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Allied Commission Policy
Jan. - Nov. 1944

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

JAQ/hd

From: Office of the Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Relations between ACC and Italian
Government

FILE No. A/CC 321

17 Sept 1944

TO: Political Section

The Acting Chief Commissioner wishes to speak to you on
subject of attached letter.

J.A.Q.
J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Chief Staff Officer

3600

1 Incl:
Cy ltr AFHQ C/8, dtd 6 Sept
subject as above

COPY**SECRET**ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Relations between ACC and Italian Government.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Acting Chief Commissioner).

1. Under date 23 August 1944 instructions on the above subject were issued by this Headquarters (letter AFHQ OFF C/S, AG 387/045 GEC-O) which reviewed in some detail the function of the Advisory Council for Italy as well as the relations between the Allied Control Commission and the Italian Government. It is now desired to amplify those instructions, particularly with respect to paragraph 3. While any formal communications, especially if they look to executive action, must pass through the channels of the Allied Control Commission, it is not intended to curtail informal contacts between the Italian Ministers and members of the Advisory Council of a nature to keep the latter informed of current Italian affairs.

2. In saying that it is desired that you take occasion to bring up with the Italian Government the matter of its relations with the Allied Control Commission, it was not intended that a formal demarche be made; you may in your discretion present the matter quite informally.

3. As to the relations with the representatives of neutral Governments accredited to the Government of Italy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have given the following instructions. While there will be no objection to neutral representatives having unofficial dealings directly with the Italian Government, it is to be understood that their formal official relations must be conducted through the Allied Control Commission. It has been established that the representatives of members of the United Nations shall deal with the Italian Government through the Allied Control Commission; it is considered that neutral nations should not be in a more favorable position.

By Command of General WILSON:

S
(Sgd) LOWELL W. ROOKER
for J. A. H. GAMBELL
Lieutenant General
Chief of StaffDISTRIBUTION:

1 - United States Political Adviser	
1 - British Resident Minister	
1 - CAO	1 - CinC Med
1 - G-1 (A)	1 - US Navy
1 - G-1 (B)	1 - MAAF
1 - G-2	1 - Hq, AAI
1 - G-3	1 - SGS
1 - G-5	1 - AG Records
1 - IS & PS	1 - AG MED
1 - PWB	2 - Addressee

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COPY**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Political Section

Brigadier Lush,

not
I regret that under the pressure of work I did not send you my comments on your memorandum 2606/COG of 28th November about the question of Allied military intervention at the request of the civil power. Meanwhile Brigadier Upjohn's memorandum came in and in my absence Mr. Schott said that the Political Section had nothing to add to it.

2. I am not altogether satisfied that, as he suggests, the question is primarily a military one. On the contrary, I feel that it has far reaching political implications of which the present tragic situation in Greece is abundant evidence. With the financing and equipping of patriots in the North and the possibility of a German withdrawal from North-west Italy too rapid to allow of Allied troops arriving on the spot within a matter of days or even weeks, I think that it is quite possible that when our Armies do get there they may find themselves faced with a situation not unlike that which exists in Greece today. If the Government then in power in Rome is not based on and not fully in harmony with the CML in the North, the situation will be further aggravated.

3. I think that a great deal can be done and will have to be done by the Allied military authorities for the protection of Allied interests under the AMHQ directive of 24th September 1944 referred to in paragraph 3 of Brigadier Upjohn's minute. At the same time I anticipate that cases will arise in which no direct Allied military interest is affected and it is on this point that I think it is important that Allied Commanders should receive prior guidance from AMHQ. Given the present divergence of views between the British Government and the United States Government as to the role which the Allies should play in Italian internal affairs, I foresee that it will be difficult to secure agreement. On the other hand, as we are an Allied Command, I think that this is a difficulty which must be faced in advance and my feeling is that the matter should be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. My own personal view, for what it is worth, is that given the long term interests of Great Britain and, I should have thought also of the United States, in the preservation of a non-Communist Italy and at least the avoidance of chaos, is that Allied Commanders should have orders to take whatever steps may be necessary to preserve law and order and to get the authority of the recognised Government to whatever extent the forces at their disposal may permit.

7.12.44

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NY President
Political Section

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7.12.44

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A/V President
Political Section.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 2606/COS

28 Nov 1944

SUBJECT: Intervention by the Allied Commission at the request
of the Italian Government.

TO : DCOS, Est Sec
DCOS, CA Sec
DCOS, Econ Sec
VP, Pol Sec

I refer to para 6 of the minutes of the Chief of Staff's Meeting
of 24 November. The points which were discussed at that meeting, and
on which I should like your views in writing, are as follows:-

- (a) If a proper request from the Italian Government for the
intervention of the Allied Commission is received, should
we accede to this request?
- (b) If it were agreed to accede to the request, what measures
should be adopted?

MSL/JC

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff

*Political section has nothing to add to the excellent presentation of
Brigadier's opinion. The function is primarily a military one and measures
taken should follow instructions as comprehensive as possible to meet conceivable
eventualities - such instructions to be given by high authority.*

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lms.

6. Disturbance at Regina Coeli Prison.

DCOS CA Sec gave a brief outline of the present position at the prison and the measures being taken to relieve conditions. COS mentioned that he had seen two very recent warning reports from Colonel Pollock to the effect that further disturbances were likely to occur and asked whether they had been received by Public Safety Sub-Com and if so what action had been taken on them. CA Sec to investigate this point. COS brought up the question as to what action should be taken if the Italian Government were to ask for our assistance in quelling such disturbance. The points at issue were whether we should intervene if ~~requested~~ asked to do so by the Italian Government and what should we do if we did intervene. COS said he would circulate a brief minute on this subject to Heads of Sections, asking for their comments, and that the matter would be further discussed at the next meeting.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

SECRET

Ref. 4/33.2/CA

2nd December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Intervention by the Allied Commission
at the request of the Italian Government.

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. Reference your 2606/008 dated 28th November, 1944, I think a restatement should be made of the principles and problems involved in the declaration of military zones.

This paper is only concerned with the question of a declaration of a military zone where it has become necessary or desirable by reason of some civil disorder involving the rendering of military aid, and not with the declaration of a military zone for purely operational reasons.

2. Where a civil disorder has led the local authorities to ask for Allied military assistance to quell the disorder three distinct problems have to be faced:

- (a) It is for the local Allied Military Commander to decide whether to call out the military forces in aid of the civil power.
- (b) It is then a matter for SACMED, or the persons duly authorised by him to decide whether to constitute a military zone.
- (c) It is then a matter for decision as to what form of military control should be instituted in the military zone.

3. As to para 2(a), the problem is a difficult one and I do not believe it is possible to formulate with great precision the principles on which the local Military Commander should be guided in giving assistance. Each set of circumstances must be judged as it arises and the decision must be at the discretion of the Military Commander. It has been laid down by AWMQ in a recent directive dated 24th September, 1944 (see 2606/008 folio 23 para 2(b)) that assistance should only be given if the local Commander is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests, but I doubt whether this is a comprehensive guide as a few examples will show.

For instance, if there is a riot, even a serious one, in Catanzaro there would be no real threat to our military interests, but it might be desirable (assuming Allied forces in sufficient numbers to be available in Catanzaro) to render assistance in aid of the civil power to prevent widespread loss of life and breakdown of the local civilian administration, or a possible spread of the trouble. Contrasted with this a very minor riot in the port of Bari might render it necessary for the local Commander to render assistance in order to secure an uninterrupted flow of military supplies to armies in the theatre.

1. Reference your 2606/COS dated 28th November, 1944. I think a restatement should be made of the principles and problems involved in the declaration of military zones.

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I think it is easy to over-estimate the importance of disorder in Rome which is of little significance in the purely military sense. In Rome, it appears that the governing factor must be the desirability of leaving the Italian Government to deal with its own problems to the maximum possible extent, but it may be necessary to render military assistance to avert serious loss of civilian life or destruction on a widespread scale. For instance if a large Communist meeting on the Palatine Hill leads to such grave disturbances as to give rise to a serious probability that there will be grave loss of civilian life and destruction of property, immediate interference by the military might be essential

- 2 -

even though there was no real apprehension as to the safety of the Allied troops. On the other hand a riot of a few hundred prisoners in the Regina Coeli Prison constitutes no threat to military security (now that security internees have been removed) and probably we should not interfere with such a riot until the Italian Government have shown themselves so incapable of dealing with it as to lead to disorders in other parts of the city.

To sum up, it merits consideration as to whether the local Military Commander ought to accede to a request to lend military assistance if in the circumstances of any particular case:

- (a) Allied military interests will be directly affected, or
 - (b) where it is necessary to prevent widespread loss of civilian life and damage to property with the possibility of a serious breakdown of civilian administration in any area.
4. (a) As to para 2 (b) above, SACOMED has under various agreements with the Italian Government ample power to declare military zones whenever he deems it desirable to do so, and down to the present the attitude has always been taken that the rendering of military assistance in aid of the civil power will always be followed by the declaration of a military zone (see 2606/COS folio 2 para 7, folio 12 para 7, folio 23 para 2(b)), but I think that this proposition requires reconsideration.

There is no legal or other principle which requires the giving of military assistance to be followed by the declaration of a military zone and though it may be a useful threat to hang over the head of the Government that the one will follow the other, it may not always be desirable to do so. For instance if troops are called out to quell a riot in Catanzaro, where I am assuming we have no military interest, there may well be no need as a matter of military necessity to establish a military zone.

Even where we have a direct military interest as in the port of Bari, there may be no need as a matter of military necessity to declare a military zone unless it is believed that a withdrawal of military aid will give rise to an immediate recurrence of the trouble or unless it is necessary for the reorganisation of the area in the interests of our military installations.

To sum up, from a purely military angle it does not appear to be possible to lay down any principles upon which the declaration of a military zone should follow the giving of military aid, and each case as it arises must be judged on its own merits by those responsible.

- (b) The above sub-paragraph does not take into consideration the political standpoint, but has dealt with the problem solely as a matter of military necessity.

As I have pointed out above we have always threatened that the giving of military aid would be followed by the declaration of a military zone, but if purely military considerations do not demand such a declaration there seems no compelling reason why political considerations should do so. It is our policy to support the Italian Government and the declaration of a military zone.

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- (b) The above sub-paragraph does not take into consideration the political standpoint, but has dealt with the problem solely as a matter of military necessity.

As I have pointed out above we have always threatened that the giving of military aid would be followed by the declaration of a military zone, but if purely military considerations do not demand such a declaration there seems no compelling reason why political considerations should do so. It is our policy to support the Italian Government and the declaration of a military zone in Rome might have very serious repercussions on that Government. On the other hand the declaration of a military zone in Catanzaro if not necessary for military reasons would not, I suspect, affect the prestige of the Government in any way, and there would seem to be no good reason for declaring such a zone.

To sum up, it seems to me that the question as to whether or not the giving of military assistance should be followed by the declaration of a military zone can only be decided on the merits of each particular case.

5. As to para 2 (c) above, if it is decided to declare any area to be a military zone then the Allied authorities can impose any form of military control from the assumption of mere police duties up to complete A.M.G. It is my view that where a military zone is created A.M.G. should temporarily be

fully imposed and it can be partially relaxed as may seem desirable after quite a short period, even as short as 24 hours. The Legal Sub-Commission has prepared a draft form of Proclamation which seems to me to be appropriate to meet any likely circumstance, and a copy is attached.

With regard to the area to be declared such a zone, I have carefully considered your suggestion that a particular building such as the Regina Coeli Prison should be declared a military zone. The suggestion is, if I may respectfully say so, ingenious, but I doubt if it is sound. If trouble occurs in one building only it would seem more appropriate to give military assistance and then to withdraw without declaring a military zone rather than take over a particular building. If the Government are incapable of running one establishment they must be so weak that it would appear desirable to take over a much larger area of their administration. Furthermore, there would be a real danger that the Government would fail in the first place to take adequate steps to deal with the problem if they realised that we were willing to take over small trouble spots and relieve them of their responsibilities in respect thereof, and it must be borne in mind that the taking over of a prison, even in Rome, would not, I think, embarrass the prestige of the Government unduly.

To sum up, I think that for administrative reasons it would be unwise to take over anything less than an administrative sub-division of the country, e.g. a province or, as in Naples, a comune. Col. Chayman informs me from practical experience that he thinks we should soon get into difficulties if we adopt anything less than an administrative sub-division of the country.

6. In my opinion the whole problem requires review and I trust that this paper - which has the concurrence of the Directors of the Legal and Public Safety Sub-Commissions - may point out in greater detail than has hitherto been done the problems and difficulties that arise. My own view is that it is impossible to lay down beforehand any clear cut principles, except in the rather general way which I have done above. Each case as it arises must be judged in the light of all the circumstances, i.e. military interests, the locality, strength and character of the disorder, and finally the position, attitude and actions of the Government in the matter.

Encl. Draft Proclamation.

Copy to: Political Section.
Legal Sub-Commission.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

J.R. Upjohn

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.,
VP CA Section.
DCOS.

PROCLAMATION

Whereas it is necessary to establish and maintain law and order in the area of

Now, therefore, I HENRY H. H. C. ALEXANDER, G. C. T., C. S. I., D. S. C.,
N. C., Field Marshal, hereby proclaim as follows:-

ART. 1

The said area is hereby established as a Military Zone and is hereinafter called "The Military Zone".

ART. 2

All powers of Government and jurisdiction and final administrative responsibility in the Military Zone are vested in me as Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and Governor of the Military Zone, and shall be exercised under the direction of such Deputy Governor as I may appoint.

ART. 3

All acts, provincial or other public officials or employees shall continue in their present duties as officials or employees under the orders of the Deputy Governor unless dismissed by him.

ART. 4

Any person who:

- 1) Violates or has violated any provision of Italian Law.
- 2) Violates any rule order or regulation governing the administration of the Military Zone or any inhabitants thereof.
- 3) Disobeys any order given under the authority of the Allied Forces or the Deputy Governor.

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4) Takes part in any demonstration or assembly not authorized by the Deputy Governor.

Now, therefore, I HAROLD P. L. G. ALEXANDER, G. C. B., G. S. E., D. S. O.,
M. C., Field Marshal, hereby proclaim as follows:-

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- 3) Disobeys any order given under the authority of the
Allied Forces or the Deputy Governor.
- 4) Takes part in any demonstration or assembly not authorized
by the Deputy Governor.
- 5) Does any act to the prejudice of good order of the
Military Zone.
- 6) Does any act to the prejudice of the safety or security
of the Allied Forces or any member thereof.
- 7) Conspires or attempts to commit, or assists or procures
the commission of any act hereby constituted an offence.

Shall be guilty of an offence and shall upon conviction by a Military Court

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be liable to punishment by death or by imprisonment or fine or both as the Court may determine and in respect of any offence under sub para 1 above the punishment which may be imposed shall not be limited to such punishment as may be prescribed for such offence by Italian law.

ART. 5

Military Courts, which shall be General Superior or Summary Military Courts, are hereby established and shall have such jurisdiction as shall be conferred upon them respectively.

ART. 6

a) Any person convicted by a Military Court may within 14 days of conviction present to the office of the Deputy Governor a Petition for Review of conviction or sentence.

b) No sentence of death shall be executed unless or until confirmed in writing by me or by an officer expressly authorized in that behalf by me in writing.

ART. 7

This Proclamation shall come into effect throughout the Military Zone upon its first publication therein.

DATED:

HAROLD P. L. G. ALEXANDER
Field Marshal
SUMMER ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
OF OPERATIONS

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff
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Ref: 2606/COS

28 Nov 1944

SUBJECT: Intervention by the Allied Commission at the request
of the Italian Government.

TO : DCOS, Est Sec
DCOS, CA Sec
DCOS, Econ Sec
VP, Pol Sec

I refer to para 6 of the minutes of the Chief of Staff's Meeting of 24 November. The points which were discussed at that meeting, and on which I should like your views in writing, are as follows:-

- (a) If a proper request from the Italian Government for the intervention of the Allied Commission is received, should we accede to this request?
- (b) If it were agreed to accede to the request, what measures should be adopted?

MSL/JG

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff

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6. Disturbance at Regina Coeli Prison.

DCOS CA Sec gave a brief outline of the present position at the prison and the measures being taken to relieve conditions. COS mentioned that he had seen two very recent warning reports from Colonel Pollock to the effect that further disturbances were likely to occur and asked whether they had been received by Public Safety Sub-Com and if so what action had been taken on them. CA Sec to investigate this point. COS brought up the question as to what action should be taken if the Italian Government were to ask for our assistance in quelling such disturbance. The points at issue were whether we should intervene if ~~was~~ asked to do so by the Italian Government and what should we do if we did intervene. COS said he would circulate a brief minute on this subject to Heads of Sections, asking for their comments, and that the matter would be further discussed at the next meeting.

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~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

PO 394.

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 240/26/COS

22 November 1944

MINUTES OF CHIEF OF STAFF'S MEETING - 22 NOVEMBER.

COS was in the chair. He introduced to the meeting S/Cmdr. Stones, who was here on a tour of inspection from the C.A. Branch, War Office. He asked Heads of Sections to give her every assistance possible.

1. Minutes of the Last Meeting.

No. 1(b) - Vehicle Situation. DCS, Est Sec, reported that he was getting out a draft Establishment Memorandum on this subject, and it was agreed that the matter should be discussed by the members of the "Memorandum" Committee immediately after their next meeting.

2. Chief of Staff's Visit to LONDON. COS gave a brief resume of the work accomplished during his recent visit to LONDON. He said that the policy of the War Office in regard to the filling of vacancies by British civilians was that such vacancies should be filled as they occurred if civilians with the necessary qualifications could be found. Posts to be filled by War Office will be restricted to HQ and only to such posts that could be filled permanently by civilians. He said that Major Talbot, who had accompanied Mr. Macmillan to London, had been charged with following up what he himself had done in London, but it would probably be necessary for someone to make a further visit to London to make the final selections. He reported that a Major Thomas would be available shortly for the post of Deputy Director, Transportation Sub-Com, and that it was possible that a Mr. Killory would be available for a senior post in the Econ Sec. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Labour had refused to allow Mr. Brynne of the Foreign Office to combine his present assignment with that of Director, Labour Sub-Com. In this connection Mr. Hopkinson pointed out that the A/President intended to take the matter up further in London and COS suggested that he should send a wire to the A/President forthwith as a reminder. Mr. Antolini asked what were the possibilities of hiring civilians from I.L.S.C. COS directed that the matter be taken up through Est Sec.

3. Officers - Visits to the Field. COS stressed the importance of officers, particularly Heads of Sections and Sub-Commissions, getting out into the field and making personal contact with officers in Regions. This applied equally to Regions in the South: officers should not confine their visits to AMG Territory.

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4. Culbertson Mission. COS reported that a group of US civilians headed by a Mr. Culbertson, had arrived and were studying four main points: the industrial productive capacity of the country, import and export mechanisms, and the currency exchange position. A report would be prepared by the Mission and the COS stressed that this should be submitted to AG for approval before issue.

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5. San Marino. It was reported that the Republic of San Marino would shortly be out of bounds to all troops due to an outbreak of typhoid, and an Army Routine Order was being issued to this effect. The Republic has been placed out of bounds to troops even after the lifting of the typhoid restriction, except for day leave parties.
6. Administration of Army Areas. COS reported that AIG 8 Army had made arrangements with Regia Armata for an Admin staff, composed of mixed Regia and Army personnel, to operate under command SCMO Army in that part of the Region at present under Army administration. DCCS Est Sec undertook to take up with the SCMO 5 Army the possibility of the same arrangement being carried out in 5 Army area.
7. Thanksgiving Day. COS had ruled that there should be a half holiday on Thursday, 25 November 1944, with only a nucleus staff in the offices. COS directed that this nucleus staff should consist of British personnel, and that all American personnel should be granted a half-day holiday.
8. Chief Commissioner's Memorandum for the Files. COS referred to the COS Memorandum for the Files on the subject of removal of Allied Officers from Southern Italy, and directed that an interim reply should be made to the Italian Foreign Minister saying that the matter was under consideration pending Mr. Macmillan's talks with the Allied Governments.
9. Office Memorandum. COS reported that an office men random would shortly be issued clarifying the contents, manner and scale of issue of the various types of instructions issued by this HQ.
10. Establishment Memoranda. DCCS Est Sec said that there were at present three Est Mem. pending in draft: (i) Transfer of domestic transport from Tptn S/C to Est Sec; (ii) Pooling of Cars; (iii) Civilian Employees. Agreed that these should be discussed after the next "Mangover" Committee Meeting.
11. Post War Civil Organization. DCCS Est Sec said that he was submitting a list of names to COS for a proposed committee to investigate the possibility of funding such an organization.
12. Cars for AFHQ. DCCS Est Sec reported that AFHQ were not satisfied with the cars supplied by the Commission. COS ruled that we must make one more effort to try and meet their requirements.
13. Devastated Areas.
 - (a) DCCS CA Sec brought up the question of devastated areas. In regard to the removal of the glass tops from desks in HQ, the CO had ruled that as the glass belonged to the Italian Govt. their approval must be obtained. CA Sec will clear this point.
 - (b) Brig. Upjohn said that the Prefectural meetings were a waste of time, that hardly anyone ever turned up and that no positive action was ever taken. He urged the necessity of stockpiling food and it was agreed that Est Sec should tie this up with Econ Sec without awaiting the return of the Director, Food Sub-Com.
 - (c) Brig. Upjohn reported that there was a draft decree in

6. CDS directed that this nucleus staff should consist of British personnel, and that all American personnel should be granted a half-day holiday.
7. Chief Commission's Memorandum for the Files." CDS referred to the CDS Memorandum for the Files on the subject of removal of Allied Officers from Southern Italy, and directed that an interim reply should be made to the Italian Foreign Minister saying that the matter was under consideration pending Mr. Macmillan's talks with the Allied Governments.
8. Office Memorandum. CDS reported that an office memorandum would shortly be issued clarifying the contents, manner and scale of issue of the various types of instructions issued by this HQ.
9. Establishment Memoranda. DCS Est Sec said that there were at present three Est Mem drafts in draft: (i) Transfer of domestic transport from Tpm S/C to Est Sec; (ii) Pooling of Cars; (iii) Civilian Employees. Agreed that these should be discussed after the next "Manpower" Committee Meeting.
10. Post War A.C. Organization. DCS Est Sec said that he was submitting a list of names to CDS for a proposed committee to investigate the possibility of forming such an organization.
11. Cars for AFHQ. DCS Est Sec reported that AFHQ were not satisfied with the cars supplied by the Commission. CDS ruled that we must make more effort to try and meet their requirements.
12. Devastated Areas.
 - (a) DCS C. Sec brought up the question of devastated areas. In regard to the removal of the glass tops from desks in HQ, the CDS had ruled that as the glass belonged to the Italian Govt. their approval must be obtained. C. Sec will clear this point.
 - (b) Brig. Upjohn said that the Prefectural meetings were a waste of time, that hardly anyone ever turned up and that no positive action was ever taken. He urged the necessity of stockpiling food and it was agreed that Est Sec should tie this up with Est Sec without awaiting the return of the Director, Food Sub-Com.
 - (c) Brig. Upjohn reported that there was a draft decree in existence which would enable private owners to get public subsidy for repairs.
 - (d) Clothing. C. Sec was a bidder for clothing for 4 Sub-Coms and Branches. It was agreed that they should make their bids to Est Sec and that Est Sec should submit a letter for approval of CDS to forward to AFHQ setting out the position and asking for a higher priority to be given to devastated areas for the issue of clothing.

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- (e) It was agreed that the PBO should publish an appeal in the Press for voluntary societies to give practical aid, and that the matter should also be represented to the I.R.B. by Col. Sec with a view to obtaining a higher priority for the release of cement and building materials.

14. Patriots. DCS Col. Sec reported that he had held a conference with SOCS 5 and 8 Armies to discuss the measures necessary for the reception of large numbers of patriots which the armies anticipate will be coming through the lines. It had been decided to set up camps in Army areas where the patriots would be disarmed, receive their certificates, be recruited for the Army, provided with employment, or dispersed to their homes. It had been agreed at the last Sierra conference that 5 Army would take 6 patriot representatives but none were required by 5 Army. COS asked DCMO to coordinate policy with ARMs Armies. It was agreed that AI should be asked to approach ARMs with a view to a policy being laid down for the feeding, clothing, and hospitalisation of patriots by the Armies. DCS Col. Sec also reported that No. 1 Special Force had agreed to increase the scope of their "Muston" reports and that the reports compiled by Major Drage would be discontinued. COS asked for more information on the economic side in these reports and instructed DCS Col. Sec to arrange for one of his staff officers to scrutinise the reports when received and have the necessary extracts forwarded to the appropriate Sub Cms.

15. URRA Directive. DCS Col. Sec said that in his opinion the draft URRA directive was not practical. Col. Sec's comments would be ready to-day. COS pointed out that the CC felt very strongly on the matter and he did not wish the negotiations to be continued on the conditions previously suggested by URRA.

16. Communications. Col. Henderson reported that civil radio and cable communications scheduled to commence 15 November had not yet been opened, as it had not been found possible to reach agreement on a commercial basis.

17. Italian Soldiers in S.E. France. Lt Col. Campbell reported that there were large numbers of Italians in S.E. France who were unemployed and starving whom it was desired to repatriate to Italy. Mr. Hopkinson said that the French authorities had agreed to the appointment of Italian consuls in Paris, Marseilles and Toulouse. It would be one of their duties to report the plight of these Italians to the French authorities. COS ruled that there should be no question of repatriation of Italians serving in France and that it would not be possible to accept anyone who lived North of the Rimini-Pisa line. The matter had been put up to ARHQ for representation to 6 Army Group. Col. Campbell said that representation was also being made for the repatriation of Italian soldiers from other countries such as Bulgaria and Roumania.

18. Matters for discussion with AI. DCMO, AI asked that matters concerning AI should be submitted to him for investigation before being referred to ARHQ.

ment, or prepared to their names. It had been agreed at the last Siena conference that 3 Army would take 6 patriot representatives but none were required by 5 Army. COS asked DCMO to coordinate policy with AFHQ. It was agreed that AFHQ should be asked to approach AFHQ with a view to a policy being laid down for the feeding, clothing, and hospitalization of patriots by the Allies. DCSA Sec also reported that No. 1 Special Force had agreed to increase the scope of their "Muster" reports and that the reports compiled by Major Drago would be also continued. COS asked for more information on the economic side in these reports and instructed DCSA Sec to arrange for one of his staff officers to summarize the reports then received and have the necessary extracts forwarded to the appropriate Sub Coms.

15. UNRRA Directive. DCSA Sec said that in his opinion the draft UNRRA Directive was not practical. Ecom Sec's comments would be ready to-day. COS pointed out that the CC felt very strongly on the matter and he did not wish the negotiations to be continued on the conditions previously suggested by UNRRA.

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17. Italian Soldiers in S.E. France. Lt Col. Campbell reported that there were large numbers of Italians in S.E. France who were unemployed and starving whom it was desired to repatriate to Italy. Mr. Hopkinson said that the French authorities had agreed to the appointment of Italian consuls in Paris, Marseilles and Toulouse. It would be one of their duties to represent the plight of these Italians to the French authorities. COS ruled that there should be no question of repatriation of Italians in S.E. France and that it would not be possible to accept anyone who lived North of the Rimini-Pisa line. The matter had been put up to AFHQ for representation to 6 Army Group. Col. Campbell said that representation was also being made for the repatriation of Italian soldiers from other countries such as Bulgaria and Romania.

18. Matters for discussion with AFHQ. DCMO, AFHQ asked that matters concerning AFHQ should be submitted to him for investigation before being referred to AFHQ. Agreed.

19. Transport. Mr. Intolini reported that the 1700 3-ton trucks promised to the Commission had been reduced to 1 1/2-ton trucks, thus in effect halving the numbers promised. Ecom Sec will prepare a memorandum on this for General Spafford to take to Washington.

20. Manufacture of munitions. Mr. Cleveland reported the formation of a committee who would meet shortly to discuss the policy involved.

21. Derequisitioning of Industrial Plants. Mr. Cleveland mentioned the number of requests by the Prime Minister to the CC for the derequisitioning of industrial plants and said that he would endeavour to get the Italian Government to submit these on a lower level to the Ecom Sec instead of writing to the CC. The Ecom Sec would then submit the requests to the Industrial Coordination Committee.

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22. Information Bureau. Mr. Cleveland asked whether it would not be possible to establish some sort of information office to which Italians could go with their problems. COS ruled that PRO should get out a press statement as to what help IC can give in Italian Government territory. Deon Sec would supply a list of questions with answers on some of the more common points. Such information bureau should be run by the Italians themselves if it were decided to set one up.

No Supplement

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff	1
Pol Sec	2
CA Sec	2
Deon Sec	1
Test Sec	2
PRO	1
DOCAO, III	2
Liaison Div	3
File	1
Spare	2

A meeting will be held in the Chief Commissioner's Office from 1100 hours to 1300 hours and 1500 hours to 1700 hours on Monday, 30 November 1944, under the Chairmanship of the Acting President, The Rt Hon H. Macmillan, who had invited the following to attend:-

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Comodore Ellery W. Steen,
Major-General R. Lewis,
Brigadier General Charles Spofford (1500 to 1700 hours)
Chief of Staff, Allied Commission, Brigadier H. S. Lush,
Deputy-Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Section, Brigadier G. R. Upjohn,
Deputy-Chief of Staff, Establishment Section, Colonel H. Pike,
Deputy-Chief of Staff, Economic Section, Mr. A. G. Antolani,
Vice-President, Political Section, Mr. E. Henderson,
Mr. T. Scott,

Secretary - Lt Col G.V.I. Shipps.

AGENDA

1. Future of the Allied Commission.

To consider the removal of "Control" from the title of the Commission as it applies to the Commission's relations with the Italian Government and the Italian Government's powers. Brigadier Upjohn will submit a memorandum describing the functions of the Sub-Commission of the Civil Affairs Section in Italian Government territory.

2. To consider any concessions which can be made in implementation of the change of title

- (i) In reality,
- (ii) As "face saving" to the Italian Government, for example:-

- (a) the removal of officers in the field from the Islands and Southern Region.
- (b) Abandonment of certain functions at Headquarters and in the field.
- (c) Demilitarisation of the Commission. Assuming the demilitarisation should not take place until the end of hostilities, as recommended by the Commission, what steps can be taken to prepare for this event.
- (d) Appointment of civilian advisers to the Italian Government.
- (e) Surrender of control by Allied Commission of Legislation and Appointments of Italian Officials.

The Chief of Staff will produce a memorandum on the above points.

3. To consider the organisation of the Economic Section and the nomination of a Vice-President and senior officials or officers at the Headquarters of the Section and in charge of the Sub-Commission. Deputy-Chief of Staff, Economic Section, will produce a plan of the Economic Section, with names of Director and Deputy-Directors. Chief of Staff will produce a memorandum on the provision of British civilian staff.

4. To consider the proposals of the Allied Commission prepared in implementation of General Wilson's MAP 510. Deputy-Chief of Staff, Economic Section, will produce proposals.

AGENDA.

1. Future of the Allied Commission.

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The Chief of Staff will produce a memorandum on the above points.

3. To consider the organization of the Economic Section and the nomination of a Vice-President and senior officials or officers at the Headquarters of the Section and in charge of the Sub-Commission. Deputy-Chief of Staff, Economic Section, will produce a plan of the Economic Section, with names of Director and Deputy-Directors. Chief of Staff will produce a memorandum on the provision of British civilian staff.

4. To consider the proposals of the Allied Commission prepared in implementation of General Wilson's WPM 840. Deputy-Chief of Staff, Economic Section, will produce memorandum.

- (i) on feeding of Italy
- (ii) Ration and supply position in Italy (with regard to transfer of responsibilities to Italian Government)
- (iii) Joint programming situation

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5. To consider the position of UNRRA and representations to be made by the Acting President in London and Washington on this matter.

6. To consider channels of communication between the Allied Commission and AFHQ, GCS, G340, G243, etc. Brigadier General Spofford will submit a staff study.

7. To consider the relations between Allied Commission, the Political Adviser and the Allied Missionaries, in light of a memorandum drawn up by the Acting

0.8.30

President and agreed provisionally with the Embassy and Chief
Commissioner.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

1. Executive Section Staffa. Executive.

1. Acting Section Head
2. Executive Director
3. Chief Staff Officer

A. G. Ardall (Div.) (A)
 Marion Cleveland (Div.) (A)
 Col. L. D. Denmore (A)

b. Information & Research Division

4. Chief of Division
5. Assistant
6. Assistant
7. Assistant
8. Assistant

Kenneth H. Taylor (Div.) (A)
 Anthony L. Villa (Div.) (A)
 Kenneth S. Sturtevant (Div.) (A)
 Major W. A. Howell (H)
 Major F. P. Richardson (B)

c. Supply & Resources Division

9. Chief of Division
10. Deputy Chief of Division
11. Chief Registration Unit
12. Asst.
13. Price Expert
14. Asst. Price Expert

Marion Cleveland (Div.) (A)
 Maj. F. W. Torrey (H)
 Lt Col. M. A. Martin (A)
 James H. Hurley (Div.) (A)
 Henry H. Bolton (Div.) (A)
 Capt. F. G. Murphy (A)

d. Administration & Personnel Division

15. Chief of Division
16. Staff Officer
17. Staff Officer
18. Staff Officer
19. Civ. Serv. Officer

Maj. B. D. Bush (A)
 Maj. G. E. Sullivan (A)
 Capt. C. J. Sturtevant (B)
 Lt. C. W. Atkins (H)
 David S. Lehman (Div.) (A)

2. Agriculture S/O.

- Director
 Deputy Director

Laurel Albaugh (Div.) (A)
 British Civilian to be selected (B)

3. Commerce S/O.

- Director
 Deputy Director

Col. W. E. Evans (B)
 Maj. W. E. Scotton (A)

4. Finance S/O.

- Joint Director
 Joint Director

Col. A. J. Geoffrey Smith (B)
 Lt Gen. J. E. Fowler (A)

5. Food S/O.

- Director
 Deputy Director

Col. W. H. Legg (B)
 Major J. J. Lewis (B)

6. Industry S/O.

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Warrant No. 3, Jan. 19, 1911. (B)
Major W. L. Howell (B)
Major W. B. Richardson (B)

Norman Cleveland (Civ.)	(A)
Sam. F. W. Pooty	(B)
Lt Col. R. A. Martino	(A)
James E. Hurley (Civ.)	(A)
Henry H. Nelson (Civ.)	(A)
Capt. F. C. Murphy	(A)

(A) (B)
 (A) (B)
 (A) (B)

Isaf. B. D. Dash
 Isaf. G. S. Shiluyev
 Isaf. C. J. Korneeva
 Isaf. C. W. Atkinas
 David S. Keiman (O.V.)

(A) Leonard Allbaugh (Gov.)
(B) 2-13-18 Gov. Ill. to be
collected

Col.	Fl.	Waves
Wad.	Fl.	Waves

Col. A. W. Cavittes Smith
Lt. Genl. J. S. Fowler

Col. W. V. Lutz,
Major C. Davis

W. S. Vaughan (Oiv.)
British civilian to be
selected.

Bryans
O. L. J. R. Smith
M. J. J. O. B. B. B.

C. Supply & Resources Division

10.	Chief of Division
11.	Deputy Chief of Division
12.	Chief Representative Unit
13.	Asst. Price Agent
14.	Asst. Private Representative

3. Administration & Personnel Division

15. Chief of Division
16. Staff Officer
17. Staff Officer
18. Staff Officer
19. Div. Rep. Officer

U.S. Agriculture 6/30.

Director
Deputy Director

3. $\frac{1}{2}$ cup sugar.

Director
Deputy Director

4. Primer 2/3

Joint Directors
Joint Directors

5. Prod 5/0.

Director
Deputy Director

6. Industry 2/3

Director
Deputy Director

7. Labor 2/3.

Director designate
Acting Director
Acting Deputy Director

- 2 -

U.	A. W. & U. S/C	Director Deputy Director	1st Col. L. A. Jony 1st Col. G. H. Rhodes	(A) (B)
S.	Transportation S/O	Director Deputy Director	Col. D. H. Adams British officer to be selected.	(A) (B)
M.	Merchant Shipping S/O	Director Deputy Director	J. J. Graham G. H. Wallace	(B) (A)

* Mediterranean Shipping Based (Italy)

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

MEMORANDUM

Ref: 4/2.1/CA

Ref: 525

SUBJECT: Functions of the Sub-Commissions
of Civil Affairs Section in
Italian Government territory.

19 Nov 44.

TO: Chief of Staff.

INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to set out shortly the functions and work performed by the Sub-Commissions in the Civil Affairs Section in Italian Government territory.

- a) In so far as the functions concern Sub-Commissions in Headquarters,
- b) The work of their representatives in the regions.

2. The Sub-Commissions concerned are:-

Displaced Persons and Italian Refugees,
Education,
Legal,
Local Government Sub-Commission and Patriots Branch,
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives,
Public Health,
Public Safety.

3. The main body of this Memorandum is divided into two parts, one part dealing with the functions in general of Sub-Commissions in Italian Government territory, and part two dealing with the particular functions which derive directly from presence of Allied troops in Italian Government territory. It is emphasised that this memorandum is NOT concerned with the army and various functions of Sub-Commissions, both at Headquarters and in the field, with regard to Allied Military Government territory.

PART I

Functions of Sub-Commissions in Italian Government territory.

4. a) LEGAL MEMORANDUMS

To act as legal adviser to the Chief Commissioner.

Advise and assist in the drafting of decrees submitted by the various Sub-Commissions in this Commission when negotiations are in progress between Sections of this Commission and the various Italian Ministries.

The reviewing of all cases heard before Allied Military Courts.
Advise the Chief Commissioner on the approval of the higher appointments to the Italian Ministry of Justice.

Italian Government territory.

TO: Chief of Staff.

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1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to set out shortly the functions and work performed by the Sub-Commissions in the Civil Affairs Section in Italian Government territory.
 - a) In so far as the functions concern Sub-Commissions in Headquarters,
 - b) The work of their representatives in the regions.
2. The Sub-Commissions concerned are:-
 - Dislocated Persons and Italian Refugees,
 - Education,
 - Legal,
 - Local Government Sub-Commissioner and Patriots Branch,
 - Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives,
 - Public Health,
 - Public Safety.
3. The main body of this Memorandum is divided into two parts, one part dealing with the functions in general of Sub-Commissions in Italian Government territory, and part two dealing with the particular functions which derive directly from presence of Allied troops in Italian Government territory. It is emphasised that this memorandum is NOT concerned with the many and various functions of Sub-Commissions, both at Headquarters and in the field, with regard to Allied Military Government territory.

PART I

Functions of Sub-Commissions in Italian Government territory.

4. a) LOCAL HEADQUARTERS.

To act as legal adviser to the Chief Commissioner.
 Advise and assist in the drafting of decrees submitted by the various Sub-Commissions in this Commission. When negotiations are in progress between Sections of this Commission and the various Italian Ministries, the reviewing of all cases heard before Allied Military Courts.
 Advise the Chief Commissioner on the approval of the higher appointments to the Italian Ministry of Justice.

LOCAL SUB-COMMISSION IN THE FIELD.

To act as advisers to Regional Commissioners in legal matters and Italian legislation.
 To supervise and sit upon Allied Military courts if such be specially authorised.

3582

b) LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB-COMMISSION - HEADQUARTERS

Receive for approval from the Ministry of Interior changes of appointment which concern Prefectorial personnel originally appointed under Allied Military Government.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB-COMMISSION - IN THE FIELD.

Not represented.

- 2 -

c) PUBLIC SAFETY - HEADQUARTERS.

Advise the Chief Commissioner in all matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

Advise and assist Italian Ministry of Interior in all matters connected with the Police forces and their organization.

To act as liaison of behalf of the Chief Commissioner with the Band Forces Sub-Commission with regard to matters connected with the administration and maintenance of Band Forces.

Deal with security matters in all parts of the country in conjunction with the Army Security branches.

Deal with the policy over movement control as required by economic condition and security.

d) DEPT. OF SECURITY - IN THE FIELD.

Carry out investigations connected with the whereabouts of individuals, both from a security and military angle.

In conjunction with the military forces cooperate with the Italian Police agencies for the enforcement of law and order, control of movement, control, investigations, planning and elaborate where illness should be concerned.

e) DEPT. OF HEALTH - SUPERVISORY - IN THE FIELD.

Act as advisor to the Chief Commissioner on all Public Health and Welfare matters.

Act as advisor to the Italian Ministry of Interior on Public Health and veterinary matters.

Act as controllers of the Italian Ministry of Health where questions of epidemics arise.

Monitor the policy as to distribution of medical supplies where these are derived from allied sources.

f) DEPT. OF HEALTH - SUPERVISORY - IN THE FIELD.

Act as advisor to the Regional Commissioner on all welfare and health matters.

Supervise the Italian agencies concerned in distribution of medical supplies which are furnished from allied sources.

In conjunction with Public Health and local military commands, formulate the laws for control of epidemics and epidemic diseases.

g) DEPT. OF EDUCATION - SUPERVISORY - IN THE FIELD.

Advise the Italian Ministry of Education on all matters connected with the Ministry of Education.

Advise the Government of Regions of Universities and the Higher Functionaries in the Ministry of Education.

Formulate the policy with regard to the distribution of Jewish teachings from textbooks. Arrange with regard to the printing of textbooks.

h) DEPT. OF POLICE - SUPERVISORY - IN THE FIELD.

Supervise the Italian Police with regard to Fascist teachings is carried out.

Advise Regional Commissioners in matters connected with Education.

tion big army security branches.
 tied with the policy of movement control as required by economic
 condition and security.

THESE ARE THE MAIN LINES OF THE
 carry out instructions connected with the whereabouts of individuals,
 both from a security and welfare angle.
 In conjunction with the military forces cooperate with the Italian
 police agencies for the enforcement of law and order, control of movement
 of persons, investigation into pilfering and sabotage when illicit
 acts are concerned.

4) THE ITALIAN SUPERVISORY COMMISSION - HEADQUARTERS
 act as advisors to the Chief Commissioner on all public health and
 welfare matters.
 Act as advisors to the Italian Ministry of Interior on Public Health
 and veterinary matters.
 Act as controllers of the Italian Ministry of Health where questions of
 economics arise.
 Advise the policy as to distribution of medical supplies where these are
 required from allied sources.

PUBLIC HEALTH SUPERVISORY COMMISSION - IN THE FIELD
 act as advisor to the regional commissioner on all public and health
 matters.
 Advise the Italian agencies concerned in distribution of medical
 supplies which are furnished from allied sources.
 In conjunction with Public Health and local military commands,
 formulate the plan for control of venereal and epidemic diseases.

5) EDUCATIONAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION - HEADQUARTERS
 act as advisors when required by the Ministry of Public Instruction on
 matters concerning education.
 Approve the appointment of rectors of universities and all higher
 functionaries in the Ministry of Education.
 Formulate the policy with regard to the organization of fascist teachings
 from textbooks. Arranges with regard to the printing of textbooks.

EDUCATIONAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION - IN THE FIELD
 Advise the regional commissioner with regard to fascist teachings is carried
 out.
 Advise regional commissioners in matters connected with education.
 Act as liaison officers for the regional commissioner with military
 organizations with regard to the acquisition of educational facilities.

6) SCIENTIFIC SUPERVISORY COMMISSION - HEADQUARTERS
 Assist the Ministry of Public Instruction and Public and for the continuance
 of works for the preservation of monuments and fine arts.
 Collect and collate the reports from officers in the field and transmit
 these reports to London, Washington and AFHQ.

LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION - IN THE FIELD

See that the policy laid down by the Commission and higher Headquarters with regard to the occupation by Allied troops of ornamental buildings is carried out.

c) PATRIOTIC BRANCH - HEADQUARTERS

Its functions:

However, should large numbers of patriots come through the lines the Sub-Commission may have to take in hand the disposal, welfare and care of these persons in conjunction with the Italian Government in the area administered by it.

a) DISPLACED PERSONS SUB-COMMISSION - HEADQUARTERS

Work in close conjunction with the various international representatives in all matters connected with the welfare and feeding of displaced persons.

Coordinating with other Sub-Commissions of this Commission, and other Military Headquarters (both higher and parallel) movement of Italian refugees. This involves both the primary evacuation and the eventual registration of these persons.

5. This Section also coordinates the work of the Sub-Commissions concerned in this Section and in the Economic Section with regard to evacuation, mine clearance, and devastated areas. All Sub-Commissions are concerned with supervising execution of the first-named; various other Sub-Commissions are concerned in the other two.

PART III

6. Functions of Sub-Commissions deriving directly from the presence of Allied troops in Italian Government territory.

a) LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

The setting up and conduction of Allied Military Courts. These are necessary to deal with the cases in which Allied personnel and stores are concerned. All such cases are reviewed in the Headquarters office of the Legal Sub-Commission. It is pointed out that these functions involve a considerable amount of work, and as an instance, the recent necessity for setting up special courts in the Bari area to deal with stealing from the transition camps is quoted.

b) PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION

Organise the assistance given by Italian police agencies to Provost Marshal detachments of the allies for the maintenance of law and order among troops and the investigation of crimes in which Allied personnel and stores are involved.

Formulation of the policy and supervision of the execution of measures taken in V.D. control, and in any matters connected with the control of movement necessitated by outbreaks of epidemic diseases for security reasons.

c) PUBLIC HEALTH SUB-COMMISSION

Determine the requirements and the measures to be taken by the Italian Ministry of Interior in connection with epidemic and other disease control.

Work in close conjunction with the various international representatives in all matters connected with the welfare and feeding of displaced persons.

Coordinated with other Sub-Commissions of this Commission, and other military Headquarters (both higher and parallel) movement of Italian refugees. This involves both the primary evacuation and the eventual repatriation of these persons.

5. This Section also coordinates the work of the Sub-Commissions concerned in this Section and in the Economic Section with regard to expropriation, mine clearance, and devastated areas. All Sub-Commissions are concerned with supervising execution of the first-named; various other Sub-Commissions are concerned in the other two.

PART II.

6. Functions of Sub-Commissions deriving directly from the presence of Allied troops in Italian Government territory.

a) ITALIAN SUB-COMMISSION:

The setting up and conduction of Allied Military Courts. These are necessary to deal with the cases in which Allied personnel and stores are concerned. All such cases are reviewed in the Headquarters office of the Legal Sub-Commission. It is pointed out that these functions involve a considerable amount of work, and as an instance, the recent necessity for setting up special courts in the Bari area to deal with sterling from the ammunition dumps is quoted.

b) PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION:

Organise the assistance given by Italian police and gendarmes to Provost Marshal detachments of the armies for the maintenance of law and order among troops and the investigation of cases in which Allied personnel and stores are involved.

Formulation of the policy and supervision of the execution of measures taken in V.D. control, and in any matters connected with the control of movement necessitated by outbreaks of epidemic diseases for security reasons.

c) PUBLIC HEALTH SUB-COMMISSION:

Determine the requirements and the measures to be taken by the Italian Ministry of Interior in connection with epidemics and other disease control.

d) EDUCATION SUB-COMMISSION:

Assist the Italian Government and determine the real requirements of the education authorities in cases where educational buildings are about to be, or have been, requisitioned for military purposes.

e) M.P.A. & A. SUB-COMMISSION:

Are the channel through which settlement of cases arising from the occupation by Allied troops of monumental and semi-monumental buildings are made.

Making of inspections of buildings so occupied.

G. R. UPJOHN, Brig,
VF SA Section,
DDOS.

3581

0640

HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 394

Ref: 6/EP/3A

14 October 1944

SUBJECT: Proclamations, General Orders &c.

TO: SACs 5th and 8th Armies (6 ea).

Regional Commissioners, ROSCAU (12), EILMA (10), LICHIA (6)
PIMONT (10), LICHIA (12) and VENEZIA (16) Regions.

Reference is made to this Headquarters letter 623/50/3A of 23rd September 44.

1. All previous correspondence in this matter is cancelled and the following will apply.

- (a) SACs 5th and 8th Armies will be responsible for the initial publication of Proclamations 1 to 4 and General Order No. 1. General Order No. 2 will only be published by the Armies on the recommendation of the Senior Finance Officer.
- (b) The Publication of further General Orders and Notices will be at the discretion of SACs 5th and 8th Armies in consultation with the Regional Commissioners of the Regions concerned.
- (c) It will be the responsibility of Regional Commissioners as and when they take over new territory to publish all other Orders and Notices which have not been published by the Armies. Regional Commissioners should satisfy themselves that Procs 1 to 4 and G.O. No. 1 have been published on a sufficiently wide basis.
- (2) So that this HQ may know what Orders have been published within Regions Regional Commissioners will report to this HQ within two weeks of the taking over new territory what Orders they have published.
- (c) Attached is a list of current Orders which should be posted by Regions.
- 2. G.O. No. 33 and Notice No. 4 shown on the attached list are still in the hands of the Printer. Copies will shortly be distributed to Regions and should be posted on receipt.
- 3. Regional Commissioners will estimate the total number of all Proclamations, General Orders &c which will meet all their future requirements and render a return to this HQ within fourteen days of receipt of this letter. This will enable this HQ to run off now the required number of copies. Some Regions now hold all the copies they will require and they will render a nil return.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

3580

923

10/10/44
618

1. All previous correspondence in this matter is cancelled and the following will apply.

- (a) SCAC's 5th and 8th Announcements will be responsible for the initial publication of Proclamations 1 to 4 and General Order No. 1. General Order No. 2 will only be published by the Armies on the recommendation of the Senior Finance Officer.
 - (b) The Publication of further General Orders and Notices will be at the discretion of SAC's 5th and 8th Armies in consultation with the Regional Commissioners of the Regions concerned.
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3. Regional Commissioners will estimate the total number of all Proclamations, General Orders & c which will meet all their future requirements and render a return to this HQ within four-teen days of receipt of this letter. This will enable this HQ to run off now the required number of copies. Some Regions now hold all the copies they will require and they will render a nil return.

BY ORDER OF THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

3580

G. R. 10/1/1
G.A. UPJOHN, Esq.
V.P. C.A. Section
Deputy Chief of Staff

- Copy to :
- 1. Chief of Staff Section (2)
 - 2. Economic Section (10)
 - 3. Lazio-Umbria and Abruzzi-Marche Regions for information
 - 4. Toscana Region (your E VIII/48/9 of 6 Oct. refers)
 - 5. Distribution List "B" less 1,33 to 50,55 to 59 and 66 to 87.

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LIST OF PROCLAMATIONS, GENERAL ORDERS AND NOTICES EXTANT1. PROCLAMATIONS

Nos.	1.	Setting up Military Government.
	2.	Property Control.
	3.	General Police and Security Regulations.
	4.	Closing of Financial Institutes and establishment of a Moratorium.

2. GENERAL ORDERS

No.	1 (Renumbered)	Taxes and Public Monies	Finance
"	2 (Revised)	Termination of restrictions on Banking Institutions and Moratorium, extension of time for protest.	Finance
"	13 (Sicily and Italy)	Right of Jews	Legal
"	20 (Italy)	Circulation of Motor Vehicles	Public Safety
"	24 (Revised)	Movement of Civilian and Passes	Public Safety
"	25 (Italy)	Public Meetings	Public Safety
"	26 (Italy)	Consignment of wheat and Barley to Peoples Granaries	Agriculture S/C
"	27 (Italy)	Regulation of Aliens	Public Safety
"	28 (Italy)	Labour Regulations	Labour S/C
"	29	Declaration of Essential Supplies	Econ. Section
"	30	Fixing prices, "Bread and Pasta"	Food S/C
"	33	Offences ("Possession of Gerry Cans")	Legal S/C

3. NOTICES

No	1	"Surrender your Arms"
"	2	Curfew
"	3	"Do not leave the Shore"
"	4	"Surrender all Military Petrol Cans"
		Graves (Italian version only) Public Safety

2. CRIMINAL MATTERS

No.	1 (Renumbered)	Taxes and Public Monies	Finance
"	2 (Revised)	Termination of restrictions on Banking Institutions and Moratorium, extension of time for protest.	Finance
"	10 (Sicily and Italy)	Right of Jews	Legal
"	20 (Italy)	Circulation of Motor Vehicles	Public Safety
"	24 (Revised)	Movement of Civilian and Passes	Public Safety
"	25 (Italy)	Public Meetings	Public Safety
"	26 (Italy)	Consignment of wheat and Berley to Peoples Granaries	Agriculture S/C
"	27 (Italy)	Regulation of Aliens	Public Safety
"	28 (Italy)	Labour Regulations	Labour S/C
"	29	Declaration of Essential Supplies	Econ. Section
"	30	Fixing prices. " Bread and Pasta "	Food S/C
"	33	Offences (" Possession of Garry Cans ")	Legal S/C
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"	3	" Do not leave the Shore "	
"	4	" Surrender all Military Petrol Cans "	
		Graves (Italian version only)	Public Safety

14 October 1944.

0 6 4 4

The problem is (a) to give greater status and authority to the Italian Government, (b) to convert the Commission of Control into a Commission of aid and guidance, and (c), to consider the introduction of UNRRA into Italy.

2. As it is necessary to preserve the Anglo-American character of the machinery of control (or aid and guidance) it will be necessary also to preserve the chain of command from the head of the Control Commission through Beamed and the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the British and American Governments.

3. This is all the more necessary as the supplies which will be required to keep the Italian population on a minimum standard of subsistence and therefore to prevent possible rioting and disorder must, in great part, come from American sources.

4. It follows that objectives (a) and (b) can most conveniently be achieved in present circumstances through the adaptation in practice of the policy of the Control Commission rather than in any formal change in the machinery of control. This could be effected by a fresh policy directive addressed to the Supreme Allied Commander by the British and American Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. At the present moment all relations with the Italian Government are conducted through the Control Commission. It is suggested that the status of the Italian Government would be enhanced if diplomatic envoys were formally accredited to the Italian Government by the British and American Governments, whose example would inevitably be followed by all the other

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5. At the present moment all relations with the Italian Government are conducted through the Control Commission. It is suggested that the status of the Italian Government would be enhanced if diplomatic envoys were formally accredited to the Italian Government by the British and American Governments, whose example would inevitably be followed by all the other Governments of the United Nations. The opening up of so many channels of communication with the Italian Government would, in the long run, be bound to weaken the machinery of control.

6. This would also imply acceptance in return of some form of Italian diplomatic representation in the capitals of the United Nations.

- 2 -

7. The difficulty lies in the double channel of approach to the Italian Government which this proposal involves, i.e., through the Ambassador and through the Control Commission.
8. It is not impossible to get over this difficulty, provided that the respective spheres of the Ambassador and the President of the Control Commission are clearly defined. The Ambassador would from the outset inform the President of the Control Commission of the views and wishes of the Foreign Office. The President would receive the same guidance from the American Ambassador. In the initial stages it would be the case that the Ambassador should not take up with the Italian Government any question directly without first consulting the President of the Control Commission.
9. As the machinery of control was gradually relaxed, the sphere of independent action by the Ambassador would be very sensu increased.
10. This means that at first the Ambassador's principal duty would be to report fully to His Majesty's Government on the political and economic situation in Italy, getting his information in great part from the President of the Control Commission. Gradually the number of ^{Subjects} ~~these steps~~ on which direct conversation between the Italian and British Governments were possible might be expected to increase.
11. As regards the operation of UNRRA in Italy, the subject would require to be raised in the UNRRA Conference due to be held in Montreal on September 15th.
12. The difficulty about the proposition is that the funds

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Ambassador would from the outset inform the President of the Control Commission of the views and wishes of the Foreign Office. The President would receive the same guidance from the American Ambassador. In the initial stages it would be the case that the Ambassador should not take up with the Italian Government any question directly without first consulting the President of the Control Commission.

9. As the machinery of control was gradually relaxed, the sphere of independent action by the Ambassador would be partly passed increased.

10. This means that at first the Ambassador's principal duty would be to report fully to His Majesty's Government on the political and economic situation in Italy, getting his information in great part from the President of the Control Commission. Gradually the number of ^{sub-steps} ~~these steps~~ on which direct conversation between the Italian and British Governments were possible might be expected to increase.

11. As regards the operation of UNRRA in Italy, the subject would require to be raised in the UNRRA Conference due to be held in Montreal on September 15th. 3573

12. The difficulty about the proposition is that the funds of UNRRA are limited to a fixed amount, and that UNRRA is at present prohibited from operating in other than allied liberated territory. Each prospective beneficiary is interested mainly in the share of the total funds which it will obtain. The advent of an ex-enemy and co-belligerent as a participant in the fund is bound to excite hostility among the other beneficiaries who are also members of UNRRA and have votes in its councils.

- 3 -

13. Furthermore it is already considered by the directors of UNRRA that the total funds are insufficient to meet the demands even of those countries who are already entitled to its benefits.

14. The consequences of raising the Italian question may therefore be to start a debate on the sufficiency of UNRRA funds, and this may be very embarrassing to His Majesty's Government, who are already in some doubt as to how they can convert their share of ^{their} UNRRA liability into goods which alone can be of use to the liberated territories.

22nd August, 1944.

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 39.

Office of the Executive Commissioner,
+++++

30th July 1944

Vice Presidents,
Administrative Section.
Economic Section.
Political Section.

Herewith for your information copy of a memorandum I have submitted to the Acting Chief Commissioner expressing my views on the proposals and discussions which have taken place in the last few days.

Captain Stone wishes to forward the memorandum to AFHQ after discussion with Vice Presidents at the V.P.'s Meeting tomorrow.

M.S. Lusk

3576

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM

29th July 1944

1. At this stage of the war it is natural to consider the future of the Allied Control Commission in its relations with the Italian Government, and with the Allied military forces, and its functions in Italy.

2. The objectives of Allied Military Government have been described as follows:-

- (a) To relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration.
- (b) To restore law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible, procure the necessary food supplies for them and where necessary provide relief and maintenance for destitutes within available resources.
- (c) To assist in making available to the occupying forces the economic resources of the occupied territory.
- (d) To promote political and military objectives of the Allied Forces in connection with future operations through efficient government of the territory and the application of the policies toward the civil population laid down by the Commander-in-Chief.

3. The functions of the Allied Control Commission laid down in Army Administrative Memorandum No. 7, dated 2 November, 1943, were also defined as follows:-

- (a) To enforce and execute the instructions of the orders and general directives of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.
- (c) To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled.
4. On the amalgamation of the Allied Control Commission with the Allied Military Government which took place last February, the Allied Control

Commission maintained all these responsibilities. May of the year 1944 3573

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2. The objectives of Allied Military Government have been described

as follows:-

- (a) To relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration.
- (b) To restore law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible, procure the necessary food supplies for them and where necessary provide relief and maintenance for destitutes within available resources.
- (c) To assist in making available to the occupying forces the economic resources of the occupied territory.
- (d) To promote political and military objectives of the Allied forces in connection with future operations through efficient government of the territory and the application of the policies toward the civil population laid down by the Commander-in-Chief.

3. The functions of the Allied Control Commission laid down in

ANM Administrative Memorandum No. 7, dated 2 November, 1943, were also

defined as follows:-

- (a) To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under the orders and general directives of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.

- (c) To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled.

4. On the assignment of the Allied Control Commission with the Allied Military Government which took place last February, the Allied Control Commission undertook all these responsibilities. Many of the objectives of Allied Military Government are applicable to advisory control maintained by the Allied Control Commission in territory handed over to the Italian Government, particularly with regard to maintenance of law and order and the economic resources of the territory.

5. The functions of the Allied Control Commission as regards both Allied Military Government and advisory control are governed primarily by the operational needs of the Allied Forces in Italy. The Italian Government is

-2-

now in Rome and will shortly have under their administration a large portion of liberated Italy. But the most important industrial portion of Italy, densely populated, is still in German hands and the enemy shows no signs of evacuating the territory without continuous fighting. In any examination of problems in the near future, that is to say so long as hostilities continue in the territory, Italy must be regarded not as a political entity but as a theatre of war. Political aspirations, long range policies for rehabilitation, must take second place to the operational and post-operational needs of the

Allied Forces.

6. It may be necessary to divide this theatre of war into two military areas, S.C., as between AMI and AFM, but on the ACC administrative (including economic) side, no division should be made. This was the basic principle underlying the amalgamation of Allied Military Government and the Allied Control Commission: it ensured co-ordination of policy and procedure at the centre and continuity throughout the territory.

7. The policy of the Allied Control Commission in the last six months has been gradually to bridge the division between Allied Military Government territory and Italian Government territory. We have evolved a process by which legislation in many cases is identical and we have aimed at similarity of principles and procedure, diverging from that policy only in the case of operational necessity. There can be no doubt as to the beneficial results of this co-ordination to the military forces, the civil population, and the Italian Government when it comes to take over more territory. An Army in the field operating in a foreign country is inevitably sensitive to the economic and political situation in its rear however long the lines of communication may be. 3574
Even if there existed no Allied Forces or installations in Sicily, Sardinia, or Southern Italy, the state of affairs in these areas, however remote from the theatre of operations, must be of concern to the Commander-in-Chief in the field.

Allied Forces.

5. It may be necessary to divide this theatre of war into two military areas, e.g., as between AA1 and AF12, but on the ACE administrative (including economic) side, no division should be made. This was the basic principle underlying the amalgamation of Allied Military Government and the Allied Control Commission: it ensured co-ordination of policy and procedure at the centre and continuity throughout the territory.

7. The policy of the Allied Control Commission in the last six months has been gradually to bridge the division between Allied Military Government territory and Italian Government territory. We have evolved a process by which legislation in many cases is identical and we have aimed at similarity of principles and procedure, diverging from that policy only in the case of operational necessity. There can be no doubt as to the beneficial results of this co-ordination to the military forces, the civil population, and the Italian Government when it comes to take over more territory. An Army in the field operating in a foreign country is inevitably sensitive to the economic and political situation in its rear however long the lines of communication may be. Even if there existed no Allied Forces or installations in Sicily, Sardinia, or Southern Italy, the state of affairs in these areas, however remote from the seat of operations, must be of concern to the Commander-in-Chief in the field. The fact that the Italian Army is under his command and that greater use will probably be made of units of this Army in the fighting zone, thereby reducing the number of security and defence divisions on the lines of communication, explains this.

8. Suggestions have been made that the Allied Control Commission should divest itself of certain responsibilities and functions in specific areas of this territory which are no longer of military interest to the Allied Forces.

-3-

that there should be a dividing line on one side of which civilian or other agencies should operate, leaving to the Allied Control Commission responsibility only in areas relatively close to the scene of operations.

9. From the point of view of distribution of military personnel these proposals are attractive but wherever the reasons may be outside this theatre they would appear to be unground from the point of view of the proper administration related always to military necessity, of the population in this theatre of war.

10. It is vitally necessary from the political point of view that the Italian Government should take the maximum responsibility in the government of the territory handed over to it. So long, however, as this is a theatre of war and so long as the Italians have the status of co-belligerents, the Government can look to but one Allied authority for direction, control and advice. That authority should be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, the agency created by the long terms of the Armistice for this purpose.

In order that the Chief Commissioner may be in a position to exercise direction and control and furnish advice he must have representatives, however thinly distributed, in all parts of the territory. He cannot in the present state of instability in this country rely on information furnished by the Italians alone, nor can he carry out his responsibilities by exercising remote control and by making use of "trouble shooters". Moreover, it is the experience not only in this country but also in other occupied territories that wherever Allied Forces or installations exist, the presence of resident Allied civil affairs officers (either administrative, police or technical) is necessary to facilitate the functions of the military authorities and to promote good relations between the civilian population and military forces without which the maximum resources of the country cannot properly be employed. There still exist in Sicily, Sardinia, and many places in Southern Italy, Allied installations and Allied Forces.

10. It is vitally necessary from the political point of view that the Italian Government should take the major responsibility in the government of the territory handed over to it. So long, however, as this is a theatre of war and so long as the Italians have the status of co-belligerents, the Government can look to but one Allied authority for direction, control and advice. That authority should be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, the agency created by the long terms of the Armistice for this purpose. In order that the Chief Commissioner may be in a position to exercise direction and control and furnish advice he must have representatives, however thinly distributed, in all parts of the territory. He cannot in the present state of instability in this country rely on information furnished by the Italians alone, nor can he carry out his responsibilities by exercising remote control and by making use of "trouble shooters". Moreover, it is the experience not only in this country but also in other occupied territories that wherever Allied Forces or installations exist, the presence of resident Allied Civil Affairs Offices (either administrative, police or technical) is necessary to facilitate the functions of the military authorities and to promote good relations between the civilian population and military forces without which the maximum resources of the country cannot properly be employed. There still exist in Sicily, Sardinia, and many places in Southern Italy, Allied installations and Allied Forces.

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11. Again, reports from the Southern areas show that the country has not reached a stage of stability which would justify complete abandonment of large areas without the presence of a few Allied officers. The standard of administration shown by heads of local Government, the numbers and degree of efficiency of the Carabinieri and other police agencies, are not sufficient to ensure that stability which is necessary, not only where Allied installations exist but throughout the country, so long as the country is a theatre of war. However much we may wish to compel the Italian local government to share on their own foot and to take full responsibility, it must be remembered that the presence of

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10. It is vitally necessary from the political point of view that the Italian Government should take the maximum responsibility in the government of the territory handed over to it. So long, however, as this is a theatre of war and so long as the Italians have the status of co-belligerents, the Government can look to but one Allied authority for direction, control and advice. That authority should be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission¹ the agency created by the long terms of the Armistice for this purpose. In order that the Chief Commissioner may be in a position to exercise direction and control and furnish advice he must have representatives, however thinly distributed, in all parts of the territory. He cannot in the present state of instability in this country rely on information furnished by the Italians alone, nor can he carry out his responsibilities by exercising remote control and by making use of "trouble shooters". Moreover, it is the experience not only in this country but also in other occupied territories that wherever Allied Forces or installations exist, the presence of resident Allied Civil Affairs Officers (either administrative, police or technical) is necessary to facilitate the functions of the military authorities and to promote good relations between the civilian population and military forces without which the maximum resources of the country cannot properly be employed. There still exist in Sicily, Sardinia, and many places in Southern Italy, Allied installations and Allied forces.

3573

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one Allied officer an advisory capacity may make the difference between order and disorder and is probably worth many hundreds of carabinieri or troops in the enforcement of law and the maintenance of stability.

12. It is recommended, therefore, that there should be no change in the responsibilities and functions of the Allied Control Commission and that the time has not yet come for a total abandonment of law, Sicily or Southern Italy, to the Italian Government. On the other hand, both from the point of view of manpower and the reconstruction of Italy, we must clearly continue the process of allowing the Italian Government to take more responsibilities. This process has, of course, already begun: the number of Allied officers in Sicily has been reduced from 100 in February to 50 at the present time and the number will be approximately 27 by mid-August. Similar reductions have been made throughout the territory handed back to the Italian Government and it is proposed that the Compartimenti of Calabria, Lucania, Apulia, Campania, Campania and Puglia, should shortly be amalgamated into one Region and that resident Allied officers should be established in not more than six of the 14 Provinces of that area.

13. When hostilities in Italy cease and the Allied Forces have left the country, then, and then only, it would seem, should the constitution of the Allied Control Commission be changed. Although the resources of the country will still be needed for the war effort, thus that urgent this objective can be accomplished with long term reconstruction policy. Quite apart from any basic change that may then take place in the status of Italy, the country will no longer be a theatre of operations and the relations of the Allied Nations with the Italian Government may clearly have undergone a change which will render many of the functions of the Allied Control Commission unnecessary. In order to prepare for this change and in order to avoid a sudden disruptive re-organization, the infiltration of civilian elements into the Allied Control Commission who would be ready to take the place of many of the military personnel, could, 357414, be made possible. These civilian personnel should, however, be members of the

however and the reconstruction of Italy, we must clearly continue the process of allowing the Italian Government to take more responsibilities. This process has, of course, already begun: the number of Allied officers in Sicily has been reduced from 150 in February to 50 at the present time and the number will be approximately 27 by mid-August. Similar reductions have been made throughout the territory handed back to the Italian Government and it is proposed that the Comandamenti of Calabria, Lucania, Apulia, Campania, Campobasso and Molise, should shortly be amalgamated into one Region and that resident Allied officers should be established in not more than six of the 16 Provinces of that area.

13. When hostilities in Italy cease and the Allied Forces have left the country, then, and then only, it would seem, should the constitution of the Allied Control Commission be changed. Although the resources of the country will still be needed for the war effort, from that moment this objective can be assimilated with long term reconstruction policy. Quite apart from any basic change that may then take place in the status of Italy, the country will no longer be a theatre of operations and the relations of the Allied Nations with the Italian Government may clearly have undergone a change which will render many of the functions of the Allied Control Commission unnecessary. In order to prepare for this change and in order to avoid a sudden disruptive re-organization, the infiltration of civilian elements into the Allied Control Commission who would be ready to take the place of many of the military personnel, could, 357, be commenced forthwith. These civilian personnel should, however, be members of the Allied Control Commission working under the authority of and reporting to the Chief Commissioner only. This process would gradually transform the Commission into an organization which could take its place in any future arrangements which may be decided upon for the reconstruction of Italy, both economically and administratively, at the end of hostilities either in this country alone or in Europe.

M.S. [initials]

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Purpose of Allied Control Commission

Cable No. 10986, Incoming, December 7, 1943; from Eisenhower:

Communication by Badoglio on Advisory Council, your 1271.

Allied Control Commission is representative of the United Nations, with following purposes:

- (a) to execute Armistice
- (b) insure that conduct of Italian Government conforms to Allied requirements.
- (c) be organ for conducting relations with Italian Government
(the channel of communication)
Advisory Council, with present representation confined to British, American, Soviet, and French representatives, has following purposes:

- (a) to watch machinery of A.C.C.
- (b) to advise President of Commission on General Policy connected therewith.

It would not be in accord with nature and purpose of this body to grant Italian Government either representation or right to send an observer.

Transfer of Territory south of Bari - determination of including Sicily & Sardinia to Italian Administration is subject to instructions & guidance of A.C.C.

Record Bureau
Displaced Persons Sub-Commission
.C.C.

H. Caccia Esq
Political Section
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
C.M.F.

11th Feb. 1944

Dear Mr Caccia,

This is just a personal note to let you know as I promised, that Colonel Kirkwood has approved my controlling the above Record Bureau which is slowly, but I think surely, beginning to work.

Can you tell me who the International Red Cross representatives are in Allied occupied Italy and where they are? I have met Dr Burchard and understand that he is in Naples but do not know about the others. Is there one in Sardinia?

I am very optimistic about future results in handling enquiries through the Record Bureau, and hope too that, ere long, we shall have adequate records of Displaced Persons. Can you tell me if there is likely to be a compulsory registration by the Italian Government of all foreigners? This seems to me to be the only way we shall ever be able to record those Displaced Persons who are now roaming around, and who are not known to their national Missions attached to the D.P. Sub-Commission.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas Parrington

Thomas Parrington British Red Cross
Controller Record Bureau

SECRET**COPY**

**ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff**

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Relations between AGC and Italian Government.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission APO 394.
(Attention: Acting Chief Commissioner).

1. Under date 23 August 1944, instructions on the above subject were issued by this Headquarters (Letter AFHQ GFF C/S, AG 387/045 GRC-O) which reviewed in some detail the function of the Advisory Council for Italy as well as the relations between the Allied Control Commission and the Italian Government. It is now desired to amplify these instructions, particularly with respect to paragraph 3. While any formal communications, especially if they look to executive action, must pass through the channels of the Allied Control Commission, it is not intended to curtail informal contacts between the Italian Ministers and members of the Advisory Council of a nature to keep the latter informed of current Italian affairs.

2. In saying that it is desired that you take occasion to bring up with the Italian Government the matter of its relations with the Allied Control Commission, it was not intended that a formal *démarche* be made; you may in your discretion present the matter quite informally.

3. As to the relations with the representatives of neutral Governments accredited to the Government of Italy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have given the following instructions. While there will be no objection to neutral representatives having unofficial dealings directly with the Italian Government, it is to be understood that their formal official relations must be conducted through the Allied Control Commission. It has been established that the representatives of members of the United Nations shall deal with the Italian Government through the Allied Control Commission; it is considered that neutral nations should not be in a more favorable position.

By Command of General WILSON:

(Sgt) LOWELL W. ROOKE
for J. A. H. GAMMILL
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

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1 - G-3	1 - SIS
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1 - PWB	2 - Addressee

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COPY**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APC 394

*Central
Reference
Library*

29 November 1943

MEMORANDUM: Relation of the Allied Control Commission
to the Italian Government

TO : All Officers, Allied Control Commission

1. The attention of all officers is invited to the fact that the Allied Control Commission occupies a position in relation to the Italian Government which is quite different from that of Allied Military Government. The Commission advises and supervises; it does not govern. This fundamental difference must be thoroughly understood by all officers who will adjust accordingly their attitude toward Italian officials and agencies, allowing them to develop their functions freely without undue interference.

2. If basic differences arise between officers of this Commission and the corresponding members of the Italian Government, the matter at issue will be submitted to the Deputy President for adjustment with the Head of the Italian Government.

3. This document is a matter of continuing policy. Each Vice President will ensure that it is understood by all officers belonging to his section.

By command of Major General JOYCE:

OFFICIAL:

E. L. GLENN
E. L. GLENN
Lt. Col., ASD
Actg Adjutant General

E. A. L. GUETERBOCK
Brigadier
Acting Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"

3568

Outline plan

21 August 43

Upon occupation of Italy, an Armistice Control Authority and an Allied Military Government will be set up.

Plan for organization and policy of each.

FILED: 950

926
3567

TO MAKINS
 Ital Ministers sections

100/100

25 December 1945

In your letter 14/130/2 of 15 December you asked what action was taken on Dragage's note No. 1154 of November 26. So far as the Commission itself was concerned the only action taken was a vote of censure from General Roger at a general staff meeting attended by all heads of sections or sub-sections then in Brindisi. The General pointed out that there were ways and ways of dealing with the Italian Ministers and that in the event of divergence of opinion between a section and its corresponding Italian Ministry, he would take up the question himself personally with the Marshal.

The written reply was sent to Dragage.

Roger Makins, Maj.
 Office of the British Resident Minister
 at Allied Force Headquarters,
 5 rue du Commerce Maritime,
 Algiers

923

3566

TO MARINS

State of Affairs
ACC II
RIG

25 January 1944

I got back to Brindisi and met General Mason MacFarlane who arrived safely today. I have since had a brief talk with him from which it was clear that he had thoroughly absorbed what the Minister had said to him about reorganization. I therefore had refrained from showing him the manuscript of the declaration of our meeting. If the reorganization is "his idea", he will not on it with even greater zest! Indeed the present plan is for him to see General Alexander tomorrow, Sunday, afternoon and to fly to Naples on Monday January 27.

I returned here alone as there was clearly work for me of us in the Naples area and as I had reluctantly to agree that Sam had better be that way. On arrival I found a certain disarray in Government circles. The Marshal now wishes to put off the transfer until the end of the month. His reasons are twofold. First there is the delay about the documents of transition. Secondly some members of his Government wish to remain until the meeting at Bari from January 28 to 30 is over. Apparently a rumor has been spread that they were running away from it to the other side of Italy. Also the Foreign Office (which is still being at Salerno) thought that Badoglio might wish in some way to use the meeting as an occasion for the Cabinet reshuffle which he told the Advisory Council he intended to make. I have warned General Mason MacFarlane of this against his first meeting with the Marshal tomorrow and am glad to say that he was totally unimpressed: as he is right, he is all out to get the Marshal and the Government transferred as quickly as possible regardless of the Bari meeting or the Cabinet reshuffle. But we shall rely on you to get the all clear on the transfer documents.

So I hope that your last visit and the Minister's meeting on January 18 may have been the turning point for the Commission. If so it will have been the right thing at the right time and no mistake. Since you left I have established for lack of nothing to do there are three gifted gentlemen in uniform writing the history of the Military Mission and Control Commission with no knowledge of each other's activities. That a voice has got to stop and why not now?

In haste to catch the pouch.

3565

923
560

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

1537
INCOMING

/MST

SECRET

38/8

PRIORITY

25700

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FIDEL

Jan 081230A

Jan 082355A

PATHE, PARGO, FABLE, FILPOT RPTD IBS FOR BEARS FOR ROGERS

New Political Directive from combined chiefs of staff to CINC follows:

1. "Within your discretion, the Italian people may be permitted to participate in such political activities (other than fascist) as do not lead to rioting and disorders" 933
936
2. "These will include the right of peaceful assembly attendance at meetings of political committees, publication and distribution of political works and such other activities of similar nature as you may determine to be advisable"
3. "Upon their release, political prisoners shall be cautioned that political activity on their part which gives rise to or tends to give rise to rioting and disorder will not be tolerated".
4. "To insure a similar liberal policy, the Allied Control Commission should also see that the Italian Government permits similar freedom of political activity in the portions of Italy which are restored to Italian jurisdiction".

Instructions end here. They supersede all earlier instructions dealing with the same matters.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - Gen Taylor)
- 1 - Mr. Gaccia) INFO

3564

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

F
HAC/dnd

Ref. No. 650.1

1 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Captain Stone

Many thanks for your memorandum of 28 January about telegram No. 25700 of 8 January giving a new political directive from the combined chiefs of staff. So far as we know, no action has been taken to communicate the substance of the directive to the Italian Government. The reason was that we did not take it as something to be passed on to the Italian Government as a formal communication. We took it to be a guidance to ACC-AMC in judging what to encourage or discourage in their day to day dealings with the Italian Government.

Unless you have strong reasons for thinking otherwise, we should be inclined therefore to continue to treat this directive as for internal consumption.

Political Section

3563

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

EWS/hjp

APO 394

28 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Caccia

There is no record in this office to indicate that the substance of the attached telegram No. 25700 dated January 8th has been communicated to the Italian Government. Will you arrange for this or shall I, and if the latter, what channel would you suggest?



ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
as above

*No communication necessary unless
Staband confirms this directive which is
meant for our guidance*
AC 1/2

3562

EMS/hjp

28 January 1944

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There is no record in this office to indicate that the substance of the attached telegram No. 25700 dated January 8th has been communicated to the Italian Government. Will you arrange for this or shall I, and if the latter, what channel would you suggest?

1 Incl:
as above

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

3561

U. S. SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

INCOMING

9 JAN 1947
1537
/mar

SECRET

38/8

PRIORITY

25700

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FIMOS

Jan 081236A

FATIMA, FARGO, FABLE, FILPOT RPTD IN FOR BEARS FOR MOGERS

Jan 082355A

New Political Directive from combined chiefs of staff to CINC follows:

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1 - Diary
1 - Gen Taylor)
1 - Mr. Gaccia) INFO

3589

U. S. SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

31 January 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO : ALL CONCERNED

1. At a very early date "that portion of Italy south of the northern boundaries of the Province of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari, and Sicily and adjacent Islands" will be handed over to the Italian Government and jurisdiction subject to the guidance and instructions of the Allied Control Commission under the Chief Commissioner.

2. North of this line Allied Military Government will continue under the direction of the Chief Commissioner acting for the Military Governor (G.O.C.-in-C. ACMF).

3. AMG 5th and 8th Armies and Regions III and IV will therefore continue their present functions. Region V will shortly be added. Regions I and II will thenceforth assume an advisory capacity only, as described in para 8 of the Chief Commissioner's memorandum of 23 January.

4. Thus both Military Government in the forward areas and the advisory functions of A.C.C. in territory administered by the Italian Government will be carried on by one organization.

5. The Administrative and Economic Sections and the Subcommissions coming under their direction will extend their advisory functions to cover the whole of liberated Italy and will advise the Chief Commissioner in their respective spheres on matters both north and south of the dividing line.

6. It is the wish of the Chief Commissioner that the Regional organization should continue both in the areas under Military Government and those under advisory control. The S.C.A.Os, 5th and 8th Armies, the R.C.A.Os of Regions III, IV and V, and the Regional Control Commissioners of Sardinia and Regions I and II will maintain their organizations (on a reduced scale in the two latter cases) and all specialist officers in the Regions as well as the C.A.Os and C.A.P.Os and C.Os will be under their command.

7. In order to centralize control of the Regional organizations (including 5th and 8th Armies AMG) and to ensure compliance by the Italian Government with the advice rendered to them and the execution of the Chief Commissioner's orders, as advised by the Economic and Administrative Sections, a third Section has been set up to be called the Regional Control and Military Government Section headed by an Executive Commissioner having the status of a Vice President under whose immediate command will come the R.C.A.Os and R.C.Cs and their staffs both administrative and specialist in all matters, and the S.C.A.Os, 5th and 8th Armies and military personnel of HQ, A.C.C., for administration and discipline.

10 copies read
1-AG File

File AG

Adm. All
31 Jan 1944

923

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8. On all matters of policy the Chief Commissioner's orders and directives (as advised by the Subcommissions) will be passed to the R.C.A.Os and R.C.Cs by this Section. Heads of Subcommissions will correspond with their representatives in the Regions (but not with representatives of other Subcommissions) on routine technical matters only. R.C.A.Os and R.C.Cs will address themselves on all matters to the V.P. of the R.C. and M.G. Section, which will also carry out (in the Establishment Branch), the MS, A & Q, G-1 and G-4 duties for all personnel of the A.C.C. All postings and assignments to Regions and to HQ will be made by the Section and no transfers of personnel from Region to Region will be carried out except by this Section.

9. This Section will also be responsible for Displaced Persons, Security and for proper liaison between A.C.C. and Regions and all Allied military (all services) formations.

10. It is important to maintain the channel of communication to Regions and Army AMGs through this Section in order that coordination of policy, continuity in administration and close liaison with military formations and units may be ensured, so far as is possible, both in the areas administered by Allied Military Government and in the territory in which the Allied officers act in an advisory capacity only.

11. It is therefore the Chief Commissioner's wish that Subcommissions should err on the side of passing too much through this Section; especially during the early stage, rather than of dealing direct with their representatives in the field.

By command of Lieut. General MacPARRANE:

MS Luk

DISTRIBUTION:

+ 10 copies Region I
10 " " II
60 Spares

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

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By command of Lieut. General MacFARLANE:

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

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10 " " II
60 Spares

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Reference #923

13 February 1944

Dear Fred:

Your letter of February 9 has just reached me this afternoon as Tony Velez was held up by bad weather. The same bad weather delayed the departure of my letter of February 11. I attach the letter together with a copy of the General's memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief.

Reading over my letter in the light of your request for comments on the proposed concerted program of policy for adoption by the Allied Governments, I think the only major difference in our position is that now I believe that events are working against postponement of the King's abdication until Rome. The reasons therefore are rather fully set forth in the General's memorandum, which is a joint composition. The new factors, which make earlier action desirable are (1) the growing conviction that the liberation of Rome is not in sight and (2) the likelihood of an agreement upon Hubert as the successor to "Four-foot six". In fact the principal stumbling block to agreement now is the extent to which he will have to delegate his powers. I know that is a major point but I think we should have this the turning point between the short and long term policies, which you outline and with which in general I agree. As to your proposed long term plan I think we should have to indicate, secretly if necessary, to the King that he will have to get aside and permit Hubert to take his place. Should it be clear that the succession passes to Hubert with the understanding that he too will hear the institutional question to the Constituent Assembly and abide by its vote and if we can get the six parties in agreement on the delegation of powers, the transfer of authority from Victor Manuel to Junior should not in our opinion give rise to trouble. The General goes off tomorrow to consult Luchiani, Foster etc. as to possible repercussions in the Army, Air Force etc. and we shall report the results of his trip.

The Six Parties are busily working to get agreement on their program and we shall in that respect also telegraph you as soon as anything concrete promises to emerge, although in the final analysis we may have to intervene to bring them together on some middle course.

I agree thoroughly with your recommendations not to pass on anything to the French or Germans for the time being, particularly to the latter. Such a course would be disastrous at the present stage of things.

923

3553

Have you my letter to Johnny Jones that Harry Diemel was to bring? It was written in haste at the last moment and has a mistake on page three. Could you please correct the sentence of the middle paragraph to read "As one reads his speech at Bari, this honorable treatment means return of the pre-Fascist colonies, i. e. Libya, Britain and Somaliland". Many thanks.

I hope still to come over soon. But since you left I have not even been back to Salerno much less Cimbrone. Harold is there today and is busy installing a telephone.

All of the best,

Yours,

3557

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EMERGENCY OPS~~
~~US CIPHER MESSAGE~~
IN

TOLO NO. 01480
23RD FEBRUARY 44

FROM : GENERAL WILSON
TO : GENERALS ALEXANDER AND MASON MACFARLANE
ORIG NO. : 55576 FHCIC

TOO 1610A.23
THT NIL
TOR 1855A.23

PRIME MINISTER HAS FORWARDED TO ME SUBSTANCE OF OBJECT ON THE
ITALIAN SITUATION WHICH HE MADE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY.
IT IS AS FOLLOWS:

" ITALIAN ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED ON THE BASIS OF UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER WITH THE KING AND RADOGLIO WHO WERE AND ARE THE
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY. ON THEIR AUTHORITY
ITALIAN NAVY, ARMY, AND AIR FORCE SURRENDERED TO US AND
HAVE SINCE COOPERATED TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY. THE
BATTLE IN ITALY WILL BE HARD AND LONG. I AM NOT YET
CONVINCED THAT ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT CAN AT PRESENT BE FORMED
WHICH WOULD COMMAND THE SAME OBEDIENCE FROM THE ITALIAN
ARMED FORCES. IF WE ENTER ROME WE SHALL BE FREE TO REVIEW
THE WHOLE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION AND SHOULD DO WITH
ADVANTAGES WE DO NOT POSSESS AT PRESENT. IT IS FROM ROME
THAT A MORE BROADLY BASED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CAN BEST BE
FORMED. WHETHER SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EQUALLY HELPFUL
TO ALLIES I CANNOT TELL. IT MIGHT TRY TO MAKE ITS POSITION
GOOD WITH THE ITALIAN PEOPLE BY RESISTING ALLIED DEMANDS.
I SHOULD BE SORRY TO SEE AN UNSETTLING CHANGE MADE AT A
TIME WHEN THE BATTLE IS AT ITS CLIMAX."

MESSAGE ENDS.

C IN C 2 (PRIVATE)
GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE, HQ A.C.C. 1 (BY S.D.R.)
(PRIVATE)

SMC 1922A.23
T T 1937A.23
RHC

3556

923

Agenda Point
Agenda include in daily Bulletin
 Subject: Relations with Italians.

TO:- Distribution Lists "A" & "C".

W.2. 71 Sub Area.
 19/A.
 25 Jan 44.

The contents of the following copy of No.2 District letter 2029/17G dated 24 Jan 44 will be brought to the notice of all ranks immediately :-

"1. The present unsettled political situation in Allied Occupied Italy makes it necessary that Allied Military personnel maintain a strictly neutral attitude towards Italian internal problems. Since even the presence of Military personnel at functions sponsored or organised by one of the many conflicting political groups may be used to indicate official approval of the principles of that group, extreme care must be exercised in accepting invitations even to those affairs which might appear purely social.

2. Military personnel will not attend Italian political meetings except on official business, and will refrain from entering into Italian political discussions with individuals."

Entered in Daily Bulletin
 1/25/44
 D.A.A. | &

Major,
 Q.M.G.

3555

0 6 7 9