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Intelligence Reports
MAY 1944 - FEB 1945

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C-2 (Intelligence Sub-Section) CAP
c/o 3000 11th Ave Command,
A.F.O. 701, U.S. ARMY.

27,000 14.

RECONSTRUCTION REPORT No B-22

Division of ITALIAN citizens
in FRANCE

Source :- A.I.A.'s informers.

After 6 SEP 45 the members of the ITALIAN colony in FRANCE adhered to republican formism. This group is negligible as compared to the remaining 800,000 ITALIANS who have shown themselves decidedly anti-GERMAN and have refused any form of collaboration. In addition, there were many members of the 4th Army (officers and other ranks) who, having avoided capture by the GERMANS, joined the FRENCH forces of resistance.

At that period, the ITALIAN Committee for the liberation in ITALY was organized by Domenico RUSSO. To this movement adhered the various anti-fascist parties who had never ceased to be active. This movement began operative in OCTOBER last and acted in close contact with the FRENCH partisans, giving the latter considerable assistance. It is sufficient to say, that during the PARIS insurrection the ITALIANS suffered 75 casualties (7 dead, 59 wounded).

Today, notwithstanding this, the treatment which ITALIANS in FRANCE are receiving is most inadequate.

The new FRENCH government's attitude towards ITALIANS is intransigent and the following provisions have already been adopted :-

- Obligatory confiscation of all ITALIAN property with the obvious aim at confiscation.
- Freezing of all ITALIAN accounts with banks.
- Confiscation of the larger enterprises and ITALIAN shops in PARIS and other important centres.
- Arrest of numerous ITALIAN citizens.

3230

Thanks to the intervention of the ITALIAN committee of liberation the FRENCH government have relaxed this latter measure and arrests are confined to elements who have co-operated with the GERMANS or fought with the Fascist Militia.

899.1

SOURCE :- S.I.I.'s informants.

After 8 Jan 43 few members of the ITALIAN colony in FRANCE adhered to republican faction. This group is negligible as compared to the remaining 600,000 ITALIANS who have shown themselves decidedly anti-GERMAN and have refused any form of collaboration. In addition, there were many members of the 4th Army (Collicourt and other units) who, having avoided capture by the GERMANS, joined the French forces of resistance.

At that period, the ITALIAN Committee for the liberation in FRANCE was engaged in persuading RUSSO. To this movement adhered the various anti-fascist workers who had never ceased to be active. This movement became operative in NOVEMBER last and acted in close contact with the French partisans, giving the latter considerable assistance. It is sufficient to say that during the 24th of August the ITALIANS suffered 76 casualties (7 dead, 69 wounded).

Today, notwithstanding this, the treatment which ITALIANS in FRANCE are receiving is most inadequate.

The new FRENCH Government's attitude towards ITALIANS is intemperate and the following provisions have already been adopted :-

- Obligatory denunciation of all ITALIAN property with the obvious aim of confiscation.
- Freezing of all ITALIAN accounts with Banks.
- Confiscation of the larger enterprises and ITALIAN shops in PARIS and other important centres.
- Arrest of numerous ITALIAN citizens.

3230

Thanks to the intervention of the ITALIAN Committee of liberation the FRENCH Government have relaxed this latter measure and arrests are confined to elements who have co-operated with the GERMANS or fought with the Fascist Militia.

The position of ITALIANS in FRANCE remains however very precarious and serious. They have the feeling that they are at the mercy of events with no qualified authority to protect their interests.

Moreover, ITALIAN patriots who, on the FRONTS/ITALIAN Frontiers have fought side by side with the AQUIS are even worse off. It has in fact, been learnt that the AQUIS have decided not to consider any longer the ITALIAN patriots in the light of co-belligerents and are denying them any help whatsoever. A case in

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HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS COMMAND ALLIED FORCE
Office of the Intelligence Officer
APO 512, US ARMY

16 February 1945

Subject: Lost Military Intelligence Service Credentials.

To : Intelligence Officers, All Units.

1. The following Military Intelligence Service credentials have been lost:

<u>Cred No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Issued to</u>	<u>Description & Location of Loss</u>
a. C-1460	Gold Badge	Ira. B. Kirkland, Special Agent CIC	Gold Shield of U. S. War Department with lettering, "War Department Military Intelligence". Lost in the vicinity of Port Area, Bastia, Corsica.
b. C-317	Gold Badge	Robert J. Caldwell, Jr., Special Agent CIC.	Gold Shield of U. S. War Department with lettering, "War Department Military Intelligence". Lost in the vicinity of Naples, Italy.

2. In the event these badges are found they should be returned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ, APO 512, by registered mail together with a complete report relative to recovery.

3. If these badges are found in the possession of an unauthorized person, such person should be placed in custody and the Chief, Counter Intelligence Section, G-2 Section, AFHQ, be notified by the most expeditious means. All credentials presented for identification should be carefully examined.

Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt Allied Commission,
(Overhead), APO 394, 22 February 1945 FRW.

/s/ Rufus H. Boyd
RUFUS H. BOYD,
Captain, Inf.,
Intelligence Officer.

312.1

(16 Feb 45)

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 2675TH REGIMENT, ALLIED COMMISSION, (OVERHEAD), APO 394, U. S. Army, 22 February 1945.

TO: See Distribution.

Immediate compliance with basic communication will be accomplished should credentials be found.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PARKIN:

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Units this Regt.
- 1 - Sub-Com & Sec Allied Commission.
- 1 - S-2 this Regt.

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F. R. WERMUTH
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

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C-2 (Intelligence Sub-section) GEF
c/o Ram ... Allied Command
... 794, U. S. Army

February 1945.

INFORMATION REPORT P-151
Situation in ... DIST

1. The attached report was received from Office Information, ...
2. It is passed on as representing an ... point of view.

Major ...
C-2 (I.O.S.-1) GEF.

12/1/45

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3-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) C-3
 c/o Force Area Allied Command
 APO 794, U. S. Army

APPENDIX 1

Unreliable

Situation in ALBO ADIVS

1. General Situation and ALBO Organization.

When the GERMANS occupied ALBO ADIVS on 9 SEP 43, they did not proceed to formally annex the territory, as has been erroneously stated, but they gave it a statute, which has much similarity to that enacted in the protectorate of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA in 1939. Citizens of ALBO ADIVS were declared subjects of the REICH, but the territory itself was left outwardly under ITALIAN sovereignty, although it is governed quite differently to the rest of occupied ITALY.

The harassing measures against the ITALIANS were not enforced directly by the German military authorities, but by the local authorities, which were purposely constituted, so that the GERMANS could rely on the protests of the ITALIANS that the REICH authorities did not intend to supervise the working of these authorities.

In the ALBO ADIVS, GERMAN law is in force for citizens of ALBO ADIVS, whereas formerly ITALIAN law applied to the ITALIANS, although they are subject to REICH military regulations. The ITALIANS are only tolerated and without rights.

Those of GERMAN blood, who opted for ITALY in the 1939 plebiscite, are also considered subjects of the REICH, but are regarded as political suspects. Those of them who had carried out anti-REICH propaganda during the plebiscite were charged with high treason.

The ITALIANS had to put up with many hardships, especially at the beginning of the occupation. There were countless cases of murder, purging of shops and deportations and there were many restrictions on personal liberty.

As can be easily appreciated, the final result of all these actions is the complete domination of the area, eliminating the ITALIAN population or compelling the ITALIANS to migrate.

Plebiscite of 1939.

The reason that the complete domination of this area has not yet been achieved is that the ITALIAN population of ALBO ADIVS is larger than generally believed. The fact that the inhabitants of this region are mostly GERMAN, spread in ITALY and abroad, as a result of the 1939 plebiscite. But the manner in which this plebiscite was carried out must be remembered. It is unnecessary to recall that both the REICH and the ALBO ADIVS governments spread propaganda to persuade the residents of ALBO ADIVS to vote for ITALY--the many tricks and the violence will be remembered. Furthermore, it must be remembered that it was not a "plebiscite," as the GERMANS now maintain, because the right to vote was reserved exclusively to citizens of GERMAN blood. The result

but they gave it a subtitle, which has much similarity to that given the Protectorate of Eritrea and SOMALIA in 1939. Citizens of Eritrea were declared subjects of the Italian, but the territory itself was left entirely under ITALIAN sovereignty, although it is governed quite differently to the rest of occupied ITALY.

The harassing measures against the ITALIANS were not entered directly by the Occupational authorities, but by the local authorities, which were purposely constituted, so that the ITALIANS could rely to the protests of the ITALIANS that the ITALIAN authorities did not intend to exercise the working of these authorities.

In the LATE 1930s, GERMAN law is in force for citizens of ITALY, whereas formerly ITALIAN law applied to the ITALIANS, although they are subject to ITALIAN military regulations. The ITALIANS are only tolerated and without rights.

Those of Eritrean blood, who voted for ITALY in the 1939 plebiscite, are also considered subjects of the ITALY, but are regarded as political suspects. Those of them who had carried out anti-ITALY propaganda during the plebiscite were charged with high treason.

The ITALIANS had to put up with many hardships, especially at the beginning of the occupation. There were sometimes cases of murder, burglary of shops and deportations and there were many restrictions on personal liberty.

As can be easily appreciated, the final results of all these actions is the complete Germanification of the area, eliminating the ITALIAN population or compelling the ITALIANS to emigrate.

Plebiscite of 1939.

The reason that the complete Germanification of this area has not yet been achieved is that the ITALIAN population of ALTO ADIGE is larger than generally believed. The fact that the inhabitants of this region are mostly GERMAN, even in ITALY and abroad, as a result of the 1939 plebiscite. But the manner in which this plebiscite was carried out must be remembered. It is unnecessary to recall that both the GERMAN and the FASCIST Governments agreed propaganda to persuade the residents of Eritrean blood to vote for ITALY--the many tricks and the violence will be remembered. Furthermore, it must be remembered that it was not a "plebiscite," as the GERMAN law maintains, because the right to vote was reserved exclusively to citizens of Eritrean blood. The results of the plebiscite in the territory covered by the treaty (which included the Province of BOZEN and some officially ITALIAN areas in the Province of TREVISO, UDINE and TRIESTE) were as follows:

Province	Intended to vote	For to ITALY	Percent	For to GERMAN	Percent
BOZEN	229,500	156,483	72.5	63,017	27.5
TREVISO	28,453	1,012	3.5	27,441	96.5
UDINE	5,555	1,576	28.4	3,979	71.6
TRIESTE	7,429	1,005	13.5	6,424	86.5

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S.I.O.H.I.I.

If, however, the INDIAN population of LING LING, which was excluded from the Privileges, is taken into consideration, the percentages appear considerably. There is a small CHINESE minority in the provinces of TAIPEI, TUNG and HUNG, and about 30 per cent are CHINESE in the PROVINCE OF SOLOMON.

The CHINESE were not able to achieve their objective of getting rid of the INDIAN residents in LING LING, because if they had done so, it would have been a mortal blow to the economy of the region.

The organization of the population of CHINESE race in LING LING is the same as in the LING. The various INDIAN organizations have been kept, but CHINESE commissions have been placed at their head. These commissions were chosen from the members of the institutions formed for the CHINESE, who had opted for CHINESE in the 1938 Privileges. For example, there was an INDIAN Agricultural Workers' Institute and a similar INDIAN Commission, which looked after the interests of those who had opted for CHINESE during the delay in transfer. The managers of credit institutions, important business concerns, etc., were chosen from the CHINESE delegates of these concerns.

Some of these concerns are still important on account of their size, e.g., the companies of Industrial Workers (all the workers were and still are INDIAN). These are still subject to the rule made by the Commission during the 1938 LING, but subject to the control of the INDIAN Commission.

2. INDIAN Police Force.

Shortly after the CHINESE occupation, the inhabitants of LING LING were called up as if in the LING. Those who had been used for some time for national work (of which the local INDIAN Party constituted officially amongst those who had opted for CHINESE in 1938, had made a list) were incorporated into the LING or the Police. Most of them were sent to other parts of occupied LING, where their knowledge of the CHINESE language was useful. (The INDIAN Police formation became early famous in LING.)

In LING LING local elements are used for police duties, but they are controlled and commanded by members from the LING.

From reports from people who have been in LING LING during the occupation, it would appear that the police forces are inferior to those in other parts of occupied LING, but superior to those in similar areas of LING.

3. Collaborative Elements.

Those of the residents of this region, who behaved particularly badly towards the INDIAN population, should be considered war criminals, e.g., advocates of CHINESE or SOLOMON, a certain PARTIS of SOLOMON, SOLOMON or SOLOMON, etc.

The "collaborator" force is described by all as a report of the 3723 who makes the most of a certain amount of popularity.

[illegible]2. Anti-Police Force

From reports from people who have been in JMW. Dies during the occupation, it would appear that the Polish forces are superior to those in other parts of occupied France, but superior to those in similar areas of Italy.

607 Laboratory and Field Studies

Those of the residents of this region, who behaved particularly badly towards the Iranian population, should be considered war criminals, e.g., against the ELIMINATION of ISLAMISM, a certain PARTIS of SOFT. POLICIES, REVENUE or ADVERTER, etc.

The "qualifier" word is confined by all as a member of the *Q* class, who makes the word of a certain amount of probability.

the following names of collaborators were mentioned by and sent them the LHO .0013:

Director General of the Zollverein Hospital

car. City of the United. Jan at 304.350

gerlondin 330210, a sister of 1052220.

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4. Financial questions.

ITALIAN money is still used in the ALTO ADIGE.

As is known, according to the Treaty of 1939, the ITALIAN State was obliged to acquire the property of the residents, who were being transferred to the TROCH under the terms of this Treaty. This is arranged through a corporation known as the Ente delle tre VALLI. At the time of the occupation, the property of the residents consisted of:

1. Property already acquired by the corporation and already resold by the corporation to ITALIANS.
2. Property already acquired by the Corporation, but not yet resold.
3. Property for which valuation was still in progress.

As far as the first category is concerned, the ITALIAN purchasers were ejected from the property without any compensation at all and the property was handed back to the original proprietors, who were only made to pay a sum to the ITALIAN Financial Commission.

The property under category "2" and the property under category "3" which was not claimed, passed for provisional administration to the said Commission, which gave this also to the CHURCHES. As for category "3" property, the valuation was not proceeded with and the property remained with the original proprietors.

ITALIAN Elements in ALTO ADIGE.

Amongst those who have remained in ALTO ADIGE, the following anti-NAZI persons have been mentioned:

Residents

Eugenio Radnich, Judge of the Tribunal of BOZEN.

Cetano Klunger of Gortano (Val Venosta).

Rogolo Kala, painter of BOZEN.

Vanderlik, owner of shop of same name of BOZEN.

Conte Carlo Sarenthalin of Sarentino.

S. Traloyer, owner of business "Fagola" at Bolzano.

Mons. Giovanni, industrialist, Lura d'Adige.

Doctor Borg, Agricultural Union of MERANO.

ITALIANS

CAV. Fassarini, ITALIAN volunteer interned by the fascists, of Via Sarentino 15, BOZEN.

Doctor Sarnapata, director of the Bank of Val di Aosta, BOZEN.

Doctor Ballovolaco, surgeon, Bolzano.

Ref. 11/211

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
ROME.

Copy to: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C.C., Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Allied Area Command.

Date: 20th January, 1945

Our 11/180 of 30th December, 1944

Source of these reports has sent us the following:-

Enclosure A: Translation of leaflet, apparently
addressed by Slovene Communists to
Italian Communists.

Enclosure B: Translation of leaflet, apparently
addressed by the C.L.N.A.I. to the
people of MILAN.

Date of information: Early January, 1945.

Source has not been able to confirm the origin
of these pamphlets, but states them to have been
received by a friend in MILAN through ordinary postal
channels. Source personally considers both inspired
by either the Communists or Fascists. Efforts are
being made to ascertain if Enclosure B. is in fact
an authentic document issued by the C.L.N.A.I.

These reports have already been handed to
Admiral Stone.

3224
Major
I.S.L.D.

"A" Enclosure to No. 11/211

1. We, Slovene Communists of the O.F. of the T.S.N.O.F. (the Directorate of the National Front of Slovene Partisans), wish to greet our Italian comrades on the occasion of the agreement reached between the C.L.N.A.I. and the O.F. This agreement is of historical importance since by it the C.L.N.A.I. recognises the existence of a free Slovene state and decrees that after the Nazi-Fascists have been expelled from TRIESTE, GORIZIA, FIUME, and POLA, these cities and their territories shall be restored to the Slovene state, to which they naturally belong.
2. Our renunciation to SLOVENIA's historical claims to the cities of VENICE and UDINE demonstrates our will to peace and harmony between the two nations.
3. After twenty years or more of slavery our martyred cities are to be restored to us. It is a great act of justice and understanding, possible only from the anti-Fascist parties.
4. At the very moment of the defeat of Fascist imperialism there will arise, at the side of a free ITALY, a free SLOVENIA, knowing how to forgive her neighbour for the long succession of wrongs suffered at his hands and ready to march, united with him, towards the brotherhood of all the free nations of the world.
5. Italian comrades, the Slav cities of TRIESTE, GORIZIA, FIUME and POLA are solemnly recognised as ours and guaranteed to us for the future. All our anger against you is abated ! We bring you, therefore, our fraternal greetings and acclaim you as more than comrades, as brothers !
6. Death to Fascism ! Liberty to the people ! Long live Free SLOVENIA ! Long live Free ITALY ! Long live Communism ! Long live the world union of soviet socialist republics !

Note : This pamphlet bore a round stamp containing a five-pointed star bearing the hammer and sickle at the centre and encircled by the following inscription : COMUNISTICKA PARTIJA SLOVENIJE
CENTRALNI ODBOR.

3223

"B" Enclosure to No. 11/241

1. People of MILAN ! The National Committee of Liberation in Northern ITALY is happy to bring to your notice the noble message sent by the Slav Communist Delegation of the C.P. to their Italian comrades, as the indication of a pact of historic significance concluded between the two peoples.
2. There can be no honest and truly Italian citizen who does not rejoice that justice has finally been done to the gallant Slav people, so long and so cruelly oppressed by loathsome Fascism.
3. The martyr cities of TRIESTE, CORFUA, POLA and FIUME will at last be restored to our new sister-state.
4. A small clique of aristocratic and war-mongering imperialists reactionaries sought to create the myth of ITALY's right to these territories, without any justification, and dragged us into a bloody war of conquest and extermination. Only stupid and egoistic Fascist imperialism could praise such conquests and exhort the Italian people to further dangerous adventures in order to "realise natural aspirations", which would inevitably lead to the enslavement of innocent peoples.
5. Ex-Fascist supporters, now incorporated in the C.L.N. conscious of the task of reconstruction which it will be a necessary duty to undertake when ITALY is liberated, have also decided that the latter's first act in international affairs must be to conclude a pact with the Slav liberation front.
6. The agreement which has been reached is a great act of justice, which serves to demonstrate to the world that true Italians, those that is, who were misled by Fascism, can themselves spontaneously fulfill their duty without waiting for the terms of an Allied armistice or the adjustments of the peace.

Note : This pamphlet was signed : The National Committee of
Liberation in Northern ITALY.

Ref. 11/209

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
ROME

Copy to: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C.C. Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.
Some Allied Area Command.

Date: 20th January, 1945

The following message addressed to the Minister CASATI and signed by CESARE SCIVO, President of the Economic Commission of Occupied Italy, has been received from a source in North West Italy.

"We consider the choice of MEDICI as Under Secretary for occupied territory most unfortunate in view of his previous activities in the ANSALDO concern. We are sending documentary evidence of this."


Major
I.S.L.D.

3221

Ref. 11/210

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy to: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C.C. Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Allied Area Command

Date: 20th January, 1945

The following message from the Liberal Party of the C.L.N.A.I., addressed to the Minister SCOCIMARRO and signed CESARE SCIVO, President of the Economic Commission of Occupied Italy, has been received from a source in North West Italy.

"As a consequence of the Republican Government's every effort to strip the country and send everything to GERMANY, in order to leave nothing behind for the Allies, occupied Italy is now facing a very serious shortage of essential foodstuffs. It is estimated that the present supply of bread will not last until the end of April. That part of last year's harvest hidden by the peasants, even if made available, could not be brought to the cities owing to lack of transport. We earnestly request the Allies to bear this food position well in mind when the time of our liberation arrives.

We are attempting to obtain help from SWITZERLAND and have written to BERLIO on the matter. We should be grateful if you would also write, asking him to assist us."


Major
I.S.L.D.

3220

Ref: 11/217

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy to: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C.C. Rome

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Allied Area Command

Date: 20th January, 1945

The following is a translation of a message received from a source in the TORIN area, dated 15th January, 1945.

"Working alone, hidden in a house for many hours of every day, it is often hard to fight demoralisation, but my faith in our cause remains unshaken. The one thing which makes my 'modest collaboration' hard and bitter is when I learn of the villainous attacks by Allied aircraft on small trains carrying civilians over secondary railway lines of no military importance. I am told that the machine gunning of a train at GIAVENO caused about 50 casualties, killed and wounded."


Major
I.S.L.D.

3219

REF: 11/221

21st J. May 1945

At a secret meeting of the "Communist Leaders" Togliatti stated:

1. Number of Communist Ministers would shortly be increased from four to six.
2. Later, Communists would claim all portfolios.
3. To achieve this they were prepared to use force and shed blood.
4. In Italy there were about 5000 persons, general and senior officers, clergy, professional men, writers and politicians who formed serious obstacle to propagation of Communism and its total victory. 3218 AM
these would be massacred.

COPY

14th January, 1945

Dear Sandro,

I was very sorry not to be able to come from LONDON to BUCARST where I should have had the chance of meeting you or one of our comrades. But it would have meant absconding myself for too long a period during a very delicate period. I shall return to LONDON at the end of February and by this time try and get me all the information possible. The situation here is not excellent. Instead of going up, we have been going downhill as is proved by our not taking part in the Government. We are strong, but the Party will not be entirely itself without you. Let us hope for the Spring.

I entirely approve your document which here, however, would appear excessively extremist. Though maintaining a less rigorous policy, I am being rather an Anti-Christ, creating a certain amount of hatred, largely compensated by popular following.

We are still ahead with the newspaper. I notice in your "A" a certain lack of interest in our problems with which you concern yourself too little. I do not see either the "B" or the "A" sufficiently mentioned, nor through the indications offered you by the "B" and "C". I hope to send you a complete collection.

The Major here was very irritated that you had not effected contact, which he attributed to your lack of interest. I told him what you had said in your letter. He is doing all that is necessary to set means of communication for you. We have decided on your accompanist for this function.

During these last few days I have seen the friends of "B" in a gross manner. Good situation. In contact with you. Directive correct.

I recommend that everything be ready for the print 3217 "A" (printing, stock of paper, ink etc.).

I do not make any recommendations for your safety but you know I have them at heart. The same for Fred whom I appreciate more and more, for Lelio, Corrado and all of them. I have had several communications from the Veneto. There seems to be a certain amount of disconcertment in respect of problems - not political ones but national ones. I have written an article to that effect for "B" and the "A", which has been much cited and much praised.

Here we are not the strongest but are more unanimous than those of whom one talks most. In spite of the knavish outcome of the crisis, our relations with our cousins are good and together with

time try and get me all the information possible. The situation here is not excellent. Instead of going up, we have been going downhill as is proved by our not taking part in the Government. We are strong but the Party will not be actively itself without you. Let us hope for the Spring.

I entirely approve your document which here, however, would appear excessively extremist. Though maintaining a less rigorous policy, I am being rather an anti-Christ, creating a certain amount of interest, largely compensated by popular following.

We are still ahead with the newspaper. I notice in your "A" a certain lack of interest in our problems with which you concern yourself too little. I do not see either the "B" or the "A" sufficiently mentioned, nor through the indications offered you by the Radio. I come to send you a complete collection.

The Mayor here was very irritated that you had not effected contact, which he attributed to your lack of interest. I told him what you had said in your letter. He is doing all that is necessary to let means of communication for you. We have decided on your accompanist for this function.

During these last few days I have seen the friends of "A. la Grasse". Good situation. No contact with you. Directive correct.

I recommend that everything be ready for the printing 3217
"A" (printing, stock of paper, ink etc.).

I do not make any recommendations for your safety but you know I have them at heart. The same for Paolo when I appreciate more and more, for Lello, Corrado and all of them. I have had several communications from the Veneto. There seems to be a certain amount of disconcertment in respect of problems - not political ones but national ones. I have written an article to take effect for Trieste the V.G. which has been much cited and much praised.

Here we are not the strongest but are more unanimous than those of whom one talks most. In spite of the haphazard outcome of the crisis, our relations with our cousins are good and together with them we are preparing to carry out administrative elections on an entire platform in its widest sense. The Government and especially the head who is responsible for what is happening in Sicily and might happen elsewhere, is inert and indolent.

All embrace to all from all and from me in particular.

(Signed) PIEMBO.

P.S. I have formed an Uff. Pol. composed as follows:
Pietro, Gino, Mario, Rinaldo, Genta, Ferr. Genitori
vice secretary.

Note: ORSINI - LUZZAPPI.

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(ALLIED FORCE)

JIC(AT)/12

19 January 1945

SUBJECT: Distribution of Reports on Exploitation of Intelligence
Objectives (Northern Italy and AUSTRIA).

TO : See Distribution overleaf.

1. The Secretariat of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee of JIC (London) maintains a library of intelligence reports which have been produced by Services and Agencies as a result of target exploitation. When such reports are received, their existence is communicated by the Secretariat to all parties who might be interested.

2. This system has been in operation for some time in the case of target reports coming in from the COMINT area of responsibility and it is proposed that the existing facilities should be extended to cover reports from the area of SIGINT.

3. It is therefore requested that one copy of any detailed intelligence report made as a result of target exploitation be sent to G-2 (I.C.S.S.) for onward transmission to the Secretariat of C.I.C.S. London.

for P. S. AIRY,
Major General, C.S.

for P. MOORE,
Air Commodore.

3215

899.1

POL. SEC. 8/35

21 JAN 1945

Objectives (continued)
TO : See Distribution overleaf.

1. The Secretariat of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee of JIC (London) maintains a library of intelligence reports which have been produced by Services and Agencies as a result of target exploitation. When such reports are received, their existence is communicated by the Secretariat to all parties who might be interested.

2. This system has been in operation for some time in the case of target reports coming in from the SCIT area of responsibility and it is proposed that the existing facilities should be extended to cover reports from the area of S.O.S.S.

3. It is therefore requested that one copy of any detailed intelligence report made as a result of target exploitation be sent to G-2 (I.O.S.S.) for onward transmission to the Secretariat of C.I.C.S. London.

W. J. S. Allen
Col G S C

Major General, G.S.

Edward etc

3216

for *P. W. Allen*
Air Commodore.

M. H. Dousfield

M. H. DOUSFIELD,
Captain, R.N.

-1-
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- 2 -
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G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) OMT
c/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 794, U.S. Army

3 204

6 January 45.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Reports on Exploitation of Intelligence
Objectives (Northern Europe and AUSTRIA).

TO : See Overleaf.

1. Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee of JIC (London) maintains a list of extant intelligence reports which have been produced by services and agencies as a result of target exploitation.

2. In accordance with instructions received from the Joint Intelligence Committee (Allied Forces), you are requested to submit one copy of all such reports to this office for transmission to C.I.C.S. (London).

3. It is stressed that the above request does not refer to reports in general terms submitted to Officers Commanding "G" Forces, but to the detailed reports submitted by the Field Team of an intelligence agency to its parent body, including those made subsequent to the close of an "G" Force operation.

4. For example, after the close of the FLEETCOM "G" Force operation, the Field Teams of the U.S.M. and R.N. Naval Intelligence units discovered material of outstanding interest in certain of the intelligence objectives in that town. Although the Director of Naval Intelligence will have received detailed reports on the material found through normal Naval channels, it is nevertheless the wish of C.I.C.S. (London) to obtain a copy of each report for purpose of record.

AWO/SS

DISTRIBUTION:

See overleaf.

3215

M.V. Wild
for J. COVENTRY, Capt.
Major, G.S.,
for Major General,
L. C. of S., G-2.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Reports on Exploitation of Intelligence Objectives (Northern Italy and Austria).

TO : See Overleaf.

1. Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee of JIC (London) maintains a list of extent intelligence reports which have been produced by services and agencies as a result of target exploitation.
2. In accordance with instructions received from the Joint Intelligence Committee (Allied Forces), you are requested to submit one copy of all such reports to this office for transmission to C.I.C.S. (London).
3. It is stressed that the above request does not refer to reports in general terms submitted to Officers Commanding "G" Forces, but to the detailed reports submitted by the field team of an intelligence agency to its parent body, including those made subsequent to the close of an "G" Force operation.
4. For example, after the close of the FLAMINGO "G" Force operation, the Field Teams of the U.S.M. and R.N. Naval Intelligence Units discovered material of outstanding interest in certain of the Intelligence Objectives in that town. Although the Director of Naval Intelligence will have received detailed reports on the material found through normal Naval channels, it is nevertheless the wish of C.I.C.S. (London) to obtain a copy of each report for purposes of record.

WJC/35

DISTRIBUTION:

See overleaf.

3215

M.V. Wind
for J. COVENEY,
Major, R.S.,
for Major General,
L. O. of S., C-2.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

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WS

AG 350.05 (30 Nov 44)CE-S-E-M

M/er 2B-939 Pentagon

4 December 1944

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign Governments.

TO : * * * *
The Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations.
* * * *

Inclosed for your information and guidance is a copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy No 5, 28 November 1944, subject: Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign Governments.


By order of the Secretary of War:

s/ Edward F. Witsell
t/ EDWARD F. WITSELL,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

1 Incl
As listed above.

DISTRIBUTION:
"X" plus
2 - Ea Corps
2 - Ea Division

Reproduced, Hq MTOUSA, 16 December 1944.


R. H. F.

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ECON SEC
CA SEC
POLITICAL SEC

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J.C.S. Policy Memo 5
28 November 1944

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFMEMORANDUM OF POLICY NO. 5BASIC POLICY GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

References: a. J.C.S. 927/2
b. J.C.S. 527/2
c. C.C.S. 432/1
d. C.C.S. 671

Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 November 1944 approved in J.C.S. 927/2 the policy circulated in Enclosure "A" hereto. This supplements the policy on release of equipment and disclosure of technical information to the U.S.S.R. in J.C.S. 527/2 which the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved on 23 December 1943 and which is attached as Enclosure "B".

2. Policies on disclosure of information have also been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the specific subjects of "Disclosure of Military Information to the Chinese" (C.C.S. 432/1) and "Policy on Release of Radar Equipment and Information" (C.C.S. 671).

A. J. McFARLAND

E. D. GRAVES, JR.,

Joint Secretariat.

3213

Inclosure No 1 to letter, WD, file AG 350.05 (30 Nov 44) OP-S-E-H,
subj: "Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign
Governments", dated 4 Dec 44.

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1968

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ENCLOSURE "A"

BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

1. Principles. The following principles shall apply in the disclosure of technical information to foreign governments:
 - a. The military security of the United States shall be safeguarded.
 - b. Classified technical information shall be disclosed only when such information can be effectively used by the recipient nation in the prosecution of the present war.
 - c. Technical information should be disclosed to foreign governments within the limitations above as is necessary for the prosecution of the present war, and especially as may be necessary in operational use.
2. Definition of Technical Information. "Technical Information" shall be deemed to include information on weapons and equipment, including instructions on maintenance and operation and any descriptive matter on components. It further includes means of manufacture, techniques and processes of weapons and equipment, together with information pertaining to the various sciences relating to weapons and equipment and to direct and indirect measures which may be employed in warfare. Information of a strategic or tactical nature ("military information") is specifically excluded from the meaning of this term.
3. Definition of Disclosure. "Disclosure of Technical Information" shall be deemed to include the furnishing of full or partial information and descriptions on weapons and equipment. The term "disclosure" includes attendance at, liaison with, or visits to demonstrations, maneuvers, schools, laboratories, proving grounds, works, yards, plants, factories, arsenals or any other like facility or means of imparting information. All foreign nationals as individuals are subject to the restrictions of disclosure as applied to their governments.
4. When Item is "Restricted". When an item of technical information is classified as "Restricted", the War and Navy Departments should determine, within the limitations established by Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combined Chiefs of Staff decisions, what information should be released.
5. When Item is "Confidential" or Higher. When an item of technical information is classified as "Confidential" or higher, the Joint Intelligence Committee shall be the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine, within the limitations established by Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff decisions, what information should be released.
6. Classification of Highest Component. The governing classification of a unit involving more than one component should be that of the most highly classified component which is necessary for the employment of the weapon or equipment. This should not change the security classification of other components of lower classification. Authorization for the disclosure of technical information as to a whole unit, such as a ship, tank, plane, or vehicle, should not in itself authorize the disclosure of auxiliary items bearing higher classifications.

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7. Reciprocal Security. Disclosure of technical information should in all cases be contingent upon the agreement of the recipient nation to effect the same security of the information as is effected by the United States.

8. No Commitment as to Supply. Disclosure of technical information does not imply that the actual equipment and materiel is available to the recipient of the technical information in supply quantities. Disclosure merely implies that there is no objection from a security point of view to the release of the information.

9. Information Not Releasable. Except by specific authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, technical information involving research and development projects, the applications of which are incapable of being introduced in the present war, shall not be released. Information specifically restricted by an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including cryptographic devices, is not to be released.

10. Operational Necessity Within a Theater. When operational necessity within a theater requires the immediate disclosure of technical information classified as "Confidential" or higher, the theater commander of U.S. forces may at his discretion make such disclosure. Whenever such disclosure is made it shall be immediately reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11. Release for Political or Economic Purposes. The necessity of the release of certain items of technical information for political or economic purposes to forward the war effort is recognized. Such releases will be confined to items classified not higher than "Restricted", decision being made in each case by the cognizant armed service (War or Navy Department). When necessity is believed to exist for the disclosure of items classified higher than "Restricted", for political or economic purposes, the question shall be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

12. Items under Consideration for Lend-Lease. Items under consideration for Lend-Lease which involve technical information shall be cleared in accordance with the procedure described in preceding paragraphs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIALENCLOSURE "B"DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO THE U.S.S.R.

Subject to reciprocity on the part of the U.S.S.R., the following policies shall serve as a general guide in the preparation and revision of lists of items of equipment, devices, and weapons, and of manufacturing processes and designs regarding which technical information may be disclosed to the U.S.S.R. to aid in the prosecution of the common war.

a. Technical information which may be released. The U.S.S.R. may be furnished with information falling within the categories listed below:

- (1) Technical information which is unclassified or carrying a classification equivalent to U.S. "Restricted".
- (2) Technical information concerning equipment, weapons, devices, manufacturing processes or designs intended for use by or from the U.S.S.R. which are in production, field test or are standard authorized equipment.
- (3) Technical information pertaining to the improvement and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and devices which are already in use by the U.S.S.R.

b. Technical information which may not be released -- The U.S.S.R. will not be furnished with technical information regarding items of equipment, devices, weapons, projects, processes or designs which fall in the following categories:

- (1) Items in the experimental, developmental, or laboratory stage.
- (2) Items in fields of scientific research which have not yet reached the stage at which their applicability to specific military or naval uses can yet be reasonably determined.
- (3) Items and processes the disclosure of which may be specifically restricted by an established agency of either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3211

Enclosure "B"

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C-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) C. M. S.
 C/S Rome Allied Area Command
 AEC 794, U. S. Army

31 OCT 44

INTELLIGENCE REPORT B-95Relations between the JAPANESE NAVY and ARMY.

Source: Various, through Etto Maggiore Generale (GIM).

From a confidential Chinese source it is learnt that the friction between the Navy and Army actually existed in Japan at the beginning of the war with China, as the Japanese Navy was against getting involved in a continental war without first being guaranteed its security in Southern waters.

Another reliable source states that the discord between the Army and Navy is almost non-existent, although from the time of the outbreak of war with America, the Navy has enjoyed more importance.

It is believed that the Navy's present strong position is a factor to be reckoned with, as the so called "Military Cliques" (Army) did not obtain for the Japanese, with their war in China and the occupation of Manchuria, the advantages previously anticipated for.

It is said that both campaigns, wanted by the Army, had been objected to by the Navy which preferred to use the Japanese forces in a southerly direction rather than westwards.

Other sources, in complete agreement with the above, assert that the differences of opinion between the Navy and Army are not of such a nature that they are detrimental to their collaboration since they always agreed on the aim which they have in common: that of strengthening the Japanese Empire.

On the other hand the informers do not exclude the possibility that, as a result of heavy defeats, the old deep seated dissension between the two armed forces may flare up again.

3219

AVE/rca

DISSEMINATION

M.V. Hixl Capt
 for J. COTTON
 Major, G. S.
 C-2(I.C.S.-S.)C.M.

1972

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Relations between the JAPANESE NAVY and ARMY.

Source:- Various, through State Magistrate General (S.M.).

From a confidential Chinese source it is learnt that the friction between the Navy and Army actually existed in Japan at the beginning of the war with China, as the Japanese Navy was against getting involved in a continental war without first being guaranteed its security in Southern waters.

Another reliable source states that the discord between the Army and Navy is almost non-existent, although from the time of the outbreak of war with America, the Navy has enjoyed more importance.

It is believed that the Navy's present strong position is a factor to be reckoned with, as the so-called "Military Oligarchy" (Army) did not obtain for the Japanese, with their war in China and the occupation of Manchuria, the advantages promised and hoped for.

It is said that both campaigns, waged by the Army, had been objected to by the Navy which preferred to use the Japanese forces in a southerly direction rather than westwards.

Other sources, in complete agreement with the above, assert that the differences of opinion between the Navy and Army are not of such a nature that they are detrimental to their collaboration since they always agreed on the aim which they have in common: that of strengthening the Japanese Empire.

On the other hand the informers do not exclude the possibility that, as a result of heavy defeats, the old deep seated disension between the two armed forces may flare up again.

3210

M.V. Hird Capt
Major, G. S.,
C-2(L.C.S-3.)CLP.

WVE/rm
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C-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) C. M. P.
U. S. Army Intelligence Command
APO 794, U. S. Army

2 NOV 1944

RECEIVED APO 794

Situation in Northern Italy

Source: Information obtained from individuals who were living in occupied Italy up to 29th of June 1944, through State Maggiore Generale (S.I.).

1) Period Comments

a) Reports to Intelligence and Communications

i) The railway line BOLLETO-VERONA is still intact, its central station, however, has been destroyed, but communication was taken place from the outskirts station of BOLLETO-VERONA.

ii) In the BOLLETO-VERONA locality the railroad up to VERONA is intact. Further up the line, however, it has suffered considerable damage, but has been provisionally repaired by the Germans and traffic has to go through very slowly.

Civilian train traffic goes south as far as RAVENNA. Towards itself the railway line is interrupted at REGGIO where heavy air attacks have completely destroyed the REGGIO mechanical workshops.

b) Reports to Navy

i) BOLOGNA has for the larger part been destroyed; its heaviest industries on the 25th of September 1943 which caused fatal casualties to six thousand civilians.

ii) VERONA is badly battered, meanwhile BOVIGO is still intact.

iii) RAVENNA has also been badly battered and almost across.

iv) MODENA near MILAN has suffered heavily and so has MILAN.

2) Reactions to Aerial Bombardment

The Italians are asking themselves why the allies bomb so often their cities and civil population when it is known that their arrival is so unduly awaited.

At first they attributed it to the war but now they ask why it is continued.

They say that if the allies are anxious to maintain the

3209

1) Aerial Bombardmentsa) Damaged to Bridges and Communications

i) the railway line BOZZANO-PIACENZA is still intact, its central station, however, has been destroyed, but court-wards take place from the outskirts station of BOZZANO RAIL-ROAD.

ii) In the BOZZANO-PIACENZA locality the railroad up to BOZZANO is intact; further up the line, however, it has suffered considerable damage, but has been provisionally repaired by the Germans and traffic has to go through very slowly.

Civilian train traffic goes south as far as MILANO. Towards Milan the railway line is interrupted at LEGNANO where heavy air attacks have completely destroyed the LOMBARD mechanical workshops.

b) Damaged to Towns

i) BOZZANO has for the moment not been destroyed; its nearest road was on the 25th of September 1943 which caused fatal casualties to six thousand civilians.

ii) VERONA is badly battered, meanwhile BOZZANO is still intact.

iii) PADOVA has also been badly battered and MILANO more so.

iv) MANTOVA more MILAN has suffered heavily and so has MILAN.

2) Reactions to Aerial Bombardments

The Italians are asking themselves why the allies bomb so often their cities and civil population when it is known that their survival is so audaciously wanted.

At first they attributed it to the war but now they ask why it is continued.

They say that if the allies are anxious to maintain the sympathies of the Italian population they should confine themselves to attacking military objectives; in fact, of recent it has been remarked that aerial attacks are more accurate.

The majority of the population is very fond of the allies and it is wonderful why it is being subjected to such treatment.

In many houses of BOLOGNA and surroundings, British and American flags are being prepared.

2) German Administration

The FORGERING BILL legality above VERONA is described as the frontier zone between Fascist ITALY and ALLIANCE and all travellers have to show their personal documents.

At BOLZANO, Italian is very seldom spoken; all the street signs are in GERMANY. All youngsters have been called up. Town policing is done by civilians wearing identification arm bands and carrying a rifle.

The Germans have reorganized the provinces of TRIESTE, BOLZANO and FRIULI in the so called "provinces operational zone", essentially the provinces of TRIESTE, BOLZANO and FRIULI are now known as the "German Military Provinces". Movement are prohibited in German and Slovenia but no longer in Italian. The authorities are exclusively German as is for the rest of Northern Italy itself. Fascists have no say at all and they can do nothing without the sanction of the Germans. Fascist elements, however, claim that were it not for their presence Italians would have received a harder treatment.

The prefect for BOLZANO is a certain Pantoni.

Curfew in BOLZANO is from 2200 hours to 0500 hours. VERONA has it from 2400 hours to 0500 hours.

4) Partisan Activities

There is considerable partisan activity on the Italian side of the ALPINE. These can be classified as follows:

- a) The so called "bandits" consisting of military elements who have remained faithful to the GERMANY and the Government.
- b) The Communists.
- c) Thieves, looters and adventurers indifferent to politics.
- d) Damages to railways caused by partisans are irrelevant owing to the fact that they can only use hand grenades.
- e) Near TRIESTE they are interfering with motor traffic by placing on the roads painted impediments which paralyze trucks.

5) Antiaircraft Defense

ITALY at present has no antiaircraft defenses.

6) Anti-Nazi/Communist Propaganda

The clandestine press is widespread throughout Northern ITALY but not in BOLZANO. There is a large number of subversive pamphlets can be found there.

Among the new clandestine papers published in ITALY are "La Nuova Italia" (New Italy) and "Libertas" (Liberty).

authorities are extremely... are that itself. Fascists have no say at all in the government... nothing without the sanction of the Council. Fascist elements, however, claim that were it not for their presence Italians would have received a harder treatment.

The prospect for MILITARY is a certain disaster.

Outlook in BOLOGNA is from 2200 hours to 0500 hours. VENEZIA. from 2200 hours to 0500 hours.

4) Domestic Activities

There is considerable partisan activity on the Italian side of the ALPS. There can be classified as follows:

- a) The so called "Bambocciata" consisting of military elements who have remained faithful to the Republic and the Government.
- b) The Communists.
- c) The Socialists, teachers and adventurers indifferent to politics.
- d) Devotes to railways owned by fascists are irrelevant owing to the fact that they can only use hand grenades.
- e) Near MILITARY they are interfering with motor traffic by placing on the roads pointed implements which punturo tyres.

5) Antifascist Defense

MILITARY at present has no antifascist defense.

6) Anti-Nazi/Partisan Propaganda

The clandestine press is widespread throughout Northern Italy, not only in BOLOGNA, though a large number of subversive pamphlets can be found there.

Among the most clandestine papers published in MILITARY are "La Nuova Italia" (New Italy) and "Libertà" (Liberty).

Communist propaganda is most active.

The majority amongst the population though young and anxious to see an end to their sufferings has a tendency for Communism. The bourgeoisie for various reasons reject it.

The BOLOGNA students and the town's Italian population in general are decidedly anti-Fascist. Very few are those who adhered to the new Fascist party.

SUMMARY

Even before the 25th of July there existed in the BOLOGNA University the so-called Communist cells. Although the population is in favour of the dynasty it is much against the King who is accused of having supported Mussolini for twenty years. A probable reason for this is that at its head would not be welcome as it would leave doubts as to who would be actually reigning. On the whole it cannot be said that the Italians are in favour of a republic.

In BOLOGNA and other places such as "Down with the Germans", "Strike", "Help the Partisans", "Kill Stalin", "Heal the King" as also the "Hammer and sickle" sign appear overnight on all the walls, and the Fascist Roman soldiers are kept busy every morning erasing them.

All told, everyone is nervous and anxious to see an end to hostilities though it is anticipated that after cessation, a civil war may break out.

7) Radio Broadcasts

Although Fascists have frozen all radios in the small villages, this has not happened in the big cities.

R. B. C. transmissions and particularly the 0930 hours broadcasts are generally listened to.

Italian appreciate "Radio Roma" talks (when they believe to be G. M. Grandi), G. M. STURZA talks as well as those talks broadcast until recently by G. M. STURZA.

As a rule they prefer British to American broadcasts because the latter are full of news of the Far-east which does not interest them.

The "Voce di Londra" (Voice of London) has no following as, at that time of the year almost everyone is out at work.

MOSCOW is very seldom listened to.

8) Other News

a) VERONA is intact and its population is certain that the city will be spared. Many Italian and German diplomats have gone there for refuge.

b) The two bridges on the PO near PORTUGHERA are intact.

c) The railway bridge at VERONA on the PO is also intact; 3203 no anti-aircraft defenses and is simply camouflaged by a smoke screen.

d) Quite a large number of the civilian population in the BRESCIA region wear a sweater in their button hole.

e) Newspapers are no longer published in Italian and only one paper

1978

All told, everyone is weary and anxious to see an end to hostilities though it is anticipated that after cessation, a civil war may break out.

7) Radio Broadcasts

Although Fascists have broken all radios in the small villages, this has not happened in the big cities.

B. B. C. transmissions and particularly the 0950 hours broadcasts are generally listened to.

Italians appreciate "Caldwell's" talks (whom they believe to be G. H. Thompson), Col. Smith's talks as well as those of the broadcast until recently by GROSSO HUNTER.

As a rule they prefer British to American broadcasts because the latter are full of news of the far-east which does not interest them.

The "Voice of London" (Voice of London) has no following as, at that time of the day almost everyone is out at work.

WOSOW is very seldom listened to.

8) Other News

a) VENEZIA is intact and its population is certain that the city will be spared. Many Italians and German refugees have gone there for refuge.

b) The two bridges on the FO near BONTALIGOSCUR are intact.

c) The railway bridge at BELLIGIA on the PO is also intact; 13203 no anti-aircraft defenses and is simply camouflaged by a screen.

d) Quite a large number of the civilian population in the BREMER BAS region wear a sweater in their button hole.

e) Newspapers are no longer published in Italian and only one paper is published in German, it is called the "Deutsches Tagblatt".

f) The "Tuesdi" Aviation Radio apparatus factories in BOLOGNA have been spared destruction by any means.

RP/rbm

for M V Hird Capt
Major, G. S.,
G-2(I.O.S.S.)/217.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMED COMMISSION
4-20-394
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ref : 51/PAT.

Subject : Intelligence Reports.

NO : 830 distribution.

25 November 1944.

Ref. #1/PAT, dated 30 August 44.

It is notified that the distribution of Intelligence Reports by the Army, England Patriots Branch, Warrenton, is being discontinued forthwith. It is considered that the ground is already sufficiently covered by the Intelligence which is available in the Warrenton Branch, and out by No. 1 Special Agent.

R. E. SPICER,
Colonel,
Director,
PATROUS Branch.

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4th 8th Army
DOA, C. A.
H. C. No. 2 District
No. 1 Special Agent
P. A.

Regional Commissioners :

Region IV, V, Joseph, Yalla

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Ref. 51/211, dated 30 August 44.

It is noticed that the distribution of intelligence referred by the Mr. London Patriot Branch, London, is being discontinued forthwith. It is considered that the ground is already sufficiently covered by the intelligence which is available in the London Branch and out by No. 1 Special Force.

R. G. S. SPICER,
Colonel,
Director,
Patriot Branch.

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Political Section
Civil Affairs Section
P.S. Branch
Adv. Det. P.S. Branch.

3207

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Ref: - 105/L/C(Ops)'B'

Adv: Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

11 Nov '44

Mr William W. Schott,
Vice President, Political Section,
HQ, Allied Commission,
A.P.O. 394.

My dear Mr Schott,

In answering your letters of 23 Oct and 1 Nov, ref: 899.1, I must first apologise most abjectly for the long delay. My only excuse is that I am a member of a section numerically quite small and when I am away or involved in some one particular matter all other business remains undone.

Here is the position with regard to participation of U.S. officers with Rankin parties. When the project first took form it was envisaged that British officers of No.1 Special Force and U.S. officers of OSS would participate in equal numbers. However, higher authority (U.S.) ruled that OSS officers did not possess requisite qualifications for such work and hence were forbidden to take part, a decision which I consider most sound. This decision dried up the only source of officers for such assignment that was open to us. This HQ (U.S.) works on a rigid Table of Organisation and has no pool of officers who might be assigned tasks such as Rankin missions. It is not considered a proper task for Fifth Army so no request will be made on them. There remains then, as the only remaining sources for U.S. officers, your own organisation and the replacement depots.

The two officers, Maj Rees and Lt. Barnes, mentioned in your last letter are not under the jurisdiction of this HQ. I don't know what steps should be taken by your HQ to obtain their services.

OSS is the sole agency charged with providing officers for Special Operations and in view of their position in regard to Rankin missions it is apparent that this HQ can do nothing in the matter of providing U.S. participation in this project.

Maj-Gen. Lemmitzer, CG, AAI (U.S. Contingent), is aware of the position in this matter as outlined in this letter.

Yours sincerely,

John H. Pease

3206

Mr William W. Schott,
Vice President, Political Section,
HQ, Allied Commission,
A.P.O. 394.

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Maj-Gen. Lemnitzer, CG, AAI (U.S. Contingent), is aware of the position in this matter as outlined in this letter.

Yours sincerely,

John H. Piepe
J. Col., G.S.C.

3206

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

S-E-C-R-E-T

Ref: 899.1

1 November 1944

Colonel J. H. Riepe,
C-3 (Sp Ops)
HQ. A.A.I.

Dear Colonel Riepe:

With reference to my letter No. 899.1 of October 23, 1944 concerning the possibility of participation of G.S.S. officers with the S.O.E.-P.W.B. teams in the Northern Regions I now have received from the Commander of No. 1 Special Force a letter reading as follows:

"With reference to the suggestion put forward by Lt. Col. Stevens at a meeting held in Brigadier Lash's office that RANKIN parties should include at least one American officer, the following are the names of two American officers who have had experience in France and who are known personally to Lt. Col. Stevens:

- 1) Lieut; TRACY HARRIS, U. S. Army Air Corps,
who may be contacted through Air
Attache, U.S. Embassy, London.
- 2) Major Jack REES, Infantry Corps,
c/o G.S.S. London.

"It would be much appreciated if the services of the above two officers could be obtained.

"On the assumption that present plans remain unchanged, there will be a total of 15 Missions; three of them being main Missions and the remaining twelve subsidiary missions."

Sincerely yours,

3205

WILLIAM W. SCHOFF
Vice President, Political Section

899.1
1.668

SECRET

Ref: IS/4/36

30th October 1944.

Subject: American Officers for RANKIN Parties
-----To: Mr. Schott;
Political Section, A.C.C.From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

With reference to the suggestion put forward by Lt. Col. Stevens at a meeting held in Brigadier Lush's office that RANKIN parties should include at least one American officer, the following are the names of two American officers who have had experience in France and who are known personally to Lt. Col. Stevens:

- 1) Lieut; TRACY BARNES, U.S. Army Air Corps,
who may be contacted through Air
Attache, U.S. Embassy, London.
- 2) Major Jack REES, Infantry Corps,
C/o O.S.S. London.

It would be much appreciated if the services of the above two officers could be obtained.

On the assumption that present plans

320

remain unchanged, there will be a total of 15 Missions; three of them being main Missions and the remaining twelve subsidiary missions.

Enulloch

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 364

Ref 899.1

23 October 1944

Dear Colonel Riepe:

At a recent meeting called by the Chief-of-Staff, ACC, the question was raised of the possibility of participation of C.S.S. officers with the A.C.S.-P.S.S. teams for the Northern Regions to operate during the vacuum period before the arrival of AMG. The three senior C.S.S. officers who were present indicated the desirability of closer cooperation between A.C.S. and C.S.S. officers in Northern Italy and they particularly wished to see at least one C.S.S. officer attached to each of the three teams now going forward to operate in Regions X and XI. They asserted that the presence of an American officer heightened the morale of their British colleagues, and that there is a demand for officers technically trained in port installations, police work, elementary engineering, and so forth.

While this, of course, is no direct concern of mine I suggest the matter to you because of the circumstances with which it was put forth and because of the particular interest shown in it by the Chief-of-Staff, Brigadier Lush, who asked me to bring it informally to the attention of the proper American official.

With kindest regards,

I remain,

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice-President, Political Section

Copy to: Colonel Monfort,
EXJAG, Civil Affairs Section,
HQ AAF.

3203

Colonel J. B. Riepe,
O-3 (Sp Ops)
HQ AAF.

1987

1. This matter should be referred to
Col. R. R. R. (R. R. R.), who
commented. The comment of American officers
should be clearly and exactly defined.

2. Other comments here.

AD - 1. AD - DCCAO

6,615-60

Chief Officer - AAE 225?

HEAD QUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 894

TOP SECRET
~~TOP SECRET~~

Ref 7899.1

18 October 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-3 Section, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 812.

SUBJECT: Attachment of U.S. Officers to U.S. Groups in Northern Regions.

1. The U.S. Army is anxious for the Northern Regions to operate during the vacuum period before the arrival of AG are ready to proceed.

2. At a meeting held yesterday in the office of the Chief of Staff, the question of the possibility of participation of U.S. officers with these teams was raised. The three senior U.S. officers who were present indicated the desirability of closer cooperation between U.S. and U.S. officers in Northern Italy and they particularly wished to see at least one U.S. officer attached to each of the three teams now being formed to operate in Regions I, II, and III. They asserted that the presence of an American officer heightened the morale of their British colleagues, and that there is a demand for officers technically trained in port installations, police work, elementary engineering, and so forth.

3. The following names of two American officers who have operated in France with one or the other of the three senior British officers were submitted by them with an expression of the hope that they might again be associated: Major Jack Reed, Infantry; and Lt. Tracy Barnes, Air Corps. These two officers are said now to be unemployed and awaiting orders in London.

4. It would be appreciated were this matter to be discussed with Colonel Glavin, G-2, and an earnest recommendation made to him that the service of American officers with the U.S. in the coming operations be made available if possible.

5. The Chief of Staff, A.C.C., concurs in this recommendation.

3201

WILLIAM J. SCHUTT
Vice-President, Political Section

Copy to: Colonel Glavin, G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) AFHQ
c/o Rome Allied Area Command,
APO 784, U. S. Army

26 OCT 44

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. E-90

Allied landings in ALBANIA.

Source: S.I.S.'s confidential source.

From various sources, it is learnt that the ALLIED landings in ALBANIA have disappointed considerably the ALBANIAN circles in ITALY who expected with certainty the liberation of their country within a comparatively short time.

The same circles, it is learnt, have also remarked with growing apprehension that the landings have been effected at 'PORT KILMA' and that occupation has been limited to territory which has been reclaimed by GREECE, and so fear that the ALLIES have already come to an agreement with GREECE for the annexation of these territories.

RE/cas

A. J. CONVENTRY,
Major, G.S.
G2 (I.O.S-S) AFHQ

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3200

Source:- S.I.M.'s confidential source.

From various sources, it is learnt that the ALLIED landings in ALGERIA have disappointed considerably the ALGERIAN circles in T.M.F. who expected with certainty the liberation of their country within a comparatively short time.

The same circles, it is learnt, have also not unkindly growing apprehension that the landings have been effected at 'empty lines' and that occupation has been limited to territory which has been reclaimed by CHARGES, and so fear that the ALLIES have already come to an agreement with CHARGE for the annexation of these territories.

RE/cis

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A J DOVERDA.
Major, G.S.
C2(I.O.S-S)AFHQ

3209

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CMF

Office of the Chief of Staff

25 October 1944.

Ref/532/008.

SUBJECT: Report from O.S.S.

TO : G - 5 Section, A.F.S.O.

1. I enclose an unsigned report (if it is worthy of such a name) purporting to come from O.S.S. You will notice that it has been widely circulated.
2. I need hardly say that the report is a travesty of the truth, mischievous and misleading.
3. I should be glad if instructions could be issued to have the report withdrawn. The facts can be ascertained from A.C.C. if required.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to : V.P. Political Section
P.R.O.
Eighth Army A.M.G.

3193

CONFIDENTIALCOPY

APO 534

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE
X - 2 Branch - P. Section

Report No. A2-212

15 October 1944.

SUBJECT: A.M.G. Policies in the Province of Ancona.

1. In the Province of Ancona and neighbouring provinces A.M.G. systematically suppresses every political manifestation press, propaganda and even private meeting suspected to be of an anti-Monarchical character.
2. Newspapers, leaflets and posters which mention either the King or the Monarchy are confiscated and the distributors arrested.
3. The Military Authorities, have dissolved all local Epuration Commissions.
4. Political parties which abstain from anti-Monarchical propaganda such as the Liberal, Christian-Democratic and Communist Parties may rely on A.M.G.'s support and help, while all circulation permits granted to all other parties are denied to the Action Party, only intransigent party on the Institutional question.
5. Because of this general A.M.G. Policy in that region particularly noticeable in the Province of Ancona, Avv. Oddo MARINELLI of the Action Party who had become Prefect right after the liberation of Ancona on the unanimous designation of all parties, was obliged to resign after little over a month in office. He has been replaced by a Career Prefect, formerly Fascist, of the A.M.G. Commissioner's liking. This roused the indignation of the overwhelming majority of the people.

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TWO SECRET

FROM: MR CATTY

CAPT. DUKE

Annex. Floor 2. Room 53. Tel. Ext. 513

TO: Mr. CACCIA, Political Section.

DATE: 27 Oct 1944

Herewith our first batch of intelligence summaries
for Director GCS under item four of our terms of
reference; Would you be kind enough to pass them on
to Embassy for transmission by bag as proposed in your
minute of 25th Oct.

F.R.C.

F.R.Catty.

*Mr. Caccia**Transmitted by bag.**1/27/44*

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CONFIDENTIAL

C-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) AFHQ
 c/o Rome Allied Area Command,
 A.P.O. 794, U.S. Army

22 OCT 44

INTELLIGENCE REPORT B-82

Relations between the JAPANESE representatives in ROME
 for the NAVY and the ARMY, throughout the period of
 GERMAN occupation.

Source:- A confidential source of the Stato Maggiore
 Generale (SII).

Office Layout.

In ROME, the offices were arranged as follows:-
 the military and airforce attachés, headed by General
 SHIMIZU, in Via ASINARA,
 the Naval and Fleet air arm attachés headed by Command-
 er MITSUNOBU in Via CLITUNNO.

Admiral ABE had his Headquarters in the offices of the Naval Attaché.
 His duties were not at all defined.

2. Relations.

Apparently there existed the maximum of cordiality, both
 offices were trying to have an upper hand in the control of the
 Embassy as far as propaganda organisation was concerned.

Particularly clever was General SHIMIZU to whose activities
 was due the higher prestige which the Army enjoyed.

3. Propaganda.

General SHIMIZU's main link with the ITALIAN press was
 professor Cino TERRA, who has now followed the General up North.
 TERRA signed many of General SHIMIZU's or even General SHIMIZU's
 officers' articles. TERRA also gave an ITALIAN colouring to the
 written articles and conferences of General SHIMIZU.

On the other hand the Naval attaché had no such clever
 support; hence the reason for the poor quality of his propagandist
 efforts.

It was not simply a case of emulation; but the diversity
 of political views was also apparent. Even in their relations with
 the ITALIAN authorities the militarist group had closer contact with
 the Fascist Party than the Navy.

26 OCT 1944

A. C. C.

Source:- A confidential source of the Stato Maggiore Generale (SM).

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4. Recognition of the Fascist Republican Government.

It is possible that the recognition by JAPAN of the Fascist Republican Government is due more to General SHIMIZU's support than the Ambassador's.

Intimately connected with General SHIMIZU is Colonel (now General) Guglielmo SCALISSA, at present in the North of ITALY.

RP/cks.

for M V Hind Capt.
A. J. COVENTRY
Major. G.S.
G-2(I.O.S-S)AFHQ

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 324

Subject : Intelligence Reports.

Ref. 76/PAT

To : Major Drage.

24 Sep. 44.

Copy to : Mr Harold Caccia, Political Section.
Col. Spicer, Interior Sub Commission.

Please make it clear to all Intelligence Teams that lists of prefects, sindaco or prominent Fascists are never to be sent out with our Intelligence Reports.

When we get any information about such people this should be sent to the Interior Sub Commission whose business it is to deal with such matters. In view of this please arrange to have cancelled your AGO/507/PAT of 18th September. - The part that gives lists of Fascists.

Chas Carthy

C. D. Mc GARRY.
Colonel.
Patriots Branch.
R.C. & M.C. Section.

3195

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Subject : Regional Reports.

Ref. 76/PAT

24 Sep. 44.

To : Mr Harold Caccia,
Political Section. *HAC*

Copy to : Major Drage.

This refers to your memo of 19th September about Region XII Report and your memo of 22nd September about Fascists.

I am quite sure that I told you that the relevant pieces of report on Region IX and Region XII had been cancelled.

With regard to the report on Fascists (Region IX), ref. ACC/507/PAT, this came from Florence and crossed our instruction ref. 70/PAT of 20 September, copy of which was sent to you. *It also is being cancelled.*

Arrangements have been made for all such advance info to be channelled through Interior Sub Com in future as should have happened in the original reports.

C. D. Mc CARTHY.
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.
R.C. & M.G. Section.

URGENT / JED 041200Z

22 September 1944

TO: Patriotic Branch
 Copies to: Brigadier Tamm
 Interior Sub-Commission

FROM: Political Section

1. I attach a copy of Patriotic Branch Memorandum AGO/507/PAC of the 18 Sep 44 which reached us this morning.

2. At the risk of laying myself open to the accusation of suffering from a persecution complex, I must inquire what is the purpose of this list of suspects? It is stated that it is forwarded for information, but have we checked any of this information from Dr. Bessant? It is, after all, a very easy accusation to make and not at all easy to prove that someone was a member of the CVRA or was a spy. If the Political Section in AGO wants elucidation on such points, surely AGO Officers in the field will need it all the more. At least I presume that the object of forwarding this information to them is that they should be in a position to take some action.

3. And I must ask, is it the duty of the Patriotic Branch to collect and disseminate this sort of information?

HAC
 H. A. GARDIA

319:

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G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) CWP
c/o Rome Allied Area Command
APO 794, U.S. Army

G 106

23 September, 1944.

SUBJECT: Change of Unit Designation and Telephone Exchange Numbers.

TO : See distribution.

Our letter G 106, of 5 July, 1944, is cancelled and the following is substituted:

1. Unit Designation:

The designation of this Unit has been altered with immediate effect and will be known as:

G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) AFHQ.

2. The location is unchanged:

Teatro delle Belle Arti,
2nd Floor British square 3rd Floor American,
59, Via SILENTIA,
ROMA.

3. The official mailing address is:-

G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) AFHQ,
c/o Rome Allied Area Command,
APO 794, U.S. Army.

4. The cable address is:-

Rome Allied Area Command for G-2 (Intelligence Objectives
Sub-Section) AFHQ.

5. The telephone exchange and extension numbers are:

ROME

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478446
478447
478448
478449
478738
478590
478593
478594
478596

General Office, Ext. 14 (Room 37)
O. C.'s Office, Ext. 16, (Room 29)

Other Extensions are:-

27 (Room 39)
34 (Room 51)
51 (Room 20)
66 (Room 56)

2001

899.1

substituted:

1. Unit Designation:

The designation of this Unit has been altered with immediate effect and will be known as:

G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) AFHQ.

2. The location is unchanged:

Teatro delle Belle Arti,
2nd Floor British equals 3rd Floor American,
59, Via SIGILLI,
ROMA.

3. The official mailing address is:-

G-2 (Intelligence Objectives Sub-Section) AFHQ,
c/o Rome Allied Area Command,
APO 794, U.S. Army.

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
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C-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ
c/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 794, U.S. Army

HC

S 204

29 August, 1944

SUBJECT: Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee.

TO : See distribution below.

Ref. C-2 (Adv. Int.) letter S 204, dated 27 Aug 44.

A meeting of the above Sub-Committee will be held in Room No. 38 (2nd floor), at 59 Via Sicilia (Teatro delle Arti), ROME, at 1000 hours on Thursday, 7 September, 1944, under the direction of D.B.G.S.(I), A.A.I.

The purpose of the meeting is:

- a. To review the lists of intelligence objectives for BOLOGNA, SPEZIA and GENOA.
- b. To determine the forces and organization necessary to deal with them.

Approved

A.J. COVENTRY,
Major, G.S.,
for B.G.S.(I),
H.Q., A.A.I.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
C/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 794 U.S. ARMY

13 Aug 44

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. D-116

INFORMATION on the GOTHIC LINE and on PARTISAN BANDS

Source: Two Italian Naval Officers who crossed the line shortly before 31 July 44, and who may be considered reliable.

Ref: Map. ITALY 1:100,000. Sheets 73,86,87,96,97,98,105,106
Note: It has not been possible to identify, either on the map or with a Gazetteer, all the place-names mentioned. Wherever possible, a map reference has been given, consisting of a sheet number followed by a stroke and a four-figure reference.

I. Area MODENA

PAVULLO (86/4732)

There are an ammunition dump in the hospital, and an M.T. Park in the pine trees.

LAVA (97/3930)

Outlying buildings are occupied by the German garrison guarding the GIARDINI road (about 1,000 men) and at FIGNOLA there is an ammunition dump

PIEVITELAGO (97/3018)

Another German garrison for the defense of the GIARDINI road (about 1,000 men).

PIUMALBO (97/3215)

German garrison of smaller size defending the GIARDINI road.

SASSUOLO (86/4455)

An important re-organising centre for German troops (a kind of large Comando Tappa).

GALATO (97/4827)

An ammunition and M.T. park in the hospital.

RAZZANO (87/6830)

An important collecting place for cattle for the provisioning of troops.

MASERA

Field hospital with clearly shown Red Cross signs being used as an artillery ammunition store.

VIGNOLA (87/6247)

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Ref:

Map. ITALY 1:100,000. Sheets 73,86,87,96,97,98,105,106
Note: It has not been possible to identify, either on the map or with a Gazetteer, all the place-names mentioned. Wherever possible, a map reference has been given, consisting of a sheet number followed by a stroke and a four-figure reference.

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There are an ammunition dump in the hospital, and an M.T. Park in the pine trees.

LAGA (07/3930)

Outlying buildings are occupied by the German garrison guarding the GIARDINI road (about 1,000 men) and at FIGNOLA there is an ammunition dump

PIEVITELAGO (07/3018)

Another German garrison for the defense of the GIARDINI road (about 1,000 men).

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German garrison of smaller size defending the GIARDINI road.

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An important re-organising centre for German troops (a kind of large Comando Tappa).

GALATO (07/4827)

An ammunition and M.T. park in the hospital.

RAZZANO (07/6850)

An important collecting place for cattle for the provisioning of troops.

MASERA

Field hospital with clearly shown Red Cross signs being used as an artillery ammunition store.

VIGNOLA (07/6247)

Clearing centre for troops destined for the Italian Front.

SPILANBERTO (07/6353)

Explosives factory which is still working, employing about 4,000 people.

LUZZANO (07/5012)

German Corps H. Q.

CASTELNUOVO MONTE (05/1344)

German garrison of about 5,000 men.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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ROCCA DI MONTESE (97/5521)

E. S., H. Q., and fortified garrison--strongly situated in an old castle, it is the H.Q., dealing with partisans.

II. GOTHIC LINE

Source's information on the Gothic Line started South of PIZZORRE. From here the line runs to DOVACCHIO and thence to BATTIOLE (105/5394)-PELILLI MONTA-MARINE DE MONTELO-South of PRUNETTA (97/4396)-South of PIASERE (97/4695)-CIREGLIO (105/4794). It consists of three lines of metal wire entanglements (not barbed), probably electrified, to a height of 60 cms. interspersed with emplacements for H.M.G.s although the latter were not yet in position. From statements made to source by persons who worked in the Todt organisation on the construction of the line itself, there are also a number of small tunnels and pill boxes. A strip of ground about 40 rs. wide extending along the whole line has been cleared of shrubbery, and the trees cut to a height of about 14.50. In the PIASERE area there are minefields. Bundles of dried shrubs were also noticed placed at regular intervals along the line, and in source's opinion probably covering mines, either anti-personnel or anti-tank.

There are defence works in reinforced concrete in the areas of SAN ROSSORE and BAGNI DI LUCCA (97/2796) but no further details are available.

Similar fortifications to the above exist on the PORRETTANA-CANATACALLO (98-6697) road, as yet without armament. The Todt Organisation was still working in the area of ACQUERINO on the construction of H.Q. emplacements and small pill-boxes.

At IMPRESA (97/4601) a fairly important German H.Q. was situated in a red villa a short way out of the town, together with some A.A. batteries, probably 88 mm, on the high ground between IMPRESA and Highway 16.

To the N.W. of GUARRATA in the area of TIZZANA, there were very large stocks of fuel situated in the wood at MACIA.

All bridges over the R. ARNO in the area of IMPOLI were destroyed, excepting those connecting important highways such as the road CERNADO-IMPOLI-FLORENCE. Neighbouring roads capable of carrying wheeled traffic, such as the road MONTELUPO-IMPOLI, had all been mined and were already partly destroyed.

III. NOTES on the ORGANISATION of the PARTISAN BANDS.

The most important and best organised band had its H.Q. at MONTEFIORINO (96/3055) and was organised as a "Corps" covering the

Source's information on the Gothic Line started South of PIZZORNE. From here the line runs to BOVACINO and thence to SANTIPOLE (105/5394)-FELTRINA MONTANA-JECTIVE DI JOTIC-O-South of PRUNELLA (97/4396)-South of PIASERE (97/4695)-CIBELIO (105/4794). It consists of three lines of metal wire entanglements (not barbed), probably electrified, to a height of 60 cms. interspersed with emplacements for H.M.C.s although the latter were not yet in position. From statements made to source by persons who worked in the Todt organisation on the construction of the line itself there are also a number of small tunnels and pill boxes. A strip of ground about 40 ms. wide extending along the whole line has been cleared of shrubbery, and the trees cut to a height of about 1m.50. In the PIASERE area there are minefields. Bundles of dried shrubs were also noticed placed at regular intervals along the line, and in source's opinion probably covering mines, either anti-personnel or anti-tank.

There are defence works in reinforced concrete in the areas of SAN ROSSORE and BAGNI DI LUCCA (97/2796) but no further details are available.

Similar fortifications to the above exist on the PORRETTANA-CAMETACALLO (93-6697) road, as yet without armament. The Todt Organisation was still working in the area of ACQUERINO on the construction of M.C. emplacements and small pill-boxes.

At IMPRESA (97/4301) a fairly important German H.Q. was situated in a red villa a short way out of the town, together with some A.A. batteries, probably 88 mm, on the high ground between MARESCA and Highway 16.

To the N.W. of GUARRATA in the area of TIZZANA, there were very large stocks of fuel situated in the wood at MACIA.

All bridges over the R. ARNO in the area of AREOLI were destroyed, excepting those connecting important highways such as the road CERETI-AREOLI-FLORENCE. Neighbouring roads capable of carrying wheeled traffic, such as the road MONTELUPO-VALMANTILE had all been mined and were already partly destroyed.

III. NOTES ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE PARTISAN BANDS.

The most important and best organised band had its H.Q. at MONTENOTIC (86/3055) and was organised as a "Corps" covering the area SAN MARTINO-ZIANI DELACOTTI-PASSO DELLE RADICI-PASSO DELLE FORCIE-MONTE GIOVARELLO-MONTE SCALODOLO-high ground between CEREDOLO and MONTE SANTA GIULIA.

Patrols from the "Corps" cover the surrounding areas reaching by day and by night, the latter in particular, to a distance of 25-30 kms from the above line. Other bands occupy the area of SESTOLI (97-4221) and FANANO in the MODENA area. The patrols operating in area of REGGIO are in contact with the bands in the PARMA area. The "Corps" has a strength of about 6,500 men, of which 1,000 are at present without arms.

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- 3 -

These bands were confining their attention to the garrison of the above-mentioned areas and to raids on the GIARDINI DEL CERRETO road, attacking the Germans on the march. There were also occasional raids on the IMILIA road.

Results obtained through the destruction of bridges included the interruption of transport on the GIARDINI road and of motor convoys for about one week on the CERRETO road.

During June about 15 bridges were destroyed on the secondary and main roads. The German telephone line between MODENA and BOLOGNA has been cut.

The electric power stations at LIGNICHO (96/0932), FARNETA, PIETRAVOLPA, CAZZARA and STAPARA were in the hands of the partisans who limited productivity to the needs of the civilian population.

Ammunition and weapons needed by the "Corps."

Ammunition:	calibre	12.7	...	...	25,000 rounds
	"	7.7	...	...	50,000 "
	"	3	...	...	50,000 "
	"	6.5	...	...	50,000 for H.G.s.
	"	6.5	...	...	20,000 for Tommy guns
	"	4.5	...	...	500 for mortars

Weapons: Light and heavy H.G.'s: 150. Sten/Tommy guns - sufficient (with adequate supply of ammunition) to fully arm the forces at present without arms. Sufficient supply of grenades and anti-tank bombs, special nails and explosives.

Around BISENZIO bands of partisans were forming, already equipped with enough explosive to blow up the road parallel to BISENZIO and to the main railway line (direttissima) FIORINCE-BOLOGNA (a road carrying a great deal of German military traffic). The carrying-out of such an operation would be made possible by dropping arms in the area sufficient to enable the partisans to block the road, which is closely guarded, for the time necessary to destroy it.

IV. LIST of PARTISAN BANDS encountered by SOURCES.

ARELLA (RAVENNATE)

About 50 men armed with Tommy guns, Italian hand grenades, pistols, 2 L.M.G.'s and 1 Hvy H.C. They had sent away many volunteers through not having arms for them.

RIGOSO (75/0207)

About 150 men, fairly well armed. As was generally the case, this band could have increased its personnel if it had the means of arming them. It lacked also medical supplies and money.

BOLOGNA has been cut.

The electric power stations at LIGURIO (96/0932), FERRARA, PIERAVOINE, GAZZANO and SPARTANA were in the hands of the partisans who limited productivity to the needs of the civilian population.

Ammunition and weapons needed by the "Corps."

Ammunition:	calibro	12.7	...	...	25,000 rounds
	"	7.7	...	...	50,000 "
	"	8	...	...	50,000 "
	"	6.5	...	...	50,000 for M.G.s.
	"	6.5	...	...	20,000 for Tommy guns
	"	4.5	...	...	500 for mortars

Weapons: Light and heavy M.C.'s: 150. Sten/Tommy guns - sufficient (with adequate supply of ammunition) to fully arm the forces at present without arms. Sufficient supply of grenades and anti-tank bombs, special nails and explosives.

Around BISTIZIO bands of partisans were forming, already equipped with enough explosive to blow up the road parallel to BISTIZIO and to the main railway line (direttissima) FLORENCE-BOLOGNA (a road carrying a great deal of German military traffic). The carrying-out of such an operation would be made possible by dropping arms in the area sufficient to enable the partisans to block the road, which is closely guarded, for the time necessary to destroy it.

IV. LIST OF PARTISAN BANDS encountered by SOURCES.

APPELLA (TAVARIELLE)

About 50 men armed with Tommy guns, Italian hand grenades, pistols, 2 L.M.G.'s and 1 Hvy M.C. They had sent away many volunteers through not having arms for them.

RICOSO (75/0207)

About 150 men, fairly well armed. As was generally the case, this band could have increased its personnel if it had the means of arming them. It lacked also medical supplies and money.

MONTI TOMBO DI GARTAGLIANI

A band commanded by a British major (Major Johnstone) 318th Commandos, dropped by parachute together with a British W/T operator and five Italian Officer Specialists. It is amongst the best organized and equipped as regards arms and means of communications. It was not yet in contact with the more distant band in the same zone. Sources established contact for it with the "Corps" at MONTEFIORE. So far has only about 60 men.

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- 4 -

CAPANNI (CANTAFIAMA)

A band of about 50 men, adequately armed. In touch with Maj. Johnstone for receiving parachute supplies.

COATE

A band of about 30 men armed with British automatic weapons. In touch with Major Johnstone.

Area surrounding CIVAGO

Bands in this area are under command of the "Corps" at MONTETORINO.

OSPITALI (beyond the GIARDINI road and out of the area of the "Corps")

A point of contact between the mobile forces of the "Corps" and the roving bands depending on partisan commands in TUSCANY. Generally, these were about 30 strong. The bands in TUSCANY generally had a better armament than those in the area of MODENA or LIGURIA, having received supplies more regularly by parachute; while their means of obtaining food were worse.

ALPE near POTENZA (27/3009)

A well armed band (about 250 men) with many Russians and some English who had escaped from prison camps, together with two wireless operators.

MANDROINI

A band of about 40 men, adequately armed. With them was an Italian wireless operator, without radio, lost during descent.

PORTAFRANCA (Near ORSICIA)

A well armed band of about 30 men. In contact with MANDROINI and the bands in TUSCANY.

DONNA ORTA (Near ORSICIA)

Well armed band of about 30. In contact with MANDROINI and bands in TUSCANY.

ORSICIA

Occupied by the "Buozzi Brigade" under the MONTETORINO "Corps" H.Q., who were carrying out raids about 15 July 44 on the PORTAFRANCA road and in the area of PRACCHIA.

MACCHIA

Well armed band of about 35 in contact with MANDROINI and L'ALPE near POTENZA.

V. RECEPTION OF SUPPLIES BY PARACHUTE

Generally received fairly regularly even though often, after being warned by radio.

Area surrounding CIVAGO.

Bands in this area are under command of the "Corps" at MONTETIORINO.

OSPITALI. (beyond the GIAPPINI road and out of the area of the "Corps")
A point of contact between the mobile forces of the "Corps" and the moving bands depending on partisan commands in TUSCANY. Generally, these were about 30 strong. The bands in TUSCANY generally had a better armament than those in the area of MODENA or LIGURIA, having received supplies more regularly by parachute; while their means of obtaining food were worse.

ALPIE TRE POTENZE (97/1009)

A well armed band (about 250 men) with many Russians and some English who had escaped from prison camps, together with two wireless operators.

MANDROMINI.

A band of about 40 men, adequately armed. With them was an Italian wireless operator, without radio, lost during descent.

PORTAFRANCA (Near ORSIGNA).

A well armed band of about 30 men. In contact with MANDROMINI and the bands in TUSCANY.

DOMIA VORTA (Near ORSIGNA).

Well armed band of about 30. In contact with MANDROMINI and bands in TUSCANY.

ORSIGNA.

Occupied by the "Buozzi Brigade" under the MONTETIORINO "Corps" R.Q., who were carrying out raids about 15 July 44 on the POPPETTINA road and in the area of PRACCHIA.

MACELLA.

Well armed band of about 35 in contact with MANDROMINI and L'ALPIE TRE POTENZE.

V. RECEPTION OF SUPPLIES BY PARACHUTE.

Generally received fairly regularly even though often, after being warned by radio and with good weather conditions, nothing is dropped. In one area peasants nearby reproduced the flares, and received the supplies instead. Source recommended frequent change of layout of flares to avoid this. Radio sets were frequently received disassembled without technical personnel or instructions.

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11V Head Capt
for A.J. COVENTRY.
MAJOR. G.S.
COMMANDING.

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OSD/C/CE/SL/CD 6

This report contains information on the composition of the Republican Ministry of Popular Culture.

Translation of extracts from detailed interrogation by SIM/OSDIO of an Italian.

Source No 197 SIM ref 5 OD

PERMANENT

Source 197 - is an intelligent civil servant, in politics a Liberal Democrat. At one time he worked for the Ministry of Popular Culture. Reliability good.

B. REPUBLICAN MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE (10 Jun 44)

1. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Minister: Bernardo MEZZASOMA

Location: Villa AMADEI at SALO on Lake Garda.

a) Cabinet

Chief of Cabinet: Giorgio AMERIGHI who in May replaced BERNARDI after the latter's resignation.

Location: Villa AMADEI and Villa SPERANZA at SALO.

b) Radio Interception Service

Head of Department: GALLIGNONE

Location: Town Hall (Municipio) at SALO.

Functions: Interception is done by operators who take down the information in shorthand. The News Bulletin is then made up from the shorthand manuscript, the morning bulletin from the news intercepted during the night and the evening one from the news intercepted during the day. A copy of the Bulletin is sent to:-

The Minister of Popular Culture.
All other Ministries.
The leading Government personalities.
MUSSOLOINI's Personal Secretariat.
The German Embassy.

c) Italian Press and Home Broadcasting Section

Head of Department: Dr. NICCARDI (who up to May 44 used to represent the Ministry in ROME).

Location: Villa SPERANZA at SALO.

Functions: This office issues instructions on the preventive censorship of newspapers, directly or through the Press Officials in the various Prefectures. It also gives special instructions to the Chief Editors of newspapers. All newspapers have to send a copy of their paper to this office which can if necessary make observations thereon to the responsible Editors.

Source 197 -

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B.

REPUBLICAN MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE (10 Jun 44)

1. CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Minister:

Bernando SPERANZA

Location:

Villa ARADZI at SALO on Lago Garda.

a) Cabinet

Chief of Cabinet: Giorgio AMERIGHI who in May replaced BERLINET after the latter's resignation.

Location: Villa ARADZI and Villa SPERANZA at SALO.

b) Radio Interception Service

Head of Department: CASALDINI

Location: Town Hall (Municipio) at SALO.

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Editors of newspapers. All newspapers have to send a copy of their
paper to this office which can if necessary make observations thereon
to the responsible Editors.

2. OUTSIDE ORGANIZATION

a)

Propaganda Control Office

Director: Prof. SAMARTANO

Location: Palazzo VOLPI

HEADQUARTERS
20 AUG 1944
A. C. C.

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CSDIC/CAT/SIM/CD 6

VENICE
TOWN PLAN
G 6960508L

Location: Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
Functions: Gives instructions for the preparation of pamphlets, notices, posters and postcards and sees that these are distributed in the provinces among workers, troops, etc.

b) Propaganda Section

Head of Section: Dr Cristoforo MERCATI (who writes under the name of "CRITER").

Location: Villa ARZUFFI in SALO.
Functions: Formerly directly under the Fascist Party Secretariat, but when the Government was transferred to the NORTH, was attached to the Ministry of Popular Culture. It collaborates with the Propaganda Control Office.

c) General Control of Entertainments (Cinemas - Theatres)

Director: Dr VENTURINI
Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
Functions: It promotes theatrical and cinematographic activities for propaganda purposes. Indies depending directly or indirectly from this office are:

- (i) ENAITE: National Corporation for the import and export of films.
Director: Dr. LOMBARDELLI
Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
- (ii) LUCE: A Corporation depending directly from the Minister and indirectly from the Controller of Entertainments.
President: Nino D'ARONA.
Location: Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
Functions: Production of films and photographs of current events.

d) Book Section

Director: Dr. DEL PRATO
Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
Functions: The reading of all books (including those by foreign authors translated into Italian) before publication.

e) Liaison Office between the Ministry of Popular Culture and the Army

Director: Col. AIELLO
Location: Elementary Schools, SALO.
Functions: Propaganda for the Armed Forces, military communications, control of War correspondents and censorship of their articles.

f) Foreign Broadcasting Branch

MILAN
TOWN PLAN
K 23606465
Director: Prof MANI
Location: Castello SFORZESCO, MILAN.
Functions: Broadcasts in foreign languages. The German command has reduced these broadcasts to one hour per day. Personnel has been reduced to about 30 translators and staff.

of "CRITERION".
Location: Villa ARADZI in SALO.
Functions: Formerly directly under the Fascist Party Secretariat, but when the Government was transferred to the NORTH, was attached to the Ministry of Popular Culture. It collaborates with the Propaganda Control Office.

c) General Control of Entertainments (Cinemas - Theatres)

Director: Dr. VENTURINI
Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
Functions: It promotes theatrical and cinematographic activities for propaganda purposes. Offices depending directly or indirectly from this office are:

(i) EMATE: National Corporation for the import and export of films.

Director: Dr. LOI QUARACCI
Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.

(ii) EUCI: A Corporation depending directly from the Minister and indirectly from the Controller of Entertainments.
President: Nino D'ARONA.

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MILAN
FISBY PLAN
K 236064.65
Director: Prof. MANT
Location: Castello SFORZESCO, MILAN.
Functions: Broadcasts in foreign languages. The German command has reduced these broadcasts to one hour per day. Personnel has been reduced to about 30 translators and editors.

g) Foreign Press Section

Location: Probably at Palazzo VOLPI, VENICE.
Functions: The procuring of foreign newspapers, the extracting of particularly important news, which is sent to the Ministry.

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CSDIC/CIT/SL/CD 6

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES

The Ministry is almost completely under the control of the German Embassy, which is at TASARO (P 3376): it comes under the Secretary of the Embassy, Dr Hans MOLLER as regards the Press, and under the Consul, RUMELIN, as regards Propaganda.

The Ministry also has frequent contacts with the Italian Section of the Reich Economic Ministry, directed by General LEHNER and located in Via MASCHERONI No 3, MILAN, from whom it obtains paper for the daily newspapers. Such transactions are entrusted to the Press official at the MILAN Prefecture, Dr. Franco FUSCA.

MILAN
TOMMY BLANK
R 22366463

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In normal times the Ministry of Popular Culture obtained information direct from the Press attaches to the various Embassies abroad, who collected information from the local press. At present such attaches are to be found only in BULGARIA, HUNGARY and SOFIA, but their information is of little value because of the great delay in transmission by post. ANFUSO, the Republican Ambassador in BERLIN, is rumoured to have said that he had no use for a Press attache.

5. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF POPULAR CULTURE AND OTHER MINISTRIES.

Liaison with the Service Ministries is maintained by an officer from each of the three services. Liaison with other Ministries consists merely of sending communications for publication.

6. TREND OF PROPAGANDA

- a) Great stress is laid on the fact that it is a point of honour that ITALY should maintain her alliance with GERMANY.
- b) The Monarchy is constantly attacked and accused of cowardice.
- c) A theme often repeated in the newspapers and on the wireless is that even if the Allies bring food to the Italians of Southern ITALY, in their hearts they despise them.

7. METHOD OF ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPAGANDA.

Meetings are held weekly at the Villa ARZUFFI, SALO, or in Palazzo VOLPI, VENEZIA, at which the Minister himself is sometimes present. The following are always present:

The Head of the Propaganda Section.
The German Consul, RUMELIN.
Col. ALESSIO, Head of the Liaison Office, and the liaison officers from the three Forces.
A number of newspaper editors.

At these meetings problems regarding the publication of current news are discussed and suggestions approved regarding the printing of notices, posters, pamphlets and propaganda booklets.

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posters, pamphlets and propaganda booklets.

C. NEWSPAPERS

MILAN	Corriere della Sera Repubblica Italiana	Chief Editor: " "	Emilio AMICUCCI Carlo BORSANI	319
TURIN	Gazzetta del Popolo La Stampa	" "	Bizio M. GRAY Concetto BENTIVOLLO	

VENICE

OSD/CAT/STW/CD 6

VENICE Il Gazzettino Chief Editor: Guido MARONI
BRESCIA Brescia Repubblica " " Corrado ROCCHI

The journalist Telesio TREMAMANI, formerly editor of the Roman newspaper "Tevere", is now at DESINZANO on Lake Garda, in charge of publications on racial problems.

18 Aug 44

for *Anthony W. Meyer*
R. E. E. EDWARDS,
Lt. Col.,
Comdt OSD/CAT, OAF.

3185

Report No. CSDIC/CMP/CEM/CDCONFIDENTIALDistributionAFHQ:-

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 CEWA.....1
 PICMC.....1
 CSDIC.....1

USA:-

IW Branch.....1

CMP:-

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 C-2 (Adv Int) ADV.....1
 Int Div ACC.....3
 "H" Sec, Adv HQ "H" Forum.....1
 No. 1, 2 (U) Sec.....1
 300 PS Sec.....1
 " " " No 1 Det.....1
 SAC HQ.....1
 Int Sec, PAF.....1
 CEMC.....1
 CEMC Adv Section.....1
 CEMC Data.....1
 CEM/CEMC CO.....1

UK:-

PAI.....1
 MI 30.....1
 MI.....2
 AME (R).....1
 ISLD.....1

PIH.....3

Memo to Jr Comdr Hopkins -
Capt Oden Liaison Officer see
with AAI advanced phoned
me today in re your request
for Mr Caccia as to how
to reach Forward Counter
Intelligence -

The answer is through
GST (1) Hq AAI

Lt Col Brown
Lo, acc

14 July 44

2023

Office of the British Resident Minister
at Allied Force Headquarters,

Algiers.

ackd 16/11/43.

I.F. 17

File
20 November, 1943.

My dear Harold,

I enclose a questionnaire on the political, social and economic forces in Sicily and South Italy which has been sent to me by Bill Bentinck. He would be very glad of answers to these questions from any source, of ours if these can be obtained without too much inconvenience.

Capt Howard
may send

2. While some of the questions are obviously unsuitable for putting to the Italian authorities direct, the Office are, nevertheless, anxious to obtain information on questions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7.

Some material
perhaps as far

3. I have sent this questionnaire to the Military Government Section and G-2, but thought I would also send one direct to you.

as to the Provinces of

Apulia are concerned. It is please file with this
until I return. *ARC*

Yours ever
Ry
8/11/43

H.A. Woods Esq.,
Allied Military Mission,
Brindisi.

3182

Questions Relating to Political, Social and Economic Forces in
Sicily and South Italy.

Political.

1. Are there signs of a Catholic political movement among the peasants and/or the lower clergy?
2. What signs are there of other types of political movement, e.g., liberal, socialist, communist, in the towns and the country?
3. How strong is nationalism?
4. Is there any sign of a desire for local autonomy?

Social and Economic.

1. Is there any definite information on the views of Italians in (a) Sicily, (b) South Italy, (c) Sardinia on emigration after the war? Have the Italians great expectations about the possibilities of emigration?
2. What has been done in (a) Sicily, (b) South Italy, (c) Sardinia during the last seven years (1) to improve the water supply, (2) to drain the land, (3) to check malaria?
3. When the latifundia are broken up, would some form of co-operative farming among peasant-owners be desirable? e.g., a Co-operative Society for purchase of machinery, seeds, fertilizers etc. and for sale of produce?
4. Is there a strong movement for (a) State-ownership of land? or (b) Co-operative Society ownership? or (c) Peasant ownership?
5. Have any new industries taken root in Sicily or South Italy during the last seven years or as a result of the war?
6. Has electrification made any progress in South Italy or Sicily during the last seven years?
7. What are the conditions of the sulphur industry as regards (a) output, (b) conditions of labour?
8. Is there any evidence of the economic effects of Allied occupation? (e.g., Has the fruit-juice industry been encouraged?).
9. Are there signs of a wish to establish regular trade unions among (1) agricultural (2) industrial workers?
10. Do the South Italians expect that all their economic difficulties are going to be solved rapidly by the United Nations?
11. What is the food situation like? Are relief measures urgent?

To: Harold Laccia Esq.,
 From: Capt E. Howard PWB Bari.

I return herewith the report by AMG Security Intelligence on political trends in Sicily. I have to make the following comments applying the questions in that report to the four provinces of Apulia.

1. There is a good deal of activity of a political kind among the peasants of Puglia although they are still the least politically conscious class. The leader of the Christian Democrat party in Bari told me that his party was making good progress in the country communes particularly in Bari province. Here there are already 30 sections at work in the various communes and he hopes soon to have 48 sections actively engaged. To give a relative idea of the activity as between Bari town itself and the province as a whole he told me that the total number of 'tesserati' (inscribed members) for the province was 2000 and for Bari town 18. The next most active provinces are Lecce and Taranto. Brindisi is the most idle.

The younger Catholic clergy of an intellectual type - those for instance who come from the Papal seminary of Molfetta - are giving enthusiastic help to the movement. The higher clergy do not mix in politics but they laid it down in a circular letter to the clergy that these might give guidance to Catholics as regards the parties. In general the clergy are favourable to the Christian Democrat party.

My informant concluded by saying that there were two main parties that appealed to the masses, the Christian Democrat and the Communist. Though in some parts of the province the majority of politically-minded peasants were Communists these people were still very religious and he believed that a number of them would be weaned away from Communist sympathies.

3180

2. In most of the towns of Puglia there are representatives of the five political parties and in the larger towns political activity is intense. It is however difficult to give an estimate of the relative strengths of the

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AMHQ
c/o Rome Area Command
APO 794, U.S. Army

SUBJECT: Change of Location.

TO: See Distribution below.

1. The location of this unit, formerly at Naples, is now changed to:-

Teatro delle Arti (2nd floor)
59 Via Sicilia
Rome

2. The official mailing address is:-

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AMHQ
c/o Rome Area Command
APO 794, U.S. Army

3. The cable address is: ROME AREA COMMAND for CAVE

4. The new telephone number will be notified as soon as allotted.

PCR/gm

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15 June 1944

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Major, G-3,
Commanding

899.1

Pal. Sec.

S. 145222

111

111

file

Teatro delle Arti (2nd floor)
59 Via Siciliana
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Bureau of Allied Force of Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (ALLIED FORCE)
Italian Intelligence Sources Sub-Committee

SUBJECT: Questionnaire.

TO : G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AMHQ,
c/o Advanced Administrative Echelon,
AFHQ, QHAF.

It is requested that a reply be given to the following at your convenience.

IMPORTANT NOTE:

1. It is requested that, as far as possible, replies be sent in TRIPPLICATE.
2. Please do NOT add, in replies to this questionnaire, any replies from another questionnaire.

SUBJECT: Greek Relief

(1) Greece was occupied by the Axis forces in the Spring of 1941. The food situation thereafter steadily deteriorated and in the early Winter famine conditions developed in Athens and Piraeus and in certain other parts of the country. What at this time was

(a) the Italian,

(b) the German policy regarding the food supplies of Greece? That is to say, was it a question of indifference, or inability to cope with the situation, or deliberate policy? If either of the former, what development of events was foreseen at the time of the occupation of the country?

(2) At the beginning of 1942 the Allied authorities decided to make an exception to their blockade policy, and sent a first shipment of wheat to Greece on the ship Radama in March. What was the reaction of the Italian and German authorities to this development? Did it alter their own action in any way, and if so how? Would they have sent food themselves if the Allies had not done so?

(3) In the Spring of 1942 a formal relief plan was proposed, providing for regular shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly, for neutral supervision and for conditions regarding the disposal of foodstuffs originating in Greece. The agreement of the Axis authorities to this plan was not however obtained until late in the Summer. What were the Italian and German reactions to it? Did they regard it as militarily advantageous to themselves? Did they regard it as potentially harmful to their prestige, and if so in what respect? Did they consider the conditions relating to the disposal of Greek produce as embarrassing to themselves, or as being intrinsically harmful or as being easily evaded? What were their views on the subject of any reservations about

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convenience.

IMPORTANT NOTE:

1. It is requested that, as far as possible, replies be sent in TRIPLICATE.
2. Please do NOT add, in replies to this questionnaire, any replies from another questionnaire.

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(a) the Italian,

(b) the German policy regarding the food supplies of Greece? That is to say, was it a question of indifference, or inability to cope with the situation, or deliberate policy? If either of the former, what development of events was foreseen at the time of the occupation of the country?

(2) At the beginning of 1942 the Allied authorities decided to make an exception to their blockade policy, and sent a first shipment of wheat to Greece on the ship Radamao in March. What was the reaction of the Italian and German authorities to this development? Did it alter their own action in any way, and if so how? Would they have sent food themselves if the allies had not done so?

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B. What was the attitude of the Italian and German authorities to the Swedish Relief Scheme during the first year of its operation, and to the activity of the neutral organisation conducting it? What were conceived to be the motives and objects of the Allies in allowing the scheme?

U.S. RESTRICTED
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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C. During 1941 and 1942 efforts were made to arrange the evacuation of a number of children from Greece, in view of the grave food situation in that country. Preparations were made to receive the children in temporary quarters in Egypt, and to pass them on to various destinations in the British Empire and elsewhere. The matter was put to the Italian Government through the International Red Cross. In the Summer of 1941 the Italian Government refused permission for the plan to proceed, on the grounds that it could not agree to the reception of these children in any part of the British Empire. The proposal was later resumed in Egypt; accommodation was prepared for them and a ship was ready to fetch them from Piraeus. The Italian Government however again refused consent to the plan, even under these altered circumstances.

Can it be ascertained what were the reasons of the Italian authorities for refusing consent both to the first and the second version of the plan?

It would be appreciated if the considerations which governed the views of the Axis authorities on all the above questions could be explained in as much detail as possible. It may be supposed that the German attitude did not coincide at all points with that of the Italians. It would be particularly useful if it could be made plain at every stage what was the Italian and what was the German view point, whether or not these were identical.

Source:
Questionnaire No. 84.
1 March 1944.

11/12/44
H. BLACKMORE,
Captain, G. S.,
Soc'y IISS, JIC(AF).

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Source:
Questionnaire No. 84.
1 March 1944.

all documents
Capt
H. BLOOMFORD,
Captain, G. S.,
Sec'y IISS, JIC (AF).

U. S. SECRET

Equals British SECRET

G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AND

C/O PENINSULAR BASE SECTION

NAFMS

APPENDIX "B"

to

MEMORANDUM:- Advanced G-2.

Types of information of interest to Advanced G-2.

Note: This list may be amended.

- - - - -

(Any answers to the undermentioned points of interest, or names, addresses and details of personnel who can supply such information, should be sent to Advanced G-2.)

The following may be taken as a guide:-

1. MILITARY. (Enemy and Neutral Army, Navy and Air Information.)

Direction of GERMAN and JAPANESE strategy in general.

Direction of GERMAN strategy in ITALY, FRANCE and BALKANS.

Reactions of Axis satellite countries, and collaborationists in occupied territory.

Intentions in RUSSIA and elsewhere.

Availability of enemy divisions released on a shorter line in any of the theatres of operations.

Intentions and plans vis-a-vis Allied invasion of FRANCE, such as defence lines and special methods.

Chemical warfare preparations and precautions - military and civil.

Personalities and chain of command.

Organizations of major units, especially armoured formations and future trends.

Methods and employment of Nebelwerfer, automatic weapons, mortars and chemical warfare, and flame-throwing tanks.

New weapons, employment, manufacture and production.

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Note: This list may be amended.

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The following may be taken as a guide:-

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Chemical warfare preparations and precautions - military and civil.

Personalities and chain of command.

Organizations of major units, especially armoured formations and future trends.

Methods and employment of Nebelwerfer, automatic weapons, mortars and chemical warfare, and flame-throwing tanks.

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New weapons, employment, manufacture and production.

Tactics, especially armoured and chemical warfare.

Manpower situation, and call-up of annual classes.

Reserves of manpower.

Reserves and stocks of ammunition, rations and fuel.

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Equals British SECRET

Communications - especially the number of trains passing through key routes or ships calling at important ports. Technical railroad and port details.

Effect of bombing, especially on communications.

Effect of Allied and Italian sabotage on ITALIAN, FRENCH and GERMAN railway systems, installations and objectives generally.

Signal information of all kinds, especially enemy interception organisations, codes and cyphers.

Orders of Battle and identifications.

Movements.

Installations, depots and dumps.

Behaviour of Axis troops in Occupied territory.

P.O.W. and Internees - locations, movements, etc.

Control of civilian movement and police activities.

Plans and directories of towns and buildings, especially headquarters.

Topography - defences, roads, railways, water supply, soil, bridges, beaches, rivers, etc., including books and pamphlets of a technical nature.

Bases - Army, Naval or Air.

2. POLITICAL. (Includes all enemy, and enemy occupied and neutral countries.)

Internal situation.

Political parties and activities.

Personalities, pro- and anti-Allied, and Collaborationists.

Political reaction and moral effect of Allied bombing.

Treatment of P.O.W. and Internees.

Location of records and offices, including plans and diagrams.

Organisation of enemy military government, and extent of power, if any, remaining with occupied country.

Effect of Allied and Italian sabotage on ITALIAN, FRENCH and GERMAN railway systems, installations and objectives generally.

Signal information of all kinds, especially enemy interception organisations, codes and cyphers.

Orders of Battle and identifications.

Movements.

Installations, depots and dumps.

Behaviour of Axis troops in Occupied territory.

P.O.W. and Internees - locations, movements, etc.

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Political reaction and moral effect of Allied bombing.

Treatment of P.O.W. and Internees.

Location of records and offices, including plans and diagrams.

Organisation of enemy military government, and extent of power, if any, remaining with occupied country.

Psychological factors affecting changes in the attitude towards GERMANY - JAPAN on the one hand, and the UNITED NATIONS on the other.

Details of strikes, riots, assassinations, underground movements.

Axis pressure on Neutral countries to permit passage of troops, or to force them into the war.

Copies of illegal communist or other newspapers.

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3. SOCIAL.

Existing and planned programs for rehabilitation by the enemy or neutral countries.

Disease control measures and their effectiveness.

ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

Location (by co-ordinates if possible) of all industrial installations in Axis Europe, particularly in FRANCE, EASTERN GERMANY, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AUSTRIA, producing for war purposes. Information is particularly desired on production of fighter aircraft, ball-bearings, tank engines, tank armor, truck motors, synthetic rubber, synthetic fuels, refineries and locomotive works. Information is also useful on flow of raw materials - steel, aluminum, oil - inside Axis Europe. (Axis Europe includes NORTHERN ITALY.) Examples of shortages of raw materials, machine tools. Evidence of activity, destination and amount of products.

Movement of industrial installations in FRANCE and WESTERN GERMANY to Central and Eastern Europe is particularly valuable.

Movement of manpower from front to factory and from factory to front in anticipation of invasion is greatly significant. Replacement of manpower by P.O.W., foreign labour and women.

Fortifications and defence works, from the point of view of when installations were built and by what labour, i.e. TODT Organisation, prisoners of war, local labour, troops. What types of material were used.

Information on prices and markets in enemy ITALY urgently required, especially ROME.

Date limit on Europe is 1944. (Balance 1939.)

Agriculture - areas under crops, harvests, harvest estimates. Fuel and power - sources of supply. Finance - wages, currency, taxation, prices.

Any and all information on industry and agriculture in JAPAN and its conquests, including those subjects set out above. Date limit may be set as far back as 1937.

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U.S. SECRET

3. SOCIAL.

Existing and planned programs for rehabilitation by the enemy or neutral countries.

Disease control measures and their effectiveness.

ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

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Fortifications and defence works, from the point of view of when installations were built and by what labour, i.e. TODT Organisation, prisoners of war, local labour, troops. What types of material were used.

Information on prices and markets in enemy ITALY urgently required, especially ROSE.

Date limit on Europe is 1941. (Balkans 1939.)

Agriculture - areas under crops, harvests, harvest estimates. Fuel and power - sources of supply. Finance - wages, currency, taxation, prices.

Any and all information on industry and agriculture in JAPAN and its conquests, including those subjects set out above. Date limit may be set as for USSR as 1937.

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REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

SECRET
Auth: Hq. Command
Initials: E. J. C.
Date: 11 May 44

DATE

OPERATIONAL ORDER No. 1.

1. INFORMATION

(a) Enemy Troops. Action may be expected in the form of raids on harbour and shipping, small seaborne landing, parachute troops or internal saboteurs. Gas and bacterium may be used.

(b) Own Troops. As shown in No. 1 Zone Operational Instruction No. 1.
(May be seen on request to Hq. Commandant)

2. INTENTION.

Enemy attacks against premises occupied by this Headquarters will be repelled.

3. METHOD.

(a) In the event of an alert due to enemy action as laid down in paragraph 1(a) above, the alarm will be given by continuous blasts on whistles. In addition Offices will be warned by telephone from the central switchboard.

(b) In such event all detailed active personnel will parade immediately outside the armoury located on the first floor of the Palace of Justice, Room 118, under their Squad Commanders (Appendix "A"); draw rifles and ammunition and proceed to their alarm posts as detailed below.

(c) All Allied personnel inside or in the immediate vicinity of A.C.C. Buildings other than those detailed in Appendix "A" will remain at normal posts of duty or obey such orders as may be issued by the Headquarters Commandant.

(d) Personnel away from the immediate vicinity (2 miles) of Headquarters will report to the nearest military unit.

(e) All Civilians i.e. employees or visitors will assemble on the first floor in Court Room number 101 and will await instructions.

(f) O.C.'s Detachments A and B will be prepared to protect the areas and Government property, in addition to furnishing any mobile detachments required.

(g) R.V. for Mobile Platoon: Sgts Mess, Ground Floor, Palace of Justice.

4. ADMINISTRATION.

(a) All ranks will be under the orders of the Headquarters Commandant.

(b) O.C.'s A and B transport will assemble all available transport within respective garages, prepared to proceed on orders from the Headquarters Commandant.

(c) O.C.'s transport and personnel Companies A and B, the Headquarters Supply Officer, the C.O.M.S. British, the Messing Officer, the Medical Officer, will submit forthwith to the Headquarters Commandant their arrangements in accordance with these instructions.

3174

2. INTENTION.

Enemy attacks against premises occupied by this Headquarters will be repelled.

3. METHOD.

- (a) In the event of an alert due to enemy action as laid down in paragraph 1(a) above, the alarm will be given by continuous blasts on whistles. In addition Offices will be warned by telephone from the central switchboard.
- (b) In such event all detailed active personnel will parade immediately outside the armoury located on the first floor of the Palace of Justice, Room 116, under their Squad Commanders (Appendix "A"); draw rifles and ammunition and proceed to their alarm posts as detailed below.
- (c) All Allied personnel inside or in the immediate vicinity of A.C.C. Buildings other than those detailed in Appendix "A" will remain at normal posts of duty or obey such orders as may be issued by the Headquarters Commandant.
- (d) Personnel away from the immediate vicinity (2 miles) of Headquarters will report to the nearest military unit.
- (e) All Civilians i.e. employees or visitors will assemble on the first floor in Court Room number 101 and will await instructions.
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4. ADMINISTRATION.

- (a) All ranks will be under the orders of the Headquarters Commandant.
- (b) O.C.'s A and B transport will assemble all available transport within respective garages, prepared to proceed on orders from the Headquarters Commandant.
- (c) O.C.'s transport and personnel Companies A and B, the Headquarters Supply Officer, the C.Q.M.S. British, the Messing Officer, the Medical Officer, will submit forthwith to the Headquarters Commandant their arrangements in accordance with these instructions.
- (d) All ranks will be made thoroughly familiar with the lay-out of the Headquarters points of the Headquarters (See Appendix "B").
- (e) Main Gates at entrances A, B, C, and D (See Appendix "B") will be closed and barred.
- (f) The Medical Officer will establish an Emergency First Aid Post with necessary equipment in Room No. 8, Ground Floor, this Headquarters.
- (g) Headquarters Supply Officer will maintain emergency rations scale covering a period of 48 hours.

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(1) Casualties; -

Service personnel - normal
Civilian personnel - Ospedale Riuniti

Ammunition;

50 rounds per man first issue.

INTER-COMMUNICATION.

Headquarters established in rooms 28, 29 and 30, ground floor, Palace of Justice.

COMMUNICATION.

1. Internal telephone communication.
2. By runner.

(a) 2 Liaison Officers or M.C.O.s. will report in person to Headquarters Commandant's Officer from all Sub-Commissions when their personnel have complied with the above instructions. In addition telephone reports to this effect will be made.

(b) An Officer will be detailed by the Headquarters Commandant for Liaison Duties at the Headquarters of No. 1 Zone Commander. (Appendix B)

(c) Telephone and teletype operators of this Headquarters will remain at their posts.

(d) O.C. Transport will hold 4 trucks for despatch purposes at the disposal of the Headquarters Commandant.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief Commissioner
Deputy Chief Commissioner
Executive Officer
Adjutant Rear
No. 1 Zone Op/Commander
Heads of Sections
Heads of all Sub-Commissions
Civil Censorship Group
O.C. American Troops
O.C. British Troops
Supply Officer (AM)
Supply Officer (B)
O i/c Transportation
Major Mason
Capt Drege
Capt Bocchini
Capt Buckley
Capt Border
Capt Davis

[Signature]
S.L. DACE
Captain, R.A.S.C.
Rear Headquarters Commandant,
Allied Control Commission

Time: -

- (a) 2 Liaison Officers or N.C.O.s. will report in person to Headquarters Commandant's Officer from all Sub-Commissions when their personnel have complied with the above instructions. In addition telephone reports to this effect will be made.
- (b) An Officer will be detailed by the Headquarters Commandant for Liaison Duties at the Headquarters of No. 1 Zone Commander. (Appendix B)
- (c) Telephone and teletype operators of this Headquarters will remain at their posts.
- (d) O.C. Transport will hold 4 Jeeps for despatch purposes at the disposal of the Headquarters Commandant.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief Commissioner
 Deputy Chief Commissioner
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant Rear
 No. 1 Zone CP/Commander
 Heads of Sections
 Heads of all Sub-Commissions
 Civil Censorship Group
 O.C. American Troops
 O.C. British Troops
 Supply Officer (A)
 Supply Officer (B)
 O i/c Transportation
 Major Mason
 Capt Drago
 Capt Bocchino
 Capt Buckley
 Capt Borden
 Capt Lewis
 Lt Bangerzone
 CSM McQuinnale
 Sgt Jelliman
 1st Sgt Alderman
 File

[Signature]
 B.L. DUFFY
 Captain, R.A.S.C.
 Rear Headquarters Commandant,
 Allied Control Commission

Time: -

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Appendix "A"

Reference Operational Order No. 1.

Officers commanding A and B Detachments will detail EM, CRs, and ITO's to act as defense troops to protect all vulnerable points of this Headquarters and will submit nominal rolls to Headquarters Commandant forthwith. O.C. Transport will instruct attached Italian soldiers under their Detachment Commander in regard to the defense of the garage.

After the alarm has been given all nominated personnel will parade under their respective Squad Commander at the armory. Squad Commanders will super-
- the drawing of arms and ammunition and will immediately take up defensive positions at their allocated posts. See Appendix "B".

Within 48 hours after the issue of this Operational Order instructions will be issued for a meeting of all Operational Commanders with the Headquarters Commandant when their detailed instructions will be given.

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| <u>Platoon A</u>
Capt Buckley, Commander
Sgt Burfield
Cpl Craswell
Pte Crouch (Runner)
Pte Allen
Pte Barlow
Pte Clarke
Pte Foy
Pte Fullerton
Ciam, Holmes
Pte Horton | <u>Platoon B</u>
Lt. Bongarzono, Commander
S/Sgt Golce
Cpl Shumfield
Pte Hess
Pte Horner
Pte Marchiondo
Pte Tochterman
Pte Rodriguez
Pte Perez
Sgt LaCava
Sgt Sorisi | <u>Platoon C</u>
Lieut Lewis, Commander
Sgt Carrie
Bdr Netherwood
Pte Wright (Runner)
Pte McCann
Pte Bennett
Rfm Robinson
Pte Simpson
Pte McCulloch
Pte Strevens
Pte Boyes |
|---|---|---|

- | | |
|---|---|
| <u>Platoon D</u>
Capt Border, Commander
S/Sgt Bonciao
T/5 Principiano
Pte Craswell
Pte Jaekel
Pte Kruger
Pte Precht
Pte Schiff
T/4 Quorra
T/4 Polomink
Pte Reed
Pte Bonardi | <u>Platoon E</u>
Sgt Jellyman, Commander
S.O.M.S. McNeil
Cpl. Papps
I/Cpl Creezer |
|---|---|

- | | |
|--|--|
| <u>MOBILE PLATOON</u>
1st Sgt Allickman, Commander
Pte Romero
Pte Younginor
S/Sgt Barber
Cpl. Lally
Sgt Loy
Cpl. Bruno
Pte Allico
Pte Mendes
Pte Coy
Pte Gardiner
Pte. Buchanan
T/Sgt. Wilson | Pte Sousa
Rfm Jones
Cpl McKeon
T/3 Congo
Cpl Barley
T/5 Brown
Pte Cantarino
Pte Barile
Pte Pace
Pte Davis
Pte Gilroy
Pte. Baker |
|--|--|

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Within 48 hours after the issue of this Operational Order instructions will be issued for a meeting of all Operational Commanders with the Headquarters Commandant when their detailed instructions will be given.

Platoon A.

Capt Buckley, Commander

Sgt Burfield
Cpl Craswell
Pte Crouch (runner)

Pte Allen

Pte Barlow

Pte Clarke

Pte Foy

Pte Fullerton

Pte Holmes

Pte Horton

Platoon B

Lt. Bongarzone, Commander

S/Sgt Goloc
Cpl Shottliff

Pte Hesb

Pte Horner

Pte Marchiondo

Pte Tachtman

Pte Rodriguez

Pte Perez

Sgt LeCave

Sgt Sorisi

Platoon C

Lieut Lewis, Commander

Sgt Carrie
Pte Netherwood

Pte Wright (runner)

Pte McCann

Pte Bennett

Pte Robinson

Pte Simpson

Pte McCulloch

Pte Stravens

Pte Boyes

Platoon D

Capt Berman, Commander

S/Sgt Bonomo

T/5 Principiano

Pte Crespani

Pte Mackel

Pte Kruger

Pte Procht

Pte Schirr

T/4 Quorra

T/4 Polowniak

Pte Reed

Pte Bermani

MOBILE PLATOON

1st Sgt Alderman, Commander

Pte Romero

Pte Younginer

S/Sgt Barber

Cnr. Lally

Sgt Loy

Cpl Byrne

Pte Allio

Pte Mendes

Pte Coy

Pte Gardiner

Pte Buchanan

T/Sgt Trigony

Pte Fried

Sgt Devine

T/5 Caputo

Pte Todaro

Sgt Mason

Platoon E

Sgt Jellyman, Commander

S.O.M.S. McNeil

Cpl. Papps

L/Cpl Creezer

Pte Terrazas

Pte Iax

Pte Maniz

Pte Friedman

Cpl Brown

L/Cpl Peters

Pte Maggiano

Pte Armstrong

Pte Friend

Pte Turner

Cpl McGrath

Cpl Intello

Pte Decker

T/5 Andiorio

Pte Bertolli

Pte Hishberg

Pte Sousa

Pte Jones

Cpl McKeon

T/3 Gengo

Cpl Barley

T/5 Brown

Pte Canterino

Pte Barile

Pte Race

Pte Davis

Pte Gilroy

Pte Dobey

Sgt White

Sgt Harrison

Sgt Molennan

Pte Diaz

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REFERENCE OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 1.

Squad responsibilities and Staff arrangements as below.

Hq Commandant Capt B. L. Drage

Adjutant - Capt E. J. Bocchino

Liaison Officer - Major G. H. L. Wilson

2 Runners

Capt Buckley

Squad "A"

10 Men

1 Sgt

1 Cpl

7 Riflemen

1 Runner

Squad "B"

10 Men

1 Sgt

1 Cpl

7 Riflemen

1 Runner

Lt Bongarzone

O./c Arms & Ammunition

C.S.M.

Nightingale

Squad "C"

10 Men

1 Sgt

1 Cpl

7 Riflemen

1 Runner

Lt Lewis

Squad "D"

11 Men

1 Sgt

1 Cpl

7 Riflemen

1 Runner

Capt Bender

Sgt Jellyman

Squad "E"

(Roof)

4 Men

Sgt Sherman

Mobile Squad

30 Men

Rendezvous (Sgt's Mess)

(5 Sections)

Squad D

"D"

Motor Pool

Personnel

Carrying

Vehicles

Squad A

Squad E

(On roof)

MAIN ENTRANCE

REAR ENTRANCE

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<u>Capt Buckley</u>	<u>Lt Bongarzone</u>	<u>O.i/c Arms & Ammunition</u>	<u>Lt Lewis</u>	<u>Capt Bender</u>
<u>Squad "A"</u>	<u>Squad "B"</u>	<u>C.S.M.</u>	<u>Squad "C"</u>	<u>Squad "D"</u>
10 Men	10 Men	Nightingale	10 Men	21 Men
1 Sgt	1 Sgt		1 Sgt	1 Sgt
1 Cpl	1 Cpl		1 Cpl	1 Cpl
7 Riflemen	7 Riflemen		7 Riflemen	7 Riflemen
1 Runner	1 Runner		1 Runner	1 Runner


Sgt Jellyman

Squad "E"
(Roof)
4 Men

Sgt Werman

Mobile Squad
30 Men
Rendezvous (Sgt's Mess)
(5 Sections)

Squad D
"D"



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SECRET

U.S. SECRET Equals Bullshit MOST SECRET

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Ref Sec 527

80 LUG 1944

C 106

5 July, 1944.

DD
DD

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) A.F.H.Q.
c/o Rome Area Allied Command
APO 794, U.S. Army

SUBJECT: Location.

TO : See Distribution below.

Our letter G 106, of 15 June, is cancelled and the following is substituted:-

1. Location of this unit:-

Tenaro delle Arti (2nd floor),
59 Via Sicilia,
ROME.

2. The official mailing address is:-

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ,
c/o Rome Area Allied Command,
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