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THE MANUFACTURE
MAY - SEPT. 1946

10000/135/438

THE MANUFACTURE OF WARLIKE STORES
MAY - SEPT. 1946

PAGES MISSING OR
PAGINATION INCORRECT -
FILMED AS FOUND

1.
All previous correspondence in file 703C/829/50
R.A. 14th June 1946

2.
Any developments on 2nd so far as they affect us?
R.B. Dei.

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Director. 18.1.48
Ref m.2. Still no developments.
Deviates 1/2

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3.

Director. 1/15/8

Ref m.2. Still no developments.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 794

Ref. : 9/28/CA

6 September 1946

SUBJECT: Manufacture of small arms.

TO : G-5 Section,
APO 794.

1. I have received numerous requests from various departments of the Italian Government as well as from certain private firms, for permission to manufacture or repair and to sell to State Departments, Commercial undertakings or private individuals, certain types of arms and ammunition.

2. The only direction which I appear to have received from you on this matter is contained in your AG 388/3/087 GEX/O of 2 August 1945 copy of which is attached for easy reference. This Directive, which was written before the conclusion of the war in the East and which consequently lays stress on our war effort, is quite clear as far as "Armaments and ammunition or implements of war" are concerned. It does not, however, define these items or state whether the manufacture of such weapons as sporting shot guns, small practice rifles or pistols of small calibre is to be restricted. Further, as this directive pre-supposed the signing of a peace treaty within a comparatively short space of time after the end of the war, it did not allow for the circumstances which have arisen in Italy during the past 12 months and which may continue for some time.

3. In fact (see my letter 501/443/20 of the 22 November 1945) positive control of manufacture of war material has not been complete owing to the absence of qualified technical staff, the only control existing being through the service Sub-commissions and their respective Ministries, leaving the manufacture by private firms without direct control.

4. As a result of this situation I am receiving the requests referred to in para 1 above, together with frequent complaints on the injustices due to a system (or rather, a lack of system) under which certain small firms are able to make and sell various weapons without any control, whereas the large and reputable firms who are under contract



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with Service Ministries are still waiting for authority to enable them to execute similar orders.

5. I therefore recommend that two decisions be taken: -

- (a) that the term War like material should be defined and that weapons which need not be considered essentially war-like, e.g. shot guns, sporting rifles and pistols or revolvers below 8 mm should be excluded from the definition.

and

- (b) that the control of manufacture, repair and distribution of weapons other than those considered as war-like, should be left entirely to the Italian Government, who may however, be required to give us such information regarding their system of control as we may require.

6. It is very desirable that some such ruling should be given at the earliest possible moment.

ELDERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Ex. Commissioner
Land Forces S/C
Navy S/C
Air Forces S/C
Econ. Section
CA Section

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TRANSLATION

3.A.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Air Forces S/C

77127/35734/1.6.4.

Rome, 28 August 1946

Dear Admiral,

2A

In reply to the requests formulated in your letter No. 9/28/CA of 29 June 1946, I transmit to you the following data supplied to me by the competent offices with regard to the type and calibre of the arms assigned to the "Carabinieri" and to other police forces as well as with regard to the system of governmental control over the production, repair and transit of war material.

The Ministry of War provides for the armament of the carabinieri, of the Finance guards, of the P.S. guards, of the corps of custody agents of penitentiaries and of the local police agents (communal guards, sworn guards etc.) according to the specialities as indicated in the enclosed list.

As to the Public Safety corps in particular, the relative rule establishes as individual armament the sword and the pistol for the warrant officers, the pistol and the musket for the "brigadiere", "vicebrigadiere", sworn guards and guards.

The detachment armament is not definitely set in the ruling. Practically it is composed of armored cars for 20 mm guns, heavy machine-guns for 60, of 6,5, machine-guns and of hand grenades and tear bombs.

Such arms are however not sufficient for the total need of the corps, regardless of the fact that the General Direction of P.S. of this Ministry of the Interior provides to integrate the supplies furnished by the Ministry of War (see enclosure) with the distribution to the detachments of automatic pistols, machine-guns and heavy machine-guns which have been obtained second hand and then opportunely revised and repaired.

The control over the production and repair of arms in military establishments and in the armament factory "Beretta" of Gardone Val Trompia is being exercised by the Ministry of War, while for the remaining civilian factories of arms and ammunition is competent the Ministry of the Interior. The latter provides also - according to art. 28 and the following of the P.S. law approved by Royal Decree 18 June 1934 No. 775 and of paragraph 7 of title 1 of the rules for the carrying out the P.S. law, approved by R.D. 27 January 1929 No. 62 - for the vigilance of the transit of war material across the borders and the various regions of the national territory.

E.S. Dist 3/9/46

Sincerely yours

Aut. C.A. Sec.

Inf. C.A. Sec.

S.C.

Land Forces S/C

Navy S/C

Air Forces S/C

Rome Sec.

De Carperi

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

A P O 3 974

Ref: 9/23/CA.

15 June 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am somewhat disturbed by information which reaches me from time to time regarding the manufacture and transit of arms and munitions in Italy.

Under Article 13 of the Armistice Terms, the manufacture of war material and its transit is prohibited except as directed by the United Nations. Further, as you will be aware, under Article 3(a) of the Revised Armistice which is now being considered by your Government, the responsibility for the control of production of armaments will be vested in the Allied organization to be set up to supervise the Armed Forces in Italy.

My attention has been particularly drawn to the extent to which the Civil Police Forces (other than CC.RR) are being armed for the maintenance of law and order.

In connection with this matter I would much appreciate, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, information from you on the following matters:

- (a) The type and scale of weapons authorized for each of these Police Forces (other than CC.RR) under Italian law;
- (b) The system of control by your Government of the manufacture, repair and transit of war material, and the Ministry by which this control is exercised.

Very truly yours,

ELMER W. TUCK
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Exec Commissioner
Land Forces
Navy S/C
Air Forces S/C
Econ Sec.

*3. I don't think the applicant
the RAF. We shall be covered
by the above policy, and in
this I think we should take no action*

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by the above policy, and in
this I think we should take no action*

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF VP, CIVIL
AFFAIRS SECTION ON MONDAY, 27 MAY 1946 AT 1430 HRS TO
DISCUSS CONTROL OF PRODUCTION OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND
WARLIKE STORES.

In the Chair: Brigadier M. CARR

Present : Commander, J.C. RISK, Navy Sub-Commission.

Colonel W. PIDSLEY, Land Forces Sub-Comm. (MIA)

Lt. Col. R. MISHALL, do.

Lt. Col. R. CURTIS, do.

Major R.C. VAN KIRK do.

S/Ldr. M.E. REID, Air Forces Sub-Comm.

Colonel H.M. WALKER, Inf. & Util. Br, Econ. Sec.

Capt. T.E. ELLIOTT do.

Lt. Col. F.J. WILSON Public Safety Sub-Comm.

Major N.W. HIND-SMITH, Office of Ex. Comm.

Major J.S. REAKES, CSO to VP, CA Section.

Background.

Brig. Carr said he had called this meeting in the capacity of an individual Officer. It was not proposed that CA Section should take over the control of armaments; no staff was available and the Section was awaiting liquidation. The Executive Commissioner had asked him to review the situation and make any recommendations considered necessary.

He had taken AFHQ Secret letter AG 388.3/087 GEG-O of 2nd August as a starting point. This letter must be read in the light of the present situation and in some aspects it was out of date as regards policy. It provided for production of arms and ammunition only to the extent required by the Allied Forces.

Brig. Carr said that a good deal of confusion had arisen as various letters had been issued by HQ AC which gave the impression that all necessary action as regards control was being taken. One letter stated it was considered that sufficient control was being exercised through Italian laws and lack of raw materials but this did not take into account any manufacture undertaken by using existing stocks, scrap and material in transit of arms. An AFHQ

Air Forces Sec

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Lt. Col. R. CURTIS, do.
Major E. C. VAN KIRK do.
S/Ldr. M. E. REID, Air Forces Sub-Comm.
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the Italian Government of the prohibition in regard to the production of arms and ammunition. Here again nothing had been done.

Matters had come to a head recently because certain elements in the Italian police forces were being supplied with quantities and types of arms and ammunition beyond those considered necessary or desirable. Although this HQ had acquiesced in the policy of issue of automatic weapons to certain elements of the Police, it had always been considered that control of issue should be maintained, which would have been the case if authorized releases from stocks and factories had been made.

Knowledge of present extent of arms and ammunition.

Brig. Carr said he understood that Economic Section were getting particulars. Capt. Elliott stated that a list of special machinery which could not be converted to civilian use had been compiled for G-5, AFHQ.

Col. Pidsley stated that the Italian Army and the CC.RR. unlike the Civil Police Forces, had scales of armaments laid down and any Italian arms or ammunition required to complete those scales were authorized by Land Forces S/C and contracts given to recognized firms by the War Minister. This arrangement only applied to War Ministry contracts, however, and attention had been drawn to the fact that army contracts at the Beretta factory were being held up by private contracts.

S/Ldr. Reid stated that the Fiat factory was making transport aircraft and Air Forces S/C was satisfied that no unauthorized production of military aircraft was going on. In answer to Col. Pidsley, S/Ldr. Reid stated that he could give no information on small arms for aircraft and said these were usually put on after the aircraft was completed; their source was unknown.

Exercise of Control.

Brig. Carr said it was apparent from discussion on the first term of reference that control was only being exercised over the contracts of the various Service Ministries and no control was being affected by Allied authorities on any projects which might be taken place outside such contracts.

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Recommendations as to action to be taken in AC to implement policy laid down.

Brig. Carr said it had been pointed out in correspondence that AC had not the necessary technical staff to administer control. He recommended that it was a matter to be taken over by one of the Service Sub-Commissions, in view of recent developments and the future of AC. In view of the fact that Land Forces was the largest Service Sub-Commission he considered it might be their responsibility.

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Col. Pidsley replied that the views of his Sub-Commission were mainly as expressed in their letter Q.009 dated 7 May. The opinion was then given that if it was felt that restriction was necessary under the terms of the Armistice the responsibility on the Italian side should be that of one Ministry, possibly the Ministry of War. If this was done then it would be necessary for one authority to take responsibility for supervision on the Allied side.

Col. Pidsley considered that the Navy would have to be separate in the matter, but all other arms could come under War Ministry. The situation rather pointed to a section composed of technical experts in addition to military personnel. Provided suitable technical assistance was forthcoming, Land Forces Sub-Commission might assume the responsibility for control.

Brig. Carr agreed, that so far as this HQ was concerned the question of the production of arms and ammunition should be taken over by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, depending on the Italian Government centralising responsibility to the War Ministry and Land Forces Sub-Commission being suitably augmented.

Action to be taken with AFHQ and Italian Government.

Brig. Carr said that following on the last recommendation the question arose as to how control would be exercised on the Italian Government side and whether any action should now be taken on the AFHQ letter dated 8 November. This would be linked up with the question of the Ministry of War taking over production because the attention of the Italian Government could then be drawn to control of arms. The situation was difficult, especially at the present time.

Land Forces Sub-Commission suggested that the Chief Commissioner should ask the Italian Government about their present machinery for control on the Italian side, where responsibility rested and suggesting that it might be under the responsibility of the Ministry of War. It was unnecessary to do more than this at the moment.

Brig. Carr expressed agreement with this suggestion.

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Brig. Carr expressed agreement with this suggestion.

Col. Pidsley undertook to prepare a draft letter to the Italian Government.

As regards the strength and armament of the Police Forces other than CC.RR., Col. Pidsley felt that AFHQ and CCS had not the same view of the picture as AC and there was a danger of orders being issued based on incomplete information. It was therefore necessary to give them all the information we have available. Brig. Carr agreed and said he would prepare a letter to AFHQ in consultation with Col. Pidsley, based on a letter prepared by Land Forces Sub-Commission.

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Commander Risk entered the meeting and Brig. Carr reviewed what had been discussed and the recommendations made. Commander Risk said that the Navy-Subcommission had refused permission for the Ministry of Marine to acquire additional weapons except in cases of emergency. A survey of naval munition factories had been carried out with a view to ascertaining those that could be converted to civilian use. No complete control was exercised, the only form of control being on a voluntary basis.

Brig. Carr said AC should put the whole case to AFHQ and if they were prepared to provide the necessary staff there was no reason why control could not be exercised.

Col. Pibley suggested that it was necessary to obtain from the Italian Government a full resume of the existing laws for manufacture of weapons, including sporting weapons.

Brig. Carr concluded the discussions by saying that the recommendations made would be submitted to the Executive Commissioner.

The meeting closed at 1515 hrs.

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