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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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AFHQ SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DEC. 1944 - FEB. 1945

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DEC. 1944 - FEB. 1945

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RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) & (Addendum)
1900 Submarine, 1948

COPY NO. 2

SUPREME ALLIED COM. UNDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICALS)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND ELAS

Note by Secretary

Since receipt of the Agreement and Resume of draft law of Amnesty circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 8, three further papers have been received relating to this agreement. These are attached as follows for information:-

- (a) Annex I - An extract from the Greek Constitution of 1911 comprising those articles referred to in Article III of the present Agreement.
- (b) Annex II - A plan for the disarmament of ELAS forces and organisations which is believed to be included in the protocol referred to in articles 5 and 6 of the present Agreement.
(Note:- No copy of this protocol has yet been received)
- (c) Annex III - An agreement regarding demilitarisation and re-registration of ELAS/ELIN shipping.

Handwritten signature
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Distribution

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
- Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Chief, G-3 Operations Section

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Note by Secretary

Since receipt of the Agreement and Resume of draft law of Amnesty circulated under Paper No. SAC (2) (45) 6, three further messages have been received relating to this Agreement. These are attached as follows for information:-

(a) Annex I - An extract from the Greek Constitution of 1911 comprising these articles referred to in Article III of the present Agreement.

(b) Annex II - A plan for the disarmament of ELAS forces and organizations which is believed to be included in the protocol referred to in articles 6 and 6 of the present Agreement.

(Note:- No copy of this protocol has yet been received)

(c) Annex III - An Agreement regarding demilitarization and re-registration of ELAS/ELW shipping.

66-5002
A. B. LASCELLES
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PMS
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secretary, General Staff
Inter Service and Political Secretariat
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ANNEX I

EXTRACT FROM THE GREEK CONSTITUTION OF 1961

The following are the Articles of the Greek Constitution which the Greek Government has suspended for the time being. They are referred to in Article IV of the Political agreement.

Article 5

With the exception of persons taken in the act of committing an offence, no one may be arrested or imprisoned without a warrant giving the reasons for the arrest, which must be presented at the moment of arrest or of imprisonment pending trial. A person arrested in the act or held in the virtue of a warrant must be brought before the competent examining magistrate without any delay, within 24 hours at the most after his arrest or, if the arrest has been made at a distance from the magistrate's official seat, within the time absolutely necessary for him to be brought there. The examining magistrate is obliged within three days at the most after his being brought before him either to release the arrested person or to issue an order for his imprisonment. If either of these time-limits expires, any order or other person charged with his custody, whether he be a civilian or a military official, must release the arrested person immediately. Violators of the above orders will be punished for illegal detention and obliged to repay all damage resulting to the offender person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the judge but can never be less than ten drachmas for each day.

Article 10

Greeks have the right to assemble quietly and unarmed; only at public gatherings can the police be present. Gatherings in the open air can be forbidden if danger to public security would result therefrom.

Article 12

Every citizen has the right of sanctuary in his own home. No house search is allowed except when and as the law ordains.

Violators of these orders will be punished for abuse of authority and obliged to make full restitution of damages to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the court but can never be less than one hundred drachmas.

Article 20

The secrecy of private correspondence is absolutely inviolable.

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Article 15

With the exception of persons taken in the act of committing an offence in one way or another, or imprisoned without a warrant giving the reasons for the arrest, which must be presented at the moment of arrest or of imprisonment pending trial. A person arrested in the act or held in the virtue of a warrant must be brought before the competent examining magistrate without any delay, within 24 hours at the most after his arrest or, if the arrest has been made at a distance from the magistrate's official seat, within the time absolutely necessary for him to be brought there. The examining magistrate is obliged within three days at the most after his being brought before him either to release the arrested person or to issue an order for his imprisonment. If either of these time-limits expires, any order or arrest of a person charged with his custody, whether he be a civilian or a military official, must release the arrested person immediately. Violators of the above orders will be punished for illegal detention and obliged to repair all damage resulting to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the judge but can never be less than ten hundred francs.

Article 16

Greeks have the right to assemble quietly and unarmed; only at public gatherings can the police be present. Gatherings in the open air can be forbidden if danger to public security would result therefrom.

Article 17

Every citizen has the right of sanctuary in his own home. No house search is allowed except when and as the law ordains.

Violators of these orders will be punished for abuse of authority and obliged to make full restitution of damages to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the court but can never be less than one hundred francs.

Article 18

The secrecy of private correspondence is absolutely inviolable.

Article 19

Political offences are tried by jury as also offences of the Press; never the do not regard private life.

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GRAM TO BE TYPED IN NT'D BY THE GERALD V. RICHMOND

(Mr. DON E. RICH.) AT 2.30 PM. 9 JULY 1971

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

MEMBERSHIP LIST

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

The following quantities of weapons are expected to be handed in by "LAC," which includes all subsidiary organizations such as POLITOBYLAKKI, etc., in accordance with the provisions below.

-	Rifles	41,500
-	Six machine guns	350
-	Light machine guns	1,050
-	Heavy machine guns	315
-	Mortars, heavy	55
-	Mortars, light	10
-	Artillery, all types	32
-	Infantry sets	15

500

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agrobacterium* strain on the transformation efficiency of *Agrobacterium* strain.

THE

1. "D" day will be the day on which the agreement concluding the conference is signed.
2. On return to T.S. Headquarters, the T.S. delegation will be accompanied by a British Liaison Mission with communications established to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison Greece. At the same time T.S. will appoint a senior Liaison Officer to be attached to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece.
3. A general order will be issued by T.S. "in clear" immediately on return to T.S. Headquarters forbidding the use of cipher over the T.S. communication system. Orders for demobilisation of T.S. will be issued by T.S. immediately thereafter.
4. T.S. will inform a British Officer appointed for the task of the state of the civil communication systems, so that plans for demobilisation and for linking up to the rest of Government may be undertaken without delay. Any communication equipment, military or civil, will be maintained in situ, and handed over to the Greek Government civil authorities on their arrival. This will include P.M.F. tools and equipment; these will not be recorded as military stores, although previously used by T.S.

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COMPLETION OF THE REPORT ON THE

The following quantity of weapons are expected to be handed in by the L.S. and include all subsidiary organizations such as the L.S. etc., in accordance with the provisions of the

Trucks	21,500
Sub machine guns	550
Light machine guns	1,050
Heavy machine guns	315
Mortars, heavy	55
Mortars, light	10
Artillery, all type	32
Binoculars sets	15

5000

The plan will consist of two phases:

Phase 1.

1. The plan will be the first on which the agreement concerning the conference is signed.

4001

2. On return to the Headquarters, the L.S. delegation will be accompanied by a British Liaison Mission with communications established to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison. Groves. At the same time L.S. will appoint a new Liaison Officer to be attached to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Groves.

4000

3. A general order will be issued by L.S. in clear immediately on return to the Headquarters forbidding the use of cipher over the L.S. communication system. Orders for mobilization of L.S. will be issued by L.S. immediately thereafter.

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4. L.S. will instruct a British Officer appointed for the task of the state of the civil communication systems, so that plans for rehabilitation and for linking up to the rest of Government may be undertaken without delay. Any communication equipment, military or civil, will be maintained in situ, and handed over to the Groves Government civil authorities on their arrival. This will include P.T.T. tools and equipment; these will not be regarded as military stores, although previously used by L.S. as such.

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5. All road blocks, demolitions, mines and booby traps will be removed and rendered safe by L.S. by 15 plus 14. L.S., L.S. will instruct an officer in each L.S. Divisional area to meet the British Forces as they move in to take over the area and report that this has been completed.

6. L.S. will disclose to a British officer appointed for the purpose all roads obstructed by broken bridges, etc., so that plans can be made for their repair and in order that British

.../transport

transport can move freely along all roads normally suitable for 3-ton transport and required to implement this plan.

Part from the material excepted in paragraph all rifles, revolvers, sub machine guns, light machine guns, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces, wireline sets, all unissued ammunition and grenades, military vehicles and general military equipment, food stocks, animals (accompanied by appropriate unarm'd personnel for their maintenance), and all material in general of whatever nature, under the control of T.S. will be handed in to T.S. guards for the safe custody of such arms, equipment, etc., at the following centres for T.S. Headquarters and formations:-

H.S.	CHIKAL.
O.S.	V.N.H.L.
6th Division	A.V.L.L.
Outstation	S.T.A.T.
Outstation	D.I.
Outstation	L.A.D.R.A.P.O.L.E.S.
9th Division	K.O.Z.A.N.
Outstation	G.R.V.L.
Outstation	F.L.O.R.A.
Independent Regt.	K.O.S.V.I. K.A.S.T.A.L.
10th Division	V.P.S.L.
Outstation	L.N.H.V.S.
Outstation	T.P.S.
Outstation	K.A.T.R.U.M.I.
11th Division	K.U.L.A.S.
Outstation	N.I.G.R.
Outstation	P.O.L.Y.G.N.O.S.
12th Division	K.U.P.I.K.T.O.S.
Outstation	L.I.C.A.I.N.I.
Outstation	K.S.V.L.
13th Division	A.G.N.I.O.N.
Outstation	P.L.S.T.E.R.T.O.M.Y.
Outstation	L.L.M.O.U.L.D.I.
14th Division	L.R.S.S.
Outstation	K.A.T.H.S., K.H.K.A.L.
3rd Cavalry Bde	T.R.O.L.I.S.
3rd Division	K.L.N.I.
Outstation	S.P.R.T.
Outstation	K.T.P.H.S.E.I.
Outstation	V.A.N.T.A.
4th Division	A.T.
Outstation	P.A.V.Z.
Outstation	A.P.H.I.O.N.L.
Island Guard	N.Y.T.U.L.I.N.I.
Island Guard	S.P.H.L.O.N.I., L.T.V.S., T.S.S.C.S.

All small dumps of ammunition will be collected at the disarmament centres.

(b) For the guard companies which will be established at the following centres:-

TRAPOLIS	IGOMINITS.	PALEA
KIPARIS	SP.RO.	PLATYSTOMON
LARIS.	ATSAKIOFOLIS	TRIKHILL.
KALAMIA.	KADITS.	DESS.
ADRI.	VARN.	KILKIS
SFER.	XIOUROLIS	DE.M.
KATO MICHONOFIO	SIDONOSTRON	ANTRI
KONOTRI	DIDIMOTICHON	KLVILL.
GRYVA.	KOSKI	FLORIN.
ASCOIL.	ORLITON	ALAPTRISION
PHYLLOCAL.	KALFATOS	AN.
PRIVZ.	YANNIN.	KOMPS.

The strength of such companies will not exceed 100 at any place. The task of these guard companies will be to maintain law and order in support of the civil power until such time as they are relieved by the National Guard, at dates which will be notified by the British authorities. On 20.1.4, the will hand in their arms to an FLS guard referred to in paragraph 7, and will then disperse to their homes.

On D plus 14 the officers in charge of the guards referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will render a certificate, in duplicate, to FLS General Headquarters certifying the number of weapons, ammunition and equipment then in their charge as custodians for the Greek Government, also a nominal roll in duplicate of those soldiers who have failed to hand in their arms, together with full military particulars, so that the quantity of material under guard, with the addition of the numbers not handed in equals the total specified in the opening clause hereof. From these certificates a total of the FLS arms, ammunition and equipment will be ascertained. A certificate will then be rendered to General SCOFFY by D plus 18 signed by M. ST.HELAS and General SARRIS, indicating that FLS has disarmed, and that the arms, ammunition and equipment are held by the officer rendering the original certificate in safe custody for the Greek Government at the places indicated.

Providing that the terms of this certificate agree, within reasonable limits, with the figures given in the opening clause hereof, it will be publicly announced that FLS has disarmed. Phase I will then have been completed.

By D plus 21 FLS General Headquarters will render to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison Greece, detailed lists of arms, ammunition and equipment, by types, and will also render statements to be made. Wireless

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The strength of each company will not exceed 100 at any place. The base of these guard companies will be to maintain law and order in support of the civil power until such time as they are relieved by the National Guard, at which time they will be notified by the National authorities. On relief, they will hand in their arms to an FLS guard referred to in paragraph 7, and will then disperse to their homes.

On D plus 14 the officer in charge of the guards referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will render a certificate, in duplicate, to FLS General Headquarters certifying the number of weapons, ammunition and equipment taken in their charge as custodians for the Greek Government, also a nominal roll in duplicate of those soldiers who have failed to leave in their arms, together with full military particulars, so that the quantity of material under guard, with the addition of the numbers not handed in equals the total specified in the opening clause hereof. From these certificates a total of the FLS arms, ammunition and equipment will be ascertained. A certificate will then be rendered to General SCOBEL by D plus 18 signed by M. SKANTOS and General S. R. FIS, indicating that FLS has disarmed, and that the arms, ammunition and equipment are held by the officer rendering the original certificate in safe custody for the Greek Government at the places indicated.

Providing that the terms of this certificate agree, within reasonable limits, with the figures given in the opening clause hereof, it will be publicly announced that FLS has disarmed. Phase 1 will then have been completed.

By D plus 21 FLS General Headquarters will render to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece, detailed lists of arms, ammunition and equipment, by types, to enable disposal arrangements to be made. Wireless equipment will be maintained in serviceable order by FLS until final disposal instructions are given. A copy of these lists will be retained by the FLS Divisional Commander to be handed over to the British authorities when required.

PHASE 2.

9. The Greek Government will re-assume control in Greece, area by area, as follows either simultaneously or stage by stage:-

(a) Southern PLOPONNES and ATTOL-KALAMATA.

.../(h)

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- (b) That part of the Province of ETHIOPIA-CHOKIS that lies beyond the Frontier Boundary, and the Provinces of LAKESSA and TRUKALLA.
- (c) The Provinces of KHALKIDHRAI, KASSA-LOPPI, KILBAS and PYLA.
- (d) The Provinces of SHAL, KAYALL, KALLO, KOLLO and VROG.
- (e) The Provinces of FLORIN and KOZANI.
- (f) The Governorate-General of SPIROS.
- (g) IONIAN ISLANDS.
- (h) ALL GREEK ISLANDS.

10. On a date or dates on or after 9 plus 18 to be decided mutually between the British authorities and the Greek Government and previously notified to F.L.S., British authorities will move into such areas recommended by units of the National Guard.

11. Arms, ammunition and equipment collected will then be handed over by the F.L.S. guards at the collecting centres to the British authorities as agents for the Greek Government, in accordance with the certificates furnished by the officers in charge of such guards referred to in paragraph 8(c).

12. The National Guard units will proceed to the points at which F.L.S. guards have been maintained, and will relieve these guards of their responsibilities. F.L.S. guards will then hand in their weapons, as indicated by the British authorities, and return to their homes. On the date appointed for the transfer of responsibility in each area, the Greek Government will assume responsibility for civil administration.

13. In view of the presence of German troops in GREECE, F.L.S. there will not be disarmed in accordance with this plan. The National Guard are already being called up in GREECE, and includes certain age groups of all F.L.S. now fighting the Germans. On formation of the National Guard all F.L.S. outside the age groups called up, will be disbanded on a date to be agreed between the Greek Government and the British Government.

- (c) The Provinces of EUBOIA and KOZANI.
- (f) The Governorate-General of TIRAS.
- (g) IONIAN ISLANDS.
- (h) DODECANESIAN ISLANDS.

10. On a date or dates on or after D plus 18 to be decided mutually between the British authorities and the Greek Government and previously notified to T.L.S., British authorities will move into such areas recommended by units of the National Guard.
11. The ammunition and equipment collected will then be handed over by the T.L.S. guards at the collecting centres to the British authorities as agents for the Greek Government, in accordance with the certification furnished by the officers in charge of such guards referred to in paragraph 9(1).
12. The National Guard units will proceed to the points at which T.L.S. guards have been stationed, and will relieve those guards of their responsibilities. T.L.S. guards will then hand in their weapons, as indicated by the British authorities, and return to their homes. On the date appointed for the transfer of responsibility in each area, the Greek Government will assume responsibility for civil administration.
13. In view of the presence of German troops in GART, T.L.S. there will not be concerned in accordance with this plan. The National Guard are already being called up in GART, and includes certain age groups of all Hellenes now fighting the Germans. On formation of the National Guard all Hellenes outside the age groups called up, will be absorbed on a date to be agreed between the Greek Government and the British Government.

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ANNEX III

SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

BY

ELAS/ELAN SHIPS AND VESSELS

AND

RE-REGISTRATION OF ELAS/ELAN SHIPPING

1. SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

i. As from the date of the signature of the Agreement between the Greek Government and the EAM Central Committee, all ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels are to surrender all arms and munitions at one of the following ports:-

GOLOS	PATRAS	KALAMATA	PIRAEUS
VERGOS	SALONIKA	KAVALLA	KITVILIANE.

ii. Twenty days grace will be allowed for the completion of the surrender of arms and munitions.

iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions unless duly commissioned and authorized by the Greek Government.

iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph i(i) through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authorities are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

2. RE-REGISTRATION

i. All ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels, whether engaged in the surrender of arms as in Section 1 or not, are to proceed at the earliest opportunity to the ports mentioned in paragraph i(i) for re-registration.

ii. Re-registration will be carried out by the Greek Harbour Master Service.

iii. No re-registration certificate will be issued until the local ownership of the ship or vessel has been fully established.

iv. Vessels captured from the enemy, Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, will be held in prize, and, subject to the

1. SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

- i. As from the date of the signature of the agreement between the Greek Government and the EAM Central Committee, all ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels are to surrender all arms and munitions at one of the following ports:-

GOLOS	PATHAS	KALAMATA	PIRAEUS
VOLOS	SALONIKA	NAVAULIA	MILITARY

- ii. Twenty days grace will be allowed for the completion of the surrender of arms and munitions.
- iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions unless duly commissioned and authorized by the Greek Government.
- iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authorities are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

2. RE-REGISTRATION

- i. All ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels, whether engaged in the surrender of arms as in Section 1 or not, are to proceed at the earliest opportunity to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) for re-registration.
- ii. Re-registration will be carried out by the Greek Harbour Master Service.
- iii. No re-registration certificate will be issued until the legal ownership of the ship or vessel has been fully established.
- iv. Vessels captured from the enemy, Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, will be held in prize, and, subject to the decision of the Prize Court, become the property of the Greek Government.

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Political Sec

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 71

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COPY NO 4

SAC (P) (45) S
10th February 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND EAM

Note by Secretary

As a result of discussions which have taken place recently in Athens between the Greek Government and EAM an agreement between the two parties has been concluded. Copy of this agreement is attached herewith for information.

J.H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, AFM.F
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, P.R.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secretary, General Staff
Inter-Services and Political Secretariat
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Note by Secretary

As a result of discussions which have taken place recently in Athens between the Greek Government and EAM an agreement between the two parties has been concluded. Copy of this agreement is attached herewith for information.

to be reviewed
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secretary, General Staff
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat
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Chief Connk
Exec. Connk
Pol. Sec.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEN GOVERNMENT
AND ERM

K 71

Liberties

The Government will secure in accordance with the Constitution and the democratic principles everywhere recognized, the free expression of the political and social opinions of the citizens, respecting any existing liberal law. It will also secure the unhindered functioning of individual liberties such as those of assembly, association and expression of views in the press. None especially the Government will fully restore Trade Union liberties.

ARTICLE I

ARTICLE II

Reinstatement of Martial Law

Martial law will be raised immediately after the signature of the present agreement. Simultaneously with this action there will be brought into force a Constitutional Act similar in all respects to Constitutional Act No. 24, whereby the suspension of those articles of the Constitution to which reference is made in Act 24 shall be permitted.

Articles 5, 10, 12, 20 and 95 of the Constitution shall be suspended forthwith throughout the country. This suspension shall continue until the completion of disarmament, and the establishment of administrative, judicial and military authorities throughout the country. As regards Article 5 in particular, this suspension shall not take effect in the cities of Athens and Piraeus and their suburbs. Especially, however, as regards persons arrested up to the present day it is agreed that Article 5 of the Constitution is not in force, and that they will be liberated within the shortest possible period of time, the necessary orders to this effect being given to the competent authorities.

Followers of ERM who may be held in captivity by their organizations shall be set free as soon as possible.

ARTICLE III

Amnesty

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December 1944, and the publication of the law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded common law crimes of first and second degree which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crime concerned. The necessary law will be published immediately after the signature of the present agreement. From this amnesty will be excluded any persons who, being under obligation to surrender their arms, as being members of the organizations of ELAS, the National Civil Guard or ELM, shall not have handed them over by the 15th March 1945. This last provision concerning exclusion from the amnesty shall be annulled after verification of the fact that the disarmament of ELAS has been effected, since there will then be no further need of details of the amnesty to be

Repeal of Martial Law

Article 147 will be raised immediately after the signature of the present agreement. Simultaneously with this action there will be brought into force a Constitutional Act similar in all respects to Constitutional Act No. 24, whereby the suspension of those articles of the Constitution to which reference is made in Act 24 shall be permitted.

Article III

Articles 5, 16, 12, 20 and 95 of the Constitution shall be suspended forthwith throughout the country. This suspension shall continue until the completion of disarmament, and the establishment of administrative, judicial and military authorities throughout the country. As regards Article 5 in particular, this suspension shall not take effect in the cities of Athens and Piraeus and their suburbs. Especially, however, as regards persons arrested in the present day it is agreed that Article 5 of the Constitution is not in force, and that they will be liberated within the shortest possible period of time, the necessary orders to this effect being given to the competent authorities.

Followers of EOK who may be held in captivity by other organisations shall be set free as soon as possible.

Article III

Amnesty

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December 1944, and the publication of the law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded common law crimes of intent life and property which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crime concerned. The necessary law will be published immediately after the signature of the present agreement. From this amnesty will be excluded any persons who, being under obligation to surrender their arms, as being members of the organisations of ELAS, the National Civil Guard or ELLAS, shall not have handed them over by the 15th March 1945. This last provision concerning exclusion from the amnesty shall be annulled after verification of the fact that the disarmament of ELAS has been effected, since there will then be no further cause and justification for it. Guarantees and details of the amnesty to be provided are contained in the draft law attached to the present agreement.

Article IV

Hostages

All civilians who have been arrested by ELAS or by the National Civil Guard (E.P.), irrespective of the date on which they were arrested, shall be set at liberty immediately. Any who may be held on the charge of collaboration with the enemy or of commission of any crime shall be handed over to the justice of the State for trial by the competent Courts according to law (see draft law of amnesty attached).

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ARTICLE VNational Army

The National Army, apart from the professional officers and N.C.O.s, shall consist of the soldiers of the classes which shall from time to time be called up. Reserve officers, N.C.O.s and other ranks, who have been specially trained in modern warfare shall remain in service as long as there is a formation requiring them. The Sacred Squadron shall remain as its permanent, since it is under the immediate orders of the Allied High Command, and shall thereafter be moved in the United National Army in accordance with the above principle. The effort will be made to extend regular conscription to the whole of Greece in accordance with the technical facilities existing and the necessities which may arise. After the demobilization of E.L.A.S. those men who belong to classes which are to be called up in accordance with the attached protocol shall report for enrollment in the units already existing. All men who have been enrolled in the units now existing, without belonging to the classes being called up, shall be discharged. All members of the permanent cadres of the National Army shall be considered by the Councils for which revision is made in Constitutional Art. VII. The political and social views of citizens surviving in the Army shall be respected.

ARTICLE VIDemobilization

Immediately on the utilization of the present agreement the armed forces of resistance shall be demobilized and in particular the E.L.A.S. Regular and Reserve, the E.L.A.W. and the National Civil Guard. The demobilization and surrender of arms shall take place according to the detailed provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached hereto, will be reviewed thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

The State will settle all questions arising out of requisitioning carried out by E.L.A.S. The arms requisitioned by E.L.A.S., including pistols, motor vehicles, etc., which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached hereto, will be reviewed thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

ARTICLE VIIForces of Civil Service

The Government will proceed, by means of Committees of Councils, to be established by a special law to the running of the personnel of the public services, officials of public companies, local Government officials, and those of other services dependent on the State or paid by it. The criteria of which the State will take account will be either professional competence, or character and personality, or collaboration with the enemy or the utilization of the official as an instrument of the dictatorship. Officials of the above services, who, during the occupation, joined the forces of resistance will return to their positions and will be considered in the same manner as other officials. The above-mentioned councils will also consider the cases

the above principles. The effort will be made to extend regular censur-
tion to the whole of Greece in accordance with the technical facilities
existing and the necessities which may arise. After the demobilization
of ELAS there can be no doubt that classes which are to be called up in accord-
ance with the attached protocol shall report for enrollment in the units al-
ready existing. All men who have been enrolled in the units now existing,
without being in the classes being called up, shall be discharged. All
members of the Government of the National Army shall be considered by
the Councils for which revision is made in Constitutional Act No. VII. The
political and social views of citizens surviving in the Army shall be suspec-
ted.

ARTICLE VI

Demobilization

Immediately on the publication of the present agreement the armed forces
of resistance shall be demobilized and in particular the ELAS, both Regular
and Reserve, the ELAV and the National Civil Guard. The demobilization and
surrender of arms shall take place according to the detailed provisions of the
protocol drawn up by the Committee of Experts, which duly initialed, is at-
tached hereto.

The State will settle all questions arising out of requisitioning carried
out by ELAS. The goods requisitioned by ELAS, including beasts, motor vehi-
cles, etc, which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed
provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached hereto,
will be regarded thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

ARTICLE VII

Part of Civil Service

The Government will proceed, by means of Committees of Councils, to be
established by a special law to the purging of the personnel of the public
services, officials of public companies, local Government officials, and
those of other services dependent on the State or paid by it. The criteria
of which the purge will take account will be either professional competence,
or character and personality, or collaboration with the enemy or the utilisa-
tion of the official as an instrument of the dictatorship. Officials of the
above services, who, during the occupation, joined the forces of resistance
will return to their positions and will be considered in the same manner as
other officials. The above-mentioned councils will also consider the cases
of officials who have taken part or collaborated in the manifestations which
have taken place between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the
present agreement. Those of them who are found to have been concerned may be
placed at the disposal of the State as provided by law. The final disposal
of such officials will be decided by the Government which shall result from
the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Officials who have already been
placed on deposit by decisions of Ministers will be submitted to
the decision of the Council above-mentioned. No official will be dismissed
solely on account of his political opinion.

*NOT attached

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ARTICLE VIIIForce of Security Services

The force of the Security Services, the Gendarmerie and City Police will be carried out as soon as possible by special juric committees on the same basis as the force of the Civil Service. All officers and other ranks of the above Corps will fall under the provisions of the Amnesty Law, who, during the period of the occupation, joined the ranks of ELAS, ELAN or the National Civil Guard, will return to their positions and will be considered by the juric Councils in the same manner as the rest of their colleagues. All the officers and other ranks of the above Corps who left their positions between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the present document shall be placed in limbo, their final disposal being left for the decision of Councils to be constituted by the Government arising from the elections.

ARTICLE IXPlaciscite and elections

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a placiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

Of this present agreement two similar copies have been made, whereof the one has been received by the Government delegation and the other by the delegation of EAM.

In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

12th February 1945.

1323

the period of the occupation in Greece, the Civil Guard, will return to their positions and will be considered by the large Councils in the same manner as the rest of their colleagues. All the officers and other ranks of the above Corps who left their positions between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the present document shall be placed on full pay, their final disposal being left for the decision of Councils to be constituted by the Government arising from the elections.

ARTICLE IX

Plébiscite and elections

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its solemnity a plébiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

If this present agreement two similar ones have been made, whereof the one has been received by the Government delegation and the other by the Delegation of E.A.

In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

12th February 1945.

4881

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Resumé of draft law of amnesty referred to
in Article 4 of the Act of Agreement

Article 1.

Para 1. An amnesty is granted to the political offences committed between the 2nd December 1944 and the date of publication of the present law. Common offences against life and property connected with the political offence but not absolutely necessary for its accomplishment are excluded from the amnesty.

Para 2. Are excluded from this amnesty all those belonging to ELAS, ELLAS and the Civil Guard who, though obliged to hand in their arms, have not done so before the 15th March 1945.

Article 2.

The Court of Appeal will settle any doubts as to the interpretation of Article 1.

Article 3.

Those who do not receive the amnesty cannot be prosecuted for the executed offences after six months in the Athens area and after the end of 1945 in the rest of Greece.

Article 4.

Those same persons who do not receive the amnesty cannot be held in custody pending trial for more than six months. After then they must be released.

Articles 5 and 6 settle some minor technical details of procedure.

1325

between the 3rd December 1944 and the end of the year 1944. Common offences against life and property connected with the political offences but not absolutely necessary for its accomplishment or executed from the amnesty.

Para 2. Are excepted from this amnesty all those belonging to ELAS, EAM and the Civil Guard who, though allied to them in their arms, have not done so before the 15th March 1945.

Article 2.

The Court of Appeal will settle any doubts as to the interpretation of article 1.

Article 3.

Those who do not receive the amnesty cannot be prosecuted for the executed offences after six months in the Athens area and after the end of 1945 in the rest of Greece.

Article 4.

Those same persons who do not receive the amnesty cannot be held in custody pending trial for more than six months. After that they must be released.

Articles 5 and 6 settle some minor technical details of procedure.

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SEC (S) (45) 7
17th February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET K 65

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COPY NO.

SUPREMACY ALLIED COM. AREA'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MEMORANDUM AND CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON SOVIET
DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

Note on Secret. 77

1. The attached memorandum summarizing the facts regarding the privileges and facilities accorded to the Soviet Delegations in Italy was prepared at the request of the British Resident Minister for comparison with the treatment accorded by the local Soviet authorities to the parallel Allied Delegations in BRITAIN and ROUMANIA, where considerable difficulty has been encountered.
2. It is not at present proposed to base any action on this memorandum, of which the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is merely requested to take note.

to General
J. E. L. SCHEIDT,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth A.F., USA
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, Hq. I.M.F.
U. S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, F.E.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secretary, General Staff
Inter Service and Political Secretariat
Spurs

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1. The attached memorandum summarizing the facts regarding the privileges and facilities accorded to the Soviet Delegations in Italy was prepared at the request of the British Resident Minister for comparison with the treatment accorded by the local Soviet authorities to the parallel Allied Delegations in BULGARIA and ROMANIA, where considerable difficulty has been encountered.

2. It is not at present proposed to base any action on this memorandum, of which the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is merely requested to take note.

to be sent
J. H. L. SCHELLAS,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, USAF
U. S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secretary, General Staff
Inter Services and Political Secretariat
Spence

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EC List - 19 Feb 45

Comms Comm
Ex Comm
Pol Sec
18 FEB 1945

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PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET
DELEGATION IN ITALY

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For reference in connection with determining what privileges and facilities should be accorded for British and US personnel accredited to the Allied Control Commission in COMINFIL and EUCOMIL, there is presented herewith a summary of information concerning the privileges and facilities accorded to the various Russian delegations in Italy. The information given applies to the Russian Embassy only to the extent so stated.

1. PERSONNEL

Soviet personnel (not including wives or children) are assigned or attached to the respective delegations in Italy as follows:-

- (a) Allied Commission: 1 Representative, 3 Officer assistants,
1 Other Rank - Total 17 persons.
- (b) Advisory Council: 1 Representative (temporarily the same as for the AC), 1 Officer assistant, 3 Civilians,
15 Other Ranks - Total 20 persons.
- (c) Military Mission (to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission of AC): 1 Representative, 17 Officer assistants
(2 more about to be readmitted), 4 Civilians,
15 Other Ranks - Total 39 persons.
- (d) Embassy: 13 Civilians.

2. FUNCTIONS

(a) Under directive of the SAC dated 26 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the AC are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.

(b) In addition to their observational functions, the personnel of the Military Mission to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission screen Soviet refugees and war-prisoners of war, visit camps and arrange for repatriation of Soviet nationals.

(c) The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council participates on an equal basis with other representatives in presiding at meetings and in the recommendations formulated by the Council.

(d) It follows from the fact that the function of the Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission is merely consultative, that no procedure is provided to ensure that he will have an opportunity to consult with his government to the taking of decisions by the Commission, or even to ensure that he or his staff are kept informed of contemplated decisions before they are taken, except insofar as this occurs through attendance at meetings.

Soviet personnel (not including wives or children) are assigned or attached to the respective delegations in ITBY as follows :-

- (a) Allied Commission: 1 Representative, 5 Officer Assistants, 1 Other Rank - Total 7 persons.
- (b) Advisory Council: 1 Representative (temporarily the same as for the AC), 1 Officer Assistant, 3 Civilian Assistants, 10 Other Ranks - Total 20 persons.
- (c) Military Mission (to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission of AC): 1 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants (2 more about to be accredited), 4 Civilians, 15 Other Ranks - Total 39 persons.
- (d) Embassy: 13 Civilians.

2. FUNCTIONS

(a) Under directive of the EAC dated 26 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all reports of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the AC are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.

(b) In addition to their observational functions, the personnel of the Military Mission to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission search Soviet POWs and the prisoners of war, visit camps and arrange for repatriation of Soviet nationals.

(c) The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council participates on an equal basis with other representatives in presiding at meetings and in the recommendations formulated by the Council.

(d) It follows from the fact that the function of the Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission is merely consultative, that no procedure is provided to ensure that he will have an opportunity to consult with his government staff in the taking of decisions by the Commission, or even to ensure that he or his staff are kept of contemplated decisions before they are taken, except insofar as this occurs through attendance at meetings.

3. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

(a) Meetings. The Soviet representative on the Allied Commission attends the Vice Presidents' meetings (attended by heads of sections and sub-commissions) which are presided over by the Deputy President. For those he is permitted to be accompanied by an AD and an interpreter. No agenda are circulated for these meetings. Members of the Military Mission attend meetings of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission when invited to do so in connection with matters affecting Soviet interests. The staff officers assigned to the other Sub-Commissions have the privilege of attending Sub-Commission meetings but do not frequently do so. Prior to each meeting of the Advisory Council, an agenda is circulated, but it is not the practice to circulate prior to the meeting papers for consideration.

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(b) Documents. All documentary information relative to the work of the Commission is made available on the initiative of the Commission to the Soviet Representative. He and his staff do not see (1) un paraphrased copies of cypher messages or (2) matter which is likely to prejudice relations with the Soviet Government. The Secret matter which it could be inadvisable to show to junior officers is shown only to the Soviet Representative. Soviet officers assigned to Sub-Commissions are not permitted to observe the work of Sub-Commissions other than those to which they are assigned. They are, upon request, shown documents at the discretion of the head of their Sub-Commission, but do not personally view themselves of this privilege.

All information affecting the Advisory Council that the delegation to it receives is made available to it on request.

(c) Information from Italian Sources. The extent to which the Soviet members of the various delegations interview personnel of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

4. INTERVIEWING

(a) Freedom of Movement

(1) South of the line AMORC - SIML - PICCINO, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within Italy. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Division officer at ROME, and issued by Headquarters, Allied Commission.

(2) For travel north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group (Administrative Memorandum No. 55, HQ, 6 December 1944 now requires concurrence of JH. Leo) is obtained for Soviet personnel, likewise through the appropriate Division officer. For such visits have been made north of the line by members of Soviet delegations at ROME during the last six weeks. The Military Mission has on at least one occasion sent officers into the forward areas without US or British authority.

(3) For inter-theatre travel, including that of Soviet diplomatic couriers, authority to travel is obtained by the appropriate British or US Division officer at ROME from JH, and travel orders are issued by the Allied Commission. Authority has in every case been obtained, though there have been some delays due to the making of replications at the last minute. Such authority consists of travel orders for use within the theatre, or when US or British facilities are used. No authorization for the unit itself is required for Allied advise personnel on duty, or for accredited diplomats and consular officials. (Letter, AFHQ G 371.2/C15 GAG-0, 7 November 1944). As to travel to or from the Soviet Union, an Allied Force Permit for the trip, which may be issued by 30 Military Mission or the US Military Mission in Moscow without its concurrence, is not discretionarily required, except as to diplomatic and consular officials (Letter JH, AFHQ G 371.2/C15 GAG-0, 5 January - Aug 1945) but this requirement has not yet actually been enforced.

(4) Entry of Soviet planes into the theatre requires clearance by HQ AFHQ, which, however, is immediately given as a matter of routine.

(b) TRANSPORTATION

(c) Information from Italian sources. The content of which is the subject of the various delegations. Interviews of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

4. REMARKS

(a) Freedom of Movement

(1) South of the line MOON - 21N - PLOMBING, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within Italy. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Liaison officer at Rome, and issued by Headquarters, Allied Commission.

(2) For travel north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group (and Minister the Memorandum No. 55, VII, 6 December 1944) requires concurrence of JH (also) is obtained for Soviet personnel, likewise through the appropriate Liaison officer. For such visits north of the line by members of Soviet delegations at Rome during the 1st and 2nd weeks. The Military Mission has on at least one occasion sent officers into the forward areas without US or British authority.

(3) For inter-theatre travel, including that of Soviet diplomatic couriers, authority to travel is obtained by the appropriate British or US Liaison officer at Rome from JH, and travel orders are issued by HQ Allied Commission. Authority has in every case been obtained, though there have been some delays due to the making of applications at the last minute. Such authority consists of travel orders for use within the theatre, or when US or British facilities are used. No authorization for the exit itself is required for Allied service personnel on duty, or for accredited diplomats and consular officials. (Letter, PHL G 371.4/015 (27-0, 7 November 1944). As to travel to IT from the Soviet Union, a Allied Force Permit for the trip, which may be issued by 20 Military Mission or the US Military Mission in Moscow without any concurrence, is not theoretically required, except as to diplomatic and consular officials (Letter PHL G 371.2/011 (31-0, 5 January - May 1945) but this requirement has not yet actually been enforced.

(4) Entry of Soviet planes into the theatre requires clearance by HQ JH, which, however, is in reality given as a matter of routine.

(b) TRANSPORTATION

(1) Vehicles permanently assigned to the Soviet delegations by US and British authorities are only two in number - one for the delegation to the AG and one for the Military Mission.

(2) The following Russian-owned vehicles are maintained:

Military Mission	4
Delegation to Advisory Council	5
Embassy	1

(3) All of the above vehicles except the Embassy vehicle receive maintenance, motor fuel and lubricants from AG.

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(4) The Soviet Representative on the AG and the Soviet Military Mission also have the use of vehicles in the AG HQ Commandant's pool.

(5) Air transportation is provided whenever requested, on the same basis as for other Allied personnel.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Radio. The Soviet authorities maintain a transmitter in Rome, with which they can communicate directly with HQ300. The Soviet delegations can send signals to US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Liaison Officer, AG, but have only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services. US and British services are made available through the AG, but the Soviet Delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communication inside and outside the AG.

6. SUPPLIES

(a) Supplies for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (1) Allied Commission: | US rations; MAFI facilities for all, PA facilities for 2. |
| (2) Advisory Council: | A British and 4 US rations; MAFI facilities for 10, PA facilities for 3. |
| (3) Military Mission: | British rations; MAFI facilities |
| (4) Embassy: | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(b) The AG has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet authorities have, however, made some importations by their own aircraft.

7. PROPAGANDA

Officially there are no facilities given to the Russians for dissemination of propaganda, except inside Russia. is one of the United Nations and PAB therefore covers it in its propaganda. Outragedly the Russian delegates do no propaganda, but there is little doubt that they give support, behind the scenes, to the Communist Newspaper Unit. The Soviet Embassy imports Soviet films for prior to showings to Italians, and these films are lent to, and shown in, Italian cinemas in Rome. The Press Agency handles outgoing news and films some news films into Italy, although it has as yet made no application to sell news to the Italian newspapers.

8. SOVIET INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE ROME

(a) No aircraft or airforce personnel are now maintained in Italy by the Soviet Union.

matter to the Liaison Officer, IC, but have only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services. US and British services are made available through the IC, but the Soviet delegations appear to have little official correspondence. That material submitted to maintain their own courier service, for communication inside and outside the theatre.

6. SUPPLIES

(a) Supply for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:

- (1) Allied Commission: US rations; M.I.VI facilities for all, RA facilities for 2.
- (2) Advisory Council: British and 1/2 US rations; M.I.VI facilities for 10, RA facilities for 2.
- (3) Military Mission: British rations; M.I.VI facilities
- (4) Embassy: Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale.

(b) The IC has not been requested to insert supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet authorities have, however, made some importations by their own aircraft.

7. PROPAGANDA

Officially there are no facilities given to the Russians for dissemination of propaganda, except under the USSR. In one of the United Nations and FAO therefore covers it in its propaganda. Naturally the Russian delegates do no propaganda, but there is little doubt that they give support, behind the scenes, to the Communist newspaper UNIT. The Soviet Embassy imports Soviet films for priv. to showings to Italians, and these films are lent to, and shown in, Italian cinemas in Rome. The press agency handles outgoing news RA files some news files into RA, although it has as yet made no application to sell news to the Italian newspapers.

8. POWER INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE ROME

- (a) No aircraft or airforce personnel are now maintained in Italy by the Soviet Union.
- (b) A part of the St. Andrews' Camp, T.A.M.T.O., is under Soviet control, for repatriation of captives.
- (c) One officer is attached to the Allied Repatriation Unit, MARLB.

9. EXISTENCE UNIT

The privileges and facilities enjoyed by the respective national components of the various Allied Commissions are depend to some extent upon the armistice provisions establishing such Commissions. For comparison, these are briefly summarised:-

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(a) The Italian Justice does not name the nation to be represented on the Commission, but simply provides for a Control Commission "representative of the United Nations" and places the commission "under orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief".

(b) The Roumanian Justice provides for an "Allied Control Commission" which will meet until the conclusion of the peace the control over the execution of the Justice terms "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers". The nation to be represented on the Commission are not named, but the fact that the Justice is signed on behalf of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the US implies the representation of all three.

(c) The Bulgarian Justice expressly provides for the participation of representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and further provides that during the whole period of the Justice the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command shall be chairman, and that until the cessation of hostilities with Germany the Commission shall be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

(d) The Hungarian Justice contains the same provisions as those described in (c) above.

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(c) The Bulgarian armistice expressly provides for the participation of representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and further provides that during the whole period of the armistice the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command shall be chairman, and that until the cessation of hostilities with Germany the Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

(d) The Hungarian armistice contains the same provisions as those described in (c) above.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO. 73

SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting.
12 January 1945.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY, 16 JANUARY 1945.

A G E N D A

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, G-3, G-2 and Air
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting - already circulated)
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 1 - already circulated)
4. ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 2 - already circulated on limited distribution)

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
Commander, 1st Force, AFHQ

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AGENDA

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, G-3, G-2 and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting - already circulated)
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 1 - already circulated)
4. ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 2 - already circulated on limited distribution)

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J. H. HSCHELES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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SAC (F) (45) let. Meeting
11th January 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

The meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) originally scheduled for 1030 hours on Tuesday 16th January 1945, will NOT be held. The date of the next meeting will be announced later.

W A Bannister May FA
per J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
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- Chief, G-3 Plans Section
- Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. MAF
- Commander, 1st Force, AFM
- Secretary, General Staff
- Inter-Services and Political Secretariat
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originally scheduled for 1030 hours on Tuesday 16th January 1945, will NOT

be held. The date of the next meeting will be announced later.

W A Bannister May 64

*for J.F. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.*

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11th January 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

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SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting
20th December, 1944.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 29TH DECEMBER, 1944.

AGENDA

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G-3 and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - already circulated)
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 151 - to be circulated)
4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 157 - to be circulated)
5. RADIO FILM FOR LIBERATED ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158 - to be circulated)
6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 159 - to be circulated)
7. REFUGEE AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRAINS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 160 - to be circulated)
8. TO MAKE GOOD:-
8. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
(Telegrams No. REF 830 and LIO 911 of 21 and 22 December to Combined Chiefs of Staff - LU OUT 7699 and 7692)
9. RELIEF TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 156 - to be circulated)
10. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALBANIA
(Telegram No. W-72253 of 19 December from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff - LIO IN 1536.)

(Telegram No. W-80595 of 21 December from U.S. War Department - LIO IN 1536.)

972

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SHARED ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON FRIDAY 29TH DECEMBER, 1944

AGENDA

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G-3 and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)
2. MEMBERS OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAS (P) (44) 56th Meeting - already circulated)
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAS (P) (44) 151 - to be circulated)
4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENTS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAS (P) (44) 157 - to be circulated)
5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY
(Paper No. SAS (P) (44) 158 - to be circulated)
6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOGICAL RESOURCES BOARD
(Paper No. SAS (P) (44) 159 - to be circulated)
7. IMMEDIATE AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE N. OCCUPIED ISLANDS
(Paper No. SAS (P) (44) 160 - to be circulated)
8. TO THE NOTE:-
9. GOOD FOLLOWING IN ITALY
(Telegram No. W-7900 and ILO 211 of 21 and 22 December to Comair Chiefs of Staff - 10 JET 7699 and 7692)
10. RELIFE IN ALBANIA
(Paper No. SAS (P) (44) 156 - to be circulated)
11. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALBANIA
(Telegram No. W-7903 of 19 December from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff - 10 JET 15364)
(Telegram No. W-80595 of 21 December from U.S. War Department - 10 JET 17265)

NOTE:- Chief, ILO is invited to attend or be represented for Items 4, 9, 10, 11

(Signature)
J. H. LASALLE
COLONEL
SECRETARY

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Political Section, IMC

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SEC 1 (F) (44) 162

27th December 1944

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. On the basis of an exchange of telegrams with HQ Allied Commission, this has been informed that the following agreement was signed on 26th December by the Italian Government, represented by BONCHI, and the CLNAI, represented by MARE :-

"(1) The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ of the Anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of ITALY NOT yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this and its delegates of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of ITALY as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government".

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (F) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 4). ^

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement quoted in paragraph 1 above and to direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLNAI of ~~the~~ approval of the agreement quoted in para 1 above.

declassified
J.H. LACCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander
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S. J. D. Tait
Chief Commissioner
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It has been informed that the following agreement was signed on 26th December by the Italian Government, represented by BONICCHI, and the CLMIL, represented by HARE:-

- (1) The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ of the Anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.
- (2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of Italy not yet liberated.
- (3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this and as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of Italy as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 4).

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement enacted in paragraph 1 above and to direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLMIL of ~~the~~ approval of the agreement.

*J.H. LASCHLIES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.*

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- British Resident Minister
- Director, F.B.
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, IS & PS
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

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SAC (P) (44) 157
27th December 1944

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COPY NO. 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Note by the Chief of Staff

1. The Sub-Committee on News Agencies appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, Minute 5) met on 26th December 1944 to consider the questions referred to it by the Supreme Allied Commander.
2. The Sub-Committee also had before it a proposal by the Chief, Commissioner, Allied Commission, to permit private news agencies to sell news to newspapers of the city of ROME, only.
3. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Supreme Allied Commander as follows:-
 - (a) Reference question (i), as to the future at which the PEB screen on news should be removed and the operation of private news agencies permitted:-

(1) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of ROME on and after 15 January 1944.

(2) That a technical sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Allied Commission, PEB, INC, and the Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ, be appointed to investigate the time and the methods by which the distribution of news to newspapers throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY by private news agencies will be feasible.

(b) Reference question (ii), as to the safeguards which should be established to ensure against the development in ITALY of a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

That for the time being no Italian news agency be permitted to distribute news in ITALY outside ROME. That the time when RFI, or any other Italian news agency, is to be permitted to enter the field of news distribution be investigated by the technical sub-committee.

(c) Reference question (iii), as to what measures should be taken to avoid publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest:

That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken, unless a serious situation from the military point of view seems likely to arise. The security risk admittedly existing as a result of the admission of private news agencies to ROME is outweighed by the advantage in respect of freedom of the press, particularly in view of the power of the Supreme Allied Commander under the armistice terms to impose necessary measures of censorship to meet particular situations which may arise.

Commander (SAC (P) (LL) 26th Meeting, Minute 5) met on 26th December 1944 to consider the questions referred to it by the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Sub-Committee also had before it a proposal by the Chief, Commissioner, Allied Commission, to permit private news agencies to sell news to newspapers of the city of Rome, only.

3. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Supreme Allied Commander as follows:-

(a) Reference question (i), as to the juncture at which the P.B. screen on news should be removed and the operation of private news agencies permitted:-

(1) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after 15 January 1944.

(2) That a technical sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Allied Commission, P.B. HQ, and the Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ, be appointed to investigate the time and the methods by which the distribution of news to newspapers throughout the remainder of liberated Italy by private news agencies will be feasible.

(b) Reference question (ii), as to the safeguards which should be established to ensure against the development in Italy of a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

That for the time being no Italian news agency be permitted to distribute news in Italy outside Rome. That the time when RFI, or any other Italian news agency, is to be permitted to enter the field of news distribution be investigated by the technical sub-committee.

(c) Reference question (iii), as to what measures should be taken to avoid publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest: 3

That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken, unless a serious situation from the military point of view seems likely to arise. The security risk admittedly existing as a result of the admission of private news agencies to Rome is outweighed by the advantage in respect of freedom of the press, particularly in view of the power of the Supreme Allied Commander under the armistice terms to impose necessary measures of censorship to meet particular situations which may arise.

(Initialed) J.H.

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Secretary, IS & PS
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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (E) (44) 158

27th December, 1944.

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COPY NO.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

Note by Chief, IMC

I. Objectives with reference to radio in ITALY

1. The ultimate objective of Allied effort in the field of radio is to promote a free radio which will not be the instrument for any government, political party or group of private interests.
2. To this end Italian radio should be adjusted to the conditions of the free ITALY of tomorrow. This does not mean that Italian radio should necessarily be remodelled along British or American lines. Rather it must be based upon Italian character, temperament, traditions and economic possibilities. It must be politically free but not beyond the reach of criticism.

II. Present PWB Policy

1. Conforming to overall directives, which call for the swiftest possible transfer to Italian hands of all domestic services, PWB transferred as of October 1, 1944, to EIAZ, the existing Italian radio organisation, the responsibility for, and the actual organisation and production of, all musical programmes in 40 territory, both "live" and recorded, representing approximately 50 per cent of the total radio output. PWB continues to assist EIAZ in the production of musical programmes especially as regards supply of recorded programmes.
2. PWB retains the right to intervene and to request modifications in EIAZ's musical programmes:-
 - (a) If it becomes apparent that these programmes pursue political aims at variance with those of the United Nations.
 - (b) If the quality, artistically or technically, of the programmes as broadcast is not of sufficiently high standard.
3. PWB retains the responsibility for and the actual organisation and production of the "spoken" programmes, e.g. news and political commentary, and other spoken features, dramatisations and prose readings.

III. Recommendations

1. Upon the basis of proposals made to it by PWB the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee (PWSOC (44) 8th Meeting) recommends that the Italian Government be invited:-

I. Objectives with reference to radio in ITALY

1. The ultimate objective of Allied effort in the field of radio is to promote a free radio which will not be the instrument for any government, political party or group of private interests.
2. To this end Italian radio should be adjusted to the conditions of the free ITALY of tomorrow. This does not mean that Italian radio should necessarily be remodelled along British or American lines. Rather it must be based upon Italian character, temperament, traditions and economic possibilities. It must be politically free but not beyond the reach of criticism.

II. Present PWB Policy

1. Conforming to overall directives, which call for the swiftest possible transfer to Italian hands of all domestic services, PWB transferred as of October 1, 1944, to E.I.A.R. the existing Italian radio organisation, the responsibility for, and the actual organisation and production of, all musical programmes in AC territory, both "live" and recorded, representing approximately 50 per cent of the total radio output. PWB continues to assist E.I.A.R. in the production of musical programmes especially as regards supply of recorded programmes.
2. PWB retains the right to intervene and to request modifications in E.I.A.R.'s musical programmes:-
 - (a) If it becomes apparent that these programmes pursue political aims at variance with those of the United Nations.
 - (b) If the quality, artistically or technically, of the programmes as broadcast is not of sufficiently high standard.
3. PWB retains the responsibility for and the actual organisation and production of the "spoken" programmes, e.g. news and political commentary, and other spoken features, dramatisations and prose readings.

III. Recommendations

1. Upon the basis of proposals made to it by PWB the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee (PWSWC (44) 8th Meeting) recommends that the Italian Government be invited:-

- (a) To create a Board of Governors to act as advisers to the management of E.I.A.R. with a term of two years composed of the following:

A nominee of the Minister of Education
 A University Professor
 An Industrialist
 A member of E.I.A.R. Employees' Association
 A Musician
 An author
 A journalist

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Each, with the exception of the first, to be nominated by the appropriate body, e.g., the Association of University Professors, the Chamber of Commerce, the Federazione Stampa, etc; the terms to be staggered in order to preserve continuity of experience.

- (b) To call upon this Board of Governors to make recommendations concerning the future organization and operation of EIAZ consistent with the maintenance of a free radio in ITALY after the time of withdrawal of PME from the Italian radio field.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, to take action accordingly.

(Initd) A.C.W.H.
for A.J. Mc G.

Distribution

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field.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, to take action accordingly.

(Intd) A.C.W.H.
for A.J. Mc O.

Copy No.

Distribution

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- U.S. Political Adviser
- British Resident Minister
- Director, PWE
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, IS & PS
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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*copy to the
Chief Commissioner
Political Section No 23*

49.5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC (P) (U) 152
25th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-586

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 99

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICS)

PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED
LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS.

Note by the Secretary

1. On 5 December 1944 the Allied Commissioner submitted to the first meeting of the Industrial Coordination Committee, Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board, a proposal that a representative of the Italian Government (other than of Industry, Resources and Labour) be admitted to membership of the Industrial Coordination Committee.

2. The Allied Commission offered the following grounds for this proposal:

"The Allied Commissioner believes that participation by the Ministry in the work of the Committee would be helpful to all parties concerned. It is now attempting insofar as possible to have all operational functions in the field of industrial production performed by the Italians themselves. If the Italian Government is to assume an increasing measure of responsibility for the Italian economy, it is essential for its representatives to begin to participate in the discussions as to the use of that economy in furthering the war effort and in decreasing the extent to which Italy needs to call on the United Nations for essential civilian supplies. Moreover, it would help the Italian Government and people to understand the necessary limitations of supply and transport, and spur them to put forth their best efforts in the development of local resources. If they participated in the deliberations on the allocation of the relatively scarce resources that are available."

3. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who presided at the meeting mentioned, has requested that the proposal be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, and has suggested that there be considered also the question of membership of representatives of the Italian Government on the Board itself.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve in principle participation by the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its dependent Committee and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to proceed accordingly.

h. C. ...
J. C. ...

PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCE COMMISSIONS.

Note by the Secretary

1. On 11 December 1944 the Allied Commission submitted to the first meeting of the Industrial Coordination Committee, Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board, a proposal that a representative of the Italian Government (Chief of Industry, Commerce and Labour) be constituted to membership of the Industrial Coordination Committee.

2. The Allied Commission offered the following reasons for this proposal:

"The Allied Commission believes that participation by the Ministry in the work of the Committee will be helpful to all parties concerned. It is now attempting industry is possible to have all operational functions in the field of industrial production performed by the Italians themselves. If the Italian Government is to assume an increasing measure of responsibility for the Italian economy, it is essential for its representatives to begin to participate in the discussion as to the use of that economy in furthering the war effort and in determining the extent to which Italy needs to call on the United Nations for essential civilian supplies. Moreover, it would help the Italian Government and people to understand the necessary limitations of supply and transport, and spur them to put forth their best efforts in the development of local resources, if they participated in the determinations as to the allocation of the relatively scarce resources that are available."

3. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who presided at the meeting mentioned, has requested that the proposal be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, and has suggested that there be considered also the question of a furthering of representatives of the Italian Government on the Board itself.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve in principle participation by the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board on its dependent Committee and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to proceed accordingly.

A. C. [Signature]
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Ref. 13 Dec 1944
Chg. [Signature]
- [Signature]

4374

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DISSEMINATION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander in Chief, Antisubmarine
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PWD
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Commission, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
G-1 (N)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Communications
Air Commander-in-Chief, Materiel
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FWD
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & IS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Communication, Allied Commission
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CONFIDENTIAL

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SAC (P) (44) 169
27th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO 23

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN
POPULATION FROM ENEMY OCCUPIED ISLANDS

Note by Secretary

1. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, wishes to raise the question of the despatch of relief to enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN and the mass evacuation of civilian population from these islands.
2. He has recently been informed by FOLEH that a delegation left RHODES on 5th December charged by the German administration and the Greek community with organising civilian relief supplies for RHODES. The delegation had been told by the German commander in RHODES that he was concerned over the shortage of food for the civilian population and that even British relief ships would be allowed. The delegation reported that the Germans were proposing to evacuate 10,000 civilians from RHODES and that the population of the island were seeking opportunities to leave. FOLEH pointed out that, unless the Turks could be persuaded to accept the responsibility for refugees from RHODES, they would become an unwelcome British commitment. He suggested that it would be more economical to introduce relief through the medium of the International Red Cross and that, if the International Red Cross were unwilling to participate, the despatch of a British ship should be considered, subject to satisfactory safeguards. He drew a parallel between the case of RHODES and the case of the CHANNEL ISLANDS.

3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accordingly requests a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy :-

- (a) As to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian population of enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN.
- (b) As to whether mass evacuation of civilians from enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN should be permitted.

He points out that it would clearly assist the enemy war effort to allow either (a) or (b).

Confidential

Chief of Staff

J. H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY

Notes by Secretary

1. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, wishes to raise the question of the despatch of relief to enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN and the mass evacuation of civilian population from those islands.
2. He has recently been informed by FOIA that a delegation left RHODES on 5th December charged by the German administration and the Greek community with organizing civilian relief supplies for RHODES. The delegation had been told by the German commander in RHODES that he was concerned over the shortage of food for the civilian population and that even British relief ships would be allowed. The delegation reported that the Germans were proposing to evacuate 10,000 civilians from RHODES and that the population of the island were seeking opportunities to leave. FOIA pointed out that, unless the Turks could be persuaded to accept the responsibility for refugees from RHODES, they would become an unwelcome British commitment. He suggested that it would be more economical to introduce relief through the medium of the International Red Cross and that, if the International Red Cross were unwilling to participate, the despatch of a British ship should be considered, subject to satisfactory safeguards. He drew a parallel between the case of RHODES and the case of the CHANNEL ISLANDS.

3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accordingly requests a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy:-

- (a) As to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian population of enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN.
- (b) As to whether mass evacuation of civilians from enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN should be permitted.

He points out that it would clearly assist the enemy war effort to allow either (a) or (b).

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Col. J. H. Lascelles
Chief of Communications Branch
War Office



487

SECRET

SECRET

IN 563

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, F.R.
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, F&E
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO 33

SAC (P) (44) 156

26th December 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELIEF TO ALBANIA

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

1. On 23 December G-5 submitted a staff study directing attention to the following:-

a. Military District HQ (Albania) had been directed to introduce relief supplies into Albania, and the troop concentration date set at 3 January 1945.

b. It is planned that the Durazzo Harbor will be swept on approximately 27 December 1944 and IL (A) needs will follow immediately.

c. Neither the U.S. nor U.K. Governments have recognized an Albanian Government, and are desirous that no action on the part of IL (A) should commit them to recognition of any particular group.

d. This Headquarters has assumed that no negotiations should be carried out with Col. Gen. HOXA (HLL), except as to Lt. Col. Palmer and requested to advise him of the nature and scope of IL (A) organization, the fact that IL (A) charter was in no way subject to alteration, and to request him to instruct his men to recommendatives to enter into the necessary local agreements with IL (A).

e. At this time it had been decided that one U.S. and one U.K. IL (A) representatives should be made available to observe any technical points that might arise.

f. Lt. Col. Palmer on his return has reported that on 20 December 1944 he outlined the IL (A) plan, and HOXA reserves consideration on issuance of the requested instructions, because of the following factors:

- (1) Number of IL (A) forces involved.
- (2) Observers.

Col. Gen. HOXA indicated that the movement of "a few" officers at his Headquarters would meet requirements, and that his organization was competent to determine relief needs and to administer supply distribution.

g. In order to make a January 15/25 delivery of emergency stores to replenish the port of Durazzo to receive relief supplies, it would be necessary to call forward approximately 1600 tons of stores at shortest notice.

h. It was suggested that these stores should not be called forward because

- (1) it was desirable to avoid a situation similar to that of IL (Y), where 1000 tons of stores were eventually unloaded during heavy

1365

1. On 23 December 6-5 submitted a staff study directing attention to the following:-

- a. Military Liaison HQ (Liaison) had been directed to introduce relief supplies into Albania, and the troop concentration date set at 3 January 1945.
- b. It is planned that Col Durazzo Harter will be swept in approximately 27 December 1944 and AL (A) recon will follow immediately.
- c. Whether the U.S. or U.K. Government has nominated an Albanian (Government), and are desirous that no action be taken on the part of AL (A) should commit them to recognition of any particular group.
- d. The Headquarters has advised that no representations should be carried out with Col. Durazzo Harter, except to Lt. Col. Palmer as they tend to revise him of the nature and scope of AL (A) organization, and to the fact that AL (A) charter was in no way subject to alteration, and to request him to instruct his staff to representatives to enter into the necessary local agreements with AL (A).
- e. At this time it had been decided that one U.S. and one U.K. AL (A) representative should be made available to clarify any technical points that might arise.
- f. Lt. Col. Palmer on his return has reported that on 20 December 1944 he contacted the AL (A) staff, and HQAL reserved consideration on issuance of the requested instructions, because of the following factors:
 - (1) Number of personnel involved.
 - (2) Observers.
- g. Col. Gen. HQAL indicated that the movement of "a few" officers at his Headquarters would not be a problem, but that his organization was competent to determine relief needs and to administer supply distribution.
- h. In order to take a January 15/21 delivery of emergency stores to repair the port of Durazzo to receive relief supplies, it would be necessary to call forward approximately 1600 tons of material immediately.
- i. It was arguable that these stores should not be called forward because:
 - (1) It was desirable to avoid a situation similar to that of AL (Y), where 2 ships stood by and were eventually unloaded during heavy tides.
 - (2) It was not desirable to load, and call forward a ship, until its need was specifically determined.
- j. It was also arguable that these stores should be called forward:
 - (1) The time lag from calling forward to sailing, approximately ten days, would permit cancellation of loading or sailing up to 2 January.
 - (2) Any delay in calling forward would so seriously postpone arrival that, once agreement reached in December 1944, further stores would not follow until February 1945.

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(3) Following arrival of Engineer stores further time would be required to put the port in order to receive relief supplies.

(4) Any unnecessary delay should be avoided as tending to increase Albanian suspicion.

2. Under these circumstances, G-5 recommended that:

a. The necessary stores be called forward ex Mideast immediately.

b. Lt. Col. Palmer be instructed to return to HOKHA's Hq on 27 December 1944.

(1) to obtain his reply to the request that he instruct his representatives at Durazzo to enter into the necessary local agreements and,

(2) to advise this Hq and IL (A) not later than 29 December 1944 of any further points requiring detailed clarification.

c. So soon such clarification be necessary the Commander and Deputy Commander IL (A) should proceed to HOKHA, after briefing, to advise final terms.

d. If these terms were not accepted

(1) IL (A) officers should return,

(2) announcements should be made immediately over PWT in Albanian and in English, of the terms of the offer and of HOKHA's refusal,

(3) the ship should be held or diverted and concentration of troops cancelled.

3. The British Resident Minister, U.S. Political Adviser, GAO and the Deputy GAO concurred in the recommendations of G-5 as set forth above except that the Deputy GAO expressed the view that just experience gives little hope of any useful action prior to reaching agreements. To call the ship forward now would only result in lost shipping time. The Deputy GAO therefore recommended that an agreement be reached prior to calling forward. Accordingly the ship was not been called forward, but Lt. Col. Palmer has been instructed to proceed as in para 2b.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to take note of the above developments.

(Infd) T.B.S.
for C.M.S.

- 1944.
- (1) to obtain his reply to the request that he instruct his representatives at Durazzo to enter into the necessary local agreements and,
 - (2) to advise this HQ and ML (4) not later than 23 December 1944 of any further points requiring detailed clarification.
- c. Should such clarification be necessary the Commander and Deputy Commander ML (4) should proceed to KORRI, after briefing, to advise local towns.
- d. If these terms were not accepted
- (1) ML (4) officers should return,
 - (2) announcements should be made immediately over P/O in Albanian and in English, of the terms of the offer and of KORRI's refusal,
 - (3) the ship should be held or diverted and concentration of troops cancelled.

3. The British Resident Minister, U.S. Political Adviser, GAO and the Deputy SAC concurred in the recommendations of C-5 to set forth above except that the Deputy SAC expressed the view that past experiences give a little hope of any useful action prior to reaching agreements. To call the ship forward now would only result in lost time. The Deputy SAC therefore recommended that an agreement be reached prior to sailing forward. Accordingly the ship has not been called forward, but Lt. Col. Palmer has been instructed to proceed as in para 2b.

4. The Supreme Allied C. Staff in Conference has agreed to take note of the above developments.

(Info) T.R.H.
for C.I.S.

496.

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DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FWS
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, ISAF
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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G-3 Special Operations
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G-5
Spares

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CofS Distribution
Chief Commissioner No 34
Political Sect No 33

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Fifth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, INTC
Secretary, General Staff
Sec. Staff, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (a) (b)
G-1 (a) (b)
G-2
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G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (a) (b)
G-4 (a) (b)
G-5
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Confidential
Chief Commissioner No. 38
Political Section No. 23

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SECRET

Political

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 500

SAC (C) (44) 123rd Meeting
SAC (C) (44) 37th Meeting
27th December 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL)

1. The 123rd Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) and the 37th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) will NOT be held on Friday, 29 December, 1944 as previously advised, but on SATURDAY, 30 DECEMBER INSTEAD.
2. Time and location of the meetings and the agenda for them will be as previously notified. The meetings are merely postponed 24 hours.

J. H. Lascelles
 J. H. LASCELLES,
 COLONEL.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
 Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 G-1 (A)
 G-1 (B)
 G-2
 G-3
 G-3 Special Operations
 G-4 (A)
 G-4 (B)
 G-4 (Nav & Th)
 G-4 (Log Plans)
 Chief, Liaison Section
 Chief Signals Officer
 U.S. Political Adviser
 British Resident Minister
 Secretary, General Staff
 Secretary, IS & PS
 Director, F.R.
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL)

1. The 123rd Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) and the 27th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) will NOT be held on Friday, 29 December, 1944 as previously advised, but on SATURDAY, 30 DECEMBER INSTEAD.

2. Time and location of the meetings and the agenda for them will be as previously notified. The meetings are merely postponed 24 hours.

W. H. L. Schell
W. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
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G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-4 (C) (Nav & In)
G-4 (C) (Log Plans)
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Signals Officer
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Director, PMS
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-5
Chief INC
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No 50 Political

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SAC (P) (AM) 26th Meeting
19th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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Section
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COPI NO 3

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON TUESDAY 19TH DECEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Commodore H.A. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Beker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Hon. Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Brand, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell M. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery H. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barton

40000

HOURS ON TUESDAY 19TH DECEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.I. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Commodore H.A. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Hon. Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Dood, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell A. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery J. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel N.B. Hitchens, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General I.L. Foster, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Major General M.A.H. Stavell,
Commander, SOG

List
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C or S
Per Sec

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nashitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, ANHQ

Mr. C. Giffis,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lescelles
Major J.G. Swettenham

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(FC (44) 35th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee held on 8th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GRADISCA"

CARLODORE KASNER said that it was reported that the German hospital ship GRADISCA would sail shortly from TRIESTE in order to take off hospital cases from their prison in CRETE. He drew attention to the instructions as a result of which this vessel had been intercepted in the course of her previous sailing from the AEGEAN and enquired whether a similar procedure was to be adopted on this occasion. He did not consider there would be any advantage in intercepting the vessel during her outward sailing from TRIESTE to CRETE.

Mr. KILK said that the Department of State still maintained the view, which they had expressed on the previous occasion, that interception of the German hospital ship was not advisable. However, he fully realised that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had endorsed the action which the British Admiralty had on that occasion ordered.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :

(a) Arrange for the interception of the GRADISCA on her return journey from CRETE and for the bringing of this vessel into a suitable Allied port so that German wounded, other than serious cases, could be disembarked and taken into custody.

(b) Determine, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to what port it would be most suitable to bring this ship in the light of availability of hospital accommodation.

3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

(Papers Nos. FC (44) 152 and SAC (P) (44) 155)

THE CONFERENCE had before them two papers, the first being a record of a

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 35th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee held on 9th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GRADISCA"

SEBASTIAN RUCKER said that it was reported that the German hospital ship "GRADISCA" would sail shortly from TRIESTE in order to take off hospital cases from their garrison in GRISE. He drew attention to the instructions as a result of which this vessel had been intercepted in the course of her previous sailing from the AEGEAN and enquired whether a similar procedure was to be adopted on this occasion. He did not consider there would be any advantage in intercepting the vessel during her outward sailing from TRIESTE to GRISE.

MR. KIRK said that the Department of State still maintained the view, which they had expressed on the previous occasion, that interception of the German hospital ship was not advisable. However, he fully realised that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had endorsed the action which the British Admiralty had on that occasion advised.

THE SUPPLEMENT ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :

(a) Arrange for the interception of the "GRADISCA" on her return journey from GRISE and for the bringing of this vessel into a suitable Allied port so that German wounded, other than serious cases, could be disembarked and taken into custody.

(b) Determine, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to what port it would be most suitable to bring this ship in the light of availability of hospital accommodation.

3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

(Papers Nos. PJ (44) 152 and SAC (F) (44) 155)

THE CONFERENCE had before them two papers, the first being a record of a meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on the subject of food rationing in Italy at which it had been decided to prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting the establishment of a 300 gramme ration throughout the liberated area of Italy; and the second attaching a draft of such a telegram and recommending that in the event of an unfavourable reply, a further telegram proposing a reduced uniform ration should be despatched.

/LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERTSON

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that previous discussions at the Political Committee in regard to food rationing had been confined to the situation in SICILY, which was somewhat different from the rest of the country in that there was at least a strong suspicion that a considerable quantity of local wheat existed in the island, though it could not be brought forward for assessment. The preparation of a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as directed at Conclusion 3(c) of IC (44) 25th Meeting had commenced but before agreement could be reached two occurrences caused the whole situation to be reviewed. The first event was the receipt of a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, urging the establishment, by importation of the necessary wheat of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY, or, alternatively, if that could not be done, the establishment of a parity ration throughout the area on a reduced scale. The second factor was a telegram from Commanding General, Fifth Army, expressing the view that, unless further supplies were made available in forward areas, militarily serious unrest was likely to result. The former Chief Administrative Officer had, therefore, held a meeting and as a result had directed that a telegram should be drawn up, putting a strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision. A draft of this telegram was now before the meeting. Meanwhile, the Allied Commission had that morning reported (cable No. S 395 - AG IN 14636 of 18 December) that notices and posters denarding more food had appeared in FLORENCE. This was a further indication of the seriousness of the situation.

MR. KIRK thought it very necessary to lay a final statement before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and especially before the Prime Minister and the President, so that they could realize the consequences of a failure to provide this food. He considered that the parsimony of the draft telegram was impressive.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, confirmed that the necessary food to implement the ration did not exist in the country, except possibly in SICILY. There the assessment had reached 86 per cent and it was his opinion and that of his advisers that the present Government would not be any more successful than its predecessor in obtaining any appreciable increase.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McMAHERY considered that portions of the telegram as at present drafted were most ill advised. Paragraph 1 in effect asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a blank cheque against future operations. The Chiefs of Staff would require an estimate of the impact on future operations of shipping the tonnage of wheat required. He was doubtful of the truth of the statement at paragraph 6 of the draft that the shipping allotted to the theatre for operational maintenance would not permit any further reduction and urged that an immediate examination should be made to determine what additional shipments were required to meet the 300 gramme ration and what proportion of these could be met from allocations already made to the theatre. The telegram should be redrafted to include this information and the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be asked to provide the balance of the

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, urging the establishment, by importation of the necessary wheat of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated Italy, or, alternatively, if that could not be done, the establishment of a parity ration throughout the area on a reduced scale. The second factor was a telegram from Commanding General, Fifth Army, expressing the view that, unless further supplies were made available in forward areas, militarily serious unrest was likely to result. The former Chief Administrative Officer had, therefore, held a meeting and as a result had directed that a telegram should be drawn up, putting a strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision. A draft of this telegram was now before the meeting. Meanwhile, the Allied Commission had that evening reported (cable No. S 395 - MC IN 14636 of 18 December) that notices and posters demanding more food had appeared in FLORENCE. This was a further indication of the seriousness of the situation.

MR. KIRK thought it very necessary to lay a final statement before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and especially before the Prime Minister and the President, so that they could realize the consequences of a failure to provide this food. He considered that the phraseology of the draft telegram was impressive.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, confirmed that the necessary food to implement the ration did not exist in the country, except possibly in SICILY. There the assessment had reached 66 per cent and it was his opinion and that of his advisers that the present government would not be any more successful than its predecessor in obtaining any appreciable increase.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McHANEY considered that portions of the telegram as at present drafted were most ill advised. Paragraph 1 in effect asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a blank cheque against future operations. The Chiefs of Staff would require an estimate of the impact on future operations of shipping the tonnage of wheat required. He was doubtful of the truth of the statement in paragraph 6 of the draft that the shipping allotted to the theatre for operational maintenance would not permit any further reduction and urged that an immediate examination should be made to determine what additional shipments were required to meet the 300 gramme ration and what proportion of these could be met from allocations already made to the theatre. The telegram should be redrafted to include this information and the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be asked to provide the balance of the shipping necessary. A contribution by the Theatre from normal sailings would assist in securing a favourable reply.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER accepted General McHANEY's views as to how the case should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was disturbed by the lack of food which he considered would sooner or later lead to unrest and disorders to the detriment of operations. He considered that definite promises to the Italians had been made and felt that action must be taken to implement them.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERTSON
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that owing to the machinery by which previous cuts in the theatre allocation of shipping had been effected these reductions had been made mainly at the expense of US military maintenance.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer establish :-

- (i) What monthly sailings of wheat, additional to those at present programmed, would be required to ensure the maintenance of a 300 gramme ration throughout ITALY during the period until the next harvest became available for consumption.
- (ii) What contribution, if any, in terms of sailings per month, could be made by the Mediterranean Theatre from the existing operational shipping programme without serious prejudice to military operations in the theatre.
- (b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in consultation with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, redraft these portions of the draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.A.C. (P) (44) 155 to which the latter had taken exception, in such a way as to put the matter in the best possible light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, adding a statement of the results of the examination carried out under (a) above.
- (c) Directed that for the present no action be taken on recommendation 3(b) of paper No. S.A.C. (P) (44) 155 pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.
- (d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for the drawing up of plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10 January 1945 but that action to implement such plans be deferred pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.
- (e) Directed that Conclusion 3(b) of PC (44) 35th Meeting be regarded as cancelled.

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure
Paper No. S.A.C. (P) (44) 154)

In addition to papers which had been considered at their previous meeting, the CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that the delegates of the GLA.I had certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy.

MR. KERR said he was in favour of any agreement which the Italian Government were prepared to make.

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- (ii) What contribution, if any, in terms of sailings per month, could be made by the Mediterranean Theatre from the existing operational shipping programme without serious prejudice to military operations in the theatre.
- (b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in consultation with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, redraft those portions of the draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.C. (P) (44) 155 to which the latter had taken exception, in such a way as to put the matter in the best possible light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, adding a statement of the results of the examination carried out under (a) above.
- (c) Directed that for the present no action be taken on recommendation 3(b) of paper No. S.C. (P) (44) 155 pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.
- (d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for the drawing up of plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10 January 1945 but that action to implement such plans be deferred pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.
- (e) Directed that Conclusion 3(b) of PC (44) 35th Meeting be regarded as cancelled.

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure
Paper No. S.C. (P) (44) 154)

In addition to papers which had been considered at their previous meeting, the CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that the delegates of the CLM.I had certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy.

MR. KIRK said he was in favour of any agreement which the Italian Government were prepared, of their own volition, to enter into with the CLM.I. On the other hand, there should not be any Allied attempt to dictate to, or to exert pressure on, either party since such action, apart from being an undesirable intervention in Italian internal affairs, might result in the establishment in Northern Italy of an authority which might later oppose the ROME Government.

MR. DANIEL STONE pointed out that the first paragraph of the draft Agreement circulated with PC (44) 144 had been drawn so as to provide for the participation of the Italian Government in the military agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLM.I, which had already been signed. The Italian Prime Minister had stated to him that he was prepared to recognise the CLM.I in these terms, or

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alternatively in the terms which had been suggested in August, but he was not willing to designate them as the agents of his Government in Northern Italy. On the other hand, he understood that the CIM.I were not willing to recognize the Italian Government in the terms proposed.

MR. GENERAL STURTELL said that, according to the views which the delegates had expressed to him, the CIM.I were now prepared to recognize the Italian Government. He was of opinion that their recognition by the Italian Government as the latter's agents would produce much improved resistance activities in northern Italy and would also decrease the problems to be met when that area was occupied. He explained that the Allied authorities had up till now been acting as intermediaries in regard to discussions between the Italian Government and the CIM.I and he urged that the time had now come for the remaining CIM.I delegate, who possessed plenary powers, to negotiate directly with the Italian Government a form of agreement for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Committee would not sign the agreement in the form proposed at present.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that an agreement between the Italian Government and the CIM.I would be advantageous. He would not, however, consider any modification of his existing agreement with the CIM.I; nor was he willing to enter into a tripartite agreement with that body and the Italian Government, since this would embroil him in any future differences between the CIM.I and the Italian Government. He agreed that representatives of the CIM.I and the Italian Government should be brought together and allowed to work out an agreement between themselves but as military considerations were involved such an agreement must be subject to his approval.

MR. GENERAL BROOKS considered that such an agreement would have two advantages. It would strengthen the hand of the Italian Government after the occupation of northern Italy and meanwhile it would strengthen the partisans and enable them to carry out increased activities. He observed that payments were at present being provided from British sources to the CIM.I and reported that it had been suggested that if the Italian Government did not agree to take over responsibility for these payments they should become a joint British and US account. Whatever the financial procedure adopted, however, the commitment would eventually be shouldered by the Italian Government under the existing general financial arrangement.

MR. BROAD said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

MR. MARSHALL SLESSOR and MR. DAVID STONE supported the Supreme Allied Commander's view that a bilateral agreement, subject to his approval, should be concluded between the Italian Government and the CIM.I, if this could be done without Allied pressure.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

would also decrease the problems to be met when that area was occupied. He explained that the Allied authorities had up till now been acting as intermediaries in regard to discussions between the Italian Government and the CIMA; and he urged that the time had now come for the remaining CIMA delegate, who possessed plenary powers, to negotiate directly with the Italian Government a form of agreement for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Committee would not sign the agreement in the form proposed at present.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that an agreement between the Italian Government and the CIMA would be advantageous. He would not, however, consider any modification of his existing agreement with the CIMA; nor was he willing to enter into a tripartite agreement with that body and the Italian Government, since this would entrap him in any future differences between the CIMA and the ROYAL Government. He agreed that representatives of the CIMA and the Italian Government should be brought together and allowed to work out an agreement between themselves but as military considerations were involved such an agreement must be subject to his approval.

MAJOR GENERAL ROCKS considered that such an agreement would have two advantages. It would strengthen the hand of the Italian Government after the occupation of northern Italy and meanwhile it would strengthen the partisans and enable them to carry out increased activities. He observed that payments were at present being provided from British sources to the CIMA and reported that it had been suggested that if the Italian Government did not agree to take over responsibility for these payments they should become a joint British and US account. Whatever the financial procedure adopted, however, the commitment would eventually be shouldered by the Italian Government under the existing general financial arrangement.

MR. BROAD said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

MR. MARSHALL STISSOR and MR. J. DILLON STONE supported the Supreme Allied Commander's view that a bilateral agreement, subject to his approval, should be concluded between the Italian Government and the CIMA, if this could be done without Allied pressure.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that no further action be taken towards concluding a tripartite agreement between himself, the Italian Government and the CIMA.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission arrange to put the remaining delegate of the CIMA in touch with the Italian Government with a view to the conclusion between these two authorities, subject to his approval, of a voluntary bilateral agreement to govern their mutual relations.

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- (c) Directed that his existing military agreement with the
C.M.I. remain unchanged.

5. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 153)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that it was desirable, in order to give the Italians greater liberty, that private press agencies should soon be permitted to operate in Italy, but arguing that such action would give rise to certain difficulties if the change were made at the present time.

MR. KIRK said that the aim should be that when the Allies left Italy they should leave behind them a healthy, free press. However, unless the Italians were given a measure of freedom now, they would not develop the ability to manage their own affairs. He fully realised that there were certain complications in practice in connection with the proposed changes but he thought that the principle was sufficiently important for these difficulties to be accepted. The position of the military in this matter was, he felt, adequately covered by the requirements of military censorship.

MR. BARNES said that P.B. was perfectly willing to hand over to the Italians the press facilities which they at present controlled in Italy. However, he pointed out that this might give rise to three difficulties. In the first place, as all incoming news was now screened by P.B., it might be necessary for military reasons to impose a political censorship by M.H.Q. the repercussions of which might on occasion be severe. In the second place it was difficult to see how private agencies could be provided with the means of communication necessary to distribute their news throughout the country unless some assistance could be provided by army signals. In this connection, he pointed out, in reply to a remark by Rear Admiral Stone, that it would not meet the case if the existing P.B. communications were handed over to an Italian agency, as such action would automatically place that agency in a position of monopoly. The third difficulty which he foresaw was that the opening up of Italy to foreign news agencies would lead to a demand by other private business organizations to commence working in the country. He thought it likely that the Motion Picture companies in particular would make such an application.

MR. R. DUNNELL STONE did not consider that incoming news handled by private agencies would need to be subject to political censorship. He thought that the Italian people should now be permitted to read accounts of current affairs as published in other countries. He pointed out that a procedure had already been set up to deal with the demands of the motion picture companies and he did not foresee any complications in this respect. He remarked that, even after the proposed admission of private agencies, there would remain a need for P.B. activities in the territory. He agreed with Mr. Barnes that it was most undesirable for the handover to be effected in any way which would tend to produce a monopoly of news in the country.

THE SUBCOM. ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, as the Allies had now

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that such action would give rise to certain difficulties if the change were made at the present time.

MR. KIRK said that the aim should be that when the Allies left Italy they should leave behind them a healthy, free press. However, unless the Italians were given a measure of freedom now, they would not develop the ability to manage their own affairs. He fully realized that there were certain complications in practice in connection with the proposed changes but he thought that the principle was sufficiently important for these difficulties to be accepted. The position of the military in this matter was, he felt, adequately covered by the requirements of military censorship.

MR. BARNES said that F.B. was perfectly willing to hand over to the Italians the press facilities which they at present controlled in Italy. However, he pointed out that this might give rise to three difficulties. In the first place, as all incoming news was now screened by F.B., it might be necessary for military reasons to impose a political censorship by HQ, the repercussions of which might on occasion be severe. In the second place it was difficult to see how private agencies could be provided with the means of communication necessary to distribute their news throughout the country unless some assistance could be provided by army signals. In this connection, he pointed out, in reply to a remark by Mr. Admiral Stone, that it would not meet the case if the existing F.B. communications were handed over to an Italian agency, as such action would automatically place that agency in a position of monopoly. The third difficulty which he foresaw was that the opening up of Italy to foreign news agencies would lead to a demand by other private business organizations to commence working in the country. He thought it likely that the Motion Picture companies in particular would make such an application.

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THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, as the Allies had now been in Italy for more than a year, we should be prepared to sacrifice certain advantages in order to give the Italians greater liberty in the management of their internal affairs, provided always that no serious interference with military operations resulted.

MR. BARNES confirmed that this was the aim towards which F.B. had been working. The only question for decision was in regard to the timing of the proposed transfer of responsibility. F.B. had been endeavouring

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to build up an Italian non-monopolistic private news agency. However, he did not yet consider that this agency was sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, disagreeing with Mr. Barnes, observed that the Italians themselves thought they were ready to stand on their own feet and applications from external private news agencies indicated that they were of this opinion also.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCLELLAN observed that, if the proposed Italian money were weak, the external private agencies would break it. He considered that the purpose for which these agencies were now trying to secure entry into the country, was to establish their post-war position.

COLONEL HITCHENS said that on grounds of military security a change would not be propitious at the present moment.

THE SURNAME CALLED COMMANDER :

- (a) Agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in Italy at the earliest moment consistent with the military security.

- (b) Appointed the following sub-committee :-

Chairman - Chief of Staff

Representatives of - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Chief Signals Officer
Director, F.B.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, INOC.

Secretary - Major W. ... Barnister

to examine and report to him :-

- (i) At that juncture the removal of the F.B. screen on news issued to the Italian press should be effected, and the operation of private news agencies in Italy permitted.
- (ii) That safeguards should be established to ensure that there should be no development in Italy of a monopolistic indigenous news agency.
- (iii) That measures should be taken in regard to the dissemination of news in Italy to avoid the

He considered that the purpose for which these agencies were now trying to secure entry into the country, was to establish their post-war position.

COLONEL HUTCHENS said that on grounds of military security a change would not be propitious at the present moment.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-MANDER :

(a) Agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in ITALY at the earliest moment consistent with the military security.

(b) Appointed the following sub-committee :-

Chairman - Chief of Staff

Representatives of - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Chief Signals Officer
Director, F.B.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, INO.

Secretary - Major W. A. Bannister

to examine and report to him :-

(i) At that juncture the removal of the P.B. screen on news issued to the Italian press should be effected, and the operation of private news agencies in ITALY permitted.

(ii) That safeguards should be established to ensure that there should be no development in ITALY of a monopolistic indigenous news agency.

(iii) That measures should be taken in regard to the dissemination of news in ITALY to avoid the publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest to the prejudice of military operations,

and that the Sub-Committee confine their recommendations to that part of ITALY, responsibility for the administration of which had been returned to the Italian Government.

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/s. RLLIF

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6. RELIEF IN YUGOSLAVIA

N 352

(Previous reference FC (44) 35th Meeting - Minute 9)

THE CONFERENCE had before them telegram No. FK 69206 to Brigadier Maclean, directing him to endeavour to reach agreement with Marshal Tito on the subject of relief, and telegram No. M.F. 829 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the contents of a telegram received from Brigadier Maclean showing the urgent need of relief in D.M.T.L. and of the contents of the Supreme Allied Commander's reply.

MAJOR GENERAL ROCKS pointed out that the reason for the breakdown of negotiations with Tito had been his failure to allow adequate supervision of relief distribution in accordance with the requirements of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McARNEY observed that there would be little prospect of obtaining any relaxation of these requirements from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. GREGG stated that an unconfirmed report had that morning reached him that Marshal Tito had agreed to the principle of unrestricted observation and to the entry initially of 100 observers.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above discussion.

7. STATUS OF URR. - GREECE

THE CONFERENCE :-

Took note of telegram No. LI 189 from III Corps, reporting that URR. was withdrawing its personnel from integration with ML GREECE in the ATHENS-PARIS area, and of telegrams Nos. FK 69914 and M.F. 462 to URR. LONDON and C.C.S. respectively requesting them to instruct Chief, URR., GREECE Commission, that in any area of withdrawal due to hostilities re-integration should be effected immediately upon cessation of such hostilities.

J. H. L. Scullies
J. H. L. SCULLIES,
COLONEL,
STORY IV.

of negotiations with Tito had been his failure to allow adequate supervision of relief distribution in accordance with the requirements of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL L. MCARDNEY observed that there would be little prospect of obtaining any relaxation of these requirements from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. OTMIL stated that an unconfirmed report had that morning reached him that Marshal Tito had agreed to the principle of unrestricted observation and to the entry initially of 100 observers.

THE SUPREMACY-LED COMANDER :

Took note of the above discussion.

7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GARRISON

THE CONFERENCE :-

Took note of telegram No. LI 189 from III Corps, reporting that UNRRA was withdrawing its personnel from integration with EL GRECE in the JIBENS-PIRATUS area, and of telegrams Nos. PR 69914 and KIT 462 to UNRRA, LONDON and CC-C respectively requesting them to instruct Civil, UNRRA, GRACE Commission, that in any area of withdrawal due to hostilities re-integration should be effected immediately upon cessation of such hostilities.

J. H. L. SCOTT
J. H. L. SCOTT,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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SAC (P) (44) 162
7 January 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by the Secretary

1. It was stated by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission at SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting (Minute 3) that the Italian Government was about to issue a statement concerning the agreements executed between the Committee of National Liberation for Southern Italy, on the one hand, and the Allied Command and the Italian Government, respectively, on the other.
2. Attached at ANNEX "A" is a translation by the Allied Commission of the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944 after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note.

J. H. MacGillivray
 J. H. MACGILLIVRAY,
 COLONEL,
 SECRETARY.

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| Director, FBI | 25 |
| Secretary, General Staff | 26 |
| Secretary, IS & PS | 27-29 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 30 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 31-33 |
| G-1 (..) | 34 |

1. It was stated by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission at SIC (P) (44) 37th Meeting (Minute 3) that the Italian Government was about to issue a statement concerning the agreements executed between the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy, on the one hand, and the Allied Command and the Italian Government, respectively, on the other.

2. Attached at Annex "A" is a translation by the Allied Commission of the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944 after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note.

J. H. Lascelles
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AMTEX #69

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PRESS OFFICE

The President of the Council informs to have received the following message from the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy:

"The Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy, confronted with the urgent task that the anti-Nazi liberation war imposes on the new Italian democracy, conscious of the responsibilities of all people anxious for a free men's peace in this moment in which war is nearing its ultimate phase;

"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifices are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties in enemy occupied territory, is inaccurate. The Allied military authorities have not accorded any form of political recognition of the aforesaid Committee of Northern Italy, but they have agreed with it on military measures aiming to the prosecution of the war behind the enemy lines. On the other hand the Italian Government, having a wider sphere of action, has recognized the CLNAI as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the still occupied territories

The President of the Council informs to have received the following message from the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy:

"The Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy, confronted with the urgent task that the anti-Nazi liberation war imposes on the new Italian democracy, conscious of the responsibilities of all people anxious for a free men's peace in this moment in which war is nearing its ultimate phase;

"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
6th January 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

There will be NO meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) on Tuesday, 9 January, 1945. The date of the next political meeting will be notified later.

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
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There will be NO meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) on Tuesday, 9 January, 1945. The date of the next political meeting will be notified later.

for enclosed
J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting
30th December 1944

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COPY NO 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON SATURDAY 30
DECEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Consultant, Allied Commission

PRESENT :-

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Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ivo C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

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Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Hooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery V. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Noss,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

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Chief Commr (31)
C of S (32)
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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

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Brigadier General C.F. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

Mr. C. Orfic,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. P. Broad,
Office of British Resident Minister

Colonel A.C.M. Hobson, representing
Chief, ING

(For Items 4 and 5)

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.A. Barnister

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 19th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GRADISCA"

(Previous reference SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - Conclusions 2(a) and 2(b))

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the GRADISCA would be brought in the first instance to ALGERIA after interception, where 400 beds were available. The numbers of wounded on board would probably exceed 400, however, and it depended on instructions sought from the War Office as to the classes of patients to be disembarked whether it would be necessary to bring the vessel into the heel ports or ALGIERS. He hoped to avoid this if possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 and Annexure)

THE CONFERENCE had before them the text of an agreement signed between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) defining their mutual relations, which had received the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. P. Broad,

Office of British Resident Minister

Colonel A.C.J. Hobson, representing
Chief, INC

(Per Items 4 and 5)

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major A.M. Bannister

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Payer No. SAC (P) (44) 161 and Annexure)

THE CONFERENCE had before them the text of an agreement signed between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) defining their mutual relations, which had received the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the Italian Government would shortly announce the fact of the agreement and at the same time issue a retraction of the statement formerly made concerning the recognition of the CLNAI by the Allied Military Command.

THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of the terms of the agreement between the Italian Government and the CLNAI, as set forth in Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

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4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

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(Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 157)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Chief of Staff reporting the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on News Agencies appointed under conclusion 5 of SAC (F) (44) 36th Meeting and recommending that private news agencies be permitted to operate in Rome and that a technical sub-committee be appointed to study the further extension of their operation in liberated Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stated that at the meeting of the Sub-Committee there had been some disagreement between the viewpoints of the Allied Commission and the Psychological Warfare Branch and the admission of private news agencies to Rome had been agreed as a compromise. He felt that, although this might involve some security risk, it should be accepted. Further extension of the activities of the news agencies would be studied by the technical sub-committee, which he recommended should be under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who should report its recommendations, with his views, to AFHQ.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after 15 January 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, so inform the private news agencies.

(b) Appointed a technical sub-committee consisting of,

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Chairman
Director, FWE
Chief, INC
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ

or their representatives, to investigate at what juncture and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated Italy, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

(c) Directed that the technical sub-committee appointed under (b) above, in carrying out their investigation, have particular regard to the safeguards required to prevent the establishment of a monopolistic indigenous news agency in Italy.

(d) Directed that no measures other than normal censorship be adopted to prevent the publication of material liable to cause disorder or unrest, unless in the opinion of the competent military authorities the precipitation of a situation prejudicial to military security should be imminent.

5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 158)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stated that at the meeting of the Sub-Committee there had been some disagreement between the viewpoints of the Allied Commission and the Psychological Warfare Branch and the admission of private news agencies to HOME had been agreed as a compromise. He felt that, although this might involve some security risk, it should be accepted. Further extension of the activities of the news agencies would be studied by the technical sub-committee, which he recommended should be under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who should report its recommendations, with his views, to AFHQ.

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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Chairman
Director, PWB
Chief, INC
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ

or their representatives, to investigate at what juncture and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

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(d) Directed that no measures other than normal censorship be adopted to prevent the publication of material liable to cause disorder or unrest, unless in the opinion of the competent military authorities the precipitation of a situation prejudicial to military security should be imminent.

5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 158)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Chief, INC, recommending that the Italian Government be invited to create a Board of Governors to act as advisers to the management of ELIR, as a first step in freeing the Italian radio from Allied control.

/MR. BARNES

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MR. BARNES said that he would prefer to see more competition in the radio field. He felt also that the Italian radio should buy its news from the private news agencies, as had been approved in principle in the case of the Italian press. He advocated the earliest possible removal of all control over news issuing both through the press and through the radio, since it would be impracticable to maintain for long the distinction between news published in Rome and news published elsewhere in Italy. It must be understood, however, that the removal of control would mean that PEB would no longer be able to carry out its directives received from LONDON and WASHINGTON. PEB's function would then pass into the purely informational stage, and could more appropriately be undertaken by the Office of War Information (USA.) and the Ministry of Information (UK) on behalf of the respective governments. He suggested that he submit a paper setting forth these considerations.

MR. MONTGOMERY agreed that some adjustment of the functions of PEB would certainly follow from the freeing of the Italian press and radio and added that he believed this to be in accordance with the wishes of LONDON and WASHINGTON. He felt that the maximum liberty consistent with military security should now be accorded to the Italian press and radio, and drew a parallel between the organization proposed for ELAR and the BBC. Proposals for relaxing existing controls were already under discussion in WASHINGTON.

MR. KIRK, approving in general the proposals under discussion, added that the PEB organization would continue to have a valuable advisory function and expressed the hope that it would be retained in this capacity.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reaffirmed that his policy was to create a free Italian press and radio as early as feasible and to allow news to be published without restraint where this was possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Approved the recommendations of Chief, INC, embodied in Part III, paragraph 1, of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 156 and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, take suitable action to implement them.
- (b) Directed that Director, PEB, submit through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee his recommendations regarding the organization and functions of PEB when the Italian press and radio had been freed and what transitional measures he advised.

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 159)

THE COMMISSIONER had before him a paper requesting that the Supreme Allied Commander approve participation by representatives of the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its dependant committees.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON remarked it as unwise to appoint representa-

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Mr. CUNNINGHAM agreed that some adjustment of the functions of PFB would certainly follow from the freeing of the Italian press and radio and added that he believed this to be in accordance with the wishes of LONDON and WASHINGTON. He felt that the maximum liberty consistent with military security should now be accorded to the Italian press and radio, and drew a parallel between the organization proposed for ELIR and the BBC. Proposals for relaxing existing controls were already under discussion in WASHINGTON.

Mr. BIRN, agreeing in general the proposals under discussion, added that the PFB organization would continue to have a valuable advisory function and expressed the hope that it would be retained in this capacity.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reaffirmed that his policy was to create a free Italian press and radio as early as feasible and to allow news to be published without restraint where this was possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the recommendations of Chief, IMC, embodied in Part III, paragraph 1, of Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158 and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, take suitable action to implement them.

(b) Directed that Director, PWB, submit through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee his recommendations regarding the organization and functions of PFB when the Italian press and radio had been freed and what transitional measures he advised.

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 159)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper requesting that the Supreme Allied Commander approve participation by representatives of the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its dependant committees.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON regarded it as unwise to appoint representatives of the Italian Government on Allied standing boards and committees, since points would inevitably arise the discussion of which in the presence of Italian representatives would be undesirable and embarrassment would therefore result. He thought it preferable to co-opt Italian representatives for those meetings and subjects where their presence would be helpful.

ADJUTANT CUNNINGHAM strongly supported the viewpoint of the Chief Administrative Officer. While recognizing that there would be frequent occasions on which the presence of Italian representatives would be advantageous, particularly in the case of the Industrial Coordination Committee, he considered

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that they should be invited to attend on those specific occasions only.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTS agreed with Admiral Cunningham and pointed out that the right of access to files, which would accompany permanent Italian membership of the board or standing committees, would be undesirable.

ADMIRAL STONE asserted that the proposal before the Conference was in line with what he understood to be the intention of the President and Prime Minister and that only regular membership was consistent with the position of the Italians as cobelligerents. He felt that regular membership of the board and committees was the best means of creating in the Italian Government a better understanding of the economic problems which the allies were facing in Italy, and that it would dispel much of the feeling on the part of the Italians that the allies were deliberately impeding the economic rehabilitation of Italy. Security requirements would be met by the screening of the individuals who were to become members of the committees and of the board.

MR. McCLELLAN said that since the board made the policy decisions, leaving detail to the committees, it would be wiser not to have Italian representatives on the board. He advocated that authority be given to the chairman of each committee to invite Italian representatives to be present at appropriate committee meetings, and recommended that discussion of subjects should be so arranged that when an Italian representative was invited to attend a meeting, his presence throughout that particular meeting, for all items, would be appropriate. Items unsuitable for discussion in the presence of the Italian representative could be discussed at a separate meeting which he would not be invited to attend.

MR. KIRK queried whether security considerations applied in respect of all committees and suggested that Italian representatives might be appointed permanently to committees in respect of which no security factors arose.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, jointly authorize the Allied Local Resources (Italian) Board to invite suitable representatives of the Italian Government to attend meetings of the Board, or of its dependent committees, upon occasions when their presence would be advantageous and would not be prejudicial to military security.

7. RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ISLANDS (Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 160)

THE COMVENTMOD had before them a paper requesting a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy as to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian populations of enemy-occupied islands in the AEGEAN, and as to whether mass evacuation of civilians from those islands should be permitted.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM explained that in his view a stage had now been reached at which clarification of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy in this matter was needed. Swedish and International Red Cross relief supplies had already

very understanding of the economic problems which the Allies were facing in Italy, and that it would dispel much of the feeling on the part of the Italians that the Allies were deliberately invading the economic rehabilitation of Italy. Security requirements would be met by the screening of the individuals who were to be members of the committee and of the board.

MR. D. MILLER said that since the board made the policy decisions, leaving details to the committees, it would be wiser not to have Italian representatives on the board. He suggested that authority be given to the chairman of each committee to invite Italian representatives to be present at appropriate committee meetings, and recommended that discussion of subjects should be so arranged that when an Italian representative was invited to attend a meeting his presence there, out of that particular meeting, for all items, would be appropriate. Items unsuitable for discussion in the presence of the Italian representative could be discussed at a separate meeting which he would not be invited to attend.

MR. KIRBY queried whether security considerations applied in respect of all committees and suggested that Italian representatives might be appointed permanently to committees in respect of which no security factors arose.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, jointly authorize the Allied Local Resources (Italian) Board to invite suitable representatives of the Italian Government to attend meetings of the Board, or of its dependent committees, upon occasions when their presence would be advantageous and would not be prejudicial to military security.

7. RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ISLANDS (Paper No. SAC (I) (44) 160)

THE CONFERENCE met before there was a paper requesting a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy as to whether relief supplies should be dispatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian populations of enemy-occupied islands in the Aegean, and as to whether mass evacuation of civilians from these islands should be permitted.

MR. IAN CAMPBELL explained that in his view a stage had now been reached at which clarification of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy in this matter was needed. Swedish and International Red Cross relief supplies had already been authorized for admission into enemy-occupied CRETE, and relief was being sent under Allied arrangements to the neighbouring part of CRETE not occupied by the enemy. A delegation had come out of KRODES asking for relief supplies and for the mass evacuation of the civilian population of that island. He pointed out that the relief or evacuation of civilians in the German-occupied AEGEAN islands would alleviate the position of the enemy garrisons and would immeasurably increase Allied difficulties in the eastern Mediterranean.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had already requested from the staff a paper embodying details of the location and strength of German garrisons,

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the numbers and nationality of the civilian populations of the islands, and other pertinent facts. He pointed out that there were the following alternatives: to mop up the German garrisons on the islands, for which sufficient resources could not be made available; evacuation of civilians, which also was not feasible; allowing the civilian populations to starve, which was undesirable; and making it possible for shipments of food to reach them, which probably would be the desirable alternative, and which, if done, should probably be under Swedish and International Red Cross auspices.

MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED said that the object of the enemy in leaving garrisons on some of the AEGEAN Islands was to cause as much embarrassment to the Allies as possible. The admission of relief to the islands would further this object. The enemy were responsible under International law for the civil populations of the islands which they held.

MR. McSHILLAK pointed out that if the relief came from Red Cross sources it would be carried in ships not in the Allied shipping pool.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS stated that indirectly Allied shipping would be affected by such shipments, since the ships used were vessels which the Allies could have seized, but did not seize, under their right of angary.

MINISTER OF GENERAL HANDING said that it would be desirable to have a statement from the Navy as to the extent to which International Red Cross relief shipments to the AEGEAN Islands would affect Allied shipping.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and G-2, review the situation in respect of civilian populations in the enemy-occupied area of GREECE and in enemy-occupied BULGARIAN and AEGEAN Islands and recommend what policy should be adopted in each case in regard to their relief and/or evacuation, taking into account particularly the following factors :-

- (a) the location, strength and supply position of the enemy garrisons;
- (b) the numbers and nationalities of the civilian populations and their capacity to support themselves;
- (c) the effect of admitting relief supplies under Swedish or International Red Cross auspices on -
 - (i) the capacity of the enemy garrisons to hold out,
 - (ii) the Allied shipping position in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- (d) the availability of Swedish or International Red Cross relief supplies in the Eastern Mediterranean;

(e) the administrative implications of the evacuation of the civilian populations, taking into account the fact that enemy-held areas

risings on some of the Aegean Islands was to cause as much embarrassment to the Allies as possible. The admission of relief to the islands would further this object. The enemy were responsible under International law for the civil populations of the islands which they held.

Mr. MacMillan pointed out that if the relief came from Red Cross sources it would be carried in ships not in the Allied shipping pool.

GENERAL CURTIS stated that indirectly Allied shipments would be affected by such shipments, since the ships used were vessels which the Allies could have seized, but did not seize, under their right of enemy.

DEUTERANT GENERAL HARDING said that it would be desirable to have a statement from the Navy as to the extent to which International Red Cross relief shipments to the Aegean Islands would affect Allied shipping.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and G-2, review the situation in respect of civilian populations in the enemy-occupied area of CRETE and in enemy-occupied DODECANESE and Aegean Islands and recommend what policy should be adopted in each case in regard to their relief and/or evacuation, taking into account particularly the following factors :-

- (a) the location, strength and supply position of the enemy garrisons;
- (b) the numbers and nationalities of the civilian populations and their capacity to support themselves;
- (c) the effect of admitting relief supplies under Swedish or International Red Cross auspices on -
 - (i) the capacity of the enemy garrisons to hold out,
 - (ii) the Allied shipping position in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- (d) the availability of Swedish or International Red Cross relief supplies in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- (e) the administrative implications of the evacuation of the civilian populations, in whole or in part, from enemy-held areas;
- (f) the naval indications of the relief and/or evacuation of these civilian populations.

8. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

THE CONFERENCE :

Task note of telegram No. MAP 330 of 21 December 1944 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting a statement of policy on the provision of bread for the populations of ITALY, SICILY and SARDEGNA, and the

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allocation of shipping to implement that policy; and of telegram No. IAC 911 of 22 December 1944, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, furnishing an estimate of the stocks and monthly sailings necessary to provide a 300 tonne basic bread ration for ITALY and SICILY and SARDINIA.

9. RELIEF TO ALBANIA

(Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 156)

THE CONFERENCE had before them, for information, a paper by the Assistant Chief of Staff, 3-5, describing the status of Albanian relief arrangements, in stating in particular that the ship to carry engineer stores for repair of the port of DURRIZO was not being called forward pending the outcome of negotiations with Colonel-General Hoxha.

ADMIRAL GUNNINGHAM stressed the need for a careful survey of the requirements necessary for opening up the port of DURRIZO, including the minesweeping commitment involved, since these requirements could only be met at the expense of other commitments. He understood that AL AIRMAIL were revising their requirements, particularly in respect of landing craft.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON remarked that no actual relief could proceed to ALBANIA before February 1945.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 156 and of the above discussion.

10. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALBANIA

THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of telegram No. W-79253 of 19 December 1944, and telegram No. W-80599 of 29 December 1944, from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US War Department respectively, stating that the United States did not contemplate sending a military mission to ALBANIA, but that it contemplated sending a State Department political representative and, possibly, military observers.

11. SPANISH AIR LINE TO THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR reported that advice had been received through the United States Political Adviser that the Spanish Government wished to operate a civil air line from the Spanish mainland to the BALEARIC Islands. The State Department were under the impression that RAF had previously agreed to the operation of this line. While this was not the case, and some confusion with the projected line to the Canaries had arisen, RAF in fact had no objection, and he understood that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement. It was merely a question of issuing the necessary warnings. The Spanish Government should be advised that the air line should comply with the existing Allied instructions regarding aircraft flying in the vicinity of Allied shipping, and should be warned that the use of JU52s would increase the risk of incidents.

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X

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that no complications vis-à-vis Allied shipping were likely to arise at present, but they might arise in the future if the GIBRALTAR-BALEARIC route were shortened.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser to inform the U.S. State Department that he had no objection to the inauguration by the Spanish Government of the proposed airline from BARCELONA to PALMA, subject to the considerations raised by the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean at (X) above.

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- (5) Directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, convey to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, for comment, through the State Department to the Spanish Government, the details of the procedures and instructions which the proposed airborne should observe to avoid incidents with Allied shipping.

12. EVACUATION OF EPIROS AND IONIAN ISLANDS

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM referred to the evacuation of PATRIZIA now proceeding and pointed out that Zervas was asking for the evacuation of 500 of his troops and of approximately 5,500 civilians from the island of LEVKAS. There appeared to be a possibility that a request would also be made for the evacuation of civilians from ZANTE and KEFALONIA. He observed that the evacuation of Greek civilians from these localities was not a commitment which he could accept. He added that he had understood the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to be to give no support either to EDES or to ELAS in this area except by way of evacuating EDES forces, but a telegram had now been received from 3 Corps indicating that a Naval patrol of the straits inside CORFU would be arranged in order to prevent landings on CORFU by ELAS or the Albanians before the island was in a position to defend itself.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the view that the 500 EDES troops should be evacuated from LEVKAS but not the 5,500 civilians. His intention was to reduce the military commitment in GREECE to the minimum as soon as possible. Evacuation of Allied troops from SALONIKA and PATRAS would be effected in accordance with this policy when conditions permitted. While the evacuation of EDES forces was desirable for humanitarian reasons actual support of Zervas would have increased the military commitment in GREECE and could not therefore be entertained.

MR. MACILLAN added that the principle followed was not to support or to make use of Greek partisan forces but only of such Greek forces as were called up legally under the auspices of the Greek Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, discuss with him further the question of evacuation of Greeks from the IONIAN Islands.

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Deputy Chief of Staff
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British Resident Minister
Director, P.E.
Secretary, General Staff

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J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, discuss with him further the question of evacuation of Greeks from the IONIAN Islands.

J.H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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- Sir Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
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- U.S. Political Advisor
- British Resident Minister
- Director, FMS
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, ES & PS
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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- G-1 (B)
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERSSUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences during week ending 30th December, 1944, will be arranged as follows:-

1. There will be NO meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference on Tuesday 26th December, 1944.
2. The 37th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference is provisionally scheduled to take place at 1030 hours on Friday 29th December. This meeting will be followed immediately by the Supreme Allied Commander's (Operational) Conference.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander's 9 o'clock meeting will NOT be held on Christmas Day.

J. H. Laschilles
J. H. LASCHILLES
CHIEF
SECRETARY.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
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G-1 (E)
G-2
G-3
G-4 (A)
G-4 (E)
G-4 (Mov & In)
G-4 (Log Plans)
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Chief Signals Officer
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British Resident Minister
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS

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3. The Supreme Allied Commander's 9 o'clock meeting will NOT be held on Christmas Day.

J. E. Lascelles
J. E. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Adm Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
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- G-1 (B)
- G-2
- G-3
- G-4 (A)
- G-4 (B)
- G-4 (Mov & Tr)
- G-5 (Log Plans)
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Chief Signals Officer
- U.S. Political Adviser
- British Resident Minister
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, IS & PS
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- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
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23rd December, 1944.

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SAC (F) (L/S) 36th Meeting
17th December 1944

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Please note that the time at which the next meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held is 1030 hrs on Tuesday 19th December.

to be seen by
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander's conference will be held is 1030 hrs on Tuesday 19th December.

de la...
J.H. LASCEAUX,
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SLC(P)(44)153
16 December 1944

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

POLICY REGARDING PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Notes by Secretary

1. In a previous paper (number PC (44)127) the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee recommended:

a. That private news agencies should not be allowed to start up in Italy as long as that country remained a theatre of operations.

b. That P.W. should endeavor to prepare the ground for the establishment of Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function when privately owned agencies begin to operate. This co-operative agency could be owned and operated by member newspapers and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

2. This paper was discussed at PC (44)32nd Meeting when the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the British Resident Minister both requested that the foregoing policy should be revised and that in order to give the Italians greater liberty, private agencies should now be permitted. In consequence, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that P.W., G-2, G-5 and the Allied Commission, should endeavor to agree on the action to be taken and report accordingly.

3. The Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee therefore held a meeting in Rome with the Allied Commission and G-5, at which it was agreed that P.W. would not interpose any objection to the entrance of private news agencies. It was, however, pointed out that their entrance might:

a. Retard the progress of a non-monopolistic private Italian agency.

b. Possibly impair the political situation through the admission of the news from outside sources which are, at the present time, screened by P.W.

4. It has been determined from consultations with the private news agencies that they will be willing and able to take over as from 15 January.

5. G-2 point out that, although there does not appear to be any direct security risk from the entrance of these private agencies, there is, in view of the disturbed political situation in the rest of territory, an indirect risk that unfiltered news might further impair the political situation to

1. In a previous paper (number FC (44)127) the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee recommended:

a. That private news agencies should not be allowed to start up in Italy as long as that country remained a theatre of operations.

b. That P B should endeavor to prepare the ground for the establishment of Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function then privately owned agencies begin to operate. This co-operative agency could be owned and operated by member news-papers and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

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b. Possibly impair the political situation through the admission of the news from outside sources which are, at the present time, screened by P B.

4. It has been determined from consultations with the private news agencies that they will be willing and able to take over as from 15 January.

5. G-2 point out that, although there does not appear to be any direct security risk from the entrance of these private agencies, there is, in view of the disturbed political situation in liberated territory, an indirect risk that unfiltred news might further impair the political situation to such an extent that it might become necessary to withdraw Allied troops from the front for internal security measures.

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6. The ruling of the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested as to whether the political advantage to be obtained by allowing the entrance of private agencies into W.L.V. justifies the increased military risk involved.

by Sweetman
for J. H. L. SCHELLS
COLOMEL
SECRETARY

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Director, F B
Secretary, General Staff
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Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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