Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/135/110

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/135/110

POST WAR IAF
APR. - DEC. 1945
(1 OF 2)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Air Headquarters,
Royal Air Force,
C.M.F.

MAAC/4.200/AIS

22nd December, 1945.

PERSONAL

Dear Air Vice-Marshal Brodie/

1. Wing Commander Fisher has asked me to reply to your letter AFSC/4.6/AIR dated 10th December, 1945.

2. The paragraph of the letter in question has been read again and on our copy the word "and" (see line four after the word "Sacmed" AFSC/4.6/AIR dated 15th November 1945) had not been deleted, which of course altered the context of the paragraph.

3. The matter has been mentioned tactfully to S.A.C.M. Secretariat who immediately realised how any misunderstanding had arisen.

Yours sincerely.

J. W. C. Wardsh

Best wishes for Xmas & the New Year.

Air Vice-Marshal I.T. Brodie, C.B.E.
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. ROME

7162

31/12

0324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE STARS AND STRIPES
MEDITERRANEAN

Vol. 2, No. 138, Saturday, November 17, 1945 — Printed In Italy — TWO

New GI Discharge Plan Set For Dec. 1

Length Of Service, Lowered Point Score To Determine New Releases

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS)—A new Army discharge plan to expedite the War Department demobilization program was scheduled today to go into effect by Dec. 1.

Under the new program disclosed by a War Department spokesman, a lowered point score and length of service factor, would jointly govern releases from the Army.

It was pointed out, however, that the plan has yet to be worked out in detail. Steps in progressive lowering of amount of service required to warrant automatic discharges have not been decided upon.

Introduction in December of the length of service factor will be a forerunner to ultimately working down to a discharge basis of 18 months in service.

Spokesmen said that this would be necessitated in view of current War Department recruiting policies under which men may enter the Army for only 18 months duty.

Extent to which the critical score, currently set at 60, will drop in December has not been set.

Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul, assistant Army chief of staff, advised Congress yesterday that the Army was waiting until further study to recommend that all men with two years of service be declared eligible for discharge in March, 1946. The point system would be scrapped entirely at that time.

It was explained that the action is dependent on how many men would be left for service overseas under the arrangement.

The spokesman observed that the War Department had topped its original demobilization goals. The Army was the number of men home last midnight. The spokesman added, however, that the present shipping capacity brings home only an estimated 600,000 men per month from Europe and the Pacific.

At the present rate all men who served in World War II and want to leave the Army will be back in civilian life around Jan. 1, 1947, the spokesman revealed.

The force maintained overseas at that time would be composed entirely of volunteers and replacements made available through Selective Service. It is hoped that by next summer occupation needs can be met without the aid of a draft.

Eisenhower Assures U. S. That Russians Want To Be Friends

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—General Dwight D. Eisenhower told Congress today that "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by war with the U. S." and wants to be friendly.

"There will never be war between Britain and the U. S.," he added.

The general made the statements in testifying before a Congressional Military Committee in support of universal military training and a merger of the Armed Forces.

General Eisenhower said: "I believe that Russia's policy is friendship with the U. S. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common [illegible] they want to be friends with the U. S."

The general said he knows some Russians were concerned over criticism of the Soviets by the American press. He added: "It is difficult for Russians to understand the free press as it operates in the U. S."

General Eisenhower said that if he thought another war inevitable he would not be here.

"I would have jumped right out of my plane over the Atlantic," he told the committee in answer to a question.

Later, General Eisenhower listed his reasons why the Army and Navy should be merged into one Department of National Defense and clinched his arguments with the declaration that there must be unity of command and direction if we are to prevent another Pearl Harbor

U. S. Agents Knew Japan Might Strike Prior To Dec. 7 Raid

Decoded Jap Notes Shown To Group Of Solons

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—Evidence indicating that U. S. Government officials knew at least two or three days beforehand that Tokyo intended to sever relations with the U. S. was presented publicly yesterday at the first session of the Senate-House Pearl Harbor investigation.

On Nov. 28, 1941, the U. S. Government intercepted and decoded a message from Tokyo setting Nov. 29 as the deadline for the completion of U. S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and saying "after that things would happen automatically."

This evidence was contained in voluminous files of intercepted Japanese diplomatic code messages which were placed in the record as the joint Congressional committee formally opened the investigation which will attempt to fix responsibility for the Dec. 7, 1941, disaster.

The files showed that on Nov. 28, 1941, the U. S. intercepted a message from Japan advising its diplomats here that negotiations with the U. S. would be broken off for all practical purposes in two or three days. The files did not show what U. S. agency intercepted the message, nor was there any immediate indication which government officials read them.

Exhibits also revealed that Japanese envoys in Washington reported to Tokyo the day before Pearl Harbor that they had been working with "influential" individuals behind their "frontal negotiations" with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

These "influential" individuals were not named. An "urgent" message sent to Tokyo stated:

"In addition to carrying out frontal negotiations with the President and Hull, we have worked directly and indirectly through cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential. (Because of its delicate bearing on the State Department please keep this point strictly secret.)"

"On the fourth," this message said, "those engaged in plan 'A' dined with the President and at

DeGaulle To Quit Job As Presider

French Leader Unable To Compron On Cabinet With Communists

PARIS, Nov. 16 (AP)—General Charles de Gaulle's offic nounced today that he had decided to resign as interim P dent of France because of his inability to compromise differ with the Communist Party and form a coalition governmen

Confirmation came from General de Gaulle's office a minutes after 3 PM, after several hours in which rumor been widespread of his imp ing resignation following days of mounting political

The letter announcing his sion was expected to be h hands of Felix Gouin, presid the Constituent Assembly, a short time.

The Assembly will be con tomorrow to hear the resig and accept or reject it. In the of acceptance, the Assembl elect a new president.

As a condition of their part tion in a three-party coalit ernment, the Communists ha

3 Main Defendants 'Guilty' In Belsen War Crimes Trial

LUNEBURG, Nov. 16 (AP) — Thirty of the 44 Belsen and Auschwitz war crimes defendants were found guilty today by a British military court.

Those found guilty included the three chief defendants, blonde Irma Grese, Joseph Kramer, commandant of the Belsen concentration camp, and Dr. Fritz Klein.

Five of the 14 persons acquitted were women.

The accused rose individually in the prisoner's dock and took the verdict without a sign of emotion as the president of the court read the findings.

The Belsen defendants have a right of appeal to the confirming officer in the British Judge Advocate General's Department or to the Judge Advocate General in London.

The trial was conducted under a modified procedure of the British Field General Court Martial.

Thirty-six witnesses were heard and 140 affidavits were declared admissible in the military court for the first time.

The court did not consider the treatment of German nationals inside the camps. The court was set up entirely on the prerogative of the victor. The terms "murder" and "manslaughter" were not mentioned throughout the trial by the prosecution and it was the first time that war criminals were tried other than on the charge of murder.

Chief British prosecutor, Colonel T. M. Backhouse, carried the bulk

BULLETIN

PARIS, Nov. 16 — International News Service reported from tonight that General Charles Gaulle has "resigned as Pr of the Fourth Republ" of Fr

manded one of the three generally considered the mo portant in the cabinet: affairs, war or interior.

De Gaulle, however, refu agree or to accept any dict the selection of his cabinet.

The Communist-De Gaul was revealed earlier today unprecedented disclosure of exchanged between Com leader Maurice Thorez a Gaulle.

Thorez, in one of his le De Gaulle, described De G refusal to grant the Com Party one of the key cabine because he "questioned the N character of the Communi "an insult to the memory Communists who have d France."

De Gaulle, in his reply, he intended to insult th munists, adding:

"I was elected unanimou I have asked for a large munist participation in the ment. However, I reserve t to attribute the Ministries fit."

Three Rioters Dead

0325

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HE STARS AND STRIPES
MEDITERRANEAN

138, Saturday, November 17, 1945 Printed in Italy TWO LIRE

y GI Discharge n Set For Dec. 1

Of Service, Lowered Point Score o Determine New Releases

GTON, Nov. 16 (ANS)—A new Army discharge plan he War Department demobilization program was ay to go into effect by Dec. 1.

e new program disclosed by a War Department lowered point score and length of service factor, govern releases from the Army.

ointed out, however, that the plan has yet to be detail. Steps in progressive lowering of amount of e to warrant auto- ges have not been

n in December of service factor will nner to ultimately n to a discharge nonths in service.

said that this would in view of current ent recruiting policies men may enter the 18 months duty.

hich the critical score, at 60, will drop in not been set.

Willard S. Paul, as- chief of staff, advised urday that the Army until further study to nt all men with two be be declared eligible in March, 1946. The would be scrapped at time.

ined that the action on how many men for service overseas angement.

han observed that the ment had topped its bilization goals. The th member of the ranged a net one home nt. The spokesman ver, that the present city brings home only 800,000 men per month and the Pacific.

ent rate all men who rld War II and want Army will be back in around Jan. 1, 1947, n revealed.

naintained overseas at uld be composed en- unteers and replace- available through Sc- e. It is hoped that by occupation needs can ut the aid of a draft.

lofers Dead

Eisenhower Assures U. S. That Russians Want To Be Friends

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—General Dwight D. Eisenhower told Congress today that "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by war with the U. S." and wants to be friendly.

"There will never be war between Britain and the U. S.," he added.

The general made the statements in testifying before a Congressional Military Committee in support of universal military training and a merger of the Armed Forces.

General Eisenhower said: "I believe that Russia's policy is friendship with the U. S. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common man and they want to be friends with the U. S."

The general said he knows some Russians were concerned over criticism of the Soviets by the American press. He added: "It is difficult for Russians to understand the free press as it operates in the U. S."

General Eisenhower said that if he thought another war inevitable he would not be here.

"I would have jumped right out of my plane over the Atlantic," he told the committee in answer to a question.

Later, General Eisenhower listed his reasons why the Army and Navy should be merged into one Department of National Defense and clinched his arguments with the declaration that there must be unity of command and direction if we are to prevent another Pearl Harbor.

U. S. Agents Knew Japan Might Strike Prior To Dec. 7 Raid

Decoded Jap Notes Shown To Group Of Solons

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—Evidence indicating that U. S. Government officials knew at least two or three days beforehand that Tokyo intended to sever relations with the U. S. was presented publicly yesterday at the first session of the Senate-House Pearl Harbor investigation.

On Nov. 28, 1941, the U. S. Government intercepted and decoded a message from Tokyo setting Nov. 29 as the deadline for the completion of U. S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and saying "after that things would happen automatically."

This evidence was contained in voluminous files of intercepted Japanese diplomatic code messages which were placed in the record as the joint Congressional committee formally opened the investigation which will attempt to fix responsibility for the Dec. 7, 1941, disaster.

The files showed that on Nov. 26, 1941, the U. S. intercepted a message from Japan advising its diplomats here that negotiations with the U. S. would be broken off for all practical purposes in two or three days. The files did not show what U. S. agency intercepted the message, nor was there any immediate indication which government officials read them.

Exhibits also revealed that Japanese envoys in Washington reported to Tokyo the day before Pearl Harbor that they had been working with "influential" individuals behind their "frontal negotiations" with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

These "influential" individuals were not named. An "urgent" message sent to Tokyo stated:

"In addition to carrying out frontal negotiations with the President and Hull, we have worked directly and indirectly through cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential. (Because of its delicate bearing on the State Department please keep this point strictly secret.)"

"On the fourth," this message said, "those engaged in plan 'A' [illegible]

DeGaulle To Quit Job As President

French Leader Unable To Compromise On Cabinet With Communists

PARIS, Nov. 16 (AP)—General Charles de Gaulle's office announced today that he had decided to resign as interim President of France because of his inability to compromise differences with the Communist Party and form a coalition government.

Confirmation came from General de Gaulle's office a few minutes after 3 PM, after several hours in which rumors had been widespread of his impending resignation following four days of mounting political crisis.

The letter announcing his decision was expected to be in the hands of Felix Gouin, president of the Constituent Assembly, within a short time.

The Assembly will be convoked tomorrow to hear the resignation and accept or reject it. In the event of acceptance, the Assembly will elect a new president.

As a condition of their participation in a three-party coalition government, the Communists had demanded one of the three posts generally considered the most important in the cabinet: foreign affairs, war or interior.

De Gaulle, however, refused to agree or to accept any dictation in the selection of his cabinet.

The Communist-De Gaulle split was revealed earlier today in an unprecedented disclosure of letters exchanged between Communist leader Maurice Thorex and De Gaulle.

Thorex, in one of his letter to De Gaulle, described De Gaulle's refusal to grant the Communist Party one of the key cabinet posts because he "questioned the National character of the Communists," as "an insult to the memory of 75,000 Communists who have died for France."

De Gaulle, in his reply, denied he intended to insult the Communists, adding:

"I was elected unanimously, but I have asked for a large Communist participation in the government. However, I reserve the right to attribute the Ministries as I see fit."

3 Main Defendants 'Guilty' In Belsen War Crimes Trial

LUNEBURG, Nov. 16 (AP) — Thirty of the 74 Belsen and Auschwitz war crimes defendants were found guilty today by a British military court.

Those found guilty included the three chief defendants, blonde Irma Grese, Joseph Kramer, commandant of the Belsen concentration camp, and Dr. Fritz Klein.

Five of the 11 persons acquitted were women.

The accused rose individually in the prisoner's dock and took the verdict without a sign of emotion as the president of the court read the findings.

The Belsen defendants have a right of appeal to the confirming officer in the British Judge Advocate General's Department or to the Judge Advocate General in London.

The trial was conducted under a modified procedure of the British Field General Court Martial.

Thirty-six witnesses were heard and 140 affidavits were declared admissible in the military court for the first time.

The court did not consider the treatment of German nationals inside the camps. The court was set up entirely on the prerogative of the victor. The terms "murder" and "manslaughter" were not mentioned throughout the trial by the prosecution and it was the first time that war criminals were tried other than on the charge of murder.

Chief British prosecutor, Colonel T. M. Backhouse, carried the bulk

BULLETIN

PARIS, Nov. 16 — International News Service reported from Paris tonight that General Charles de Gaulle has "resigned as President of the Fourth Republ" of France."

0326

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

under which men may enter the Army for only 18 months duty.

Extent to which the critical score, currently set at 60, will drop in December has not been set.

Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul, assistant Army chief of staff, advised Congress yesterday that the Army was waiting until further study to recommend that all men with two years of service be declared eligible for discharge in March, 1946. The point system would be scrapped entirely at that time.

It was explained that the action is dependent on how many men would be left for service overseas under the arrangement.

The spokesman observed that the War Department had topped its original demobilization goals. The three millionth member of the Army was discharged last night.

The spokesman added, however, that the present shipping capacity brings home only an estimated 600,000 men per month from Europe and the Pacific.

At the present rate all men who served in World War II and want to leave the Army will be back in civilian life around Jan. 1, 1947, the spokesman revealed.

The force maintained overseas at that time would be composed entirely of volunteers and replacements made available through Selective Service. It is hoped that by next summer occupation needs can be met without the aid of a draft.

Three Rioters Dead In Jerusalem Clash

JERUSALEM, Nov. 16 (UP)—Three rioters were killed and many injured while 37 British airborne troops were wounded by home made bombs today as Jewish mobs surged through the streets of Tel Aviv for the second straight day, looting and burning British property.

Disorders spread to Jaffa, where the police and soldiers fired into the anti-British mob, wounding eleven rioters. There were also minor outbreaks in Jerusalem.

Numerous policemen and soldiers were injured by stones which the rioters, who were defying a 24-hour a day curfew, threw as they attacked government and commercial buildings at Tel Aviv.

The over-all casualty toll in Tel Aviv in two days of rioting were five rioters killed, 68 wounded and 67 policemen and soldiers wounded in addition to many, on both sides, who suffered minor injuries.

Property damage is estimated at one million dollars. Veteran British airborne troops poured into the city to reinforce the hard-pressed police and soldiers of the local garrison, and assumed charge of the whole Tel Aviv area with orders to shoot all violators of the curfew. The curfew is being rigidly enforced in an attempt to minimize after-hours activity in the streets of Tel-Aviv.

Planes which circled over the

(Continued on page 8)

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—General Dwight D. Eisenhower told Congress today that "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by war with the U. S." and wants to be friendly.

"There will never be war between Britain and the U. S.," he added.

The general made the statements in testifying before a Congressional Military Committee in support of universal military training and a merger of the Armed Forces.

General Eisenhower said: "I believe that Russia's policy is friendship with the U. S. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common [illegible] to be friends with the U. S."

The general said he knows some Russians were concerned over criticism of the Soviets by the American press. He added: "It is difficult for Russians to understand the free press as it operates in the U. S."

General Eisenhower said that if he thought another war inevitable he would not be here.

"I would have jumped right out of my plane over the Atlantic," he told the committee in answer to a question.

Later, General Eisenhower listed his reasons why the Army and Navy should be merged into one Department of National Defense and clinched his arguments with the declaration that there must be unity of command and direction if we are to prevent another Pearl Harbor incident in the future.

General Eisenhower told the committee that America would have lost World War II had it not been for the unified command under which the Allies fought.

The general qualified himself as a competent witness before the committee, saying:

"I come before you as a soldier to whom you entrusted command of the greatest forces ever brought to war against an enemy—a force of more than five million soldiers and sailors brought together from several nations and united in a common enterprise.

"It is my experience that the en-

(Continued on page 7)

Latest News

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (UP)—Britain's Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King are scheduled to leave for Ottawa on Saturday, it was announced in Washington today.

PARIS, Nov. 16 (UP) — Otto Abetz, Hitler's ambassador to France during German occupation, arrived under guard in Paris today.

ALMERIA, Spain, Nov. 16 (AP) —More than 100 persons were killed and 31 were injured in a collision of a passenger train and a freight train between Huenta Santa and Ciergal Wednesday night.

[illegible] things would happen automatically."

This evidence was contained in voluminous files of intercepted Japanese diplomatic code messages which were placed in the record as the joint Congressional committee formally opened the investigation which will attempt to fix responsibility for the Dec. 7, 1941, disaster.

The files showed that on Nov. 28, 1941, the U. S. intercepted a message from Japan advising its diplomats here that negotiations with the U. S. would be broken off for all practical purposes in two or three days. The files did not show what U. S. agency intercepted the message, nor was there any immediate indication which government officials read them.

Exhibits also revealed that Japanese envoys in Washington reported [illegible] Pearl Harbor that they had been working with "influential" individuals behind their "frontal negotiations" with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

These "influential" individuals were not named. An "urgent" message sent to Tokyo stated:

"In addition to carrying out frontal negotiations with the President and Hull, we have worked directly and indirectly through cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential. (Because of its delicate bearing on the State Department please keep this point strictly secret.)"

"On the fourth," this message said, "those engaged in plan 'A' dined with the President and advised him against Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in his mind."

William D. Mitchell, committee counsel, put the messages into the record as the committee moved

(Continued on page 8)

Thirty of the 74 Belsen and Auschwitz war crimes defendants were found guilty today by a British military court.

Those found guilty included the three chief defendants, blonde Irma Grese, Joseph Kramer, commandant of the Belsen concentration camp, and Dr. Fritz Klein.

Five of the 14 persons acquitted were women.

The accused rose individually in the prisoner's dock and took the verdict without a sign of emotion as the president of the court read the findings.

The Belsen defendants have a right of appeal to the confirming officer in the British Judge Advocate General's Department or to the Judge Advocate General in London.

The trial was conducted under a modified procedure of the British Field General Court Martial.

Thirty-six witnesses were heard and 140 affidavits were declared admissible in the military court for the first time.

The court did not consider the treatment of German nationals inside the camps. The court was set up entirely on the prerogative of the victor. The terms "murder" and "manslaughter" were not mentioned throughout the trial by the prosecution and it was the first time that war criminals were tried other than on the charge of murder.

Chief British prosecutor, Colonel T. M. Backhouse, carried the bulk of the load of detailing the atrocities at the two camps, laying principal emphasis on the state of affairs at Belsen.

He labelled as "undoubted war crimes" the internment of people without trial because of religion or nationality. He described how 12,000 men and 28,000 women were packed into a comparatively small area of the camp.

Solons Claim Swiss Tried To Conceal Nazi Assets

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS)—A Senate Military Affairs subcommittee charged last night that Swiss Government and banking officials collaborated in a Nazi attempt to preserve German economic assets for another try at world domination.

The committee released four letters written from Switzerland in the early part of this year by Emil Puhl, former vice president of the Reichsbank, to Dr. Walter Funk, Reichsbank president and German minister of economics. Funk is under indictment as a Nazi war criminal.

The Germans sent Puhl to Switzerland to nullify the work of an Allied mission headed by Laughlin Currie, who obtained government agreement that the Swiss would immobilize all Nazi assets in Switzerland.

Chairman Harley M. Kilgore (D., W. Va.) of the subcommittee on elimination of German resources for war, said Puhl-Funk correspondence "makes it clear that the principal concern of the Swiss was the prospect of future business dealings with a postwar Germany."

BERNE, Nov. 16 — The Swiss government today ordered a thorough investigation of charges by the U. S. Senate Military Affairs sub-committee that it and Swiss bankers had collaborated with the Nazis in an effort to conceal German assets in Switzerland.

The charges were quickly denied yesterday and today official Swiss quarters said that even before the results of the investigation were known they were convinced that "no underhand transactions" took place with the Germans.

tion in a three-party coalition ernment, the Communists ha

BULLETIN

PARIS, Nov. 16 — International News Service reported from tonight that General Charle Gaulle has "resigned as Pres of the Fourth Republ" of Fra

manded one of the three generally considered the mos portant in the cabinet: fo affairs, war or interior.

De Gaulle, however, refus agree or to accept any dicta the selection of his cabinet.

The Communist-De Gaulle was revealed earlier today unprecedented disclosure of exchanged between Comm leader Maurice Thorez and Gaulle.

Thorez, in one of his let De Gaulle, described De G refusal to grant the Comm Party one of the key cabinet because he "questioned the Na character of the Communist "an insult to the memory of Communists who have die France."

De Gaulle, in his reply, he intended to insult the munists, adding:

"I was elected unanimously I have asked for a large munist participation in the go ment. However, I reserve the to attribute the Ministries as it."

Communist Force Entering Manch

CHUNGKING, Nov. 16 (U Military circles in Chu claimed today that thousan Chinese Communist reserve being landed in Russian-held ren and Port Arthur to tak the areas of Manchuria whi now being evacuated by Red troops.

Communists were reported pouring reinforcements into churia by sea and overland race to forestall the three airborne occupation of the te by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Nationalist armies.

On the other hand, Comm sources said that 100 Am manned tanks moved out U. S. Marine beachhead at sin and were racing north an toward the embattled Manc border.

CHUNGKING, Nov. 16 A Chinese Communist spok announced that the Comm are to hold a general electi all China north of the Yangtze River.

The spokesman said the demand would be presented imminent meeting of the P consultative council.

Chungking Communists any knowledge of a sep movement in Inner Mongo

0327

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNB No. 785017

...may enlist the ...18 months duty.
...ich the critical score, ...at 60, will drop in ...not been set.
...Willard S. Paul, as...hief of staff, advised ...erday that the Army ...ntil further study to ...at all men with two ...e be declared eligible ...in March, 1946. The ... would be scrapped ...t time.
...tined that the action ...on how many men ...for service overseas ...angement.
...mm observed that the ...ent had topped its ...bilization goals. The ...th member of the ...ff and was home ...it. The spokesman ...er, that the present ...city brings home only ...00,000 men per month ...and the Pacific.
...ent rate all men who ...rld War II and want ...Army will be back in ...around Jan. 1, 1947, ...n revealed.
...taintained overseas at ...uld be composed en...unteers and replace...available through Se...e. It is hoped that by ...occupation needs can ...out the aid of a draft.

...ofers Dead ...usalem Clash

...EM, Nov. 16 (UP)— ...rs were killed and ...d while 37 British ar...s were wounded by ...bombs today as Jewish ...d through the streets ...for the second straight ...and burning British ...

...spread to Jaffa, where ...and soldiers fired into ...ritish mob, wounding ...ers. There were also ...renks in Jerusalem. ...s policemen and soldiers ...ed by stones which the ...o were defying a 24-...curfew, threw as they ...government and com...ildings at Tel Aviv.
...-all casualty toll in Tel ...o days of rioting were ...killed, 68 wounded and ...en and soldiers wounded ...to many, on both sides, ...red minor injuries.
...damage is estimated at ...n dollars. Veteran Bri...me troops poured into ...to reinforce the hard...pice and soldiers of the ...son, and assumed charge ...hole Tel Aviv area with ...shoot all violators of the ...e curfew is being ready...in an attempt to mini...er-hours activity in the ...Tel-Aviv.
...which circled over the

...ntinued on page 8)

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—General Dwight D. Eisenhower told Congress today that "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by war with the U. S." and wants to be friendly.

"There will never be war between Britain and the U. S.," he added.

The general made the statements in testifying before a Congressional Military Committee in support of universal military training and a merger of the Armed Forces.

General Eisenhower said: "I believe that Russia's policy is friendship with the U. S. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common man, and they want to be friends with the U. S."

The general said he knows some Russians were concerned over criticism of the Soviets by the American press. He added: "It is difficult for Russians to understand the free press as it operates in the U. S."

General Eisenhower said that if he thought another war inevitable he would not be here.

"I would have jumped right out of my plane over the Atlantic," he told the committee in answer to a question.

Later, General Eisenhower listed his reasons why the Army and Navy should be merged into one Department of National Defense and clinched his arguments with the declaration that there must be unity of command and direction if we are to prevent another Pearl Harbor incident in the future.

General Eisenhower told the committee that America would have lost World War II had it not been for the united command under which the Allies fought.

The general qualified himself as a competent witness before the committee, saying:

"I come before you as a soldier to whom you entrusted command of the greatest forces ever brought to war against an enemy—a force of more than five million soldiers and sailors brought together from several nations and united in a common enterprise.

"It is my experience that the es-

(Continued on page 2)

Latest News

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (UP)—Britain's Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King are scheduled to leave for Ottawa on Saturday, it was announced in Washington today.

PARIS, Nov. 16 (UP) — Otto Abetz, Hitler's ambassador to France during German occupation, arrived under guard in Paris today.

ALMERIA, Spain, Nov. 16 (AP) —More than 100 persons were killed and 31 were injured in a collision of a passenger train and a freight train between Fuenta Santa and Gergal Wednesday night.

...things would happen automatically."

This evidence was contained in voluminous files of intercepted Japanese diplomatic code messages which were placed in the record as the joint Congressional committee formally opened the investigation which will attempt to fix responsibility for the Dec. 7, 1941, disaster.

The files showed that on Nov. 28, 1941, the U. S. intercepted a message from Japan advising its diplomats here that negotiations with the U. S. would be broken off for all practical purposes in two or three days. The files did not show what U. S. agency intercepted the message, nor was there any immediate indication which government officials read them.

Exhibits also revealed that Japanese envoys in Washington reported to Tokyo the day before Pearl Harbor that they had been working with "influential" individuals behind their "frontal negotiations" with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

These "influential" individuals were not named. An "urgent" message sent to Tokyo stated:

"In addition to carrying out frontal negotiations with the President and Hull, we have worked directly and indirectly through cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential. (Because of its delicate bearing on the State Department please keep this point strictly secret.)"

"On the fourth," this message said, "those engaged in plan 'A' dined with the President and advised him against Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in his mind."

William D. Mitchell, committee counsel, put the messages into the record as the committee moved

(Continued on page 8)

Thirty of the 14 Belsen and Auschwitz war crimes defendants were found guilty today by a British military court.

Those found guilty included the three chief defendants, blonde Irma Grese, Joseph Kramer, commandant of the Belsen concentration camp, and Dr. Fritz Klein.

Five of the 14 persons acquitted were women.

The accused rose individually in the prisoner's dock and took the verdict without a sign of emotion as the president of the court read the findings.

The Belsen defendants have a right of appeal to the confirming officer in the British Judge Advocate General's Department or to the Judge Advocate General in London.

The trial was conducted under a modified procedure of the British Field General Court Martial.

Thirty-six witnesses were heard and 140 affidavits were declared admissible in the military court for the first time.

The court did not consider the treatment of German nationals inside the camps. The court was set up entirely on the prerogative of the victor. The terms "murder" and "manslaughter" were not mentioned throughout the trial by the prosecution and it was the first time that war criminals were tried other than on the charge of murder.

Chief British prosecutor, Colonel T. M. Bachhouse, carried the bulk of the load of detailing the atrocities at the two camps, laying principal emphasis on the state of affairs at Belsen.

He labelled as "undoubted war crimes" the internment of people without trial because of religion or nationality. He described how 12,000 men and 28,000 women were packed into a comparatively small area of the camp.

...tion in a three-party common government, the Communists had de-

BULLETIN

PARIS, Nov. 16 — International News Service reported from Paris tonight that General Charles de Gaulle has "resigned as President of the Fourth Repub" of France."

manded one of the three posts generally considered the most important in the cabinet: foreign affairs, war or interior.

De Gaulle, however, refused to agree or to accept any dictation in the selection of his cabinet.

The Communist-De Gaulle split was revealed earlier today in an unprecedented disclosure of letters exchanged between Communist leader Maurice Thorez and De Gaulle.

Thorez, in one of his letter to De Gaulle, described De Gaulle's refusal to grant the Communist Party one of the key cabinet posts because he "questioned the National character of the Communists," as "an insult to the memory of 75,000 Communists who have died for France."

De Gaulle, in his reply, denied he intended to insult the Communists, adding:

"I was elected unanimously, but I have asked for a large Communist participation in the government. However, I reserve the right to attribute the Ministries as I see fit."

Communist Forces Entering Manchuria

CHUNGKING, Nov. 16 (UP)—Military circles in Chungking claimed today that thousands of Chinese Communist reserves are being landed in Russian-held Dairen and Port Arthur to take over the areas of Manchuria which are now being evacuated by Red Army troops.

Communists were reported to be pouring reinforcements into Manchuria by sea and overland in a race to forestall the threatened airborne occupation of the territory by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist armies.

On the other hand, Communist sources said that 100 American-manned tanks moved out of the U. S. Marine beachhead at Tientsin and were racing north and west toward the embattled Manchurian border.

CHUNGKING, Nov. 16 (INS)—A Chinese Communist spokesman announced that the Communists are to hold a general election for all China north of the Yellow River.

The spokesman said that the demand would be presented at the imminent meeting of the political consultative council.

Chungking Communists denied any knowledge of a separatist movement in Inner Mongolia.

Solons Claim Swiss Tried To Conceal Nazi Assets

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS)—A Senate Military Affairs subcommittee charged last night that Swiss Government and banking officials collaborated in a Nazi attempt to preserve German economic assets for another try at world domination.

The committee released four letters written from Switzerland in the early part of this year by Emil Puhl, former vice president of the Reichsbank, to Dr. Walter Funk, Reichsbank president and German minister of economics. Funk is under indictment as a Nazi war criminal.

The Germans sent Puhl to Switzerland to nullify the work of an Allied mission headed by Lauchlin Currie, who obtained government agreement that the Swiss would immobilize all Nazi assets in Switzerland.

Chairman Harley M. Kilgore (D., W. Va.) of the subcommittee on elimination of German resources for war, said Puhl-Funk correspondence "makes it clear that the principal concern of the Swiss was the prospect of future business dealings with a postwar Germany."

BERNE, Nov. 16 — The Swiss government today ordered a thorough investigation of charges by the U. S. Senate Military Affairs sub-committee that it and Swiss bankers had collaborated with the Nazis in an effort to conceal German assets in Switzerland.

The charges were quickly denied yesterday and today official Swiss quarters said that even before the results of the investigation were known they were convinced that "no underhand transactions" took place with the Germans.

0328

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Tribunal Postpones Elder Krupp Trial

NUREMBERG, Nov. 16—Gustav von Bohlen Krupp will not be tried on war crimes charges until he is able to appear in court, according to a ruling handed down by the International War Crimes Tribunal today.

The court ruled that since the health of the elder Krupp made it impossible for him to appear in person at his trial, it would be postponed until such time as his health improved enough for him to be present in court.

The court failed to render a decision on French, Russian and American requests that Alfred Krupp, son of the German munitions magnate, should be substituted for the father so that the trials could be held as scheduled.

The British prosecutor opposed the move and asked that Gustav Krupp, the father, be tried in absentia.

The Krupp family attorney, who eloquently pleaded for dismissal of the case against the 75-year-old armament king, served notice that the substitution of the son, Alfred, would lead the defense to demand a full 30-day delay.

Robert H. Jackson, chief American prosecutor, who first moved for trial of the son in place of the aged father, recommended a 12-day postponement to Dec. 2. He said the evidence against both Krupps was identical and only a brief delay would be necessary.

The reversal apparently caught the British by surprise. One of the British prosecution staff said: "Our difference is one of methods, not the principle."

Meanwhile, an International News Service report from London said that the private secretary of Rudolph Hess before his flight to England in 1941 was finally arrested.

The woman, Fraulein Speer, is believed to be in possession of major secret documents concerning Hess' mysterious flight to England.

Clergymen In Britain Pirating Parish Help

LONDON, Nov. 16 (UP) — A black market in curates is the latest one to crop up on shortage-bound Britain, according to the Daily Mirror. The newspaper said today that harassed rectors and vicars are searching for help in running their parishes, and are resorting to "pirating" methods usually associated with suburban housewives' searches for cooks and housekeepers. Rev. G. W. Clarkson, rector of Skegness, Lincolnshire, told the Daily Mirror that "all kinds of offers are held out to entire curates from other parsons. It is a regular black market."

Dachau Trial Opens For Forty Prisoners

DACHAU, Nov. 16 — Forty of the original 42 prisoners were present when the trial in connection with the notorious Dachau concentration camp opened today.

One of the missing defendants is in Oslo and the other has not yet been found.

Meanwhile, the Warsaw Radio reported that Paul Hoffman, German commandant of the infamous Maidenek concentration camp in Poland, was sentenced to death at Lublin, where he had been on trial before a special court. London reported, according to Reuter's that Heinz Endress of Neckarsulm had been sentenced to die by beheading for taking part in the murder of four American airmen in March, 1945, by [illegible]

The prisoners were [illegible] charges relating to the deaths of more than 30,000 people as well as carrying on experiments by subjecting prisoners to malarial infections, blood poisoning and other diseases.

GOERING'S BROTHER

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS)—Albert Goering, brother of the former Reichsmarshal, has been tracked down and arrested in Germany, according to a BBS report. The broadcast said he was picked up by a Czech investigating force operating with American military help.

Austria Asks Allies For Tyrol Plebiscite

VIENNA, Nov. 16 (UP) — The provisional Austrian government has presented a note to the Allied Council [illegible] to the occupation powers, demanding plebiscite in South Tyrol to determine the attitude of the Austrian population toward reannexation. That part of Tyrol is at present in Italian hands.

Dr. Karl Grueber, undersecretary at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, made this revelation at a press conference today.

He stated that the separation of northern from southern Tyrol seriously weakened the economic and political stability of Austria. He added that failure to remove the irritation point would permanently embitter relations between Austria and Italy.

NO JOB FOR A MAN WITH A WEAK HEA



Literally running for his life, this lieutenant—member of a British mine disp scurries away from a mine to which he has just attached a rope. The pictur at Hastings, England. The squad was called to rope the mine, to keep it from cement blocks scattered along the beach. (British Co

Japs Reported Too Poor To Pay Occupation Cost

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Edwin S. Pauley, President Truman's reparations representative who arrived in Tokyo Tuesday, said yesterday he believed Japan would be unable to pay the cost of Allied occupation, let alone "recurring reparations." Pauley explained that the U. S. policy is to use Japanese wealth:

1. For occupation.
2. For import of a minimum supply of goods to assure survival of Japanese.
3. For reparations.

"I am not optimistic that there will be anything left for reparations of a recurring nature after paying cost of occupation," he said.

Later, in answering a direct question, he said he [illegible] doubt[illegible] even to pay occupation costs.

Explaining "recurring reparations," Pauley said they were reparations which might be paid after removal of tangible assets such as gold, silver and machinery which might be used in other countries.

JAP INFLATION

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—War-crushed Japan must cut her peacetime budget in half and multiply her taxes by five in order to control inflation, the semi-official postwar currency council reported Wednesday to the finance ministry.

The press reported that the

Reich Control To Go To State Department

LONDON, Nov. 16 (AP)—Control of the American zone in Germany will be taken away from the Army and turned over to the U. S. state department "sometime between April 1 and July 1," William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of public and cultural relations, said here today.

Benton said: "The Army will not be withdrawn but will become what the Army should be, an occupying military force, in contradiction to its present status which is that of 'military government'."

Italy May Purchase

Spanish Env By U. S. In

MUNICH, Nov. [illegible] Spanish Consulate closed by the milit[illegible] and the chancell[illegible] charges of issuing [illegible] visas illegally afte[illegible] ceased operations, [illegible] ment officials disc[illegible]

Four of the visas [illegible] nationals. Ninete[illegible] passports were G[illegible] wed to Spaniards.

The chancellor, [illegible] Waldbott von B[illegible] German. Consul [illegible] went to Switzerla[illegible] leaving Bassenh[illegible] instructing him t[illegible] of the records "[illegible] closed," investigato[illegible]

The investigation [illegible] Major Peter Vuco[illegible] gence branch of [illegible] ernment.

The Spanish Con[illegible] ordered closed las[illegible] American troops o[illegible] gion, but passports [illegible] issued as late as Oc[illegible] the Swiss Consula[illegible] ized to operate in [illegible] zone and no visas [illegible] tionals were permit[illegible]

Ex-Hungary Pr[illegible]

0329

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNB No. 785017

ibunal Postpones
lder Krupp Trial

UREMBERG, Nov. 16—Gustav von Bohlen Krupp will not
d on war crimes charges until he is able to appear in court,
ing to a ruling handed down by the International War
Tribunal today.
e court ruled that since the health of the elder Krupp
s impossible for him to appear in person at his trial,
id be postponed until such time as his health improved
for him to be present.

rt
court failed to refute a de-
on, French, Russian and
an requests that Alfred
ow of the German muni-
ionist, should be substitu-
for father so that the trials
be held as scheduled.
British prosecutor opposed
ve and asked that Gustav
the latter, be tried in ab-

Krupp family attorney, who
ly pleaded for dismissal of
e against the 75-year-old
ial king, served notice that
ilitation of the son, Alfred,
ld the defense to demand
-day delay.
t H. Jackson, chief Ameri-
ecutor, who last moved for
the son in place of the aged
recommended a 12-day post-
nt to Dec. 2. He said the
e against both Krupps was
l and only a brief delay
be necessary.
reversal apparently caught
him by surprise. One of the
prosecution staff said: "Our
ase is one of methods, not
people."
wise, an International News
report from London said
e private secretary of Hit-
Hess, before his flight to Eng-
1941 was finally arrested.
woman, Prudent Speer, is
to be in possession of major
documents concerning Hess'
ne flight to England.

ria Asks Allies
Tyrol Plebiscite

NA, Nov. 16 (UP) — The
ial Austrian government
ented a note to the Allied
[illegible] Commission, demanding plebis-
cite in Tyrol to determine
ure of the Austrian popu-
ward reannexation. That
Tyrol is at present in Ital-
ds.
rl Gruber, undersecretary
Austrian Foreign Ministry,
e revelation at a press con-
today.
ted that the separation of
Iran southern Tyrol ser-
affected the economic and
stability of Austria. He
hat failure to remove the
point would permanently
relations between Austria
y.

Clergymen In Britain Pirating Parish Help

LONDON, Nov. 16 (UP) — A black market in curates is the latest one to crop up on shortage-bound Britain, according to the Daily Mirror. The newspaper said today that harassed rectors and vicars are searching for help in running their parishes, and are resorting to "pirating" methods usually associated with suburban housewives' searches for cooks and housekeepers. Rev. G. W. Clarkson, rector of Skegness, Lincolnshire, told the Daily Mirror that "all kinds of offers are held out to entice curates from other parishes. It is a regular black market."

Dachau Trial Opens
For Forty Prisoners

DACHAU, Nov. 16 — Forty of the original 42 prisoners were present when the trial in connection with the notorious Dachau concentration camp opened today.

One of the missing defendants is in Cuba and the other has not yet been found.

Meanwhile, the Warsaw Radio reported that Paul Hoffman, German commandant of the infamous Maidanek concentration camp in Poland, was sentenced to death at Lublin, where he had been on trial before a special court. London reported, according to Reuter's, that Heinz Endress of Neckarsulm had been sentenced to die by beheading for taking part in the murder of four American airmen in March, 1945, in Oberpfalz.

The precedents were [illegible] relating to the deaths of more than 30,000 people as well as carrying on experiments by subjecting prisoners to malarial infections, blood poisoning and other diseases.

GOERING'S BROTHER

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS) — Albert Goering, brother of the former Reichsmarshal, has been tracked down and arrested in Germany, according to a BBC report. The broadcast said he was picked up by a Czech investigating force operating with American military help.

NO JOB FOR A MAN WITH A WEAK HEART



Literally running for his life, this lieutenant—member of a British mine disposal squad—scurries away from a mine to which he has just attached a rope. The picture was taken at Hastings, England. The squad was called to rope the mine, to keep it from rolling into cement blocks scattered along the beach. *(British Combine Photo)*

Japs Reported Too Poor
To Pay Occupation Cost

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Edwin S. Pauley, President Truman's reparations representative who arrived in Tokyo Tuesday, said yesterday he believed Japan would be unable to pay the cost of Allied occupation, let alone "recurring reparations." Pauley explained that the U. S. policy is to use Japanese wealth:

1. For occupation.
2. For import of a minimum supply of goods to assure survival of Japanese.
3. For reparations.

"I am not optimistic that there will be anything left for reparations of a recurring nature after paying cost of occupation," he said.

Later in answering a direct question, he said he [illegible] of the cost of occupation costs.

Explaining "recurring reparations," Pauley said they were reparations which might be paid after removal of tangible assets such as gold, silver and machinery which might be used in other countries.

JAP INFLATION

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Wartorn Japan must cut her peacetime budget in half and multiply her taxes by five in order to control inflation, the semi-official postwar currency council reported Wednesday to the finance ministry.

The press reported that the

Reich Control To Go To State Department

LONDON, Nov. 16 (AP)—Control of the American zone in Germany will be taken away from the Army and turned over [illegible] sometime between April 1 and July 1," William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of public and cultural relations, said here today.

Benton said: "The Army will not be withdrawn but will become what the Army should be, an occupying military force, in contradiction to the present status which is that of 'military government'."

Italy May Purchase

Spanish Envoy Held
By U. S. In Germany

MUNICH, Nov. 16 (AP) — The Spanish Consulate here has been closed by the military government and the chancellor arrested on charges of issuing 209 passports and visas illegally after the consulate ceased operations, military government officials disclosed today.

Four of the visas went to German nationals. Nineteen women given passports were Germans recently wed to Spaniards, officials said.

The chancellor, Count Charles Waldbott von Bassenheim, is a German. Consul Alvaro de Silvela went to Switzerland on Oct. 25, leaving Bassenheim in charge of [illegible] instructing him to assume custody of the records "if the consulate closed," investigators said.

The investigation was headed by Major Peter Vacca of the intelligence branch of the military government.

The Spanish Consulate first was ordered closed last spring when American troops occupied the region, but passports and visas were issued as late as Oct. 10, 1945. Only the Swiss Consulate was authorized to operate in the American zone and no visas to German nationals were permitted.

Ex-Hungary Premier Wa

0330

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

...ought Hess before his flight to England in 1941 was finally arrested.

The woman, Fraulein Speer, is believed to be in possesion of major secret documents concerning Hess' mysterious flight to England.

Austria Asks Allies For Tyrol Plebiscite

VIENNA, Nov. 16 (UP) — The provisional Austrian government has presented a note to the Allied Council for Austria in the occupation powers, demanding plebiscite in South Tyrol to determine the attitude of the Austrian population toward reannexation. That part of Tyrol is at present in Italian hands.

Dr. Karl Grueber, undersecretary at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, made this revelation at a press conference today.

He stated that the separation of northern from southern Tyrol seriously weakened the economic and political stability of Austria. He added that failure to remove the irritation point would permanently embitter relations between Austria and Italy.

The original 43 prisoners were present when the trial in connection with the notorious Dachau concentration camp opened today.

One of the missing defendants is in Oslo and the other has not yet been found.

Meanwhile, the Warsaw Radio reported that Paul Hoffman, German commandant of the infamous Maidenek concentration camp in Poland, was sentenced to death at Lublin, where he had been on trial before a special court. London reported, according to Reuter's that Heinz Endress of Neckarsulm had been sentenced to die by beheading for taking part in the murder of four American airmen in March, 1945, in Germany.

The prisoners were charged relating to the deaths of more than 30,000 people as well as carrying on experiments by subjecting prisoners to malarial infections, blood poisoning and other diseases.

GOERING'S BROTHER

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS)—Albert Goering, brother of the former Reichsmarshal, has been tracked down and arrested in Germany, according to a BBS report. The broadcast said he was picked up by a Czech investigating force operating with American military help.

Eisenhower Assures U. S. Of Russian Friendship

(Continued from page 1)

tabbalanced, in fact, of a single fighting team composed of the three services, air, land and sea, each supplying the other with support at the proper balance is the only successful solution to the problems of modern war."

General Eisenhower then made a personal plea to Congress for adoption of a postwar universal military training program, declaring that "the greatest single motivating force for world peace today is the organized military potential of the U. S."

General Eisenhower cautioned that development of war technique would give the U. S. no time to prepare if it were attacked again.

"With the introduction of atomic and electronic warfare and the astounding advances being made almost hourly in aerial warfare the tempo is increasing in geometric progression," General Eisenhower asserted.

"If war comes to us again, the fact seems inescapable that we will not have time to train units before we are faced with the final issue of defeat or victory.

"Certainly it would be unconscionable to gamble on a fortuitous recurrence of the time to prepare bought by the blood of our Allies in 1917 and in 1942.

"We must be prepared on M-Day, the day the enemy strikes, or we may never be prepared to avert defeat at the hands of any aggressor who uses against us the weapons of the future."

MERGER SUPPORT

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Generals Carl A. Spaatz and Omar N. Bradley testified for unification of all armed forces before the Senate Military Committee today.

Spaatz declared that America as top-dog nation, would be the number one target and open to air attack and that without a merger, we could not have time to unify the command after hostilities began.

Bradley said his experiences as ground commander convinced him that a single armed forces department is needed and that it was "inconceivable" that anyone should oppose such a setup.

U-Boats' End

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS) — One hundred German submarines now at anchor in western Scotland and Northern Ireland will be towed out to sea within the next two or three weeks and sunk in the greatest mass scuttling of German warships since the German fleet was sunk in Scapa Flow after World War I.

...ay Occupation Cost

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Edwin S. Pauley, President Truman's reparations representative who arrived in Tokyo Tuesday, said yesterday he believed Japan would be unable to pay the cost of Allied occupation, let alone "recurring reparations." Pauley explained that the U. S. policy is to use Japanese wealth:

1. For occupation.
2. For import of a minimum supply of goods to assure survival of Japanese.
3. For reparations.

"I am not optimistic that there will be anything left for reparations of a recurring nature after paying cost of occupation," he said.

Later, in answering a direct question, he said he [illegible] able ever to pay occupation costs.

Explaining "recurring reparations," Pauley said they were reparations which might be paid after removal of tangible assets such as gold, silver and machinery which might be used in other countries.

JAP INFLATION

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—War-crushed Japan must cut her peacetime budget in half and multiply her taxes by five in order to control inflation, the semi-official postwar currency council reported Wednesday to the finance ministry.

The press reported that the council had been charged with preparation of a five year program to stabilize currency already ballooned by a mushrooming black market. The council recommended a 1946-47 budget of not more than 15 billion yen, compared with a current budget of 111 billion, 434 million yen, a newspaper said. The council was quoted as urging current tax revenues of 14 billion yen to be boosted to 76 billion.

Allied Headquarters directed the Japanese government to say by December 15, what it is doing to provide the empire's 70,000,000 people with enough to eat. It further ordered a long range program for Japanese agriculture, including a report on such questions as farm indebtedness, taxes, credit and production.

Winter snows in northern Japan and increasingly sharp winds in Tokyo pointed to the Japanese food and housing shortages.

Supreme Headquarters indicated that new democratization directives would be aimed at the land system through which tenants have been held in virtual bondage for generations. But Kyodo indicated that the Japanese themselves might steal a march on the high command and act independently.

Reich Control To Go To State Department

LONDON, Nov. 16 (AP)—Control of the American zone in Germany will be taken away from the Army and turned over to the U. S. state department sometime between April 1 and July 1," William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of public and cultural relations, said here today.

Benton said: "The Army will not be withdrawn but will become what the Army should be, an occupying military force, in contradiction to its present status which is that of 'military government'."

Italy May Purchase 101 P-38 Fighters

ROME, Nov. 16 (UP)—The Italian government and officials of the American Foreign Liquidation Commission are negotiating for Italian purchase of 101 P-38 Lightning fighters in a joint effort to bolster the Italian air force and to save the high priced combat planes from the scrap heap, the United Press learned from an unimpeachable American source today.

The same source also revealed that a number of the 223 P-38s which had been declared surplus, already have been beaten into scrap and that the spanking new motors and the valuable precision instruments were subjected to the wrecking hammer as well as the torches.

The present deal, under negotiation, would give the Italian government 23 standard Lightning fighters and 78 of the photographing and reconnaissance type, called F-5's.

The Italian air force plans to substitute the new planes for 150 outmoded P-39 Airacobras, given to Italy by America when Italy came into the war on the Allied side.

The Italian government argues that purchase of the planes would lift the morale of its air force which is now at rockbottom, despite its good showing with the Allies, due to poor pay, the fact that pilots are allowed to fly only a few hours monthly and the fact that gunnery practice is prohibited.

Swedish Atom Bombs

LONDON, Nov. 16 (Reuter's)—On his return from London, Swedish scientist and Nobel Prize laureate Professor Karl Manne Georg Siegbahn told correspondents of the Swiss Telegraph Agency in Stockholm that Sweden is in a position to produce atom bombs.

By U. S. I...

MUNICH, Nov. ... Spanish Consulate ... closed by the mili... and the chancel... charges of issuing ... visas illegally aft... ceased operations, ... ment officials de...

Four of the visas ... nationals. Nineteen ... passports were G... wed to Spaniards ...

The chancellor, ... Waldbott von B... German. Consul ... went to Switzerl... leaving Bassenh...

instructing him t... of the records "... closed," investigato...

The investigation ... Major Peter Vacc... gence branch of t... ernment.

The Spanish Co... ordered closed la... American troops o... gion, but passports ... issued as late as O... the Swiss Consulate ... ized to operate i... zone and no visas ... tionals were permi...

Ex-Hungary P... Trial Opens

LONDON, Nov. ... war crime trial of ... ian Premier Bela ... before the Budapest ... yesterday, according ... broadcast today, ... dispatch from Budap...

Imredy was be... three-count indictm... helped get Hungar... helped the Hun... movement seize po... promulgate anti-Je...

The radio repo... judge, Karol Nagy, ... of the people's cou... that the Germans ... on Imredy's appoi... premiership."

WEAT... REPO...

The weatherman ... racing form and ... today's forecast wa... for another 24 ho... going to be fair an... just a touch of fog ... Maximum temperat... were Rome, 62; Na...

Yesterday's tempe...

Rome
Naples
Perugia

0331

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

...in 1941 was finally arrested.
...woman, Fraulein Speer, is
...ed to be in possession of major
...documents concerning Hess'
...rious flight to England.

...tria Asks Allies ...or Tyrol Plebiscite

...NNA, Nov. 16 (UP) — The
...nal Austrian government
...ented a note to the Allied
...for consideration to the ec-
...n peace, demanding plebis-
...South Tyrol to determine
...titude of the Austrian popu-
...toward reannexation. That
...Tyrol is at present in Ital-
...ds.

Karl Gruber, undersecretary
...Austrian Foreign Ministry,
...his revelation at a press con-
...e today.

...tated that the separation of
...rn from southern Tyrol ser-
...weakened the economic and
...al stability of Austria. He
...that failure to remove the
...ion point would permanently
...er relations between Austria
...aly.

...the accused at prisoners were present when the trial in connection with the notorious Dachau concentration camp opened today.

One of the missing defendants is in Oslo and the other has not yet been found.

Meanwhile, the Warsaw Radio reported that Paul Hoffmann, German commandant of the infamous Maidenek concentration camp in Poland, was sentenced to death at Lublin, where he had been on trial before a special court. London reported, according to Reuter's that Heinz Endress of Neckarsulm had been sentenced to die by beheading for taking part in the murder of four American airmen in March, 1945, in Germany.

The proceeds here [illegible] relating to the deaths of more than 30,000 people as well as carrying on experiments by subjecting prisoners to malarial infections, blood poisoning and other diseases.

GOERING'S BROTHER

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS) —Albert Goering, brother of the former Reichsmarshal, has been tracked down and arrested in Germany, according to a BBC report. The broadcast said he was picked up by a Czech investigating force operating with American military help.

...enhower Assures U. S. ...f Russian Friendship

...ntinued from page 1)

...ent, in fact, of a single ...team composed of the ...services, air, land and sea, ...upplying the other with sup... the proper balance is the ...ccessful solution to the prob... ...modern war."

...al Eisenhower then made ...nal plea to Congress for ...n of a postwar universal ...training program, declar... "the greatest single moti... force for world peace today ...rganized military potential ...U. S."

...al Eisenhower cautioned ...velopment of war technique ...ive the U. S. no time to ...ll it were attacked again ... the introduction of atomic ...trionic warfare and the ...e advances being made al... ...rely in aerial warfare the ...s increasing in geometric ...ion." General Eisenhower ...

...ar comes to us again, the ...e inescapable that we will ...e time to learn skills before...ares with the final issue of ...r victory.

...ld it would be unwise ...e to gamble on a fortuitous ...e of the time to prepare ...by the blood of our Allies ...nd in 1942.

...st be prepared on M-Day, ...the enemy strikes, or we ...nay never be prepared to avert defeat at the hands of any aggressor who uses against us the weapons of the future."

MERGER SUPPORT

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Generals Carl A. Spaatz and Omar N. Bradley testified for unification of all armed forces before the Senate Military Committee today.

Spaatz declared that American an island-mass nation, would be the bomber one target and open to air attack and that without a merger we could not have time to unify the command after hostilities began.

Bradley said his experiences as ground commander convinced him that a single armed forces department is needed and that it was "inconceivable" that anyone should oppose such a setup.

U-Boats' End

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS) — One hundred German submarines now at anchor in western Scotland and Northern Ireland will be towed out to sea within the next two or three weeks and sunk in the greatest mass scuttling of German warships since the German fleet was sunk in Scapa Flow after World War I.

...y Occupation Cost

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Edwin S. Pauley, President Truman's reparations representative who arrived in Tokyo Tuesday, said yesterday he believed Japan would be unable to pay the cost of Allied occupation, let alone "recurring reparations." Pauley explained that the U. S. policy is to use Japanese wealth:

1. For occupation.
2. For import of a minimum supply of goods to insure survival of Japanese.
3. For reparations.

"I am not optimistic that there will be anything left for reparations of a recurring nature after paying cost of occupation," he said.

Later, in answering a direct question, he said he [illegible] able ever to pay occupation costs.

Explaining "recurring reparations," Pauley said they were reparations which might be paid after removal of tangible assets such as gold, silver and machinery which might be used in other countries.

JAP INFLATION

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—War-crushed Japan must cut her peacetime budget in half and multiply her taxes by five in order to control inflation, the semi-official postwar currency council reported Wednesday to the finance ministry.

The press reported that the council had been charged with preparation of a five year program to stabilize currency already ballooned by a mushrooming black market. The council recommended a 1946-47 budget of not more than 15 billion yen, compared with a current budget of 111 billion, 434 million yen, a newspaper said. The council was quoted as urging current tax revenues of 14 billion yen to be boosted to 70 billion.

Allied Headquarters directed the Japanese government to say by December 15 what it is doing to provide the empire's 70,000,000 people with enough to eat. It further ordered a long range program for Japanese agriculture, including a report on such questions as farm indebtedness, taxes, credit and production.

Winter snows in northern Japan and increasingly sharp winds in Tokyo pointed to the Japanese food and housing shortages.

Supreme Headquarters indicated that new democratization directives would be aimed at the land system through which tenants have been held in virtual bondage for generations. But Kyodo indicated that the Japanese themselves might steal a march on the high command and act independently.

Reich Control To Go To State Department

LONDON, Nov. 16 (AP)—Control of the American zone in Germany will be taken away from the Army and turned over "sometime between April 1 and July 1," William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of public and cultural relations, said here today.

Benton said: "The Army will not be withdrawn but will become what the Army should be, an occupying military force, in contradiction to its present status which is that of 'military government'."

Italy May Purchase 101 P-38 Fighters

ROME, Nov. 16 (UP)—The Italian government and officials of the American Foreign Liquidation Commission are negotiating for Italian purchase of 101 P-38 Lightning fighters in a joint effort to bolster the Italian air force and to save the high priced combat planes from the scrap heap, the United Press learned from an unimpeachable American source today.

The same source also revealed that a number of the 223 P-38s which had been declared surplus, already have been beaten into scrap and that the sparkling new motors and the valuable precision instruments were subjected to the wrecking hammer as well as the flamethrower.

The present deal, under negotiation, would give the Italian government 23 Standard Lightning fighters and 78 of the photographic and reconnaissance type, called F-5s.

The Italian air force plans to substitute the new planes for 150 outmoded P-39 Aircobras, given to Italy by America when Italy came into the war on the Allied side.

The Italian government argues that purchase of the planes would lift the morale of its air force which is now at rockbottom, despite its good showing with the Allies, due to poor pay, the fact that pilots are allowed to fly only a few hours monthly and the fact that gunnery practice is prohibited.

Swedish Atom Bombs

LONDON, Nov. 16 (Reuter's)—On his return from London Swedish scientist and Nobel Prize laureate Professor Karl Manne Georg Siegbahn told correspondents of the Swiss Telegraph Agency in Stockholm that Sweden is in a position to produce atom bombs.

...By U. S. In Germany

MUNICH, Nov. 16 (AP) — The Spanish Consulate here has been closed by the military government and the chancellor arrested on charges of issuing 200 passports and visas illegally after the consulate ceased operations, military government officials disclosed today.

Four of the visas went to German nationals. Nineteen women given passports were Germans recently wed to Spaniards, officials said.

The chancellor, Count Charles Waldbott von Bassenheim, is a German. Consul Alvaro de Silvela went to Switzerland on Oct. 24, leaving Bassenheim dozens of [illegible] instructing him to assume custody of the records "if the consulate closed," investigators said.

The investigation was headed by Major Peter Vacca of the intelligence branch of the military government.

The Spanish Consulate that was ordered closed last spring when American troops occupied the region, but passports and visas were issued as late as Oct. 10, 1945. Only the Swiss Consulate was authorized to operate in the American zone and no visas to German nationals were permitted.

Ex-Hungary Premier War Trial Opens In Budapest

LONDON, Nov. 16 (AP)—The war crime trial of former Hungarian Premier Bela Imredy opened before the Budapest People's Court yesterday, according to a Moscow broadcast today, quoting a [illegible] dispatch from Budapest.

Imredy was being tried on a three-count indictment alleging he helped get Hungary into the war, helped the Hungarian Fascist movement seize power and helped promulgate anti-Jewish laws.

The radio reported that the judge, Karol Nagy, vice president of the people's court, "pointed out that the Germans strongly insisted on Imredy's appointment to the premiership."

WEATHER REPORT

The weatherman pulled out his racing form and prayed that today's forecast would hold [illegible] for another 24 hours, since it's going to be fair and warmer with just a touch of fog in the morning. Maximum temperatures forecast were Rome, 62, Naples, 65.

Yesterday's temperatures:

	Max.	Min.
Rome	57	38
Naples	59	46
Foggia	58	42

0332

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Baseball Briefs

BROOKLYN, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The Dodgers announced the sale of Johnny Peacock to New Orleans where the veteran catcher will be signed as playing manager of the Southern Association Pelicans. Peacock will succeed Fresco Thompson who resigned as New Orleans pilot to rejoin the Brooklyn organization as a scout.

ST. LOUIS, Nov. 16—The St. Louis Browns will play an exhibition schedule of 35 games next spring, according to Bill DeWitt, general manager. The schedule includes 18 games with the Chicago Cubs, seven with Pittsburgh, at least two with the Chicago White Sox and about eight with Pacific Coast League teams.

PITTSBURGH, Nov. 16—The Pirates further expanded their farm system with the conclusion of a working agreement with the Hollywood club of the Pacific Coast League. Hollywood makes the seventh club in the Pirate's chain.

ELIZABETHTOWN, Ky., Nov. 16—Commissioner Happy Chandler said yesterday the case of the signing of Negro Jackie Robinson by Branch Rickey of the Dodgers had not been presented to the baseball commission. The commissioner refused to comment on a report that he had refused to recognize a protest from the Negro National and American League protesting the manner in which the player was signed.

CINCINNATI, Nov. 16—Gene Thompson, pitcher for the Cincinnati Reds until he joined the Navy three years ago, has been discharged and placed on the Redleg's active roster. The big righthander was stationed at the New London sub base.

LANCASTER, Tex., Nov. 16—Paul Dean plans to hit the major league comeback trail again next spring. Paul said he would stay on his farm here until spring and then join the St. Louis Browns. Now 32, he was discharged from the Army as a sergeant a month ago after 15 months service.

CHICAGO, Nov. 16—Lon Warneke was returned by the Chicago Cubs, with the announcement the veteran pitcher was shopping for an umpiring job in the minor leagues. He served mainly as a relief hurler during part-time service with the Cubs last year.

Montreal Six Takes Hockey Loop Lead

MONTREAL, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Montreal scored a 2-0 triumph over the hapless New York Rangers here last night to take the lead in the National Hockey League while Detroit was downing the visiting Chicago club, 5-2, to move the Red

Army Coach Frets But Cadets Carefree About Meeting Penn

Col. Blaik Concerned About Penn Attack, Quakers' Line

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The Army Cadets and their football coach, Col. Earl Blaik, don't see eye-to-eye on two gridiron matters but it's nothing serious. The Cadets refuse to get alarmed over Saturday's game with Penn while the coach is worrying, and the boys favor participation in the Rose Bowl, while Blaik says he doesn't.

In a breakdown of these points, Blaik contends that Army will be facing its toughest line test of the year. He cites the accomplishments of the Quaker forwards who have not been scored on in six games. Navy and Columbia, the only teams to score on Penn, had to resort to the air to register.

The good colonel also continues to fret over Army's pass defense and fears the worst against Penn's Bob Evans who rifled four touchdown heaves against a good Columbia team last week. However, the Cadets in their pass rebuttals, offensive and defensive—come up with a few statistics which sort of smash Blaik's fears.

For against Notre Dame last week Army topped the Irish at supposedly the latter's best weapon, passing. Army connected on ten out of 13, two of them for touchdowns, and bottled up Notre Dame's aerial attack to the point where the Irish made good on only six out of 23 forwards.

On the question of the bowls, Blaik figures that by the time Army plays its finale against Navy two weeks from tomorrow they will have had enough.

Blaik announced one change in the starting lineup against Penn. Barney Poole will take over at left end, replacing Dick Pitzer.

In the Penn camp, Coach George Munger said his bunch of kids might have been scared of the Army last year but they weren't now as the cadets are not supermen and it won't be anything like that 62-7 [illegible] but were not ... expect to win. [illegible] said he knew down," Munger [illegible].

Navy Loses Passer

BALTIMORE, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Navy will lose its passing star, Bob Hoernschmeyer, for tomorrow's game with Wisconsin and possibly for the Army game in two weeks due to a chronic weak right shoulder, similar to a pitcher's "dead" arm. Bruce Smith will start in Hunchy's place, Coach Oscar Hagberg said.

O'Connell Gets Gate

COLUMBIA, Mo., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Missouri's Big Six title hopes were dealt a severe blow yesterday when it was announced by Coach Chauncey Simpson that sophomore Jack

GAMES today

PROBABLE WINNERS IN CAFS

EAST
ARMY at Penn
Coast Guard Academy at YALE
COLGATE at Syracuse
COLUMBIA at Princeton
CORNELL at Dartmouth
Harvard at BROWN
NYU at RUTGERS
Temple at HOLY CROSS
Wisconsin vs. NAVY at Baltimore

MIDWEST
Illinois at OHIO STATE
INDIANA at Pittsburgh
IOWA STATE at Drake
KANSAS STATE at Kansas
MARQUETTE at Kentucky
MINNESOTA at Iowa
NOTRE DAME at Northwestern
OKLAHOMA at Missouri
PENN STATE at Michigan State
PURDUE at Michigan

SOUTH
ALABAMA at Vanderbilt
Auburn vs GEORGIA at Columbus, Ga.
Catawba at VMI
Clemson at TULANE
LSU at Georgia Tech
Maryland vs. VIRGINIA at Washington, D. C.
Kings Point Merchant Marines at WILLIAM AND MARY
North Carolina State at MIAMI, Fla., (Fri.)
LOUISVILLE AF at South Carolina
Presbyterian at FLORIDA
Richmond at VPI
WAKE FOREST at North Carolina

SOUTHWEST
Arkansas at SMU
Baylor at TULSA
TEXAS A and M at Rice
TCU at TEXAS
Texas Tech at OKLA. A AND M

ROCKY MOUNTAIN
West Texas at COLORADO COLLEGE

FAR WEST
Idaho at WASHINGTON
OREGON at California
ST. MARY'S at UCLA
WASHINGTON STATE at Oregon State

Angelini's Sub-Par 70 Paces Field In Italian Open Play

By Sgt. MERRELL WHITTLESEY
Staff Correspondent

ROME, Nov. 16—The home pros gave a group lesson to the entire field in the Italian Open golf championship today as they finished 1-2-3 in the first round of the 72-hole medal play event over the Rome course. Alfonso Angelini came in late with a par of 35s for a 70, good for a one-stroke advantage over the two-time Italian champion, 22-year-old Ugo Grappasonni, whose 71 was in turn one shot ahead of Pietro Manca's 72.

The new 16th and 17th holes were put into play for the first time, a long par five and a rugged par four, and they prevented any fast finishes with the 17th proving a particular stumbling block. At that 12 players in the starting field of 54 were 75 or better and 16 were under 80, far better scoring than the two previous tournaments open to Allied golfers over the same course.

Pvt. Tom Bolt, the Texas amateur whose "bad-boy" antics have marked his previous tournament appearances in Italy, was what the boys down Texas way call "snake-bit," meaning his luck was all bad, as he posted a two-over par 73.

Bolt was out in 38, two over par, with seven pars and two bogeys and had to wait 14 holes to get his only birdie over the course where he usually scatters four or five. He matched regulation figures coming back for a 35 but promised to do better tomorrow. He didn't throw a club, incidentally, as his behavior was exemplary.

Grouped with Bolt at 73 were Gdm. Stan Taggart, a British professional, the veteran of the assistent pros at the home club, Umberto Grelli, and Aldo Casera, an Italian pro from San Remo, near

MacPhail Releases Yanks' New Plans

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The New York Yankees came up with the choicest pot of stew of the current Hot Stove League season yesterday in the form of a three-ply announcement by President Larry MacPhail and part-owner Dan Topping.

MacPhail and Topping revealed that more than 500,000 dollars will be spent to improve Yankee Stadium next year, with half of that sum going for the installation of a lighting system for night baseball in 1946, and that George Weiss, hitherto director of the Yankees' vast farm system, also will be in charge of all player operations within the Yankee organization.

It also was announced that professional football will be played in the stadium next fall, with the team being either a member of the National Football League or the new All-America Football Conference, depending on the attitude of the neighboring New York Football Giants in regard to choice Sunday playing dates.

MacPhail said the lighting system would be ready on April 1, but

St. Mary's Declare Out Of Rose Bow May Play Alaba

Pacific Coast Cha Tied By Contrac To Pasadena

LOS ANGELES, Nov. 16 (— Whatever hopes the y unbeaten St. Mary's foo team entertained of windi in the Rose Bowl on New Y Day vanished yesterday the announcement that Gaels "would not fit int agreement now existing" reg the selection of contestants post-season classic at Pasad

Commissioner Victor O. Sel of the Pacific Coast Confe who made the announcement the main opposition to St. M was the fact that the school a member of the circuit. D pointed out that the Rose by tradition and contract, ha come a "for members only" p sition.

However the Gaels are c certain to wind up in some Year's bowl, possibly the Bowl at New Orleans against beaten Alabama.

It was noted by the Asso Press that Los Angeles writers, who were campaignin a Rose Bowl berth for St. M while Washington was in th ference lead, became "churc lent" after Southern Cali and UCLA popped back int championship race last Satu

No Bowl For Navy

ANNAPOLIS, Md., Nov. 16 (Navy's unbeaten but once eleven will hang up its fo togs after its traditional clas Army on Dec. 1.

Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Annapolis superintendent, a ruled out a New Year's Day appearance for the Middies a statement yesterday that not the intention of the U States Naval Academy to p pate in any post-season f games this year."

Name Shrine Coaches

SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. 16 (—Once again it will be Andy at the helm for the East and "Babe" Hollingberry for the in the 21st annual East ball game in Kezar [illegible] on New Year's Day.

Kerr, Colgate mentor, will assisted by Bernie Bierman o nesota and Beattie Feath North Carolina State. The erners will gather at Northw University, Evanston, Ill., an arrive here on Dec. 20. The train at Santa Clara Uni

Forty Basketball Te Enter Five PBS Le

0333!

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

seball Briefs

XN, Nov. 16 (ANS)— s announced the sale Peacock to New Orleans eteran catcher will be laying manager of the Association Pelicans. ll succeed Prisco who resigned as New ot to rejoin the Brook- ation as a scout.

TS, Nov. 16—The St. ns will play an exhibi- le of 35 games next ording to Bill DeWitt, nager. The schedule in- ames with the Chicago n with Pittsburgh, at ith the Chicago White bout eight with Pacific e teams.

RGH, Nov. 16—The rther expanded their with the conclusion of greement with the Hol- of the Pacific Coast lywood makes the sev- the Pirate's chain.

THTOWN, Ky., Nov. 16 ner Happy Chandler ay the case of the sign- o Jackie Robinson by key of the Dodgers had resented to the baseball . The commissioner re- mment on a report that ed to recognize a pro- the Negro National and League protesting the which the player was

TTI, Nov. 16—Gene pitcher for the Cincin- ntil he joined the Navy s ago, has been dis- d placed on the Red- ive roster. The big r was stationed at the n sub base.

TER, Tex., Nov. 16— plans to hit the major eback trail again next l said he would stay on re until spring and then . Louis Browns. Now 32, charged from the Army nd a month ago after 15 rvice.

O, Nov. 16—Lon War- [redacted] the announcement the tcher was shopping for ng job in the minor served mainly as a re- during part-time service ubs last year.

eal Six Takes key Loop Lead

EAL, Nov. 16 (ANS)— ored a 2-0 triumph over New York Rangers here to take the lead in the ockey League while De- lowning the visiting Chi- [illegible] to move the Red

Army Coach Frets But Cadets Carefree About Meeting Penn

Col. Blaik Concerned About Penn Attack, Quakers' Line

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The Army Cadets and their football coach, Col. Earl Blaik, don't see eye-to-eye on two gridiron matters but it's nothing serious. The Cadets refuse to get alarmed over Saturday's game with Penn while the coach is worrying, and the boys favor participation in the Rose Bowl, while Blaik says he doesn't.

In a breakdown of these points, Blaik contends that Army will be facing its toughest line test of the year. He cites the accomplishments of the Quaker forwards who have not been scored on in six games. Navy and Columbia, the only teams to score on Penn, had to resort to the air to register.

The good colonel also continues to fret over Army's pass defense and fears the worst against Penn's Bob Evans who rifled four touchdown heaves against a good Columbia team last week. However, the Cadets in their pass rebuttals, offensive and defensive—come up with a few statistics which sort of smash Blaik's fears.

For against Notre Dame last week Army topped the Irish at supposedly the latter's best weapon, passing. Army connected on ten out of 13, two of them for touchdowns, and bottled up Notre Dame's aerial attack to the point where the Irish made good on only six out of 23 forwards.

On the question of the bowls, Blaik figures that by the time Army plays its finale against Navy two weeks from tomorrow they will have had enough.

Blaik announced one change in the starting lineup against Penn. Barney Poole will take over at left end, replacing Dick Pitzer.

In the Penn camp, Coach George Munger said his bunch of kids might have been scared of the Army last year but they weren't now as the cadets are not supermen and it won't be anything like that 62-7 [illegible] but we're not lying down," Munger [illegible]

Navy Loses Passer

BALTIMORE, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Navy will lose its passing star, Bob Hoernschmeyer, for tomorrow's game with Wisconsin and possibly for the Army game in two weeks due to a chronic weak right shoulder, similar to a pitcher's "dead" arm. Bruce Smith will start in Hunchy's place, Coach Oscar Hagberg said.

O'Connell Gets Gate

COLUMBIA, Mo., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Missouri's Big Six title hopes were dealt a severe blow yesterday when it was announced by Coach Chauncey Simpson that sophomore Jack

GAMES today

PROBABLE WINNERS IN CAPS

EAST
ARMY at Penn
Coast Guard Academy at YALE
COLGATE at Syracuse
COLUMBIA at Princeton
CORNELL at Dartmouth
Harvard at BROWN
NYU at RUTGERS
Temple at HOLY CROSS
Wisconsin vs. NAVY at Baltimore

MIDWEST
Illinois at OHIO STATE
INDIANA at Pittsburgh
IOWA STATE at Drake
KANSAS STATE at Kansas
MARQUETTE at Kentucky
MINNESOTA at Iowa
NOTRE DAME at Northwestern
OKLAHOMA at Missouri
PENN STATE at Michigan State
PURDUE at Michigan

SOUTH
ALABAMA at Vanderbilt
Auburn vs GEORGIA at Columbus, Ga.
Catawba at VMI
Clemson at TULANE
LSU at Georgia Tech
Maryland vs. VIRGINIA at Washington, D.C.
Kings Point Merchant Marines at WILLIAM AND MARY
North Carolina State at MIAMI, Fla., (Fri.)
LOUISVILLE AF at South Carolina
Presbyterian at FLORIDA
Richmond at VPI
WAKE FOREST at North Carolina

SOUTHWEST
Arkansas at SMU
Baylor at TULSA
TEXAS A and M at Rice
TCU at TEXAS
Texas Tech at OKLA. A AND M

ROCKY MOUNTAIN
West Texas at COLORADO COLLEGE

FAR WEST
Idaho at WASHINGTON
OREGON at California
ST. MARY'S at UCLA
WASHINGTON STATE at Oregon State

Angelini's Sub-Par 70 Paces Field In Italian Open Play

By Sgt. MERRELL WHITTLESEY
Staff Correspondent

ROME, Nov. 16—The home pros gave a group lesson to the entire field in the Italian Open golf championship today as they finished 1-2-3 in the first round of the 72-hole medal play event over the Rome course. Alfonso Angelini came in late with a pair of 35s for a 70, good for a one-stroke advantage over the two-time Italian champion, 22-year-old Ugo Grappasonni, whose 71 was in turn one shot ahead of Pietro Manca's 72.

The new 16th and 17th holes were put into play for the first time, a long par five and a rugged par four, and they prevented any fast finishes with the 17th proving a particular stumbling block. At that 12 players in the starting field of 54 were 75 or better and 16 were under 80, far better scoring than the two previous tournaments open to Allied golfers over the same course.

Pvt. Tom Bolt, the Texas amateur whose "bad-boy" antics have marked his previous tournament appearances in Italy, was what the boys down Texas way call "snake-bit," meaning his luck was all bad, as he posted a two-over par 73.

Bolt was out in 38, two over par, with seven pars and two bogeys and had to wait 14 holes to get his only birdie over the course where he usually scatters four or five. He matched regulation figures coming back for a 35 but promised to do better tomorrow. He didn't throw a club, incidentally, as his behavior was exemplary.

Grouped with Bolt at 73 were Gdm. Stan Taggart, a British professional, the veteran of the assistent pros at the home club, Umberto Grelli, and Aldo Casern, an Italian pro from San Remo, near

MacPhail Releases Yanks' New Plans

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The New York Yankees came up with the choicest pot of stew of the current Hot Stove League season yesterday in the form of a three-ply announcement by President Larry MacPhail and part-owner Dan Topping.

MacPhail and Topping revealed that more than 500,000 dollars will be spent to improve Yankee Stadium next year, with half of that sum going for the installation of a lighting system for night baseball in 1946, and that George Weiss, hitherto director of the Yankees' vast farm system, also will be in charge of all player operations within the Yankee organization.

It also was announced that professional football will be played in the stadium next fall, with the team being either a member of the National Football League or the new All-America Football Conference, depending on the attitude of the neighboring New York Football Giants in regard to choice Sunday playing dates.

MacPhail said the lighting system would be ready on April 1, but

St. Mary's Declared Out Of Rose Bowl; May Play Alabama

Pacific Coast Champ Tied By Contract To Pasadena

LOS ANGELES, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Whatever hopes the young, unbeaten St. Mary's football team entertained of winding up in the Rose Bowl on New Year's Day vanished yesterday with the announcement that the Gaels "would not fit into an agreement now existing" regarding the selection of contestants in the post-season classic at Pasadena.

Commissioner Victor O. Schmidt, of the Pacific Coast Conference, who made the announcement, said the main opposition to St. Mary's was the fact that the school is not a member of the circuit. It was pointed out that the Rose Bowl, by tradition and contract, has become a "for members only" proposition.

However the Gaels are almost certain to wind up in some New Year's bowl, possibly the Sugar Bowl at New Orleans against unbeaten Alabama.

It was noted by the Associated Press that Los Angeles sports writers, who were campaigning for a Rose Bowl berth for St. Mary's while Washington was in the conference lead, became "church silent" after Southern California and UCLA popped back into the championship race last Saturday.

No Bowl For Navy

ANNAPOLIS, Md., Nov. 16 (ANS) Navy's unbeaten but once tied eleven will hang up its football togs after its traditional clash with Army on Dec. 1.

Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, Annapolis superintendent, all but ruled out a New Year's Day bowl appearance for the Middies with a statement yesterday that "it is not the intention of the United States Naval Academy to participate in any post-season football games this year."

Name Shrine Coaches

SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Once again it will be Andy Kerr at the helm for the East and Orme "Babe" Hollingberry for the West in the 21st annual East-West football game in Kezar Stadium here on New Year's Day.

Kerr, Colgate mentor, will be assisted by Bernie Bierman of Minnesota and Beattie Feathers of North Carolina State. The Easterners will gather at Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., and will arrive here on Dec. 20. They will train at Santa Clara University.

Forty Basketball Teams Enter Five PBS Leagues

0334

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CINCINATTI, Nov. 16—Gene Thompson, pitcher for the Cincinnati Reds until he joined the Navy three years ago, has been discharged and placed on the Reds' leg's active roster. The big righthander was stationed at the New London sub base.

LANCASTER, Tex., Nov. 16 — Paul Dean plans to hit the major league comeback trail again next spring. Paul said he would stay on his farm here until spring and then join the St. Louis Browns. Now 32, he was discharged from the Army as a sergeant a month ago after 15 months service.

CHICAGO, Nov, 16—Lon War- was released by the Chicago Cubs, with the announcement the veteran pitcher was shopping for an umpiring job in the minor leagues. He served mainly as a relief hurler during part-time service with the Cubs last year.

Montreal Six Takes Hockey Loop Lead

MONTREAL, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Montreal scored a 2-0 triumph over the hapless New York Rangers here last night to take the lead in the National Hockey League while Detroit was downing the visiting Chicago club, 5-2, to move the Red Wings into a second place tie with the Black Hawks.

Goalie Bill Durnan turned in his first shutout of the season for the Canadiens as teammates Jimmy Peters and Murph Chamberlain scored the goals on passes from each other.

In the game at Detroit the Black Hawks, fighting to retain a first-place tie with the Canadiens, played on even terms through the first period but a goal by Jerry Brown in the second and two shots by Mud Bruneteau early in the third clinched the victory for Detroit.

Trainer Smith Denies Jockey Club Charges

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Trainer Tom Smith denied yesterday a New York Jockey Club charge that he had doped the winning horse at Jamaica on Nov. 1 and was expected to appeal the club's suspension of his license for one year.

Action against Smith was announced after the Jockey club had found him guilty of administering caffein to a horse, Magnific Duel, owned by Mrs. Elmendan Graham, better known as Elizabeth Arden, cosmetics queen.

George Cameron, who developed Count Fleet and many other race-horse specialists, was considered as the likely successor to Smith as trainer for Mrs. Graham's Maine Chance Farm stable of thoroughbreds.

passing. Army connected on ten out of 13, two of them for touchdowns, and bottled up Notre Dame's aerial attack to the point where the Irish made good on only six out of 23 forwards.

On the question of the bowls, Blaik figures that by the time Army plays its finale against Navy two weeks from tomorrow they will have had enough.

Blaik announced one change in the starting lineup against Penn. Barney Poole will take over at left end, replacing Dick Pitzer.

In the Penn camp, Coach George Munger said his bunch of kids might have been scared of the Army last year but they weren't now as the cadets are not supermen and it won't be anything like that 62-7 ... "But we're not lying down," Munger said.

Navy Loses Passer

BALTIMORE, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Navy will lose its passing star, Bob Hoernschmeyer, for tomorrow's game with Wisconsin and possibly for the Army game in two weeks due to a chronic weak right shoulder, similar to a pitcher's "dead" arm. Bruce Smith will start in Hunchy's place, Coach Oscar Hagberg said.

O'Connell Gets Gate

COLUMBIA, Mo., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Missouri's Big Six title hopes were dealt a severe blow yesterday when it was announced by Coach Chauncey Simpson that sophomore Jack O'Connell, regular fullback, had been dismissed from the university for failure to attend classes.

Joe Kirkwood's 68 Paces Mobile Open

MOBILE, Ala., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Joe Kirkwood, the Philadelphia trick shot artist, took the lead in the 10,000 dollar Azalea golf tournament here yesterday with a four-under par 68 over a field of 138.

Kirkwood scored an eagle on the first hole, a 368-yard par four, where he knocked a drive on the green and holed a putt for a deuce.

Three others broke 70, Ben Hogan, Sammy Byrd and Denny Shute with 68s. Art Doering of Denver and Pat Cirelli of White Plains, N. Y., had 71s. Lt. Cary Middlecoff of Memphis and Frank Stranahan of Toledo, the amateurs who set a golf precedent by winning the recent Pinehurst and Durham opens, respectively, trailed with 73 and 74.

Hank Camelli Out

PITTSBURGH, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Catcher Hank Camelli, just discharged from the Army after being inducted last spring, became the first Pirate player to sign for the 1946 season when he attached his signature to a Bue contract.

finished 1-2-3 in the first round of the 72-hole medal play event over the Rome course. Alfonso Angelini came in late with a pair of 35s for a 70, good for a one-stroke advantage over the two-time Italian champion, 22-year-old Ugo Grappasonni, whose 71 was in turn one shot ahead of Pietro Manca's 72.

The new 16th and 17th holes were put into play for the first time, a long par five and a rugged par four, and they prevented any last finishes with the 17th proving a particular stumbling block. At that 12 players in the starting field of 54 were 75 or better and 16 were under 80, far better scoring than the two previous tournaments open to Allied golfers over the same course.

Pvt. Tom Bolt, the Texas amateur whose "bad-boy" antics have marked his previous tournament appearances in Italy, was what the boys down Texas way call "snake-bit," meaning his luck was all bad, as he posted a two-over par 73.

Bolt was out in 36, two over par, with seven pars and two bogeys and had to wait 14 holes to get his only birdie over the course where he usually scatters four or five. He matched regulation figures coming back for a 35 but promised to do better tomorrow. He didn't throw a club, incidentally, as his behavior was exemplary.

Grouped with Bolt at 73 were Gdm. Stan Taggart, a British professional, the veteran of the assistant pros at the home club, Umberto Grelli, and Aldo Casera, an Italian pro from San Remo, near Genoa. The latter claimed to have played his first golf in four years the past week as he was released from two years in a German prison camp just last month.

Capt. Bryan Silk, the former New Zealand amateur champion and winner of the British C.M.F. tournament over the same course two days ago, was even par through 15 holes but had nothing good to say for the new holes as he finished 6-6-4 for a 74, four shots off the pace but still in the running. He was tied with another prewar British pro, Sgt. Jim Watt.

The field was made up of contestants from six nations, including H.R.H. the Duke of Segovia, whose brother is pretender to the Spanish throne. The Duke, who played with Victor H. Lofaro of the American Embassy, had three bad holes in a round of 84. Lofaro had 90.

The low scorers:

Alfonso Angelini (I)	35-35,	70
Ugo Grappasonni (I)	35-36,	71
Pietro Manca (I)	34-38,	72
Umberto Grelli (I)	36-37,	73
Aldo Casera (I)	37-36,	73
Pvt. Tom Bolt (US)	38-35,	73
Gdm. Stan Taggart (GB)	36-37,	73
Sgt. Jim Watt (GB)	38-36,	74
Capt. Bryan Silk (NZ)	36-38,	74
Lt. Col. James Ker (GB)	36-39,	75
Pfc. John Wetzel (US)	37-38,	75
Polveo Travaini (I)	39-36,	75
Bdr. T. Walker (GB)	37-39,	76
Gnd. C. H. Griffith (GB)	40-37,	77
Ceriale Croce (I)	39-39,	78
Cpl. Keene (GB)	39-40,	79
Sp. di San Faustino (I)	38-42,	80
S/Sgt. Charles Lally (US)	39-41,	80

a—Amateur (US)—United States; (GB)—Great Britain; (NZ)—New Zealand; (SA)—South Africa; (I)—Italy.

MacPhail Releases Yanks' New Plans

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The New York Yankees came up with the choicest pot of stew of the current Hot Stove League season yesterday in the form of a three-ply announcement by President Larry MacPhail and part-owner Dan Topping.

MacPhail and Topping revealed that more than 500,000 dollars will be spent to improve Yankee Stadium next year, with half of that sum going for the installation of a lighting system for night baseball in 1946, and that George Weiss, hitherto director of the Yankees' vast farm system, also will be in charge of all player operations within the Yankee organization.

It also was announced that professional football will be played in the stadium next fall, with the team being either a member of the National Football League or the new All-America Football Conference, depending on the attitude of the neighboring New York Football Giants in regard to choice Sunday playing dates.

MacPhail said the lighting system would be ready on April 1, but declined to specify how many night games the Yankees would play. Other planned stadium improvements include the erection of sideline stands during the football season to increase the park's gridiron crowd capacity from the present 76,000 to 80,000, and the construction of a new press box.

Topping, who owns an orphaned professional football team now merged with the Boston Yanks of the NFL, said he would like to have it continue in the circuit if the football Giants give Topping five of the nine football Sundays in New York next season.

Northern Loop Back

DURHAM, N. C., Nov. 16 (ANS)—The class C Northern Baseball League will resume activity next season, St. Cloud, Minn., will replace Wausau, Wis., the latter transferring to the Wisconsin State League.

No Bowl For Navy

ANNAPOLIS, Md., Nov. 16 Navy's unbeaten but on eleven will hang up its togs after its traditional cl Army on Dec. 1.

Vice Admiral Aubrey W Annapolis superintendent, ruled out a New Year's D appearance for the Midd a statement yesterday tha not the intention of the States Naval Academy to pate in any post-season games this year."

Name Sh[illegible] Coaches

SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. —Once again it will be An at the helm for the East a "Babe" Hollingberry for t in the 21st annual En ball game in Kezar ... on New Year's Day.

Kerr, Colgate mentor, wi seated by Bernie Bierman, nesota and Beattie Feat North Carolina State. Th erners will gather at Nort University, Evanston, Ill., arrive here on Dec. 20. T train at Santa Clara U

Forty Basketball T[eams] Enter Five PBS L[eagues]

LEGHORN, Nov. 16—P from PBS units already tered the five PBS b a s k leagues which will get un Leghorn late this month. Al Baggett, Theater Spec ice Athletic Officer, and eph Helyenek of PBS S Service announced team play twice each week in robin schedule.

Leaders in each league pete for the Base cham in playoff tournaments at of the season.

Same Old Rac[e]

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 The entire slate of 1945 o the United States Lawn T sociation, headed by Presi rond E. Ward of New renominated yesterday to se in 1946. Elections will b the annual meeting here o

'Florida Football Smel[ls]

TALLAHASEE, Fla., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Accusing the Univ Florida football team of failing "to show either the ability t the ability to fight," Gov. Millard Caldwell yesterday urged t Board of Control to examine the subject and examine a c the future.

Caldwell said the state and its university has suffered prestige because of the football team's failure and suggested be best to quit the field and content ourselves with intramura

The Florida team this season has won three games, lost tied one with two contests to play. In the Southeastern C they have won one, lost three and tied one.

0335

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

, Nov. 16 — Gene
cher for the Cincin-
he joined the Navy
go, has been dis-
laced on the Red-
roster. The big
as stationed at the
ub base.

, Tex., Nov. 16 —
ns to hit the major
ck trail again next
aid he would stay on
until spring and then
ouis Browns. Now 32,
rged from the Army
a month ago after 15
e.

e announcement the
r was shopping for
job in the minor
rved mainly as a re-
ring part-time service
s last year.

l Six Takes ey Loop Lead

AL, Nov. 16 (ANS)—
ed a 2-0 triumph over
New York Rangers here
take the lead in the
key League while De-
ning the visiting Chi-
-2, to move the Red
second place tie with
wks.
Durnan turned in his
of the season for the
s teammates. Jimmy
Murph Chamberlain
goals on passes from

ne at Detroit the Black
ting to return a first-
h the Canadiens played
rns through the first
s post by Jerry Brown
nd and two shots by
ean early in the third
e victory for Detroit.

Smith Denies key Club Charges

ORK, Nov. 16 (ANS)—
n Smith denied yester-
Yorx Jockey Club charge
ad doped the warning
nches on Nov. 1 and was
appeal the club's sus-
his license for one year.
gainst Smith was an-
after the Jockey club had
guilty of administering
to a horse, Nashua Joel.
Mrs. Elizabeth Graham,
own as Elizabeth Arden,
queen.
Cameron, who developed
et and many other rece-
ations, was considered as
y successor to Smith as
or Mrs. Graham's Maine
Farm stable of thorough-

passing. Army connected on ten out of 13, two of them for touchdowns, and bottled up Notre Dame's aerial attack to the point where the Irish made good on only six out of 23 forwards.

On the question of the bowls, Blaik figures that by the time Army plays its finale against Navy two weeks from tomorrow they will have had enough.

Blaik announced one change in the starting lineup against Penn. Barney Poole will take over at left end, replacing Dick Pitser.

In the Penn camp, Coach George Munger said his bunch of kids might have been scared of the Army last year but they weren't now as the cadet[illegible] "Texas [illegible] that 62-7 [illegible] U. S." win [illegible] down," Munger [illegible]

Navy Loses Passer

BALTIMORE, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Navy will lose its passing star, Bob Heermschmeyer, for tomorrow's game with Wisconsin and possibly for the Army game in two weeks due to a chronic weak right shoulder, similar to a pitcher's "dead" arm. Bruce Smith will start in Hunchy's place, Coach Oscar Hagberg said.

O'Connell Gets Gate

COLUMBIA, Mo., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Missouri's Big Six title hopes were dealt a severe blow yesterday when it was announced by Coach Chauncey Simpson that sophomore Jack O'Connell, regular fullback, had been dismissed from the university for failure to attend classes.

Joe Kirkwood's 68 Paces Mobile Open

MOBILE, Ala., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Joe Kirkwood, the Philadelphia trick shot artist, took the lead in the 10,000 dollar Azalea golf tournament here yesterday with a four-under par 68 over a field of 138.

Kirkwood scored an eagle on the first hole, a 368-yard par four, where he knocked a drive on the green and holed a putt for a deuce.

Three others broke 70, Ben Hogan, Sammy Byrd and Denny Shute with 69s. Art Doering of Denver and Pat Circelli of White Plains, N. Y., had 71s. Ed. Cary Middlecoff of Memphis and Frank Stranahan of Toledo, the amateurs who set a golf precedent by winning the recent Pinehurst and Durham opens, respectively, trailed with 73 and 74.

Hank Camelli Out

PITTSBURGH, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Catcher Hank Camelli, just discharged from the Army after being inducted last spring, became the first Pirate player to sign for the 1946 season when he attached his signature to a Bue contract.

finished 1-2-3 in the first round of the 72-hole medal play event over the Rome course, Alfonso Angelini came in late with a pair of 35s for a 70, good for a one-stroke advantage over the two-time Italian champion, 22-year-old Ugo Grappasonni, whose 71 was in turn one shot ahead of Pietro Manca's 72.

The new 16th and 17th holes were put into play for the first time, a long par five and a rugged par four, and they prevented any fast finishes with the 17th proving a particular stumbling block. At that 12 players in the starting field of 54 were 75 or better and 16 were under 80, far better scoring than the two previous tournaments open to Allied golfers over the same course.

[illegible] the Texas amateur whose "bad-boy" antics have marked his previous tournament appearances in Italy, was what the boys down Texas way call "snake-bit," meaning his luck was all bad, as he posted a two-over par 73.

Bolt was out in 38, two over par, with seven pars and two bogeys and had to wait 14 holes to get his only birdie over the course where he usually scatters four or five. He matched regulation figures coming back for a 35 but promised to do better tomorrow. He didn't throw a club, incidentally, as his behavior was exemplary.

Grouped with Bolt at 73 were Gdm. Stan Taggart, a British professional, the veteran of the assistant pros at the home club, Umberto Grelli, and Aldo Casera, an Italian pro from San Remo, near Genoa. The latter claimed to have played his first golf in four years the past week as he was released from two years in a German prison camp just last month.

Capt. Bryan Silk, the former New Zealand amateur champion and winner of the British CMF tournament over the same course two days ago, was even par through 15 holes but had nothing good to say for the new holes as he finished 6-6-4 for a 74, four shots off the pace but still in the running. He was tied with another prewar British pro, Sgt. Jim Watt.

The field was made up of contestants from six nations, including Hitch the Duke of Segonia, whose brother is pretender to the Spanish throne. The Duke, who played with Victor H. Lottus of the American Embassy, had three bad holes in a round of 84. Lottus had 90.

The low scorers:

Alfonso Angelini (I)	35-35, 70
Ugo Grappasonni (I)	35-36, 71
Pietro Manca (I)	34-38, 72
Umberto Grelli (I)	36-37, 73
Aldo Casera (I)	37-36, 73
Pvt. Tom Bell (US)	38-35, 73
Gdm. Stan Taggart (GB)	36-37, 73
Sgt. Jim Watt (GB)	38-36, 74
Capt. Bryan Silk (NZ)	36-38, 74
Lt. Col. James Ker (GB)	36-39, 75
Sgt. John Wetzel (US)	37-38, 75
Polvo Travani (I)	39-36, 75
Bdr. T. Walker (GB)	37-39, 76
Gnd. C. H. Griffith (GB)	40-37, 77
Cesare Croce (I)	39-39, 78
Gnr. Keene (GB)	39-40, 79
n. di San Faustina (I)	38-42, 80
T-Sgt. Charles Lally (US)	39-41, 80

I—Amateur (US)—United States, (GB)—Great Britain, (NZ)—New Zealand, (SA)—South Africa, (I)—Italy.

MacPhail Releases Yanks' New Plans

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (ANS) — The New York Yankees came up with the choicest pot of stew of the current Hot Stove League season yesterday in the form of a three-ply announcement by President Larry MacPhail and part-owner Dan Topping.

MacPhail and Topping revealed that more than 500,000 dollars will be spent to improve Yankee Stadium next year, with half of that sum going for the installation of a lighting system for night baseball in 1946, and that George Weiss, hitherto director of the Yankees' vast farm system, also will be in charge of all player operations within the Yankee organization.

It also was announced that professional football will be played in the stadium next fall, with the team being either a member of the National Football League or the new All-America Football Conference, depending on the attitude of the neighboring New York Football Giants in regard to choice Sunday playing dates.

MacPhail said the lighting system would be ready on April 1, but declined to specify how many night games the Yankees would play. Other planned stadium improvements include the erection of sideline stands during the football season to increase the park's gridiron crowd capacity from the present 70,000 to 90,000, and the construction of a new press box.

Topping, who owns an orphaned professional football team now merged with the Boston Yanks of the NFL, said he would like to have it continue in the circuit if the football Giants give Topping five of the nine football Sundays in New York next season.

Northern Loop Back

DURHAM, N. C., Nov. 16 (ANS)—The class C Northern Baseball League will resume activity next season, St. Cloud, Minn., will replace Wausau, Wis., the latter transferring to the Wisconsin State League.

and UCLA popped back into the championship race last Saturday.

No Bowl For Navy

ANNAPOLIS, Md., Nov. 16 (ANS) Navy's unbeaten but once tied eleven will hang up its football togs after its traditional clash with Army on Dec. 1.

Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, Annapolis superintendent, all but ruled out a New Year's Day bowl appearance for the Middies with a statement yesterday that "it is not the intention of the United States Naval Academy to participate in any post-season football games this year."

Name Shrine Coaches

SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. 16 (ANS) —Once again it will be Andy Kerr at the helm for the East and Ornie "Babe" Hollingberry for the West in the 21st annual East-[illegible] football game in Kezar [illegible] here on New Year's Day.

Kerr, Colgate mentor, will be assisted by Bernie Bierman of Minnesota and Beattie Feathers of North Carolina State. The Easterners will gather at Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., and will arrive here on Dec. 20. They will train at Santa Clara University.

Forty Basketball Teams Enter Five PBS Leagues

LEGHORN, Nov. 16—Forty teams from PBS units already have entered the five PBS basketball leagues which will get underway in Leghorn late this month. Maj. E. Al Baggett, Theater Special Service Athletic Officer, and Sgt. Joseph Helyenck of PBS Special Service announced teams would play twice each week in a round-robin schedule.

Leaders in each league will compete for the Base championships in playoff tournaments at the close of the season.

Same Old Racket

NEW YORK, Nov. 16 (ANS)—The entire slate of 1945 officers of the United States Lawn Tennis Association, headed by President Holcomb E. Ward of New York, was nominated yesterday to serve again in 1946. Elections will be held at the annual meeting here on Jan. 19.

'Florida Football Smells'

TALLAHASSEE, Fla., Nov. 16 (ANS)—Accusing the University of Florida football team of failing "to show either the ability to win or the ability to fight," Gov. Millard Caldwell yesterday urged the State Board of Control to examine the subject and examine a course for the future.

Caldwell said the state and its university has suffered a loss of prestige because of the football teams failure and suggested "it may be best to quit the field and content ourselves with intramural sports."

The Florida team this season has won three games, lost four and tied one with two contests to play. In the Southeastern Conference they have won one, lost three and tied one.

0336

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(Continued from page 1)

haltingly through its first open session against a background of glaring klieg lights for movie men, surging throngs of spectators and fresh dickering between Republican and Democratic members of the investigating group.

Rear Adm. Russell E. Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, the two who were in command at Pearl Harbor when the attack was launched, were among the audience.

One exhibit of 253 printed pages was comprised of translations from intercepted diplomatic messages sent by Japan between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941. The earliest was marked translated Aug. 6, 1941, showing that the diplomatic code was "broken" at least by that date.

The other of 126 typed pages was comprised of military messages, the earliest dating back to Dec. 2, 1940, and marked translated on Jan. 14, 1941.

Other evidence that Japan was preparing for war was shown:

1. Tokyo dispatches to the Japanese ambassador at Berlin Nov. 30 ordered notification of Germany that there was extreme danger of war and it might come "quicker than anyone dreams," translated Dec. 1.

2. Tokyo instructions to destroy secret documents and all but one code machine in the Washington embassy. This was translated Dec. 4.

Republican members of the committee protested vigorously at the hearing's start that they had been unable to examine the mass of evidence before them.

"It is only in the last week that we obtained modification of the presidential order to permit us to examine witnesses for preparation," said Sen. Owen Brewster (R., Me.). "It is only in the last 48 hours that I have received this stack of papers which should be examined, if we are to examine witnesses intelligently. I want the record to show that."

Sen. Homer Ferguson (R., Mich.) agreed, but Chairman Alben W. Barkley (D., Ky.) recalled that the committee had voted more than a week ago to begin the hearings on the 15th.

Japanese War Criminal Dies In Tokyo Hospital

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (INS) — Japanese army colonel Nobuyuki Ijima, accused war criminal, died yesterday of natural causes in Tokyo hospital.

Ijima was accused of launching a movement to abolish all Christian teachings in Japan and wipe out all foreign influences while he held the post of senior officer of military tactics at St. Paul's Episcopal University.

The university was founded by English missionaries, but was taken over by the Japanese during the war.

mander of American forces in the Western Pacific, continued to ignore the Philippines court order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. The writ would remand Yamashita to the custody of the Philippines Commonwealth and take the case out of the hands of the military commission now hearing it.

General Styer contended that the court was without jurisdiction over the American Army, a spokesman said. However, decision on this action was referred to General Douglas MacArthur, it was learned, because the Allied commander himself had turned over the civilian functions of the Commonwealth to President Osmena.

The American Army is now faced with two possibilities: one is to continue to deny jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This would be a difficult position to maintain in face of General MacArthur's specific order. The second possibility is to attempt to fight a petition for a writ in a formal court hearing, which would automatically admit jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This action would force the Army to abide by the court's decision.

2 Tons Of Mail Lost In ETO Plane Crash

FRANKFURT, Nov. 16 (AP) — Four thousand pounds of mail from troops in Germany to the U. S. were destroyed Nov. 10, when a U. S. army transport plane crashed near Chateau Thierry and killed its four-man crew, American forces officials announced today.

Investigators reported the plane unloaded cargo at Frankfurt when bad weather prevented its landing at its original destination, Schweinfurt. The plane was then loaded with two and one-half tons of homebound mail and took off for Paris.

The wreckage caught fire after the crash, but more than 800 pounds of mail were salvaged.

[illegible] Expected Right Away

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—It will be some time before the proposed United Nations Commission can take specific steps to eliminate atomic weapons from the world's arsenals, authorities said today as the three-power communique, disclosing the results of the historic atomic energy conference, was given further study.

Although President Truman, Prime Ministers Clement Attlee and W. L. MacKenzie King said "such a commission should be set up" at the "earliest possible date," they suggested that its work should unfold by separate stages "in order to gain the world's confidence."

The three leaders said they believed the commission might [illegible] world-wide [illegible] and scientific [illegible] even.

Mentioned as a second step was "development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials."

Meanwhile, first editorial comment on the results of the talks varied widely.

The New York Times said editorially today that the atomic agreement signed by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and Mackenzie King "presents no final solution of the awesome problem thrust upon the world" by the discovery of atomic energy.

The newspaper added that the agreement "goes as far as possible in the present state of the world to avert further use of atom bombs and similar weapons of mass destruction and to release atom energy for peaceful and humanitarian as well as patriotic citizens."

In entrusting the problem to a United Nations organization "the three countries furthest advanced in the knowledge of atom energy have shown both their faith in the United Nations and their good will toward all nations," the newspaper asserted.

In short, the Times declared: "Three nations have issued an invitation to all to drop power politics and join with them in promotion of peace and progress. They can with good conscience await replies."

"The communique," said the Kansas City Star, "represents perhaps the best attempt that can be made at present to solve the problem that is insoluble unless war can be prevented."

The paper said that inspections would be a "proper safeguard" so no nation can produce bombs secretly, but added that this "might not prove effective against a powerful aggressive nation."

London comment ranged from lukewarm to highly critical.

Strongest was a 40-word Daily Express editorial in large type which said, in part: "The policy . . . is inadequate. It does not meet the situation. Henceforth at every international conference the atomic bomb will be present."

The News Chronicle saw "an appreciable advance" from President Truman's earlier "sacred trust" attitude. It welcomed the three-power readiness to share atomic knowledge "in principle."

3,600 Buffalo Div. Men Leave Leghorn

LEGHORN, Nov. 16—The Victory ships Frostberg and Eufala left the port of Leghorn today at 6:30 AM with 3,600 officers and men of the 92nd Infantry Division aboard. This represented the final contingent of the Buffalo division to leave the Mediterranean Theater.

The expected date of arrival at Hampton Roads, Va., is Nov. 28.

Embarkation ceremonies yesterday included addresses by Brig. Gen. Francis H. Oxx, commanding general, PBS, and Brig. Gen. John E. Wood, commanding general of the 92nd. Music was furnished by the 117th Army Ground Forces Band.

Forty Killed In 3 British Air Crashes In One Day

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS) — At least 40 persons were killed, including many servicemen, in three Royal Air Force plane crashes reported today.

The largest number of casualties resulted when a giant troop carrier crashed while taking off from Castel Benito airport, Tripoli, North Africa, killing 28.

Five RAF officers, eight crew members and three Belgian civilians were killed when a RAF plane crashed at Schaerbeek Jockey Club, Brussels.

THREE DEAD IN JERUSALEM CLASH

(Continued from Page 1)

city during the day's alert for the massing of new mobs, dropped flares after dark to aid troops on patrol.

UNIFORM RESTRICTIONS

JERUSALEM, Nov. 16 (AP)—Emergency restrictions against the wearing of British or foreign uniforms by civilians—designed both to trap illegal immigrants and to prevent the operation of illegal "armies"—were clamped down by the British today in the wake of riots Wednesday and Thursday at Tel Aviv.

The regulations stated that a person wearing even articles that might be mistaken for a uniform or part of a uniform would be liable to penalties ranging up to life imprisonment.

Official and unofficial estimates, meanwhile, put the number of dead between three and five after the second outbreak of rioting at Tel Aviv was halted by gunfire of British troops and a large number of arrests were made.

The official casualties toll for Thursday was one Jew dead and one seriously injured, although earlier private reports had said two were killed.

[illegible] fense should be [illegible] Government and [illegible] as secretary, he [illegible] young in mind." [illegible] said the man s[illegible] caliber of Gener[illegible] MacArthur or Ad[illegible] the military bra[illegible] the man would [illegible] be "incidental," h[illegible]

"The principal [illegible] from this war," [illegible] held air comman[illegible] the Pacific, asser[illegible] for unity of co[illegible] chap to boss the[illegible]

HALSEY IN[illegible]

NEW ORL[illegible] —If uni[illegible]ion [illegible] Forces is [illegible]red, [illegible] F. Halsey [illegible]aid he [illegible] present amalgam[illegible] air power and [illegible] Navy offers a co[illegible] which to start.

"I don't know [illegible] unification have [illegible] before," the Th[illegible] mander declared [illegible] ference which p[illegible] in his honor, "[illegible] we have comple[illegible] in ships, air and [illegible] want to build u[illegible] not go on from [illegible] this were an invit[illegible] and AAF to joi[illegible] admiral replied: "[illegible] they do. They [illegible] they want to."

Expressing his [illegible] on unification, [illegible] said: "I am adam[illegible] that we must ha[illegible] mand in the fiel[illegible] to advantage a[illegible] number of disad[illegible] merger of the [illegible] Departments."

Italian Police [illegible] Film Strike D[illegible]

ROME, Nov. 16— [illegible] epithet of "Fascis[illegible] armed with a tom[illegible] clubs, and using [illegible] jeeps, today broke[illegible] tion of striking m[illegible] workers in front [illegible] Theater on Via [illegible] jeeps cut into th[illegible] speed, sending s[illegible] standers sprawlin[illegible] ment to prevent [illegible]

The demonstra[illegible] strikers from othe[illegible] in Rome, claimed [illegible] the Splendore T[illegible] peacefully to the[illegible] them in their s[illegible] wages.

Nobel [illegible]

STOCKHOLM, [illegible] Gabriella Mistral, [illegible] ean poet, was a[illegible] Nobel prize for l[illegible] officially announ[illegible] poet's real name i[illegible] Alcayaga.

0337

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

through its first open against a background of kleg lights for movie men, throngs of spectators and ering between Republican mocratic members of the ting group.

Adm. Husband E. Kimmel j. Gen. Walter C. Short, who were in command at arbor when the attack was d, were among the audi-

xhibit of 253 printed pages prised of translations from ted diplomatic messages Japan between July 1 and 1941. The earliest was translated Aug. 8, 1941, that the diplomatic code ken" at least by that date. ther of 126 typed pages was d of military messages, the dating back to Dec. 2, 1940, rked translated on Jan. 14,

evidence that Japan was g for war was shown: kyo dispatches to the Jap- mbassador at Berlin Nov. ered notification of Ger- that there was extreme of war and it might come r than anyone dreams," ted Dec. 1.

kyo instructions to destroy documents and all but one machine in the Washington y. This was translated

blican members of the com- protested vigorously at the 's start that they had been examine the mass of evi- fore them.

only in the last week that ined modification of the al order to permit us to witnesses for preparation," Owen Brewster (R., Me.), ly in the last 48 hours that received this stack of papers should be examined, if we examine witnesses intelli- I want the record to show

Homer Ferguson (R., Mich.) but Chairman Alben W. (D., Ky.) recalled that the ee had voted more than a o to begin the hearings on

ese War Criminal In Tokyo Hospital

YO, Nov. 16 (INS) — Japa- ny colonel Nobuyuki Ijima, war criminal, died yester- natural causes in Tokyo hos-

was accused of launching ment to abolish all Chris- chings in Japan and wipe foreign influences while he e post of senior officer of tactics at St. Paul's Epis- niversity.

niversity was founded by missionaries, but was taken the Japanese during the

mander of American forces in the Western Pacific, continued to ignore the Philippines court order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. The writ would remand Yamashita to the custody of the Philippines Commonwealth and take the case out of the hands of the military commission now hearing it.

General Styer contended that the court was without jurisdiction over the American Army, a spokesman said. However, decision on this action was referred to General Douglas MacArthur, it was learned, because the Allied commander himself had turned over the civilian functions of the Commonwealth to President Quezon.

The American Army is now faced with two possibilities: one is to continue to deny jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This would be a difficult position to maintain in face of General MacArthur's specific order. The second possibility is to attempt to fight a petition for a writ in a formal court hearing, which would automatically admit jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This action would force the Army to abide by the court's decision.

2 Tons Of Mail Lost In ETO Plane Crash

FRANKFURT, Nov. 16 (AP) — Four thousand pounds of mail from troops in Germany to the U. S. were destroyed Nov. 10, when a U. S. army transport plane crashed near Chateau Thierry and killed its four-man crew, American forces officials announced today.

Investigators reported the plane unloaded cargo at Frankfurt when bad weather prevented its landing at its original destination, Schweinfurt. The plane was then loaded with two and one-half tons of homebound mail and took off for Paris.

The wreckage caught fire after the crash, but more than 800 pounds of mail were salvaged.

Not Expected Right Away

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—It will be some time before the proposed United Nations Commission can take specific steps to elminate atomic weapons from the world's arsenals, authorities said today as the three-power communique, disclosing the results of the historic atomic energy conference, was given further study.

Although President Truman, Prime Ministers Clement Attlee and W. L. MacKenzie King said "such a commission should be set up" at the "earliest possible date," they suggested that its work should unfold by separate stages "in order to gain the world's confidence."

The three leaders said they believed the commission might well develop [illegible] world-wide [illegible] and scientific knowledge.

Mentioned as a second step was "development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials."

Meanwhile, first editorial comment on the results of the talks varied widely.

The New York Times said editorially today that the atomic agreement signed by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and Mackenzie King "presents no final solution of the awesome problem thrust upon the world" by the discovery of atomic energy.

The newspaper added that the agreement "goes as far as possible in the present state of the world to avert further use of atom bombs and similar weapons of mass destruction and to release atom energy for peaceful and humanitarian as well as patriotic citizens."

In entrusting the problem to a United Nations organization "the three countries furthest advanced in the knowledge of atom energy have shown both their faith in the United Nations and their good will toward all nations," the newspaper asserted.

In short, the Times declared: "Three nations have issued an invitation to all to drop power politics and join with them in promotion of peace and progress. They can with good conscience await replies."

"The communique," said the Kansas City Star, "represents perhaps the best attempt that can be made at present to solve the problem that is insoluble unless war can be prevented."

The paper said that inspections would be a "proper safeguard" so no nation can produce bombs secretly, but added that this "might not prove effective against a powerful aggressive nation."

London comment ranged from lukewarm to highly critical.

Strongest was a 40-word Daily Express editorial in large type which said, in part: "The policy . . . is inadequate. It does not meet the situation. Henceforth at every international conference the atomic bomb will be present."

The News Chronicle saw "an appreciable advance" from President Truman's earlier "sacred trust" attitude. It welcomed the three-power readiness to share atomic knowledge "in principle."

3,600 Buffalo Div. Men Leave Leghorn

LEGHORN, Nov. 16—The Victory ships Frostberg and Eufala left the port of Leghorn today at 6:30 AM with 3,600 officers and men of the 92nd Infantry Division aboard. This represented the final contingent of the Buffalo division to leave the Mediterranean Theater.

The expected date of arrival at Hampton Roads, Va., is Nov. 28.

Embarkation ceremonies yesterday included addresses by Brig. Gen. Francis H. Oxx, commanding general, PBS, and Brig. Gen. John F. Wood, commanding general of the 92nd. Music was furnished by the 117th Army Ground Forces Band.

Forty Killed In 3 British Air Crashes In One Day

LONDON, Nov. 16 (INS) — At least 40 persons were killed, including many servicemen, in three Royal Air Force plane crashes reported today.

The largest number of casualties resulted when a giant troop carrier crashed while taking off from Castel Benito airport, Tripoli, North Africa, killing 28.

Five RAF officers, eight crew members and three Belgian civilians were killed when a RAF plane crashed at Scheerbeek Jockey Club, Brussels.

THREE DEAD IN JERUSALEM CLASH

(Continued from Page 1)

city during the day's alert for the massing of new mobs, dropped flares after dark to aid troops on patrol.

UNIFORM RESTRICTIONS

JERUSALEM, Nov. 16 (AP)—Emergency restrictions against the wearing of British or foreign uniforms by civilians—designed both to trap illegal immigrants and to prevent the operation of illegal "armies"—were clamped down by the British today in the wake of riots Wednesday and Thursday at Tel Aviv.

The regulations stated that a person wearing even articles that might be mistaken for a uniform or part of a uniform would be liable to penalties ranging up to life imprisonment.

Official and unofficial estimates, meanwhile, put the number of dead between three and five after the second outbreak of rioting at Tel Aviv was halted by gunfire of British troops and a large number of arrests were made.

The official casualties toll for Thursday was one Jew dead and one seriously injured, although earlier private reports had said two were killed.

fense should be set up within the Government and the man selected as secretary, he said, "should be young in mind." General Doolittle said the man should be of the caliber of Generals Eisenhower or MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz, but the military branch from which the man would be selected would be "incidental," he added.

"The principal lesson learned from this war," the general, who held air commands in Europe and the Pacific, asserted, "was the need for unity of command, with one chap to boss the entire show."

HALSEY INVITES ARMY

NEW ORLEANS, Nov. 16 (ANS) — If unification of the Armed Forces is needed, Admiral William F. Halsey said here yesterday, the present amalgamation of the fleet, air power and Marines in the Navy offers a complete setup from which to start.

"I don't know why advocates of unification have not suggested it before," the Third Fleet commander declared in a press conference which preceded a parade in his honor, "but in the Navy we have complete unity of force in ships, air and ground. If they want to build up anything, why not go on from that?" Asked if this were an invitation to the Army and AAF to join the Navy, the admiral replied: "I don't care what they do. They can come in if they want to."

Expressing his personal opinion on unification, Admiral Halsey said: 'I am adamant on the fact that we must have unity of command in the field, but I can see no advantage and a tremendous number of disadvantages in any merger of the War and Navy Departments."

Italian Police Break Up Film Strike Demonstration

ROME, Nov. 16—Greeted with the epithet of "Fascists!" Italian police armed with automatic weapons and clubs, and using ex-U. S. Army jeeps, today broke up a demonstration of striking movie and theater workers in front of the Splendore Theater on Via del Tritone. The jeeps cut into the crowd at high speed, sending strikers and bystanders sprawling over the pavement to prevent being run over.

The demonstrating workers, strikers from other movie theaters in Rome, claimed they had come to the Splendore Theater to appeal peacefully to the workers to join them in their strike for higher wages.

Nobel Prize

STOCKHOLM, Nov. 16 (AP) — Gabriella Mistral, 56-year-old Chilean poet, was awarded the 1945 Nobel prize for literature, it was officially announced today. The poet's real name is Lucila Godoy Y Alcayaga.

0338

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Fury Of Indonesia Fighting Slackens

BATAVIA, Nov. 16 — As the battle for the Surabaya naval port entered its seventh day, Allied headquarters announced today that Indonesian resistance was descreasing, but "sniping and mortar fire continues."

"Our troops are extending occupied areas to include the marshalling yards," said the official announcement, reported by Reuter's.

Earlier, the Netherlands News Agency reported that British troops had slowed down their offensive to consolidate their gains.

The scheduled meeting of Dr. Hubertus Van Mook, deputy lieutenant governor of the Netherlands East Indies, with Indonesian Republican leaders, was cancelled at the last moment.

British press reports that Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands would represent Queen Wilhelmina in negotiations with the Indonesians were denied at The Hague. A high government official said the prince will not go to Indonesia.

DUTCH MARINES

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS) — An officer of the Netherlands Marines said yesterday that 4,000 Netherlands Marines, trained during the last year at U. S. Marine camps at Lejeune, N. C., and Quantico, Va., have been ordered to the Netherlands East Indies.

U. S. Agents Knew Japan Might Strike

(Continued from page 1)

haltingly through its first open session against a background of glaring klieg lights for movie men, surging throngs of spectators and fresh clickering between Republican and Democratic members of the investigating group.

Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, the two who were in command at Pearl Harbor when the attack was launched, were among the audience.

One exhibit of 253 printed pages was comprised of translations from intercepted diplomatic messages sent by Japan between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941. The earliest was marked translated Aug. 6, 1941, showing that the diplomatic code was "broken" at least by that date.

The other of 126 typed pages was comprised of military messages, the earliest dating back to Dec. 2, 1940, and marked translated on Jan. 14, 1941.

Other evidence that Japan was preparing for war was shown:

1. Tokyo dispatches to the Japanese ambassador at Berlin Nov. 30 ordered notification of Germany that there was extreme danger of war and it might come "quicker than anyone dreams," translated Dec. 1.

2. Tokyo instructions to destroy secret documents and all but one code machine in the Washington embassy. This was translated Dec. 4.

Republican members of the committee protested vigorously at the hearing's start that they had been unable to examine the mass of evidence before them.

"It is only in the last week that

Munitions Explosion Kills 132 In Japan

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (AP) — The Japanese news agency Kyodo reported today that 132 persons were killed and 75 injured on Nov. 12 at Maruyama on Kyushu Island when occupation troops exploring an ammunition dump accidentally touched off the explosives. The explosion destroyed 32 houses and damaged nearly 150 others, the news agency said.

Yamashita War Trial In Legal Red Tape

MANILA, Nov. 16 (AP) — The war crimes trial of General Yamashita, former Japanese commander in the Philippines, appeared today to be heading for a tremendous legal tangle when Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, commander of American forces in the Western Pacific, continued to ignore the Philippines court order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. The writ would remand Yamashita to the custody of the Philippines Commonwealth and take the case out of the hands of the military commission now hearing it.

General Styer contended that the court was without jurisdiction over the American Army, a spokesman said. However, decision on this action was referred to General Douglas MacArthur, it was learned, because the Allied commander himself had turned over the civilian functions of the Commonwealth to President Osmeña.

The American Army is now faced with two possibilities: one is to continue to deny jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This would be a difficult position to maintain in face of General MacArthur's specific order. The second possibility is to attempt to fight a petition for a writ in a formal court hearing, which would automatically admit jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This action would force the Army to abide by the court's decision.

2 Tons Of Mail Lost In ETO Plane Crash

FRANKFURT, Nov. 16 (AP) — Four thousand pounds of mail from troops in Germany to the U. S.

THE TIME PASSES SLOWLY



A group of Pacific veterans sprawl at ease in an Army transport plane flying them home at top speed. Great distances, however, makes the time pass slowly over the Pacific. (Acme Photo)

Atom Council Efficiency Not Expected Right Away

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—It will be some time before the proposed United Nations Commission can take specific steps to eliminate atomic weapons from the world's arsenals, authorities said today as the three-power communique, disclosing the results of the historic atomic energy conference, was given further study.

Although President Truman, Prime Ministers Clement Attlee and W. L. MacKenzie King said "such a commission should be set up" at the "earliest possible date," they suggested that its work should unfold by separate stages "in order to gain the world's confidence."

The three leaders said they believed the commission might well elevate [illegible] first at a world-wide [illegible] scientists.

Mentioned as a second step was "development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials."

Meanwhile, first editorial comment on the results of the talks varied widely.

The New York Times said editorially today that the atomic agreement signed by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and Mackenzie King "presents no final solution of the awesome problem thrust upon the world" by the discovery of atomic energy.

The newspaper added that the agreement "goes as far as possible in the present state of the world to avert further use of atom bombs and similar weapons of mass destruction and to release atom energy for peaceful and humanitarian as well as patriotic citizens."

In entrusting the problem to a United Nations organization "the three countries furthest advanced

3,600 Buffalo Div. Men Leave Leghorn

LEGHORN, Nov. 16—The Victory ships Frostberg and Eufala left the port of Leghorn today at 6:30 AM with 3,600 officers and men of the 92nd Infantry Division aboard. This represented the final contingent of the Buffalo division to leave the Mediterranean Theater.

The expected date of arrival at Hampton Roads, Va., is Nov. 28.

Embarkation ceremonies yesterday included addresses by Brig. Gen. Francis H. Oxx, commanding general, PBS, and Brig. Gen. John E. Wood, commanding general of the 92nd. Music was furnished by the 117th Army Ground Forces Band.

Forty Killed In 3 British Air Crashes In One Day

Gen. Devers 'Serve Und For Sake

WASHINGTON, —General Jacob mander of the Forces, advocated ment of the Arma day and told the Affairs Committe willing to serve officer in the eve tion.

Senator Warren evoked Dever's c asked about the f vices that "they w nated."

"I would be glad a Navy man to s eral Devers said. are placed in to place the good of and not the good Forces, Navy or

Maj. Gen. Mill sistant chief of Forces in the Theater, also had unification and long conflict" be and Navy on pe

NAVY AG

CHICAGO, No Gen. James H. H terday that "at Navy" favors a ses and air for administrative de

General Doolitt ment at a news preceded his ap 25th annual meet con. Petroleum I fense should be Government and as secretary, he young in mind." said the man caliber of Gener MacArthur or A the military br the man would be "incidental."

"The principa from this war, held air command the Pacific, asse for unity of co chap to boss th

HALSEY IN

—If unification Forces is [illegible] F. Halsey [illegible] present amalgam air power and Navy offers a ex which to start.

"I don't know unification have before," the T mander declared ference which in his honor, we have compl in ships, air an want to build not go on from this were an inv and AAF to j admiral replied they do. They they want to."

Expressing hi on unification said: "I am ad that we must mand in the no advantage number of di

0339

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785047

ry Of Indonesia Fighting Slackens

ATAVIA, Nov. 16 — As the battle for the Surabaya naval ntered its seventh day, Allied headquarters announced toat Indonesian resistance was decreasing, but "sniping ortar fire continues."

ur troops are extending occupied areas to include the lling yards," said the official announcement, reported by 's.

rther, the Netherlands News Agency reported that British had slowed down their ve to consolidate their

ferenced meeting of Dr. Van Mook, deputy lieutgovernor of the Netherlands dies with Indonesian leaders, was cancelled at moment.

h press reports that Princess of the Netherlands would Queen Wilhelmina in negns with the Indonesians ead at The Hague. A high official said the prince to Indonesia.

DUTCH MARINES

HINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS) — er of the Netherlands Mariaid yesterday that some nese Marines, trained with the use of U. S. Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Va., and Camp Lejeune, N. C., and Quantico, have been ordered to the ch East Indies.

Agents Knew pan Might Strike

(Continued from page 1)

through its last operating a background of king heads for movie news, throngs of spectators and steering between Republican and Democratic members of the ring group).

Aunt Hannah is flanked Gen. Walter C. Short, who were in command at Harbor when the attack was , were among the audi-

ection of the printed heaps of transcriptions from ted diplomatic messages Japan between July 1 and 1941. The earliest was Translated Aug. 5, 1941, that the diplomatic code oken" at least by that date. ther of 126 typed pages was d of military messages, the dating back to Dec. 2, 1940, ried translated on Jan. 11,

Japanese final reply was ng for war was shown. k to dispatches to the Japbassador in Berlin Nov. ered notification of Germ that there was extreme of war and it might come er than anyone dreams." ated Dec. 7.

k to instructions to destroy documents and all but one machine in the Washington y. This was translated

blican members of the committee vigorously at the start that they had been to examine the mass of evidefore them.

mony in the last week that

Munitions Explosion Kills 132 In Japan

TOKYO, Nov. 16 (AP) — The Japanese news agency Kyodo reported today that 132 persons were killed and 75 injured on Nov. 12 at Muroyama on Kyushu Island when occupation troops exploring an ammunition dump accidentally touched off the explosives. The explosion destroyed 32 houses and damaged nearly 150 others, the news agency said.

Yamashita War Trial In Legal Red Tape

MANILA, Nov. 16 (AP) — The war crimes trial of General Yamashita, former Japanese commander in the Philippines, appeared today to be heading for a tremendous [illegible] of American forces in the western Pacific, continued to ignore the Philippines' supreme order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. The writ would remand Yamashita to the custody of the Philippines Commonwealth and take the case out of the hands of the military commission now hearing it.

General Styer contended that the court was without jurisdiction over the American Army, a spokesman said. However, decision on the action was referred to General Douglas MacArthur, it was learned, because the Allied commander himself had turned over the civilian functions of the Commonwealth to President Osmena.

The American Army is now faced with two possibilities: one is to continue to deny jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, which would be a difficult position to maintain in face of General MacArthur's specific order. The second possibility is to attempt to file a petition for a writ in a formal court hearing, which would automatically admit jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. This action would force the Army to abide by the court's decision.

2 Tons Of Mail Lost In ETO Plane Crash

FRANKFURT, Nov. 16 (AP) — Four thousand pounds of mail from troops in Germany to the U. S.

THE TIME PASSES SLOWLY



A group of Pacific veterans sprawl at ease in an Army transport plane flying them home at top speed. Great distances, however, makes the time pass slowly over the Pacific.

(Acme Photo)

Atom Council Efficiency Not Expected Right Away

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16—It will be some time before the present United Nations Commission can take specific steps to eliminate atomic weapons from the world's arsenals, authorities said today as the three-power communique, disclosing the results of the historic atomic energy conference, was given further study.

Although President Truman, Prime Ministers Clement Attlee and W. L. MacKenzie King said "such a commission should be set up" at the "earliest possible date," they suggested that its work should unfold by separate stages "in order to gain the world's confidence."

The three leaders said they believed the commission might well [illegible] first at a [illegible] and scientific [illegible].

Mentioned as a second step was "development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials."

Meanwhile, first editorial comment on the results of the talks varied widely.

The New York Times said editorially today that the atomic agreement signed by Presidents Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and Mackenzie King "presents no final solution of the awesome problem thrust upon the world" by the discovery of atomic energy.

The newspaper added that the agreement "goes as far as possible in the present state of the world to avert further use of atom bombs and similar weapons of mass destruction and to release atom energy for peaceful and humanitarian as well as patriotic citizens."

In entrusting the problem to a United Nations organization "the three countries furthest advanced

3,600 Buffalo Div. Men Leave Leghorn

LEGHORN, Nov. 16—The Victory ships Fruelberg and Eufala left the port of Leghorn today at 8:30 AM with 3,600 officers and men of the 92nd Infantry Division aboard. This represented the Italian contingent of the Buffalo division to leave the Mediterranean Theater.

The expected date of arrival at Hampton Roads, Va., is Nov. 28.

Embarkation ceremonies yesterday included addresses by Brig. Gen. Frances H. Oxx, commanding general, PBS, and Brig. Gen. John E. Wood, commanding general of the 92nd. Music was furnished by the 117th Army Ground Forces Band.

Forty Killed In 3 British Air Crashes In One Day

Gen. Devers Would 'Serve Under Navy' For Sake Of Merger

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (ANS) —General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the Army Ground Forces, advocated a single department of the Armed Forces yesterday and told the Senate Military Affairs Committee he would be willing to serve under a Naval officer in the event of consolidation.

Senator Warren Austin (R., Vt.) evoked Dever's comment when he asked about the fears of some services that "they would be subordinated."

"I would be glad to serve under a Navy man to start with," General Devers said. "If real men are placed in top spots they will place the good of the country first and not the good of the Ground Forces, Navy or Air Forces."

Maj. Gen. Miller G. White, assistant chief of staff for Ground Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, also backed the proposed unification and cited the "warloving conflict" between the Army and Navy on personnel policies.

NAVY AGREEABLE

CHICAGO, Nov. 16 (ANS)—Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle said yesterday that "at least half the Navy" favors a merger of land, sea and air forces into a single administrative department.

General Doolittle made the statement at a news conference which preceded his appearance at the 26th annual meeting of the American [illegible].

Some should be set up within the Government and the man selected as secretary, he said, "should be young in mind." General Doolittle said the man should be of the caliber of Generals Eisenhower or MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz, but the military branch from which the man would be selected would be "incidental," he added.

"The principal lesson learned from this war," the general, who held air commands in Europe and the Pacific, asserted, "was the need for unity of command, with one chap to boss the entire show."

HALSEY INVITES ARMY

NEW ORLEANS, Nov. 16 (ANS) —If unification of the Armed Forces is [illegible], Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., here yesterday, the present organization of the fleet, air forces and Marines in the Navy offers a complete setup from which to start.

"I don't know why advocates of unification have not suggested it before," the Third Fleet commander declared in a press conference which preceded a parade in his honor, "but in the Navy we have complete unity of force in ships, air and ground. If they want to build up anything, why not go on from that?" Asked if this were an invitation to the Army and AAF to join the Navy, the admiral replied: "I don't care what they do. They can come in if they want to."

Expressing his personal opinion on unification, Admiral Halsey said: "I am adamant on the fact that we must have unity of command in the field, but I can see no advantage and a tremendous number of disadvantages in any

0340

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

101 velivoli americani
sarebbero ceduti all'Italia

L'« United Press » è informata che fra il Governo italiano e funzionari dell'Ufficio americano per la liquidazione dei residuati di guer[illegible] sono attualmente in corso r[illegible]iati per la cessione all'Italia di centouno apparecchi del tipo « P-38 » Lighting da combattimento. La cessione ha lo scopo di restituire all'arma aerea italiana una certa efficienza e nello stesso tempo di evitare che costosissimo materiale, quale quello degli apparecchi da combattimento, sia condannato alla distruzione.

Aerei militari di tipo Lightning dati all'Italia?

Tra [illegible] Governo italiano e funz[illegible] dell'Ufficio americano per la liquidazione dei residuati di guerra sono in corso negoziati per la cessione all'Italia di centouno aeroplani del tipo « P-38 » Lightning da combattimento. La cessione ha lo scopo di restituire all'arma aerea italiana una certa efficienza e nello stesso tempo di evitare che costosissimo materiale quale quello degli apparecchi da combattimento sia condannato alla distruzione.

In base alle trattative in corso l'Italia potrà disporre di 23 Lightning del modello in serie da caccia e di 78 velivoli pure Lightning adattati per la ricognizione aerea e per la ripresa di fotografie. Questi ultimi tipi sono noti nell'aviazione americana con la sigla « F-5 ». Al Governo italiano sarà richiesto un equo prezzo.

Da parte italiana si pensa di rimpiazzare con i nuovi acquisti gli ormai superati Aircobra « P-39 » che furono dati all'aeronautica italiana al momento di entrare in guerra contro la Germania. *(UP).*

0341

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Borsa di Milano

MILANO, 16.

Il mercato ha dimostrato di non aver aggiunto ancora quella base solida necessaria per la stabilità della quota nella borsa ovvero non era da prevedersi che dopo la fermezza di ieri e i notevoli vantaggi conseguiti da alcuni valori in particolare, questi oggi avrebbero leggermente ceduto per consolidarsi. Così infatti è avvenuto. Molti dei valori a fondo speculativo, dopo aver aggiunta nel corso della seduta nelle punte massime, hanno ceduto in chiusura perdendo buona parte dei vantaggi conseguiti nella seduta di ieri.

Una buona parte dei titoli, particolarmente quelli a mercato ristretto, ha comunque avuto anche di più la propria posizione. Attività di scambi modesta e tendenza nettamente irregolare; scarsa attività anche per i fondi stabili che chiudono leggermente più calmi. Più richiesti i Buoni del Tesoro, nel seguire la loro cedenza di fine anno per tutte le scadenze.

I trattati. Valori di Stato: 1,750,000; Buoni del Tesoro: 5 milioni 200.000; titoli azionari: 20.905; obbligazioni: 2.950.

* * *

Rendita 5 per cento c. 98.45; id. d. f. m. 98.35; id. 3,50 per cento c. 105; id. d. f. m. 105; Redimibile 5 per cento c. 96.10; id. id. f. m. 98.20; id. 3.50 per cento c. 91.65; id. id. f. m. 92.10; Prestito Venezia 3 per cento fi. c. 2.1 97; B. T. 5 per cento 1946 98,50; id. 1949 98,50; id. 1950 1.a serie 98,30; id. 2.a serie 98,30; id. 1951 98,30; id. 1952 98,30; id. 1953 98,30; id. 1954 98,30; id. 1955 98,30; id. 1956 98,30; id. 1957 98,30; id. 1958 98,30; id. 1959 98,30; id. 1960 98,30; id. 1961 98,30; id. 1962 98,30; id. 1963 98,30; id.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

85A

FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE, CBE.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.

PERSONAL.

AFSC/46/AIR. 16th December, 1945.

Dear

84A

With reference to your letter MAAC/4200/AIS paragraph three, we realise that GENERAL EDGEWAY is Deputy to GENERAL MORGAN as Supreme Allied Commander, and if any misunderstanding has arisen in S.A.Cs Secretariat I would like you to apologise for me, but I would also like you to read again the first paragraph of my letter of even reference dated 15th November, I believe I am still correct in saying that the Chief Commissioner is Deputy to General Morgan as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, although in General Morgan's absence in practice, General Ridgeway would be President of the Allied Commission.

2. I trust that you will take this up ~~tentatively~~ forthfully so as not to raise any hairs. I re-emphasise that I am referring to the job of President of the Allied Commission, and not the job known as SAC/PSD.

WTY 18/17

Yours sincerely

AVM 7169

Wing Commander Mannell Fisher,
Secretary to The M.A.A.C,
Caserta.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

84 F

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, RCAF.

Date :- 12th December, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/1200/ALS.

80 F

Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force.

Please refer to your AFSC/46/AIR dated 15th November 1945.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander does not for the present wish the present interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat desires to point out that Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway is the Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander and not Admiral Stone the Chief Commissioner as stated in paragraph 1 of your above mentioned letter.

Maxwell Fisher.

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.
Secretary to The
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

7158

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION L 97 14/12 ORDERLY ROOM 46/A.F.

0344

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

83A

FROM : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C., ROME.

TO : MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE.

DATE : 5th DECEMBER 1945.

REF : AFSC/46/AIR.

CIVILIAN MECHANICS

Reference is made to paragraph 4,6,(VI) to your MAAC/4000/ALS dated 16th November 1945.

2. The projected plan was to employ an Italian Civilian Aircraft Maintenance Unit at Ciampino Airfield, Rome. The unit,composed of highly trained civilian technicians from the Rome Area, was formerly employed by the American Area Repair Section, Bari and received several commendations for outstanding services. However, the plan to hire the unit as a whole has now been dropped due to numerous special privileges requested by the headman of the civilian unit, and therefore Italian Civilian Mechanics will be employed as individuals in accordance with the provisions set forth in AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No.34 dated the 29 June 45 and Rome Allied Area Command Civilian Labour Information Bulletins 19, 20,21, cs.

W. N. Bradshaw

for FRANK E. MAREK
Lt Col., Air Corps
AIR I

7156

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TO: D/D, S.S.O. AIR III.

WING COMMANDER NEWMAN, Executive Officer, Mediterranean British Air Priorities Board, called on me this morning and we agreed on the following action:

(i) Reference enclosure 81A this file. Wing Commander Newman will take up the matter of the Internal Courier Services which can be taken over by the Italians from the British, and possibly from the American Carriers, with Wing Commander Cooke, Movements A.H.Q. Italy. He will also discuss the matter with Wing Commander Fisher and Air Commodore Elton who is Chairman of the Mediterranean Priorities Board. The next Board Meeting is on the 5th December when this matter will be discussed and decisions reached if possible; I propose to attend the meeting with Major Gilday, or in his absence Major Sass.

(ii) We discussed with Wing Commander Cooke (on the telephone - Freedom 731) the matter of would-be passengers on R.A.F. Transport Command Aircraft paying their fares in sterling. A.H.Q. Italy entirely agree that this method of payment is most irregular, and Flight Lieutenant Hatrill is shortly returning from Cario where he has taken up this question with a view to getting higher authority to agree that the fares should be paid in lire as is the practice with the U.S. A.T.C. I have informed Major Bentley. Wing Commander Cooke will inform us of any decision reached in Cario.

2. I handed a copy of our Priorities Board Directive (obtained off Major Gilday's desk) to Wing Commander Newman for his comments in due course. Will Air III please ensure that copies of our directive are sent to M.A.A.C. Secretariat for information.

A.C.C.

A.F.S.C. A.C. NO(2).
DATE: 22nd November, 1945.
1 copy on file AFSC/46/AIR.
1 copy on file AFSC/24/5/AIR.

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 16th November, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/4000/ALS.

FORCES SUB-C 1597 20 11 SH. SECRET REG 46/Air

1. Reference is made to your AFSC/46/AIR dated 31st October, 1945:

2. The decisions taken on paragraphs 1 to 4 were communicated to Air Vice-Marshal Brodie on his visit here, and were :-

(a) that in view of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive that the Italian Air Force was to be grounded when hostilities in Europe ceased, except for certain transport services and a limited amount of flying for other aircrews, it would be unwise to stage a fly-past of the Italian Air Force over Rome.
(b) that the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MED/ME should confine his tour to an informal visit of the Italian Air Force Centocelle.

3. Reference Para. 5 (i) the Secretary to M.A.A.C. is discussing with Plans, Air Headquarters Italy, the whole question of the future of the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty is ratified. Allied Force Headquarters will then be requested to re-open the position of the Italian Air Force and consideration will also be given to the question of operational training for Italian Air Force Squadrons.

Para. 5 (ii) Allied Force Headquarters are still unwilling that the interim policy for the I.A.F. should be passed on to the Italian Air Ministry in toto, therefore the ruling as contained in this Committee's MAAC/4001/ALS dated 22nd September, 1945, must be adhered to.

Para. 5 (iii) No changes at present.

Para. 5 (iv) This whole question is dependent upon the answer given by A.F.H.Q. to Para. 5 (i) above.

Para. 5 (v) The future of M.A.A.C., and future U.S.A.A.F. representation on M.A.A.C. must, for the time being, be held in abeyance. When the type and location of any United States Headquarters which might replece M.T.O.U.S.A., is determined, this matter will be given further consideration.

4. Reference Para. 6 (i) Army Air Forces Service Command has stated that the Committee which went to the States for conferences concerning all U.S.A.A.F. airfields in Italy, has left Washington for this country. The decision regarding GIOIA airfield will be communicated to you when the result of their deliberations is known.

Para. 6 (ii) Air Ministry has been signalled for the results of the test flights of the S.M.95 and have been informed that the Italian Air Force have requested authority to construct a further six of these aircraft. If the results of these tests are satisfactory, and it is the considered opinion of the United States and British technicians that it would be, in effect, worthwhile constructing these aircraft, a ruling will have to be

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(a) that in view of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive that the Italian Air Force was to be grounded when hostilities in Europe ceased, except for certain transport services and a limited amount of flying for other aircrews, it would be unwise to stage a fly-past of the Italian Air Force over Rome.
(b) that the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MED/ME should confine his tour to an informal visit of the Italian Air Force Centocelle.

3. Reference Para. 5 (i) the Secretary to M.A.A.C. is discussing with Plans, Air Headquarters Italy, the whole question of the future of the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty is ratified. Allied Force Headquarters will then be requested to re-open the position of the Italian Air Force and consideration will also be given to the question of operational training for Italian Air Force Squadrons.

Para. 5 (ii) Allied Force Headquarters are still unwilling that the interim policy for the I.A.F. should be passed on to the Italian Air Ministry in toto, therefore the ruling as contained in this Committee's MAAC/4001/ALS dated 22nd September, 1945, must be adhered to.

Para. 5 (iii) No changes at present.

Para. 5 (iv) This whole question is dependent upon the answer given by A.F.H.Q. to Para. 5 (i) above.

Para. 5 (v) The future of M.A.A.C., and future U.S.A.A.F. representation on M.A.A.C. must, for the time being, be held in abeyance. When the type and location of any United States Headquarters which might replece M.T.O.U.S.A., is determined, this matter will be given further consideration.

7152

4. Reference Para. 6 (i) Army Air Forces Service Command has stated that the Committee which went to the States for conferences concerning all U.S.A.A.F. airfields in Italy, has left Washington for this country. The decision regarding GIOIA airfield will be communicated to you when the result of their deliberations is known.

Para. 6 (ii) Air Ministry has been signalled for the results of the test flights of the S.M.95 and have been informed that the Italian Air Force have requested authority to construct a further six of these aircraft. If the results of these tests are satisfactory, and it is the considered opinion of the United States and British technicians that it would be, in effect, worth while constructing these aircraft, a ruling will have to be obtained from the Combined Chiefs of Staff before work can begin.

With regard to the BREDA 308 civil aircraft, it is noted that construction has ceased. Work on this aircraft is not to continue until a further communication is received from this Committee.

Para. 6 (iii) The purpose of authorising Italian Air Force pilots to fly was to maintain a passable degree of pilot efficiency. It was specifically intended that the amount of flying authorised (6 hours per month) would be the minimum consistent with this policy and, further, that such flying time should be allotted to the maintenance of pilot proficiency as contrasted to training in combat flying and military technique.

No allotment of Allied ammunition can, therefore, be made to the Italian Air Force. (Yes, see 6(ii))

/ Page 2.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

likely to be favourable if SAC is consulted.

Para. 6 (iv) The question of ground and air training for the Italian Air Force is dependent upon the answer received from Allied Force Headquarters requesting that the position of the Italian Air Force be re-opened.

Para. 6 (v) This question is now under consideration at Allied Force Headquarters.

Action

Para. 6 (vi) This is agreed in principle. It is requested that this Committee be informed under what terms and conditions these Italian mechanics could be employed, and also whether they would be military or civilian personnel.

No, unofficial civilians.

Yes

Action

Para. 6 (vii) Request this Committee be provided with fuller details concerning this project. Allied Force Headquarters can then be requested to allow the Italian Courier Service to carry Allied personnel other than those connected with the Allied Commission. The question of carrying mail and civilians urgently required in parts of Italy, provided official mail and priority passengers are not turned off, should also be studied and this Committee advised.

Para. 6 (viii) The question of further Air Sea Rescue Commitments for the Italian Air Force is already in hand with Air Staff, Air Headquarters ITALY.

Para. 6 (ix) The sale by the U.S.A.A.F. to the Italians of 100 P.38 aircraft is now being considered, and details are being worked out by the Army and Navy Liquidation Committee.

7159

Maxwell Fisher

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT.

DATE: 19TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3e- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3e, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "Without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6i - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that you will inform the Allied Commission whether or not it is intended that the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED ~~xxx~~ as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters". 7148

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "Without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that you will inform the Allied Commission whether or not it is intended that the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as amended above may be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, either in the form of a directive from A.F.H.Q. or in the form of a letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission to the Italian Air Ministry.

J.J. W.O. 15/11

I.E. BROOKS,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

To:- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Date:- 2nd November, 1945.

Ref:- AFSC/46/Air.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

With reference to our conversation as to whether or not it would be policy to send a copy of the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force to the Italian Air Ministry, I have again been through it and find that very few alterations are required and I cannot see that any offence can be taken by the Italians. As a matter of fact, I myself drafted the Interim Policy at the beginning of July and ultimately after some pressure we obtained the authorised version from A.F.H.Q. on the 25th September.

2. Attached is a copy of A.F.H.Q. letter. In the script I have made pencil amendments in order to bring the directive up to date and I have also made a few marginal notes for your information.

3. I would be glad to know whether you have any objections as to sending the directive to the Italian Air Ministry from this office (not from A.F.H.Q. owing to alterations), providing I persuade Caserta to change their mind to allow the Italian Air Force to know what they are supposed to be doing which I have been keen to do ever since the war ended and for what purpose I originally wrote the draft. With your support, I think it will give me a greater likelihood of being able to inform the Italian Air Ministry of the Interim Policy.

I.E.BRODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

From:- Air Vice Marshal I.E. Wolfe, CBE.

78A

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

SECRET

ASC/46/Air.

31st October, 1945.

Dear

During his recent visit to Rome, I spoke with Air Vice Marshal Whitford about my coming down to Caserta to discuss with Air Headquarters certain matters of policy as regards the Italian Air Force, which I would like to get cleared up in view of the changes in the Management and I think that Whitford will be speaking to you about this. I would like if possible to make my visit to you before the C-in-C returns to Rome on the 17th November. I have to attend an official Italian function in Naples on the 9th November so perhaps you would be so good as to give me a little time that afternoon or the following forenoon.

2. Yesterday I took the opportunity of asking the C-in-C whether he would like to meet Senior Italian Officers as well as making official calls on the American Ambassador and Chief Commissioner. I also asked if he would like to inspect a representative cross section of the Italian Air Force (I.A.F.) at Centocelle (Rome). He agreed that he would pay the official calls, that he would attend either a Cocktail Party or the R.A.F. film "Air Plan" followed by snacks - in the Palazzo Volpi (our mess) - and that he would inspect a part of the Italian Air Force at Centocelle. I am arranging for the C-in-C to pay his calls on the 18th and a Cocktail Party or film the same evening. We would very much appreciate it if you and/or your S.A.S.C. would attend the function at the Palazzo and also the inspection at Centocelle during the forenoon of the 19th November.

7145

3. I have arranged with the Italian Chief of Air Staff that during the inspection at Centocelle, the C-in-C be shown the arrangements made for the Military Courier Service (the main centre of which is at Centocelle), the conditions under which the Italians live and the inspection of detachments of each of the Squadrons of the Italian Air Force to be followed by a fly past of representative flights of each type of unit; in view there will also be a specimen of each main type of Italian owned aircraft. I have told the Italian Chief of Air Staff what I think would be best to do though not in detail because I want to see whether the Italian Air Force can organise a thing of this sort for themselves and carry it through effeciently. The fly past part of the programme will be a test of efficiency and at the same time I am sure that it will raise the morale of the I.A.F.

4. I have asked the CAS to work out a programme covering a period of from 2 to 2½ hours altogether, including the possibility of refreshments at the end; if you wish, I will send you a copy of the ultimate programme as soon as I can get it. The C-in-C will probably be asked to arrive at about 0930 hours so he should be clear of Centocelle by about noon.

0352

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Dear

During his recent visit to Rome, I spoke with Air Vice Marshal Whitford about my coming down to Caserta to discuss with Air Headquarters certain matters of policy as regards the Italian Air Force, which I would like to get cleared up in view of the changes in the Management and I think that Whitford will be speaking to you about this. I would like if possible to make my visit to you before the C-in-C returns to Rome on the 17th November. I have to attend an official Italian function in Naples on the 9th November so perhaps you would be so good as to give me a little time that afternoon or the following forenoon.

2. Yesterday I took the opportunity of asking the C-in-C whether he would like to meet Senior Italian Officers as well as making official calls on the American Ambassador and Chief Commissioner. I also asked if he would like to inspect a representative cross section of the Italian Air Force (I.A.F.) at Centocelle (Rome). He agreed that he would pay the official calls, that he would attend either a Cocktail Party or the U.S.A.F. film "Air Plan" followed by snacks - in the Palazzo Volpi (our mess) - and that he would inspect a part of the Italian Air Force at Centocelle. I am arranging for the C-in-C to pay his calls on the 18th and a Cocktail Party or film the same evening. We would very much appreciate it if you and/or your S.A.S.O. would attend the function at the Palazzo and also the inspection at Centocelle during the forenoon of the 19th November.

3. I have arranged with the Italian Chief of Air Staff that during the inspection at Centocelle, the C-in-C be shown the arrangements made for the Military Courier Service (the main centre of which is at Centocelle), the conditions under which the Italians live and the inspection of detachments of each of the Squadrons of the Italian Air Force to be followed by a fly past of representative flights of each type of unit; on view there will also be a specimen of each main type of Italian owned aircraft. I have told the Italian Chief of Air Staff what I think would be best to do though not in detail because I want to see whether the Italian Air Force can organise a thing of this sort for themselves and carry it through effeciently. The fly past part of the programme will be a test of efficiency and at the same time I am sure that it will raise the morale of the I.A.F.

4. I have asked the CAS to work out a programme covering a period of from 2 to 2½ hours altogether, including the possibility of refreshments at the end; if you wish, I will send you a copy of the ultimate programme as soon as I can get it. The C-in-C will probably be asked to arrive at about 0930 hours so he should be clear of Centocelle by about noon.

5. The main things which I would like to discuss with you are:

(1) The spirit in which you wish the existing directives for the I.A.F. and for the A.F.S.C. to be complied with. Is it your intention to encourage a really efficient I.A.F.. In the past, before the Italians started to operate with U.S.A.F., the British had some contempt for the Italians and we did not like the way they treated our prisoners in North Africa. I think however that we should now encourage them and help them to become effective friends of the future - I hope we've got rid of the bad leaders.

7145

0 3 5 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(ii) May the interim policy for the I.A.F. (Your AG 091.711/231 SACM-O dated 23rd September, 1945) now be passed on to the Italian Air Ministry, as was originally intended some 4 months ago when I drafted that directive.

(iii) Any changes in the Peace Terms for the I.A.F. from that which was prepared some 2/3 months ago by Packenham in order to give me a background on which to take current action.

(iv) The principle involved in the construction of aircraft by the Italians. My view is that we should keep alive the three firms primilarly concerned and allow them work so far as it is reasonable and looking ahead to about April 1946, by which time we hope that something more or less definite about the Peace Terms will become available.

(v) The future Anglo/American Air Force set up in this country. For example is it intended that M.A.A.C. shall continue as such or should we (like M.M.I.A.) refer direct to A.F.H.Q. Colonel Burwell, the present American Air Adviser at A.F.H.Q. will be going home shortly and he has suggested that my Deputy Director - Brigadier General Lee - shall take his place as the American Air Adviser; provided General Lee will thereby not have so much work as to jeopardise the work he now does at A.F.S.C. as Chief of Staff I would raise no objection.

6. I have several things outstanding of minor importance, with which I will not now trouble you in detail but if you have time I would like to discuss.

(i) The allocation of Gioia aerodrome to the I.A.F.

7143

(ii) Permission for six SM.95s and one Breda BR.308 to be constructed.

(iii) Allotment of an Air Firing Range and Allied ammunition to the Italians for Fighter training purposes.

(iv) Air and ground training for I.A.F.

(v) Responsibility for feeding the I.A.F. which like the Italian Navy is a British commitment until the 1st. May, 1946, whereas the Italian Army is becoming an Italian Government commitment very soon - why the difference?.

(vi) Request by A.F.C., Ciampino, for six English speaking Italian Officers to learn and take over some of the duties of American ground personnel and of Italian mechanics to replace American mechanics - applicable to similar British organisations?.

(vii) Is it not time that the Italian Military Courier Service undertook more of the British and American Courier commitments or at least be allowed to carry Allied personnel other than those connected with the Allied Commission?. The Italians are capable of giving far more help than they now do and their accident record is better than ours.

0354

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

primarily concerned and bring them work as far as it is reasonable and looking ahead to about April 1946, by which time we hope that something more or less definite about the Peace Terms will become available.

(v) The future Anglo/American Air Force set up in this country. For example is it intended that M.A.A.C. shall continue as such or should we (like M.M.I.A.) refer direct to A.F.H.Q. Colonel Burwell, the present American Air Advisor at A.F.H.Q. will be going home shortly and he has suggested that my Deputy Director - Brigadier General Lee - shall take his place as the American Air Advisor; provided General Lee will thereby not have so much work as to jeopardise the work he now does at A.F.H.Q. as Chief of Staff I would raise no objection.

6. I have several things outstanding of minor importance, with which I will not now trouble you in detail but if you have time I would like to discuss.

(i) The allocation of Gioia aerodrome to the I.A.F.

7143

(ii) Permission for six SM.95s and one Breda BZ.308 to be constructed.

(iii) Allotment of an Air Firing Range and Allied ammunition to the Italians for Fighter training purposes.

(iv) Air and ground training for I.A.F.

(v) Responsibility for feeding the I.A.F. which like the Italian Navy is a British commitment until the 1st. May, 1946, whereas the Italian Army is becoming an Italian Government commitment very soon - why the difference?.

(vi) Request by A.T.C., Ciampino, for six English speaking Italian Officers to learn and take over some of the duties of American ground personnel and of Italian mechanics to replace American mechanics - applicable to similar British organisations?.

(vii) Is it not time that the Italian Military Courier Service undertook more of the British and American Courier commitments or at least be allowed to carry Allied personnel other than those connected with the Allied Commission?. The Italians are capable of giving far more help than they now do and their accident record is better than ours.

(viii) Similarly the I.A.F. could take over more Air Sea Rescue duties with H.S.Ls and with aircraft from Lake Bracciano (near Rome) covering the Gulf of Genoa and Tyrrhenian Sea. Why not save our manpower?.

(ix) Sale by the Americans of about 100 Lightnings to the I.A.F., in exchange for the loan of Aerocobras. Similarly the British might sell the Spitfires 5A to the Italians, together with spare parts and any replacements that may be in the country (it has been noted that the Spitfire 5A has recently been declared obsolete).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(x) Families joining R.A.F. families in Italy and on what priority within Priority 3.

7. I'm afraid that the above is somewhat of a bellyfull for you, especially at this time. Nevertheless I'd be grateful for guidance from you as to the policy which you and the new C-in-C wish us to follow.

Yours

Air Vice Marshal F.J. Fogarty, DFC. AFC.
Air Headquarters, RAF. Italy.
C.M.F.

7141

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

77A

COPY.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO.512.

AC.334/111 SACS-O. 28 August, 1945.

Subject: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Thru: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO.394.

To: Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Brodie, CBE,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AC.334/111 IS&PS-O.

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Adviser on the Allied Commission and in particular to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME, and Commanding General; Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.

7139

b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, until a final policy is determined either by revision of the armistice terms, or by a peace treaty with ITALY, the Italian Air Force will be permitted to remain within the ceiling which was authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when hostilities against the Germans were continuing. You will receive direction from time to time as to the exact strength at which this air force is to be maintained within that ceiling. All Italian Air Force units will for the present remain unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander and authorisation for the employment of those units as may be thought fit will be given to you by the Mediterranean Allied Committee on his behalf. In consequence:

a. Your primary function is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorised resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AFO.394.

To: Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Brodie, CBE,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AG.334/111 ISAPS-O.

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Adviser on the Allied Commission and in particular to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.

7139

b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, until a final policy is determined either by revision of the armistice terms, or by a peace treaty with ITALY, the Italian Air Force will be permitted to remain within the ceiling which was authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when hostilities against the Germans were continuing. You will receive direction from time to time as to the exact strength at which this air force is to be maintained within that ceiling. All Italian Air Force units will for the present remain unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander and authorisation for the employment of those units as may be thought fit will be given to you by the Mediterranean Allied Committee on his behalf. In consequence:

a. Your primary function is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorised resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit Allied policy instructions to the Italian Air Ministry, and secondly, to assist that Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

Continued/2.....

This was read over to the Italian Air Minister (Dr. Cevolotto) and to the C.A.S. (Gen Armone Cat) by F/O Beneducci in the presence of A.V.M. Brodie on 12 Oct 45. They took no notes though the C.A.S. wrote a few words once or twice.

AOC 12/10/45.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

b. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of the Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

c. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDME and AAF/AFHQ for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

5. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The Allied decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained will be conveyed to you, from time to time, by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You will also receive from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee instructions in regard to the maintainance of those units. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not main-
tain any units in excess of those authorised. 7138

6. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organisation, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDME and AAF/AFHQ.

7. Over and above the requirements of the authorised flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organising such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this theater. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively will be conveyed to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

8. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staff of RAF/MEDME and AAF/AFHQ.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

c. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

5. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The Allied decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained will be conveyed to you, from time to time, by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You will also receive from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee instructions in regard to the maintenance of those units. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorised.

7138

6. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organisation, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

7. Over and above the requirements of the authorised flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organising such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this theater. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively will be conveyed to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

8. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staff of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

(SGD) C.W. CHRISTENBERRY,
COLONEL, AGD,
ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RHF/wp 76A

AP 756

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/231 GCS-C

23 September 1945

SUBJECT: Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

TO: Air Vice-Marshal I. E. BRODIE, OBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

PART I. POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In it should be stipulating the interim policy; i.e., the policy to be adopted between the between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of and the Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential Air Transport Services and Air/Sea Rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favor of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian air crew to keep in flying practice and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:

a. The Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the Italian Air Force will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of Rome are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied officers of the Allied forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the Italian Air Force, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission, may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

CONFIDENTIAL

0364

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/231 SACS-O,
dtd 23 September 1945 (Cont'd)

b. The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats, crews and marine craft as will be made available to the Italian Air Force.

c. Aircraft allotted by the Allies will be on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P-39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the Italian Air Force but aircraft wastage is unlikely to be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the Air Force Sub-Commission as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the Italian Air Force having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

d. The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore Squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practice will be permitted. These aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of 10 hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

e. Fighter aircraft will be concentrated, as far as is practicable, in one place. Fighter pilots will be restricted to a maximum of 6 hours flying per month.

f. The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the Italian Air Force as required and at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the Italian Air Force until such time as authorization from the Air Forces Sub-Commission for its use by the Italian Air Force is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/ER of the 30th June.

g. The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22d June, 1945.

h. Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as practicable, all air material, whether in the South or North of Italy, will be concentrated in as few depots as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

i. Ab-initio or primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

j. Ground Courses for Officers and Flying Personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the Italian Air Force, especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly, Flying Control Courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the Air Forces Sub-Commission will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

k. On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will also assist the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

l. Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is de-requisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly. 7134

m. Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force are to be declared to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.

4. a. It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that international standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organization and meteorological organization.

b. No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but the decisions of the High Allied authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government in due course. A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

CONFIDENTIAL

0364

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

PART II. IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is desired that, as soon as you are ready, the various implications should be discussed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission with representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. The following subjects are recommended for discussion as part of a proposed agenda:

a. Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorized units, bases, and depots, with special reference to:

(1) The organization of the Air Ministry down to the ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Units Area and re-disposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE.

(2) Formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to coordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(3) The retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of air-crew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

b. Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorized ceiling of 31,000.

c. Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

d. Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

e. Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economizing in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/231 SACS-O,
dtd 23 September 1945 (Cont'd)

f. Salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel, although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. . CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - Addressee
4 - Chief Commissioner, AICOM
1 - C/S, FTOUSA
2 - SACS
2 - C-in-C, MED
2 - COMNAVNAM
5 - CG, AAF/ATO
5 - C-in-C, RAF/MEDME
2 - CAO
2 - The Secretaries, Med Allied Air Committee, c/o ALS, RAF/MEDME
2 - US POLAD
2 - BR RES MIN
1 - D/CAO
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-2
1 - G-3
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-5
1 - AFHQ Message Center
2 - AG Records
1 - AG MED

7132

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

785

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: A.F.S.C. A.C. LUCCA.
A.F.S.C. A.C. CASERTA.
A.F.S.C. A.C. NAPLES.
A.F.S.C. A.C. MILAN.
A.F.S.C. A.C. PALERMO.

DATE: 26TH SEPTEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

DIRECTIVE FOR A.F.S.C. ALLIED COMMISSION, ITALY.

Attached is a copy of the new directive for the A.F.S.C. which has just been issued by SACMED.

2. You will notice that all correspondence is, in future, to be addressed only to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, as appropriate. Normally the channels of communication with M.A.A.C. and the Chief Commissioner will be only through A.F.S.C. H.Q. ROME.

7136

3. As M.A.A.C. will have a small Secretariat three copies of every letter will have to be sent to CASERTA, where one copy will be retained by M.A.A.C. Secretariat, and the other two copies will be distributed to MILAN and to A.F./ PET.

4. We are NOT permitted to send a copy of this directive to the Italian Air Ministry though I am allowed to inform the Italian Air Minister and the Italian Chief of Staff of the gist of the directive for their personal information. Therefore you are NOT to show the directive to any Italian, nor to impart the gist of it. You should, however, make it clear to the Italian C.O's that the training of the Italian Air Force is their own responsibility, and that it is our function to see that the I.A.F. is efficient, and to assist them as much as possible towards this aim (see paragraph 3a of the directive).

5. It is requested that all officers under your Command should understand the terms of this directive and any new officers coming in should also be shown it; where appropriate the Adjutant of A.F.S.C. Units will make necessary arrangements to ensure that officers posted in to the A.F.S.C. are informed accordingly.

D.D. ✓
S.S.O. — 27/9

I.E. BROOKE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

74A

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 22nd September, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/A.C.C/AIR.

70A

Directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Reference is made to your letter AASC/16/AIR, dated 11th September, 1945:

2. It is now confirmed that the above directive is downgraded from "SECRET" to "CONFIDENTIAL".

3. The gist of such portions as you may consider advisable, may be conveyed to the Italian Air Ministry. The Italian Air Ministry will not, however, be furnished with either a copy of the Directive or with extracts in writing from it.

For the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

Marshall Tisher.

Air Vice-Marshal,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Lt. K. Abbott
Lieutenant Colonel, A.G.

RECEIVED FROM
Wing Commander 7124

MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES SECRETARIAT

Copy No : A-5, MAF/2000.

ALLIED COMMISSION
ORDERLY
46/air

Su '75 [illegible] 26/9

26/9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

RESTRICTED

739
Air Sec 12

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFC ~~512~~

AG 334/111 GSCD-O

18 September 1945

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

TO: Air Vice Marshall I.E. BRODIE, OBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission
APO 394

19 A Air 70B

Classification of letter this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 20 August 1945, is reduced from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

R. H. Frese

R. H. FRESE
Major, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Addressee
4 - ALCOM
1 - C/S AFC
2 - SAAS
2 - C in C Med
2 - COMNAVEAF
5 - AAF/AFO
5 - RAF/MEDME
2 - CAO
2 - Secretaries, Med Allied Air Committee, C/o ALS, RAF/MEDME
2 - US POLAD
2 - Br DEP POLAD
1 - D/CAO
1 - C-1 (A)
1 - C-1 (B)
1 - C-2
1 - C-3
1 - C-4 (A)
1 - C-5
1 - AFHQ Message Center
2 - AG Records

7127

Air 5/a 12

Su 74 A V 75 A

RESTRICTED

U 3 0 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

7126

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

19th September, 1945.

AFSC/S.523/SIGS.

Dear

Thank you for your letter DO/JTP dated 8th September, 1945. My Signals Officer (SQUADRON LEADER CHAPMAN) happened to be visiting IMOCE during the first few days of this month and also discovered that the Italians were mis-using the World Guard frequency.

2. It is actually the Italian fighter squadrons doing formation flying and not the Czechs, who were the offenders.

3. However, the practice of using World Guard was stopped immediately, and a VHF frequency has since been obtained solely for the use of the Italian Air Force.

4. I have no objection to your communicating direct with S/Ldr. CHAPMAN, and in his absence with F/Lt. O'CONNOR, concerning signals matters. When policy is affected or a strawberry or raspberry to the I.A.F. is indicated, my signals officer will inform me.

7126

Yours

Group Captain J.E. Paine,
H.Q. M.C.A.F.
R.A.F. C.M.F.

COPY: FILE AFSC/S/SIGS - paragraph 4.✓

TOP SECRET

AIR FORCES 71R
HQ AIR
27/8. S.2. ALO.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

B-1056

TOP SECRET

SAC (45) 4th Meeting
24 August 1945

COPY NUMBER

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 23RD AUGUST 1945

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

PRESENT:

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

7124

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel C. G. Blakeney, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel C. R. Tuff, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

- - - - - - - - - - - -

PRESENT:

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

7124

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel C. G. Blakeney, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel C. R. Tuff, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

A/D D 30/7
S.S.O. 28/8
A.F.

B.F. D.D.
B.F. S.S.O. 1/9.
Paras 5-8 inclusive for information 27/8.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General A. D. Ward,
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Major General M. G. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MTOUSA

Major General M.W.M. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br)

Colonel P. McC. Smith, representing
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 9 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

7122

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that the Chief Signal Officer was pursuing this matter with the Allied Commission. It appeared that it might be possible to use certain land lines jointly for both civilian and military traffic. A measure of approval for such a procedure had been received from the United States War Department and similar approval was being sought from the British War Office. It had not yet been possible, however, to settle details of the financial arrangements which joint use would involve. Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorised a relaxation of the previous security regulations, so as to allow ship owners in ITALY and GREECE to forward messages regarding shipping movements through normal commercial channels.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

3. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 4)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Colonel P. McC. Smith, Rep[illegible],
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 9 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

7122

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that the Chief Signal Officer was pursuing this matter with the Allied Commission. It appeared that it might be possible to use certain land lines jointly for both civilian and military traffic. A measure of approval for such a procedure had been received from the United States War Department and similar approval was being sought from the British War Office. It had not yet been possible, however, to settle details of the financial arrangements which joint use would involve. Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorised a relaxation of the previous security regulations, so as to allow ship owners in ITALY and GREECE to forward messages regarding shipping movements through normal commercial channels.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

3. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that in order to provide the basis for the ten internal security brigades, the formation of which was to be the first step in the reorganisation of the Italian Army, six Italian Guard Battalions would be turned over to Italian government control by 25 August. By 20 September this number would be increased to eleven battalions. It was considered that no further releases of Guard battalions would then be possible unless they were replaced by Allied troops or unless guard commitments were reduced. This aspect was under further examination.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

B-1056

4. JUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that as a result of the discussion at the previous meeting the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, had held at AFHQ a conference attended by representatives of the Allied Commission. In consequence, it had been decided to amend the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 8 in two respects. The first was to lay down as an AFHQ directive that salt and tobacco were to be considered disease and unrest items and so were not to be released to the Jugoslavs. It had previously been intended to leave the decision on this matter to 13 Corps. In the second place the directive now stipulated specifically that items of Italian government ownership might only be released to the Jugoslavs if there was evidence that effective control of such items had been assumed by the Germans or by the Fascist Republican authorities. As so amended the directive had now been despatched* to 13 Corps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that on a recent visit to VENEZIA GIULIA he had discovered that the war booty, claimed by the Jugoslavs, had in fact been in the possession of their civilian agents throughout the negotiations. Now that it had been decided that certain of these items could not be released to JUGOSLAVIA, 13 Corps might require some further direction as to the use of force in order to seize these items.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in noting the above reports, directed:

that the measures necessary to appropriate to Allied Military Government uses items such as salt and tobacco, which were held within the Allied occupied area and were not now to be released to JUGOSLAVIA, could properly be left to Commander, 13 Corps.

7121

5. FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

(Paper No. SAC (45) 13)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that since Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, had been dissolved, it was necessary to have an arrangement whereby Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and the Commanding General, AAF/MTO, should act together, in committee, on air matters of common Allied interest, and attaching a draft charter for such a committee.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the object of the proposed committee was to bind the Commanding General, AAF/MTO and himself together so that they could offer joint advice to the Supreme Allied Commander on Allied air matters and also to provide one authority with which the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, could deal. In reply to a query by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, he said that the Allied Liaison Section, which the paper proposed should act as Secretariat to the Committee, was an RAF staff section under his command.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, with the agreement of the Deputy U.S. Political Adviser, suggested that it would be advisable for the Committee to have an Allied Secretariat and asked whether the secretarial facilities could not be provided by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

stipulated specifically that items of Italian government ownership might only be released to the Jugoslavs if there was evidence that effective control of such items had been assumed by the Germans or by the Fascist Republican authorities. As so amended the directive had now been despatched* to 13 Corps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAYDEN said that on a recent visit to VENEZIA GIULIA he had discovered that the war booty, claimed by the Jugoslavs, had in fact been in the possession of their civilian agents throughout the negotiations. Now that it had been decided that certain of these items could not be released to JUGOSLAVIA, 13 Corps might require some further direction as to the use of force in order to seize these items.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in noting the above reports, directed:

that the measures necessary to appropriate to Allied Military Government uses items such as salt and tobacco, which were held within the Allied occupied area and were not now to be released to JUGOSLAVIA, could properly be left to Commander, 13 Corps.

T121

5. FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

(Paper No. SAC (45) 13)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that since Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, had been dissolved, it was necessary to have an arrangement whereby Commander-in-Chief, MAF MEDME, and the Commanding General, AAF/MTO, should act together, in committee, on air matters of common Allied interest, and attaching a draft charter for such a committee.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the object of the proposed committee was to bind the Commanding General, AAF/MTO and himself together so that they could offer joint advice to the Supreme Allied Commander on Allied air matters and also to provide one authority with which the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, could deal. In reply to a query by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, he said that the Allied Liaison Section, which the paper proposed should act as Secretariat to the Committee, was an RAF staff section under his command.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, with the agreement of the Deputy U.S. Political Adviser, suggested that it would be advisable for the Committee to have an Allied Secretariat and asked whether the secretarial facilities could not be provided by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

COLONEL BASTION said that the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat could assume certain duties for routing papers to and from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee but could not provide complete secretarial facilities for that Committee, as these would be of a somewhat technical nature and would, therefore, require the attention of Air Force officers.

*AG 386.3/223 GEG-O dated 19 August 1945

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the draft charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 13, subject to its amendment in order to :-

(a) provide that Committee with an Allied Secretariat;

(b) set out the relationship between that Secretariat and the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

6. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION

(Paper No. SAC (45) 14)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a revised draft directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission had previously been responsible in certain respects to the Mediterranean Allied Air Commander-in-Chief and now that this appointment was terminated it was proposed that the Sub-Commission should be responsible to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander.

7128

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three service sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analagous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General McNarney also considered that the statement, that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee could authorise use of Italian Air Force units as they thought fit, required redrafting, as the Committee could only perform this function within the general policy determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. He also questioned the implication in the proposed draft directive that the Italian Air Force would remain indefinitely under Allied control. The policy of turning over the Italian Army to the Italian government had already been recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General McNarney considered that a start in the same direction might shortly be necessary in regard to the Italian Air Force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

6. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION

(Paper No. SAC (45) 14)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a revised draft directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission had previously been responsible in certain respects to the Mediterranean Allied Air Commander-in-Chief and now that this appointment was terminated it was proposed that the Sub-Commission should be responsible to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander. 7129

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three service sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analagous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General McNarney also considered that the statement, that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee could authorise use of Italian Air Force units as they thought fit, required redrafting, as the Committee could only perform this function within the general policy determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. He also questioned the implication in the proposed draft directive that the Italian Air Force would remain indefinitely under Allied control. The policy of turning over the Italian Army to the Italian government had already been recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General McNarney considered that a start in the same direction might shortly be necessary in regard to the Italian Air Force.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD, referring to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander's last remark, said the difficulty was that nobody knew what size or type of air force would be permitted to ITALY by the Peace Treaty. There were indications that the present Italian Air Force was larger than the limit which was likely to be finally imposed. Consequently, the handover of the Italian Air Force to the Italian government might give rise to difficulties at a later stage. However, the Italian Air Ministry was assuming increasing administrative control. Referring to the portions of the draft directive dealing with

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the channels of responsibility of the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, he said it ought to be made clearer that, while on service matters the sub-commission would deal with Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, on other broader matters it was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to redraft, in the light of the above discussion, the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 14 and, after obtaining the necessary Air Force concurrences, to submit the revised draft to him for his approval.

7. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION

(Paper No. SAC(45) 15)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper concluding that a policy for Italian civil aviation could not be laid down until further guidance was received, and attaching a draft signal designed to obtain such guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that, as the matter was so tied up with the terms of the prospective Italian Peace Treaty, it was not possible to go further without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He agreed with the questions proposed by the draft signal but thought it desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should make recommendations in regard to them. He considered these recommendations should be, firstly, that Italian civil aviation should be permitted but should not be allowed to operate in VENEZIA GIULIA or other disputed territories, secondly, that the Italian government should be allowed to own and control the Italian civil air lines, and thirdly, that the Italian aviation industry should not be revived. He explained that the small Italian Air Force, which the Peace Treaty was likely to permit, and the requirements of Italian civil aviation were most unlikely to be large enough to give a sufficient market for an Italian aircraft industry to be an economic proposition. Consequently, if such an industry were revived, there would always be a danger of the Italians in order to gain further markets, seeking either to obviate the military terms of the Peace Treaty or to spread their civil aviation further afield. However, he agreed that for economic reasons the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, on anything other than a very small scale, was not a practical proposition for some years.

MR. CFFIE considered, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed, that it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander at the present stage to make a definite recommendation that an Italian aviation industry should not be allowed. He thought, however, that the general subject of civil aviation should be raised as it was possible that the British and United States governments would shortly wish to discuss with the Italian government problems affecting British and United States civil aviation.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that if development of civil aviation was allowed it did provide a nucleus for war expansion. GERMANY had already

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

for his approval.

7. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION

(Paper No. SAC(45) 15)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper concluding that a policy for Italian civil aviation could not be laid down until further guidance was received, and attaching a draft signal designed to obtain such guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that, as the matter was so tied up with the terms of the prospective Italian Peace Treaty, it was not possible to go further without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He agreed with the questions proposed by the draft signal but thought it desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should make recommendations in regard to them. He considered these recommendations should be, firstly, that Italian civil aviation should be permitted but should not be allowed to operate in VENEZIA GIULIA or other disputed territories, secondly, that the Italian government should be allowed to own and control the Italian civil air lines, and thirdly, that the Italian aviation industry should not be revived. He explained that the small Italian Air Force, which the Peace Treaty was likely to permit, and the requirements of Italian civil aviation were most unlikely to be large enough to give a sufficient market for an Italian aircraft industry to be an economic proposition. Consequently, if such an industry were revived, there would always be a danger of the Italians in order to gain further markets, seeking either to obviate the military terms of the Peace Treaty or to spread their civil aviation further afield. However, he agreed that for economic reasons the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, on anything other than a very small scale, was not a practical proposition for some years.

MR. CFFIE considered, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed, that it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander at the present stage to make a definite recommendation that an Italian aviation industry should not be allowed. He thought, however, that the general subject of civil aviation should be raised as it was possible that the British and United States governments would shortly wish to discuss with the Italian government problems affecting British and United States civil aviation.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that if development of civil aviation was allowed it did provide a nucleus for war expansion. GERMANY had already taught us that lesson once. He therefore considered that it should be stipulated that no Italian aircraft industry would be permitted for the present. This provision could, if necessary, be relaxed later. However, if the stipulation were not made now, it would be difficult to impose it later.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER considered that the statement that the present directive to the Allied Commission prohibited discussion of civil aviation with the Italians should be deleted from the draft signal. He had been unable to trace any such direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he believed that this decision was taken by the Supreme Allied Commander and could be reversed by him if he so wished.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with Air Marshal Garrod that it was desirable to comment, in so far as military implications were concerned, on the questions being put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From the military point of view, he considered that State ownership of Italian civil aviation would simplify Allied control. He also thought that, in regard to the possibility of permitting the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, the question should be posed as to whether that industry should be State owned and controlled, or privately owned as at present.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the statement in the draft signal that if an Italian civil aviation industry were permitted it would be difficult to exercise technical control of design, observed that this appeared contradictory to the recommendation that no attempt should be made to impose an Allied control on Italian research. This recommendation had been agreed at a previous meeting and the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the British draft of the Italian Peace Treaty had been forwarded on that basis.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F MEDME, and the Commanding General, A.A.F/MTO, to redraft in the light of the above discussion, the signal circulated under paper No. S.A.C (45) 15, and subsequently to despatch it.

8. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

(Paper No. S.A.C (45) 11)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper, circulating the comments which the Supreme Allied Commander had made on the draft Peace Treaty with ITALY, as prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reported that when in LONDON he had obtained some information from the Foreign Office with regard to the status of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been set up by the POTSDAM Conference, had placed the question of the Italian Peace Treaty at the top of its agenda. The Foreign Office understood that the Treaty would include a settlement of both the Northeast and Northwest Italian frontier questions, would cover the future of the former Italian colonies and would impose appropriate limitations on the Italian armed forces. The Foreign Office were anxious to have the Supreme Allied Commander's views, especially with regard to a permanent settlement in the Northeast, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was already examining this matter. It was hoped that the Council of Foreign Ministers would produce an agreed draft Treaty comparatively quickly. The other interested parties such as ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA would then be given an opportunity to comment on this draft. The Foreign Office were optimistic that a final Treaty would be ratified about the end of the year.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN reported that he had received a personal signal from Brigadier General Spofford asking for certain information about Italian industry and indicating that the United States War Department were now actively

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

717

if an Italian civil aviation industry were permitted it would be difficult to exercise technical control of design, observed that this appeared contradictory to the recommendation that no attempt should be made to impose an Allied control on Italian research. This recommendation had been agreed at a previous meeting and the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the British draft of the Italian Peace Treaty had been forwarded on that basis.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, R.F MEDME, and the Commanding General, ..F/MTO, to redraft in the light of the above discussion, the signal circulated under paper No. S.C (45) 15, and subsequently to despatch it.

8. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

(Paper No. S.C (45) 11)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper, circulating the comments which the Supreme Allied Commander had made on the draft Peace Treaty with ITALY, as prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reported that when in LONDON he had obtained some information from the Foreign Office with regard to the status of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been set up by the POTSDAM Conference, had placed the question of the Italian Peace Treaty at the top of its agenda. The Foreign Office understood that the Treaty would include a settlement of both the Northeast and Northwest Italian frontier questions, would cover the future of the former Italian colonies and would impose appropriate limitations on the Italian armed forces. The Foreign Office were anxious to have the Supreme Allied Commander's views, especially with regard to a permanent settlement in the Northeast, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was already examining this matter. It was hoped that the Council of Foreign Ministers would produce an agreed draft Treaty comparatively quickly. The other interested parties such as ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA would then be given an opportunity to comment on this draft. The Foreign Office were optimistic that a final Treaty would be ratified about the end of the year.

7117

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN reported that he had received a personal signal from Brigadier General Spofford asking for certain information about Italian industry and indicating that the United States War Department were now actively interested in the question of the Peace Treaty.

THE DEPUTY SUPRIME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

9. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

(Paper No. S.C (45) 12)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a record of a meeting held between the

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Supreme Allied Commander and Major General Basilov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate in regard to repatriation.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that certain persons, whom the Russians claimed to be Soviet citizens, were accommodated in displaced persons camps under Allied Commission control and also in camps operated by UNRRA. He had received directions in regard to the disposal of some of these persons to British prisoner of war camps. As AC was an integrated Anglo-American undertaking, his problem was an Allied one and these persons must be considered under Allied rather than British or American control. The divergence between the British and United States positions was therefore giving him some embarrassment. Further, in view of the YALTA Agreement, he questioned the desirability of sending displaced persons to prisoner of war camps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN explained that the prisoner of war camps to which these displaced persons had been sent, were camps for liberated Allied prisoners of war and not camps for captured enemy prisoners of war. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, need not therefore be disturbed by the thought that these Soviet citizens were being treated as enemy prisoners of war.

BRIGADIER GENERAL DERLE said that the terms of the agreements signed at YALTA stipulated that civilian Soviet citizens would be treated in precisely the same way as Soviet military personnel, who had been made prisoners by the enemy and liberated by the United States or British forces.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that there was now no divergence of opinion between the British and United States governments in regard to the interpretation of the YALTA Agreements except in so far as the use of force, to effect the repatriation of unwilling persons, was concerned. In this respect, Field Marshal Alexander's position was that he would not forcibly return to RUSSIA or elsewhere people who did not wish to go.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that the major difficulty in regard to the YALTA Agreement was the determination of what constituted a Soviet citizen. In regard to the use of force to effect repatriation, while he personally had a directive from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to personnel in purely United States custody (and which directive differed from that issued to Field Marshal Alexander in his British capacity), he considered it most desirable that, as certain persons were held as an Allied responsibility the question should be posed on an Allied basis to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

> Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (MTOUSA), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to examine the Allied commitments in the Theatre for prisoners of war and displaced persons, with particular regard to the desirability of the use of force to effect repatriation, and as a result of this examination to draft for his approval:
>
> (a) A signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

States positions was therefore giving him some embarrassment. Further, in view of the YALTA Agreement, he questioned the desirability of sending displaced persons to prisoner of war camps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN explained that the prisoner of war camps to which those displaced persons had been sent, were camps for liberated Allied prisoners of war and not camps for captured enemy prisoners of war. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, need not therefore be disturbed by the thought that these Soviet citizens were being treated as enemy prisoners of war.

BRIGADIER GENERAL EBERLE said that the terms of the agreements signed at YALTA stipulated that civilian Soviet citizens would be treated in precisely the same way as Soviet military personnel, who had been made prisoners by the enemy and liberated by the United States or British forces.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that there was now no divergence of opinion between the British and United States governments in regard to the interpretation of the YALTA Agreements except in so far as the use of force, to effect the repatriation of unwilling persons, was concerned. In this respect, Field Marshal Alexander's position was that he would not forcibly return to RUSSIA or elsewhere people who did not wish to go.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that the major difficulty in regard to the YALTA Agreement was the determination of what constituted a Soviet citizen. In regard to the use of force to effect repatriation, while he personally had a directive from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to personnel in purely United States custody (and which directive differed from that issued to Field Marshal Alexander in his British capacity), he considered it most desirable that, as certain persons were held as an Allied responsibility the question should be posed on an Allied basis to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (MTOUSA), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to examine the Allied commitments in the Theatre for prisoners of war and displaced persons, with particular regard to the desirability of the use of force to effect repatriation, and as a result of this examination to draft for his approval:

(a) A signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting that an Allied policy directive be given to the Supreme Allied Commander on this matter.

(b) Instructions to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and any other agencies concerned, as to how persons considered to be an Allied commitment should be handled pending receipt of the instructions to be requested from the Combined Chiefs of Staff under (a) above.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10. USE OF NORTHWEST ITALIAN PORTS FOR TRAFFIC TO SWITZERLAND

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the Admiralty had requested his views in regard to the use of the ports of GENOA and SAVONA by Spanish ships engaged in the transportation of goods to SWITZERLAND. SAVONA was already under Italian control and GENOA would be on 1 September. While the capacity of these ports was considerable the ability of the inland communications (especially the railways) to clear them was limited. In consequence, the situation might arise later in which the Italians would complain that supplies for Northwestern ITALY were being interferred with by the transit of this traffic to SWITZERLAND. He had replied to the Admiralty that from a naval point of view he had no objection provided Spanish ships concerned would accept his routing instructions.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to investigate this matter further.

11. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL

MR. BROAD said he was informed that the Greek Government, considering that they were about to have serious economic difficulties in regard to the supply of oils and fats, had requested assistance from the British and United States Ambassadors, who in turn had referred this request to their governments. The Deputy Resident Minister had further had a signal from the British Ambassador to GREECE enquiring whether, pending such assistance on governmental level, AFHQ could make a loan to GREECE of 2,000 tons of olive oil from ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that he had received a copy of some of the signals to which the Deputy Resident Minister had referred and a preliminary examination had been made. This indicated that any major assistance from ITALY was out of the question. It was believed that this year only some 52,000 tons of olive oil had been amassed in the whole of ITALY as against 45,000 tons last year in that part of the country which was then under Allied control. Furthermore, he had information which indicated that the Greeks had not amassed some of last year's crop of olive oil in the AEGEAN Islands and that vigorous measures in these areas would produce results. A similar request for loans had been received in respect of both the US and British zones in AUSTRIA. He felt that the Greek government had not realized that there was a world-wide shortage of oils and fats. He had also noted the Supreme Allied Commander's signal sent from GREECE indicating that failing ITALY an attempt should be made to get supplies from NORTH AFRICA or MIDDLE EAST. He was not hopeful of this but he wished to explore certain aspects of the matter further.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to investigate the matter further and, in due course, to submit appropriate recommendations in regard to the Greek government's request.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

had replied to the Admiralty that from a naval point of view he had no objection provided Spanish ships concerned would accept his routing instructions.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to investigate this matter further.

11. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL

MR. BROAD said he was informed that the Greek Government, considering that they were about to have serious economic difficulties in regard to the supply of oils and fats, had requested assistance from the British and United States Ambassadors, who in turn had referred this request to their governments. The Deputy Resident Minister had further had a signal from the British Ambassador to GREECE enquiring whether, pending such assistance on governmental level, AFHQ could make a loan to GREECE of 2,000 tons of olive oil from ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that he had received a copy of some of the signals to which the Deputy Resident Minister had referred and a preliminary examination had been made. This indicated that any major assistance from ITALY was out of the question. It was believed that this year only some 52,000 tons of olive oil had been amassed in the whole of ITALY as against 45,000 tons last year in that part of the country which was then under Allied control. Furthermore, he had information which indicated that the Greeks had not amassed some of last year's crop of olive oil in the AEGEAN Islands and that vigorous measures in these areas would produce results. A similar request for loans had been received in respect of both the US and British zones in AUSTRIA. He felt that the Greek government had not realized that there was a world-wide shortage of oils and fats. He had also noted the Supreme Allied Commander's signal sent from GREECE indicating that failing ITALY an attempt should be made to get supplies from NORTH AFRICA or MIDDLE EAST. He was not hopeful of this but he wished to explore certain aspects of the matter further.

714

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to investigate the matter further and, in due course, to submit appropriate recommendations in regard to the Greek government's request.

J.G. Sneetman

J.G. SNEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

E-1056

DISTRIBUTION:

NORMAL, PLUS:

Head of Air Forces Sub-Commission, thru Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	Copy No. 45
DAG, G-1(Br)	" " 46
AC of S, G-1 (MTOUSA)	" " 47

EXTRACTS

Commander, Land Forces, GREECE	Minute 11	1 copy
MMT/MSA	Minute 10	1 copy
CSO	Minute 2	1 copy

7112

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789017

EXTRACTS

Commander, Land Forces, GREECE	Minute 11	1 copy
MAAT/USA	Minute 10	1 copy
CSO	Minute 2	1 copy

7112

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

70A

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. Rome.

To:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.
(Attention W/Cdr. Fisher).

Date:- 11th September, 1945.

Ref:- AFSC/46/Air. SECRET

Directive for A.F.S.C., Allied Commission, Italy.

Referring to the telephonic conversation between Wing Commander Fisher, Secretariat, MAAC and Group Captain Jarman, A.F.S.C., Rome, the following copies of minutes are forwarded for reference:

" The Chief Commissioner approves the request that the Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission be downgraded. While he is in agreement with minutes 87 and 88, he believes a copy of the document could be shown (not given) to the Air Ministry having first obtained a pledge of secrecy with particular emphasis that absolutely no disclosure be made to the press. "

Minute 87. From the Chief Staff Officer to the Executive Officer, states:

" Ref. folio 84. My recommendation is that the Directive can be downgraded below "Secret", but that it should not be shown to the Italian Air Ministry, since I think that it would be tactless to show them in print that they have no control over their own Air Force, although, of course, they know this perfectly well. I feel also that if it were given to the Air Ministry it might leak into the Press with undesirable results. " 7119

Minute 88. From Executive Commissioner to Chief Commissioner, states:

" Attached is submitted for your decision.

I agree with minute 87 above. "

See 23A

24/9

(I.R. JARMAN, C/Capt),

AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

708

From:- Senior Staff Officer, Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.

To:- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Date:- 5th September, 1945.

Ref:- AFSC/303/1/Org.

Subject:- DIRECTIVE FOR A.F.S.C. ALLIED COMMISSION, ITALY.

The A.O.C. has asked that the directive for this Sub-Commission be down graded from a SECRET document to allow its distribution to include a copy to the Italian Air Ministry.

I have received verbal approval from A.F.H.Q. through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, provided it also receives your approval.

May I be informed of your decision after you have given this request your consideration.

7108

L.E.JARMAN, G/CAPT.
SENIOR STAFF OFFICER.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

5

AG 334/111 SACS-O

AF 687

ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS
APO 512

RAS/lja

AIR FORCES SC

:::::::::::::::::::::
: S E C R E T :
:Auth: SAC MT :
:Initials :
:Date: 28 August 45 :
:::::::::::::::::::::

28 August 1945

69A

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

TO: Air Vice-Marshal I. E. BRODIE, CBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this headquarters on 6 March 1945, under reference AG 334/111 ISACS-O.

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Adviser on the Allied Commission and in particular to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.

7106

b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, until a final policy is determined either by revision of the armistice terms, or by a peace treaty with ITALY, the Italian Air Force will be permitted to remain within the ceiling which was authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when hostilities against the Germans were continuing. You will receive direction from time to time as to the exact strength at which this air force is to be maintained within that ceiling. All Italian Air Force units will for the present remain unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander and authorization for the employment of those units as may be thought fit will be given to you by the Mediterranean Allied Committee on his behalf. In consequence:

Copy No 6 in circulation.

SECRET

SECRET

0341

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr, AG 334/111 SACS-O,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

a. Your primary function is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorized resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit Allied policy instructions to the Italian Air Ministry and, secondly, to assist that Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

b. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

c. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDME and AAF/ATO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

SECRET

0392

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~SECRET~~

AFHQ Ltr, AG 334/111 (AC)-O,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

5. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The Allied decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained will be conveyed to you, from time to time, by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You will also receive from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee instructions in regard to the maintenance of these units. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized.

6. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

7. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this theater. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively will be conveyed to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

7104

8. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. CHRISTMERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Addressee
4 - Chief Commissioner, ACC
1 - C/S MTO
2 - SACS
2 - C-in-C, MED
2 - COMNAVNEM
5 - CG, AAF/MTO
5 - C-in-C RAF/MEDME

(Distribution continued on reverse side)

EC Hist - 30 Aug 45
3 Chief Cmnr
4 Exec Cmnr
5-6 Air Forces Sec

3

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr, AG 334/111 GACS-O,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

2 - CAO
2 - The Secretaries, Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, c/o ALS, RAF, MEDME
2 - US POLAD
2 - BR REP MIN
1 - D/CAO
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-2
1 - G-3
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-5
1 - AFHQ Message Center
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M & D

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET

AIR FORCES S/C

62A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

..F 665
SAC (45) 14
21st August 1945

SECRET
COPY NO 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Secretary

1. On the dissolution of Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its two national components, it has become necessary to revise the existing directive for the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

2. The draft directive at Appendix 'A' has therefore been prepared by Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDITERRANEAN in conjunction with Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and has received the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

7102

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

A/D.D. Air AFHQ 24/8
BF-D D for inf only. 1/9
BF-S.S.O - for inf only.
46R 23/8

DISTRIBUTION:

Normal

E.C. DIST - 22 Aug
EX COM : Copy No 32
Old Records - 33

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION
6306
46/Air

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MISSION

Note by Secretary

1. On the dissolution of Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its two national components, it has become necessary to revise the existing directive for the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

2. The draft directive at Appendix 'A' has therefore been prepared by Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME in conjunction with Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and has received the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

7102

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

A/D.D Air MMB 24/8
BF-DD 24/8 ref. 19
BF-S.S.O. - for inf only.
AFHQ 23/8

DISTRIBUTION:

Normal

E.C. DIST - 22 Aug
EX COM : Copy No 32
AIR FORCES s/c " - 33
Copy retained by C.C. No 31.

ALLIED AIR FORCES COMMISSION
6306
46/Air

I

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 13356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

APPENDIX 'A'

D R A F T

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

TO : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, OBE,
Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

THRU : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supercede and cancel the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AG 334/111 IS&PS-O.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

3. a. The Italian Air Force has been permitted to remain at a ceiling laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until a final policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force is decided either by a revision of the Armistice Terms or a Peace Treaty with Italy.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorised resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them in accordance with the policy laid down by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, and secondly, to assist the Italian Air Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. The following instructions supercede and cancel the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AG 384/111 IS&PS-O.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

3. a. The Italian Air Force has been permitted to remain at a ceiling laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until a final policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force is decided either by a revision of the Armistice Terms or a Peace Treaty with Italy. 7106

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorised resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them in accordance with the policy laid down by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, and secondly, to assist the Italian Air Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the Officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves.)

b. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

6. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained is one for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Maintenance of these units will be regulated by instructions from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

7. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorised. All the Italian Air Force units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee who will authorise them to be used as they consider fit.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organisation, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner, for information and on matters which are his direct concern. The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

9. Over and above the requirements of the authorised flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organising such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this Theatre. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively rests with the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

10. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air

7098

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

out should keep in close touch with
rities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

6. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained is one for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Maintenance of these units will be regulated by instructions from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

7. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorised. All the Italian Air Force units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee who will authorise them to be used as they consider fit.

7098

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organisation, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner, for information and on matters which are his direct concern. The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

9. Over and above the requirements of the authorised flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organising such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this Theatre. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively rests with the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

10. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C.W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

III

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA.

ROME: 12th August, 1945.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

PROT. 011841/Sg.U/4510/Coll.

To Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Brodie,
Air Officer Commanding,
A.F.S.C. A.C. Rome.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal.

I am in receipt of your letter AFSC/46/AIR of the 24th July which I found on my return from my second visit North.

2. I wish to thank you first of all for the clarification and assurances you give me on so many points. I am also limiting the arguments in my reply to those which are indispensable, whilst waiting for the opportunity to discuss by word of mouth matters of interest to us in the near future.

3. With regard to para 3, 4, 5 of your letter, I wish to reaffirm that it was not my intention to criticise your intervention at Lecce. I just wanted to inform you with the most absolute frankness of the repercussions following your visit and of the matters discussed by you which became known to me in a normal manner during office hours. Obviously the personnel had taken your programmatic suggestions to be instructions, and for this very reason and misunderstanding I found it necessary to write to you.

The episode has had, if nothing more, the effect of convincing you of the state of mind and spirit of our personnel which sometimes reveals notable and perhaps often excessive sensibility.

4. As regards paragraph 25, and having taken into consideration your views on the matter and W/Cdr GLADSTONE's statement, I am pleased to state that the remarks expressed to me did not correspond to facts and thus this Officer's work and conduct were not prejudiced.

I should, therefore, be particularly grateful if you would transmit this fact on my behalf to W/Cdr. Gladstone.

I must, nevertheless, question a technical assumption held by W/Cdr. Gladstone regarding the balance of the S.79. With Alfa 128 engines the aircraft is not tail heavy but nose heavy, as verified by the fact that the best balanced aeroplanes often carry an additional weight of a quintal in the tail. Please accept this technical observation in a friendly and cordial spirit.

5. In connection with para 6. I thank you for the understanding shown towards our difficulties and for your offer to help us, of which I shall avail myself during our future conversations.

6. As regards para 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, I must inform you that the training course for Flying Control has already started. I will form an opinion on the results shown on my next visit to Lecce. I hope to be able to clarify by word of mouth rather than in writing the question of the control exercised by A.F.S.C. and how it should be applied.

7. The personnel problems dealt with in paras 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 have already been solved as you required with regard to CAPTAIN ZEGRINI, MAJOR SCOTTU

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2. I wish to thank you first of all for the clarification and assurances you give me on so many points. I am also limiting the arguments in my reply to those which are indispensable, whilst waiting for the opportunity to discuss by word of mouth matters of interest to us in the near future.

3. With regard to para 3, 4, 5 of your letter, I wish to reaffirm that it was not my intention to criticise your intervention at Lecce. I just wanted to inform you with the most absolute frankness of the repercussions following your visit and of the matters discussed by you which became known to me in a normal manner during office hours. Obviously the personnel had taken your programmatic suggestions to be instructions, and for this very reason and misunderstanding I found it necessary to write to you.

The episode has had, if nothing more, the effect of convincing you of the state of mind and spirit of our personnel which sometimes reveals notable and perhaps often excessive sensibility.

4. As regards paragraph 25, and having taken into consideration your views on the matter and W/Cdr GLADSTONE's statement, I am pleased to state that the remarks expressed to me did not correspond to facts and thus this Officer's work and conduct were not prejudiced.

I should, therefore, be particularly grateful if you would transmit this fact on my behalf to W/Cdr. Gladstone.

I must, nevertheless, question a technical assumption held by W/Cdr. Gladstone regarding the balance of the S.79. With Alfa 128 engines the aircraft is not tail heavy but nose heavy, as verified by the fact that the best balanced aeroplanes often carry an additional weight of a quintal in the tail. Please accept this technical observation in a friendly and cordial spirit.

5. In connection with para 6. I thank you for the understanding shown towards our difficulties and for your offer to help us, of which I shall avail myself during our future conversations.

6. As regards para 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, I must inform you that the training course for Flying Control has already started. I will form an opinion on the results shown on my next visit to Lecce. I hope to be able to clarify by word of mouth rather than in writing the question of the control exercised by A.F.S.C. and how it should be applied.

7. The personnel problems dealt with in paras 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 have already been solved as you required with regard to CAPTAIN ZEGRINI, MAJOR SCOTTU and CAPTAIN RUGGERO. // The two C.O's mentioned in paras 12 - 16 will be substituted as soon as possible, a change which will depend on how soon the right type of substitute can be found. I am of the opinion that it is best to wait rather than lay oneself open to criticism due to the too frequent changes which are incomprehensible and perturbing to the various sections. I will explain this better at our meeting.

Naturally, as in the past, these movements will not be ordered without your approval as laid down in the Armistice conditions. //

8. I have noted what you write in para 17 and am pleased that it should be so. Experience had revealed inopportune interference, which had undoubtedly

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR TRANSPORT SCHEDULE

EFFECTIVE 10 NOVEMBER 1945

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE—APO 744

SCHEDULED AIR MAIL SERVICES: UNITED KINGDOM— FRANCE — GERMANY— AUSTRIA

READ DOWN





TABLE II

INFORMATION FLIGHTS: INTER THEATRE—LOCAL IN ITALY— BALKAN SERVICES

READ DOWN



ALL TIMES GMT

TABLE III

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR TRANSPORT SCHEDULE

EFFECTIVE 10 NOVEMBER 1945

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE—APO 744

TABLE II

SCHEDULED AIR MAIL SERVICES UNITED KINGDOM— FRANCE — GERMANY— AUSTRIA

READ UP

FLIGHT NUMBER CARRIER FREQUENCY		351 DLY	353 DLY	380 DLY	352 DLY	382 DLY	318 DLY	320 DLY	322 DLY	324 DLY	362 DLY	424 DLY	426 DLY	302 DLY	330 DLY	340 DLY	344 DLY	334 DLY	338 DLY	330 DLY
LONDON (RUNNYMEDE)	LV						1340	1355	1400	1420								1530		
	AR						1450	1505	1510	1530										
PARIS (VILLACOUBLAY)	LV	0950		1025	1045	1110					1125	1300	1315	1515	1520	1520	1530		1555	1600
	AR													1200						
BREMEN	LV											0850	0905							
	AR		0930																	
BERLIN (TEMPELHOF)	LV		0720	0805	0825	0850					0905							1220		1340
	AR				0755															1255
FRANKFURT (EschborN)	LV															1235				
	AR																			1215
FRITZLAR	LV																			
	AR																1245			
NÜRNBERG	LV	0665			0645															
	AR																		1215	
SALTRUPG (SALBURG A/E)	LV														1225					
	AR																			
MARSEILLES (ISTRES LE TUBE)	LV																			
	AR																			

TABLE III

INFORMATION FLIGHTS INTER THEATRE—LOCAL IN ITALY — BALKAN SERVICES

READ UP

FLIGHT NUMBER CARRIER FREQUENCY		18 ATC DLY	34 MATS DLY	40 MATS DLY	50 MATS DLY	212 ATC DLY	218 ATC DLY	72 MATS DLY	21 MATS DLY	204 ATC DLY
PARIS (ORLY)	LV					1925	2040			2150
	AR					1630	1745			1855
MARSEILLES (MARIGNANE)	LV					1640	1715			1755
	AR									
MARSEILLES (ISTRES)	LV									
	AR	1250								
VIENNA (TULLN)	LV									
	AR		1030							
UDINE (CAMPOFORMIDO)	LV									
	AR				1600					
MILAN (LINATE FORLANINI)	LV				1255					
	AR			1025	1210					
PISA (SAN GIUSTO)	LV		0815	0900	1045	1315	1430			
	AR		0730	0815	1000	1145				
ROME (CIAMPINO)	LV		0630	0715	0900			1015	1405	
	AR								1315	
NAPLES (CAPODICHINO)	LV								1230	
	AR								1140	
FOGGIA (FOGGIA)	LV							0830		1405
	AR									
BARI (BARI A/D)	LV									
	AR									
PALERMO (BOCCA DI FALCO)	LV	1125								
	AR	1055								
BUDAPEST (MATYASFOLD)	LV	0915								
	AR	0845								
BELGRADE (ZEMUN)	LV	0630								
	AR									
BUCHAREST (BANEASA)	LV					0650				
	AR					0620				
ATHENS (ELEUSIS)	LV					0115				
	AR									
CAIRO (PAYNE)	LV									

ALL TIMES GMT

7092

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

A.O.C.S Copy.

EFFECTIVE
10 NOV. 1945

AIR TRANSPORT SCHED

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
APO 744
ISSUE NO. 2

TABLE INDEX

SCHEDULED AIR MAIL SERVICES

STATION (AIRDROME IN PARENTHESIS)	TABLE
BERLIN, GERMANY (TEMPLEHOF)	II
BREMEN, GERMANY	II
FRANKFURT, GERMANY (ESCHBORN)	II
FRITZLAR, GERMANY	II
KITZINGEN, GERMANY	II
LONDON, ENGLAND (BOVINGDON)	II
MARSEILLES, FRANCE (ISTRES LE TUBE)	II
NUREMBURG, GERMANY	II
PARIS, FRANCE (VILLACOUBLAY)	II
SALZBURG, AUSTRIA (SALZBURG A/D)	II
SCHWEINFURT, GERMANY	II

NOTES

1. MATS AND INTER THEATER ATC AND BALKAN SERVICES SHOWN FOR INFORMATION ONLY.
2. SCHEDULED INFORMATION FLIGHTS ARE AIRLINE SERVICES OPERATED BY ATC AND MATS.

SCHEDULED AIRLINE SERVICES

STATION (AIRDROME IN PARENTHESIS)	TABLE
BERLIN, GERMANY (TEMPLEHOF)	I
BREMEN, GERMANY	I
BUCKEBURG, GERMANY	I
FRANKFURT, GERMANY (ESCHBORN)	I
KASSEL, GERMANY (ROTHWESTEN)	I
LINZ, AUSTRIA	I
LONDON, ENGLAND (BOVINGDON)	I
MARSEILLES, FRANCE (ISTRES LE TUBE)	I
MUNICH, GERMANY (REIM)	I
NAMUR, BELGIUM	I
NAPLES, ITALY (CAPODICHINO)	I
NICE, FRANCE	I
NUREMBURG, GERMANY	I
PARIS, FRANCE (VILLACOUBLAY)	I
PILSEN, CZECHOSLOVAKIA	I
REGENSBURG, GERMANY (PRUFENING)	I
ROME, ITALY (CIAMPINO)	I
SALZBURG, AUSTRIA (SALZBURG A/D)	I
VIENNA, AUSTRIA (TULLN)	I
WIESBADEN, GERMANY (ERBENHEIM)	I

NOTES

1. EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE - EATS
2. AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, EUROPEAN DIVISION - ATC
3. MEDITERRANEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE - MATS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TRANSPORT SCHEDULE

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
APO 744

ISSUE NO. 2

CANCELS ALL PREVIOUS ISSUES

TABLE INDEX

SCHEDULED AIRLINE SERVICES

STATION (AIRDROME IN PARENTHESIS)	TABLE
BERLIN, GERMANY (TEMPLEHOF)	I
BREMEN, GERMANY	I
BUCKEBURG, GERMANY	I
FRANKFURT, GERMANY (ESCHBORN)	I
KASSEL, GERMANY (ROTHWESTEN)	I
LINZ, AUSTRIA	I
LONDON, ENGLAND (BOVINGDON)	I
MARSEILLES, FRANCE (ISTRES LE TUBE)	I
MUNICH, GERMANY (REIM)	I
NAMUR, BELGIUM	I
NAPLES, ITALY (CAPODICHINO)	I
NICE, FRANCE	I
NUREMBURG, GERMANY	I
PARIS, FRANCE (VILLACOUBLAY)	I
PILSEN, CZECHOSLOVAKIA	I
REGENSBURG, GERMANY (PRUFENING)	I
ROME, ITALY (CIAMPINO)	I
SALZBURG, AUSTRIA (SALZBURG A/D)	I
VIENNA, AUSTRIA (TULLN)	I
WIESBADEN, GERMANY (ERBENHEIM)	I

NOTES

1. EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE - EATS
2. AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, EUROPEAN DIVISION - ATC
3. MEDITERRANEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE - MATS

SCHEDULED INFORMATION SERVICES

STATION (AIRDROME IN PARENTHESIS)	TABLE
ATHENS, GREECE (ELEUSIS)	III
BARI, ITALY (BARI A/D)	III
BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA (ZEMUN)	III
BUCHAREST, ROUMANIA (BANEASA)	III
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY (MATYASFOLD)	III
CAIRO, EGYPT (PAYNE)	III
FOGGIA, ITALY (FOGGIA A/D)	III
MARSEILLES, FRANCE (ISTRES LE TUBE)	III
MARSEILLES, FRANCE (MARIGNANE)	III
MILAN, ITALY (LINATE FORLANINI)	III
NAPLES, ITALY (CAPODICHINO)	III
PALERMO, SICILY (BOCCA DI FALCO)	III
PARIS, FRANCE (ORLY)	III
PISA, ITALY (SAN GIUSTO)	III
ROME, ITALY (CIAMPINO)	III
UDINE, ITALY (CAMPOFORMIDO)	III
VIENNA, AUSTRIA (TULLN)	III

7093

NOTES

1. ALL TIMES SHOWN ARE GMT.
2. ALL SCHEDULES SUBJECT TO INTERRUPTIONS AND CHANGES WITHOUT NOTICE.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR TRANSPORT SCHE

EFFECTIVE 10 NOVEMBER 1945

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE—AF

SCHEDULED AIRLINE SERVICES: UNITED KINGDOM—WESTERN EURO

READ DOWN

401 BATS DLY	403 BATS DLY	431 BATS DLY	376 BATS DLY	366 BATS DLY	423 BATS DLY	379 BATS DLY	325 BATS DLY	327 BATS DLY	429 BATS DLY	333 BATS DLY	331 BATS DLY	297 BATS DLY	417 BATS DLY	431 BATS DLY	415 BATS DLY	389 BATS DLY	347 BATS DLY	391 BATS DLY	393 BATS DLY	349 BATS DLY	419 BATS DLY	401 BATS DLY	303 BATS DLY	309 BATS DLY	307 BATS DLY	407 BATS DLY	399 BATS DLY	409 BATS DLY	395 BATS DLY	421 BATS DLY	315 BATS DLY	371 BATS DLY	375 BATS DLY	379 BATS DLY	FLIGHT NUMBER CARRIER FREQUENCY	308 BATS DLY	274 BATS DLY	316 BATS DLY	370 BATS DLY
																					0745	0755	0800	0820	0830		0840		0850	0855	0930	0955	1145		1240	AR LONDON (BOVINGDON) LV				
																					0935				1020				1040			1230				PARIS (VILLACOUBLAY)	1225	1045	1145	1330
							0725	0740	0755	0815	0825		0835		0920	0925	0930	0935	0940	0945	1020					1105	1115		1125	1125		1205					NAMUR	1035			
											1030																										WIESBADEN (ERBENHEIM)	0950		0940	0940
								1000 1100				1040 1125		1215	1140 1225	1145 1230	1150	1155 1240	1200 1245	1205			1110 1155		1325		1150 1235					1330	1450	1455	1500	FRANKFURT (ESCHBORN)	0730	0735	0745	0815
			0750	0935	0855 1035	0950																			1205 1235												BUCKEBURG				
				1115	1135				1110 1140				1150 1220																		1215 1245						BREMEN				
			0840 0910	1145	1205																	1130			1435						1415						KASSEL (ROTHWESTEN)				
		0715 1000	1040	1345	1405				1340				1420	1425	1435							1215 1245 1345	1345				1425	1435	1435	1435							BERLIN (TEMPLEHOF)				
						1140						0850				1420		1450	1435																NUREMBURG				
0650	0805																																				MUNICH (RIM)				
0720								1310 1340																													REGENSBURG (PRUFENING)				
0750																																					PILSEN				
0830																																					SALZBURG (SALZBURG A/D)				
0900	0835							1455																													LINZ				
	0905																																				VIENNA (TULLN)				
	0935																																				MARSEILLES (ISTRES LE TUBE)				
	1035																																				NICE				
1015	1050						1010 1055			1100		1525 *																										ROME (CIAMPINO)				
							1330 1400 1500																														NAPLES (CAPODICHINO)				

NOTES
* Via Frankfurt

TABLE I

ALL TIMES SHOWN GMT

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TRANSPORT SCHEDULE

EFFECTIVE 10 NOVEMBER 1945

OPEAN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE—APO 744

AIRLINE SERVICES: UNITED KINGDOM--WESTERN EUROPE — ITALY

READ UP

	FLIGHT NUMBER CARRIER FREQUENCY	308 EATS DLY	374 EATS DLY	316 EATS DLY	370 EATS DLY	372 EATS DLY	304 EATS DLY	406 EATS DLY	408 EATS DLY	392 EATS DLY	310 EATS DLY	394 EATS DLY	416 EATS DLY	414 EATS DLY	398 EATS DLY	418 EATS DLY	420 EATS DLY	400 EATS DLY	432 EATS DLY	388 EATS DLY	328 EATS DLY	390 EATS DLY	326 EATS DLY	396 EATS DLY	422 EATS DLY	430 EATS DLY	378 EATS DLY	334 EATS DLY	332 EATS DLY	428 EATS DLY	348 EATS DLY	350 EATS DLY	367 EATS DLY	377 EATS DLY	404 EATS DLY	402 EATS DLY
LV															1405	1450	1340	1450																	
AR	LONDON (BOVINGDON)	1225	1045	1145	1330		1245				1315	1335				1300												1455	1500	1505	1515	1525				
LV		1035			1140							1145				1215				1400	1415	1435	1430													
AR	PARIS (VILLACOUBLAY)	0950			1055	1140		1035	1025	1230		1100	1320	1305														1255							
LV				0940																															
AR	NAMUR			0910																															
LV																																			
AR	WIESBADEN (ERBENHEIM)																														1250	1305			
LV										1010				1045	1055					1140	1155	1155	1250	1345	1115	1430						1405	1430		
AR	FRANKFURT (ESCHBORN)	0730	0735	0745	0835	0920	0935			0925				1000	1010					1055	1055	1110	1205	1305											
LV							0850																	1135											
AR	BUCKEBURG										0930		1005											1105						1150		1225			
LV											0900		0925											1035						1120		1155			
AR	BREMEN																1020																1340		
LV																	0950							0835	0905					0920			1310		
AR	KASSEL (BOTTMEDTEN)										0700		0735	0750		0805	0820															0955	1140		
LV																		1030	1345																
AR	BERLIN (TEMPLEHOF)																	1000	1100																
LV																		0900		0905		0920					1240							1440	1432
AR	NUREMBURG						0700	0705	0715	0735		0750			0820								** 1440											1410	
LV																																		1340	
AR	MUNICH (REIM)																																	1300	
LV																																		1230	1402
AR	REGENSBURG (PRUFENING)																																		1325
LV																					0815														1305
AR	PILSEN																				0815														1235
LV																																		1115	1150
AR	SALZBURG (SALZBURG A/D)																				0700														
LV																																			
AR	LINZ																																		
LV																							1135					1200								
AR	VIENNA (TULLN)																						1050												
LV																							A	0805											
AR	MARSEILLES (ISTRES LE TUBE)																						0805												
LV																							0735												
AR	NICE																						0835												
LV																																			
AR	ROME (CIAMPINO)																																		
LV																																			
AR	NAPLES (CAPODICHINO)																																		

NOTES
** Via Frankfurt

TABLE I

ALL TIMES SHOWN GMT

been engineered by R.A. personnel and not ignored by Allied personnel. For your information I must tell you that the R.A. personnel have been warned that they are not to approach Allied Officers for their own personal service reasons, and that severe disciplinary action will be taken against any one disregarding this warning.

9. As regards paragraph 18 in connection with the higher policy of retiring high ranking Italian Officers, I agree that it is a matter to be discussed. I am not aware of any of these officers having ever drawn Allied rations either in the past or at present, unless they were not on active service.

10. On the cessation of hostilities with Germany, we gave all aircrew the opportunity to leave the service if they so desired, but no definite scheme can be laid down as referred to in your para 21 until the Peace terms are made known. I will also discuss this subject with you.

11. With regard to LECCE, LEVERANO and FROSINONE dealt with in paras 19, 20, 22, I intend to discuss this verbally with you, as I intend to discuss the question of St. Vito di Taranto and the repair of unserviceable aircraft.

12. I have nothing to add regarding the enquiries you made through W/Cdr CLIFT and LT/COL. CORSINI in the normal function of his duties (para 26.) I must point out, however, that a plan dealing with future policy is also of interest to this H.Q. even in its initial stages, and, therefore, the communication of it or not to the Stato Maggiore depends on its importance and of the possibility of eventually putting it into operation.

13. As regards the Air Academy, we await the decision which you say will be reached in a few days.

Yours affectionately,

(SGD) M. AIMONE CAT,
Chief of Air Staff.

7090

D.D
S.S.O
C.T.O.
W/Cdr Rogers WER 21/8.
S.T.O

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

670

Roma li, 12 AGO 1945

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

PERSONALE CONFIDENZIALE

Prot. 0118141 /Sg.U - 4510 Rott.

AIR VICE MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE
Air Officier Commanding.
A.F.S.C./ A.C. - R O M A

Caro Maresciallo Brodie,

rispondo alla Sua lettera AFSC/46/AIR del 24 luglio c.a., trovata al ritorno della mia seconda ispezione agli Enti e Comandi dell'Italia Settentrionale.

2. Desidero innanzi tutto ringraziarLa per i chiarimenti e le assicurazioni che ha voluto darmi. Limito anche io e ben volentieri gli argomenti di questa risposta allo stretto indispensabile, in attesa di trattare a voce gli altri che possono avere un effettivo interesse per noi, nei riguardi dell'avvenire.

3. Circa i numeri 3-4-5 della Sua lettera devo confermarLe che non era affatto nelle mie intenzioni di criticare il Suo intervento presso la Base di Lecce. Io desideravo soltanto informarLa con la più assoluta ed obiettiva franchezza delle ripercussioni che mi erano pervenute tramite le brevi relazioni di ufficio con le quali mi si informava della sua visita e delle questioni da Lei trattate. Evidentemente il personale aveva scambiato la Sua esposizione programmatica per disposizioni esecutive, determinando l'equivoco che io ho pur dovuto raccogliere e trasmettere per Sua conoscenza.

7088

L'episodio ha avuto, se non altro, l'utilità di farLe con-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Prot. 011841/Sg.U - 4510 Ris.

AIR VICE MARSHAL I.E. TRODLE
Air Officier Commanding.
A.F.S.C./ A.C. - ROMA

Caro Maresciallo Brodie,

rispondo alla Sua lettera AFSC/46/AIR del 24 luglio c.a., trovata al ritorno della mia seconda ispezione agli Enti e Comandi dell'Italia Settentrionale.

2. Desidero innanzi tutto ringraziarLa per i chiarimenti e le assicurazioni che ha voluto darmi. Limito anche io e ben volentieri gli argomenti di questa risposta allo stretto indispensabile, in attesa di trattare a voce gli altri che possono avere un effettivo interesse per noi, nei riguardi dell'avvenire.

3. Circa i numeri 3-4-5 della Sua lettera devo confermarLe che non era affatto nelle mie intenzioni di criticare il Suo intervento presso la Base di Lecce. Io desideravo soltanto informarLa con la più assoluta ed obiettiva franchezza delle ripercussioni che mi erano pervenute tramite le brevi relazioni di ufficio con le quali mi si informava della sua visita e delle questioni da Lei trattate. Evidentemente il personale aveva scambiato la Sua esposizione programmatica per disposizioni esecutive, determinando l'equivoco che io ho pur dovuto raccogliere e trasmettere per Sua conoscenza.

L'episodio ha avuto, se non altro, l'utilità di farLe constatare l'attuale stato d'animo del nostro personale che rivela, talvolta, notevole e forse anche eccessiva sensibilità.

7088

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

4. Analogamente, circa il n° 25, sono lieto di constatare, tramite il Suo giudizio e le precisazioni dello stesso W./C. Gladstone, che le notizie pervenutemi non rispondevano alla opera ed alla condotta di questo Ufficiale. Le sarei quindi particolarmente grato se Lei volesse dare atto di questo mio doveroso riconoscimento al W.C.Gladstone.

Devo tuttavia modificare una nozione tecnica del W.C.Gladstone circa il centraggio dell' S. 79. Con i motori Alfa 128, l'apparecchio non è pesante in coda, bensì in prua, tanto vero che gli aerei meglio regolati e più equilibrati in volo, portano sovente un peso aggiuntivo di un quintale, in coda. Prego credere che questa mia osservazione tecnica vuole essere del tutto cordiale ed amichevole.

5. Circa il n° 6, La ringrazio per la comprensione delle nostre difficoltà e per la conseguente Sua offerta di aiuto che conto di utilizzare nel corso delle nostre prossime conversazioni.

7087

6. Circa i numeri 7-8-9-10-11, devo informarLa che il Corso addestramento per il controllo di volo è in atto. Ne constaterò andamento e risultati in occasione della mia prossima visita a Lecce. Conto di chiarire a voce, meglio di quanto sia possibile per iscritto, il nostro pensiero relativo al controllo esercitato all'AFSC ed alle modalità della sua applicazione.

7. I problemi del personale di cui ai numeri 12-13-14-15 e 16,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

tramite il Suo giudizio e le precisazioni dello stesso W./C. Gladstone, che le notizie pervenutemi non rispondevano alla opera ed alla condotta di questo Ufficiale. Le sarei quindi particolarmente grato se Lei volesse dare atto di questo mio doveroso riconoscimento al W.C.Gladstone.

Devo tuttavia modificare una nozione tecnica del W.C.Gladstone circa il centraggio dell' S. 79. Con i motori Alfa 128, l'apparecchio non è pesante in coda, bensì in prua, tanto vero che gli aerei meglio regolati e più equilibrati in volo, portano sovente un peso aggiuntivo di un quintale, in coda. Prego credere che questa mia osservazione tecnica vuole essere del tutto cordiale ed amichevole.

5. Circa il n° 6, La ringrazio per la comprensione delle nostre difficoltà e per la conseguente Sua offerta di aiuto che conto di utilizzare nel corso delle nostre prossime conversazioni.

7087

6. Circa i numeri 7-8-9-10-11, devo informarLa che il Corso addestramento per il controllo di volo è in atto. Ne constaterò andamento e risultati in occasione della mia prossima visita a Lecce. Conto di chiarire a voce, meglio di quanto sia possibile per iscritto, il nostro pensiero relative al controllo esercitato all'AFSC ed alle modalità della sua applicazione.

7. I problemi del personale di cui ai numeri 12-13-14-15 e 16, sono già stati risolti nel senso da Lei desiderato, per quanto riguarda il Capitano Zegrini, il Maggiore Scottu ed il Capitano Ruggero.

Circa i due Comandanti di cui ai numeri 12-16 permane la necessità del loro avvicendamento appena possibile. Tale possi-

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

bilità è riferita alla disponibilità di Ufficiali adatti al compito, nella situazione particolarmente delicata in relazione agli eventi trascorsi, alle condizioni presenti ed alla evenienze prossime. Sono del parere che sia meglio attendere anzichè porsi in condizioni di sconfessare la propria opera con movimenti troppo frequenti, incomprensibili e perturbatori per l'andamento dei Rè parti. Chiarirò meglio a voce questa situazione.

Naturalmente, e come già nel passato, questi movimenti non verranno ordinati senza il Suo benestare, come stabilito dalle condizioni di armistizio.

8. Circa il n° 17, prendo atto molto volentieri della Sua dichiarazione. L'esperienza aveva rivelato interferenze inopportune, indubbiamente sollecitate dal personale della R.A. ma non respinte dal personale Alleato. Per Sua conoscenza La informo che il personale della R.A. è stato diffidato, con la prospettiva di incorrere in severe sanzioni, dal richiedere l'intervento di Ufficiali Alleati per la risoluzione delle proprie vicende personali di servizio.

9. Circa il n° 18 relativo al collocamento in congedo di Ufficiali Italiani di grado elevato, aderisco volentieri alla Sua proposta di discuterne insieme per edurla nel miglior modo sulla situazione e sul carattere dei provvedimenti che dovranno essere presi al momento opportuno, ma che non possono essere immediatamente applicati per le ragioni che Le esporrò. Per quanto concerne il rientro delle nazioni alleate, da parte di questi Ufficiali, non mi

7085

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

pito, nella situazione particolarmente delicata in relazione agli eventi trascorsi, alle condizioni presenti ed alle evenienze prossime. Sono del parere che sia meglio attendere anzichè porsi in condizioni di sconfessare la propria opera con movimenti troppo frequenti, incomprensibili e perturbatori per l'andamento dei Ré parti. Chiarirò meglio a voce questa situazione.

Naturalmente, e come già nel passato, questi movimenti non verranno ordinati senza il Suo benestare, come stabilito dalle condizioni di armistizio.

8. Circa il n° 17, prendo atto molto volentieri della Sua dichiarazione. L'esperienza aveva rivelato interferenze inopportune, indubbiamente sollecitate dal personale della R.A. ma non respinte dal personale Alleato. Per Sua conoscenza La informo che il personale della R.A. è stato diffidato, con la prospettive di incorrere in severe sanzioni, dal richiedere l'intervento di Ufficiali Alleati per la risoluzione delle proprie vicende personali di servizio.

7085

9. Circa il n° 18 relativo al collocamento in congedo di Ufficiali Italiani di grado elevato, aderisco volentieri alla Sua proposta di discuterne insieme per edurla nel miglior modo sulla situazione e sul carattere dei provvedimenti che dovranno essere presi al momento opportuno, ma che non possono essere immediatamente applicati per le ragioni che Le esporrò. Per quanto concerne il ritiro delle razioni alleate, da parte di questi Ufficiali, non mi risulta che alcuno di loro abbia ritirato e ritiri la razione se non è effettivamente impiegato.

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10. Alla fine delle ostilità con la Germania è stato subito applicato il criterio di inviare in congedo tutto il personale di volo che ne ha fatto domanda, come è detto nel suo nº 21. Ma lo schema definitivo per la razionale soluzione di questo problema non potrà essere applicato che sulla base dei nuovi ordinamenti dell'Arma che potranno essere a loro volta concretati, quando si avranno notizie precise e definitive circa i termini imposti dal trattato di pace.

Sono in corso studi al riguardo; ma tali studi non potranno essere ultimati se non quando saranno risolte con apposita Legge dello Stato, comune a tutte le Forze Armate, le questioni relative allo stato giuridico ed amministrativo degli estromessi per cause di forza maggiore. Le parlerò anche di questo argomento.

11. Per le questioni di Lecce, Leverano e Frosinone, di cui ai numeri 19-20-22 mi riservo di trattarne verbalmente come da Lei proposto. 7083

Analogamente, per gli argomenti di cui ai numeri 23 e 24 circa S.Vito di Taranto e la riparazione degli aerei inefficienti, Le prospetterò il nostro punto di vista.

12. Non ho nulla da replicare circa le notizie da Lei chieste al W.C. Clift in accordo con il Ten.Col.Corsini, per naturale esercizio delle sue attribuzioni. (nº26). Devo rilevare soltanto che gli studi a carattere programmatico interessano anche lo Stato Maggiore, fino dalla loro impostazione iniziale e che, per conseguenza, il comunicarlo o meno allo Stato Maggiore dipende dalla impor-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10. Alla fine della [illegible] plicato il criterio di inviare in congedo tutto il personale di volo che ne ha fatto domanda, come è detto nel suo n° 21. Ma lo schema definitivo per la razionale soluzione di questo problema non potrà essere applicato che sulla base dei nuovi ordinamenti dell'Arma che potranno essere a loro volta concretati, quando si avranno notizie precise e definitive circa i termini imposti dal trattato di pace.

Sono in corso studi al riguardo; ma tali studi non potranno essere ultimati se non quando saranno risolte con apposita Legge dello Stato, comune a tutte le Forze Armate, le questioni relative allo stato giuridico ed amministrativo degli estromessi per cause di forza maggiore. Le parlerò anche di questo argomento.

7083

11. Per le questioni di Lecce, Leverano e Frosinone, di cui ai numeri 19-20-22 mi riservo di trattarne verbalmente come da Lei proposto.

Analogamente, per gli argomenti di cui ai numeri 23 e 24 circa S.Vito di Taranto e la riparazione degli aerei inefficienti, Le prospetterò il nostro punto di vista.

12. Non ho nulla da replicare circa le notizie da Lei chieste al W.C. Clift in accordo con il Ten.Col.Corsini, per naturale esercizio delle sue attribuzioni. (n°26). Devo rilevare soltanto che gli studi a carattere programmatico interessano anche lo Stato Maggiore, fino dalla loro impostazione iniziale e che, per conseguenza, il comunicarlo o meno allo Stato Maggiore dipende dalla importanza e dalla eventuale possibilità di applicazione dello studio stesso.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

3. Per l'Accademia Aeronautica restiamo in attesa della ulti
ma definitiva notizia, da Lei annunciata per i prossimi giorni.

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
Generale di Squadra Aerea
(Mario AIMONE-CAT)

Suo affmo

7082

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CTF TO AIR FORCES S/C /a 4/Jan/45 66A

CONFIDENTIAL

31 July 1945

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

TO : Commander-in-Chief, RAF Med Me,
CG, AAF/MTO

1. With the dissolution of MAAF as an Allied Headquarters, the existing directive to Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet, Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (AG 334/111 IS&PS-O dated 6 March 1945) has become out of date.

2. It is desired that RAF MedMe and AAF/MTO jointly, and in consultation with Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, draft a revised directive to the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

3. In addition to outlining the functions and responsibilities of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, the directive will set forth clearly the procedures, channels of communication and such other items as are considered necessary for the efficient operation and smooth functioning of the Air Forces Sub-Commission as an agency of the Allied Commission and of Allied Force Headquarters.

4. The revised directive will then be submitted through this office to the Supreme Allied Commander for his approval.

(signed) L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Major General, G.S.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff

7089

Copy to:
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission.

E772 5/8/45

#6/HIR

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

65A (4)

T R A N S L A T I O N

From : Ministero dell'Aeronautica
Il Capo Gabinetto

To : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Erodie Air Officer Commanding
A.F.S.C. R O M E

Date : 26th July 1945

Ref : 22316/4165 Coll.

624

Dear,

On behalf of the Minister, who is indisposed, I acknowledge your AFSC/46 Air dated 21st July.

The Minister has asked me to assure you that he is studying the problem and will answer as soon as the C.A.S., now on a round of inspection in Northern Italy, will return to Rome.

Yours

Col. Mario Porru

7078

E601 31/7/45

46/AIR

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

65A

MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO

22316 / 1165 Segr.

Roma, lì 26 luglio 1945

Signor Maresciallo,

per incarico del Signor Ministro, attualmente indisposto, Le accuso ricevuta del foglio n.AFSC/46AIR, in data 21 corrente.

Il Signor Ministro mi incarica di assicurarLe che ha messo allo studio il problema prostettatogli e Le risponderà dopo che il Capo di Stato Maggiore, ora in giro di ispezione nell'Italia Settentrionale, sarà rientrato a Roma.

Voglia gradire l'espressione del mio ossequio devoto

Ten. Col. Mario Borra

AIR VICE-MARSHAL
I.E. BRODIE
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING
A F S C = R O M A =

7077

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

64A (L)

TRANSLATION.

FROM : I.A.F. "STATO MAGGIORE", Secreteriel Office, Rome.

TO : A.F.S.C., A.C., Rome.

DATE : 24th July 1945

REF. : 011704/Sg.U./4148 COLL.

63A 56A

AERONAUTICA GENERAL COMMAND FOR THE NORTH OF ITALY.

With reference to your AFSC/46/AIR dated 19th July 1945 and further to our letter 011520/Sg.U./329 dated 8th July 1945, I agree with you that it is at present unwise to change the designation of Generale AIR I's Command and leaving the word "GENERALE".

Furthermore this Command (Gen. Piffi's), which is of a temporary nature, will be disbanded when it's formation will no longer be required. An eventual modification at the present time, would no doubt cause arbitrary supositions which are to be avoided due to the situation.

CHIEF OF STAFF
(Gen. AIROLDI-CAT)

Translated by Sgt. Cumbo.

707

644

STATO MAGGIORE R. AERONAUTICA

Segreteria — Roma, li 24 LUG 1945 — 194

Prot. N. 011704 / Sg.U/4148 Rott. — Allegati — Risposta al foglio N. — del

OGGETTO: Comando Generale Aeronautica Alta Italia.-

All'A.F.S.C. - A.C. = R O M A =
(tramite ufficio di Collegamento)

Con riferimento alla nostra lettera 011520/Sg.U/3290 dell'8 Luglio ed in risposta alla vostra AFSC/46/AIR del 19 Luglio 1945 sono d'accordo con voi sull'attuale inopportunità di modificare la designazione del Comando retto dal Generale BIFFI lasciando anche la parola "Generale".-

Tanto più che questo Comando a carattere temporaneo, dovrà essere sciolto quando cesseranno le ragioni che ne hanno consigliato l'istituzione ed una eventuale modifica, in questo momento, darebbe luogo a supposizioni arbitrarie che la situazione sconsiglia di provocare.-

7074

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
Generale di Squadra Aerea
(Mario AJMONE-CAT)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

63A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY.

DATE: 19TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

56A

With reference to your letter 011520/3g.U/3290 of the 6th July, I spoke with GENERAL BIFFI on the 14th July concerning the nomenclature which he should adopt. We agreed that it would be unwise now to change his designation, and in any event it appears, after this passage of time, to be of little consequence. I asked GENERAL BIFFI to consult you about this.

2. I suggest that we take no further action on this unless you wish merely to cut out the word "Generale", to which we would have no objection.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

7U72

file

629

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/46/AIR. 21st July, 1945.

Dear

UNITÀ AEREA.

With the cessation of hostilities and the redeployment of Italian Air Force Units then under the operational control of Balkan Air Force, Unità Aerea is now considered to be redundant.

2. I therefore have to request that you will give instructions for Unità Aerea to be disbanded at an early date.

3. I would like to be informed of your proposals for the redisposition of the functions carried out by Unità Aerea, for example, as between your Air Ministry and 4th Z.A.T. I would also like to be informed of the resulting reassignment of all the Senior Officers down to, and including Lieutenant Colonel now in Unità Aerea.

4. In order that the most amicable arrangements may be made I suggest that before taking executive action you will forward me a brief plan as a basis for a subsequent discussion with you.

5. (i) I wish to inform you that I have now withdrawn all A.F.S.C. Staff Officers from BARI, except an Equipment Staff Officer whose duty it will be to help and supervise equipment matters in 4th Z.A.T, particularly in connection with MONTVARCA.

(ii) GROUP CAPTAIN GILLASON will be my senior representative in the 4th Z.A.T. area, and I propose to empower him to deal with 4th Z.A.T. on minor matters which can be settled amicably without causing the delay necessary in referring every matter to the Italian Air Ministry and to myself.

(iii) Similarly WING COMMANDER CLIFT, who is my representative at TARANTO, will continue to assist the Seaplane Wing as before, and any matters arising in the Seaplane Wing which needs Allied laision with 4th Z.A.T, will be dealt with by him.

7071

Yours

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

UNITÀ AEREA.

With the cessation of hostilities and the redeployment of Italian Air Force Units then under the operational control of Balkan Air Force, Unità Aerea is now considered to be redundant.

2. I therefore have to request that you will give instructions for Unità Aerea to be disbanded at an early date.

3. I would like to be informed of your proposals for the redisposition of the functions carried out by Unità Aerea, for example, as between your Air Ministry and 4th Z.A.T. I would also like to be informed of the resulting reassignment of all the Senior Officers down to, and including Lieutenant Colonel now in Unità Aerea.

4. In order that the most amicable arrangements may be made I suggest that before taking executive action you will forward me a brief plan as a basis for a subsequent discussion with you.

5. (i) I wish to inform you that I have now withdrawn all A.F.S.C. Staff Officers from BARI, except an Equipment Staff Officer whose duty it will be to help and supervise equipment matters in 4th Z.A.T, particularly in connection with MINERVA/CA.

(ii) GROUP CAPTAIN OLLASON will be my senior representative in the 4th Z.A.T. area, and I propose to empower him to deal with 4th Z.A.T. on minor matters which can be settled amicably, without causing the delay necessary in referring every matter to the Italian Air Ministry and to myself.

(iii) Similarly WING COMMANDER CLIFT, who is my representative at TARANTO, will continue to assist the Seaplane Wing as before, and any matters arising in the Seaplane Wing which needs Allied laision with 4th Z.A.T, will be dealt with by him.

7071

Sunday SSO.
Para 6 SEO form 50
D.T.O. just filed 29/4.
S.J.O. [illegible]
[illegible]
D D 26/7

Yours

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Copy to G/C Ollason – para 5 (ii) action.
" " Wing Cdr Clift – para 5 (iii) action.

Doctor M. Cevelotto,
Minister for Air,
Italian Air Ministry,
ROME.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

61A

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/46/AIR. PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL.

24th July, 1945.

Dear 54A

I am replying to your letter 011532/Sg.U/3835/Coll of the 8th July 1945 which concerns many matters arising out of my report to you on my visit to LECCE a little while ago. The translation of your letter came to my notice on my return from the North some days after our last conversation.

2. I do not propose to answer your letter in much detail except where major policy is affected, or actual action is contemplated, as I think that most of these things are best discussed rather than written in order that misunderstandings be avoided.

3. It seems that my action at LECCE and my letter to you has, in fact, caused some unfortunate misapprehension and 'pique': this I would like to clear up. Possibly the polite and consultative terms in which my letter was written, may have lost some of its meaning in translation, particularaly my first paragraph.

4. When I arrived at LECCE and interrogated A.F.S.C. representatives concerning certain action which I expected would have been taken, I found that very little progress was being made. In order to find out the reasons, I decided to interview the various people concerned with the Station Commandant, who however, I found was not at LECCE. I therefore spontaneously, as distinct from premeditatedly, asked for a conference of all the Unit and Section Commanders to be called so that I could have an exploratory discussion to find out what the difficulties were. At the meeting I expressly avoided giving any instructions to the people on the spot (although it is in my terms of reference to do so if necessary,) because it is, and has Ber some time, been my intention to show as many people as possible that the Italian Air Ministry itself controls the Italian Air Force. 7079

5. During these discussions I gave some advanced information as to probable moves etc in order that the people at LECCE could best anticipate and arrange accommodation for Units already at LECCE. For example it may have seemed to you that I "instructed" that the school at LEVERANO was to move to LECCE on a certain date. These dates were "tentatively" agreed to suit the Cadets coming out of the Italian Air Force Academy. On my return, however, I found that certain factors had changed, and therefore no such definite orders were given.

6. I appreciate that you have delicate difficulties and I hope you will tell me if and how we can help.

7. You mention that recently there appears to have been more control of Italian Air Force by the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Whether or not this is in fact the case is perhaps contraversial - it rather depends on what you mean by

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I am replying to your letter [illegible]/Eng.U/3695/Cdr of the 2nd July 1945 which concerns many matters arising out of my report to you on my visit to LECCE a little while ago. The translation of your letter came to my notice on my return from the North some days after our last conversation.

2. I do not propose to answer your letter in much detail except where major policy is affected, or actual action is contemplated, as I think that most of these things are best discussed rather than written in order that misunderstandings be avoided.

3. It seems that my action at LECCE and my letter to you has, in fact, caused some unfortunate misapprehension and 'pique': this I would like to clear up. Possibly the polite and consultative terms in which my letter was written, may have lost some of its meaning in translation, particularly my first paragraph.

4. When I arrived at LECCE and interrogated A.F.S.C. representatives concerning certain action which I expected would have been taken, I found that very little progress was being made. In order to find out the reasons, I decided to interview the various people concerned with the Station Commandant, who however, I found was not at LECCE. I therefore spontaneously, as distinct from premeditatedly, asked for a conference of all the Unit and Section Commanders to be called so that I could have an exploratory discussion to find out what the difficulties were. At the meeting I expressly avoided giving any instructions to the people on the spot (although it is in my terms of reference to do so if necessary,) because it is, and has for some time, been my intention to show as many people as possible that the Italian Air Ministry itself controls the Italian Air Force.

7079

5. During these discussions I gave some advanced information as to probable moves etc in order that the people at LECCE could best anticipate and arrange accommodation for Units already at LECCE. For example it may have seemed to you that I "instructed" that the school at DEVEPANO was to move to LECCE on a certain date. These dates were "tentatively" agreed to suit the Cadets coming out of the Italian Air Force Academy. On my return, however, I found that certain factors had changed, and therefore no such definite orders were given.

6. I appreciate that you have delicate difficulties and I hope you will tell me if and how we can help.

7. You mention that recently there appears to have been more control of Italian Air Force by the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Whether or not this is in fact the case is perhaps controversial - it rather depends on what you mean by "control". So far as the Fighter squadrons and Baltimore Squadrons are concerned, there is, of course, a good deal less control than during the days when those units were operating under a Royal Air Force organisation. As regards No.2 Squadron, CENTOCELLE, control has undoubtedly increased because previously its job was comparatively unimportant, but now that they are carrying a large number of British and American personnel, it is my duty to ensure that everything possible shall be done to ensure the utmost safety in flying and efficiency, and in this respect I do not forget the Italians who travel by these Courier Services to the South as well as the North. Consequently I have suggested to you, and I think you have readily agreed, to begin training courses such as Flying Control etc. In many other ways too, it may appear that we have controlled the I.A.F. more, because we have made a number of suggestions for improving efficiency and standards in the Italian Air Force, in all of which you have expressed agreement. Also with the liberation of the North, a number of directives and instructions

Continued/2.....

0427

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

have had to be issued. Again the change in conditions since the 3rd May 1945 has necessitated the redeployment of the Italian Air Force and other means of employing it to the best advantage and with most economy in Petrol and Oil. Therefore the A.F.S.C. has had to ask you to do a good many more things than would otherwise have been the case.

3. On the whole I do not think that the A.F.S.C. has unnecessarily controlled the Italian Air Force, and indeed I consider that it has done everything in its power to assist the Italian Air Force in these difficult times.

9. I should perhaps take this opportunity of saying that it is still the duty of the A.F.S.C. to supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that its standard of efficiency is at least maintained, and to ensure that Allied policy and instructions are carried out.

10. Therefore I propose to continue to inform you of my observations and make suggestions as a result of our visits to your Units. As regards my report on LECCE for example, I did have hard things to say but I think that you will agree most most of them were justified. I hoped that you would have noticed that although in some cases my criticisms were severe, they were constructive as distinct from destructive. In any event, I must admit that I am not accustomed to the apparent procrastination which was going on in respect of the Italian Air Force at LECCE, but which I am glad to say appears now to have ceased.

11. It has been reported by my representatives at LECCE that things are now moving there, probably as the result of your instructions which you kindly mentioned in your letter to me.

12. On reconsideration I think that I may have been a little unjust with COLONEL LEONE in my criticism of him because it now appears to me that he lacked a lead from higher Italian authorities, and therefore I shall be content if you wish to leave him in command at LECCE. I understand that COLONEL LEONE had a commendably good operational record. 7069

13. As regards the changes which I suggested in my letter to you, I hope you will read my original letter again and carefully note the wording which I used in respect of the personnel movements stated. In each case I gave my opinion (and that of my Staff) concerning certain individuals, and I said that "it is for your consideration etc". I think, therefore, you can have no complaint that I did not "consult you" as this in itself was in the form of consultation rather than "instructions" to remove certain officers and replace them with certain others. It is, of course, the function of the Italian Air Ministry to appoint officers to fill vacancies, and in the case of Senior Officers down to and including LT/COLs, it is still the function of this Sub-Commission only to approve or disapprove. With the exception of a few changes which you wished to make in SARDINIA, and which I was unable to allow at the time, I can remember no occasion on which we have gone against your wishes.

14. As regards the other individuals mentioned in our letters, it was suggested that CAPTAIN ZEGRINI should be "appointed" the Officer in charge of Flying Control as the Lieutenant appointed, probably by UNITA AEREA, knew little about Flying Control, but there was no suggestion that he should be "promoted". I understand that COLONEL LEONE agrees that CAPTAIN ZEGRINI should be appointed as I suggested, but I repeat that this change is for you

0428

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10. Therefore I propose to continue to inform you of my observations and make suggestions as a result of our visits to your Units. As regards my report on LECCE for example, I did have hard things to say but I think that you will agree that most of them were justified. I hoped that you would have noticed that although in some cases my criticisms were severe, they were constructive as distinct from destructive. In any event, I must admit that I am not accustomed to the apparent procrastination which was goingon in respect of the Italian Air Force at LECCE, but which I am glad to say appears now to have ceased.

11. It has been reported by my representatives at LECCE that things are now moving there, probably as the result of your instructions which you kindly mentioned in your letter to me.

12. On reconsideration I think that I may have been a little unjust with COLONEL LEONE in my criticism of him because it now appears to me that he lacked a lead from higher Italian authorities, and therefore I shall be content if you wish to leave him in command at LECCE. I understand that COLONEL LEONE had a commendably good operational record.

7069

13. As regards the changes which I suggested in my letter to you, I hope you will read my original letter again and carefully note the wording which I used in respect of the personnel movements stated. In each case I gave my opinion (and that of my Staff) concerning certain individuals, and I said that "it is for your consideration etc". I think, therefore, you can have no complaint that I did not "consult you" as this in itself was in the form of consultation rather than "instructions" to remove certain officers and replace them with certain others. It is, of course, the function of the Italian Air Ministry to appoint officers to fill vacancies, and in the case of Senior Officers down to and including LT/COLs, it is still the function of this Sub-Commission only to approve or disapprove. With the exception of a few changes which you wished to make in SARDINIA, and which I was unable to allow at the time, I can remember no occasion on which we have gone against your wishes.

14. As regards the other individuals mentioned in our letters, it was suggested that CAPTAIN ZECRINI should be "appointed" the Officer in charge of Flying Control as the Lieutenant appointed, probably by UNITA AEREA, knew little about Flying Control, but there was no suggestion that he should be "promoted". I understand that COLONEL LEONE agrees that CAPTAIN ZECRINI should be appointed as I suggested, but I repeat that this change is for you to decide.

15. As regards MAJOR SCOTTO, my Staff are still of the opinion that he has little initiative and tends to dislike changes, but whether or not he be replaced, by CAPTAIN ROGGERO or some other Officer is for you to decide.

16. Similarly whether the C.O. of the Fighter Storms shall be replaced is for you to decide, but I would like to know with whom you propose to replace him if you do intend to replace him. I appreciate your information concerning the person I suggested as a possible substitute.

17. One more thing about my criticism of certain Officers at LECCE. I wish to state categorically that no Italian Officer was consulted; obviously that course of action on our part would have been contrary to correct procedure and good discipline.

Continued/3.....

0429

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

13. As regards the higher policy of retiring High Ranking Italian Officers, I propose to write a separate letter asking you to retire a number of Generals and Colonels as a large number have not been employed since the Armistice, and it would appear that a large number never will; meantime these Officers are drawing Allied rations. But before writing to you on this subject officially, I would like to discuss the matter with you.

19. There seems to have been a complete misunderstanding concerning work to be done on the airfield at LECCE. At no time have I ever contemplated, and I have certainly never suggested, that a new "runway" shall be constructed at LECCE, and I would myself be averse to this unnecessary expenditure of Italian Air Force funds. What I suggested should be done was that a part of the grass surface of the airfield should be levelled off so that light aeroplanes could land more-or-less into the wind if the wind were strong and not along the existing "runway". I understand that this work is now in hand and will not incur much expenditure.

20. As regards the move of the Flying Refresher School now at LEVERANO, I am still of the opinion that it should go to LECCE rather than elsewhere such as SAN PANCRAZIO. If for no other reason than to permit of flying after heavy rain, it seems to me that this School should anyway be moved before the winter sets in. Furthermore by closing down LEVERANO a large piece of land could be transferred to agriculture which is, I believe, a matter of high concern to the Italian Government. I do not think the suggestion to send a small Unit to SAN PANCRAZIO a good one, even if we could obtain permission for you to occupy that airfield, as it would be uneconomical in respect of overhead expense and personnel and, if not required by the Allies, SAN PANCRAZIO could otherwise also be turned back to agriculture; this, however, cannot yet be done as SAN PANCRAZIO has not yet been derequisitioned, and incidentally nor has LECCE.

21. As regards the release or retirement of a certain number of aircrews (including pilots,) I would like to speak with you, but meantime there would appear to be no reason, so far as the Allies are concerned, why a limited number of aircrews should not be released if they volunteer. I agree with you that it would be imprudent to order a large number of aircrews to be retired at this moment, but if would, no doubt, take some time to formulate the conditions under which they should be retired, and therefore I think it might perhaps be a good thing to make a plan in case, at a later date, it may be necessary at short notice to retire a fairly large number of aircrews.

7068

22. With regard to the O.T.U. at FROSINONE, I think it would be advisable for this School to be moved before the winter rains set in, but at the moment I propose not to advise any particular action and to leave the place much as it is now. I would, however, like to discuss with you the advisability of continuing with this School after say September, and if so with what type aircraft it should be equipped and where it should move to, so that the O.T.U. would have the advantage of a hard runway.

23. As regards the S.R.A.M. at ST. VITO DI TARANTO, I am now informed that the British Navy no longer requires the hangar, and therefore it would be available to you. If may, however, be necessary for you to arrange its disposal with the Italian Ministry of Marine. I suggest that the hangar accommodation could be used for housing the pool of P.39s or other serviceable aircraft which are not, or will not, be in immediate use. It has been suggested that an Aircraft Holding Unit might be beneficial so that you will have a reserve of aircraft from which to draw to replace wastage, in any [illegible]

0430

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

surface of the airfield should be [illegible] more-or-less into the wind if the wind were strong and not along the existing "runway". I understand that this work is now in hand and will not incur much expenditure.

20. As regards the move of the Flying Refresher School now at LEVERANO, I am still of the opinion that it should go to LECCE rather than elsewhere such as SAN PANCRAZIO. If for no other reason than to permit of flying after heavy rain, it seems to me that this School should anyway be moved before the winter sets in. Furthermore by closing down LEVERANO a large piece of land could be transferred to agriculture which is, I believe, a matter of high concern to the Italian Government. I do not think the suggestion to send a small Unit to SAN PANCRAZIO a good one, even if we could obtain permission for you to occupy that airfield, as it would be uneconomical in respect of overhead expense and personnel and, if not required by the Allies, SAN PANCRAZIO could otherwise also be turned back to agriculture; this, however, cannot yet be done as SAN PANCRAZIO has not yet been derequisitioned, and incidentally nor has LECCE.

21. As regards the release or retirement of a certain number of aircrews (including pilots,) I would like to speak with you, but meantime there would appear to be no reason, so far as the Allies are concerned, why a limited number of aircrews should not be released if they volunteer. I agree with you that it would be imprudent to order a large number of aircrews to be retired at this moment, but if would, no doubt, take some time to formulate the conditions under which they should be retired, and therefore I think it might perhaps be a good thing to make a plan in case, at a later date, it may be necessary at short notice to retire a fairly large number of aircrews.

7068

22. With regard to the O.T.U. at FROSINONE, I think it would be advisable for this School to be moved before the winter rains set in, but at the moment I propose not to advise any particular action and to leave the place much as it is now. I would, however, like to discuss with you the advisability of continuing with this School after say September, and if so with what type aircraft it should be equipped and where it should move to, so that the O.T.U. would have the advantage of a hard runway.

23. As regards the S.R.A.M. at ST. VITO DI TARANTO, I am now informed that the British Navy no longer requires the hangar, and therefore it would be available to you. If may, however, be necessary for you to arrange its disposal with the Italian Ministry of Marine. I suggest that the hangar accommodation could be used for housing the pool of P.39s or other serviceable aircraft which are not, or will not, be in immediate use. It has been suggested that an Aircraft Holding Unit might be beneficial so that you will have a reserve of aircraft from which to draw to replace wastage, in say two or three month's time. The P.39s would be stored, presumably, with their wings off so as to occupy less space. I would like to discuss this matter with you so that amicable preparations can be made.

24. As regards the matter of your being allowed to retain a number of unserviceable aeroplanes requiring many man-hours to repair you may like to discuss the matter. The position as I see it is that they are to be stored without maintenance, and so far as possible at LECCE; this is in accord with the original instructions, and I may add, was the major factor on which I obtained for you a reversal of the original instruction that all these aircraft were to be broken down. There can, therefore, be no question of taking these aircraft in for repair, in addition to which it is, at present, the policy not to allow the Italian Air Force a larger number of aircraft or personnel than there were in the I.A.F. on the 3rd May, 1945.

Continued/4.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

25. As regards your references to certain actions taken by WING COMMANDER GLADSTONE, I attach his remarks at Appendix "A" to this letter. It would appear to me that you have been partially misinformed, and I consider that his actions have been correct.

26. As regards the paragraph concerning certain action taken between LT/COL. CORSINI and WING COMMANDER CLIFT, I am not sure to what you refer. I think that it is to do with tentative enquiries on my behalf in respect of a certain plan which has not yet been decided upon. If I am correct, I can see no objection to WING COMMANDER CLIFT obtaining for me some information which I required. It is part of the function of the Staff Officers of the Air Forces Sub-Commission who are at such places as TARANTO, LECCE etc, to make enquiries which I may want from time to time.

27. As regards the Air Academy, I have made further enquiries but I regret that no decision can yet be reached by higher authority.

Believe me, dear General, to be

Yours ever,

General M. Aimone Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

7066

Pass to D/D
SSO
PTO.
SHO.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

APPENDIX "A".

COMMENTS BY WING COMMANDER GLADSTONE ON I.A.M. LETTER
014532/Sg.U/3835/Coll dated 8th July,
1945.

The statements contained in GENERAL AIMONE CAT'S letter to you are, in my opinion, a distortion of what actually took place at SESTO CALENDE and ROME, and I have given below my version of what did happen at these two interviews, at both of which COL. BERETTA was present.

On my second visit to MILAN I went to the S.I.A.I. and found that work was at a standstill due to instructions that had been received about the seating arrangements in the SM.79 aircraft. A scheme had been received from the Air Ministry which in addition to being uncomfortable for the passengers also moved the centre of gravity backwards, not to any dangerous extent but the aircraft is normally tail heavy, and it is inadvisable to make it more so.

The seats for the S.I.A.I. conversion were already made for 4 aircraft, and the firm did not know quite what to do. If they had to modify the seating arrangements there was bound to be a considerable delay, and I therefore told them to carry on with the original arrangements for 4 aircraft, leaving the W.C's in two of the aircraft as they had already been installed.

Neither Col. BERETTA nor I saw any officer from the R.A. while we were at VERCIATE, and I did not examine the two solutions as alleged. If I had seen this Officer I should naturally have discussed the matter with him. On my return to ROME I informed COL. BERTAGNOLLIO of the action I had taken and as far as I knew he approved, and stated that they would get out an alternative scheme.

Another point that has not been raised is that the firm had instructions to take out all tanks, remove the self sealing material and then replace them. This would have taken five days and was apparently being done because it was considered that self sealing tanks were not necessary in peace time. I told them not to proceed with the work and on my return to ROME informed COL. BERTAGNOLLIO, who did not know of these instructions which had apparently been issued by the Technical Office of the 1st Z.A.T. in MILAN.

The S.I.A.I. informed me that they had been having work held up repeatedly by modifications such as that mentioned above. This was also confirmed by both the Augusta and Bestetti firms.

With regard to the aircraft at these two firms I gave no instructions about putting in seats with backs to the wall but I asked the S.I.A.I. who were working in conjunction with them to ensure that work on the aircraft was not held up by modifications to the seats.

For the R.A. to mention this as a reason for delay in delivery of these aircraft is surprising. When I visited them at the end of May, Augusta had 2 and Bestetti 1 aircraft practically complete as T.B's. On my last visit six weeks later, although the only work necessary was the conversion to passenger type, in neither case was the aircraft ready. The aircraft at Bestetti will not be ready for test flying until August the 8th, and the two at Augusta may be ready early next week. Bestetti were short of material which I know was in the stores in MILAN, and although there were 2 W.C.O's at the firm, no attempt seems to have been made to get the material. All three aircraft should have been completed 2/3 weeks

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

...ing items in the SM.79 aircraft. A scheme had been received from the Air Ministry which in addition to being uncomfortable for the passengers also moved the centre of gravity backwards, not to any dangerous extent but the aircraft is normally tail heavy, and it is inadvisable to make it more so.

The seats for the S.I.A.I. conversion were already made for 4 aircraft, and the firm did not know quite what to do. If they had to modify the seating arrangements there was bound to be a considerable delay, and I therefore told them to carry on with the original arrangements for 4 aircraft, leaving the W.C's in two of the aircraft as they had already been installed.

Neither Col. MORETA nor I saw any officer from the R.A. while we were at VERCIATE, and I did not examine the two solutions as alleged. If I had seen this Officer I should naturally have discussed the matter with him. On my return to ROME I informed COL. BERTAGNOLIO of the action I had taken and as far as I know he approved, and stated that they would get out an alternative scheme.

Another point that has not been raised is that the firm had instructions to take out all tanks, remove the self sealing material and then replace them. This would have taken five days and was apparently being done because it was considered that self sealing tanks were not necessary in peace time. I told them not to proceed with the work and on my return to ROME informed COL. BERTAGNOLIO, who did not know of these instructions which had apparently been issued by the Technical Office of the 1st Z.A.T. in MILAN.

The S.I.A.I. informed me that they had been having work held up repeatedly 7065 by modifications such as that mentioned above. This was also confirmed by both the Augusta and Bestetti firms.

With regard to the aircraft at these two firms I gave no instructions about putting in seats with backs to the wall but I asked the S.I.A.I. who were working in conjunction with them to ensure that work on the aircraft was not held up by modifications to the seats.

For the R.A. to mention this as a reason for delay in delivery of these aircraft is surprising. When I visited them at the end of May, Augusta had 2 and Bestetti 1 aircraft practically complete as T.B's. On my last visit six weeks later, although the only work necessary was the conversion to passenger type, in neither case was the aircraft ready. The aircraft at Bestetti will not be ready for test flying until August the 6th, and the two at Augusta may be ready early next week. Bestetti were short of material which I know was in the stores in MILAN, and although there were 2 N.C.O's at the firm, no attempt seems to have been made to get the material. All three aircraft should have been completed 2/3 weeks ago. I am certain that there was no delay over the seats, and similar seating arrangements to S.I.A.I. are being installed. With regard to the two special aircraft I did not say that they were to have no preference and that if they needed aircraft they could take the three on the strength of Unità Aerea. It had been suggested to me that the special flight would probably go up to VERCIATE and try to get these aircraft out of the firm by making nuisances of themselves, and I told COL. BERTAGNOLIO that they should not do this but I was referring to the special flight personnel and not to the Air Ministry, and I am certain that he was aware of this.

I never told them to use the three SM.79 aircraft belonging to the Unità Aerea, although I did state that these aircraft were seldom flown and would be useful in the Courier Service.

Continued/2.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I told the S.I.A.I. to proceed with the aircraft on the original lines, as work was being held up and the Firm did not know what to do. Actually GENERAL BIFFI had asked me to look into this matter and I informed him of all the actions I had taken. He approved and was glad that work was proceeding again.

(SIGNED) J.L. GLADSTONE, W/CDR,
CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DRAFT COPY.

COMMENTS ON CHIEF OF AIR STAFFS LETTER. ENCLOSURE 57A

TO: A.O.C.

1. I have read the Chief of Staff's long and unhappy letter, and find myself, viewing it from our own standards, agreeing with him on most of the major points and only uncertain on those decisions where local knowledge is necessary.

2. The control of the I.A.F. has certainly increased where they had hoped for a relaxation. The tone of this letter indicates an air of frustration in one who has worked to improve the position of his service, and now feels that he has failed.

3. He complains of side tracking and reducing the authority of the I.A.M. On this point I think that the Air and Organisation Staffs have always dealt through the correct channels, our specialist officers are not always so correct and a word at the Staff Conference might remedy this.

4. In dealing with individual postings, or even suggesting them, we have touched upon a very tricky question, and one that I, before taking up this post, was specially briefed to avoid. I dont think that we can contradict the C.A.Ss statement, that we have insufficient knowledge of the persons concerned, and should, I think, confine ourselves to suggesting that an officer is replaced and leaving the choice of the replacement to the I.A.M.

5. The constant movement of units is irritating to the Air Ministry; our policy being, to concentrate units for supervision. During the War I understood and agreed with this but since the war in Europe finished I have thought that a revision is necessary.

Now we concentrate masses of disgruntled airmen together, give them a very limited amount of flying and do not permit them to repair their old aircraft.

I believe that the Bailey Report should be scrapped and that in

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

hoped for a relaxation. The tone of this letter indicates an air of frustration in one who has worked to improve the position of his service, and now feels that he has failed.

3. He complains of side tracking and reducing the authority of the I.A.M. On this point I think that the Air and Organisation Staffs have always dealt through the correct channels, our specialist officers are not always so correct and a word at the Staff Conference might remedy this.

4. In dealing with individual postings, or even suggesting them, we have touched upon a very tricky question, and one that I, before taking up this post, was specially briefed to avoid. I dont think that we can contradict the C.A.Ss statement, that we have insufficient knowledge of the persons concerned, and should, I think, confine ourselves to suggesting that an officer is replaced and leaving the choice of the replacement to the I.A.M. 7063

5. The constant movement of units is irritating to the Air Ministry; our policy being, to concentrate units for supervision. During the War I understood and agreed with this but since the war in Europe finished I have thought that a revision is necessary.

Now we concentrate masses of disgruntled airmen together, give them a very limited amount of flying and do not permit them to repair their old aircraft.

I believe that the Bailey Report should be scrapped and that in order to keep all these men employed they should be permitted to repair their old and unwarlike junk. They do not use our spares or equipment. The flying limitation should remain the same and Courier Services would not suffer.

I make this suggestion and also a suggestion that machine shops, in operation throughout Italy, should not be closed down as they are giving employment, because by doing so we are forcing unemployment upon them and creating an anti-British feeling which should I think be avoided.

/2.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. are receiving their quota of men and have not taken any action on our suggestion that they employ more Italians; also they have not asked for the workshop space in the units we are closing down.

6. The C.A.S. has objected to the move of the School at Leverano to Lecce on the grounds of overcrowding and also because of the concentration of so many different types of units with their senior officers on one aerodrome.

I do not think that we would lose anything by letting them remain at Leverano or to move to San Pancrazio. It would not complicate our supervision and we hold a trump card in our ability to ration petrol and oil.

He complains that it is uneconomical to construct another runway at Lecce. The contract for this work is 12,000,000 lire.

The annual Air force budget is 200,000,000 lire.

7. The explanation of the multiple operation rooms is not quite clear to me and I will discuss it with G/C Ollason.

It appears that they are now used as unit offices.

8. In the latter paragraphs of his letter the C.A.S. 'puts us on the spot' regarding Lecce and the displacement of officers , and in my opinion we would be wrong to persist in our original suggestions.

7062

S.S.O.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5949

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED COMMISSION, C.M.F.

DATE: 16TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

589

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 11th July, 1945.

2. The Air Officer Commanding is away visiting Units in North Italy. He will give you more definite information on his return.

3. From my incomplete knowledge I can only state that the draft directive follows British Air Ministry policy and has been discussed at M.A.A.F.

4. It is noted that the final letter is to be submitted to you for approval.

L.E. JARMAN, G/CAPT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

7060

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

584

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

14 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission.

SUBJECT: Italian Air Force Interim Policy. 52413

1. Your letter of 9 July 1945, file AFSC/46/AIR, submitting a proposed letter to the Italian Government for the approval of N.A.A.F., refers.

2. Before any final letter is sent to the Italian Government, I should like to have it submitted to me for approval.

3. In the meantime, will you inform me whether some of the proposals contained in the draft letter, such as paragraph 2 thereof, are the result of a directive or other instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

M. W. Stone

HILARY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Executive Commissioner

7059

E.25
46/Mi

Refer Adm Stone at Vice President's meeting
that directive is made up from signals
conferring from A.F. (London) & current policy & practice

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA.

ROME. 8th July, 1945.

Ref: 011532/Sg.U/3835/Coll.

To: Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Brodie,
A.F.S.C. A.C. Rome.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

1. I was informed of your visit to LECCE, and of the conference and subjects discussed directly with the Commanding Officers, and I was on the point of writing to you on this and other important problems essential to us in this delicate period of our national and military lives, when I received your letter AFSC/46/AIR of the 26th June.

2. One of the conditions under which I have collaborated, since the assumption of my difficult and bitter assignment, is one of absolute frankness and thus before replying to the various arguments referred to in your letter, I feel it my duty to clarify the situation which has gradually arisen, with grave inconvenience to the central and other governing bodies and to the units themselves.

3. In his letter AFSC/23/AIR of the 27th February 1945, your predecessor Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet, informed me that according to the directives of the Supreme Allied Command, relating to the slackening of control on Italian Government Institutions, the activity of the A.F.S.C. would immediately undergo a metamorphosis, in the sense of conceding more autonomy and initiative to the Italian Aeronautical Authorities.

This autonomy and initiative, according to Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet would have been such as to give the Ministry for Air exclusively the right to deal with its Air Force whose existance or otherwise would depend on the extent of the efforts made by the Ministry to transform it into an efficient and well organised force.

It is true that with the same letter dispositions given were so restricted and drastic to exclude completely the possibility that the Minister for Air could assume the responsibilities with which they wished to attribute him, as I pointed out in my answer. Anyhow the intention was appreciated and welcomed, and from it we were able to obtain the annulment of certain measures which would have been detrimental and prejudicial to the precarious life of the Italian Air Force, and dangerous to the subsequent reflections on the morale of the personnel and of the entire Country.

There exists a long, voluminous and painful correspondence on this subject.

We hoped that once the war was over in Europe, the control imposed by the Allies would materially improve, as we were led to suppose since February 1945. Instead the policy followed by the A.F.S.C. recently has not only squashed these hopes, but has instilled in all personnel, also those on Units and of every rank, the painful and uncomfortable sensation that the control has been increased and embittered without any plausible motives.

The frequent contacts between Officers of the A.F.S.C. and various sections at which questions have been discussed directly, often of a delicate and important nature without the knowledge of this H.Q, have contributed in increasing and strengthening this feeling, especially in view of the fact that the only function of this H.Q. in relation to the Allied Control is eliminated, thus raising a doubt as to its right of existance.

57A 43A This file. 104 on 23/AIR 7058
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

26th June.

2. One of the conditions under which I have collaborated, since the assumption of my difficult and bitter assignment, is one of absolute frankness and thus before replying to the various arguments referred to in your letter, I feel it my duty to clarify the situation which has gradually arisen, with grave inconvenience to the central and other governing bodies and to the units themselves.

3. In his letter AFSC/23/AIR of the 27th February 1945, your predecessor Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet, informed me that according to the directives of the Supreme Allied Command, relating to the slackening of control on Italian Government Institutions, the activity of the A.F.S.C. would immediately undergo a metamorphosis, in the sense of conceding more autonomy and initiative to the Italian Aeronautical Authorities.

This autonomy and initiative, according to Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet would have been such as to give the Ministry for Air exclusively the right to deal with its Air Force whose existance or otherwise would depend on the extent of the efforts made by the Ministry to transform it into an efficient and well organised force.

It is true that with the same letter dispositions given were so restricted and drastic to exclude completely the possibility that the Minister for Air could assume the responsibilities with which they wished to attribute him, as I pointed out in my answer. Anyhow the intention was appreciated and welcomed, and from it we were able to obtain the annulment of certain measures which would have been detrimental and prejudicial to the precarious life of the Italian Air Force, and dangerous to the subsequent reflections on the morale of the personnel and of the entire Country.

There exists a long, voluminous and painful correspondence on this subject.

We hoped that once the war was over in Europe, the control imposed by the Allies would materially improve, as we were led to suppose since February 1945. Instead the policy followed by the A.F.S.C. recently has not only squashed these hopes, but has instilled in all personnel, also those on Units and of every rank, the painful and uncomfortable sensation that the control has been increased and embittered without any plausible motives.

The frequent contacts between Officers of the A.F.S.C. and various sections at which questions have been discussed directly, often of a delicate and important nature without the knowledge of this H.Q, have contributed in increasing and strengthening this feeling, especially in view of the fact that the only function of this H.Q. in relation to the Allied Control is eliminated, thus raising a doubt as to its right of existance.

Your report on LECCE has in fact alarmed the personnel who, in this unaccustomed proceeding has, not unreasonably, foreseen an attitude of relegating the Aeronautical H.Q. to a back number, whereas it has always attributed to the H.Q. the authority and comprehension to deal with all its interests, functions and military existance.

I am cognisant and openly admit that your action, and that of your Officers, is inspired in good faith, but it is my duty to point out that the consequent situation far from easing matters complicates and embitters the life of the Italian Air Force in all its organisms.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The following arguments and the attached documents will bear out my case. I have, however, to remind you of some preceding orientations on the spiritual conditions of the Air Force personnel.

4. On taking over my post in December 1944, I had some long conversations with your predecessor, and one with the C-in-C Sir John Slessor, on the critical material situation, and above all spiritual situation of the Italian Air Force. 98 of 26B - S.I/AIR 12B of S.I/AIR

I expounded the serious difficulties encountered by the Command which were due, in general, to the sudden and confused individual and collective trials undergone by the personnel, the effects of which could not be smoothed without calmness, time, authoritativeness, and understanding. In this respect I asked for instructions in order to solve subordinately the restrictions which handicap every initiative and every decision taken, even of modest proportions (my letters of the 7th and 10th January 1945, and reply by Sir John Slessor on 15th January 1945 refer.)

The present situation has improved noticeably because of the improved discipline in all units, but has notably deteriorated because of the influx of personnel who are left high and dry due to lack of employment, and also to the painful duty of having to reduce the number of personnel who have already been employed during the war and who are today redundant, from the Allied point of view, owing to the progressive exhaustion of supplies of flying material, which are no longer renewed from Allied sources, and has to rely on national resources only, and this administered according to the uncontrollable Allied criterion.

This criterion is naturally vastly different from our own, which, if we had the power to control at pleasure our new aircraft, would be one of strict economy and maximum employment.

Under these conditions the direct Allied interference, whether from the H.Q. Unit or its detachments cannot help but engineer misunderstanding, ambiguity, delusion, and future ill feeling which will affect the work of expansion and rebirth carried out so far with so much effort by this H.Q, in spite of humiliations which it thought its duty to undergo in order to eliminate the repercussions from its units.

It is as well not to forget the essential and fundamental importance of this delicate and difficult work, from which can be explained that little operational help which we were able to give to the Allied Cause, and also, and above all, the value to the spiritual and material reconstruction of its country, that the I.A.F. can contribute with its own personnel.

I ask you, dear Marshal Brodie and your officers, to remember all this, if political reasons of which I am ignorant do not prevent you from doing so.

I now come to the individual arguments. 3A This file. 7057

5. At the end of the European War, LECCE airport, like all the other Italian Aeronautical organisations, waited for instructions from this H.Q. who had previously asked for them from the Allies (see 011070/Sg.U. of 28th April, 1945.)

Until then LECCE had always functioned to the complete satisfaction of the Allies, and without the slightest incident for a number of months with far greater number of aircraft than now; a large number of Liberators, all the Italian Bomber and Transport planes, and all or nearly all the Fighters.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

decision taken, even of modest proportions (my letters of the 7th and 10th January 1945, and reply by Sir John Slessor on 15th January 1945 refer.)

The present situation has improved noticeably because of the improved discipline in all units, but has notably deteriorated because of the influx of personnel who are left high and dry due to lack of employment, and also to the painful duty of having to reduce the number of personnel who have already been employed during the war and who are today redundant, from the Allied point of view, owing to the progressive exhaustion of supplies of flying material, which are no longer renewed from Allied sources, and has to rely on national resources only, and this administered according to the uncontrollable Allied criterion.

This criterion is naturally vastly different from our own, which, if we had the power to control at pleasure our new aircraft, would be one of strict economy and maximum employment.

Under these conditions the direct Allied interference, whether from the H.Q. Unit or its detachments cannot help but engineer misunderstanding, ambiguity, delusion, and future ill feeling which will affect the work of expansion and rebirth carried out so far with so much effort by this H.Q, in spite of humiliations which it thought its duty to undergo in order to eliminate the repercussions from its units.

It is as well not to forget the essential and fundamental importance of this delicate and difficult work, from which can be explained that little operational help which we were able to give to the Allied Cause, and also, and above all, the value to the spiritual and material reconstruction of its country, that the I.A.F. can contribute with its own personnel.

I ask you, dear Marshal Brodie and your officers, to remember all this, if political reasons of which I am ignorant do not prevent you from doing so.

I now come to the individual arguments. 3A This file. 7057

5. At the end of the European War, LECCE airport, like all the other Italian Aeronautical organisations, waited for instructions from this H.Q. who had previously asked for them from the Allies (see C11070/Sg.U. of 28th April, 1945.)

Until then LECCE had always functioned to the complete satisfaction of the Allies, and without the slightest incident for a number of months with far greater number of aircraft than now; a large number of Liberators, all the Italian Bomber and Transport planes, and all or nearly all the Fighters.

This signifies that although the individual commanders could be criticised, they have accomplished their duties during the War and under the worst conditions of service which the airport has experienced.

If, today, these Commanders appear uncertain and sluggish, it is because they lack precise orders of a general character and cannot take the initiative owing to insufficient authority and excess of control. from UK (& AFSC?)

In other words, they find themselves in the same circumstances to those in which I find myself, although naturally on a reduced scale.

In fact you recognise this state of affairs at the beginning of No.4 in your letter.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

It is clear, from this paragraph, that I can neither attempt to reorganise the Italian Air Force, nor can you advise me accordingly, as you are still unaware of our destiny in the near future. It is impossible not to realise that the Commanding Officers and the various sections do not feel the consequences of such a situation.

6. The Unità Aerea is also subject to the uncertainties of this wait for future policy which is taking so long to be cleared up; it can, therefore, not be held responsible for the excessive vagueness in receiving directives from me, whilst I am waiting to undertake something more precise, complete and rational.

The rumour regarding the slowing up of the transfer of the fighters from CANNE to LECCE for which you blame the Comando Unità Aerea, was actually my own directive, which the Unità and the squadrons obeyed.

This directive was given with a view to favour operational personnel who were due for leave and who would have been held up if an immediate transfer had taken place. If I had not given this order, the non-combattants in Base jobs would have reached home first, and the operational units would have justly resented it.

The order, which I considered it my duty to give, would have not placed any obstacle to the functioning of the units, because these units, owing to the intense war activity and the absence of part of its personnel, were in need of a certain period of rest and stock-taking, whereas the Allied units would not have been subject to any delay once the aircraft had been transferred immediately to LECCE, as was indeed the case.

As you will see it was not a case of passive resistance on the part of the squadrons, because they had not been moved North. If this had been the case, the Comando Unità and this H.Q. would have incurred such a grave organic deficiency to have merited the strictest disciplinary action.

With regard to the request for transport, it is necessary to consider that the material to be transferred from CANNE to LECCE was notably superior to that transferred from LECCE to CANNE.

This last transfer imposed by urgent operational exigencies was initially performed by transporting the minimum required. Subsequently with the advent of winter transport arrived at odd intervals with the rest of their requirements. Finally in the move from CANNE, Nissen Huts given them by the previous occupiers had to be transported.

7. You state that you cannot give me precise information as to how we should form our reorganisation. Instead, in your letter you expound, considerations, advice and detailed directions which augment our hardships.

7056

(a) That the actual organisation of the Unità Aerea is not in keeping with the new functions of the Units, is natural and was to be expected; in fact I would have already modified it if I had had the power.

It is not correct to state that each LECCE Command has a corresponding Command, hierarchically superior at the Comando Unità Aerea, as would result from the present arrangement.

The LECCE Units, in the absence of new orders, have continued to function as in the past, according to previous Allied instructions, when they were under the operational control of single Allied officers attached to the Unit

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

This directive was given with a view to favour operational personnel who were due for leave and who would have been held up if an immediate transfer had taken place. If I had not given this order, the non-combattants in Base jobs would have reached home first, and the operational units would have justly resented it.

The order, which I considered it my duty to give, would have not placed any obstacle to the functioning of the units, because these units, owing to the intense war activity and the absence of part of its personnel, were in need of a certain period of rest and stock-taking, whereas the Allied units would not have been subject to any delay once the aircraft had been transferred immediately to LECCE, as was indeed the case.

As you will see it was not a case of passive resistance on the part of the squadrons, because they had not been moved North. If this had been the case, the Comando Unità and this H.Q. would have incurred such a grave organic deficiency to have merited the strictest disciplinary action.

With regard to the request for transport, it is necessary to consider that the material to be transferred from CANNE to LECCE was notably superior to that transferred from LECCE to CANNE.

This last transfer imposed by urgent operational exigencies was initially performed by transporting the minimum required. Subsequently with the advent of winter transport arrived at odd intervals with the rest of their requirements. Finally in the move from CANNE, Nissen Huts given them by the previous occupiers had to be transported.

7. You state that you cannot give me precise information as to how we should form our reorganisation. Instead, in your letter you expound, considerations, advice and detailed directions which augment our hardships.

7056

(a) That the actual organisation of the Unità Aerea is not in keeping with the new functions of the Units, is natural and was to be expected; in fact I would have already modified it if I had had the power.

It is not correct to state that each LECCE Command has a corresponding Command, hierarchically superior at the Comando Unità Aerea, as would result from the present arrangement.

The LECCE Units, in the absence of new orders, have continued to function as in the past, according to previous Allied instructions, when they were under the operational control of single Allied officers attached to the Units and in direct touch with B.A.F.

With the end of the War in Europe the duties of these Officers have changed, for the obvious reason that today the Units do no longer come under B.A.F. but under A.F.S.C.

Nevertheless no one has officially informed this H.Q. or Comando Unità to date of this important transfer of control.

This does not alter the fact that disciplinary action at LECCE depends on the senior ranking officer, according to the old dispositions of the Regia Aeronautica. That he does not come up to scratch from the Allied point of view is another question.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The Allies have the right to demand substitution according to their wishes, but it would be opportune if they did not suggest the replacements by name, owing to the slight knowledge which they have of the personnel, owing to the embarrassment caused to this H.Q. and owing to the unfortunate reaction to such changes by the units, with the result that the Allies would be the first to admit their error of judgement, and would demand new substitutions after a short interval with serious results on the morale of personnel and this H.Q. I will return later to this subject.

(b) No one knew until today that LECCE would remain solely in the hands of the R.A. and that these units would have to remain.

On the contrary, it had been mentioned that all bombers would be used as transport planes and that the fighters would probably be moved elsewhere.

(c) No one could have anticipated the sudden decision to transfer the Fighter School from FROSINONE to LECCE, thus affecting the fourth movement in the space of 8 months (from 3rd November 1944 to 18th June 1945) from VESUVIUS to GAUDO to FROSINONE to LECCE, with the inevitable consequences.

(d) The same applies to the transfer of the School from LEVERANO to LECCE, with the added complication of constructing a runway which diverges 20° from the preceding runway and which will cost a minimum of 12 million lire, apart from the time necessary to complete the work.

Our idea is to spend such sums on work which is indispensible and useful also in the future.

We do not think that the construction of a new runway can be considered in the above category, and it is for this reason that in the preliminary conversations, the outcome of which was communicated directly to the Units but not to this H.Q, it was proposed to transfer the school at LEVERANO to SAN PANCRAZIO and not to LECCE.

From the attached memo it is to be noted that the transfer of the School from LEVERANO to LECCE should have taken place between June 25th and July 7th, but even news of this transfer was not communicated to this H.Q. except by our own Units, and thus we could not intervene at all whilst awaiting clarification or precise orders.

I must point out that due to the above reasons this H.Q. is definitely contrary to the transference of the School at LEVERANO to LECCE, and to the construction of a new runway on this airport.

If, and in spite of this explicit declaration, the A.F.S.C. intends to stay by its decision, then if it will let us know the order will be executed in the best and quickest way.

7055

(e) (i) Whilst awaiting a new and more rational order it will be arranged according to your wishes that the Officer Commanding LECCE assumes complete disciplinary control of all detachments on his airport.

(ii) That all contacts between R.A.F. Liaison Officers and other Italian Officers take place invariably through the command.

(iii) That the Officer Commanding should arrange for a weekly conference of O.C. Sections to discuss points raised by G/Capt. OLLASON, in order that everything should run smoothly according to the judgement and wishes of the A.F.S.C.

(f) Unless an explicit order is given by the Allies, in which case the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(c) No one could have anticipated the sudden decision to transfer the Fighter School from FROSINONE to LECCE, thus affecting the fourth movement in the space of 8 months (from 3rd November 1944 to 18th June 1945) from VESUVIUS to GAUDO to FROSINONE to LECCE, with the inevitable consequences.

(d) The same applies to the transfer of the School from LEVERANO to LECCE, with the added complication of constructing a runway which diverges 20° from the preceding runway and which will cost a minimum of 12 million lire, apart from the time necessary to complete the work.

Our idea is to spend such sums on work which is indispensible and useful also in the future.

We do not think that the construction of a new runway can be considered in the above category, and it is for this reason that in the preliminary conversations, the outcome of which was communicated directly to the Units but not to this H.Q, it was proposed to transfer the school at LEVERANO to SAN PANCRAZIO and not to LECCE.

From the attached memo it is to be noted that the transfer of the School from LEVERANO to LECCE should have taken place between June 25th and July 7th, but even news of this transfer was not communicated to this H.Q. except by our own Units, and thus we could not intervene at all whilst awaiting clarification or precise orders.

I must point out that due to the above reasons this H.Q. is definitely contrary to the transference of the School at LEVERANO to LECCE, and to the construction of a new runway on this airport.

If, and in spite of this explicit declaration, the A.F.S.C. intends to stay by its decision, then if it will let us know the order will be executed in the best and quickest way.

7055

(e) (i) Whilst awaiting a new and more rational order it will be arranged according to your wishes that the Officer Commanding LECCE assumes complete disciplinary control of all detachments on his airport.

(ii) That all contacts between P.A.F. Liaison Officers and other Italian Officers take place invariably through the command.

(iii) That the Officer Commanding should arrange for a weekly conference of O.C. Sections to discuss points raised by G/Capt. OLLASON, in order that everything should run smoothly according to the judgement and wishes of the A.F.S.C.

(f) Unless an explicit order is given by the Allies, in which case the Government and the interested parties would have to be informed, it is not possible for this Ministry to weed out high ranking officers of the Air Force without incurring serious repercussions of a moral and material character.

In fact, a law does not yet exist on this question. This will certainly have to be considered, but only when the Allies have explicit provisions for the future of the Regia Aeronautica and on the basis of the budget contributed by the country.

This problem is the most serious and delicate to be confronted by the Ministry, and depending on the Government's action lies the future of the Regia Aeronautica.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The personnel at present on active service is that foreseen at the request of M.A.A.F. and confirmed by the A.F.S.C.

(g) The same applies with regard to the number of crews and pilots. It is rather hard on these boys to have to be released from the service after having taken a brilliant part in the War against the Germans.

These two problems, common to all the Armed Forces, are not only military problems but also political, and therefore it is absolutely necessary that the political authorities responsible for internal order in the country and for its reconstruction, should study and solve them as best they can with a view to prevent the most serious consequences.

This H.Q. can solve the question from the military technical side, when it will be given the precise data on which it can impose the solution.

It appears impudent to act on suppositions since the gravity of the consequences would not make it worthwhile, especially taking into account the delicate and unstable internal situation in which this country finds itself.

8. I will refer to the immediate action to be taken, as stated in your letter.

(a) Instructions will be issued as you require as regards the Flying Control School at LECCE.

We will try to send to the school the personnel you suggest. I am not quite clear as to why CAPTAIN NEGRINI should be promoted to Senior Officer in charge of Flying Control.

In our organisation acting ranks do not exist. Promotion is always definite and as such cannot be granted except when the regulations demand, regulations which have to be adhered to until such time as they are changed.

(b) The question relating to operations rooms needs clarifying.

In the I.A.F. the Stormo Operations Room deals with practice flying in times of peace and operations in times of war.

That which you call Base Operations is the equivalent to our Aerodrome Command, which is responsible for all flying activities on the aerodrome, including the meteorological section.

The Stormo Sections do not interfere with the functions of the Aerodrome Command, and receive all flying orders from the latter.

7054

At the end of the War the Stormo Operational Offices take the name and functions of Training Offices, and deal singly and cumulatively with all the requirements of the Stormo Section.

I do not think, therefore, that any changes are necessary unless the A.F.S.C. wishes the abolition of the Stormo Training Offices, in which case the Airport Operations Office would be responsible for all training sections displaced on the aerodrome.

This would not seem opportune, because it would entail relieving of their jobs the O.C. sections who are necessary to guide the men in the event of war, and also because the Airport Operations Control Office would be given too great a responsibility.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

will be given the precise data on which it can impose the solution.

It appears impudent to act on suppositions since the gravity of the consequences would not make it worthwhile, especially taking into account the delicate and unstable internal situation in which this country finds itself.

8. I will refer to the immediate action to be taken, as stated in your letter.

(a) Instructions will be issued as you require as regards the Flying Control School at LECCE.

We will try to send to the school the personnel you suggest. I am not quite clear as to why CAPTAIN ZEGRINI should be promoted to Senior Officer in charge of Flying Control.

In our organisation acting ranks do not exist. Promotion is always definite and as such cannot be granted except when the regulations demand, regulations which have to be adhered to until such time as they are changed.

(b) The question relating to operations rooms needs clarifying.

In the I.A.F. the Stormo Operations Room deals with practice flying in times of peace and operations in times of war.

That which you call Base Operations is the equivalent to our Aerodrome Command, which is responsible for all flying activities on the aerodrome, including the meteorological section.

The Stormo Sections do not interfere with the functions of the Aerodrome Command, and receive all flying orders from the latter.

7054

At the end of the War the Stormo Operational Offices take the name and functions of Training Offices, and deal singly and cumulatively with all the requirements of the Stormo Section.

I do not think, therefore, that any changes are necessary unless the A.F.S.C. wishes the abolition of the Stormo Training Offices, in which case the Airport Operations Office would be responsible for all training sections displaced on the aerodrome.

This would not seem opportune, because it would entail relieving of their jobs the O.C. sections who are necessary to guide the men in the event of war, and also because the Airport Operations Control Office would be given too great a responsibility.

With regard to Major SCOTTU and Capt. RUGGERO I would reply that, so far SCOTTU's services have been very much appreciated with definite proof of wrong-doing, and any action taken would be humiliating and detrimental to this Officer.

(c) The change of C.O. to the Fighter Stormo took place because of many serious reasons of an important and delicate character of which Air Vice-Marsnal BOWEN-BUSCARLET was well aware, and with which change he was in complete agreement.

The return of this Officer to his old Command after such a short interval of time would be incomprehensible to the squadrons, indecorous for this H.Q, embarrassing to the Unità Aerea, all of whom have tried hard to bring the situation,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

which was deteriorating, back to normal.

A substitution can be arranged as soon as possible, but not by the person mentioned by you.

No consideration of a professional character could today, hostilities having ended, have had more importance than that imposed at the time by the substitution.

As I realise that you have neither the time nor the opportunity to acquaint yourself with our personnel, I must presume that this change was suggested to you by some of your officers, or some of my officers. This procedure is very dangerous to the morale and discipline of my men.

It would be opportune, therefore, that I should be consulted in similar circumstances before your choice is confined to individuals, as it is my duty to see that such changes take place except when for reasons which I shall ways explain clearly to you, I do not think it possible to effect such a change.

(d) I agree with you as regards the Officer Commanding IECCE airport who was appointed by my predecessor GENERAL PIACENTINI, following a queer elective system which I have since abolished, but I regret that I cannot agree with the substitution you name, for reasons which at your request I can tell you verbally.

I hope to effect the substitutions as soon as possible with more suitable elements.

(e) Urgent and important orders are always transmitted by teleprinter, or when not secret also by telephone. The MOSCIONE - LECCE transfer was first telephoned and then sent in writing to the Comando Unita.

It is certain that your telephone call to C/Capt. OLLASON must have reached LECCE before the orders from the Comando Unita, who relied on written communications.

9. I will go to LECCE on my return from the North of Italy, leaving immediately after dealing with the dispositions in your letter.

In the meantime the Under Secretary of State, Colonel Remondino and the Minister have gone to LECCE with my instructions. I would emphasise that my visits would have a beneficial moral effect, if only I could give the personnel satisfactory news as to their future.

The visits I have undertaken so far have been useful only in so far as being able to convince the Units of this H.Q. interest in their future, eliminating false illusions, but giving them hope of some improvements.

The present circumstances, do not even permit the hope of an improvement.

All the same I shall carry out my duties even in this, but in a manner which in my capacity as Commander I consider the most favourable.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

57B

REPLY TO APPENDIX "A".

I. Orders have already been given for the Flying Control at Lecce to be concentrated as quickly as possible in the principal building destined for this purpose.

II. There are no objections to the arrangements made for the allotting of buildings at Lecce which were made by you during your visit there.

III. Before giving orders for the construction of a new runway at Lecce aiport I would ask you to give consideration to the objections opposed and the thoughts expressed in this connection.

I shall await confirmation of your orders before discussing expenses at the Ministry or starting on the work.

IV. According to your wishes it has already been arranged for the Fighter School to be subordinated to the Fighter Command(Comando Raggruppamento Caccia) until further orders.

There will be no waste of energy in following the training programme which has been laid down by the Air Staff and which can be carried out in its entirety when the School will be in a position to carry out its functions with a certain amount of regularity without other transfers or the menace of other trasfers. The Fighter School is considered by us as preliminary training for all types of aircraft especially as today there are fast single-seater bomber aircraft and the pilot has to be familiar, in case of emergency, with all aspects of the aircraft in flight and with all the necessary manoevres.

V. The fitting of the Cant.Z. 1007bis as a passenger aircraft has succeeded fairly well; the prototype has been sent to Centocelle to be examined by you.

I consider that it would be as well to adapt all the Cant. Z. 1007 bis as transport aircraft as they are mosre suitable for transport than for training. There is also the fact that the Cant. Z. 1007 bis will never be able ~~to~~ usefully to take the place of the Baltimores of the School at Frosinone, as long as the Baltimore Stormo remains in service, as the small number of pilots required have to be trainied on the Baltimores (twin-engined aircraft-easy to fly) and not on the Cant.Z. 1007 bis which has very different characterisics. The number of Baltimores at the School can be reduced but the type of aircraft cannot be changed

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

during your visit there.

III. Before giving orders for the construction of a new runway at Lecce aiport I would ask you to give consideration to the objections opposed and the thoughts expressed in this connection.

I shall await confirmation of your orders before discussing expenses at the Ministry or starting on the work.

IV. According to your wishes it has already been arranged for the Fighter School to be subordinated to the Fighter Command(Comando Raggruppamento Caccia) until further orders.

There will be no waste of energy in following the training programme which has been laid down by the Air Staff and which can be carried out in its entirety when the School will be in a position to carry out its functions with a certain amount of regularity without other transfers or the menace of other trasfers. The Fighter School is considered by us as preliminary training for all types of aircraft especially as today there are fast single-seater bomber aircraft and the pilot has to be familiar, in case of emergency, with all aspects of the aircraft in flight and with all the necessary manœvres.

V. The fitting of the Cant.Z. 1007bis as a passenger aircraft has succeeded fairly well; the prototype has been sent to Centocelle to be examined by you.

I consider that it would be as well to adapt all the Cant. Z. 1007 bis as transport aircraft as they are mosre suitable for transport than for training. There is also the fact that the Cant. Z. 1007 bis will never be able ~~to~~ usefully to take the place of the Baltimores of the School at Frosinone, as long as the Baltimore Stormo remains in service, as the small number of pilots required have to be trainied on the Baltimores (twin-engined aircraft-easy to fly) and not on the Cant.Z. 1007 bis which has very different characterisics. The number of Baltimores at the School can be reduced but the type of aircraft cannot be changed until the dissolving or re-equipping of the Baltimore Stormo.

VI. With reference to your desire to transfer elsewhere the S.R.A. of S. Vito di Taranto, when the work in progress has been completed, I consider it would be advisable to transfer the machinery and part of the personnel to the SR.A.M. (Bomber and Transport Section) at Lecce.

By part of the personnel I mean the specialists who may be considered indispensable to complete the technical organisation of the S.R.A.M. at Lecce. The remaining personnel could be transferred to other departments or dismissed.

7052

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

In this manner the hangar at S. Vito di Taranto will be made available for the British Navy.

VII. Among the two solutions which you suggest to me I think it would be more suitable and useful to suggest a third which would also be agreeable to the Technical Departments of the Ministry (Direzione Costruzioni).

This would be as follows: gradual reduction in the rythm of work, reducing the functions of the S.R.A.M. at Galatina to that of partial overhaul of engines and of occasional assistance to aircraft in transit to that base until the base carries ~~traffic exclusively~~ bomber and transport traffic.

Subsequently one of the solutions proposed by you could be adopted according to the exigencies and the situation of the moment which cannot at the moment be forseen with any certainty.

With regard to the S.A.C.A. Firm at Brindisi, its connection with the R.A. will automatically be broken by the imminent cessation of work on the Alfa 126, when supplies of spare parts are exhausted.

VIII. Concerning the overhaul of DB. 605 AND DB. 601 engines, the arrangements for having more frequent "general overhauls" which were made at the O.R.M. at Brindisi have already been adopted so that "top overhauls" are no longer carried out.

IX. The R.A. does not have an abundance of drivers. The figure 980 which was given in a report from the Personnel Directorate includes drivers and assistants who are not drivers.

The Director of Personnd is making arrangements to supply the needs of the S. and T. Column at Giovinazzo and of all the Air Force Departments which lack these specialists.

OTHER ARGUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL BY THE AFSC/AC.

1. In my letter dated 10th January 1945 to Sir John Slessor I asked for the return of the Ministry and the Air Staff to their H.Q. giving the essential motives of a moral and material character.

The reply of Sir John Slessor, dated 15th January 1945 gave us some hope in this direction.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Galatina to that of partial overhaul of engines and of occasional assistance to aircraft in transit to that base until the base carries ~~traffic for~~ bomber and transport traffic.

Subsequently one of the solutions proposed by you could be adopted according to the exigencies and the situation of the moment which cannot at the moment be forseen with any certainty.

With regard to the S.A.C.A. Firm at Brindisi, its connection with the R.A. will automatically be broken by the imminent cessation of work on the Alfa 126, when supplies of spare parts are exhausted.

VIII. Concerning the overhaul of DB. 605 AND DB. 601 engines, the arrangements for having more frequent "general overhauls" which were made at the O.R.M. at Brindisi have already been adopted so that "top overhauls" are no longer carried out.

IX. The R.A. does not have an abundance of drivers. The figure 980 which was given in a report from the Personnel Directorate includes drivers and assistants who are not drivers.

The Director of Personnel is making arrangements to supply the needs of the S. and T. Column at Giovinazzo and of all the Air Force Departments which lack these specialists. 2051

OTHER ARGUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL BY THE AFSC/AC.

1. In my letter dated 10th January 1945 to Sir John Slessor I asked for the return of the Ministry and the Air Staff to their H.Q. giving the essential motives of a moral and material character.

The reply of Sir John Slessor, dated 15th January 1945 gave us some hope in this direction.

We are still awaiting a decision on this although the availability of the premises at the Air Ministry would always have made it possible to centralize the main departments which today are scattered all over Rome in eight different buildings far from one another which leads to added expenses, work, movement, bad control, loss of time, and a bad return which is easy to imagine.

2. After a long and painful controversy we were successful in obtaining permission for the Italian aircraft which were to be disposed of, to be saved. Your latest instructions have reopened the question as though no decision had been reached in this connection, contrary to the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

assurances we had been given.

2. The maximum number of hours of work beyond which damaged aircraft or aircraft to be renewed must be destroyed has been fixed without regard to the fact that the Italian industries are in the middle of a crisis and have to pay the workmen even though they do no work.

This arrangement would be comprehensible if the Italian industries had to work for the Allies as before. Otherwise why take away old aircraft from the Air Force and work from the factories?

3. The question of the Air Academy has not yet been solved. The recruiting centres of the other armed forces however have never undergone any suspension of their courses even if they have had limitations placed on the numbers of their pupils.

The Air Force has certainly not merited less favourable treatment than the other Armed Forces. And time presses.

5. In spite of the position that I was obliged to adopt in the case of Colonel Martire (Letter 011301/Sg.U of 2nd June 1945), whose disciplinary conduct has been altogether deplorable it seems to me that nothing has yet been done to air the matter by means of the internal discipline ot the Air Force and to uphold the authority and prestige of the Superior Officers.

And also the Allied officers ought to deplore with us the fact that officers of the R.A. try to interest them in their own personal affairs which should be dealt with by Italians (for example the case of Lt. Col.Dentice which occurred under your predecessor, which caused serious embarrassment to the Minister at that time and put a General of the service in a false position).

6. The reply (enclosure 2) which was sent following my remonstrances on the arbitrary arrest and detention of the fighter pilot Lt. Giusto Raffaele, belonging to an operational unit employed on operations at the side of the Allies states that "arrest, interrogation and establishment of his alibi followed the normal procedure and that the G-2 Commander is of the opinion that the case was treated expeditiously from all points of view".

Nevertheless it does not seem to me that the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Italian industries had to work for the Allies as before. Otherwise why take away old aircraft from the Air Force and work from the factories?

3. The question of the Air Academy has not yet been solved. The recruiting centres of the other armed forces however have never undergone any suspension of their courses even if they have had limitations placed on the numbers of their pupils.

The Air Force has certainly not merited less favourable treatment than the other Armed Forces. And time presses.

5. In spite of the position that I was obliged to adopt in the case of Colonel Martire (Letter 011301/Sg.U of 2nd June 1945), whose disciplinary conduct has been altogether deplorable it seems to me that nothing has yet been done to air the matter by means of the internal discipline ot the Air Force and to uphold the authority and prestige of the Superior Officers.

And also the Allied officers ought to deplore with us the fact that officers of the R.A. try to interest them in their own personal affairs which should be dealt with by Italians (for example the case of Lt. Col.Dentice which occurred under your predecessor, which caused serious embarrassment to the Minister at that time and put a General of the service in a false position).

6. The reply (enclosure 2) which was sent following my remonstrances on the arbitrary arrest and detention of the fighter pilot Lt. Giusto Raffaele, belonging to an operational unit employed on operations at the side of the Allies states that "arrest, interrogation and establishment of his alibi followed the normal procedure and that the G-2 Commander is of the opinion that the case was treated expeditiously from all points of view".

Nevertheless it does not seem to me that the normality of the procedure and the speed of the investigations were carried out expeditiously from this point of view.

On the contrary I must point out that the following cannot be considered normal:

the arrest of an operational officer whose identity and activities can be vouched for by a long line of superior officers, perfectly well known to the Allies.

after once having arrested and released him to arrest him again, deceiving on his arrival his superior officer, his C.O. who accompanied him on order to watch his interests and be ready to assume his part of the responsibility.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

detain this officer for 40 days without informing him of the charges as though he were a common criminal and keeping him in company which was certainly neither pleasant nor deserved.

release him after 40 days without even apologising for the mistake.

In my letter I deplored such a procedure which not only damages and offends the individual concerned but also seriously humiliates the organisation to which he belongs.

Even if the reply did not mention this argument it it could at least have contained some regret at this incident on the part of G-2 to be passed on to the persoh concerned to compensate in some measure for his sufferings both moral and physical and to show to the junior officers the effect, no matter how modest, of the interest shown by higher authority according to their duty.

7. I enclose an extract of the report of the Direzione Costruzioni concerning the adapting of the S.79 from an operatinal to a transport type.(enclosure 3).

From this report it appears that the solution suggested by the Engineer Colonel, Chief of the Direzione Costruzioni, is better than the one suggested by the firm and initially approved by W/C Gladstone.

Therefore it is not clear why different solutions should be adopted instead of the best one. The solution of benches with their backs to the walls, suggested owing to the urgency of the work, is certainly more logical than that of separate seats.

In any case, leaving out the technical side of the problem it would be better if the Central Departments of the ministry were not deprived of their authority over the firms by untimely and contrasting interventions. There is no reason why W/C Gladstone should not consult the Direzione Costruzioni in view of the fact that this department is also asked to concern itself with the problems investigated by W/C Gladstone, acording to the directive issued by the Head of the A.F.S.C.

Further I must ask you to induce W/C Gladstone in future to avoid expressing himself, as he has done in the case of the aircraft which were to be prepared for the Lord Lieutenant and for the President of the Council and to announce drastic arrangements for putting aircraft, destined for the use of the highest Air Force authorities, to other uses.

Everything can be arranged for and carried out through the proper channels even if this is by means of tacit and

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Even if the reply had not mention this argument it it could at least have contained some regret at this incident on the part of G-2 to be passed on to the person concerned to compensate in some measure for his sufferings both moral and physical and to show to the junior officers the effect, no matter how modest, of the interest shown by higher authority according to their duty.

7. I enclose an extract of the report of the Direzione Costruzioni concerning the adapting of the S.79 from an operatinal to a transport type.(enclosure 3).

From this report it appears that the solution suggested by the Engineer Colonel, Chief of the Direzione Costruzioni, is better than the one suggested by the firm and initially approved by W/C Gladstone.

Therefore it is not clear why different solutions should be adopted instead of the best one. The solution of benches with their backs to the walls, suggested owing to the urgency of the work, is certainly more logical than that of separate seats.

In any case, leaving out the technical side of the problem it would be better if the Central Departments of the ministry were not deprived of their authority over the firms by untimely and contrasting interventions. There is no reason why W/C Gladstone should not consult the Direzione Costruzioni in view of the fact that this department is also asked to concern itself with the problems investigated by W/C Gladstone, according to the directive issued by the Head of the A.F.S.C.

Further I must ask you to induce W/C Gladstone in future to avoid expressing himself, as he has done in the case of the aircraft which were to be prepared for the Lord Lieutenant and for the President of the Council, and to announce drastic arrangements for putting aircraft, destined for the use of the highest Air Force authorities, to other uses.

Everything can be arranged for and carried out through the proper channels even if this is by means of tacit and indisputable orders.

But it does not seem wise, especially in the present delicate situation that officers of the AFSC should show scant regard for the highest political and military authorities in Italy.

8. It appears that Lt. Col/ Corsini, Commander of the Seaplane Unit has been given the task by W/C Clift of studying the collaboration between aircraft and Allied naval units in rescue operations. Instead of receiving this news from a subordinate officer, the Air Staff would have liked to have been warned directly and in advance.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

9. It appears that W/C Gladstone has announced that if the services mentioned above are to continue to develop, the seaplane which is actually destined for the service between Elmas and Bracciano will be withdrawn. Considering the long and difficult negotiations which were necessary to arrive at the arranging of this service, which is essential for communication with Sardinia, it would have been better to make provision for this at the time , if it was indispensable, without previously worrying those concerned.

10. The problems and the work which interest the life of the small Air Force which is operating are many, difficult and delicate, but they are by far inferior to those which concern the liquidation and withdrawal of the greater Air Force which was.

I would be infinitely grateful to you if this painful reality which is borne by those who have the bitter burden of facing and surmounting it could be borne in mind in order to avoid complications and disagreements which delay the work of reconstruction and which, if they persist, will end by discouraging even the sanest and most w illing optimism.

Chief of the General Staff
Generale di Squadra Aerea
(Mario Ajmone-Cat)

Affectionately yours
(Signature)

7047

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

57 e

Lecce, 18th June 1945.

Bomber and Transport Unit — Enclosure N.1
To Comando Unità Aerea BARI

Ref: 3391/ord.

Subject: Visit of General Brodie.

Today General Brodie, on a visit to this base, gathered together the Commanders of the Units and the Heads of Technical and Airfield Services who are concerned with the imminent movememts of the units, and gave them the following information: discussed the following

1. Transfer of the Fighter Pilots School.

The School with its dependant S.R.A. is to transfer to Lecce airport.
The transfer will commence on the 25th of this month and be completed by 7th July.
Barracks and tents will be taken from Leverano to Lecce airfield for the new establishment.

2. Lecce Airfield.

7045

With reference to the flying activity which is to be carried out by the School, also during the winter season, it is intended to carry out work immediately to level the surface of the airfield and to prepare a runway transversal to the existing one.

3. Operations Roomse (Traffic).

Thisis to be the same for all the units at the base and is to include the meteorological services and the traffic control.
The Operations Rooms existing with the said units are therefore to be abolished.

4. Night Stormo.

Transfer of the 1st Gruppo (S.82) to Rome to the airport of Centocelle or Guidonia.
The intention so far is to locate this Gruppo at Centocelle and refuel the aircraft at Pisa.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the imminent movements of the units, and gave them the following information:

1. Transfer of the Fighter Pilots School.

The School with its dependant S.R.A. is to transfer to Lecce airport.
The transfer will commence on the 25th of this month and be completed by 7th July.
Barracks and tents will be taken from Leverano to Lecce airfield for the new establishment.

2. Lecce Airfield.

7045

With reference to the flying activity which is to be carried out by the School, also during the winter season, it is intended to carry out work immediately to level the surface of the airfield and to prepare a runway transversal to the existing one.

3. Operations Rooms (Traffic).

Thisis to be the same for all the units at the base and is to include the meteorological services and the traffic control.
The Operations Rooms existing with the said units are therefore to be abolished.

4. Night Stormo.

Transfer of the 1st Gruppo (S.82) to Rome to the airport of Centocelle or Guidonia.
The intention so far is to locate this Gruppo at Centocelle and refuel the aircraft at Pisa.

5. S.R.A. of the Bomber Units.
S.R.A at Lecce Airport.

As it is foreseen that in future Major repairs will be entrusted to the firms there will be a considerable reductions in the total work which is assigned to them.

S.R.A. S. Vito.: Work will be completed on the Cant.Z and S.79 which were admitted by special orders and [illegible] the shops will then close.

Officer Commanding
Signed: Col. Pilot LEONE Leonello

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ENCLOSURE 3

577 D

AIR MINISTRY
DIRECTORATE OF AERONAUTICAL CONSTRUCTION

Memorandum for H.E. C.A.S. of the R.A.
Headquarters.

Various Technical Questions Discussed with the A.F.S.C.

During a redent interview which took place between an officer of this Directorate and W/Cdr Gladstone of the A.F.S.C. various questions were discussed, prihcipally the following:

1) S.M. 79 Transport Aircraft Being Fitted by Several Firms in the North?

As the Air Staff has already been informed the installation of passenger seats in the aircraft in question has been studied by the SIAI who had arrived at the solution of eight seats in pairs, four of which would face forward and four sideways. This solution, however, has several drawbacks the most serious one being the regrettable situation which would arise if one of the passengers were to suffer while flying in bumpy weather.

Another solution was therfore studied which, while it was the same as that of the firm where centralisation was concerned, provided single seats all facing foward. This idea was communicated to W/C Gladstone who approved it on condition that this variation did not cause any delay in the date of delivery.

The offcer who was sent to Sesto Calende in order to give instructions for carrying out the above found W/c Gladstone on the spot. W/C Gladstone examined the two solutions, that of the SIAI and that of the Air Ministry, preferred th former and gave the following orders to the firm:

a) The first four aircraft will be made according to the SIAI specification, but two with lavatories and two without.
b) The work for the installation of mail carriers in the engine nacelle fairing is however to continue. These orders were not given to the Officer of the Construction Department and were only heard of during the course of an interivew in Rome.

During this interview W/C Gladstone examined a compromise solution which had been previously studied by this Directorate and approved it, appending his signature to the drawing. He also gave other instructions for example that the 79 being prepared at the Bestetti Firm and the Agusta Firm were to have benches

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78501/7

officer of this Directorate and W/Cdr Gladstone of the A.F.S.C. various questions were discussed, prihcipally the following:

1) S.M. 79 Transport Aircraft Being Fitted by Several Firms in the North?

As the Air Staff has already been informed the installation of passenger seats in the aircraft in question has been studied by the SIAI who had arrived at the solution of eight seats in pairs, four of which would face forward and four sideways. This solution, however, has several drawbacks the most serious one being the regrettable situation which would arise if one of the passengers were to suffer while flying in bumpy weather.

Another solution was therfore studied which, while it was the same as that of the firm where centralisation was concerned, provided single seats all facing foward. This idea was communicated to W/C Gladstone who approved it on condition that this variation did not cause any delay in the date of delivery.

The officer who was sent to Sesto Calende in order to give instructions for carrying out the above found W/c Gladstone on the spot. W/C Gladstone examined the two solutions, that of the SIAI and that of the Air Ministry, preferred th former and gave the following orders to the firm:

a) The first four aircraft will be made according to the SIAI specification, but two with lavatories and two without.

b) The work for the installation of mail carriers in the engine nacelle fairing is however to continue. These orders were not given to the Officer of the Construction Department and were only heard of during the course of an interivew in Rome.

During this interview W/C Gladstone examined a compromise solution which had been previously studied by this Directorate and approved it, appending his signature to the drawing. He also gave other instructions for example that the 79 being prepared at the Bestetti Firm and the Agusta Firm were to have benches with backs to the walls according to the SIAI solution although this solution would have caused a delay in delivery.

He also added that the two SM 79 aircraft in preparation at the SIAI and destined for the Lord Lieutenant and the Head of the Government, were not to have any precedence over the others and that if the Transport Stormo found itself in any difficulties due to lack of serviceable aircraft, it was to use the three SM 79 on the strength of the Unità Aerea and assigned "ad personam".

Rome, 26th June 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From: AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION, H.Q. ALLI COMMISION

To: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY,
C.A.S.

Date: 27th June 1945.

Ref: AFSC/INT/G/I 342.

Arrest of Lt. Raffaele GIUSTO.

Reference your 011271/Sg.N. dated 30th May 1945, a reply has now been received from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 AFHQ to the effect that Giusto was arrested after his presence in Italy came to notice (by virtue of the fact that he passed the controls at Bari) on reasonable suspicion of his being identical with a wanted enemy agent of similar physical description.

His detention, interrogation and the establishment of his alibi through the competent Allied C.I. channels followed normal procedure and G-2 AFHQ consideres that the case was handled expeditiously and properly in all respects.

7043

The temporary loss of his documents and of a telegram handed to this Sub Commission for him, due to the removal from Bari of the F.S. Section which handled his case is being taken up with the authorities concerned. These papers will be returned to him through this Sub Commission when traced.

Allegations of misdemeanours on the part of the guard at No.1 Transit Camp to the effect that they traded with a prisoner are being investigated.

T.C.N. PEARCE W/CDR INT
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Roma, lì 8 Luglio 1945

Prot.n. 011532/Sg.U/3835 fall

ALL'A.V.M. I.E.. BRODIE
CAPO DELL'A.F.S.C./A.C.

= R O M A =

Caro Maresciallo Brodie,

7042

1. Ero stato informato della Sua visita a Lecce, del rapporto da Lei tenuto ai Comandanti e degli argomenti con essi direttamente trattati.- Stavo per scriverle su questo ed altri problemi di importanza essenziale per noi, in questo delicato periodo della nostra vita aeronautica e nazionale, quando mi è pervenuta la Sua lettera AFSC/46/AIR del 26 Giugno c.a.-

2. In omaggio alla più assoluta franchezza cui ho condizionato la mia collaborazione, fino dall'assunzione del mio difficile ed amaro compito, prima di rispondere ai vari argomenti che Lei mi prospetta, ho il dovere di chiarire la situazione che si è venuta gradualmente determinando da qualche tempo a questa parte, con grave disagio spirituale degli Enti Centrali e periferici e degli stessi Reparti dell'Arma.-

3. Con lettera AFSC/23/AIR del 27 Febbraio 1945, il suo predecessore AVM BOWEN-BUSCARLET, mi informava che secondo le direttive del Comando Supremo Alleato, relative al rilassamento del controllo sulle istituzioni del Governo Italiano, l'attività dell'AFSC avrebbe subito una metamorfosi, nel senso di concedere maggiore autonomia ed iniziativa alle Autorità Aeronautiche Italiane.-

Questa autonomia ed iniziativa, secondo il V/M BUSCARLET sarebbero state tali da impegnare direttamente ed esclusivamente il Ministero dell'Aeronautica, circa le sorti dell'Arma, la quale ""avrebbe dovuto esistere o cadere a seconda degli sforzi del Ministero della Aeronautica, di trasformarla in un'Arma efficiente e bene organizzata"" - (N°1,2,3 della lettera sopracitata).-

E' vero che con la stessa lettera si davano disposizioni così restrittive e drastiche da escludere in modo assoluto che il Ministero dell'Aeronautica potesse assumere le responsabilità che gli si voleva no attribuire - come esplicitamente dichiarai nella mia risposta.-Tut

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.1/NND No. 785017

Prot.n. [illegible]

ALL'A.V.M. I.E.. BRODIE
CAPO DELL'A.F.S.C./A.C.

= R O M A =

Caro Mariscialo Brodie,

7042

1. Ero stato informato della Sua visita a Lecce, del rapporto da Lei tenuto ai Comandanti e degli argomenti con essi direttamente trattati.- Stavo per scriverle su questo ed altri problemi di importanza essenziale per noi, in questo delicato periodo della nostra vita aeronautica e nazionale, quando mi è pervenuta la Sua lettera AFSC/46/AIR del 26 Giugno c.a.-

2. In omaggio alla più assoluta franchezza cui ho condizionato la mia collaborazione, fino dall'assunzione del mio difficile ed amaro compito, prima di rispondere ai vari argomenti che Lei mi prospetta, no il dovere di chiarire la situazione che si è venuta gradualmente determinando da qualche tempo a questa parte, con grave disagio spirituale degli Enti Centrali e periferici e degli stessi Reparti dell'Arma.-

3. Con lettera AFSC/23/AIR del 27 Febbraio 1945, il suo predecessore AVM BOWEN-BUSCARLET, mi informava che secondo le direttive del Comando Supremo Alleato, relative al rilassamento del controllo sulle istituzioni del Governo Italiano, l'attività dell'AFSC avrebbe subito una metamorfosi, nel senso di concedere maggiore autonomia ed iniziativa alle Autorità Aeronautiche Italiane.-

Questa autonomia ed iniziativa, secondo il V/M BUSCARLET sarebbero state tali da impegnare direttamente ed esclusivamente il Ministero dell'Aeronautica, circa le sorti dell'Arma, la quale ""avrebbe dovuto esistere o cadere a seconda degli sforzi del Ministero della Aeronautica, di trasformarla in un'Arma efficiente e bene organizzata"" - (N°1,2,3 della lettera sopracitata).-

E' vero che con la stessa lettera si davano disposizioni così restrittive e drastiche da escludere in modo assoluto che il Ministero dell'Aeronautica potesse assumere le responsabilità che gli si voleva no attribuire - come esplicitamente dichiarai nella mia risposta.-Tuttavia l'intenzione era apprezzabile e gradita, e di essa ci si valse per ottenere la revoca di provvedimenti che sarebbero stati nefasti e pregiudizievoli per la precaria vita dell'Aviazione Italiana e pericolosi per i conseguenti riflessi sul morale del personale e dell'intero Paese.-

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Esiste un lungo, voluminoso e doloroso carteggio al riguardo.-

Si aveva ragione di sperare che, per la fine della guerra in Europa, l'esercizio del controllo da parte Alleata, migliorasse effettivamente, nel senso annunciato fino dal febbraio 1945.- Invece la linea di condotta seguita in questi ultimi tempi dall'AFSC, non soltanto ha deluso queste speranze ma ha generalizzato in tutto il personale, anche dei reparti e di qualsiasi grado, la penosa e sconfortante sensazione che il controllo sia stato aumentato ed inasprito, senza che se ne intuisca la plausibilità dei motivi.-

Hanno contribuito ad accrescere ed avvalorare questa sensazione, i frequenti contatti che gli Ufficiali dell'AFSC prendono con i reparti, con i quali trattano direttamente molte questioni, anche delicate ed importanti, ad insaputa dello Stato Maggiore la cui unica funzione, in relazione al controllo alleato, viene ad essere così eliminata con grave pregiudizio della sua stessa ragione di essere.-

Il Suo rapporto di Lecce ha infatti allarmato il personale che, nel procedimento inconsueto, ha ritenuto logicamente di rilevare una specie di estromissione dello Stato Maggiore dell'Aeronautica, alla cui autorità e comprensione esso attribuisce la tutela degli interessi, del funzionamento e della vita dell'Arma.-

Io devo ritenere e desidero anche ammettere di gran cuore che la azione Sua e degli ufficiali dell'AFSC sia ispirata alla massima cordialità ed alla migliore assistenza; ma ho anche il dovere di prospettarle che la situazione conseguente, lungi dall'agevolare complica ed amareggia la vita dell'Arma in tutti i suoi organismi.-

Gli argomenti che seguiranno ed i documenti allegati contribuiranno a chiarire le mie affermazioni.-

Per intanto sono costretto a rammentarLe alcuni precedenti orientativi sulle condizioni spirituali del personale dell'Arma.-

4. Nell'assumere la mia carica, nel dicembre 1944 ebbi varie lunghe conversazioni con il Suo predecessore ed una con il Comandante in Capo Inglese, Sir John Slessor, sulla criticissima situazione materiale e sopratutto spirituale dell'Aeronautica.-

Esposi le gravi difficoltà di esercizio del comando che ne conseguivano sopratutto a causa delle improvvise e travolgenti crisi sin

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ropa, l'esercizio del controllo da parte Alleata, migliorasse effettivamente, nel senso annunciato fino dal febbraio 1945.- Invece la linea di condotta seguita in questi ultimi tempi dall'AFSC, non soltanto ha deluso queste speranze ma ha generalizzato in tutto il personale, anche dei reparti e di qualsiasi grado, la penosa e sconfortante sensazione che il controllo sia stato aumentato ed inasprito, senza che se ne intuisca la plausibilità dei motivi.-

Hanno contribuito ad accrescere ed avvalorare questa sensazione, i frequenti contatti che gli Ufficiali dell'AFSC prendono con i reparti, con i quali trattano direttamente molte questioni, anche delicate ed importanti, all'insaputa dello Stato Maggiore la cui unica funzione, in relazione al controllo alleato, viene ad essere così eliminata con grave pregiudizio della sua stessa ragione di essere.-

Il Suo rapporto di Lecce ha infatti allarmato il personale che, nel procedimento inconsueto, ha ritenuto logicamente di rilevare una specie di estromissione dello Stato Maggiore dell'Aeronautica, alla cui autorità e comprensione esso attribuisce la tutela degli interessi, del funzionamento e della vita dell'Arma.-

Io devo ritenere e desidero anche ammettere di gran cuore che la azione Sua e degli ufficiali dell'AFSC sia ispirata alla massima cordialità ed alla migliore assistenza; ma ho anche il dovere di prospettarle che la situazione conseguente, lungi dall'agevolare complica ed amareggia la vita dell'Arma in tutti i suoi organismi.-

Gli argomenti che seguiranno ed i documenti allegati contribuiranno a chiarire le mie affermazioni.-

Per intanto sono costretto a rammentarLe alcuni precedenti orientativi sulle condizioni spirituali del personale dell'Arma.-

4. Nell'assumere la mia carica, nel dicembre 1944 ebbi varie lunghe conversazioni con il Suo predecessore ed una con il Comandante in Capo Inglese, Sir John Slessor, sulla criticissima situazione materiale e sopratutto spirituale dell'Aeronautica.-

Esposi le gravi difficoltà di esercizio del comando che ne conseguivano sopratutto a causa delle improvvise e travolgenti crisi singole e collettive subite dal personale, i cui effetti non potevano essere sanati che con calma, tempo, autorevolezza, comprensione.-

In relazione alle attribuzioni inerenti alla mia carica, chiesi inoltre direttive circa il modo di assolverle subordinatamente alle restrizioni che inficiscono ogni iniziativa ed alle difficoltà che in

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

traiciano ogni decisione anche quando semplice e modesta (mie lettere del 7 e del 10 gennaio 1945 - risposta di Sir John Slesser del 15 gennaio 1945).-

La situazione odierna se è di fatto migliorata sensibilmente per la maggiore consistenza disciplinare dei reparti, è per contro notevolmente peggiorata per gli squilibri determinati dal recupero di altro personale non impiegabile a causa della mancanza di mezzi, e per la penosa prospettiva di riduzione del personale già impiegato in guerra ed oggi esuberante, dal punto di vista alleato, in relazione al progressivo esaurimento del materiale di volo, non più rinnovato con mezzi alleati ed alimentato solo con mezzi e risorse nazionali, ma anche questi gestiti secondo l'insindacabile criterio alleato.- Tale criterio, naturalmente, molto diverso da quello di stretta economia e di massima utilizzazione che noi applicheremmo se avessimo la facoltà di amministrare liberamente i nostri aerei nuovi, quelli vecchi e gli stessi rottami.-

In queste condizioni le dirette interferenze aliene fra Enti Centrali e periferici, non possono che ingenerare incomprensioni, equivoci, delusioni, preoccupazioni avvenire che minano alla base tutto il lavoro di distensione e rinnovamento svolto finora con tanta fatica dallo Stato Maggiore attraverso ad amarezze ed umiliazioni che egli riteneva suo preciso dovere subire, pur di eliminarne ed attuarne le ripercussioni alla periferia.-

Ed è bene che non si dimentichi l'importanza essenziale e fondamentale di questa opera delicata e difficile, dalla quale dipende non soltanto la migliore esplicazione di quel pò di attività aerea che ci è oggi consentita a servizio degli Alleati, ma anche e sopratutto il valore del contributo che l'Aeronautica potrà dare con il proprio personale, in ogni modo e sotto ogni forma alla ricostruzione spirituale e materiale del Paese.- Prego Lei, caro Maresciallo BRODIE ed i suoi Ufficiali di voler tener presente tutto questo, se direttive politiche a me ignote non lo vietano.-

E vengo agli argomenti singoli.-

5. A guerra Europea finita la base di Lecce, come tutte le altre organizzazioni Aeronautiche Italiane, è rimasta in attesa di disposizione da parte dello Stato Maggiore, il quale le aveva a suo volta richieste agli Alleati, con apposito promemoria, contenente delle propo

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78507/7

re del 7 e del 10 gennaio 1945 - risposta di Sir John Slessor del 15 gennaio 1945).-

La situazione odierna se è di fatto migliorata sensibilmente per la maggiore consistenza disciplinare dei reparti, è per contro notevolmente peggiorata per gli squilibri determinati dal recupero di altro personale non impiegabile a causa della mancanza di mezzi, e per la penosa prospettiva di riduzione del personale già impiegato in guerra ed oggi esuberante, dal punto di vista alleato, in relazione al progressivo esaurimento del materiale di volo, non più rinnovato con mezzi alleati ed alimentato solo con mezzi e risorse nazionali, ma anche questi gestiti secondo l'insindacabile criterio alleato.- Tale criterio, naturalmente, molto diverso da quello di stretta economia e di massima utilizzazione che noi applicheremmo se avessimo la facoltà di amministrare liberamente i nostri aerei nuovi, quelli vecchi e gli stessi rottami.-

In queste condizioni le dirette interferenze aliente fra Enti Centrali e periferici, non possono che ingenerare incomprensioni, equivoci, delusioni, preoccupazioni avvenire che minano alla base tutto il lavoro di distensione e rinnovamento svolto finora con tanta fatica dallo Stato Maggiore attraverso ad amarezze ed umiliazioni che egli riteneva suo preciso dovere subire, pur di eliminarne ed attuarne le ripercussioni alla periferia.-

Ed è bene che non si dimentichi l'importanza essenziale e fondamentale di questa opera delicata e difficile, dalla quale dipende non soltanto la migliore applicazione di quel pò di attività aerea che ci è oggi consentita a servizio degli Alleati, ma anche e sopratutto il valore del contributo che l'Aeronautica potrà dare con il proprio personale, in ogni modo e sotto ogni forma alla ricostruzione spirituale e materiale del Paese.- Prego Lei, caro Maresciallo BRODIE ed i suoi Ufficiali di voler tener presente tutto questo, se direttive politiche a me ignote non lo vietano.-

E vengo agli argomenti singoli.-

5. A guerra Europea finita la base di Lecce, come tutte le altre organizzazioni Aeronautiche Italiane, è rimasta in attesa di disposizione da parte dello Stato Maggiore, il quale le aveva a suo volta richieste agli Alleati, con apposito promemoria, contenente delle proposte di massima, circa il futuro impiego della R.A. (lettera 011070/Sg.U del 28 aprile 1945).-

Fino ad allora Lecce aveva sempre funzionato con piena soddisfazione da parte Alleata e senza il minimo incidente, per una quantità di mezzi aerei molto superiore a quella attuale: una grossa unità di Liberators, tutto il Bombardamento ed i Trasporti italiani e tutta o quasi tutta la Caccia.-

.../7040

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Ciò significa che, per quanto le singole persone dei comandanti possano essere criticabili, esse hanno pur risposto bene, durante la guerra e nelle peggiori condizioni di servizio di quell'Aeroporto.-

Se oggi esse appaiono alquanto incerte ed inerti, si è perchè difettano di direttive precise a carattere generale e non possono assumersi iniziative per insufficienza di autorità ed eccesso di controllo.-

In altri termini, esse si trovano nelle mie stesse condizioni e ne subiscono i medesimi effetti, naturalmente in iscala ridotta.-

Lei stesso, del resto, riconosce implicitamente questa situazione all'inizio del n.4 della Sua lettera.-

Dalla Sua frase risulta infatti chiaramente che nè io nè la possibilità di tentare una qualche riorganizzazione aeronautica, nè Lei è in grado di consigliarmi in proposito, perchè non ancora al corrente di quello che potrà essere il nostro destino a breve scadenza di tempo.- E' impossibile ritenere che i Comandanti in sottordine ed i reparti non risentano le conseguenze di simile situazione.-

6. L'Unità Aerea è anche essa soggetta alle incertezze di questa aspettativa che tarda molto a chiarirsi; essa non può essere quindi ritenuta responsabile della eccessiva vaghezza delle direttive che io posso darle, in attesa di realizzare qualche cosa di più preciso completo e razionale.-

La voce che corre circa la lentezza del trasferimento della squadriglia Caccia da Canne a Lecce e che Lei attribuisce al deficiente funzionamento del Comando Unità Aerea, non era che una mia direttiva alla quale l'Unità ed i reparti si sono attenuti.-

Questa direttiva era intesa a favorire il personale dei Gruppi combattenti affinchè le operazioni del trasferimento non protraessero troppo l'invio in licenza presso le proprie famiglie, degli aviatori più meritevoli.- Senza questo provvedimento, sarebbe accaduto che i non combattenti sarebbero stati favoriti nei confronti dei combattenti, con giustificato risentimento di questi ultimi.-

L'ordine, che d'altra parte ritenevo mia facoltà di dare, non avrebbe comunque nuociuto al funzionamento dei reparti e dei servizi; perchè i reparti, dopo l'intensa attività di guerra svolta ed a causa dell'allontanamento di una parte del personale, avrebbero dovuto avere un certo periodo di riposo e revisione del materiale [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Se oggi esse appaiono alquanto incerte ed inerti, si è perchè difettano di direttive precise a carattere generale e non possono assumersi iniziative per insufficienze di autorità ed eccesso di controllo.-

In altri termini, esse si trovano nelle mie stesse condizioni e ne subiscono i medesimi effetti, naturalmente in iscala ridotta.-

Lei stesso, del resto, riconosce implicitamente questa situazione all'inizio del n.4 della Sua lettera.-

Dalla Sua frase risulta infatti chiaramente che nè io nè la possibilità di tentare una qualche riorganizzazione aeronautica, nè Lei è in grado di consigliarmi in proposito, perchè non ancora al corrente di quello che potrà essere il nostro destino a breve scadenza di tempo.- E' impossibile ritenere che i Comandanti in sottordine ed i reparti non risentano le conseguenze di simile situazione.-

6. L'Unità Aerea è anche essa soggetta alle incertezze di questa aspettativa che tarda molto a chiarirsi; essa non può essere quindi ritenuta responsabile della eccessiva vaghezza delle direttive che io posso darle, in attesa di realizzare qualche cosa di più preciso completo e razionale.-

La voce che corre circa la lentezza del trasferimento della squadriglia Caccia da Canne a Lecce e che Lei attribuisce al deficiente funzionamento del Comando Unità Aerea, non era che una mia direttiva alla quale l'Unità ed i reparti si sono attenuti.-

Questa direttiva era intesa a favorire il personale dei Gruppi combattenti affinchè le operazioni del trasferimento non protraessero troppo l'invio in licenza presso le proprie famiglie, degli aviatori più meritevoli.- Senza questo provvedimento, sarebbe accaduto che i non combattenti sarebbero stati favoriti nei confronti dei combattenti, con giustificato risentimento di questi ultimi.-

L'ordine, che d'altra parte ritenevo mia facoltà di dare, non avrebbe comunque nuociuto al funzionamento dei reparti e dei servizi; perchè i reparti, dopo l'intensa attività di guerra svolta ed a causa dell'allontanamento di una parte del personale, avrebbero dovuto avere un certo periodo di riposo e revisione del materiale, mentre i servizi allestiti (ricupero delle piste metalliche) non avrebbero sofferto ritardi, una volta che gli aerei si fossero trasferiti immediatamente a Lecce, come l'ordine stabiliva e come fu fatto.-

Come vede non si è trattato di resistenza passiva da parte delle

../7039

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

squadriglie, per la supposta delusione del mancato trasferimento al Nord.- Se così fosse stato, il Comando Unità e lo stesso Stato Maggiore sarebbero incorsi in una deficienza funzionale talmente grave da meritare i più severi giudizi e provvedimenti.-

Analogamente per quanto riguarda la richiesta dei mezzi di trasporto, è necessario considerare che il materiale da trasferire da Canne a Lecce era notevolmente superiore a quello trasferito da Lecce a Canne.-

Questo ultimo trasferimento, imposto da esigenze operative urgenti, fu inizialmente eseguito trasportando lo stretto indispensabile.- Successivamente i Gruppi migliorarono le loro troppo precarie sistemazioni in rapporto alla stagione invernale, con successivi trasporti parziali.- Infine, nello sgombero di Canne, dovettero trasportare a Lecce anche dei pagliericci a tamiere ondulata che furono loro ceduti sul posto dai reparti che li precedettero.-

7. Lei stesso afferma di non potermi dare precisi ragguagli su cui basare la nostra riorganizzazione.- Per contro nella Sua lettera mi espone considerazioni, consigli e direttive di dettaglio che aumentano il nostro disagio.-

a) - Che l'attuale organizzazione dell'Unità Aerea risulti pesante in relazione al nuovo schieramento ed alle nuove attribuzioni dei reparti, è naturale ed era da attendersi; tanto vero che io la avrei già modificata se ne avessi avuto la facoltà.-

Tuttavia non è esatto che ogni reparto di Lecce abbia un reparto corrispondente, gerarchicamente superiore, presso il Comando Unità Aerea, come risulta dall'ordinamento in vigore.-

I reparti di Lecce, in mancanza di nuovi ordini hanno continuato a funzionare come per il passato, secondo le precedenti direttive alleate, quando erano sotto il controllo operativo dei singoli ufficiali alleati dislocati presso le varie Unità, in diretto collegamento con il BAF.-

Alla fine della guerra Europea l'azione di questi Ufficiali ha cambiato aspetto, per la evidente ragione che oggi l'impiego dei reparti non interessa più il BAF, ma l'AFSC.-

Tuttavia nessuno ha comunicato ufficialmente e tutt'oggi, allo Stato Maggiore od al Comando Unità, questo pure importante trapasso di dipendenza per l'impiego.-

Ciò non toglie che per la parte disciplinare la Base di Lecce di

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Nord.- Se così fosse stato, il Comando Unità e lo stesso Stato Maggiore sarebbero incorsi in una deficienza funzionale talmente grave da meritare i più severi giudizi e provvedimenti.-

Analogamente per quanto riguarda la richieste dei mezzi di trasporto, è necessario considerare che il materiale da trasferire da Canne a Lecce era notevolmente superiore a quello trasferito da Lecce a Canne.-

Questo ultimo trasferimento, imposto da esigenze operative urgenti, fu inizialmente eseguito trasportando lo stretto indispensabile.- Successivamente i Gruppi migliorarono le loro troppo precarie sistemazioni in rapporto alla stagione invernale, con successivi trasporti parziali.- Infine, nello sgombero di Canne, dovettero trasportare a Lecce anche dei padiglioni a tamiera onculata che furono loro ceduti sul posto dai reparti che li precedettero.-

7. Lei stesso afferma di non potermi dare precisi ragguagli su cui basare la nostra riorganizzazione.- Per contro nella Sua lettera mi espone considerazioni, consigli e direttive di dettaglio che aumentano il nostro disagio.-

a) - Che l'attuale organizzazione dell'Unità Aerea risulti pesante in relazione al nuovo schieramento ed alle nuove attribuzioni dei reparti, è naturale ed era da attendersi; tanto vero che io la avrei già modificata se ne avessi avuto la facoltà.-

Tuttavia non è esatto che ogni reparto di Lecce abbia un reparto corrispondente, gerarchicamente superiore, presso il Comando Unità Aerea, come risulta dall'ordinamento in vigore.-

I reparti di Lecce, in mancanza di nuovi ordini hanno continuato a funzionare come per il passato, secondo le precedenti direttive alleate, quando erano sotto il controllo operativo dei singoli ufficiali alleati dislocati presso le varie Unità, in diretto collegamento con il BAF.-

Alla fine della guerra Europea l'azione di questi Ufficiali ha cambiato aspetto, per la evidente ragione che oggi l'impiego dei reparti non interessa più il BAF, ma l'AFSC.-

Tuttavia nessuno ha comunicato ufficialmente a tutt'oggi, allo Stato Maggiore od al Comando Unità, questo pure importante trapasso di dipendenza per l'impiego.-

Ciò non toglie che per la parte disciplinare la Base di Lecce dipenda di fatto dal Comandante più elevato in grado, secondo le disposizioni del vecchio ordinamento della R.A.-

Che questi svolga le proprie attribuzioni in modo più o meno soddisfacente dal punto di vista Alleato, è un'altra questione.- Gli Alleati hanno il diritto di esigerne la sostituzione secondo il loro

7037

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

giudizio.- Ma sarebbe forse opportuno che non suggerissero i nomi dei sostituti, per la scarsa conoscenza che hanno del personale, per l'imbarazzo in cui mettono lo Stato Maggiore al riguardo, e per i deprecabili riflessi che si avrebbero nei reparti, con conseguenze che gli stessi Alleati sarebbero i primi a deplorare e che imporrebbero nuove sostituzioni a breve scadenza di tempo, con grave disagio morale del personale e dello Stato Maggiore.- Ritornerò in seguito su questo importante e delicato argomento.-

b) - Nessuno ha saputo fino ad oggi, che la Base di Lecce sarebbe stata affidata ai soli reparti della R.A. e che questi avrebbero dovuto permanervi.-

Al contrario, si era parlato della utilizzazione di tutto il Bombardamento per il Trasporto e del probabile trasferimento della Caccia altrove.-

c) - Nessuno poteva pensare che si decidesse l'improvviso trasferimento della Scuola Caccia da Frosinone a Lecce, effettuando così il quarto movimento nello spazio di otto mesi (dal 3 novembre 1944 al 18 giugno 1945) da Campo Vesuvio a Gaudo, a Frosinone, a Lecce, con le inevitabili conseguenze che ne derivano: materiali, sul rendimento della Scuola; morali, sullo spirito del personale.-

d) - Analoghe considerazioni valgono per il trasferimento della Scuola di Leverano a Lecce, con la non indifferente complicazione della costruzione ex-novo di una pista divergente di 20 gradi dalla precedente, per l'importo minimo di 12 milioni di lire di spesa e l'impiego di notevole tempo per l'ultimazione dei lavori.-

Il nostro punto di vista è quello di spendere l'esiguo e stremato bilancio, per lavori indispensabili ed utilizzabili anche per il futuro.-

Non sembra a noi che la costruzione della nuova pista rientri fra questo genere di lavoro.-

Ed è anche per questa ragione che nelle conversazioni preliminari, la cui conclusione è stata comunicata direttamente ai reparti ma non allo Stato Maggiore, era stato proposto il trasferimento della Scuola di Leverano a S.Pancrazio, e non a Lecce.-

Dal foglio accluso (all.1) risulta inoltre che il trasferimento della Scuola da Leverano a Lecce avrebbe dovuto avvenire dal 25 giugno al 7 luglio.- Anche di questa tassativa disposizione lo Stato Maggiore non è stato informato che dai propri dipendenti e non ha potuto quindi intervenire in nessun modo, in attesa di chiarimenti o di ordini precisi.-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

[illegible] del personale, per l'imbarazzo in cui mettono lo Stato Maggiore al riguardo, e per i deprecabili riflessi che si avrebbero nei reparti, con conseguenze che gli stessi Alleati sarebbero i primi a deplorare e che imporrebbero nuove sostituzioni a breve scadenza di tempo, con grave disagio morale del personale e dello Stato Maggiore.- Ritornerò in seguito su questo importante e delicato argomento.-

b) - Nessuno ha saputo fino ad oggi, che la Base di Lecce sarebbe stata affidata ai soli reparti della R.A. e che questi avrebbero dovuto permanervi.-

Al contrario, si era parlato della utilizzazione di tutto il Bombardamento per il Trasporto e del probabile trasferimento della Caccia altrove.-

c) - Nessuno poteva pensare che si decidesse l'improvviso trasferimento della Scuola Caccia da Frosinone a Lecce, effettuando così il quarto movimento nello spazio di otto mesi (dal 3 novembre 1944 al 18 giugno 1945) da Campo Vesuvio a Gaudo, a Frosinone, a Lecce, con le inevitabili conseguenze che ne derivano: materiali, sul rendimento della Scuola; morali, sullo spirito del personale.-

d) - Analoghe considerazioni valgono per il trasferimento della Scuola di Leverano a Lecce, con la non indifferente complicazione della costruzione ex-novo di una pista divergente di 20 gradi dalla precedente, per l'importo minimo di 12 milioni di lire di spesa e l'impiego di notevole tempo per l'ultimazione dei lavori.-

Il nostro punto di vista è quello di spendere l'esiguo e stremato bilancio, per lavori indispensabili ed utilizzabili anche per il futuro.-

Non sembra a noi che la costruzione della nuova pista rientri fra questo genere di lavoro.-

Ed è anche per questa ragione che nelle conversazioni preliminari, la cui conclusione è stata comunicata direttamente ai reparti ma non allo Stato Maggiore, era stato proposto il trasferimento della Scuola di Leverano a S.Pancrazio, e non a Lecce.-

Dal foglio accluso (all.1) risulta inoltre che il trasferimento della Scuola da Leverano a Lecce avrebbe dovuto avvenire dal 25 giugno al 7 luglio.- Anche di questa tassativa disposizione lo Stato Maggiore non è stato informato che dai propri dipendenti e non ha potuto quindi intervenire in nessun modo, in attesa di chiarimenti o di ordini precisi.

A questo riguardo devo dichiarare che per le ragioni sopra esposte, lo Stato Maggiore è di parere nettamente contrario al trasferimento della Scuola di Leverano a Lecce ed alla costruzione di una nuova pista su quell'aeroporto.

7035

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Se a malgrado di queste esplicita dichiarazione l'AFSC ritiene di confermare il proprio punto di vista, non ne che da disporre e lo ordine sara eseguito nel migliore e più sollecito dei modi.-

e) - In attesa di un nuovo e più razionale ordinamento verrà disposto secondo le vostre richieste:

- che il Comandante la Base di Lecce assuma il controllo disciplinare,logistico e d'impiego di tutti i reparti ivi dislocati;
- che i contatti tra gli Ufficiali di collegamento della RAF con gli Ufficiali dei reparti, avvengano sempre e soltanto tramite il Comando della Base;
- che il Comandante della Base indica le riunioni settimanali dei Comandanti di reparto e dei capi sezione del Comando, per trattare gli argomenti che il GC/ Ufficio metterà in discussione, al fine di raggiungere nel più sollecito modo quel funzionamento aeroportuale che risponda ai criteri ed ai desideri dell'AFSC.-

f) - Allo stato delle cose ed a meno che si tratti di un ordine esplicito da parte Alleata da notificare al Governo ed agli interessati, non è possibile al Ministero di estromettere gli Ufficiali superiori in servizio nell'Arma, senza incorrere in serie ripercussioni di carattere morale e materiale.-

Infatti, non esiste ancora una legge per la riduzione dei quadri che consideri e disciplini questo provvedimento il quale dovrà certo essere preso, ma solo quando gli Alleati avranno risolto esplicitamente le sorti della R.A. e sulla base delle disponibilità del bilancio che le attribuirà il Paese.-

Questo problema è il più grave e delicato che il Ministero dovrà affrontare; e dal modo come lo risolverà, ne conseguiranno gli effetti buoni o cattivi per quanto rimarrà della R.A. e per il Paese.-

D'altra parte, il personale attualmente in servizio e quello previsto dagli organici proposti a richiesta del M.A.A.F. e di massima confermati dall'AFSC.-

g) - Analoghe considerazioni vanno fatte per quanto concerne il numero degli equipaggi e dei piloti.- Per questi è un pò difficile lo allontanamento quale strano premio per aver partecipato brillantemente alla guerra contro la Germania.-

Inoltre questi due problemi - comuni a tutte le Forze Armate - non sono soltanto militari, ma anche politici.- E' quindi indispensa

che le autorità politiche responsabili dell'ordine interno del

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ordine sarà eseguito nel migliore e più sollecito dei modi.-

e) - In attesa di un nuovo e più razionale ordinamento verrà disposto secondo le vostre richieste:

- che il Comandante la Base di Lecce assuma il controllo disciplinare, logistico e d'impiego di tutti i reparti ivi dislocati;
- che i contatti tra gli Ufficiali di collegamento della RAF con gli Ufficiali dei reparti, avvengano sempre e soltanto tramite il Comando della Base;
- che il Comandante della Base indica le riunioni settimanali dei Comandanti di reparto e dei capi sezione del Comando, per trattare gli argomenti che il GC/ Olleson metterà in discussione, al fine di raggiungere nel più sollecito modo quel funzionamento aeroportuale che risponda ai criteri ed ai desideri dell'AFSC.-

f) - Allo stato delle cose ed a meno che si tratti di un ordine esplicito da parte Alleata da notificare al Governo ed agli interessati, non è possibile al Ministero di estromettere gli Ufficiali superiori in servizio nell'Arma, senza incorrere in serie ripercussioni di carattere morale e materiale.-

Infatti, non esiste ancora una legge per la riduzione dei quadri che consideri e disciplini questo provvedimento il quale dovrà certo essere preso, ma solo quando gli Alleati avranno fissato esplicitamente le sorti della R.A. e sulla base delle disponibilità del bilancio che le attribuirà il Paese.-

Questo problema è il più grave e delicato che il Ministero dovrà affrontare; e dal modo come lo risolverà, ne conseguiranno gli effetti buoni o cattivi per quanto rimarrà della R.A. e per il Paese.-

D'altra parte, il personale attualmente in servizio è quello previsto dagli organici proposti e richiesta dal M.A.A.F. e di massima confermati dall'AFSC.-

g) - Analoghe considerazioni vanno fatte per quanto concerne il numero degli equipaggi e dei piloti.- Per questi è un pò difficile lo allontanamento quale strano premio per aver partecipato brillantemente alla guerra contro la Germania.-

Inoltre questi due problemi - comuni a tutte le Forze Armate - non sono soltanto militari, ma anche politici.- E' quindi indispensabile che le autorità politiche responsabili dell'ordine interno del Paese e della sua ricostruzione, li studino e li risolvano secondo le migliori possibilità al fine di prevedere e prevenire le più serie conseguenze.-

Lo Stato Maggiore potrà risolvere la questione dal punto di vista tecnico-militare, quando avrà avuto i dati precisi sui quali impostare la soluzione.-

7033

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Ma è indispensabile che questi dati esistano, quale che sia la loro entità, e che l'autorità politica ne valuti la portata e disponga in conseguenza.-

Sembra quanto meno imprudente muoversi in questo campo, sulla base di supposizioni ed induzioni, poichè la gravità delle conseguenze lo sconsiglia, specie nella delicata ed instabile situazione interna in cui il Paese si trova.-

8. Mi riferisco agli immediati provvedimenti da prendere, contenuti nella lettera.-

a) - Saranno emanate le istruzioni che desiderate circa il funzionamento della Scuola Controllo del Volo a Lecce.-

Per quanto riguarda il personale da assegnare alla Scuola si cercherà di utilizzare quello da voi indicato.- Non ho capito perchè il Capitano ZEGRINI dovrebbe essere promosso Ufficiale superiore per il controllo del volo.-

Nei nostri ruoli non esistono le promozioni temporanee in relazione alle funzioni esercitate.- La promozione è sempre definitiva e come tale non può essere concessa che entro i precisi termini stabiliti dalle leggi in vigore, alle quali bisognerà pure attenersi fino a quando non siano state sostituite da altre.-

b) - Nella questione degli uffici Operazioni si è certamente incorsi in un equivoco che è opportuno chiarire.-

Nella R.A. l'Ufficio Operazioni di Stormo si occupa di addestramento in pace e di operazioni in guerra.-

Quello che Lei chiama l'Ufficio Operazioni di Base, e per noi il Comando Aeroporto con relative attribuzioni circa i servizi meteorologici ed il movimento e la disciplina di volo sull'aeroporto.-

Gli uffici di Stormo non interferiscono affatto con quello di aeroporto, alle cui direttive sottostiamo per quanto riguarda la disciplina di volo aeroportuale.-

A guerra finita gli uffici Operazioni di Stormo prendono nome e funzioni di uffici Addestramento, seguendo a questo scopo le attività singole e collettive dei reparti dello Stormo.-

Non mi sembra, quindi, che vi siano varianti da effettuare al riguardo, a meno che l'AFSC desideri l'abolizione degli Uffici Addestramento di Stormo.- In tal caso, però, dovrebbe far capo all'Ufficio Operazioni di aeroporto, anche tutta la parte relativa all'addestramen

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

loro entità, e che l'autorità politica ne valuti la pericolosità e agisca in conseguenza.-

Semora quanto meno imprudente muoversi in questo campo, sulla base di supposizioni ed induzioni, poiche la gravità delle conseguenze lo sconsiglia, specie nella delicata ed instabile situazione interna in cui il Paese si trova.-

8. Mi riferisco agli immediati provvedimenti da prendere, contenuti nella lettera.-

a) - Saranno emanate le istruzioni che desiderate circa il funzionamento della Scuola Controllo del Volo a Lecce.-

Per quanto riguarda il personale da assegnare alla Scuola si cercherà di utilizzare quello da voi indicato.- Non ho capito perche il Capitano ZERINI dovrebbe essere promosso Ufficiale superiore per il controllo del volo.-

Nei nostri ruoli non esistono le promozioni temporanee in relazione alle funzioni esercitate.- La promozione è sempre definitiva e come tale non può essere concessa che entro i precisi termini stabiliti dalle leggi in vigore, alle quali bisognerà pure attenersi fino a quando non siano state sostituite da altre.-

b) - Nella questione degli Uffici Operazioni si è certamente incorsi in un equivoco che è opportuno chiarire.-

Nella R.A. l'Ufficio Operazioni di Stormo si occupa di addestramento in pace e di operazioni in guerra.-

Quello che Lei chiama l'Ufficio Operazioni di Base, e per noi il Comando Aeroporto con relative attribuzioni circa i servizi meteorologici ed il movimento e la disciplina di volo sull'aeroporto.-

Gli uffici di Stormo non interferiscono affatto con quello di aeroporto, alle cui direttive sottostiamo per quanto riguarda la disciplina di volo aeroportuale.-

A guerra finita gli uffici Operazioni di Stormo prendono nome e funzioni di uffici Addestramento, seguendo a questo scopo le attività singole e collettive dei reparti dello Stormo.-

Non mi semora, quindi, che vi siano varianti da effettuare al riguardo, a meno che l'AFSC desideri l'abolizione degli Uffici Addestramento di Stormo.- In tal caso, però, dovrebbe far capo all'Ufficio Operazioni di aeroporto, anche tutta la parte relativa all'addestramento singolo e collettivo delle diverse specialità dislocate sull'aeroporto stesso.-

La qualcosa non è mai parsa opportuna nello studio degli ordinamenti della R.A., sia perche estromette i Comandanti dei reparti che dovranno poi guidarli e risponderne nelle operazioni di guerra, sia perche si darebbero in tal modo, esorbitanti attribuzioni all'ufficio aeroportuale di controllo del volo.-

7039

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Circa la designazione della persona fra il Maggiore SCOTTU ed il Capitano RUGGERO mi riserbo di rispondere, risultandomi finora che lo SCOTTU sia un elemento molto apprezzato, al quale non si possa infliggere un provvedimento umiliante e dannoso per lui, se non in seguito all'accertamento di sicuri e provati motivi.

c)- Il cambio di Comandante del Raggruppamento Caccia avvenne per molte e serie ragioni di carattere importante e delicato che il Suo predecessore AVM Buscarlet conobbe e condivise pienamente.

Il ritorno sulla decisione presa allora, a così' breve scadenza di tempo, sarebbe incomprensibile per i dipendenti, indecoroso per lo Stato Maggiore, imbarazzante per il Comando Unità Aerea, a tutto scapito degli sforzi fatti finora per normalizzare una situazione morale e disciplinare gravemente compromessa e che minacciava di peggiorare.

Una sostituzione potrà avvenire appena possibile, con elemento diverso da quello da Lei indicato.

Nessuna considerazione di carattere professionale può avere oggi, a guerra finita, maggior valore di quelle che imposero, a suo tempo, la sostituzione.

Poichè ritengo che Lei non possa avere avuto tempo e modo di conoscere il nostro personale debbo presumere che questo trasferimento Le sia stato suggerito da qualcuno dei Suoi o dei miei Ufficiali. Questo procedimento è molto pericoloso per il morale e la disciplina dei miei dipendenti.

Sarebbe bene, quindi, che io fossi interpellato in simili circostanze, prima che la Sua scelta si fissasse sui singoli. Perchè se non no e non avrò mai difficoltà da opporre, quando simili provvedimenti non ledano a mio giudizio gli interessi di servizio singoli o collettivi, avrò sempre il dovere di farlo in caso contrario, motivandone esplicitamente le ragioni.

d)- Condivido il Suo parere circa la persona del Comandante della Base di Lecce che ebbe a suo tempo quella destinazione dal mio predecessore Generale PIACENTINI in seguito al gradimento da questi richiesto ed ottenuto dai gregari dei Reparti da Bombardamento, secondo un nuovo strano procedimento elettivo da me abolito.

Ma sono spiacente di non potere condividere il Suo parere sul sostituto che Lei propone, per solide ragioni che, a Sua richiesta, potrò esporle verbalmente.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

il Capitano RUGGERO mi riserbo di rispondere, risultandomi finora che lo SCOTTU sia un elemento molto apprezzato, al quale non si possa infliggere un provvedimento umiliante e dannoso per lui, se non in seguito all'accertamento di sicuri e provati motivi.

c)- Il cambio di Comandante del Raggruppamento Caccia avvenne per molte e serie ragioni di carattere importante e delicato che il Suo predecessore AVM Buscarlet conobbe e condivise pienamente.

Il ritorno sulla decisione presa allora, a cosi' breve scadenza di tempo, sarebbe incomprensibile per i dipendenti, indecoroso per lo Stato Maggiore, imbarazzante per il Comando Unita Aerea, a tutto scapito degli sforzi fatti finora per normalizzare una situazione morale e disciplinare gravemente compromessa e che minacciava di peggiorare.

Una sostituzione potra avvenire appena possibile, con elemento diverso da quello da Lei indicato.

Nessuna considerazione di carattere professionale può avere oggi, a guerra finita, maggior valore di quelle che imposero, a suo tempo, la sostituzione.

Poiche ritengo che Lei non possa avere avuto tempo e modo di conoscere il nostro personale debbo presumere che questo trasferimento Le sia stato suggerito da qualcuno dei Suoi o dei miei Ufficiali. Questo procedimento e molto pericoloso per il morale e la disciplina dei miei dipendenti.

Sarebbe bene, quindi, che io fossi interpellato in simili circostanze, prima che la Sua scelta si fissasse sui singoli. Perchè se non no e non avro mai difficolta da opporre, quando simili provvedimenti non ledano a mio giudizio gli interessi di servizio singoli o collettivi, avro sempre il dovere di farlo in caso contrario, motivandone esplicitamente le ragioni.

d)- Condivido il Suo parere circa la persona del Comandante della Base di Lecce che ebbe a suo tempo quella destinazione dal mio predecessore Generale PIACENTINI in seguito al gradimento da questi richiesto ed ottenuto dai gregari dei Reparti da Bombardamento, secondo un nuovo strano procedimento elettivo da me abolito.

Ma sono spiacente di non potere condividere il Suo parere sul sostituto che Lei propone, per solide ragioni che, a Sua richiesta, potrò esporLe verbalmente.

Conto di effettuare la sostituzione appena possibile, con elemento adatto.

e)- Gli ordini urgenti ed importanti sono sempre trasmessi per telescrivente o, se non segreti, anche per telefono. Per il trasferimento della Sezione Caccia da Frosinone a Lecce fu telefonato prima e scritto poi al Comando Unita.

E' certo che la Sua telefonata diretta al GC/ OLLASON, deve essere giunta a Lecce prima degli ordini del Comando Unita, il quale però ha disposto in merito a stretto giro di posta.

7031

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78507/7

9. Mi recherò a Lecce dopo rientrato dal giro che intendo fare nell'Italia Settentrionale, partendo subito dopo avviate le disposizioni contenute nella Sua lettera ed allegato, cui questa risponde.

Nel frattempo vi si è recato il Sotto-Capo di Stato Maggiore Colonnello [redacted] in accompagnamento del Ministro e con mie precise istruzioni. Desidero tuttavia chiarire che le mie visite avrebbero un sicuro benefico effetto morale, qualora potessi portare le notizie soddisfacenti che il personale attende ansiosamente.

Le visite da me fatte finora sono state utili soltanto per dimostrare al personale il vivo ed appassionato intervento dello Stato Maggiore in difesa delle sorti dell'Arma e dei suoi componenti,; eliminando illusioni, sì; ma anche confortando più modeste speranze.

L'insieme delle circostanze attuali non mi consentirebbe che di deludere anche le piu' modeste speranze.

Tuttavia farò fino alla fine il mio dovere, anche in questo delicatissimo campo, ma nelle circostanze e con le modalità più favorevoli che la mia sensibilità di Comandante saprà indicarmi.

RISPOSTA ALL'APPENDICE "A"

I. E' stato già ordinato che il Controllo di volo in Lecce sia accentrato al piu' presto nel fabbricato principale destinato a questo uso.

II. Nulla da obiettare circa la destinazione dei fabbricati di Lecce da Lei stabilita in occasione della Sua visita.

III. Prima di dare ordini per la costituzione di una nuova pista di volo sull'Aeroporto di Lecce, La prego di considerare le obbiezioni opposte ed il pensiero espresso al riguardo.

Resto in attesa della conferma del Suo ordine, prima di prospettare la spesa al Ministero e dare corso all'inizio dei lavori.

IV. E' già stato disposto, secondo il Suo desiderio, di porre la Sezione Scuola Caccia alle dipendenze del Comando Raggruppamento Caccia, fino a nuovo ordine.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

nell'Italia Settentrionale, partendo subito dopo avviate le disposizioni contenute nella Sua lettera ed allegato, cui questa risponde.

Nel frattempo vi si è recato il Sotto-Capo di Stato Maggiore Colonnello REMONDINO in accompagnamento del Ministro e con mie precise istruzioni. Desidero tuttavia chiarire che le mie visite avrebbero un sicuro benefico effetto morale, qualora potessi portare le notizie soddisfacenti che il personale attende ansiosamente.

Le visite da me fatte finora sono state utili soltanto per dimostrare al personale il vivo ed appassionato intervento dello Stato Maggiore in difesa delle sorti dell'Arma e dei suoi componenti,; eliminando illusioni, sì; ma anche confortando più modeste speranze.

L'insieme delle circostanze attuali non mi consentirebbe che di deludere anche le piu' modeste speranze.

Tuttavia farò fino alla fine il mio dovere, anche in questo delicatissimo campo, ma nelle circostanze e con le modalità più favorevoli che la mia sensibilità di Comandante saprà indicarmi.

RISPOSTA ALL'APPENDICE "A"

I. E' stato già ordinato che il Controllo di volo in Lecce sia accentrato al piu' presto nel fabbricato principale destinato a questo uso.

II. Nulla da obiettare circa la destinazione dei fabbricati di Lecce da Lei stabilita in occasione della Sua visita.

III. Prima di dare ordini per la costituzione di una nuova pista di volo sull'Aeroporto di Lecce, La prego di considerare le obbiezioni opposte ed il pensiero espresso al riguardo.

Resto in attesa della conferma del Suo ordine, prima di prospettare la spesa al Ministero e dare corso all'inizio dei lavori.

IV. E' già stato disposto, secondo il Suo desiderio, di porre la Sezione Scuola Caccia alle dipendenze del Comando Raggruppamento Caccia, fino a nuovo ordine.

Non vi sarà nessuno spreco di energia seguendo il programma di istruzione che è stato stabilito dallo Stato Maggiore ed il cui ciclo potrà essere completamente svolto quando le Scuole avranno modo di funzionare con una certa regolarità, senza esecuzione né minaccie di altri trasferimenti. La Scuola Caccia è considerata da noi come istruzione preliminare per tutte le specialità, specie oggi che esistono aerei da Bombardamento veloci monocomandi e che il pilota deve

7034

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

preventivamente familiarizzarsi con tutti gli assetti dell'aereo in volo e con tutte le manovre conseguenti.

V. La trasformazione del Cant. Z. 1007 bis in passeggeri è riuscita abbastanza bene; il prototipo è stato trasportato a Centocelle per vostro esame.

Io credo sia opportuno trasformare tutti i Cant.Z.1007 bis in trasporto dato che questo aereo serve meglio per il trasporto che per la Scuola. Tanto più che il Cant.Z.1007 bis non potrà mai sostituire utilmente i Baltimore della Scuola di Frosinone, fino a che rimarrà in servizio uno Stormo Baltimore, i cui pochi piloti occorrenti dovranno comunque essere addestrati sul Baltimore (bimotore facile all'imbardata) e non sul Cant.Z.1007 bis, che ha caratteristiche di pilotaggio notevolmente diverse. Il numero dei Baltimore della Scuola potrà essere ridotto; ma non potrà essere sostituito il tipo di aereo fino allo scioglimento od alla trasformazione dello Stormo Baltimore.

VI. In relazione al Suo desiderio di trasferire altrove la S.R.A. di S.Vito di Taranto a lavori in corso ultimati, ritengo sarebbe opportuno dislocare macchinari e parte del personale presso la S.R.A.M. Bombardamento e Trasporto di Lecce.-

Per parte del personale, intendo quello specializzato che sarà giudicato indispensabile per completare l'organico tecnico della S.R.A.M. di Lecce.- Il rimanente personale potrà essere trasferito ad altri Enti o dimesso.-

In tal modo l'hangar di S.Vito di Taranto sarà reso disponibile per la R.Marina Britannica.-

VII. Fra le due soluzioni che Lei mi espone riterrei più conveniente ed utile suggerirne una terza che sarebbe anche gradita agli Enti Tecnici del Ministero (Direzione Costruzioni).-

E cioè: graduale contrazione del ritmo di lavoro, riducendo i compiti della S.R.A.M. di Galatina a quelli di revisione parziale dei motori e di assistenza occasionale agli aerei in transito per quella base, fino a che questa svolgerà traffico per aerei da Bombardamento e Trasporto.-

Successivamente potrebbe essere adottata una delle due soluzioni

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

in volo e con tutte le manovre [illegible]

V. La trasformazione del Cant. Z. 1007 bis in passeggeri è riuscita abbastanza bene; il prototipo è stato trasportato a Centocelle per vostro esame.

Io credo sia opportuno trasformare tutti i Cant.Z.1007 bis in trasporto dato che questo aereo serve meglio per il trasporto che per la Scuola. Tanto più che il Cant.Z.1007 bis non potrà mai sostituire ultimente a Baltimore della Scuola di Frosinone, fino a che rimarrà in servizio uno Stormo Baltimore, i cui pochi piloti occorrenti dovranno comunque essere addestrati sul Baltimore (bimotore facile all'imbardata) e non sul Cant.Z.1007 bis, che ha caratteristiche di pilotaggio notevolmente diverse. Il numero dei Baltimore della Scuola potrà essere ridotto; ma non potrà essere sostituito il tipo di aereo fino allo scioglimento od alla trasformazione dello Stormo Baltimore.

VI. In relazione al Suo desiderio di trasferire altrove la S.R.A. di S.Vito di Taranto a lavori in corso ultimati, ritengo sarebbe opportuno dislocare macchinari e parte del personale presso la S.R.A.M. Bombardamento e Trasporto di Lecce.-

Per parte del personale, intendo quello specializzato che sarà giudicato indispensabile per completare l'organico tecnico della S.R.A.M. di Lecce.- Il rimanente personale potrà essere trasferito ad altri Enti o almeno.-

In tal modo l'hangar di S.Vito di Taranto sarà reso disponibile per la R.Marina Britannica.-

VII. Fra le due soluzioni che Lei mi espone riterrei più conveniente ed utile suggerirne una terza che sarebbe anche gradita agli Enti Tecnici del Ministero (Direzione Costruzioni).-

E cioè: graduale contrazione del ritmo di lavoro, riducendo i compiti della S.R.A.M. di Galatina a quelli di revisione parziale dei motori e di assistenza occasionale agli aerei in transito per quella base, fino a che questa svolgerà traffico per aerei da Bombardamento e Trasporto.-

Successivamente potrebbe essere adottata una delle due soluzioni da Lei proposte, a seconda delle esigenze e della situazione del momento che non possono essere previste fin d'ora, in modo sicuro.-

Circa la Ditta S.A.C.A. di Brindisi i suoi rapporti con la R.A. saranno automaticamente interrotti dalla immanente cessazione dei lavori sugli Alla 12b, per esaurimento di parti di ricambio.-

7029

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

VIII. Per quanto riguarda le revisioni dei motori DB.605 e DB.601 il provvedimento di rendere più frequenti le "general Overhauls", che vengono fatte presso l'C.R.M. di Brindisi è già stato adottato, così che non vengono più fatte "top Overhauls".-

IX. La R.A. non ne abbondanza di autisti.- La cifra di 960 portata in una situazione della Direzione Personale, include nello stesso numero autisti conduttori ed aiuto autisti non conduttori.-

Il Direttore del Personale ha in corso i provvedimenti per sopperire nel modo più sollecito alle esigenze della colonna S e T di Gravinazzo e di tutti gli altri Enti Aeronautici che dirottano di questi specialisti.-

ALTRI ARGOMENTI CONNESSI CON L'Esercizio del controllo da parte dell'AFSC/AC

1. Nella mia lettera in data 10 gennaio 1949 a Sir John Slessor, richiesi il ritorno del Ministero e dello Stato Maggiore dell'Aeronautica, nella loro sede, adducendo essenziali motivi di carattere morale e materiale.-

La risposta di Sir John Slessor, in data 15 gennaio 1949, dava adito a qualche speranza.-

Si è ancora in attesa di una decisione, nonostante la disponibilità dei locali presso la sede del Ministero avrebbe sempre consentito la riunione degli Enti Centrali, oggi sparsi per la città di Roma, in ben otto località diverse e lontane fra di loro, con le conseguenze di spese, lavoro, movimento, deficiente controllo, perdita di tempo, scarso rendimento, che è facile immaginare.-

2. Dopo una lunga e penosa controversia si era riusciti ad ottenere che gli aerei italiani da accantonare avrebbero dovuto essere salvati. Le Sue ultime disposizioni hanno riaperto la questione come se nulla fosse stato deciso al riguardo, contrariamente alle assicurazioni che ci sono state date.-

3. Si fissa il massimo delle ore di lavoro oltre il quale gli aerei avariati o comunque da ripristinare devono essere demoliti, nonostante che le industrie italiane siano in crisi e debbano pagare gli ope

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

provvedimento di rendere più frequenti le "general Overhauls", che vengono fatte presso l'O.R.M. di Brindisi e già stato adottato, così che non vengono più fatte "top Overhauls".-

IX. La R.A. non ha abbondanza di autisti.- La cifra di 900 portata in una situazione della Direzione Personale, include nello stesso numero autisti conduttori ed altri autisti non conduttori.-

Il Direttore del Personale ha in corso i provvedimenti per sopperire nel modo più sollecito alle esigenze della colonna S e T di Grottaglie e di tutti gli altri Enti Aeronautici che dipendono da questi specialisti.-

ALTRI ARGOMENTI CONNESSI CON L'esercizio del controllo da parte dell'AFSC/AC

1. Nella mia lettera in data 10 gennaio 1945 a Sir John Slessor, richiesi il ritorno del Ministero e dello Stato Maggiore dell'Aeronautica, nella loro sede, adducendo essenziali motivi di carattere morale e materiale.-

La risposta di Sir John Slessor, in data 15 gennaio 1945, dava adito a qualche speranza.-

Si è ancora in attesa di una decisione, nonostante la disponibilità dei locali presso la sede del Ministero avrebbe sempre consentito la riunione degli Enti Centrali, oggi sparsi per la città di Roma, in ben otto località diverse e lontane fra di loro, con le conseguenze di spese, lavoro, movimento, deficiente controllo, perdita di tempo, scarso rendimento, che è facile immaginare.-

2. Dopo una lunga e penosa controversia si era riusciti ad ottenere che gli aerei italiani da accantonare avrebbero dovuto essere salvati. Le Sue ultime disposizioni hanno riaperto la questione come se nulla fosse stato deciso al riguardo, contrariamente alle assicurazioni che ci sono state date.-

3. Si fissa il massimo delle ore di lavoro oltre il quale gli aerei avariati o comunque da ripristinare devono essere demoliti, nonostante che le industrie italiane siano in crisi e debbano pagare gli operai anche senza lavorare.-

Questo provvedimento sarebbe comprensibile se le industrie italiane dovessero lavorare quanto prima per conto degli Alleati.- Altrimenti perchè togliere vecchi aerei all'Aeronautica e lavoro all'industria?

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

4. La questione dell'Accademia Aeronautica non è stata ancora risolta.- Gli Istituti di Reclutamento delle altre Forze Armate, invece, non hanno mai subito sospensioni di corsi anche se avranno avuto limitazioni nel numero degli allievi.-

L'Aeronautica non ha certo demeritato per subire un trattamento sfavorevole nei confronti delle altre Forze Armate.- E il tempo stringe.-

5. Nonostante la posizione che sono stato costretto a prendere nella questione del Colonnello Martire (lettera 011301/Sg.U del 2 giugno 1945), la cui condotta disciplinare è stata sommamente deplorevole non mi sembra sia stato ancora fatto qualche cosa per sanarla a tutela della disciplina interna dell'Arma, ed a convalida dell'autorità e del prestigio del superiore.-

Eppure gli stessi ufficiali Alleati dovrebbero deplorare con noi che ufficiali della R.A. cerchino di interessarli ai loro casi personali di competenza dei superiori italiani (vedi ad esempio il caso del Ten.Col. Dentice avvenuto sotto il Suo predecessore, che arrecò un serio imbarazzo al Ministro di allora e mise in falsa posizione un Generale dell'Arma).-

6. La risposta (allegato 2) pervenuta in seguito alle mie rimostranze sull'arbitrario arresto e detenzione del pilota da caccia Ten. Giusto Raffaele, appartenente ad un reparto combattente impegnato in operazioni di guerra a fianco degli Alleati, informa che "arresto, interrogazione e presentazione dell'allora, seguirono la normale procedura e che il Comando Forze Alleate G-2 è d'avviso che il caso fu trattato speditamente sotto tutti i punti di vista".-

Non mi sembra tuttavia che ci si possa compiacere della normalità della procedura e della speditezza degli accertamenti.-

Io devo osservare, invece, che non può apparire normale:

- arrestare un ufficiale combattente della cui identità ed attività risponde tutta una scala gerarchica di superiori, perfettamente noti ai Comandi Alleati;

- arrestarlo nuovamente dopo averlo già una volta arrestato e poi rilasciato, ingannando per giunta l'ufficiale superiore suo comandante, che lo accompagnava per tutelarne le sorti, pronto ad assumere la sua parte di responsabilità;

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4. La questione dell'Accademia Aeronautica non è stata ancora risolta.- Gli Istituti di Reclutamento delle altre Forze Armate, invece, non hanno mai subito sospensioni di corsi anche se avranno avuto limitazioni nel numero degli allievi.-

L'Aeronautica non ha certo demeritato per subire un trattamento sfavorevole nei confronti delle altre Forze Armate.- E il tempo stringe.-

5. Nonostante la posizione che sono stato costretto a prendere nella questione del Colonnello Martire (lettera 011301/Sg.U del 2 giugno 1945), la cui condotta disciplinare è stata sommamente deplorevole non mi sembra sia stato ancora fatto qualche cosa per sanarla a tutela della disciplina interna dell'Arma, ed a convalida dell'autorità e del prestigio del superiore.-

Eppure gli stessi ufficiali Alleati dovrebbero deplorare con noi che ufficiali delle R.A. cercano di interessarli ai loro casi personali di competenza dei superiori italiani (vedi ad esempio il caso del Ten.Col. Dentice avvenuto sotto il Suo predecessore, che arrecò un serio imbarazzo al Ministro di allora e mise in falsa posizione un Generale dell'Arma).-

6. La risposta (allegato 2) pervenuta in seguito alle mie rimostranze sull'arbitrario arresto e detenzione del pilota da caccia Ten. Giusto Raffaele, appartenente ad un reparto combattente impegnato in operazioni di guerra a fianco degli Alleati, informa che "arresto, interrogazione e presentazione dell'allora, seguirono la normale procedura e che il Comando Forze Alleate G-2 è d'avviso che il caso fu trattato speditamente sotto tutti i punti di vista".-

Non mi sembra tuttavia che ci si possa compiacere della normalità della procedura e della speditezza degli accertamenti.-

Io devo osservare, invece, che non può apparire normale:

- arrestare un ufficiale combattente della cui identità ed attività risponde tutta una scala gerarchica di superiori, perfettamente noti ai Comandi Alleati;

- arrestarlo nuovamente dopo averlo già una volta arrestato e poi rilasciato, ingannando per giunta l'ufficiale superiore suo comandante, che lo accompagnava per tutelarne le sorti, pronto ad assumere la sua parte di responsabilità;

- detenere questo ufficiale per 40 giorni senza notificargli le accuse, come un colpevole comune ed in compagnia non certo piacevole e meritata;

- rilasciarlo dopo 40 giorni senza nemmeno scusarsi per l'equivoco.-

7027

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Nella mia lettera deploravo una simile procedura che non solo danneggia ed offende il colpito, ma umilia, e seriamente, anche l'organizzazione cui questo appartiene.-

Se la risposta non ha trattato questo argomento, avrebbe potuto per lo meno contenere una deplorazione dell'incidente da parte del comando Forze Alleate G-2, da trasmettere all'interessato per compensarlo in parte delle sofferenze morali e materiali sofferte e dimostrare agli inferiori gli effetti, sia pure modestissimi, del doveroso interessamento dell'autorità superiore.-

7. Le accludo uno stralcio di relazione della Direzione Costruzioni relativo alla trasformazione degli S.79 da bellici in trasporto (allegato 3).-

Da questa relazione risulta che le soluzioni prospettate dal Colonnello Ingegnere capo della Direzione Costruzioni, sarebbero migliori di quelle prospettate dalla Ditta, ed inizialmente approvate dal W/C Gladstone.-

Non è quindi chiaro perchè debbano essere adottate soluzioni promiscue anzichè la soluzione migliore.-

La soluzione delle panche addossate alle pareti, consigliata dall'urgenza della trasformazione, è già più logica di quella con i sedili opportuni.-

In ogni modo prescindendo dalla risoluzione tecnica del problema, sarebbe bene che gli Enti Centrali del Ministero non fossero esautorati nei riguardi delle Ditte, da interventi intempestivi e contrastanti.- Nulla impedirebbe di fatto, che il W/C Gladstone interpellasse preventivamente la Direzione Costruzioni, visto che anche questo Ente è chiamato ad interessarsi dei problemi che il W/C/ Gladstone svolge, secondo le direttive del Capo dell'A.F.S.C.-

Devo pregarla inoltre di indurre il W/C Gladstone ad evitare per l'avvenire di esprimersi come ha fatto nei riguardi degli aerei da approntare per il Luogotenente e per il Presidente del Consiglio e di preannunciare drastici provvedimenti per altra utilizzazione degli aerei destinati in uso alle più Alte Autorità Aeronautiche.-

Tutto può essere fatto e disposto nella dovuta forma, anche mediante ordini tassativi ed indiscutibili.-

Ma non sembra opportuno, specie nel delicato momento attuale, che [illegible] di ufficiali subordinati dell'AFSC, si ostenti scarso riguar-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Nella mia lettera deploravo una simile procedura che non solo danneggia ed offende il colpito, ma umilia, e seriamente, anche l'organizzazione cui questo appartiene.-

Se la risposta non ha trattato questo argomento, avrebbe potuto per lo meno contenere una deplorazione dell'incidente da parte del comando Forze Alleate G-2, da trasmettere all'interessato per compensarlo in parte delle sofferenze morali e materiali sofferte e dimostrare agli inferiori gli effetti, sia pure modestissimi, del doveroso interessamento dell'autorità superiore.-

7. Le accludo uno stralcio di relazione della Direzione Costruzioni relativo alla trasformazione degli S.79 da bellici in trasporto (allegato 3).-

Da questa relazione risulta che le soluzioni prospettate dal Colonnello Ingegnere capo della Direzione Costruzioni, sarebbero migliori di quelle prospettate dalla Ditta, ed inizialmente approvate dal W/C Gladstone.-

Non è quindi chiaro perchè debbano essere adottate soluzioni promiscue anzichè la soluzione migliore.-

La soluzione delle panche addossate alle pareti, consigliata dall'urgenza della trasformazione, è già più logica di quella con i sedili opportuni.-

In ogni modo prescindendo dalla risoluzione tecnica del problema, sarebbe bene che gli Enti Centrali del Ministero non fossero esautorati nei riguardi delle Ditte, da interventi intempestivi e contrastanti.- Nulla impedirebbe di fatto, che il W/C Gladstone interpellasse preventivamente la Direzione Costruzioni, visto che anche questo Ente è chiamato ad interessarsi dei problemi che il W/C/ Gladstone svolge, secondo le direttive del Capo dell'A.F.S.C.-

Devo pregarLa inoltre di indurre il W/C Gladstone ad evitare per l'avvenire di esprimersi come ha fatto nei riguardi degli aerei da approntare per il Luogotenente e per il Presidente del Consiglio e di preannunciare drastici provvedimenti per altra utilizzazione degli aerei destinati in uso alle più Alte Autorità Aeronautiche.-

Tutto può essere fatto e disposto nella dovuta forma, anche mediante ordini tassativi ed indiscutibili.-

Ma non sembra opportuno, specie nel delicato momento attuale, che da parte di Ufficiali subordinati dell'AFSC, si ostenti scarso riguardo per le **più Alte Autorità** Politiche e Militari Italiane.-

8. Risulta che il Ten.Col.Corsini Comandante del Raggruppamento Idro, abbia avuto incarico dal W/C Clift di studiare la collaborazione fra

7026

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

aerei e mezzi navali alleati nelle operazioni di salvataggio.- Anziche ricevere la notizie dal proprio subordinato lo Stato Maggiore avrebbe gradito esserne direttamente e preventivamente informato.-

9. Risulta che il W.C. Gladstone abbia annunciato che se i servizi di cui sopra dovranno prendere sviluppo, verrebbe ritirato l'idro attualmente destinato ai servizi di collegamento Elmas-Bracciano.- Dati i lunghi e penosi precedenti per addivenire all'esercizio di questa linea d'importanza essenziale per i collegamenti con la Sardegna, sarebbe stato meglio attuare questo provvedimento al momento opportuno, se indispensabile,senza turbare preventivamente gli interessati.-

10. I problemi ed i lavori che interessano la vita della piccola Aeronautica che opera sono molti,difficili e delicati, ma sono di gran lunga inferiori a quelli che interessano la liquidazione e lo sgombero della più grande Aeronautica che fu.-

Le si sarebbe infinitamente grati, ove questa dolorosa realtà che incombe su chi ha l'amaro onere di affrontarla e superarla, fosse tenuta presente, ad evitare complicazioni e disagi che ritardano il lavoro ricostruttivo e che, persistendo, finirebbero con lo scoraggiare anche i più sani e volitivi ottimismi.=

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
Generale di Squadra Aerea
(Mario AJMONE-CAT)

7025

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Lecce, li 18 Giugno 1945

RAGGRUPPAMENTO BOMBARDAMENTO
E TRASPORTI

proт.n.3391/ord.

ALLEGATO N.1
- AL COMANDO UNITA' AEREA =BARI=

OGGETTO: Visita Generale Brodie.=

In data odierna il Generale BRODIE, in visita a questa base, convocato i Com.ti dei Raggruppamenti, i Com.ti di Reparti, i Capi dei Servizi Tecnici ed aeroportuali, interessati ai prossimi movimenti dei Reparti ed ha fatto loro le seguenti comunicazioni:

1° - Trasferimento Scuola Pilotaggio Caccia -

La Scuola con la relativa S.R.A. si trasferisce sull'Aeroporto di Lecce.
Il movimento, dovrebbe iniziarsi il giorno 25 c.m. ed ultimarsi entro il 7 Luglio.
Per la niova sistemazione verranno trasportati da Leverano all'Aeroporto di Lecce i baraccamenti e le tende.

2° - CAMPO DI VOLO DI LECCE

In relazione all'attività di volo che dovrà svolgervi la Scuola anche nella stagione invernale, sono previsti immediati lavori per la livellazione della superficie del campo e per l'allestimento di una pista trasversale e quella esistente.-

3° - UFFICIO OPERAZIONI (Traffico)

Dovrà essere unico per tutti i Reparti della base e convogliare il servizio meteorologico e controllo traffico.

In conseguenza dovranno essere aboliti gli uffici operazione esistenti presso detti Reparti.

4° - STORMO NOTTURNO

Trasferimento del I° Gruppo (S.82 a Roma sul campo di Centocelle oppure guidonia.
La questione allo stato presente degli studi, prevede la dislocazione su Centocelle con rifornimento dei velivoli a Pisa.

5° - S.R.A. DEL RAGGRUPPAMENTO B.T.

S.R.A. AEROPORTO LECCE

Siccome è previsto che le grandi riparazioni saranno in avvenire affidate alle Ditte, ridurrà organici ed attività in rapporto alle l'entità dei lavori che resteranno assegnati.-

S.R.A. S.VITO: Ultimerà i suoi lavori circa i Cant.Z ed S.79 ammessi con particolare elenco e poi chiuderà.=

IL COMANDANTE
F/to Col Pilota LEONE Leonello

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

In data odierna il Generale BRODIE, in visita a questa base, convocato i Com.ti dei Raggruppamenti, i Com.ti di Reparti, i Capi dei Servizi Tecnici ed aeroportuali, interessati ai prossimi movimenti dei Reparti ed ha fatto loro le seguenti comunicazioni:

1° - Trasferimento Scuola Pilotaggio Caccia -

La Scuola con la relativa S.R.A. si trasferisce sull'Aeroporto di Lecce.
Il movimento, dovrebbe iniziarsi il giorno 25 c.m. ed ultimarsi entro il 7 Luglio.
Per la nuova sistemazione verranno trasportati da Leverano all'Aeroporto di Lecce i baraccamenti e le tende.

2° - CAMPO DI VOLO DI LECCE

In relazione all'attività di volo che dovrà svolgervi la Scuola anche nella stagione invernale, sono previsti immediati lavori per la livellazione della superficie del campo e per l'allestimento di una pista trasversale e quella esistente.-

3° - UFFICIO OPERAZIONI (Traffico)

Dovrà essere unico per tutti i Reparti della base e convogliare il servizio meteorologico e controllo traffico.

In conseguenza dovranno essere aboliti gli uffici operazione esistenti presso detti Reparti.

4° - STORMO NOTTURNO

Trasferimento del I° Gruppo (S.82 a Roma sul campo di Centocelle oppure guidonia.
La questione allo stato presente degli studi, prevede la dislocazione su Centocelle con rifornimento dei velivoli a Pisa.

5° - S.R.A. DEL RAGGRUPPAMENTO B.T.

S.R.A. AEROPORTO LECCE

Siccome è previsto che le grandi riparazioni saranno in avvenire affidate alle Ditte, ridurrà organici ed attività in rapporto all'entità dei lavori che resteranno assegnati.-

S.R.A. S.VITO: Ultimerà i suoi lavori circa i Cant.Z ed S.79 ammessi con particolare elenco e poi chiuderà.=

IL COMANDANTE
F/to Col.Pilota LEONE Leonello

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ALLEGATO 3

MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA
Direzione delle Costruzioni Aeronautiche

PROMEMORIA PER S.E.
IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R.A.
S E D E

Questioni tecniche varie trattate con la A.F.S.C.

In occasione di un recente abboccamento avvenuto tra un Ufficiale di questa Direzione ed il W.C. Gladstone della A.F.S.C. sono stati esaminati vari argomenti dei quali si elencano i principali:

1) APPARECCHI SM.79 DA TRASPORTO IN CORSO DI APPRONTAMENTO PRESSO ALCUNE DITTE DEL NORD.-

Come è già noto a codesto S.M. la sistemazione dei posti passeggeri negli apparecchi in questione era stata studiata dalla SIAI che aveva concretato una soluzione con otto posti abbinati di cui quattro con fronte alla direzione di marcia e quattro di spalle. Tale soluzione presentava però vari inconvenienti tra cui quello più grave derivava dalla situazione incresciosa che si sarebbe verificata qualora qualcuno dei passeggeri avesse avuto a soffrire per il volo in aria agitata.

Era stata perciò studiata un'altra soluzione che, pur essendo equivalente a quella della Ditta agli effetti del centraggio, prevedeva dei posti singoli e tutti con fronte marcia. Questa idea era stata accennata al W.C. Gladstone il quale l'aveva approvata pur ponendo la condizione chetale variante non dovesse portare alcun ritardo alle date di consegna.

7022

L'Ufficiale inviato a Sesto Calende per impartire gli ordini esecutivi in proposito trovò sul posto il W.C. Gladstone il quale esaminò le due soluzioni, quella della SIAI e quella del Ministero, e preferì la prima impartendo alla Ditta i seguenti ordini:

a) I primi quattro apparecchi devono uscire nella versio

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Questioni tecniche [illegible]

In occasione di un recente abboccamento avvenuto tra un Ufficiale di questa Direzione ed il W.C. Gladstone della A.F.S.C. sono stati esaminati vari argomenti dei quali si elencano i principali:

1) APPARECCHI SM.79 DA TRASPORTO IN CORSO DI APPRONTAMENTO PRESSO ALCUNE DITTE DEL NORD.-

Come è già noto a codesto S.M. la sistemazione dei posti passeggeri negli apparecchi in questione era stata studiata dalla SIAI che aveva concretato una soluzione con otto posti abbinati di cui quattro con fronte alla direzione di marcia e quattro di spalle. Tale soluzione presentava però vari inconvenienti tra cui quello più grave derivava dalla situazione incresciosa che si sarebbe verificata qualora qualcuno dei passeggeri avesse avuto a soffrire per il volo in aria agitata.

Era stata perciò studiata un'altra soluzione che, pur essendo equivalente a quella della Ditta agli effetti del centraggio, prevedeva dei posti singoli e tutti con fronte marcia. Questa idea era stata accennata al W.C. Gladstone il quale l'aveva approvata pur ponendo la condizione chetale variante non dovesse portare alcun ritardo alle date di consegna.

7022

L'Ufficiale inviato a Sesto Calende per impartire gli ordini esecutivi in proposito trovò sul posto il W.C. Gladstone il quale esaminò le due soluzioni, quella della SIAI e quella del Ministero, e preferì la prima impartendo alla Ditta i seguenti ordini:

a) I primi quattro apparecchi devono uscire nella versione SIAI, ma due con gabinetto e due senza.

b) I lavori per la sistemazione della posta nei poppini devono invece proseguire. Questi ordini non vennero comunicati all'Ufficiale delle Costruzioni e sono stati conosciuti solo nel corso di un colloquio avvenuto qui a Roma.

./.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

In tale colloquio il W.C. Gladstone esaminò una soluzione di compromesso studiata ulteriormente da questa Direzione e la approvò apponendo la sua firma sullo schizzo illustrativo; dette inoltre altre disposizioni e cioè che i 79 in approntamento presso la Ditta Bestetti e presso l'Agusta dovevano uscire con la soluzione SIAI o addirittura con le panche addossate alle pareti qualora la soluzione SIAI avesse causato un qualsiasi ritardo nelle consegne.

Aggiunse anche che i due apparecchi SM.79 in preparazione alla SIAI e destinati al Luogotenente ed al Capo del Governo non dovevano avere alcuna precedenza sugli altri e che se lo Stormo Trasporti si fosse trovato in difficoltà per mancanza di aeroplani efficenti avrebbe dovuto utilizzare i tre SM.79 in forza all'Unità Aerea ed assegnati "ad personam".-

Roma, li 26 Giugno 1945.-

7020

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Car/c

ALLEGATO 2

Dal : Air Forces Sub Commission,H.Q.A.C.
Al : Ministero dell'Aeronautica
Data : 27 Giugno 1945
Prot. : AFSC/INT/G/I/342

ARRESTO DEL TEN.Raffaele GIUSTO

Con riferimento alla vostra 011271/Sg.N. datata 30 Maggio 945 è giunta risposta dall'Assistente Chief of Staff G-2 del Comando Forze Alleate, informando che il Ten.GIUSTO fu arrestato dopo che era stata segnalata la sua presenza in Italia (in vista del fatto che egli aveva passato i controlli a Bari) sul ragionevole sospetto della sua identica somiglianza con un agente nemico ricercato.

Il suo arresto, interrogazione e presentazione del suo alibi attraverso i competenti organi Alleati del C.I.seguirono la normale procedura ed il Comando Forze Alleate G-2 è d'avviso che il caso fu trattato speditamente sotto tutti i riguardi.

La perdita temporanea dei suoi documenti e di un telegramma consegnato a questa Sottocommissione per lui, perdita causata dal trasferimento da Bari della Servizi Sicurezza che trattava il caso, è oggetto di discussione con le autorità interessate. Questi documenti gli saranno restituiti attraverso questa Sottocommissione appena rintracciati.

Si sta investigando sul presunto cattivo comportamento della guardie al Campo di Transiti n.1 che lo avrebbero trattato con un prigioniero.-

f/to T.G.N.PEARCE, W/CDR IV 7019
per AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

0500

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

56A (t)

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA.

ROME.
6th July 1945.

Ref: 011520/Sg.U/3290.

To Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Brodie,
A.F.S.C. A.C. Rome.

D918 4/7/45

46/2i

45A

Dear Air Vice--Marshal,

I am replying to your letter of the 25th June 1945, reference AFSC/46 /AIR.

1. The initiative in the official formation of a Regia Aeronautica General Command for the North of Italy was taken by the A.F.S.C. and not by this H.Q. following an interview which you gave GENERAL BIFFI.

I had not even envisiaged this solution as I was waiting for the political situation to be clarified, and had given GENERAL BIFFI the widest attributions in order to resolve as soon as possible and without excessive friction an equivocal situation generated by the C.L.N.A.I. exercising all the powers.

This new ambiguity added to the strange directive issued by COLONEL CHARLES POLETTI, of which I am including a copy, and which will have to be clarified by the A.F.S.C/A.C, justifies what I foresaw and my subsequent line of conduct.

The POLETTI decree in general, is a repetition of the decree issued previously by C.L.N.A.I. and abolished by Colonel POLETTI with a measure of general character.

This was no doubt done from the point of view of COL. POLETTI for a just and good cause, but it has neither solved nor simplified the situation.

2. The official designation adopted by order No.16419 of the 4th June 1945, emanating from the Cabinet of the Minister for Air is the one which General BIFFI communicated to me from notes made in the course of conversation.

I have no doubt that General BIFFI's error lay in not having differentiated between "ALTA ITALIA" and "ITALIA SITTENTRIONALE".

I wish, nevertheless, to point out that I had received no direct communication, either verbally or in writing on this subject, and in consequence having heard what GENERAL BIFFI had to say about the matter, I had no reason to discuss it, busy as I was, in order to establish the functions of the new Command, in a way which would be useful at present and less prejudicial in the future.

I must confess, on the other hand, that I, myself, cannot find a significant difference between 'ALTA ITALIA' and 'ITALIA SETTENTRIONALE', because in fact this difference does not exist in the Italian language - I pointed this out to W/CDR. PEARCE some time ago.

3. What I have found superfluous, is the adjective "GENERALE" attributed to the Comando Aeronautica "A.I" o "I.S", because it has not been the habit of the Regia Aeronautica to give this appellative to the territorial Commands, which are

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. The initiative in the official formation of a Regia Aeronautica General Command for the North of Italy was taken by the A.F.S.C. and not by this H.Q. following an interview which you gave GENERAL BIFFI.

I had not even envisiaged this solution as I was waiting for the political situation to be clarified, and had given GENERAL BIFFI the widest attributions in order to resolve as soon as possible and without excessive friction an equivocal situation generated by the C.L.N.A.I. exercising all the powers.

This new ambiguity added to the strange directive issued by COLONEL CHARLES POLETTI, of which I am including a copy, and which will have to be clarified by the A.F.S.C/A.C, justifies what I foresaw and my subsequent line of conduct.

The POLETTI decree in general, is a repetition of the decree issued previously by C.L.N.A.I. and abolised by Colonel POLETTI with a measure of general character.

This was no doubt done from the point of view of COL. POLETTI for a just and good cause, but it has neither solved nor simplified the situation.

2. The official designation adopted by order No.16419 of the 4th June 1945, emanating from the Cabinet of the Minister for Air is the one which General BIFFI communicated to me from notes made in the course of conversation.

I have no doubt that General BIFFI's error lay in not having differentiated between "ALTA ITALIA" and "ITALIA SITTENTRIONALE".

I wish, nevertheless, to point out that I had received no direct communication, either verbally or in writing on this subject, and in consequence having heard what GENERAL BIFFI had to say about the matter, I had no reason to discuss it, busy as I was, in order to establish the functions of the new Command, in a way which would be useful at present and less prejudicial in the future. 701

I must confess, on the other hand, that I, myself, cannot find a significant difference between 'ALTA ITALIA' and 'ITALIA SETTENTRIONALE', because in fact this difference does not exist in the Italian language - I pointed this out to W/CDR. PEARCE some time ago.

3. What I have found superfluous, is the adjective "GENERALE" attributed to the Comando Aeronautica "A.I" o "I.S", because it has not been the habit of the Regia Aeronautica to give this appellative to the territorial Commands, which are all commanded by Generals, all of very high rank:

i.e:

COMANDO AERONAUTICA DELLA LIBIA.
COMANDO AERONAUTICA DELLA SICILIA.
AERONAUTICA DELLA SARDEGNA.
COMANDO AERONAUTICA DELL'EGEO.

4. As will be noted the word "Regia" has never been inserted in the designations of the Territorial Aeronautical Commands.

gk 12/7

Continued/2.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

All the above mentioned Commands have always had the above appellatives which in writing have borne the Royal Coat of Arms, exactly as will be found in the attached cutting from a letter addressed to this Headquarters.

GENERAL BIFFI using intelligent initiative and without the necessity of receiving any particular orders to this effect, has already regularised integrally this question.

It will not, therefore, be necessary to give other orders than those of changing the "A.I" to "I.S" and to avail of the opportunity, if you agree, to omit the "GENERALE" which is new and superfluous in our establishment.

5. The Cabinet is awaiting your decision before taking further action.

(SGD)
M. AIMONE-CAT,
GENERAL.
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF.

7017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

36A

= R I S E R V A T A =

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Roma, li 6 Luglio 1945

prot.n. 011520 /Sg.U 3790

ALL'AIR VICE MARESCIALLO I.E. BRODIE
- Capo A.F.S.C. - A.C. -
R O M A

Caro Maresciallo Brodie,

rispondo alla Sua lettera AFSC/46/AIR del 29.6.1945.

1. L'iniziativa della costituzione ufficiale di un Comando Generale della R.A., per l'Italia del Nord, non è partita da questo Stato Maggiore ma dalla A.F.S.C. a seguito del colloquio da Lei avuto con il Generale BIFFI.

Io non mi ero nemmeno prospettato questa soluzione in attesa che la situazione politica fosse meglio chiarita e pur avendo investito il Generale BIFFI delle più ampie attribuzioni allo scopo di risolvere al più presto e senza eccessivi attriti, la situazione equivoca generata dall'esercizio di tutti i poteri, da parte del C.L.N.A.I.-

Il nuovo equivoco aggiunto dalla strana ordinanza del Colonnello Charles POLETTI, che Le accludo in copia (allegato 1) e che bisognerà senz'altro chiarire da parte della A.F.S.C./A.C/ giustifica le mie previsioni e la mia conseguente linea di condotta al riguardo.

L'ordinanza POLETTI, in sostanza, ripete quella a suo tempo fatta dal C.L.N.A.I. e da lui abolita con provvedimento di carattere generale.

Essa è certo stata emanata a fin di bene, dal punto di vista 7016
del Colonnello POLETTI, ma non serve nè a risolvere nè a semplificare la situazione.

2. La designazione ufficiale adottata con ordine n° 16419 del 4/6 1945 del Gabinetto del Ministro è quella che il Generale BIFFI, di ritorno dal Suo ufficio, mi comunicò, traendola da appunti presi nel corso della conversazione.
Non esito a credere che il BIFFI sia incorso in errore, non avendo fatto differenza fra "Alta Italia" e "Italia Settentrio

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ammiraglio Vice Maresciallo T.E. Brodie
- Capo A.F.S.C. - A.C. -
ROMA

Caro Maresciallo Brodie,

rispondo alla Sua lettera AFSC/46/AIR del 29.6.1945.

1. L'iniziativa della costituzione ufficiale di un Comando Generale della R.A., per l'Italia del Nord, non è partita da questo Stato Maggiore ma dalla A.F.S.C. a seguito del colloquio da Lei avuto con il Generale BIFFI.

Io non mi ero nemmeno prospettato questa soluzione in attesa che la situazione politica fosse meglio chiarita e pur avendo investito il Generale BIFFI delle più ampie attribuzioni allo scopo di risolvere al più presto e senza eccessivi attriti, la situazione equivoca generata dall'esercizio di tutti i poteri, da parte del C.L.N.A.I.-

Il nuovo equivoco aggiunto dalla strana ordinanza del Colonnello Charles POLETTI, che Le accludo in copia (allegato 1) e che bisognerà senz'altro chiarire da parte della A.F.S.C./A.C./ giustifica le mie previsioni e la mia conseguente linea di condotta al riguardo.

L'ordinanza POLETTI, in sostanza, ripete quella a suo tempo fatta dal C.L.N.A.I. e da lui abolita con provvedimento di carattere generale.

Essa è certo stata emanata a fin di bene, dal punto di vista del Colonnello POLETTI, ma non serve nè a risolvere nè a semplificare la situazione.

2. La designazione ufficiale adottata con ordine n° 16419 del 4/6 1945 del Gabinetto del Ministro è quella che il Generale BIFFI, di ritorno dal Suo ufficio, mi comunicò, traendola da appunti presi nel corso della conversazione.
Non esito a credere che il BIFFI sia incorso in errore, non avendo fatto differenza fra "Alta Italia" e "Italia Settentrionale".

Desidero tuttavia ricordare che a me non è pervenuta nessuna notizia diretta al riguardo, nè verbale nè scritta, e che per conseguenza, di fronte alla dizione comunicatami dal BIFFI, non ho avuta nessuna ragione di discuterne i termini, occupato, co

./.

7001/6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

me ero, di stabilire le funzioni del nuovo Comando, nel modo più utile per il presente e meno pregiudizievole per l'avvenire.

Devo, d'altra parte, confessare che io stesso non avrei rilevato una sensibile differenza fra "Alta Italia" e "Italia Settentrionale", perchè di fatto questa differenza, nella lingua italiana, non esiste.

Ed è quanto comunicai a suo tempo al S/C Pearce quando, a disposizioni del Ministero già impartite, questo Ufficiale mi accennò alla diversità fra le due dizioni "A I" e "I S.".-

3. Quanto mi parve superfluo, fu invece l'aggettivo "Generale" attribuito al Comando Aeronautica "A I" o " I S" .-

E ciò perchè non è mai stato nelle consuetudini della R.A. di attribuire tale appellativo ai Comandi territoriali, tutti retti da Generali anche di grado molto elevato (Squadra).

Così ad esempio:

- Comando Aeronautica della Libia
- Comando Aeronautica della Sicilia
- Aeronautica della Sardegna
- Comando Aeronautica dell'Egeo.-

7015

4. Come risulta da quanto sopra, la parola "regia" non è mai stata inserita nelle designazioni dei Comandi Aeronautici territoriali.

Tutti i suddetti Comandi hanno sempre avuto per intestazione ufficiale, la propria indicazione, nella forma sopra detta, sormontata dallo Stemma Reale. Esattamente come l'attuale "Comando Generale Aeronautica Alta Italia", del quale accludo, a chiarimento e dimostrazione, una intestazione di lettera ufficiale pervenuta allo Stato Maggiore, appositamente tagliata dalla copia originale.

Come vede il Generale BIFFI senza bisogno di particolari ordini al riguardo, attenendosi con intelligente iniziativa alle mie direttive, ha già provveduto a regolarizzare integralmente que-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Devo, d'altra parte, confessare che io stesso non avrei rilevato una sensibile differenza fra "Alta Italia" e "Italia Settentrionale", perchè di fatto questa differenza, nella lingua italiana, non esiste.

Ed è quanto comunicai a suo tempo al S/C Pearce quando, a disposizioni del Ministero già impartite, questo Ufficiale mi accennò alla diversità fra le due dizioni "A I" e "I S.".-

3. Quanto mi parve superfluo, fu invece l'aggettivo "Generale" attribuito al Comando Aeronautica "A I" o " I S" .-

E ciò perchè non è mai stato nelle consuetudini della R.A. di attribuire tale appellativo ai Comandi territoriali, tutti retti da Generali anche di grado molto elevato (Squadra).

Così ad esempio:

- Comando Aeronautica della Libia
- Comando Aeronautica della Sicilia
- Aeronautica della Sardegna
- Comando Aeronautica dell'Egeo.-

7015

4. Come risulta da quanto sopra, la parola "regia" non è mai stata inserita nelle designazioni dei Comandi Aeronautici territoriali.

Tutti i suddetti Comandi hanno sempre avuto per intestazione ufficiale, la propria indicazione, nella forma sopra detta, sormontata dallo Stemma Reale. Esattamente come l'attuale "Comando Generale Aeronautica Alta Italia", del quale accludo, a chiarimento e dimostrazione, una intestazione di lettera ufficiale pervenuta allo Stato Maggiore, appositamente tagliata dalla copia originale.

Come vede il Generale BIFFI senza bisogno di particolari ordini al riguardo, attenendosi con intelligente iniziativa alle mie direttive, ha già provveduto a regolarizzare integralmente questa faccenda.

Non vi sarebbe quindi ragione di dare altri ordini in merito, se non per mutare l'"A I " in "I S" e profittare dell'occasione, se Lei fosse d'accordo, per togliere quel "Generale" che appare del tutto nuovo e quindi superfluo, nei nostri ordinamenti.

5. Il Gabinetto del Ministro è in attesa di una Sua decisione per disporre in conseguenza.=

IL.CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
(Generale di Squadra Aerea)
(Mario AJMONE-CAT)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

56B

Allegato 1

COPIA

QUARTIERE GENERALE
GOVERNO MILITARE ALLEATO
LOMBARDIA

ORDINE PER LA NOMINA DI UN COMMISSARIO N.66

con la presente si ordina quanto segue:

Art.1

Il Generale Giuseppe BIFFI (nome del Commissario) è temporaneamente nominato Commissario per il Ministero dell'Aeronautica per l'Alta Italia (Direzione Generale o Ministero).

Art.2°

Il Commissario ha i seguenti compiti:

1°-) Provvedere al rinvenimento, all'inventario e alla custodia, dei documenti, dei fondi e di tutti i beni di pertinenza degli Uffici, in attesa di curarne la consegna agli organi competenti dell'Amministrazione Italiana;

2°-) Provvedere alla liquidazione del personale dipendente e delle cose di pertinenza degli Uffici;

3°-) Curare l'applicazione delle ordinanze del Governo Militare Alleato concernenti l'epurazione dei funzionari e degli impiegati fascisti;

4°-) Osservare tutti gli ordini e le istruzioni emanate per iscritto dal Governo Militare Alleato; 7014

5°-) Rimettere al Governo Militare Alleato entro il 30 Giugno 1945 un particolareggiato rapporto sulla situazione amministrativa e finanziaria degli uffici dipendenti;

Art.3°

All'infuori dei compiti menzionati nel precedente articolo il Commissario non può esercitare alcun altro potere.

F/to Charles POLETTI
Colonnello

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOMBARDIA

ORDINE PER LA NOMINA DI UN COMMISSARIO N.66

con la presente si ordina quanto segue:

Art.1

Il Generale Giuseppe BIFFI (nome del Commissario) è temporaneamente nominato Commissario per il Ministero dell'Aeronautica per l'Alta Italia (Direzione Generale o Ministero).

Art.2°

Il Commissario ha i seguenti compiti:

1°-) Provvedere al rinvenimento, all'inventario e alla custodia,dei documenti, dei fondi e di tutti i beni di pertinenza degli Uffici, in attesa di curarne la consegna agli organi competenti dell'Amministrazione Italiana;

2°-) Provvedere alla liquidazione del personale dipendente e delle cose di pertinenza degli Uffici;

3°-) Curare l'applicazione delle ordinanze del Governo Militare Alleato concernenti l'epurazione dei funzionari e degli impiegati fascisti;

4°-) Osservare tutti gli ordini e le istruzioni emanate per iscritto dal Governo Militare Alleato;

7014

5°-) Rimettere al Governo Militare Alleato entro il 30 Giugno 1945 un particolareggiato rapporto sulla situazione amministrativa e finanziaria degli uffici dipendenti;

Art.3°

All'infuori dei compiti menzionati nel precedente articolo il Commissario non può esercitare alcun altro potere.

F/to Charles POLETTI
Colonnello
Governo Militare Alleato.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Allegato n. 2

Milano, li 29 giugno 1945

Comando Generale aeronautica dlta Italia

Ufficio Segreteria Comando

Prot. N. 180/B *Allog.* N. 121228 data - 4 LUG 1945

Al MINISTERO R. AERONAUTICA

DIREZIONE PERSONALE MILITARE

R O M A

Oggetto: Carenza Ufficiali Commissari ed Amministrazione alla I° e II° Zona.

7013

e.p.c.All'Ufficio Stato Maggiore R.A. - ROMA-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

9055

FKB V MAAZ NR 100103
FROM ~~LOMB~~ LOMBARDIA REGION ACAIR MILAN
101700
TO AOC ACAIR ALCOM ROME

AIR S/C

QQX GR 76 BT

REF NO 1442 RESTRICTED . A.391 — MBA
IN CLEAR PD
PARA ONE PD REF YOUR A POINT THREE NINE ONE COLONEL POLETTI CONTACTED STATED CONTENT PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS WITH BIFFI WORKING ACCORDING ~~O/I/I~~ YOUR DIRECTIVES COPIES OF WHICH WERE GIVEN PD REASON OF POLETTIS ORDER A SIX SIX APPOINTING BIFFI LIQUIDATOR WAS TO GIVE OFFICAIL SANCTION TO GENERALS ACTIVITIES PD COPY OF BIFFIS STATEMENT FORWARDED TO YOU PD PAREN TO ALCOM ACAIR ROME FOR AOC FROM ADV ~~ACAD/I/I~~ ACAIR MILAN SIGNED DIAMONT PAREM

7U12

NT 101700
SENT 0316 KGD BB KK

R-0316B---"JOE"---"BK

good 12/7 46 Ltr

A935 11/7/45

110830

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

FROM:- A.F. SUB-COMM (ROME)

TO:- H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

UNCLASSIFIED (.) A. 396 (.) TOO 0917004. JULY (.)

YOUR U 496 DATED 6TH. JULY AUTHORITY FOR S. 79 AIRCRAFT TO BE ALLOTTED TO PRINCE UMBERTO GIVEN BY CHIEF COMMISSIONER (ALLIED COMMISSION) IN LETTER REFERENCE AFSC/46/AIR DATED 16/6/43 TO PRIME MINISTER (.) AIRCRAFT SUPPLIED IN REPLACEMENT OF S.M. 75 REQUIRING ENGINE CHANGE AND COLLECTED 23 JUNE (.)

W.M. BISDEE W/CDR.,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

PRIORITY - ROUTINE.

7011

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

S.S.O. Please supply the answer I wonder what they want to know them for. HBS 9/7

AIR N140/107
9586
8569

A918 9/9/45

426/AIR 7010

FM 3/6 LRCF V MMDQ NR 5 R/ I.
T ADD
TO AIR FORCES SUB- COMMISSION -. ROME
FROM HEADQUARTERS MAAF 061000Z
REF NO U496 UNCLASSIFIED- ROUTINE 6 JULY 1945
SUBJECT AIRCRAFT FOR PRINCE UMBERTO(.)
2 REQUEST YOU SUPPLY DATE ON WHICH THIS WAS SUPPLIED(,)
AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
ET
SENT MMDQ MKJ UKH MKH AR K
RD NR 5 1854E CDH AR TKS

Permission given by Adam Stanton 16/6 - sec 42

07/6208

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

524

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F. C.M.F. (A.L.S.)
COPY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

DATE: 9TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AD.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

With reference to the conversation between AIR VICE-MARSHAL DAMER, AIR VICE-MARSHAL BRODIE and GROUP CAPTAIN REID at CASERTA on the 5th July, the attached draft of a letter which it is proposed to send to the Italian Air Ministry is forwarded for approval.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Sec 58A Adm 7006
wants to see letter to I.A.F. before
despatch.

DRAFT.

[redacted]

[redacted] H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F. FOR APPROVAL.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

7008

PART I - POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircrew to keep in flying practise rather than to become more efficient in war-like exercises, and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-

(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of RCHE are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

PART I - POLICY.

7008

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircrew to keep in flying practise rather than to become more efficient in war-like exercises, and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-

(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of ROME are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from ROME are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied Officers of the Allied Forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the I.A.F, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

(ii) The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

services, together with such boats crews and marine craft as will be made available to the I.A.F.

(iii) Allied type aircraft will be allotted as required by the Allies on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P.39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the I.A.F, but aircraft wastage will not be replaced; / spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practise will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of six hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

7007

(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

(vi) The Air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the I.A.F, but aircraft wastage will not be replaced; / spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practise will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of six hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

7067

(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

(vi) The Air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the I.A.F. until such time as authorisation from the A.F.S.C. for its use by the I.A.F. is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/EQ of the 30th June.

(vii) The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/EIR of the 22nd June, 1945.

(viii) Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as possible, all air material, whether in the North or South of Italy, will be concentrated in as few Depots as possible.

(ix) Ab-initio flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for Officers and flying personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

7006

(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derequisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for Officers and flying personnel.

Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

7006

(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derequisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

(xiii) Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the I.A.F. are to be declared to the A.F.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in overseas, Italy and possibly/and so help in the war against Japan.

4. (i) It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in Petrol & Oil, & perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that International standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organisation and meteorological organisation.

(ii) No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but as soon as possible the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda:

(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

(a) the organisation at the Air Ministry down to the Z.A.T. level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through

7005

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda: 7005

(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

(a) the organisation at the Air Ministry down to the Z.A.T. level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Unità Aeree and redisposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th Z.A.T;

(b) formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to co-ordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(c) the retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

(ii) Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, with a view to forming companies to work for the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean theatre, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorised ceiling of 51,000.

(iii) Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U, as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

X (iv) Formation of an Aircraft Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organised maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection 7003 it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, discuss salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

(vii) Discuss advantages and disadvantages of enlistment on a voluntary, as

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

X (iv) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organised maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, discuss salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

(vii) Discuss advantages and disadvantages of enlistment on a voluntary, as opposed to, a conscription basis.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 9th July, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/46/AIR.

7003

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/135/110

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/135/110

POST WAR IAF
APR. - DEC. 1945
(2 OF 2)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
DELLA R. AERONAUTICA.

TO: A.F.S.C. A.C ROME.

5112 (7)

REF: R.41890/S3./3728/Coll.

3rd July, 1945.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

I am grateful to you for your kind letter of the 22nd june, AFSC/46/AIR in connection with the aircraft for the LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF THE REALM and for the PRIME MINISTER, and for the 57 air line seats available at SEMEGNO.

D. 791 7/7

Yours,

MARIO AIMONE-CAT.

46/Air

Pass to S.E.O. K 350

7002

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

R. 41890/f.3 /3728 bell.

Caro Generale BRODIE,

Vi sono grato per la cortese comunicazione in data 22 giugno c.a. N° AFSC/46/AIR relativa a= gli apparecchi per S.A.R. il Luogotenente Generale del Regno e per il Signor Primo Ministro, e per la segnalazione delle 57 poltroncine disponibili a Se regno.=

Gradite i miei più cordiali saluti

Roma, lì 3 Luglio 1945.-

I. E. BRODIE
Air Vice Marshal
A.F.S.C. - A.C.
R O M A

7000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5049

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY.

DATE: 9TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE COMMAND - NORTHERN ITALY.

Thank you for your letter 1975A/8704/Coll of the 4th July.

2. In order to overcome some discrepancies in the directives this Sub-Commission has issued to you and to the A.F.S.C. representative in MILAN, and the order issued by the Provincial Commissioner, LOMBARDIA REGION to GENERAL BIFFI, the A.F.S.C. representative in MILAN has been instructed to confer with the Provincial Commissioner and it is hoped that agreement in MILAN will be reached, and GENERAL BIFFI will be instructed accordingly.

3. We will inform you of the result of the conference.

I.E. BROOKE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6994

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

49A

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

FROM: A.F. SUB COMM (ROME)

TO: A.F. SUB COMM (MILAN C/O A.C. LOMBARDIA REGION
ATTENTION S/LDR DIAMANT.

UNCLASSIFIED P.394 T.0.0 091545B JULY 1945 (.)

REFERENCE MY P.391 T.0.0 071740B JULY 1945 (.) 48A

THIRD PARAGRAPH SHOULD READ 17TH JULY AND NOT 20TH (.)

TO BE ENCYPHERED
IF SENT BY W/T.

ROUTINE

T. de HEIDUCCI, W/O
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6998

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

48A

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

FROM;- A.F. SUB-COMM (ROME)

TO - A.F. SUB-COMM (MILAN.) C/O A.C. LOMBARDIA REION.
(FOR SQUADRON LEADER DIAMANT.)

RESTRICTED (.) A. 391. T.O.O. 071740A. JULY (.)

REQUEST YOU SEE COLONEL POLETTI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CONCERNING HIS UNDATED ORDER TO GENERAL BIFFI (.) AT MY REQUEST EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER HERE HAS SENT POLETTI A SIGNAL SUGGESTING BIFFI WORKS UNDER YOU ON DIRECTIVES ALREADY ISSUED TO YOU (.)

PARA 2. TAKE WITH YOU MY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE AFSC/354/1/ORG OF 15 MAY WHICH AGREED BY M.A.A.F. ALSO TAKE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT POLICY LETTERS AFSC/829/ENG OF 22 JUNE AND AFSC/655/EQ. OF 13 JUNE (.)

PARA. 3. I HOPE TO VISIT YOU AND POLETTI ON ABOUT 20 JULY (.)

13

PRIORITY .....

I.E. BRODIE A.V.M.
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6998

Ref 45A & 46A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4815.

REGIONAL COMMISSIONER LOMBARDIA REGION

1413 071730 ROUTINE

IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS PD

SUBJECT IS YOUR ORDER APPOINTING GENERAL BIFFI AS COMMISSIONER FOR

AIR MINISTRY IN NORTHERN ITALY PD

PAREN TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER LOMBARDIA REGION FROM HQ AIRCOM CITE

ACEXC PAREN

AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION ADVISES THAT SQUADRON LEADER DIAMANT IS CHARGED BY

THEM WITH THE DUTIES YOU HAVE ENUMERATED AND DESIRE THAT BIFFI WORK UNDER

HIS DIRECTION PD D'AMANT IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SEE YOU PD PLEASE ADVISE OF

ULTIMATE ARRANGEMENT

0846 9/8/45
46/Dec

Copy to : Air Force S/C

343

Executive Commissioner

/s/ Norman E. Fiske

47A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 7TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

46A

The attached letter has been received from the Italian Air Minister, and I would like your advice.

2. It seems that COLONEL POLETTI has issued a directive direct to GENERAL BIFFI who is the Senior Italian Air Force Officer in Northern Italy, and does not quite line up with the directives we have issued to our A.F.S.C. representative in MILAN (SQUADRON LEADER DIAMANT,) nor to instructions given to the Italian Air Ministry. It may be that there has been insufficient liaison between our representative in MILAN and COLONEL POLETTI, although I believe that COLONEL POLETTI's directive to GENERAL BIFFI was issued after an interview that COLONEL POLETTI had with GENERAL BIFFI who was accompanied by my Senior Intelligence Officer (WING COMMANDER PEARCE,) of this Headquarters.

3. The procedure we have, I think, correctly adopted is that we have issued directives to our representative in MILAN simultaneously with instructions to the Italian Air Ministry in ROME, under whom GENERAL BIFFI directly comes. There is, however, no doubt that the Provincial Commissioner is the man on the spot, and provided he informs this H.Q. it would seem to be correct for him to issue instructions as he thinks best in the case of immediate problems, but I suggest that there should be some consultation between COLONEL POLETTI and the A.F.S.C. representative MILAN (S/Ldr. DIAMANT,) before issuing instructions direct to GENERAL BIFFI, otherwise there is bound to be confusion, and probably the Provincial Commissioner's instructions may, at times, vary from instructions we have obtained from the Chief Commissioner here, or Headquarters M.A.A.F.

4. In order to deal with the present immediate problem, I propose, if you agree, to get my representative in MILAN, (S/LDR. DIAMANT,) to see COLONEL POLETTI with, at least, the three directives we have issued so as to put COLONEL POLETTI in the picture, and I propose further to inform S/LDR. DIAMANT to keep COLONEL POLETTI informed of any important problems which have since arisen, or will arise, in the future.

A most important

6997

5. I realise that S/LDR. DIAMANT should consider himself on the staff of the Provincial Commissioner, but normally instructions to the Italian Air Force in the North will continue to be issued through the Italian Air Ministry simultaneously with the local A.F.S.C. representative.

6. The three main important directives which have been issued are at 38A on this file, 7A on file AFSC/655/3/EQ (herewith), and the attached directive which deals with I.A.F. Reception Centres and Salvage Units.

47B

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The attached letter has been received from the Italian Air Minister, and I would like your advice.

2. It seems that COLONEL POLETTI has issued a directive direct to GENERAL BIFFI who is the Senior Italian Air Force Officer in Northern Italy, and does not quite line up with the directives we have issued to our A.F.S.C. representative in MILAN (SQUADRON LEADER DIAMANT,) nor to instructions given to the Italian Air Ministry. It may be that there has been insufficient liaison between our representative in MILAN and COLONEL POLETTI, although I believe that COLONEL POLETTI's directive to GENERAL BIFFI was issued after an interview that COLONEL POLETTI had with GENERAL BIFFI who was accompanied by my Senior Intelligence Officer (WING COMMANDER PEARCE,) of this Headquarters.

3. The procedure we have, I think, correctly adopted is that we have issued directives to our representative in MILAN simultaneously with instructions to the Italian Air Ministry in ROME, under whom GENERAL BIFFI directly comes. There is, however, no doubt that the Provincial Commissioner is the man on the spot, and provided he informs this H.Q. it would seem to be correct for him to issue instructions as he thinks best in the case of immediate problems, but I suggest that there should be some consultation between COLONEL POLETTI and the A.F.S.C. representative MILAN (S/Ldr. DIAMANT,) before issuing instructions direct to GENERAL BIFFI, otherwise there is bound to be confusion, and probably the Provincial Commissioner's instructions may, at times, vary from instructions we have obtained from the Chief Commissioner here, or Headquarters M.A.A.F.

4. In order to deal with the present immediate problem, I propose, if you agree, to get my representative in MILAN, (S/LDR. DIAMANT,) to see COLONEL POLETTI with, at least, the three directives we have issued so as to put COLONEL POLETTI in the picture, and I propose further to inform S/LDR. DIAMANT to keep COLONEL POLETTI informed of any important problems which have since arisen, or will arise, in the future.

5. I realise that S/LDR. DIAMANT should consider himself on the staff of the Provincial Commissioner, but normally instructions to the Italian Air Force in the North will continue to be issued through the Italian Air Ministry simultaneously with the local A.F.S.C. representative.

6. The three main important directives which have been issued are at 38A on this file, 7A on file AFSC/655/3/EQ (herewith), and the attached directive which deals with I.A.F. Reception Centres and Salvage Units.

Ian S. Brodie.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778507

DIRECTIVE FOR I.A.F. RECEPTION CENTRES AND SALVAGE UNITS.

47B

1. The above named units will be set up initially at:

MILAN	ANCONA
TURIN	BOLOGNA
PADUA	FORLI
GENOA	RAVENNA
FLORENCE	PISTOIA

They will be staffed by fully accredited Italian Air Force personnel who will have been previously approved by the Air Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

They will be entirely self-supporting except for POL which they are authorised to draw from Allied sources.

2. The units will be required to control and administer their own personnel, but will be subject to Allied military regulations insofar as these apply to all members of the armed forces.

3. The units will have the task of locating, collecting, interrogating and investigating Italian personnel who were known to be or whom it is reasonably believed were at some time, members of the Italian Air Force or of the Republican Italian Air Force. Reports on these persons are to be made available to the Allied Military Security Authorities, who shall have the right to demand the handing over of any Italian personnel if they should consider such a course necessary or expedient. The units will be responsible for detaining or disposing of all Italian personnel not so required by the Allied Military Authorities. In the event of enemy military personnel falling into the hands of these units, they are to be handed over to the Allied Military Authorities forthwith.

4. Any information of an intelligence nature which is discovered as a result of interrogation of such personnel is to be passed to the Allied Intelligence authorities as quickly as possible.

5. Units will work under No.1 P.I.U. through the Senior R.A.F. Officer of the A.F.S.C. for the location, collection, listing and reporting of all material, including documents, equipment, aircraft and supplies etc. which has been the property of the I.A.F. or of the Germans. No material is to be removed without permission of the authorities mentioned above, and in the meantime the material is to be safe-guarded from theft in the best possible way. It must be realised that all military material is to be considered to be the property of the Allies until it is released by the proper Allied authorities.

6992

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 15th May, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/354/1/ORG.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778017

They will be staffed by fully accredited Italian Air Force personnel who will have been previously approved by the Air Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

They will be entirely self-supporting except for POL which they are authorised to draw from Allied sources.

2. The units will be required to control and administer their own personnel, but will be subject to Allied military regulations insofar as these apply to all members of the armed forces.

3. The units will have the task of locating, collecting, interrogating and investigating Italian personnel who were known to be or whom it is reasonably believed were at some time, members of the Italian Air Force or of the Republican Italian Air Force. Reports on these persons are to be made available to the Allied Military Security Authorities, who shall have the right to demand the handing over of any Italian personnel if they should consider such a course necessary or expedient. The units will be responsible for detaining or disposing of all Italian personnel not so required by the Allied Military Authorities. In the event of enemy military personnel falling into the hands of these units, they are to be handed over to the Allied Military Authorities forthwith.

4. Any information of an intelligence nature which is discovered as a result of interrogation of such personnel is to be passed to the Allied Intelligence authorities as quickly as possible.

5. Units will work under No.1 F.I.U. through the Senior R.A.F. Officer of the A.F.S.C. for the location, collection, listing and reporting of all material, including documents, equipment, aircraft and supplies etc. which has been the property of the I.A.F. or of the Germans. No material is to be removed without permission of the authorities mentioned above, and in the meantime the material is to be safe-guarded from theft in the best possible way. It must be realised that all military material is to be considered to be the property of the Allies until it is released by the proper Allied authorities.

6992

I.E. PRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 15th May, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/354/1/ORG.

Distribution:

Each I.A.F. Unit.	6 copies
No.1 F.I.U.	3 copies
G.2 15th Army Group.	2 copies
M.A.T.A.F. for G/Capt. Wiseman.	2 copies
H.Q. M.A.A.F. for C.I.C.	2 copies
File and spares.	5 copies

0537

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

46 A
(t)

FROM : MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA.

T O : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION. A.C. ROME.

DATE : 19754/8744 Coll.

REF. : 4th JULY 1945.

B

AIR FORCE COMMAND. NORTHERN ITALY

The Air Force Command, Northern Italy, has forwarded the attached copy of an order issued by A.M.C. which is contrary to, as it can be seen, the arrangements made with the Air Forces Sub Commission, when the abovementioned Command was formed.

2. We ask your Sub Comaission to let us know what importance must be given to this order, to eventually alter the instructions given to General BIFFI.

The MINISTER.

ALLIED COMMISSION
D725 5/7/45
46/Air.

6991

TRANSLATION

46B
It)

C O P Y

H.Q. A.M.G. LOMBARDIA.

ORDER FOR THE NOMINATION OF A COMMISSIONER N° 66

Herein the following orders are issued :

ART I

General BIFFI Giuseppe (name of the Commissioner) is temporarily named Commissioner for the Air Ministry in Northern Italy (General Directorate or Ministry).

ART II

The Commissioner has the following duties :

(1) Be in charge of recovery, inventory and custody of documents funds and all goods belonging to these offices until these being transfered to Italian Administration.

(2) Liquidate the dependent personnel and matters belonging to these Offices.

(3) See that A.M.G. orders concerning the epuration of fascist employees and officials are carried out.

(4) Obey all written orders and instructions given by A.M.G.

(5) Hand over to A.M.G., before the 30th June 1945, a report on the administrative and financial situation of the dependent Offices.

ART III

Apart from the duties mentioned in Art II, the Commissioner cannot exercise any other authority.

699

(s) CHARLES POLETTI
Colonel.

A . M . G .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0540

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

464

DD

Roma, 4 LUG. 1945 A.

Ministero dell'Aeronautica

GABINETTO DELMINISTRO

All. SOTTOCOMMISSIONE
AERONAUTICA A.C.
(tramite Ufficio Collegamento)
R O M A

Segreteria

Prot. N. 19754 / 57 Hh Gab. Allegati 1

Risposta al f. N. del

OGGETTO: Comando Aeronautica Alta Italia

Il Comandante Aeronautica Alta Italia ha trasmesso la copia allegata di una ordinanza emessa dal Governo Militare Alleato che, come può rilevarsi dal testo, contrasta con gli accordi presi con codesta A.F.S.C. al momento della costituzione del Comando in questione.

2. Si prega codesta A.F.S.C. di voler comunicare quale valore debba essere dato all'ordinanza stessa in modo da poter eventualmente modificare gli ordini a suo tempo impartiti al Generale BIFFI.=

IL MINISTRO

6984

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

BEST COPY POSSIBLE
FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

COPIA

QUARTIERE GENERALE
GOVERNO MILITARE ALLEATO
LOMBARDIA

ORDINE PER LA NOMINA DI UN COMMISSARIO N° 65

Con la presente si ordina quanto segue:

Art. 1°

Il Gen. Giuseppe BIFFI (nome del Commissario) è temporaneamente nominato Commissario per il Ministero dell'Aeronautica per l'Alta Italia (Direzione Generale o Ministero).=

Art. 2°

Il Commissario ha i seguenti compiti:

1°)- Provvedere al rinvenimento, all'inventario e alla custodia dei documenti, dei fondi e di tutti i beni di pertinenza degli Uffici, in attesa di curarne la consegna agli organi competenti dell'Amministrazione Italiana;
2°)- Provvedere alla liquidazione del personale dipendente e delle cose di pertinenza degli Uffici;
3°)- Curare l'applicazione delle ordinanze del Governo Militare Alleato concernenti l'epurazione dei funzionari e degli impiegati fascisti
4°)- Osservare tutti gli ordini e le istruzioni emanate per iscritto dal Governo Militare Alleato;
5°)- Rimettere al Governo Militare Alleato entro il 30 Giugno 1945 un particolareggiato rapporto sulla situazione amministrativa e finanziaria degli Uffici dipendenti

Art. 3°

All'infuori dei compiti menzionati nel precedente articolo il Commissario non può esercitare alcun altro potere.=

F/to CHARLES POLLETT
Colonnello
Governo Militare Alleato

P.....c.....c.

Il Capo Ufficio Centrale
(Cap. [illegible])

6988

83

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0542

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4317

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

CONFIDENTIAL.

29th June, 1945.

AFSC/1.6/AIF.

Dear

It has been brought to my attention that the I.A.F. Command in Northern Italy is using the official designation "COMANDO GENERALE AERONAUTICA ALTA ITALIA".

2. I am sure you will agree that this title smacks too much of the Partisan regime, and is not the one agreed to by me, and passed verbally to yourself and to GENERAL BIFFI.

3. In order to avoid confusion, I thought it better to confirm in writing that the designation agreed to verbally was "COMANDO GENERALE DELL'AERONAUTICA DELL'ITALIA SETTENTRIONALE", the word "REGIA" being added when the time was considered opportune.

4. Perhaps you would let me have your confirmation that the correct designation will be communicated to all interested formations, together with your opinion as to whether it is now opportune to reintroduce the adjective "REGIA".

Yours

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6987

H.E. General M. Aimone Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

0544

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. ROME.

TO : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. TARANTO.

DATE: 20th June, 1945.

FILE : AFSC/1.6/AIR.

ST VITO di TARANTO.

The Air Officer Commanding has considered the future of St Vito di Taranto and has requested that no further aircraft be accepted there for repair, pending the probable move of the personnel to Lecce and the aircraft to Taranto (Seaplane Wing).

2. As soon as the present aircraft under repair are completed, you are to arrange for St Vito di Taranto to be closed down, the disposal of personnel, machinery and spares at your discretion.

3. It is understood that they have one SM 79 and one C.R. 1007 under repair, and when these are ready, it is intended to turn over the hangar to the Royal Navy, who require the accommodation.

L.E. JARMAN, G/CAPT.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6985

43A

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/46/AIR. 26th June, 1945.

Dear

I visited LECCE on the 18th June and have the following observations to make. I wish to emphasise that my criticisms are intended to be constructive and for the good of the Italian Air Force rather than as an instruction from the Allies, and I feel sure that you will treat this letter accordingly.

2. It seems to me that the Station is working under a "go-slow" policy and insufficient control by the Station Commander (COL. MSONI,) resulting in some avoidable inefficiency.

3. As regards the alleged "go-slow" policy, I think the fault may lie largely with Unità Aerea. For example, rumour has it that the Fighter Squadrons at CANNE were told not to hurry their move to LECCE but to take their time; I believe these fighter squadrons thought they were going North, and when they were told to move to LECCE they took every opportunity to delay the move; for example, stating that there was insufficient transport. Incidentally they asked for about twice as much transport to move from CANNE to LECCE as they had for their much quicker move into CANNE some time ago. I quote this purely as an example, and I feel I need not trouble you with smaller instances. The "go-slow" policy is vitiated by there being no centralised authority at LECCE, and this brings me to the second main point.

4. I appreciate that you have intentions to re-organise the I.A.F. in the South by merging part of Unità Aerea with 4th T.A.F, the rest being moved to ROME, but until the interim policy for the Italian Air Force is specifically laid down by the Allies, you must find it difficult to make detailed arrangements. I am afraid that until higher authority lays down the policy in writing, I have only been able to tell you verbally that the position will remain similar to what it is now. Therefore I am unable to assist you by giving you the necessary detailed facts on which to base your re-organisation. However, I think that meantime it would be an advantage for all the Units at LECCE to be under the direct control of the Station Commander (COL. MSONI) rather than being under complete control of Unità Aerea, except for discipline which I understand is the responsibility of the Station Commander. It seems to me that the whole organisation is very top heavy in that each unit at LECCE has a senior counterpart at UNITA AEREA to whom he has to refer for even minor details; consequently my representatives at LECCE find unjustifiable delays in getting a move on. I suggest that the correct approach between the R.A.F. liaison Officer at LECCE and a Unit Commander at LECCE is through the Station Commander, which is a principle that GROUP CAPTAIN OLLASON complies with, but he tells me that usually when he goes to the Station Commander on some topic, he is requested to communicate with the Unit Commander affected. To put it in a nutshell, there seem to be too many water tight compartments at LECCE, and little co-ordination of effort on the Station as a whole. This is not an unusual tendency; in order to overcome it and from my personal experience and that of many officers who have been Station Commanders, a weekly conference of all Heads of Sections with

698

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

and for the good of the Italian Air Force rather than as an instruction from the Allies, and I feel sure that you will treat this letter accordingly.

2. It seems to me that the Station is working under a "go-slow" policy and insufficient control by the Station Commander (COL. BRONI,) resulting in some avoidable inefficiency.

3. As regards the alleged "go-slow" policy, I think the fault may lie largely with Unità Aerea. For example, rumour has it that the Fighter Squadrons at CAUSE were told not to hurry their move to LECCE but to take their time; I believe these fighter squadrons thought they were going North, and when they were told to move to LECCE they took every opportunity to delay the move; for example, stating that there was insufficient transport. Incidentally they asked for about twice as much transport to move from CAUSE to LECCE as they had for their much quicker move into CAUSE some time ago. I quote this purely as an example, and I feel I need not trouble you with smaller instances. The "go-slow" policy is vitiated by there being no centralised authority at LECCE, and this brings me to the second main point.

4. I appreciate that you have intentions to re-organise the I.A.F. in the South by merging part of Unità Aerea with 4th T.A.F, the rest being moved to ROME, but until the interim policy for the Italian Air Force is specifically laid down by the Allies, you must find it difficult to make detailed arrangements. I am afraid that until higher authority lays down the policy in writing, I have only been able to tell you verbally that the position will remain similar to what it is now. Therefore I am unable to assist you by giving you the necessary detailed facts on which to base your re-organisation. However, I think that meantime it would be an advantage for all the Units at LECCE to be under the direct control of the Station Commander (COL. BRONI) rather than being under complete control of Unità Aerea, except for discipline which I understand is the responsibility of the Station Commander. It seems to me that the whole organisation is very top heavy in that each unit at LECCE has a senior counterpart at UNITA AEREA to whom he has to refer for even minor details; consequently my representatives at LECCE find unjustifiable delays in getting a move on. I suggest that the correct approach between the R.A.F. liaison Officer at LECCE and a Unit Commander at LECCE is through the Station Commander, which is a principle that GROUP CAPTAIN OLLASON complies with, but he tells me that usually when he goes to the Station Commander on some topic, he is requested to communicate with the Unit Commander affected. To put it in a nutshell, there seem to be too many water tight compartments at LECCE, and little co-ordination of effort on the Station as a whole. This is not an unusual tendency; in order to overcome it and from my personal experience and that of many officers who have been Station Commanders, a weekly conference of all Heads of Sections and Unit Commanders is usually held, and it goes a long way towards better efficiency and co-ordination.

5. The matter mentioned in the preceding paragraph and also our observations elsewhere, indicate that there are too many senior officers in the Italian Air Force, and I hope you will not think it presumptuous on my part to suggest that a large number should, in the interests of the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, be retired.

6. Similarly it is my belief that there are too many aircrews, particularly pilots, in the Italian Air Force, and I would like to suggest that the release or retirement of a considerable number should soon be considered by you. In this connection I hesitate to forecast the eventual fate of the R.A, but I very much doubt whether a larger Air Force than at present existing, and reckoned

Continued/2.....

0546

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

in terms of aircraft as well as personnel, will be permitted under the Peace terms. This comment is without prejudice as to whether or not the Peace terms will allow of an Italian Air Force at all.

7. I consider that the following immediate action, and that shown in Appendix "A" to this letter; should be taken. I have placed some items of not so confidential a nature for ease of distribution in your Ministry in Appendix "A".

(i) I suggested to you a little while ago that a small Flying Control School should be opened at LECCE to train Flying Control Officers. Progress has been somewhat slow, and I gather that the Officers we suggested as instructors at this school are not being made available because they belong or have recently gone to various Units and are, therefore, not available for posting into Station H.Q. We suggested CAPTAIN RUGGERO to be the C.O. of the School but we would rather prefer him to be left in the Operations Room, and we suggest that CAPT. ZEGRINI should be made Senior Flying Control Officer, he being assisted by a Lieutenant who has been posted in by Unità Aerea but who knows very little about flying control. I also understand that CAPT. PAPENIAN has gone to VENICE to open up the Signals Organisation, the Met. forecasting station and aircraft safety, and perhaps it would be as well to leave him there - a suitable substitute should be found for the Flying Control School.

(ii) Now that the war against GERMANY is over, there appears to be no necessity to have 5 different operations rooms. Unfortunately COL LEONI was away from LECCE when I visited there, but I gather that he agrees that there should be only one operations room. Nothing, however, has been done to close down the redundant operations rooms and to concentrate in the main station operations room which has been placed next door to Aircraft Movements and Met. Forecasting. I understand that MAJOR SCOTTO has been ear-marked as the Senior Station Operations Officer, and I would like you to consider him being replaced by his Deputy, CAPTAIN ROCCHIO: I believe that MAJOR SCOTTO lacks efficiency and drive, and obstructs whenever possible.

(iii) I would like you also to consider the removal of COL. ZAPPETTA who is the Commander of the Fighter Wing, because he lacks personality and drive, and is not a sufficiently good pilot to gain the confidence of the Pilots under his command. It is for your consideration whether COL. ZAPPETTA should not be replaced by LT/COL. FINALI, who is at present at Unità Aerea. Incidentally I am told LT/COL. FINALI gets on well with LT/COL. TRAVAGNO, the C.O. LEVERANO, and from this point of view it might be an advantage to have LT/COL. FINALI at LECCE because we are asking you to move the Flying School from LEVERANO to LECCE.

(iv) You will agree, I am sure, that the appointment of an exceptionally efficient officer to COMMAND LECCE is necessary, and I feel that COL. LEONI, although a pleasing person, is not perhaps quite the right type as he is inclined to be easy going, and I think I am right in saying that he does not get around the station sufficiently. Would you please consider replacing him by LT/COL. VICENZI.

(v) It may be as well that enquiries be made as to whether or not orders issued by your Ministry are always received by the lower formations and units which are effected. I suspect that this does not always happen. For example, the move of the fighter part of the C.T.U. from FROSINONE to LECCE was not known at LECCE except through GROUP CAPTAIN OLLASON, who was informed by me; it may be that in this case there was an unavoidable delay as the order would have

0547
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(i) I suggested to you a few weeks ago that a small Flying Control School should be opened at LECCE to train Flying Control Officers. Progress has been somewhat slow, and I gather that the Officers we suggested as instructors at this school are not being made available because they belong or have recently gone to various Units and are, therefore, not available for posting into Station H.Q. We suggested CAPTAIN ROCCHRO to be the C.O. of the School but we would not prefer him to be left in the Operations Room, and we suggest that CAPT. ZECHINI should be made Senior Flying Control Officer, he being assisted by a Lieutenant who has been posted in by Unità Aerea but who knows very little about flying control. I also understand that CAPT. PARENZAN has gone to VENICE to open up the Signals Organisation, the Met. forecasting station and aircraft safety, and perhaps it would be as well to leave him there - a suitable substitute should be found for the Flying Control School.

(ii) Now that the war against GERMANY is over, there appears to be no necessity to have 5 different operations rooms. Unfortunately COL LEONI was away from LECCE when I visited there, but I gather that he agrees that there should be only one operations room. Nothing, however, has been done to close down the redundant operations rooms and to concentrate in the main station operations room which has been placed next door to Aircraft Movements and Met. Forecasting. I understand that MAJOR SCOTTO has been ear-marked as the Senior Station Operations Officer, and I would like you to consider him being replaced by his Deputy, CAPTAIN ROCCHRO: I believe that MAJOR SCOTTO lacks efficiency and drive, and obstructs whenever possible.

(iii) I would like you also to consider the removal of COL. ZAPPETTA who is the Commander of the Fighter Wing, because he lacks personality and drive, and is not a sufficiently good pilot to gain the confidence of the Pilots under his command. It is for your consideration whether COL. ZAPPETTA should not be replaced by LT/COL. FINALI, who is at present at Unità Aerea. Incidentally I am told LT/COL. FINALI gets on well with LT/COL. TRAVAGLIO, the C.O. LEVERANO, and from this point of view it might be an advantage to have LT/COL. FINALI at LECCE because we are asking you to move the Flying School from LEVERANO to LECCE.

(iv) You will agree, I am sure, that the appointment of an exceptionally efficient officer to COMMAND LECCE is necessary, and I feel that COL. LEONI, although a pleasing person, is not perhaps quite the right type as he is inclined to be easy going, and I think I am right in saying that he does not get around the station sufficiently. Would you please consider replacing him by LT/COL. VIGEVANI.

(v) It may be as well that enquiries be made as to whether or not orders issued by your Ministry are always received by the lower formations and units which are effected. I suspect that this does not always happen. For example, the move of the fighter part of the C.T.U. from FOGGINONE to LECCE was not known at LECCE except through GROUP CAPTAIN OLLASON, who was informed by me; it may be that in this case there was an unavoidable delay as the order would have gone through Unità Aerea, whereas my instructions went direct to G/Capt. OLLASON.

8. Finally, I have reason to believe that a visit to LECCE by you would be a popular move amongst the I.A.F. there; in making this suggestion I wish to say that this subject was not raised or discussed by, or with, Italian Officers.

6482

I.E. PROBERT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

H.E. GENERAL M. AIMONE CAT,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry, Rome.

0548

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

APPENDIX "A".

"With reference to para 7 of Letter AFSC/46/AIR dated 22nd June, the following comments arising from my visit to LECCE on 18th June are forwarded for information and action."

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

(i) Flying Control is now divided as between the Main Building and the Fighter Tower on the other side of the aerodrome. I understand that the Fighter Flying Control will be taken away from the Fighter Flying Control tower and placed in the main building. For your information the ends of the runway have been connected to the flying control in the main building, and it is intended to use the Fighter Control buildings for crash parties - a good idea. In the interests of aircraft safety, would you please issue instructions that flying control is to be centralised in the main building as soon as possible.

(ii) Whilst at LECCE I was asked about the policy ruling concerning the Tuffa Blocked Buildings as to whether the Italians can occupy them forthwith in order to avoid further robbing, and I suggested that the Cant.1007 personnel should move in, together with the personnel from LEVERANO [redacted], and to leave the SM.82 squadron personnel in their present accommodation as it is possible that they will be moved Northwards in the near future, i.e. when S.I.A.I. can undertake the major overhauls;

(iii) I suggested that work be commenced on the airfield at LECCE to level off a landing strip as an alternative landing area for the LEVERANO school aircraft ([redacted]), so that aircraft will be able to land into wind instead of across wind on the permanent runway. Perhaps you would like to consider issuing instructions on this point.

6981

(iv) Whilst at LECCE I also suggested that the Fighter part of the O.T.U. which is moving from FROSINONE to LECCE should be put under the Command of the O.C. Fighter Wing at least until the flying school from LEVERANO is moved to LECCE, [redacted]. During a conversation with COL. REMONDINO on the 20th June, however, it seemed that the fighter part of the O.T.U. is redundant, because it would seem to be a waste of effort to convert any more fighter pilots from MACCHIS to Allied type fighters, as although the Allied type fighters are being handed over to you on loan, aircraft replacements will not be made, and therefore gradually through wastage, these squadrons may eventually disappear.

(v) I inspected the Cant.1007 which is being converted to passenger carrying and as the modification is a good one, it may be worth while converting the remaining 1007's to passenger type, but before doing so would you please inform me of the result of the prototype, and also advise whether or not they should be used on Courier Services, or alternatively to replace Baltimores at the O.T.U. FROSINONE, concerning which I spoke with COL. REMONDINO on the 20th June.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(i) Flying Control is now divided as between the Main Building and the Fighter Tower on the other side of the aerodrome. I understand that the Fighter Flying Control will be taken away from the Fighter Flying Control tower and placed in the main building. For your information the ends of the runway have been connected to the flying control in the main building, and it is intended to use the Fighter Control buildings for crash parties - a good idea. In the interests of aircraft safety, would you please issue instructions that flying control is to be centralised in the main building as soon as possible.

(ii) Whilst at LECCE I was asked about the policy ruling concerning the Tuffa Blocked Buildings as to whether the Italians can occupy them forthwith in order to avoid further robbing, and I suggested that the Cant.1007 personnel should move in, together with the personnel from LEVERANO [redacted] take place, and to leave the SM.82 squadron personnel in their present accommodation as it is possible that they will be moved Northwards in the near future, i.e. when S.I.A.I. can undertake the major overhauls.

(iii) I suggested that work be commenced on the airfield at LECCE to level off a landing strip as an alternative landing area for the LEVERANO school aircraft ([redacted]), so that aircraft will be able to land into wind instead of across wind on the permanent runway. Perhaps you would like to consider issuing instructions on this point.

6981

(iv) Whilst at LECCE I also suggested that the Fighter part of the C.T.U. which is moving from FROSINONE to LECCE should be put under the Command of the C.C. Fighter Wing at least until the flying school from LEVERANO is moved to LECCE, [redacted] During a conversation with COL. REMONDINO on the 20th June, however, it seemed that the fighter part of the C.T.U. is redundant, because it would seem to be a waste of effort to convert any more fighter pilots from MACCHIES to Allied type fighters, as although the Allied type fighters are being handed over to you on loan, aircraft replacements will not be made, and therefore gradually through wastage, these squadrons may eventually disappear.

(v) I inspected the Cant.1007 which is being converted to passenger carrying and as the modification is a good one, it may be worth while converting the remaining 1007's to passenger type, but before doing so would you please inform me of the result of the prototype, and also advise whether or not they should be used on Courier Services, or alternatively to replace Baltimores at the C.T.U. FROSINONE, concerning which I spoke with COL. REMONDINO on the 20th June.

(vi) Whilst at LECCE I also discussed the future of ST. VITO DI TARANTO and requested that no further aircraft be accepted there for repair, pending the probable move of the personnel to LECCE and the machines to TARANTO (SEAPLANE WING.) As soon as the present aircraft under repair at ST. VITO are completed, would you please arrange for ST. VITO DI TARANTO to be closed down - the disposal of personnel, machinery and spares is at your discretion. For your information they have one S.79 and one CZ.1007 under repair at ST. VITO, and it is intended to turn over the hangar in use at ST. VITO to the Royal Navy whom it is understood require this accommodation.

(vii) I discussed the future of GALATINO and it would seem that two alternatives present themselves, namely to convert the engine repair shop to M.T. Maintenance for LECCE, which is now done in the open at LECCE, or to close it

Continued/2.....

0550

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

own altogether and move the machinery into LECCE workshops; most of the civilian labour is believed to come from the North. For your information it is the intention that Alfa Romeo 126 and 128 engines be overhauled in future at the Alfa Romeo factory in the North. I would be glad to know which of these two alternatives you wish adopted. Similarly it is the intention that S.A.C.A. (BRINDISI) be closed down gradually.

(viii) It has yet to be decided whether or not 605 and 601 engines should be given what we call "top overhaul" as distinct from "major overhauls", and I would welcome the opinion of your staff on this point; if it is decided not to do top overhauls but to do major overhauls more frequently than would otherwise be necessary, it would seem that repair shops at LECCE for the top overhauls of these engines would not be required.

(ix) I was informed that the S.&.T. Column at GIOVINAZZO was 50 drivers short and that your Air Ministry instructed 4th Z.A.T to provide 50 drivers. 4th Z.A.T. on the other hand are said to be short of M.T. drivers, whereas elsewhere there is said to be a surplus of M.T. drivers. I think it would be as well to investigate this report as I gather that you have sufficient drivers to drive all the vehicles normally serviceable in the Italian Air Force.

22nd June, 1945.

6984

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0552

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

429

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F. (A.I.S.)

DATE: 25TH JUNE, 1945.

REF: AFSC/39/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Chief Commissioner has asked me to prepare a paper for his signature to SACMED requesting that now that hostilities are over in Europe, a new directive may be issued on the subject of Italian Civil Aviation, because the development of Civil Aviation would aid employment in the North and the Italian Government and A.C. transport problems.

2. I have suggested to the Chief Commissioner that the preparation of the memorandum be postponed until the return of AIR VICE-MARSHAL BAKER from the U.K. as I understood from him that he was going to discuss the future of the Italian Air Force at the Air Ministry, and no doubt he will have discussed Italian Civil Aviation and Italian aircraft factories at the same time.

3. It is, therefore, requested that on his return, A/V/M BAKER be shown this letter, and I would appreciate it if he would let me know the earliest moment at which he could see me on these matters, particularly as the Royal Air Force must inform the Italian Air Ministry officially as to the interim policy, which has now been held up for a month awaiting a directive from M.A.A.F. Without this directive it is not practicable to carry through a lot of re-organisation at the Italian Air Ministry, and elsewhere, which I consider should be done as soon as possible.

Pass S.S.D. sent 26/6
D/D 26/6

T.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6429

COPY:
FILE 46/AIR.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR FORCES
S/C 410

21 June 1945

Dear Dr. de Gasperi:

Reference your letter of 12 June, file 61/09482/26, addressed to the Chief Commissioner, concerning the release of certain undelivered aircraft now being held in Northern factories, the Chief Commissioner received at the same time a similar communication from the Prime Minister. A copy of his reply is enclosed herewith.

Very truly yours,

/s/ L. W. Stearns

L. W. STEARNS
Major, AGD
Staff Officer to the Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Dott. Alcide de Gasperi
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
Italian Government
Rome

FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
0.351 23/6/45 6977
46/Air

cc: Exec. Commt.
Air Forces S/C
NMD x IPOW S/C

WMS 23/6.

42B

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

42/09482/26

rough translation

Rome, June 12th 1945

Dear Admiral,

A certain number of aircrafts, already manufactured by order of the so-called Social Republic, were found, at the time of liberation of Northern Italy, in several factories of the zone. Said aircrafts could solve, to a considerable extent, the problem of our air transportation.

Information has reached me in particular that a number of airplanes for a total of 18 S.79, 6 S.82, 1 S.75, 2 S.95, 5 G.12 are to be found at Vergiate (S.I.A.I. plant), in Sesto Calende, in Turin and elsewhere.

As you are well aware how critical is the problem of transportation in Italy at the present moment, I beg to call your attention on the above, in order to obtain that the competent Allied Authorities kindly examine the possibility of handing over said crafts to our Aviation, which would destine them directly to transport service, with the temporary exception of those needing modifications. This concession would also allay the burden of the aid already being given Italy by the Allies, in this field, of which

6976

0534

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Rome, June 12th 1945

Dear Admiral,

A certain number of aircrafts, already manufactured by order of the so-called Social Republic, were found, at the time of liberation of Northern Italy, in several factories of the zone. Said aircrafts could solve, to a considerable extent, the problem of our air transportation.

Information has reached me in particular that a number of airplanes for a total of 18 S.79, 6 S.82, 1 S.75, 2 S.95, 5 G.12 are to be found at Vergiate (S.I.A.I. plant), in Sesto Calende, in Turin and elsewhere.

As you are well aware how critical is the problem of transportation in Italy at the present moment, I beg to call your attention on the above, in order to obtain that the competent Allied Authorities kindly examine the possibility of handing over said crafts to our Aviation, which would destine them directly to transport service, with the temporary exception of those needing modifications. This concession would also alley the burden of the aid already being given Italy by the Allies, in this field, of which we are deeply grateful.

6976

Thanking you for your kind assistance in the matter believe me, dear Admiral

Yours

(signed) DE GASPERI

Admiral Ellery W. Stone U.S.N.R.
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
ROME

cc: Air Forces S/C
Exec. Comm'r
WMD & IPOW S/C

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

EWS/dfe

42C

AFSC/46/AIR.

16 June 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

With reference to your letter number 485 res. dated 11 June, the Allied Commission is glad to be able to inform you that at a conference held at Caserta on 8 June and attended by the Director of the Air Forces Subcommission, a decision was reached whereby certain aircraft and equipment found in the North will be released to the Regia Aeronautica. Details of these releases will be communicated by the Air Forces Subcommission to the Minister for Air.

Arrangements are being made for the first two SM.79 aircraft to be placed at the disposal of H.R.H. the Lieutenant General of the Kingdom and to the President of the Council of Ministers, their present aeroplanes being withdrawn and allotted to the Regia Aeronautica for the Italian Courier Services.

/s/ ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

6974

cc: Exec. Comm't
Air Forces S/C
PWD & POW S/C

0557

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

C

4043

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/46/AIR.

22ND JUNE, 1945.

Dear

826/019.

1. With reference to letter 17292/3390.Coll dated 12th June 1945, I am glad to be able to inform you that aircraft from the North may be collected for the Lieutenant/General of the Realm and for the Prime Minister, in substitution of the aircraft now at their disposal.

2. You may like to know that there are 57 Civil Air Line Aircraft type seats available at the MAGAZZINO CENTRALE DI CASSERIAPALATO, SESTRIO, and you may like to have these fitted to the two aircraft mentioned in paragraph 1.

3. The general policy concerning equipment in the North is contained in my letter AFSC/655/EQ dated 14th June, and the policy as regards aircraft and factories in the North is contained in my letter AFSC/829/ENG dated 22nd June, which are being despatched to your Ministry.

4. I think these two letters will go a long way towards the efficient maintenance of the existing Italian Air Force, and will satisfy your immediate needs.

5. Will you please inform the Minister for Air when he takes up his new office.

Yours

L.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6973

H.E. General M. Aimone Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

COPY FILE: AFSC/826/ENG.
AFSC/655/EQ.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

39A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: INDUSTRY & COMMERCE SUB-COMMISSION,
H.Q. A.C. ROME.

DATE: 23rd JUNE, 1945.

REF: AFSC/829/ENG.

USE OF CIVIL FIRMS IN THE NORTH BY
THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

38A

With reference to the attached, it is requested that when planning the turn-over of the firms concerned to other than Italian Military purposes, you will retain such factory space as is required for the I.A.F. I hope to let you have further details later in respect of S.I.A.I. and Alfa Romeo.

2. Any comment which you have to make will be appreciated.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6972

36A 49

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY.

DATE: 22ND JUNE, 1945.

REF: AFSC/529/ADC.

ITALIAN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE.

Authority has now been obtained for the use of certain repair facilities in the North to maintain and improve the general condition of Italian aircraft being used on Courier Services.

2. Sanction has been obtained for the use of the S.I.A.I. Works at SESTO CALENDE for the overhauling of Savoia Marchetti aircraft, and Alfa Romeo, MILAN, for Alfa Romeo engines. In addition to these two firms the ten S.M.79 which are at present at MONTECHI-ARCOVE and the four S.M.79 at the Ansaldo Aeronautica Giovanni Augusta at GALATINA-PUGLIA may be completed, but for ease of contracting, supervision, economy and turning over to civilian industrial manufacture it is suggested that these two firms should not be given further work by you.

3. At the S.I.A.I. Works the following aircraft are under construction or overhaul, and permission is given to proceed with the work:

(i) 1 S.M.95 Civil Version. This aircraft is to be completed as soon as possible. Anticipate completion in 2/3 weeks.

(ii) 1 S.M.95 Military version. This aircraft is to be completed as soon as possible after the civil version.

(iii) 13 S.M.79. 4 of these aircraft should be almost ready for test flying, with a further 6 by the end of June. The remaining 3 should be completed about a month later.

(iv) 1 S.M.75. Should be completed by the end of July.

(v) 6 S.M.82. Should be completed by the end of July.

(vi) There are also 12 - Fiat G.12 aircraft under construction at the Fiat Works in TURIN, and 5 of these are in a fairly advanced state. Delivery promises have been given as follows:

6976

1st Aircraft	15/7/45
2nd Aircraft	10/8/45
3rd Aircraft	30/8/45
4th Aircraft	15/9/45
5th Aircraft	30/9/45

4. It is considered that these delivery promises could be anticipated if you were to bring pressure to bear on the Fiat Co.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Authority has now been obtained for the use of certain repair facilities in the North to maintain and improve the general condition of Italian aircraft being used on Courier Services.

2. Sanction has been obtained for the use of the S.I.A.I. Works at [redacted] for the overhauling of Savoia Marchetti aircraft, and Alfa Romeo, [redacted], for Alfa Romeo engines. In addition to these two firms the two S.M.79 which are at present at [redacted] and the four S.M.79 at the Cant [redacted] Aeronautica Giovanni Agusta at [redacted] may be completed, but for ease of contracting, supervision, economy and turning over to civilian industrial manufacture it is suggested that these two firms should not be given further work by you.

3. At the S.I.A.I. Works the following aircraft are under construction or overhaul, and permission is given to proceed with the work:

(i) 1 S.M.95 Civil Version. This aircraft is to be completed as soon as possible. Anticipate completion in 2/3 weeks.

(ii) 1 S.M.95 Military version. This aircraft is to be completed as soon as possible after the civil version.

(iii) 13 S.M.79. 4 of these aircraft should be almost ready for test flying, with a further 6 by the end of June. The remaining 3 should be completed about a month later.

(iv) 1 S.M.75. Should be completed by the end of July.

(v) 6 S.M.82. Should be completed by the end of July.

(vi) There are also 12 - Fiat G.12 aircraft under construction at the Fiat Works in [redacted], and 5 of these are in a fairly advanced state. Delivery promises have been given as follows:

6970

1st Aircraft	15/7/45
2nd Aircraft	10/8/45
3rd Aircraft	30/8/45
4th Aircraft	15/9/45
5th Aircraft	30/9/45

4. It is considered that these delivery promises could be anticipated if you were to bring pressure to bear on the Fiat Co.

5. Permission is given for the work on these 5 G.12 aircraft to be completed, and a decision will be made later as to whether work is to proceed on the remaining 7. It is requested that you ascertain from the Fiat Co. whether further material will be required, and also obtain some information about the probable delivery dates for these aircraft. It readily hardly be stated that a decision on this matter will be very largely influenced by reasonable delivery dates and availability of material.

6. As sanction has not been obtained for the number of aircraft in the Transport Wing to be increased, it will be necessary to take out of service

Continued/2.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

an equal number of aircraft as those new aircraft are delivered. The S.I.A.I. Works can deal with about 8 aircraft at a time and reckon that complete overhaul will take 6/8 weeks. 6 SM.79's and 2 SM.82's are to be selected and flown in to VENCIATE for overhaul. They should take up a load of 100 octane petrol and lubricating oil to enable finished aircraft coming from the Firms to be test flown and finally flown to ROME.

7. If the aircraft are delivered from the Firms according to the delivery promises, it will be necessary to form a pool of aircraft awaiting overhaul. Whether this pool would be at ROME or MILAN has not been decided, but a decision will be made when the necessity arises - your opinion as to where the pool of aircraft should be would be appreciated.

8. It is understood that S.I.A.I. have all the material to complete the aircraft at present in their Works, and all material with the exception of Fabric and dope solvent for the overhauls. It is requested that information may be obtained from them as to the quantity of fabric and solvent needed for the first 8 overhauls, and arrangements will then be made to have this material released.

9. It is suggested that all the SM.79's should have the Alfa 126 engines replaced with Alfa 128 engines. The S.I.A.I. have 15 serviceable Alfa 128 engines in their stores. Will you please investigate this suggestion and inform this Sub-Commission of your recommendations.

10. Sanction is also given for the overhaul of Alfa 126 and 128 engines to be done in the Alfa Romeo Works in MILAN. The monthly production should not exceed 25 Alfa 128 engines and 12 Alfa 126 engines, although these figures are subject to revision.

11. As production commences at Alfa Romeo, production at GALATINA and S.A.C.A. should be eased off and finally stopped when the required monthly output is reached at Alfa Romeo. Alfa Romeo have in their stores 60 dismantled Alfa 128 engines, and work could be commenced immediately on these. Until such time as unserviceable Alfa 126 engines can be delivered to MILAN, work should be commenced on the 18 engines removed from the 6 SM.79 aircraft undergoing overhaul.

12. Should further manufacturing facilities be required in the North, it is requested that you will inform this Sub-Commission of details of the work needed, together with the name of the firm selected to undertake the work. If the request is considered justified, authority will be sought to obtain the necessary sanction for the work to be put in hand.

6969

I.E. RIDDIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8. It is understood that [illegible] aircraft at present in their Works, and all material with the exception of Fabric and dope solvent for the overhauls. It is requested that information may be obtained from them as to the quantity of fabric and solvent needed for the first 6 overhauls, and arrangements will then be made to have this material released.

9. It is suggested that all the SM.79's should have the Alfa 126 engines replaced with Alfa 128 engines. The S.I.A.I. have 15 serviceable Alfa 128 engines in their stores. Will you please investigate this suggestion and inform this Sub-Commission of your recommendations.

10. Sanction is also given for the overhaul of Alfa 126 and 128 engines to be done in the Alfa Romeo Works in MILAN. The monthly production should not exceed 25 Alfa 128 engines and 12 Alfa 126 engines, although these figures are subject to revision.

11. As production commences at Alfa Romeo, production at GALATINA and S.A.C.A. should be eased off and finally stopped when the required monthly output is reached at Alfa Romeo. Alfa Romeo have in their stores 60 dismantled Alfa 128 engines, and work could be commenced immediately on these. Until such time as unserviceable Alfa 126 engines can be delivered to MILAN, work should be commenced on the 18 engines removed from the 6 SM.79 aircraft undergoing overhaul.

12. Should further manufacturing facilities be required in the North, it is requested that you will inform this Sub-Commission of details of the work needed, together with the name of the firm selected to undertake the work. If the request is considered justified, authority will be sought to obtain the necessary sanction for the work to be put in hand.

6964

I.H. REDDIN,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Comm 46 Gen V
820/Eng V

Copy sent MILAN OFFICE — 27/6 WS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. ROME.

TO : HQ. MAAF. (Attention A.L.S.)

DATE: 20th June, 1945.

REF : AFSC/46/Air.

Report on Italian Air Force by D/D Ops.

With reference to your letter MAAF/4200/ALS dated 16th June, 1945, the Air Officer Commanding has considered this report and has marked his comments in pencil, on the original.

This annotated copy is attached.

L.E.JARMAN, G/CAPT.
SENIOR STAFF OFFICER.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

369

From:- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 16th. June, 1945.

Ref:- MAF/4200/AIS.

Report on Italian Air Force by D/D.Ops.

8.B.

1. Attached, as requested, is a copy of the report made by D/D.Ops of this Headquarters.

2. You are requested to carefully peruse this report and submit your comments to this Section.

3. It would be appreciated if your reply can be made without delay, in order that both the report and your comments can be studied, at the same time, by the Chief of Staff/MAF. on his return from the U.K.

for (C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/MAF. MedME.

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
D. 165
KBW 17/6
46/Air

6967

0565

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Notes on Air Plan

(3) Strength at 1 June.

28 ~~11 2~~ total. made up as

follows. 2311 officers.
16657 airmen.
51 officers and 3024, with RAF.
160 " " 5909, with USAAF.

(4) Overall strength at 1 June.

316 assigned to units
176 in depots

492 total
240 serviceable & in commission

316 assigned to units. 176 assigned to depots.

(5) Do not like the words "wide spread alarm" It implies that the Southern and Island services are influenced by the Italians whereas they are used quite conventionally by their government officials although a report submitted by Sqn Ldr suggests that they are making complete fantasies.

(6) Leaves much room for improvement. Land planes would be even more suitable than sea planes, but we do not have anything by using them. The sea planes operate with little or no assistance from the allies.

6966

(7) D.D. ops was completely misinformed. Turin not Turin; the suggestion that trips to UK came from allied commission Rome, not from the Italian air ministry.

0566

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

We are restricting them to the mainland and to Sicily and Sardinia

(8) Our present services call for a lower figure than 7 a/c per day. The services operating are.

Rome - Naples. 2 a/c on six days to be reduced to 2 a/c for 4 days 8 / week.

Rome - Palermo. 3 / week.

Rome - Cagliari. 3 / week

Naples - Cagliari. 3 / week.

North Coast: 2 a/c on seven days 14 a/c / week

Tobruk 31 a/c per week. or a little under 5 per day.

a 60% serviceability is a reasonable figure for I.A.F. as DDOps [illegible] of 12-16 UE aircraft is reasonable for the Courier service.

(9) This is not necessary as it is included in 8 above.

(10) Not agreed. Training of fighter units 6964 include V.H.F. control. The Italians have 50 VHF sets in a factory in the North; supplement to put up all transport aircraft.

0567

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(11) This seems to be quite sound although I do not see why we have to consider Turkish feelings about an air-sea rescue of our own pilots.

It appears absolutely a reversal of the agreed policy for Italian participation in air-sea Rescue.

(13) limited to six hours maximum per pilot per month.

(14) This is the agreed policy. There is at present an unlimited amount of flying being done at Foggia and I feel that all the training establishments should come under some limitation in hours per pilot or aircraft.

(15). Agreed and in process of forming. Latest report from Leece are disappointing.

0568

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3511

From: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION.
To: EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION.
Date: 18th June 1945.
Ref: AFSC/46/AIR

Appointment of Italian Service Attachés Abroad.

3B11

Reference paragraph (3) of the Executive Commissioner's letter 590/2/EC dated 13th June 1945 it is reported that no application has so far been received from the Italian Government for the appointment of service attachés to neutral capitals.

Autograph copy
for T.G.M. PEARCE W/CDR IMT
AIR VICE MARSHAL.
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

Copy to:

Naval Sub Commission.
Land Forces Sub Commission.(MMIA)

6961

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/2657
15 June 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Executive Commissioner, Hq. Allied Commission.

Subject: Appointment of Italian Service Attaches Abroad.

1. In accordance with paragraph (3) of the Executive Commissioner's letter 590/2/EC of 13 June, it is reported that the Navy Sub-Commission has, as of the present date, received no application from the Italian Government for the appointment of service attachés to neutral capitals.

H. W. ZARTH,
COMMODORE, U.S. NAVY,
FOR REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

Copy to:
Land Forces, S/C. (AMMIA)
Air Forces S/C.

6960

0570

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

33

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 590/2/AC

13 June 1945

SUBJECT: Appointment of Italian Service Attaches Abroad

TO : Navy Subcommission
Land Forces Subcommission (MMIA)
Air Subcommission

1. G-5 Section, AFHQ, has informed this Headquarters that it has been agreed that the Italian Government may be permitted to appoint service attaches to neutral capitals subject to each individual appointment being approved by both the British and American representatives as well as the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. Consideration would also be taken as to whether such appointments would be useful to the Allied war effort.

2. In the case of the United Nations, appointments would be limited to countries whose forces are actively engaged in the Italian theatre and would also be subject to SACMED's approval.

3. It is not intended that this information be transmitted to the Italian Government unless applications have been received by you from the Italian Government for the appointment of service attaches. Therefore, it would be appreciated if you would inform the Executive Commissioner's Office if any applications have been received to date.

A. B. ARNOLDY.
Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

AOE
SSO

ALLIED FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
D.90 14/6/45
ORDERLY ROOM
AG/Air
COMMISSION

6959

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/dfe 37A

AFSC/16/AIR.

16 June 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

29A

With reference to your letter number 485 ris. dated 11 June, the Allied Commission is glad to be able to inform you that at a conference held at Caserta on 8 June and attended by the Director of the Air Forces Subcommission, a decision was reached whereby certain aircraft and equipment found in the North will be released to the Regia Aeronautica. Details of these releases will be communicated by the Air Forces Subcommission to the Minister for Air.

Arrangements are being made for the first two SM.79 aircraft to be placed at the disposal of H.R.H. the Lieutenant General of the Kingdom and to the President of the Council of Ministers, their present aerogiannes being withdrawn and allotted to the Regia Aeronautica for the Italian Courier Services.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

6958

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

2004
31 A

With reference to enclosure 28A, attached is a letter to the President of the Council of Ministers, for your signature. 30C is relevant.

2. I would like to take this opportunity of informing you very briefly as to the interim policy of the Italian Air Force which I enclose at enclosure 29A. 30C

3. I suggest that it might be a good thing for me to say a few words on the interim policy for the Italian Air Force at your Vice Presidents' Meeting next Wednesday - do you agree?

4. So far as it affects you, are you please in agreement with 30C.

I.F. McCREERY,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 13th June, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/46/AIR.

Executive Commissioner

I have amended 31A to comply with existing circumstances. Mr Kelly can go in 3rd person without 6951 signature

S. 13/6.

DRAFT:

FROM: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C. APO.394.

TO: PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

With reference to your letter n. 485 ris. dated 11th June, I am glad to be able to inform you that at a conference held at CASERTA on the 8th June and attended by the Director of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, a decision was reached whereby certain aircraft and equipment found in the North will be released to the Regia Aeronautica. Details of these releases will be communicated by the Air Forces Sub-Commission to the Minister for Air.

2. Arrangements are being made for the first two SM.79 aircraft to be placed at the disposal of H.R.H. the Lieutenant General of the Kingdom and to yourself, your present aeroplanes being withdrawn and allotted to the Regia Aeronautica for the Italian Courier Services.

Yours

6955

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0574

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

31C

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

At a meeting held at Caserta on 6th June, between the Chief-of-Staff and the A.C.A.S. of the Air Forces Sub Commission, ACC, the following was agreed :- (C.M.S.O & C.T.O. attended after preliminary discussion C&S- AOC)

(i) Italian Air Force material discovered in Italy should be centralised and placed under the control of the A.C.C. A.F.S.C. He is authorised to make issues of such material as is necessary to maintain the authorised Italian Air Force, and should encourage the use of such materials so as to reduce to a minimum the issues required from R.A.F. sources.

(ii) Repair facilities in Northern Italy may be utilised to overhaul the aircraft and engines which are to be used on the Italian Courier Service subject to concurrence of Chief Commissioner.

(iii) Only such quantities of petrol as are necessary to meet the approved flying commitment of the Italian Air Force will be issued.

(iv) Provided the Chief Commissioner agrees, new aircraft and engines discovered in Northern Italy may be made available to the Italian Air Force as replacements or to bring Italian Air Force up to establishment, but not to increase the new holding of aircraft above the authorised establishment. 6354

(v) Lists of major items of Italian equipment discovered, e.g. aircraft, M.T. engines etc, are to be submitted to this Headquarters for re-submission to the Air Ministry.

Action on file

12/6.

BRIEF REVIEW OF I.A.F.

30A

1. Interim Policy between the cessation of hostilities and the peace terms - much as now organised:

(i) Bomber/Transport a/c - all on courier services.
(ii) Seaplanes - on Air Sea Rescue & Courier Services.
(iii) Fighters - in status quo; limited to a maximum of 6 hours flying per pilot per month.

2. Allied type a/c i.e. 3 Squadrons of Airacobras and Spitfires, and 2 Squadrons of Baltimores to be on loan to I.A.F. without backing in a/c but probably some backing in spare parts until they run out in this theatre. Therefore these will gradually disappear through wastage.

3. A/c and sufficient spares to meet the needs of the existing I.A.F. will be released from the North. All a/c now under construction in the North will be completed and released to the I.A.F, except new types which will be flown to the U.K.

4. With the facilities in the North, the I.A.F. should be able to maintain itself except for petrol and oil, and possibly a few other things.

5. It is not the policy to allow the I.A.F. to increase its a/c strength.

6. The C.of.S M.A.A.F. is going to the U.K. very soon and will be discussing the future of the I.A.F. at the British Air Ministry. On his return we hope to announce the future policy to the I.A.M, thro' the C.C.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
DATE: 13th June, 1945.
REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

6953

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Translation

AIR FORCES SC 293

The President of the Council of Ministers

n. 489 ris.

Rome, 11 June 1945

Dear Admiral,

in North Italy, when the liberation took place we were fortunate enough to find in the various plants for aeronautics construction planes already ordered by the so-called Social Republic, which might in great part solve the problem of air transport.

As from the list, it appears that in Vergiate (S.I.A.I.), in Desto Calende, in Turin and elsewhere there are as a whole 18 S. 79, 6 S.82, 18.75, 2 S.95, 5 G.12.

Will you kindly ask the competent commands to allot these planes to our Air Force, which wants to use them directly for transport, after having made the necessary transformations.

In particular, it would be urgent to obtain the allotment of 2 S. 79 to replace the two planes which are at present at the disposal of H.R.H. the Lieutenant General of the Kingdom and myself, which have now worn down and can no longer be conveniently used.

Trusting in your kind intervention, I thank you and remain,

Yours sincerely,

I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EC HIST - 12 JUNE 45

→ ACTION: AIR FORCES SC 6952
INFO: CHIEF COMM
EXEC COMM
WMD & PoW SC.

e.c.

Air Forces Sfc

Will you please submit a reply to this letter on your file for signature by C.C.

OFFICE, EX. COMM'R. 12/6/45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

29 A

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 11 GIU. 1945

Prot.n. 485 ris.

Caro Ammiraglio,

nell'Alta Italia, all'atto della liberazione si sono fortunatamente trovati nelle varie fabbriche di costruzioni aeronautiche apparecchi già commessi dalla cosiddetta Repubblica Sociale, i quali potrebbero risolvere in buona parte il problema dei trasporti aerei.

Mi consta particolarmente, come dall'elenco a parte, che a Vergiate (S.I.A.I.), a Sesto Calende, a Torino ed altrove vi sono apparecchi per un complesso di 18 S.79, 6 S.82, 1 S.75, 2 S.95, 5 G.12.

La pregherei di voler interessare i comandi competenti perchè questi apparecchi vengano assegnati alla nostra Aviazione, che intende fin d'ora servirsene direttamente a scopo di trasporto, dopo avervi apportato le necessarie trasformazioni.

In particolare sarebbe urgente ottenere l'assegnazione di due S.79 per sostituire i due apparecchi attualmente a disposizione di S.A.R. il Luogotenente Generale del Regno e mia, i quali per il lungo logorio, non sono più in condizione di es-

./.

6951

Sig. Ammiraglio
ELLERY W. S T O N E
Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

sere convenientemente usati.

Sicuro del suo cortese interessamento in proposito, sentitamente la ringrazio.

Con molti cordiali saluti

G. Bonomi

6950

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ELENCO APPARECCHI DA TRASPORTO DISPONIBILI OD IN CORSO DI APPRONTAMENTO AL NORD

Ditta	S.79	S.82	S.75	S.95	G.12
S.I.A.I.	12	6	1	2	-
BESTETTI (Arcore)	2	-	-	-	-
AGUSTA	4	-	-	-	-
FIAT AERITALIA	-	-	-	-	5

Inoltre presso l'AERITALIA vi sarebbe la possibilità di approntare entro alcuni mesi altri 7 velivoli G.12; presso la S.I.A.I. potrebbero essere costruiti entro la fine dell'anno n.8 S.M. 95.

6949

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Cypher message

41/07 28A

S/L Air Force Sub-Commission Rome

Repeated/- Headquarters Balkan Air Force.

From/- HQ. MAAF CMF S.S.O. A/218 4th June.

Secret. Full control of Italian Air Force units in Balkan Air Force herewith transferred to Air Force Sub-Commission (Rome). All units, excepting Courier Services, to remain grounded until cleared by this Headquarters.

Distr/ AFSC Rome (see note ←)

Signed Eisenhower

A.714 8/6/45

46/Air

See Note

575 opr.

TOO 0715408
TOR 0721308
TOO 0721608
6948

LOOSE MEMBRANDUM

To: A.C.C.

UTILISATION OF ITALIAN FACTORIES IN LIBERATED ITALY

DIRECTIVES

1. Attached hereto is a copy of an AFHQ statement of interim policy regarding munitions factories and I have checked with M.M.I.A and confirmed that the provisions of this letter have not been varied.

2. From a study of this letter the following points emerge as being of considerable importance:

a) Para 3. It is apparent from this paragraph that if the Allied Air Forces do not wish to avail themselves of available repair or other facilities, and it is to be assumed that aircraft factories would not be required by any of the other services, the factories would revert to Italian civilian industry. In that event the part to be played by them in the national reconstruction would be agreed between the Italian Government and the Allied Commission, presumably by conversion to the production of non-warlike goods.

b) Para 4. The directions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirming or revising the interim policy have not yet been received. The Allied Commission is, therefore, bound by the directive appearing at para 5 under reference AFHQ AG.306.3/OPS CSC-O dated 11th February, 1945.

c) Para 5. The AFHQ letter quoted in the preceding subpara is quite clear in its terms and it is obvious from para 4 a that every effort will be made to keep the factories working on some form of production possibly to avoid the political repercussion of wide-scale unemployment.

d) Para 4 a of AFHQ letter. It will be noted that the Allied Commission is responsible under this paragraph for making a survey of all Italian warlike stores. This has subsequently been amplified by the Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission, who has instructed the Industry Sub-Commission to initiate the action and further stated that the three Service Sub-Commissions will furnish information and advice in so far as the respective services are concerned (Memorandum 5012/37/SC dated 16th April, 1945 refers). It is unnecessary to point out that the conduct of such a survey in respect of Italian Air Force material in the North would be quite beyond the capabilities of this Sub-Commission without very considerable assistance.

PAYMENT OF CONTRACTORS' BILLS

6947

3. In connection with para 3 of the attached letter I referred to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2. From a study of this letter the following points emerge as being of considerable importance:

a) Para 3 It is apparent from this paragraph that if the Allied Air Forces do not wish to avail themselves of available repair or other facilities, and it is to be assumed that aircraft factories would not be required by any of the other services, the factories would revert to Italian civilian industry. In that event the part to be played by them in the national reconstruction would be agreed between the Italian Government and the Allied Commission, presumably by conversion to the production of non-warlike goods.

b) Para 4 The directions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirming or revising the interim policy have not yet been received. The Allied Commission is, therefore, bound by the directive appearing at para 5 under reference AFHQ AG.360.3/057 (SC-C dated 11th February, 1945.

c) Para 5 The AFHQ letter quoted in the preceding subpara is quite clear in its terms and it is obvious from para 4, a that every effort will be made to keep the factories working on some form of production possibly to avoid the political repercussion of wide-scale unemployment.

d) Para 4 c of AFHQ letter. It will be noted that the Allied Commission is responsible under this paragraph for making a survey of all Italian warlike stores. This has subsequently been amplified by the Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission, who has instructed the Industry Sub-Commission to initiate the action and further stated that the three Service Sub-Commissions will furnish information and advice in so far as the respective services are concerned (Memorandum 9012/57/Ms dated 16th April, 1945 refers). It is unnecessary to point out that the conduct of such a survey in respect of Italian Air Force material in the North would be quite beyond the capabilities of this Sub-Commission without very considerable assistance.

6947

PAYMENT OF CONTRACTORS' BILLS

3. In connection with para 3 of the attached letter I referred to the Finance Sub-Commission the question of payment to civilian firms for contractual work done for the Allied Services, if the option to utilise factory repair or other facilities were exercised.

4. Major TIMSON, Joint Director of that Sub-Commission confirmed that the position is quite clear under the Armistice terms and the main points are as follows:

a) Under the Armistice terms the Allied Governments have the right to call upon the Italian Government to deliver and pay for equipment such as partially completed aircraft in Italian civilian factories which the Allies may desire to utilise.

b) The Italian government is financially responsible for the cost of maintenance of all Allied Forces in Italy including such repair and other services that they may require.

/c)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

c) The British Government does not provide and has refused to provide any sterling backing for AMG lire expended by the British Forces in Italy.

d) The cost of any expenditure of AMG lire in payment of contractors bills is, therefore, borne entirely by the Italian Government, and it is, in a sense, immaterial whether the actual payment is made from Service funds or by the Italian Government on behalf of the various Services. Particular attention is drawn to the words "in a sense" as in practice various accounting difficulties would arise were lire payments in Italy to be shown as charges against the Air Force Vote at Air Ministry. Such difficulties have been experienced by the Americans who have now, however, created a special War Department fund to which dollar equivalents of lire payments are transferred, the fund thus representing the dollar total which would normally be credited to the Italian Government.

5. In view of para 4 d. above I pointed out to Major TIBBOTS that were Headquarters M.A.A.F. to decide to utilise repair or other facilities at Italian firms they would obviously prefer to have the bills paid by the Italian Government direct. While he agreed that this might be arranged I have the feeling that it would be preferable to enquire more closely into the mechanism of such payment before referring it to Headquarters M.A.A.F. as a practical proposition. The views of the Command Accountant and of the Financial Adviser would also have to be consulted.

Wing Commander
Senior Equipment Officer. 6946

7th June, 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4454.

From : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. 26A

TO : Air Vice-Marshal I. E. Brodie, C.B.E., A.F.S.C., Allied Commission, Rome.

Date : 26 May 1945.

Ref : MAAF/S.44/Air. CONFIDENTIAL

26C

Herewith for information copy of a Minute which has been sent to the Chief of Air Plans of this Headquarters in regard to the matters arising out of the conference on the Italian Air Force held on 24th May.

J. H. EDWARDES-JONES,
Air Commodore,
D.D. of Ops.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION
AG 3a
R 8n 2
2675

28/5.

6945

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief of Air Plans.
Copy for info. to -- Air Forces Sub-Commission.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. At a conference held by Chief of Staff, R.A.F., on 24th May 1945 the future of the Italian Air Force was thoroughly discussed. A number of points were raised which need clarification; these are set out below, and I want you to make a thorough investigation of this problem and let me have your recommendations.

Courier Services.

2. A clear-cut plan for operating the courier services should be laid down. The questions which need clarification are:

a. How many aircraft are to be used?

b. How much POL is required?

c. What wireless and safety arrangements are required?

d. What maintenance is required, and who will be responsible?

3. I have a list of the land and seaplane routes now in operation and others proposed by AOC, AFSC. These are given on a separate list attached.

4. The question of restrictions on flights by Italian aircraft should be reviewed. AOC AFSC stated that roughly all flights South of Rome were for the benefit of the Italians and all flights North of Rome for the Commission. In addition, he stated that he wished to run special flights to Lampedusa and Pantellaria about three times per month for the Commission. The advisability of allowing these latter flights should be carefully considered.

5. The question was raised as to whether there were any qualifications for Italian aircrew to carry passengers. AOC AFSC stated that at present there are none, but that all pilots employed were competent. It was agreed that some qualification should be laid down.

6. The question of authorisation of passenger flights was also discussed. I consider there should be greater control of these flights and the passengers than at present. It may be advisable to place the whole of the courier services under 216 Group or MATS.

7. The question of the use of Baltimores for the courier service was also discussed. It is believed that Air Ministry has authorised their use for this purpose, and also the issue of spares on loan. This should be examined, reference being made to an Air Ministry signal on the subject.

Aircraft Factories.

AOC AFSC.

457B
26B
6944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Courier Services.

2. A clear-cut plan for operating the courier services should be laid down. The questions which need clarification are:

a. How many aircraft are to be used?

b. How much POL is required?

c. What wireless and safety arrangements are required?

d. What maintenance is required, and who will be responsible?

3. I have a list of the land and seaplane routes now in operation and others proposed by AOC, AFSC. These are given on a separate list attached.

4. The question of restrictions on flights by Italian aircraft should be reviewed. AOC AFSC stated that roughly all flights South of Rome were for the benefit of the Italians and all flights North of Rome for the Commission. In addition, he stated that he wished to run special flights to Lampedusa and Pantellaria about three times per month for the Commission. The advisability of allowing these latter flights should be carefully considered.

5. The question was raised as to whether there were any qualifications for Italian aircrew to carry passengers. AOC AFSC stated that at present there are none, but that all pilots employed were competent. It was agreed that some qualification should be laid down.

6. The question of authorisation of passenger flights was also discussed. I consider there should be greater control of these flights and the passengers than at present. It may be advisable to place the whole of the courier services under 216 Group or MATS.

6944

7. The question of the use of Baltimores for the courier service was also discussed. It is believed that Air Ministry has authorised their use for this purpose, and also the issue of spares on loan. This should be examined, reference being made to an Air Ministry signal on the subject.

Aircraft Factories.

8. The use of Italian aircraft factories was discussed. AOC AFSC asked whether they could restart work for the I.A.F. to a limited degree. It was considered that this question should be raised with SACMED.

9. It was suggested that if Baltimores are to be used for the Courier service they should be converted in aircraft factories, or by the I.A.F. If this is done, the question was raised as to who should vet conversion work. AOC AFSC suggested that his Engineer Officer could vet the original conversion and that as there was no structural alteration to the aircraft involved the work could then proceed on other aircraft, if satisfactory.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Airfields.

10. The question of airfields to be used by the I.A.F. was discussed. AOC AFSC stated that the probable requirements would be Centocelle, Littorio, Guidonia, Bari, Lecce, Milan (Linate), Turin (Aer Italia), and Frosinone (For O.T.U.). In addition, there is a requirement for seaplanes to be based at Bracciano, Naples (Nisida), Cagliari, Taranto, Brindisi, Lake Varano, and Venice. Authority will be required for the use of Venice, both by MAAF and the Navy. It is not clear who gave authority for the use of Nisida. It is believed that no air authority was given.

Lecce.

11. The question of this airfield was discussed. AOC AFSC stated that he would like the I.A.F. to take over the airfield and buildings, as he wished to move the fighter squadrons there and to open a Flying Control school. I believe that he received this clearance from this Headquarters after the conference.

Flying Control.

12. AOC AFSC asked whether flying control should be built up in the I.A.F. It was agreed that if the I.A.F. is to operate efficiently, flying control is essential. In this connection, AOC stated that he would like a small school started at Lecce with approximately ten pupils per course.

Fighter Squadrons

13. The future of the I.A.F. fighter squadrons was discussed. It was suggested that as the Spitfires and P-39s would gradually die out, the squadrons should be gradually reduced from five to three. A policy should be laid down for their training, with a maximum amount of flying per pilot per month. When this figure has been decided, sufficient petrol for this purpose can be issued.

O.T.U.

14. The question was raised whether the O.T.U. should continue. AOC AFSC stated that it was necessary for the present for conversion purposes.

Air Sea Rescue.

15. AOC AFSC wished to know how much it was intended to utilise the I.A.F. on Air Sea Rescue work. It was agreed that this should be investigated with the Aircraft Safety Section and MACAF. The original idea was that the I.A.F. should eventually take over all air sea rescue in the Adriatic.

Navigation.

16. AOC AFSC requested that a Navigation officer be attached to his Headquarters to assist in navigation problems. This should be taken up with the Chief Navigation Officer of this Headquarters.

---

17. All these questions need investigation and others will appear as now

6913

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

No publication

Lecce.

11. The question of this airfield was discussed. AOC AFSC stated that he would like the I.A.F. to take over the airfield and buildings, as he wished to move the fighter squadrons there and to open a Flying Control school. I believe that he received this clearance from this Headquarters after the conference.

Flying Control.

12. AOC AFSC asked whether flying control should be built up in the I.A.F. It was agreed that if the I.A.F. is to operate efficiently, flying control is essential. In this connection, AOC stated that he would like a small school started at Lecce with approximately ten pupils per course.

Fighter Squadrons

13. The future of the I.A.F. fighter squadrons was discussed. It was suggested that as the Spitfires and P-39s would gradually die out, the squadrons should be gradually reduced from five to three. A policy should be laid down for their training, with a maximum amount of flying per pilot per month. When this figure has been decided, sufficient petrol for this purpose can be issued.

O.T.U.

14. The question was raised whether the O.T.U. should continue. AOC AFSC. stated that it was necessary for the present for conversion purposes.

Air Sea Rescue.

6943

15. AOC AFSC wished to know how much it was intended to utilise the I.A.F. on Air Sea Rescue work. It was agreed that this should be investigated with the Aircraft Safety Section and MACAF. The original idea was that the I.A.F. should eventually take over all air sea rescue in the Adriatic.

Navigation.

16. AOC AFSC requested that a Navigation officer be attached to his Headquarters to assist in navigation problems. This should be taken up with the Chief Navigation Officer of this Headquarters.

---

17. All these questions need investigation and others will appear as you make your review. The question of administrative courses should also be given some attention, but this should be dealt with carefully as the Chief of Staff, R.A.F., holds the view that R.A.F. admin. courses are normally not suitable for the I.A.F.

J. H. EDWARDS-JONES,
Air Commodore,
D.D. of Ops.

26 May 1945.
MAAF/S.44/Air.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I.A.F. AIR LINES IN USE AND PROPOSED.

I. Landplanes.

(A) Rome -- Naples -- Bari -- Lecce.
Daily in each direction, except Sundays.

(B) Rome -- Palermo.
Three times per week round flight.

(C) Rome -- Bologna -- Milan -- Treviso -- Bologna -- Rome.
With night stop at Milan. It is planned to fly one aircraft each way each day, which means that there will normally be four aircraft in operation at any one time. It is proposed to include Turin in this circuit when available.

II. Seaplanes.

(A) Naples (Misida) -- Cagliari.
Three times per week, round flight. Seaplanes based on Cagliari.

(B) Taranto -- Augusta.
Three times per week, round flight.

(C) Proposed, Rome -- Cagliari.
Two or three times per week.

(D) Proposed, Rome -- Augusta.-- Taranto.
Two or three times per week. This might include Naples.

(E) Proposed; Naples -- Rome -- Genoa.
Three times per week. This might include Leghorn.

(F) Proposed; Taranto -- Lake Varano -- Ancona -- Venice.
Three times per week.

6942

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

26A

25A

STATO MAGGIORE R. AERONAUTICA

1^ Sezione - Operazioni

li 25 MAG 1945 194

Prot. N. 26068/op.8 | 3151 Bell Alleg. ..... Risposta al foglio N. ..... del .....

OGGETTO: Trasferimento Stormo Baltimore.-

Al' AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION /A2. R O M A

1. In risposta al foglio AFSC/21/Air del 21 Maggio 1945 e a seguito delle comunicazioni verbali si conferma che è stato disposto il trasferimento di un Gruppo dello Stormo Baltimore da Biferno all'Aeroporto dell'Urbe il giorno 28 corrente mese.

2. L'altro Gruppo si trasferirà suddetto Aeroporto non appena il primo Gruppo si sarà sistemato.

6941

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

26A
(4)
25A1H

From : I.A.F. Stato Maggiore
To : Air Forces Sub Commission, A.C., Rome
Date : 25th May 1945
Ref : 26068/OP/8/3181/COLL

18A
26A

TRANSFER OF BALTIMORE WINN

With reference to your letter AFSC/21/AIR of the 21st May 1945 and further to verbal information, we confirm you that instructions have beam issued in order that a Group of Baltimore Wing be transferred from Biferno to Rome Airfield on the 28th inst.

2. The other Group will be transferred to the a/m Airfield as soon as the first one is organized.

The Chief of Staff.

translated by E. Gasparini

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION
C605
ORDERLY ROOM
46/Air

6948

SECRET

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE POLICY AND STATUS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

HQ., M.A.A.F., CMF : 24.5.45.

Present: Chief of Staff, RAF.
A.V.M. Brodie, AFSC, Rome.
A.O.A., MAAF.
Air Cdre. Wincer, C.A.
Air Cdre. Woolley, C.I.O.
Air Cdre. Edwards-Jones, D/D Ops.
G/Capt. McLaren Reid, A.L.S.
G/Capt. Sherman, Training.
G/Capt. French, Rep. C.M.S.O.
Wing Cr. Grant, Air Training.
Wing Cr. Fisher, A.L.S.
Wing Cr. Knowles, A.F.S.C.
Squadron Ldr. Conroy, A.L.S.

1 The Chief of Staff opened the meeting by stating that with the ending of the war in Europe, our relations with the Italian Air Force had changed, and called for review.

He reminded the meeting that the Italians were an ex-enemy people, but that after their defeat they had shown a certain willingness to collaborate with the Allies. This had been accepted without any promise that it would give them any better standing at the Peace Conference, or entitle them per se to any measure of re-armament after the war. The Italian Air Force depended for its existence after defeat of Italy upon the contribution which it had made to the war effort against Germany, and the onus was placed upon the Italians to put forward the maximum effort, advised, aided, and where necessary supplied so far as the Allies thought fit to make resources available. The function of A.F.S.C. during the war was to ensure that the greatest use was made by the Italians of their expressed willingness to co-operate.

2 Now that the war in Europe had ended, it seemed clear that the I.A.F. no longer has a right to remain in being. It was predicated upon a contribution to the war effort which no longer could be made. On the other hand, it was clear that, from a political point of view, and from a common-sense one, if indeed the Peace Treaty granted the Italians any measure of air forces, the present organization should not be allowed to go to pieces. Consequently, an interim policy was submitted to the Air Ministry for the I.A.F., and this has now been broadly approved. Signals GB.56 May 5 and MHW.657 May 20 refer.

These signals confer on M.A.A.F. the broad right to employ certain material in certain ways in respect of the I.A.F. It remains to interpret in terms of British support and help and manpower how much and in what proportions facilities made available should be used.

3 Arising out of the former statement, A.V.M. Brodie asked whether the policy of the A.F.S.C. should be to let things drift, or to build up the I.A.F. to as efficient a force as possible.

C.O.S. stated that our policy, viewed from a negative angle would

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Wing Cr. Grant, Air Training.
Wing Cr. Fisher, A.L.S.
Wing Cr. Knowles, A.F.S.C.
Squadron Ldr. Conroy, A.L.S.

1 The Chief of Staff opened the meeting by stating that with the ending of the war in Europe, our relations with the Italian Air Force had changed, and called for review.

He reminded the meeting that the Italians were an ex-enemy people, but that after their defeat they had shown a certain willingness to collaborate with the Allies. This had been accepted without any promise that it would give them any better standing at the Peace Conference, or entitle them per se to any measure of re-armament after the war. The Italian Air Force depended for its existence after defeat of Italy upon the contribution which it had made to the war effort against Germany, and the onus was placed upon the Italians to put forward the maximum effort, advised, aided, and where necessary supplied so far as the Allies thought fit to make resources available. The function of A.F.S.C. during the war was to ensure that the greatest use was made by the Italians of their expressed willingness to co-operate.

2 Now that the war in Europe had ended, it seemed clear that the I.A.F. no longer has a right to remain in being. It was predicated upon a contribution to the war effort which no longer could be made. On the other hand, it was clear that, from a political point of view, and from a common-sense one, if indeed the Peace Treaty granted the Italians any measure of air forces, the present organization should not be allowed to go to pieces. Consequently, an interim policy was submitted to the Air Ministry for the I.A.F., and this has now been broadly approved. Signals GB.56 May 5 and MSW.657 May 20 refer.

4IA

These signals confer on M.A.A.F. the broad right to employ certain material in certain ways in respect of the I.A.F. It remains to interpret in terms of British support and help and manpower how much and in what proportions facilities made available should be used. 6934

3 Arising out of the former statement, A.V.M. Brodie asked whether the policy of the A.F.S.C. should be to let things drift, or to build up the I.A.F. to as efficient a force as possible.

C.O.S. stated that our policy, viewed from a negative angle would be not to allow the I.A.F. to collapse. From a positive point of view, we were under no obligation, and we were in no position where manpower was concerned to do more than keep it together in a moderate state of efficiency. It had been stated that the Royal Navy was adopting much the same policy.

A.C.A. considered that the I.A.F. should be left to carry on as best it could without Allied assistance, in view of our own acute manpower shortages. A.V.M. Brodie felt that at least some supervision should be exerted in our own interests. He stressed that the I.A.F. needed careful watching to ensure that they did not misuse material at their disposal, quite apart from any question of their using it to the best advantage of the Allies. It was stated that the present establishment of the A.F.S.C. was 41 officers and 107 other ranks.

/ Conclusions . . .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Decision :

(a) Our policy should be to keep the I.A.F. in being above the level of collapse, but not necessarily at a high level of fighting efficiency.

(b) No increases in establishment are to be made without very careful consideration, and only in the dearest cases, which must be referred to the C.O.S.

(c) The work and establishment of the A.F.S.C. vis-a-vis the I.A.F. in the present circumstances are to be scrutinized with a view to reduction.

4 Interim Policy

C.O.S. stressed that the assistance set out in GB.56 May 5 and approved by the Air Ministry in no way condoned the existence of the I.A.F. or promised anything to the prejudice of the terms of the Peace Treaty. This must always be kept in mind. The provisions of this signal do not confer on the Italians any rights, nor do they imply the necessity to give the I.A.F. the whole of the facilities set out in it.

This signal made provision for :

(a) the establishment of a courier service " of a size sufficient to meet the reasonable needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian administration as soon as possible. "

(b) for the handing over on loan of up to 40 Baltimore aircraft for conversion to passenger transport under Italian arrangements.

(c) for permission to be given to the I.A.F. to retain the use of their present fighter aircraft, including P.39's.

5 Courier Service.

A.V.M. Brodie stated that the courier service was intended to operate between ROME, MILAN, TRIESTE, and BOLOGNA, and later TUNIS, and possibly other centres. C.O.S. emphasised the need for this service to be organized, rigidly controlled, and kept under close scrutiny to avoid undue expansion and misuse. A.C.A. suggested controlling supplies of aviation fuel as the best means of doing this. Arising out of this point, it was apparent that the British would in fact have to supply fuel for all I.A.F. activities, and that the question of the overall allotment of fuel for flying, transportation, as well as other supplies, would have to be carefully investigated.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(c) The work and establishment of the A.F.S.C. vis-a-vis the I.A.F. in the present circumstances are to be scrutinized with a view to reduction.

4 Interim Policy

C.O.S. stressed that the assistance set out in GB.56 May 5 and approved by the Air Ministry in no way condoned the existence of the I.A.F. or promised anything to the prejudice of the terms of the Peace Treaty. This must always be kept in mind. The provisions of this signal do not confer on the Italians any rights, nor do they imply the necessity to give the I.A.F. the whole of the facilities set out in it.

This signal made provision for :

(a) the establishment of a courier service " of a size sufficient to meet the reasonable needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian administration as soon as possible. "

(b) for the handing over on loan of up to 40 Baltimore aircraft for conversion to passenger transport under Italian arrangements.

(c) for permission to be given to the I.A.F. to retain the use of their present fighter aircraft, including P.39's.—

5 Courier Service. 6938

A.V.M. Brodie stated that the courier service was intended to operate between ROME, MILAN, TRIESTE, and BOLOGNA, and later TUNIS, and possibly other centres. C.O.S. emphasised the need for this service to be organized, rigidly controlled, and kept under close scrutiny to avoid undue expansion and misuse. A.C.A. suggested controlling supplies of aviation fuel as the best means of doing this. Arising out of this point, it was apparent that the British would in fact have to supply fuel for all I.A.F. activities, and that the question of the overall allotment of fuel for flying, transportation, as well as other supplies, would have to be carefully investigated.

6 It was stated that approximately 50 SM 79 and 82, and 50 Cant seaplanes were available for the service, together with an unknown number completed or in production in Northern Italy.

The question of how far the Italian aircraft industry should be permitted to work now that the European war had ended was discussed. It was clear that this was a matter of major principle, and the responsibility of A.F.S.C. to represent the situation as known to HQ MAAF for consideration of the Air Commander-in-Chief.

7 It was clear that the question of safety precautions, flying control, pilots' and crews' qualifications, and the general operation of the courier service carrying British officials must receive very close

/ consideration . .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

consideration, that it should not be launched on anything approaching even a moderate scale without this being done.

Conclusions.

(a) D/D Ops. to consider every aspect of the establishment of this service, and to report as soon as possible on the lines which it should follow, and the necessary limitations on its functions.

(b) A.F.S.C. to submit a statement, with recommendations, on the position regarding Italian industry for high level representation.

(c) D/D Ops. is to co-operate with C.I.O. and C.M.S.O. wherever necessary in producing the above report. The security aspect of the travel of Italians is one calling for particular consideration.

8 Baltimores.

C.O.S. pointed out that the fact that the Air Ministry were prepared to loan up to 40 Baltimores did not necessarily mean that we should loan this number to them. A.V.M. Brodie was of the opinion that they would be necessary, but this obviously required checking with the reasonable requirements for passenger carrying.

The situation regarding backing was discussed. C.O.S. recommended that since they were on loan, we should keep the aircraft serviceable, i.e. supply backing or not as we considered desirable; but that we should hand over no spares in bulk which would enable the Italians to keep more aircraft in being than we deemed advisable. A.V.M. Brodie asked if the aircraft factories owned by Italians could be used to maintain these aircraft in spares, the cost of production being borne by the Italians. C.O.S. ruled that if ultimately the Italian aircraft factories were allowed to turn out aircraft spares, and if on investigation C.M.S.O. considered that this was a necessary source of supply, it was possible that these factories would be used.

9 The question of the conversion of the Baltimores and their inspection after conversion was discussed. A.V.M. Brodie said that the A.F.S.C. could supervise the conversion of the prototype, but that owing to shortage of staff, the remainder would be similarly converted by the Italians. He stated that this would be satisfactory.

Conclusions :

6937

(a) D/D Ops. to consider and recommend upon the number of Baltimores to be loaned to meet the overall transport requirements and the courier service.

(b) C.M.S.O. to investigate and approve, if he could do so, proposals for conversion.

10 Fighters.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

wherever necessary in producing the above report. The security aspect of the travel of Italians is one calling for particular consideration.

8 Baltimores.

C.O.S. pointed out that the fact that the Air Ministry were prepared to loan up to 40 Baltimores did not necessarily mean that we should loan this number to them. A.V.M. Brodie was of the opinion that they would be necessary, but this obviously required checking with the reasonable requirements for passenger carrying.

The situation regarding backing was discussed. C.O.S. recommended that since they were on loan, we should keep the aircraft serviceable, i.e. supply backing or not as we considered desirable; but that we should hand over no spares in bulk which would enable the Italians to keep more aircraft in being than we deemed advisable. A.V.M. Brodie asked if the aircraft factories owned by Italians could be used to maintain these aircraft in spares, the cost of production being borne by the Italians. C.O.S. ruled that if ultimately the Italian aircraft factories were allowed to turn out aircraft spares, and if on investigation C.M.S.O. considered that this was a necessary source of supply, it was possible that these factories would be used.

9 The question of the conversion of the Baltimores and their inspection after conversion was discussed. A.V.M. Brodie said that the A.F.S.C. could supervise the conversion of the prototype, but that owing to shortage of staff, the remainder would be similarly converted by the Italians. He stated that this would be satisfactory.

Conclusions :

6937

(a) D/D Ops. to consider and recommend upon the number of Baltimores to be loaned to meet the overall transport requirements and the courier service.

(b) C.M.S.O. to investigate and approve, if he could do so, proposals for conversion.

10 Fighters.

It was clear that the fighters were not necessarily required in their operational capacity, and should be redistributed or used during the interim period primarily to enable pilots to keep up their flying skill. Flying obviously must be controlled in relation to maintaining this at a certain level, and to the expenditure of fuel.

In this connection, C.O.S. enquired as to the previous experience of these pilots as bomber-transport pilots. A.V.M. Brodie stated that the Italian C.A.S. had stated that a number had bomber experience, but there seemed to be some doubt. The question of conversion was one which needed looking into, and it was stressed that there must be no question of inexperienced pilots finding a way into transport employment to the detriment of safety.

/ It was agreed . . .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

It was agreed that, so long as any need existed, conversion could continue at FROSINONE, subject to review.

Conclusions :

(a) D/D Ops., with A.F.S.C., to investigate and report upon the best distribution and employment of fighters with the principles in view.

(b) A.F.S.C. to report on the training of fighter pilots in bomber-transport work.

11 Training.

(a) Ab initio. C.C.S. pointed out that no ab initio training was authorised. A.V.M. Brodie said that this was understood, but that he was not satisfied that a certain amount might not be going on. He agreed to check and confirm.

(b) Conversion training, FROSINONE. This would be justified only in so far as the need for pilots to be converted existed. D/D Ops. should investigate this question as a part of the whole problem.

(c) Training staff. A.V.M. Brodie agreed that no additional training staff would be required for the above commitments. It was stressed that the resources of the training staff, as of any other Branch of this Headquarters, would be at his disposal pari passu with other Commands.

12 Air/Sea/Rescue.

D/D Ops. agreed to investigate in consultation with M.A.C.A.F. the Allied requirements for Italian assistance in this work.

13 Supply.

It has been stated above that fuel, spares, equipment, and other materials will have to be supplied perhaps to a considerable extent at the expense of the British. It will therefore be necessary to assess what the cost in terms of this to the I.A.F. will be to us, and to submit a definite proposal for the reconstitution of the I.A.F. within the terms above to the Air Ministry for approval. This would be a natural outcome of D/D Ops' overall investigation made in consultation with A.F.S.C., A.O.A., A.S.C.-in-C and C.M.S.O., and will form a basis of organization of the I.A.F. in the immediate future. D/D Ops. to report with the minimum delay.

14 Bases and airfields.

(a) BRACCIANO. A.V.M. Brodie asked for the use of Bracciano as a seaplane base between Rome and Genoa, owing to the fact that no usable strip

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

to use the airfield, not only to store obsolescent aircraft, but for the operation of fighter aircraft during the interim period.

(c) FROSINONE. It was agreed that the Italians could still continue to use this, so long as the need for a Baltimore conversion school existed.

(d) NISIDA. A.V.M. Brodie reported that the I.A.F. is operating from NISIDA to SICILY. D/D Ops. asked if M.A.A.F. had given permission for the use of NISIDA., and it was confirmed that no such permission had been given. The question of Navy consent being necessary was discussed, and it was agreed that A.F.S.C. should take the matter up with the Navy side of the Commission, and if necessary, A.L.S. with the Naval authorities.

15 Ground training.

C.O.S. said that the Italians might think well of instituting a certain amount of ground training. He felt, however, that it was for them to do this, and while we would advise, we were not in a position to provide instructors or other material resources. He felt that an administration school was a larger step than the Italians were capable of taking, since their own administration seemed to be in a state of chaos, but that possibly something on the lines of the NCO's school or the Aircrew Officers' school might be organized by them themselves.

In general, he felt that R.A.F syllabuses, as such, would be of very little practical value to the Italians, who individually had not much idea of what was involved. He recommended that Wing Cdr. Bisdee, who is responsible for this, should consult with G/Capt. Training at this Headquarters, and he would have no objection to selected Italian officers visiting the school at SULMONA. He was not prepared to accept Italian personnel as members of British courses.

16 C.O.S. was emphatic that Moral Leadership Courses, as understood by the R.A.F., were not appropriate to foreign air forces. There were a number of reasons for this, and in any case the introduction of such courses under British auspices must be referred to and carefully considered by the Air Ministry. It was understood that some information had been supplied. This should not be followed up, and no attempt should be made to stimulate interest in these courses without prior reference to the Chief of Staff personally.

6935

17 War Savings Certificates.

C.O.S. outlined the circumstances in which these were made available to the Italians, and pointed out that all except some £900 had been returned. A.F.S.C. had been somewhat difficult on this subject over a long period, and the matter was not made easier by wholly irregular action by an ex-member of the staff communicating privately with certain particular individuals of political importance. He pointed out that the Italians had

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

permission had been given. The question of Navy consent being necessary was discussed, and it was agreed that A.F.S.C. should take the matter up with the Navy side of the Commission, and if necessary, A.L.S. with the Naval authorities.

15 Ground training.

C.O.S. said that the Italians might think well of instituting a certain amount of ground training. He felt, however, that it was for them to do this, and while we would advise, we were not in a position to provide instructors or other material resources. He felt that an administration school was a larger step than the Italians were capable of taking, since their own administration seemed to be in a state of chaos, but that possibly something on the lines of the NCO's school or the Aircrew Officers' school might be organized by them themselves.

In general, he felt that R.A.F syllabuses, as such, would be of very little practical value to the Italians, who individually had not much idea of what was involved. He recommended that Wing Cdr. Bisdee, who is responsible for this, should consult with G/Capt. Training at this Headquarters, and he would have no objection to selected Italian officers visiting the school at SUNNONA. He was not prepared to accept Italian personnel as members of British courses.

16 C.O.S. was emphatic that Moral Leadership Courses, as understood by the R.A.F., were not appropriate to foreign air forces. There were a number of reasons for this, and in any case the introduction of such courses under British auspices must be referred to and carefully considered by the Air Ministry. It was understood that some information had been supplied. This should not be followed up, and no attempt should be made to stimulate interest in these courses without prior reference to the Chief of Staff personally.

6935

17 War Savings Certificates.

C.O.S. outlined the circumstances in which these were made available to the Italians, and pointed out that all except some £900 had been returned. A.F.S.C. had been somewhat difficult on this subject over a long period, and the matter was not made easier by wholly irregular action by an ex-member of the staff communicating privately with certain particular individuals of political importance. He pointed out that the Italians had invested relatively large sums individually at the expense of the British Treasury by purchasing certificates in lira redeemable in sterling. We could in no circumstances agree with the representations of the Italian authorities that re-purchase should be allowed, & since by far the greater majority had refunded, he saw no reason why the remainder should not do so also. A matter of considerable principle was involved, and he proposed to take action in conformity with the reported instructions of the Air Ministry to obtain a complete refund.

If there were still recalcitrants, action would be taken to cancel the numbers of the certificates in Italian hands. Owners would then have to claim their right to payment and would be repaid in the currency in which the purchases were made.

The question of correspondence through irregular channels was also taken up.

/ 18 . . . .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

18 Relations of A.F.S.C. with H.Q., M.A.A.F.

Draft

C.O.S. stated that the directive issued to the A.F.S.C. (A.G.334/111 IS&PS-O dated 6th March 1945), might require revision in the light of present circumstances, but that its principles still remained effective as a guidance to the attitude to be adopted towards the I.A.F.

Emphasis was laid on the necessity for A.O.C., AFSC. to keep in very close touch with this Headquarters, especially during the interim period. Relatively small matters might involve large questions of policy, and it was particularly important that nothing should be done to compromise the later situation. Such touch should be maintained both by reporting as necessary, and by personal contacts, and C.O.S. reiterated once more his instructions that A.L.S. and A.F.S.C. should meet every 7 to 10 days during this period, either in this Headquarters or in ROME, so as to keep fully informed.

C.O.S. particularly stressed once more that the resources of this H.Q. were available to the A.F.S.C., and that they should not hesitate to visit or consult branches, who could probably give them considerable help, and, if necessary, direction.

19 Communications.

All Intelligence matters should be normally forwarded direct to the C.I.O., with copies to A.L.S. where this was considered necessary.

C.O.S. stated that Intelligence reports would not necessarily be followed by executive action, and where this was necessary, it would form the subject of a special communication to the executive side.

All executive matters are to be addressed to A.L.S. for action either by them or the appropriate branch, or for the information of the C-in-C or C.O.S. if appropriate.

26th May 1945

GB.16

Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff,
R.A.F., MED.ME.

6934

Distribution :

C-in-C, Med.ME
C of S, Med.ME

External :

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

in very close touch with this Headq[illegible] period. Relatively small matters might involve large questions of policy, and it was particularly important that nothing should be done to compromise the later situation. Such touch should be maintained both by reporting as necessary, and by personal contacts, and C.O.S. reiterated once more his instructions that A.L.S. and A.F.S.C. should meet every 7 to 10 days during this period, either in this Headquarters or in ROME, so as to keep fully informed.

C.O.S. particularly stressed once more that the resources of this H.Q. were available to the A.F.S.C., and that they should not hesitate to visit or consult branches, who could probably give them considerable help, and, if necessary, direction.

19 Communications.

All Intelligence matters should be normally forwarded direct to the C.I.O., with copies to A.L.S. where this was considered necessary.

C.O.S. stated that Intelligence reports would not necessarily be followed by executive action, and where this was necessary, it would form the subject of a special communication to the executive side.

All executive matters are to be addressed to A.L.S. for action either by them or the appropriate branch, or for the information of the C-in-C or C.O.S. if appropriate.

6934

Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff,
R.A.F., MED ME.

26th May 1945

GB.16

Distribution :

C-in-C, Med.ME
C of S, Med.ME
A.O.A.
Air Cre. Winser, C.A.
Air Cre. Woolley, C.I.O.
G/Capt. McLaren Reid, A.L.S.
G/Capt. Sherman, Training.
A/Cre. Edwards-Jones, D/D Ops.
G/Capt. French, D/C.M.S.O.
Wing Cdr. Grant, Air Training.

X A.S.O.-in-C.

External :

A.V.M. Brodie, A.F.S.C. (3)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET.

243

MINUTES OF CHIEF OF STAFF'S CONFERENCE AT CASERTA - 24th May, 1945.

By hand of a Officer

Present: Chief of Staff.
A.O.A.
A.C.C. A.F.S.C.
D.D.Ops.
C.I.C.
Command Acct.
Group Captain SPERMAN.
Group Captain FREMON.
Wing Commander MIGNER.
Wing Commander
Squadron Leader OCHROT.

C. of S. opened the conference by stating that its object was to study the interim policy concerning the Italian Air Force on the lines contained in the Air Ministry signal replying to A.A.A.F.'s request for a directive.

A.O.C. asked for a clarification of the functions of the A.F.S.C. - whether to strive to make the I.A.F. more efficient or to let things drift.

C. of S. said we should not go out of our way to make I.A.F. efficient if it will result in cutting down available man-power. Really it was up to the Italians to maintain their own efficiency. A.F.S.C. should keep them, as a body, efficient, reasonably occupied and leave it at that.

A.O.A. said that he would like to see all R.A.F. tradesmen withdrawn from the I.A.F.

C. of S. agreed but said that while some of the operational officers might be withdrawn, he did not want the efficiency to go by the board.

C. of S. ,on subject of establishments , said:
a)We should not now increase our support.
b)We should study possible reductions in the light of this conference

A.O.A. said that he did not think we needed to watch the activities of the I.A.F. in attempting to rebuild old aircraft. C. of S. asked S.E.S.C to look into this question.

C. of S. said he wished to emphasise that the interim policy did not in any way promise the Italians that they would have an Air Force. This would depend entirely on the Peace Treaty. On the subject of Civil Aviation he said that, as far as he knew, there was no policy at the moment.

(A.O.A. said that he had an idea that there was some tie-up behind the scenes between the Italians and Transport Command.)

C. of S. outlined the three main points of the interim policy:
a) The I.A.F. can run a Courier Service for the essential needs of the Allied Commission.
b) Baltimores are being handed over on loan for conversion to civil aircraft.
c) The I.A.F. can retain the fighters, including 6133 types, on conditions not yet laid down.

A.O.A. in course of discussion on position of factories in the North, asked whether the factories' M.T. repair facilities were needed by D.M.S.. S.M.S.O. said he did not know, but would investigate.

C. of S. on subject of Courier Service, asked D.D.Ops. to produce an Air Plan.

A.O.C. stated that there was some difficulty in siting Squadrons for the Service owing to difficulties of accomodation and the Italians possess insufficient tentage to provide a solution in that way.

C. of S. said the Courier Service would have to be tied up with SHAEF and the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Wing Commander FISHER.
Wing Commander
Squadron Leader GOWRY.

C. of S. opened the conference by stating that its object was to study the interim policy concerning the Italian Air Force on the lines contained in the Air Ministry signal replying to M.A.A.F.'s request for a directive.

A.C.C. asked for a clarification of the functions of the A.F.H.Q. - whether to strive to make the I.A.F. more efficient or to let things drift.

C. of S. said we should not go out of our way to make I.A.F. efficient if it will result in cutting down available man-power. Really it was up to the Italians to maintain their own efficiency. A.F.H.Q. should keep them, as a body, efficient, reasonably occupied and leave it at that.

A.C.A. said that he would like to see all R.A.F. tradesmen withdrawn from the I.A.F.

C. of S. agreed but said that while some of the operational officers might be withdrawn, he did not want the efficiency to go by the board.

C. of S. ,on subject of establishments , said:

a)We should not now increase our support.

b)We should study possible reductions in the light of this conference

A.C.A. said that he did not think we needed to watch the activities of the I.A.F. in attempting to rebuild old aircraft. C. of S. asked S.H.S.O to look into this question.

C. of S. said he wished to emphasise that the interim policy did not in any way promise the Italians that they would have an Air Force. This would depend entirely on the Peace Treaty. On the subject of Civil Aviation he said that, as far as he knew, there was no policy at the moment.

(A.C.A. said that he had an idea that there was some tie-up behind the scenes between the Italians and Transport Command.)

C. of S. outlined the three main points of the interim policy:

a) The I.A.F. can run a Courier Service for the essential needs of the Allied Commission.

b) Baltimores are being handed over on loan for conversion to civil aircraft.

c) The I.A.F. can retain the fighters, including 6933 types, on conditions not yet laid down.

A.C.A. ,in course of discussion on position of factories in the North, asked whether the factories' M.T. repair facilities were needed by D.M.S.. S.H.S.O. said he did not know, but would investigate.

C. of S. ,on subject of Courier Service, asked D.D.Ops. to produce an Air Plan.

A.C.C. stated that there was some difficulty in siting Squadrons for the Service owing to difficulties of accommodation and the Italians possess insufficient tentage to provide a solution in that way.

C. of S. said the Courier Service would have to be tied up with 216 Group and the Americans.

A.C.C. raised question of specialist officers to vet details of the scheme i.e. Navigation, Flying Control etc. On the question of Flying Control he said that he wished to start a Flying Control School at LECCE now that the Italians will be flying from their own airfields.

C. of S. raised question of flight control, and, after some discussion, said that someone must look into both safety aspect and vetting of the air manifest to prevent unauthorised flights and carrying of unauthorised passengers. He asked who would authorise flights and was informed by the A.C.C. that it would be done by Major BIRCH of the Allied Commission. C. of S. seemed dissatisfied despite the A.C.C.'s assurance that there would be no abuse and asked D.D.Ops to investigate this point. He said that he was particularly anxious to keep the size of the Courier Service down to fulfil reasonable needs only.

C. of S. asked whether the Italians want the BALTIMORES and asked D.D.Ops to look into.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

C. of S. ,still on subject of Baltimores, stated that our promise was to give them to the Italians on loan and without any replacement backing or other major repair backing. He suggested as a decision that we give them the aircraft on loan and day-to-day spares as required but no backing. He asked S.H.S.O. to look into the matter with D.D.Ops and reiterated that we loan 40 aircraft with no replacements and loan spares as required. We must, however, retain right to decision as to whether aircraft, on becoming U/S should be repaired, cannibalised or reduced to produce.

C. of S. , after further discussion on factory question, stated that this must be decided on higher level.

C. of S. asked who is to convert the Baltimores and who is to be responsible for vetting the work from the safety view-point.

A.C.C. said that the A.P.S.O. Engineer staff was inadequate to supervise the whole of the work.

C. of S. stated that the R.A.F. should be responsible for supervision if British passengers were to be carried.

ACC. pointed out that the work was being done to R.A.F. plans, and after further discussion, it was agreed that inspection of the prototype could be left to the C.T.O. of the A.F.S.O.

A.C.C. on the subject of the conversion of fighter pilots to bomber transport, said that he aimed to put the fighter pilots through the MOSQUITO O.T.U. and to put them on S.M. 79s recovered from the North.

C. of S. asked about the remaining fighters, Spitfires, P.39s and Macchis if the pilots were transferred to transport aircraft.

A.C.C. stated that he thought that the reduction in number of fighter pilots would coincide with the reduction, by wastage, of the fighter aircraft.

C. of S. suggested that the fighter squadrons should remain in being for ease of administration but that possibly the I.E. might be cut down to provide a bigger reserve. There would be no backing, however, and flying hours must be kept down, possibly by reduction of the fuel allotment. D.D.Ops to examine this in his survey. P. 39s are also on loan to the Italians but it must clearly be understood that the Italians do not own these aircraft. They still belong exclusively to the Allies.

C. of S. on subject of Training, asked whether A.P.S.O. would ask for any help from U.S.A.F. for the training programme.

A.C.C. said Yes, and he would welcome visits from specialist officers to advise on Navigation, Flying Control, etc.

C. of S. on subject of Airfields asked what was the objection to LAKE TRASCHIANO as Seaplane base.

D.D.Ops. stated that it was due to the presence of a secret Tank Corps experimental station but that the latter had no objection to the use of the rest of the lake itself provided that there was no encroachment on the buildings.

A.C.C. wished it made absolutely clear as to whether the lake is clear from the security angle.

C. of S. said it was a matter for decision by A.F.H.Q. but that D.D.Ops would find out.

C. of S. raised question of LEUCOE and asked whether it had been definitely mothballed or not. There was some confliction of opinion, but C. of S. stated that it was evident that at present it belongs to the Americans (AAFSC/MTO) and instructed the A.D.S. to obtain confirmation from the latter that it is alright for the fighters to return there from CAIRO.

A.C.C. in reply to a question from C. of S., stated that he wished to keep FROSINONE open for the time being.(On subject of MESSIDA as seaplane base it appeared, after discussion, that U.S.A.A.F.'s permission had not been obtained for its use.) A.C.C. also stated that we might ask for seaplane

6939

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

A.C.S. said that the A.F.S.C. Engineer staff was inadequate to supervise the whole of the work.

C. of S. stated that the R.A.F. should be responsible for supervision if British passengers were to be carried.

ACS. pointed out that the work was being done to R.A.F. plans, and after further discussion, it was agreed that inspection of the prototype could be left to the C.E. of the A.F.S.C.

A.C.C. on the subject of the conversion of Fighter pilots to bomber transport, said that he aimed to put the fighter pilots through the ANDERMAT C.T.U. and to put them on U.K. 70s recovered from the North.

C. of S. asked about the remaining fighters, Spitfires, I.70s and Macchis if the pilots were transferred to transport aircraft.

A.C.C. stated that he thought that the reduction in number of fighter pilots would coincide with the reduction, by wastage, of the fighter aircraft.

C. of S. suggested that the fighter squadrons should remain in being for ease of administration but that possibly the I.S. might be cut down to provide a bigger reserve. There would be no backing, however, and flying hours must be kept down, possibly by reduction of the fuel allotment. D.D.Ops to examine this in his survey. I. 70s are also on loan to the Italians but it must clearly be understood that the Italians do not own these aircraft. They still belong exclusively to the Allies.

C. of S. on subject of Training, asked whether A.F.S.C. would ask for any help from M.A.A.F. for the training programme.

A.C.C. said Yes and he would welcome visits from specialist officers to advise on Navigation, Flying Control, etc.

C. of S. on subject of Airfields asked what was the objection to LAKE BRACCIANO as Seaplane Base.

D.D.Ops. stated that it was due to the presence of a secret Tank Corps experimental station but that the latter had no objection to the use of the rest of the lake itself provided that there was no encroachment on the buildings.

A.C.C. wished it made absolutely clear as to whether the lake is clear from the security angle.

C. of S. said it was a matter for decision by A.F.H.Q. but that D.D.Ops would find out.

C. of S. raised question of LEECH and asked whether it had been demobilised or not. There was some confliction of opinion, but C. of S. stated that it was evident that at present it belongs to the Americans (AAFSC/MTO) and instructed the A.F.S. to obtain confirmation from the latter that it is alright for the fighters to return there from CATUR.

6939

A.C.C. in reply to a question from C. of S., stated that he wished to keep FROSINONE open for the time being.(On subject of NISSIDA as seaplane base it appeared, after discussion, that M.A.A.F.'s permission had not been obtained for its use.) A.C.C. also stated that he might ask for seaplane base at VENICE, and also stated that the Navy had enquired about a base at ANCONA, Venice, Genoa & Leghorn.

C. of S. referred matter to D.D.Ops and asked him to sort it out with the Navy.

A.C.C. said that he thought that he could, himself, sort the matter out with the Naval Sub Commission.

C. of S. asked:

D.D.Ops To write survey of the I.A.F. in interim period.

A.C.A. To investigate possibility of reduction in establishments.

and stated that specialist officers of M.A.A.F.H.Q. are on call by A.F.S.C. at any time, although they have no over-riding responsibility regarding such things as inspection of crashes, etc.

Some discussion followed on Flying Control, and it was agreed that M.A.A.F. would try to loan a body rather than have one established.

/C. of S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

C. of S. on subject of Courses, stated that the Italians must draw up their own syllabi (2) , helped by us, but that he felt that the admin. courses should be kept as simple as possible with P.T., drill etc. G/Capt SHERMAN would look into position and C. of S. suggested that the A.F.S.C. officer in charge of the programme should come down to see the Group Captain.

A.C.C. nominated Wing Commander PIGNOT.

C. of S. did not agree with Naval Leadership Courses owing to the possible political angle and to the undesirability of internationalising the courses at this stage. Furthermore, he did not want the growth of uncontrolled Naval Leadership Courses as the greatest care is taken to supervise our own. It was agreed that A.F.S.C. should not write to the Italian Air Ministry and tell them not to proceed with these courses but that the matter should be allowed to loose.

Considerable discussion followed on the subject of the sale of National Savings Certificates and , finally, instructions were given that the A.F.S.C. is to ensure that the balance of £900 still outstanding from the original £10,000is refunded to the Italian holders in the immediate future. The Command Accountant stated that if the Italain holders did not reclaim their money in a reasonable time he would forward a list of the certificates to the Director of National Savings and would have the certificates cancelled.

S. of S. on subject of Intelligence Reports, said that the A.F.S.C. must not assume that reports forwarded to the C.I.C. were automatically actioned and stressed that if we wished action taken they should be addressed to the AIS, or there should be a clear request for action to be taken.

Conference closed with a discussion on the question of the equipment captured in the North, raised by the A.C.C.

C.I.C. stated that all equipment captured in the North was the property of the Allies and none of the Italian Armed Services had any claim to it whatsoever.

A.C.C. asked for C.M.S.C.'s permission to take over spares for aircraft actually in use with the Italians, and particularly for aircraft on the Courier Service. He suggested that a representative of the C.M.S.C. should visit the North and effect clearance on the spot. This was not agreed to.

C. of S. instructed the S.F.S.C. and the C.I.C. to investigate the matter fully.

NOTE:

The above notes are subject to the minutes of the meeting as produced by M.A.A.F. These notes are circulated for information of British and American Staff Officers of this Headquarters, and they should be passed by hand of an Officer, and not through the registry.

6931

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0608

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

Air 23a

G2AS
MAY 232230B

E/2AS
MAY 241100
PRIORITY

FIVE ARMY Gps for HUSE
HQ ALCOM

CONFIDENTIAL.

Please inform of any contemplated reconstruction projects planned by Italian Government on which demobilized patriots could be employed. Also inform as to possibility of enlistments on Italian army or other services in lieu of sailings. This information urgently required. Cite our FIVE.

Distribution

Action: Patriots Br.
Info: A/Ff-Secretariat
Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
Land Forces S/C (2)
Navy S/C
Air S/C
File (2)
Float

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
A606
23/Air

6930

Su 46A

Orig
To investigate & report

1cy Rec
25/5

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2-75
22A

HDS/Amcf

Ref: 8280/20(L)

23 May 1945

SUBJECT: Request for Information- French A.C. Representative

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission
Navy Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Commission

1. As per attached copy of 22 May letter from French Representative, A.C., this Division is in receipt of a request for information pertaining to your Sub-Commission.

2. Kindly advise this office what reply may be given.

H.B.Hatsburg
Capt.

1 Encl: Copy of Letter from the French Representative dtd 22 May 45

C231

23/Air

6929

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the French
Representative
APO 394

Rome 22 May 1945
B/Ufficio 2.124

TO : Liaison Division
A.C., H.Q.

SUBJECT: Information about Italian Army

1. The representative of the French Minister of the "Defense Nationale", personally on mission in Italy, has asked me to provide him with some information about the Italian Army.

2. Would you kindly get such information as:

- actual state of the Italian marine: number of ships, strenghth etc..
- actual state of the air force: number and kinds of planes, strenghth etc..
- actual state of the Army: strenghth, armament etc..

from the Sub-Commissions concerned.

For Major General DE ALVEI,
French Representative,
Lieutenant d'Avenas, 6927
Assistant,

/s/ D'Avenas

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Cypher Message

396/21

TOP SECRET

To - AFSC Allied Commission Rome

From - HQ MAAF, S.S.O.

GB 95 May 21st TOPSECRET

Following for Brude from Baker GB

Reference GB 56 May 5 not repeated to you but copy sent personally. Air Ministry state that Foreign Office have approved without repeat without prejudice to provisions of Peace Treaty.

2. Before however, Italians are informed, I wish to have a meeting here this week to define the extent of line far we will go.

3. Fisher will be coming up early and will have preliminary discussion, and I suggest a meeting later on, probably Thursday or Friday. I will suggest date later.

6926

TOO 211300B
TOR 211435B
TOD 211500B

IMPORTANT

FORM S. 123 (Established—July 1939).

SET

LOG SHEET NO.

OPERATOR

STATION GR.

H.M.S. AT

DAY

MONTH

YEAR

DATE

SECRET

TIME	KC/S.	Signal Strength	TO	No. of Msg. etc.	FROM	TYPE OF MESSAGE AND REMARKS	BEARING	Office Serial No.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

Cypher Message 41622 2nd 217

From HQ Balkan Air Force
(Repeated) HQ MAAF Caserta - 21A Group
Air Forces Sub-Commission Rome - MACAF

From MAAF CMF 16A 0/306 22nd May

Most immediate to the Headquarters Signal
MX 56663 19th May to Balkan Air Force

A597
21/Air

Cypher Message Action to be discontinued
after 15th June

(1) Immediate action is to be taken in
accordance with Letter MAAF/C065/2/SPSO
dated 11th May 1945 to forward withdrawal
rolls of RAF personnel on strength to 6 BSU
for Central Ground Planned Control
the necessary staff will be provided.

(2) On completion, signal rolls
to 6 BSU, and forward to SPSO MAAF

6925

550
for action
16A
22/5

(for

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

Typed Message

6/15/22

for RAF Bureaus and other officers Only

branch of Bureau category changed or night
date if tour expired and in the case of
Bureaus only, the number of operational hours
flown on present operational tour, eye and
other group number of Medical Secretary if
eye and service group number for both officers
and Bureaus and ground personnel also
annotation to be made against each
individual volunteering to delay release
date period of deployment.

(5) Italian personnel are to be shipped
X if by Balkan Air force in conjunction 6924
with AFSC Rome.

(6) all party action to be completed by date
of disbandment.

(Page 7.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

Egypt via Caf
Par 3

416/52

Para 7. All equipment and MT to be disposed of or orders arrangements to be made by Sattan Air Force and 214 Group.

Dept. AFSC Rome

Shipment by

To: 2210158
Tuk 2215 B
To: 2216158

Orig Sent Chief 7

6923

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, R.A.F. C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.

Date:- 20th. May, 1945.

Ref:- MAAF/4203/ALS.

Italian Air Force - Policy.

1. Reference is made to your letter addressed to the Italian Air Ministry, copy to this Headquarters, reference AFSC/28/AIR dated 5th. May, 1945.

2. It is noted that in para.1.(i) the Italians have been instructed to restrict flying to a minimum of six hours per pilot per mensum, except at the O.T.U. Frosinone, where the conversion course will continue.

3. As you are well aware, the Italian Air Force, (apart from the Courier Service), ceased to exist when the hostilities in Europe ended, and your instruction is inclined to exceed the present policy. You are therefore requested to inform this Headquarters where permission was obtained for such a ruling to be given.

4. You are reminded that, on matters of policy, it is the province of this Headquarters to make such decisions. Should, therefore, you consider that the policy requires alteration, it is your duty to prepare a case to support your recommendations, for consideration by this Headquarters, who will be in a position to give a specific ruling.

6922

A. Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff,
Royal Air Force/MedME.

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
C.480
28/Air

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

BL

P 395/19 LRKB V MMMDQ NR 1

QVR 2 FROM MAAT 192150B

TO: HQ BAF (R) AF SUB COMMISSION

(R) AF SUB COMMISSION BARI

GR --- BT MX 54663 CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR PETER ONE SEVEN OF MAY SEVENTEEN PD SINCE THERE IS NOW NO

RPEAT// REPEAT NO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE FIGHTER LIAISON

SECTION CMA IT MAY BE DWIBBZND// DISBANDED FORTHWITH PD

JMD A

KK

RECD WBS 0455B

15/1505

N37/20

AIR S/C

16A

0935

24

ALLIED FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (AIR) A579

21/Air/6921

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

E/1420

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

MSG Center No : N 76/19
Classification : S
Precedence : —
From : MAAF
To : AIR FORCE SUB COM. ALCOM

Date | Time Rec'd : 171030 B
Date | Time Sent : 181726 B
Reference NR : MX 54591
Cite :

SECRET X TO AAFSC MTO RPT MTSAF INFO RPT AIR

FORCE SUB COMMISSION ROME INFO FROM MAAF MIKE XRAY FIVE FOUR

MX 54591

FIVE NINE ONE RE SAN PANCRAZZIO AND LECCE AIRFIELDS BINCY ASSIGNED

TO ABLE ABLE FOX SUGAR CHARLIE SLANT MIKE TARE OBOE EFFECTIVE ONE

AAFSC/MTO

FIVE MAR ONE NINE FOUR FIVE

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION
R. 570
ABC 19/5.
SECRET MAIL
22/Air

6920

22/5

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR
M103/1946
JE/1421 141

A.572
1945
ORDERLY ROOM
21/Apr

6919

LRKE V LCJP NR 42/19 ROUTINE
T - ADD
FROM HQ BALKAN AIR FORCE 191045B
TO A.F.S.C. ROME.
COPY GR -- BT
GHM/76, 19 MAY CONFIDENTIAL/ ROUTINE.
PERSONAL BRODIE FROM MILLS (.)
I NOTE FROM YOUR A.229 MAY 11TH THAT BALTIMORE SQUADRONS
MOVE TO LITTORIO AS SOON AS ACCOMMODATION IS COMPLETE (.)
AS WE BADLY WANT ALL THE SPACE WE CAN GET AT PIFERNO I
WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DO ALL YOU POSSIBLY CAN
TO PRESS FORWARD THE MOVE OF THE TEC SQUADRONS (.)
BT 191045B
SENT NR 42 FH AR K
N NR 42 1147 EAD AR KK

1205

0620

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

E/1238 ~~15A~~ 13A

W173/17

AIR S/C

LRKB V LGJP NR 11[illegible]/17 ROUTINE QVR 2

TO HQ MAAF (R) A F SUB COMMISSION ROME

(R) A F SUB COMM BARI

FROM HQ BALKAN AIR FORCE

QQY

017 17TH MAY 1945 ~~11A~~ 12A

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE YOUR MX54452 MAY 16 IS IT INTENTION THAT F L S SHALL MOVE WITH I A F FIGHTER SQUADRONS TO LECCE AND PASS TO CONTROL A F S C OR IS THIS UNIT TO BE DISBANDED •

BT 171730B

SENT

A • M • AR

RECD NR 7 // 17/2203 ? B AAA AR KKK

AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS ALLIED A561 MAY 1945 21/Air

6918

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEA

Cypher Message 332/6 12A

To - AFSC Rome (R) BAF AFSC Bari

FROM - HQ MAAF CMF

MX 5HH52 May 16th Secret

~~ZZA~~ GA

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION A.549 HAW 17/5 ORDERLY ROOM 21/Air

Your A229 of 11th May refers.

Para 2. Concur in your proposed moves of T A F Units to Lecce & kind arrangements for reconditioning are now in hand and Units can move forthwith.

Para 3. Agree to move of Baltimores to Pattullo as soon as P O L and accommodation arrangements are established

TOO 16183&B
TUR 16232&B
TUJ 16234&B

Pentimo

Dist - AFSC Rome 6447-18/5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From : Squadron Leader N.K. Price.

11A

PERSONAL and
TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES
C.F.

GB.16

5th May 1945

Dear

6B

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a signal (GB.66 dated 5th May 1945) which the Chief of Staff has sent to A.C.A.S.(F) regarding the Italian Air Force.

for (N.K. Price),
Squadron Leader,
P.S.O. to Chief of Staff,
ROYAL AIR FORCE, MTO. HQ.

Air Vice-Marshal I.C. Brodie, C.B.E.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,
ROME.

6916

Enc.1.

S.S.O.
for private inf.

Good luck 7/5.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Pass to Legation

10A ~~9A~~

282/13

Cypher Message

To - MATAF (A) BAF AFSE Rome

From - HQ MAAF S.S.O.

A 108 May 13th Confidential.

All Italian types of aircraft in use in MATAF Area are to be grounded and impounded forthwith

Para 2. These aircraft are being reserved for Italian Air Force use only and details of all aircraft impounded should be signalled to their Headquarters.

Para 3. Italian Civilian Aircraft operating under Air Force Sub Commission Control are not reported not to be included.

6915

Routing: R.527 15/5 HBD UNDERLY ROOM 21/Air

TOO 1315478
TOR 1318008
TOD 1316208

Dist - AFSE, Rome

Ltd. 14/5.

E/672
AIR 40
N 188/13

LRKB V LGJP [redacted] NR 83/13 ROUTINE CONF T ADD

FROM [redacted] M A A F 131735B

TO AIR [redacted] RCE SUB COMMISSION ROME

REF NO M.54236

GR--- BT

FOLLOWING IS A COPY OF OUR MIKE MX.50216.

XRAY FIVE ZERO TWO ONE [redacted] SIX DATED ONE

APRIL REQUESTED IN YOUR ABLE TWO

THREE TWO DATED ELEVEN MAY QUOTE HE

REACTION AND ELATION WHICH WILL

FOLLOW NEWS OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES MAY

TEMPORARILY AFFECT FLYING JUDGEMENT OF AIRCREWS PD IN ORDER

TO AVOID RECKLESS FLYING AND CONSEQUENT

CASUALTIES CMA DAMAGE AND UNDESIREABLE

INCIDENTS DURING THE FESTIVE

PERIOD FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

CMA THE AIR C IN C DIRECTS

THAT ALL AIRCRAFT OF THIS COMMAND

NOT ENGAGED ON ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS

ARE TO BE GROUNDED IMMEDIATELY UPON

CAPITULATION OF GERMANY OR NOTIFICATION

THAT HOSTILITIES ARE TO CEASE [redacted] PD

THE DETERMINATION OF THE ESSENTIAL

CHARACTER OF OPERATION WILL BE AT

THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMANDERS OF

THE REPECTIVE COMMANDS PD ORDER

6914

ALLIED AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
A.523
ORDERLY ROOM
21/Air

See 17A on 33/Air.

A 232

C 0 2 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TO AVOID RECKLESS FLYING AND CONSEGEUNT
CASULTIES CMA DAMAGE AND UNDESIREABLE
INCIDENTS DURING THE FESTIVE
PERIOD FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
CMA THE AIR C IN C DIRECTS
THAT ALL AIRCRAFT OF THIS COMMAND
NOT ENGAGED ON ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS
ARE TO BE GROUNDED IMMEDIATELY UPON
CAPITULATION OF GERMANY OR NOTIFICATION
THAT HOSTILITIES ARE TO CEASE [redacted] PD
THE DETERMINATION OF THE ESSENTIAL
CHARACTER OF OPERATION WILL BE AT
THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMANDERS OF
THE REPECTIVE COMMANDS PD ORDER
WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL RESCINDED
BY THIS HEADQUARTERS UNQUOTE
MODIFYING THE ABOVE MESSAGE OUR MIKE
XRAY FIVE FOUR ONE EVEN ONE DATED
TWELFTH MAY IS AS FOLLOWS QUOTE COMMANDERS
CONCERNED WILL TAKE SUCH STEPS
AS THEY DEEM NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT
THE SPIRIT OF MIKE XRAY FIVE ZERO TWO
ONE SIX PD NO FORMAL ACTION WILL BE
TAKEN BY THIS HEADQUARTERS TO INVOKE
THE PROVISION S OF ABOVE STATED SIGNAL
PD THE DESIRE IS THAT ALL FLYING
BE STRICTLY CONTROLED BY THE RESPECTIVE COMMAND

131735B

Sent V.M
Recd 13/2033B

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0626

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

FROM: A.F.SUB.COMM. (ROME)

TO : HQ. M.A.A.F. (R) HQ. B.A.F. (R) 54 FTC DETACHMENT LECCE(PLEASE PASS TO A.F.SUB.COMM.DEF) (R) A.F.SUB.COMM. BARI (R) B.A.F. COMMAND POST.

CONFIDENTIAL(.) A 229 TOO. 11153CB MAY

YOUR MX 52939 DATED MAY SIX (.) AS SOON AS LECCE IS DERequisitioned PROPOSE MOVING ALL ITALIAN FIGHTER SQUADRONS FROM CAGNE TO LECCE TOGETHER WITH FIGHTER PORTION OF O.T.U. NOW AT BROGLIOPE (.)

HAS LECCE BEEN DERequisitioned YET (?)

(2) ALSO PROPOSE MOVING BALLISTE SQUADRONS FROM BITERIO TO LITTORIO FOR COURIER SERVICE AS SOON AS ARRANGEMENTS AT LITTORIO FOR P.O.L. AND ACCOMMODATION COMPLETED (.)

(3) DO YOU AGREE PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE (.)

PRIORITY -

I.E.MCGUIRE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6913

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Cypher Message

211/09 TA

To - H.Q. BAF (R) AFSC Rome. AFSC Caserta
AFSC Bari/BAF Command Post

From - HQ MAAF.

MX 52989 May 8th Secret.

→ 4A Sec 21/A-1

Your A 636 of May 4th refers.

Para 2. Withdrawal of Italian Air Force
Squadrons from operations is announced in
Detailed instructions concerning the future
use of the Italian Air Force will be
issued when a Form Policy is received
from Air Ministry.

21/AU

AG88

TOO 081128B
TOR 090700B
TOD 101300B

6912

Rendall

Distr - AFSC Rome

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Rocket message

19 of 21

6A

To:- AFSC ACC Rome

From:- HQ MAAF CMF SSO. GB/59 4th May.

6B

Top Secret. Following for Brooke from Baker.

Reference my GB 56 5th May, Air Ministry are endeavouring to obtain an interim policy on lines suggested. Meanwhile a counter offered limited to essential requirements can be permitted, but you should make sure that it is not taken for granted that this or other concessions are agreed policy.

(2). We are exploring the possibility of returning the P 39's to enable flying practice to be continued. This for your information only.

6911

3. Please keep us closely in touch with reactions in any direction.

Disp AFSC Acc Rome TOO 0712 5B
TOO 0714 15B
TOO 0715 5B

IMPORTANT

#9
7819.
68

OUTGOING CYPHER MESSAGE.

TO : AIR MINISTRY, WHITEHALL

FROM : H.Q. M.A.A.F. S.S.O.

See 21A.

GB.56. May 5th, 1945. TOP SECRET.

Following for A.C.A.S.(P) from BAKER.

Further to your AX.747, January 12th, as a result of the surrender in Italy a policy is required for the Italian Air Force during the period between the present and the final settlement under the Peace Terms.

2. I suggest that our immediate policy should be conditioned by the assistance given by Italy in the latter stages of the battle here. I think that it is fair to say that the Italian Air Force despite many difficulties have made as effective a contribution as could be expected and that this effort has been of material help to us. Further, the Italian forces generally have played a notable part in liberation of Northern Italy. The Italian Air Force has considerable prestige in the eyes of the public and is on this account a factor of political significance.

3. In view of the foregoing, the following proposals are made in respect of the immediate employment of the Italian Air Force. 6919 urgent need exists primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission for an internal air transport courier service which would also be used for the movement of Italian Government officials and administrators. Such a service would in addition be of value to us in certain circumstances for transportation of spares and materials. The I.A.F. has some fifty Seaplanes. SM.79 and 82's and about the same number of Cant 501 and 506 / Further

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

surrender in Italy a policy is required for the Italian Air Force during the period between the present and the final settlement under the Peace Terms.

2. I suggest that our immediate policy should be conditioned by the assistance given by Italy in the latter stages of the battle here. I think that it is fair to say that the Italian Air Force despite many difficulties have made as effective a contribution as could be expected and that this effort has been of material help to us. Further, the Italian forces generally have played a notable part in liberation of Northern Italy. The Italian Air Force has considerable prestige in the eyes of the public and is on this account a factor of political significance.

3. In view of the foregoing, the following proposals are made in respect of the immediate employment of the Italian Air Force. 6910 urgent need exists primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission for an internal air transport courier service which would also be used for the movement of Italian Government officials and administrators. Such a service would in addition be of value to us in certain circumstances for transportation of spares and materials. The I.A.F. has some fifty Seaplanes. SM.79 and 82's and about the same number of Cant 501 and 506 / Further, it is understood that spares and probably serviceable bomber/transport types are available at an undamaged factory near MILAN. We propose, therefore, that a service should be initiated and operated by the Italian Air Force under the supervision of this Headquarters of a size sufficient to meet the reasonable needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian administration as soon as possible.

/Continued Page 2.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

GB.56 (Continued).

4. BALTIMORES. The I.A.F. has 40 Baltimores on loan from us. We would suggest handing these over without backing to the Italian Air Force in recognition of the part they have played for conversion to passenger transport under their own industrial arrangements. Alternatively, we suggest that the loan should be continued for reasons given in para. 5 below.

5. FIGHTERS. The I.A.F. have 20 Spitfire V's, 70 Macchi and 105 P.39's. P.39's are scheduled to be withdrawn by the Americans and so far as we know, this condition will be implemented. There are more than 300 pilots who will raise a most difficult problem both for us and the Italian Authorities if they are grounded and unemployed. We feel, therefore, that the aircraft should remain with the I.A.F. for the time being and that pilots should be allowed to fly. A proportion would be converted to Bomber/Transport role for use on the courier service and we would influence I.A.F. to start administrative and disciplinary training to occupy their personnel.

6. It would be made clear that any concessions given in this way would be without prejudice to the eventual Peace settlement. Such a policy would, without doubt, be much appreciated by Italians of consequence and would recognise the goodwill which the Italian Services have shown in the last stages of the war. If the peace treaty disallows any military Air Force, these proposals would put them in the position of possessing an almost ready-made civilian air transport system. Any complete and immediate / termination of the I.A.F. as a flying service is bound to have its

6909

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

transport under their own industrial arrangements. Alternatively, we suggest that the ban should be continued for reasons given in para. 5 below.

5. FIGHTERS. The I.A.F. have 20 Spitfire V's, 70 Macchi and 105 P.39's. P.39's are scheduled to be withdrawn by the Americans and so far as we know, this condition will be implemented. There are more than 300 pilots who will raise a most difficult problem both for us and the Italian Authorities if they are grounded and unemployed. We feel, therefore, that the aircraft should remain with the I.A.F. for the time being and that pilots should be allowed to fly. A proportion would be converted to Somber/Transport role for use on the courier service and we would influence I.A.F. to start administrative and disciplinary training to occupy their personnel.

6. It would be made clear that any concessions given in this way would be without prejudice to the eventual Peace settlement. Such a policy would, without doubt, be much appreciated by Italians of consequence and would recognise the goodwill which the Italian services have shown in the last stages of the war. If the peace treaty disallows any military air force, these proposals would put them in the position of possessing an almost ready-made civilian air transport system. Any complete and immediate / termination of the I.A.F. as a flying service is bound to have far reaching repercussions which should be given full consideration in reaching a policy decision.

6909

Priority :-

Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution :-

C. of S. (Orig) CS.16.
C-in-C.
D/D. Ops.
A.L.S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0633

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

For information

S.S.O. ~~mf~~

D.D. ✓

S.E.O.

Org 1. ✓

S.I.O.

Ken P. Bratton
AOC

5/5.

The attached report was drafted by me for the Chief of Staff AAF & there is no ~~guarantee~~ guarantee that it will be sent as drafted though AS/S Baker agreed in principle.

HHB.

DRAFT

SECRET CYPHER MESSAGE

To AIR MINISTRY (R) AFSC ROME

From HQ MAAF CAF SSO

GG. May 4th 1945 TOP SECRET

Bearing in mind help given by ITALIAN AIR FORCE in liberated ITALY and by partisans in NORTH ITALY recommend following concessions as a gesture, but without prejudice to terms of peace treaty.

2 All Italian bomber/transport and seaplane type aircraft available to assist in internal air transport courier services primarily for benefit of Allied Commission who wish it, and secondarily for Italian Government officials and administrators. Aircraft not already transport aircraft preferably to be modified to passenger or purely freight carrying by Italians.

3 All BALTIMORE aircraft but left to ITALIAN AIR FORCE from British sources to be handed over to Italians, if necessary held against ultimate reparations. Not essential to give backing in further aircraft ~~or spares~~ but preferably if practicable, especially spares. ~~At present ITALIAN AIR FORCE hold approximately 45 BALTIMORES.~~ Propose Italians be instructed to convert these to passenger transport under their own industrial arrangements.

6908

4 Fighters pilots of ITALIAN AIR FORCE present most difficult problem because if grounded and unemployed will raise grave discontent and political repercussions. If above para 2 agreed intend converting

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

liberated ITALY and by partisans in NORTH ITALY recommend following concessions as a gesture, but without prejudice to terms of peace treaty.

2 All Italian bomber/transport and seaplane type aircraft available to assist in internal air transport courier services primarily for benefit of Allied Commission who wish it, and secondarily for Italian Government officials and administrators. Aircraft not already transport aircraft preferably to be modified to passenger or purely freight carrying by Italians.

3 All BALTIMORE aircraft ~~left~~ but to ITALIAN AIR FORCE from British sources to be handed over to Italians, if necessary held against ultimate reparations. Not essential to give backing in further aircraft ~~or spares~~ but preferable if practicable, especially spares. ~~At present ITALIAN AIR FORCE hold approximately 45 BALTIMORES.~~ Propose Italians be instructed to convert these to passenger transport under their own industrial arrangements.

690x

4 Fighters of ITALIAN AIR FORCE present most difficult problem because if grounded and unemployed will raise grave discontent and political repercussions. If above para 2 agreed intend converting larger portion aircrew to bomber/transport which will be easy as all Italian aircrew widely experienced. Suggest remainder be allowed temporarily to do ground administrative training with limited flying (under guise of necessity for internal security).

5 Understand that S.M. 79 and 82 factory near MILAN in good state and expect to find some airworthy aircraft and spares in NORTH as backing for existing Italian bomber/transport types.

6 ITALIAN AIR FORCE volunteer to assist our further war effort

/ by deploying . . .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DRAFT

Top Secret 6c

SECRET CYPHER MESSAGE

To AIR MINISTRY (R) APSC ROME

From HQ MAAF CMF SEC

CC. May 4th 1945 TOP SECRET

Bearing in mind help given by ITALIAN AIR FORCE in liberated ITALY and by partisans in NORTH ITALY recommend following concessions (as a gesture) but without prejudice to terms of peace treaty.

2 All Italian bomber/transport and seaplane type aircraft available to assist in internal air transport courier services primarily for benefit of Allied Commission who wish it, and secondarily for Italian Government officials and administrators. Aircraft not already transport aircraft preferably to be modified to passenger or purely freight carrying by Italians. (Some exception to continue thereafter for MSR)

3 All BALTIMORE aircraft (last) left to ITALIAN AIR FORCE from British sources to be handed over to Italians, if necessary held against ultimate reparations. Not essential to give backing in further aircraft or spares but preferable if practicable. ~~At present ITALIAN AIR FORCE hold approximately 45 BALTIMORES.~~ Proposed Italians be instructed to convert these to passenger transport under their own industrial arrangements.

4 Fighters (pilots) of ITALIAN AIR FORCE present most difficult problem because if grounded and unemployed will raise grave discontent and political repercussions. If above para 2 agreed intend converting larger portion aircrew to bomber/transport which will be easy as all

6907

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

liberated ITALY and by partisans in NORTH ITALY recommend following concessions (as a gesture) but without prejudice to terms of peace treaty.

2 All Italian bomber/transport and seaplane type aircraft available to assist in internal air transport courier services primarily for benefit of Allied Commission who wish it, and secondarily for Italian Government officials and administrators. Aircraft not already transport aircraft preferably to be modified to passenger or purely freight carrying by Italians. [Some seaplane Bombers to be used for AMSR]

3 All BALTIMORE aircraft left to ITALIAN AIR FORCE from British sources to be handed over to Italians, if necessary held against ultimate reparations. Not essential to give backing in further aircraft or spares but preferable if practicable. ~~At present ITALIAN AIR FORCE hold approximately 45 BALTIMORES.~~ Proposed Italians be instructed to convert these to passenger transport under their own industrial arrangements.

6907

4 Fighters pilots of ITALIAN AIR FORCE present most difficult problem because if grounded and unemployed will raise grave discontent and political repercussions. If above para 2 agreed intend converting larger portion aircrew to bomber/transport which will be easy as all Italian aircrew widely experienced. Suggest remainder be allowed temporarily to do ground administrative training with limited flying (under guise of necessity for internal security).

5 Understand that S.M. 79 and 82 factory near MILAN in good state and expect to find some airworthy aircraft and spares in NORTH as backing for existing Italian bomber/transport types.

6 ITALIAN AIR FORCE volunteer to assist our further war effort

/ by deploying . . .

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

BEST COPY POSSIBLE
FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

0639

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNO No. 785017

by deploying to FAR EAST which not (R) not recommended, and in transport duties within MEDITERRANEAN basin which is doubtful help, unless given British or American type aircraft, but each shows right attitude.

7 If ITALIAN AIR FORCE bomber/transport employment until peace treaty agreed and military air forces entirely disallowed after peace, Italians would have almost ready-made civilian air transport.

++ 8 9 Request immediate reply particularly to para. 2.

Priority :

Air Marshal,
C-in-C, RAF, Med. M.E.

Distribution :

++

8 Following aircraft available in ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

(a) Bomber/transport SM.79 and 82 qty. fifty (R) fi

(b) Seaplane CZ.501 and 506 qty. fifty-five (R) fift

(c) MACCHI 202 and 205 qty. seventy (R) sevent

in each case plus various oddments.

Allied type aircraft BALTIMORE/qty. forty (R) forty, SPITF V twenty (R) twenty, and P.39 qty. one hundred and five (R) one h and five, which are scheduled to be withdrawn by AMERICANS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

36A
5A

FROM : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, LECCE.

TO : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE : 7th. MAY 1945.

REF. : AFSC/L/14/T. 1A & 2A

Reference your AFSC/23/Air, Conference minutes, the following information is forwarded.

2. Flying Control Officers. I have suggested the following personnel as a nucleus and the Italian station commander has agreed: Capt. Ruggiero, Capt. Zegrini, Capt. Parezan, Maresciallo Norchi Maresciallo Ronzi.

3. Move of Leverano. I have confirmed with W/Cmdr. Gladstone that there is no objection from a maintenance point of view to the move of the Refresher Unit to Lecce.

4. Attached is a list of Cant Z pilots at present at Lecce, with details of their flying experience.

C306

23/Air

S.S.O.

Action on

when Lecce is de-requisitioned:

please Remind me.

15/5. AOC

W Quarrington
OFFICER COMMANDING
Air Forces Sub Commn
LECCE

AOC Thanks 15/5

Lecce not de-requisitioned, but we have authority to move units from Bari and Canne. (Enclosure 14A, S21 refers)

6905

15/5.

FLYING ACTIVITY OF THE PILOTS ON THE STRENGTH OF THE 98th BOMBER GROUP

RANK	SURNAME	INITIALS	FLYING HOURS			
			Three engined	Twin engined	Single engined	TOTAL
Capt.	BELLINVIA	Carmelo	815 h. 30'	500 h.	92 h.	1407 hs 30'
Capt.	OTTAVIANI	Vincenzo	585 h.	15 h.	100 h.	700 hrs.
Lt.	SANFILIPPO	Enzo	640 h.	170 h.	70 h.	880 hrs.
Lt.	PISTONE	Otello	256 h.	180 h.	70 h.	506 hrs.
Lt.	RAGAZZI	Guido	245 h.	60 h.	85 h.	390 hrs.
Lt.	CARULLI	Camillo	860 h.	--	71 h.	931 hrs.
Lt.	PARRONI	Dino	150 h.	--	300 h.	450 hrs.
Lt.	VACCA	Mario	270 h.	--	100 h.	370 hrs.
Lt.	SEGALA	Domenico	355 h.	--	60 h.	425 hrs.
Lt.	ZAMBONI	Lino	140 h.	--	60 h.	200 hrs.
Lt.	PRUNERI	Vittorio	279 h.	450 h.	620 h.	1349 hrs.
Lt.	MARSELLA	Isidoro	450 h.	--	70 h.	520 hrs.
Lt.	CAPONETTI	Franco	315 h.	--	100 h.	415 hrs.
Lt.	LUCCHESI	Mario	819 h.	1 h.	70 h.	900 hrs.
Lt.	BROSO	Bruno	420 h.	60 h.	140 h.	620 hrs.
Lt.	LATTARULLO	Nicola	950 h.	--	50 h.	1000 hrs.

6904

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

RANK	SURNAME	INITIALS	FLYING HOURS: Three engined	Twin engined	Single engined	TOTAL
Lt.	BRUSCOLI	Marcello	830 h.	500 h.	70 h.	1400 hrs.
Lt.	COMIN	Egidio	100 h.	300 h.	100 h.	500 hrs.
Lt.	CANIPARI	Giuseppe	316 h. 15'	10 h.	90 h.	416 h. 15'
Lt.	ERARIO	Vittorio	1050 hrs.	50 h.	50 h.	1150 hrs.
Lt.	ARDUINI	Angelo	370 hrs.	120 h.	186 h.	670 hrs.
Lt.	ALLEGRI	Mario	515 hrs.	90 h.	110 h.	715 hrs.
2nd Lt.	ORSUCCI	Enzo	510 hrs.	—	120 h.	630 hrs.
2nd Lt.	MAROTTI	Enzo	70 hrs.	—	100 h.	170 hrs.
2nd Lt.	CROTTA	Carlo	1065 hrs.	40 h.	60 h.	1165 hrs.
2nd Lt.	MACAUDA	Salvatore	345 hrs.	179 h.	184 h.	708 hrs.
2nd Lt.	BERTOLI	Giovanni	390 hrs.	—	60 h.	450 hrs.
W/O	ANDREIS	Arturo	370 hrs.	—	460 h.	830 hrs.
W/O	CORFINI	Mario	600 hrs.	150 h.	60 h.	870 hrs.
W/O	GISOLFI	Vincenzo	770 hrs.	350 h.	300 h.	1420 hrs.
W/O	STORARI	Luciano	1000 hrs.	350 h.	250 h.	1600 hrs.
W/O	BOTTAZZOLI	Lucio	540 hrs.	40 h.	180 h.	770 hrs.
W/O	CATENA	Luigi	15 hrs.	15 h.	1300 h.	1330 hrs.
W/O	SIMONE	Vito	510 hrs.	20 h.	70 h.	600 hrs.

6903

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

RANK & SURNAME	NAME	FLYING HOURS: Three engined	Twin Engined	Single engined	TOTAL
Sgt.Maj.	FOLLIERO Franco	520 h.	60 h.	70 h.	650 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	PAOLINI Battista	600 h.	10 h.	60 h.	670 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	ROSSI Mario	200 h.	150 h.	100 h.	450 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	VIOLANTE Vito	140 h.	250 h.	70 h.	460 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	SOTTILI Ugo	260 h.	40 h.	100 h.	400 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	LOMARDI Dario	350 h.	—	200 h.	550 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	ROSEO Italico	130 h.	100 h.	300 h.	530 hrs.
Sgt.Maj;	MENEGHINI Armando	530 h.	--	70 h.	600 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	SANTACHIARA Augusto	181 h. 50'	--	250 h.	431 hs 50'.
Sgt.Maj.	MIGLIOLI Fedele	600 h.	50 h.	50 h.	700 hrs.
Sgt.Maj.	BERZERO Vinicio	257 h.	100 h.	40 h.	397 hrs.
Sgt.	NARDINI Carlo	291 hs. 15'.	—	60 h.	351 hr. 15'.
Sgt.	RISI Arnaldo	92 h.	160 h.	62 h.	324 hrs.
Sgt.	DORIGO Renzo	120 hrs.	160 h.	120 h.	400 hrs.

6902

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET.

PRECIS OF MEMORANDUM FROM ITALIAN C.A.S. TO AIR VICE-MARSHAL ARCHER ON THE FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. General Aimone Cat makes the following proposals as to how the Italian Air Force could be utilised after the termination of hostilities in Europe, during the period which will bring to a close the war in the Pacific, and during the Armistice period.

(a) To limit the activities of the Force to internal courier services, the extent of which would depend upon the serviceability of the old material and the quantity of petrol which the Allies would allow.

(b) To continue to employ the Italian Air Force in conjunction with Allied Forces in any capacity consented by the Allies.

2. The C.A.S. is not in favour of the first solution. Leading, as it would, to what would mean practically the disbanding of the Italian Air Force, he considers it would cause grave repercussions both in the Force and throughout the country.

Should the Allies decide on the second solution, General Aimone Cat suggests that the Italian Air Force could be utilised in the following ways: -

(a) By transferring the operational units to the Far East - or

(b) By allotting to the Italian Air Force all, or part, of the auxiliary activities in the Mediterranean in connection with the war in the Pacific.

In order that (a) be put into execution, a formal declaration of war on the part of Italy against Japan would be necessary, and for other reasons the utilising of the Italian Operational Units in the Pacific is not considered by the C.A.S. to afford a practical solution. Nevertheless, he says, should the Allies decide upon this course, the Italian Air Force would be very well satisfied.

(b) would be independent of a state of war between Italy and Japan and could be put into action immediately. Under Allied Control the Italian Air Force could carry out:

(i) the transport of military and other personnel, post and courier services, using both Allied and Italian material, covering the whole or part of the Mediterranean;

(ii) A.S.R. with the Seaplane Units which have already shown themselves capable of good work in this difficult and delicate sphere;

(iii) various airfield and workshop services at Italian Bases for the use of Allied aircraft in transit, under the control of, and with the assistance of Allied technicians.

6901

3. Should the foregoing programme be thought worthy of our consideration, the C.A.S. proposes that the matter be gone into fully. For our information he tells us that the personnel which could be employed in these activities would be taken, to begin with, from the personnel now working in United Aereo Units and workshops. He proposes that this personnel could be gradually increased from other sources until it is double the present figure.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(b) To continue to employ the Italian Air Force in conjunction with Allied Forces in any capacity consented by the Allies.

2. The C.A.S. is not in favour of the first solution. Leading, as it would, to what would mean practically the disbanding of the Italian Air Force, he considers it would cause grave repercussions both in the Force and throughout the country.

Should the Allies decide on the second solution, General Aimone Cat suggests that the Italian Air Force could be utilised in the following ways:

(a) By transferring the operational units to the Far East - or

(b) By allotting to the Italian Air Force all, or part, of the auxiliary activities in the Mediterranean in connection with the war in the Pacific.

In order that (a) be put into execution, a formal declaration of war on the part of Italy against Japan would be necessary, and for other reasons the utilising of the Italian Operational Units in the Pacific is not considered by the C.A.S. to afford a practical solution. Nevertheless, he says, should the Allies decide upon this course, the Italian Air Force would be very well satisfied.

(b) would be independent of a state of war between Italy and Japan and could be put into action immediately. Under Allied Control the Italian Air Force could carry out:

(i) the transport of military and other personnel, post and courier services, using both Allied and Italian material, covering the whole or part of the Mediterranean;

(ii) A.S.R. with the Seaplane Units which have already shown themselves capable of good work in this difficult and delicate sphere;

(iii) various airfield and workshop services at Italian Bases for the use of Allied aircraft in transit, under the control of, and with the assistance of Allied technicians.

6901

3. Should the foregoing programme be thought worthy of our consideration, the C.A.S. proposes that the matter be gone into fully. For our information he tells us that the personnel which could be employed in these activities would be taken, to begin with, from the personnel now working in Unità Aeree Units and workshops. He proposes that this personnel could be gradually increased from other sources until it is double the present figure.

The absolute guarantee of the efficiency of such an organisation could be assured if, with the aid of the Allies, the economical conditions afforded were adequate to today's needs. The cost of this could even be included in Italy's reparations bill. As he has previously requested, General Aimone Cat asks that the I.A.F. be given at least similar economical conditions to those which are given to the lesser favoured of the United Nations (for example, Yugoslavia). It is the opinion of the General that if this were done, the deficiencies found in the Italian ground crews with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. which are cause for complaint, and the element of discontent found in the Italian Units, would be overcome, whilst at the same time a concession of this nature would enlarge the choice of the best technical and professional elements, in addition to producing beneficial, moral, material and political repercussions.

H/ Brentz.
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ROME.

29th April, 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0646

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ROME.

FROM:	Date:	TO	INT.	DATE
	I/C Brodie AVM. B. ~~HUSCARLET~~.		✓	
	G/C F.M. ~~DENNY~~. M. JARMAN			
	~~COL. G. BRENTA~~			
	~~LT~~. COL. M. BALDRIDGE			
	W/C A.H. KNOWLES			13/4
	~~MAJ. E.J. CASS~~.			
	~~S/LDRT. PEARCE~~.			
	S/L F.L. BRADSHAW.			15
	~~S/L. E. TOTT~~.			
	~~F/L J. WHITE~~,			
	~~F/L B. DENNIS~~.			
	~~MRS. E. BRENTA~~.			

X Action.

/ ~~Information~~.

Remarks: Please return to PA

FROM: I.A.F. STATO MAGGIORE.

TO: AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE,
A.F.S.C. A.C. ROME.
THROUGH LIAISON OFFICE.

DATE: 28TH APRIL, 1945.

REF: 011070/SgU/2813.Coll.

SUBJECT: Forwarding of a memorandum.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal.

As requested I am sending you a memo in which the hopes of the I.A.F. are explained under three headings:

(1) contribution up to this date.

(2) hopes on the present situation which, as you will see in the enclosed note, are by now superceded by current events.

(3) hopes on the post-war situation which have, as explained, an apparent and urgent character.

2. I have also forwarded a copy of the enclosed memo to the Minister, and the Chief of the ~~Stato Maggiore Generale~~ General Staff, so that they may inform H.E. the President of the Cabinet of Ministers.

6906

(Sgd) CHIEF OF STAFF.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MEMO ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE [redacted]ALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. HOPES OF THE I.A.F.

(a) To carry on with the small Military Air Force and the civilian Air Force allowed by the peace clauses.

(b) To see the principle laid down by Political Allied Authorities allied. That is, the future position of Italy and its Institutions placed in a better position pertaining to Italy's participation in the United Nations' Cause, and its large contribution to the war against Germany and Japan with every means in its possession, or with means supplied by the Allies.

2. CONTRIBUTION UP TO THIS DATE.

(a) Air warfare. The C-in-C M.A.A.F. is aware, and in any case it is explained in the form enclosed to letter ref No. 010649/Sg.U dated 6th March, as far as the activity between the 9th September 1943 and 28th February 1945 is concerned.

The moral and material conditions under which the operational units have operated are also known from the direct ascertainment by Allied Officers assigned to the control of the Unit's activity and of their lives, or from the correspondence between the A.F.S.C. A.C. and the I.A.F. Staff Office.

(b) Works services. These are also known. On the whole this was less successful than the preceding one, because, although a few units have been praised and received proposals of help, improvements and rewards, others have caused disciplinary disturbances and forceful postings.

It must be borne in mind, however, that these disturbances were often due to the modest moral and material treatment received by the Units, for the spiritual crisis which reigns in the Country and the pressing needs of material life for the individuals and their families.

Improving the standard of living would no doubt increase the efficiency and would facilitate that disciplinary control which is now severe and intransigent.

(c) Information services. This, contrary to the two others, might not be known, though it had a large, generous, and pressing activity. The Allied Army Headquarters are fully satisifed and have expressed their satisfaction and prise on the whole, and individually.

On the whole this work is so efficient, that the requests for contribution are always increasing, and we shall soon be short of radio specialists who are now available and suitable for the special work, in fact special short courses are being carried out to increase this form of essential contribution.

3. HOPES ON THE PRESENT POSITION. (Superceded by recent events.)

(a) To have a larger and direct contribution towards the end of the war in Italy.

The Balkan Sector is becoming smaller and losing importance. If it is possible, for the Air Force to operate on the Italian front on tactical operations against German troops and organisations, and eventually using even the MACCHIS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2. CONTRIBUTION UP TO THIS DATE.

(a) Air warfare. The C-in-C M.A.A.F. is aware, and in any case it is explained in the form enclosed to letter ref No. 010649/Sg.U dated 6th March, as far as the activity between the 9th September 1943 and 28th February 1945 is concerned.

The moral and material conditions under which the operational units have operated are also known from the direct ascertainment by Allied Officers assigned to the control of the Unit's activity and of their lives, or from the correspondence between the A.F.S.C. A.C. and the I.A.F. Staff Office.

(b) Works services. These are also known. On the whole this was less successful than the preceding one, because, although a few units have been praised and received proposals of help, improvements and rewards, others have caused disciplinary disturbances and forceful postings.

It must be borne in mind, however, that these disturbances were often due to the modest moral and material treatment received by the Units, for the spiritual crisis which reigns in the Country and the pressing needs of material life for the individuals and their families.

Improving the standard of living would no doubt increase the efficiency and would facilitate that disciplinary control which is now severe and intransigent.

(c) Information services. This, contrary to the two others, might not be known, though it had a large, generous, and pressing activity. The Allied Army Headquarters are fully satisifed and have expressed their satisfaction and prise on the whole, and individually.

On the whole this work is so efficient, that the requests for contribution are always increasing, and we shall soon be short of radio specialists who are now available and suitable for the special work, in fact special short courses are being carried out to increase this form of essential contribution.

3. HOPES ON THE PRESENT POSITION. (Superceded by recent events.)

(a) To have a larger and direct contribution towards the end of the war in Italy.

The Balkan Sector is becoming smaller and losing importance. If it is possible, for the Air Force to operate on the Italian front on tactical operations against German troops and organisations, and eventually using even the MACCHIS.

Heavy bombers could continue to drop supplies to the Partisans.

The transports could carry on their services, which are very necessary to the Country under its present conditions.

The Seaplanes could carry on their present watch, scouting and rescue duties.

(b) To store instead of scrapping the a/c which are not to be used for the above-mentioned services, concentrating them under Allied control, on one of the airfields not in war use.

Thus saving time and work, and not depriving the surviving Air Force of the

Continued/2..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778507

few means which, lacking of anything better, the I.A.F. will endeavour, after the war, to keep in serviceable condition by exploiting the local handicraft if short of industrial resources.

To limit the scrapping to the indispensable minimum required to maintain the present a/c used in this last phase of the European War.

4. HOPES ON THE POST-WAR POSITION (OF AN APPARENT AND URGENT CHARACTER.)

Between the end of hostilities in Europe, which is now very near, and Peace, there will occur the period of war against Japan, and the Armistice.

It is presumed that, unless unforeseen and extremely favourable changes take place, this period will last a few years.

The prospective alternatives of the Italian Air Force after the war are, therefore, two:

(a) Its activities to be limited to internal courier services, the extent of which would depend on the serviceability of the old material and the quantity of petrol supplied by the Allies.

(b) Participate until peace with the Allied air activity in whatever form or measure granted.

The first case is the worst - it is more dangerous and harmful, because it would practically lead to the disbandment of the Air Force which managed to operate up to now. It would cause grave moral and material repercussions in the Air Force, and most of all in the Country.

The second case, if considered by the Allies, could be developed in two ways;

to transfer the Operational Units useful to the war effort, to the Far East -

or, to allot to the Italian Air Force all, or part, of the auxiliary activities to be carried out in the Mediterranean, in conjunction with the war in the Far East.

The first way would imply a state of war between Italy and Japan, which has not, up to now, been officially declared, and would meet difficulties and complications since it means adding to a distant place a small heterogenous unit in a great mass of homgeneity. However, the I.A.F. would be very pleased of such a solution, if the Allies think it agreeable from a military, organic, as well as Administrative point of view.

6898

The second way is independent of a state of war between Italy and Japan and could be easily and immediately applied.

The duties, which, <u>under Allied control,</u> could be entrusted to the Italian Air Force in the Mediterranean, from the end of the European War and during all the duration of hostilities with Japan, and the Armistice, and up to the Peace conclusions, could be the following:-

(a) Transport of Allied military personnel, post and rapid courier service,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

take place, this period will last a few years.

The prospective alternatives of the Italian Air Force after the war are, therefore, two:

(a) Its activities to be limited to internal courier services, the extent of which would depend on the serviceability of the old material and the quantity of petrol supplied by the Allies.

(b) Participate until peace with the Allied air activity in whatever form or measure granted.

The first case is the worst - it is more dangerous and harmful, because it would practically lead to the disbandment of the Air Force which managed to operate up to now. It would cause grave moral and material repercussions in the Air Force, and most of all in the Country.

The second case, if considered by the Allies, could be developed in two ways;

to transfer the Operational Units useful to the war effort, to the Far East -

or, to allot to the Italian Air Force all, or part, of the auxiliary activities to be carried out in the Mediterranean, in conjunction with the war in the Far East.

The first way would imply a state of war between Italy and Japan, which has not, up to now, been officially declared, and would meet difficulties and complications since it means adding to a distant place a small heterogenous unit in a great mass of homgeneity. However, the I.A.F. would be very pleased of such a solution, if the Allies think it agreeable from a military, organic, as well as Administrative point of view.

6898

The second way is independent of a state of war between Italy and Japan and could be easily and immediately applied.

The duties, which, under Allied control, could be entrusted to the Italian Air Force in the Mediterranean, from the end of the European War and during all the duration of hostilities with Japan, and the Armistice, and up to the Peace conclusions, could be the following:-

(a) Transport of Allied military personnel, post and rapid courier service, using Italian and Allied material, over the whole or part of the Mediterranean Basin; with necessary organisation and flight control.

(b) Air Sea rescue and scouting with the Seaplane Units which have been able to show, up to this date, a recognised ability in this delicate and difficult form of activity.

(c) Various airfield and workshop duties for transitory Allied a/c landing on Italian bases, under the control and with the help of Allied Technicians.

Continued/3.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

If this programme could be met on a general basis, both in parts or on the whole, the details could be studied in accordance with the terms which will be laid down.

We would like to inform you, just as a matter of point, that the personnel to be employed in the above mentioned activity would, at first, have to be obtained from the personnel working in "Unita Aerea" squadrons and workshops, and it could be gradually increased until it reaches the double of the present amount.

The absolute assurance of the moral and material efficiency of such an organisation would be easily guaranteed if the Allies provided means of supplies and economical assistance, adequate to the present urgent requirements. This might be debited by expected reparation from Italy.

This treatment, as explained several times to the AFSC/AC could be similar to the one of the Allied Nations in a less favourable position in this field.

This would, no doubt, enable us to overcome every difficulty, such as deficiencies met with up to now in some of the operational units, and the well known discontent amongst the Operational Unit personnel. We would also be able to choose and employ the best technical and professional personnel.

The eventual adoption of these proposals, would revive all the hopes of the Air Force. It would show an appreciation to the work contributed up to now, and cause splendid and profitable moral material and Political repercussions in the country.

CHIEF OF STAFF.
GENERAL M. AIMONE CAT.

6897

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

U A S S

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Roma li, 28 APR 1945

Prot.n° 011070 / Sg. U. / 2814 Coll.

A.V. MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE
CAPO A.F.S.C. - A.C.
R O M A
(tramite Ufficio di Collegamento)

OGGETTO: Trasmissione pro-memoria.-

Caro Maresciallo,

Come da Sua richiesta Le invio un pro-memoria nel quale ho esposto le aspirazioni dell'Aeronautica italiana, sotto le tre voci:

- contributo dato finora
- aspirazioni circa la situazione attuale che, come vedrà dalla nota a fianco, sono ormai superate dagli eventi in corso
- aspirazioni circa la situazione antecedente la pace che hanno invece, come annotato, carattere di attualità e di urgenza.-

Lo stesso pro-memoria ho inviato al Ministro ed al Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale perché ne informino S.E. il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri.-

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE

6896

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

PROMEMORIA IMPIEGO AERONAUTICA ITALIANA

10 Aprile 1945

1. ASPIRAZIONI DELL'AERONAUTICA ITALIANA

a) Sopravvivere con quella piccola Aviazione Militare e quell'Aviazione Civile che le saranno consentite dalle clausole di pace.-

b) In applicazione del principio espresso dalle Autorità Politiche Alleate, che la situazione futura dell'Italia e quindi delle sue Istituzioni, sarà tanto migliore, quanto maggiore la sua partecipazione alla causa delle Nazioni Unite, dare il massimo contributo alla guerra contro la Germania ed il Giappone, in tutte le forme che le sono consentite dai mezzi dei quali dispone e da quelli che possono esserle concessi dagli Alleati.-

2. CONTRIBUTO DATO FINORA

a) Alla Guerra Aerea - E' noto al Comando in Capo del M.A.A.F., ed in ogni modo risulta dallo specchio accluso alla lettera n.010649/Sg.U del 6 Marzo 1945, per quanto concerne l'attività svolta dal 9 Settembre 1943 al 28 Febbraio 1945.-

Sono note, inoltre, le condizioni morali e materiali nelle quali hanno operato i Reparti dell'Unità Aerea, sia per constatazione diretta da parte degli Ufficiali Alleati preposti al controllo della loro attività e della loro vita, sia per quanto risulta dalla corrispondenza fra l'Ufficio C./A.C. e lo Stato Maggiore dell'Aeronautica.-

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

b) Ai Servizi di lavoro - E' anche esso noto.- In complesso è stato meno brillante del precedente, perchè mentre alcune Unità hanno riscosso elogi e proposte di aiuti, miglioramenti e premi, altre hanno dato luogo ad inconvenienti disciplinari ed allontanamenti arbitrari.-

Bisogna tuttavia riconoscere che tali inconvenienti sono stati spesso conseguenza del modesto trattamento morale e materiale ricevuto dalle unità, in relazione alla crisi spirituale che travaglia il Paese ed alle pressanti necessità di vita materiale dei singoli e delle loro famiglie.-

Migliorando le condizioni di vita, aumenterebbe certo il rendimento e sarebbe più agevole il controllo disciplinare, perchè più giustamente severo ed intransigente.-

c) Ai Servizi Informazioni - Non è forse noto come i due precedenti, pur essendo stato largo di attività generosa e cruenta.- I Comandi delle Armate Alleate ne sono ampiamente soddisfatti e non hanno che espressioni di ammirazione ed elogio per l'insieme e per i singoli.-

Il complesso di questo lavoro è di tale rendimento che le richieste di contributo sono sempre in aumento e si è quasi prossimi ad esaurire gli specialisti radio ancora disponibili ed idonei allo speciale servizio; tanto che si stanno conducendo speciali corsi accelerati per continuare ad alimentare ed accrescere questa forma di contributo essenziale.-

3. ASPIRAZIONI CIRCA LA SITUAZIONE ATTUALE (Superate dagli eventi)

a) Dare un più ampio e diretto contributo alla fi[illegible]lla

6894

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

guerra in Italia.

Il settore Balcanico si sta riducendo e perde importanza.-

Se possibile fare operare l'Unità Aerea sul fronte italiano per operazioni tattiche contro le truppe e le organizzazioni tedesche, impiegando eventualmente anche i Macchi.-

I bombardieri pesanti continuerebbero ad agire per il rifornimento dei partigiani.-

I trasporti continuerebbero i loro servizi così necessari al Paese, nelle presenti condizioni.-

Gli Idrovolanti non avrebbero che da proseguire il loro attuale servizio di sorveglianza, esplorazione e soccorso.-

b) Immagazzinare anzichè demolire gli aerei che non dovrebbero essere impiegati per gli scopi sopradetti, concentrandoli tutti, sotto controllo Alleato, su di uno o più aeroporti non impiegati per la guerra.-

E ciò, sia per guadagnare tempo e lavoro, sia per non privare la superstite Aviazione di quei pochi mezzi che, in mancanza di meglio, essa cercherebbe, a guerra finita, di tenere in efficienza con risorse di artigianato, se in assenza di possibilità industriale.-

Limitare le demolizioni all'indispensabile per l'efficienza degli aerei da impiegare in questa ultima fase della guerra europea.-

4. ASPIRAZIONI CIRCA LA SITUAZIONE ANTECEDENTE ALLA PACE (di attualità e urgente)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Fra la prossima fine della guerra in Europa e la pace, intercorre il periodo della guerra al Giappone e quello dell'armistizio.-

Secondo le più attendibili previsioni, e salvo imprevisti estremamente favorevoli, questo periodo avrà la durata di qualche anno.-

Le alternative che si prospettano per l'Aviazione Italiana a fine guerra Europea sono quindi due:

- o limitare le proprie attività ai trasporti aerei interni, per quel tanto che sarà consentito dall'efficienza già ridotta del vecchio materiale e dai rifornimenti di essenze che gli Alleati vorranno accordare;
- o partecipare ancora e fino alla pace, alle attività aeree Alleate, in quella forma e misura che potrà e vorrà essere concessa.-

Il primo caso è il peggiore, più pericoloso e deprecabile, perchè condurrebbe praticamente al disfacimento dell'Aviazione rimasta in piedi finora, con gravi ripercussioni morali e materiali nei confronti dell'Arma e sopratutto del Paese.-

Il secondo caso, ove fosse preso in considerazione dagli Alleati, potrebbe essere sviluppato in due modi:

- o trasferendo in estremo oriente le Unità Aeree utilizzabili per la guerra;
- o attribuendo all'Aviazione Italiana tutte o parte delle attività ausiliarie da svolgere nel bacino del Mediterraneo, in dipendenza della guerra in Oriente.-

Il primo modo implica lo stato di guerra fra Italia e Giappone, non ancora formalmente dichiarato, e presenta le difficoltà e complicazioni dovute all'inserimento a grande distanza di un piccolo nucleo eterogeneo in una grande base omo-

6892

../..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

genea.- Tuttavia l'Aviazione Italiana sarebbe lietissima di una tale soluzione, sempre che questa convenisse agli Alleati dal punto di vista militare, organico ed amministrativo.-

Il secondo modo, è indipendente dallo stato di guerra fra Italia e Giappone ed è di più agevole ed immediata realizzazione.-

I servizi che sotto diretto controllo Alleato potrebbero essere affidati all'Aviazione Italiana nel bacino del Mediterraneo, dalla fine della guerra europea per tutta la durata della guerra in Giappone e dell'armistizio, fino alla conclusione della pace, potrebbero essere i seguenti:

a) Trasporti militari, di personale e posta e servizi di corrieri rapidi per conto degli Alleati utilizzando materiale italiano ed alleato, in tutto o parte del bacino del Mediterraneo; relative organizzazioni aeroportuali e di assistenza al volo.-

b) Servizi di sorveglianza e soccorso in mare, con le unità idrovolanti che hanno finora dimostrato di sapere svolgere con tutta dedizione e riconosciuta abilità questa delicata e difficile attività.-

c) Servizi vari di aeroporto e di officina per gli aerei alleati di transito su basi italiane, sotto controllo e con l'ausilio di Tecnici Alleati.-

Se questo programma fosse accolto in linea di massima, in tutto od in parte, ne potrebbero essere studiati i dettagli secondo i termini che verrebbero precisati.-

A titolo indicativo si fa presente che il personale utilizzabile nelle attività di cui sopra sarebbe, in un primo tem-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

po, quello in servizio nei reparti e nelle officine della Unità Aerea, e che il numero di questo personale potrebbe essere gradualmente aumentato fino a raggiungere circa il doppio dell'attuale.-

La garanzia assoluta dell'efficienza materiale e morale di una simile organizzazione, sarebbe agevolmente assicurata dalla adozione, da parte Alleata, di un trattamento alimentare ed economico adeguato alle più impellenti necessità attuali, da addebitare; se del caso, in conto riparazioni all'Italia.

Detto trattamento, come fu più volte prospettato alla AFSC/AC, potrebbe essere simile a quello della Nazione Alleata meno favorita in questo campo.

Esso consentirebbe certamente di superare le difficoltà e le deficienze riscontrate finora in qualche Unità lavoratori ed i noti malumori fra il personale dell'Unità Aerea, mentre favorirebbe la scelta e l'utilizzazione dei migliori elementi tecnici e professionali.

L'eventuale adozione di queste ultime proposte, restituirebbe vita e speranza all'Aviazione, premiando in modo tangibile il contributo dato finora, e produrrebbe ottime e benefiche ripercussioni morali, materiali e politiche nel Paese.=

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
Generale di Squadra Aerea
(M. AJMONE-CAT) 689f

2A

35A

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT R.A.F. HEADQUARTERS
ALGIERS, 1945 AT 10.30 HRS.

SECRET.

Participating as per agenda.

Present: AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. SPAEDE.
GROUP CAPTAIN T.E. JAMES.
COLONEL M.T. [illegible].
WING COMMANDER W.D. DOWDE.
WING COMMANDER [illegible] STEVENS.
GROUP CAPTAIN V.C. [illegible].
WING COMMANDER A.H. HOLMES.
MAJOR E.J. [illegible].
WING COMMANDER H.E. BOCOCK.
WING COMMANDER [illegible] STEPHENS.
SQ. LEADER [illegible].

The A.O.C. stated that this conference had arisen out of a meeting held at CASERTA last week which he had attended with A.V-M. SIR EDMUND HOAPLEY and COL. BAXTER.

1. FUTURE POLICY.

(i) After cessation of Hostilities.

(a) The Liberators will be withdrawn on the cessation of hostilities. This was admittedly confirmed at A.A.F. last week. A.O.C. and S.D. both consider that some of the Liberators at least should be retained, and this will be taken up again when appropriate.

(b) Although the Air C-in-C stated that all U.S.A.F. fighters would be grounded, it was agreed that the other fighters should not be grounded on the cessation of hostilities. Some of them, at any rate, should be used so that the Italians can be given some flying practice.

(c) There is no ruling yet about the Baltimores. G/C [illegible] stated that the Baltimore could be made into a 7 seater carrier a/c; it was decided that G/C [illegible] should arrange for one of these a/c to be made available for our inspection either at FOGGIA or ROME. W/Cdr [illegible] stated that he would get W/Cdr [illegible] to call in at 205 Group to see a passenger Baltimore and to report on its suitability for air transport in Italy - an appreciation of the potential freight carrying capacity of the Baltimore is also required.

6889

(d) G/C [illegible] confirmed that the state of SM.82 a/c is better now than they were six months ago; they have recently been overhauled, and previous engine trouble had been completely cured. 16 + 4 SM.82's can be maintained indefinitely. It was agreed that the Conts are a waste of time and if possible should be replaced.

(e) [illegible] appears to stand out as a choice in the South of Italy for all

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HQMR A.F. 8458.
FLTR COMZUKEWP U.S. ECONOC.
FLTR COMZUKEWP U.K. TECHOC.
3Q AIRCON LEADER F.M. MCCONNAUGH.

TOP SECRET

FROM U.S.C.O. attend this conference and action can of a meeting held at CASABLANCA. Last week which be read extended with U.S.A.F. DIRECTIVE.

1. ITALIAN POLICY.

(a) The Admiralty will be responsible on the execution of hostilities. This was confirmed orally conference with A.A.F. last week. A.C.O.S. and D.D. Local commanders must keep in close liaison and this will be taken up again when appropriate.

(b) Although the Air Chiefs stated that all U.S.A. fighters would be provided, it was agreed that the other squadrons should not be provided on the construction of hostilities. Some of them, at any rate, should be used so that the Spitfires can be taken home fighter pressure.

(c) There is no military yet about the Baltimores. G/O MCCALL stated that the Baltimores could be flown into a 7 months airstrip s/qs. It was decided that G/C Flight should prepare for one of them a/c to be made available for our transportation either to ROME or FOGGIA. T/Cdr ROCK stated that he would like T/Cdr C.DEGOZ to call in at 205 group to see a Beaufighter modification and to report on its suitability for air transport in Italy - an appreciation of its probable fighting capacity would also be also required.

(d) The U.S.C.O. asked for confirmation that arrangements had been made for the Spitfires to be flown into MALTA.

(e) ISSOA drove to Rome and a photo in the Roman of Italy for the construction of a large part of the U.S.A.F. G/C DUTTON said that the Americans were extending the runway at FOGGIA, so it didn't look as it would be quite safe airfield. In addition in the FIGHT zone we suggested that the South Italy Italy, and particularly as regarding where airfields in this vicinity. It was thought that every support should be given to this part of the Mediterranean zone.

(f) The U.S.C.O. made a statement on civil administration that we are not allowed to disarm the enemies until the Italians during the Declaration date. However, this phase of the Yalta Conference A.C. on 25th April 1945. The Italian Air Ministry appears to be endeavoring to the established policy.

3

6889

(i) [illegible] as over.

(a) The A.O.C. remarked that he was favourably impressed by the hard work put in by the [illegible]. Units and workshops, thanks to the right work put in by the [illegible]. Units and workshops, thanks to the right [illegible] are very busy, and therefore less the Administrative formations are top heavy, and therefore less efficient. At the moment, A.A.F. (C/Cdr [illegible]AS) is working out [illegible] establishments and it is likely that some bodies will be available in the near future to work in Sicily and N.A.F. Unless.

(b) In answer to "How should we use the I.A.T?" the D.D. gave certain facts and figures concerning the amount of supplies and bombs dropped over Yugoslavia in recent months. These figures compared unfavourably with work could be expected from the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. The D.D. said he thought the I.A.T. should be taken out of the Yugoslavia job, and should be used up and down Italy transporting supplies and personnel. The A.O.C. asked if the transport aircraft were being used to [illegible] front output, and G/C OLIVER stated that there was always a waiting list for passengers, but he was not sure about freight. It was thought that some Allied officers objected to travelling on what they called 'clapped out Italian a/c'. A/Cdr. ROYCE confirmed that the courier service organisation was being used to capacity. This service will probably be extended by conplanes.

G/C OLIVER thought that the S.A.A.F. operated favourably on supply dropping with Allied a/c and he confirmed that the effort of the Co-Belligerents was poor. He stated that [illegible] are now being reduced and perhaps some of their supply a/c could be turned over to the I.A.T.

The supply of DC3's and Dellingtons to the I.A.T. was discussed; it appears that in the Mediterranean there are about 200 of these a/c were not being used. G/C OLIVER said that the Wellington is a post war operational training a/c. It was agreed that the supply of Dellingtons to the I.A.T. should be discussed with A/Cdr. [illegible] on his visit to A.F.H.Q.

The D.D. said that he thought further Halifax a/c could be handed over to the I.A.T. if we could confirm that there were plenty of trained crews available who could man them. A/Cdr ROYCE said that although the Italian pilots were good, the navigators were poor. It was generally agreed that the Italians have experienced air and ground personnel available, but no [illegible] in which to employ them.

6888

The D.D. stated that anything we can show the Air Transport Command which will relieve USAAF of work would be welcomed. If suitable aircraft types were given to the I.A.T., such as the transport work in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and even North Africa could be taken over from the Allies.

A/Cdr [illegible] said that if any more Allied a/c types were given to the Italians, we should get a firm promise from the Allies to supply crews and equipment. This had unfortunately not

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

bombs dropped over Russia and in recent months
co-operate unfavourably if the work could be extracted from the
R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. The D.D. said he thought the I.A.F.
should be taken out of the Yugoslavia job, and should be used
up and down Italy transporting supplies and personnel. The
A.C.A.S. asked if the transport aircraft were being used to
reach Rhodes, and C/S [illegible] stated that there was always a
shortage list for passengers, but he was not sure about freight.
It was thought that some Allied officers objected to travelling
on what they termed 'clapped out Italian a/c'. A/Cdr. [illegible]
confirmed that the courier service organisation was being used
to capacity. This service will probably be extended by sur-
face.

C/C Military thought that the S.A.S. command favourably on supply
dropping established a/c and it confirmed that the effort of the
Corps was poor. It stated that 334 Div are now being re-used
and perhaps some of their supply a/c could be turned over to the
I.A.F.

The supply of DC3's and Williamsons to the I.A.F. was discussed;
it appears that in the disturbances in the air about 200 of these
a/c were not being used. C/C Military said that the Williamson
is a post war operational training a/c. It was agreed that the
supply of Williamsons to the I.A.F. should be discussed with
A/Cdr. [illegible] on his visit to A.F.H.Q.

The D.D. said that he thought further RAAF a/c could be handed
over to the I.A.F. if he could confirm that there were plenty
of trained crews available who could have to the a. /Cdr Perm
said that although the Italian pilots were good, the ground crews
were poor. It was generally agreed that the Italians have
adequate air and ground personnel available, but not enough
in which to employ them.

6388

The D.D. stated that anything we can show the Air Transport
Command which will relieve USAAF effort would be appreciated.
If suitable aircraft types were given to the I.A.F. much of the
transport work in Italy, chiefly, Sardinia and even Corsica
could be taken over from the Allies.

A/Cdr [illegible] asked that if any more Allied a/c types were given
to the Italians, we should get a firm promise from the Allies
to supply spares and equipment. This had unfortunately not
been done previously with the Allied a/c at present in use in
the I.A.F.

It was suggested that the Italians are doing more for the war
effort in the "air" sphere than other small countries.

It was agreed that C/C Military with the assistance of the D.D.
should draft a note on this subject (for submission to D.[illegible]).

Continued /5.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2. TRAINING IN I.A.F.

(i) W/Cdr ROYCE and W/Cdr POCOCK were handed a copy of G/C OLLASON'S letter on training in the B.T Wing at LECCE and were asked to submit a similar one in respect of CATTE, ALTENZO and FROSINONE. G/C OLLASON was asked to submit a report on the 612CCMI Squadrons at LECCE.

(ii) G/C OLLASON asked that a Navigation Officer be brought in. The A.O.C. said he thought that there was every chance of our getting an Air Observer. It was thought that a Gunnery Leader would not be necessary at this stage of the war. It was thought that a Flight Engineer on the maintenance side would be useful; it was decided to discuss this with C.M.S.O. when he visits ROME in the near future, in fact the whole question of Engineer, Signals and R/T technical staff would then be brought up. There should be an A.F.S.O. Officer at LECCE, BIZERNO and FROSINONE to look after maintenance, form 700 etc. G/C OLLASON said that an Intelligence Officer (W/O MONTECLETIE) at present attached to him from 334 Wing had been very useful indeed, and if possible he should be transferred to A.F.S.O. G/C JUDSON agreed to see this Officer when at LECCE, and meantime W/Cdr PEARCE verbally to arrange that he is not withdrawn from LECCE.

(iii) It was agreed that S/Ldr. BRANSOM would signal H.A.A.F. (W/Cdr GRANT) to see if they could obtain for us an R.A.F. Transport Sqdn syllabus. (Action has already been taken to obtain Fighter and Bomber O.T.U. syllabuses.)

(iv) Flying Control in the I..F. is practically non-existant at the moment. The first thing seems to be to get the I. .F. personnel. There are many I..F. Officers available; G/C OLLASON said he would submit the names of about 4 he had in mind. F/O MONTECLETIE would be able to get flying control going at LECCE. H.A.A.F. to be asked to lend us an Officer for a week or so to make a general survey. It might be a good thing to form a small Flying Control School at LECCE. The A.O.C. will take this up with the Italian A.M.

W/Cdr KNOWLES was asked to make enquiries as to what equipment was available for Flying Control; S/Ldr CHALLEN to be contacted by W/Cdr KNOWLES.

3. ENGINEERING POLICY.

C.M.S.O. is going to take action similar to that taken in the case of the Equipment Branch in order better to assist the Engineering Branch of the I..F. It was decided that W/Cdr GLADSTONE, W/Cdr ROYCE, S/Ldr CHALLEN and T/Lt. WITCHELL should be here during C.M.S.O's visit. W/Cdr. KNOWLES to contact C.M.S.O's Office to obtain the date of A/Cdr. TIZZES'S visit to A.F.S.C. 6887 the Italians will be told by A.O.C. that such a meeting is to take place and have certain Technical Officer standing by in case they are required for consultation.

4. OBSOLETE ITALIAN A/C.

A decision has been made at ....F. whereby I..F. will be allowed to retain some 150 obsolete a/c. A letter on this subject is at present awaited from A.F.H.Q; meanwhile the Italian Air Minister and Prime Minister have been informed verbally. Some of the 150 a/c are at present being used on the courier service; W/Cdr ROYCE was asked to notify ROME which a/c are being used for

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

near future, in fact the whole question of Engineer, Signals and [illegible] staff would then be brought up. There should be an A.P.S.C. officer at HQCOE, DIMINO and FROSINONE to look after maintenance, form 700 etc. G/C GILLSON said that an Intelligence Officer (F/O [illegible]) at present attached to him from 334 Wing had been very useful indeed, and if possible he should be transferred to HQCOE verbally to arrange that he is not withdrawn from LECCE.

(iii) It was agreed that S/Ldr. GOLDSTON would signal H.Q.A.A.F. (W/Cdr GRANT) to see if they could obtain for us an R.A.F. Transport Cmd syllabus. (Action has already been taken to obtain Fighter and Bomber C.F.U. syllabuses.)

(iv) Flying Control in the A.A.F. is practically non-existant at the moment. The first thing seems to be to get the A.A.F. personnel. There are many A.A.F. Officers available; G/C GILLSON said he would submit the names of about 4 he had in mind. F/O MOUNTJOYTIE would be able to get flying control going at LECCE. H.Q.A.A.F. to be asked to lend us an Officer for a week or so to make a general survey. It might be a good thing to form a small Flying Control School at LECCE. The A.C.C.C. will take this up with the Italian A.A.

W/Cdr KNOWLES was asked to make enquiries as to what equipment was available for Flying Control; S/Ldr CHAPMAN to be contacted by W/Cdr KNOWLES.

3. ENGINEERING POLICY.

C.M.S.O. is going to take action similar to that taken in the case of the Equipment Branch in order better to assist the Engineering Branch of the A.A.F. It was decided that W/Cdr GILDSTONE, W/Cdr ROYCE, S/Ldr CHAPMAN and F/Lt. MITCHELL should be here during C.M.S.O's visit. W/Cdr. KNOWLES to contact C.M.S.O's office to obtain the date of A/Cdr. TEDDER'S visit to A.P.S.C. The Italians will be told by A.C.C. that such a meeting is to take place and have certain Technical Officer standing by in case they are required for consultation.

4. OBSOLETE ITALIAN A/C.

A decision has been made at H.Q.A.A.F. whereby A.A.I. will be allowed to retain some 150 obsolete a/c. A letter on this subject is at present awaited from A.F.H.Q; meanwhile the Italian Air Minister and Prime Minister have been informed verbally. Some of the 150 a/c are at present being used on the courier service; W/Cdr ROYCE was asked to notify HQCOE which a/c are being used for this purpose. PALMO, being an airfield remote from repair facilities, has been suggested as a good storage place. FROSINONE and ST. VITO DI TARANTO are possible alternatives. If the airworthy and other a/c are taken to PALMO, they will be guarded. (The R.A.F. Maintenance Unit nearby has been moved.)

5. ORGANISATION.

(i) With 4th Z.A.T. There was a discussion on the possibility of combining Units [illegible] W/Cdr ROYCE stated that these two H.Q's each had different

Continued /4...

6887

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

functions. It would be a good thing if the Units Force combined with the Air Ministry. Units Force appears to be a stop gap, and interferes with 4th Z...C. Alternatively Units Force and 4th Z.A.F. might well be combined.

(ii) (iii) It was proposed, and generally agreed, that the following Staff Officers, and the Main Equipment Section, would be moved to ROME from BARI as soon as arrangements can be made for their reception this end. W/Cdr GLADSTONE, S/Ldr CHURCH, F/Lt MITCHELL and one Equipment Officer, together with O.R's as required. It was the considered view that ROME is the place where major policy is dealt with, and the Staff Officers should be here for that purpose and for educating the Italian A.F. W/Cdr ROYCE said that it would be necessary to have substitutes, possibly of a lower rank, at BARI. However, moves will not take place until after the visit of C.M.S.O, except of FLIGHT LIEUTENANT MITCHELL, whose N.C.O. could carry on at BARI for the time being.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between H.....F. and this H.Q. will take place; W/Cdr FISHER (A.A.S) to visit ROME once a fortnight, and the A.O.C. to visit H.....F. once a fortnight. It was agreed that there would be a conference at A.F.H.Q. ROME each Wednesday afternoon of ROME OFFICE DEPARTMENTAL HEADS. It was agreed that a Conference, similar to the one held on the 22nd April, should be held about once a month - the middle of the month being preferable.

(v) It was agreed that F/LT WHITE should deal with all establishment questions as Camp Commandant. R.A.F.

G/C GILLSON said that he could do with a Clerk at LECCE. In view of the shortage of Clerks in this Command, it was suggested that he might employ a civilian for the work - there being the necessary vacancy on the establishment to cover this.

G/C JARVIS made a statement on the situation as regards communication a/c, to the effect that there is to be a drastic reduction in the Command. The Italian A.F. should be approached on the subject with a view to securing perhaps a SAVOIA, and A.F.S.C. ROME should contact H.Q. M.A.A.F. about the possibility of getting an AVSON a/c for LECCE on receipt of "a case" from LECCE.

W/Cdr ROYCE referred to the job which S/C DE BENEDUCCI was at present doing at BRINDISI, and it was agreed that this Officer should be ~~promoted~~ to the rank of FLIGHT LIEUTENANT as there is a Squadron Leader Org. post at BRINDISI not filled - W/Cdr ROYCE for action.

(vi) In view of certain Officers from BARI being shifted to ROME, the correspondence position should sort itself out. M.A.A.F (thro W/Cdr FISHER) again to be asked to address everything to A.F.S.C. ROME for distribution, rather than that correspondence should go direct to BARI, or even to BARI via B.A.F.

6. FUTURE OF LECCE AND BROCHIONE.

It was decided that the C.M.U. should be left at BROCHIONE. G/C GILLSON in consultation with W/Cdr GLADSTONE to inform A.O.C. whether the flying refresher unit at BRINDISI can be accommodated at LECCE. On receipt of which, M.....F. to be asked for approval of Air Forces Sub-Commission's proposals in the event of LECCE

6886

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

have subordinate, [illegible] except [illegible]
place until after the visit of C.M.S.C, except [illegible]
where H.C.C. could carry on at BARI for the time being.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between H.....F. and this H.Q. will take place; W/Cdr FISHER (A.L.S) to visit ROME once a fortnight, and the A.C.C. to visit H.....F. once a fortnight. It was agreed that there would be a conference at A.F.S.C. ROME each Wednesday afternoon of ROME OFFICE DEPUTIES and ISLAND. It was agreed that a Conference, similar to the one held on the 22nd April, should be held about once a month - the middle of the month being preferable.

R.A.F.

(v) It was agreed that F/Lt WHITE should deal with all/establishment questions as Camp Commandant.

G/C OLLASON said that he would do with a Clerk at LECCE. In view of the shortage of Clerks in this Command, it was suggested that he might employ a civilian for the work - there being the necessary vacancy on the establishment to cover this.

G/C JAMES made a statement on the situation as regards communication a/c, to the effect that there is to be a drastic reduction in the Command. The Italian A.F. should be approached on the subject with a view to securing perhaps a CAPRONI, and A.F.S.C. ROME should contact H.Q. M.A.A.F. about the possibility of getting an AVSON a/c for LECCE on receipt of "a case" from LECCE.

W/Cdr ROYCE referred to the job which F/O DE BENEDUCCI was at present doing at BRINDISI, and it was agreed that this Officer should be promoted to the rank of FLIGHT LIEUTENANT as there is a Squadron Leader Org. post at BRINDISI not filled - W/Cdr ROYCE for action.

6885

(vi) In view of certain Officers from BARI being shifted about, the correspondence position should sort itself out. M.A.A.F (thro W/Cdr FISHER) again to be asked to address everything to A.F.S.C. ROME for distribution, rather than that correspondence should go direct to BARI, or even to BARI via D.A.F.

6. SUITE OF LECCE AND BROCHIONE.

It was decided that the C.T.W. should be left at BROCHIONE. G/C OLLASON in consultation with W/Cdr GLADSTONE to inform A.C.C. whether the flying refresher unit at BRINDISI can be accommodated at LECCE, on receipt of which, M.A.A.F. to be asked for approval of Air Forces Sub-Commission's proposals in the event of LECCE being de-requisitioned.

G/C OLLASON as O.C. A.F.S.C. Detachment, LECCE, to take over control of the MACCHI squadrons. (A.C.C. has asked C...S. I...F. not to move MACCHI Sqdns from LECCE to BROCHIONE pending a decision.

7. MOVE NORTHWARDS.

A comprehensive plan is not as yet possible. On the Intelligence side, Wing Commander Pearce said that he had one Officer (F/O REID) ready to move into BELLI as soon as the North falls; W/Cdr PEARCE to discuss with A/Cdr WOOLLEY in view of the shortage of Intelligence Officers at A.F.S.C. On

Continued /5..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the Department side, neither can be settled until we actually know what is left in the North; W/Cdr [illegible] has the matter under constant review. The move Northwards to be discussed with C.A.S.O. when he visits A.F.S.O.

The A.O.C. said he thought it would be a good thing if a copy of R.A.A.F.'s plan on future planning could be obtained, or even perused by an A.F.S.O. Officer. W/Cdr [illegible] will be approached on this; G/C PLETCHER (PLANS) R.A.A.F. is directly concerned.

8. EDUCATION.

A.O.C. asked all Officers present to circulate too much rather than too little information.

G/C GILLSON spoke about training curriculae etc. and the News Sheet at LOCOTE which was most popular. The magazine known as "Victory" was very popular. W/Cdr [illegible] said that R.A.A.F. were very right on this type of thing, but that he would do his best to see what could be obtained.

9. GENERAL.

W/Cdr [illegible] asked whether there was any likelihood of the R.A.F. being used in the Pacific. The A.O.C. said he didn't think there was any likelihood whatever.

I.D. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

6885

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 24th April, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/23/ATH.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4. OBSOLETE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT.

Decision made at M.A.A.F. (on 10th April) whereby I.A.F. will be allowed to retain some 150 obsolete aircraft. Therefore those which are airworthy to be flown to an airfield remote from repair facilities, e.g. Palata. Aircraft which cannot be flown without considerable repair to be left where they are, provided the Italians do not work on them? No raw material or spares will be provided for maintenance or repair of these aircraft.

About 2% of these aircraft are now being used to boost up the transport squadrons, but when they become past praying for they should be flown to a remote airfield.

5. ORGANISATION.

(i) Units Force and 4th T.A.F.

Can we force the Italians to combine these two Headquarters?

(ii) A.F.S.C.

Movement of certain Officers from BARI to ROME.

(iii) Equipment.

Proposed move of main Equipment Section from BARI to ROME, and future demand channels for Italian Air Force.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between M.A.A.F. and this H.Q. is required by Chief of Staff M.A.A.F. Wing Commander Fisher, (A.L.S) is being given the sole job of looking after this Sub-Commission's interests, and will make a fortnightly visit to this H.Q. A.C.C. will make a fortnightly visit to M.A.A.F. Suggest Staff Conference at A.F.S.C. ROME on Wednesday afternoons, i.e. after Vice President's Conference, and before exchange of weekly information with M.A.A.F. which would then be made every other Wednesday and Thursday respectively.

(v) A.F.S.C. Establishments.

(a) Any additions required.

(b) Any deletions required.

e.g. Instead of F/O Armament Officer, add Squadron Leader or Flight Lieutenant Air Reservor.

(vi) Distribution of correspondence.

(a) To and from M.A.A.F, and formations higher than A.F.S.C. through A.F.S.C. ROME.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

About 25 of these aircraft are now being used to boost up the transport squadrons, but when they become past praying for they should be flown to a remote airfield.

5. ORGANISATION.

(i) Unite Force and 4th T.A.F.

Can we force the Italians to combine these two Headquarters?

(ii) A.F.S.C.

Movement of certain Officers from BARI to ROME.

(iii) Equipment.

Proposed move of main Equipment Section from BARI to ROME, and future demand channels for Italian Air Force.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between M.A.A.F. and this H.Q. is required by Chief of Staff M.A.A.F. Wing Commander Fisher, (A.L.S) is being given the sole job of looking after this Sub-Commission's interests, and will make a fortnightly visit to this H.Q. A.O.C. will make a fortnightly visit to M.A.A.F. Suggest Staff Conference at A.F.S.C. ROME on Wednesday afternoons, i.e. after Vice President's Conference, and before exchange of weekly information with M.A.A.F. which would then be made every other Wednesday and Thursday respectively.

(v) A.F.S.C. Establishments.

(a) Any additions required.

(b) Any deletions required.

e.g. Instead of F/O Armament Officer, add Squadron Leader or Flight Lieutenant Air Observer.

(vi) Distribution of correspondence.

(a) To and from M.A.A.F, and formations higher than A.F.S.C. through A.F.S.C. ROME.

(b) Letters from A.F.S.C. detachments direct to ROME, copy to BARI when required for information vis-a-vis UNITA AEREA, ZAT 4 and B.A.F.

6. FUTURE OF LECCE AND FROSINONE.

Lecce is being returned to the Italians in toto. Should the whole of the O.T.U, including Refresher Training etc. be removed from FROSINONE to LECCE? It may be profitable to leave Baltimore training at FROSINONE and have all other training at LECCE, e.g. Macchis at LECCE.

Continued /5.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

7. MOVE NORTHWARDS.

In the Italian battle progresses, what plan should be adopt, and what res forces have we?

8. INFORMATION - too much rather than too little.

9. GENERAL - any other business.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Ref: AMSO/23/AIR.
Date: 21st April, 1945.

DISTRIBUTION.

AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE.
GROUP CAPTAIN E.E. JAPP.
COLONEL M.N. BALDRIGE.
[redacted]
WING COMMANDER W.B. ROWE.
WING COMMANDER R.J. LEWIS.
GROUP CAPTAIN H.C. GILLAM.
WING COMMANDER A.N. MONTEITH.
MAJOR E.J. SASS.
WING COMMANDER N.E. POCOCK.
WING COMMANDER C.G.N. PRINCE.
SQUADRON LEADER D.L. WRIGHT.
File.

6883

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0612

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

951

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION. ALLIED COM. BOARD. 18.11001.

AIR HEADQUARTERS, N.A.A.F. ITALY.

DESIRED INTRD.

947.

ADLE RIGHT EIGHT THREE TO REFERENCE YOUR ADLE FOUR THREE SIX DATED OCT SEVEN SEPTEMBER ONE NINE FOUR SIX TO INFORMATION CONTAINED. IN ADDITION CONTROL MUST BE EFFECT DOG FOX CHA THREE THREE ELEVEN TO

6882

ABSC/AB/2/AIR.

DUPLEX.

A.C.A.S. G2 (I).

S.O. [signature] A.C. MORTON. W/O

F. HQ, F/LT.

