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A F H Q

July 1944 - Feb 1945

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
ADQUARTERS COMZND ALLIED FORCI
APO 512, US ARMY

18 February 1945

322.96

Subject: Utilization of Limited Assignment Personnel.

To : All Concerned.

1. In accordance with directives of the Commanding General, MTOUSA, every effort will be made to absorb and utilize limited assignment enlisted personnel in service and overhead units. A personnel audit was made for the purpose of spotting those jobs then being performed by general assignment enlisted men which limited assignment enlisted men could perform. General assignment men, who are replaced by limited assignment men, are to be retrained for combat service.

2. The 1st increment of limited assignment enlisted men have arrived in the various units, and problems are arising in effectively utilizing them. In the near future an officer from the Replacement and Training Command will contact units for the purpose of assisting in placement of limited assignment men.

3. Junior Officers and Non-commissioned Officers exercising immediate supervision of training must be impressed with the importance of their tasks. Painstaking effort must be taken and considerable leadership exercised to determine the capabilities of and to utilize each assigned soldier to best advantage in this program. The importance of on-the-job training must be stressed for the proper absorption of these men. Unit Commanders are enjoined to cooperate to the fullest extent.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL RAMSEY:

Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt, Allied Commission,
(Cvhd), APO 394, 22 February 1945

/s/ A. D. Getman
A. D. GETMAN,
Captain, AGD,
Adjutant.

322.96

(22 Feb 45)

1st Ind

GBP/rs1

HEADQUARTERS, 2675TH REGIMENT, ALLIED COMMISSION, (OVERHEAD), APO 394, U. S.
Army, 22 February 1945.

TO: See Distribution.

For your information and compliance.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PARKIN:

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- 1 - Regions Allied Commission.

G. B. PATE
WOJG USA
Asst Adjutant

4324

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

RHF/wfb

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 675/017 GDS-0

18 January 1945

SUBJECT: Conservation of Electric Power Facilities of Italian Utilities
TO : All Concerned

Letter, this headquarters, file AG 675/171 GDS-0, subject as above, dated 31 October 1944, is amended as follows:

a. Paragraph 2a (5) is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"(5) Other Military Facilities - Lighting of mess halls, kitchens, workshops, etc, should be the minimum commensurate with efficient working, and will in no case exceed 6.5 watts per square foot."

b. Paragraph 2b is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"b Heating and Cooking -

- (1) Electric heating will be permitted only in essential industrial processes engaged in production for the military effort, and in hospitals for treatment of patients.
- (2) Only under exceptional circumstances will electric heating or cooking be allowed, other than in paragraph (1) above. Such exceptional usage will be only on express written authority of army commanders for army areas and AFHQ for area in rear of army rear boundaries".

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

R. H. Freese
R. H. FRESE,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

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R E S T R I C T E D

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CONFIDENTIALRHF/awm
AP 654ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.3/039 PMG-0

14 January 1945

SUBJECT: Solicitation of Floral Business by Italian Florists.

TO : All Concerned.

1. It has been brought to the attention of this headquarters that Italian florists have solicited floral telegraphic orders for transmission to the United States and United Kingdom from United States and British personnel.
2. There is no way at the present time by which an Italian florist can effect delivery of flowers in the United States or United Kingdom. Such activity is patently illegal. Consequently, any member of the Allied Forces who expends monies for such service can expect to suffer the resulting financial loss.
3. Personnel having knowledge of such activities are requested to report the facts to the nearest Military Police.
4. It is desired that the foregoing be brought to the attention of all personnel.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

/s/ R. H. Frese
R. H. FRESE,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt Allied Commission
(ovhd), APO 394, 18 January 1945 785016091.3
(14 Jan 45) 1st Ind NWD/rs1
HEADQUARTERS, 2675TH REGIMENT, ALLIED COMMISSION, (OVERHEAD), APO 394, U. S.
Army, 18 January 1945.

TO: All Concerned.

For your information, guidance, and compliance.

By order of Colonel PERKIN:

N. W. DRAGNEFF
Major, AGD
Adjutant 4922DISTRIBUTION:

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Sections, Allied Commission.

SECRETBX 67803
DEC 122244A6/3928
DEC 131520A
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED BACKED CITE FIBOS

ALL, 3 DIST, ADIST, DAFAC, DAF, III CORPS, MARF, CINC MND, PMS, MBS,
MORUS, RAAC, MELA, MBS HENR

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

HEADQUARTERS

17 DEC 1944

SECRET.

1. Field Marshal ~~ALFRED~~ assumed command in the Mediterranean Theatre at 0700 hours 12 December 1944 on the departure of General WILSON for UNITED KINGDOM.
2. With effect from 1200 hours Saturday, 16 December, 1944, Lieutenant General ~~MAJOR CLARK~~ will assume command of 5th and 8th Armies with the title of Commanding General, 15 ARMY GROUP.
3. At the same time, Headquarters Allied Armies in ITALY will become HEADQUARTERS, 15 ARMY GROUP.
4. Consequential changes in administrative organization will be put into effect a few days later. Separate instructions follow.
5. ~~MUSKIE~~ 1 DISTRICT will be temporarily under command of Commanding General, 15 ARMY GROUP pending issue of instructions mentioned in para 4 above.

DIST

ACTION: Chief of Staff
 INFO: Chief Commissary
 C.A. Sec
 Econ Sec
 Pol Sec
 Estab Sec
 Land Forces SC
 Navy SC
 Air SC
 Communications SC
 WD & I FOR SC
 File 2
 Fla t

SECRET

Return to → copy for Mr. Schott
 UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
 ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

August 7, 1944

Encl. 655

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee of Supreme Allied
 Commander's Political Committee.

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the Supreme Allied Commander's Political Committee has created a Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee to act on behalf of the Political Committee in all Psychological Warfare matters not involving major political decisions.

The Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee consists of Brigadier General A. J. McChrystal, Chief of the Information and Censorship Section of AFHQ, Chairman; Mr. Russell Barnes, Director of the Psychological Warfare Branch; Mr. J. Barman, Deputy Director of the Psychological Warfare Branch; the British Resident Minister, and myself.

The new sub-committee held its first meeting on August 4. A copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed. Discussions of possible interest to the Department included:

1. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ITALY. The British Resident Minister initiated this discussion, pointing out that it is likely that the economic situation in Italy will deteriorate further and inflationary symptoms become worse and that the Italians will make propaganda to the effect that the Allies are responsible for the conditions from which they are suffering. He suggested that PWE undertake propaganda measures to make clear to the Italian people, as well as to the British and American publics, that the Italians themselves are responsible for whatever economic difficulties they may face because of their entrance into the war against the Allies. He emphasized that the Allied Armies only entered Italy because Italy declared war against the Allies and that any unfavorable economic consequences of the presence of Allied troops in Italy are the ultimate responsibility of the Italian people and not of the Allies. He suggested that it be made clear to the Italian people that while the Allies are doing and will do everything they can to assist Italian economy it is up to the Italians themselves to bear their share of the burdens of war and accept their responsibility for doing all they can to work out their own salvation without whining. I pointed out that this might become a rather delicate matter in view of the large Italian-American population in the States and suggested that the necessary propaganda measures to be taken should avoid giving offense to this group. It was agreed that PWE would prepare plans for later action.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington

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The Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee consists of Brigadier General A. J. McCrystall, Chief of the Information and Censorship Section of A-16, Chairman; Mr. Russell Barnes, Director of the Psychological Warfare Branch; Mr. F. Harman, Deputy Director of the Psychological Warfare Branch; the British Resident Minister, and myself.

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2. . . .

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2. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF PWB. Mr. Macmillan acquired about the extent of political intelligence activities carried on by PWB which he feels duplicate those being performed by the American and British members of the Advisory Council for Italy, the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission and the American and British Consulates in liberated Italy. Mr. Barnes and Mr. Harman said that OWI and PWB offices in Washington and London are pressing them for more instead of less such political reporting. I strongly supported Mr. Macmillan in taking exception, in particular, to interviewing of officials of the Italian Government by PWB officers. (PWB issues a weekly political intelligence report, much of which is made up of accounts of interviews with Italian Government officials by anonymous PWB officers). He pointed out that contacts with members of the Italian Government so far as the Allies are concerned are the function of the Allied Control Commission and American and British representatives on the Advisory Council, and that uncoordinated interviews by PWB officers with Italian officials might very well make more difficult the work of our authorized representatives. On the other hand, the PWB Political Intelligence reports frequently include accounts of political party meetings and other events in parts of Italy in which there are no State Department or Foreign Office representatives, and these reports are useful to all concerned. It was agreed that PWB would submit to the next meeting of the Subcommittee certain information on which to base plans for continuing the useful functions of its Political Intelligence Report without duplicating the work of State Department and Foreign Office representatives. The latter could be asked to furnish PWB from their contacts political intelligence required for propaganda planning.

3. PRESS, RADIO AND MOVIES IN ITALY. Mr. Barnes said that PWB was anxious to turn back to Italian responsibility as soon as possible the control of press, radio and movies now exercised by PWB. The Allied Publications Board, set up some months ago to regulate the publication of newspapers in Italy, particularly in view of the necessity for rationing newsprint, now licenses the publication of newspapers and it is illegal for newspapers to appear without such a license. Mr. Barnes said that PWB was very reluctant to turn over such machinery to the Italian Government since it would amount to encouraging the Government to continue a control of the press that might become little different from that exercised by the Fascist regime. The Subcommittee agreed that before the Allied Control machinery is turned over to the Italian Government in territory under the Government's jurisdiction it should be modified to eliminate licensing requirements in order to encourage the principle of a free press, but retain such measures as are necessary for the time being to ration newsprint.

Mr. Barnes said PWB, which now is the sole agency furnishing world news to the newspapers and radio stations in liberated Italy, is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible from this field, and permit the American and British services to sell their news competitively to the Italian newspapers and radio stations. He foresaw considerable difficulty in this matter, however, since for if any of the Italian newspapers at present could afford to pay the amounts

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In connection with the immediately foregoing paragraph, I suggest that the Department take advantage of any opportunity to encourage the American press associations to send appropriate representatives to Italy to investigate

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the field and make whatever plans are possible for selling their services to the Italian newspapers and radio stations. It obviously will take some time to work out a program for resumption of private enterprises in this field, but I believe that it is important for the American agencies concerned to begin making their plans as soon as possible if they have any long range interest in establishing their services in Italy. I am informed that Reuters already is prepared to start its service into Italy on very short notice whenever this field is opened to private enterprise and I would like to see our American press services in as good a competitive position as possible.

Respectfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy

Enclosure:

Copy of minutes, as stated.
(single copy to Department)

File No. 830

In triplicate to Department

Copies to:

AMB/IR Ambassador Kirk, Advisory Council for Italy, Rome
AMB/IR William H. Schott, Requisite, Political Section, AEU, Rome

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PC (44) 26th Meeting
27th September 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

TOP SECRET

COPY NO-

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT
1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Sir James H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant-General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major-General Lowell T. Hooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major-General I.T.P. Hughes, representing
Commander, Force 140

Major-General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major-General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

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General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant-General Sir James H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant-General J.G.H. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major-General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

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Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Colonel C.E. Lewin Harris,
G-5 Section, AFHQ

Mr. C. Office,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose
Major C.N.F. Odgers

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K-276

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 25th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 20th September 1944.

2. CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 5)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMBELL reported that subsequent to the last meeting of the Political Committee, the Supreme Allied Commander had agreed, after further consideration, that in spite of the conclusion then reached it would be preferable for control of Force 133 elements in ROMANIA and BULGARIA to be vested in AFHQ and action had been taken accordingly.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of the above.

3. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROMANIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 6)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EAKER and MAJOR-GENERAL AIREY reported that arrangements for the evacuation of the Poles in question by air were possible, but pointed out that this involved a risk of difficulties with the Russians which might prejudice future Allied activities in ROMANIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that Article 5 of the Armistice with ROMANIA provided for the handing over to the Soviet High Command by ROMANIA of all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war in their hands and that the action proposed in respect of Poles in ROMANIA was inconsistent with this article. He understood that no firm undertaking had been given to General Anders regarding their evacuation.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEAUMONT-NESBITT observed that General Anders would certainly wish the Allies to do their best for Poles in ROMANIA and also for those in YUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. He suggested that Poles in ROMANIA might be advised to report to the British Mission there and that authority should be sought for that mission to act on behalf of the Polish Government.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMBELL considered that General Anders should be informed that the risk of evacuation in a clandestine manner was not acceptable but that the possibility of evacuating Poles in ROMANIA under the auspices of the British Mission was under examination.

MR. MACMILLAN considered that the problem should be put before the State Department and the Foreign Office for guidance.

MR. KILK suggested that General Anders might also be advised to have the matter taken up by the Polish Government in LONDON and WASHINGTON.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister to inform the State Department and the Foreign Office respectively of the situation regarding Poles in ROMANIA and other Balkan countries, in the light of the above discussion, and to request their guidance as to the policy to be adopted.

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(b) Directed that the Chief, Liaison Section, Major General Anders that they ask attached to evacuation of forces from ROMANIA in a clandestine manner was unacceptable but that instructions were being sought from LONDON and WASHINGTON in the matter; and advise him to request the Polish Government to take the matter up also with WASHINGTON and LONDON.

4. PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE ROYAL YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 109)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft agreement for negotiation with the Royal Yugoslav Government to cover the activities in YUGOSLAVIA of ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) and the forces under its command.

MR. MACMILLAN said that at present certain delegates from Marshal Tito were about to arrive at BARI to discuss matters connected with relief supplies for YUGOSLAVIA and that Commander, Balkan Air Force, had urged that Dr. Subasic should send out to BARI representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to join in these discussions. He understood that Dr. Subasic had ordered his representative in C.I.R.O. to attend. If representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government did arrive, he considered that they and Marshal Tito's delegates should be invited to agree on certain general principles on the basis of which relief in YUGOSLAVIA would be operated. The two basic principles were equitable distribution and the granting of facilities for inspection by the Allies, who were providing the relief supplies. If Marshal Tito declined to grant inspection facilities it might be necessary to refuse to supply relief. If, on the other hand, the basic principles were agreed then it would be possible to introduce clauses dealing with the status of Allied personnel working in YUGOSLAVIA in connection with relief, thus eventually building up to something like the agreement under discussion. It was clear that the Royal Yugoslav Government had in practice no power to carry out the agreement as at present drawn. Their representatives must first be asked to accept the principle of joint negotiation with Marshal Tito's delegates, and at the end of these negotiations it must be decided whether a formal agreement was required.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUGHES observed that the two basic principles referred to by Mr. Macmillan were the two main points for discussion in the forthcoming talks between Marshal Tito's delegates and Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA). In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he said that relief matters had only been discussed in broad outline with Marshal Tito by Brigadier Maclean. He emphasised that Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), had no intention of referring in his discussions with Marshal Tito's delegates to the draft agreement at present under discussion.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER emphasised the necessity for insisting that Marshal Tito did not remove the Allied relief representatives once they were installed in YUGOSLAVIA. He added that, if the arrival of the delegates of the Royal Yugoslav Government were delayed, it would be possible to mark time with Marshal Tito's delegates by requesting them to produce details of their various relief requirements.

MR. KIRK pointed out that the normal technical procedure would be the negotiation of an agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government as

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MR. MACMILLAN said that no previous discussions had been held with Marshal Tito were about to arrive at BARI to discuss matters connected with relief supplies for YUGOSLAVIA and that Commander, Ballan Air Force, had urged that Dr. Subasic should send out to BARI representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to join in these discussions. He understood that Dr. Subasic had ordered his representative in C.I.R.O. to attend. If representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government should be invited to agree on certain general principles on the basis of which relief in YUGOSLAVIA would be operated. The two basic principles were equitable distribution and the granting of facilities for inspection by the Allies, who were providing the relief supplies. If Marshal Tito declined to grant inspection facilities it might be necessary to refuse to supply relief. If, on the other hand, the basic principles were agreed then it would be possible to introduce clauses dealing with the status of Allied personnel working in YUGOSLAVIA in connection with relief, thus eventually building up to something like the agreement under discussion. It was clear that the Royal Yugoslav Government had in practice no power to carry out the agreement as at present drawn. Their representatives must first be asked to accept the principle of joint negotiation with Marshal Tito's delegates, and at the end of these negotiations it must be decided whether a formal agreement was required.

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MR. KIRK pointed out that the normal technical procedure would be the negotiation of an agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government as originally suggested. He agreed, however, that Marshal Tito had de facto power in YUGOSLAVIA and pointed out the difficulty of combining the two elements. He added that embarrassment would result if Marshal Tito were consulted first in this matter, or if negotiations were conducted with anyone other than the Royal Yugoslav Government. He felt that the Royal Yugoslav Government should be induced themselves to initiate discussion with Marshal Tito's delegates.

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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMBELL considered that discussions at BARI should be left in the hands of the representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department with Commander, HL HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) acting as a technical adviser.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that further consideration of the draft agreement be postponed.
- (b) Endorsed the views of the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister recorded above and invited them, in conjunction with G-5 and Commander, HL HQ (BALKANS), to work out a plan of action based on the above discussion.

5. DISPOSAL OF YUGOSLAV EX-PRISONERS OF WAR

(Paper No. PC (44) 110)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a letter from the Allied PW Repatriation Unit, CUP, requesting instructions for the disposal of 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war detained in SWITZERLAND, together with recommendations on this subject by the Chief, Liaison Section.

MAJOR-GENERAL BLUMONT-NESEBITT emphasised the importance of not moving these Yugoslavs until the conditions of service in the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation had been made known to them.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the importance of concentrating Royalist and Partisan Yugoslavs in separate camps and suggested that the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslavs in question should be held at MARSEILLES until suitable arrangements for their accommodation had been made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that G-4 (Mov & Tr) examine the possibility of moving the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war direct from MARSEILLES to the MIDDLE EAST.
- (b) Endorsed the recommendations of the Chief, Liaison Section, set forth in paragraph 3 of paper No. PC (44) 110 and directed that he inform HQ Allied PW Repatriation Unit accordingly.

6. AGREEMENT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 101 (Revised))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a revised draft agreement with the Greek Government covering operation of a British force supported by an Allied Relief Organisation in GREECE, as amended by the Foreign Office.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the State Department had agreed to the text of the Foreign Office draft subject to certain minor amendments* and had expressed their willingness that the agreement should now be negotiated with the Greek Government.

5. DISPOSAL OF YUGOSLAV EX-PRISONERS OF WAR

(Paper No. PC (44) 110)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a letter from the Allied PW Repatriation Unit, GWF, requesting instructions for the disposal of 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war detained in SWITZERLAND, together with recommendations on this subject by the Chief, Liaison Section.

MAJOR-GENERAL BLANCHET-NEUBERT emphasised the importance of not moving these Yugoslavs until the conditions of service in the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation had been made known to them.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the importance of concentrating Royalist and Partisan Yugoslavs in separate camps and suggested that the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslavs in question should be held at MARSEILLES until suitable arrangements for their accommodation had been made.

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MR. MACMILLAN reported that the State Department had agreed to the text of the Foreign Office draft subject to certain minor amendments* and had expressed their willingness that the agreement should now be negotiated with the Greek Government.

* These amendments are as follows :-

- (a) In line 2 of the preamble substitute "Greek units" for "other allied units". If units of other nationalities in addition to British and Greek are in fact to be employed the United States Government suggest "Greek units and other units".
- (b) Line 5 of the preamble should be amended to read "restoring stable conditions under which relief may be provided".

- 4 -

/ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that paragraph 10 of the agreement as at present drafted, left the position regarding Merchant Seamen open. He agreed, however, that this was properly a matter for the Ministry of War Transport.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of the above.

7. TEXT OF ARMISTICE WITH ROMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 111)

THE COMMITTEE took note of the terms of the Armistice imposed on ROMANIA.

8. ARMISTICE WITH BULGARIA

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that the negotiation of the armistice with BULGARIA would now probably take place in MOSCOW and that there might be points arising in the course of the negotiations on which the views of the Mediterranean Theatre should be expressed.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROCKS said that the terms of the armistice were under preparation by the European Advisory Council in LONDON. He suggested that consideration should be given to points which it was desired to include from the point of view of the Mediterranean Theatre, and that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to put these before the European Advisory Council. He suggested that an inter-service committee should be established to investigate the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Instructed the Secretary to draft for his approval a telegram to the British Chiefs of Staff asking whether his views on points of particular concern to the Mediterranean Theatre which might arise in connection with the Bulgarian Armistice negotiations were required.

(b) Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the establishment of a Committee, representative of the appropriate service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre, to study the material available in AFHQ indicating the probable content of the Armistice terms to be imposed on BULGARIA and to report to him what, if any, recommendations should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Council to cover points of interest to the Allied service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre.

9. OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN

(Telegram No. 0075 of 26th September from Force 140 to BAF)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM draw attention to a telegram in which Commander, Force 140, requested Commander, Balkan Air Force, to hold 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment in KYTHIRA. He pointed out that the retention

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9. OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN

(Telegram No. G075 of 26th September from Force L40 to R.F.)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM drew attention to a telegram in which Commander, Force L40, requested Commander, Balkan Air Force, to hold 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment in KYTHERA. He pointed out that the retention of this squadron at KYTHERA would be valueless, since the advanced base for light naval craft was being moved to POROS with 9 Commando. He considered that the Greek Sacred Squadron should also be moved to POROS.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the views of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, recorded above, and instructed the Secretary to arrange that Commander, Force L40, issue instructions for the earliest possible movement of 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment to POROS.

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VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he would be discussing voluntary relief with Mr. Myron Taylor in ROME on 29th September and enquired what steps had been taken for its organisation.

CAPTAIN STONE replied that a Committee consisting of representatives of the Italian Government, Italian Red Cross and the Vatican had been set up to handle and distribute voluntary relief when supplies arrived. An Allied Control Commission Liaison Officer with the Committee had been appointed and co-ordination with UNRRA effected.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL Clark said that he envisaged difficulty in providing transport for voluntary relief. Moreover, it seemed uncertain whether or not voluntary relief supplies of the suggested categories would be additional to the minimum tonnages of each category supplied under the normal civil supply arrangements for Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that all voluntary relief must be co-ordinated under a single control. Additional relief organisations would undoubtedly wish to participate in voluntary relief in ITALY and the position in respect of GREECE had also to be considered. He referred to the offer by the New Zealand Government of approximately 700 tons of foodstuffs to the people of GREECE (TROOPERS telegram GEN 270 dated 25th September 1944).

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the supplementing of relief tonnages authorised by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee with additional voluntary relief supplies in one country would lead to difficulties in other countries less favourably treated.

MR. MCILLAN observed that three factors conditioned the restriction of relief supplies provided under the authority of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee:-

- (a) Certain relief items might be in world short supply.
- (b) Insufficient shipping tonnage might be available to transport the full tonnage required even though the supplies might be available.
- (c) Expenditure might not be authorised in respect of certain commodities which were considered to be outside basic relief needs.

In his opinion it would be inappropriate that voluntary relief should be used to supplement tonnages officially restricted for the reasons in (a) or (b) but there would be no objection to supply by voluntary relief of commodities for which expenditure by the Allied Governments was not authorised.

CAPTAIN STONE said that in the case of ITALY there were certain items of relief supplies, notably milk, in respect of which the official allowance was clearly inadequate and which could be readily supplemented by voluntary relief. He could see no objection to voluntary relief in such circumstances.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above discussion.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above discussion.

J. H. L. Scelies
J. H. L. SCELIES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVSTA
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief, PJB
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ ILEF
Liaison Section
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission
Commander, Balkan Air Force
Commander, Force 140
Commander, N HQ (Balkans)
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EXTRACTS

H.M. Ambassador to Greece
Commander, ILE HQ (Greece)

Item 6 (1 copy)
Item 6 (1 copy)

Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 U.S. Political Adviser
 British Resident Minister
 Chief, PWB
 Secretary, General Staff
 G-1 (A)
 G-1 (B)
 G-2
 G-3
 G-3 Special Operations
 G-4 (A)
 G-4 (B)
 G-5
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 Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ JEF
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 Commander, Force 140
 Commander, M HQ (Balkans)
 Spares

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EXTRACTS

H.M. Ambassador to Greece
 Commander, III HQ (Greece)
 Item 6 (1 copy)
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ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS
G-3 Section
APO 912

APC/AS/JJR

SP2
+15
2177
D10

G-3: 370.43

10 July 1944

SUBJECT: Move of AFHQ.

TO: Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 374

1. According to the latest information available, AFHQ
will officially close at Algiers at 0001 July 23 and will
open at Caserta at 0001 July 23.

2. The forward mission of G-3 will arrive on the 16th of
July at Caserta with only skeleton personnel and equipment
and will not be in a position to deal with matters having refer-
ence to the general files until the arrival of the G-3 rear
echelon on or about the 23rd, departing Algiers on the 20th.
The Chief of Section will report Algiers on the 20th and will
arrive at the new Headquarters on the same day.

3. In order to avoid unnecessary delay in delivery due to
this Headquarters being in transit it is suggested that letter
correspondence be addressed to G-3 AFHQ adv. as of the 16th, and
earlier as of the 17th.

NORMAN P. BRADY
Major, P.A.
Executive Officer.

4910

