

ACC

10000/135/3

10000/135/3

CONFERENCES, GENERAL
MAR. - AUG. 1944

AGENDA FOR A CONFERENCE - DIFFICULTIES OF THE
ITALIAN AIR FORCE - TO BE HELD AT HQ, MED/M.E.,
AT 11.00 HOURS ON TUESDAY, 8TH. AUGUST, 1944.

TRAINING:

1. Is the training of the I.A.F. to continue after the present 5 Squadrons have become operational. If so, is a training establishment to be set up for this purpose.

MAINTENANCE ORGANISATION:

2. Is the A.C.C. to be responsible for 1st and 2nd Echelon maintenance of Italian Units of the Balkan Air Force.

The A.C.C. is responsible for 3rd and 4th Echelon maintenance of all Units of the Italian Air Force. Are they in a position to accept this commitment. If not, how soon will they be ready to service :-

- (a) Baltimores,
- (b) P.39's,
- (c) Engines.

4. Have the Italian Air Force an Equipment Holding Unit for storage of

- (a) P.39 aircraft,
- (b) Equipment and Spares for P.39's.

ISSUES FROM AMERICAN SOURCES:

5. What arrangements have been made by A.C.C. with the AAFSC/MED with regard to the terms of issue of P.39 aircraft and spares to the I.A.F.

ESTABLISHMENTS:

6. The A.C.C. have no servicing or Equipment personnel over and above a few Staff personnel who are attempting Unit work for five Squadrons. Is the BALKAN AIR FORCE prepared to lend the Fighter Wing Liaison Section to the A.C.C. for Unit work until the Units are all handed over to the Balkan Air Force. Alternatively, is an additional establishment required in the A.C.C. for this purpose.

7. Certain Tradesmen have been lent to the A.C.C. for Technical training of the I.A.F. on BALTIMORE aircraft. When can these men be released to return to No. 214 Group.

8. Are the A.C.C. able, and willing, to provide this M.O. with copies of the I.A.F. Unit Establishments of personnel and transport. (Information on STRENGTH is also required).

2. Is the A.C.C. to be responsible for 1st and 2nd Echelon maintenance of Italian Units of the Balkan Air Force.
3. The A.C.C. is responsible for 3rd and 4th Echelon maintenance of all Units of the Italian Air Force. Are they in a position to accept this commitment. If not, how soon will they be ready to service :-

- (a) Baltimores,
- (b) P.39's,
- (c) Engines.

4. Have the Italian Air Force an Equipment Holding Unit for storage of
 - (a) P.39 aircraft,
 - (b) Equipment and Spares for P.39's.

ISSUES FROM AFRICAN SOURCES:

5. What arrangements have been made by A.C.C. with the AAFSC/AFMO with regard to the terms of issue of P.39 aircraft and spares to the I.A.F.

ESTABLISHMENTS:

6. The A.C.C. have no servicing or Equipment personnel over and above a few Staff personnel who are attempting Unit work for five Squadrons. Is the BALKAN AIR FORCE prepared to lend the Fighter Wing Liaison Section to the A.C.C. for Unit work until the Units are all handed over to the Balkan Air Force. Alternatively, is an additional establishment required in the A.C.C. for this purpose.

7. Certain Tradesmen have been lent to the A.C.C. for Technical training of the I.A.F. on BALTIMORE aircraft. When can these men be released to return to No. 214 Group.

8. Are the A.C.C. able, and willing, to provide this H.Q. with copies of the I.A.F. Unit Establishments of personnel and transport. (Information on STRENGTH is also required).

132

PRIORITIES:

9. What is to be the priority of issues of equipment, transport, Flying Clothing, 'C' Stores, etc., to the I.A.F., via a via issues to 500 Squadron and the Baltimore Wing in D.A.F., and other general operational commitments.

CONDITION OF OPERATIONAL P.39's.

10. The A.C.C. has complained to this H.Q., of the operational fitness of the P.39 aircraft being issued. Has the complaint been represented to AAFSC/AFMO and if so, where is the reply.

Paragraph 11 / Continued....

CONTINUED...

METHOD OF APPROACH OF A.C.C. TO AMERICAN SUPPLY AUTHORITIES:

11. What are the methods adopted by the A.C.C. to overcome difficulties which may be experienced by the Italians in dealing with AAFSC/ATO over questions of Supply.
12. What is the position with regard to the supply of Ammunition.
13. What is the position in regard to the suspension of issue of Ground Equipment for P.39 aircraft.
14. What steps has the A.C.C. taken with the AAFSC/ATO to obtain information with regard to action being taken by AAFSC/ATO to have the supplies authorized.
15. Can A.C.C. keep this H.Q. informed of the steps taken, and replies received, on matters of this kind.

14.

What steps has the A.C.C. taken with the AAFSC/MTO to obtain information with regard to action being taken by AAFSC/MTO to have the supplies authorized.

15.

Can A.C.C. keep this H.Q. informed of the steps taken, and replies received, on matters of this kind.

MAAF/2342/EQ.
7th. August. 1944.

C.M.S.O.
H.Q. MAAF C.I.F.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES
APO 650

30
ADS-HCH-THH

22 August 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution:

1. A meeting was held at AAFSC/MTO, 21 August 1944, to determine scale of equipment and supplies for IAF. The following were present:

Col. Smith	AAFSC/MTO
Lt. Col. Hahn	AAFSC/MTO
Col. Eaton	AAF/MTO
Lt. Col. Hartwig	AAF/MTO
G/Capt. Eccles	ACC
W/Cmdr Dunlop	ACC

Adm. Dunlop 2/18

2. In accordance with General Eaker's directive, it was agreed:

- To deliver P-39 aircraft combat worthy.
- To supply such tools, spares, and equipment as is necessary to keep the P-39's operational, the IAF to supply common items from their own supply.

3. Aircraft:

To be delivered equipped as per Form AAF #263, less certain items agreed between AAFSC/MTO and ACC.

4. OEL:

Such items as set forth in Memo from General Borum to General Whitten, dated 10 August 1944, and agreed between Lt. Col. Hahn and W/Cmdr Dunlop.

5. Engines:

30 day level of spare engines will be supplied based on 200 combat hours average change time. AAFSC/MTO will obtain from U.S. other commitments for P-39 engines and will then give balance of spares to IAF.

6. Common Spares:

AAFSC/MTO will deliver a 90 day level, based on AAF Table II pack-up.

7. Engine Spares:

2. In accordance with General Eaker's directive, it was agreed:

- a. To deliver P-39 aircraft combat worthy.
- b. To supply such tools, spares, and equipment as is necessary to keep the P-39's operational, the IAF to supply common items from their own supply.

3. Aircraft:

To be delivered equipped as per Form AAF #263, less certain items agreed between AAFSC/MTO and ACC.

4. OEL:

Such items as set forth in Memo from General Borum to General Whitten, dated 10 August 1944, and agreed between Lt. Col. Hahn and W/Cmdr Dunlop.

5. Engines:

30 day level of spare engines will be supplied based on 200 combat hours average change time. AAFSC/MTO will obtain from U.S. other commitments for P-39 engines and will then give balance of spares to IAF.

6. Common Spares:

AAFSC/MTO will deliver a 90 day level, based on AAF Table II pack-up.

7. Engine Spares:

No spares except top overhaul exist in the theater. AAFSC/MTO will supply a 90 day level of same.

8. Belly Tanks:

Col. Eaton will get decision as to whether 180 each, 75 gallon belly tanks per month will be supplied.

9. Propellers and Hub Assemblies:

These items are critical; AAFSC/MTO will get a decision from the U.S. as to the level of spare props and hubs to be delivered to the IAF.

10. Spares Peculiar to P-39's:

All surplus after meeting American and Allied commitments will be turned over to IAF.

SECRET

AAFSC/MTO
AAFSC/MTO
AAF/MTO
AAF/MTO
ACC
ACC
Lt. Col. Hahn
Col. Eaton
Lt. Col. Hartwig
G/Capt. Eccles
W/Cmdr Dunlop

SECRET

(Memo re IAF, 22 August 1944, cont'd)

11. Ammo and Practice Bombs:

37mm: AAFSC/MTO will supply, based on monthly estimates submitted by Balkan Air Force.

100 lb. practice bombs: AAFSC/MTO will supply 100 now and 50 per month on demand.

12. Bombs:

Balkan Air Force to submit monthly requirements to A-4, AAF/MTO. Col. Eaton will determine from Air C-in-C whether demands will be met.

13. It is clearly understood that the equipment and spares to be delivered depend upon their being available in the theater. No equipment or spares will be requisitioned from the U.S.

14. The following schedule of delivery of aircraft was agreed:

- a. 10 to 12 the first week.
- b. 4 to 6 each week thereafter until 48 have been delivered.
- c. Delivery of balance to be determined at a later date.

15. Delivery of Supplies:

AAFSC/MTO will make equipment and supplies FOB their depots, ACC will arrange transportation.

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - AAF/MTO (C/S, A-3, A-4)
 1 - ACC (Air Force Sub-Commission), Rome
 1 - ACC (" " " ")
 1 - ACC (" " " ")
 1 - ACC (" " " ")
 10 - AAFSC/MTO
 10 - Balkan Air Force
 1 - MAAF, CMSC

W. H. Eaton
 W. H. EATON
 Colonel, A.C.
 Asst C/S, A-4

13. It is clearly understood that the equipment and spares to be delivered depend upon their being available in the theater. No equipment or spares will be requisitioned from the U.S.

14. The following schedule of delivery of aircraft was agreed:

- a. 10 to 12 the first week.
- b. 4 to 6 each week thereafter until 48 have been delivered.
- c. Delivery of balance to be determined at a later date.

15. Delivery of Supplies:

AAFSC/MTO will make equipment and supplies FOB their depots, ACC will arrange transportation.

W. H. Eaton
W. H. EATON,
Colonel, A.C.
Asst C/S, A-4

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - AAF/MTO (C/S, A-3, A-4)
- 1 - ACC (Air Force Sub-Commission); Rome
- 1 - ACC (" "); Bari ✓
- 1 - ACC (" "); Naples ✓
- 10 - AAFSC/MTO
- 10 - Balkan Air Force
- 1 - MAAF, CMSC

SECRET
2

ICE.
slope.
ss Flap.

CYPHER SIGNAL OXM 99/16

TO AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION = ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION BARI
(R) AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAPLES

FROM AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION , ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ROME BT

RA113 16 AUGUST SECRET . FROM BUSCARLET . REFERENCE
MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT MAAF AUGUST 8 . TO DISCUSS
PROGRESS AND POSITION OF IAF 1 . BARI ARE TO TAKE ACTION ON
POINTS AS FOLLOWS . PARA 11 (A) PRESS BAF FOR WASTAGE
RATES OF AIRCRAFT AND CONFIRM WITH MAAF THAT RATES FOR
AIRCREW AND AIRCRAFT CAN BE ACCEPTED . PARA 13 (A) (B)
(C) PUT PRESSURE ON ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION REQUIRED AND CONSULT WITH BAF AS TO MINIMUM
TRANSPORT ESTABLISHMENT . 2. NAPLES ARE TO EXAMINE PARA 14
AND HAVE RECOMMENDATIONS READY FOR ME ON MY RETURN TO NAPLES
AS X TO WHAT TRADESMEN CAN BE RELEASED . ALSO PARA 15 (C)
INFORM/AFSC/HTO THAT WE PREFER DELIVERY OF P 39'S
ON DEMAND AND IF ANY DIFFICULTY SIGNAL NAME OF OFFICER
WHO I SHOULD INTERVIEW ON MY RETURN TO NAPLES

BT 161210B TOD 170230B

AFSC NAPLES

SGT HARRIS/JRW

SECRET

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD AT HQ. I.A.A.F.
ON WEDNESDAY, 6th AUGUST, 1944 TO DISCUSS
THE PROGRESS & POSITION OF THE ITALIAN AIR
FORCE.

Present:-

Chief of Staff, MEAME.

A.O.A.

C.M.S.O.

D/A.O.A.

War Org. (Morning session only)

O.2 (Part of afternoon session)

S/Ldr. Eng.

A.O.C. . .

A.C.C.

G/Capt. Eccles, A.F.S.C., A.C.C.

A/Cdre. Jackson, A.O.A., B.A.F. (afternoon session)

1. The Chief of Staff said the meeting had been called to discuss two broad issues, namely:-

(a) The progress of the training and equipment of I.A.A.F. squadrons and the transfer of one Baltimore and one P.39 squadrons scheduled for landing over to B.A.F. on 15th August. Further, in the event of this proving impracticable, as seemed likely, what was necessary to ensure its taking place with the least delay, and by what date this could reasonably be expected.

(b) The position of the A.C.C. after handing over these squadrons and what would be required by A.V.4 A.C.C. to enable him to meet the various commitments for which he would be responsible.

BALTIMORE POSITION.

1. A.V.4 A.C.C. stated that owing to the spares position and the low priority accorded to the I.A.A.F. it was no longer possible to meet the committed date of August 15th. He expected to be able to hand over one squadron to B.A.F. in mid-September provided that equipment and particularly "Q" stores was made available.

2. Considerable discussion followed on the equipment and spares situation from which the following emerged:-

(a) There seemed little doubt that the low priority accorded to the I.A.A.F. had resulted in their demands being sunk below the incoming demands of higher priority Commands with the result that modest but essential requirements were not met by No. 114 H.U.

(b) Examination of the I.A.A.F. "Q" stores demands gave colour to

A.O.C. 1.1
G/Capt. Eccles, A.F.S.C., A.C.C.

A/Care. Jackson, A.O.C., B.A.F. (afternoon session)

1. The Chief of Staff said the meeting had been called to discuss two broad issues, namely:-

(a) The progress of the training and equipment of I.A.F. squadrons in the transfer of one Baltimore unit to P.39 squadrons scheduled for landing over to B.A.F. on 15th June. Further, in the event of this proving impracticable, as seemed likely, what was necessary to ensure its taking place with the least delay, and by what date this could reasonably be expected.

(b) The position of the A.C.C. after handing over these squadrons and what would be required by A.F. A.C.C. to enable him to meet the various commitments for which he would be responsible.

BALTIMORE POSITION.

A.V.M. A.C.C. stated that owing to the spare position and the low priority accorded to the I.A.F. it was no longer possible to meet the committed date of August 15th. He expected to be able to hand over one squadron to B.A.F. in mid-September provided that equipment and particularly "Q" stores was made available.

2. Considerable discussion followed on the equipment and spare situation from which the following emerged:-

(a) There seemed little doubt that the low priority accorded to the I.A.F. had resulted in their demands being sunk below the incoming demands of higher priority Commands with the result that modest but essential requirements were not met by No. 114 H.U.

(b) Examination of the I.A.F. "Q" stores demands gave colour to this, since many contained small quantities which if issued could not adversely affect other Commands.

(c) That the I.A.F. had never received, and needed an initial issue of equipment, to provide a working stock and backing. Unlike P.A.T.A.F. and B.A.F., the I.A.F. had no ACPs attached to provide a reserve.

(d) It appeared that B.A.F. had made a demand originally for the pack-up for five Baltimore squadrons which was reduced to three, but at the request of the H.U. to save unpacking these five pack-ups were despatched and were just arriving. A.O.C. B.A.F. stated that in an appreciation sent to M.A.A.F. ALGERS on 10th June it was made clear that the I.A.F. squadrons forming under A.C.C. and those for which the pack-ups were demanded were

128
PAGE 2.

/demanded were

. 2 .

the same. He submitted that whatever error in despatch had taken place could not be laid at the door of B.A.F., and that as the pack-ups were only now arriving, two months later, A.C.C. had not actually lost much as the result of misdirection. He had realised the importance of some of this equipment and had arranged for it to be accepted by 37 A.S.F., WCCOLA, who would unpack, bin, and meet on first priority the demands of the I.A.F. It was pointed out that at the moment B.A.F. were only immediately concerned in one Baltimore squadron, i.e. No. 13 Hellenic, and that the greatest care must be taken not to retard the I.A.F. squadrons' progress by anticipating demands.

4. Conclusions on game. Item 1.

IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) It should be made clear to the appropriate P.U.s. that a low priority does not mean non supply until overtaken by demand on higher priority is met, but a judicious interpretation. (D.H.A.S.)

(b) The I.A.F. should be given an initial issue of "C" stores on priority 1 as soon as possible. (P.H.A.S.)

(c) The I.A.F. should demand on No. 37 A.S.F. for any items which they can supply more expeditiously than other sources and fetch by air on the quickest means possible. (A.C.C. C.M.S.O.)

(d) A.C.C. should keep M.A.A.F. (P.H.A.S.) informed of any difficulties or supply under signal P.50324 dated 25/5 (Enc. 3A, 4A, 4B, 4C/2342/2a.)

P.39 POSITION.

5. A.C.C. A.C.C. said that he could make no promise as to when the P.39 squadrons could be handed over because:-

(a) There had been a complete stoppage of delivery of ground equipment and stores other than A.O.G.

(b) The operational aircraft being received were not combat-worthy and the first six required major overhaul

In discussing the second point reference was made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff's signal JMW 358 dated 29th April, 1944, (Enc. 18A file MAF/2342/2a.) which authorised the issue of "superceded types of combat-worthy aircraft." It would appear that this was a matter which should be brought up on a high level since unpredictable delay in receiving must arise.

On the question of spares the position was much the same as in the case of the Baltimores. Originally A.C.C. A.C.C. experienced no

(c) It should be made clear to the appropriate U.S. that a low priority does not mean non supply until we are down on higher priority is met, but a judicious interpretation. (D.M.S.)

(b) The I.A.F. should be given an initial issue of "C" stores on priority 1 as soon as possible. (D.M.S.)

(c) The I.A.F. should demand on No. 37 A.S.P. for any items which they can supply more expeditiously than other sources and fetch by air on the quickest means possible. (A.C.C. C.M.S.O.)

(1) A.C.C. should keep A.A.A.F. (D.M.S.) informed of any difficulties of supply. (A.C.C. dated 25/5 (Enc. 1/4, file 1142/2542/29.)

P.39 POSITION.

5. A.C.C. A.C.C. said that he could make no promise as to when the P.39 squadrons could be handed over because:-

(a) There had been a complete stoppage of delivery of ground equipment and spares other than A.C.C.

(b) The operational aircraft being received were not combat-worthy and the first six required major overhaul.

In discussing the second point reference was made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff's signal EAM 358 dated 29th April, 1944, (Enc. 184 file 1142/2542/29.) which authorised the issue of "surpassed types of combat-worthy aircraft." It would appear that this was a matter which should be brought up on a high level since unpredictable delay in receiving must be made.

On the question of spares the position was much the same as in the case of the Baltimore. Originally A.C.C. A.C.C. experienced no difficulties, and the local U.S. authorities promised to issue certain equipment and "C" stores. These did not materialise, and only lately it transpired that a policy signal cancelling this had been received from WASHINGTON. Copies of this had only been sent to us on our request on this day. From those it seemed that the matter was in discussion between high authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. A request for requirements was included but this had not been passed to A.C.C. nor had the U.S. authorities here retained a copy of A.C.C. demands.

It was pointed out that A.C.C. in the first place must deal with AAFSC 'M.T.C. on the question of requirements, and lodge with them in writing their demands if they cannot be met as a result of personnel contact, forwarding a copy to NO. 11 A.A.F. (C.M.S.O.) for higher local action.

127
/ PAGE 3.

On the question of keeping aircraft flying in such a way that the final para. of P.M. 358, reading "no aircraft can be expected to maintain these aircraft nor to supply spare parts beyond the stocks currently available in our theatre", would make the issue of available spares to keep aircraft combat-worthy aircraft, without reference outside this theatre.

A.M.M. A.C.C. stated that the P. 39 squadrons could be housed over within 14 days of receiving the necessary combat-worthy aircraft, spares and day-to-day stores.

6. Conclusion as para 3.5

IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) The attention of the C.M. C. would be drawn to the serviceability and spares situation. (C. of S.)

(b) A.C.C. would lodge with A.A.F.S. S.M.M. (copy to C.M.S.C.) a list of requirements, and that C.M.S.C. would take this up. (A.C.C. and C.M.S.C.)

(c) Items common to British and American supply should be issued for American aircraft from British stocks if available and D.M. & S. was to be so informed. (D.M. & S.)

2.39 ILLUSTRATION

1. A hold-up had been experienced receiving parts and materials, except for 37mm ammunition. This was an American supply and Washington authority was being sought. It was felt that if available in the area it should be issuable as a matter of interpretation of the intention of the original directive.

Conclusion

(a) This matter to be drawn to the attention of the C.M.C. (C. of S.)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPLY OF ENGINE AND P.39 SOURCES IN P.M. 3.

8. The question of the responsibility for supply of engine and undercarriage parts, C.C. were handed over to P.M. 3. was discussed in the light of para 358 (para. 1 above). It was clear that so far as American aircraft were concerned the U.S. authorities would receive for limited demand from both B.A.F. and C.C. and it was not responsible to expect them to tolerate submissions from two sources. So far as the Baltimore squadrons were concerned discussion took place as to whether these should be maintained by the C.C. or by the D.M.S. organization. The latter would impose an additional load on D.M.S. and relieve the I.L.P. of a responsibility which it was theirs to undertake and would be at no cost to the I.L.P. Against this it would provide a dual source of supply of aircraft engines to the Wing, involving segregation and administrative difficulties. A.M.M. A.C.C. pointed out that the maintenance of Baltimore would mean the I.L.P. taking over another factory and this would be extremely difficult to obtain.

(c) Items common to British and American supply should be issued for American aircraft from British stocks if available and D.I. 4-2. was to be so informed. (D.I. 2-3.)

1. is hold-up had been announced regarding this but was not clear, correct for 57mm ammunition. This was an limited supply and was in short supply. It was felt that it was available in the area it should be issuable as a matter of interpretation of the intention of the original directive.

(iv) The matter be drawn to the attention of the S.D.O., G.
(G. of S.)

3. The on this of the responsibility for supply once a window under training with I.C. were handed over to I.C. was discussed in the light of Aerial Mail 558, para. 5 above). It was clear that so far as American aircraft were concerned the U.S. authorities would receive coordinated demands from both B.A.F. and C.O.C. and it was not reasonable to expect them to tolerate submissions from two sources. As far as the Baltimore bombers were concerned discussion took place as to whether these could be maintained by the I.C.C. or by the B.A.F. organization. The latter would impose an additional load on D.M.C.S. and relieve the I.A.F. of a responsibility which it was theirs to undertake and would be at no cost to the B.A.F. Against this it would provide a main source of supply of aircraft engines to the Wing, involving segregation and administrative difficulties. A.M. & C.C. pointed out that the maintenance of Baltimore would mean the I.A.F. taking over another factory and this would be extremely difficult to obtain.

(c) Maintaining and improving the physical fitness of B.A.F. equipped with air force personnel and those theatre should be made through i.C.O. who could coordinate requirements with their own as necessary. (C.S.C.; B.A.F., D.H. & S.).

(b) The maintenance of Baltimore should be referred to D. M. S. for his views on his ability to supply and be considered by A.C.C. from the Italian angle. An application to be prepared for discussion as soon as possible. It was agreed that B.A.S. would deal with D. M. S. (repeating to C.M.S.O.) on questions relating to Baltimore supply. (A.C.C., C.M.S.O.; D. M. S.)

WING LIAISON SECTION.

10. The question was raised of the establishment and location of the Wing Liaison Section. Under the terms of WHEEL/1606/ORG dated 24 July this was allocated to A.C.C. with the agreement of the C. in C., but has been established on B.A.F. It was clear that the Section was divided into operational and technical administrative personnel and that while the former were an essential part of B.A.F. the latter were a necessary part of A.C.C. with the function of reporting the maintenance and supply position back to A.C.C. The Establishment Branch were consulted and

IT WAS AGREED that

- (a) Establishment LAL/HIAF/2245 should be amended to delete 1 F/Lt. Equip., 1 F/Lt. Engineering, 1 Sgt. Co./Asst., 1 V/Sgt. Fitter, 5 Sgts. Fitter IIA.
(A.O.A., Estab, A.C.C., B.A.F.)
- (b) The personnel in (a) should be added to A.C.C. establishment.
(A.O.A., A.C.C., Estab, B.A.F.)
- (c) When B.A.F. had received all its I.A.F. squadrons the whole of the personnel in (a) and (b) would be located within B.A.F. (B.A.F.)
- (d) Until such time B.A.F. would make available to A.C.C. any of the above personnel as would expedite the delivery of the squadrons. They would be required at VESUVIUS.
(B.A.F.)

SUBSEQUENT TRAINING.

11. It was clear that training would have to be continued to provide a backing for B.A.F. Italian squadrons, and B.A.F. said that they were working out wastage rates to hand to A.C.C. Since the training effort would have to be based on the operational effort, it might be necessary to limit the former, and it was suggested that the B.A.F. rates should also be sent to M.A.I.F. for comment. A.V.M. A.C.C. raised the question of the desirability of training in the MIDDLE EAST organisation, accepting that the original intention was that A.C.C. should be responsible for training. It was recognised this would add to the MIDDLE EAST commitment and would possibly be resisted by the Italians who obviously wanted to lay the foundations of a post-war Air Force.

IT WAS AGREED

- (a) That B.A.F. would send their wastage rates to HQ. M.A.I.F. as well as to A.C.C.
(B.A.F.)
- (b) That training should be assumed to be an A.C.C. responsibility as now laid down, but that the point should be brought to the notice of the C. in C.
(C. of S.)

A.V.M.

- (c) That A.C.C. would review his training requirements in the light of this, observing that the training commitment would be 10% MIDDLE EAST except for relatively few BRITISH posts to be included in the review in para. 12 below.
(A.C.C.)

ESTABLISHMENT REQUIREMENTS. A.C.C.

- (c) When B.A.F. had received all its I.A.F. squadrons the whole of the personnel in (a) and (b) would be located within B.A.F. (B.A.F.)
- (d) Until such time B.A.F. would make available to A.C.C. any of the above personnel he would expedite the delivery of the squadrons. (B.A.F.)

SUBSEQUENT TRAINING.

11. It was clear that training should have to be continued to provide a backing for B.A.F. Italian squadrons, and B.A.F. said that they were working out wastage rates to hand to A.C.C. Since the training effort would have to be based on the operational effort, it might be necessary to limit the former, and it was suggested that the B.A.F. rates should also be sent to B.A.F. for comment. A.V.M. A.C.C. raised the question of the desirability of training in the MIDDLE EAST organisation, also, time that the original intention was that A.C.C. should be responsible for training. It was recognised this would add to the MIDDLE EAST commitment and would possibly be resisted by the Italians who obviously wanted to lay the foundations of a post-war Air Force.

IT WAS AGREED

(a) That B.A.F. would send their wastage rates to HQ. M.A.F. as well as to A.C.C. (B.A.F.)

(b) That training should be assumed to be an A.C.C. responsibility as now laid down, but that the point should be brought to the notice of the C. in C. (C. of S.)

(c) That A.C.C. would review his training requirements in the light of this, observing that the training commitment would be 100% Italian except for relatively few British posts to be included in the review in para. 12 below. (A.C.C.)

ESTABLISHMENT REQUIREMENTS, A.C.C.

12. There seemed little doubt that there was a need to review the A.C.C. establishment in the terms of the work as a whole, i.e., political, in relation to B.A.F., maintenance, supply, and training, since one of the reasons for delay lay in the utilisation of staffs allotted for other duties. Emphasis was laid on the need for strict economy and close appreciation of needs.

IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) A.C.C. would make a comprehensive survey and forward their conclusions to HQ. M.A.F. (A.C.C.)

ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSPORT FOR I.A.F.

13. It was stated that no information was available on this subject. A.V.M. A.C.C. said that these did not exist, although the Italian Air Ministry were working on establishments. The root of the trouble lay in the Italians being very short of transport and quite unable to equip up to our establishments as they would wish to do. It was pointed out that transport was an essential factor in the operational employment of the squadrons and that lack of it might seriously limit this. Clearly it was necessary to define the role of the squadrons, the minimum transport needed, and then put against it what that Italians could supply. B.A.F. said that 214 Group had already been informed that transport would be required to put the I.A.F. squadrons on a similar footing to ours.

IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) B.A.F. would investigate and determine the operational role of these squadrons and make recommendations on transport requirements. (A.C.C., B.A.F.)

(b) A.C.C. to approach the Italians to find out how much transport they have available. (A.C.C.)

(c) A minimum transport establishment should be made as a result of (a) and (b) and the Italians pressed to accept it. (A.C.C.)

(d) Requirements from British sources, if any, to be notified to 214 Group with the least delay. (D.P. & S, C.M.S.C.)

TRAINING ON LOAN FROM 214 GROUP.

14. IT WAS AGREED that the above tradesmen employed on technical training on Baltimore could be released at the end of August with one or two exceptions, and that A.V.M. A.C.C. would note this in his survey (para. 12). (A.C.C., A.C.A.)

RECEPTION OF P.39s.

15. IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) Reception and holding would be done at LEVERANO. (A.C.C.)

(b) Gradual reception was preferable to bulk.

(c) A.V.M. A.C.C. would contact A.A.P.S.C./M.T.C. regarding (b). (A.C.C., C.M.S.C.)

PICTORA SPACE, I.A.F.

16. A letter has been recently dispatched on this subject.

IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) B.A.F. would investigate and determine the requirements of these squadrons and make recommendations on transport requirements.

(b) A.C.C. to approach the Italians to find out how much transport they have available. (A.C.C.)

(c) A minimum transport establishment should be made as a result of (a) and (b) and the Italians pressed to accept it. (A.C.C.)

(d) Requirements from British sources, if any, to be notified to 214 Group with the least delay. (D.M.S., C.M.S.O.)

TRANSPORT ON LOAN FROM 214 GROUP.

14. IT WAS AGREED that the above tradesmen employed on technical training on Baltimore could be released at the end of August with one or two exceptions, and that A.V.H. A.C.C. would note this in his survey (para. 12). (A.C.C., I.C.A.)

RECEPTION OF P.39s.

15. IT WAS AGREED THAT

(a) Reception and holding would be done at LIVERPOOL. (A.C.C.)

(b) Gradual reception was preferable to bulk.

(c) A.V.H. A.C.C. would contact A.I.P.S.C./M.F.O. regarding (b). (A.C.C., C.M.S.O.)

FACTORY SPACE, I.A.F.

16. A letter has been recently despatched on this subject.

IT IS AGREED THAT

(a) C.M.S.O. and I.V.A. A.C.C. would discuss this. (A.C.C., C.M.S.O.)

RATIONS FOR I.A.F.

17. Originally there were two scales of rations, Scale A being considerably superior to Scale B and given to aircrew, ground crews etc. These had now been combined into one scale slightly better than Scale B. All supply was American and all attempts to obtain a better ration had been turned down. There was a general feeling that aircrew, at least when flying operationally, should get a comparable ration, and that

/ PAGE 6.

/and that

difficulties would be met, for instance in the Baltimore wing where the Greek squadron would be on British rations and the Italian ones on reduced ones. Rations had in our own case been found to be bound up with operational efficiency, and apart from the fact that the Italians resented the difference in rations it was felt to be in our own interest that the flying crews at least should have their rations supplemented. If necessary this might have to be done from British sources. It was not merely a question of providing the Italian aircrew with the means of subsistence, but with what had been found necessary in our own and other Air Forces to keep them operationally fit. There was a medical aspect to the problem.

IT WAS AGREED

(a) That A.O.A., who was in touch with AFHQ. on the subject should continue his representations, consulting the medical authorities as necessary and press at least for the issue of flying rations as appropriate. (A.O.A.)

CONCLUSION:-

C. in C. Messrs.
C. of S. Messrs.
A.O.A. (1)

C.R.S.O. (1)

A.V.R. A.O.A. (3)

HQ. B.A.F. (3)

Encl. 64.

NOTES OF A MEETING HELD AT HEADQUARTERS, No. 214 GROUP, NAPLES, ON 8th JAN, 1944, TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL TO LET A CONTRACT TO THE ALFA-ROMEO COMPANY FOR SUPPLYING WORK FOR No. 113 G.U.

Present:

Capt. Britton.
S/Ldr. Alexander
S/Ldr. Willoughby
S/Ldr. Skinner

No. 214 Group.

Capt. A. Bowden
W/Cdr. J.E. Garland

Financial Adviser.
Asst. Financial Adviser.

W/Cdr. E.M. Winter

A.S.C.

Col. Brenta

Head of Construction, I.A.A.

Mr. Di Pites

Commissioner appointed by the project.

Mr. Bordini

Alfa-Romeo Co. Technical Administrator.

1. It was stated that the work on No. 113 G.U. had exceeded the capacity of the unit and it was necessary to find further capacity. The Alfa-Romeo Company had the necessary capacity and were willing to undertake work on I.A.A. behalf. For this purpose it was proposed to let a contract to the Alfa-Romeo Company, Bologna for repair or manufacture of technical equipment as required from time to time. The questions for the meeting to consider were

- (a) the basis on which the contractor should be remunerated.
 - (b) the procedure for placing orders.
2. After a general discussion the following points were agreed as a basis for negotiation:
- (a) that a contract should be let.
 - (b) that the contractor should be given repetition work as far as possible. This would enable bulk orders to be placed for each of which the contractor would submit a separate quotation. Prices quoted should be subject to check by No. 214 Group before acceptance, and verification that the prices quoted are fair and reasonable.
 - (c) that work done should be to the satisfaction of No. 214 Group who should be the inspecting authority under the contract.
 - (d) that raw materials for each job should if necessary be provided by No. 214 Group and accounted for by the Company to the satisfaction of the I.A.A. in a manner to be decided.

Albuquerque Technical
Institute

The company stated that the figure of 16 live apellies only, to skilled

labour, the charges for unskilled labour being included in the percentage for overheads.

4. The financial adviser pointed out:

(a) that the figure of 16 lire an hour, representing the average rate for skilled workmen, is practically the same as the highest rate paid by the U.A.A.

(b) that the rate of 250% for overheads appears much too high by comparison with actual overheads in comparable factories elsewhere.

(c) that the rate of profit is higher than obtains in the U.A.A. and North Africa.

He stated that he would have to consult the A.C.C. on the above points and after doing so would inform his Group of the result with recommendations for the financial basis of the contract.

See also letter to
Col Evans from Financial
Adviser R.A.F.
file no 1st $\frac{1}{2}$ Enclosure.....

EXCERPTS OF REPORT BY AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER'S CONFERENCE A.C.C.
30TH MAY, 1944.

0206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1. The I.A.F. has continued to support the Allied War effort.
2. The Fighter Wing has carried out offensive sweeps on the Dalmatian Coast and long range fighter escort to supply dropping missions.

215 sorties were carried out in April.
290 sorties have been carried out this month (to date).

Results have been good, rolling stock, M/T, and shipping have been damaged or destroyed.
3. The Bomber Transport Wing has been employed on supply dropping missions in the Balkans.

150 sorties were carried out in April, which dropped a net total of 143 tons of stores.

Activity this month has been limited by bad weather conditions, only 42 sorties having been successful in dropping 22 tons of supplies.

12 Cant's were attacked on 12th May by 10 plus Me.109's and 5 Cant's were shot down and 2 seriously damaged. The Cant's claim 4 109's shot down of which 2 are certainities.

In view of this and difficulty in providing long range escort, we are resorting to night flying and hope to average 6 sorties per night.
4. The Seaplane Wing has carried out good work on U-Boat hunts, convoy escort duties and Air/Sea Rescue. 5 British and 2 Italian aircrew have been rescued during the period under review.
5. In addition there were many courier, A.A. co-operation and parachute dropping flights.
6. Future Operations will continue as before, though the problem of keeping our rather elderly aircraft in a serviceable condition is growing.
7. Maintenance and Equipment have improved slightly, but have been hampered by a go-slow policy in the Italian Air Ministry, and by the failure of the Government to pay what they owe to the factories, in spite of pressure on a high level.
8. The labour dispute at the Alfa-Romeo works has been settled.
9. The SAMITA Works at REMEVEVTO has staged a remarkable recovery and will eventually be the main I.A.F. fighter repair base.
10. Substitution seems to have reached rock bottom. Although we are not up to our ceiling of 12,000, it is not clear when additional

3. The Bomber Transport Wing has been employed on supply dropping missions in the Balkans.

150 sorties were carried out in April, which dropped a net total of 145 tons of stores.

Activity this month has been limited by bad weather conditions, only 42 sorties having been successful in dropping 22 tons of supplies.

12 Cant's were attacked on 12th May by 10 plus Me.109's and 5 Cant's were shot down and 2 seriously damaged. The Cant's claim 4 109's shot down of which 2 are certain.

In view of this and difficulty in providing long range escort, we are resorting to night flying and hope to average 6 sorties per night.

4. The Seaplane Wing has carried out good work on U-Boat hunts, convoy escort duties and Air/Sea Rescue. 5 British and 2 Italian aircrew have been rescued during the period under review.

5. In addition there were many courier, A.A. co-operation and parachute dropping flights.

6. Future Operations will continue as before, though the problem of keeping our rather elderly aircraft in a serviceable condition is growing.

7. Maintenance and Equipment have improved slightly, but have been hampered by a go-slow policy in the Italian Air Ministry, and by the failure of the Government to pay what they owe to the factories, in spite of pressure on a high level.

8. The labour dispute at the Alfa-Romeo works has been settled.

9. The SANITA Works at RENEVENTO has staged a remarkable recovery and will eventually be the main I.A.F. fighter repair base.

10. Substitution seems to have reached rock bottom. Although we are not up to our ceiling of 32,000, it is not clear where additional personnel are coming from, unless we can draw on E.O.W. and other sources.

11. The Italian Air Ministry is most unsatisfactory, almost entirely on the administrative side. The operational side is hampered by inefficiency, red-tape, and a "go-slow" policy. A purge is essential.

W.B. Bunker

W.A.P. BUNKER-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

120

26th May 1944.

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

RA 0209
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION TO IONAL
COMMISSIONERS CONFERENCE A.C.C. - 30TH MAY 1944.

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF I.A.F.

1. The Italian Air Force has continued to support the Allied war effort.

2. FIGHTER WING.

The Fighter Wing has been employed on offensive sweeps on the Dalmatian Coast. Until now they have been under the operational control of the Desert Air Force, but with the commencement of the land battle D.A.F. have had their attention focussed entirely on the Italian front, and the control has now passed to 242 Group, who have welcomed their new operational units with enthusiasm. During April they carried out 215 operational sorties and to date this month (26th May) they have carried out 290 operational (offensive) sorties. Results have been good, damage having been inflicted on rolling stock, S/T, barges, schooners and small craft. They have also carried out long range escort for supply dropping aircraft.

3. BOMBER TRANSPORT WING. During April a total of 150 sorties were flown on supply dropping missions in Yugoslavia and Albania, and a net total of 143 tons of supplies were dropped. So far this month supply dropping has been severely handicapped by bad weather conditions in the Balkans, and by failure to put out ground signals in the dropping areas. Although 124 sorties (26th May) have been flown, 82 of these have been abortive, and only 22 tons of supplies have been dropped. On 14th May 12 Cant 1007 aircraft were returning from a successful mission and were attacked by 10 plus Me.109's, within sight of the Italian coast. The escort had all returned to base, and we lost 5 aircraft and crews, and had 2 more aircraft severely damaged. This is the first occasion on which the enemy has reacted in force, and the attack was well planned and carried out. There is no doubt that the cant's were taken by surprise, but they claim 4 Me.109's shot down, of which 2 are certainties, and the morale of the Cant crews is unshaken in spite of their severe blow. In view of this, and of the difficulty in keeping the long range fighters serviceable, it has been decided, for the present, to drop supplies at night. It is hoped to average 6 aircraft per night throughout the month, though this will be subject to weather conditions.

4. SEAPLANE WING.

The seaplane Wing continues to carry out very valuable work as part of the Mediterranean Area Coastal Air Forces. U-Boat hunts, convoy escort duties and Air/Sea Rescue are their main duties. A total of over 400 hours were flown on these duties during April. So far, this month, 124 sorties have been flown to date, and 20 successful Air/Sea rescue missions have resulted in saving 5 British aircrew and 2 Italian aircrew.

5. In addition there were many sorties for courier services, anti-aircraft co-operation and parachute dropping exercises.

FUTURE OPERATIONS.

sorties. Results have been good, damage minor. They have also carried out stock, M/T, barges, schooners and small craft. long range escort for supply dropping aircraft.

3. BOMBER TRANSPORT WING. During April a total of 150 sorties were flown on supply dropping missions in Yugoslavia and Albania, and a net total of 143 tons of supplies were dropped. So far this month supply dropping has been severely handicapped by bad weather conditions in the Balkans, and by failure to put out ground signals in the dropping areas. Although 124 sorties (26th May) have been flown, 82 of these have been abortive, and only 22 tons of supplies have been dropped. On 14th May 12 Cant 1007 aircraft were returning from a successful mission and were attacked by 10 plus Me.109's, within sight of the Italian coast. The escort had all returned to base, and we lost 5 aircraft and crews, and had 2 more aircraft severely damaged. This is the first occasion on which the enemy has reacted in force, and the attack was well planned and carried out. There is no doubt that the cant's were taken by surprise, but they claim 4 Me.109's shot down, of which 2 are certainties, and the morale of the Cant crews is unshaken in spite of their severe blow. In view of this, and of the difficulty in keeping the long range fighters serviceable, it has been decided, for the present, to drop supplies at night. It is hoped to average 6 aircraft per night throughout the month, though this will be subject to weather conditions.

4. SEAPLANE WING.

The seaplane wing continues to carry out very valuable work as part of the Mediterranean Area Coastal Air Forces. U-Boat hunts, convoy escort duties and Air/Sea Rescue are their main duties. A total of over 400 hours were flown on these duties during April. So far, this month, 124 sorties have been flown to date, and 100 successful Air/Sea rescue missions have resulted in saving 5 British aircrew and 2 Italian aircrew.

5. In addition there were many sorties for courier services, anti-aircraft co-operation and parachute dropping exercises.

FUTURE OPERATIONS.

6. Future operations will be limited by our ability to maintain our rather elderly aircraft in a serviceable condition. In spite of weather and other conditions, we have managed to exceed the operational effort which I set as our target the last time I addressed this Conference.

MAINTENANCE AND EQUIPMENT.

7. The maintenance and equipment aspect of the I.A.F. shows a slight improvement, despite the efforts of a "go-slow" policy which has appeared on the Administrative side of the Italian Air Ministry. What improvement there has been is entirely due to the efforts made by Colonels Brenia and Cigerza, of the Italian Air Force, and of Wing Commander Clay of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

/Continued.....2.....

-2-

8. In spite of urgent representations made on a high level the greater part of the civilian firms working for the I.A.F. have still not been paid and in consequence they are finding it extremely difficult to carry on.

9. The labour disputes at the Alfa-Romeo Works have now been settled satisfactorily, thanks to the efforts of Colonel Brenta, who has received the very greatest assistance from Colonel Poletti.

10. The S.A.N.I.T.A. Works at BENEVENTO has made considerable progress towards reconstruction. The resurrection of this Works has been truly remarkable. Two months ago it was little more than a heap of rubble, but energy and initiative have now transformed it into a very serviceable little factory, and it is still continuing hard with its reconstruction. It is hoped to turn this into the main fighter repair workshops for the I.A.F.

SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME.

11. It appears that we are now nearing rock-bottom as regards I.A.F. manpower. The number supplied to the Allied Forces is now well over 10,000, and there are outstanding demands for over 2,000 more. Although we are not yet up to our ceiling of 32,000, it is not yet clear where the additional personnel can be drawn from, unless we can tap some other source of supply, such as P.O.W. Possibly, with the fall of Rome, we shall obtain a further influx through personnel who remain behind or who cross the lines to join us.

GENERAL.

12. I am most dissatisfied with certain aspects of the Italian Air Ministry. The efforts of the operational side are hampered by inefficiency, red-tape and a deliberate "go-slow" policy. My predecessor carried out a purge on the operational side, and I have every intention of doing the same on the administrative side. Even the basic organisation within the Air Ministry is faulty and there will have to be drastic changes if the I.A.F. is to continue as an efficient fighting service.

W.A.B. Bunker.

W.A.F. BUNKER-PUSCARELLI,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

26th May 1944.

11. It appears that we are now nearing rock-bottom as regards I.A.F. manpower. The number supplied to the Allied Forces is now well over 10,000, and there are outstanding demands for over 2,000 more. Although we are not yet up to our ceiling of 32,000, it is not yet clear where the additional personnel can be drawn from, unless we can tap some other source of supply, such as P.O.W. Possibly, with the fall of Rome, we shall obtain a further influx through personnel who remain behind or who cross the lines to join us.

GENERAL.

12. I am most dissatisfied with certain aspects of the Italian Air Ministry. The efforts of the operational side are hampered by inefficiency, red-tape and a deliberate "go-slow" policy. My predecessor carried out a purge on the operational side, and I have every intention of doing the same on the administrative side. Even the basic organisation within the Air Ministry is faulty and there will have to be drastic changes if the I.A.F. is to continue as an efficient fighting service.

W.A.B. Bower-Puscalet.

W.A.F. BOWER-PUSCALET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

26th May 1944.

0 2 1 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MINUTES (A.O.C.'S MEETING NO.2 - AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION.

22nd May 1944.

FIGHTERS.

The first point Colonel Fanali raised was on the question of the future employment of Re.2002's and Re.2001's. As regards the Re.2001 the A.O.C. suggested that it should be used only as a long range fighter, and that he thought it would die out very rapidly. Colonel Fanali said that the fitting of the long range tanks took so long that he thought that there would always be some short range 2001's. The A.O.C. said that the whole question of the fighters depended on whether or not we are going to get any Allied fighters, and what types they would be. Colonel Fanali suggested that the Re.2001's with the long range tanks should be left at Lecce, and the ordinary ones go to Nuova - this was agreed.

The A.O.C. said that before talking about the Re.2002's he would like to state that he had seen Air Commodore Harcourt-Smith, A.O.C. 242 Group who was going to send a Technical N.C.O. to Nuova to help with maintenance, and also a detachment of Spitfires which will go out on the Missions with anything which is sent from Nuova, and will provide safety in the form of V.H.F. The A.O.C. was unable to say how many would be sent, but had been asked if there would be room for a Squadron. As much trouble had been taken in fitting American Bombs to the Re.2002, and as it is an accurate Dive Bomber, the A.O.C. said it should be used as such accompanied by Spitfires. Colonel Fanali was interested to know where it will be used, and was told that it would be used on the Dalmatian Coast. Many difficulties present themselves in using it on this side whilst the battle is going on, but it is hoped that the aircraft in question will ultimately be used on this side. The A.O.C. said that good care would be taken to see that they are not over-worked, so that proper maintenance can be carried out.

Colonel Fanali said that more D-B Engines were required. Colonel Brenta is arranging for more to be sent to the Alfa-Romeo Works for overhaul. The A.O.C. said that the amount of flying by the Macchi's should be cut down to one Squadron of 205's and one of 202's, but this again depended on whether Allied Aircraft were given. Every possible measure is being taken to step-up the overhaul of engines, commensurate with good workmanship. With one Squadron of 12 205's and one of 12 202's with the others behind as an immediate reserve, and with the reduced amount of flying, it was hoped to see every day on the serviceability list 12 205's serviceable and 12 202's serviceable.

Colonel Fanali asked when would the 2002's start to operate. The A.O.C. replied that their training should be finished first, and then use made of them when the Spits arrived from 242 Group. Wing Commander Clay said he thought that the aircraft should not be used too much for practise purposes, as they are now in good condition, and if they are used a great deal in this way, their serviceability would drop. Colonel Fanali said that the aircraft would only be used for training up to a total of 6/8 hours per aircraft. The total number of flying hours should not exceed 100 hours for all 2002's, of which about 80 hours had been carried out up to the present.

0 2 1 4

going to send a Technical N.C.O. to Nuova to help with maintenance, and also a detachment of Spitfires which will go out on the Missions with anything which is sent from Nuova, and will provide safety in the form of V.H.F. The A.O.C. was unable to say how many would be sent, but had been asked if there would be room for a Squadron. As much trouble had been taken in fitting American Bombs to the Re.2002, and as it is an accurate Dive Bomber, the A.O.C. said it should be used as such accompanied by Spitfires. Colonel Fanali was interested to know where it will be used, and was told that it would be used on the Dalmatian Coast. Many difficulties present themselves in using it on this side whilst the battle is going on, but it is hoped that the aircraft in question will ultimately be used on this side. The A.O.C. said that good care would be taken to see that they are not over-worked, so that proper maintenance can be carried out.

Colonel Fanali said that more D-B Engines were required. Colonel Brenta is arranging for more to be sent to the Alfa-Romeo Works for overhaul. The A.O.C. said that the amount of flying by the Macchi's should be cut down to one Squadron of 205's and one of 202's, but this again depended on whether Allied Aircraft were given. Every possible measure is being taken to step-up the overhaul of engines, commensurate with good workmanship. With one Squadron of 12 205's and one of 12 202's with the others behind as an immediate reserve, and with the reduced amount of flying, it was hoped to see every day on the serviceability list 12 205's serviceable and 12 202's serviceable.

Colonel Fanali asked when would the 2002's start to operate. The A.O.C. replied that their training should be finished first, and then use made of them when the Spits arrived from 242 Group. Wing Commander Clay said he thought that the aircraft should not be used too much for practise purposes, as they are now in good condition, and if they are used a great deal in this way, their serviceability would drop. Colonel Fanali said that the aircraft would only be used for training up to a total of 6/8 hours per aircraft. The total number of flying hours should not exceed 100 hours for all 2002's, of which about 80 hours had been carried out up to the present.

Colonel Fanali said that up to the present maintenance has not been all that it should be. Maintenance in the Squadron should deal only with the lighter form of repairs. Heavier repairs should be done in workshops. The A.O.C. said that it was the intention that in time the Sanita Factory should become the fighter repair factory, and it was not intended that major modifications and repairs should be carried out at the flight.

117

Wing Commander Shore raised the question of Vis, saying that he didn't think it expedient that the Italians should use it. On enquiry the A.O.C. was told that Vis was under the Command of H.Q. 242 Group, and he said that he would write a letter on the subject. No Advance Party is to go to Vis at present.

Wing Commander Shore said that he had noticed at Nuova that it always seemed that the same pilots were doing the job, and that this does not appear to be fair. The A.O.C. said that all pilots must be kept in practice so that they will be fit for the Allied Aircraft, if they come.

Continued.....2.....

-2-

General Piacentini said that if we get the Allied Aircraft, training could be done at Leverano. The A.O.C. said that Air Marshal Sir John Linnell had advised against using Sicily. Colonel Francois is to investigate which aerodromes would best suit the purpose.

BOMBER TRANSPORT.

Colonel Sgarlata said that in view of the recent attack made against our formation, he thinks it advisable to revise the formation and that it might be more convenient to send a smaller formation of Bombers, as 12 bombers are considered difficult to defend. Could consideration be given to either one formation of 5 or two formations of 3 to enable the fighters to exert their maximum attention, or alternatively use at night.

Group Captain Russell said he also thought smaller formations would be better. He said that one of the escort nearly always turns back, and one other usually accompanied it. Group Captain Russell recommended night flying, and the A.O.C. agreed. The A.O.C. upon enquiry, was advised that the Can'ts were all right for use as a night bomber. Colonel Sgarlata said that 6 aircraft could be used each night, but this all depends on the intensity of the job which is to be done. The S.82's can be used at night with the Can't's. The question of the Night Ops would be in the hands of the Controlling Authority, but the A.O.C. said that they can give 12 targets each night, but this does not mean that the 12 must be dropped on each night. The A.O.C. suggested that night flying should be started right away using 6 aircraft, and Group Captain Eccles agreed. Group Captain Russell asked whether lighter loads would be taken at night. General Piacentini said that this would depend whether it was moonlight or starlight. With the Can't's the same load could be carried during moonlight or starlight, but with the S.82's although the same load would be carried in moonlight, a lighter load would have to be carried at night. The A.O.C. said that a start on night ops should be made immediately. Wing Commander Clay raised the question of one S.82 at Brindisi - could it be changed for either an SM.84, 79 or 75. The A.O.C. said he would write about this.

Group Captain Eccles raised the question of an aircraft going into Berane to bring out some American wounded near about the 27th. Colonel Sgarlata said this would be impossible during the day, but said he would have a talk with the pilots before giving a final opinion. They will let the Group Captain know what state of moon is required, and how soon the operation can be carried out. The A.O.C. said he assumed that the crews will be briefed as regards making use of all navigational aids, when night flying commenced.

On request by the A.O.C. General Piacentini said he would arrange for the courier flight which at present went from Lecce to Naples three times weekly would in future call at Crotone. A lorry must be laid on to take personnel from the airfield, also a representative to pick up mails. A letter would be written about this.

SEAPLANES.

The Seaplane Wing was satisfactory. The question of fuel was

Can'ts were all right for use as a night target, but this all depends on the intensity of the 6 aircraft could be used each night, but this all depends on the intensity of the 6 aircraft. The S.82's can be used at night with the Cant's. The job which is to be done. The S.82's can be used at night with the Cant's. The question of the Night Ops would be in the hands of the Controlling Authority, but the A.O.C. said that they can give 12 targets each night, but this does not mean that the 12 must be dropped on each night. The A.O.C. suggested that night flying should be started right away using 6 aircraft, and Group Captain Eccles agreed. General Piacentini said that this would depend whether it was moonlight or starlight. With the Cant's the same load could be carried during moonlight or starlight, but with the S.82's although the same load would be carried in moonlight, a lighter load would have to be carried at night. The A.O.C. said that a start on night ops should be made immediately. Wing Commander Clay raised the question of one S.82 at Brindisi - could it be changed for either an SM.84, 79 or 75. The A.O.C. said he would write about this.

Group Captain Eccles raised the question of an aircraft going into Berane to bring out some American wounded near about the 27th. Colonel Sgarlata said this would be impossible during the day, but said he would have a talk with the pilots before giving a final opinion. They will let the Group Captain know what state of moon is required, and how soon the operation can be carried out. The A.O.C. said he assumed that the crews will be briefed as regards making use of all navigational aids, when night flying commenced.

On request by the A.O.C. General Piacentini said he would arrange for the courier flight which at present went from Lecce to Naples three times weekly would in future call at Crotone. A lorry must be laid on to take personnel from the airfield, also a representative to pick up mails. A letter would be written about this.

SEAPLANES.

The Seaplane Wing was satisfactory. The question of fuel was raised, and Wing Commander Clay said that the disturbing information ~~being~~ spread that the 87 and 100 Octane Fuel was unsuitable for use was untrue, and that it is perfectly all right.

MISC:

Colonel Brenta emphasised that engines must be sent up from Brindisi, also they are short of certain essential spares. Colonel Brenta also asked if it would be possible to have a truck from Lecce to Pomigliano every 10 days, and it was agreed that this could be settled internally.

Continued.....3.....

-3-

154
A date could not be fixed for the next meeting in view of the fact that it depends on the question of the allotment of Allied Aircraft. The A.O.C. said he would call a meeting immediately he had any news in this respect.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission,
23rd May 1944.
Ref: 328/ORG.

Distribution:

General Piacentini.
Circulation.
File.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission,
23rd May 1944.
Ref: 328/ORG.

Distribution:

General Piacentini.
Circulation.
File.

133 May 1944.

NOTES.

Colonel Francois remarked that he was very happy with the position, but would like to know what future operations were going to be like. The A.O.C. stated that he had visited D.A.F. and that they wanted the I.A.F. to continue operating on the Dalmatian Coast. On the other hand there is a promise that one operation, to start with, will be allowed on this side. The operation will be in the nature of an attack on communications, and we shall be asked to knock a bridge down. Further instructions were awaited in this respect.

Colonel Francois thought that considerable risks were being taken. The A.O.C. said that every effort is being made to make the operations as safe as possible, and that V.H.F. is to be fixed in aircraft. This installation will give a definite "fix" if anyone gets into trouble. A prototype is going to be built right away, and General Piacentini will be asked to send people to see the installation installed, and then the equipment can be fitted by I.A.F. personnel immediately. General Piacentini stated that it will be fitted as soon as it arrives. Colonel Francois, upon enquiry, was told that it was the best set. It may not be so good in the Regiane, but it will be all right in the Macchi's.

Colonel Francois requested a definite ruling as to how the Operations Room should carry out its work. The A.O.C. replied that the Fighter Wing hadn't had either an Operations or Intelligence Officer on a permanent basis, and said that he had spoken to Desert Air Force on the matter. D.A.F. are unable to let us have anybody permanent themselves. It was not possible for the A.O.C. to get the posts of the Operations Officers established, and D.A.F. had suggested that Italian Officers should be trained. This would be started at once at D.A.F. Headquarters.

Colonel Francois then said that he would like to see the Briefing Orders and then pass them on himself to his crews. Wing Commander Shore replied that this has been going on for some time; the orders have been passed to Colonel Francois who has been briefing the crews. The A.O.C. said that the close contact which the D.A.F. trained Operations and Intelligence Officers would have with the current situation, would be of great advantage in briefing the pilots. The Officers chosen to go to D.A.F. on the course should be able to speak English. Colonel Francois asked whether the question of rank made any difference, to which the A.O.C. replied that any rank will do, but the quicker they are got away the better. The A.O.C. followed this up by saying that now they are so much further North they will be in much better touch with D.A.F. and will be able to have a much better Intelligence Branch. Wing Commander Shore will now be able to visit D.A.F. more often, and the position should be more satisfactory.

Colonel Francois said that he would like to be able to give the order as to which Squadron should go out on missions, to which Wing Commander Shore replied that this had always happened. The A.O.C. said that the aim is to make the Italian Squadrons stand on their own feet, and the Wing Commander should affect the necessary liaison with D.A.F.

A.O.C. said that every effort is being made to make the operations as safe as possible, and that V.H.V. is to be fixed in aircraft. This installation will give a definite "fix" if anyone gets into trouble. A prototype is going to be built right away, and General Fiorentini will be asked to send people to see the installation installed, and then the equipment can be fitted by I.A.F. personnel immediately. General Fiorentini stated that it will be fitted as soon as it arrives. Colonel Francois, upon enquiry, was told that it was the best set. It may not be so good in the Reggiane, but it will be all right in the Macchi's.

Colonel Francois requested a definite ruling as to how the Operations Room should carry out its work. The A.O.C. replied that the Fighter Wing hadn't had either an Operations or Intelligence Officer on a permanent basis, and said that he had spoken to Desert Air Force on the matter. D.A.F. are unable to let us have anybody permanent themselves. It was not possible for the A.O.C. to get the posts of the Operations Officers established, and D.A.F. had suggested that Italian Officers should be trained. This would be started at once at D.A.F. Headquarters.

Colonel Francois then said that he would like to see the Briefing Orders and then pour them on himself to his crews. Wing Commander Shore replied that this has been going on for some time; the orders have been passed to Colonel Francois who has been briefing the crews. The A.O.C. said that the close contact which the D.A.F. trained Operations and Intelligence Officers would have with the current situation, would be of great advantage in briefing the pilots. The Officers chosen to go to D.A.F. on the course should be able to speak English. Colonel Francois asked whether the question of rank made any difference, to which the A.O.C. replied that any rank will do, but the quicker they are got away the better. The A.O.C. followed this up by saying that now they are so much further North they will be in much better touch with D.A.F. and will be able to have a much better Intelligence Branch. Wing Commander Shore will now be able to visit D.A.F. more often, and the position should be more satisfactory.

Colonel Francois said that he would like to be able to give the order as to which Squadron should go out on Missions, to which Wing Commander Shore replied that this had always happened. The A.O.C. said that the aim is to make the Italian Squadrons stand on their own feet, and the Wing Commander ¹¹⁴ here to effect the necessary liaison with D.A.F.

Colonel Francois asked if there was any hope of requests which had been made for materials, tyres etc, particularly equipment for the Macchi, being received. Wing Commander Clay said that he had brought back from Naples for test, Main Wheels and Tyres of some Allied types of aircraft. Experiments proved to be successful. Nail Wheels, Tyres, etc. are also coming, but they are in short supply. Wing Commander Clay also said that the Fighter Wing is being fed with equipment and material all the time, 15/20 crts of stuff going to the I.A.F. weekly. The supply position is getting better.

The A.O.C. said that to avoid confusion, we must refer to the Airfield of the 4th Stormo as NUOVA. Operationally it is still known as Gimet.

Continued.....2

-2-

Wing Commander Shore asked who was going to fit the V.H.F., and was informed that Squadron Leader Chapman has the matter in hand. A fitting party is to be sent from Signals W.A.A.F. and the work is to be carried out at Brindisi. It was agreed that the whole question of fitting V.H.F. would have to be sorted out, as Italian fittings would not marry up with ours.

Group Captain Eccles asked if they were satisfied with the new American Bomb, and was informed that it is working very well.

Wing Commander Clay emphasised that there is to be an improvement in the quality of the Fighter Aircraft engines, and said that the improvement would continue for the next few months.

The A.O.C. then summed up the Fighter position by saying that he thought that D.A.F. will take more interest in the I.A.F. and that the A.O.C. D.A.F. intends visiting them himself.

BOMBERS.

Colonel Scarlatta asked if it might be possible to arrange that Missions start earlier in the day in view of the advent of the hot weather. The A.O.C. replied that he would write to D.A.F. and 242 Group on the question, and that if there is likely to be any danger, the loads must be decreased.

The situation of the efficiency of the S.32 was discussed, and Colonel Scarlatta asked if it would be possible to have a four day break after each mission for check up and inspection. Wing Commander Clay recommended that until such time as we have sufficient S.32's to provide two shifts, four days for inspection should be allowed. It was ruled that the matter should be put up to 266 Force.

Group Captain Eccles brought up the question of the fittings for the containers. Wing Commander Clay informed that there are 3,600 now available, and some are to be made at Benevento in addition. About 800 per month are used. Wing Commander Clay said that before the present stock runs out we shall have more.

Flight Lieutenant Goss brought up the question of aircraft being able to land on alternative aerodromes. At the moment the Italians are given their landing times etc. by the Americans, and there was likely to be mix-ups between Italian and American aircraft landing at the same time. The A.O.C. said that an American Officer would be coming as assistant to the S.A.S.O. and this would be the type of job which he would tackle. It was explained that a Group Captain will arrive soon at Lecce, being of equivalent Rank to the American Officer who is at present in Command there.

thought that D.A.F. will take more interest in the I.M.I. and D.A.F. intends visiting them himself.

DOCKERS.

Colonel Scarlatia asked if it might be possible to arrange that Missions start earlier in the day in view of the advent of the hot weather. The A.O.C. replied that he would write to D.A.F. and 242 Group on the question, and that if there is likely to be any danger, the loads must be decreased.

The situation of the efficiency of the S.32 was discussed, and Colonel Scarlatia asked if it would be possible to have a four day break after each mission for check up and inspection. Wing Commander Clay recommended that until such time as we have sufficient S.32's to provide two shifts, four days for inspection should be allowed. It was ruled that the matter should be put up to 266 Force.

Group Captain Eccles brought up the question of the fittings for the containers. Wing Commander Clay informed that there are 3,600 now available, and some are to be made at Benevento in addition. About 800 per month are used. Wing Commander Clay said that before the present stock runs out we shall have more.

Flight Lieutenant Gear brought up the question of aircraft being able to land on alternative aerodromes. At the moment the Italians are given their landing times etc. by the Americans, and there was likely to be mix-ups between Italian and American aircraft landing at the same time. The A.O.C. said that an American Officer would be coming as assistant to the S.A.S.O. and this would be the type of job which he would tackle. It was explained that a Group Captain will arrive soon at Lecce, being of equivalent rank to the American Officer who is at present in Corrad there.

113

SEAPLANES.

Colonel Cornini first of all raised the question of Engines for motor boats. The A.O.C. said that we must ask the Air Force to supply, as the work of the Seaplane Wing is very highly appreciated.

The equipment position for Seaplanes appeared to be difficult, but Wing Commander Clay is doing everything to assist. A signal is to be sent to Flight Lieutenant Kennedy who is now in Egypt, to contact 111 M.U. for a supply of Casein Glue.

The question was discussed about land which had been planted having been requisitioned as a cricket pitch. Five tons of flour had been given in lieu. Wing Commander Clift said that he had done everything in his power to stop the requisitioning. The A.O.C. informed that he will take up the question with Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason Macfarlane, as it was the principle of the thing which mattered.

Continued.....3

-3-

Wing Commander Clift suggested that the Air Sea Rescue aircraft at Varana should be withdrawn, Varana then to be used in case of emergency only. This would mean an addition of two aircraft on the strength the whole time. This was recommended in view of the high incidence of malaria in that area, and also in view of the fact that Catalina Amphibians will be operating in the Foulia Area soon. The Italian aircraft are to remain at Varana until the Catalinas arrive.

Wing Commander Clift then brought up the question of Transport Fuel, stating that 3,000 gallons per month was insufficient; Brindisi was getting 5,000 gallons per month. Wing Commander Clay agreed that the figure can be increased to 5,000 gallons per month.

In view of the fact that British Officers were involved recently in a fatal accident, the question of a Court of Enquiry was raised. The A.O.C. said that as 242 Group Officers were concerned, the A.O.C. of 242 Group should be approached as to whether he wished a Court of Enquiry. Wing Commander Clift said he would go into the matter with the A.O.C. 242.

MISC:

The A.O.C. asked General Piacentini how often he thought the meetings should be held, and it was agreed that one every 14 days would be sufficient.

The A.O.C. said that having been with the I.A.F. a month he was enjoying it very much, and much appreciated the helpful attitude of everybody. General Piacentini replied that the I.A.F. would like to get some British aircraft. The A.O.C. promised that he would approach M.A.A.F. just as soon as the Maintenance and Equipment position in the I.A.F. was considered really satisfactory and right up to standard.

W. A. B. Boren-Ducanier

W.A.B. BOREN-DUCANIER,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

should be approached as to whether he wished a Court of Enquiry. Wing Commander Clift said he would go into the matter with the A.O.C. 242.

MISC:

The A.O.C. asked General Piacentini how often he thought the meetings should be held, and it was agreed that one every 14 days would be sufficient.

The A.O.C. said that having been with the I.A.F. a month he was enjoying it very much, and much appreciated the helpful attitude of everybody. General Piacentini replied that the I.A.F. would like to get some British aircraft. The A.O.C. promised that he would approach M.A.A.F. just as soon as the Maintenance and Equipment position in the I.A.F. was considered really satisfactory and right up to standard.

W.A.B. - Bureau.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COM ANDER.

Air Forces Sub Commission,
Allied Control Commission.
Ref: 323/ORG.

112

Dist:
General Piacentini.
Circulation file. ✓
File.

COPY No. 2.

FROM : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, NAPLES.

TO : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, BARI.

DATE : 5th APRIL 1944.

REF : ASC/S. 2.

Most
SECRET

(7)

Conference at AFHQ 31st March 1944.

1. A Conference was held on 31st March 1944 at AFHQ with General ROBERTSON in the Chair.
2. It appears that Washington consider the number of rations they are being asked to supply to the Italian Armed Forces in Italy out of all proportion to the value to the Allied effort received from such expenditure, and the shipping space involved.
3. They have therefore requested that the figures be examined immediately, and an explanation given as to the necessity and advisability of maintaining such large forces.
4. They have further requested that an entity should be set up to superintend matters.
5. After hearing the figures of all three Services, the Meeting decided that the Air Force figures should be accepted as presented, but that both the Army and Navy should re-examine their requirements, and submit figures in greater detail.
6. It was also decided that the Commission to control matters should be centred in M.M.I.A. who would be the channel through which everything should be passed.

(W. L. Winter)
Wing Commander,
Air Forces Sub Commission.

Copy No. 1.....S.D.C., Bari.
No. 2.....File.

0 2 2 6