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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ACC

10000/132/495

ACC/DV
246

0914

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

10000 | 132 | 485

Acc/DV
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750
Allied Military Government
Aug 1943 - Nov 1944

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

WS
HE

Ref: 855/29/24.

29th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of DISORDER & DISORDER.

TO : AAI Army HQ.
Attn: C.M.S.

1. I refer to my letter 105/14/24 of 14th September and C.M.S.'s letter 105/536 of 14th September addressed to C.A.I., A.M.H., copy to me.
2. After further consideration I would like to send para 2 of my letter to read as follows:-

"In connection with the 5(6ps) plans have been made to send detachments to Allied officers now operating in those areas with the carrier forces with the object of trying to persuade the local committees and bands to preserve law and order pending the arrival of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied Military Government. The officers have, however, been specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of Liberation of Italy whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate these officers from P.T.I. who, with the approval of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist those officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."

Hq ACC	by Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date-time 30 SEP 1944	
by Gen.	1000
init	<i>h</i>

WALTER V. SMITH
Captain, USAF
Acting Chief Commissioner

4797

Copy to: AAI Army
British Resident Director, AAFS
US Political Adviser, AAFS
British High Commissioner to Allied Advisory Council.
Political Section.

RC & MG Sec

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner,
AFO 394

11th September 1944.Ref: 805/14/CA.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY.

TO : Advance Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.
Attn: C.C.S.

1. I have to acknowledge your 16/1/G(Ops) dated 6.Sep.44 and note the principles laid down for the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY.

2. Plans will be made to meet, so far as is possible, the varying conditions which may be found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the number of troops to be employed must be closely related, in inverse proportion, to the amount of food for the civil population which can be made available in those areas.

3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of Allied Military Government in the same manner as has been done throughout this campaign. That is to say, civil affairs officers will accompany the occupying troops and set up the preliminary stages of government. These civil affairs officers would normally be drawn from AMG 5 Army if the occupying troops are to be found from that Army. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and light mobile columns only are used, it will be appreciated that the AMG staff of 5 Army will also be fully occupied with the Army and that only a small number of advanced civil affairs officers will be available from that source. I should be grateful, therefore, for the earliest information possible as to the composition of the occupying force to be employed and the sources from which it will be drawn.

4. Following up the spearhead forces, three Regional organisations are in process of formation. These will be employed in place of 5 Army AMG if those officers are not available.

5. These organisations or AMG task forces will be directed towards GENOA the centre of LIGURIA, TURIN the centre of PIEDMONTE, and MILAN the centre of LOMBARDY. Their total strength will amount to approximately 250 officers.

-2-

6. Steps have already been taken to furnish the minimum amount of food required for the urgent operations but so far as is known at present no transport will be available to move this food into the areas. For this purpose it will be necessary for the AMG task forces to be provided with:-

120	3-ton trucks	for	LIGURIA
360	"	"	PIEMONTE
360	"	"	LOMBARDY.

This fact has already been brought to the notice of G-5 AFHQ with the suggestion that in the event of the employment of mobile columns entering the country in the face of weak and comparatively docile enemy forces, certain units with their transport should be allotted to the task of carrying food for civilian needs.

7. The mobility of the AMG task forces is by no means assured. Requests for extra personnel vehicles have not yet been met and I have been advised that in the event of rapid occupation, I should request your Headquarters to provide personnel vehicles.

8. In consultation with DCS(Ops), plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of ensuring that during any period which may elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied forces, law and order should be preserved by the National Committee of Liberation. In accordance with these plans it is proposed to infiltrate into the area three officers from AGC and three officers from FWD who, under the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise both these officers and the National Committee of Liberation, during any such period. It is not intended to set up Allied Military Government through the means of these officers who will have no executive powers. Allied Military Government will not be set up until the arrival of Allied troops with their accompanying civil affairs officers.

9. I trust these plans have your approval in principle. A copy of this letter is being sent to AFHQ.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner 4795

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ
British Resident Minister, AFHQ
US Political Adviser, AFHQ
British High Commissioner to Allied Advisory Council.
Political Section.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS,
 ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
 APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 50346/COS.

13 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration - N.W. Italy.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

1. GAO AAI (Maj. Gen. Robertson) held a meeting yesterday at AAI HQ at which his senior officers, SOAC and G-4 5 Army, HQ's NW Italy, DCOG and myself were present.
2. The GAO explained the tactical appreciation for the occupation of NW Italy which he explained would be carried out by 5 Army troops who would probably find resistance limited to a few Italian divisions already decimated by the partisans and a small nucleus of German troops.
3. He stated that as soon as occupation was completed, by agreement with G-4 5 Army and the C-in-C, a British static HQ (No. 2 District) would be set up with several subordinate military HQs (Areas and Sub-Areas). The HQ of the District had not yet been determined but would probably be ALESSANDRIA.
4. He explained that in this area in his opinion the duty of the military District was to assist AAI in the administration of NW Italy. The military interests were so small that in this area the roles would be reversed and military interests would probably be subordinate to AAI.
5. After the withdrawal of 5 Army occupational troops the garrison troops of the area would probably be British and Italian. Minimum forces of British troops would be two battalions and one armoured car regiment; the maximum, two tired British divisions with an undetermined number of Italian troops.
6. He laid stress on the difficulties of communications, particularly at the outset before the opening of the port of GENOA and emphasized the fact that it would be impossible to carry much food into the area before that port was open. At this point General Tait, G-4 5 Army, asked it to be made perfectly clear that 5 Army could NOT provide transport for the haulage of food for civilians.
7. General Robertson stated that he intended to give great weight to the distribution of local resources in the area. A Local Resources Board (Forward) would be set up on which AAI would have the strongest representation. He hoped

-2-

to set up an Industrial Coordination Committee, headed on the ACC with an ACC Chairman whose proposals would carry sufficient weight to be acceptable to the main Board. GAO stated that Major-General Hares, Commanding General designate of the District would set up his Forward HQ near FLORENCE and agreed that it was most desirable that Regional Commissioners should be located near him. DOWAG AAI is trying to arrange this.

8. I gave an appreciation of the entry of AAI into this area. Subject to agreement by Commanding General, 5 Army the Regional Commissioners would accompany the task forces with their provincial teams under the general direction of 5 Army AAI. General Hares proposed and I agreed that it would be necessary for him to have a small AAI Liaison staff at his District HQ if it was not located near one of the Regional HQs.

9. General Robertson explained shortly that the role of the No.2 District would be as follows:-

- (a) To command the Allied and Italian troops placed in the District for the preservation of order.
- (b) To assist AAI and the Italian Government in the preservation of order, prevention of sabotage, etc.
- (c) To coordinate the utilization by the armed forces of local resources.
- (d) Local administration of all British troops in the District.
- (e) Organization of the overland L of C to FLORENCE.

M.S. Lox

Brigadier
Chief of Staff 4133

220/86.

Copy to: VPs. Pol Sec
FCOS, DE Sec
ECOS, Econ Sec
DCOS, Int Sec
DGAO, AAI

AMG GROUP
ADV HQ 2 DISTRICT
CISF

SECRET

20 Nov 44

21/AMG/6

TO : Chief of Staff Section, Allied Commission.
AAI. AMG.

SUBJECT: AMG Group with Adv. HQ 2 District.

1. Please note that an AMG office has been set up in FLORENCE Area to represent Regions Lombardia, Piemonte and Liguria in planning for U.S. ITALY occupation in co-operation with Adv H.Q. 2 District.

2. Offices are situated at :

- (a) Adv. H.Q. 2 District at "Torre A. Cona" Map Ref: 98964 1/200000.
Tele through Florence ask for Adv 2 District, Ext. 20.
- (b) Office and Mess in Florence at 66 Via Della Robbia.

3. The Group is composed of the following Officers:

Col. William E. Jordan	(A)	Allied Commission Liaison Officer.
Lt. Col. D. Morley-Fletcher	(B)	Region Lombardia
Lt. Col. William Morton	(A)	Region "
Major A. B. Howell	(B)	" Piemonte.
Major W. W. Walker	(A)	" " (not yet arrived)
Major Robert E. Doe	(A)	" Liguria
Major R. W. J. Wyatt	(B)	" "

4. Correspondence should be addressed to Adv. HQ 2 District for AMG Group.
It is important that the letters ADV or Advanced be inserted.

(signed) D. Morley-Fletcher,
Lt. Colonel
Staff Officer, AMG Group,
2 District.

Copy to: AMG Region Lombardia
AMG Region Liguria
AMG Region Piemonte
Public Relations, Allied Commission.

4723
A.C. COS DIST:
DOOS C.A. Section
" Econ. Section
" Political Section
" Entab. Section
Communications SW

AMG GROUP
ADV HQ 2 DISTRICT
CMF

SECRET

20/11/6

20 Nov 44

TO : Chief of Staff Section, Allied Commission.
ATTN: AMG.

SUBJECT: AMG Group with Adv. Hq 2 District.

1. Please note that an AMG office has been set up in FLORENCE Area to represent Regions Lombardia, Piemonte and Liguria in planning for N.S. ITALY occupation in co-operation with Adv H.Q. 2 District.

2. Offices are situated at :

- (a) Adv. H.Q. 2 District at "Torre A Coma" Map Ref: 08561, 1/200000.
Tels through Florence ext for Adv 2 District, ext. 20.
- (b) Office and Mess in FLORENCE at 66 Via Della Robbia.

3. The Group is composed of the following Officers:

Col. William R. Jordan	(A)	Allied Commission Liaison Officer.
Lt. Col. D. Morley-Fletcher	(B)	Region Lombardia
Lt. Col. William Norton	(A)	Region "
Major A. E. Howell	(B)	" Piemonte.
Major " " "	(A)	" " (not yet arrived)
Major Robert E. Doe	(A)	" Liguria
Major R. M. J. Myatt	(B)	" "

4. Correspondence should be addressed to Adv. Hq 2 District for AMG Group.
It is important that the letters ADV or Advanced be inserted.

(signed) D. Morley-Fletcher,
Lt. Colonel
Staff Officer, AMG Group,
2 District.

Copy to: AMG Region Lombardia
AMG Region Liguria
AMG Region Piemonte
Public Relations, Allied Commission.

4733
A.C. Ops DIST:
DOCS C.A. Section
" Econ. Section
" Political Section
" Estab. Section
Communications Sub-Comm.

SECRET

He
has
P. Sec
8143

ACTION HQ AGO INFO ADV SAI 3 ANG TOSCANA REGION

6/16

MAIN AND 8 ARMY

P 533

OF PRIORITY

GOT 151930A

AREZZO

SECRET. By agreement TOSCANA region propose handover provinces /
region control 0800 hours Wednesday 18 Oct.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

List

Hq: P.R. Br. ②

sq: Co. 5 Det

P.A. Sec

Pol. Sec

Est. Sec

APC

File

450

4792

SECRET

GOT 160830A

09231

RESTRICTED

Handwritten: 7314, 70, 8/

HQ ACC

65/08

MAIN AMO 8TH ARMY FROM VENEZIA REGION

M 612

OCT 081100A



IMPORTANT

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED. From DUNLOP. Please inform all Sections addressing telegrams to this HQ that quickest delivery achieved if addressed AMO EIGHTH ARMY FOR VENEZIA REGION.

Handwritten: 70/10-100, 6/10, 8/10

750

LIST

ACTION: AM
INFO: C.C.S.
C.A. Sec
Jol Sec
Communications SC
Ecce Sec
Est Sec
Army SC
Navy SC
Air SC
P.R.O.
W.M.D. & I.P.O. 4791
A/CC
File 2
Float

RESTRICTED

OCT 081245A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CENTRAL COMMISSION
APO 974

TOP SECRET

Ref: A.C.C. 12/44.

17 September 44.

SUBJECT: Administration of RECONQUERED TERRITORY.

TO: A.C.C.

I refer to the Commander-in-Chief's letter of September 11th. (US 516)

1. The general plan for establishment of Allied Military Government was outlined in my SDC 1/44 of September 11th. In para 3 of the Commander-in-Chief's letter (para. 1) I should assume that A.C.C. 5th Army would be occupied elsewhere and I should employ the regional staffs to set up the initial stages of A.C.C. They would then enter the areas with the light mobile columns and would then enter under the command of the local Party commander.

2. Para. 8 of my letter of September 11th defines the action proposed in any vacuum period which may elapse between withdrawal of enemy forces and occupation by Allied troops. A copy of the proposed directive to Allied officers and personnel in these areas was attached to my SDC 12/44 of September 7th.

3. In the absence of any other instructions from you I would suggest that the attitude of A.C.C. officers to the various political parties or organizations in eastern Italy (vide 7a of the Commander-in-Chief's letter) should be that followed in the past and in operations now, namely immediate contact with and use of Italian local government's administrative machine, taking the advice of the National Committee of Liberation in the appointment of temporary (Italian) officials wherever these committees are found to be satisfactory. Care will be taken, as is now done, to prevent these committees setting themselves up as alternative government and every effort will be made to preserve the structure and machinery of Italian local government.

WILLIAM E. STONE,
Captain, USA,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to:

A.C.C.
Political Section.
Captain Stone
A Branch (then RC+MB Sec.)

TOP SECRET

Hq ACC	Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED	
17 Sept 1330	
Hq	
PWR.	

4790

TOP SECRETHEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 39.Regional Control and Military Government Section.

9th September, 1944.

Ref: 63/12/2.

SUBJECT: Administration of PLACENTIA & LOMBARDY.

TO : C-5 Section, AFHQ.
Attn: Colonel Charles Spofford.

As we come under you tomorrow I am sending you copies of the Acting Chief Commissioner's reply to the CGC outlining his plans for the setting up of Allied Military Government in I.G. Italy, including his plans for the period of vacuum which may take place before Allied Military Government can be established.

2. In this connection we have had various meetings with General Alexander's HQ (Ops), the Political Section, S.O.E. and A.S.E. With the approval of the CGC it is proposed to act in accordance with para. 8 of Captain Stone's letter to the CGC, that is to say, three AOC officers will be infiltrated into the chief centres of the territory in an advisory role and HQ repeat HQ as executive AOC officers. I enclose a directive which it is proposed to send to S.O.E. and A.S.E. officers in the field and a directive for the AOC and HQ officers which it is proposed to infiltrate.

3. As Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Kirk were brought into the initial discussions on this matter I am sending a copy by hand to Mr. Macmillan and am seeing that a copy is sent to Mr. Kirk. You may care to discuss with them.

4. If there are any objections to the plan as outlined from any source, would you kindly let me know immediately because it is essential that we should get the plans in operation without delay.

(Sgd) M. S. Lush.

Brigadier, 4789
Executive Commissioner.

MSH/30.

Copy to: British Resident Minister, AFHQ.
US Political Advisor, AFHQ.

TOP SECRET.COPY.SUBJECT: Administration PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY.Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/6(Ops).

6 Sep 44.Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

1. In reply to your 805/5/04 of 1 Sep 44 the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problems raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:-

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an AMG administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
- (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in the provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the task will be diverted for this purpose.
- (c) The quicker an AMG organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The AMG organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
- (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as widely as possible. The AMG organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.

2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles just mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let us know at once.

3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.

4. 1 copy of this letter is being sent to AFHQ.

(Sgt) A. HARDING. Lt. Gen.

Chief of General Staff.

AMH/bps.

Copy to: AFHQ.

4703

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS TO ALLIED OFFICIALS CONCERNING
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CONSULATIONS
AND 19.

REF: 8057/101.

SUBJECT: Administration of the Office of the Chief of Consulations.

TO: 1. American Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy,
Italian Office of General Staff.

1. I have the honor to inform you of the following details of the principles laid down for the conduct of civil affairs in Italy and Germany.

2. Plans will be made to make, so far as is possible, the working conditions which may be found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the number of troops to be employed must be closely related, in inverse proportion, to the amount of food for the civil population which can be digested into those areas with the troops.

3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of Allied Military Government in the same manner as has been done throughout this campaign. That is to say, civil affairs officers will accompany the occupying troops and set up the preliminary stages of government. These civil affairs officers would normally be drawn from the 5 Army if the occupying troops are to be found from that Army. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and light mobile columns only are used, it will be recommended that the 1st Army of 5 Army will also be fully equipped with the Army and that only a small number of advanced civil affairs officers will be available from that source. I should be grateful, therefore, for the earliest information possible as to the composition of the forces to be employed and the source from which it will be drawn.

44437

Alfred L. Jones in Tokyo,
Chief of Federal Staff.

1. I have no recommendations for the (top) level of the staff and the principal staff are for the conduct of civil affairs in the area and the principal staff are for the conduct of civil affairs in the area and the principal staff are for the conduct of civil affairs in the area.
2. There will be no need to make, as far as is possible, the existing conditions which are found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the review of troops to be sent will not be directly related to the number of troops to be sent to the civil population which can be imported into these areas with the troops.
3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of the military government in the same manner as has been done throughout this country. This is to say, civil affairs officers will manage the emergency troops and set up the preliminary stages of government. These civil affairs officers would normally be from the 5 Army if the emergency troops are to be sent. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and might not that much. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and might not that much. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and might not that much.
4. I have also been fully occupied with the Army and with only a small number of advanced civil affairs officers will be available from that source. I should be grateful, therefore, for the earliest information possible as to the composition of the force to be employed and the source from which it will come.
5. Following up the operational forces, these medical organizations are in excess of numbers. These will be employed in part of 5 Army and in those officers are not available.
6. These organizations or are these forces will be increased towards the end of the year, then the order of priority, and then the order of the order. Their total strength will amount to approximately 200 officers.

6. Steps have already been taken to furnish the minimum amount of food required for the urgent necessities but as this is known at present no forecast will be available to move this food into the service. For this purpose it will be necessary for the air task force to be provided with

Year	3-ton (metric ton)	5-ton (metric ton)	10-ton (metric ton)	20-ton (metric ton)
1990	11	1	1	1
1991	11	1	1	1
1992	11	1	1	1
1993	11	1	1	1
1994	11	1	1	1
1995	11	1	1	1
1996	11	1	1	1
1997	11	1	1	1
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2019	11	1	1	1
2020	11	1	1	1
2021	11	1	1	1
2022	11	1	1	1
2023	11	1	1	1
2024	11	1	1	1
2025	11	1	1	1
2026	11	1	1	1
2027	11	1	1	1
2028	11	1	1	1
2029	11	1	1	1
2030	11	1	1	1

This plant has already been brought to the notice of the public, with the expectation that in the course of the development of mobile culture extending the country in the face of what had comparatively little area, forest, certain within which their transport should be a factor in the work of carrying food for surviving breeds.

7. The mobility of the AEC trade program is by no means assured. For example, the entire personnel situation here was just blown apart and I have been advised that in the event of major reorganization, I should request your headquarters to provide personnel assistance.

4. In consultation with the (Gen.), there have been many to send
elections to Allied officers not operating in those areas with the
patrol forces with the object of obtaining their during any period which may
elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied
forces, but will only should be prevented by the national committee of
liberation. In accordance with these plans it is proposed to introduce
into the offensive columns from 4, 5, and three columns from 4, 5, who,
under the authority of the Allied officers not operating, will make both
known officers and the national committee of liberation, during any such
period. It is not intended to use to Allied officers concerned during

4735

785016

The book has already been donated to the nation of our ally India as well as to other countries. It is hoped that it will contribute to the education of the people of those countries and help them to understand the true nature of Communism and its danger to the world.

[illegible]

U. In consultation with the (U.S.), plans have been made to send
delegations to Allied countries and operating in those areas with the
purpose of securing the subject of currency. But during any period which may
elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied
forces, law and order should be preserved by the national Committee of
Administration. In countries where there should be no reference to the
into the area of the United States. The plan should be to place the
under the authority of the Allied countries and operating, with a view to
their relations and the national Committee of Administration, during any such
period. It is not intended to be in Allied Military Government through
the areas of these countries who will have to exercise power. Allied Military
Government will not be set up until the arrival of Allied troops and their
comprehensive civil administration.

2. I trust there were your approval in principle.
This follows in being sent to you.

1. **Accounting**
 2. **Finance**
 3. **Marketing**
 4. **Operations**
 5. **Human Resources**
 6. **Information Systems**
 7. **Business Law**
 8. **Business Ethics**
 9. **Business Writing**
 10. **Business Communication**
 11. **Business Statistics**
 12. **Business Calculus**
 13. **Business English**
 14. **Business History**
 15. **Business Geography**
 16. **Business Economics**
 17. **Business Psychology**
 18. **Business Sociology**
 19. **Business Anthropology**
 20. **Business Linguistics**
 21. **Business Philosophy**
 22. **Business Art**
 23. **Business Music**
 24. **Business Dance**
 25. **Business Theater**
 26. **Business Film**
 27. **Business Television**
 28. **Business Radio**
 29. **Business Internet**
 30. **Business Mobile**
 31. **Business Cloud**
 32. **Business Big Data**
 33. **Business Analytics**
 34. **Business Intelligence**
 35. **Business Systems**
 36. **Business Process**
 37. **Business Innovation**
 38. **Business Entrepreneurship**
 39. **Business Social Media**
 40. **Business Cybersecurity**
 41. **Business Privacy**
 42. **Business Sustainability**
 43. **Business Environmental**
 44. **Business Social Responsibility**
 45. **Business Governance**
 46. **Business Compliance**
 47. **Business Risk**
 48. **Business Insurance**
 49. **Business Tax**
 50. **Business Real Estate**
 51. **Business Transportation**
 52. **Business Energy**
 53. **Business Water**
 54. **Business Air**
 55. **Business Land**
 56. **Business Space**
 57. **Business Time**
 58. **Business Money**
 59. **Business Power**
 60. **Business Influence**
 61. **Business Authority**
 62. **Business Credibility**
 63. **Business Trust**
 64. **Business Loyalty**
 65. **Business Commitment**
 66. **Business Dedication**
 67. **Business Passion**
 68. **Business Enthusiasm**
 69. **Business Excitement**
 70. **Business Joy**
 71. **Business Happiness**
 72. **Business Well-being**
 73. **Business Health**
 74. **Business Fitness**
 75. **Business Strength**
 76. **Business Endurance**
 77. **Business Resilience**
 78. **Business Flexibility**
 79. **Business Adaptability**
 80. **Business Creativity**
 81. **Business Innovation**
 82. **Business Entrepreneurship**
 83. **Business Social Media**
 84. **Business Cybersecurity**
 85. **Business Privacy**
 86. **Business Sustainability**
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 100. **Business Space**
 101. **Business Time**
 102. **Business Money**
 103. **Business Power**
 104. **Business Influence**
 105. **Business Authority**
 106. **Business Credibility**
 107. **Business Trust**
 108. **Business Loyalty**
 109. **Business Commitment**
 110. **Business Dedication**
 111. **Business Passion**
 112. **Business Enthusiasm**
 113. **Business Excitement**
 114. **Business Joy**
 115. **Business Happiness**
 116. **Business Well-being**
 117. **Business Health**
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 242. **Business Dedication**

DRAFTTOP SECRET

TO : ALL Representatives (LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, GUINEA, and LEBERON).

1. You are being sent to LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE and LEBERON in order to assist the S.O.F. and O.S.S. officers now working with the patriots in carrying out the instructions attached.
2. You will operate under the command of the senior Allied officer in whose area you are located. You will advise him, and with his agreement you will advise the National Committee of Liberation, on any aspects which may be of assistance regarding local government and preservation of law and order.
3. You will appreciate that Allied Military Government will not be set up in those areas until the arrival of Allied troops and civil affairs officers. You will NOT set up Allied Military Government and you will make this perfectly clear to all concerned. You will not in an advisory and not an executive capacity in your relations with the National Committee of Liberation and the civilian population. You are being sent to advise and guide in preparation for Allied Military Government but you are not an executive officer of Allied Military Government.
4. You should report to the senior Allied officer working with the patriots and your communications to this Headquarters should be addressed through him. You will likewise receive any further instructions after your arrival through him.

TOP SECRET.

S.O.E. and O.S.S. Officers in the Field.

1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your Headquarters before putting them into operation.
2. Until Allied troops arrive with Allied Military Government officers, Allied Military Government will not be set up in the areas in which you are operating. Your objective in the meantime should be to do everything in your power through the local Committees of Liberation or Patriot Bands to ensure that a total breakdown of local administration is avoided until the arrival of Allied troops, when Allied Military Government will be established. You should make this latter fact clear to the Committees and Patriot Bands and you may add that the length of time which ~~will~~ Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied Forces. A message signed by General Alexander to the Committees and Patriots is being sent with these directions.
3. Allied Military Government implies that the proclamations of General Alexander, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, have the force of law. The execution of these proclamations and General Alexander's orders on civil matters is carried out by Allied Military officers who work through the local Italian Government machinery, stripped of Fascists. It has been the policy to invoke the advice of National Committees of Liberation in the execution of these orders.
4. In carrying out the general policy defined above before the establishment of Allied Military Government you should follow such further orders as may be given by General Alexander. In civil matters everything will be done in Rome to see that the Italian Government are associated with these orders. You, on your part, should do your utmost to assure the local Committees and Patriot Bands that the Central Italian Government in Rome has the support of General Alexander and the Allied Nations. Consequently, you should warn Local Committees against challenging the authority of the Government.
5. The first duty of Patriot Bands is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty is to preserve law and order. As they may be the only friendly armed units in the area, Patriots Bands should be used at your discretion for such police purposes as may be possible and consonant with their first duty. Police arm bands will be provided to you for such police purposes.

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6. It will be found necessary, in order to set up local government for the preservation of law and order, to appoint Prefects, Sindacos and other local Government officials in the place of Fascists. You should warn the National Committees that any appointments made by them must be regarded as provisional (Regenti) only and that they will be subject to confirmation by the Allied Military Government in consultation with the Italian Government in Rome.

7. It should be remembered that public utilities and electric power installations are of vital importance and should be protected from destruction by all possible means. They should be guarded whenever possible.

8. It is essential that your Sitreps in future should include information as to the political, administrative and economic situation and reports on public opinion.

9. In order to assist in preparing for the state of affairs outlined above, three officers from A.G.S. and 3 officers from P.M.B. are being sent to the chief centres to work under the authority of A.G.S. and P.M.B. officers and advise them on the lines of the directions above. These directions are also being sent to all A.G.S. and P.M.B. officers in the field in order that co-ordination of policy may be assured.

9th September 1944.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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7 November 1943

To: General Joyce.

As a possible interest I am sending herewith
copy of a joint note presented to the Soviet Delegation
at the Moscow Conference by Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden with
regard to military government in Italy.

J. C. Holmes
J. C. HOLMES,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.

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File

Handwritten notes:
Hull - one - each, Russian, American
7/11/43 - 337 - Conference

22 Oct

Joint Note by Mr. Hull and Mr. [unclear]

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRETUNITED STATES AND BRITAIN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ALLIED
OPERATIONS IN ITALY

There is certainly for the [unclear] of the policies which have been followed in connection with Allied military government of occupied enemy territory in Italy in very [unclear] there have been any misunderstandings [unclear] there [unclear] in connection with the [unclear] and [unclear] followed in [unclear] with the political and administrative problems resulting from Allied operations in Italy.

Our military operations against Italy were in the [unclear] stage. It was obvious that a military organization linked to the invading forces would be required to control and administer, under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, the civil population and to restore their economic life, in view of the widespread destruction of public services which would be [unclear] upon the [unclear] of the enemy. The military government would also be required to administer the [unclear] to [unclear] in such a way as to promote the military purposes and objectives of the Allied forces in their continued operations against the enemy. It was the [unclear] intention to abolish the Fascist regime and some interim administrative machinery had to be prepared before an indigenous administrative regime could emerge.

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General
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General Eisenhower was instructed that the military government was to be based upon the following principles:

I. The Allied Military Government was to be essentially military and non-political. It was to serve primarily in the role of assistant to the combat troops in the military operations and therefore it could only be staffed by military personnel and be non-political in character.

II. At the same time the military occupation was to deliver the people from the Fascist regime and to restore their freedom from Nazi oppression.

III. The Fascist party, its leaders and all its auxiliaries, including the militia and youth movements, were to be completely destroyed, the Fascist hierarchy removed from all its authority, and the Fascist control over the economy and administration completely eliminated. Fascist propaganda and propaganda aims, as well as, were prohibited. Officials and semi-active members of the Fascist party were to be removed and interned.

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IV. Freedom of speech and of the press in so far as military interests were not prejudiced on the grounds of security, and freedom of religious worship, were to be permitted.

V. All discriminatory laws based on the grounds of color, race or creed were to be nullified.

VI. Political prisoners were to be promptly released and the Fascist Special Tribunals for the Defense of the State were to be abolished.

VII. The

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VII. The administration was to be entirely military and impartial and no organized political groups were to be associated with it.

VIII. All criminals charged by the United Nations were to be imprisoned and held subject to further action.

The Commander-in-Chief was also given guidance as to the introduction of emergency military currency, a moratorium on debts, and the suppression of enemy government and Fascist funds. In particular the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to give careful attention to the matter of sound, fair and voluntary labor relations and to fix, if necessary, the hours and wages of labor.

The instructions on the above lines were issued to General Eisenhower at the end of June and the Allied Military Government began to operate immediately upon the first occupation of Sicilian territory in July.

The Allied force in Sicily found local and provincial government at a complete standstill. The Civil Affairs officers staffing the military government quickly set up the local administrative authorities, operated the municipal administrations and essential local services, enforced the proclamations and orders of the military governor, issued local regulations to insure security and local order, coordinated with combat commanders requisitioning procurement and billeting and implemented generally the policy of the military administration described above.

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In all this activity the utmost possible use was made of local Italians commanding the confidence of the people, who were well disposed to the allied cause and not tainted with fascist ideas. In particular it was found possible to control and use to a large extent the non-fascist Italian police (Carabinieri), but of course the political police (OVRA), and the Squadristi, were abolished and their members incarcerated.

The policy of rooting out the fascist regime was carried thoroughly into effect. Fascist officials were removed and jailed. All fascist organizations were disbanded. Discriminatory laws were annulled, but otherwise local customs and laws were continued in force. The urgent problem of feeding the town populations was tackled with considerable success despite the almost complete absence of transportation. For military reasons, where necessary relief supplies were distributed from stocks imported by the allied forces.

All reports show that Allied Military Government in Sicily has fulfilled its primary objectives: (1) to facilitate military operations; (2) to root out fascism. It has performed an essential function in reestablishing the necessary public services, thereby enabling the combat forces to perform their task with the maximum support and cooperation of the civilian population. It has also helped to make available for the common war effort the economic resources of the island.

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This form of military government was extended to the Italian mainland when the Allied forces began the invasion in September.

At this juncture the general situation was transformed by the surrender of Italy and the declared intention of the Badoglio Government to assist the Allies against Germany. This was not permitted to alter the policy of the Allied Governments to enforce the terms of surrender and the Badoglio Government accepted this situation. This leaves the Allied Commander-in-Chief in absolute authority to take whatever measures may be necessary to carry out the terms imposed upon and accepted by the Badoglio Government.

The most recent developments have been the Italian declaration of war against Germany, and the acceptance by the Allies of Italy as a co-belligerent with, among other conditions, the understanding that the Italian Government should be reorganized upon a broader and more liberal basis by the inclusion of representatives of anti-Fascist political groups.

As a result of these developments it is now contemplated that Military Government will be restricted in the future to the combat zone and that elsewhere supervision and control of the Italian administration will be carried out through the agency of a Control Commission under, so long as the military situation requires, the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief.

The arrangements for giving effect to this change and for associating other interested Allied Governments with the work of control are described in a separate paper entitled: "Allied Control Machinery in Italy", dated October 21st, which was circulated by Mr. Egan at the meeting of the Conference on October 22nd.

It will be seen from the foregoing that although the administration of

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conquered Italian territory has hitherto necessarily been controlled by military considerations, the intention and result have already been such as to give effect in a large measure to the principles enunciated by Mr. Molotov at the meeting of the Conference on the 22nd of October.

In accordance with the proposed new arrangements for the administration of Italian territory described in the paper circulated by Mr. Eden and referred to above, it would further fall to the Council of Allied High Commissioners to formulate administrative policies for Italy.

London, October 23, 1943.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 354

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 24)

26 July 1944

Redesignation of Regions and Announcement of Regional Commissioners I
Administration of Provinces in LAZIO and UMBRIA II
Functions and Location of Region "Z" III
Assignment of U.S. Personnel IV

I --- REDSIGNATION OF REGIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS.

Effective 0001 hours 1 August 1944, ROE Region is redesignated Region IV, and the present Region IV is redesignated Region "Z", with no change in headquarters personnel. Colonel CHARLES FOLETTI, 0923774, AUS, is announced as Regional Commissioner of the new Region IV. Brigadier J. N. DUNLOP, O.P.E., M.C., T.D., 16547, General Staff, is announced as Regional Commissioner, Region "Z".

II --- ADMINISTRATION OF PROVINCES IN LAZIO AND UMBRIA.

Effective 0001 hours 1 August 1944, the new Region IV will assume, and Region "Z" will relinquish, the administration of all provinces in LAZIO and UMBRIA which are not then under the administration of AMG S Army.

III - FUNCTIONS AND LOCATION OF REGION "Z"

Region "Z" will commence the study of problems of its Region. Regional Headquarters will be located in a place north of ROE to be designated by the Regional Commissioner.

IV -- ASSIGNMENT OF U.S. PERSONNEL.

A. U.S. Personnel of Region IV (formerly ROE Region) will continue to be assigned to "L" Company, 2675 Regiment.

B. U.S. Personnel of Region "Z" (formerly Region IV) will continue to be assigned to "D" Company, 2675 Regiment.

C. Subject to the above, officers, IN/ORS, vehicles and stores, will be transferred by mutual agreement between Regional Commissioners concerned and the final approval of Headquarters Allied Control Commission.

By order of Captain STONE:

see No. 24 of 29 July
with record of Dec IV

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ON HEADQUARTERS

ROBERT E. DOR

I Redesignation of Regions and Announcement of Regional Commissioners
II Administration of Provinces in LAZIO and UMBRIA
III Functions and Location of Region "Z"
IV Assignment of U.S. Personnel

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By order of Captain STONE:



Robert E. Doe
ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.F.
Secretary General

*see No. 26 of 27 July 44
which was under file 92.0*

DISTRIBUTION:

"C"
Incl groups 2 & 3
Loss Nos. 82 & 83

RECEIVED

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SUBJECT: Report for month ending 31 May 44.

SECRET

100 AMG Eighth Army Main

04/7

8 Jun 44

10 Allied Control Commission (5 copies)
Executive Commission's Branch

Copies to: Chief of Staff, Main Eighth Army
DA and QMG Main Eighth Army
RG AMG Region IV
RC AMG Region V.

1. This report is designed to give a general picture of the territory during the month. Detailed information on the new territory taken over has been furnished in the Sitrops and Special Reports.

2. During the month considerable new territory was taken over, mainly in FROSINONE Province, but including a small part of AQUILA. Both Provincial AMG teams are functioning; the FROSINONE team in FROSINONE itself (will move to FUGGI) and the AQUILA team from SEZZANO where it will remain until SUMMERA is taken.

Since the end of the month CAMPOLONGO Province has been handed over to REGION V.

3. The new territory can be roughly divided into two types:

(i) the immediate vicinity of the original battlefields, i.e. the lower part of the CASINO plain, in which neither dwellings nor inhabitants (in any number) exist, and

(ii) territory behind the so-called Hitler Line which is not heavily damaged except in isolated spots.

The policy with regard to (i) has been to "reel" it off and allow no civilians to enter. This policy will be continued by the Provincial Commissioner but some inhabitants are bound to slip in. A special Italian Commission is to be appointed as the administration of this area is a matter of long-term policy.

4. POLITICAL.
Rifianco.

There are no events of political activity of any significance.

In all the newly occupied country our troops have been welcomed with something of the old Sicily welcome. There appear in some places to be small bands of so-called partisans not always of the same point of view. For instance, in one town there were three armed partisan groups.

- (1) The Prince of Piedmont's faction flying the Italian flag with crown.
- (2) A democratic partisan faction flying the Italian flag without crown.

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4/12

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1. This report is designed to give a general picture of the territory during the month. Detailed information on the new territory taken over has been furnished in the Citrus and Special Reports.

2. During the month considerable new territory was taken over, mainly in PROSINONE Province, but including a small part of AQUILA. Both Provincial AEC teams are functioning; the PROSINONE team in PROSINONE itself (will move to STUCCI) and the AQUILA team from STUCCI where it will remain until SULEMA is taken.

3. Since the end of the month CANTONASSO Province has been handed over to REGION V.

4. The new territory can be roughly divided into two types:

(i) The immediate vicinity of the original battlefield, i.e. the lower part of the CANTONASSO plain, in which neither dwellings nor inhabitants (in any number) exist, and

(ii) Territory behind the so-called Hitler line which is not heavily damaged except in isolated spots.

The policy with regard to (i) has been to "weed" it out and allow no civilians to enter. This policy will be continued by the Provincial Commissioner but some inhabitants are bound to stay in. A special Italian Commissioner is to be appointed as the administration of this area is a matter of long-term policy.

5. POSITIONAL. There are no events of political activity of any significance.

In all the newly occupied country our troops have been welcomed with something of the old locally venomous. There appear in some places to be small bands of so-called partisans now always of the same point of view. For instance, in one town there were three armed partisan groups.

- (1) The Prince of Fighent's faction flying the Italian flag with crown.
- (2) A democratic partisan faction flying the Italian flag without crown.
- (3) A Communist partisan force flying the hammer and sickle.

It is doubtful whether the partisan groups so far encountered have performed any function beyond preying on the local populace.

6. LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

(i) The new Prefect for CANTONASSO arrived during the month and seems satisfactory so far. A Prefect has been suggested for PROSINONE and the area in under consideration.

(ii) Under the new directive all Sindaco in newly occupied cantons are to be arrested, and this directive is being implemented. Actually, very few Sindaco have been found to date; nearly all have fled, and in most cases taken the occasional funds with them.

(2)

6. ECONOMICS AND REVENUES.

The newly captured territory has been systematically looted by the Germans. No food has been found in any of the granaries, and all livestock has been removed.

Power plants and installations, motor-works and equipment, and most of the mills have been destroyed. In practically all the towns and villages have been removed from the houses. The power mills and stocks of cereals and foodstuffs (these latter partly destroyed) will be the subject of detailed reports. Apart from these the new territory in Romania.

7. AGRICULTURE.

In general the prospects of a really good wheat crop are excellent. The trouble will be to harvest the crop in some areas where there are heavy concentrations of mines.

On the whole the image to growing crops, even in the CLASINO plain is not so great as one would have expected it to be.

It is too early yet to judge of the Italians' reception of the new harvesting policy which is being put into operation as far forward and as soon as soon as possible. In an agricultural area it is difficult to judge the reaction to the new grain prices; the farmers are the only people who really know what production costs have been in Romania occupied territory, and the farmer who will pay other than the price of wheat in too low has not to be born.

8. LABOR.

No particular labor troubles have emerged, and the employment of large numbers of laborers on German and army roads continues to function smoothly under the British Army Road Service; the number so employed in May was approximately 12,500.

9. MILITARY.

The British Army has taken over the setting up of courts for the trial of spies taken in British Army areas, and the first cases will be tried early in June.

10. SUPPLIES.

Owing to the smooth functioning of our stockpiles, we have been able to answer all calls for supplies, and have placed approximately ten trucks in every town and village occupied, usually within 24 hours of capture, and in some cases a great deal less.

As the speed of advance quickens the problems are, of course correspondingly increased. Future policy and working details have been co-ordinated with Regions IV and V. With the full use of our own (C) Coy, part of the Romanian transport and the usual whole-hearted co-operation of the Army itself, the immediate future seems to be assured. After that such problems on the speed of advance, but so far as can be forecast the feeding problems (in the early days) of Regions IV and V will be solved.

11. REVENUES.

7. AGRICULTURE.

In general the prospects of a really good wheat crop are excellent. The trouble will be to harvest the crop in some areas where there are heavy concentrations of refugees.

On the whole the delay to growing crops, even in the GASSING plain is not as great as one would have expected it to be.

It is too early yet to judge of the Italian reception of the new feeding policy which is being put into operation as far forward as is soon as soon as possible. In an agricultural area it is difficult to judge the reaction to the new grain prices; the farmers are the only people who really knew what production costs have been in GASSING occupied territory, and the farmer who will get other than that the price of wheat in too low has yet to be born.

8. LABOUR.

No particular labour troubles have emerged, and the employment of large numbers of labourers by Corps and Army units continues to function normally under British Army orders. The number so employed in Italy was approximately 12,000.

9. REPAIRS.

As might be expected, the setting up of courts for the trial of spies taken in British Army areas, and the first cases will be tried early in June.

10. SUPPLIES.

Owing to the smooth functioning of our stockpiles, we have been able to answer all calls for supplies, and have placed balanced 3 ton packs in every town and village occupied, usually within 24 hours of capture, and in some cases a great deal less.

As the speed of various questions the problems are, of course correspondingly increased. Future policy and working details have been co-ordinated with Regions IV and V. With the full use of our own GCV, part of the Regions transport and the usual whole hearted cooperation of the Army itself, the immediate future seems to be assured. After that such depends on the speed of advance, but so far it can be forecast the feeding problems (in the early days) of Regions IV and V will be solved.

11. REFUGEES.

The refugee problem has been the chief "headache" in newly occupied territory, and the flow to the rear has been swollen by the ex-Italians of the destroyed towns of the GASSING plain who cannot be "expelled" in any area. Towns captured since they have contained large quantities of refugees from GASSING area, but there is no doubt that the bulk of these unfortunate people has not yet been encountered so that the bulk of this problem may still have to be broken.

The GASSING camps have been kept forward and kept effective with the stream of refugees who have been moved to the rear by British Army transport.

The number of refugees passed back to rear areas during the month was 4,500. The number in June will probably be appreciably more.

(5)

12.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

For Gariboldi were found in the early stages of the advance but are now coming across fairly large numbers, most of whom are "bandits". They will all be collected, vetted and eventually sent back to replacement depots when time and transport permit.

Our own mobile Gariboldi are doing excellent work, and since they feel that they are part of the liberating force, their morale is high. They are very well received by newly occupied Catania, who seem to see in them a symbol of returning law and order.

13.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

No ordnance or unusual provisions of kindred except for medical has been encountered. The almost total lack of equipment (30 or more operations were performed) on night by the light of a single American lamp which had been borrowed) humiliates our Italian military and Red Cross hospitals who have to cope with civilian hospital. The complete absence of ambulances makes it necessary to borrow the services at the very time when they are most badly pressed.

Group Captain,
Ordnance Corps,
113 Eighth Army.

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Political Section
R HC

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

8 July 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 20)

APPOINTMENT OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, REGION V

Announcement is made of the appointment of Colonel ROBERT P.
MARSHALL, 0198555, Field Artillery, as Regional Commissioner, Region V,
effective 9 July 1944, vice Colonel F. L. WHITLEY, relieved.

By order of Captain STONE:



[Signature]
A. J. COLLINS
Captain, R.A.
Assistant Secretary General

DISTRIBUTION:

"C"
Incl Group 2 & 3
less Nos. 82 & 83

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RESTRICTED

Covers

HEADQUARTERS REGION 4
 ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
 A. P. O. 394

Dear Reber.

Thursday
 29 June.

I send you herewith, as promised, a
 personal copy of my letter sent yesterday
 to H.Q. A.C.C. You will, I know, keep R.C.M. & S. in
 informed of your activities.

Yours faithfully,

W. R. D. G.

4700

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
Allied Control Commission

JED/am

AFC 394

TO : Headquarters Allied Control Commission 27 June 1944
(R.C. and M.C. Section)
SUBJECT: Rape of Italian Women by French African Troops

1. The attached copy of a letter from the Provincial Commissioner, Viterbo will probably reach you also through Fifth Army channels.
2. Lt. Col. Donnan Carter is the fourth Provincial Commissioner of Region Four to have experience of the complaints which follow the passage of French coloured troops. The others are the Provincial Commissioners of Littoria, Prosinone, and Rome Provinces. All agree as to the seriousness of the situation.
3. The importance of the Viterbo report is that it discloses little or no improvement since the early days of the attack.
4. I therefore feel that it is my duty, as Regional Commissioner concerned, to draw your attention to the very grave repercussions which may follow this state of affairs.
5. Cynical or apologetic comment on the maltreatment of Italian women by French coloured troops takes one or more of the following forms.
 - a. That the stories are greatly exaggerated.
 - b. That other coloured troops - British or American - are as bad.
 - c. That the offences are done in the heat of battle.
 - d. That rape of the women of a conquered country is a natural habit among North African tribes.
 - e. That - any way - the Italians "asked for it" when they attacked France.
6. As for (a) I am convinced that the stories are not exaggerated. The evidence from CAC's is overwhelming. Intentionally, I have not called for an official report from the Communes through which French troops passed. It appeared likely that this would only aggravate local feeling. I can however, substantiate the volume of complaint by official investigation if you think fit.
7. Comparison with other coloured troops is a most fallacious and dangerous argument. The small number of complaints in respect of American Negro or British Indian or African troops is in complete contrast with the volume of complaints which follow the C.S.F.

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1. The attached copy of a letter from the Provincial Commissioner, Viterbo will probably reach you also through Fifth Army channels.
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 - b. That other coloured troops - British or American - are as bad.
 - c. That the offences are done in the heat of battle.
 - d. That rape of the women of a conquered country is a natural habit among North African tribes.
 - e. That - any way - the Italians "asked for it" when they attacked France.
6. As for (a) I am convinced that the stories are not exaggerated. The evidence from C.O.'s is overwhelming. Intentionally, I have not called for an official report from the Communes through which French Troops passed. It appeared likely that this would only aggravate local feeling. I can however, substantiate the volume of complaint by official investigation if you think fit.
7. Comparison with other coloured troops is a most fallacious and dangerous argument. The small number of complaints in respect of American Negro or British Indian or African Troops is in complete contrast with the volume of complaints which follow the C.S.F.
8. By no means all the offences are carried out in the heat of battle. Indeed the majority of reports come from the area behind the battle line. In a case brought to my notice at Monte Comoretz on 10 June in a rest area, two sisters had been raped by Germans. The younger, a little girl of 12.

4708

Arguments (a) and (e) are, in my submission, of deadly danger to Allied cause. We are not fighting in Africa, we are fighting in Europe. The French Troops are fighting under Allied leaders and in it in U.S. uniforms. Great Britain and the United States are

edged to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It is a in comment on "freedom not fear", that a C.A.O. has to gather the alien women together, in one building in a village, under the guard of a Carabinieri and the immediate protection of an American officer, to save them from the molestation of French coloured troops.

10. I think that I can claim to be a constant and firm friend of France. I feel that responsible French authorities should be warned of the terrible harm that is being done to France by these outrages. Very serious comments are already being made among American and British Troops on this subject. The Canadian Corps who fought North of the Iridi were reported as being completely disgusted by the behavior of French African Troops South of the River. Stories of Italian girls who have attacked and killed their coloured assailants are being recounted with approval.

You are aware of growing and organized resentment among Italians. You are also aware of the comments of the German Radio.

11. A most important factor to my mind is that this subject is coming to a head. It has been a serious matter for about six weeks. The truth will not be hidden much longer. Whatever may be the censorship restrictions in this country, before long wounded officers and men will be reaching both Great Britain and the United States. Some, at least, are incensed enough to make protests. There is at least a danger of political capital being made out of the matter both in the United States and in England.

12. It is clear that military considerations alone must determine whether the value in battle of these admittedly fine fighting men is or is not offset by the moral and political damage done to the Allied cause.

13. I submit however, that for A.C.C. there can only be one possible stand to take. We must report what we know, firmly and fairly. It will not be sufficient for us to say to history or to our own people that "it was only to be expected".

14. The Commander in Chief's Directive of the 11 June on our relations with the Italian people gives us a clear guide.

I feel it my duty to report to your Headquarters that the conduct of French African Troops has not been in accordance with that directive.

4707

10. I think that I can only say that the French authorities should be warned of the terrible harm that is being done to France by these outrages. Very serious comments are already being made among American and British troops on this subject. The Canadian Corps who fought North of the Rhine were reported as being completely disgusted by the behavior of French African Troops South of the River. Stories of Italian girls who have been attacked and killed their coloured assailants are being recounted with approval.

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
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John W. Dunlop, Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

SECRET

SUBJECT: Atrocities of C.E.F.
 TO : A.C.F., Fifth Army (Field)
 Copy to H. . Region IV

The story of the atrocities committed by the C.E.F. is already known to everyone in this theatre and, even if it is not so already, will shortly be the same in Great Britain and in the United States of America.

The position, as it would seem, is getting worse if, indeed, that is possible. The attitude of "On fait la guerre" seems to be the reaction of the Officers with whom one has attempted to speak. It is known that there are Officers in C.E.F. who individually deplore what is going on, but their views have little or no effect on the situation as a whole.

It is not proposed to go into great detail of individual complaints in this letter. The writer has himself seen women of over 60 years of age with battered heads as a result of assault and rape. Almost every day fresh cases are reported to the Public Security Officer, and it was only the chance presence of a CAC that prevented one of the staff at the ACC billet from rape.

Reports from out in the Province are even worse. There is one case in which the small son of a man who harboured two American airmen was sexually assaulted. From the Montefiascone District, where things seem to have been worse than anywhere, a Red Cross worker has today told the news of a young woman and her child being murdered.

That atrocities of this nature are going on cannot be argued. They are of a kind which is only paralleled by stories from Russia and otherwise has not been approached even by the propaganda of any country. It is known that the Bishop of Montefiascone is collecting evidence for submission to the Pope and the writer feels that repercussions are bound to be wide and violent.

Quite apart from this side of the matter there is the question of looting. Valuables which cannot possibly be of military necessity are, of course, being taken. But, and it is suggested that this is of more immediate consequence, things are being taken which seriously hamper the work of ACC.

Finally the whole position of ACC is being undermined in a manner which is making unnecessary difficulties. It is only too obvious that we cannot stop the atrocities, and we are forced to admit. The writer has himself had to advise certain people not to return to their homes, and has had to refuse to order women to work in the fields. The confidence of the Italian people in ACC must suffer and co-ordination reduced. In other words the whole thing is an indirect blow to the war effort.

It is requested, as strongly as is possible, that the matter be brought to the notice of the GOC with utmost urgency. The writer

4103

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Reports from out in the Province are even worse. There is one case in which the small son of a man who harboured two American airmen was sexually assaulted. From the Monteriascone District, where things seem to have been worse than anywhere, a Red Cross worker has today told the news of a young woman and her child being murdered.

That atrocities of this nature are going on cannot be argued. They are of a kind which is only paralleled by stories from Russia and otherwise has not been approached even by the propaganda of any country. It is known that the Bishop of Monteriascone is collecting evidence for submission to the Pope and the writer feels that repercussions are bound to be wide and violent.

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It is requested, as strongly as is possible, that the matter be brought to the notice of the GOC with utmost urgency. The writer must once again point out that he cannot guarantee keeping the Italian people quiet on the Viterbo section of the L of C unless there is complete change of attitude shown by the Allied Troops in this area. It is already too late to expect any improvement until the G.I. is finally passed out into another Province.

A.D. Bonham-Carter
Lt. Colonel,
Acting Provincial Commissioner
Viterbo Province

24 June 1944

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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HQ ACC, REGION 9 AND CAMPORASSO INFO ARMY 8 ARMY MAIN

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AND POLCORPS

BORN

SITREP 2.

IMMEDIATE

JUNE 181800

SITREP 2. ALL REG PERSONNEL PREVIOUSLY WITH 5 CORPS NOW ATTACHED
POLCORPS THIS WEEKEND SINCE FORMER PLAN NOW OBTAINED. CHIETI PESCARA
PROVINCES NOW TAKEN OVER COMPLETELY BY REG. TIRANO TOWN IN ATRI RAY
ENTER TOWN TO DAY. ATRI TOWN HAS REPORTED. ALL MORE IMPORTANT
COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN VISITED FOR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS WITH STOCKS OF FOOD
LIFEWAS LEFT-BEHIND POPULATION ENTIRELY PRO ARMY. COMMITTEE
BASED MAIN OF LIBERATION FORMED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNISTS
SOCIALISTS DEMOCRATS ACTIONISTS LIBERALS INCARCERATED LEADING FASCISTS
IMMEDIATELY ARMY LEFT AND APPOINTED NEW OFFICIALS. PARTISANS VERY
ACTIVE IN THE APENNINES. PEOPLE CALM ORDERLY AFFAIRS RAPIDLY RETURNING
TO NORMAL. FAIR HARVEST ANTICIPATED. STOCKPILES BEING MADE IN PESCARA
BUT DISTRIBUTION MOST DIFFICULT WITH ONLY 11 TRUCKS AVAILABLE OUT OF
ESTIMATED 125 AVAILABLE SITUATION SATISFACTORY GENERALLY WILL TAKE OVER
IMMEDIATELY.

ACC DISSEM

Action...C & G
Info....Sec Gen
Dep C G
Econ Sec
Admin Sec
Pol Sec
Info Div
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File
Front

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JUNE 20/

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
EXPLANATION OF THE SETTING UP AND OPERATION OF
(HISTORY)
FILED: 923

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SECRET

Second Revised Draft
Squads British Most Secret

SECRET

BIGOT

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION

6

August 21, 1943

OUTLINE PLAN FOR OCCUPATION OF ITALY.

A. ASSUMED SITUATION

1. Further provision must be made for a quick occupation of a major part or all of Italy as a consequence of an armistice. It is assumed herein that the Italian Government and armed forces make a complete submission to the Allied Nations and that Italian territory is to be occupied by Allied Forces. The administrative system and the economy of Italy are to be brought under an Armistice Control Authority as rapidly as may be. In areas where active operations against German forces are still in progress, Allied Military Government will be established. The following plan establishes the scheme for both Military Government and post-armistice control which this situation would require, and prescribes the formations of personnel which the execution of the scheme would involve.

2. An Armistice Control Authority operates in a different situation from a Military Government. The latter takes the place of a government which has been expelled, while the former operates upon a government which, after submission, has been kept in operation. The function of the Armistice Control Authority will be to maintain conditions favorable to the use of Italy as a base of operations, to enforce the conditions of the armistice, and to carry out such other policies as may be prescribed by higher authority. Whereas the powers belonging to a Military Government flow from general principles of international law, the activities of an Armistice Control Authority are restricted to the terms of the armistice. If, however, the Allied Nations reserve for themselves all the powers of an occupying power, they will have even under an armistice the same plenary authority they would have had if they had simply driven out the Italian Government. Still, in post-armistice conditions even more than during Military Government, it will be desirable to control the administration and economy of Italy by indirect methods, through the Italian Government, so as adequate results are produced. Until further directives are given as to the organization and methods of the post-armistice control, the Armistice Control Authority will do all that may be necessary to safeguard the interests of the United Nations, but will refrain from any avoidable anticipation of questions of major policy.

3. It is assumed that the disarmament of military, naval and air formations, the collection of surrendered materiel, the

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14503

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3. It is assumed that the disarmament of military, naval and air formations, the collection of surrendered materiel, the demobilization of the Italian armed forces, and like service matters involved in administering an armistice will be assigned to appropriate Military, Naval and Air Control Sections to be established by the Commander in Chief. Military Government Section AFHQ looks to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to prepare detailed plans for these aspects of armistice control. Accordingly the chart showing the post-armistice structure set out in Appendix I merely reflects the necessity of such units in the organization, but implies nothing as to their internal structure. Similarly it is to be expected that Civilian Agencies will be brought into Italy to perform various functions - relief, rehabilitation, supply, and the like. It may be that some functions which at the outset are performed by military personnel will later be transferred to the Civilian Agencies. The Chart, therefore, tentatively assigns a place to these Agencies, but does not prejudice their organization or the range

100.

CF 21 Aug. 43.

Squash British MOST SECRET

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- 2 -

Equals British MOST SECRETIAN ACTION TO BE TAKEN.

4. In the assumed situation, Italian forces offer no resistance and so far as the Italian government is concerned Allied control may be established over the government and territory as rapidly as the formations of personnel arrive on the ground. This will be the work of the Armistice Control Authority to be established in the name of the Allied Nations by the Allied Commander in Chief.

5. German forces, however, will be present in Italy and it is to be expected that at some point they will have dug themselves into positions which they are endeavoring to hold. To drive them from that line and to exclude them from Italy will be the function of certain combat formations. It is assumed that the 15th Army Group would be charged with this mission. Allied Military Government would then be established in the immediate rear of the 15th Army Group, performing the same function as AMG in Sicily performed during the operation Husky. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer would be responsible directly to the General Officer Commanding 15th Army Group, just as in Sicily.

6. The present plan, therefore, must cover two distinct operations: An Allied Military Government forming part of the 15th Army Group and following its progress in clearing the ground, and Armistice Control Authority which extends its control over Italian territory as rapidly as the tactical developments permit. As the 15th Army Group advances the Allied Military Government will turn over the area it has been governing, to be thereafter administered by the Italian Government under the supervision and direction of the Armistice Control Authority. It is to be expected that events will develop rapidly, so that in execution the plan will have to be modified to meet changing conditions.

7. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT: The organization of the Allied Military Government will follow the pattern already established for the operation Husky.

8. ARMISTICE CONTROL AUTHORITY: The organization of the Armistice Control Authority will consist at the outset of a National Headquarters, Regional Organizations, and Control Officers located in the provincial capitals and elsewhere as may be found convenient. The National Headquarters will move into Rome as promptly as may be and establish itself there as an agency for the control of the Italian National administration. It will, under the Allied Commander in Chief, direct that administration as may be necessary in the interest of the United Nations and will see to it that the conditions laid down in the armistice are fulfilled. It will be divided into special staff sections (Legal, Financial, Public Health, etc.), whose duties would include the control of the respective ministries and agencies of the Italian Government.

9. Regional organizations of the Armistice Control Authority will be progressively established as rapidly as the occupation of the Italian territory is effected. These organizations will serve only a temporary purpose. (See paragraph 11 below.) At the outset the Regional Headquarters will be in direct control of the area.

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9. Regional organizations of the Armistice Control Authority will be progressively established as rapidly as the occupation of the Italian territory is effected. These organizations will serve only a temporary purpose. (See paragraph 10 below.) At the outset the Regional Headquarters will be in direct control of the area assigned to it, subject to such orders as it receives from Headquarters of the Armistice Control Authority. Presumably some Regions will be organized before the National Headquarters can be in effective operation.

10. Control Officers will be assigned within each Region, at provincial capitals and elsewhere as may be needed for the supervision of public administration and for other purposes. They will be the local representatives of the Armistice Control Authority and the means by which the National Headquarters keeps itself in constant touch with local conditions. Control Officers will execute the instructions and policies they receive from above.

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11. It is to be anticipated that at the outset in at least some of the Regions local dislocations and disorders will be encountered which must be handled on the spot. Therefore the Regional Headquarters, with its local Control Officer, must have authority, in the early days of the occupation, to cope with situations on its own responsibility, subject to such directions as it may receive from National Headquarters at Rome. As soon, however, as it becomes practicable to do so, the Regional Headquarters will be eliminated from the chain of command. The Armistice Control Authority will thereafter deal directly with the local Control Officers. Thus as rapidly as may be the Armistice Control Authority will be operating on the sound principle that its structure should correspond to the governmental system it is controlling. It would have its units of authority in *JUSTA POSITION* to those units of the Italian Government: A Headquarters supervising the National administration at Rome, and a Provincial Control Officer supervising each provincial prefect. Additional Control Officers will be assigned to assist the Provincial Control Officer and to supervise other local matters, such as the operation of harbors and docks, transportation and communication centers, and banks. The Fascist Party has been so deeply involved in Italian public administration that the eradication of the former will leave the latter in a somewhat paralyzed condition. Hence the Headquarters of Armistice Control Authority at Rome will require the support of a number of Control Officers throughout the country.

12. When the Regional Headquarters have been eliminated from the chain of command it will still be desirable to make such a disposition of personnel that there will be some supporting element between the National Headquarters at the top and the local Control Officers at the bottom. In each *REGION* will be a group of qualified officers, who will act as a "trouble shooting" staff for the various divisions of the National Headquarters. The Regional Control Officers will be responsible for the administration of his group and will keep the National Headquarters advised on their activities. It is important that each Regional group be kept at the minimum number consistent with efficiency. The functions of the Regional staff officers will be:

- a. To inspect the working of Armistice Control activities within the Area;
- b. To make recommendations on administration and policy to the Armistice Control Authority;
- c. To submit situation reports to Armistice Control Authority.

The Regional special staff would not have representatives of *4761* one of the divisions at Armistice Control Authority Headquarters, but only such as seemed necessary and appropriate to the Area. The Area comprising the industrial North would be staffed with specialists on utilities, production and labor, but would perhaps not need a specialist on agriculture, whereas in the South of Italy a different allotment of staff representatives would be made. Special staff officers will be reallocated as needs arise.

ment: A Headquarters supervising the National Armistice Control Office, Rome, and a Provincial Control Officer supervising each provincial prefect. Additional Control Officers will be assigned to assist the Provincial Control Officer and to supervise other local matters, such as the operation of harbors and docks, transportation and communication centers, and banks. The Fascist Party has been so deeply involved in Italian public administration that the eradication of the former will leave the latter in a somewhat paralyzed condition. Hence the Headquarters of Armistice Control Authority at Rome will require the support of a number of Control Officers throughout the country.

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13. It may later be found desirable to do away with the Regional organization and to substitute an Area of two Regions as the units within which the "trouble shooting" group is to operate.

14. For Sardinia there will be one Senior Control Officer, who will communicate directly with Headquarters of the Armistice Control Authority. He will have under him a Provincial Control Officer, with staff, for each of the three provinces in the island.

15. At an appropriate time Sicily will be brought into the system of the Armistice Control Authority.

16. The extension of control over Italian territory will inevitably take some time, depending upon the tactical situation.

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Provision must therefore be made for holding personnel at a suitable point where Regional teams may be formed, to be dispatched to their respective Regions as soon as the ground is cleared. The Military Government School and Holding Center now at Tizi Ouzou will accordingly be moved to the mainland, and as near to Rome as is practicable, to receive personnel from the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere, and to carry on the indoctrinating and organizing essential to the scheme.

C. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN.

17. An Allied Military Government for Region 2, comprising Calabria, Lucania and Apulia, is already provided for in the operation Baytown. It is now being formed in Sicily with personnel there present. In the event of a post-armistice occupation this group will establish itself as the Regional Armistice Control Authority for Region 2.

18. An Allied Military Government for Region 3, comprising Campania, is already provided for in operation Avalanche. It is now being formed at Tizi Ouzou. In the event of an armistice this group will establish itself at Naples as the Regional Armistice Control Authority for Region 3.

19. The Allied Military Government Headquarters now formed at Palermo for the purpose of becoming the governing authority over Regions 1 (Sicily), 2, and 3 in connection with operations Baytown and Avalanche will continue as a part of 15th Army Group and will follow it in its movement of clearing German forces from Italian territory. This AMG Headquarters will organize Military Government behind the line held by 15th Army Group, and for that purpose will be furnished the necessary personnel from the Military Government School and Holding Center. As rapidly as conditions permit the Allied Military Government will turn over territory occupied to the Armistice Control Authority and go on with the 15th Army Group.

20. The Headquarters group contemplated in the memorandum on Preparation for Post-Husky operations, now being formed at Tizi Ouzou, will be prepared to become the Armistice Control Authority for the post-armistice period. While continuing, therefore, to organize for the mission already assigned to it, it will also plan for the alternative that is has to take over the control of the Italian National Government and Italian economy pursuant to an armistice. This would involve some adaptation of its structure to the requirements of the new situation. Planning for the armistice Control Authority will have first priority.

21. It is to be expected that the British and American Governments will decide upon directives as to the structure and methods of post-armistice control in Italy. What the superstructure of this control will be cannot be foreseen now. But it seems reasonable to expect that the special staff divisions, Legal, Financial, Public Health, etc., will have to be perpetuated in any system of post-armistice control. In any event, the Allied Commander in Chief must be prepared, if an armistice should be made, promptly

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22. Allied Military Governments for Region 4, comprising Abruzzi and Lazio, and for Region 5, Umbria and the Marches, will be formed at Tizi Ouzou as rapidly as personnel become available. They will plan for both alternatives: ~~Unit of the Allied Military Government being set up in the wake of the establishment of a Regional Headquarters of the Armistice Control Authority (first priority), and the occupation of its ~~assigned~~ area as a unit of the Allied Military Government in the wake of the 15th Army Group.~~

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23. Similarly an Allied Military Government for Region 6, Sardinia, will be formed at TIZIOUZO as soon as may be. It will plan for the two alternatives. This group will have personnel selected to meet the additional qualification that they will have to operate with a French Air Force, and will thus have special problems of liaison.

24. Tuscany is designated as Region 8, and Emilia as Region 9, in the present plan. [The number 7 has already been referred to as the National Headquarters] For each Region a skeleton organization will be formed at TIZIOUZO, to be somewhat strengthened as additional personnel becomes available. It is expected, however, that most of the strength for these Regional organizations will be found by withdrawing officers from the Regions earlier to be occupied. In every Region, once it has its territory under control, personnel will be taken out and made available, through the Holding Centre, for later Regional teams.

25. The School and Holding Centre will be removed to the vicinity of Rome at the earliest practicable moment, in order that it may be accessible to the National Headquarters and in the most advantageous position for assembling teams to take over additional Regions as they may be cleared. The extension of the Armistice Control Authority as new areas are cleared will involve constant shifting of personnel; it will be the function of the Centre to receive this personnel as well as any additional strength which may be made available, and to organize new units.

26. The initial estimates of personnel for the several Regions and for the Headquarters of the Armistice Control Authority are set out in Appendixes. This strength will subsequently be reduced as the situation permits and as the needs for extending control to the north require. The maximum utilization of personnel requires that no rigid schedule be prescribed at this time. Similarly, the system of alternating British and American personnel in the several headquarters and special staff divisions may have to be somewhat departed from in the interest of the rapid formation of mobile, effective, and well-rounded teams. The proportion of total American to total British personnel has been agreed upon by the two Governments. It will suffice, therefore, if in any team a fair distribution prevails between the two nationalities.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMISTICE CONTROL AUTHORITY.

27. The Armistice Control Authority will have the structure indicated in Appendix 1. There will be a Chief, assisted by a Deputy Chief. The Executive, under their direction, has general administrative supervision over all activities of the Authority, both in the staff divisions and in the field. Directly attached to the office of the Executive is a Supervisory Section whose duty it will be to study the organization and procedures of the various elements in the system, to obtain information as to the progress of work and the efficiency of operations, and to recommend such corrective measures as may be found desirable.

28. The special staff divisions are grouped for convenience of supervision into an Administrative Section and an Economic Section, each

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28. The special staff divisions are grouped for convenience of supervision into an Administrative Section and an Economic Section, each under a Chief. The ~~SEVERAL~~ divisions will perform functions which, for present purposes, are adequately indicated by their respective ~~NAMES~~. The details of their organization and duties will depend upon the conditions imposed in the armistice.

29. It is to be anticipated that the situation which finally presents itself will have features which can not be accurately foreseen. Hence this scheme will have to be fitted to the special circumstances when the time arrives. All personnel drawn into military government work must, therefore, be prepared for hasty readjustment in plans. For example, it might become necessary to establish restricted areas subject to special military control approaching the intensity of a Military Government.

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The principles here laid down will, therefore, be applied flexibly to whatever eventualities arise.

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LIST OF APPENDICES

1. Chart of Armistice Control Authority.
2. Summary of officers for regions Military Government and Armistice control and differences made available by conversion from Government to control.
3. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 1.
4. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 2.
5. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 3.
6. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 4.
7. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 5.
8. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 6.
9. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 8.
10. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 9.
11. Comparative table of Military Government to Armistice Control (Estimated) Region 7 (National Headquarters).
12. Estimate of Personnel of Region 7 (National Headquarters) for Military Government and Armistice Control including civilian agencies.

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
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Appendix 1.

CHART OF ARMISTICE CONTROL AUTHORITY

NOTE: The ministries and Italian Government which would by the respective staff divided in parenthesis.

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
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CHART OF ARMISTICE CONTROL AUTHORITY

NOTE: The ministries and agencies of the Italian Government which would be controlled by the respective staff divisions are indicated in parenthesis.

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APPENDIX 2. SECRET
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SUMMARY OF OFFICERS FOR REGIONS MILITARY GOVERNMENT
AND ARMISTICE CONTROL AND DIFFERENCES MADE AVAILABLE BY CON-
VERSION FROM GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL

<u>REGION</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u> <u>MIL. GOVT.</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u> <u>ARMISTICE CONTROL</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u> <u>DIFFERENCE</u>
1	210) Includes 80) at present	62	- 148
2	195) AMG HQ	101	- 94
3	152	76	- 76
4	200	101	- 99
5	135	76	- 59
6	100	26	- 74
7 (Nat HQ)	417	374	- 43
8	150	76	- 74
9	200	101	- 99
AMG HQ	—	80	+ 80
TOTAL	1759	1073	- 686

NOTES:-

1. Not more than 1395 officers can be deployed at any time. However it is not envisaged that Regions 1 - 9 will all require to be under Military Government at the same time.

2. Personnel are only "available" for Military Government of Regions 1 to 7. Before personnel can be produced for Military Government of Regions 8 and 9, Regions 1 to 6 will have to be wholly or partially converted to Military Control.

3. AMG HQ is required to control and administer Military Government set up in the wake of the advancing combat troops. Personnel for AMG HQ will mostly be obtained from Officers in Regions 1 and 2.

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APPENDIX 3

Comparative table of Military Government
to Armistice Control
Region 1

	Mil. Govt.						Armistice Control					Differencer							
	Brig. Gen.	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Capt.	Lts.	TOTAL	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Capt.	Lients.	TOTAL	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Capt.	Lients.	TOTAL
Administration	1	1	1	2	4	5	15	1*	1	1	2	2	7	1		1	2	4	8
Legal		1	1	2	3	1	8	1	1	1	1		4			1	2	1	4
Financial		1	2	3	6	3	15		1	1	3	2	7	1	1	2	3	1	8
Public Health		1	3	2	3		9		1	1	1		3	1	2	1	2		6
Public Safety		1	1	1	2		5	1			1		2		1	1	1		3
Agriculture		1	1	2	3	3	10			1	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	7
Transportation		1	2	2			5		1	1			2	1	1	1			3
Economics		1	2	2			5	1		1			2		2	1			3
Labor				1	1		2			1			1				1		1
Education				1			1			1			1						
Information				1	1		2			1	1		2						
Property Controller			1	1	2	1	5			1	1		2		1		1	1	3
C.A.Os.		3	13	28	10	9	63	3	6	4	3		16	3	10	22	6	6	47
C.A.F.Os.			7	21	20	17	65	2	3	2	3		10		5	18	18	14	55
Total	1	11	34	69	55	40	210	4*	10	20	17	11	62	8	24	49	38	39	148

* Includes 1 Brigadier or Brig. Gen.

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APPENDIX 4COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
TO ARMISTICE CONTROLREGION 2

	MILITARY GOVERNMENT						ARMISTICE CONTROL						DIFFERENCES					
	Colonels	Lt.Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Totals	Colonels	Lt.Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt.Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total
Administration	2*	1	4	5	7	19	1*	1	2	4	3	11	1		2	1	4	8
Legal	1	1	2	3	1	8		1	1	1		3	1		1	2	1	5
Financial	1	2	3	6	5	17	1	1	1	2	2	7		1	2	4	3	10
Public Health	1	3	2	2		8		1	1	1		3	1		1	1		5
Public Safety	1	1	1	2	2	7		1		1	1	3	1		1	1	1	4
Agriculture	1	1	2	2	1	7		1	1	1		3	1		1	1	1	4
Transportation	1	2	2			5	1	1	1			3		1	1			2
Economics	1	2	2			5		1	1			2	1	1	1			3
Labor		1	1			2		1	1			2						
Education			1			1			1			1						
Information			1	1		2			1	1		2						
Property Controller		1	2	3		6		1	1	1		3			1	2		3
C.A.Os.	3	13	25	8	7	56	3	7	13	4	4	31		6	12	4	3	25
C.A.F.Os.		2	15	15	14	52		4	8	8	7	27		4	7	7	7	25
TOTAL	12	36	63	47	37	195	6	21	33	24	17	101	6	15	30	23	20	94

* Includes. 1 Brig.

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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
TO ARMISTICE CONTROL

REGION 3

APPENDIX 5

	Military Govt.						Armistice Control						Difference					
	Colonels	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total
Administration	2*		2	4	5	13	1*		2	1	2	6	1			3	3	7
Legal	1	1	1	1	1	5		1	1		1	3	1			1		2
Financial	1	2	3	2	2	10	1	1	2			4		1	1	3	3	6
Public Health	1	2	2	3		8		1	1	2		4	1	1	1	1		4
Public Safety	1	1	2	3		7	1		1			2		1	1	3		5
Agriculture		1	1	2		4		1		1		2		1	1			2
Transportation		1	2	2		5		1	1	1		3			1	1		2
Economics		2	2	3	2	9		1	1	2	2	6		1	1	1		3
Labor		1	1	2		4			1	1		2		1		1		2
Education			1			1			1			1						
Information			1	1		2			1	1		2						
Property Controller		1	1	2		4			1	1		2		1		1		2
C. A. Os.	1	6	17	21	5	50		2	9	10	3	24	1	4	8	11	2	26
C. A. P. Os.		3	9	10	8	30		2	5	5	3	15		1	4	5	5	15
TOTALS	7	21	45	56	23	152	3	10	27	25	11	76	4	11	18	31	12	76

* Incl. 1 Brig.

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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
TO ARMISTICE CONTROL

APPENDIX 6

REGION 4

	MIL. GOV. SEC.						ARMISTICE CONTROL						REFERENCE					
	Colonels	Lt Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total
Administration	2*	1	2	4	5	14	1*	1	1	2	3	8	1		1	2	2	6
Local	1	2	2	3		8	1	1	1	1		4		1	1	2		4
Financial	1	2	3	5	1	13	1	1	1	3		6		1	2	2	1	6
Public Health	1	2	3	2		8		1	1	1		3	1	1	2	1		5
Public Safety	1	1	2	3		7	1		1	1		3		1	1	2		4
Agriculture			1	1	2	4			1	1		2		1		1		2
Transportation	1	2	3			6		1	2			3	1	1	1			3
Economics			1	2	2	5		1	1	1		3			1	1		2
Labor			1	1	2	4			1	1		2			1			2
Education			1	1	1	3		1		1		2			1			1
Information				1	1	2			1	1		2						
Property Controller			1	2	3	6			1	2	1	4			1	1	1	4
C.A.Os.	1	17	19	15	10	62	1	9	9	8	5	32			8	10	7	30
C.A.P.Os.			6	18	18	42		2	9	9	7	27			4	9	9	30
Total	8	38	60	61	33	200	5	18	30	32	16	101	3	20	30	29	17	99

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* incl. 1 Brig.

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APPENDIX 7

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

TO ARMISTICE CONTROL

REGION 5

	MILITARY GOVT.						ARMISTICE CONTROL						DIFFERENCE					
	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Cpts.	Lieuts.	Total	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Cpts.	Lieut.	Total	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Cpts.	Lieuts.	Total
Administration	2*		3	3	2	10	1*		2	1	1	5	1		1	2	1	5
Legal	1	1	2	2		6		1	1	1		3	1		1	1		3
Financial	1	2	3	5		11	1	1	2	2		6		1	1	3		5
Public Health	1	1	3	1		6		1	1	1		3	1		2			3
Public Safety	1	1	1	1		4		1	1			2	1			1		2
Agriculture		1	1	2		4		1		1		2			1	1		2
Transportation		1	2			3		1	2			3						
Economics		1	2			3		1	1			2			1			1
Labor			1			1			1			1						
Education			1			1			1			1						
Information			1	1		2			1	1		2						
Property Controller		1	1	2		4			1			1		1		2		3
C.A.Os.		6	18	10	6	40		4	11	6	4	25		2	7	4	2	15
C.A.P.Os.		3	12	14	11	40		1	6	7	6	20		2	6	7	5	20
TOTALS	6	18	31	31	19	135	2	12	31	20	11	76	4	6	20	21	8	59

* Incl. 1 Brig.

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APPENDIX 8

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Section 6

	MIL. GOVT.					PUBLIC SERVICE					DISTANCE							
	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Cols.	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Totals
Adm. Instruct-	2		2			7	1		1	1		3	1		1	2		4
Legal		1	1			2			1			1		1				1
Financial		1	1			2		1				1			1			1
Public Health		1	1			2		1				1		1				1
Public Safety		1	1			2		1				1		1				1
Agriculture																		
Transportation																		
Economics		2	3	2		7		1	1	1		3		1	2	1		4
Labor																		
Education																		
Information			1			1		1				1						
Property Controller		1	1			2		1				1		1				1
C.M.P.S.			3	11	15	29			1	2	2	5			2	9	15	21
C.M.Gs.		3	12	25		40		3	3	3		9			15	22		37
TOTAL	2	10	32	41	15	100	1	5	11	7	2	26	1	5	21	34	13	76

* Incl. 1 Brig.

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APPENDIX 9

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

TO ~~ARMISTICE~~ ^{Armistice} CONTROLREGION 8

	Military Govt.						ARMISTICE Control						Difference					
	Colonels	Lt Cols	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt Cols	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt Cols	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total
Administration	2*		2	4	5	13	1*		2	1	2	6	1			3	3	7
Legal	1	1	1	1	1	5		1	1		1	3	1			1		2
Financial	1	2	3	2	2	10	1	1	2			4		1	1	3	3	6
Public Health	1	2	2	3		8		1	1	2		4	1	1	1	1		4
Public Safety	1	1	2	3		7	1		1			2		1	1	3		5
Agriculture		1	1	2		4		1		1		2			1	1		2
Transportation		1	2	2		5		1	1	1		3			1	1		2
Economics		2	2	3	2	9		1	1	2	2	6		1	1	1		3
Labor		1	1	2		4			1	1		2		1		1		2
Education			1			1			1			1						
Information			1	1		2			1	1		2						
Property . . . Controller		1	1	2		4			1	1		2		1		1		2
C.A.Os.	1	6	17	21	5	50		2	9	10	3	24	1	4	8	11	2	26
C.A.P.Os.		3	9	9	7	28		2	5	5	3	15		1	4	4	4	13
TOTALS	7	21	45	55	22	150	3	10	27	25	11	76	4	11	18	30	11	74

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* Incl. 1 Brig.

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APPENDIX 10

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTTO MILITARY CONTROLREGION 9

	MIL. GOVT. SEC						MIL. CONTROL						DIFFERENCE					
	Colonels	Lt Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Captains	Lieuts.	Total	Colonels	Lt. Cols.	Majors	Capt.	Lieuts.	Total
Administration	2*	1	2	4	5	14	1*	1	1	2	3	6	1		1	2	2	6
Legal	1	2	2	3		8	1	1	1	1		4		1	1	2		4
Financial	1	2	3	5	1	13	1	1	1	3		6		1	2	2	1	6
Public Health	1	2	3	2		8		1	1	1		3	1	1	2	1		5
Public Safety	1	1	2	3		7	1		1	1		3		1	1	2		4
Agriculture		1	1	2		4			1	1		2		1		1		2
Transportation	1	2	3			6	1	2				3	1	1	1			3
Economics		1	2	2		5	1	1	1			3			1	1		2
Labor		1	1	2		4			1	1		2		1		1		2
Education		1	1	1		3	1		1			2			1			1
Information			1	1		2			1	1		2						
Property Controller		1	2	3	2	8			1	2	1	4		1	1	1	1	4
C.A.Os.	1	17	19	15	10	62	1	9	9	8	5	32		8	10	7	5	30
C.A.P.Os.		6	18	18	15	57		2	9	9	7	27		4	9	9	8	30
	8	38	60	61	33	201	5	18	30	32	16	101	3	20	30	29	17	99

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* incl 1 Brig.

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APPENDIX 11

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TABLE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

AND DISCIPLINE CONTROL

REGION 7

	MILITARY GOVT.							DISCIPLINE CONTROL							DIFFERENCE							
	Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen.	Colonel	Lt. Col.	Major	Capt.	Lieut.	TOTAL	Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen.	Colonel	Lt. Col.	Major	Capt.	Lieut.	TOTAL	Colonel	Lt. Col.	Major	Capt.	Lieut.	TOTAL
Administration	2	3	2	5	9	9	10	40	2	3	2	5	9	9	10	40						
Legal		1	4	5	7	9		25		1	4	6	9	5		25						
Financial		1	6	24	25	24		70		1	6	12	23	23		65	2	2	1			5
Public Health		1	3	7	11	15		40		1	3	5	13	14		36	2	1	1			4
Public Safety		1	6	6	10	12		35		1	6	6	10	12		35						
Agriculture			2	3	9	6	5	25			2	3	8	5	4	22			1	1	1	3
Transportation		1	4	9	16	15	2	48		1	4	9	15	15	2	46						
Economics			4	4	7	10		25			4	3	6	9		22	1	1	1			3
Labour			2	2	6	5		15			2	2	6	5		15						
Education			1	3	3	2	1	10			1	3	3	2	1	10						
Information*			2	10	13	14	2	41				2	5	6		13	2	3	8	8	2	23
Property Controller			1	3	6	5		15			1	3	6	5		15						
HQ Staff Mil. Admin					2	4		8				2	4	6		16						
C.A.P.Os.																						
	2	8	37	2	10	10	36	112	2	8	3	6	17	18	3	37	2	1	13	12	3	43

* Included 3 officers for Italian Foreign Relations
 " " " Colonial Affairs.
 Total $\frac{3}{6}$

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APPENDIX 12.ESTIMATE OF PERSONNEL OF REGION 7 (NAT HQ) FOR MILITARY GOVERN-
MENT AND ARMISTICE CONTROL INCLUDING CIVILIAN AGENCIES

	<u>AMG</u>	<u>CONTROL</u>	<u>CIVILIAN AGENCIES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
National Govt.) or Hqs. Secretariat Control)	70	50	10	60
Legal	25	15	5	20
Financial	70	50 (1)	20 (2)	70
Public Health	40	10	20	30
Public Safety	35	15		15
Agriculture	25	10	15	25
Transportation	46	46		46
Economics & Supply	25	10	30) 30)	70
Labor	15	15		15
Education	10	5		5
Information	41	13	(3)	13
Property Control	15	5		5
Total	417	244	130	374

(1) Exchange Control 20
 Currency Dept. 15
 Customs & Revenue 5
 Bank Control 10
 50

(2) Lend Lease 10
 Accountants 10

(3) Subject to FWE & Censorship
 Plans.

(4) Civilian Agency Estimates on
 initial Basis.

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

COPY NO.	1	-	Chief of Staff
" "	2	-	CAO
" "	3	-	G-3 (Plans)
" "	4	-	Mr. Murphy
" "	5	-	Mr. MacMillan
" "	6	-	Brig. Gen. Holmes
" "	7	-	Colonel Maxwell
" "	8	-	Lt. Colonel Dalrymple
" "	9	-	Lt. Colonel Fairman
" "	10	-	Major Jackman
" "	11	-	Major Barratt
" "	12	-	Captain Todd
" "	13	-	Captain de Knoop
" "	14 - 25	-	Planning Staffs Tizi Ouzou
" "	26 - 29	-	AMG School Tizi Ouzou
" "	30	-	War Diary
" "	31	-	File
" "	32 - 50	-	Spare

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HEADQUARTERS 120

Pol. Sec.

9 FEB 44

NOTE

NOTE

52 AREA, 6 BASH SUB AREA, 71 SUB AREA, 151 SUB AREA, AMG 2 REGION, 214 OF HAF, 15 AB
 ASSO, RE 12 31. ITALIAN COMB

ACOF, FLAMING, 6 ARMY, 3 ARMY, 57 AREA, 94 SUB AREA, 151A, ACO, 214, 215, 216

DISTR

091652

3 252

NOTE



1ST. UNDER AUTHORITY OF ACME OGD DISTR NO 39 DATED 7 FEB 44 REF 0300 HRS 9 FEB 44
 ON 3 DISTRICT IS ORDERED BY CASTELLANOS HAF REF 2 4133.

2ND. THE CASE FOUR 57 AREA AND 94 SUB AREA HAVE BEEN COMB OF 2 DISTRICT TO COMB
 OF 3 DISTRICT FOR ALL PURPOSES.

3RD. THE CASE SIX PROVINCE OF TONERA VALLEY FROM COMB OF 94 SUB AREA TO 52 AREA TAV
 PARADO COMB OF 2 DISTRICT. ALL THROUGH.

THE 120

ACTION AMG RE
 HPO NEW ACY
 AMG REG III
 AMG REG IV
 CB
 SGT

ACME REG

(INFO) PA TO CC
 BUCK SEC
 ADMIN SEC
 SC & RE SEC
 POL SEC
 NAVY SEC
 LAND FORCES
 AIR FORCES
 TELECOM SEC
 WAR MATR DIRM SEC
 ST JEFFS
 S-1
 G-2
 H1 COMMS
 ADZ

4743

0988

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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*Return to Gen Halperin
Mr. Brock Smith*

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