

ACC

10000/135/34

AFSC, BA
FEB.-MA

10000/135/34

AFSC, BAF, IAF, JOINT POLICY
FEB. - MAY 1945

Date Opened: 9/2/45

Part.

AFSC / BAF / IAF Joint Policy

Returned
To: Encls. Late Inits.

~~SSO 44 5/5 148~~

5/17/15 AG WINE

SSD 3A 12/15

550 99 15/15

5.5.0. 14A 17/15-73

15A 18/5.

Mar 21/91

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550-21A 25/3.

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Signature

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Figure 1

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Received	Encls.	Date	Initials
SSO	14A	5/5	MS.
17.4.4	6A	11/5	
SSO	8A	14/5	
SSO	9A	15/5	
13.0.	14A	17/5	
	15A	18/5	
AOE	M1	19/5	MS.
AOE	16A		MS.
SSO	18A	21/5	MS.
SSO	21A	25/5	

1920
1930

Handwritten notes and signatures:
 10000 / 135 / 34
 THIS FOLDER
 CONTAINS PAPERS
 FROM FEB. 1945
 TO APR. 1945
 CATALOGUE.

SECRET

Lyphat message

144/c4

Top- HQ WAAF COME

Receivable- Air Force Sub-Commission Rome
Air Force Sub-Commission Lecce
Air Force Sub-Commission Bari
Balkan Air Force Command Post

From-

HQ Balkan Air Force A/636 May 4th
To- 1040 B

Secret- Subject is Italian Air Force Squadrons
under Balkan Air Force Operational Control.

20. Owing to the recent rapid withdrawal of the
German forces from the Sarajevo and Brod areas
and the shortening of the enemy's lines of communications
in Yugoslavia the remaining suitable targets for
the Italian Air Force are now only at extreme ranges.
In order to attack these targets aircraft have to
operate at V/S and be repelled and warned by
a British R and R party.

1230

the intended

Ref: HQ Balkan Air Force A/636 w/lay 615
Too low B

Secret Subject is Italian Air Force Squadrons
under Balkan Air Force Operational Control.

2.0. Owing to the recent rapid withdrawal of the
German force from the Danube and Bred areas
and the shortening of the enemy's lines of communications
in Yugoslavia the remaining suitable targets for
the Italian Air Force are now only at extreme range.

In order to attack these targets aircraft have to
operate at V/S and be repelled and recovered by
a British R and R party.

1230

3.0. In view of the political situation, the interest
dislike of the Yugoslavs for the Italians and the
complication of staying Italians through Yugoslav
territory it is considered that we would be
well advised at this stage of the war to withdraw
these squadrons from operations.

(Para 4)

SECRET

Typed message

Page 2

144/04

40. The above remarks apply primarily to the Baltimore
Aircraft and Spitzer Squadrons & the special duty
transport squadrons based at these are equipped
and old aircraft unsuitable to undertake the longer
flights they are now called upon to perform.

50. Your concurrence is requested.

Edw. C. Jones Sub-Commissioner
Rome

Shifano Jr

TO: 041121B
TO: 041420B
TO: 041500B

Spk. SACS. MAAT (H/As. Edwards Jones) & agreed that
the intended flight will be

lights very low

So your convenience is requested.

Sup. Am. Jones Sub-Commission
Rome

Dispora Jr

TOO 041121B
TOR 041420B
TOD 041500B.

Spk. SRSO. DRAF (H/ls. Gm. Jones) & agreed that
above is best thing to do. Also mentioned that with Jones
in disagreement, we should not withdraw from Rome &

Canine
S/S 1200hrs
J229
J/S

1800

3A

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/23/AIR.

4th April, 1945.

With further reference to my letter AFSC/23/AIR of the 31st March, 1945.

2. I have to inform you that the question of permitting No.9 Squadron to go into the line has been thoroughly discussed at H.Q. N.A.A.F. and H.Q. Italian Air Force. While wishing to accede to your request, it is with regret that this has not been found possible. This is due entirely to the lack of spare parts available for these aircraft, in particular tyres and inner tubes.

W.B.

W.A.B. DOWSE-JUDGMENT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

H.E. General M. Aisone Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

Copy on 128/Mir

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

OUTGOING MESSAGES.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
TO: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, BARI.

SECRET A.49 T.O.O 091410A FEBRUARY 1945 (.)

FOR DENNY FROM BUSCARLET (.)

YOUR 344/ORG of 7TH FEB (.)

ONE (.) GENERAL GAETA HAS COME OUTSIDE HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE FROM AINONE CAT IN RAISING THIS (.) POSSIBLE HE WILL BE ORDERED NOT TO RAISE IT BUT WILL INFORM YOU ON THIS LATER (.)

TWO (.) REQUEST YOU SEE ELLIOT AND ASK HIM NOT TO MAKE DEFINITE DECISION TILL HE HAS SEEN ME IN LATTER HALF NEXT WEEK (.)

THREE (.) MY VIEWS ARE (A) B.A.F HAS NOT EXPERIENCE OR CLOSE TOUCH WITH ITALIANS WE HAVE AND WILL HAVE TO ASK OUR ADVICE OFTEN (B) TO ENSURE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SIDE MUST BE IN CLOSEST TOUCH WITH OPERATIONS (C) ITALIANS HAVE NOT PROVED THEY CAN HANDLE OPERATIONAL SIDE WITHOUT USUAL ITALIAN DELAYS (.)

MISTAKES (.) AND GENERAL INEFFICIENCY (D) PRESENT SCHEME OF B.A.F DEALING DIRECT WITH FIGHTER LIAISON SECTION (.) 254 WING OR 334 WING SEEMS TO BE IDEAL AND TO CUT OUT POSSIBILITY OF DELAYS AND MISTAKES (E) NO OBJECTION TO ITALIANS HAVING THEIR OWN OPERATIONS ROOM AND MAINTAINING CLOSEST LIAISON WITH B.A.F BUT THEIR COMMUNICATIONS ARE GOOD REASON FOR CUTTING OUT UNITA AS ANOTHER STEP BETWEEN B.A.F AND UNITS ALSO WE MUST ALWAYS BE RIGHT IN PICTURE (.)

FOUR (.) DIRECTIVE TO GAETA WAS TO PUT HIS KINGDOM IN ORDER NOT TO ENLARGE IT AND SUGGEST HE FIRST GETS DOWN TO SOME SEMBLANCE OF ORGANISATION IN HIS COMMAND (.) FIVE (.) LET ME KNOW ELLIOTS REACTIONS (.)

TO BE ENCRYPTED
IF SENT BY W/T.

PRIORITY: IMPORTANT

William Buscarlet

1804

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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IF SENT BY W/T.

Walter Bussell

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

PRIORITY: IMPORTANT

702

SECRET

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Royal Air Force, BARI.

7th February, 1945.

AFSC/344/ORG.

Dear

A.O.C.

To-day Smythe (B.A.F. Deputy S.A.S.C.) showed me the attached memorandum, and suggested you might like to express your views on it before his A.O.C. sees the General. He is probably seeing him on Monday.

It is quite obviously a matter for your decision, and a ticklish one at that. My comments are only made because I am here, and not available for any discussion with you should you desire.

Apart from the typically Italian way of going about such a matter of major policy it would appear on the surface to be a very logical and practical change. The A.F.S.C. is relieved of the buffer position which it at present holds between B.A.F. and the I.A.F. operational units; and direct liaison and cooperation between the two are simplified. It is also more in keeping with the liaison/administrative role which the A.F.S.C. is filling.

As against this, and apart from the question of whether B.A.F. desire any closer contact about current operations, it is doubtful even so whether any extra work or efficiency would be achieved by cutting out the A.F.S.C., who must after all be in the picture when moves take place.

The great weakness is that each command - Ministry, Unita' Aerea and 40. Z.A.T. - is 'watertight', and takes no interest in the units. If the C.O. of Unita' Aerea concentrated upon the weaknesses of 40. Z.A.T., and saw that it attended to the needs and functions of the units, then he would be fulfilling a useful function. It would appear that he is widening his kingdom before putting it in order.

In conclusion, it is considered that this is an opportunity for establishing a clearer relationship between the commands; so that if fighter units in the Carne mud are crying for gun boots then Unita' Aerea becomes aware of the fact and sees that they are issued by 40. Z.A.T.. When they have proved their ability to administer, then the question of operational control could be considered.

There are also of course the points that A.F.S.C. can be played off against B.A.F., and procrastination may be facilitated by putting any unwelcome matter through the wrong office.

Yours Sincerely,
F.M. Denny

F.M. DENNY,
GROUP CAPTAIN

2. It is quite obviously a matter for your decision, and not available for one at that. My comments are only made because I am here, and not available for any discussion with you should you desire.

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Yours Sincerely, *F.M. Denny*

F.M. DENNY,
GROUP CAPTAIN.

AIR VICE MARSHAL W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET, C.B.E., D.F.C.,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.

1228

*Translation sent to
C.A.S. General Airme. Cut on 11/3*

Bari, February, 2nd., 1945.

MEMO FOR GROUP CERTAIN SMYTHE.

Ref. to our conversation this morning.

General GAETA is asking to be introduced to Air Vice Marshal ELLIOT. The General proposes to submit to him the following points regarding the practical functioning of UNITA' AEREA H.Q., and the connection between the latter and B.A.F. H.Q.

It is General GAETA's opinion that all operational matters affecting the Italian Squadrons should be dealt with by both B.A.F. H.Q. and UNITA' AEREA H.Q. in close cooperation.

The C.O. of the UNITA' AEREA, under which the Italian Squadrons operating with B.A.F. are, should be directly responsible towards the A.O.C. B.A.F.

On the other hand, all general problems of an administrative nature should be the concern of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

At present, instead, operational matters are dealt with between B.A.F., H.Q. and the Italian Squadrons direct, or through the A.F.S.C., without the UNITA' AEREA H.Q. coming into the picture or playing any active part at all and there is no real an working contact between B.A.F. and UNITA' AEREA H.Q.

This seems to be in contrast with the fact that the A.F.S.C. is not an operational body, while the UNITA' AEREA is. The latter is supposed to have operational authority over the Italian Squadrons and be responsible to B.A.F.

General GAETA would therefore like to hear A.V.M. ELLIOT'S opinion on this matter, which entails delicate problems of cooperation, discipline and responsibility.

(Signed) MAJOR M. BUCCHI.
ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICER.

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1229

1809