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PATRIOTIC RESISTERS

June 1944 - March 1945

1053

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3201/206/50.

10 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problem in N. ITALY.

TO : VP, GA Section.

1. In reply to your letter TS/45/18/GA of 5 March 1945, herewith for your retention copy of JPS Study No. 2/265 (Final).

2. In accordance with Conclusion 7(c) of the Minutes of SACRED's Political Conference of 20 February 1945, (copy forwarded you under this office letter 3201/190/X of 28 February) the last sentence has been deleted from para 6 of JPS Study No. 2/265 (Final).

/JC.

Edith Hunt
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: SO to GO (with copy of JPS Study No. 2/265
Pol. Adv. (Final and to note para 2 above).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(c) or (d)
By *[Signature]* DATE *[Signature]*
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

18 February 1945

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

Cover Note by MJPS.

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from Chief of Staff on 16 February 1945, we have prepared the attached interim report on measures to deal with patriot problems in Northern ITALY.
2. In the time available it has not been possible to consult 15 Army Group, Allied Commission, or MIA.

(Sgt) G. L. KEBBLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.,
G-3 Plans.

Representatives concurred in
conference but the time
factor has prevented signature
being obtained

(L.T. CAMERON,
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans
W.A. ADAMS
Commander,
Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION:

List "A" plus,
OG, 15th Army Group
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander SOM
British Resident Minister
US Political Adviser
A/O of S, G-5

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TOP SECRET.

P/265 (Final)

TOP SECRET.

18 February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

INTERALIA REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PATRIOT PROBLEMS
IN NORTHWEST ITALY.

OBJECT.

1. To examine all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern ITALY and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:

- a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.
- b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
- c. The prevention of fighting between Slovenes and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern ITALY were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.
- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. By AFHQ.

- 2748
- (1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest ITALY" was issued on 24 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 26918 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.

1. To examine all plans and proposals for dealing with prisoners of the occupation of Northern ITALY and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:

- a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.
- b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
- c. The prevention of fighting between Slovene and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENETIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

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- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.
- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. By AFHQ.

- (1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest ITALY" was issued on 21 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 26916 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.

- (2) The covering approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the scales of food and clothing, envisaged in the instructions given to 15th Army Group, has been asked for in MAY 864 dated 15 February.

- (3) A letter is being dispatched to HMA, copy to 15th Army Group, which lays down a general policy for the introduction of patriots into the Italian Army to fill, as far as possible, the 48,000 existing vacancies under the present ceiling, and instructs HMA to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands for employment with the five Italian combat groups. (Patriots are now filtering through the lines at a rate of about 500 per week

-2-

and it is anticipated that on the occasion of Northern Italy it will be possible to absorb at least 10,000 patriots in this manner into the Italian Army). Depending on the success with Italian combat groups, the use of Italian patriot reconnaissance companies with British and U.S. divisions is also envisaged.

b. By 15th Army Groups in conjunction with Allied Command.

It is understood that the following measures have been taken:

- (1) Messages giving detailed anti-scorch instructions have been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.
- (2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centres.
- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LOS with patriot bands.

c. By Allied Command.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local AMG representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northwestern Italy are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern Italy are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the obvious difficulty.

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g. By Allied Commission.

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(1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AM "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local GLN representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.

(2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.

(3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.

(4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.

(5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.

(6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

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3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northwestern ITALY are now well advanced. Plans for North-eastern ITALY are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the obvious difficulty.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

4. To meet the object stated at paragraph 1 above, the following additional measures are recommended:

a. The establishment of closer links between the GLNI and the KORE Government.

There will be advantages in representatives being ^{ac}credited from each of these organisations to the other, though the nomination of suitable persons will represent a difficulty. In this connection an exchange of missions between SACRED and the GLNI has also been considered, but as our object is now to play down the patriots, such a course does not appear desirable.

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b. Informal Agreement as to Suitable Italians for Military Government Positions.

There will be advantages if the ROME Government and the GHQAI can be induced to agree on lists of suitable candidates for employment as prefects, etc., under A.G. SACRED could then undertake that, when instituting an Allied Military Government, agreed nominees would be considered for such appointments.

5. In regard to the object of paragraph 4 b, we have assured that this refers to riots and not to normal operations of war against Fascist formations which may be ^{or} complying with German orders. In our opinion, the danger of armed disturbances developing between Fascists and patriots is small and the real danger is that of strife among patriots of diverse political opinions. The measures already taken, supplemented by those suggested at paragraph 4, should deal with this contingency.

6. In regard to the object given at paragraph 4 c, the best insurance will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions remain urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY. ~~It is our opinion that the best insurance for the establishment of a stable government in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government.~~

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SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
330 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 3207/13/COS.

16 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Movement of Patriots in the Italian Army.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander,
Allied Forces Headquarters.

1. The dispersal of patriots immediately on liberation has been a matter of constant consideration, and indeed anxiety, on the part of myself and my advisers for some months. Arrangements made to meet this extremely difficult problem, which were spread upon last July by all parties concerned including members of Special Forces and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful. A new approach must now be made.

2. Hitherto our aim has been to make of the patriots, after liberation, good civilians; to rehabilitate them in their normal vocations; to give them preferential treatment in the matter of employment; to clothe them and to feed them insofar as supplies make it possible; to recruit them as individuals into the Italian Army; and to repatriate them to their homes if they are not found to be locals. Finally, our policy has been to disarm them.

3. Our reports from Allied Military Government officers, however, have shown that patriots expect better and different treatment. They are disillusioned at their reception. Those that have really fought in bands and companies have experienced the desire to continue the fight in the same formations. The masses supplies of food and clothing that we have been able to give do not, in their opinion, fulfill the promise made to them by the Allied nations when they have been operating. The order to disarm is the final straw. They resent it and the majority of them disobey it. True, we have had no serious trouble so far but, in my opinion, a fundamentally different situation will arise when we get to the north with its more virile population and (estimated) 100,000 patriots in well organized bands.

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4. The experience of the Allied Nations in Belgium, France and Greece have exposed the vital danger which threatens any government, be it military or indigenous, which has to face, in the initial stages of liberation, the presence of armed bands of men accustomed to living by force of arms alone, who are readily affected and crumbled into political organizations, the object of which is to usurp the power of the legitimate government and to set up a government by force rather than through elective processes.

5. We must, therefore, in this country endeavour to avoid the release of those bands of patriots who, armed with Allied rifles and equipped with Allied food and money, encouraged by Allied officers, have aided the Allied war effort. Placarded from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only viable method of dealing with them is to disarm and more attractive to retain the

1. The disposal of patriots immediately on liberation has been a matter of constant consideration, and linked closely, on the part of myself and my advisers for some months. Arrangements have to meet this extremely difficult problem, which were agreed upon last July by all parties concerned including members of special forces and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful: a new approach must now be made.

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4. The experiences of the Allied nations in Belgium, France and Greece have exposed the vital danger which threatens any government, be it military or indigenous, which has to face, in the initial stages of liberation, the presence of armed bands of men accustomed to living by force of arms alone, who are readily attracted and enrolled into political organizations, the object of which is to usurp the power of the legitimate government and to set up a government by force rather than through elective processes.

5. We must, therefore, in this country endeavor to avoid the abuses of large bands of patriots who, armed with Allied rifles and equipped with Allied food and money, encouraged by Allied officers, have added the Allied war effort. Adapted from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only virile members of a defeated population, they find it easier and more attractive to retain the role of fighters and thus become an easy prey to the forces of anarchy.

6. I believe that with patriots and understanding we can overcome many of the material causes of disillusionment but attempts at wholesale disarmament will ever be a source of resentment and of resistance for a portion of these persons.

7. The offer to enlist individuals into the Italian Army under the normal conditions of recruitment for that Army, intended to meet the desires of those who wish to carry on the fight, have met with little success. From many Italian sources, from the patriots themselves and from members of the Italian Government, have come requests that they should be recruited into the fighting element of the

Army in their patri- t bands under their patriot off- ers so that the comradeship and loyalty displayed behind the lines may not be lost after liberation. I am now convinced that whether in fact they will join the Army in these circumstances or not, we must give them the opportunity to do so.

8. The technical objections to this course are well understood. In the very difficult task of reorganizing the Italian Army the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission naturally dislikes the idea of forming special units within that Army which might become political formations and which would be of doubtful value militarily. He must object to accepting men into the Italian Army on their own terms; he must resist the breaking up of existing Army units in order to fit in special bands. General Browning's objections are expressed in the enclosed proposed draft reply to the Italian Chief of Staff's letter attached.

9. I submit that we must consider accepting the principle of taking into the Italian Army patriot bands as units, in numbers not exceeding any that of a company, under their own existing officers. In my opinion the political, and indeed administrative advantages, must outweigh the military objections, for by doing so we shall be going a long way to ensure the preservation of law and order in the North and the avoidance of political and civil strife. I would ask, therefore, for your earliest and urgent consideration that the principle be approved.

10. The members of the Italian Army within the present ceiling are fully committed to combat groups, security divisions and service units working for the Allies; the latter units comprise some 100,000 men. It is true that at present the Italian Army is 48,000 men short of establishment. On first impression, therefore, it would appear simple to absorb the patriots in bands into existing formations and so fill the establishment. In fact, however, there would be difficulties. The desire of the patriots to continue the fight would not be wholly met by absorption into internal security divisions or services units. They ask to join the combat groups. These groups are already organized and it would be difficult to absorb ready made patriot units into them. The formation of further combat groups is precluded at present by restrictions of ceiling and equipment. Nevertheless such are the advantages of wise employment of the patriots and such are the dangers of neglecting any opportunity that I would strongly recommend (a) immediate reconsideration of the ceiling of the Italian Army by an addition of up to 100,000 men, and immediate measures to form at least one and subsequently further combat groups and (b) direction to the Italian War Ministry to recruit patriots in bands forthwith to fill the deficiency in establishment recorded above.

11. General Browning, with whom I have discussed the contents of this letter, regards the proposal as unwise from a purely military point of view. If, however, political considerations prevail over military considerations, he is prepared to overcome the practical difficulties in order to absorb patriot bands into composite units of the Italian Army provided that requisite equipment and clothing is forthcoming.

12. Our present policy towards the patriots is being attacked both in this country and in the Allied countries, particularly in the United States. We should not reject any opportunity to create, particularly in Northern Italy, an atmosphere of content and cooperation as against resentment, and hostility, towards the Allies. We must support the legitimate Italian Government, we

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13. Whatever, therefore, the technical difficulties of raising or adjusting the distribution of the ceiling may be; whatever the extra financial commitments (and we must remember that many millions of lira and many tons of supplies are

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already being poured into the patriot stores in the North), these should and must be overcome in order to give to the patriots what they think is their due reward and make them part of a responsible government rather than potential tools of disorder. This is a matter with an international, even a world-wide aspect and should not be judged, in my opinion, on the basis of local and parochial considerations of purely military exigencies in this theatre of operations.

/s/ ELBERT W. STONE

ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Acting President, EL. AG.
Mr. Noel Charles
Mr. Alexander Kirk
G-5 Section, AFHQ.
Liaison Forces Div-Com.
Political Section
CA Section
"A" File

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I realize that Col. Pitts' main objection to the change in policy was desirable. I am sure that the subject, which you have raised in this letter, is a very important one, so do I.

2. EXISTING POLICY

As you are well aware, the existing policy was adopted last Summer after considerable discussion on both the military and political aspects, both for now and post-war, by all authorities concerned including patriot leaders. After discussion by high level authority this policy was stated in LIA letters 1/14 of 23 Jul 44 with amendment 73/8/19 of 30 Nov 44. I need hardly say that the whole matter has been continuously watched ever since by all Allied authorities concerned - particularly in view of the tragic occurrences in Germany.

3. REASON FOR POLICY

While a large number of factors affected the problem, among the main ones are the following:-

- (a) There can be only one official Italian army and its prestige and authority must be maintained and enhanced both for now and post-war.
- (b) "Private armies" of patriots or anyone else within liberated territory would not only undermine the authority of the official Italian army but would be the seeds of grave potential trouble in the future.
- (c) Mollin patriots who undoubtedly have widely different political views as complete bands would:-

(i) tend to create political "nuclei" within the army, to the detriment of the policy that the army is above politics and with possible serious post-war repercussions.

(ii) be of doubtful value militarily. The bands are not all composed of trained soldiers. Though they may be useful guerrillas, they would require training in British weapons, platoon and company tactics, etc. before being suitable for absorption into the (British armed) combat groups. The leaders of the bands would, in most cases, have to be replaced by regular officers which would cause resentment in the bands.

(iii) mean accepting the bands on their own terms instead of ours. Real "patriot" should be patriotic enough to accept what the Allies order in order to contribute his maximum to the war effort and the liberation of Italy, without causing difficulty to the Allies.

(iv) mean that existing official army units ²⁷⁴² have to be broken up in order that the bands may replace them. Apart from the military and psychological effect of such a procedure on an army unit, widespread application would undermine and destroy the basic homogeneity of the army.

The developments in U. S. of the 1960s, prove conclusively the wisdom of the U.S. policy in 1945 and no other in that policy can be accounted which might bring about an end to the state of affairs in the U.S.

[illegible]

I graduated in 1907.

- (a) I do not account your contention that there is a paradox.
(b) I am in favor that men called in, come into the army unwillingly.
(c) While some bonds may be willing to come into the army as bonds on their own terms, my information is that a very few of course is that the reason why we have secured for the army only a few hundred patriots out of the thousands available is liberty & freedom is that:
(i) patriots do not feel inclined to change their lives and easy life for the more circumscribed life of a soldier.
(ii) as soon as their lives or values are offered, they want to go home. They would be unable, at any rate, to do so if they enlist in the army.

(iii) Movement is strongly discouraged by many of the leaders who realize that once they have cultivated the (so leaders) become non-entities without power instead of personally important people.

(d) "our statement that 'those' who are screening to fight encounter difficulties when attempting to join the army' is not a fact. Screening agencies have been set up and any patriot is at liberty to join the army if he wishes. These agencies have had little work, due entirely to the patriots own decision as to what they are prepared to do.

5. Quasi-Newton algorithms

- (a) The solution has also been decided by the allied, taking into account all the factors involved.
- (b) The fact that only a few patriots have enlisted and many have evaded the call-up (which is the law of the land) does not invalidate the solution or prove it wrong.
- (c) The potentially large number of patriots in the north was a factor that was taken into account in framing the patriot policy. Failure to continue with that policy as "Order 15" in liberat can only accentuate the military and political difficulties and dangers mentioned above.

• G. J. van der Grinten

- (e) far from valuing the patriot effort, there has been a tendency to give undue prominence to it, at the expense of the good work done by the official Italian, etc. It is largely for this reason that let it considerably more notification has been given in the press and elsewhere to the leaders of the army and its valuable aid to the allied or friend.
- (b) The matter of provision of food, clothing, etc. for patriots is, as you know, a complex problem, affected by a number of factors such as availability of supplies, shipping, etc. As you also know, supplies for the Italian army are very short. The ally's part is in maintaining a reservoir which can be tapped to provide supplies on demand for all our army.
- (c) My patriot can enter the army provided he is suitable. Let "only a small number" - see also my para 4 (4) above.
- (d) Will appreciate the value of "links of affection and comradeship", see my remarks in 3 (c) above. Presumably the patriot should put his country above self, no matter what his nationality.
- (e) As regards your para. 3 (b) see my para. 4 (c) above. Judging by results of enlistments, the patriots will only come in on their own terms.

(ii) as soon as either 1341 or 1342 is identified, then send to #0 home. There would be no problem, at any rate, in identifying 1341 or 1342 as the correct one.

(iii) Estimated is not a "discovery" or matter of fact. It is a matter of opinion that depends on what the "discovery" becomes.

(d) Our statement that "those who are anxious to fight encounter difficulties when attempting to join the army" is not a fact. Some agencies have been set up, and our priority is to liberty to join the army if he wishes. These agencies have had little work, but entirely to the patriots can decision to help them or ordered to do.

Figure 2.

(a) The solution has always been decided by the allied, taking into account all the factors involved.

(7) The fact that only a few concrete test subjects and their have revealed the call-9 (which is the law of the land) does not invalidate the solution or prove it wrong.

(c) The potentially large number of retractions in the report was a factor that was taken into account in issuing the Patriot policy. Failure to continue with that policy as a free press is liberal can only accentuate the military and political discrimination and dangers mentioned above.

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(a) Any form, including the District officers, there has been a tendency to give undue prominence to it, at the expense of the good work done by the official Italian press. It is largely for this reason that let be considerably more solicitation has been given to the press and cinema to be in touch with the new and its development and to the public at large.

(b) The matter of provision of food, clothing, etc. for detainees is, as you know, a complex problem, especially where a number of factors such as availability of supplies, shipping, etc. are concerned. I am sure that the Italian army are very good at this sort of thing, but it is not in the hands of the Italian army alone to provide supplies on a grand scale and winter.

(c) are reflected on as to the Army provided he is suitable, the "only" a small number - also by the (1) etc.

(3) will, expressing the value or "line of affection and comradeship", see marks in 3 (c) above. Presumably the district should put his own marks above said marks, and that his nationality.

(iv) as to this year's price, $\frac{3}{4}(p)$ can be paid, + (c) above, owing by country club, still, in 1944, 1945 and 1946.

7. Your paragraph 4.

- (a) I am in agreement with much of what you say. Undoubtedly, the patriots represent a valuable aid to the allied cause and to Italy.
- (b) I am doubtful of your assertion of the unanimity of thought of the patriots as regards the political aspect. The latter here is as stated in my para. 3 (c) (ii) above.
- (c) The real point at issue is whether patriots shall be permitted to enter the army as bands or as individuals. In this connection see my para 3 (c) above.

8. Your paragraph 5.

- (a) I also see para. 6 (b) above - you doubtless appreciate that:-
- (a) Movement is part of the policy laid down by high allied authority.
- (b) In view of the unfortunate state of affairs between Italy and the allies during recent years and the fact that fascism and anti-Allies feeling has not yet been completely eliminated, it is essential, on the grounds of security alone if for no other reason, to make very sure that Italians crossing the line are what they say they are.
- (c) With the best will in the world, issues of clothing, food, etc. can only be issued as authorized and not indiscriminately to all and sundry - see also my para. 6 (b) above.

9. Your summary

- (a) I have commented already on most of this and would add only the following remarks:
- (b) It is the allied policy NOT to permit "the existence of another armed force apart from the army" (see my para. 3 (b) above). Hence the procedure laid down for patriots.
- (c) Patriots must be considered as civilians till they are officially enrolled into the Italian army.
- (d) On whole matter of formation of mountain units was fully considered recently by high allied authority. In theory, there is something to be said for the idea - in practice the difficulties of producing and maintaining fully equipped mountain organizations on a different establishment to combat groups, combined with those of keeping even the combat groups up to strength, have rendered the proposition impracticable. No useful purpose can be served by reopening the question, particularly at a time when the Italian army is some 48,000 short of its authorized establishment and difficulties are being encountered to make up that shortage, which is mainly in essential service units.
- (e) All contact with patriot forces in the North must be through H.Q. 15th army group and NOT direct.

10. CONCLUSION.

- (a) You will have seen from above that I am in virtually complete disagreement with your memorandum.
- (b) I am constrained to say that I think it is based on false premises and an incorrect view of the problem as a whole.
- (c) No departure from the patriot policy laid down by higher authority can be permitted.
- (d) In connection with all the above, the really important thing at the moment is that allied policy, the authority of the Italian Government and the law of the land, shall be upheld by:-
- (i) strict adherence to the patriot policy laid down.
 - (ii) obtaining the necessary soldiers for the Italian Army by

8. Your paragraph 5.

Also see my para. 6 (b) above - you doubtless appreciate that:-

(a) Disarmament is part of the policy laid down by high Allied

authorities.

(b) In view of the unfortunate state of affairs between Italy and the Allies during recent years and the fact that fascism and anti-Allies feeling has not yet been completely eliminated, it is essential, on the grounds of security alone if for no other reason, to make very sure that Italians crossing the line are what they say they are.

(c) With the best will in the world, issues of clothing, food, etc. can only be issued as authorized and not indiscriminately to all and sundry - see also my para. 6 (b) above.

9.

Your summary

(a) I have commented already on most of this and would add only the following remarks:

(b) It is the Allied policy NOT to permit "the existence of another armed force apart from the army" (a. my para. 3 (b) above). Hence the procedure laid down for patriots.

(c) Patriots must be considered as civilians till they are officially enrolled into the Italian army.

(d) The whole matter of formation of mountain units was fully considered recently by high Allied authorities. In theory, there is something to be said for the idea - in practice the difficulties of producing and maintaining fully equipped mountain organizations on a different establishment to combat groups, combined with those of keeping even the combat groups up to strength, have rendered the proposition impracticable. An useful purpose can be served by reopening the question, particularly at a time when the Italian army is some 48,000 short of its authorized establishment and difficulties are being encountered to make up that shortage, which is mainly in essential service units. (e) All contact with patriot forces in the north must be through H.Q. 15th Army Group and WOZ direct.

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CONCLUSION.

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(i) strict adherence to the patriot policy laid down. **2741**

(ii) obtaining the necessary soldiers for the Italian army by ensuring effective call-up and non-deviation of their duty by all men of military age.

W.O. G. G. G.
to H. I. G.

TRANSLATION

Ref: 84/08

TO : COL. FIDELITY MAIL

Date: 2 Jan 45

SUBJECT: Patriots

1.

Introduction

In Italy today, the following paradox exists:-

Those who are forced to go into the army, are admitted.

Those who are anxious to fight encounter difficulties when attempting to join the army.

The latter are the Patriots.

The problem of the Patriots has lately acquired extraordinary proportions and very shortly it will be imperative to find a solution.

In fact:-

Thousands of Patriots have for some time now lived in liberated Italy and over three thousand have recently crossed the line because they were attacked by whole German divisions.

Nearly 100,000 Patriots will become available when Northern Italy is liberated.

3.

Policy of the Allied authorities and wishes of the Patriots.

(a) The Allied authorities have shown a tendency to:-

- disperse these formations, giving the Patriots the impression that their support to the war of liberation is of little account.
- not provide adequately and immediately to the vital necessities (food, billets, clothing) of those who crossed the line.
- allow only a small number of Patriots - always isolated men - to enter combatist units of the army.

Thus these links of affection and comradeship formed in partisan groups, in the midst of the struggle and continued risks, are broken, links which, bearing in mind Italian character, are so very important to the performance of these tasks.

- (b) On the other hand the Patriots most ardently desire to continue to fight the Germans, whenever possible, maintaining to its greatest perfection.

4.

Psychology of the Patriots.

- They have the profound conviction, which is even backed by Allied recognition, that they have given everything for the Allied and national causes and expect therefore a moral and material treatment corresponding to the risks they have taken so far.

- They are first class combatants chosen for hazards and privations of a difficult war.

- They represent all parties. During the partisan war politics and never been made, both chiefs and followers having only one thought, that of fighting for the common cause.

- Among the chiefs there are numerous regular army and reserve officers as well as improvised commanders who, with their courage and organizing ability,

2720

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Thus these links of official and comradeship formed in partisan units, in the midst of the struggle and continued risks, are broken. Links which, bearing in mind Italian character, are so very important to the performance of these tasks.

(b) On the other hand the Patriots most ardently desire to continue to fight the Germans, when ever possible, maintaining to its utmost efficiency.

4. Paradoxicality of the Patriots.
- They have to profound conviction, which is even backed by Allied recognition, that they have given everything for the Allied and national causes and expect therefore a moral and material treatment corresponding to the risks they have taken so far.
 - They are first class combatants chosen by hazards and privations of a difficult war.
 - They represent all parts. During the Partisan or political and never been made, both chiefs and followers having only one thought, that of fighting for the common cause.
 - When the chief is there are numerous regular army and reserve officers as well as improvised commanders who, with their courage and organizing ability, have won the esteem and consideration of their followers.
 - The mass of the followers is sound and their only desire is that of continuing to fight against the Germans. Once they are absorbed by the army they will become soldiers with all the qualities common to the Italian soldiers enhanced by an ideal.
 - Every adventure is therefore to be gained by taking these men into the regular units of the army including, naturally, officers of proven capacity, tact and energy. These Patriots would promptly regain order and discipline and

would give Italian units marked impulse in their fighting spirit.

- In, on the other hand, these youths were left to themselves and their immediate necessities (food, billeting and clothing) not provided for it is to be surmised that they would become easy prey of the more dangerous elements willing to hide their arms and later to employ force in order to acquire their necessities.

5. Treatment given in many cases to patriots who have recently crossed the line.

- Immediate disarmament, incorporation into coloured units, long marches down under the rain, extended questioning (treatment almost equal to that given to P.O.s.),
- no moral or medical assistance (patriots arrive from over the line with scabbles and other inflicting devices),
- no issue of clothing to replace their rags or to protect the men against the hardships of winter,
- inadequate feeding (patriots receive the same ration as civilian refugees which is totally inadequate),
- Italian military authorities can do nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the patriots because, unfortunately, they have no availability of food, clothing or means of transport.

Summary

During in mind that:-

- it is in the common interests that Italy should remain a peaceful country and that no alteration of the internal order should take place in the rear of the operating army,
- that the existence of another armed force apart from the army would create a dangerous competition between the said armed forces,
- it would be a real shame, from an operational point of view, to waste so much precious material particularly suitable for mountain warfare. It is considered advisable that the following measures be taken:-
- that the patriots be treated, the moment they cross the line, as true and proper combatants for the Allied cause and not as suspects;
- that suitable patriots reception camps be formed behind the line where the patriots may find a suitable and comfortable environment (blankets, food, clothing, sick bay, baths, etc.) in order to give these men, who have suffered so much and who arrived starved and naked, a minimum of comfort;
- that the formation of these patriot groups into regular army units led by capable and self-officers, be allowed;
- that, according to the directives, studies be started at once in order to expedite the immediate enrollment and cadre of the northern Italy patriots when the armies advance.

Since most of the men or natives of the mountainous regions or men who have fought for a long time in the mountains these studies could be based, for example, on the policy of organizing Alpini Regiments or at least troops equipped for mountain warfare. These units could be grouped in such a way as to constitute one or more main units to operate in the mountains or to be enlisted, for employment, to Allied Divisions for patrol or guide duties.

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- immediate disarmament, incorporation into coloured units, long marches by unit in rain, extended stay at stations (treatment almost equal to that given to P.O. 6),
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SUMMARY

- 3 points in mind that:-
- it is in the common interests that Italy should remain peaceful country and that no alteration of the internal order should take place in the rear of the operating army,
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 - that the patriots be treated, the moment they cross the line, as true and proper combatants for the Allied cause and not as suspects;
 - that suitable patriots' equipment corps be formed behind the line where the patriots may find a suitable and comfortable equipment (blankets, food, clothing, sick bay, latrine, etc.) in order to give these men, who have suffered so much and who arrive starved and naked, a minimum of comfort;
 - that the formation of these patriot groups into regular army units led by capable and able officers, be allowed;
 - that, according to reliable directives, studies be started at once in order to organize the immediate enrollment and control of the northern Italy patriots when the German advance.

Since most of the men or natives of the mountainous regions or men who have fought for a long time in the mountains these studies could be used, for example, on the policy of organizing alpine formations or at least troops equipped for mountain warfare. These units could be grouped in such a way as to constitute one or two main units to operate in the mountains or to be allotted, for employment, to Allied Divisions for patrol or guide duties.

Once the enrollment plan has been established, some could contact the military staff of the Italian forces of the north in order to prepare the carrying out of the plan as and when the regions of northern Italy are liberated.

The Chief of Staff
(Sgd) P. BARRATI

SECRET

SUBJECT: Patriots

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

3/1/102/2

25 January 45

TO: Patriot Branch A.C. (6)

1. Herewith an illuminating and constructive report on an important angle of the Patriot problem.
2. My staff have already discussed with you the necessary action in connection with para V(d).

h *Brown*
Major General
M.M.I.A.

Copy to: Chief of Staff
Political Section, A.C.
MMA LO Eighth Army
MMA LO Fifth Army
MMA LO 1 District

2739

SECRET

REPORT ON A VISIT TO SIENA AND FLORENCE FROM 8 TO 13
JANUARY TO INVESTIGATE THE ITALIAN PATRIOT SITUATION

I. INTENTION

The object of my visit was to contact patriots, hear their views and complaints, and obtain a first hand impression of patriot psychology, in order to discover why hitherto so few patriots have joined the regular Italian army despite the facilities available.

II. METHOD

The methods adopted in every case were unofficial, friendly contacts where and whenever possible. NO Allied or Italian authority was advised of these visits and official contacts were strictly avoided. No question as to my identity was put by the patriots and needless to say, I expressed no opinions.

III. CONTACTS. SIENA

(a) During the morning of 8 Jan at SIENA the first opportunity of contacts with the patriots there took the form of two lorry-loads of men, both young and old, all wearing the familiar red scarf and singing songs, which drove past me in the main street. I enquired from a passerby who these men were and what was their destination, and was informed that they were patriots who had volunteered for combat service in the Italian Army.

A short time later I saw a young man wearing a red scarf standing by himself on a street corner. I approached him and asked him if any of his friends had joined up that morning. He replied that nearly all had done so and that he had tried but had been refused owing to the fact that wounds he had received while fighting the Germans in a band of patriots had not properly healed up. He showed me his wounds. They were quite genuine. Of his own initiative he asked me to accompany him to the HQ of the band where, he said, he would show me round. I told him I was interested in patriots and he asked me if I was a Communist. I explained that I was a British officer with a genuine interest in the Italian Patriot question.

I was taken to the HQ of the 1st Reggimento "Garibaldi" Patriot Div. Here several men gathered round me while many others were singing and shouting outside, all apparently very happy at the thought of joining the Army.

I was shown grim photos of the tortured bodies of patriots who had been mutilated by German or Fascist soldiers. I saw a terrible plaque on which were engraved the 200 names of all the members of the band who had been killed in fighting or shot in reprisals carried out by the Germans. I spoke with a young man of 20, a Battalion Commander, who had distinguished himself in combat as a leadership, and who seemed to be the ideal of many present, including a father of 50 who had been wounded three times in combat under the leadership of this youth. Both the son and the father had been accepted into the Army that morning. The young man, though holding a senior, if unofficial rank, was joining

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I eventually got in contact with the Band Leader. I was greatly impressed by this man, not so much because he had done much fighting and suffered under the Fascist rule, but because he had very sane, broad-minded views on all questions affecting the present situation.

He is a man of about 50. Nine years ago a Fascist Federal officer of SIENA denounced him to the authorities for Communist tendencies. He was imprisoned and only escaped from jail during an Allied bombing raid on NAPLES in 1942. Ever since that day he has been actively fighting "the Nazi-Fascist", as he put it.

III. (Contd)

(a) (Contd)

He told me there were 800 men in his band. The officers were all men chosen for their leadership and rest of them had never held any commissioned rank in the Italian Army. He was quite frank about his Communist ideas and appreciated the reasons which governed the Policy of not allowing Patriot bands to be recruited into the Italian Army as a whole. He remarked quite spontaneously, "There must be one Italian Army representing the only power in Italy. I realize the difficulties and dangers of recruiting Patriot bands, with all their different political 'red hues', as whole units under their own officers. For this reason I have spoken to my men, told them to overcome this very strong clannish spirit and let their ardent desire to fight over-rule all. This they have done, Captain, and you can see for yourself how they are reacting."

(b) It was very evident from our conversation that the Patriots despise the Regular Army officers and are reluctant to serve under them. The reasons stated by the Leader were:-

(i) Italian officers either co-operated with the Germans or hid during the occupation, appearing as if by magic in dandy uniforms and polished boots to offer their services to the Allies and "throw a line" about their cowardly "resistance" during the enemy occupation.

The Patriots, on the other hand, chose the hard way and openly resisted, fought and died for their ideals. Many saw father, mothers or friends shot or carried off by the Germans.

(ii) The Patriots kept accurate lists of Italians, both military and civilian, who helped the Germans and were ardent Fascists. When the Allies arrived the Patriot Leader gave all possible information to Allied F.S.S. and C.I.C. To his horror and bitter disappointment some of these Fascists walk the streets of SIENA, while others are actually employed by the Allies.

Adolfo Barocchi - ex Federal officer and Fascist collaborator, the man who denounced the Siena Patriot leader to the authorities and had him imprisoned for 9 years, is now a free man somewhere in Rome.

(iii) No operation in the Army. The same old "Gang" still in high places.

The Patriots hold the Allies in high esteem and are very grateful for the help given them during their period of combat behind the line. Although some of the Siena patriots handed in their arms with reluctance, their leader realised that it was a just and wise law laid down by the Allies.

General Ferardi C.C.S. had not visited the 1st Raggruppamento Garibaldi at Siena, I asked the leader if Gen Ferardi had been to Siena and he replied that the C of S had called on the "Mistake" C of S HQ is situated a few blocks further down. Evidently there is a difference of opinion between these two Siena bands. The "Mistake" has several regular officers in its ranks, some of whom are mistrusted by the 1 "Garibaldi" as they have played

the difficulties and dangers of recruiting Patriot Bands, with all their different political "red hues", as whole units under their own officers. For this reason I have spoken to my men, told them to overcome this very strong clannish spirit and let their ardent desire to fight over-rule all. This they have done, Captain, and you can see for yourself how they are reacting."

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Forardi did not take any promises to the "Aviata" band which, according to the speaker, had not found one single volunteer for the Army. They wanted to join as a band and keep their own officers.

(c) Summary

From contacts made the following facts are of great importance:-

- (1) Bands differ in their political life - some are more "red" than others, and once in liberated territory, work separately.

III. (c) (Cont'd)

- (2) There is strict discipline in bands and leaders are chosen for their initiative and courage.
- (3) Real Patriots are determined to fight the Germans and Fascists, even beyond the frontiers of Italy.
- (4) Bands are NOT subsidised from outside. Some, however, do get support etc. from the Communist section of the Italian Government.

Patriots will join the Italian Army 100% :-

- (1) When their Band leader gives them the word "go" (c.f. 1 Garibaldi, Siena)
- (2) When they see separation really hitting the Army.
- (3) When they know that sooner or later they will meet their enemies in combat.

It is interesting to note that the 1 Garibaldi joined up almost to a man and that many of them were leaving their own homes in Siena.

I did not visit the "Arista" Group as the Italian Army Screening Agency was established temporarily in their H.Q.

The Main Square was full of parents and friends seeing these Patriots off in Italian Army lorries. They were the first volunteers for the Italian Army I had seen and talked with, and they were very happy. In one small village near Siena every man volunteered for the Army that morning.

IV. CONTACTS FLORENCE

The next three days were spent in Florence. It was difficult at first to seek out the various Patriot HQs without bumping into Military Officials both Italian and Allied. Certain parts of the city, however, were very populated with the familiar "red scarved" youths and, when the opportunity presented itself, contacts were made in the street and later at the various HQs.

The first visit paid was to the Patriots Transit Camp in Via Montebello 68, run by AMG 5 Army. After a few minutes the band leader was called. He was a man of about 30 and, from the start of our talk, it was clear that he had definite grudge against the Italian Army and the treatment meted out to Patriots by the Allies. He informed us that none of his men wanted to join the Army unless they were kept in bands under their own officers and said that much bad feeling had been created in the place because some of his volunteers had been assigned to muleteer units and Labour Bns.

"We want to fight or find work", he said. "At the moment my men can't do either and after 14 days they are obliged to leave this camp. There is a lot of ill feeling amongst them and many are hungry and have no good clothes to wear."

When asked if Gen Berardi had visited them and what transpired, he replied that at Xmas the C of S had paid them a visit. He made a speech, praising their brave efforts and pointing out that the Italian Army was proud of them - but he made no promises and his visit was a definite "flop".

It was evident that this leader, with his personal views and complaints,

1 Garibaldi, Siena)

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Then asked if Gen Bonardi had visited them and ~~what~~ ²²³⁷ ~~trans:~~ replied that at times the C of S had paid them a visit. He made a speech, praising their brave efforts and pointing out that the Italian Army was proud of them - but he made no promises and his visit was a definite "flop".

It was evident that this leader, with his personal views and complaints, was a stumbling block to any volunteer spirit amongst his men. It is also quite probable that his superiors in the Political world have issued certain instructions to him which control the whole movement and action of his band. One felt that, had there been a less "bolshie" leader many of the Patriots would have volunteered for the Army a long time ago.

On 12 Jan a visit was paid to the HQ of the POTENTE Partisan Div. The "General" was away but a long and interesting talk was held with 2 i/c a man of perhaps 33, and his lady secretary who was a cultured woman with a broad-minded view on the whole Patriot problem.

- 4 -

IV. (Cont'd)

The 2 i/c had been an exile from Italy for 10 years and had returned via France during 1942. Ever since that time he had actively opposed the Germans and Republican Fascists and later became a Regtl Comd in the Potente Div.

There had been several volunteers from his Div but the response had been poor. This was due, to a large extent, to the fact that the Italian Army Screening Agencies had not been able to answer many of the queries put to them by the Patriots, nor could they define clearly the Allied Policy governing their employment. Many patriots were "put off" at the sight of "gold braids and jack boots".

The following views were stated by the Div 2 i/c during our talk :-

- (1) Certain spirit lacking in the Italian Army.
- (2) Italian Regular officers "the same old crowd" with no personal interest in the soldier.
- (3) Very few Italian officers chose to side with the Partisans during the difficult days.
- (4) Officers who co-operated with the Germans and Fascists while Partisans were fighting are not at large and some employed by the Allies.
- (5) Patriots ask one thing. To be accepted for combat in the Italian Army. They cannot be happy in labour or Muleteer Units.
- (6) Some Patriots are being arrested and put in 17th Camps by the Allies because they have no identity cards or documents. Many Patriots burnt all these to avoid possible reprisals by Germans against their families.

My personal impressions were that most of the "Potents" would volunteer for the Army, if handled properly.

There are about 2,600 possible volunteers in the Florence area. These consist of the following bands - Celani, Benicelli, Fancinelli and Sueti.

The majority of the "Potents" have no fixed political views and are not assisted in any way by Political Parties - the leaders, however, may be.

On instructions from the C.I.N. all ex-partisans wear red scarves. A red scarf does not mean a communist.

V. PERSONAL VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS

- (a) All depends on the Band leader. If he says - JOIN UP - the men will do so at once.
- (b) Patriots are of all political parties - majority do not know the definition of a communist.
- (c) All real Patriots want to fight - and given the opportunity and guarantee - they will do so. However, they want to see execution in the army.
- (d) Screening and recruiting agencies should be dressed in Battledress and should be band picked and well briefed. The existing personnel in activities of these agencies should be reviewed by Patriot Branch, A.C., who are the controlling authority and to whom this personnel has been handed over by the War Ministry as authorized.
- (e) Where the operational situation permits, Screening Agencies should

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- (2) Italian Regular Officers "the same old crowd" with no personal interest in the soldier.
- (3) Very few Italian officers chose to side with the Partisans during the difficult days.
- (4) Officers who co-operated with the Germans and Fascists while Partisans were fighting are now at large and some employed by the Allies.
- (5) Patriots ask one thing. To be accepted for combat in the Italian Army. They cannot be happy in Lebourg or Muletoor Units.
- (6) Some Patriots are being arrested and put in PW Camps by the Allies because they have no identity cards or documents. Many Patriots burnt all these to avoid possible reprisals by Germans against their families.

My personal impressions were that most of the "Potents" would volunteer for the Army, if handled properly.

There are about 2,600 possible volunteers in the Florence area. These consist of the following bands - Canini, Sordicelli, Panchicelli and Buvi.

The majority of the "Potents" have no fixed political views and are not assisted in any way by Political Parties - the leaders, however, may be.

On instructions from the C.I.N. all ex-partisans wear red scarves. A red scarf does not mean a communist.

V. PERSONAL VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS

- (a) All depends on the Band leader. If he says - JOIN UP - the men will do so at once.
- (b) Patriots are of all political parties - majority do not know the definition of a communist.
- (c) All real Patriots want to fight - and given the opportunity and guarantee - they will do so. However, they want to see operation in the Army.
- (d) Screening and recruiting Agencies should be dressed in battle dress and should be hand picked and well briefed. The existing personnel and activities of these agencies should be reviewed by Patriot Branch, A.S., who are the controlling authority and to whom this personnel has been handed over by the War Ministry as authorized.
- (e) Where the operational situation permits, Screening Agencies should operate well forward.

F.R. SILEY
Captain
G.I. (Int) MMIA

1087

SECRET.

7th January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

I submit a first draft of ^a ~~your~~ letter on the enrolment of patriots into the Italian Army. I discussed it at length with General Browning last night who made several useful additions himself and entirely agrees with the contents thereof. If you agree I suggest a discussion with Political Section and Brigadier Upjohn at a very early date.

M.S.C.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Pol Sec
DPO, CA Sec

I shall be very glad to have
a discussion on this when
convenient
2738

J.P.

1088

785016

SECRET.
PERSONAL & URGENT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
+++++

DRAFT.

Ref: 7 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots in Italian Army.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander,
Allied Force Headquarters.

1. The disposal of patriots immediately on liberation has been a matter of constant consideration, and indeed anxiety, on the part of myself and my advisers for some months. Arrangements made to meet this extremely difficult problem, which were agreed upon last July by all parties concerned including members of Special Force and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful and we are constantly learning by experience that a new approach must be made towards the subject.

2. Hitherto our aim has been to make of the patriots, after liberation, good civilians: to rehabilitate them in their normal vocations: to give them preferential treatment in the matter of employment: to clothe them and to feed them insofar as supplies make it possible: to recruit them as individuals into the Italian Army: and to repatriate them to their homes if they are not found to be locals.

Finally, our policy has been to disarm them. 2133
3. Our reports from Allied Military Government officers have shown that patriots expect better and different treatment. They are disillusioned at their reception. These

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3. Our reports from Allied Military Government officers have shown that patriots expect better and different treatment. They are disillusioned at their reception. Those that have really fought in bands and companies have expressed the desire to continue the fight in the same formations. ~~When this is the case we~~ ^{we give them an opportunity to do so.} The message supplies of food and clothing that we have been able to give do not in ^{their} opinion fulfill the promises made to them by the Allied missions with whom they have been

operating. The order to disarm is the final straw; they resent it and the majority of them disobey it. Granted hitherto we have had no serious trouble but, in my opinion, a fundamentally different situation will arise when we get to the north with its more virile population and (estimated) 100,000 patriots in well organized bands.

4. The experiences of the Allied Nations in Belgium, France and Greece have exposed the vital danger which threatens any government, be it military or indigenous, which has to face, in the initial stages of liberation, the presence of armed bands of men accustomed to living by force of arms alone, who are readily affected and enrolled into political organizations whose object is to usurp the power of the legitimate government and set up a government which is little short of tyranny.

5. We must in this country endeavour to avoid the misuse of these gallant bands of partisans who, armed with Allied rifles and equipment, provided with Allied food and money, encouraged by equally gallant Allied officers, have aided the Allied war effort. Disrupted from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only virile members of a defeated population, they find it easier and more attractive to retain the role of fighters and become an easy prey to force and anarchy.

6. I believe that with patience ²⁷⁹ can overcome many of the material causes of disillusionment but attempts at disarmament will ever be a source of resentment and of resistance for a portion of these persons.

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7. The offer to enlist individuals into the Italian Army under the normal conditions of recruitment for that Army, intended to meet the desires of those who wish to carry on the fight, have met with little success. From many Italian sources, from the patriots themselves and from members of the Italian Government, have come requests that

they should be recruited into the fighting element of the Army in their patriot bands under their patriot officers so that the comradeship and loyalty displayed behind the lines may not be lost after liberation. Whether in fact they will join the Army in these circumstances or not, we must give them the opportunity to do so.

8. The technical objections to this course are well

understood. In the very difficult task of reorganizing the

Italian Army the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission naturally

dislikes the idea of forming special nuclei within that Army

which might become political formations and which would be of doubtful value militarily. He must object to accepting men

into the Italian Army on their own terms; he must resist the

breaking up of existing official Army units in order to fit in

special bands. General Brenning's objections are well

expressed in the enclosed proposed draft reply to the Italian

Chief of Staff's letter attached, which he has submitted to me for concurrence.

9. But it seems to me that we must consider accepting the

principle of taking into the Italian Army patriot bands as

units, in numbers not exceeding say that of a company, under their own existing officers. In my opinion the political,

and indeed administrative advantages, must outweigh the military

objections, for by doing so we shall be going a long way to

ensure the preservation of law and order in the North and the avoidance of political and civil strife.

10. The members of the Italian Army within the present

calling are fully committed to combat groups, security

battalions and service units working for the Allies. The

patriots are unwilling to serve even in their own companies in the latter two groups. I submit, therefore, for your

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10. The members of the Italian Army within the present ceiling are fully committed to combat groups, security ²⁷²³ battalions and services units working for the Allies. The patriots are unwilling to serve even in their own companies in the latter two groups. I submit, therefore, for your earnest and urgent consideration, that the ceiling of the Italian Army should be raised in order that the patriots may be attracted in collective bodies to form part of either the existing or new combat groups organized to take part in operations with Allied Forces, ~~collectively~~ ^{separately}, ~~in divisions~~ which would to a great extent overcome the problem of provision of technical equipment. The maximum

Additional ceiling would be 100,000 and it is doubtful whether this full number would be required. Alternatively, there is the possibility of earmarking, say, some 40,000 within the existing ceiling for the absorption of patriot bands by the formation of 8 additional I.S. Divisions, even at the expense of the provision of service units for the Allies.

11. If this were accepted and political considerations were held to outweigh the military ones, General Browning is perfectly prepared to work out a plan whereby the practical difficulties could be overcome in order to absorb patriot bands into composite units of the Italian Army, provided always that the requisite equipment, clothing, etc., was forthcoming. [As a military proposition he considers this unsound (see para 8) but he fully realises the political implications and is, of course, fully prepared to implement any decision you give after weighing the political and military factors in this complicated problem.] *[Point: who is sent to get regular training etc.]*

12. Our present policy towards the patriots is being attacked both in this country and in the Allied countries, particularly in the United States. We should not reject any opportunity to create, particularly in Northern Italy, an atmosphere of content as against resentment^{in Italy} towards the Allies. We must support the legitimate Italian Government. We know that there are many forces willing and prepared to assist this Government. The concession to the patriots outlined above would have a tremendous effect, in my opinion, on the patriots now in German occupied Italy. It would make them enter liberation part of the armed forces of the country whose duty it would be to

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The concession to the patriots outlined above would have a tremendous effect, in my opinion, on the patriots ²¹³²now in German occupied Italy. It would make them alter liberation part of the armed forces of the country whose duty it would be to preserve rather than disrupt order. It would give them scope to use their loyalty and patriotism, it would direct their hatred of Fascism into the right channels and it would draw the

heat from this potential political bonfire. *and if not offered to accept with the Army, etc. we will accept it as it is like the regular Army*
13. Whatever, therefore, the technical difficulties of ^{my}or adjusting the distribution of ^{what}raising the ceiling may be: whatever the extra financial ^{in a}commitments (and we must remember that many millions of lira ^{are} are

and many tons of supplies are being poured into the patriot states in the North), these should and must be overcome in order to give to the patriots what they think is their due reward and make them part of a responsible government rather than potential disillusioned tools of disorder. This is a matter with an international, even a world-wide aspect and should NOT be judged, in my opinion, on the basis of local and parochial considerations of purely military exigencies in this theatre of operations.

ELIJAH W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

CORI

HEADQUARTERS
ANG FIFTH ARMY
APO 434 U.S. ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The following is a report of conversation with two partisans of the the Ligurian Division who left their homes in the Southern end of Parma province on 13th October. Both men seemed intelligent and less excitable than most of their type.

1. Partisan Operations.

The men belonged to the Ligurian Division which is organized by a British Officer (ex-POW) called Major Lot (Sic). It numbers about 1800 men at the present time and is organized in 6 Brigades. It follows the usual mixed organization, partly political (Communist and Party of Action) and partly military. It contains few Italian regular officers. The zone of operations is a rough circle of 20 miles radius round Varese Igna.

The partisans are feeling the onset of bad weather very much. They are without recent clothing and boots and the contadini are loath to give their shelter owing to fear of German reprisals. For the same reason they are finding it difficult to get food. For these reasons it is to be expected that large numbers of men will give up and go home or attempt to pass through the Allied line as refugees.

2. Conditions in La Spezia.

Conditions in La Spezia are appalling. At the end of September the Germans expected the arrival of the Allies and therefore blew up the water supply after advising the population by post to draw off a week's supply in domestic containers. They blew up at the same time many other items of public utilities including bakeries.

3. Food Supply.

Conditions throughout Liguria and La Spezia, both non-producing provinces have to be seen to be believed. Real famine and sickness are universal. The bread ration in the granaries of black bread when available; the population try to go out and scrounge for themselves but this is not very successful and a whole day's effort will, with luck, produce a kilo of flour from somewhere. This scrounging all has to be done by women as the able bodied men are scared off being picked up by the Germans for forced labour. Wheat costs 5000 to 6000 lire a quintal on the black market if indeed it can be found at all.

In Parma, on the other hand, conditions are not too bad. Meat and vegetables can be bought quite freely in the hotels and restaurants and prices, though high, are within reason. The black market price of wheat is about 400 lire a quintal. In this area wheat was generally distributed

- 3 -

to all families sufficient to last till the end of the year. A large amount is still in the hands of the contadini while some was seized. The latter is still in the magazines and informants know of no general removal of grain by the Germans. The latter are, however, using local resources for their own use. A direct question elicited the answer that in this area the Allies would find plenty of grain at the New Year unless the Germans had destroyed everything in the magazines.

4. Agriculture.

The livestock population had been considerably reduced. I did not press for an estimate of the percentage reduction.

Autumn wheat planting is going on and is well in hand subject to two limiting factors, one, the shortage of draft animals; two, the reluctance of able bodied men to work in the fields near the principal roads used by the Germans for fear of being carried away for forced labour.

5. Clothing.

Clothing and shoes can still be bought in Rome in the black market but only for astronomical prices, especially the latter. There is no clothing at all in Agropoli and in Spoleto. Some individual merchants, however, are known to have hidden stocks in the mountains.

6. G.P.R.

Very few now on duty and these are all keen Fascists. Police work is carried on by the Questore (Publica Sicurezza), the P.M.A. and the Militia. The bulk of the G.P.R. have either gone underground or joined the Partisans.

When asked about popular reaction to the restoration of the G.P.R. informants replied that they would receive a mixed reception since although the people recognise that few of them are now collaborating it was still thought that they had continued working for the Fascists for too long (up to July of this year).

7. Politics.

The population are said to have little or no interest in politics. There is the usual story of lack of political education, effective repression of any political trends and the infiltration of former supporters of fascism into present day anti-fascist organizations in an effort to get ready for acceptance by the Allies. The importance of the Communist Party is said to be entirely unnatural and is attributed to the fact that for the last twenty years only two parties, Fascist and Communist, have been recognized: all anti-fascists therefore had to call themselves communists as there was no alternative. The bulk of the people, however, are undoubtedly of moderate centre-party inclinations.

3 November 1944.

(Signed) F.B.R. Wynora, Major.

CONFIDENTIALOffice of the Chief of Staff Distribution, 8th November 1944.

Ec n Sec	-	1
Civ Aff Sec	-	1
Pol Sec	-	1
PRC	-	1

MJDT V MJAQ NR18
FROM LISBON 241326
TO ASTERI NAPLES
GR37 BT



N/84/24

Political Section

STAMPA 19 PUNTO NOTEVOLEECO HAAVUTO NOTIZIA
REUTER RIPRODOTTA NELLA STAMPA LOCALE
COLLABORAZIONE MOVIMENTI PATRIOTI ITALOFRANCESI
IN ALPI OCCIDENTALI - DAJETA

Press Report 19. The Reuter report that French-Italian patriots are collaborating in the Western Alps has caused a favourable impression.
D'AJETA

BT
SENT NR18 241821B AMD
CORR ACTION ADD TO ESTERI NAPLES
K

RCD NR 18 24 Q12///// 24/1821 B IGD

2723

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

REF: 822

24 November 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Mitchener,
Propaganda & Policy Services,
Psychological Warfare Branch,
Unit No. 12,
U.S.A.P.O. 512

I have discussed with the Chief Commissioner, your memorandum of 21st November about the proposal that Signor Orlando should broadcast to the Patriots in Northern Italy on the Italia Combatta Programme. Commodore Stone feels that the question whether a broadcast by so prominent a person as Signor Orlando to the Patriots should be made, or not, is one which would have to be decided by General Alexander who would probably wish to see the script of the broadcast before it was made. In any case, however, in view of the existing political situation the Chief Commissioner could not agree to Sig. Orlando being asked to broadcast at the present time.

822/

H. L. S'A. ROBINSON
Acting Vice President, Political Section

2727

136

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SEC ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS
P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

To: Political Section, Allied Commission (att. Mr. Hopkinson)
From: Mr. Fletcher, Propaganda and Policy Services.
Date: 31st November, 1944.

It has been brought to the notice of PWB that
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando has unofficially expressed his
willingness to address the patriots of Northern Italy
on the "Italia Combate" programme. We should therefore
be glad to have your agreement to our approaching Orlando
with a request to make this broadcast.

This request in no way diverges from our normal
practice over the last six months of arranging for members
of the Italian government to speak on the "Italia Combate"
programmes. His talk is likely to cover his speech of
November 24th, and General Alessandro's recent statement to
the patriots (Nov. 1944).

pp. Lanken Fletcher
LANKEN FLETCHER

2728

Political SectionTel: 489081
Ext: 383

Ref: 3152/PH

22 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Wounded Patriots.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy.

1. The Allied Commission has under consideration the handling of wounded Italian Patriots. The following points and recommendations are submitted for your comments.
2. Since Patriot activities in enemy territory are conducted under the direction of AAI, it is hardly necessary to restate the valuable services which they have performed for the Allied Armies in Italy.
3. For humane as well as military reasons this Headquarters requests that the whole question of reception and hospitalization of wounded patriots be reviewed by your Hq. At present there is no well defined policy for this important problem.
4. It appears that in the Fifth Army area, wounded patriots in many cases, are passed through military channels to the Italian Army hospital depot attached to Fifth Army, but the practice is not uniform, and in other cases they are passed to civilian hospitals. In Eighth Army area also the practice is not uniform, and most of the Patriots, after being passed through Army channels finally arrive in a civilian hospital.
5. This treatment offers little encouragement to patriots, for although the technical treatment to be found in Italian civilian hospitals may be as good as in the military hospitals, there are three disadvantages:
 - a) Immediately after an area is liberated the civilian hospitals may be exceedingly short of essential medical supplies just at the moment when they are most required.
 - b) Civilian hospitals only receive civilian hospital rations which are on a much lower scale than Italian Army rations.
 - c) Cigarettes and other small personal items which may be available in military hospitals are never available in civilian hospitals.
6. It seems essential in the interests, not only of justice and gratitude, but also in the maintenance of Patriot morale and effectiveness, that Patriots should receive proper hospital treatment when wounded in fighting on the side of the Allies. This question may become even more serious when larger bands are met with in the North.

-2-

7. It is felt that if Patriots cannot be dealt with in Italian military hospitals this fact may well become known to Patriots in the North and that they may be less willing to undertake the valuable services which they are at present rendering to the Allies.

8. Accordingly it is requested that authority be given for the treatment in Italian Military hospitals, when available, of all Patriots wounded in operation on the side of the Allies. It is further requested that, in cases where no Italian military hospital is readily available, authority may be given for wounded Italian Patriots to be received in Allied hospitals, as is the case at present when soldiers of other belligerent nations - e.g. Greeks, Poles, Brazilians - are wounded.

9. As you are aware, although there are now only about 800 wounded Patriots, considerably larger numbers may be expected with operations in Northern Regions, when a definite policy on this question may be an operational necessity as well as a humane gesture.

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. S. Lusk
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: AMHQ, G-5 Section.
DCG&O, Civil Affairs Section, HQ ASI.
Patriots Branch.
Land Forces Sub-Comm.
Political Section.
Commander Holdsworth, No.1 Special Force, CMF.

2724

SUBJECT: Patriots

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. TS/G/19
// Nov 44

TO : POLITICAL SECTION

Ref your note of 12 Nov regarding proclamation
re Patriot status proposed by the Italian Government to
be issued by General ALEXANDER.

1. Please see my G/19 of 5 Aug to Acting Chief
Commissioner and the latter's A/CC 324.5 dated 8 Aug.
2. I have no further information of developments.

d. Browning
Major General
M. M. I. A.

128

2723

7 November 1944

TO: Chief of Staff Section (attn: Lt. Col. G. W. L. Shipp).
Civil Affairs Section, Patriots Branch.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, (SSIA).

FROM: Political Section

1. Sig. Del Balzo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in handing us the enclosed copy of Sig. Bonomi's letter to the Acting Chief Commissioner of the 2nd August, said that the Italian Government was still anxious for the issuance of a statement on the lines proposed.

2. From an examination of the file it appears that this request was submitted to General Alexander by the Acting Chief Commissioner on the 8th of August, but that no reply has been received. Is there any information available here on the subject? If not, I would propose to take the matter up at General Alexander's Headquarters when I go there the end of next week.

H. L. d'A. ROBINSON
Acting Vice President, Political Section

C-0-X-Y

TRANSLATION

Rome, August 2, 1944

Dear Admiral,

As you are aware, the Allied Control Commission has recently adopted several practical measures in recognition of the contribution given by Italian patriots to the allied war effort against the Germans. The Italian Government have also noted on the same lines.

The Italian Government are of the opinion that such measures could be very usefully developed and integrated in a statement to be issued by the Allied High Command in Italy, of which I take leave to enclose a draft copy.

You will note that the aim of the statement is that of considering the patriots, who are fighting with unshaken vigour and considerable self-sacrifice in the occupied territory, as an integral part of the Italian Corps of Liberation and of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander.

Such recognition would not only place them under the protection of the rules of warfare, but would undoubtedly give them encouragement and incentive of particular significance and importance. I need hardly stress the important place the patriots' movement occupies within the framework of our national life and in the consciousness of the Country.

I have no doubt, therefore, that you will give the matter your most earnest consideration in the interest not only of our own, but also of the common war effort.

Thanking you in advance for the kind interest I feel sure you will take in the matter,

Believe me, Yours very sincerely,

2721

ROUGH TRANSLATION OF DRAFT STATEMENT

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy has issued the following statement:

1. - The Italian patriots constitute a fighting army, under the leadership of regularly appointed officers and is a part of the Italian Corps of Liberation and of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy.

2. - Italian patriots bear their arms openly against the Germans and have received precise instructions to conduct the war against the enemy according to the rules of warfare. They wear a badge which has been duly notified in accordance with international rules. General Alexander considers these troops as one of the armies at present under his command.

3. - The status of regular fighting troops as an integral part of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the war against Germany places them under the protection of International Conventions. Any reprisal that has been, or should henceforth be, exercised against the patriots organisations and the patriots themselves, would, therefore, represent a violation of the rules of warfare which are binding also on Germany.

The Allied Chief Command will make every effort in order that the authors of any atrocity committed against troops acting under its orders shall be placed under trial and duly punished.

ROME,

2723

Previous paper please

*for
... can 9.*

TRANSLATION

Rome, August 2, 1944

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ACMIL

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

HMS/afe

A/CC 324.5

11 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Director, Army Sub-Commission
Allied Control Commission

Reference is made to your letter of 10 August calling my attention to para 3 of my letter A/CC 324.5 dated 8 August.

Thank you for calling this error to my attention. I am writing the C-in-C, AAI at once requesting that the word "subsequently" be changed to "simultaneously."

ELDERY W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Political Section
Patriots Branch

822

2716

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date 11 Aug 1944
Via <i>Major</i>
Initials <i>WPR</i>

SECRET

SECRET

784

RMB/afe

A/CC 324.5

11 August 1944

Subject: Statement Giving Recognition to Italian Patriots


To: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference is made to my letter dated 8 August, A/CC 324.5, on the above subject. The second line of para 3 of my letter incorrectly reflects General Browning's views in that the word "subsequently" should read "simultaneously".

2. I should be grateful if this correction is made on my original letter.

ELERY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Army Sub-Commission
Political Section
Executive Commissioner for
Patriots Branch
Files A B



2715

SECRET

SUBJECT: Patriot - Status.

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

Army Sub Commission, M.M.I.A.
H.C., A.C.C.

NOTE:

9/19

10 AUG 44.

To: Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

1. I have your A/C 324.5 dated 8 August and I must draw attention to your para. 3.

2. In my 6/19 dated 5 Aug I said that I recommended the issue of a statement paying tribute to the "regular Italian Army simultaneously." This appears in your para. 3 as "the regular Italian Army troops at the front subsequently." This is very different. The vast majority of the regular Italian Army is not at the front but doing work in rear areas which is exceedingly valuable. Moreover, the issue of these troops should not be left out of the statement. Nevertheless, the issue of the Italian Army statement separately would have nothing like the same effect as an issue simultaneously.

3. Would you therefore please the C.-in.-C accordingly at once in order that he may know my actual views before he gives any decision in the matter.

Yrs. RB.

Major General,
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

copy to: Political Section A.C.C. ✓
Patriot Branch A.C.C.

277

SUBJECT: Patriots

T O E S E R E T

Army sub Commission, (MIRA)
H.C. ACC

HOME.

6/15

3

Aug 4, 40

Political Section, ACC (Mr. CACCIA) ✓

Your remarks on my letter of 1 Aug "

1. ORIGIN.

Yes, I realize that this is normal practice and expresses the Italian Government's feelings.

BUT2. CONTENT.

It is not the Allied policy and the Italian Government should be under no illusions. Patriot activity is of course part of the war effort of ITALY. On the other hand, it is AAI (BSS Ops) who control and maintain liaison with bands North of the line. The Minister for War does not really come into the picture till the bands are over-passed by our advance and the personnel are then available to him as volunteers or conscripts for the official Italian Army. The Patriot is a civilian to all intents and purposes till he is officially enlisted as a soldier again by the M. of. W.

The last sentence is NOT correct. It should read :

....."fighting as volunteers in the ranks of the regular Italian Army or as individuals for special purposes authorized by the Allies.".....

There are no special Patriot units used by us (as far as I know) South of the line, though individuals may be used as guides, scouts, reconnaissance personnel or couriers beyond the line etc.

3. CONCLUSION.

I think the patriot policy is perfectly clear to those who deal with patriots. The only reason I wrote my letter of 1 Aug was that:

- (a) the Council of Ministers did not seem clear on it.
- (b) we should not let such a vague statement stand as is to prevent trouble in dealing with Patriots and disappointment or disillusionment later on.

822

1. ORIGINAL.

Yes. I realize that this is normal practice and expresses the Italian Government's feelings.

BUT

2. CONTENT.

It is not the Allied policy and the Italian Government should be under no illusions. Patriot activity is of course part of the war effort of ITALY. On the other hand, it is AAI (SAS Ops) who control and maintain liaison with bands North of the line. The Minister for War does not really come into the picture till the bands are over-passed by our advance and the personnel are then available to him as volunteers or conscripts for the official Italian Army. The Patriot is a civilian to all intents and purposes till he is officially enlisted as a soldier again by the M. of W.

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bvs.LB.
3-0-0.

A. Browning

Major General,
Army Sub Comm, A.C.G.

copy to: Patriot Branch, ACC (Col. McCarthy.)

822

SUBJECT: Patriots.

TOP SECRET

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ MILA.

ROME.

G/19

1 Aug 44.

Political Section, ACC (Mr. CACCIA)
Patriots Branch, ACC (Col. MCCARTHY)

copy to: AAI (Ops) E

Ref attached, the origin of which I cannot trace: -

1. This is completely contrary to existing policy. As you know, H.Q. AAI recently forbade 5 Army to make use of the PACCHIAFANTO AMIATA as formed bands.

2. I gave my views as regards the whole policy of recognising Patriot Bands and dealings with Patriots in my G/19 of 25 Jul 44.

3. I was informed yesterday by Gen CXILIA that the Italian Government was going to press for official recognition of these Patriot Bands, so the matter seems to be coming to a head.

4. The matter is for AAI's decision of course, but I write this in view of the categorical statement in the last sentence of the attached letter.

trvs.LB.
5-c.
encl.2.

A. Brown
Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received the attached H.Q. AAI letter, 115/G(Ops)E dated 30 Jul.

2712

1. Origin - This. I think was an official communication.

Ref attached, the origin of which I cannot trace.

1. This is completely contrary to existing policy. As you know, H.Q. AAI recently forbade 5 Army to make use of the PACCHIALENTI AMIATA as formed bands.

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twv.LR.
5-c.
encl.2.

A. Brown
Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

2712

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received the attached H.Q. AAI letter, 115/G(Ops)B dated 30 Jul.

1. Origin - This, I think, was an official communiqué published in accordance with normal practice after a Cabinet meeting to record publicly what the Government had discussed, decided etc.
2. Content - Is not the last sentence the only objectionable one from your point of view? And surely even that can be interpreted as far in with your requirements?

HAJ

COR.

TRANSLATION.

In its meetings of Saturday 15th and Monday 17th, the Council of Ministers has heard the Minister of War's account of the military effort of the Country for participation in the war.

The Minister has made references to the present state of the Army, to the problem of cadres, and to the necessity of an expansion and selection, to the admission of the volunteers in the ranks of the Army and also to the necessary liaison between the Army and the bands of patriots.

The Council has approved the account of the Minister of War and has encouraged him to proceed with his effort.

The Council interpreting the feelings of the country, and trusting the Allies for overcoming every difficulty of material order, which mark the limits of the deployment line of Italian troops, has examined the concrete forms for intensifying the contribution of our arms to the war of liberation.

The council has decided to make use of the spirit of voluntarism so widely spread in the country, and especially ardent in the regions which get freed by and by, to put at the disposal of the aims of the common cause the greatest possible number of fighters.

The Council of Ministers after having amply discussed the possibilities of helping every form of resistance in the occupied regions, has acknowledged that the armed bands of partisans who fight against the German invader must be considered as integral part of the war effort of the Nation. Therefore, the Minister of War, making the necessary agreements with the Allies, will take the necessary steps to establish regular liaison with these bands, to better their cadres, to increase the material and moral support of which they are in need. To the patriots who fought in bands and who will find themselves on this side of the front, will be given the possibility to go on fighting like volunteers in the cadres of special units.

O.K.?

Done

This can be made

to depend on what

we mean by "like".

tVB.C.5.

SUBJECT: Authority for Promotion and
Awards to Partisans.

TOP SECRET

Adv Headquarters
All d Armies in Italy.

COPY.

115/C(Ops)B.

To: Major B. Ashford Russell.
No. 11 (U) Section.

Please refer to your No. 0192/1 dated 16 July 44.

With regard to the award of promotions and decorations to Partisans by individuals and isolated groups, it is the ruling of this Headquarters that such practice would be undesirable. It is believed that if this authority were granted it would usurp the functions of the existing official Italian Army. This decision is based upon the following factors: -

- a. We would be storing up trouble for the future, as some bands would thus be afforded some degree of official recognition not extended to others.
- b. The bands, which are of different political beliefs, might interpret this authority as discrimination, which might well engender internal dissension within the whole Partisan movement.
- c. If this authority were granted it would tend to emasculate present arrangements made for newly liberated parts of Italy.

Briefly stated our policy is that we are extremely grateful to the good work being done by the Partisans but, of necessity, there can only be one official Italian Army. As a corollary of this, all promotions and awards must emanate from the Italian Army.

30 Jul 44.
JHR/WJH

s/d John H. NIEFE, Col. G.S.C.
for Lieut General.
Chief of General Staff.

copy to: M.M.I.A.

copytvs=5-c.

2719

Political Section

SSS/cfc

A/CC 324.5

3 August 1944

Subject: Statement Giving Recognition to Italian Patriots

To: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. The Prime Minister of the Italian Government, desiring to have the Patriots receive maximum support and avoid being treated as fringe figures, has proposed that the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, issue a statement of which a draft copy is enclosed.

2. The statement has been coordinated with General Browning of my Army sub-Commission who feels that on the whole the issuance of such a statement would be helpful, and I recommend that such a statement be issued.

3. General Browning adds, however, and I concur, that it will be also desirable to issue subsequently another statement, paying tribute to the regular Italian Army troops at the front. The last statement issued by you, praising the work of the Italian troops in the offensive which began in May, was very well received by the Italian press and it seems clear that another such statement would also be helpful to the morale of both the Army and the civilian population.

ELLEN K. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl.
Draft of statement

cc: Army S/c
Pol. Sec.
Ex. Com. for Patriots Bo.

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-time 9 Aug 1400
Via HH 9 Mgrs.
Initials DMR

2703

822

IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO
DEI MINISTRI

C O P Y

:::::::::::::::::::
::HQ ACC, APO 394 ::
:: Sec'y Gen ::
::Rec'd 4 Aug 1130::
::By - DRA ::
:::::::::::::::::::

TRANSLATION

Ref. 1/158

Roma, August 2, 1944

Dear Admiral,

As you are aware, the Allied Control Commission has recently adopted several practical measures in recognition of the contribution given by Italian patriots to the Allied war effort against the Germans. The Italian Government have also acted on the same lines.

The Italian Government are of opinion that such measures could be very usefully developed and integrated in a statement to be issued by the Allied High Command in Italy, of which I take leave to enclose a draft copy.

You will note that the aim of the statement is that of considering the patriots, who are fighting with unabated vigour and considerable self-sacrifice in the occupied territory, as an integral part of the Italian Corps of Liberation and of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander.

Such recognition would not only place them under the protection of the rules of warfare, but would undoubtedly give them encouragement and incentive of particular significance and importance. I need hardly stress the important place the patriots' movement occupies within the framework of our national life and in the consciousness of the Country.

I have no doubt, therefore, that you will give the matter your most earnest consideration in the interest not only of our own, but also of the common war effort.

Thanking you in advance for the kind interest I feel sure you will take in the matter,

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely

/s/ I. Bonomi

Admiral Hilary W. Stone, U.S.N.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
R O M E

2708

C O P Y

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy has issued the following statement:

1. The Italian Patriots constitute a fighting army under the leadership of officers and is a part of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy.

2. Italian patriots bear their arms openly against the Germans and have received precise instructions to conduct the war against the enemy according to the rules of warfare. They wear a badge which has been duly notified in accordance with international rules. General Alexander considers these troops as one of the forces at present under his command.

3. The status of regular fighting troops as an integral part of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the war against Germany places them under the protection of international conventions. Any reprisal that has been, or should henceforth be, exercised against the patriots organizations and the patriots themselves, would therefore, represent a violation of the rules of warfare which are binding also on Germany. The Allied Chief Command will make every effort in order that the authors of any atrocity committed against troops acting under its orders shall be placed under trial and duly punished.

Head, Allied Armies in Italy

ALLIED COMMISSION
PATRIOT BRANCH
ADV.DET.
APO 394

~~HS~~
~~HH~~

Tel. 902

SECRET
Pat Lom/18
31 October 1944

SUBJECT : Patriots, Intelligence on.

TO : Regional Commissioner
Lombardia Region.

1. The attached intelligence relating to Patriots in Lombardia Region is passed to you please for your information.

2. It should be noted that this intelligence statement supersedes all relative intelligence previously reported - Appendix "A" to A.C.C. - report on Patriot Activities in Region XI, dated 14 September 1944, refers.

F.E. Gillett

F.E. GILLETT
Major, 5 Innis D.C.
Provincial Commissioner
Lombardia Region.

822
/

Copy to GOC No. 2 District.

SCAO AMG 5 Army.

OC No.1 Special Force.

OC, FWB.

CCAO, AAI.

A.C.

Political Section ✓

Civ. Affairs Section

Economic Section

P.R. Branch

Patriot Branch

Patriot Branch, Adv.Det. (2)

AMG Section - Adv.HQ 2 District.

2706

SECRET

Pat Log/18

30 October 1944.

LOMBARDIA PATRIOTS - Locations, Designations, Leaders, Strength. (May Ref. 1:200,000 Road - Italy)
(Intelligence available at H.Q. A.S.I. 30 October 1944.)

Province	Grid Ref.	Location Area	Designation	Leader / Comdr.	Strength	Remarks
VARESE	D-9713 J-9568	Campo del Pioni Gallarate	Babotage Squadra	Battioni	2/300	
COMO	E-1903 K-1698 K-1095 E-3632 E-4554 E-4932 E-4325	Como Villa Guardia Azziano Dervio M. Legnone M. Alto Murgno	55 Gar. Sic. Squadra V. Gerola Alto Dervio tartano Bis. Treilici Martini		100 50+150 500 50	
	E-4521 E4012	NW of Introbio Mandello-Abbadia	Gar. Ass. Sde. Mandello		300	
MILANO	K-2564	Milano		Gen. Peleccchio		
PAVIA	K-1933	Pavia			400	
SONDRIO	E-6433 B-6211 E-8237 E-7762 E-8952 E-9545 E-9239 E-9336	S. of Valassina N. of Calamone S. of Sondrio S. of Sondrio Parco localino M. Contolo Biancone area Castello dell'	Green Platoon Matteotti Bde. Donlalo Gr. 40 Gar. Bde. Rogneda Gr.	Carona Nicola Rovoli Ninola	80 80 mob. 10 armed. 100, 40 ass. 70 1000 100 15. arms.	
	A-2271 A-2853	Locua Area Bormio M. Gavio		Patrina	300 200	3035

- 2 -

SECRET

Province	Grid Ref.	Location Area	Designation	Letter/Code	Strength	Remarks
BERGAMO	B-5412	Yucco Area		Castone	60	
	B-5955	Barina		Maj. Ruggero	150 well armed	
	B-5595	St. Confo Alto	Giuseppe Barlissa Band	Domenico	200	
	K-6488	Bavigno	53 & 86 Bari, 34c.			
	B-7716	S. of M. Corte			500	
	B-7930	Colate	Grobica Div. forming		500	
	B-8801	Corno Lunga		Capt. Bonomi	150-700	
CREMONA	P-1506	S. of Casalmaggiore			150 well armed	
BRESCIA	A-3545	Casale di Tenda	Green Flame Div.			
	A-1741	N. of Biolo				
	A-1235	P. Invernigo	Tito Sperra Bde.	Bruti	300	
	A-1235	P. Trevigino	3d Bn.	Signorini		
	A-1234	Breno Area	Green Flame Div. HQ		800	
	A-1234	Breno Area	Artoli Tank Div.	Fiori (Gen. M. Rini), 2 i/c Riontini.		
	A-0506	Darfo				
	B-0595	N. of Rovigno	Arby B.		30	
	B-0888	N. of Iodirino	3 Lombardina Bde.		200	
	B-1392	N. of Iodirino				
	B-0880	N. of Iodirino				
	B-0558	Verona				
	A-2829	Verona				
	B-2898	NW of Lago d'Idro	F. Lorenzo Bde.	Capt. Villa	1800-1900	
MANTOVA	A-2802	N. of Lago d'Idro	Mat. Piopo	L. Canino	300	
	B-2325	S. of Trebbio		Bagolini	70	
				V. Canino	100	

MANTOVA No intelligence available.

SECRET

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC UNITED STATES COMMISSION
 (USP)
 Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel. 576730

27th October, 1964

Ref 510/100 /000

SUBJECT: Master Reports.

TO : Number 1 Special Forces
 Attention: Major Tulloch.

1. I have just found out that the information contained in these reports is made available to Regional Commissioners by a patriot organisation at HQ. A.A.I. and your reports therefore are not required for them. Would you therefore please delete the following recipients from your distribution list:

Brigadier Upjohn
 Brigadier Denico
 Col. Hancock
 Col. Pomeroy
 Col. Marshall
 Col. Brown and
 Col. Denmore.

2. The reports are, however, of great value to Political Section at this HQ as well as to myself. Could you please see therefore that Political Section get a copy of these reports in the future as well as Chief of Staff.

Worship Ltn

Chief Staff Officer,
 To the Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Economic Section
 Civil Affairs Section
 Political Section ✓
 Region Malia
 " Venesia
 " Lombardy
 " Liguria
 " Piemonte

2703

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Ref: 90/PAT

26 October 1944.

Subject: Italian Patriots.

To: P.R.O.
Copy to: Political Section.

I attach copy of today's UNION JACK. Two statements in the paragraph headed "Partisans" in the article "Why Kick A Man When He's Down" appear to me to be somewhat exceptionable.

1. One hundred thousand Italian patriots have not been killed in battle against the German Army since Mussolini fell.
2. It is quite untrue to suggest that if it had not been for the Italian patriots another 100,000 Englishmen would have been killed, and that we should still be nearer Sicily than the Po Valley.

The tone of this paragraph runs counter to the policy of this H.Q. vis-a-vis the patriots.

In my judgment it would be a mistake to have any comment put in a forthcoming number of the UNION JACK, but you may think it worth while to draw the editor's attention to the points which I have made.

P. N. Dagnus

Sir P. N. Dagnus,
Major,
Patriots Branch.

I doubt if the article as a whole was the first attempt I have seen in Union Jack during the last year to treat Italian as collaborators etc etc

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Subject : Decree on Patriots

Ref. 95/PAT.

29 Sep. 44.

To : Brigadier Lash.
Admin. Section.
Interior Sub Commission.
Political Section.

1. I attach a copy of the translation of the decree on Patriots which is being examined today by the Cabinet.

2. If it is passed, as it should be, it becomes law tomorrow.

3. There have been two alterations to the original proposal as put up by the Italian Patriot Committee: -

- (i) The first article has been split into two.
- (ii) The words "in liberated Italy" have been inserted after the word "Patriots" in Article 1 and in the first line of Article 2.

Chas. Carthy Col

S. D. Mc CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

2701

872

ORDERS IN COUNCIL

PUBLISHED BY THE

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

By the authority given me by the virtue of the decree of June 25, 1944, No. 1111, in virtue of which I am authorized to issue orders in Council, I hereby order that the following be done:

Following the proposal of the Prime Minister, I hereby order that the following be done:

to have sanctioned and to promulgate the following:

Art. 1. A National Committee for Patriots in Italy is hereby formed and attached to the Prime Minister's Office.

Art. 2. The function of the National Committee for Patriots in Italy is to study on a uniform basis all problems concerning Patriot activities in their fight against Fascism and to promote all necessary measures.

Art. 3. The Committee will be under the Presidency of the Prime Minister and will consist of the Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office who will be Vice-President, an Under-Secretary of State for War, appointed by the Prime Minister, an Under-Secretary of State for Peace and Information and four Experts appointed by a decree of the Prime Minister on the advice of the Cabinet. The President of the Committee will appoint a Secretary chosen from among its members.

Art. 4. A Patriot Office depending upon the National Committee with the task of fulfilling its directives will be formed and attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The Patriot Office has the following function: to ascertain and to survey Patriot activities and evaluate them according to proved facts; to issue certificates to coordinate the various ways of moral and material assistance to Patriots; to guarantee the re-employment of Patriots in the war of liberation.

2700

Art. 1. A National Committee for the Study of the Italian Economy is hereby formed and attached to the Prime Minister's Office.

Art. 2. The function of the National Committee for the Study of the Italian Economy is to study on a uniform basis all problems concerning Italy's economic life in their light of the Government and Fascist aims and to promote all necessary measures.

Art. 3. The Committee will be under the Presidency of the Prime Minister and will consist of the Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office who will be Vice-President, an Under-Secretary of State for War, appointed by the Prime Minister, an Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Information and four experts appointed by a Board of the Prime Minister on the advice of the Cabinet. The President of the Committee will appoint a Secretary chosen from among its members.

Art. 4. A Patriotic Office depending upon the National Committee with the task of fulfilling its directives will be formed and attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The Patriotic Office has the following functions: to ascertain and to coordinate patriotic activities and activities in accordance with the Government's policy; to issue instructions to coordinate the various work of social and material assistance to Italy; to coordinate the work of the various patriotic organizations; to guarantee the re-employment of patriots in the war of liberation.

Art. 5. The rules for the organization and functioning of the Patriotic Office will be defined by a Decree of the Prime Minister in agreement with the Treasury Minister on the advice of the National Committee.

Art. 6. The expenditures needed for the functioning of the Office formed by virtue of the authority of this Decree will be charged to the Treasury Minister-Budget in the account of the Prime Minister's Office. The Treasury Minister is authorized to modify the Budget accordingly.

Art. 7. This Decree comes into effect on the day following its publication.

2700

CONFIDENTIAL.HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 901/29/CA.

28th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Treatment of Patriots in ITALY - Final Stage.

TO : Director, Patriots Branch.

1. I refer to your letter 64/Pat of 25 Sept 1944.
2. This document constituted a memorandum on the policy, past, present and future, regarding the treatment of patriots.
3. I would ask you to assure yourself in future that before sending out such documents which affect the policy of the Commission as a whole, your statements and proposals have the authority of the head of your Section.
4. You will have realised from yesterday's meeting that the document did not represent the views either of this Headquarters or of the Regional Commissioners, and I should be glad, therefore, if you would withdraw the letter; discuss the matter with me; if necessary send out a modified letter.

(Sgd) N. S. 2699

MBL/JN.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Pol Sec ✓

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH.
APO 394.

~~SECRET~~

Ref: 64/121

25 Sept. 44

SUBJECT: Treatment of Patriots in Italy -
Final stage.

To: Brigadier M. Lush,
Brigadier Upjohn,
Mr. Harold Gaccia.

Copies for information to:
Brigadier Matwarding,
Commander Holdsworth
AMC Fifth Army
AMC Eighth Army

1. Undoubtedly the handling of patriots in the North of Italy will be on a much larger scale than in central Italy; the patriots in the North are reputed to be tougher than those in central Italy; also they are well organised vide Appendix attached.
2. It seems clear that it is necessary to endeavour to harness and control the energies of the patriots in the North from now until such time as they are finally dissipated into the civilian population. Otherwise there is almost certain to be trouble wherever they are left uncontrolled especially if they are not put into proper civil or military employment after peace has been established in their areas.
3. HQ AII are eager that patriots in the north should now be satisfied about their future so that they may give of their best over the next few weeks. A letter is probably being sent to us from G Ops to this effect.
4. At present, the fact that many patriots, e.g. in Florence, have not been finally rehabilitated has not presented a serious public safety problem because, first, there are not enough of them and second, we have strong military forces everywhere in the vicinity.
5. What the patriots want is to know that they will be properly employed either in the Army or in civil life after the fighting is over. This means that if we wish to satisfy the patriots we must present to them a plan for military and civil employment which they will accept. 2893
6. The present military terms are unacceptable because the patriots wish to continue fighting with their own officers and they refuse to join up if they are to be split into different units in the army.
7. I have discussed the problem of recruitment briefly with General

To: Brigadier A. Lush,
Brigadier Ughetto,
Mr. Harold Gacola.

Copies for information to:
Brigadier Melwaring,
Commander Holdsworth
AAG Fifth Army
AAG Eighth Army

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5. What the patriots want is to know that they will be properly employed either in the Army or in civil life after the fighting is over. This means that if we wish to satisfy the patriots we must present to them terms for military and civil employment which they will accept. 2696

6. The present military terms are unacceptable because the patriots wish to continue fighting with their own officers and they refuse to join up if they are to be split into different units in the army.

7. I have discussed the problem of recruitment briefly with General Browning and he has asked us to call meeting to discuss this after his return from Sardinia about the forth of October. Whether or not on all grounds it is desirable that the patriots should join the army has also to be considered; and an answer must be given in the near future and the patriots told what that answer is.

8. With regard to civil employment, I find that many patriots refuse to accept the terms which the army can offer them because the pay is too low and the work unattractive. This has not been a serious problem in Florence but in the North it may be serious and it is suggested that the Italian Patriot Committee could produce one or two civilians for each Region who should canvass leading industrial firms and find jobs for patriots according to their qualifications and experience. If the Italian Patriot Committee can take on this work it would be of great assistance.

2.

9. Both the army authorities and any civilian employment bureau that is formed by Italians must be able to make early contact with patriots, if possible before they are finally disbanded so that a clear scheme for reemployment will be known to the bands in good time.

10. The difficulty in doing this is to get the armies and corps to agree to let the patriots be contacted in the most forward areas. I think, however, that Ali feels sufficiently strongly about the necessity of settling the qualms of patriots on this head, to insist that patriots should be contacted at a very early stage.

11. Col. Mayo, feels strongly that the publicity given to patriots on the radio and in the press is exaggerated and that we are making too much fuss about their rehabilitation, and that the directives to this end given in our order of 18 July and 24 July are not 'realistic'. He thinks all this will end only in causing trouble for Italy.

12. The daily Combatti programme, sponsored by Brig. Mainmaring, is probably the strongest single authority responsible for encouraging and emphasizing the importance of the patriots.

13. There is, undoubtedly, much in what Col. Mayo says but it is difficult to reconcile these views with the practical necessity for encouraging the Italian patriots at this juncture. A little later on perhaps one could ask PWs to include their comments on patriots amongst their articles on the courage and endurance of the whole civil population. At some stage it may be wise to eliminate from the news papers practically all reference to patriots but this presumably would be when Italy was almost entirely liberated.

14. In the mean time the present policy is to endeavour to look after the patriots when they are disbanded and I should like to have a directive if I am to proceed on the lines mentioned above and take particular trouble to put patriots into the army and civil employment. Also is it desirable to cut down our propaganda?

C.D. McCarthy

C.D. McCarthy.
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

SECRET

THE ITALIAN ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN ITALY.

1. From information received in the last few days it is possible to give a somewhat clearer picture of the internal organization of the Partisan movement in Italy.
2. The "core" of the movement, as has of course long been known, is in MILAN. This is the logical result of three main causes:
 - (a) Milan is the natural centre of German occupied Italy.
 - (b) As Italy's principal industrial town it has a large working population which has, in the past, provided a fertile field for anti-Fascist organization.
 - (c) As a result of (a) the Committee of National Liberation in Milan has a firm foundation of well organized underground activity which parties of the left had established and maintained throughout the Fascist regime. The CLN was thus able to begin the evolution of an active central organization at a time when Partisan activity in the rest of Italy was sporadic and entirely uncoordinated. The Committee has gradually increased the extent of its influence until at present it is believed that it is recognized by the great majority of the Partisans.
3. In essence the CLN aims to coordinate the activities of all resistance elements which are prepared to act against Germans and Fascists, and to eliminate friction arising both from the wide variety of causes which have induced Italians to join resistance groups, and from the tendency of a large number of political parties to attempt to capitalize on the resistance movement.
4. (a) The courses from which the Partisan movement derives almost all its active strength are five-fold:
 - (i) Members of the Italian Army before the Armistice, who for various reasons later refused to throw in their lot with the Germans and Fascists. Their political views appear to be pro-289 ally neutral, but it is probable that they are not.

In essence the City aims to coordinate the collection of all resources which are required to set up and run the various clubs and to allocate funds or grants both from the variety of sources which have funded Italian football associations groups, and from the tendency of a large number of settled parties to attempt to contribute to the development of soccer movement.

4. (a) The sources from which the turbines receive guided missiles are five-fold : -

(1) Members of the Italian Army before the Armistice, who for various reasons later returned to "Ghrow in their lot with the German and Fascists. Their political views appear to be ²⁸⁸⁴pre-2884; tly monodist and it is probable that the majority of these units which remained independent of the GIL derived from these sources.

(1.1) Commutative

(111) Action Party members.

(33) *500 ml. of*

(v) χ^2 -statistic. Theorem 2.11.

(a) The ability of this element should however be qualified. Operating with Parham is a large and heterogeneous body of individuals, or, as the word suggests, together with an unknown number of Russian, Polish, Czech, and even German agents from the Ministry, Glavsek, and a considerable number of allied ex-SS.

5. When it became clear that the CIA in ELLEN had received a real authority over the complex movement, and that it had been recognized by the various military and political organizations, a number of individuals, including a number of individuals, were referred to as "Colonel". The latter is based in the military and was referred to as "Colonel".

6. (a) The General Command of the ELLEN was composed of five members, one from each of the five principal resistance elements, and a military adviser.

(b) The Operations section of the Command virtually runs the ELLEN and consists of the Communist and Action Party representatives and the military adviser.

(c) Colonel X was welcomed by all parties and was considered President of the Committee. This however raised a difficulty in that the three parties of the left could not agree as to the allocation of the necessary posts. He therefore refused the Presidency and has taken up the appointment of military adviser with its ex officio seat in the Operations section, a task for which his capabilities make him eminently suitable.

7. The Committee has achieved a considerable degree of cooperation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in addition it is pointed out that when communications consist chiefly of confessions or facts, they are occasionally more or less, liaison duties require a very great significance.

8. The lack of communication and the clandestine nature of the organization have made close control of all 2895 operations particularly in the case of distant bands, out of question. The Committee therefore consists itself with its operational policy and concentrates mainly on organization. A.A.I. therefore maintain their direct operational control of the bands by means

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.O. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 324

Subject: Composition of the Rome Patriot Committee.

Ref. 35/PAT.

25 Sept. 44.

To: Administrative Section (2)

Copy to: Political Section

On instructions from Brig. DSH, I am sending you copy of the suggested members of the Patriot Commissions for Rome. The Italian Patriot Committee has decided that it is necessary to have three commissions for Rome, each commission consisting of three military members (of whom one will be a soldier, one a sailor, and one a member of the Air Force) and three civil members. It has not been decided who should preside over each commission.

If you could let me know whether the names are suitable I will inform the Italian Patriot Committee at once that the three commissions can start to function immediately.

Have you please any views as to who should preside over each commission? (The object of each commission, as you know, is to discover who were the real patriots when Rome was liberated, and to see that they are given suitable employment).

Cdr. Carthy

C.D. MCARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.O. & M.G. Section.

CONF.MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONS FOR ROME

1st Commission for ROME:

Ten. Col. MARCHESE Lello
 Ten. Col. SPOTT Lucio
 Cap. BARRONDELLI Mario
 D-1. DE VITO Carlo
 B. MARINI Francesco
 MARCONI Francesco

2nd Commission for ROME:

Cap. MOSCONI Fulvio
 Ten. Vasc. LENTINI Giovanni
 Ten. Col. GUARISELLA Lucio
 D-1. VIGILIER Roberto
 B. DI SERRA Franco
 A. D'AGOSTINO Lorenzo

3rd Commission for ROME:

Ten. Col. GERRONE Mirto
 Magg. SALVARESI Antonio
 Cap. MURRO Giuseppe
 D-1. PAN Vittorio
 A. RIGGI Gianni
 D-2. RIGGI Carlo

2693

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTERIOR SUB COMMISSION
APO 394

95/Pat

16,944.

SUBJECT: Formation of Italian Patriot Committee

TO: Distribution below.

The Italian Government have set up an Italian Patriot Committee under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister with the following terms of reference:-

1. The Commission will be called "Commissione per i Patrioti"
2. It will be presided over by the Prime Minister and, in his absence, the Under Secretary of State to the Presidency.
3. The members will be:-

H.E. Mario P. LERMO, Under Secretary of State for War.

H.E. Giuseppe SP. ALATO, Under Secretary of State for Press and Information.

Dr. BAUER or other representatives of the C.I.N.

General ODDONE (Military)

4. The directives of the Commission will be carried out by a corresponding "Ufficio Patriote". The work will be undertaken by military and civilian personnel.

5. The head of this, Lt. Col. BATTABO, will also be Secretary of the "Commissione".

In their relations with the Allied Control Commission and the Regions, this Committee will deal with the Patriot Branch of the RC and MG Section. Officers of this Commission will reciprocally deal with this Italian Patriot Committee through the Patriot Branch and not direct.

Distribution:

(M.S. LUSH) Brigadier, Executive
Commissioner.

2692

822

Committee under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister with the following terms of reference:-

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3. The members will be:-

H.E. Mario P. LEMMO, Under Secretary of State for War,

H.E. Giuseppe SPALARO, Under Secretary of State for Press and Information.

Dr. BAUER or other representatives of the C.L.N.

General ODDONE (Military)

4. The directives of the Commission will be carried out by a corresponding "Ufficio Patriote". The work will be undertaken by military and civilian personnel.

5. The head of this, Lt. Col. BARABO, will also be Secretary of the "Commissione".

In their relations with the Allied Control Commission and the Regions, this Committee will deal with the Patriot Branch of the RC and MG Section. Officers of this Commission will reciprocally deal with this Italian Patriot Committee through the Patriot Branch and not direct.

MSL

(M.S. LUSH) Brigadier, Executive Commissioner.

2892

Distribution:

C(Group 1)

(41.) He explained that as Dr. Jones was unable to express his position in writing, I signed his own part in the summaries for his place and the Committee now consists of the members in addition to the President, his Agent, and his Secretary. The parties are represented. I said this appeared to be a satisfactory point in

I asked if he could have the paper if possibly suitable
 toward the important subjects to which the original
 correspondence with it speaks. I thought of the above matter,
 the President said he would try to find them out and I
 think that they had been found. It would be
 necessary for them to have knowledge with the matter
 with which they had to work before they were really
 satisfied.

J. C. C.

2691

He discussed the distinction of Federal representation to join the Italian Army and I said I thought it might be clearly understood that all Federal soldiers serving through the lines since the beginning of August had been completely listless and very few appear to want to join the Italian Army. This was agreed but the answer would probably be discussed by the Canadian. My point in raising it was to avoid any startling losses with Italians coming through the line has not been sold about it.

571) I was asked what my feelings were towards the Government and I replied that the Government was a very small one and that I thought that it should be in the hands of the people. I said that I did not think that the Government should be recognised.

(vii) The Rome Conference.

I asked if it would be possible to have this Committee functioning and the names of Patriots in some fully listed by the end of September because I thought it desirable that this problem should be resolved before we received large sums in Northern Italy. The President thought this would be possible.

(viii) He discussed the advisability of recognizing those who had helped the Patriots. I advised that I had been told that this was mainly a political method of securing a 'patron' following in order to strengthen the position of certain parties. In any case, I mentioned that we had discussed the matter very fully in July and decided that it would be almost impossible to make a complete list of all who had helped Patriots. In some cases this would embrace whole villages and in a case like Naxos an almost infinite number of people would claim to be considered as helpers.

P. J. Harvey

Chas. E. Carter

C. D. Mc CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Council,
N.C. & M.S. Section.

Records of the meeting of the Committee on Military +
 Reproduction 11, 1944 - 11 19 44.
 The Committee on Military + Reproduction 11, 1944
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 The Committee on Military + Reproduction 11, 1944
 The Committee on Military + Reproduction 11, 1944
 The Committee on Military + Reproduction 11, 1944

The Committee on Military +

- (-)
- a) Committee on Military + Reproduction
 - b) Committee on Military + Reproduction
 - c) Committee on Military + Reproduction
 - d) Committee on Military + Reproduction
 - e) Committee on Military + Reproduction

As the name of each section will be put a military or
 a civilian.

The Committee on Military + Reproduction will be put a military or
 a civilian.

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- a) Committee on Military + Reproduction

The Committee on Military + Reproduction will be put a military or
 a civilian.

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The Committee on Military + Reproduction will be put a military or
 a civilian.

Cell.
Spediz.
Tratt.:
Vis.:

R. MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

✓ P

Telegramma in PARTENZA

N.° coll: 1429

Oggetto: Ripetizione telegramma

Data: 6 Settembre 1944 Tramite: G.A.C. = Filo Cifra =

Diretto a: Ambasciata Italiana MADRID

Testo: (originale) N.°

725 Settembre 6

Suoi 714 e 764. Si invia ripetizione chiesta: "massima collaborazione, con quella disciplina abnegazione, patriottismo che fanno del movimento di resistenza nelle generose provincie settentrionali italiane uno dei più ammirevoli e importanti contributi che l'Italia dà alla liberazione del territorio nazionale ed una delle più certe ragioni di speranze nel suo nuovo risorgimento. Prego assicurare Visconti Venosta".


VIDAU

Not for despatch
Text in cipher enclosed

27 SET 1944

ASPEDITO

2683



Diretto a: Ambasciata Italiana MADRID

Testo: (originale) N.º

725 Settembre 6

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
VIDAU

Not for despatch
Text in cipher enclosed

27 SET 1944

ESPEDITO

2688



Consegnato a:

il

822

DRAFTSUBJECT MATTER FOR PAMPHLET ON PATRIOTS.

1. It is suggested that P.W.B. produce a thousand copies of a pamphlet about Patriots. In this pamphlet the responsibility of the Italian Govt for ensuring that patriots are dealt with fairly when their fighting is done should be stressed. Certain facts also should be brought out, which Allied officers of any branch or formation who may have to deal with patriots ought to know.

2. DEFINITION OF A PATRIOT.

Patriots may be of any nationality, and are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important information.

3. WHERE PATRIOTS WILL FIGHT.

It has been laid down by A.A.I. H.Q. that assistance from Patriots will be welcomed inside the area in which each band has been fighting. It will be impossible to take armed bands of Patriots on to provinces further forward.

4. HISTORY OF THE PATRIOT MOVEMENT.

An account of the Patriot movement is being prepared. In this connection it should be remembered that patriots have achieved successes in a large number of areas not only before Allied troops have arrived but also immediately after they have arrived, e.g. in the course of street fighting in FLORENCE.

5. RE-EMPLOYMENT OF PATRIOTS.

After the enemy has been cleared from a district in which a band has been functioning, the members of the band will, in many cases need to earn their livings at once. It is estimated that about 50% will go to their homes, but that the remainder 50% will need work. Plans for providing them with work must be made by AMG officers in conjunction with Sub Area Garrison HQ staff, and Labour officers. It is important that these plans should be made before patriots are asked to hand in their arms, so that the patriot is taken straight off to work immediately after he has handed in his arms.

6. JOBS FOR PATRIOTS.

Patriots can be employed as policemen, guards, orderlies, engineer labourers, clerks, and drivers. Some patriots, furthermore, will want to join the Italian Navy, Army and Air Force. Special note should be taken of prominent patriots in any band, with a view to giving them special employment on a higher scale of wages.

822

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7. CONTROL OF PATRIOTS.

It must be understood that patriots are controlled by the Senior Military Comd. in the district until such time as he has handed over to A.M.G. The period for which patriots may be under command of the senior Military Comd. may vary from a few hours to a few weeks. During this period Special Force officers may be the link between patriot leaders of the band and the Military Comd. During this period AMG officers should consult with the Mil. Comd. as to when and how each patriot band will be dealt with. It must be

impressed on all concerned that every patriot band must be treated on an individual basis. Due consideration must be given to any band which has suffered casualties or behaved in gallant manner.

8. HANDING IN OF ARMS.

Plans for the handing in of arms must always be made between the senior A.M.G. officials present and band leaders, if possible, after consultation with the Allied Military Comd. It should be explained to the patriots that some of their arms will be dropped again by air for further use in the North.

9. BOGUS PATRIOTS.

Bogus patriots must be put down ruthlessly. It will usually be found that any genuine band will be glad to assist in this task.

10. DISTURBANCES.

Every kind of disturbance may take place. If an A.M.G. officer feels that he has not sufficient weapon power to cope, he must lose no time in calling in the Senior Military Comd. and asking him to deal with the disturbance. If the A.M.G. officer can deal with the disturbance either through his carabinieri or through his Patriot representatives he should of course do so.

11. PATRIOT REPRESENTATIVES.

Patriot representatives work in pairs, one from the military and one from the political CLN groups. They are sent out from HQ in response to a request from A.M.G. of Armies. They are in no way political and are not allowed to make any political propaganda whatever. Their main duties are, first, to help spear head C.A.O.s in their identification of leaders of Patriot bands, second, to help to select suitable Patriots out of the bands to work on the C.A.O.'s staff, and third, to assist A.M.G. in dealing with political problems.

12. REPORTS.

It is important to get from leaders of Patriot bands a complete report of the band's past activities together with a list of the members of the band. Patriot representatives must also put in a report weekly on what they have done with any special recommendations for the future. All these reports must be forwarded as soon as possible through proper channels to H.Q. A.C.C., Patriot Branch, in Rome.

13. ITALIAN PATRIOT COMMITTEE.

The Prime Minister himself is presiding over the Italian Patriot Committee which has many functions but is chiefly concerned with the care

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13. ITALIAN PATRIOT COMMITTEE.

The Prime Minister himself is presiding over the Italian ²⁰⁰⁰~~Patriot~~ Committee which has many functions but is chiefly concerned with the care of genuine Patriots. It is hoped that the Committee will be able to pay salaries, and compensation to deserving cases, to provide transport for Patriot representatives, to provide information for the A.C.C. Intelligence Section, and to collect complete lists for historical and other purposes of the composition and activities of all Patriot bands throughout Italy.

14. ISSUE OF PATRIOT CERTIFICATES.

Certificates of merit will be issued to all genuine Patriots by A.M.G. If possible, these should be distributed at a public ceremony

and the Patriot banked by some senior officer for their services.

15. LIAISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT ALLIED FORMATIONS AND HQ WITH REGARD TO PATRIOTS.

A.M.G. officers must remember to keep in close contact on the subject of Patriots, with the Military Comd., Garrison Comd. Special Forces, P.W.B., I.C.U. and labour officers. It might be advisable to have daily a meeting of Patriots for the first few days with these people present.

16. COMMUNAL COMMITTEES.

It must be explained to Patriots that special Communal Committees are being set up in each commune to look after the rehabilitation of Patriots.

17. GENERAL ALEXANDER'S POSTERS.

The subject matter of these posters should be drawn to the attention of leaders of Patriot bands.

31.8.44.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Ref/64/43/PAT.

24 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Patriots.

TO : Distribution as Below.

1. I enclose for your general information, copies as listed under distribution, of the following papers which may be of interest to your staff and I shall be particularly grateful if you will arrange that your Patriot Representatives are able to see these papers:

The Patriot Movement in Italy. This paper will be of considerable interest to many. The main object of its production is to enable everyone to realise what the Patriot Movement has achieved so far. It does also explain exactly how patriot units and gaps are organised which is so important when disarming has to be considered.

Speech of 22 August 1944. This will be of interest to those who want to know of the constitutions and scope of the Patriots Branch. The speech was delivered at the Acting Chief Commissioner's meeting in Rome on 22 August 1944.

Current Problems. I am circulating this note so that you may see what we are working on at present. If you have any comments I shall be grateful if you will let me have them.

2. Danger Points in German Occupied Territory.

Notes on particular places e.g. power stations, the PO River, and notes on the composition of bands in German occupied territory are being distributed to those concerned. I mention this here so that if anyone should for any particular reason require such information, it may be possible to find it with A.M.G. of Armies. If you do not find it there please ask this Branch and if it can be obtained it will be sent to you.

C.D. Mc Carthy
C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

CMR/FRS.

2684

822

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C.D. Mc Carthy
C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

CDM/WRS.

COPIES TO:

Brigadier Lush
Brigadier Manning
Admin Section
Economic Section
Political Section
P.W.B.
P.R.O.
Information Div
M.M.I.A.
Air Forces S/C
Navy S/C
Security Br.

(2)
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(1)

DISTRIBUTION:

A.M.G. 5 Army (5)
A.M.G. 8 Army (5)
R.C. Region 1 (1)
R.C. Region 2 (1)
R.C. Region 3 (1)
R.C. Region 4 (1)
R.C. Region 5 (6)
R.C. Region 6 (1)
R.C. Region 7 (1)
R.C. Region 8 (9)
R.C. Region 9 (8)
R.C. Region 10 (7)
R.C. Region 11 (9)
R.C. Region 12 (8)
No. 1 Special Force (2)

2884

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

PATRIOT BANDS IN CENTRAL ITALY

(This report concerns only the liberated areas of Regions 4, 5 and 8.)

1. ORIGIN OF THE BANDS.

The Patriot Movement does not represent something completely new in Italian life; it can be considered a new and wider development of the struggle carried out during the last twenty years by several underground organizations against the Fascist regime. The activities of these underground organizations had a direct influence in creating the conditions which made possible the coup-d'etat of July 25, 1943.

After the coup-d'etat, leaders and members of the underground organizations came out into the open. With the re-establishment of the Fascist regime (25 Sept. 1943), it became imperative for anti-fascists in enemy occupied territory, to go into hiding. The same was done by many other people who had not taken part in the anti-fascist activities before July 25th; and who after that date had shown sympathy for the new regime and for the Allied cause.

As a result of the armistice, most of the Italian Army disbanded. Officers and soldiers went home or tried to reach home, hoping that the Allies would soon arrive. When the new Fascist Government was re-established and it became evident that the enemy was going to occupy parts of the country for a certain while, officers and soldiers who did not want to join the new Fascist Army or were afraid of being sent to Germany to work, went into hiding.

Among the hundreds of thousands who went into hiding during the months of September and October 1943, there was a minority willing to engage in anti-fascist and all anti-German activities. In the towns the old anti-fascist organizations absorbed many of the people willing to act against the enemy. New groups were formed mainly by former officers in the Italian Armed Forces. In the rural districts a separation was soon established between members of bands and those who were simply waiting for the arrival of the Allies. Also in the rural districts, members of the former anti-fascist organizations succeeded in establishing some kind of authority over the bands, except for those bands which were formed by officers and men of the disbanded Italian Army.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF BANDS.

Fairly large bands were already in existence at the end of September. They could be found chiefly in the mountainous regions. There were 28 bands in the Maiella and the Gran Sasso. A cluster of bands could be found all along the ARA SARAPIA from RIVET to ASCOLI and for a depth of about 30 to 40 miles.

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Fairly large bands were already in existence at the end of September. They could be found chiefly in the mountainous regions. There were 2 bands in the Maiella and the Gran Sasso. A cluster of bands could be found all along the VIA Salaria from Rieti to Ascoli and for a depth of about 30 to 40 miles north of this road. Other bands were formed in the Upper Tiber Valley and surrounding districts. Bands could be found in the sparsely inhabited area of MAREMA, from CECINA to CIVITA VECCHIA. Large concentrations of bands were formed in the mountains north and east of the Arno Valley. Small groups which in some cases developed into large bands existed in the mountains between Lazio and Abruzzi, and in the hilly districts of southern Lazio (Castelli Romani, Monti Lepini). It is possible that the average strength of genuine bands in rural areas of Regions 4, 5 and 8 has varied from 8,000 to 12,000 true patriots.

It soon became customary for the bands in the rural districts to have some kind of military organisation, and they called themselves Battalions or Brigades. Battalions were bands with a strength of around 100 men. Brigades were usually bands or groups of bands with a strength which varied from about 250 men to a maximum of 800 men. Most Brigades had around 350 men.

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In the towns, the leaders of the anti-fascist organisations who had some experience of underground work, organised Gruppi d'Azione Patriottica (G.A.P.), small squads usually containing from five to twelve men. In the city of Rome there were both bands which usually had been organised by officers of the Italian Army and "gangs". It is possible that in the city of Rome there have been as many as 7,000 to 8,000 true patriots.

3. CENTRAL CONTROL.

While bands and gangs were being organised spontaneously in every section of Central Italy, efforts were being made to coordinate their activities and to bring them under some kind of unified control.

Before the coup-d'etat of 25 July 1943 an agreement had been reached between the six main anti-fascist political parties, and in most provincial capitals clandestine committees were formed by representatives of the six parties. After a while all the clandestine committees adopted the name of Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale (C.L.N.).

In Central Italy the Rome C.L.N. soon acquired special importance. It established a Giunta Militare, also composed of representatives of the six parties. After the armistice, the Rome Giunta Militare tried to establish contact with the provincial C.L.N.'s in Central Italy and with the bands, but on the whole the real influence of the Rome Giunta Militare on the bands outside the cities' area was negligible. The fact remained however, that most bands considered themselves subordinated to the provincial C.L.N.'s, and through them to the Giunta Militare.

Soon after the armistice, anti-German officers of the Italian Army organised in Rome, the Military Clandestine Front. An offshoot of this organisation was the Comando Bande, divided into two sections: Bande Interne and Bande Esterne. The C.B.I. was supposed to control bands inside Rome and to it were connected several military bands formed by loyal officers and men of disbanded units of the Italian Army. The C.B.E. was supposed to contact the Patriot Bands outside Rome. Only at a late stage was the C.B.E. able to establish contact with a certain number of bands in Central Italy, but, as in the case of the G.M., contact did not mean control.

Dissident political groups tried to establish their own unified Patriot Command. Their efforts had negligible results.

A number of bands had been organised spontaneously chiefly in the mountainous areas of Central Italy. Not less than two important central organisations and several smaller ones had been established in Rome, but there was little relationship between the former and the latter.

More successful were local attempts at creating cooperation between different bands. In several instances small bands got together and formed Brigades. In this way came into existence the Spartaco Brigades in Macerata Province and in Siena Province, the Garibaldi Brigades of Foligno, of the Pratomagno, of Pisa Province of Ancona Province, the Arno Brigade in the Valdarno, the Granaiol Brigade near Spoleto, etc.

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Brigades also tried to get together. There was a time for instance when several Brigades in the provinces of Macerata and Perugia were working together. Later on various Brigades in the Marche Region established cooperation and formed a Garibaldi Division. Another Division came into existence in the Arno valley. In the provinces of Siena and Grosseto, officers of the Italian armed forces brought together several bands and formed a Raggruppamento which was in contact with the C.B.E. Other Raggruppamenti were formed in northern Lazio, southern Lazio and in the area east of Lazio.

4. ARMAMENT - FOOD AND CLOTHING - POLITICS.

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The majority of the Patriots who went to the hills or the mountains of Central Italy in September and October 1943, had little or no arms. A band of more than 200 patriots on the Gran Sasso had more than 40% casualties when attacked by the Germans because of a deficiency in weapons and ammunition. The situation improved before the end of Autumn 1943, thanks to the attacks made against barracks of the Fascist Militia and the Carabinieri and thanks also to the raids on dumps of either the Italian or the German Armies. In certain districts arms were supplied by the Allies.

The food situation for the patriots in Central Italy was altogether satisfactory. Peasants gave generously. More food was obtained by the patriots by raiding the depots organised either by Italian or German authorities. Even in the city of Rome food was obtainable for the patriots. A large organisation sprang into being for the transport of foodstuffs from the countryside to the city.

A severe winter helped in creating a serious situation as far as clothing was concerned. Shoes also were practically unobtainable.

Politics have been an important element in the life of the patriots in Central Italy. The rank and file can be considered anti-German and anti-Fascist. In each band have usually been present a few patriots with rather determined political views who tried to acquire a following in the bands.

Until the end of April a sharp distinction existed between "badogliani" and "anti-badogliani". The former were supporters of Marshall Badoglio and of the Crown. The latter were in favour of the overthrow of the Monarchy. In this second group the most active elements were the Democrats (Action Party) and the Communists. The solution of the political crisis of April 1944 improved the relations between "badogliani" and "anti-badogliani". On the other hand the cleavage between Democrats and Communists increased.

There is little doubt that the Communists have found a more favourable ground for their propaganda among patriots than either the Monarchists (mostly regular Army officers) or the action party Democrats. On the other hand it appears that in most patriot bands the Communists were a minority and that their success in establishing their leadership was mostly due to better organisation and greater spirit of initiative.

5. ALLIED SUPPORT.

It is known that soon after the armistice of September 8, 1943, contacts were established between the Allied Armies in Italy and several bands in Central Italy. The bands received arms, ammunition, and funds. Directives were given to them concerning operations to be carried out.

An important element in the relationships between the bands and the Allies was represented by the propaganda coming from Allied radio stations. The Patriots were encouraged to carry out acts of sabotage against the enemy. Certain broadcasts could be interpreted by the patriots in such a way that they expected their work to be recognised and rewarded when the areas in which they operated were liberated.

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It was something of a shock for many patriots to find, on their first contacts with Allied troops or with A.M.G. representatives, that the Allied officers with whom they came in touch knew little or nothing of patriot activities and had little or no idea of what Allied propaganda had said and promised.

/6. ACTIVITIES

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6. ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ENEMY.

In the appendix are listed a series of examples of what bands and "gangs" did in Central Italy during the period of enemy occupation. It is impossible yet to give a complete record of patriot activities in Central Italy and it will be some time before all facts are collected and verified. It is impossible yet to say how many Germans and Fascists have been killed by the patriots, or how many trucks or railway were destroyed. By summing up what the bands did in various areas, the total is far from negligible.

Patriot activities in Central Italy can be summarized as follows:

- (a) Killing of Fascists and of Germans.
- (b) Sabotage against means of communications.
- (c) Attacks in the outlying districts against small groups of Fascists, of Carabinieri and of Germans.
- (d) Raids on food and petrol dumps.
- (e) Supplying information valuable to the Allied war effort.

A German map shows the areas in which it was not advisable for Germans to travel unless they were in fairly large numbers. It is an indication of the seriousness of the problem created by the patriots to the enemy troops. It appears that the Germans usually believed the patriots to be more numerous, better organized and better armed than they really were.

Considerable hardships were endured by the patriots during the months of enemy occupation. Their losses at times have been fairly high. The number of people shot by the Germans in Rome alone is probably between 1000 and 1500. Everywhere in Central Italy bands suffered losses. One Garibaldi Brigade in Umbria is reported to have had about 60 patriots killed, out of a total strength of less than 500. A group of bands in the Province of Grosseto suffered the loss of 43 patriots killed. A Spartaco Brigade in Siena Province is reported to have suffered 75 casualties out of a strength of less than 600 men. An Army band lost in one engagement 18 killed at Capranica. In another engagement at Colle Croce a C.L.N. band lost 25 patriots killed while 7 more were killed in minor skirmishes, the enemy suffering 22 casualties. In one day at Montemurro the patriots lost 16 killed.

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22 August 1944.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

APPENDIX

Patriot Activities in Central Italy.

There follow now a few examples of what the patriots did in Central Italy. The list is by no means comprehensive but from the few examples given an idea can be gained of the kind of acts the patriots were performing throughout the whole of Central Italy.

R O M E =

12th Sept. '43 - During the curfew hours, in the Prenestina zone isolated Germans were attacked by an Action Party Squad of Tor Sapienza armed with revolvers and 5 Germans were killed. In reprisal the Germans shot 10 Italians.

Sept. '43 - The leader of the "Filippino" band established in Rome a W/T clandestine information service in favour of the Allied force. On Sept. 15th 1943 a wireless transmitter was carried from the Contrada la Storta to Rome by FILIPPO and other helpers on a small cart laden with vegetables in order to elude the strict control of the Nazi-fascists on all road approaches to Rome.

Sept. 20-22nd '43 - Acts of sabotage were carried out by the "Garibaldino" Group at the Garage "Stella d'Italia", Via Pompeo Magno which was being used as a repair shop. 30 Jeeps (North-African booty) were rendered unusable by breaking of axles and destroying of parts and tyres.

The electrical and telephone installations were damaged by the patriots of the group "Garibaldino".

Early Sept. '43 - Two fascists were wounded in a skirmish against fascists at ALPINO. An attack was made against Germans and paratroopers in vicinity of MONTE MARIO. Two Germans and one paratrooper were killed. (Group "Garibaldino").

28th Oct. '43 - Squads of the Action Party attacked a militia garriesci (Piazza Ungherie) at night and wounded some militia-men.

6th Nov. '43 - At night at Via Regina Elena a squad of Action Party, with an explosive grenade, sabotaged a German garage. One person was killed. Three vehicles and a considerable amount of material were damaged.

12th Nov. '43 - A mixed group

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The electrical and telephone installations were also damaged by the Patriots of the group "Garibaldino".

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6th Nov. '43 - At night at Via Regina Elena a squad of Action Party, with an explosive grenade, sabotaged a German garage. One person was killed. Three vehicles and a considerable amount of material were damaged.

12th Nov. '43 - A mixed group of Action Party and Communist Party men, at night, detached a wagon from a German train loaded with ammunition and incendiary bombs at the Prenestina Station. Part of the material was destroyed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

27th Nov. '43 - A squad of the Action Party at the Prenestina Station at night attacked a train loaded with ammunition and fuel. Five wagons with their loads were destroyed.

28th Nov. '43 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party executed at 2030 hours in Via Megella a fascist consul called MUSSO (sic) killing him with revolver shots.

9th Dec. '43 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party killed a German of the S.S. with revolver shots at Via Regina Elena, at 1750 hours.

19th Dec. '43 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked Hotel Flora, a German H.Q., with grenades. This occurred at 1805 hours. 14 Nazi-fascists were killed and 2 trucks were damaged.

16th Jan. '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party sabotaged a German garage with a bomb at Via San Nicolò da Tolentino at 1750 hours. 5 German trucks were damaged.

January '44 - Sabotage squads were formed by the "Filippo" band. They scattered thousands of nails on the Cassia and Flaminia highways.

23rd Jan. '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked, with a bomb, German troops at the Railway Station in Piazza del Cinquecento at 1800 hours. 4 Germans were killed and 19 wounded.

23rd March '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked a German Company with hand grenades at Via Raselle at 1500 hours. 32 Nazis were killed and 71 wounded.

June '44 - Members of the Filippo band, in a Company of 80 strong, occupied FORTE MONTE MARIO, at the time of the Allied entry into Rome. They captured 25 German soldiers, a tank and various arms and ammunition. Another band occupied the Military Hospital Baldi and saved all medical equipment, uniforms and provisions left behind by the Germans.

Sept. '43 - June '44 - From the very first days of Nazi occupation of Italy, the Action Party was very active in the production of false identity documents and their distribution to Partisans in the whole of Italy. False documents in circulation included the following:

1. Papers stating unfitness for military service;
2. Papers stating membership of the Fascist Republican Forces;
3. Papers stating absence from labour service of the Ispetto-
reto Fascista Repubblicano;
4. Ausweis of the Todt organisation;

the orders of the German High Command and

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19th Dec. '42 = G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked Hotel Flores, a German H.Q., with grenades. This occurred at 1805 hours. 14 Nazi-fascists were killed and 2 trucks were damaged.

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June '44 - Members of the Pillippo band, in a Company of 80 strong, occupied TORRE MONTE MARIO, at the time of the Allied entry into Rome. They captured 25 German soldiers, a tank and various arms and ammunition. Another band occupied the Military Hospital Belci and saved all medical equipment, uniforms and provisions left behind by the Germans.

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4. Ausweise of the Front organisation;
5. By falsifying the orders of the German High Command and Embassy the Action Party was able to sequester vehicles and food supplies which, with false permits, were sent through German control points to patriots in the hills.

LEA 3 I O (not including Rome).

On September 18, 1943 the Sardinian band (Italian Army) engaged the enemy near Caprenica, inflicting about 50 casualties. Lighten Patriots were killed.

In October 1943, Patriots of the bands near TURRITA TIBERINA made two successful attacks against trains carrying ammunition and petrol. Three attacks were made against the railway bridge on the GALATINA river.

6th. Dec. '43 - A C.I.N. band using a machine gun, and sabotaging the road with a mine and nails killed 2 German officers, wounded another and destroyed a vehicle on the Via Appia.

20 Dec. '43 - Two actions were engaged in on the principal railway lines of Rome-Cassino and Rome-Formia by a C.I.N. band. Two trains were blown up - one carrying troops and one loaded with war material and fuel. On the Rome-Formia line there were 400 dead and many wounded. On the Rome-Cassino line the goods vans loaded with war material and fuel were completely destroyed together with 2 engines. The German personnel on the train were all killed.

At the end of January, the Patriot band at TURRITA TIBERINA, in order to help the Allied landing at Anzio, mined several roads near the Tiber river.

Also at the end of January, the bands of GENZANO attacked small units in the German rear in an effort to help the Allied troops at Anzio. They met with strong resistance and suffered severe casualties.

In March '44 a Fascist who had denounced an escaped Allied P.O.W. was killed at Monte Celio by members of the Partisan Brigade. Members of the same Brigade sabotaged effectively German telephone lines at SETTECAMINI, MONTE CELIO, GUTRONIA, PONTE LUCANO, MONTE LIBRETTI.

Several bands in MIOCIARIA (Prov. of FROSINONE) were active in cutting wires and putting nails on roads during the period October 1943 - May 1944. In the period of the enemy withdrawal, they engaged effectively small German units, which lost 43 killed and 179 prisoners. The bands lost ten Patriots killed.

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19th May '44 - At Rustica Vecchia a band connected with the C.B.E. threw hand grenades at a truck. 6 Germans were killed and truck immobilized.

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M A R C H E -

G.A.P. of FERMO in Sept. '43 obtained by force from the Fascists 25 rifles, 3 Breda machine guns, 2 cases of hand grenades and 13 cases of ammunition.

Oct. '43 - The C.L.N. group of MONTE NERO - CINGOLI fought a Nazi-fascist force. They killed 1 German, captured 3 and also a vehicle.

Nov. Dec. '43 - The Niccolò di Monastero Group had a clash with Nazi-fascists at S. GINESIO. Eight of the enemy were killed. The Patriots lost one killed.

March '44 - The a/m group began a cleaning up operation against the Nazi-fascists. In heavy fighting the enemy lost several killed and wounded. The Patriots had 2 killed and several wounded.

Nazi-fascist reaction to the activities of the C.L.N. bands in the province of ASCOLI during the early months of '44 was very strong. They employed strong forces against the Patriots and on the 18th March '44 16 Patriots were killed at MONTENO NACO in severe fighting.

In April '44 a C.L.N. band captured and shot near MONTEFOMO a German Captain of the Intelligence Service who had worked his way into the band as well as four other spies captured in the RIVITTOLO-MONTENONACO area.

May '44 - The AVENALE di CINGOLI group attacked a Fascist H.Q. at SARNANO. The town was finally captured by the Patriots. The Patriots had 2 men killed.

On May 18, 1944, a force of about 300 Italian S.S. attacked the Patriots in the area of MONASTERO. The enemy was reported to have left behind nearly 40 dead and wounded.

In June '44 C.L.N. bands attacked the enemy in retreat. There was fighting along the ASCOLI-AMANDOLA-MACERATA road - in the areas at MONTE CALIO - ARQUATA - ACQUASANTA - CASTIGLIONE - ORTIDA. These attacks delayed the enemy's movements and allowed the Patriots to retrieve a large quantity of cattle. In the hills the Germans were prevented from looting and requisitioning.

On June 13th '44 a G.A.P. attacked a group of Republican Guards who had halted in the middle of the square at FERMO. They killed one officer and wounded 3 others. The G.A.P. had 4 men wounded.

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with Nazi-fascists at S. CINESIO. Eight of the enemy were killed. The Patriots lost one killed.

March '44 - The a/m group began a cleaning up operation against the Nazi-fascists. In heavy fighting the enemy lost several killed and wounded. The Patriots had 2 killed and several wounded.

Nazi-fascist reaction to the activities of the C.L.N. bands in the province of ASCOLI during the early months of '44 was very strong. They employed strong forces against the patriots and on the 18th March '44 16 Patriots were killed at MONTEHO=NACO in severe fighting.

In April '44 a C.L.N. band captured and shot near MONTERORNO a German Captain of the Intelligence Service who had worked his way into the band as well as four other spies captured in the RIVITOLLO-MONTEMONACO area.

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U M B R I A = S A B I N A =

In October 1943, the Giuseppe Garibaldi Brigade located near Foligno attacked enemy transport. Fifteen Germans and fascists were reported killed.

In order to obtain arms, ammunition and food, the Garibaldi, Gramsci and Spartaco Lavagnini Brigades attacked barracks of the Fascist Militia and of the Carabinieri at Camerino, at Nocera Umbra (when two Carabinieri were killed), at Campello (where two agents of the Fascist Police were killed), at Matigge di Trevi.

Two Fascists were killed by members of the Spartaco Brigade on January 24.

In November 1943, members of the Spartaco Brigade took 800 quintals of wheat and distributed it to the population. In March, members of the Garibaldi Brigade took 200 quintals of wheat from the Germans.

Severe mopping-up operations were undertaken by the Germans at the end of November 1943 and in March 1944. In the course of an engagement at Colle Croce, 25 Patriots were killed, the enemy suffering eight casualties. In the course of another engagement at Bettonia six more Patriots were killed by the Germans.

A C.L.N. band at Monterotondo in Sabina, regularly, twice a week, from November 1943 to March 1944 put nails on the roads Salaria, Fomentana and Tiburtina.

The same C.L.N. band at Monterotondo attacked enemy transport on Dec. 8th (when six Germans were killed), on Dec. 18th (when five Germans were killed), on Jan. 15th 1944 (when seven Germans were killed). When the enemy was withdrawing (June 1944), the band attacked two enemy armoured cars which were captured. The Patriots lost 10 killed and 16 wounded.

A B R U Z Z I

25th Sept. '43 - The band of Bosco Martese attacked a German cleaning-up party consisting of 26 troop-carrying vehicles loaded with troops and two 82mm artillery pieces. The Germans were forced to withdraw leaving 57 killed or wounded behind. A Fiat 1100, 2 trucks loaded with mines and several cases of hand grenades were also captured.

January 1st, 1944 - Members of the band located in Perugia destroyed or damaged with hand grenades 12 enemy vehicles near Forca Caruso.

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January 1st, 1944 - Members of the band located in Poggio destroyed or damaged with hand grenades 12 enemy vehicles near Foca Caruso.

February 7th. - Members of the band located in Pescina killed an enemy D/R at Km. 140 on Via Tiburtina.

11th March '44 - 400 Germans attacked the Patriots at UNITO and in the surrounding hills. The battle lasted 3 hours. The Patriots were obliged to retreat. 36 Patriots were killed but the Germans had 23 casualties.

A small band in the Collepardo area carried out cutting of telephone wires and sabotaging of petrol dumps during the Winter and the Spring.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 6 -

The Marsica Band in eight months of partisan struggle lost 15 dead and 12 wounded. They have to their credit: - 45 Germans and Fascists killed and wounded, 41 trucks destroyed or damaged, 40 railway wagons sabotaged, 3 armoured cars rendered unserviceable, 15 cases of ammunition and 70 weapons of various kinds captured.

T U S C A N Y (Area liberated at 15th August).

During January and February 1944, members of the C.L.N. Brigade Spartaco Lavagnini engaged the enemy at MUR=LO and MONTE CUCIO. The Patriots had severe losses but they are reported to have killed or wounded 30 Fascists. The Boceheggiano mines were damaged in March.

During the Winter and Spring, C.A.P. of CHIUSI tried to halt trains at that important railway centre.

A Fascist leader was killed at ORTIGNANO on March 8th by members of a Garibaldi Battalion. A few days later the same battalion attacked the Carabineers of Talla and obtained a considerable quantity of hand grenades. Another group of Carabineers was attacked at Chiusi della Verne. Another Fascist was killed at BIBBINA. Four Germans were killed on March 23rd and six more on April 2nd. The same Battalion is reported to have engaged actively the enemy during their withdrawal (Part of the area where the Battalion operated had not been liberated by August 15th).

During night of April 15th, Patriots from SINADUN=GA cut enemy telephone wires. On May 25th other Patriots attacked an enemy vehicle and killed two Germans.

The Distaccamento Riva (C.B.E.) reports that in May they were able to halt, for several hours, 40 enemy vehicles near San Quirico d'Orcia. A Fascist was shot by them at Montalcino on June 3rd.

At end of June, 1944, Patriots demolished two road bridges near Castiglione.

The C.L.N. Brigade Spartaco Lavagnini, operating in Siena Province, reports to have had the following losses in engagements with the enemy: 42 Patriots killed, 33 wounded. The same Brigade also reports that on June 3rd it inflicted 42 casualties on the enemy and 49 casualties on

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The 3rd Garibaldi Brigade is reported to have collaborated wholeheartedly with the Allies. Patriots were sent through the lines to carry useful information on military activities of the enemy and location of mined areas. Losses of this formation were considerable, the total in dead, wounded and prisoners amounting to well over 150 men.

RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
P.C. & M.G. Section
Patriots Branch
APO 394

Ref/46/14/EAT.

22 August 1944.

Speech made by Colonel C.D. MC CARTHY Patriots Branch
at Regional Commissioner's Conference 22 Aug. 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.2 and 3.3 or (a)
16-1-1988, Rule 1.4

1. Patriot Bands many of which are large and highly organized bodies have been created in various centres of German occupied territory in Italy and have received considerable encouragement and active help and instructions from the Allied Command. It is therefore clearly one of our chief tasks to look after the individual members of these bands when their fighting is over and in this connection it has been laid down by A.A.I. that bands must not accompany the Allies forward out of their own areas.

The Patriots Branch of A.U.C. was formed early in July as a result of an instruction from A.A.I. and is responsible for all dealings with Resistance Groups as seen as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops.

2. In all dealings care is taken to distinguish between bogus Patriots and genuine patriots who are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important military information to the benefit of the Allied War effort. It must be remembered that these genuine patriots have in very many cases lived extremely precarious lives, suffered considerable casualties and been a very great nuisance to the enemy. Let us not forget that they have been living under the black cloud of torture and death not only for themselves but also for their families. I will read you the text of a German Order signed for the Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces and found in the SUBBIANO area in mid-July:

ONE. Whoever is found in possession of arms or explosives and does not report them to the nearest German Headquarters WILL BE SHOT.

TWO. Whoever gives shelter to bandits, protects them or gives them clothing, food or arms..... WILL BE SHOT.

THREE. If it is found that anyone knows a group of rebels or even a single rebel without having reported them to the nearest Headquarters, he..... WILL BE SHOT.

FOUR. Whoever gives information to the enemy or to the bandits on the location of German Headquarters or military dumps... WILL BE SHOT.

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Declassified by Colonel C.D. McQuinn Patriots Branch
at National Commissioner's Conference 22 Aug. 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, SEC. 2E1 AND 5D1 OF (C)
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NARS, FILE

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FOUR. Whoever gives information to the enemy or to the bandits on the location of German Headquarters or Military Hubs.. WILL BE SHOT.

FIVE. Any village where it can be proved that there are bandits or where attacks against German or Italian soldiers have been made, or where acts of sabotage intended to damage or destroy warlike stores, have taken place.... WILL BE BURNED TO THE GROUND. However, male inhabitants of the village over 18 years old... WILL BE SHOT. Women and girls will be interned in labour camps.

There is no doubt that many Patriots have acted with extreme bravery and courage and a note of their activities has been prepared and is available to those who would like to read it.

/3. Many

- 2 -

3. Many questions have been asked of the political tendencies of patriot bands. After speaking to a large number of patriots in various corners of the country I personally feel that in the great majority of cases these men have been fighting first to defeat the Germans, second to destroy Fascism and third in the case of some of them, to build up a new Italy.

Most of them have at this stage of the war very little idea of the aims and ambitions of the six political parties in Italy but they are keenly alive to the fact that something drastic must be done about politics in the very near future and being mostly young and active men they are keenly susceptible to influence and require a lead from the Italian Government. Some of them will undoubtedly be of importance in the new Italy and they are a great responsibility for us all.

4. Plans have been drawn up for dealing with patriots. A message in poster form agreed by General Alexander has been distributed in forward areas, a form of certificate of merit has been approved and certificates have been sent to Regions and to the 5 and 3 Armies for distribution. Although many patriots are used for a short while by the Army in their own area as guides and patrols and for reconnaissance work, the intention generally is to direct nearly all of them into civil life. About 50% return to their own homes and occupation locally. Of the remainder some will be used for police duties or as drivers, others will be employed on engineering work, and on mine clearance; and arrangements have been made for recruiting and passing back volunteers for service in the Italian Army and Air Force. Communal committees are being set up to assist Provincial Commissioners in this work, and to help weed out bogus applicants among the genuine patriots. The problems of collecting and disposing of the patriots' arms is in hand. The arms will be used for future operations as directed by A.A.I.

5. Reports are being received from Patriot Representatives and from the leaders of the Patriot bands. Information from these reports is extracted and passed on when relevant, for use by P.R.O., P.W.D. and by the press. Italian newspapers are closely scrutinized. Information is being collected about conditions in enemy occupied territory in order that suitable plans can be made for handling patriot problems in that territory when it has been liberated.

6. Liaison is maintained with the Italian Ministry of War through an Italian senior officer who is responsible for coordinating the work of the two groups which are recognized - the G.I.A. Group and the Military Centre Group.

7. Directives have been issued as required in agreement with A.A.I. and other authorities. It is fair to say that the task of ensuring that these directives are acted upon by Allied officers concerned and by the leaders of the patriot bands is well in hand. The broad political aspect of the patriot problem has been borne constantly in mind, and very close liaison is being maintained with those Allied officers who are concerned with the political future in Italy.

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8. The patriot question is very much in the news at present and I am bombarded with questions about what we are likely to find on the other side of the line. We have a fairly good idea and I am endeavouring to furnish this information when it is essential to do so. At the same time I am endeavouring to see that those on the other side of the line are properly informed about what is going on this side of the line. I would like in conclusion to take this opportunity to thank the press, P.R.O. and P.W.B. for the active cooperation given in recent weeks and for the manner in which publicity has been treated. The power of the press is tremendous in this present era of the patriot movement; and we must remember that the Germans are spreading propaganda against us as energetically as they can so that it is necessary for us to encourage our patriots as much as we can. I am trying to help in this firstly by ensuring that the proper arrangements are made for their welcome on this side of the line and secondly by taking care that they shall be informed immediately what that welcome will be.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

CURRENT PROBLEMS

(A) PROBLEMS FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

1. Institution of a Patriot Commission for Italy.
2. Patriot Committee for Rome.
3. Nomination of truly representative Patriot Representatives.
4. Keeping a check on names and performances of genuine Patriots and seeing that they have employment.
5. Providing Patriot Branch with information.
6. Collect money for Patriot needs, such as pay and salary for Patriot Representatives, compensations for Patriots and provision of food, clothing and cigarettes to fighting Patriots pending their employment.
7. Provide transport and drivers for Patriot Representatives.

(B) PROBLEMS FOR A.M.G. OF ARMIES.

The whole brunt of the patriot problem falls on the Armies. The following will be helpful for handling patriot problems behind the Army areas.

1. Collection of stories for propaganda purposes and we should like to send Press Representatives up to witness the distribution of certificates.
2. Collecting and forwarding of reports from Patriot Representatives and Band Leaders.
3. A short summarised weekly report of patriot activities.

(C) PROBLEMS FOR REGIONS (in addition to some or all the A.M.G. problems).

These are connected with the final winding up of the patriots in each Region.

- 1.. Training of an Allied officer, whole or part time, to look after patriot problems in each Region.

Formation of an Italian Patriot Committee and prodding of it to

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1. Training of an Allied officer, whole or part time, to look after patriot problems in each Region.
2. Formation of an Italian Patriot Committee and prodding of it to see that it functions.

(D) PROBLEMS FOR INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Information to AMG of Armies and Regions concerning composition of forward bands etc.
2. Information regarding Po flooding, sea flooding and pump station preservation.
3. Information regarding Prefects and prominent men in present occupied area.

/s/ A. Stoddart

- 2 -

4. Statement on damage to be avoided - this may need a special committee of Italians.
5. Collect reports weekly from Patriot Representatives and Band Leaders (through Armies and Regions) and examine and pass to Italian Government for their need.

(E) PROBLEMS FOR PROPAGANDA SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Collect news from all Regions all sources. Collect good stories and statistical data.
2. Produce anti-Bocho and anti-Fascist propaganda.
3. Give news to patriots of what is happening through P.R.O., P.W.B., B.B.O. broadcasts to civilians, leaflets and press.

(F) PROBLEMS FOR H.Q. SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Look after problem of returning volunteers.
2. Investigate question of providing patriots with food, cigarettes, clothes and boots.
3. Keep up to date lists of Italian officers for special jobs.

22 August 1944.

✓
Paraphrase of Telegram Received
from American Legation, Bern, dated
August 7, 1944.

No. 249. Confidential.

For Foreign Affairs from Magistrati dated July 31.

The resistance movement contacts, particularly in Piedmont, are becoming more frequent and regular. Especially in Novara and Vercelli, it appears that German and Neo-Fascist repressive measures under the direction of Marshal Graziani have caused some fights. Continuous aid of people enable the Partisans to find protection and defence in the mountains where plans for renewed offensive operations are prepared.

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DRAFT

TOP SECRET

1. OBJECT

To find a formula for absorbing and controlling "Patrioti" as they are overrun by our advance.

2. FACTORS

(a) The size of the "patrioti" movement is uncertain but it probably greatly exceeds 100,000 men.

Deduction: The formula will have to be one which is fully elastic.

(b) The Southernmost areas that have been intensively developed by S.O.E. and C.S.S. are Ancona-Florence-Spezia.

Deduction: Since these places have not yet fallen to our advance, we have as yet no true indication, other than analogy, of how great a problem "patrioti" may prove.

(c) Our propaganda, both overt and clandestine, has led the patriots to believe that we rate their efforts very highly, and count on them physically to prove their love for Italy. General Alexander's name has been closely coupled with these appeals.

Deduction: If, when an area is liberated, due attention and consideration is not given to patrioti, who in many cases will have risked their lives for the Allied cause, a disgruntled, and, owing to their past resort to force, dangerous minority will be brought into being that is likely to be anti-Allied, and who are likely to spread the news North, with harmful results on patriot activity.

(b). The Southernmost areas that have been intensively developed by S.O.E. and O.S.S. are Ancora-Florence-Spezia.

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(d) Owing to the unsettled outlook in National politics, and the Italians' natural predilection for political assassination, there is known to be a strong probability that many patrioti, who are now using their arms against the Germans, look on them as constituting a useful political asset for the future.

Deduction: The formula must produce an honourable and
coerent reason for arms being handed in.

(e) The Italian political scene is notable for the number of parties which exist, and the small respect they individually command. "Patrioti" bands, however, are quite normally composed of mixed political elements.

Deduction: The formula must be non-political, and must perpetuate the cooperation that now exists in the name of Italy (or possibly liberty).

(f) There is a manpower ceiling as regards the active part of the Italian army which is controlled by the Italian the/Chief of Staff. If patrioti were called to the colours, it could only be to fight, since there is otherwise no apparent advantage in belonging to the Italian army.

Deduction: The formula must be outside the ordinary military machine; since the need for a solution is urgent and it would not be reasonable to approach the Italian Chief of Staff with a proposal for increasing the fighting Italian Army to an indefinite size (see (a) above) and expect anything but a flat, though delayed, refusal.

(g) It is now desired to develop Italian agriculture to the maximum extent.

Deduction: The formula must retain men on the land and provide them with an additional motive for intensive cultivation.

(h) Patrioti so far encountered largely consist of countrymen. This will not prove to be the case in the

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(h) Patrioti so far encountered largely consist of countrymen. This will not prove to be the case in the more industrial North.

Deduction: The formula must be equally applicable to both town and countrymen.

(i) While the Italian is susceptible to flattery, his recent military experiences are likely to have proved that 'a loud regimental band does not win a battle'.

Deduction: The formula must therefore, while dignifying

those who have played an active part, also offer some definite material reward, however slight.

3. COURSES

(a) To let nature take its course and trust in

A.M.G.

(b) To initiate and sustain a propaganda drive for the return of weapons, intensive agriculture etc. but make no further use of existing patrioti organisations.

(c) To take a positive decision and cause the Italian Government to form a "Legion of Free Italy" with honours and limited benefits, which will control the handing in of arms, and contribute to the political welfare of the country. Allied influence in the Italian Government's action to be explicit.

4. ARGUMENT

(a) It would appear that Britain and the U.S. are equally interested in:

i. Retaining moral prestige in Italy after the war.

ii. Avoiding an intensive Communist movement in Italy.

(b) If this be so, then they must on the one hand try to reward those who cooperated with them by ensuring

that, when the Allies finally leave Italy, not only will the "patrioti" have some benefit remaining, but also that

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(c) Neither 'laissez faire' nor the cynical betrayal of an implied obligation are worthy policies consciously to be accepted by Britain and the U.S.

5. RECOMMENDATION

That course (c) or some variation thereof be adopted.

6. FACTORS AFFECTING RECOMMENDED COURSE

(a) The Allied Governments obviously do not wish to commit themselves to any post war interest in an Italian semi-political institution.

Deduction: The Legion must be strictly non-political and it should have an allied 'cachet', but derive its benefits from the Italian Government under charter.

(b) Benefits can be of the following natures:

- i. Honourable
- ii. Financial
- iii. Sociological

Deduction: i. costs nothing and can therefore be given.
ii. is necessarily a matter for the Italian Government.
iii. which includes health, education and housing might in part be feasible.

(c) It is presumably intended to restrict very severely after the war the Italian army.

Deduction: Army medical and technical services which are at present existent might, on demobilisation of the fighting forces, be drafted to another purpose.

7. THE PLAN

2672

(a) 'The League of Free Italy' is formed under the Presidency of General Bencivenga, or some other accepted

Italian semi-political institution.

Deduction: The Legion must be strictly non-political and it should have an allied 'cachet', but derive its benefits from the Italian Government under charter.

(b) Benefits can be of the following natures:

- i. Honourable
- ii. Financial
- iii. Sociological

Deduction: i. costs nothing and can therefore be given.
ii. is necessarily a matter for the Italian Government.
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Deduction: Army medical and technical services which are at present existent might, on demobilisation of the fighting forces, be drafted to another purpose.

7. THE PLAN

2672

(a) 'The League of Free Italy' is formed under the Presidency of General Bencivenga, or some other accepted leader of Resistance, with a Governing body on which all leading political parties are, by constitution, represented.

(b) The Governing body shall decide the location of partisan groups and establish local committees who shall determine those qualified for membership..

(c) When a group is approved, it shall receive a letter, signed by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill

v. Local all-party committee to be set up at once to approve names.

(a) While the plan, as stated, is obvious, ²⁸⁷ it is obvious that the

political cooperation that took place in war and continue that cooperation in peace (in fact an Italian Lodge of Buffaloes).

ii. The official title of ? (Patrioti, Combattori or whatever seems appropriate in Italian).

iii. The right to extra and free medical benefits for patrioti members of their families, subject to limitations to be defined.

(It might be possible to link this up with the medical service. of the Carabinieri, who are omnipresent.)

iv. Membership can only be achieved by the production and surrender of arms, or, failing this, by well supported evidence that the applicant did actually operate against the enemy by some other means.

v. Local all-party committee to be set up at once to approve names.

8. COMMENT

(a) While the plan, as stated, is obvious²⁶⁷ indeed, it nevertheless embraces the really important points, namely, the surrender of arms, political fusion and the prestige of the Allies.

(b) The public formation of such a league would have an excellent effect on patrioti in Northern Italy and would show them that the Allies meant business, and at the same time proposed to be loyal to their supporters.

(c) The potential political implications are considerable and appear likely only to be beneficial.

D R A F T

SUBJECT: General Instruction on the Administration of

Patriots in Occupied Italy.

References (1) A.A.I. letter No. 40/0(Cps) of 20 June 44

(2) Minutes of meeting held in Rome on 3 July 44.

Definition of Patriots.

1. For the purpose of this instruction Patriots may be of any nationality and are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important military information.

Patriot Poster signed by General Alexander.

2. 20,000 have already been sent to 5 Army and 30,000 to 8 Army.

3. They should be put up in forward areas as soon as these are liberated.

4. The contents of the poster will also be broadcast locally by P.W.B. and will be put in Italian newspapers.

5. Particular care should be taken that Patriot bands see this poster as soon as possible.

Issue of Patriot Certificates.

6. Certificates (of merit) will only be issued to individuals but in special cases letters of thanks by Corps Commanders or other senior commanders may be sent to 2889 or 2890 who have actively aided the Allied cause. Certificates

822

Definition of Patriots.

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Issue of Patriot Certificates.

6. Certificates (of merit) will only be issued to individuals but in special cases letters of thanks by Corps Commanders or other senior commanders may be sent to 2884 or villages who have actively aided the Allied cause. Certificates will be endorsed by a recognised Patriot leader and by an Allied officer who will probably be the C.A.O. If for any reason a Patriot leader wishes to remain anonymous his signature should be replaced by a pseudonym or signed by a Patriot representative. Posthumous certificates will be awarded to next of kin.

1 Special Invoice

115 Via Bernabò
ORLANDI

M. M. 23/

Duchessa
Colonna di
Cesaro & her
daughter Mita
Alberto Corti
la croce Alice
Bertasi

7. Care must be taken not to issue certificates to bogus Patriots who, for instance, only became Patriots after their area was liberated. On the other hand C.A.O.'s. may issue certificates to borderline cases at their discretion.
8. It is proposed to number these certificates by blocks and issue them at the same time as this instruction to A.M.O., Armies and to Regions.
9. There must inevitably be a considerable backlog in the issue of some certificates which will therefore be issued by Regions after A.M.O. spearhead C.A.O.'s. have left.
10. Also all Regions will issue certificates, if properly vouched for by Patriot leaders, in respect of areas liberated within the last few months. Regional Commissioners should give this matter very early attention and will where necessary set up special commissions to deal with outstanding problems e.g. in the Rome area.

Patriot Representatives for Corps Areas.

11. These Patriot Representatives are Italian and belong to the Military Central Italy Group controlled by Col. Bernabè, and to the Comitato Liberazione Nazionale controlled by Mr. Bauer who has done much valuable work as the Chief of the Military Section of the C.L.N.
12. Patriot representatives are in no way political.
13. Their main duties are first to help the spearhead C.A.O.'s. in the identification of leaders of Patriot bands, second to help to select suitable Patriots.

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13. Their main duties are first to help the spearhead C.A.O.'s in the identification of leaders of Patriot bands, second to help to select suitable Patriots out of the bands to work on the C.A.O.'s staff and third to assist ²⁰⁸³ in dealing with all their Patriot problems.

14. A total of ten have been sent up with drivers to A.A.O. at 5 and 8 Armies for distribution to Corps areas. Four are for 5 Army and six for 8 Army of whom two are for the

/Atlantic

1202

785016

Adriatic Coast Further representatives can be provided, on demand, for A.M.G. Areas or for Regions.

15. Patriot representatives are paid by their own organisation. They should be housed by A.M.G.

16. D.Q.M.G.(A.M.G.) is sending instructions to armies that these representatives will be put on the A.M.G. ration strength and will draw petrol for their cars.

17. The transport position is tight but sanction has been obtained that these representatives should have cars which may be requisitioned locally for this purpose.

Surrender of Arms. (Including Hand Grenades and Bombs).

18. The surrender must be to C.A.O's. and Allied officers who should if practicable sign the receipt, otherwise Patriot leaders should give individual receipts from C.A.O's. or Allied officers.

19. After much consideration it has been decided that all Patriots and all others should be given one reason only for handing in their arms and that this should be that the law requires them to do so.

20. C.A.O's. may employ Carabinieri or others for receiving and guarding the surrendered arms.

21. Care must be taken with the storage of grenades and bombs which should be handed in to Ordnance as soon as possible.

22. C.A.O's. have discretion to fix the date

28/1/42

1203

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20. C.A.O.'s. may employ Carabiniers or others for receiving and guarding the surrendered arms.

21. Cars must be taken with the storage of grenades and bombs which should be handed in to Ordnance as soon as possible.

22. C.A.O.'s. have discretion to fix the date ^{28.8.44} arms should be handed in but this should be as early as possible.

23. Lists of arms handed in by Patriots and eventually handed over to No. 1 Special Forces must be turned in to Patriot Branch A.C.C.

24. C.A.O.'s. have permission to reissue arms to temporary

/ policeman

police men who may in fact be drawn out of patriot bands.

25. Surrendered arms will as far as possible be moved to central points such as Perugia whence they will be taken over by No. 1 Special Force and returned to South Italy where they will in fact be used for dropping by parachute. They are urgently required for this purpose. A.A.G. at Armaes should notify this Headquarters at what central points they can collect arms. Grenades and bombs need not be so collected.

26. When spearhead C.A.G.'s move on they must notify the AMG/ACC officer to whom they hand over what quantity of arms they have collected and where they are stored.

27. A short report must also be sent by A.A.G. Armaes at the end of each month to give a picture of the position as far as it is known or guessed in order that this H.Q. may have an idea what arms are still hidden, with any recommendations for dealing with the problem.

Re-employment of Patriots.

28. It is decided that AMG/ACC will take over the handling of Patriot bands behind the Allied lines.

29. Once behind the Allied lines their military function ceases.

30. It must be remembered that C.L.E. Committees have no legal status as soon as A.A.G. have taken control.

31. Patriot resistance groups have no political function and they must conform to the requirements of Allied military

Grenades and bombs need not be so collected.

26. When spearhead C.A.O.'s move on they must notify the AAG/ACC officer in whom they hand over what quantity of arms they have collected and where they are stored.

27. A short report must also be sent by A.A.O. Armies at the end of each month to give a picture of the position as far as it is known or guessed in order that this H.Q. may have an idea what arms are still hidden, with any recommendations for dealing with the problem.

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29. Once behind the Allied lines their military function ceases.

30. It must be remembered that C.I.N. Committees have no legal status as soon as A.A.O. have taken control.

31. Patriot resistance groups have no political function and they must conform to the requirements of Allied Military government. ²⁶⁸⁸

32. Patriot leaders are to prepare nominal rolls of their groups and reports on their operations previous to the Allied occupation of the Communes from which they were operating.

33. It is extremely important that while order is to be maintained and arms have to be surrendered, Patriots should be treated with great tact and sympathy in order to avoid arising antagonism and discouragement which would become known and have an adverse effect upon patriots still operating against the enemy. Leaders of Patriot groups should be thanked by A.M.E. officers, for the assistance which they have rendered to the allies, and told to convey to their groups the allied appreciation of their efforts. Peremptory orders about handing in arms are a particular source of aggravation and should be avoided.

34. Patriot Representatives should enter new areas with C.A.O's., set up a special Patriot office and produce for the C.A.O. a complete list as soon as possible - but most of the work should be completed within five days - to show names of Patriots entitled to certificates and proposals for their re-employment.

35. Yugoslavs are urgently required back in their country to fight and special arrangements should be made to send them back south quickly through the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission or the Italian Refugee Branch.

36. Special Committees of Italians should be set up by the C.A.O's. in Communes to organise re-employment and dispersal of Patriots on the lines set out in the attached appendix.

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34. Patriot representatives should enter now areas with C.A.O.'s. set up a special Patriot office and produce for the C.A.O. a complete list as soon as possible - but most of the work should be completed within five days - to show names of Patriots entitled to certificates and proposals for their re-employment.

35. Yugoslavs are urgently required back in their country to fight and special arrangements should be made to send them back south quickly through the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission or the Italian Refugee Branch.

36. Special committees of Italians should be set up by the C.A.O.'s. in Communes to organise re-employment and dispersal of Patriots on the lines set out in the attached appendix.

2685

C.D. Mc Carthy.
Patriot Branch.
R.C. & M.I. Section.
for Executive Commissioner.

Regarding Formation of Committees

under para 5 of attached Instructions

● ● ● ● ● ● ●

and

- (i) The Committee ~~should~~ be formed and exist at Commune level only in the first instance. In view of lack of transport and communications, and the disorganization caused by war conditions it would be impossible to expect all patriots spread over a considerable area to make their way to Provincial HQ.

- (ii) The Committee will be constituted as follows: -
 Sindaco (or Commissario Prefettizio) to preside
 2 members of the Giunta Comunale if formed as such or otherwise 2 well-known and respected local residents.
 4 or more representatives chosen by and from the Patriots.
 (The above numbers particularly in regard to the Patriots need not be firm. Discretion is permitted but in principle the number should be kept small and "wisely".)

- (iii) Consistency of policy, co-ordination of the efforts of the Council Committees and means of communication from AIG/ACC HQ shall be effected at Provincial level by and through the Prefect acting on the advice and under the supervision of the Provincial Commissioner.

2. The function and purpose of the Committee is as follows. They will firstly determine whether persons calling themselves patriots are in fact patriots as defined in the Instructions. After sifting for this purpose, the bogus patriots will be ignored. The genuine patriots will be classified and dealt with in the following manner: -

- (2) Local absorption into their ordinary ways of life and means of livelihood and employment (particularly agricultural and harvesting) which may still exist in the local area. They will be dealt with as any other residents of the locality who had remained there. This process will apply both to patriots whose home is in the particular area and to non-residents if the latter so wish.

- (ii) Non-residents who do not want to stay in the area. It is believed that this class will be very small in number. They will return to their homes. Their return will be arranged locally by the C.A.O to Provincial HQ. thence by the Provincial Commissioner.
- (A simple procedure would be for a pass entitling a patriot to travel to his home to be issued by the Committee and countersigned by the C.A.O.)

- (iii) Those who want to join the Army immediately (as opposed to waiting for "call up" if and when liable) will be conveyed to Provincial HQ and thence under Provincial arrangements to such points as may be determined by the Allied/Italian Military authorities. To enable this to be done, the Army Sub-Commission⁶ must keep Regional Commissioners 26.8.40's informed as to the places⁶ which such persons are to be conveyed to and any

1. (1) The Committee/successor will be formed and exist at Commune level only in the first instance. In view of lack of transport and communications, and the disorganization caused by war conditions it would be impossible to expect all patriots spread over a considerable area to make their way to Provincial HQ.

(ii) The Committee will be constituted as follows: -
 Sindaco (or Commissario Prefetizio), to preside
 2 members of the Giunta Comunale if formed as such or otherwise 2 well-known and respected local residents.
 4 or more representatives chosen by and from the Patriots.
 (The above numbers particularly in regard to the patriots need not be five. Discretion is permitted but in principle the number should be kept small and "wieldy".)

(iii) Constancy of policy, co-ordination of the efforts of the Communal Committees and means of communication from AM/ACC HQ shall be effected at Provincial level by and through the Prefect acting on the advice and under the supervision of the Provincial Commissioner.

2. The function and purpose of the Committee is as follows. They will firstly determine whether persons calling themselves patriots are in fact patriots as defined in the Instructions. After sifting for this purpose, the bogus patriots will be ignored. The genuine patriots will be classified and dealt with in the following manner: -

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(A simple procedure would be for a pass entitling a patriot to travel to his home to be issued by the Committee and countersigned by the CAO.)

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(iv) Those who wish to continue to serve as Patriots and who according to the decision of the appropriate military authority are needed for the purpose. (As in (iii) it is necessary that the Committee should have sufficient information to enable them to refer such patriots to the proper quarter.)

- 2 -

(v) Jugo-Slavs who have not already been sifted and dealt with under para 36 of the Instructions will be returned through Displaced Persons and Refugee Sub-Commissions for special employment in Jugo-Slav fighting forces.

3. The Simdaco and/or his officials will keep proper records of the Committee's proceedings including the names, certificates (if any) and classification of all persons dealt with and the method and date of their disposal.

Nominal rolls and lists prepared under paras 32 and 34 of the Instructions together with any other relevant information which may be required shall be made available to the Committee.

2663

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref/30/8/PAT.

24 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Re-employment of Patriots.

TO : Distribution Overleaf.

1. This directive is issued after agreement with H.Q., A.A.I. and is for the guidance of A.M.G. officers in connection with Appendix "A" of the General Instruction for the Administration of Patriots in Military Government Territory reference 30/4/PAT dated 18 July 1944.

2. It should be used as a basis for discussion with Area Commissioners, Town Majors, Engineer or other Military units and Labour Officers who, other things being equal, should be asked to give priority for employment to genuine Patriots with certificates. C.A.O.'s should be instructed to get in touch with the nearest Labour Officers (D.A.D.L. or S.L.C.O.) as soon as possible and give them the names of suitable Patriots who can be used as civilian workers.

3. Some Patriots may be taken for special operations, some will be disposed of locally, some will move to or have to be transported to a distance for re-employment and some foreigners e.g. Yugoslavs will be despatched through the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission. There will, however, remain a hard core of say 30% over whom a good deal of trouble may have to be taken and the following suggestions for their re-employment are approved in principle by A.A.I. and the other authorities concerned.

- (a) Some of them may be enlisted in the Regular Italian Army by the special Italian Officers being sent up by M.M.I.A. Full details of the new scheme are given in Army Sub-Commission letter C/19 dated 25 July 1944 - copy attached.
- (b) The reengagement of Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza as such should not be made, on account of administrative difficulties arising from the establishment of the strength ceiling for these agencies. Where feasible they should be employed as special police, pending their return to Reception Centres established at Grosseto and Civitot.
- (c) Employment by Engineer or other military units for urgent work on bridging, road repairing, dock clearance and military repair work as soon as an area has been liberated.
- (d) Employment by AMG/ACC for duties similar to (c) as and when required.
- (e) Employment by AMG/ACC for special police and motor car drivers.

2682

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1. This directive is issued after agreement with H.Q., A.A.I., and is for the guidance of A.M.G. officers in connection with appendix "A" of the General Instruction for the Administration of Patriots in Military Government Territory reference 30/4/PAT dated 16 July 1944.

2. It should be used as a basis for discussion with Area Commanders, Town Majors, Engineer or other Military units and Labour Officers who, other things being equal, should be asked to give priority for employment to genuine Patriots with certificates. C.A.O's. should be instructed to get in touch with the nearest Labour Officers (D.A.D.M. or S.L.C.O.) as soon as possible and give them the names of suitable Patriots who can be used as civilian workers.

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- (a) Some of them may be enlisted in the Regular Italian Army by the special Italian Officers being sent up by M.M.I.A. Full details of the new scheme are given in Army Sub-Commission letter C/19 dated 23 July 1944 - copy attached.
- (b) The reengagement of Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza as such should not be made, on account of administrative difficulties arising from the establishment of the strength ceiling for these agencies. Where feasible they should be employed as special police, pending their return to Reception Centres established at Grosseto and Chiati.
- (c) Employment by Engineer or other military units for urgent work on bridging, road repairing, dock clearance and military repair work as soon as an area has been liberated.
- (d) Employment by AMG/ACC for duties similar to (c) as and when required.
- (e) Employment by AMG/ACC for special police and motor car drivers.
- (f) Employment by Area Commanders and Town Majors as watchmen.
- (g) Where it is clear to a C.A.O. that he will have an impossible task in absorbing locally his hard core of Patriots, he should be instructed to raise particulars quickly to his Provincial Commissioner who should arrange for work within the Provinces.
- (h) The problem of training and providing de-mining squads in back areas is being considered.
4. The problem of paying and feeding Patriots who are employed in some of the manners suggested above should be studied. Full instructions for feeding

- 2 -

civilians employed on military duties are given in "Instructions Regarding the Employment of Civilian Labour (Italy and Sicily)". For issue of U.S. rations to civilians see MATOUA circular No. 14 dated 4 February 1944.

NORMAN E. FISKE,

Colonel.

Norman E. Fiske
Colonel

778 Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/WRB.

DISTRIBUTION:

SCAO, AMG 5 Army.
SCAO, AMG 8 Army.
R.C., Region IV.
R.C., Region V.
R.C., Region VIII.
R.C., Region IX.
R.C., Rome Region.
Secretary General.
Admin Section.
Economic Section.
Political Section.
Army Sub-Commission.
Navy Sub-Commission.
Air Force Sub-Commission.
Civil Affairs Branch.
Displaced Persons Sub-Comm.
Italian Refugee Branch.
Public Relations Branch.
PMB (Attn: Mr. Raynor).
Public Safety Sub-Comm.
Labour Sub-Commission.
No. 1 Special Force.
O.S.S.
A.G. A.A.I. (PES(ops)).
Main A.A.I. (G(SD)).
Main AAI (D.C.A.O.).
Main AAI (D.Q.V.G.).
Main AAI (D.A.G.).

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C O P Y

SUBJECT:- Italian Military Personnel from Enemy Occupied Italy.

Army Sub-Commission, A.C.C.
Main H.Q. MIA
ROME.

C/19

25 Jul 44.

Ministry of War

Copy to: HQ AAI

MIA

Army Sub-Comm LO Naples

" " " 5 Army

" " " 8 Army

A.C.C. Patriots Section.

Navy Sub-Comm. ACC.

Air Forces Sub-Comm. ACC.

HQ ACC

Army Sub-Comm LO.

1 District.

2 District.

3 District.

5 Corps HQ.

1. Certain arrangements have been made, in agreement with the Patriots Branch at ACC, with a view to enlisting into the Italian Army at the earliest possible moment, Patriots encountered in newly-liberated areas who volunteer for such enlistment.

2. These arrangements which are in effect an extension of the provision of MIA letter, G/19 of 3 June (and are to be read as such) are as follows: -

- (a) The Ministry of War will at once send a Screening Agency (not exceeding 4 officers and 6 men) to join the AGI officer dealing with the re-settlement of Patriots at HQ of each 5th Army, 8th Army and Polish Corps.
- (b) The Screening Agencies will interview volunteers as required by the AGI officer. They will decide whether these can be accepted within the number that the Ministry of War consider can be absorbed from time to time without detriment to the cohesion and efficiency of the existing Army.
- (c) Those accepted will be given a pass authorizing them to be passed back (through refugee channels) to the nearest Italian enlistment centre for immediate enlistment.
- (d) The Agencies will travel and operate as required by the AGI officer concerned inside the Army areas concerned and within the terms given them by the Ministry of War.
- (e) These Agencies will move forward in accordance with the advance of the Armies concerned.
- (f) In order to deal with Patriots who are still waiting in areas behind Army rear boundaries, the Ministry of War will detail and hold in readiness at Rome three similar Agencies which will be available to visit centres and operate as required by the Patriot Branch of ACC. These Agencies will be disbanded as soon as the area has been "cleared" or the normal calling-up Agency is estab-

3 District.
 5 Corps HQ.
 8 Army.
 A.C.O. Patriots Section.
 Navy Sub-Com. ACC.
 Air Forces Sub-Com. ACC.

1. Certain arrangements have been made, in agreement with the Patriots Branch at SSC, with a view to enlisting into the Italian Army at the earliest possible moment, Patriots encountered in newly-liberated areas who volunteer for such enlistment.
2. These arrangements which are in effect an extension of the provision of MMH Letter, 9/19 of 5 June (and are to be read as such) are as follows: -

(a) The Ministry of War will at once send a Screening Agency (not exceeding 4 officers and 6 men) to join the ARS officer dealing with the re-settlement of Patriots at HQ of each 5th Army ; 8th Army and Polish Corps.

(h) The Screening agencies will interview volunteers as required by the JAG officer. They will decide whether these can be accepted within the number that the Ministry of War consider can be absorbed from time to time without detriment to the cohesion and efficiency of the existing army.

(c) Those accepted will be given a pass authorising them to be passed back (through refugee channels) to the nearest Italian enlistment centre for immediate enlistment.

(d) The Agencies will travel and operate as required by the War Office concerned inside the Army areas concerned and within the terms given them by the Ministry of War.

(c) These agencies will now forward in accordance with the authority of the articles concerned.

(f) In order to deal with Patriots who are still waiting in areas behind army zone boundaries, the Ministry of War will detail and hold in readiness at ROME three similar agencies which will be available to visit control and operate as required by the Patriot Branch of HQ. These agencies will be disbanded as soon as the matter has been "cleared" or the normal calling-up agency is established by proclamation.

3. Other men of military age, including Patriots and volunteers who have not been accepted for immediate enlistment, will remain as civilians until called upon to register (or re-register) for service in the ordinary way.

(sgt) L. BROCKING.
Major General.
Army Sub-Comm. A.C.C.

DRAFT

File

HC
GR

SUBJECT: Re-employment of Patriots.

This directive has been agreed by A.A.I. and is for the guidance of A.A.G. officers in connection with appendix "A" (attached) of the General Instruction for the Administration of Patriots in Military Government Territory reference 30/1/PAT dated 13 July 1944.

It should be used as a basis for discussion with Area Commanders Town Majors and Royal Engineer Units who can employ patriots and who, other things being equal should be asked to give priority for employment to genuine Patriots with certificates.

Some Patriots may be taken for special duties, some will be disposed of locally some will have to or have to be transported to a distance for re-employment and some foreigners e.g. Yugoslavs will be despatched under special arrangements. There will however remain a hard core of say 30 % over whom a good deal of trouble may have to be taken and the following suggestions for their re-employment are approved in principle by A.A.I. and the other authorities concerned.

- (1) Removal of minefields under Royal Engineers supervision.
- (2) Employment by Royal Engineers units for urgent work on bridging, road repairing and military repair work immediately an area is occupied.
- (3) Detachment in the Regular Italian Army or the Carabinieri by the special mission being set up by M.M.I.A. who will send a caravanser to every newly liberated area to make the necessary arrangements.

822

236)

Town Majors and Royal Engineer Units who can employ patriots and who, other things being equal should be asked to give priority for employment to genuine patriots with certificates.

Some Patriots may be taken for special duties, some will be disposed of locally some will move to or have to be transported to a distance for re-employment and some foreigners e.g. Yugoslavs will be despatched under special arrangements. There will however remain a hard core of say 30 % over whom a good deal of trouble may have to be taken and the following suggestions for their re-employment are approved in principle by A.A.I. and the other authorities concerned.

- (1) Removal of minefields under Royal Engineers supervision.
- (2) Employment by Royal Engineers units for urgent work on bridging, road repairing and military repair work immediately an area is occupied.
- (3) Enlistment in the Regular Italian Army or the Carabinieri by the special mission being set up by M.M.I.A. who will send a commissar to every newly liberated area to make the necessary arrangements.
- (4) Employment by AME/AMM for duties similar to (2) as and when required.
- (5) Employment by AMG/ACC for special police and motor car drivers.
- (6) Employment by Area Commanders and Town Majors for guard duties including the guarding of Italian ammunition dumps until these are taken over by the Italian Army.

(7)

- 2 -

- (7) Where it is clear to a GAO that he will have an impossible task in absorbing locally his hard core of Patriots he must pass particulars quickly to his Provincial Commissioner who should arrange rehabilitation within the Province.

The problem of paying and feeding patriots who are employed in some of the manners suggested above should be carefully studied. Full instructions for feeding civilians employed on military duties are given in

Copies being sent for information and comment please to:-

Maj. Gen. Cornwall Rogers	A.A.I.
Brig. Melmaring	A.A.I.
Brig. Ritchie	A.A.I.
-----	-----
Political Section	A.C.O.
Maj. Gen. Browning	A.C.O.
Col. Upjohn	A.C.O.
Civil Affairs Branch	A.C.O.
-----	-----
Patriot Representatives	ROME.

2659

SECRET

FORMATION OF COMMUNAL COMMITTEES FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT
AND DISPERSAL OF PATRIOTS.

1. (a) The Committee will be formed and exist at Commune level only in the first instance.
- (b) Subject to local conditions a suggested form of committee is as follows:-

Sindaco (or Commissario Profetizio) to preside;

Four or more representatives chosen by and from the patriots;
two members of the Giunta Comunale if formed as such or otherwise
two well known and respected local residents.

- (c) Consistency of policy, co-ordination of the efforts of the Communal Committees and means of communication from AMG/ACC HQ should be effected at Provincial level by and through the Prefect acting on the advice and under the supervision of the Provincial Commissioner.

2. The function and purpose of the Committee are as follows. They will firstly determine whether persons calling themselves patriots are in fact patriots. After sifting for this purpose, the bogus patriots will be ignored. The genuine patriots will be classified and dealt with in the following manner:-

(a) Local absorption into their ordinary walks of life and means of livelihood and employment (particularly agricultural and harvesting) which may still exist in the local area. They will be dealt with as any other residents of the locality who had remained there. This process will apply both to patriots whose home is in the particular area and to non-residents if the latter so wish. Preference may be given to patriots in providing employment.

(b) Non-residents who do not want to stay in the area. It is believed that this class will be very small in number. They will return to their homes. Their return will be arranged locally by the CAO to Provincial HQ thence by the Provincial Commissioner.

(c) Those who want to join the Army immediately (as opposed to waiting for "call up" if and when liable) will be conveyed to Provincial HQ and thence under Provincial arrangements to such points as may be determined by the Allied/Italian Military authorities. To enable this to be done the MIA will keep Regional Commissioners and SCAs informed as to the places to which such persons are to be conveyed and any other relevant information for the purpose.

(d) Those who wish to continue to serve as patriots. These will be selected, in small numbers, by the appropriate military agencies if needed.

(e) Yugo Slavs who have not already been sifted and dealt with under these instructions will be returned through Displaced Persons Sub-Commission for

Sindaco (or Commissario Prefetizio) to preside; four or more representatives chosen by and from the patriots; two members of the Giunta Comunale if formed as such or otherwise two well known and respected local residents.

(c) Consistency of policy, co-ordination of the efforts of the Communal Committees and means of communication from AMG/ACC HQ should be effected at Provincial level by and through the Prefect acting on the advice and under the supervision of the Provincial Commissioner.

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(d) Those who wish to continue to serve as patriots. These will be selected, in small numbers, by the appropriate military agencies if needed.

(e) Yugo Slavs who have not already been sifted and dealt with under these instructions will be returned through Displaced Persons Sub-Commission for special employment in Yugo Slav fighting forces.

3. The Sindaco and/or his official will keep proper records of the Committee's proceedings including the names, certificates (if any) and classification of all persons dealt with and the method and date of their disposal.

Lists prepared by patriot leaders together with any other relevant information which may be required will be made available to the Committee.

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD ON 3 JULY 44 IN ROME TO DISCUSS THE

ADMINISTRATION OF PATRIOTS IN OCCUPIED ITALY

PRESIDENT :-

Brigadier H.B. Lush (Chairman)	Executive Commissioner, A.C.C.
Mr. Col. Ames	Rome Region
Mr. Bauer	Patriot (C.I.N.)
Col. Bernabo	Patriot (Military)
Group Captain Benson	MB 8 Army
Maj Gen Browning	M.M.I.A.
Capt Buckley	A.C.C.
Mr. Caccia	A.C.C.
Col. Carter	C.B.S.
Brigadier Dunlop	Region IV
Major Fielden	A.C.C.
Lieut Harris	No.1. Special Force
Col. Hiske	A.C.C.
Major Koch	O.S.S.
Lieut McNamara	A.C.C.
Brigadier McInvering	A.A.I.
Col. Mc Carthy	A.C.C.
Col. McFort	A.C.C.
Col. Pidsley	M.M.I.A.
Mr. Rayer	P.W.B.
Major Talbot	A.C.C.
Mr. Reber	A.C.C.
Major Tennant	No.1. Special Force
Col. Upjohn	A.C.C.
Col. Young	A.C.C.

Patriot Reps with AMK of Armies

1. It was decided that Representatives should be found only from the Michalis and Bauer parties. C.S.S. and Special Force stated that they could not provide Officers but would send relevant information through C.S.S. Ops A.I.I. whence it could, after screening, be passed to armies and then to Corps HQs and down to C.A.C.s. One Patriot Rep of the Michalis and one of the Bauer party will be at each Corps H.Q.
2. It was agreed that the duties of Patriot Reps should be to identify leaders of Patriot bands and to help AMK to deal with them. For this purpose they should help to select a few suitable local patriots to serve on the staff of each C.A.C.
3. The duties of Patriot Reps are to be in

Detailed instructions to be sent to AMK at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.G. Section.

Group Captain Benson
 Maj Gen Browning
 Capt Buckley
 Mr. Gascia
 Col. Carter
 Brigadier Dunlop
 Major Fielden
 Lieut Harris
 Col. Fiske
 Major Koch
 Lieut Macnamara
 Brigadier Mainwaring
 Col. Mc Carthy
 Col. Moffatt
 Col. Pidsley
 Mr. Rayner
 Major Talbot
 Mr. Zaber
 Major Tennant
 Col. Uelohn
 Col. Young

228 8 Army
 M.M.I.M.
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.
 C.S.S.
 Region IV
 A.C.C.
 No. 1. Special Force
 A.C.C.
 O.S.S.
 A.C.C.
 A.C.I.
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.
 M.M.I.M.
 P.M.S.
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.
 No. 1. Special Force
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.

Patriot Reps with AMI of Armies

1. It was decided that Representatives should be found only from the Michaelis and Bauer parties. 933 and Special Force stated that they could not provide Officers but would send relevant information through 225 Ops AMI whence it could, after screening, be passed to armies and then to Corps HQ and down to C.I.C.S. One Patriot Rep of the Michaelis and one of the Bauer party will be at each Corps H.Q.

2. It was agreed that the duties of Patriot Reps should be to identify leaders of Patriot bands and to help AMI to deal with them. For this purpose they should help to select a few suitable local patriots to serve on the staff of each C.I.C.S.

3. The duties of Patriot Reps are to be in no way political.

4. Permission to put Patriot Reps on the AMI ration strength and to allow them to draw petrol was later obtained from AMI (C).

5. It was also agreed later that the Michaelis and Bauer Reps should be called Patriot Reps (MI) and Patriot Reps (C.I.N.) respectively.

Detailed instructions to be sent to AMI or Arms by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.C. Section.

2657

.....6/.....

Preliminary action in occupation.

6. The poster prepared by PWB for Gen Alexander's signature was approved subject to an additional clause appealing for the gathering of the harvest. This poster is to be posted in forward areas, and the contents put in Italian newspapers and broadcast by PWB.

- (a) P.W.B.
(b) Detailed instructions to be sent to AM at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.G. Section.

7. The surrender of arms must be justified by law and not on grounds of military expediency i.e. the statement that arms will be returned to Northern Italy.

8. The time of handing in arms to be at the discretion of C.A.O.S who may use Patriots for temporary police work if necessary.

9. Arms must be handed in to AM and not to carabinieri though the latter may handle the collection thereof. Receipts for arms should be given and should be signed by C.A.O.S.

- Detailed instructions to be sent to AM at Armies by Patriot Br. of R.C. & M.G. Section.

Certificates of merit.

10. After discussion it was decided not to issue collective certificates of merit since this would be most difficult to administer and would certainly cause ill feeling.

11. It was agreed that the only certificates of merit to be issued to Patriots (apart from those given to persons who have helped escaping prisoners of war) should be to members of recognized fighting bands who have carried arms, carried out demolitions or engaged in sabotage. It will be the duty of C.A.O.S helped by their Patriot Bps to adjudicate in doubtful cases.

12. The certificates will be signed by General Alexander in facsimile, and will also be endorsed by the local Patriot leader and an Allied Officer.

13. Regional Officers will take over from departing Army C.A.O.S the responsibility for the issue of certificates.

Subsequent employment of Patriots.

14. It was suggested that the problem of finding employment

- (a) P.W.B.
(b) Detailed instructions to be sent to AM at Armies by Patriot Br. of R.C. & M.G. Section.

1224

Detailed instructions
to be sent to AMT at
Armies by Patriot Br.
of R.D.M.G. Section.

(c) P.W.B.
(d) Detailed instruc-
tions to be sent
to AMT at Armies
by Patriot Br. of
RC & MG Section.

Draft proposals to be
put up by Patriots
Branch.

.....15/.....

8. The time of handing in arms to be
at the discretion of C.A.O.s who may use Patriots
for temporary police work if necessary.

9. Arms must be handed in to AMT and
not to carabinieri though the latter may handle
the collection thereof. Receipts for arms
should be given and should be signed by C.A.O.s.

Certificates of merit.

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to issue collective certificates of merit since
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or engaged in sabotage. It will be the duty of
C.A.O.s helped by their Patriot help to adjudicate
in doubtful cases.

12. The certificate will be signed by
General Alexander in facsimile, and will also
be endorsed by the local Patriot leader and an
Allied Officer.

13. Regional Officers will take over
from departing Army C.A.O.s the responsibility
for the issue of certificates.

Subsequent employment of Patriots.

14. It was suggested that the problem of
finding employment for Patriots should be handled
by a committee at every provincial seat of
government reporting to the prefect and the AMT
representative. In rural areas the men can
usefully be employed on agriculture, in towns
on the clearance of debris, and the necessary
reconstruction of roads and essential buildings.
It is essential to find work to absorb the
Patriots otherwise militant political parties
would resurget.

15. The G.O.C. M.M.I.A. stressed that as Italian conscription law extended into AMI territory, Patriots of military age were liable for service. In practice it would take a little time to establish the machinery for registration etc. in forward areas. Pending further notifications patriots of military age should therefore be encouraged to act on a temporary basis in the same way as those of other age groups.

Persons who have assisted Allied F.O.W. to escape.

16. A scheme of aid is in operation for people who have assisted Allied F.O.W. to escape. This was discussed and it was decided that no further action could be taken meantime.

C. D. Mc Carthy
C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriot Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

All Allied members present.
AMC 5 Army (5)
AMC 8 Army (10)
Interior Subcommission (1)
Spores (10)
File (1)
War Diary (1)

2656

Patriot-Administration of the English
MINUTES OF COM-REPO WFO ON 3 JULY 44 IN ROME DISCUSS THE

ADMINISTRATION OF PATRIOTS IN OCCUPIED ITALY

ATTENDANCE:-

Brigadier M.S. Duka (Chairman)	Executive Commissioner, A.C.O.
Lt. Col. Ames	Rome Region.
Mr. Bauer	Patriot (G.I.N.)
Col. Bernabo	Patriot (Military)
Group Capt Benson	AMG 8 Army.
Maj Gen Browning	M.H.I.A.
Capt Buckley	A.C.O.
Mr. Caccia	A.C.O.
Col. Gertor	O.S.B.
Brigadier Dunlop	Region IV.
Major Fielden	A.C.O.
Lieut Harris	No 1 Special Force.
Col. Fiske	A.C.O.
Major Koch	O.S.B.
Lieut Macnamara	A.C.O.
Brigadier Mainwaring	A.A.I.
Col. Mc Carthy	A.C.O.
Col. Monfort	A.C.O.
Col. Fidalley	M.H.I.A.
Mr. Rayner	P.W.D.
Major Talbot	A.C.O.
Mr. Reber	A.C.O.
Major Tennant	No 1 Special Force
Col. Upjohn	A.C.O.
Col. Young	A.C.O.

Patriot Reps with AMG of Armies

1. It was decided that Representatives should be found only from the Michaelis and Bauer parties. CCS and Special Force stated that they could not provide officers but would send relevant information through CCS Ops AA1 whence it could, after screening, be passed to armies and then to Corps HQs and down to C.A.Os. One Patriot Rep. of the Michaelis and one of the Bauer party will be at each Corps HQ.
2. It was agreed that the duties of Patriot Reps. should be to identify leaders of Patriot bands and to help AMG to deal with them. For this purpose they should help to select a few suitable local patriots to serve on the staff of each C.A.O.

3. The duties of Patriot Reps. are to be in no way political.

822
 Detailed instructions to be sent to AMG at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.O. Section.

Mr. Gaeola
 Col. Carter
 Brigadier Dunlop
 Major Fielden
 Lieut Harris
 Col. Panko
 Major Koch
 Lieut McNamara
 Brigadier Mainwaring
 Col. Mc Carthy
 Col. Monfort
 Col. Pidsley
 Mr. Rynor
 Major Talbot
 Mr. Reber
 Major Tennant
 Col. Upjohn
 Col. Young

A.C.C.
 A.C.C.
 O.S.S.
 Region IV.
 A.C.C.
 No 1 Special Force.
 A.C.C.
 O.S.S.
 A.C.C.
 A.A.I.
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.
 M.M.I.A.
 P.W.B.
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.
 No 1 Special Force
 A.C.C.
 A.C.C.

Patriot Reps with AMG of Armies

1. It was decided that Representatives should be found only from the Michaelis and Bauer parties. OSS and Special Force stated that they could not provide officers but would send relevant information through SAC Ops AAI whence it could, after screening, be passed to armies and then to Corps HQs and down to C.A.Cs. One Patriot Rep. of the Michaelis and one of the Bauer party will be at each Corps HQ.
2. It was agreed that the duties of Patriot Reps. should be to identify leaders of Patriot bands and to help AMG to deal with them. For this purpose they should help to select a few suitable local patriots to serve on the staff of each C.A.C.

3. The duties of Patriot Reps. are to be in no way political.

4. Permission to put Patriot Reps. on the AMG ration strength and to allow them to draw petrol was later obtained from AAI (Q).

5. It was also agreed later that the Michaelis and Bauer Reps. should be called Patriot Reps. (MIL) and Patriot Reps. (C.L.N.) respectively.

Detailed instructions to be sent to AMG at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.C. Section.

2653

.....6/.....

Preliminary action in occupation.

6. The poster prepared by PWB for Gen Alexanders signature was approved subject to an additional clause appealing for the gathering of the harvest. This poster is to be posted in forward areas, and the contents put in Italian newspapers and broadcast by PWB.

- (a) P.W.B.
(b) Detailed instructions to be sent to AMG at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.G. Section.

7. The surrender of arms must be justified by law and not on grounds of military expediency i.e. the statement that arms will be returned to Northern Italy.

8. The time of handing in arms to be at the discretion of C.A.Cs who may use Patriots for temporary police work if necessary.

9. Arms must be handed in to AMG and not to carabinieri though the latter may handle the collection thereof. Receipts for arms should be given and should be signed by C.A.Cs.

Detailed instructions to be sent to AMG at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.G. Section.

Certificates of merit.

10. After discussion it was decided not to issue collective certificates of merit since this would be most difficult to administer and would certainly cause ill feeling.

11. It was agreed that the only certificates of merit to be issued to Patriots. (apart from those given to persons who have helped escaping prisoners of war) should be to members of recognised fighting bands who have carried arms, carried out demolitions or engaged in sabotage. It will be the duty of C.A.Cs helped by their Patriot Reps. to adjudicate in doubtful cases.

12. The certificate will be signed by General Alexander in facsimile, and will also be endorsed by the local Patriot leader and an Allied officer.

- (a) P.W.B.
(b) Detailed instructions to be sent to AMG at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.C. & M.G. Section.

13. Regional Officers will take over from departing Army C.A.Cs the responsibility for the issue of certificates.

Subsequent employment of Patriots.

14. It was suggested that the problem of finding employment for Patriots should be handled by a committee at every provincial seat of government reporting to the Prefect and the AMG representative. In rural areas the men can usefully be employed on agricultural work.

Draft proposed to be put up by Patriot Branch.

at the discretion of C.A.Os who may use Patriots for temporary police work if necessary.

9. Arms must be handed in to AMI and not to carabinieri though the latter may handle the collection thereof. Receipts for arms should be given and should be signed by C.A.Os.

Certificates of merit.

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12. The certificate will be signed by General Alexander in facsimile, and will also be endorsed by the local Patriot leader and an Allied officer.

13. Regional officers will take over from departing Army C.A.Os the responsibility for the issue of certificates.

Subsequent employment of Patriots.

14. It was suggested that the problem of finding employment for Patriots should be handled by a committee at every provincial seat of Government reporting to the Prefect and the AMI representative. In rural areas the men can usefully be employed on agriculture; in towns on the clearance of debris, and the necessary reconstruction of roads and essential buildings. It is essential to find work to absorb the Patriots otherwise militant political parties would resurrect.

15. The G.O.C. M.M.I.A. stressed that as Italian conscription law extended into AMI territory, Patriots of military age were liable for service. In practice it would take a little time to establish the machinery for registration etc. in forward areas. Pending further notifications Patriots of military age should therefore be encouraged to act on a temporary basis in the same way as those of other age groups.

Detailed instructions to be sent to AMI at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.O. & M.G. Section.

- (a) P.W.B.
- (b) Detailed instructions to be sent to AMI at Armies by Patriot Branch of R.O. & M.G. Section.

Draft proposals to be put up by Patriot Branch.

.....16/....

Persons who have assisted Allied P.O.Ws to escape.

16. A scheme of aid is in operation for people who have assisted Allied P.O.W. to escape. This was discussed and it was decided that no further action could be taken meantime.

Wm. Carthy
O.D. MC GARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriot Branch,
R.C. & M.O. Section.

DISTRIBUTION

All Allied members present.
AMG 5 Army (5)
AMG 8 Army (10)
Interior Sub Commission (1)
Spaced (20)
File (1)
War Diary (1)

MAPS FILMED ON
35MM ROLL

PWB ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

PWB UNIT No. 8. APO 512

29th June, 1944

Mr. Reber

Mr. Rayner has asked me to send you the following extract from a telegram which has been sent to Colonel MacFarlane, our representative with Advance A.A.I.:

"The situation with patriots overtaken by our armies is becoming acute. Can you enquire what action is being taken or contemplated. A number of new factors have arisen and Reber has suggested that he and I should visit your headquarters to discuss the matter with B.G.S.(Ops) if this is of value."

Elizabeth Stachewicz

for J. Rayner

2650

1233

SR

Magistrati's telegram No. 194, June 27, from the Italian Legation at Berne for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is confirmed by information from many sources that in North Italian provinces's expectation of Allied troops steady progress and increasing activity of resistance is growing stronger. The local press echoes these advices and press services of the co-belligerent Legations and the Royal Italian Legation daily contribute indirectly all available details. Contacts with the resistance forces are increasing as more and more liaison men cross Italian-Swiss border in Tessin. It is presumed that after a period in which neo-Fascists appealed to conciliation and cooperation they are now starting violent repression policy. Neo-Fascist authorities in Piedmont and Genoa now threaten serious reprisals and are trying to put them into effect according to messages received here. The situation is definitely turning against them, however.

Italian patriotic resistance

CC

*Handed over
16 July 40
G.M.H.*

2649

1234

WS
✓

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM
RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICAN MISSION,
ALGIERS, DATED JULY 29, 1944.

Important

Telegram No. 798 dated July 26, 2 p.m., in paraphrase, from Bern, is quoted as follows:

"Confidential.

"No. 235, July 21. For Foreign Affairs from Magistrati.

"In spite of neo-Fascist and German reaction, all reports received from Northern Italy show increasing and better organization of resistance movements. Railroad traffic is delayed a great deal and at time is practically interrupted. Throughout North Italy there is tension, and additional events, coordinated with continuous strikes and labor walkouts, are anticipated impatiently. The impression prevailing here is that under such conditions, it would be very useful if the whole Partisan movement could be put under one command at the present time and be directed by a Supreme Chief and represented by his name. The significance of Marshal Tito is known in Yugoslavia. If our high command were to appoint a Commander-in-Chief of resistance forces, the impression generally would be that of a movement guided and organized directly by our army, legal and government authorities. Reaction would still be extremely favorable inside regions still occupied by Germans and abroad.

268

"Repeat to Kirk at Naples; to Department."

*Copy handed to
Roberti - 6 Aug 44*

2648

des

SECRET

Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

4C/C(OPS).

22 June 44

A.C.C. (5)
 Army Sub Commission (5)
 Fifth Army (100)
 AMG Fifth Army (5)
 Eighth Army (100)
 AMF Eighth Army (5)
 2 Polish Corps (20)
 O.S.S. (5)
 No. 1 Special Force (5)
 P.W.D. (3)

At a meeting held at ACC in Rome 21 June, it was decided that the following agencies responsible for the organization of resistance groups, namely:

OSS
 No. 1 Special Force,
 National Committee of Liberation
 and Italian Military Organization for Central Italy,

would provide representatives to go forward and attach themselves to AMF with both Fifth and Eighth Armies. These representatives will be given passes by this Headquarters initially to report to AMF. Thereafter, armies will issue the necessary passes so that they can circulate freely within the army areas.

These representatives will act as Liaison Officers between AMF and the resistance group leaders. It is not possible to disclose the names of the resistance group leaders before the territory is liberated by the forward troops, firstly, on account of security, and secondly, because in many cases they are only known by code words. The representatives, however, will be able to establish their identity, and this will lead to the identification of the sub-leaders in the outlying districts.

ACC, dealing through AMF with both armies, will be responsible for all dealings with resistance groups as soon as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops. In principle, AMF will use the existing resistance group organization to gain their cooperation in handing in their arms and returning to their normal life in liberated Italy. Troops will be instructed, except in cases of necessity, not to disarm the patriots or to have direct dealings with them. They should be directed to contact the AMF organization.

ACC, in conjunction with FWF, will arrange for the production of suitable posters to be put up in the towns and villages, thanking the patriots for the good work they have done to hasten their liberation, calling upon the leaders to contact AMF to receive instructions about where and when to hand in their arms so that these may be dropped without delay on other patriots in the North to carry on the good work.

2647

822

At a meeting held at JCC in Rome 24 June, it was decided that the following agencies responsible for the organization of resistance groups, namely:

CSS

No. 1 Special Force.

National Committee of Liberation

and Italian Military Organisation for Central Italy,

would provide representatives to go forward and attach themselves to AMF with both Fifth and Eighth Armies. These representatives will be given passes by this Headquarters initially to report to AMF. Thereafter, armies will issue the necessary passes so that they can circulate freely within the army areas.

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JCC, in conjunction with FME, will arrange for the production of suitable posters to be put up in the towns and villages, thanking the patriots for the good work they have done to hasten their liberation, calling upon the leaders to contact AMF to receive instructions about where and when to hand in their arms so that these may be dropped without delay on other patriots in the North to carry on the good work.

JCC will provide a suitably worded document, thanking the patriot for his good work and at the same time acting as a receipt for the arm he hands in.

Most patriots will wish to return to their normal occupations. They should be encouraged to do so. There will be some, however, whose homes are in Northern Italy and who will require subsistence. These will be directed by AMF to camps to be established by JCC in the East and West sectors.

/2.....

Army Sub Commission (5)
Fifth Army (100)
AMF Fifth Army (5)
Eighth Army (100)
AMF Eighth Army (5)
2 Polish Corps (20)
O.S.S. (5)
No. 1 Special Force (5)
P.W.E. (3)

-2-

One will, of course, be made by military personnel of any information which the P-traits can give, but military personnel will not employ patriots in any fighting role once they have been liberated.

It is emphasized that military personnel must not become involved in problems raised by resistance group leaders or patriots, and no promises will be made to them. They will in all cases be referred to AMT with whom the representatives of the various organizations will be working in close touch.

JWSKJ/TH

0711.1.1
Lt. Gen.,
Chief of General Staff.

U. S. SECRET
 Manual British SECRET

OUTGOING

CRIPPS/hft/msr

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JUNE 222352B

SECRET

PRIORITY

ACC REAR

HOME AREA COMMAND, AMG FIVEARY, AMG EIGHTAFMY, REGION FIVE
 AMG, CAMPOBASSO

SUBJECT IS PARTISANS AND THEIR REPORTED STATEMENT TO AMG OFFICERS WITH ARMY THAT
 THEY HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED OR INSTRUCTED BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OR BADOGLIO TO GOVERN
 AREAS AFTER LIBERATION PD TO HOME AREA COMMAND FOR AMG REGION FOUR FOR HOME REGION
 ACC FOR REGION EIGHT AMG CMA AND FIVE ARMY CMA AMG EIGHT ARMY CMA REGION FIVE AMG
 CMA CAMPOBASSO FROM ACC REAR FROM STANSGATE SIGNED MACFARLANE PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
 BY HIGHEST AUTHORITY DENY THAT ANY SUCH AUTHORITY OR INSTRUCTION EVER GIVEN BY THEM
 OR THEIR PREDECESSORS PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT STATE THAT PARTISANS WERE INSTRUCTED
 TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN AREAS FROM WHICH ENEMY HAVE BEEN DRIVEN PENDING AND UNTIL
 ARRIVAL OF RECOGNIZED AMG AUTHORITY PD NO APPOINTMENTS TO ADMINISTRATION MADE
 IN SUCH INTERIM BY PARTISANS HAVE ANY VALIDITY EXCEPT IN SUCH CASES AS ARE
 APPROVED AND CONFIRMED BY RESPONSIBLE AMG AUTHORITY PD IT IS HOWEVER CLEARLY AGREED
 THAT DUE CONSIDERATION AND RECOGNITION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE VALUABLE
 EFFORTS WHICH ARE AND HAVE BEEN MADE BY PARTISANS IN FURTHERANCE OF ALLIED CAUSE
 SUBJECT TO FORGOING LIMITATION AND AS FAR AS IS COMPATIBLE WITH ESTABLISHED AMG
 ORGANIZATION AND APPROVED POLICY

AUTHENTICATED:

E. J. CHIOCCA
 CTO USA
 Adjutant

2646

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- 1 Adj Main

U. S. SECRET
 Manual British SECRET

1239

Patrol Report

He

AND FIVE ARMY AND EIGHT ARMY INFO REGION FIVE AND REGION EIGHT

ADV AAI

ACC ADV

ADV 296
7 145

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

Civil Affairs Branch.

INFORMED DEPARTMENT PATRICE REPE OF MILITARY AND CIVIL REPORT CIVIL PARTIES AS FOLLOWS
 PD FIRST IN EACH CAR THREE WILL BE ONE REE ALSO DRIVER ALSO THREE DATE NOTICES
 ALSO TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO REPEAT TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO NOTICES ALSO TWO COPIES OF
 IDENTIFIER AND TWO IDENTIFICATION PAPERS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL TO BEHOLD TO AM
FIVE ARMY AND EIGHT ARMY INFORMATION AND REGION FIVE AND REGION EIGHT AND ALLIED
ARMIES IN JULY FOR INFORMATION MAINTAINING FROM ADVANCE CHARLIE ADVANCE FROM NO CARNEY
CHARLIE
 CARNEY TO SIXTH FOUR DAYS ONE DEPART FROM REACHED EIGHT JULY DEPART AND
 INFORMATION AT REGION FIVE WILL AWAIT FURTHER IN 1. TIGHTEN FROM GROUP GALT
 BEHOLD TO THIRD FOUR CARNEY REPEAT NOTICES TIGHTEN WILL DEPART FROM REGION
 EIGHT JULY ONE AND FIVE ARMY TO THIRD TWO CARNEY WILL BE READY LEAVE FROM TIGHTEN
 JULY WITH ADMINISTRATIVE GALT WILL GROUP GALT BEHOLD PLEASE TELEPHONE INSTRUCTIONS FROM
 REPEAT TO FIFTH IN AN EIGHT CARNEY SEPARATELY ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO REPEAT
 ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO NOTICES TO AND FIVE ARMY AND ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO REPEAT
 ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO TO AND EIGHT ARMY ALSO REPEATS OF THIRD JULY AND REPEATS
 RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS TO IT IN HANDS ZERO CERTIFICATES OF REPEAT REPEATS BY BLOCKS
 TO REPEAT YOU WITHIN A WEEK TO SIXTH ONE(b) ALLIED ARMIES ITALY REPEAT THAT PATRICE
 REPEAT CAN OBTAIN REPEAT CERTIFICATE AT CIVIL HEADQUARTERS PLEASE ADVANCE

44-1522

COPIES TO:- AAI
 ACC MAIN for Civil Affairs Branch
 ACC REAR for Admin Section
 FOR NAME
 Col Ricko
 Security
 Political
 P.O.C.

2645

1240

Magistrati's telegram No. 207, July 3, from the Italian Legation at Berne to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Growing Partisan activity and improved organization, as a result of substantial assistance received recently, is confirmed by reports from Valtellina. It is indicated by appearances that German alarm at the general Italian-Swiss border situation has caused the Germans to adopt measures of increased severity, among them prohibition in many border districts of all traffic. A steady increase in contacts with north Italy and Partisans has not been prevented by these steps, however.

Ital. Patriotic Resistance

*(forwarded)
1944*

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RECEIVED

23 AUG 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
A.C.C.
A. C. C. C.

MJDT V MJAQ NR19

T

FROM LISBOA 241455

TO ESTERI NAPLES

GR 115 BT

STAMPA 21 PUNTO EDITORIALE TIMES VENTITRE
MAGGIO INTITOLATO VIRGOLETTE ITALIA RIVIE
VIRGOLETTE COMMENTANDO NOTIZIA IMPIEGO

SEIDEIVISIONI TEDESCHER PERLOTTA CONTRO A// PATRIOTI

NORDITALIA DICECHE PUREESSENDO ANCORA

DIFFICILE VALUTAREPESO OPINIONE GRUPPIPOLITICI

RAPPRESENTATI INNUOVO GOVERNO BADOGGIO EST

COMUNQUE BENPALESE SENTIMENTO MOLTIIMILIANI

CHEGCCORRA COMBZ// COMBATTERE PERUNA ITALIA LIBERA

VIRGOLA SENTIMENTOCHE CONTRIBUI UNSECOLOFA

ALLA FORMAZIONE DELRISORGIMENTO PUNTO OGGI

COMEALLORA PATRIOTI GIRANO PERLE COMAPGNE

EDOPERANO SABOTAGGI NELLECITTA PUNTO GUANDO

REGIME FASCISTA CADDE MOLTI SICHIESERO

SEESISTESSE ANCORA UOPSPIRITO CHEPOTESSE

FARRISORGER ITALIA PUNTO TALESP// TALESPIRITO MANCAVA

ETREGNAVA APATIA GENERALE PUNTO MAOGGI

VITACOMINCIA ARISORGERE PUNTO MOVIMENTO

2643

FROM: Lisbon DATE: 24 May

No. 21. Press.

News items concerning Italian
patriots in North Italy.
DRAJETA

STAMPA 21 PUNTO EDITORIALE TIMES VENTITRE
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FARRISORGER ITALIA PUNTO TALESP// TALESPIRITO MANCAVA

ETREGNAVA APATIA GENERALE PUNTO MAOGGI

VITACOMINCIA ARISORGERE PUNTO MOVIMENTO

LOBERAZIONE STA AFFERMANDOSI ESI MANIFESTERA

NONCOME CENTOANNIFA INCINQUE GLORIOSE

GIRONATE MILANESI BENSI INNESI DILOTTA

TENACE NELLEREGIONI NONANCORA REDENTE PUNTO

MAORA COMEALLORA LOBBIEITIVO E ROMA E LIBERTA

- DAJETA .

ET

SENT NR19 24/1855B ES B1 K

RECD NR 29 24/1355 B A-A AR

2643

FROM: Lisbon DATE: 24 May

No. 21. Press .

News items concerning Italian
patriots in North Italy.
D.L.J.T.A.

N13/26

FROM: LISBON

TO: ESTERI NAPLES

BGV44 S LSS 47 25 1946 FIL EAT

ESTERI NAPLES

STAMPA 22 PUNTO STAMPA BRITANNICA QUESTI ULTIMIGIORNI DA NOTEVOLE RILIEVO
INLUNGHE CORRISPONDENZE EMOZIONANTI NOTIZIE RELATIVE ORGANIZZAZIONE
ETAZIONI MOVIMENTO RESISTENZA PATRIOTTI PUNTO VIENTEMESSO IN PARTICOLARE
RISALTO CREAZIONE CONSIGLIO MILITARE ITALOALLEATO PER DIREZIONE ATTIVITA
PATRIOTTI PRIMI COMMENTI PUBBLICATI PUNTO TRASMETTO CONRASSEGNA STAMPA
AMPIO RIASSUNTO DETTE CORRISPONDENZE DAJETA

ACC DIST

ACTION/ ITAL GOVT

INFO/ POL SEC

FILE



FROM: Lisbon

DATE: 25 May 1944

No. 22 (Press): The British Press during these last days gives great emphasis to the organization and action of the patriotic resistance movement. Especially emphasized is the creation of an Italo-Allied Military Council for the direction of the activity of patriots and the first comments have been published. I am sending along with other press items this correspondence.

DAJETA.

2642

COPY

Telegram No. 100 dated April 12, from Bern, for Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

With regard to the situation of armed resistance in Northern Italy, recent information available here indicates that its organization is improving little by little and that in certain Alpine zones it is particularly active. The Piedmont group, which is chiefly military in character, is extending its influence in the direction of Liguria. Both political and military resistance is present in Lombardy. Members of the Royal Navy are serving the organization in Veneto where an agreement on the basis of the Tagliamento line has been reached with Tito partisans. Armament is greatly needed everywhere, particularly small automatic arms and hand bombs. In the Piedmontese valleys of Chisone and Pellice recently some battles of importance have occurred. In the daily fights between the neo-Fascists and our forces it seems generally that the Germans prefer not to intervene.

Various sources have informed me that it is absolutely essential that the co-belligerent Governments and the Royal Government intensify their propaganda. This could best be achieved by the steady and systematic dropping of newspapers and leaflets from the air. The population should be supplied evidence in these publications proving that both the moral and material support and help given our armed forces has been continuous and will be increased steadily. I believe this is important to offset German propaganda which has been trying to emphasize resistance south of Rome against the Allies and help it by Republican forces. For some time the Germans have been dropping this propaganda from planes.

