subject of instructions issued as required.

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

ATTACHMENT "A"

PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TRAFFIC OVER THE
COMMERCIALY OPERATED CABLES, NAPLES - MALTA AND BRINDISI - MALTA.

1. All messages will bear the message instruction 'FIL' (to be transmitted by landline or cable only) at the beginning.
2. Outgoing messages may only be addressed to Italian Embassies, Missions, etc., abroad, and the Italian Embassy in the Argentine is specifically excluded from these communications.
3. Outgoing messages for transmission in clear. Messages will be handed in by the Italian Government to the Political Section, Headquarters, A.C.C., Rome. After approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the HQ Adjutant's office with an endorsement on one copy "Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CLEAR" signed by the endorsing officer. Messages will then be authenticated by the HQ Adjutant's office and passed to the A.C.C. Signal Center for transmission to the military signal office controlling the cable office.
4. Outgoing messages for transmission in cipher. Cipher and clear text copies will be handed by the Italian Government to the Political Section, HQ's A.C.C. After approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the HQ Adjutant's office, with an endorsement on one cipher copy "Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CIPHER" signed by the endorsing officer. A ciphered copy will then be authenticated by the HQ Adjutant's office and passed to the A.C.C. Signal Center for transmission to the military signal office controlling the cable office. A second cipher copy together with a clear copy will be sent by the HQ Adjutant's office to the A.C.C. Signal Center, for check for agreement of texts; after check both these copies will be returned to the Political Section with any necessary comment.
It should be noted that cipher copies of approved messages may be passed for transmission without being delayed for the check by A.C.C. Signals.
5. Incoming Messages. Incoming messages, in clear or in cipher will be delivered without delay to the Italian Government. A clear copy of each message will also be delivered to the Political Section.
6. All charges by the cable company will be met by the Italian Government.

ATTACHMENT "B"PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TRAFFIC OVER THE
COMMERCIALY OPERATED RADIO CIRCUITS FROM ITALY TO THE U.S. AND U.K.

1. Outgoing messages may be addressed to any address dealt with by the operating companies.
2. Messages will be in clear only, and will be of an entirely non-secret nature.
3. Messages will be handed to the Political Section, Hqrs. A.C.C. After approval they will be sent to the Hq. Adjutant's office with an endorsement on one copy "Approved for transmission over commercial radio IN CLEAR, subject to Field Press Censorship Approval" signed by the endorsing officer. The latter part of this endorsement will be deleted if it is not a press message.
The message will then be authenticated by the Hq. Adjutant's office and passed to the radio operating company for transmission, via Field Press Censorship if so endorsed.
4. Incoming messages will be delivered to the Hq. Adjutant's Office A.C.C., which will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the Political Section.
5. All charges by the radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

1:005

File

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

Ref 703

15 September 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters.
Copies to: Communications Censorship, AFHQ,
British Resident Minister,
U. S. Political Advisor,
British High Commissioner,
U.S. Representative, Advisory Council to Italy,
Communication Sub-Commission, A.C.C.

With reference to your memoranda GCB/1101 and G-5:311.5-6 of the 5th and 6th September, your attention is drawn to the danger in excluding the Italian Embassy in Argentina from the concession.

2. The routine that has necessarily been followed by the Italian Foreign Office for some time, and by this restriction must continue to be followed, is for all communications to and from the Argentine to be transmitted via Madrid. This involves a first transmission in one cipher held by Madrid and Buenos Aires and a second transmission in the cipher approved and checked by Allied Authorities.

3. It is evident that the existence of two cipher copies of the same texts is a serious factor in reducing the security value of either cipher, particularly as we must assume that the cipher in use on the Madrid-Buenos Aires link is known to the enemy.

723

4. On the other hand, except for causing delay and inconvenience, there is nothing gained by the restriction. It is not considered that it would be reasonable to ban all Italian Government communications with the Italian Embassy at Buenos Aires because of the political tendencies of the Argentine Government.

5. Perhaps you would care to reconsider this ruling in view of the above considerations.

H. A. Goodie
Vice President
Political Section.

11004

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512, US Army

CCB/1101

5 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Italian Official Cables.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
Att: Director, Communications Sub-Commission,
APO 394, U.S. Army.

1. It has been agreed that the Italian Government may now send to their missions abroad cipher cables. The exception to the agreement is the Argentine.

2. The cables will be handled in exactly the same way in which the present government cables are being handled.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

/s/ Thomas H. Finn
THOMAS H. FINN
Lt. Col., Inf.,
Communications Censorship.

11003

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section,
APO 512

G-5: 311.5-6

6 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Communications - Italian Government Cablegrams to
Embassies abroad.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
A.P.O. 394.

1. Reference G-5: 311.5-6 of 4 August.
2. This H.Q. has now no objection to the extension of the facilities requested with the exception of Argentina where the privilege must be withheld. The concession is granted on the distinct understanding that all cables in cipher will be handed to you in clear and cipher, and that the cipher books are deposited with you.
3. It is necessary for this H.Q. to be provided with a list of the approved missions, cable addressees and individuals authorized as addressees or signers. It is requested that this be supplied to this H.Q. in quadruplicate to ensure adequate distribution.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

/s/ T. B. Jackman
T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel.

1100

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

Ref: ~~100/100~~

26 November 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

SUBJECT : Italian Communication with Russia

1. With reference to your telegram F 50270 and other correspondence in regard to the cypher communications between the Italian Government and the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, the following difficulty has arisen. Until recently the Italian Government sent their telegrams to Moscow through Soviet channels. A few weeks ago, however, they started sending their telegrams to the Political Section with a request that they should be transmitted through British or American channels.
2. This request was referred to the Foreign Office by the British Embassy, who were informed in reply that the British Government felt unable to accede to it for fear of causing misunderstandings with the Soviet Government. The Embassy were instructed to inform the Italian Government that communications through British channels could not be permitted and to suggest that they should be sent either through commercial or through Soviet channels. After consultation with the Allied Commission the Embassy telegraphed to the Foreign Office pointing out that in the first place the question of control of trans-communication was an Allied not merely a British responsibility and secondly it would be embarrassing to insist on the Italian Government taking action which is technically contrary to the arrangements laid down by Allied Force Headquarters, unless the text of telegrams sent through commercial or Russian channels were simultaneously communicated to the Political Section. It was pointed out that the Russians might be expected to object to this on account of the threat to the security of their own cyphers. The Embassy suggested to the Foreign Office that it would be preferable to wait the decision in regard to the provision of an independent deposited cypher for the Italian Representative in Moscow before making representations to the Italian Government. Meanwhile, the telegrams have been held up and the Italian Government have been informed accordingly.
3. A telegram has now been received by the Foreign Office from the British Ambassador in Moscow saying that he has been informed by the Italian Ambassador that the Soviet channels were given up when the Rumanian Government made their final request for an armistice, as a result of which the Peoples' Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said that they were unwilling any longer to accept messages lest there should be a misunderstanding with the British and American Governments. The

- 2 -

Soviet Government suggested that the Italian Government should make a fresh approach to the Allied Commission for freedoms to communicate with its representative in Moscow. This is, of course, in line with the proposal made by General Soussapourov reported in the telegram to Allied Force Headquarters, No. S-356 of 27 October 1944.

4. The Foreign Office have not yet commented on this telegram but meanwhile it is suggested that, as there are also technical difficulties in the way of transmitting these telegrams in the cyphers of the United States Embassy, Allied Force Headquarters might be willing to transmit the telegrams through military channels. The recent telegrams addressed to Moscow sent to the Commission by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are accordingly enclosed, and the Political Section request that they may be informed whether Allied Force Headquarters are prepared to arrange for their onward transmission.

For the Chief Commissioner:

H. L. d'A. HOPKINSON
Acting Vice President, Political Section

11000

C/1139

AGWAR FOR CCS AND CENTRAL DISTRICT UK BASE SEC (LONDON) FOR BRITISH
CHIEFS OF STAFF, SHAFF, ALCON FOR⁺⁺
AFHQ SIGNED WILSON

65/17

PK 53734

PRIORITY

CITE PHGEG

NOV 171337A

++ INFORMATION

SECRET.

Paragraph three of NAF 796 requested specific guidance on whether in connection with the naming of direct representatives by ITALY such representatives are to be allowed secret communication with their Govt. Imminence of such representatives taking up their posts makes guidance necessary at once and it is requested that a reply be given on this point alone if not possible yet to reply fully to the whole cable.

Dist


Action - S.O. to Chief Commissioner

Info - C. o. S.
File

Pd Sec

POL SEC

NOV 171820A



SECRET
ALLIED CONTROL COM ISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AS
/HH
C/406

TO: ALLIED COMMISSION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N73/09
FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
REFERENCE No: F50270 PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: Nov 091433A OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE FHGEG

SECRET PD

(Reur S-356 of 27 October S-362 of 8 November and A/CC 201 of 5 November)

Specific guidance still awaited from CCS as to whether Italian representatives are to be allowed secret communication with their government. Instructions will be forwarded on receipt of CCS decision.

723

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: SO to A/CC (2)

INFO: A/CC
CoS
File
Political Section
'A' Files

200.3

DATE and Time of RECEIPT Nov 091715

Distribution:

SECRET

SECRET

AFHQ

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

5-362

8 NOV 44

SECRET

PRIORITY

A/CHIEF COMMISSIONER

MY TELEGRAM SUGAR DASH THREE FIVE SIX OF TWO SEVEN OCTOBER REFERS TO
PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE ACTION CMA INFO TO BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER
AND UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FROM HQ ALLIED COMMISSION FROM STONE
PERSONAL PAREN

IN VIEW OF THE ARRIVAL IN UNITED STATES OF THE ITALIAN ECONOMIC MISSION
CMA THE LARGE NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS WHO HAVE RESUMED DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND THE ANTICIPATED EARLY EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES CMA I SHOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
DECISION TAKEN REGARDING CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN UNITED NATIONS

AUTHENTICATED:

cc: Political Section
Chief of Staff
VP Float File
"A" Files

MILERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

103-7

SECRET

File
10/23

APRQ FOR GEORGE FIVE ACTION CMA INFO TO BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER
AND UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

MOB RM

2-362

8 NOV 44

SECRET

PRIORITY

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

MY TELEGRAM DASH DASH THREE FIVE SIX OF TWO SEVEN OCTOBER REFERS TO
PARK TO APRQ FOR GEORGE FIVE ACTION CMA INFO TO BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER
AND UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FROM ALLIED COMMISSION FROM STONE
PROPOSAL PARK IN VIEW OF THE LARGER NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS WHO HAVE
IMPROVED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND THE ANTICIPATED EARLY
EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES CMA I SHOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MY DECISION TAKEN REGARDING CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATION BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WITH ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN
UNITED NATIONS

Official - U.S. of I. Crim. Committee

723

709.6

COPY

AFHQ

ALLIED COMMISSION

S-356

SECRET

PRIORITY

A/CHIEF COMMISSIONER

SECRET PD YOUR MEMORANDUM THREE ONE ONE POINT TWO TWO DASH ONE ZERO OF
 THIRTY SEPTEMBER REFERS PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FOR ACTION CMA
INFO TO BRITISH RESMIN AND UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FROM ALLIED
COMMISSION FROM STONE PERSONAL PAREN GENERAL SUSLOPAROV CALLED TODAY
 TO SUPPORT REQUEST OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT IT MAY BE PERMITTED TO
 HAVE CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTATIVE IN MOSCOW WITHOUT
 DEPOSITING CLEAR TEXT AND KEY TO CODE PD PARA TWO PD SINCE DECISION
 CONTAINED IN YOUR MEMORANDUM UNDER REFERENCE YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED
 ENQUIRY IN MY SUGAR THREE FOUR SEVEN OF TWO EIGHT SEPTEMBER WHETHER
 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MAY COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON
 AND WASHINGTON BY MEANS OF CODES AND CIPHERS NOT DEPOSITED WITH ALLIED
 COMMISSION PD I SHALL BE GLAD OF EARLY REPLY AND TO KNOW WHETHER ANY
 DECISION TAKEN REGARDING LONDON AND WASHINGTON WILL AFFECT MOSCOW OR
 OTHER ITALIAN MISSIONS TO UNITED NATIONS WHO HAVE RESUMED DIPLOMATIC
 RELATIONS

AUTHENTICATED

/s/ J. W. Q.

J. A. QUALYE

Major, R.A.

Staff Officer to A/CC 5

DISTRIBUTION

Sir Noel Charles
 Hon. Alexander Kirk
 Chief of Staff
 Political Section
 "A" Files

28 October 1944

TO : Communications Sub-Commission
FROM : Political Section

Please see the attached note by Sig. Cittadini about the routing of this telegram. If these messages are, in fact, to be passed through the AGC Bucharest, that can presumably only be done via AFHQ and will presumably need AFHQ concurrence. Would you obtain this through Chief Signals Officer, Caserta?

H. A. GAGOLA

723

10004

Political Section

ENB/54

EAS/drr

H.C.

Zlu

W.S.

A/CG 311.5

23 September 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your Memorandum GBI/GEN/10/44 of the 14 September 44 regarding the departure of a joint Anglo-American mission whose object will be to go into the question of Italian Government communications with their missions abroad and communications between such missions.

2. As this mission will presumably report in the first instance to Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta before coming on to Rome, we attach a copy of the latest revision of Executive Memorandum No. 46 which sets out the present procedure regarding Italian Government message traffic. We would suggest that this memorandum would repay study by the mission before proceeding to this Headquarters.

3. As commentary on the proposed terms of reference for the mission we should be grateful for some elucidation on point 1 which lays down that the mission shall watch Italian diplomatic communications and their security. As regards point 2, it is our understanding that the provision of suitable means of communications for the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Italian missions abroad is a military responsibility which in the past has been carried out by the Communications Sub-Commission through the Chief Signal Officer at AFHQ. We understand from your memorandum of the reference that this procedure should continue. As regards point 3, we would inquire by what means the mission intend to keep the Foreign Office and State Department informed of the contents of Italian telegrams. As the mission is to be set up within the framework of the Allied Control Commission, we presume that this reporting will be done through normal ACC channels to AFHQ and that it will be for AFHQ to arrange that these communications are forwarded to London and Washington. As regards the suggestion that the mission should also have the function of keeping the Allied Control Commission itself informed of the contents of Italian telegrams we must point out that these telegrams should, as at present, go at once to the Political Section who have to deal with the Italian authorities about all the subjects raised therein. It could only lead to delay if the Political Section did not receive these telegrams at least simultaneously with the mission. As regards point 4, the Communications Sub-Commission has already sent to Allied Force Headquarters full information regarding Italian ciphers in use and as requested in your memorandum, we confirm that these will continue to be forwarded to AFHQ for approval prior to their being brought into use. As regards lines of communications we should repeat that our understanding is that these are under military control and that all information on this subject should only be given by the Chief Signal Officer at AFHQ.

723.1

106.3

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Letter A/CC 311.5 dated 23 Sept 44 (Cont'd).

4. Guidance on the above points would be appreciated before the arrival of the mission.

5. As billets and office accommodation will have to be provided for the mission we should be grateful if you can inform us as soon as possible of the exact number of the mission and the proposed date of arrival.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copies to: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Signal Officer, AFHQ
U.S. Representative to the Advisory
Council of Italy
British High Commissioner
Political Section
Communications Sub-Commission

Letter prepared by Mr. Cascia, Political Section

3 9 327

Hq ACC Secy Gen.	
DISPATCHED	
Date Time	24 SEP 1944 1610
Via	Message
Initials	em. 10522

TOP SECRET

COPYEXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM NUMBER 46ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MESSAGE TRAFFIC1. INTERNAL

(a) Italian Government messages within Government territory, except Sardinia, are not subject to censorship; messages ^{may} be in clear or in cipher. They may be subject to inspection, if required, to check the official nature of message.

(b) Italian Government messages to or from Sardinia are liable to censorship; cipher will therefore only be used on this channel that have been approved by Allied authorities and of which copies are held. The censorship exercised will be laid down by the Communications Sub-Commission from time to time, in accordance with ^{the instructions of the} ~~introductions~~ from the military authorities concerned.

2. EXTERNAL

(a) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated submarine cables from Naples to Malta or from Brindisi to Malta for Italian Missions, etc. abroad. Messages are subject to the approval of Political Section, A.C.C.; they may be in clear or in the codes and or ciphers approved by Allied Force Headquarters. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Attachment "A".

(b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Italy to the United States or the United Kingdom ~~for~~ any addresses dealt with by the operating companies. On these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the Political Section and also to Field Press Censorship in case of Press messages; they may only be in clear and will be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Attachment "B".

3. GENERAL

Italian Government messages may be passed over Allied operated circuits, telegraph, cable or radio, as arranged with the military

that have been approved by Allied authorities and of which copies are held. The censorship exercised will be laid down by the Communications Sub-Commission from time to time, in accordance with instructions from the military authorities concerned.

2. EXTERNAL

(a) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated submarine cables from Naples to Malta or from Brindisi to Malta for Italian Missions, etc. abroad. Messages are subject to the approval of Political Section, A.C.C.; they may be in clear or in the codes and or ciphers approved by Allied Force Headquarters. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Attachment "A".

(b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Italy to the United States or the United Kingdom ~~for~~ any addresses dealt with by the operating companies. On these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the Political Section and also to Field Press Censorship in case of Press messages; they may only be in clear and will be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Attachment "B".

3. GENERAL

Italian Government messages may be passed over Allied operated circuits, telegraph, cable or radio, as arranged with the military authorities concerned from time to time. These arrangements will be made the subject of instructions issued as required.

10901

At/ M.S.LUSH
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

ATTACHEMENT "A"

COPY

PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TRAFFIC
OVER THE COMMERCIALY OPERATED CABLES, NAPLES-MALTA
AND BRINDISI - MALTA

1. All messages will bear the message instruction "FIL" (to be transmitted by landing or cable only) at the beginning.
2. Outgoing messages may only be addressed to Italian Embassies, Missions, etc. abroad.
3. Outgoing messages for transmission in clear. Messages will be handed in by the Italian Government to the Political Section, Headquarters, A.C.C. Rome. After approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the HQ Adjutant's office with an endorsement on one copy "Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CLEAR" signed by the HQ Adjutant's office and passed to the A.C.C. Signal center for transmission to the military signal office controlling the cable office.
4. Outgoing messages for transmission in cipher. Cipher and clear text copies will be handed by the Italian Government to the Political Section, HQ's A.C.C. After approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the HQ Adjutant's Office, with an endorsement on one cipher copy "Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CIPHER" signed by the endorsing officer. A ciphered copy will then be authenticated by the HQ Adjutant's Office and passed to the A.C.C. Signal Center for transmission to the military signal office controlling the cable office. A second cipher copy together with a clear copy will be sent by the HQ Adjutant's office to the A.C.C. Signal Center, for check; after check, both these copies will be returned to the Political Section with any necessary comment. It should be noted that cipher copies of approved messages may be passed for transmission without being delayed for the check by A.C.C. Signals for agreement of texts.

10990
in clear or in cipher

1 2 3 1

2. Outgoing messages may only be addressed to Italian Embassies, Missions, etc. abroad.

3. Outgoing messages for transmission in clear. Messages will be handed in by the Italian Government to the Political Section, Headquarters, A.C.C. Rome. After approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the HQ Adjutant's office with an endorsement on one copy "Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CLEAR" signed by the HQ Adjutant's office and passed to the A.C.C. Signal center for transmission to the military signal office controlling the cable office.

4. Outgoing messages for transmission in cipher. Cipher and clear text copies will be handed by the Italian Government to the Political Section, HQ's A.C.C. After approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the HQ Adjutant's Office, with an endorsement on one cipher copy "Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CIPHER" signed by the endorsing officer. A ciphered copy will then be authenticated by the HQ Adjutant's Office and passed to the A.C.C. Signal Center for transmission to the military signal office controlling the cable office. A second cipher copy together with a clear copy will be sent by the HQ Adjutant's office to the A.C.C. Signal Center, for check; after check, both these copies will be returned to the Political Section with any necessary comment. It should be noted that cipher copies of approved messages may be passed for transmission without being delayed for the check by A.C.C. Signals for agreement of texts.

5. Incoming messages. Incoming messages, in clear or in cipher, will be delivered without delay to the Italian Government. A clear copy of each message will also be delivered to the Political Section.

6. All charges by the cable company will be met by the Italian Government.

COPY

ATTACHMENT "B"

PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TRAFFIC OVER
COMMERCIALY OPERATED RADIO CIRCUITS FROM ITALY TO THE U.S. AND

U.K.

1. Outgoing messages may be addressed to any address dealt with by the operating companies.

entirely Messages will be in clear only, and will be of an
~~entirely~~ non-secret nature such as press releases.

3. Messages will be handed to the Political Section, HQ., A.C.C. After approval they will be sent to the HQ Adjutant's office with an endorsement on one copy "Approved for transmission over commercial radio IN CLEAR subject to Field Press Censorship approval" signed by the endorsing officer. The messages will then be authenticated by the HQ Adjutant's office and passed to the *Field* ~~Head~~ Press Censorship office, Rome. If approved they will be duly endorsed and forwarded by that office to the radio operating company for transmission.

4. Incoming Press messages will be sent by the Field Press Censorship office to the Hq. Adjutant's office A.C.C. which will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the Political Section.

5. All charges by the radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

1. Outgoing messages may be addressed to any address dealt with by the operating companies.

entirely Messages will be in clear only, and will be of an ~~entirely~~ non-secret nature such as press releases.

3. Messages will be handed to the Political Section, HQ., A.C.C. After approval they will be sent to the HQ Adjutant's office with an endorsement on one copy "Approved for transmission over commercial radio IN CLEAR subject to Field Press Censorship approval" signed by the endorsing officer. The messages will then be authenticated by the HQ Adjutant's office and passed to the *Field Press* ~~Field~~ Press Censorship office, Rome. If approved they will be duly endorsed and forwarded by that office to the radio operating company for transmission.

4. Incoming Press messages will be sent by the Field Press Censorship office to the Hq. Adjutant's office A.C.C. which will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the Political Section.

5. All charges by the radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

10009

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

Subject: ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CIPHER COMMUNICATIONS.Signal Section,
A. F. H. Q.

CM 215.

11 Oct 44.

Asst Chief of Staff G2.

Copy to: Resident Minister's Office.

G.S.

U.S. Political Advisor.

Political Section A.C.C.

U.S. Representative on Advisory
Council for Italy.

British High Commissioner.

With reference to unsigned letter from Resident Minister's Office,
number 3/150/6 dated 10 October.

1. It appears that our letter X215 of Oct 5th addressed to the Resident Minister's Office and concerning Italian Government Cypher Communications was not sufficiently explicit, and that a misunderstanding has arisen.
2. The Chief Signal Officer AFHQ is the controlling authority in all signal matters for this theatre. In so far as the Allied Control Commission is concerned, Colonel J. L. HENDERSON, the Director of the Communications Sub-Commission, is responsible to the Chief Signal Officer for all cypher and signal matters.
3. To avoid any counter-orders or complications it was considered that any civilian cipher operators, who would be working under the responsibility of Colonel HENDERSON, should receive their initial instructions from that officer. It was suggested therefore that the two people concerned should proceed direct to AFHQ.
4. It is regretted that the brevity and insufficient amplifications of our letter X215 of Oct 5th has led to this misunderstanding.

J. L. Henderson
Major General,
Chief Signal Officer.

100-3

TOP SECRET

3/150/6.

TOP SECRET

To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
 From : Resident Minister's Office.
 Subject : Italian Government Cypher Communications.
 Reference : Your memorandum GBI/5073 of October 4th.

So far as the British side is concerned, the Control Commission can get all the political guidance necessary for the Mission from the British High Commissioner's Office who are more familiar than we are with the background.

2. Two British members of the Mission have already arrived in Rome and are in touch with the Control Commission and with the High Commissioner's Office.

3. When these two members of the Commission were on their way from England we asked the Office of the Chief Signal Officer whether they would like us to arrange for them to proceed to Caserta before starting their work in Rome. They replied (X215 of October 5th) that "it does not appear that this subject affects us and it is suggested that the two members concerned should proceed direct to Rome". We think it might be advisable for the Office of the Chief Signal Officer (to whom a copy of this note is being sent) to confirm to the Control Commission that they are not interested in the subject of Italian Government cypher communications, particularly in view of (a) your own note to the Control Commission of September 14th in which you say that "any question of opening up new communications must be taken up with the Chief Signal Officer, A.F.H.Q." and (b) the Control Commission's note to you of September 21st where they say that "as regards lines of communications we should repeat that our understanding is that these are under military control and that all information on this subject should only be given by the Chief Signal Officer at A.F.H.Q."

10th October, 1944.

Copy to: Chief Signal Officer. — Political Section, A.C.C.
 G-5. U.S. Representative on Advisory
 U.S. Political Adviser. Council for Italy.
 British High Commissioner.

This has been overtaken by 109.7
 Sweats the 13th

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

Ref # 723

10 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Italian Official Cables.

TO : The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italian Government.

1. Permission has been received for the Italian Foreign Office to communicate by cable with all Italian Embassies and Missions in Allied or neutral countries, with the exception of the Argentine.

2. The routine to be followed will be the same as for present cables to Madrid, etc.

3. Communications on entirely non-secret matters may be sent in clear or in the commercial code approved by A.F.H.Q. (AR 33). These may commence forthwith.

4. Communications on secret or confidential matters will require to be in an approved cipher. This may be either the cipher now in use, or the "A D" cipher proposed in your letter of 26th April. The use of this cipher is now approved, on the understanding that it is utilized in conjunction with new over-ciphering tables, and provided that the total number of groups to be enciphered shall not exceed approximately three and one half times the number of subtractor groups.

5. In order to expedite the delivery of these tables, every assistance will be given by this office by forwarding them through Allied channels of communication where desired.

6. Eight copies of the new code and tables should be delivered to the Communications Sub-Commission of A. C. C.

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice-President, Political Section.

Copy to:
Communication Sub-Commission.

1056



sent -
1 9/17/49
nr. 6/524/234

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

MEMORANDUM FOR THE POLITICAL SECTION A.C.C.

Col. Henderson of the Communications Subcommission requested to be informed as to the telegraphic address of the Italian Missions abroad and to receive a list of those with which this Ministry communicates at present by cable through the A.C.C.

It would be much appreciated, therefore, if the Political Section A.C.C. could communicate to Col. Henderson the following reply to his queries:

1°) Telegraphic address: ITALDIPL in case of Diplomatic Missions whether Embassy or Legation and ITALCONSUL for Consular offices followed by the name of the locality.

2°) The Missions abroad with which this Ministry communicates at present by cable are: R. Embassy Madrid, R. Embassy Buenos Ayres (through Madrid), R. Embassy Ankara, R. Legation Bern, R. Legation Lisbon, R. Legation Stockholm, R. Legation Dublin, R. Consulate General in Tangiers.

Rome, September 16th. 1949.



JLH/epc

H
WS


HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Telephone 489081 Ext. 400

9th September, 1944

MEMO

TO: Political Section.

1. Copy of A.F.H.Q. letter CCB/1101/7 5th September attached at "A".
2. Draft reply for your consideration and transmittal to Italian Foreign Office attached at "B".
3. A telegram has been sent, copy attached at "C", to clear up the situation regarding cables in clear. In the meantime, I think it is safe to assume that it is intended these are included.



J.L. HENDERSON
Colonel
Director, Communications Sub-Commission

INCL: Three attachments - "A", "B", "C".

109.4

A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512, US Army

OCB/1101

5 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Italian Official Cables.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
Att: Director, Communications Sub-Commission,
APO 374, U.S. Army.

1. It has been agreed that the Italian Government may now send to their missions abroad cipher cables. The exception to the agreement is the Argentine.
2. The cables will be handled in exactly the same way in which the present government cables are being handled.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

THOMAS H. FIRM,
Lt. Col., Inf.,
Communications Ceremony.

109.3

DRAFT

JLH/epc

B

5 copies

~~HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Telephone 489081 Ext. 400~~

Ref: 723
In reply
refer to: CS/31/1

10th September, 1944

Subject : Italian Official Cables.

To : The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italian Government.

1. Permission has been received for the Italian Foreign Office to communicate by cable with all Italian Embassies and Missions in Allied or neutral countries, with the exception of the Argentine.
2. The routine to be followed will be the same as for present cables to Madrid, etc.
3. Communications on entirely non-secret matters may be sent in clear or in the commercial code approved by A.F.H.Q. (AR38). These may commence forthwith.
4. Communications on secret or confidential matters will require to be in an approved cipher. This may be either the cipher now in use, or the 'A D' cipher proposed in your letter of 26th April. The use of this cipher is now approved, on the understanding that it is utilised in conjunction with new over-ciphering tables, and provided that the total number of groups to be enciphered shall not exceed approximately three and one half times the number of subtractor groups.

- 2

5. In order to expedite the delivery of these tables, every assistance will be given by this office by ~~transmitting~~^{forwarding} them through Allied channels of communication where desired.

6. ~~Kindly note that~~ Eight copies of the new code and tables should be delivered to the Communications Sub-Commission of A.C.C.

WILLIAM W. SCOTT
Vice Pres - Technical Section, A.C.C.

J. BRANDENSON
Colonel
Director, Communications Sub-Commission

Cpy 1 - Communications Sub-Commission

10081

C O P Y

"C"

A.F.H.Q.

A.C.C.HQ.

2978

RESTRICTED
ROUTINE

8 SEPT 44

REF LETTER CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER ONE ONE ZERO ONE DATED
FIVE SEPT PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH TWO FROM HENDERSON
SIGNED STONE PAREN PRESUME AUTHORIZATION INCLUDES TRANSMISSION
OF MESSAGES IN CLEAR ON NON DASH SECRET MATTERS CMA AS FOR
MADRID ETC .

10090

31 August 1944

Political Section:

In answer to your note which is attached:

- (1) Cables of the Italian Government for Tripoli was in error; neither have we ever passed such traffic. The revision to Memo No. 46 was corrected accordingly.
- (2) Cables for Stockholm and Ankara are non-existent as far as we are concerned. We have never handled cables for the Italian Government to these addresses (to our present knowledge):
- (3) Cables to be handled over the commercially operated radio from Naples must first be approved by your office. Only press releases and matters of a non-classified nature that are liable to publication at a later date, may be sent over these facilities; the reason being to protect security. The Field Press Censorship Office will of course cut those parts of such cables that may be injurious to the Allied Governments and the Italian Government.

Col Dodder

Then

How do they go?

Please ascertain

Amz

1/9

Thom
MadridW.B. SIMMONS
1st Lt., S.C.

Communications Office

10079

Communications Office:

30 Aug 1944

This seems in general to me a correct statement of present procedure. But there are three points:

- (1) To the best of my knowledge we have never passed any telegrams from the Italian Government to Tripoli. Has any other Section?
- (2) What happens about cables for Stockholm and Ankara?
- (3) Who decides whether a message is non-classified and can go over the commercially operated radio from Naples?


H.A.
H.A. CACCIA
Political Section

10976

NOTE

Mr Schott, Political Section.

1. Herewith draft reply, which I have not sent until you have given your agreement.
2. Also Executive Memo file, including No.46. Please return when finished.
3. I have in mind the re-draft of this memo which is very out of date now, though the principles hold good. I am waiting for
 - (a) handing back to the Italian Government certain cables to Sicily and Sardinia which will alter Attachment 'A'.
 - (b) permission to extend the foreign service to Stockholm, Berne, etc which will alter Attachment 'B'.
 - (c) permission to commence civil international cablegrams, which will alter the whole thing.



J.L. HENDERSON,
Colonel,
Director, Communications Sub-Commission.

EXT 400
16th August 1944.

100.7

723

723

May 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Royal Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Reference is made to the Ministry's recent request for permission to use the Naples - Malta - Gibraltar submarine cable service for messages to Tangier. This service has now been authorized subject to the conditions which are applicable to the Madrid service and may begin at any time.

Samuel Reber
Vice President, Allied Control Commission
Political Section

723

10976

PEAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

HTWM/174

Pol. Sec

9464

12th May 1944.

In reply refer
to: TFS/26/1/12.

Subject: Italian Message Traffic - Tangier.

To: Political Sub-Commission, Main HQ, Allied Control Commission.

1. A short time ago Mr Manzini of the Italian Foreign Office asked permission to use the Naples - Malta - Gibraltar submarine cable service for messages to Tangier.

2. This service has now been authorised subject to the conditions which are applicable to the Madrid service, and may begin at any time. Would you please pass the information to the Italian Foreign Office.

J.L. Henderson
for J.L. Henderson,
Colonel,
Director, Communications Sub-Commission.

mg. S.C.

10575

SECRET

Pol Sec

3087-65
HC

ACC MAIN FOR MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY

AFHQ 500 0180

FS3195

AUG 15 1035B

HEADQUARTERS
15 AUG 1944
A. C. C.

53/15

SECRET
PRIORITY
CITE/PRIORI

MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY ON ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CABLE TRAFFIC. (1) WHAT CODES ARE USED (2) ARE THEY DEPOSITED WITH ABLINE (3) ARE CERTIFIED CLEAR TEXTS SUBMITTED WITH ENCIPHERED MEMORANDUMS (4) ARE THERE CLEAR TEXTS VERIFIED (5) DOES CENSORSHIP KEEP COPY (6) WHAT DISPOSITION OF COPIES ARE MADE. REPORT FULLY ON CHANGES IN PROCEDURE FROM EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM 45

723

ACC DIVE

ACTION- COMMUNICATIONS 2

INFO- CCG

A/CC

ADJ

POLITICAL SEC

FILE & FLOAT 3

10974

SECRET

1 2 4 9

U S SECRET Equals British SECRET

JLR/enc

~~HE~~
~~2-11~~

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Telephone 489081 Ext. 400

7th August, 1944

In reply
refer to: CS/26/1/61

Subject : Communications - Italian Government Cables to
Embassies abroad.

To : Political Section.

1. I have a copy of this reply to your # 723.
2. In respect of para. 4, we have had a reply already
permitting the introduction of the new cipher.

(Gen. Henderson)

J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel
Director, Communications Sub-Commission

723

Incl: Letter from A.F.H.Q.

10573

U. S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

1 2 5 0

785016

SECRET

Communications S.C.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/jjr

6559

G-5: 311.5-6

4 August 1944

SUBJECT: Communications - Italian Government Cables
to Embassies abroad.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission
APO 394

- 51
1. Reference is made to Ref #723 of 14 July.
 2. G-2 and Signals here advise that the extension of the facilities requested should be delayed for operational reasons until at least 1 September.
 3. The matter will accordingly be reconsidered then.
 4. With regard to paragraph 4 of your letter a separate reply will be sent.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. Jackman
Major.

T. B. JACKMAN
Major.

SECRET

DIRECTOR.	105.2
DIRECTOR.	
S. O. 1.	
S. O. 2.	
CENSORSHIP.	
CHIEF CLERK.	
Received 7/8/44	
CS/26/1	

DRAFT

J. S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

Please type

July, 1944.

In reply refer

to: TS/26/1/50

Subject: Italian Government Cablegrams to Embassies Abroad.

To: A.F.H.Q.

1. Authority is requested for the existing privilege permitted to the Italian Government to communicate with the Italian Embassies in Madrid, Lisbon and Tangiers to be extended to include the embassies in Berne, Ankara, Stockholm and Buenos Aires, under the same restrictions that at present apply, viz. that cables are subject to pre-transmission inspection by the Political Section, ACC, and the ciphered texts are subject to post-transmission check to ensure transmission of authorized texts only.
2. The request has been on hand for some time, but has not been previously submitted from here, as it was considered that the severe restrictions generally placed on international communications prior to the landing in France made the time inopportune. There appears to be no particular reason why the extension should not now be granted in principle, though there may be special objection to some particular embassy.
3. The only security question involved would seem to be the reliance to be placed on the good faith of the Italian staff at the Embassies in question; there is no question of one message route being more secure than another, as the present cables to Madrid are dealt with by the Spanish telegraph service between Gibraltar and Madrid.

10071

J. S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

- 2 -

U. S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

4. There is still outstanding the question of a change in the cipher used on this service. This was requested of His Chief Signal Officer, AFHQ from this Commission in letter TS/26/1/5 dated 5th May, 1944, and a reminder sent to your headquarters in letter CS/26/1/38 dated 27th June, 1944.

It would be convenient to authorize the extensions requested in para 1 at the same time as giving approval for the change of cipher, so that the new cipher books could be distributed simultaneously to the present and newly authorized embassies. It is therefore requested that a decision be given on this matter at the same time.

Copy to: Communications Sub-Commission.

British High Commissioner

in Ref to Army General

10070

U. S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

DRAFT Subject: Station ^{Correspondent} ~~Summit~~ ^{Telegram}
to Embassies abroad.

A. F. H. Q. TS/26/1/50

1. Authority is requested for ~~the extension of~~
the existing privilege ~~permitted~~ to the Station
Summit to communicate with the Station Embassies
in Moscow, Leningrad and Tientsin to be extended to
include the embassies in Bern, ~~and~~ Ankara,
Stockholm & Buenos Aires, under the same
restrictions that at present apply, viz, that
cables are subject to pre-transmission inspection by
the Political Section A.C.C., and the airtel
cables are subject to post-transmission check to
ensure transmission of authorized cables only.

2. The request has been ^{on hand} ~~out~~ for some time,
but was ^{has} ~~not~~ ^{been previously} submitted from here, as it was
considered that the same restrictions ^{generally} placed on
international communications prior to the ^{launching} ~~opening~~ of the
French need the time inspection. There appears to be
no particular reason why the extension should ^{not} ~~not~~
be granted in principle, though there may ^{be} ~~be~~ ^{special} objection to
some particular embassy.

3. The only security question involved would seem to be the reliance to be placed on the good faith of the Italian staff at the Embassy in question; there is no question of our messages being more secure than others, as the present cables to Madrid are dealt with by the Spanish telegraph service between Gibraltar and Madrid.

4. ~~There is the question of a change in the cipher used on this service, which is still outstanding.~~
 There is still outstanding the question of a change in the cipher used on this service, ^{also matter} which is still outstanding.
 This was requested from this Commission in letter 75/26/1/5 dated 5 May 1944
 and a reminder sent to your headquarters in letter C3/26/1/38 dated 27 June 1944.

It would be convenient to ~~be~~ authorize in parallel the ~~revisions~~ requested ~~by~~ at the same time as giving approval for the change of cipher, so that the new cipher books could be ^{simultaneously} distributed to the present and newly authorized embassies. It is therefore requested that a decision be given on this matter at the same time.
 Copy to ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~relevant~~ ^{relevant} etc.

Mr H.A. Caccia.

TOP SECRET

I discussed these questions with Col: Henderson on his return.

He tells me that in a reply to Reber ~~that~~ he did not wish to extend before D day, since ~~the~~ in all the cutting down of that time all Italian priveleges were in danger of being wiped out. But now he considered the time ripe for a general reconsideration of extension.

He promised to take no action without consulting you or Halford.

2. He told me also that there was a projected change of cypher suggested by the Italian government, which is under consideration by AFHQ. He expects a reply shortly.

He suggests the question of extension to other neutral countries should await the change of standard cypher into general use.

[Signature]
J.M. PEARSON.
Major.
3/7

[Handwritten: OK]
[Handwritten: Done hold for vac]

1 2 5 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No. 785016

10963

2/7
Major.
O.H.R. RANDSON.

Major Pearson

Please

TOP**SECRET**

Copy

Col Henderson on
his return of ask
him not
to take
any action without first
talking to me (w/ my
above)

Please refer to Makins' letter to Dew (most secret) No. 3/150/3 of April 12th about arrangements in force for the transmission of Italian cypher telegrams between Naples and Madrid. *Halper*

We recently took up with the G.C. and C.S. the question of providing Italian missions abroad with a safe inter-communication cypher. We realized that the Germans presumably read messages exchanged between Italian missions in cypher, though we were not aware that there had been any leakage of important information. Nevertheless we felt that the position was unsatisfactory. G.C. and C.S. agreed and suggested that the cypher deposited with EMTEA (see enclosure in Makins' letter), which is already held by the Italian Embassy at Madrid, should be issued to other Italian posts as well. We are in favour of this for two reasons: (1) It reduces the danger of leakage to the Germans. (2) It relieves our own missions from the burden of cyphering and de-cyphering Italian telegrams sent through them. These two considerations outweigh the possible disadvantage of not having immediate knowledge of what is passing between Italian missions but G.C. and C.S. can arrange for us to see the decyphered texts of a good 75% of all Italian telegrams. *HAC*

We suggest therefore that, if you see no objection, you should tell the Italian Government that we should be glad if they would distribute the deposited cypher to all posts in neutral countries and use it for all confidential correspondence, thus eliminating the strain on our own cypher arrangements and reducing the risk of leakage to the enemy. Before doing so, however, you will doubtless consult your United States colleague since in some posts, as you know, it is the United States mission which at present transmits Italian telegrams. If the United States authorities do not wish to follow suit, we are quite content to limit our action to the posts at which U.S. Missions transmit the Italian telegrams. *Smithy*

Would you also let the Italian Government know in whatever way you think best that we have seen certain Italian *10* telegrams passing

Smithy
we have to
be approached
first?

- 2 -

I suppose

I see

Italian

Telegrams

ed not have

been sent

by the Americans

who are

responsible for

communications

from Tangiers

& Lisbon.

passing between Lisbon and Naples and Tangier and Naples which are not familiar to us and ask whether they are in any of the cyphers handed over to our Embassy at Madrid (see enclosed copy of Madrid telegram No. 117 of March 6th) which is supposed to contain a complete list of Italian cyphers. You will appreciate that all information about changes in Italian systems of communication and, in particular, methods of cyphering should be reported to us without delay.

TOP SECRET

10966

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Reference #723

29 May 1944

His Excellency don Renato Prunas
Secretary General Royal Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

With reference to your memorandum No. 3210 of 23 May asking for the extension to Berne, Tangiers, Ankara, Stockholm and Buenos Aires of telegrams under a similar arrangement to that obtaining to Madrid and Lisbon, I am directed to inform you that this cannot at present be conceded. When opportunity permits, there will be no objection to extending these facilities to other capitals where we have your assurance of the loyalty of the staff of the Royal Italian Government, but the present moment does not seem opportune for extending these privileges. The tendency at the moment is to restrict communications for the furtherance of the military effort and these facilities, if granted, might well have to be withdrawn suddenly for military reasons.

It is therefore considered better to postpone consideration of the extension of these communications until a later date. I am sure you will agree with these conclusions.

[Signature]
J. M. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

10303

Ad Section

JLH/epc
14th May, 1944

8798

*SR
W/C*

Mr. Reber,

I do not know what considerations led to Madrid and Lisbon being selected in the first case, but I imagine it was only because the Allied authorities were satisfied with the good faith of the Italian staff at those places.

There is no question of the message route being secure, as messages between Gibraltar ^{to} Madrid are handled by the Spanish telegraph service.

I can therefore see no point in withholding facilities to other capitals where the Allied authorities are satisfied with the loyalty of the staff to the Royal Italian Government.

On the other hand, I consider that it is not an opportune moment to make the request. The tendency at the moment is to suspend all forms of communication other than for the immediate military effort, particularly where countries other than U.S., U.K., or U.S.S.R. are concerned, and I think it quite likely that far from the permission being granted, if the matter is drawn to notice, the present communications may be subjected to further restrictions.

HEADQUARTERS
20 MAY 1944
A. C. C.

J. L. Henderson

J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel
Director, Communications Sub-Commission

723

*SR + HE agreed with final para.
(renewal of staff) H.*

5/24

Colonel Henderson

Do you think the time
has come when we can ask for
telegram in clear to those other
places? I should oppose
cipher facilities but have no
particular view about plain
messages.

V. Robin

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

105211

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to call the attention of the Allied Control Commission on the following matter.

This Ministry is at present authorized to communicate by telegram in plain text with the Royal Embassy in Madrid and the Royal Legation in Lisbon, while telegrams to the other Missions in Bern, Tangiers, Ankara, Stockholm and Buenos Aires must be in English and handed to the A.C.C. to be forwarded in code.

This means quite a delay in our communications with the above mentioned Missions, impairing in the present circumstances the efficiency of such a complex and delicate service.

In this connection, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be most grateful if the A.C.C. could kindly draw the attention of Allied Headquarters on the possibility of examining the question with a view to obtaining that telegrams addressed to the Italian Missions in Bern, Tangiers, Ankara, Stockholm and Buenos Aires might follow the same system already functioning in respect of our communications with Madrid and Lisbon. *pc*

SALERNO, 23 MAG 1944

10663

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Reference #723

15 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Samuel Reber, Political Section, Hq ACC, Naples
SUBJECT : Italian Government Cable Messages

With reference to my memorandum of 7 March regarding the transmission of telegrams from the Italian Government I now attach an advance copy of a draft on this subject.

The only point on which I should like your instructions is that in Appendix "B", Paragraph 3, it mentions that messages will be handed in by the Italian Government and approved by the Political Section, Salerno. I do not know whether this conforms with your wishes. It would certainly expedite the dispatch of messages and I could forward to Naples those of which I thought were doubtful.

With regard to outgoing messages in cypher (Appendix "B", Paragraph 4) I think that if a message is considered by the Italian Government sufficiently important to go in cypher, it should be forwarded automatically for your approval in Naples.

If you have any comments on the routings or checks suggested by the memorandum, I should be glad if you would let me have copy of any communications which you send to the Tele-Communications Section.

J. M. Pearson
J. M. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

*file*723
(Adj)

10962

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Reference #723

21 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Samuel Haber, Political Section, Hq ACC, Naples

SUBJECT : Italian Government Cable Messages (Incoming)

With reference to cyphered messages received with your memorandum of 20 March I enquired from the Italian Government when we should receive the decyphered texts and was informed that they must already have been decyphered on their way to them.

If you will refer to Appendix B of the memorandum on Italian Government Message Traffic which I forwarded to you you will note in Paragraph 5 that the ACC Signal Center is to pass such messages without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy of each message to the Political Section via ACC Signals for decyphering if in cypher. The paragraph goes on to say that messages need not be delayed for the check by the Political Section before being delivered to the Italian Government.

I have ascertained that these arrangements are now in force. In this instance you should have received from ACC Signals not the original cyphered message but the decyphered text. Colonel Henderson tells me these have been delivered to you today.


J. M. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

10981

723

Advance Copy

SECRET

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MILITARY TRAFFIC1. Informal.

(a) Italian Government messages within Government territory are not subject to censorship; messages may be in clear or in cipher. They may be subject to interception, if required, to check the official nature of the message.

(b) Italian Government messages will be accepted and passed over the military encrypted submarine cables from Naples to Malta (Italy) and thence to England (Australia), taking priority after military and U.S. and U.S. Government traffic. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix A.

2. Formal.

(a) Italian Government messages may continue to be passed in Allied ciphers over the military radio circuits to Algeria for addresses abroad. The rules for and procedure for dealing with this traffic are established.

(b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated submarine cables from Naples to Malta or from Malta to Naples for the Italian Government offices in Malta or London only. Messages are subject to the approval of the political section; they may be in clear or in the code and ciphers approved by AFM. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix B.

(c) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Naples to the U.S. (R.O.A.S.) or from Naples to the U.S. (G. and U.) for any addresses dealt with by the operating companies. On these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the political section and also to field press censorship; they may only be in clear, and will be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix C.

1. Internal.

- (a) Italian Government messages within Government territory are not subject to censorship; messages may be in clear or in cipher. They may be subject to inspection, if required, to check the official nature of the message.
- (b) Italian Government messages will be accepted and passed near the military cabled submarine cables from Naples to London (Sicily) and thence to England (Australia), taking priority over military and U.S. and U.K. Government traffic.
- The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix A.

2. External.

- (a) Italian Government messages may continue to be passed in Allied cipher over the military radio circuits to America for addresses abroad. The rules for and procedure for dealing with this traffic are established.
- (b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated submarine cables from Naples to Milan or from Milan to Rome, for the Italian Government offices in Milan or Rome only. Messages are subject to the approval of the political section, and they may be in clear or in the codes and ciphers approved by AFM. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix B.
- (c) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Naples to the U.S. (R.O.A.S.) or from Naples to the U.K. (O. and S.) for any address dealt with by the operating agencies. In these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the political section and also to Field Force censorship; they may only be in clear, and will be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix C.

10060

ATTENTION "A"

procedure for dealing with Italian Government traffic over the military operated cables Naples-Palermo and Palermo-Cagliari.

1. Messages will be handled in by the Italian Government to the A.G. office, Room 21, Provincia Building, Naples. (Arrangements for transmission between Palermo and Naples will be made by the Italian Government.)
2. The A.G. office will type the message on the form required for transmission by the military unit operating the cable, authenticate, and pass to the signal office concerned.
3. Incoming messages from Palermo or Cagliari will be delivered by the signal office of the unit operating the cable to the A.G. office, AOC Naples, via AOC signal center, from where they will be collected by Italian Government courier.
4. Similar arrangements, as convenient locally, will be made at Palermo and Cagliari.
5. At no stage is translation or deciphering required, but copies of messages should be retained for reference.

4. similar arrangements, as convenient locally, will be made at Palermo and Cagliari.
5. At no stage is translation or deciphering required, but copies of messages should be retained for reference.

10019

APPENDIX VI.

Procedure for dealing with Italian Government traffic over the commercially operated cables Naples-Malta and Brindisi-Malta.

1. All messages will bear the message instruction FTL (to be transmitted by landline or cable only) at the beginning.
2. Outgoing messages may only be addressed to the Italian Government offices at Madrid or Lisbon.
3. Outgoing messages for transmission in clear. Messages will be handed by the Italian Government to the Political Section, ACC, Salerno, which will either approve locally or forward to the Political Section, ACC, Naples, for approval. In either case, after approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples, with an endorsement on one copy. Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CIPHER signed by the endorsing officer. The message will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed via ACC Signal Center to the Signal Center for transmission.
4. Outgoing messages for transmission in cipher. Cipher and clear text copies will be handed by the Italian Government to the Political Section, ACC, Salerno, which will either approve locally or forward to the Political Section, ACC, Naples, for approval. In either case, after approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples, with an endorsement on one cipher copy. Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CIPHER signed by the endorsing officer. A ciphered copy will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed to the Signal Center via ACC Signal Center for transmission. A second cipher copy together with a clear copy will be sent by the A.G. office to the Signal Center, Naples, for check. After check both copies will be forwarded by the Signal Center to the Political Section, Naples, with any necessary comment. It should be noted that cipher copies of approved messages may be passed for transmission without being delayed for the check by ACC Signals for agreement of texts.
5. Incoming messages. Incoming messages for the Italian Government in clear or in cipher will be delivered by the Signal Center to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples via ACC Signal Center who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy of each message to the Political Section (via ACC Signals for deciphering if in cipher). Messages need not be delayed for the check by the Political Section before being delivered to the Italian Government.
6. All charges by the cable company will be met by the Italian Government.

mission over commercial cables in CLEAR signed by the endorsing officer. The message will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed via ACC Signal Center to RB3 Signal Center for transmission.

4. Outgoing messages for transmission in cipher. Cipher and clear text copies will be handled by the Italian Government to the Political section, ACC, Salerno, which will either approve locally or forward to the Political section, ACC, Naples, for approval. In either case, after approval they will be forwarded by the Political section to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples with an endorsement on one cipher copy. Approved for transmission over commercial cables IN CIPHER signed by the endorsing officer. A ciphered copy will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed to RB3 Signal Center via ACC Signal Center for transmission. A second cipher copy together with a clear copy will be sent by the A.G. office to ACC Signal Center, Naples, for check. After check both copies will be forwarded by ACC Signal Center to the Political section, Naples, with any necessary comment. It should be noted that cipher copies of approved messages may be passed for transmission without being delayed for the check by ACC Signals for agreement of texts.

5. Incoming messages. Incoming messages for the Italian Government in clear or in cipher will be delivered by RB3 Signal Center to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples via ACC Signal Center who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy of each message to the Political section (via ACC Signals for deciphering if in cipher). Messages need not be delayed for the check by the Political section before being delivered to the Italian Government.

6. All charges by the cable company will be met by the Italian Government.

109.23

APPENDIX A.C.

procedure for dealing with Italian Government traffic over the commercially operated radio circuits Naples-U.S. and Naples-U.K.

1. Outgoing messages may be addressed to any address dealt with by the operating companies.
2. Messages will be in clear only, and will only be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases.
3. Messages will be handed to the Political Section, ACC, Salerno, who will forward to Political Section, ACC, Naples. If approved, they will be sent by the Political Section to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples, with an endorsement on one copy. Approved for transmission over commercial radio IN CLEAR subject to Field Press Censorship approval, signed by the encasing officer. The message will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed to the Field Press Censorship office, 4/c AFHQ PHO, 8 San Felice, Naples. If approved they will be duly endorsed and forwarded by that office to the radio operating company for transmission.
4. Incoming messages will be sent by the Field Press Censorship office to the A.G. office, ACC, Naples, who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the Political Section, ACC.
5. All charges by the commercial radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

to Political Section, AOC, Naples. If approved, they will be sent by the Political Section to the A.G. office, AOC, Naples, with an endorsement on one copy approved for transmission over commercial radio IN CLEAR subject to Field Press Censorship approval, signed by the endorsing officer. The message will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed to the Field Press Censorship office, 8 San Felice, Naples. If approved they will be duly endorsed and forwarded by that office to the radio operating company for transmission.

4.

Incoming messages will be sent by the Field Press Censorship office to the A.G. office, AOC, Naples, who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the Political Section, AOC.

5.

All charges by the commercial radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

141
3007

HEAD HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APC 394

Reference #723

7 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Samuel Reber, Vice-President, Political Section;
Main Headquarters, ACC, Naples

SUBJECT : Transmission of Telegrams from Italian Government

Attached are four copies of the experimental message sent by the Italian Foreign Office to Lisbon. These copies are to be forwarded to Civil Affairs Section, A.F.H.Q.

The message was sent by the following procedure:

1. Five copies of the message were handed to the Political Section, Salerno, by an official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. One copy was initialed here and sent to the AG Section.
3. The AG Section typed the message up in the proper form for teletyping to Hq., ACC at Naples. One copy of the form was returned to the Political Section with the copy of the original attached.
4. The message was received by the Signals Center, Hq., ACC, Naples, and passed on to P.B.S. to be cabled to Lisbon, via Naples-Malta-Gibraltar.
5. Upon completion of Step 3, the other four copies of the original were forwarded by courier to the Political Section, Naples for inspection and transmittal to Civil Affairs Section at Algiers. (i.e., by this letter.)
6. The one copy of the original and the copy of the AG form were filed with Political Section files, Salerno.

If the above procedure is to be used to send all future messages from the Italian Foreign Ministry to Madrid and Lisbon, it will be noted that Political Section, Naples will see the messages only after they have been sent. All messages upon reception at ACC, Naples could be sent to Political Section there for approval for onward transmission, if this is thought necessary; in which case Signals Center, Hq., ACC, Naples will have to be advised. Messages to Italian missions abroad

109.6

other than Madrid and Lisbon will be sent in the usual manner; i.e., via Civil Affairs and British Resident Minister, Algiers.

Should all messages to Madrid and Lisbon go by cable, and if not, what procedure of selection is to be adopted? Your instructions on the above would be appreciated.

DM Dechen
for J. E. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

APO 394 - U. S. ARMY

723.0

March 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Civil Affairs Section, Allied Force Headquarters.

In pursuance of the agreement of Allied Force Headquarters to the resumption of direct communications between the Italian Foreign Office and its Missions in Madrid and Lisbon, there are enclosed a self-explanatory Memorandum from Near Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, relating to the transmission of two experimental messages sent by the Foreign Office, one to Lisbon and one to Madrid, and the copies of these messages.

It would be appreciated if the confirmation copies of these telegrams could be forwarded to the respective Italian Missions.

A further Memorandum detailing procedure to be followed in connection with the transmission of Foreign Office messages including the measures to be taken to insure proper handling and security involved in transmission of coded messages, is now under preparation, a copy of which will be submitted as soon as approved.

Samuel Heber
Vice President Allied Control Commission
Political Section

Enclosed:

No. 51 to Madrid
No. 50 to Lisbon

10954

cc to C.A.

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APC 394

Reference #723

7 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Samuel Reber, Vice-President, Political Section;
Main Headquarters, ACC, Naples

SUBJECT : Transmission of Telegrams from Italian Government

Attached are four copies of the experimental message sent by the Italian Foreign Office to Lisbon. These copies are to be forwarded to Civil Affairs Section, A.F.H.Q.

The message was sent by the following procedure:

1. Five copies of the message were handed to the Political Section, Salerno, by an official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. One copy was initialled here and sent to the AG Section.
3. The AG Section typed the message up in the proper form for teletyping to Hq., ACC at Naples. One copy of the form was returned to the Political Section with the copy of the original attached.
4. The message was received by the Signals Center, Hq., ACC, Naples, and passed on to P.B.C. to be cabled to Lisbon, via Naples-Malta-Gibraltar.
5. Upon completion of Step 3, the other four copies of the original were forwarded by courier to the Political Section, Naples for inspection and transmittal to Civil Affairs Section at Algiers. (i.e., by this letter.)
6. The one copy of the original and the copy of the AG form were filed with Political Section files, Salerno.

723

If the above procedure is to be used to send all future messages from the Italian Foreign Ministry to Madrid and Lisbon, it will be noted that Political Section, Naples will see the messages only after they have been sent. All messages upon reception at ACC, Naples could be sent to Political Section there for approval for onward transmission, if this is thought necessary; in which case Signals Center, Hq., ACC, Naples will have to be advised. Messages to Italian missions abroad

109.3

other than Madrid and Lisbon will be sent in the usual manner; i.e., via Civil Affairs and British Resident Minister, Algiers.

Should all messages to Madrid and Lisbon go by cable, and if not, what procedure of selection is to be adopted? Your instructions on the above would be appreciated.

Pfc. Donald M. Decker
for J. M. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

10952

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Reference #723

15 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Samuel Reber, Political Section, Hq ACC, Naples
SUBJECT : Italian Government Cable Messages

With reference to my memorandum of 7 March regarding the transmission of telegrams from the Italian Government I now attach an advance copy of a draft on this subject.

The only point on which I should like your instructions is that in Appendix "B", Paragraph 3, it mentions that messages will be handed in by the Italian Government and approved by the Political Section, Salerno. I do not know whether this conforms with your wishes. It would certainly expedite the dispatch of messages and I could forward to Naples those of which I thought were doubtful.

With regard to outgoing messages in cypher (Appendix "B", Paragraph 4) I think that if a message is considered by the Italian Government sufficiently important to go in cypher, it should be forwarded automatically for your approval in Naples.

If you have any comments on the routings or checks suggested by the memorandum, I should be glad if you would let me have copy of any communications which you send to the Tele-Communications Section.

J. M. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

10951

723 (collected)

Political Section

Advance Copy

SECRETITALIAN GOVERNMENT MESSAGE TRAFFIC1. Internal.

(a) Italian Government messages within Government territory are not subject to censorship; messages may be in clear or in cipher. They may be subject to inspection, if required, to check the official nature of the message.

(b) Italian Government messages will be accepted and passed over the military operated submarine cables from Naples to Palermo (Sicily) and thence to Cagliari (Sardinia), taking priority after military and U.S. and U.K. Government traffic.

The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix A.

2. External.

(a) Italian Government messages may continue to be passed in Allied ciphers over the military radio circuits to Algiers for addressees abroad. The rules for and procedure for dealing with this traffic are established.

(b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated submarine cables from Naples to Malta or from Brindisi to Malta, for the Italian Government offices in Madrid or Lisbon only. Messages are subject to the approval of the political section, AOC; they may be in clear or in the codes and ciphers approved by AFHQ. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix B.

(c) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Naples to the U.S. (N.C.A.A.) or from Naples to the U.K. (C. and W.) for any addressees dealt with by the operating companies. On these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the political section and also to Field Press Censorship; they may only be in clear, and will be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix C.

10050

- (a) Italian Government messages may continue to be passed in Allied ciphers over the military radio circuits to Algiers for addresses abroad. The rules for and procedure for dealing with this traffic are established.
- (b) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially (C and W) operated submarine cables from Naples to Malta or from Brindisi to Malta, for the Italian Government offices in Madrid or Lisbon only. Messages are subject to the approval of the political section, AGO; they may be in clear or in the codes and ciphers approved by AFHQ. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix B.
- (c) Italian Government messages may be passed over the commercially operated radio circuits from Naples to the U.S. (R.C.A.A.) or from Naples to the U.K. (C. and W.) for any addresses dealt with by the operating companies. On these circuits, messages are subject to the approval of the political section and also to Field Press Censorship; they may only be in clear, and will be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases. The detailed procedure for dealing with this traffic is given in Appendix C.

APPENDIX "A"

Procedure for dealing with Italian Government traffic over the military operated cables Palermo-Palermo and Palermo-Cagliari.

1. Messages will be handled in by the Italian Government to the A.G. office, Room 21, Provincia Building, Naples. (Arrangements for transmission between Palermo and Naples will be made by the Italian Government.)
2. The A.G. office will type the message on the form required for transmission by the military unit operating the cable, authenticates, and pass to the signal office concerned.
3. Incoming messages from Palermo or Cagliari will be delivered by the signal office of the unit operating the cable to the A.G. office, ACC Naples, via AGC signal center, from where they will be collected by Italian Government courier.
4. Similar arrangements, as convenient locally, will be made at Palermo and Cagliari.
5. At no stage is translation or deciphering required, but copies of messages should be retained for reference.

4. similar arrangements, as convenient locally, will be made at Palermo and Cagliari.
5. At no stage is translation or deciphering required, but copies of messages should be retained for reference.

109-9

APPENDIX II

Procedures for dealing with Italian Government traffic over the occasionally encrypted cables Naples-Rome and Rome-Naples.

1. All messages will bear the message instructions III (to be transmitted by landline or cable only) at the beginning.
2. Outgoing messages may only be addressed to the Italian Government offices at Madrid or Lisbon.
3. Outgoing messages for transmission in cipher. Messages will be handled by the Italian Government to the Political Section, C.I. Bureau, which will either approve locally or forward to the Political Section, C.I. Bureau, for approval. In either case, after approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the A.S. Office, A.C. Bureau, with an endorsement on one copy, approved for transmission over enciphered cables in cipher, signed by the endorsing officer. The message will be then be authenticated by the A.S. Office and passed via A.C. Office to the signal center for transmission.
4. Outgoing messages for transmission in plain. Cipher and clear text copies will be handled by the Italian Government to the Political Section, A.C. Bureau, which will either approve locally or forward to the Political Section, A.C. Bureau, for approval. In either case, after approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the A.S. Office, A.C. Bureau, with an endorsement on one copy, approved for transmission over enciphered cables in cipher, signed by the endorsing officer. The message will be then be authenticated by the A.S. Office and passed via A.C. Office to the signal center for transmission.
5. Incoming messages. Incoming messages for the Italian Government in cipher or in plain will be delivered by the signal center to the A.S. Office, A.C. Bureau, via the signal center who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy of each message to the Political Section (via the signal center for each-keeping in cipher). Messages need not be delayed for the check by the Political Section before being delivered to the Italian Government.
6. All changes by the cable company will be met by the Italian Government.

Signal Center to the Signal Center for transmission.

4. Intending messages for transmission in cipher. Cipher and clear text copies will be handled by the Italian Government to the Political Section, AOC, Naples, which will either approve locally or forward to the Political Section, AOC, Rome, for approval. In either case, after approval they will be forwarded by the Political Section to the A.G. office, AOC, Naples with an endorsement on one of their copy. Approved for transmission over commercial cables in cipher signed by the commanding officer. A ciphered copy will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed to the Signal Center via AOC Signal Center for transmission. A second cipher copy together with a clear copy will be sent by the A.G. office to the Signal Center, Naples, for check. After check both copies will be forwarded by the Signal Center to the Political Section, Naples, with any necessary comment. It should be noted that cipher copies of approved messages may be passed for transmission without being delayed for the check by AOC Signals for agreement of texts.
5. Intending messages. Intending messages for the Italian Government in clear or in cipher will be delivered by the Signal Center to the A.G. office, AOC, Naples via AOC Signal Center who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy of each message to the Political Section (via AOC Signals for checking if in cipher). Messages need not be delayed for the check by the Political Section before being delivered to the Italian Government.
6. All changes by the cable company will be not by the Italian Government.

10943

APPENDIX "C"

Procedure for dealing with Italian Government traffic over the commercially operated radio circuits Naples-J.S. and Naples-J.M.

1. Outgoing messages may be addressed to any address dealt with by the operating company.
2. Messages will be in clear only, and will only be of an entirely non-secret nature such as press releases.
3. Messages will be handed to the political section, AOC, Palermo, who will forward to political section, AOC, Naples. If approved, they will be sent by the political section to the A.G. office, AOC, Naples, with an endorsement on one copy approved for transmission over commercial radio by CLEAR subject to Field Press Censorship approval, signed by the answering officer. The message will then be authenticated by the A.G. office and passed to the Field Press Censorship office, 4/0 AFHQ, P.M.G. 8 San Felice, Naples. If approved they will be duly endorsed and forwarded by that office to the radio operating company for transmission.
4. Incoming messages will be sent by the Field Press Censorship office to the A.G. office, AOC, Naples, who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the political section, AOC.
5. All charges by the commercial radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

for transmission over commercial radio company. The message will then be authenticated by the undersigned officer. The message will then be passed to the Italian Government by the A.G. office and passed to the field press censorship office, c/o ARMA PRO, 8 San Felice, Naples. If approved they will be duly censored and forwarded by that office to the radio operating company for transmission.

4. Incoming messages will be sent by the field press censorship office to the A.G. office, A.G. Naples, who will pass them without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy to the political section, A.G.

5. All charges by the commercial radio company will be met by the Italian Government.

700-27

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Reference #723


21 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO:: Mr. Samuel Reber, Political Section, Hq ACC, Naples
SUBJECT : Italian Government Cable Messages (Incoming)

With reference to cyphered messages received with your memorandum of 20 March I enquired from the Italian Government when we should receive the decyphered texts and was informed that they must already have been decyphered on their way to them.

If you will refer to Appendix B of the memorandum on Italian Government Message Traffic which I forwarded to you, you will note in Paragraph 5 that the ACC Signal Center is to pass such messages without delay to the Italian Government, sending a copy of each message to the Political Section via ACC Signals for decyphering if in cypher. The paragraph goes on to say that messages need not be delayed for the check by the Political Section before being delivered to the Italian Government.

I have ascertained that these arrangements are now in force. In this instance you should have received from ACC Signals not the original cyphered message but the decyphered text. Colonel Henderson tells me these have been delivered to you today.


J. M. PEARSON
Captain
Political Section

10946

W. S. ~~Stevens~~
Mr. ~~Stevens~~

Attached copy of a letter from TeleCium SubCommission will refresh
your memory. The first test message will be sent today via Naples -
Malta - Gibraltar. Margini has seen Col. Henderson and will
inform the Italian Government -

6-3-44.

~~Myers~~

Capt

10945

C O P Y

JLH/arr/dmd

(Draft)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

In reply refer to: AG 311.5
TC/2/1

Subject: Cipherng of Italian Government Communications Between Italy
and Spain.

To: Lt. McCreery, Message Center
Copy to Adjutant General
Copy to C/C Royal Corps of Signals, 71 Sub-Area
Copy to Mr. Reber

1. A date will be fixed shortly for the introduction of a ciphered message system between Italy and Spain, for the Italian Government messages only.

2. Outgoing messages from Italy will be enciphered by the Italian Government. The cipher text accompanied by two copies of the plain text version will be sent by hand to the ACC (Adjutant General), where they will be passed to the Political Section for security inspection.

3. If the result of this inspection is satisfactory, the ciphered message and one copy of the plain text will be sent to you, for check of agreement of the texts. Ciphered messages may however be passed for transmission without being delayed until the check for agreement of text has been completed.

All messages should bear the message instruction FIL (to be transmitted by landline or cable only) at the beginning, and this must be checked. Messages will be routed over the Brindisi - Malta - Gibraltar submarine cable system.

3. Incoming messages will be routed back over the same cables. One copy of the ciphered message will be sent by 71 Sub Area Signals direct to the Italian Government another copy being sent to you. This copy should be deciphered and the ciphered copy and a plain copy sent to Mr. Reber for check for security violation. He will retain or destroy the message.

For Col. J. L. HENDERSON
Telecommunications and Posts Sub-Commission

10064

Now the route in Para 2 should read:

"Naples - Malta - Gibraltar"

COPY

3 MAR 1944
Amg XV

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

/hft/dmd

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

M/C NO :

PREC : ROUTINE

REF NO : 4723

FROM : FATIMA

FILED : MAR 031615A

TO : FATIMA REAR

REC'D : MAR 031713A

via teletype

Reur for use Italian commercial code for certain message not understood.
Reur 2417 Feb 28. However see no objection to using it for unclassified messages
provided clear texts are approved by censorship prior to encoding. Forward to
Chief Signal Officer AFHQ, attention FHSIG-1, 2 copies code books. Extract
original by courier.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AG
- 1 - DSG (info)
- 1 - DCC (info)
- 1 - Telecomms (action)

This is the arrangement between the
Telecommunications Sub-commission and
the Italian Government.

For whom to whom?

Not understood.

SR

10943

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FEB 28

FATIMA

FREEDOM

REFERENCE FIVE ONE THREE FOUR ONE OF FOURTEENTH FEBRUARY PAPEN TO
FREEDOM FOR FHEID FROM FATIMA FROM HENDERSON SIGNED MACFARLANE PAPEN
SUBJECT ITALIAN MESSAGES TO MADRID PD MAY CERTAIN MESSAGES WHICH WOULD
OTHERWISE GO IN CLEAR BE SENT IN AN ITALIAN PRIVATE COMMERCIAL CODE
PD TWO COPIES OF THE CODE BOOKS TO BE SUPPLIED TO AFHQ

AUTHENTICATED:

E. J. CHIOCCIA
CWO, USA
Asst Adj

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AG DSC ECC ea
- 1 - Telecom Sub-Com Col Henderson

10942

JLH/ech

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

In reply refer
to: T3/26/14

27 February 1941.

Subject: Italian Communications.

To : The Political Section.

1. A representative of the Italian Foreign Office has asked this Sub-Commission for communication between Italy and Ankara for diplomatic messages. **Is it** agreed that the manner of establishing communication should now be raised with AFHQ.

H. L. Henderson
J. L. HENDERSON,
Colonel,

Director, Telecommunication and Posts Sub-Commission.

Captain Pearson

*No Ram in asking - but I thought
the Italians were going to use
Madrid as a ^{inter} distribution
center for all their messages to
their Missions abroad?*

3
For my use this for reference

Circular messages only -

*The Italian Government wants to include Ankara
in the simplified code system, arranged for Madrid -*

AA
27/2
10941

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET
OUTGOING

Extra AG

/dfo

4/04

755

091200H

SECRET

PRIORITY

FATIMA

FREEDOM

REURAD SEVEN ZERO SIX OF TWO TWO OCTOBER PRUNAS WHO IS NOW ACTING AS SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE EMPHASIZED ON ARRIVAL THE HANDICAP FROM WHICH ROYAL
ITALIAN EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS ABROAD SUFFER IN NOT HAVING ANY QUICK TELEGRAPHIC
COMMUNICATIONS WITH BRINDISI WHILE FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT CAN COMMUNICATE
DIRECTLY AND RAPIDLY WITH ITALIAN COMMUNITIES IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES PD TO FREEDOM
FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD THE LOYALTY OF THE ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
TO THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED BUT PRESENT NECESSITY OF ROUTING
ALL CORRESPONDENCE THROUGH ALGIERS SERIOUSLY REDUCED THEIR EFFICIENCY IN THEIR
DEALINGS WITH ITALIAN COLONIES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS PD ITALIAN AUTHORITIES
WOULD OF COURSE SUBMIT TO ANY FORM OF CENSORSHIP THAT IS REQUIRED AND WOULD
INDEED BE GRATEFUL IF WE COULD SUPPLY CIPHERS PD THEY URGED HOWEVER THAT SOME MORE
RAPID MEANS OF COMMUNICATION BE PROVIDED PD PARA I NOTE FROM YOUR TELEGRAM THAT
QUESTION IS UNDER INVESTIGATION AND I TRUST THAT SOLUTION MAY NOT BE UNDULY
DELAYED

AUTHENTICATED:

Pol
DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

10940

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS 311 2
723

U. S. SECRET

Equals British SECRET

CONTROL COMMISSION

OUTGOING

/cen

11/15

955

158834A

NOV

NOV

SECRET

PRIORITY

FATIMA

FREEDOM

ITALIANS PRESSING FOR DECISION REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION
 WITH MADRID PD PARM TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA REWARD SEVEN FIVE FIVE SIGNED
JOYCE PARM PD CAN YOU GIVE ANY INDICATION WHAT OBSTACLES ARE IN THE WAY OF
 SOLUTION PD AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED ITALIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY FORM
 OF CONSENSHIP AND CONTROL PD DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH PROPER SAFEGUARDS HAS
 OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOE

Major, AIG

Secretary of Commission

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG
 1 - Diary

109.3

U. S. SECRET

Equals British SECRET

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British MOST SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 APO 512 U.S. ARMY

5 November 1943

To : Allied Military Mission,
 Italy.

Reference your cables No. 448 of 16 October and 537 of 22 October and our reply No. 706 of 22 October. The following is an extract from a ~~has been~~ letter which was received from Civil Affairs and Office of the British Minister.

"We are not in favour of this proposal and consider that for political reasons all Italian diplomatic messages should continue to pass over the FATIMA-FREEDOM circuit. Not all the messages that pass at present are transmitted by us in toto or without reference to the State Department or Foreign Office. We consider it important that this check on the Italian messages should be maintained for the time being."

The Chief of Staff is in complete agreement with the foregoing and has instructed us to inform you to this effect. Will you please inform the authorities concerned of this decision and that all messages will continue to pass over the FATIMA-FREEDOM circuit.

Telegram to AFHQ hereinto
 after consultation with CP-Staff
 na Kilo

K.W.D. STRONG
 Brigadier,
 A.C. of S., G-2.

Copy to : Civil Affairs,
 A.F.H.Q.

10033

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British MOST SECRET

1 2 9 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

CONTROL COMMISSION
ALLIED ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ - INCOMING MESSAGE

/ecn

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO: 26/17

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 2254

PREG : URGENT

FILED : NOV 171836A

FROM : FREEDOM

REC'D : NOT GIVEN

TO : FATIMA

Question contained your cable 955 of 15 November is answered in our letter of November 5th which should have reached you by now. (ACTION FATIMA FOR JOYCE FROM 32 FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE JEGEL). For the reasons stated therein no departure from the present procedure can be permitted for the time being.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary

2704-311-Communications

10907

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET

CONTROL COMMISSION
 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OUTGOING

HC/hft

SECRET

PRIORITY

FATIMA

FREEDOM

NOV

NOV

13
 1041
 201935A

GEORGE TWO MEMORANDUM OF FIFTH NOVEMBER JUST RECEIVED QUOTING YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS ALL ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SHOULD CONTINUE TO PASS OVER FATIMA FREEDOM CIRCUIT PD PAREN TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PAREN PD OUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS SEVEN FIVE FIVE AND NINE FIVE FIVE SHOW POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN ESTABLISHING DIRECT CIRCUIT AND NOW THAT CONTROL COMMISSION HAS BEEN SET UP POLITICAL CONTROL SHOULD BE EXERCISED HERE UNDER DIRECTIVES FROM AFTER EXCEPT IN CASES OF DOUBT WHICH SHOULD AND WOULD BE REFERRED PD IF WE DESIRE RADIOGLIO GOVERNMENT TO HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF CARRYING ON CMA IT SHOULD BE GIVEN THIS BETTER FORM OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES PD IT IS UNDESIRABLE PRACTICE TO DELAY ROUTINE BUSINESS TO WHICH BULK OF MESSAGES REFER CMA IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE FEW MESSAGES WHICH HAVE SIGNIFICANCE PD THEREFORE REQUEST EARLY RECONSIDERATION OF QUESTION OF DIRECT CIRCUIT WHICH HAS SIGNAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL ADVANTAGES FROM ALLIED POINT OF VIEW PD OUR MESSAGE FIVE THREE SEVEN REFERS

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG
 1 - Diary

AUTHENTICATED:

109.36

ROBERT E. DOE.
 Major, A. G. D.,
 Secretary of Commission.

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET

1299