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AFHQ - POLITICAL Committee
(Letters for Mr. Schott)
Dec 1944

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 34th Meeting
1st December, 1944.

COPY NO 44

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
ROOM AT 1500 HOURS ON THURSDAY 30TH NOVEMBER, 1944

cc 1051
DEC 2 - RECD

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John E.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.E. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.C.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. F.C. Reinhardt, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Mace,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Psychological Warfare Branch

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant General Ira C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry X. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gommell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. F.G. Reinhardt, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Hooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier C.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 Plans, AFHQ

Colonel T.R. Henn,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 33rd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd November, as subsequently amended.

2. PARTISAN WISEDEMANORE IN BARI
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL NOCE reported that the Partisan Commander in BARI had now received instructions from Marshal Tito that JANL personnel in ITALY were to conform with the orders in force for all Allied troops. While he had undertaken, therefore, that arms would not be carried off duty, personnel on guard or picquets would be armed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that officers commanding hospitals had complained that Partisan Commissars were discharging JANL patients without reference to the RAMC staff. He had accordingly requested Brigadier Maclean to ask Marshal Tito to issue orders designed to discontinue this practice.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GANELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ridden by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy would be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander, SOE it was proposed to increase the monthly contribution to the Committee from 100 million lire to 160 million lire.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note with approval of the above

4. REDEEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Minute 8)

BAR had now received instructions from Marshal Tito that JANL personnel in ITALY were to conform with the orders in force for all Allied troops. While he had undertaken, therefore, that arms would not be carried off duty, personnel on guard or picquets would be armed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that officers commanding hospitals had complained that Partisan Commissars were discharging JANL patients without reference to the RMC staff. He had accordingly requested Brigadier Maclean to ask Marshal Tito to issue orders designed to discontinue this practice.

THE DEPUTY SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMBELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ridden by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy would be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander, SOG it was proposed to increase the monthly contribution to the Committee from 100 million lire to 160 million lire.

THE DEPUTY SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note with approval of the above

4. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that the Officer Commanding DELHI had reported from SPLIT that food was so scarce that he had supplied a certain quantity including flour to the local population. In exchange for it he had been receiving vegetables. Admiral Cunningham felt that it was improper for H.M. ships to engage in barter, but had queried whether it would not be possible to allow naval craft proceeding to YUGOSLAVIA to carry up to 10 tons of supplies drawn from military stocks, as had been done at the time of the German withdrawal from GREECE.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that the two ships, previously lost for YUGOSLAVIA, had not been sailing at TARANTO for some 10 days as it was felt that if they had proceeded immediately to YUGOSLAVIA in accordance with Conclusion 6(a) of PC(44) 33rd Meeting, Partisan local commanders might have refused to allow them to unload, pending receipt of TITO's orders. Brigadier Macle was now on his way to BELGRADE with instructions to obtain TITO's agreement to the unloading of these ships and other emergency measures of relief without prejudice to the B.M.I. discussions. He appreciated, however, that it might be some time before TITO's instructions were received at the ports.

MR. BRADB pointed out that a telegram had already been despatched to BELGRADE embodying the instructions given to Brigadier Macle.

LIAISON GENERAL GUNSON thought that ad hoc relief should be introduced forthwith on the lines suggested by Admiral Cunningham.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for the immediate sailing for destinations previously planned of the two relief ships now held at TARANTO, and for their retention offshore from their destinations if Marshal Tito's agreement to their discharge had not been received by the time they arrived.

(b) authorized the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to arrange further that vessels proceeding to Yugoslav ports should each carry up to 10 tons of relief supplies drawn from military stocks if, in the opinion of these two officers, the supplies provided under (a) above proved insufficient to relieve destitution in the vicinity of the ports.

5. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 10)

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPENCER reported that contrary to Conclusion 10(a) of PC (44) 33rd Meeting, G-5 with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff, the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister had deemed it advisable to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that steps were being taken to initiate relief operations in ALBANIA. Before this decision could be implemented, it would be necessary to allot the service units required by AL (ALBANIA). This question was now under review but it would probably be some weeks before relief supplies began to reach ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

6. ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 12)

IN MARCH 1945, BRIGADIER GENERAL SPENCER thought that ad hoc relief should be introduced forthwith on the lines suggested by Admiral Cunningham.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for the immediate sailing for destinations previously planned of the two relief ships now held at T. S. L. and for their retention offshore from their destinations if Marshal Tito's agreement to their discharge had not been received by the time they arrived.
- (b) Authorized the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to arrange further that vessels proceeding to Yugoslav ports should each carry up to 10 tons of relief supplies drawn from military stocks if, in the opinion of these two officers, the supplies provided under (a) above proved insufficient to relieve destitution in the vicinity of the ports.

5. REPORT FROM ALBANIA
(Previous reference 20 (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 10)

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPENCER reported that contrary to conclusion 10(a) of FC (44) 33rd Meeting, G-5 with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff, the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister had deemed it advisable to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that steps were being taken to initiate relief operations in Albania. Before this decision could be implemented, it would be necessary to allot the service units required by MI (ALBANIA). This question was now under review but it would probably be some weeks before relief supplies began to reach Albania.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

6. ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY
(Previous reference FC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 12)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL observed that, in advancing the Allied Governments' desiderata in connection with the new Italian Cabinet, the Allied Commission had asked that General Piacentini, the Italian Chief of Air Staff, be relieved of the additional role of Secretary of Staff for Air and that a non-service Secretary of State be appointed. 4940

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the Allied Commission had at his request also asked for the retention of Admiral de Courten as Minister of Marine.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above statement.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF

(Previous reference EC (44) 142)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper:-

- (a) Revealing that the assessment of Sicilian grain had fallen short of previous estimates, and that it would be necessary to import 160,000 tons of wheat between January and June 1945 if the bread ration of 300 grammes were to be maintained.
- (b) Outlining five courses open to the Supreme Allied Commander, and requesting direction as to which of them should be adopted.

MAJOR GENERAL SPOTTISWOODE pointed out that, in addition to the five courses suggested, it might be possible to institute emergency soup kitchens or canteen-like arrangements.

BRIG. DIETLICH stated that:-

- (i) Even if assessment had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grammes.
- (ii) The local administration though it had improved on last year's record had clearly failed to organize effective assessment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.
- (iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grammes per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.
- (iv) Signor BONOMI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if repressive measures were tightened up. He pressed most strongly for imports in order to permit the maintenance of the 300 grammes ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to send a shipment of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January, 1945.
- (v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 grammes ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political repercussions.

MR. BARNES thought that this problem, if not resolved, could give the Sicilian a stick with which to beat the ROC government. He also reported that small farmers were unwilling to surrender their grain, arguing that the large holders were retaining theirs for sale on the black market.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPENFORD pointed out that, in addition to the five courses suggested, it might be possible to institute emergency soup kitchens or canteen-like arrangements.

BRIGADIER HUGH stated that:-

- (i) Even if assessment had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grammes.
- (ii) The local administration though it had improved an last year's record had clearly failed to organize effective assessment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.
- (iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grammes per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.
- (iv) Signor BONOMI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if existing measures were tightened up. He pressed most strongly for imports. In order to permit the maintenance of the 300 grammes ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to send a shipment of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January, 1945.
- (v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 grammes ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political repercussions.

MR. HARRIS thought that this problem, if not resolved, would give the Sicilians a stick with which to beat the ROME government. He also reported that small farmers were unwilling to surrender their grain, arguing that the large holders were retaining theirs for sale on the black market.

ATTORNEY GENERAL CLARK agreed that much grain was being held by the farmers. He felt that the Sicilians would always ask for more, and he urged that the Italian Government must find a solution for this problem themselves.

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MR. BRAD observed that the situation of an, new Italian Government which might be formed was likely to be difficult for some time.

He felt that if nothing were done to help it over this problem its instability would be increased. He suggested that a

compromise should be adopted. Imported supplies should continue

to be provided, but on an "ad hoc" basis, depending on the

situation from month to month. At the same time the Italian

Government should not be informed of this policy, but pressure

on them to extract further grain in SICILY should be increased.

MR. REINHART doubted whether indirect pressure on the Italian Government was likely to produce the desired results.

BRIG. GEN. G. M. L. SPOTFORD AND BRIG. GEN. LUSH, replying to

a question by the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreed that

raising the price paid to farmers would not bring about an

improvement in the situation. Contrary to the allegations of certain

farmers, it was considered that the price of 1,000 lire per quintal

was a fair one and covered costs of production.

MR. MACGILL GIBSON pointed out that the Sicilian separatist movement was strong, and that it was believed in certain quarters to have the support of the Allied Governments. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER did not believe that this was a suitable case for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would accept neither the diversion of shipping from operational commitments in order to bring in imports, nor the use of force to increase an assessment. He felt, therefore, that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S ruling of 24 September should be maintained, namely that no withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available. He was of the opinion that no indication should be given to the Italians that they might receive supplies after the December ship-load. He agreed that the Sicilian population should not be allowed to die of starvation, but felt that if the Italian administration were incapable of feeding it adequately, soup kitchens or similar measures under Allied control should be instituted.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944. (see X above) be maintained without modification.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to Sicily could be expected by them after the December ship-load already promised.
- (c) Directed that G-5 study and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of organizing emergency distribution of food in SICILY under Allied control.

BRIG. DIER CAMPBELL SPOTTWOOD AND BRIG. DIER LUSH, replying to a question by the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreed that raising the price paid to farmers would not bring about an improvement in the situation. Contrary to the allegations of certain farmers, it was considered that the price of 1,000 lire per quintal was a fair one and covered costs of production.

MR. MARSHALL STELLON pointed out that the Sicilian separatist movement was strong, and that it was believed in certain quarters to have the support of the Allied Governments. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER did not believe that this was a suitable case for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would accept neither the diversion of shipping from operational commitments in order to bring in imports, nor the use of force to increase transport. He felt, therefore, that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S ruling of 24 September should be maintained, namely that no further imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available. He was of the opinion that no indication should be given to the Italians that they might receive supplies after the December ship-load. He agreed that the Sicilian population should not be allowed to die of starvation, but felt that if the Italian administration were incapable of feeding it adequately, soup kitchens or similar measures under Allied control should be instituted.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944 (see X above) be maintained without modification.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to Sicily could be expected by them after the December ship-load already promised.
- (c) Directed that G-5 study and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of organizing emergency distribution of food in SICILY under Allied control.
- (d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer examine and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee as to the repercussions on operational shipping commitments if the imports required to maintain the bread ration in SICILY at 200 grammes were sanctioned.

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8. BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 143)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper and draft telegram to the War Office recommending the formation of a British Military Mission to be despatched to ALBANIA at an early date and outlining its main functions.

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/MR. BROAD...

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MR. BROAD explained that neither the British nor the U.S. Government were at present willing to recognize the P.N.C. who were virgins by the "de facto" government in BANIA.

Consequently it was not proposed to send diplomatic representatives to that country. It was necessary to maintain contact but it was thought to be undesirable to keep the existing SOE missions in the country in view of the nature of their past activity. It was therefore suggested that the most practical "stop-gap" would be a military mission.

MR. REINHARDT reported that an OSS party was in Italy in readiness to go into ALBANIA. The State Department had been informed of the British intentions outlined in the paper under discussion.

MR. CUNNINGHAM thought it was illogical to withdraw the SOE missions and introduce an OSS party simultaneously.

MAJOR GENERAL ROCKS replied that the OSS party in question was only a small one headed by an Army Captain. He also pointed out that, unlike SOE, OSS did not engage in covert activity only. He was of the opinion nevertheless that a U.S. Military Mission, similar in character and composition to the British Mission suggested should also be sent into ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to despatch to the War Office the draft telegram as amended in discussion.*
- (b) Directed that G-5 seek authority from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a U.S. Military Mission to ALBANIA, similar in character and composition to the British Mission, under discussion.

9. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT BARI

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR understood that the U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister were contemplating closing their offices in BARI. Both these offices had been of great assistance to Commanders Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic, and he thought it highly desirable to maintain US and British political advisers in BARI, even after representation had been set up in BRISQABZ and TIRAN.

MR. BROAD explained that the office of the British Resident Minister in BARI, of which he was himself normally in charge, covered YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and BULGARIA, the first two countries named being their principal interest. When missions were properly established in YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA, there would no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the British Resident Minister's office at BARI. Nevertheless, he proposed to suggest to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser that they should attach representatives to the ACC Balkan Air Force when they closed their offices in BARI.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

missions and introduce an OSS party simultaneously.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOSE replied that the OSS party in question was only a small one headed by an Army Captain. He also pointed out that, unlike BOE, OSS did not engage in covert activity only. He was of the opinion nevertheless that a U.S. Military Mission, similar in character and composition to the British Mission suggested should also be sent into Albania.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to despatch to the War Office the draft telegram as appended in discussion.*
- (b) Directed that G-5 seek authority from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a U.S. Military Mission to Albania, similar in character and composition to the British Mission, under discussion.

9. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT BARI

MAJOR GENERAL SLESSOR understood that the U.S. Political Advisor and British Resident Minister were contemplating closing their offices in Bari. Both these offices had been of great assistance to Commanders Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic, and he thought it highly desirable to maintain US and British political advisors in Bari, even after representation had been set up in RICHMOND and FLORENCE.

MR. BROOD explained that the office of the British Resident Minister in Bari, of which he was himself normally in charge, covered YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and HUNGARY, the first two countries named being their principal interest. When missions were properly established in YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA, there would no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the British Resident Minister's office at Bari. Nevertheless, he proposed to suggest to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Advisor that they should attach representatives to the JOC Balkan Air Force when they closed their offices in Bari.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Endorsed MR. BROOD's suggestion recorded above and invited him to take action accordingly.

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J. H. L. Scrimgeour
J. H. L. SCRIMGEUR
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

* Despatched as FY 61059
dated 1st December, 1944

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Supreme Allied Commander
Field Marshal Alexander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FE2
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
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G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Spurs

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EXTRACT

Commander, Balkan Air Force	Minutes 2,4,5,6,8 and 9	4 copies
ASAC (P.L.K.N.S) c/o G-5	Minutes 4,5,8, and 9	2 copies
Commander 60MTC c/o COMLO	Minutes 3,8 and 9	2 copies

Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, FWD
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & P
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G-1 (S)
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G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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K 561

SAC (F) (44) 161 annexure
20th December 1944

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COPY NO 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. It is recalled for information that the Supreme Allied Commander has already approved paragraphs (1) and (2) of the agreement set out in para 1 of paper No. SAC (F) (44) 161 (see telegram F74143 of 25 December from FREEDON to Allied Commission). By implication he has also approved para (3) of the agreement in question (see telegram quoted above and telegram No. S-403 of 26 December to FREEDON from the Allied Commission).
2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (F) (44) 161 is therefore cancelled. Instead the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the CIMA as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC (F) (44) 161.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident in Rome
Director, F. I.
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, Intelligence
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Commission, Allied Commissioner
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G-1 (E)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)

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J.H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Notes by Secretary

1. It is notified for information that the Supreme Allied Commander has already approved paragraphs (1) and (2) of the agreement set out in para 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 (see telegram F74143 of 25 December from FREEDOM to Allied Commission). By implication he has also approved para (3) of the agreement in question (see telegram quoted above and telegram No. S-403 of 27 December to FREEDOM from the Allied Commission).

2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 is therefore cancelled. Instead the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the GNAI as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

J.H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Liaison Officer
Director, G-2
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, G-2 & G-3
Chief Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Spares

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COPY NO. 33

HC (44) 35th Meeting (Compendium)
13th December 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. At the request of Mr. Broad the following amendment is issued to the Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the Political Committee :-

Item 11. Add after Brigadier Lusk's statement the following :-

"MR. BROAD said that M.M. Government considered that it was necessary to adhere to the existing agreement under which proposed appointments must all be submitted to the Allied Commission for approval."

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

J.H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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- British Resident Minister
- Director, FIB
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, IS & P
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- G-1 (A)
- G-1 (B)
- G-2
- G-3
- G-3 (Special Operations)
- G-4 (A)
- G-4 (B)

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J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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British Resident Minister
Director, FIB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & P
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 (Special Operations)
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Commander, Balkan Air Force
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EC (44) 152
13th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO 32

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

Record of a meeting held in the Chief Administrative
Officer's Office at 1100 hours on Wednesday 13th
December 1944.

PRESENT :-

Lieutenant General J.G.M. Clerk,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. F. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel D.M. Libby, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Major General R.G. Lewis,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (B)

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied
Commission

Colonel J.E. Butterworth,
G-5 Section

Colonel J. Legg,
Allied Commission

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political
Adviser

SECRETARY :-

Major J.G. Sweetman

THE MEETING had before them the following documents from the Allied
Commission :-

- (a) A letter from the Chief Commissioner stating strongly the case for implementing a 300 gramme bread ration in ITALY, but recommending that, in the event of shipping being inadequate to support such a scale, ration parity should nevertheless be established throughout the liberated area (including SICILY and SARDINIA).
- (b) A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, explaining the position in regard to food supplies in ITALY and recommending that, if shipping to make a 300 gramme ration possible cannot be guaranteed, the decision to reduce the ration in the southern area and at the same time equalise it throughout the country should be communicated to the Italian Government in a joint statement to be made by the

PRESENT :-

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Brood, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel D.M. Libby, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (A)

Major General R.G. Lewis,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (B)

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied
Commission

Colonel J.E. Butterworth,
G-5 Section

Colonel J. Legg,
Allied Commission

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political
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SECRETARY :-

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- (b) A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, explaining the position in regard to food supplies in ITALY and recommending that, if shipping to make a 300 grams ration possible cannot be guaranteed, the decision to reduce the ration in the southern area and at the same time equalise it throughout the country should be communicated to the Italian Government in a joint statement to be made by the Allied Governments.
- (c) A draft joint statement by the Allied Governments in accordance with (b) above.

COLONEL HENN stated that there were three problems which the meeting should consider. The first was that of wheat supplies for SICILY. The Supreme Allied Commander had reported on 24th September to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he did not propose to import wheat into that island as sufficient local grain was available. Later, in view of the failure of the

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assessment of Sicilian wheat to reach early estimates, the Allied Commission had been directed to investigate the possibilities of emergency feeding in SICILY, but examination had shown that little could be expected in this respect. At PC (44) 35th Meeting, Minute 3(c), G-5 had been directed to prepare a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the position and the immediate action which had been directed, and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continual Italian failure to secure adequate local amassment. G-5's draft cable on this subject had not been concurred by G-4 (A), who maintained that any further diversion of shipping from operational requirements was not acceptable and consequently a ration, which could not be covered by existing allocations, could not be recommended. The second problem before the meeting was the consideration of the Allied Commission's recommendation that it was necessary to establish parity in rationing, so as to provide to the best of our ability an equitable standard throughout the country. The Allies had a clear responsibility in this respect. Thirdly, the meeting should produce a draft statement for publication in the event of the equalisation of the ration, at a level below 300 grammes, being necessary.

BRIGADIER LUSH said the Chief Commissioner was strongly of opinion that equalisation of the ration was essential. The decision as to the scale at which parity should be effected must be made on the basis of a firm allocation of shipping for the importation of supplies. It was important that no premium should be made to maintain the ration on a level above what the shipping allocation would permit.

The Chief Commissioner further felt that any disparity in SICILY would create a most serious situation in that island. Brigadier Lush added that the fact must be faced that in SICILY further local supplies would not be produced for amassment on any appreciable scale no matter what action was taken. He further pointed out that the 300 gramme ration could not be implemented on the present shipping allocation without prejudicing the stock-pile which was earmarked to provide the minimum impact ration in northern ITALY.

MR. KIRK considered that the Chief Commissioner's letter made a very strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration. In view of the present situation in ITALY and the statements which had been made by both the President and the Prime Minister (which had been interpreted in ITALY as a promise of a 300 gramme ration) he considered that SACMED ought to make the final request for an increased shipping allocation to allow of the establishment of a ration on this scale. The telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should therefore state fully the case for such a ration and point out the serious consequences to be expected from any reduction so that the President and the Prime Minister could assess the responsibility involved in a decision to withhold further shipping. He did not consider that the telegram should include any reference to the establishment of the ration on the scale of 250 grammes, nor was it necessary to raise the question of a joint statement at this stage. It should be emphasised that the establishment of a 300 gramme ration would not represent an especial favour to ITALY at the expense of other countries, but was merely the minimum essential to prevent disease and unrest and provide conditions in ITALY suitable for the continuance of our military operations.

X

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed with Mr. Kirk that the telegram should be confined to presenting the case for a 300 gramme ration. He felt that experience in SYRIA had shown that there was no sovereign remedy for producing

mission's recommendation that it was necessary to establish parity in rationing, so as to provide to the best of our ability an equitable standard throughout the country. The Allies had a clear responsibility in this respect. Thirdly, the meeting should produce a draft statement for publication in the event of the equalisation of the ration, at a level below 300 grammes, being necessary.

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed with Mr. Kirk that the telegram should be confined to presenting the case for a 300 gramme ration. He felt that experience in SYRIA had shown that there was no sovereign remedy for producing hoarded grain quickly. Several measures were necessary and these took a considerable time. On current decisions, supplies for SICILY were ensured until 10th January only, consequently sufficient time for effective action to bring out hoarded supplies was not available. Representations had been made in LONDON that the procedure for making the recent cuts in shipping had discriminated unfairly against this theatre and some additional allocation might be made available. He questioned whether it was right to divert in the next month some 14,000 tons of wheat to SICILY in view of Lieutenant General CHAMBERLAIN's opinion (expressed in AAI message CAO 346 of 12 December) that further supplies were urgently required in forward areas if militarily serious unrest was to be avoided.

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COLONEL LIEBY said that discussions now proceeding would not produce an increase in the theatre shipping allocation greater than three to four ships per month. He stressed that military maintenance could not be subject to any further cuts if operations were to continue. There could be no question of providing increased civilian shipments within the existing allocation. It was for that reason that while this allocation stood he could not agree to any policy involving an increase on the ration (of 200 grammes flour equivalent to 250 grammes bread) which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed in their reply to LAC 71 of 28 December 1943.

COLONEL IEGG pointed out that the purpose of diverting 14,000 tons to SICILY was to avoid a reduction of the ration as the consequences of such a step were likely to be more serious than failure to raise the ration in the north. The Allied Commission desired to raise the ration in the forward area but did not consider that this should be done until a firm shipping allocation had been received and consequently a firm assessment had been made of the scale of ration which could be maintained.

COLONEL BUTTERWORTH, in reply to Major General Lewis, stated that the shipping required to implement a 300 gramme ration would be of the order of eight ships per month. He confirmed that the wheat was available and that shipping was the limiting factor. The advance of the armies had led to an increased civil commitment which it was not possible to meet within a static shipping allocation.

MR. BROAD agreed with Mr. Kirk that SACRED should recommend a 300 gramme ration in the strongest possible terms.

BRIGADIER LUSH enquired whether planning for the import of further wheat into SICILY after 10th January should proceed. In his view such shipments would be necessary, though the Italian Government should not be so informed at this stage.

THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER :

- (a) Directed that G-5 (in conjunction with G-4 (A), G-4 (B), British Resident Minister and U.S. Political Adviser) prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff asking a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY in accordance with Mr. Kirk's remarks at 'X' above.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945 but defer any action to implement such plans for the present.
- (c) Approved in principle the proposal to establish parity in ration scales throughout liberated ITALY but ruled that no further action towards such parity, or in regard to the proposed joint statement by the Allied Governments, be taken until a reply had been obtained to the telegram to be despatched under (a) above.

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- (a) Directed that G-5 (in conjunction with G-4 (A), G-4 (B), British Resident Minister and U.S. Political Adviser) prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY in accordance with Mr. Kirk's remarks at 'X' above.
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J. G. Sweetman
J.G. SWEETMAN,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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British Resident Minister
Director, FMB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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G-3 Special Operations
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Secretary, IS & FS	27-29
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LIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 35th Meeting
8th December, 1944

COPY NO. 33

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1130 HOURS ON SATURDAY
9TH DECEMBER, 1944.

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 34th Meeting - already circulated)
2. ALLEGED YUGOSLAV DESERTERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 148 - already circulated)
3. SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN TO YUGOSLAV
AREA OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
(Paper No. PC (44) 150 - already circulated)
4. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)
5. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTINGS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)
6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure - already circulated)
7. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - already circulated)
(Telegram No. FX 62867 to Maclean Mission - MC OUT 1313 - 4 Dec)
8. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. PC (44) 149 - already circulated)

Note:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is requested to
attend for Items 2 and 3.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL

Secretary.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 34th Meeting - already circulated)
2. ALLEGED YUGOSLAV DESERTERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 143 - already circulated)
3. SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN TO YUGOSLAV
ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
(Paper No. PC (44) 150 - already circulated)
4. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)
5. ITALIAN SCHOOER ROUTINGS
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TO TAKE NOTE:-

Note:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is requested to attend for Items 2 and 3.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL

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Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14	G-3 Sp. Ops.
Chief of Staff	15	G-4 (A)
Chief Administrative Officer	16	G-4 (B)
Deputy Chief of Staff	17	G-5
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20	Commander, SCM
British Resident Minister	21-24	Spares
Director, FWE	25	
Secretary, General Staff	26	
Secretary, IS & FS	27-29	
Chief, Liaison Section	30	
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33	
c/c IS & FS		

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EC (Ln) 150

7th December, 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO. 22

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

SURVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS INTO
THE YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION

Note by Secretary

1. A letter has been received by MIMA from the Italian Minister of War, charging that representatives of the Yugoslav Partisans are inviting desertion of Italian soldiers. It is alleged that trucks were sent from the headquarters of the Partisan Committee in ROME to SIENA to collect Italian soldiers who were to desert from Army units in order to enlist in Yugoslav formations. It is stated that the trucks actually returned with some seven Italian soldiers.

2. Liaison Section states that a report by the intelligence officer of the United States Army Air Force Support Command, MTO, shows the following facts:-

- (a) There have recently been 462 desertions of men of Yugoslav origin, out of a total of 1600 such troops in the Italian division in the Command. There is no direct evidence that these desertions were provoked by Yugoslavs but the Commanding General of the division, his Chief of Staff, and several subordinate commanders were found to be of that opinion.
- (b) The Italian officers suspect the Yugoslav Headquarters in NAPLES to be the source of this proselytising. All the desertions of soldiers of Yugoslav origin have so far been from those units of the division which are located in the close neighbourhood of NAPLES. The units further away have not so far suffered from desertion.
- (c) These Italian officers state that the propaganda carried out by the Yugoslavs stresses the point that, unless Yugoslavs now join with Tito, it will be another five years or more before they see their families across the Adriatic, during the imminent third war, which it is implied is sure to come between Russia and the remainder

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CONVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS INTO
THE YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION

Note by Secretary

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2. Liaison Section states that a report by the intelligence officer of the United States Army Air Force Support Command, WFO, shows the following facts:-

- (a) There have recently been 462 desertions of men of Yugoslav origin, out of a total of 1600 such troops in the Italian division in the Command. There is no direct evidence that these desertions were provoked by Yugoslavs but the Commanding General of the division, his Chief of Staff, and several subordinate commanders were found to be of that opinion.
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(d) These desertions are markedly impairing the morale of native Italian troops.

3. There are known to be a minimum of 18 Yugoslav Partisan officers in ROME, 3 in NAPLES and 3 in TARANTO, apart from the NLA authorities in Bari area. It is believed that a close investigation would reveal the existence of many more and their location in areas of Italy in which the Yugoslavs can have no legitimate interest. There are, in addition, the Royal Yugoslav Delegates in ROME and ALGERIA.

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4. It is expected that a united provisional Yugoslav Government founded on the Subasic-Tito agreement will soon be established. When this takes place, it will be possible to call upon this government to reduce its military representation in Italy to conform with its legitimate needs, which, apart from NLA Headquarters in Bari, would appear to be best related to a military component for any diplomatic mission it may wish to maintain in Rome.

5. In the interim, Liaison Section (with the concurrence of G-2, G-3, the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser) recommends:-

- (a) That G-5 be directed to request the Allied Commission to address an interim reply to the Italian Minister of War stating that the Supreme Allied Commander shares the Minister's apprehension as to the effect of acts of this kind and has ordered a complete investigation into the activities of Yugoslav Partisan officers in Italy.
- (b) That G-2, G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission be instructed to collect all information available as to the numbers, locations and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison officers and missions in Italy, and to render a report to the Political Committee in due course.
- (c) That a further communication be made to the Italian Minister of War as soon as this report has been considered.
- (d) That, as soon as it is established, the united provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to eliminate superfluous liaison officers and missions, reducing its military representation to conform to its proper needs in Italy.
6. G-5 have pointed out that representations to the Yugoslavs to require the return of the alleged deserters to Italian military jurisdiction cannot at present be made, as the communication from the Italian Minister of War fails to identify the persons who are stated to have deserted.
7. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize action in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

to be considered
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL

G-3, the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser)
recommend:-

- (a) That G-5 be directed to request the Allied Commission to address an interim reply to the Italian Minister of War stating that the Supreme Allied Commander shares the Minister's apprehension as to the effect of acts of this kind and has ordered a complete investigation into the activities of Yugoslav Partisan officers in ITALY.
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to Commander
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
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G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Commander, Balkan Air Force
Spares

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Supreme Allied Commander
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
 Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 U.S. Political Advisor
 British Resident Minister
 Director, PAB
 Secretary, General Staff
 Secretary, IS & PS
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EC (44) 35th Meeting

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RESTRICTED

The 35th Meeting of the Political Committee will take place on SATURDAY 6TH DECEMBER at a time to be advertised later and NOT on WEDNESDAY 6th December as previously notified. Revised Agenda will be circulated in due course.

J. H. L. SCHLES
J. H. L. SCHLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PW/B
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
C-1 (A)
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C-3 Special Operations
C-4 (A)
C-4 (B)
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5th December, 1944.

and NOT on WEDNESDAY 6th December as previously notified. Revised

Agenda will be circulated in due course.

J. H. L. Schell
J. H. L. SCHELL
COLONEL
SECRETARY

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FWE
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
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G-3 Special Operations
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G-4 (B)
G-5
SOM (IO)
Spares

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5th December, 1944.

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