

0448

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/MND No.

785017

ACC

10000/135/626
(I)

ALLIED
MAR. 194

0449

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No.

785017

10000/135/626
(I)

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION, ITALIAN AIR FORCE, POLICY
MAR. 1944 - APR. 1945; JAN. 1946

0451

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.4/RND No.

~~AKS~~	~~Min 2~~	~~7/12~~	~~8~~
~~Col S.~~	~~Min 3~~	~~9/12~~	~~66~~
~~Col.~~	~~we.~~	~~11/12~~	~~2~~
~~AKS~~	~~Mc.~~	~~19/12~~	~~2~~
~~AKS~~	~~E. 37A~~	~~22/12~~	~~2~~
~~AKS~~	~~11.9~~	~~18/3~~	~~18~~
~~AKS~~	~~MT 3~~	~~16/4~~	~~2~~
~~AKS~~	~~MT 4~~	~~17/4~~	~~2~~
~~AKS~~	~~MT 5~~	~~21/4~~	~~2~~
~~AKS~~	~~MT 6~~	~~23/4~~	~~2~~

124 870

10000 / 135 / 626

THIS FOLDER
CONTAINS PAPERS
FROM MAR - 1944
TO APR - 1945
CATALOGUE.

Minute 13.

To: - Command Intelligence Security Officer.
(W/Cdr. Wardlaw.)

1. Please see Encl. 102 and 102A.
2. Briefly, the AFSC wish to organise an Italian 'P' Staff inside the Italian Air Ministry, to keep the records of all I.A.F. personnel employed with the RAF.
3. The scheme is sound and has the blessing of ^{Kear} Section 4, there is one point, however, on which I would like your advice.
4. At Encl. 102A, the AFSC suggest the Italians should keep a record of locations of RAF units.
5. I spoke to G/Capt. Jarman on this point and he was of the opinion that this information would be allowed by this H.Q.

Chamney
(C. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
Wing Commander,
for
Allied Liaison Section.

15th. Apr. 1945.

Minute 14.

To : Allied Liaison Section, M.A.A.F.

1. It is not considered advisable to pass to the Italians a copy of the R.A.F. Location List

Wardlaw
T.E.C. WARDLAW
Wing Commander

Command Intelligence (Security) Officer
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

19th April, 1945.

of all I.A.F. personnel employed with the RAF.

3. The scheme is sound and has the blessing of ^{RAF} Section 4, there is one point, however, on which I would like your advice.

4. At Encl. 102A, the AFSC suggest the Italians should keep a record of locations of RAF units.

5. I spoke to G/Capt. Jarman on this point and he was of the opinion that this information would be allowed by this H.Q.

Cheney

(C. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.
15th. Apr. 1945.

Minute 14.

To : Allied Liaison Section, M.A.A.F.

1. It is not considered advisable to pass to the Italians a copy of the R.A.F. Location List.

W. E. C. WARDLAW

T.E.C. WARDLAW
Wing Commander
Command Intelligence (Security) Officer
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
19th April, 1945.

Minute 15.

To:- Command Intelligence (Security) Officer.

1. Reference is made to Min. 14.
2. It is pointed out that the only locations which would be supplied to the Italians are those on which I.A.F. personnel are employed. (approx. 30).
3. The Italian Authorities, administer all such personnel on RAF units, and maladministration is caused by reason of the Italian Authorities not knowing the locations of their personnel. Italian Area H.Q., cannot be expected to administer efficiently, the personnel in these areas without this knowledge, and it has been found frequently that some detachments are not being paid, neither are they being inspected, because of this.

/ para. 4.

Minute 15. (cont.)

4. It is suggested that the Air Forces Sub-Commission be allowed to supply the locations of RAF units concerned to the Italian Air Ministry.
5. Will you please consider this proposal and let me have your comments.

Conroy
 (C. CONROY),
 Squadron Leader,
 Wing Commander,
 Allied Liaison Section.

for

21st. Apr. 1945.Minute 16.To : Allied Liaison Section.

1. Your Minute 15. No objection is raised to the Italian Air Ministry being furnished with the location of the units referred to in para. 2 of your Minute.

24th April, 1945.

T.E.C. WARDLAW
 T.E.C. WARDLAW
 Wing Commander

Command Intelligence (Security) Officer.

Minute.12.

To:- C-in-C/RAF.14022.

1. Reference is made to Min.11, para.2. sub-para.IV, attached, and to your verbal instructions to me this morning.
2. I have coordinated with D/D.Ops and herewith are the answers you require:-
 - (a) H.A. 2.A.P. state that they require from an operational point of view, 3 Squadrons of P.39s immediately. Moreover, H.A. 2.A.P. are well aware that because of insufficient aircraft, 2 of these Squadrons must roll up after 2 1/2 months and the third after 3 1/2 months.

(b) (i) The reasons why Italian Air Force Squadrons are not used in D.A.P. are:-

- (a) The shortage of airfields in Northern Italy makes it imperative that only Allied Air Forces operate in the front line. If Italian Air Force Squadrons were employed it would necessitate the withdrawal of our own squadrons in order to give them airfields.
- (b) The Italian Air Force squadrons are not efficient, in comparison with our own squadrons.

(c) I have spoken to Group Captain/Organisation who states, it will be necessary to inform Air Ministry and obtain permission for the arming of No.9. I.A.F. Squadron with P.39s. This is the province of Organisation and at the earliest it will be 7 or 8 days before such approval can be obtained.

b. Connorsy St.
 (C. Connor),
 Squadron Leader,
 Wing Commander,
 Allied Liaison Section.

for

Date:- 26th. Mar. '45.

Noted

(a) H.Q. B.A.F. state that they require from an operational point of view, 3 Squadrons of F.39s immediately. Moreover, H.Q. B.A.F. are well aware that because of insufficient aircraft, 2 of these Squadrons must roll up after 24 months and the third after 36 months.

(b) (i) The reasons why Italian Air Force Squadrons are not used in B.A.F. are:-

(a) The shortage of airfields in Northern Italy makes it imperative that only Allied Air Forces operate in the front line. If Italian Air Force Squadrons were employed it would necessitate the withdrawal of our own squadrons in order to give them airfields.

(b) The Italian Air Force squadrons are not efficient, in comparison with our own squadrons.

(c) I have spoken to Group Captain/Organisation who states, it will be necessary to inform Air Ministry and obtain permission for the arming of No. 9 I.A.F. Squadron with F.39s. This is the province of Organisation and at the earliest it will be 7 or 8 days before such approval can be obtained.

b. Kennedy St.

(C. Connor),
Squadron Leader,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

for

Date:- 26th. Mar. '45.

only

Minute 11

C-in-C.

Please see Minute 9 overleaf, which contains in paras. 3 and 4 broad rulings given on the submissions of the Italian Air Minister and Chief of Staff.

2

The answers are :

(i) 2. para 12(a).

There are 2 Squadrons of Operational type Macchi at 16 UE each. There is 1 Squadron of Training type Macchi . . at 12 UE each.

The Bailey Report recommends putting these together in one training unit. If kept as separate Units, the additional cost will be approximately 50 extra personnel, mostly domestic.

I recommend that we accept this, in order to allow the Italians to save face.

(ii) 2. para 12 (b).

There is no objection to storage of obsolescent aircraft, but of course unless they are maintained, the rate of deterioration will be rapid. Personally I think that there will be a natural tendency to misemploy manpower for this purpose, but so long as it is made perfectly clear that this is not to be done, I think we can accept the proposal.

(iii) 4. para 15 (a).

PAN.3358 dated 29th April 1944 laid down that the Italians were only to be given "superseised combatworthy aircraft", and MSW.149 dated 30th January from A.C.A.S. repeats this in the form "only with obsolete aircraft no longer required in the theatre."

One Spitfire V Squadron was allowed by special permission of the Air Ministry, and apart from the fact that at present we are not, according to C.M.S.C., in a position to equip another squadron, we could not equip any further Italian Squadrons without Air Ministry authority. It is probable that if we roll up a number of Spitfire 9 Squadrons, and put the aircraft in to the O.T.U.s, thereby releasing Spitfire V, or, alternatively, when the O.T.U.s themselves roll up, Spitfire V will become available. But presumably the Yugoslavs, Greeks, Turks, and Egyptians will have prior claims. In some cases (e.g. the Greeks) further re-equipment has been refused.

Therefore, on all counts, we are not justified in re-equipping any Italian Squadrons.

(iv) 4. para 15 (b). P.39.

The Bailey Report recommends putting these together in one training unit. If kept as separate units, the additional cost will be approximately 50 extra personnel, mostly domestic.

I recommend that we accept this, in order to allow the Italians to save face.

(ii) 3. para 12 (b).

There is no objection to storage of obsolescent aircraft, but of course unless they are maintained, the rate of deterioration will be rapid. Personally I think that there will be a natural tendency to misemploy manpower for this purpose, but so long as it is made perfectly clear that this is not to be done, I think we can accept the proposal.

(iii) 4. para 15 (a).

PAN.3356 dated 29th April 1944 laid down that the Italians were only to be given "superseceded combatworthy aircraft", and MSW.149 dated 30th January from A.C.A.S. repeats this in the form "only with obsolete aircraft no longer required in the theatre."

One Spitfire V Squadron was allowed by special permission of the Air Ministry, and apart from the fact that at present we are not, according to C.M.S.C., in a position to equip another squadron, we could not equip any further Italian Squadrons without Air Ministry authority. It is probable that if we roll up a number of Spitfire 9 Squadrons, and put the aircraft in to the C.T.U.s, thereby releasing Spitfire V, or, alternatively, when the C.T.U.s themselves roll up, Spitfire V will become available. But presumably the Yugoslavs, Greeks, Turks, and Egyptians will have prior claims. In some cases (e.g. the Greeks) further re-equipment has been refused.

Therefore, on all counts, we are not justified in re-equipping any Italian Squadrons.

(iv) 4. para 15 (b). P.39.

C.M.S.C. informs me that there are approximately 70 P.39s in reserve. These will last, on the basis of normal British wastage:

- (a) with 2 squadrons 6 months
- (b) with 3 squadrons 2 1/2 months.

In the case of (b), after 2 1/2 months the P.39 squadrons will become a wasting asset.

It is for your decision whether in view of the present situation of the war this is acceptable as the best contribution to the war effort which the I.A.F. can make.

I temporarily attach the original documents to which the above relates, as they are not in this file.

I suggest that it would be prudent to discuss the Italian situation

/ with

Yes

No

Agree

From NCg Squn
if D.O. Ops. can
use 30 Spitfires etc
which have
very little
loss of
in 2 1/2 months 3

(File MA47/4200/AIS)

Minute 11 (Contd)

the Italian situation with

A.O.C., A.F.S.C., before replying to A.F.H.Q., and you might also care to speak with A.O.C., B.A.F., as to the present and future effectiveness of Italian Air Force Squadrons.

20th March 1945

(Loose copy to A.I.S.)

*Gudon*Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff.Minute 12

Reference:- 1447/1200/115.

Minute 10.

Memorandum of Staff/1447/115.

1. Reference is made to Min. 2. para. 4. (a) (i) and (ii) on this file.

(a) (i) D.A.S. has stated that he is preparing an appreciation of the Spitfire position, and in view of the proposal to convert it. Rights from Martineau to Spitfires, he is not prepared at present to guarantee the timing of No. 9. Squadron with Spitfires.

On the other hand, in the proposal to roll up two Spitfire squadrons is agreed to, the position will be altered considerably and there is every reason to believe that No. 9 Squadron could be so armed.

(a) (ii) As regards the timing of this Squadron with F. 10s, D.A.S. has stated that he is not in a position to give figures in support of his advice to the effect that No. 9. Squadron should not be formed. D.A.S. suggests this view.

Both D.A.S. and D.A.S. state however, that this reasoning is based on the H.A.S. policy of savings and reserve to replace. They add, there is no reason why the Italian should not aim the third squadron with F. 10s, providing it is made clear to them that further replacements cannot be considered.

Marshall

(D.A. 115/115),
Chief Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 20th March, 1945.

prepared to prevent a guarantee the arming of No. 9 Squadron with Spitfires.

On the other hand, if the proposal to roll up two Spitfire squadrons is agreed to, the position will be altered considerably and there is every reason to believe that No. 9 Squadron could be so armed.

(c) (ii) As regards the arming of this Squadron with T.39s, S.A.S.C. is loose minded at No. 9, given figures in support of his advice to the effect that No. 9 Squadron should not be formed. S.A.S.C. supports this view.

Both S.A.S.C. and D.3.649, state however, that this reasoning is based on the R.A.F. policy of wastage and reserve to replace. They add, there is no reason why the Italians should not arm the third squadron with T.39s, provided it is made clear to them that further replacements cannot be considered.

W. J. Shaw

(S.A.S.C.)
The Commander,
Staff Liaison Section.

Date: 20th March, 1945.

File : NAME/1200/ALS

Minute 2

To : A.I.S.

The C-in-C has considered enclosures 53a and 54a and attachments thereto, giving the reactions of the Italian Air Minister, the Italian Chief of Staff, and the comments of A.O.C., A.P.S.C., and has made the following rulings.

2 The C-in-C feels that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force authorities is one which would naturally arise from the condition of being a defeated nation. There is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and there cannot be one until the matter is settled at the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, Italy is allowed such an Air Force as will make as effective a contribution to the war effort as is possible.

3 On the specific points raised by the A.O.C., A.P.S.C., the following rulings have been made :

Para. 12 (a). There is no objection to the number-plates of the Macchi squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which these aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the manpower absorbed in this way is indeed "little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the O.T.U."

Para. 12 (b). There is no objection to obsolescent aircraft of no use to the war effort being stored or otherwise retained if the Italians wish this, provided that no Italian manpower is absorbed in their maintenance or care.

4 With reference to paragraph 15 of the same letter :

(a) (i) It is not possible to provide British types of aircraft for re-equipment of Italian squadrons.

(ii) The C-in-C is prepared to consider allowing No. 9 Squadron to arm with P.39s, provided that reserves are likely to carry three squadrons over a reasonable period of, say, 3 to 4 months. Will you ask C.M.S.O. to review the position regarding this ?

5 With reference to paragraph 15 (b), it is not agreed to re-arm the Cant squadrons with Baltimores.

policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and there cannot be one until the matter is settled at the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, Italy is allowed such an Air Force as will make as effective a contribution to the war effort as is possible.

3 On the specific points raised by the A.C.C., A.P.S.C., the following rulings have been made :

Para. 12 (a). There is no objection to the number-plates of the Macchi squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which these aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the manpower absorbed in this way is indeed "little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.T.U."

Para. 12 (b). There is no objection to obsolescent aircraft of no use to the war effort being stored or otherwise retained if the Italians wish this, provided that no Italian manpower is absorbed in their maintenance or care.

4 With reference to paragraph 15 of the same letter :

(a) (i) It is not possible to provide British types of aircraft for re-equipment of Italian squadrons.

(ii) The C-in-C is prepared to consider allowing No. 9 Squadron to arm with P.39s, provided that reserves are likely to carry three squadrons over a reasonable period of, say, 3 to 4 months. Will you ask C.M.S.O. to review the position regarding this ?

5 With reference to paragraph 15 (b), it is not agreed to re-arm the Cant squadrons with Paltimores.

6 Will you please co-ordinate action.

14th March 1945.

Loose copies to : D/D Ops.
: C.M.S.O.

Altk
Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff.

Minute 10

Minute 6.

To: Chief of Staff.

1. Encls 34A, 34A, B & C.
I am of the opinion that Italian journalists should not be given access to any classified document published by the Allies. There appears to exist, among material passed by censorship for general publication, an inclusion in the periodical in question.

T.H.C. Hardlaw

T.H.C. HARDLAW
Wing Commander,
for Chief Intelligence Officer.

18th December 1944.

Minute 7

Use discussed Min. 6 as relevant papers & avoid
have you could refer to 1944-45 as this is present in
Security matter. Would you please pass a file to the

1944-45 after day to
22/12
Produce
Cox

Minute 8

To: Allied Liaison Section.

1. Minute 7. Please see enclosure 37A. *T.H.C. Hardlaw*

T.H.C. Hardlaw
Wing Commander
Command Intelligence (Security) Officer

28th December, 1944.

Minute 9.

C180

be discussed with the other people
 that you would refer, to the SEC as this is present in
 security matter. While you please pass the file back

to the other day to

24/12

Gordon
 Cox

Minute 8

To : Allied Liaison Section.

1. Minute 7. Please see enclosure 37A.

28th December, 1944.

T.E.C. Hardlaw

Wing Commander

Command Intelligence (Security) Officer

Minute 9.

857

Reference:-
MAF 150/ALS.

- Min. 1.-

To: Operations (for attention G/Capt. Lawson).

1. Herewith the report from the A.V.M. for your comments.

5th. December, 1944.

J.S. Baker
(J.S. BAKER),
Flight Lieutenant,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Min. 2.

TO: Allied Liaison Section

1. Reference Min. 1. The report at Encl. 32A is only an interim report and does not contain sufficient details for Air Staff to make any comments.
2. When the full report promised by Air Vir Marshal Bowen-Huscarlet at para 2 of his letter arrives, would you please send it to Air Staff for perusal.

7th December 1944.

I.D.W. Lawson
I.D.W. LAWSON,
Group Captain, R.A.F.,
Combat Operations.

Min. 3.

To: Chief of Staff.

Enclosure 32A for information. Do you wish this Section to draft a reply?

9th December 1944.

C. Conroy
C. CONROY, F/Lt.,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

CWC
Pub 32 A, referring to decision of Staffs. Main by
of a (1st Lt. Bowen) Jones on 1st Dec 1944

for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Min. 2.

To: Allied Liaison Section

1. Reference Min. 1. The report at encl. 30a is only an interim report and does not contain sufficient details for Air Staff to make any comments.
2. When the full report provided by Air Vice Marshal Bowen-Buscalet at para. 2 of his letter arrives, would you please send it to Air Staff for perusal.

P. H. Halsey

Group Captain, R.A.F.,
Combat Operations.

7th December 1944.

him?

To :- Chief of Staff.

Enclosure 32 A for information. Do you wish this Section to draft a reply?

Cheney
G. Cheney, 3/Lt.
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

2th December 1944.

4

CWC *Encl 32 A*, referring to discussion of Italian Affairs by General Clark (18th Army) is an excellent summary of Allied conclusions. Perhaps you have something more to add and AFHQ policy - if I suggest that I should refer to AFHQ to get their policy view and discuss. Depending on what they say to the Air Staff.

W. H. Halsey

1/12

5

Col 5.

Yes - I think the principle is well established that the Americans should have a common policy and take action in this matter. There is already no question of joint plans. Particular steps British discussions as well as US. 11/12

CONFIDENTIALTOP SECRET

LAW I/801/22.

To: A.C.C., L.A.F., Italy.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Discussions were held at the Air Ministry between the Director of Policy (AS), his staff, and representatives of the R.A.F. and USAF in Italy on the 16th, 5th, and 7th January 1946 on the subject of the reorganization of the Italian Air Force as a result of SIGCOP's signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (NAF 1103). Opportunity was given to the staff of D.of Pol (AS) to study the paper that led up to the signal.

2. This paper was compared with the comments sent by the Supreme Allied Commander on the draft headings of the Military clauses of the proposed Peace Treaty with Italy; and it was noted that the suggested reorganization of the Italian Air Force as an interim measure was based on this. It is understood that these draft headings were tabled at the Committee on Conference.
3. It was pointed out by the Air Ministry that the future of the Italian Air Force could only be considered in conjunction with the future of other ex-enemy co-belligerent air forces that were being sponsored by the Russians. The British and U.S. Governments desired to keep these at a low strength and had made every endeavour to persuade the Russians not to build them into large air forces, and with this in view the Italian Air Force would have to be of approximately the same size. It was therefore necessary to state the strength of the Italian Air Force in numbers of combat and non-combat aircraft as opposed to a first line strength of aircraft since the organization of the Russian Air Force is so different from those of the Anglo-U.S. Air Forces, and for the same reason it would be essential to fix a personnel ceiling. The Roumanian, Bulgarian, and Finnish Air Forces, being based on the Russian model, are part of the Army, and the Russians work to an approximate figure of between four to six men to each aircraft, and they are likely to object to a much larger figure for the Italians. The A.C.A.S. (P), however, has asked the Foreign Office to ask for a ceiling of 20,000, since the R.A.F. work to a yardstick of 2,000 men per squadron, but it is generally expected that this will be reduced to a ceiling of 15,000 for the Italian Air Force as the result of bargaining with the Russians. It is not considered that a ceiling need be placed upon the interim Italian Air Force, but there is no doubt that efforts should be made to reduce the present size of the Italian Air Force to a figure approximating the post-Peace Treaty ceiling, so that there will not have to be a heavy reduction suddenly imposed.

(100-1103). Opportunity was given to the staff of D. of Pol (15) to study the paper that led up to the signal.

2. This paper was compared with the comments sent by the Supreme Allied Commander to the draft headings of the military clauses of the proposed Peace Treaty with Italy, and it was noted that the suggested reorganization of the Italian Air Force as an interim measure was based on this. It is understood that these draft headings were tabled at the abortive London Conference.
3. It was pointed out by the Air Ministry that the future of the Italian Air Force could only be considered in conjunction with the future of other ex-enemy co-belligerent air forces that were being sponsored by the Russians. The British and U.S. Governments desired to keep these at a low strength and had made every endeavour to persuade the Russians not to build them into large air forces, and with this in view the Italian Air Force must have to be of approximately the same size. It was therefore necessary to state the strength of the Italian Air Force in numbers of combat and non-combat aircraft as opposed to a first line strength of squadrons since the organization of the Russian Air Force is so different from those of the Anglo-U.S. Air Forces, and for the same reason it would be essential to fix a personnel ceiling. The Romanian, Bulgarian, and Finnish Air Forces, being based on the Russian model, are part of the Army, and the Russians work to an approximate figure of between four to six men to each aircraft, and they are likely to object to a much larger figure for the Italians. The A.C.A.S. (P), however, has asked the Foreign Office to ask for a ceiling of 20,000, since the I.A.F. work to a yardstick of 2,000 men per squadron, but it is generally expected that this will be reduced to a ceiling of 15,000 for the Italian Air Force as the result of bargaining with the Russians. It is not considered that a ceiling need be placed upon the Italian Air Force, but there is no doubt that efforts should be made to reduce the present size of the Italian Air Force to a figure approximating the post-Peace Treaty ceiling, so that there will not have to be a heavy reduction suddenly imposed.
4. The Air Ministry considers that the first line strength of the Peace Treaty Italian Air Force will be limited to 100 Fighter aircraft, 40 military transport aircraft, and 20 Air Sea Rescue aircraft, both the latter categories to be unarmed, and the 100 fighters to be based with the necessary communications and training aircraft, and marine craft. They feel that it is undesirable for the Air Force Reserve aircraft to be given a G.I. role, and therefore armed, because that would mean raising the ceiling of aircraft for Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland.

5. Also regard/2

002

13/219 (1st Draft) (B)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

TOP SECRET

COPY No. 13

2 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCESUBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Navy pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. a. The Italian Navy is at present being operated in both Allied and Italian interests for transport, mine-sweeping and related duties. No useful purpose would therefore be served except perhaps a raising of morale, by handing the Navy back to Italian Government control. It is desirable however that the strength of the Italian Navy should be gradually reduced from the armistice period to that to be permitted under the terms of the Peace Treaty.

- b. In regard to the Italian Government's needs, after the present Armistice period, G. S. S. D., in his comments in the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the view that the Italian armed forces must be governed by these conditions:

- (1) They must be restricted in size, for Italy's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic incapacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.

Italian Navy pending conclusion of the peace treaty, and to ensure the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control.

General Considerations

2. a. The Italian Navy is at present being operated in both Allied and Italian interests for transport, mine-sweeping and related duties. No useful purpose would therefore be served except perhaps a raising of morale, by handing the navy back to Italian Government control. It is desirable however, that the strength of the Italian Navy should be gradually reduced free the armistice period to that to be permitted under the terms of the Peace Treaty.

b. In regard to the Italian Government's needs, after the present armistice period, G.C.M.G., in his comments in the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the view that the Italian armed forces must be governed by these conditions:

- (1) They must be restricted in size, for Italy's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.
 - (2) They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly east with JUGOSLAVIA.
 - (3) They must not be strong enough to offer Italy any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.
- c. The post-Peace Treaty Navy will have to be formed initially from the present Italian fleet which is already being maintained in a reasonable state of operational efficiency under Allied tutelage.

ITALIAN NAVY - DISCUSSION FOR REFERENCE

3. The Italian Navy is employed in accordance with the Cunningham-de Courten agreement and the appendix to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Paper 515/1 dated 19th

March 1944.

4. Under these orders much of the Italian ships are of use to the Allies are kept running and the others laid up.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that the Admiralty, in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, through the need of the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D.C., will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Action by the executive agency will conform with the policies laid down in this paper or such specific instructions as may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

6. This directive then proceeds to lay down that the Allied Naval Area Commander will have the responsibility for operational control and administration of the

Italian Navy.

7. It is to be noted that the area under the command of the Allied Naval Area Commander (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) is not co-terminous with the area under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive does not specify that the Italian Navy shall be employed within the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean's command.

PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY:

8. The present strength of the Italian Navy is:

5 Battleships
9 Cruisers
11 Destroyers
22 Torpedo Boats

operation with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Action by the executive agency will conform with the policies laid down in this paper or such specific instructions as may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

6. This directive then proceeds to lay down that the Allied Naval Area Commander will have the responsibility for operational control and administration of the

Italian Navy.

7. It is to be noted that the area under the command of the Allied Naval Area Commander (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) is not co-extensive with the area under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive does not specify that the Italian Navy shall be employed within the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean's command.

PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY:

8. The present strength of the Italian navy is:

5 Battleships	
9 Cruisers	
11 Destroyers	
22 Torpedo Boats	
19 Corvettes, including 8 being converted for minesweeping	
33 Submarines	
.. number of auxiliaries and small surface craft including four groups of minesweepers.	
Personnel at present total 53,000	

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY:

9. In accordance with the terms of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive the Italian ships are employed under the operational command of the Allied Naval Area Commander. The two newer battleships "Vittorio Veneto" and "Vittorio Veneto" are laid up in the Pittle Lakes; of the other three, two are at Taranto and one at Syracuse. Four of the cruisers and one destroyer are operated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet as required for the carrying of naval drafts or other services. The remainder of the Italian ships are under the operational control of the Flag Officer Italy and liaison subject to the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. These ships are used to a large extent in the carrying of ex P.C.'s and displaced persons and are almost entirely operated on duties of direct benefit to the Italians.
10. Italian Naval personnel are being used to replace British personnel in certain duties in Italian ports as the use of the ports permits.
11. In general, the administration of the Italian Navy is under the Italian Naval authorities subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet which is normally only exercised to the minimum extent necessary.
12. The Italian Navy has operated satisfactorily under the present system of control and has proved of value to the United Nations and to us. The retention of the present control will ensure the continued use of this service to the best advantage.
- FUTURE REQUIREMENTS UNTIL CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY
13. Until the conclusion of the peace treaty the requirements of the United Nations and of Italy will necessitate the employment of the Italian Navy on duties similar to those which it now performs.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

Officer Italy and liaison subject to the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. These ships are used to a large extent in the carriage of ex-P.O.'s and displaced persons and are almost entirely operated on duties of direct benefit to the Italians.

10. Italian Naval personnel are being used to replace British personnel in certain duties in Italian ports as the use of the ports permits.

11. In general, the administration of the Italian Navy is under the Italian Naval authorities subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, which is normally only exercised to the minimum extent necessary.

12. The Italian Navy was operated satisfactorily under the present system of control and has proved of value to the United Nations and to it. The retention of the present control will ensure the continued use of this service to the best advantage.

FOURTH AND FINAL PARTS UNTIL CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY

13. Until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty the requirements of the United Nations and of Italy will necessitate the employment of the Italian Navy on duties similar to those which it now performs.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

14. Supplies, Maintenance and Repair:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that as the Mediterranean is an area of British operational responsibility the United Kingdom is primarily responsible on behalf of the United Nations for the necessary repair, maintenance and supply of Italian Naval vessels in that area. Maintenance of Italian Naval vessels is in all cases subject to the provisos that:

001

TOP SECRET

- a. Italian resources ~~and~~ stores are ~~applied~~ to the maximum extent of their availability.
- b. No facilities ^{or} of stores are used which would prejudice United States or British operational requirements.
- c. A considerable quantity of stores of all kinds has been supplied to the Italian Navy to bring it to an efficient state and to permit of its operation in the interest of the United Nations and of Italy.

15. Rations:

- a. Under E.M.N 365 (which numbered N.P. 607) the ceiling of the Italian Navy was fixed at 75,000. The present strength of the Italian Navy is 55,000; for which the British are responsible for providing the Allied Military Element of the nation. Rations are delivered only in bulk to Italian Depots at L.M.N.T.O., and are thereafter an Italian responsibility.

- b. The Allied Military Element of the nation is as follows:-

<u>Provided from Allied Sources</u>		<u>Scale in ccs per day</u>	
Flour	15		
Dried Vegetables (i.e. Peas/Beans/Lentils)	2		
Meat Canned or Fish Canned	3	Fish	per month
Cheese	6/7	issued	
Sugar	1		
Macaroni or Flour	3	Sardines 2 ccs	10 days
Flour (in lieu of Rice)	2	Herring 4 ccs	3 days
Vegetables Dehydrated		Salmon 3 ccs	2 days
(or vegetables Fresh, in lieu 8 ccs)			

15. Rations:

- a. Under E.M. 165 (which answered M.F. 687) the rationing of the Italian Navy was fixed at 75,000.
- The present strength of the Italian Navy is 99,000; for which the British are responsible for providing the Allied military element of the ration. Rations are delivered daily in bulk to Italian Depots at L.R.N.T.O. and are thereafter an Italian responsibility.

- b. The Allied Military Element of the ration is as follows:-

<u>Provided from Allied Sources</u>		<u>Scale in ozs per day</u>	
Flour	15		
Dried Vegetables (i.e. Peas/beans/Lentils)	2		
Meat Canned or Fish Canned	3	Fish	per
Cheese		6/7	issued month
Sugar	1		
Macaroni or Flour	3	Sardines	2 ozs 10 days
Flour (in lieu of Rice)	1	Herring	4 ozs 3 days
Vegetables Dehydrated		Salmon	3 ozs 2 days
(or vegetables Fresh, in lieu 8 ozs)			
Catsup or Tomato Paste	1/2		
Coffee	1/2		
Pepper	1/200		
Fruit Presc	4		
Vegetables Fresh	3		

TOP SECRET

PERMIT OF IMPORTATION

1. Locally manufactured, at present being supplied from allied stocks, are:

(1) Wheat	1885 tons	(4) Sugar	92 tons
(2) Preserved meat or fish	272 tons	(5) Coffee	46 tons
(3) Dried Vegetables	156 tons	(6) Pepper	3.66 tons

These tonnages can NOT be met out of existing stocks held in Italian army depots and earmarked for the Italian Navy and Air Force until after 1 February 1945 nor from existing civil imports. It is desirable for the Italian Government to assume full responsibility for retaining their Navy and Air Force W.C.F. 1 February 1945, but their ability to do so will depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports as stated above. Financial commitment is \$58,000 dollars monthly, or \$696,000 dollars a year.

FUNCTION OF THE SUB-COMMISSION

10. The Navy Sub-Commission is the vehicle, set up under Article 37 of the Armistice Treaty with Italy as the Allied organization to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Navy. Moreover, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being, the head of the Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commander on Italian naval matters. Irrespective of any changes which may be made in the structure and degree of control to be exercised over the Italian Navy, until the Peace Treaty comes into operation the Navy Sub-Commission continues to function.

CONCLUSIONS:

10. 2. That the present system of Allied Control of the Italian Navy, its operations and its maintenance, is a necessary and essential part of the Allied actions and

838

these companies can not be met out of existing stocks held in Italian Navy deposits and earmarked for the Italian Navy and Air Force until after 1 February 1946. It is desirable for the Italian Government to secure full responsibility for restoring their Navy and Air Force W.E.F. 1 February 1946, but their ability to do so will depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports suggested above. Financial commitment is 358,000 dollars monthly, or 4,296,000 dollars a year.

PROPOSAL OF NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED JOINT STAFF:

16. The Navy Sub-Commission is the vehicle, set up under Article 37 of the Armistice Terms with Italy as the Allied organization to regulate and execute the Terms of the Armistice for the control of the Italian Navy. Moreover, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being, the head of the Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian naval matters. In respect of any changes which may be made in the strength and cadres of command to be exercised over the Italian Navy, until the Peace Treaty comes into operation, the Sub-Commission must continue to function.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

17. a. That the present system of Allied Control of the Italian Navy, its operation and administration is satisfactory to both the United Nations and the Italian Government.
- b. That it is not desirable to return the Italian Navy to Italian Government control.
- c. That the Italian economy does not permit the assumption of the Italian Government of the Allied Military element of the action prior to 1 February 1946, and that further study is necessary, to examine whether it will be capable of doing so after that date.

TOP SECRET

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- A. That an immediate examination should be made to see if the Italian Government is willing and capable of undertaking full responsibility for reorganizing the Italian Navy with effect from 1 January 1940.
- B. That the Navy Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the 1940s Treaty.
- C. That the Italian Navy should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time.

Loose Minute.To:- S.P.S.O.

1. The A.P.S.O. Rome, are advising the Italian Air Ministry to form a Personnel Section inside the Italian Air Ministry, to deal with the statistics as regards the non-operational personnel employed with the AAF and RAF.
2. They have requested that an officer from this Headquarters with documentation and statistical experience be loaned to the Air Ministry for a period of 3 or 4 days, to act in the capacity of an adviser.
3. Are you prepared to supply such an officer for this duty?

Cheney

(C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 18th. Apr. 1945.Ref:- MAY/4200/A.S.

106

SECRET CENTER MESSAGE

To : Headquarters M.A.A.F. S.S.O.


From : Air Forces Sub-Commission Allied Commission Rome.

E. 171 17th April 1945. CONFIDENTIALPersonal for BAKER from BISCARLET.

Your GE 36 April 16th Acknowledged.

Distribution :

C of S (Action)
C-in-C
D.D. Ops.
A.I.S.



Notes on meeting under the training slip
General Cannon.

18th April 1945.

W.S./L206/15. ✓

Distribution

Commanding General AAF/ITC.

Commander in Chief/RAF. HODGE.

Chief of Staff/RAF. HODGE.

A.C.I.

C.N.S.O.

Notes on the proceedings of a meeting under the Chairmanship
of General Canham,
on 12th April, 1945.

105A

1. Air Vice Marshal Bowen-Burcarlet giving a brief outline of the present construction of the Italian Air Force, stated that the I.A.F. consisted of, 5 allied equipped squadrons (2 Baltimore-2739, 1 Spitfire) operating under R.A.F., 4 Bomplane squadrons operating under A.A.F., one Courier Transport Squadron, as well as a few miscellaneous types of aircraft.

2. It was also stated by the A.V.M. that the above squadrons were making their contribution to the war effort. The allied equipped squadrons were operating over Yugoslavia, dropping supplies and running wounded personnel; whilst the Bomplane were mine spotting, submarine hunting, etc. The Courier Transport Squadron was practically the sole means of transport for Government Officials in the execution of their duty.

3. In addition to the above, there are approximately 150 miscellaneous aircraft, only 25 of which are considered to be airworthy. The Italian authorities are particularly anxious to retain all these aircraft by storage instead of having to reduce them to produce.

4. It was agreed, in view of the protest made by the Italian authorities, that, on political and morale grounds, these aircraft could be stored away providing that the minimum number of personnel were used for maintenance.

5. The question of supplies was discussed. It has been the practice to supply the I.A.F. with raw materials etc. in order to keep the Italian aircraft in the air, and there was a tendency for the Italians to make excessive demands on No. 214 Group.

6. G.M.C. stated that all such demands would be carefully scrutinized and such materials supplied, based upon the number of aircraft established as airworthy. Materials would not be supplied for the maintenance of the 150 earmarked for storage.

7. It was agreed that the decision to relegate the machines for training should stand.

8. A.V.M. Bowen-Burcarlet stated that it was probable that in the near future some airfield would be de-requisitioned by the U.S.A.F. and it was suggested that this airfield should be turned over to the Italian Air Force.

9. The feeling of the meeting was that such a concession would be a gesture of goodwill to the I.A.F. providing there was no reason for its retention by the U.S.A.F.

were making their contribution to the war effort. The Allied equipped squadrons were operating over Yugoslavia, dropping supplies and removing wounded personnel, whilst the seaplanes were mine spotting, submarine hunting, etc. The courier transport squadron was practically the sole means of transport for Government officials in the execution of their duty.

3. In addition to the above, there are approximately 190 miscellaneous aircraft, only 35 of which are considered to be airworthy. The Italian authorities are particularly anxious to retain all these aircraft by storage instead of having to reduce them to produce.

4. It was agreed, in view of the protest made by the Italian authorities, that, on political and morale grounds, these aircraft could be stored away providing that the minimum number of personnel were used for maintenance.

5. The question of supplies was discussed. It has been the practice to supply the L.A.F. with raw materials etc. in order to keep the Italian aircraft in the air, and there was a tendency for the Italians to make excessive demands on No. 214 Group.

6. G.N. 6. stated that all such demands would be carefully scrutinized and such materials supplied, based upon the number of aircraft established as airworthy. Materials would not be supplied for the maintenance of the 450 earmarked for storage.

7. It was agreed that the decision to relegate the Macchi for training should stand.

8. L.V.M. Doreau-Bucquet stated that it was probable that in the near future Lecce Airfield would be de-requisitioned by the U.S.A.F., and it was suggested that this airfield should be turned over to the Italian Air Force.

9. The feeling of the meeting was that such a concession would be a gesture of goodwill to the L.A.F. providing there was no reason for its retention by the Allied Air Forces.

10. Furthermore, the ceiling of the L.A.F. is authorized at 31,000, of this total 22,000 are employed as the Operational Air Force, whilst the remainder are employed by the L.A.F. (6,500 and 2,500 respectively).

11. A staff officer from this Headquarters has examined the construction of the Italian Air Force from an establishment angle. It is agreed that 22,000 is too heavy for such an operational force, and an establishment is being prepared which will ensure that the personnel are being employed advantageously. Both the AAF and RAF expressed a desire to employ as many L.A.F. personnel as could be thrown up by the investigation.

Date: 18th. Apr. 1945.

RAF/1200/ALD.

From:- Allied Division Section, U. . M.A.A.P. C.M.P.

To:- A.R.C.C. A.C. Rome.

Date:- 15th. Apr. 1945.

Ref:- MAP/4200/AIR.

Italian Personnel employed with
Royal Air Force Units.

1. Reference is made to your letter of 2/360/1/ONG dated 14th. Apr. 1945, together with the draft proposal attached.
2. The proposal that the Italian Air Ministry should form a 'P' Staff Section to deal with statistics of the I.A.P. personnel employed with the USAF and RAF is considered perfectly sound. It is felt that, given adequate support, through correct periodical returns, notification of movements etc, by the Allies, the scheme should solve the many difficulties and doubts as to the correct allocation of the non-operational personnel.
3. As regards para.3. of your letter, the existing policy contained in MAP/4762/8/ONG dated 31st. August, 1944, is still in operation.
 - (a) To fill existing RAF Establishment vacancies.
 - (b) To replace personnel who are required to return to UK or proceed to another theatre of war.
4. The above policy has not been adhered to, literally, as it has been proved that Italian labour does not substitute British labour, man for man. Therefore on many instances Italian labour is not held against establishment.
5. The latest returns from units have been sent to you under reference MAP/4201/2/15, these have been collected by formations on Groups and should serve as a sound basis upon which the MAP quota is allocated.
6. As regards para.5. (ii) of your letter under reference the next issue of Command Routine Orders will contain instructions that all units will, on the first day of the month, as from 1st. May, send a return to you, direct, showing all I.A.P. personnel employed by them. It is not necessary to keep A.I.P. informed of these figures. Furthermore, Commands and Groups are being instructed to inform you of every movement of I.A.P. personnel.

1. Reference is made to your letter AFM/350/1/AMG dated 14th Apr. 1945, together with the draft proposal attached.

2. The proposal that the Italian Air Ministry should form a 'P' Staff Section to deal with statistics of the I.A.F. personnel employed with the IMAF and IAF is considered perfectly sound. It is felt that, given adequate support, through correct periodical returns, notification of movements etc, by the allies, the scheme should solve the many difficulties and doubts as to the correct allocation of the non-operational personnel.

3. As regards para. 3. of your letter, the existing policy contained in WAAF/1762/6/AMG dated 31st. August, 1944, is still in operation.

"(a) To fill existing IAF Establishment vacancies.
(b) To replace personnel who are required to return to UK or proceed to another theatre of war."

4. The above policy has not been adhered to, literally, as it has been proved that Italian labour does not substitute British labour, man for man. Therefore on many instances Italian labour is not held against establishment.

5. The latest returns from units have been sent to you under reference WAAF/4201/2/AMG, these have been collected by Sorptions in Groups and should serve as a sound basis upon which the IAF quota is allocated.

6. As regards para. 5. (ii) of your letter under reference the next issue of Command Routine Orders will contain instructions that all units will, on the first day of the month, as from 1st. May, send a return to you, direct, showing all I.A.F. personnel employed by them. It is not necessary to keep A.I.A. informed of these figures. Furthermore, Commands and Groups are being instructed to inform you of every movement of I.A.F. personnel.

7. The loan of a 'P' Staff officer is being referred to S.A.B.G.

8. As far as supplying the 'P' Staff Section in the Italian Air Ministry with location of IAF units is concerned, this matter is under consideration and a decision will be given at a later date, meanwhile there is no reason why the Section should not be operational without delay.

Henry H.

for

(C. GUNTON),
Squadron Leader,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF, Middle East.

102

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. ROME.

TO : ALLIED LIAISON SECTION.

DATE: 14TH APRIL, 1945.

REF : AFSC/360/1/CRG.

ITALIAN PERSONNEL EMPLOYED WITH R.A.F. UNITS.

Referring to your MAAF/4201/2 ALS. dated 28th March, 1945, this Headquarters has difficulty in reconciling your returns of personnel with those of the Italian Air Ministry.

2. It is proposed to ask the Italian Air Ministry to form a small "P" Staff section to keep track of those I.A.F. personnel working for the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.

3. The draft proposal is attached.

4. To make this scheme effective it is necessary that we have some idea of the establishment or allotment of I.A.F. personnel to R.A.F. units, those for U.S.A.A.F. units are already formed in companies of approximately 150 men and an establishment issued, and the Allied Liaison Section should be in a position to supply us with this information and to keep us up to date with any alterations or additions to the list.

We should also receive a copy of the I.A.F. strength returns from the R.A.F. units and you should arrange with M.A.A.F. to let us have these.


5. If there are no objections to this scheme from your Section we aim to have it effective from 1st May, but before that date I should like from you -

- (i) The establishments or allocations mentioned in Para 4.
- (ii) Agreement that we receive direct copies of I.A.F. strength returns.

L. E. Jarman

L. E. JARMAN, G/CAPT.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

R
18/4
A.L.S.



"P" STAFF ORGANISATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCEIntention

To form a small "P" staff organisation in the Italian Air Ministry to deal with all matters relating to I.A.F. strength of personnel serving with U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F.

Information

The Director of personnel, Italian Air Ministry controls and is responsible for the allotting of I.A.F. personnel to Allied Units as requested by Air Forces Sub Commission. Information regarding these is often hard to obtain and it suffers from inaccuracies and a certain time - lag in its receipt by the Air Forces Sub Commission and the Italian Air Ministry. This information, plus details of location, are most important for many reasons, such as ration strength-returns by areas, and the like.

A need for some central body, in whom all information would be centralized and kept up to date has become apparent.

Execution

Formation To form this I.A.F. "P" Staff it is suggested that it be established within the Italian Air Ministry, under the joint control of the Director of Personnel, and the Air Forces Sub Commission.

Staff The staff necessary should be small, consisting of one Captain (or 1st Lieutenant) and two N.C.O.s for clerical duties.

Duties Their duties would commence by the superintending of the designing and the making of a suitable wall-board, preferably of wood, with cross lines of tape, and a supply of small cards of varying size for insertion in their appropriate places, on which strengths, locations of units, etc. are written, and kept up to date.

A suggested lay-out is shown on the accompanying Appendix "A", with necessary headings. One board should be used for those on service with the U.S.A.A.F. and another for those with the R.A.F.

Operation It is further suggested that, in the case of the R.A.F. units with Italian personnel, permission might be

Information

The Director of personnel, Italian Air Ministry controls and is responsible for the allotting of I.A.F. personnel to Allied Units as requested by Air Forces Sub Commission. Information regarding these is often hard to obtain and it suffers from inaccuracies and a certain time - lag in its receipt by the Air Forces Sub Commission and the Italian Air Ministry. This information, plus details of location, are most important for many reasons, such as ration strength-returns by areas, and the like.

A need for some central body, in whom all information would be centralized and kept up to date has become apparent.

Execution

Formation To form this I.A.F. "B" Staff it is suggested that it be established within the Italian Air Ministry, under the joint control of the Director of Personnel, and the Air Forces Sub Commission.

Staff The staff necessary should be small, consisting of one Captain (or 1st Lieutenant) and two N.C.O.s for clerical duties.

Duties Their duties would commence by the superintending of the designing and the making of a suitable wall-board, preferably of wood, with cross lines of tape, and a supply of small cards of varying size for insertion in their appropriate places, on which strengths, locations of units, etc. are written, and kept up to date.

A suggested lay-out is shown on the accompanying Appendix "A", with necessary headings. One board should be used for those on service with the U.S.A.A.F. and another for those with the R.A.F.

Operation It is further suggested that, in the case of the R.A.F. units with Italian personnel, permission might be granted to the Air Forces Sub Commission to contact the R.A.F. units direct by signal in order to obtain the latest information, thus relieving HQ MAAF and other formations, of a quantity of signal traffic and resulting in a consequent saving of time. In the case of the I.A.F. personnel with the U.S.A.A.F., communication could similarly be made with CG. AFSC/MTO. All such signal would, if so desired, be repeated to HQ MAAF by service post.

.2.

If the suggestion of a visible means of details of personnel is found to be acceptable, and proves its worth, it would doubtless prove of assistance to the Director of Personnel, I.S.F. and this Sub Commission if applied further to deal with the Italian Air Force as a separate entity, and show strength against establishment.

It is recommended that the Officer and N.C.O.s detailed should possess some knowledge of personnel matters, and should be chosen preferable from the existing staff of the Directorate of Personnel.

It is further suggested that, if a member of HQ MAAF "B" Staff could be loaned for two or three days to assist the Air Forces Sub Commission and the Italian Air Ministry in this matter, it would be of valuable assistance.

F.L. Bradshaw
F.L. BRADSHAW S/LDR
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

11th April 1945.

101


Loose Minute.To: - C.M.S.O. (Maint. Plans.).

10

84

1. Reference is made to your loose minutes
MAAF/5121/M. Plans dated 19th. March and 5th. April,
1945.

2. Para. 6. second sentence, of the AFHQ
Directive to the A.P.T.C., reference AG 334/111
ISOPIS-0, dated 6th. March, is not intended to deprive
the Italian Air Force of issues of aircraft materials,
including P.C.L. without which the Italian Air Force
could not continue to operate.



(C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader.
For Wing Commander.
Allied Liaison Section.

Date: - 12th. Apr. 1945.

Ref: - MAF/4200/U.S.

848

R.A.F. Form 1924

POSTAGRAM.Originator's Reference Number:—
360M/207/P.4To: Allied Liaison Section, H.Q.
M.A.A.P. R.A.F., C.M.P.

Date:— 10th April, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM/167

From: No. 360 Maintenance Unit (A.A.P.) R.A.F., C.M.P.


Italian Air Force (non operational) PersonnelHerewith information requested in your letter
MAAP/4200/MS dated 3rd April, 1945.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| (A) Total Employed | - | 251 |
| (B) Tradesmen | - | WIL |
| (C) Employed as Labourers | | 216 (8th Coy. Manovalanz Aeroporto |
| Employed as Guards | | 35. (78th Nucleo Guardia) |

2 Of the above approximately 100 attend for duty each day.

3. It is anticipated that within the next two weeks the Labour
Company will be replaced by an Italian P.O.W. (Co-Operators) COY.

H. W. Stoppa F/15
Squadron Leader Commanding
No. 360 Maintenance Unit (A.A.P.)
Royal Air Force C.M.P.



904

MS

Originator's
SignatureTime of
Origin

047

From: Headquarters, No. 387 Wing, U.S.A.F. T.O.S.

To: Filled Liaison Section, U.S. M.A.A.F. U.S.A.F. C.M.E.
(Copy to U.S. M.A.A.F.)

Date: 8th April, 1945.

Ref: 2875/575/3/2.

COMMENTARY.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE (ARMY OFFICERS) PERSONNEL.

Reference is made to your letter/2000/455, dated 3rd April, 1945, and it is noted that this document contains a total number of 2 Officers and 134 other ranks.

2. These personnel are allocated as follows:-

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>Other Ranks.</u>
No. 387 Wing U.S.	2.	140.
No. 14036 A.M.E.S.	-	11.
No. 8043 "	-	15.
No. 388 "	-	11.
No. 14035 "	-	9.
No. 899 "	-	10.
No. 4 P.C.U.	-	10.
No. 5 S.S.S.	-	4.
No. 13 S.A. W/A Station	-	7.
No. 14 U.A. W/A Station	-	22.
TOTAL	2.	134.

3. The 2 Officers are responsible to No. 3 U.A. T.O.S. for the administration of the personnel on the Italian side. All other ranks are employed on guard duties and there are no Italian who are employed as

840

Reference is made to your memo of 19/10/66/1000/0000/0000/0000, dated 19/10/66, 19/10/66, and it is notified that this Headquarters controls a total number of 2 Officers and 13/4 Other Ranks.

2. These personnel are allocated as follows:-

	Officers	Other Ranks
No. 107 King S.S.	1	40.
No. 14036 S.S.S.S.	-	11.
No. 2013 "	-	10.
No. 308 "	-	11.
No. 14335 "	-	8.
No. 699 "	-	10.
No. 1 S.S.S.S.	-	10.
No. 2 S.S.S.S.	-	4.
No. 13 S.S.S.S. Station	-	7.
No. 11 S.S.S.S. V/A Station	-	22.
TOTAL	2.	134.

3. The 2 Officers are responsible to No. 3 S.S.S.S.S.S., for the administration of the personnel on the Italian side. All other ranks are employed on guard duties and there are no technicians who are employed as 040.

[Signature] S/L
 For Group Captain, Commanding,
 No. 107 King, S.S.S.S.

12/4 AKS

12/4
 42000

From :- No. 110 Maintenance Unit. R.A.F., C.M.F.

To :- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q., M.A.A.F., R.A.F., C.M.F.

Date :- 9th. April, 1945.

Ref :- 110MU/4003/P.4.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE (Non operational) PERSONNEL.

In accordance with your letter MAAF/4200/LAS, dated 3rd. April, 1945, hereunder information required :-

(a) <u>TOTAL EMPLOYED.</u>	-	63.
(b) <u>TRADESMEN etc.</u>	Fitters (Engine)	23.
	Fitters (Airframe)	19.
	Armourers.	4.
	Electricians.	6.
	Instrument Repairers.	3.
	Carpenters.	1.
	Motor Boat Crew.	3.
	Storemen.	1.

All the above tradesmen are employed in the capacity of their trade.

- (c) GENERAL DUTIES. Three men are classed as AGH/G.D's.
Two of these do labourers work, and one does part-time clerical work.

11/4
ALS

(J.D.KNOX) F/LT.
for Wing Commander, Commanding,
No. 110 Maintenance Unit,
Royal Air Force, C.M.F.

From: Saigon: Commanair,
Mo. 159 M.V., R.A.S., C-13.

To: Headquarters, M.A. (P.), R.A.S., C.M.F.
(Allied Liaison Section).

Date: 9th April, 1945.

Ref: 45020/202/14/00.

(97) 96
Extra
Went
to

ARMED AND ARMED (NON-OPERATIONAL) PERSONNEL.

Reference your letter 4445/4200/45 dated 2nd April, 1945, herewith as requested, the number of Italian Air Force Personnel (non-operational) assigned at this Unit.

(a)

	<u>ARMED</u>	<u>NON-OPERATIONAL</u>
W/O.	1	-
S/S.	1	-
SP5.	10	-
C.R.'s.	30	6

(b)

	<u>ARMED</u>
W/O.	1
S/S.	1
SP5.	1
C.R.'s.	4

(c)

	<u>ARMED</u>	<u>NON-OPERATIONAL</u>
W/O.	1	-
S/S.	1	-
SP5.	10	-
C.R.'s.	30	6
TOTAL	42	6

R. Walker
S/M.
Sgt. Garry G. Walker, R.A.S.,
The 1st Airborne Division, Italy.

785017

Knolls

111

Doc. 1800, English, German, Italian,
etc. 100. 1/2 inch. 100. 1/2 inch. 100. 1/2 inch.

4/11/2004

10/4
ALS
803

Ans

From: No. 1 Echelon, No. 113 H.U., R.A.F., C.M.F.

To : Allied Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.F., R.A.F., C.M.F.

Date: 3rd April, 1945.

Ref : 11370/S.L./40/AIR.35A.

95

80 SECRET.

LDO

ITALIAN AIR FORCE (NON OPERATIONAL) PERSONNEL.

With reference to your letter HQAF/4200/ALS. dated 3rd April 1945,
herewith information required.

(a)	121.		<u>Total 121.</u>
(b)	Pilots (C.O. & W.O. Discip.)	2	
	Fitters aero engines	6	
	Armourers	1	
	Inst/Repre.	1	
	Electricians	2	
	D.M.T's.	2	
	Medical Orderlies	2	
	Cooks	15	
	Clerks	4	
	Barber	1	
	Sg/Assts.	5	
			<u>Total 48.</u>
(c)	Guards	68	
	Batmen	2	
	Labourers	3	
			<u>Total 73.</u>

All employed in this capacity.

(Signature)

(C.B. BOURNEMAN) S/Ldr.,
for Wing Commander, Commanding,
1 Ech. No. 113 H.U., R.A.F. C.M.F.

Auto-Letter 1. 1000
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
11/4 343
4200

94

15

SECRETMAAF/1006/002MAAF/1006/002MAAF/1006/002

93

Re-organisation of Italian Air Force

Reference is made to your Letter Minute
1016/MAAF of 30 April 1965.

2. I think that before holding a Staff Meeting to discuss this problem we should await the return of A.C.A. who is tomorrow visiting A.P.S.O. and this is one of the points he will be discussing while he is there.
3. I propose therefore to refer the matter to the A.C.A. on his return and if he agrees will arrange a Meeting.

C. M. Stj.

(C. M. Stj.)
Chief, Communications,
Organisation 1.

1 April 1965

Copies to : Org 2.
A.C.A.

MAAF/1006/002	10/4
MAAF/1006/002	10/4

842

SECRET

To:- Org. 1.
Org. 2.
A.I.S.

Re-Organisation of Italian Air Force.

Reference D. Air C in C's instructions to examine the possibility of re-organising the Italian Air Force on U.S. lines (more or less); will Org. 1 call a Staff Meeting to discuss the whole problem. I am not sure whether the Staff are interested since no question of control of I.A.S. Officers arose at the D. Air C in C's Meeting.

W. Mitchell
(H.E. Mitchell)
Group Captain,
Head Personnel Staff Officer.

Ref:- MAAF/DOIG/1940

Date:- 9 April, 1940.

Approved	10/4
Head	4200
Staff	
File	

92

From :- Mr. 124 Main Street, New York, N.Y.

To :- Allied Division, New York, N.Y.

Date :- 14 April, 1945.

Ref :- 100/591 P.

100/591 P. (Continued)

In reply to your letter dated 10 April, 1945, the following information is submitted in respect of this unit.

- (a) Total employed 10 (including).
- (b) Personnel (if any) and whether they are employed in the regular, reserve, total or other.
- (c) General duties, nature, whether they are a part of the regular, reserve, etc.

Handwritten signature

100/591 P.	
100/591 P.	10/4
4200	

340

91

From :- No. 54 Personnel Transit Centre, R.A.F., C.M.F.
To :- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q., M.A.A.F., R.A.F., C.M.F.
Date :- 7th April, 1945.
Ref :- 54PTC/402/P.4.

Italian Air Force (non-operational) Personnel.

With reference to your MAAF/4200/ALS dated 3rd April, 1945
the following information is forwarded as requested:-

- (a) 56
- (b) 1 Mar/LtO Rigger }
1 Serg.Majr Mechanic } Employed on
1 Serg.Majr Armourer } Guard duties.
- (c) 50 Other Ranks. General duties employed as guards.

94
ALS


10/4
4200
Squadron Leader, Commanding,
No. 54 Personnel Transit Centre,
ROYAL AIR FORCE, C.M.F.

From : Headquarters No.336.P.R.Wing. Royal Air Force.
 To : Headquarters Allied Liaison Section. H.Q. M.A. A.F. R.A.F. C.M.F.
 Date : 6th April 1945.
 Ref : 336W/1007/3/Org.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

In accordance with your letter reference MAAF/4200/ALS dated 3rd April 1945, the following return in respect of the personnel of No.33 Specialist Company, Italian Air Force, who are employed at this Wing Headquarters, is forwarded.

- (a) 1 Officer and 94 Non-commissioned ranks.
- (b) Basic Tradesmen Italian Air Force. 43.
 Total Employed with R.A.F. 10.
 viz. N/Orderly.....1.
 M.T.M.....6.
 Carpenter.....2.
 Taylor.....1.
 Total Employed at Italian Camp, Domestic Site.8.
 viz. Clerk.G.D.....1.
 Cooks.....5.
 Equip Assts.....2.
- (c) General Duties. Italian Air Force. 51.
 Total Employed with R.A.F. 55.
 viz. Guards.....8.
 Labourers.....47.
 Total Employed at Italian Camp, Domestic Site.9.
 viz. General Duties..
- Total Non-Effective.12. (Included in above totals.)
 viz. Sick....3.
 Prison..2.
 Leave...7.



Ramadan
 Wing Commander, Commanding.
 No.336.P.R.Wing. R.A.F.

Loose Minute.

To: Chief of Staff/RAF, MEDUSA.

1. The policy regarding the Italian Air Force at the present moment, as far as equipping it with Allied aircraft is concerned, is based upon the contents of a signal from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (P.W. 358 of 29 April, 1944) to SACMEX. Extracts from this signal are as follows:
"You may authorize the Air Commander in Chief MEDUSA to re-equip during the hostilities with Germany, such Italian aircraft squadrons as he thinks fit with superceded types of combat worthy aircraft no longer required by the Allied Air Forces. Such re-equipment is only to be undertaken if it is in the interests of the war against Germany, and you should make it quite clear to the Italian Government that such action is wholly without prejudice to any ultimate decision about the status of the Italian Air Force during the post-war period. No commitment can be accepted to maintain these aircraft nor to supply spare parts beyond the stocks currently available in your Theatre". As far as purely Italian types of aircraft are concerned the C-in-C. decided in a letter to the Italian Chief of the Air Staff (JMS.1076 of 15th. Jan. 1945) that such equipped squadrons must be maintained from existing Italian material resources, and that the Italian Authorities must retain in the Service, only such Italian equipped Units as can effectively contribute to the war against Germany.

2. C.G. MEDUSA's authority was asked that we should give the Italians 3 S.A.F. and 2 Light Bomber Squadrons on the terms of P.W. 358 of 29th. Apr. 1944, quoted above, and consent was given in P.W. 358 of 16th. June, 1944. The Italians were finally given the aircraft to form 2, P39 and 1 Spitfire Squadrons and 2 Baltimore Squadrons.

3. In JMS.1076, para. 4. of Jan. 15th. 1945, it was agreed between the late C-in-C/MEDUSA and General Almonet that a review should be made of Italian resources by the A.F.S.C., the Italian Air Ministry and Staff Officers from M.A.A.F., to determine what Italian equipped units could be usefully employed and maintained from Italian resources for a period of 12 months. It was agreed that an important factor in this review was the work of the newly appointed technical commission. Group Captain Bailey, the engineer staff officer representing this M.A.F., was instructed to recommend the immediate reduction to produce of all aircraft which were not likely to be useful for this purpose.

4. On the advice of the Bailey report, Air Marshal Slessor ruled that the Macchi, which is no longer a front line aircraft is to be relegated to training and the Cant 1007 and Cant 501

Forces. Such re-equipment is only to be undertaken if it is in the interests of the war against Germany, and you should make it quite clear to the Italian Government that such action is wholly without prejudice to any ultimate decision about the status of the Italian Air Force during the post-war period. No commitment can be accepted to maintain these aircraft nor to supply spare parts beyond the stocks currently available in your Theatre. As far as purely Italian types of aircraft are concerned the C-in-C. decided in a letter to the Italian Chief of the Air Staff (JCS.1076 of 15th. Jan. 1945) that such equipped squadrons must be maintained from existing Italian material resources, and that the Italian Authorities must retain in the service, only such Italian equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against Germany.

2. C.G. HAWORTH's authority was asked that we should give the Italiana 3 S.B.P. and 2 Light Bomber Squadrons on the terms of WAF.358 of 29th. Apr. 1944, quoted above, and consent was given in PWU's of 16th. June, 1944. The Italians were finally given the aircraft to form 2, P39 and 1 Spitfire Squadrons and 2 Baltimore Squadrons.

3. In JCS.1076, para.4, of Jan. 15th. 1945, it was agreed between the late C-in-C/MedM and General Amon Galt, that a review should be made of Italian resources by the A.F.S.O., the Italian Air Ministry and Staff Officers from A.F.S.O., to determine what Italian equipped units could be usefully employed and maintained from Italian resources for a period of 12 months. It was agreed that an important factor in this review was the work of the newly appointed technical commission. Group Captain Bailey, the engineer staff officer representing this U.S., was instructed to recommend the immediate reduction to produce of all aircraft which were not likely to be useful for this purpose.

4. On the advice of the Bailey report, Air Marshal Slesor ruled that the Marchis, which is no longer a front line aircraft is to be relegated to training and the Cant 1007 and Cant 501 aircraft are to disappear as they become unserviceable beyond the limits of economical repair, or require material which is in short supply, to make the serviceable.

5. All other aircraft which cannot be reasonably repaired or require spares which are scarce, and the mass of different types of obsolete fighters, bombers, communication and training aircraft are all to be stripped of parts and instruments and are to be reduced to produce.

-page 2.-

6. In a letter to the A.F.S.C., General Almone Gat, wrote in considerable detail of the consequences of the reduction of the Italian Air Force. In brief the General agrees that the I.A.F. should be reorganised with a small but efficient force. When this is put into effect however, he requires further concessions.
7. The line of thought in the General's mind, (as summarized by the A.O.C. A.F.S.C.) is as follows:-
 - (a) (i) That No.9. Squadron should be equipped with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or,
 - (ii) To allow it to come into line, with the war being at the stage it is, this Squadron is equipped with P.39.s.
 - (b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Cant. Squadron (1007) with Baltimores.
8. The above suggestions were duly considered and it was ruled that:-
 - (a) (i) The supply of Spitfires was not sufficient to allow such re-arming, as there were prior commitments for these aircraft.
 - (ii) The pool of P.39.s. (approximately 70 in reserve) was only sufficient to back up the two existing squadrons for a period of six months, judging by the usual wastage rates of R.A.F. squadrons.
 - (b) The re-arming of the Cant 1007 Squadron with Baltimores was not possible.
9. The Italian Air Ministry made one or two tentative bids through the A.F.S.C. for help in developing Civil Air transport. This was refused (PHAIR signed SACRED 12.2.45) on the grounds that it was impossible to find resources either in equipment or in suitably trained personnel without detriment to the war effort. They were further informed that, until further notice they should confine their air transport activities to the use of such aircraft of the I.A.F. as may be approved for this purpose by the Air Forces Sub-Commission.
10. Attached is the latest directive from A.F.H. to A/V/M. Bower-Bunbarlet.

some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or,

(11) To allow it to come into line, with the war being at the stage it is, this Squadron is equipped with P.39.e.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the diving Cant Squadron (1007) with Baltimores.

8. The above suggestions were duly considered and it was ruled that:-

(a) (i) The supply of Spitfires was not sufficient to allow such re-arming, as there were prior commitments for these aircraft.

(ii) The pool of P.39.s. (approximately 70 in reserve) was only sufficient to back up the two existing squadrons for a period of six months, judging by the usual wastage rates of R.A.F. squadrons.

(b) The re-arming of the Cant 1007 Squadron with Baltimores was not possible.

9. The Italian Air Ministry made one or two tentative bids through the A.F.S.C. for help in developing Civil Air Transport. This was refused (WHAIR signed SACMAD 12,2.45) on the grounds that it was impossible to find resources either in equipment or in suitably trained personnel without detriment to the war effort. They were further informed that, until further notice they should confine their air transport activities to the use of such aircraft of the I.A.F. as may be approved for this purpose by the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

10. Attached is the latest directive from A.F.H. to A/V/M. Rosen-Buscarlet.

338

(H.M. Fisher),
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 10th April, 1945.

Ref:- MAJ/L200/US. ✓

SECRET

18

AG 091.712/151 GCT-0

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RHF/1ja AP 495

SECRET

: AUTH: SAC MT :

: INITIALS: RHF :

: 7 April 1945 :

: 7 April 1945 :

7 April 1945

SUBJECT: CERSA and CERSETI Units for Italian Air Force

TO: Commanding General
15th Army Group
APO 777

1. The Air Force Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, has requested authority for setting up of Italian Air Force CERSA and CERSETI units, similar to those detailed in MMIA letter SD/25 of 17 March 1945 and approved for the Italian Army by 15th Army Group cable SD/1399 of 27 March 1945.

2. Units will be self-contained except for POL and will consist of six (6) to ten (10) officers and NCO's with their own transport. Their duties will be as follows:

a. To trace, administer and control Italian Air Force personnel in newly liberated territory and to screen them for undesirable elements.

b. To locate and subsequently salvage material belonging to the Italian Air Force but of no further use to the Allies.

3. It is desired to establish units at:

Florence	Arezzo
Lucca	Forli
Pistoia	Ravenna
Leghorn	Bologna

4. Personnel will be vouched for by Air Forces Sub-Commission and will be issued the necessary credentials. Some units have been set up already with the approval of Headquarters, Fifth Army and it is desired to implement those for FORLI and RAVENNA as soon as possible.

5. You are requested to say whether it is agreed that such units should operate in the Army areas, and to signify approval to the early dispatch of units for FORLI and RAVENNA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee - 4200
- 2 - CG, Fifth Army
- 2 - Hq Brit Iner, Fifth Army
- 2 - Hq Eighth Army
- 2 - Land Forces Sub-Commission AG (MMIA)
- 2 - Air Forces Sub-Commission AG

R. H. Freese
R. H. FRESE
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

- 2 - Hq 1 District
- 2 - ALS, Hq MAF
- 1 - G-3 Org, Foreign
- 2 - AG Records, AFHQ
- 1 - AG M&D

SECRET

SECRET


From: No. 4 R.A.F. General Hospital, C.M.F.
To: Allied Liaison Section, H.Q., M.A.A.F., R.A.F., C.M.F.
Date: 6th April, 1945.
Ref: 4200/ALS/Red.

Italian Air Force (Non-Operational) Personnel.

In accordance with your letter MAAP/4200/ALS dated 3rd April, 1945, herewith the information as requested in respect of this unit.

- (a) Total employed: 56.
- (b) 2 Cooks employed as cooks for Italian Personnel.
- (c) 52 employed on guards. 1 W.C. i/c. and 1 Cpl 1st Class employed on administrative duties.

S. Howting R/L.
for S. HOWTING, F/Lt.,
Wing Commander, Commanding
No. 4 RAF General Hospital
R.A.F. C.M.F.



From:- Officer Com. nding, 14 Signals Centre, R.A.F. C.M.F.
 To:- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters, R.A.A.F. R.A.F. C.M.F.
 Date:- 6th April 1945.
 Ref:- 1430/501/P4.

Italian Air Force (non operational) Personnel.

Herewith return called for in your MAAB/4200/ALS., dated 3rd April 1945.

(a) <u>Total Employed.</u>	14. (Two Senior N.C.O's. 12 O.Ranks)
(b) <u>Tradesmen.</u>	NIL.
(c) <u>General Duties.</u>	GUARDS.

MAAB/4200/ALS.

1/4 ALS

573

8/4
4200/ALS

[Signature]
 W.A. KACANTZ F/O.
 Commanding, 14 Signals Centre.
 Royal Air Force, C.M.F. FORCES.

FROM : HEADQUARTERS, No. 305 WING,
Royal Air Force, C.M.F.

TO : ALLIED LIAISON SECTION, ✓
HEADQUARTERS M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

DATE : 7th April, 1945.

REF. : 335W/756/ORG.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE (NON OPERATIONAL) PERSONNEL.

With reference to your MAAF/L200/ALS dated 3rd April 1945,
herewith information required in respect of Italian Air Force
Personnel employed by this Unit.

(a) Marshal 1st Class 1.
Marshal 3rd Class 1.
Sergeant Major 1.
Sergeants 3.
10 Aviere 3.
Av, Scelto 12.
Avieri 101.
Total 125.

(b) Tradesmen.

1 Av.Sc. Fitter Aircraft.	} None at present being employed on similar duties.
1 Av. Sc. Motoriste Engineering.	
1 M.llo 1st Pilot	
1 M.llo 3rd Motoriste Engineering.	
1 Serg.Magg. Photographer.	
2 Sergeants Mechanical Transport.	
1 Sergeant Clerical Work.	

(c) General duties 117

Guards 36.
General duties 65.
Hospital 5.
Leave 6.
Absent 7.
TOTAL 117.

herewith information required in respect of Italian Air Force Personnel employed by this Unit.

- (a) Marshal 1st Class 1.
Marshal 3rd Class 1.
Sergeant Major 1.
Sergeants 3.
10 Aviere 5.
Av, Scolto 15.
Avieri 101.

Total 125.

(b) Trademen.

- 1 Av. Sc. Matter Aircraft.
1 Av. Sc. Motorists Engineering.
1 M. llo 1st Pilot
1 M. llo 3rd Motorists Engineering.
1 Serg. Mags. Photographer.
2 Sergeants Mechanical Transport.
1 Sergeant Clerical Work.

None at present
being employed on
similar duties.

(c) General duties 117

- Guards 36.
General duties 65.
Hospital 3.
Leave 6.
Absent 7.

TOTAL 117.

633

for Group Captain, Commanding.
Headquarters No. 555 Wing.
Royal Air Force, C. M. F.

7/4
HVS

eb.

4201/2

LOOSE MINUTE

To : A.L.S.

Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

Reference our Loose Minute MAAF/5121/M.Plans
dated 19th March 1945, may a reply now be given please.

E. J. Smith
(E.J. SMITH) W/Cdr.
for Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.

MAAF/5121/M.Plans.

5th April 1945.

W. L. C.

832

83

Loose Minute.

To:- C.M.S.O. (att. W/Cdr. Smith).

1. Reference is made to your loose minute WRAF/5121/W.Plane dated 30th. March, 1945.
2. It has been decided not to re-arm No.9. Italian Air Force Squadron.

G. Conroy

(G. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 1th. Apr. 1945.

Re:- WRAF/5121/W.

Copy to:- Operations.

05201

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

82

LOOSE MINUTE

To : A.L.S.

Re-Arming No 9 Squadron I.A.F.

68

Reference Operations Loose Minute S/Lt/Air dated 20th March 1945. Can you please say whether a decision has now been reached regarding the re-arming of No. 9 Squadron I.A.F. with Spitfire Aircraft.

E.J. Smith

(E.J. Smith) 1/Cdr.
For Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.

MAAF/5121/H.Plans.

30th March 1945.

Copy to :
OPERATIONS.

Amalgamated	Stamp
H.Q.	30/3
DATE	4/2/46

830

From:- Allied Liaison Section, R.A.F. C.M.F.

To:- See Distribution below:-

Date:- 3rd. Apr. 1945.

Ref:- RA.37/1200/ALS.

Italian Air Force (non operational) Personnel.

1. It is requested that you submit to this Headquarters, details as to how the Italian Air Force personnel employed on your Unit, are employed.

2. Information requested is a brief statement showing:-

- (a) Total Employed.
- (b) Tradesmen (if any) and whether they are employed in this capacity, giving totals and trades.
- (c) General duties, showing whether they are employed as guards, labourers, etc.

3. The return should be brief and it would be appreciated if a reply could be given immediately.

Leannon
(C. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff, R.A.F. Medals.

For

Distribution:-

No. 336 Wing. ✓
No. 54. F.M.C. ✓
No. 337 Wing. ✓
No. 143 M.U. ✓
No. 159 M.U. ✓
No. 110 H.U. ✓
No. 124 M.U. ✓ No. 360 M.U. ✓

No. 336 (F.P.) Wing. ✓
No. 4. R.A.F. Gen Hosp. ✓
No. 335 Wing. ✓
No. 14 Sig. Centre. ✓

80
81 Extracted

1. It is requested that you submit to this Headquarters, details as to how the Italian Air Force personnel employed on your unit, are employed.
2. Information requested is a brief statement showing:
 - (a) Total Employed.
 - (b) Tradesmen (if any) and whether they are employed in their capacity, giving totals and trades.
 - (c) General duties, showing whether they are employed as guards, labourers, etc.
3. The return should be brief and it would be appreciated if a reply could be given immediately.

Lebenway

(S. Genrov),
Squadron Leader,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAS, Medaf.

for

Distribution:-

No. 306 Wing. ✓
No. 54. F.T.C. ✓
No. 207 Wing. ✓
No. 113 B.N. ✓
No. 159 M.H. ✓
No. 110 L.B. ✓
No. 124 M.U. No. 306 M.U. ✓

No. 306 (P.R.) Wing. ✓
No. 4. R.A.F. Gen Hosp. ✓
No. 235 Wing. ✓
No. 14 Sigs. Centre. ✓

828

File.

MAAF/4200/ALS. ✓

O.S.A. Firm.

Leopoldo De Lieto, Ing.

5. A.L.S. C.M.S.O. W/h.
MAAF.

1. In reply to your loose minute MAAF/
5130/1/M. Plans dated 17th. March, 1945.

2. The attached correspondence is passed
to you for information and any necessary action.

(G. Conroy),
quadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Loose Minute.

To: - A.C.A.

Italian Air Force.

1. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force, as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is 31,000.

The division of this total is as follows:

22,000 Operational Air Force.
6,500 Employed by the U.S.A.A.F.
2,500 Employed by the R.A.F.

Non-Operational Personnel (2,500) - Policy.

1. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for, and implementation of, R.A.F. man-power.

(a) To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies.

(b) To replace personnel who are required to return to the United Kingdom or proceed to another theatre of war.

(c) To give further assistance to Units who, by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and labourers.

Skilled personnel are employed in workshops of M.U.S. whilst the rest are employed as labourers, guards, and general duties men.

2. The responsibility for the administration of these Italians remains that of the Italian Air Force, in everything but the provision of accommodation and domestic requirements.

3. Where there are 25 to 50 personnel, an Italian officer is in charge.

4. All Italian Air Force personnel are subject to the Italian Military Law, which is administered by the Italian officers in accordance with the Italian code.

Records.

1. The Italian authorities concern their records are incomplete, owing to the loss of the original documents and general upheaval of the Italian Organisation as the war spread through the country. The lack of reliable and rapid communications from Italian Detachments to Home Headquarters, and from thence to the Italian Air Ministry.

2. Desertions are commonplace. The historical documents of all Italian Air Force personnel are so incomplete that the Italian Authorities have little chance of bringing the deserters to book.

Non-Operational Personnel (2,500) - Policy.

1. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for, and implementation of, R.A.F. man-power.
 - (a) To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies.
 - (b) To replace personnel who are required to return to the United Kingdom or proceed to another theatre of war.
 - (c) To give further assistance to Units who, by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and labourers.
- Skilled personnel are employed in workshops of R.U.S. whilst the rest are employed as labourers, guards, and general duties men.
2. The responsibility for the administration of these Italians remains that of the Italian Air Force, in everything but the provision of accommodation and domestic requirements.
3. Where there are 25 to 30 personnel, an Italian officer is in charge.
4. All Italian Air Force personnel are subject to the Italian Military Law, which is administered by the Italian officers in accordance with the Italian code.

Records.

1. The Italian authorities confess their records are incomplete, owing to the loss of the original documents and general upheaval of the Italian Organisation as the war spread through the country. The lack of reliable and rapid communications from Italian Detachments to Zone Headquarters, and from thence to the Italian Air Ministry.
2. Desertions are commonplace. The historical ³²⁴ documents of all Italian Air Force personnel are so incomplete that the Italian authorities have little chance of bringing the deserters to book.
3. Returns have been called for, from all formations, from time to time. These have been submitted to the A.P.S.D. for comparison with the Italian records. Three months ago the Italian figures were approximately 1,500 in excess of R.A.F. figures. This discrepancy has been considerably reduced and the totals now show a more favourable comparison.
4. A.L.S. has recently obtained nominal rolls of all I.A.F. personnel employed with the R.A.F., and it is considered these will be of great assistance to the Italian Air Ministry.
5. Copies of returns submitted to the Air Forces Sub-Commission, on 12th. and 28th. March, 1945, under reference MAW/1201/ALS, are attached at Appendices "A" and "B".

Cheney
 (C. CHENEY), S/Ldr.
 Wing Commander,
 Allied Liaison Section.

Date: 30th. Mar. 45.
 Ref: MAW/1200/ALS.
 for

FILE
4200/ALS

ASD/922.2/4

29 March 45.

Accommodation in North West Italy.

4- G-3 MAAF 29 Mar Reference Minute 2 above, will you please confirm your wishes in the matter as requested by Q'aint) in their para 2.

JNG/mmc

DANIEL NOCE,
Major General, GSC.,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

5. ALS, 'O' Maint.
H. MAAF. through 30 MAR.
G-3.

1. This Section's attached letter MAAF/4200/ALS was submitted for a decision by A.F.H.C.
2. The Air Forces Sub-Commission recommend the formation of the two E.A.T. Headquarters. This H.Q. supports the proposal.
3. It would be appreciated if A.F.H.C. would give concurrence.

(J. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

76

From:- Allied Liaison Section, U.S. M.A.A.F. R.A.F. C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 28th. March, 1945 ✓

Ref:- MAAP/4200/MR.

1. Reference is made to your letter APAG/65/B. dated 9th. March, 1945.

2. A.P.H. in their ASD/922/2/B. dated 17th. March, 1945, state that Headquarters Nos. 1 and 2 Districts, which are responsible for the future administration of Padua and Milan respectively, will be informed of the formation of No.1. S.A.T. at Milan and No.2. S.A.T. at Padua.

3. In regard to para.4. of your above quoted letter, the ruling is that the Italian Air Force will not be allowed to occupy any building which is required by the Allies, and it appears premature, at this stage, to state which buildings will not be needed by the Allied Forces.

G. Conroy

for

(G. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF, Rome.

Copy to:-

A.P.H. (G.2).

75

LOOSE MINUTE

To : Allied Liaison Section. Ref: MAAF/5130/1/M.Plans.

It is requested that your comments on the correspondence passed to you under cover of our loose minute of even reference dated 17th March, 1945, may now be forwarded.

~~64~~

62.

E.J. Smith

(E.J. SMITH) W/CDR.
for Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.

Copy to - Org. 1(b).
(Your MAAF/1647/1/Org. dated 31st March, 1945)

824

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
ADT 3/4
42200

74

From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, G.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 3rd. April, 1945.

Ref:- HMAF/4200/ALS.

1. Further to my HMAF/4200/ALS of the 28th. March, 1945.
2. The question of re-arming No.9. Squadron, Italian Air Force with P.39's has now been thoroughly discussed. While wishing to accede to this request from the Italians, it is with regret that this has not been found possible, due entirely to the lack of spare parts available for these aircraft, in particular tyres and inner tubes.
3. It would be appreciated if this decision could be conveyed to General Simone Gat.

(F.J. Fogarty),
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer in Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Copy to:- C-in-C/RAP. No. 33.
A.O.A.

External: A.P.H. (B.C.S.).

From:- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.P. C.M.F.

To:- Allied Force Headquarters.
(Lieut. Col. J.G. Sweetman. Supreme Allied Commander's
Secretariat).

Date:- 29th. March, 1945.

Ref:- MAAP/4200/ALB.

1. Reference is made to the attached buck-slip and papers.
2. Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet wrote direct to this Headquarters summarizing the letters of the Italian Prime Minister and the Italian Chief of the Air Staff.
3. A copy of this Headquarters reply to A/V/M. Bowen-Buscarlet was, yesterday, sent to you under reference MAAP/4200/ALB dated 28th. March, 1945.
4. It is therefore suggested that this copy be used as a basis for a reply to Brigadier Lush the Executive Commissioner, at the same time informing him that A/V/M. Bowen-Buscarlet is aware of the decisions taken by this Headquarters.

M. Fisher

for (R.M. Fisher),
Wing Commander,
Air Vice Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF, Veduggia.

From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.


Date:- 28th. March, 1945.

Ref:- MAAF/4200/ALS. ✓

1. Reference is made to your letter AFSC/23/AIR dated 2nd. March, 1945.

2. There has been no policy laid down as to any development of Italian Civil Air Transport. It is impossible to find the resources either in aircraft or in suitably trained personnel, without detriment to the war effort.

3. In view of the ruling contained in A.F.H.Q. signal, reference FX.25720 dated 12th. February, 1945, the C-in-C feels that he cannot, at this stage, advise you to approve the Italian Government's proposal to transfer Civil Aviation from the Air Ministry to the Ministry of Transport.


Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer i/o Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

From:- H. Quarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, G.M.F.
 To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.
 Date:- 28th. March, 1945.
 Ref:- MAF/4200/115. ✓

1. Reference is made to your letter MAF/24/11 dated 8th. March, 1945, together with the letters of the Italian Minister for Air and the Italian Chief of the Air Staff. The C-in-C has given full consideration to the views expressed in your letter and has asked me to inform you that he fully realises, and appreciates, that your task in keeping up the morale of the Italian Air Force, and in attempting to satisfy the aspirations of General Amodeo is both a difficult and delicate one.

2. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force authorities is one which would naturally arise from existing conditions. As you are aware there is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and meanwhile, Italy is allowed such an Air Force as will make an effective contribution to the war effort as possible.

3. However, you will agree that existing difficulties in supply of aircraft and equipment, together with deficiencies of trained personnel ready to take their place in operational units, makes it difficult at this stage of the war, fully to meet the requests enumerated in your letter. We have done as far as we possibly can, and the decisions on these are as follows:-

(i) Para. 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number planes of the Macchi squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which these aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Para. 12 (b).

The storage of obsolescent aircraft cannot be agreed to, as the rate of deterioration would be too rapid without proper maintenance. These aircraft must therefore be reduced to produce.

(iii) Para. 15 (a).

It is not possible to provide planes for the re-equipment of Italian squadrons as there are prior claims on any such aircraft that may be thrown up in the future.

2. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force authorities is one which would naturally arise from existing conditions. As you are aware there is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and meanwhile, Italy is allowed much an Air Force as will make an effective contribution to the war effort as possible.

3. However, you will agree that existing difficulties in supply of aircraft and equipment, together with deficiencies of trained personnel ready to take their place in operational units, makes it difficult at this stage of the war, fully to meet the requests enumerated in your letter. We have gone as far as we possibly can, and the decisions on these are as follows:-

(i) Item 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number pilots of the Macchi squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which those aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Item 12 (b).

The storage of obsolescent aircraft cannot be seen to, as the rate of deterioration would be too rapid without proper maintenance. These aircraft must therefore be reduced to produce.

(iii) Item 15 (a).

It is not possible to provide piston V8 for the re-equipment of Italian Squadrons as there are prior claims on any such aircraft that may be thrown up in the future.

(iv) Item 15 (b).

A conference is being held to-day at Headquarters Italian Air Force to discuss the re-arming of No. 9 Squadron. Until the recommendations of this conference have been submitted to the C-in-C for his consideration, no ruling can be laid down at this stage.

[Signature]
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer in Charge Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

Copy to:-

A.C.A. } C-in-C/RAF. MedE.
C.P.H. } (S.C.S.).

71A

D R . P T . LETTER.

From:- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q., M.A.A.F., R.A.F., C.S.F.

To :- Allied Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. COMS.

Date:- March, 1945.

Ref :- MAAR/4200/AIS.

1. Reference is made to your letter AFSS/23/AIR, dated 8th March, 1945, together with the letters from the Minister for Air and the Italian Chief of Staff.
2. The reactions of the Italian Air Minister, the Italian Chief of Staff and the contents of the A.C.C., A.F.S.C., have been duly considered by the C-in-C and the following rulings have been made.
3. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force Authorities is one which would naturally arise from the condition of being a defeated nation. There is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force; and there cannot be one until the matter is settled at the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, Italy is allowed such as Air Force as will make as effective a contribution to the war effort as is possible.
4. On the specific points raised by the A.C.C., A.F.S.C. the following rulings have been made :-

(1) Para. 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number plates of the

vehicles used at the training centre

for Air and the Italian Chief of Staff.

2. The reactions of the Italian Air Minister, the Italian Chief of Staff and the comments of the A.C.C., A.F.S.C., have been duly considered by the C-in-C and the following rulings have been made.

3. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force Authorities is one which would naturally arise from the condition of being a defeated nation. There is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force; and there cannot be one until the matter is settled at the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, Italy is allowed such as Air Force as will make as effective a contribution to the war effort as is possible.

4. On the specific points raised by the A.C.C., A.F.S.C. the following rulings have been made :-

(i) Para. 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number plates of the Macchi Squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which these aircraft are ~~not~~ ^{being} provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Para. 12 (b).

The storage of the obsolescent aircraft cannot be agreed to, as the rate of deterioration would be rapid without proper maintenance. Furthermore, it is considered that such aircraft would be of greater value were they reduced to produce.

- 2 -

(iii) Para. 15(a).

It is not possible to provide Spitfire V's for re-equipment of Italian Squadrons. There are proper claims on any Spitfire V's that may be thrown up in the future.

(iv) Para. 15(b).

The C-in-C agrees to the rearming of No. 9 Squadron with P.39's. The reserves of P.39's on the basis of normal British wastage, can carry two of these Squadrons over a period of 2½ months and the third approximately 3½ months. When the reserve of P.39's is exhausted there is no possibility of obtaining further supplies. The approval of the Air Ministry, will be requested for the formation of this Squadron.

Air Vice Marshal,
Chief of Staff/P.A.F. MEDVE.

(iv) Para. 15(b).


The C-in-C agrees to the rearming of No. 9 Squadron with P.39's. The reserves of P.39's on the basis of normal British wastage, can carry two of these Squadrons over a period of 2½ months and the third approximately 3¼ months. When the reserve of P.39's is exhausted there is no possibility of obtaining further supplies. The approval of the Air Ministry, will be requested for the formation of this Squadron.

Air Vice Marshal,
Chief of Staff/A.P. MEDAE.

81


70
LOOSE MINUTE.To : A.L.S.48
Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

Reference A.F.M.Q. directive AG334/111 IS&PS-0 dated 6th March, 1945, para. 6 second sentence. Does this mean that we are no longer allowed to make issues of aircraft materials, (including P.O.L) to maintain Italian aircraft as has been the practice in the past?



(E.J. SMITH)

w/Cdr.

for Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.19th. March, 1945.MAAF/5121/Maint. Plans.

69

From:- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.F. R.A.F. C.M.F.
To:- Allied Forces Headquarters, C.M.F.
Date:- 27th. March, 1945.
Ref:- MAAF/1200/ALS.

I.A.F. Reception Centres and Salvage Units.

1. The attached letter has been received from the Air Forces Sub-Commission.
2. It is requested that the points outlined in this letter be considered and requisite authority granted to the requests contained in para.6.
3. With reference to para.6. (d) guidance is sought defining the powers and freedom which may be granted to these units for the carrying out of their duties.
4. It would be appreciated if an immediate reply could be given.

Chenoy &

for (C. CHENOY),
Squadron Leader,
Air Vice Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF, Middle.

Encl:- 1.

016

SECRETSECRET

To:- H.Q. M.A.A.F. Algiers,
Air Forces Sub. Commission (Rome).

Originator's Reference No:-
MAAF/1550/5/ORG.

Copy to:- H.Q. 244 Group, R.A.F. C.M.F.

Copy on File: MAF/1606/ORG.

Date:- 24th. March 1945.

From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.F.

Italian Air Force - Allotment of Aircraft for O.T.U. and P.T.U.

1. In order to provide the requisite flying training for ~~retraining~~ ^{retraining} ~~aircrew~~ ^{aircrew} ~~beading~~ ^{beading} the following Italian squadrons:-

No. 26 and 132 - Baltimore.
Nos. 10 and 12 - P.39.
No. 20 Spitfires

it is requested that D.M. & S. Algiers will allot aircraft to bring holdings up to a total of:-

8 Baltimore.
2 Spitfire Mark V.

to the Italian O.T.U. which is situated at Fuscinone.

2. The aircraft are to be delivered to the Italian Air Force, under arrangements to be made between D.M. & S. M.A.A.F. Algiers and Air Forces Sub. Commission.

3. In addition 6 P.39 aircraft are being allotted to the O.T.U. by the Italian Air Force from their bulk supply of this type.

Originator's
Signature:-

For
W. M. Marshall
Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer i/c Administration, R.A.F.,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Distribution (Internal):-

785017

1. In order to provide the requested flying training for the 100th Air Refueling Wing, the following Italian squadrons:-

Nov. 23 and 132 - Baltimore.
Nov. 10 and 12 - P. 39.
Nov. 20 Solitaires

it is requested that D.M. & S. Adams will allot amount to bring holdings up to a total of:-

C. G. LINDGREN,
C. G. LINDGREN, JR.

to the Italian G.N.V. which is situated at Protonovo.

4. The aircraft are to be delivered to the Italian Air Force, under arrangements to be made between D.M. & S. M.A.A.S. Aircraft and Air Forces Sub-Commission.

5. In addition 6 B-39 aircraft are being allocated to the C.A.U. by the Italian Air Force from their bulk supply of this type.

Computer's
Signature-

100

[illegible]

Distribution (Ingram)

C.M.S.O. (2)
C/Opt. Ops.
C/Opt. Ops.
A.M.S.
Opt. 2.
ARDEC.
Financial Admin.
Command Account


1000 12 25 1900

LOOSE MINUTE

To: A.L.S., C.M.S.O., C/S R.A.F.

Ref: HQMAF/A.44/AIR

1. Reference minute 9 on file HQMAF/A200/AIS dated 14 March signed by Chief of Staff, R.A.F., and further to C.M.S.O.'s loose minute reference 5121/Maint/Plans. It is suggested that in view of the fact that we will shortly be rolling up R.A.F. Spitfire squadrons, consideration should be given to rearming No. 9 Squadron, IAF, with Spitfires, either Mark V's or, if they are insufficient of these available, with Mark IX's. There should be ample Spitfires available to back this new squadron and the available P-39's can be used to maintain the two present squadrons for as long as possible.



P.B. STURGESFORD,
Lt. Colonel, SAAF,
Operations.

20th March, 1945.

Note. Mark IX are not 'superior' combat units, in fact
Mark V are doubtfully so.
In either case the Ministry (ACAST)
commitment to them would be necessary

2/13

BLS

LOSS MINUTE

To :

A.L.S.

Copy to - D/D. Ops.

Ref: MAAF/5121/Ma. Plans.

I.A.F. P.39's.

Reference C. of S. Minute M.9 dated 14th March, 1945, in your file 4200/ALS.

2. We have reviewed the P.39 position and from the information available have assessed it as follows :-

(a) There are approximately 70 operational P.39 Q's available in the I.A.F.

(b) With the existing two squadrons and an assumed monthly wastage of 3 per squadron the reserve will last for 6 months.


(c) If an additional squadron is armed with P.39's the wastage can only be backed for 2 1/2 months.

(d) Of the 70 P.39 Q's mentioned 2(a) 24 are in stored reserve. Some of these have been robbed of small parts but it is understood that they could all eventually be prepared for operational use.

3. From the above we recommend that a third P.39 Squadron should not be formed.

E.J. Smith
(E.J. SMITH) W/CDR.
for Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.

Date : 17th March, 1945.



312

65

Italian Air Force.

Policy.

1. ^{been} There has no policy ruling been given as yet as regards the post-war future of the Italian Air Force and the policy at present is to prune it in such a manner as to produce a small but efficient Air Force, capable of being used to advantage against the common enemy.
2. Five I.A.F. Squadrons are equipped with Allied types, 1 Spitfire V - 2 P.39. and 2 Baltimore. It is not intended to equip any further Squadrons with Allied Aircraft.
3. The remaining Squadrons are equipped with Italian aircraft and it is becoming increasingly difficult to produce spares. It has been ruled that the Macchis, which are no longer a front line aircraft are to be relegated to training and the Cent 1007 and Cent 504 aircraft are to disappear as they become unserviceable beyond the limits of economical repair, or require material to make them serviceable which is in short supply.
4. All other aircraft which cannot be reasonably repaired or require spares which are scarce, and the mass of different types of obsolete fighters, bombers, communication and training aircraft are all to be stripped of parts and instruments and are to be reduced to produce. 2

Manpower.

1. The ceiling of the I.A.F., as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is 31,000. Of this total 22,000 are earmarked as the Operational Air Force, while the remaining 9,000 are being used by the U.S.A.A.W. and the R.A.F. in manpower substitution.
2. The reduction of the Operational Air Force, will produce further personnel for the Allied Air Forces.

craft and it is becoming increasingly difficult to produce spares. It has been ruled that the Macchis, which are no longer a front line aircraft are to be relegated to training and the Cant 1007 and Cant 501 aircraft are to disappear as they become unserviceable beyond the limits of economical repair, or require material to make them serviceable which is in short supply.

4. All other aircraft which cannot be reasonably repaired or require spares which are scarce, and the mass of different types of obsolete fighters, bombers, communication and training aircraft are all to be stripped of parts and instruments and are to be reduced to produce. ?

Manpower.

1. The ceiling of the I.A.F., as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is 31,000. Of this total 22,000 are earmarked as the Operational Air Force, while the remaining 9,000 are being used by the U.S.A.A.F. and the R.A.F. in manpower substitution.

2. The reduction of the Operational Air Force, will produce further personnel for the Allied Air Forces.

Italian Air Force.Order of Battle.Under the Operational Command of B.A.F.

10 L.A.F. Squadron.	Canne.	P.39.	} S.E.F.
12 " "	" "	" "	
20 " "	" "	Spitfire V.	
102 " "	Lecce.	M.C.202.	
155 " "	" "	M.C.205.	
28 " "	Biferino	Baltimore	} I.B.
132 " "	" "	IV and V.	
SE. Ops.			
1. " "	Lecce	S.M. 82.	} Sp. Ops.
88 " "	" "	C.2.1007	

Under the Operational Command of M.A.C.A.F.

82 L.A.F. Squadron	Taranto	C.2. 506	} Seaplanes.
83 " "	Brindisi	C.2. 501 - 506	
84 " "	Taranto	" "	
	Det. Elmas.	C.2. 506	
85 " "	Taranto	C.2. 501 - 506	
		P.3. 14.	

Under the control of the Italian Air Ministry.

2 L.A.F. Courier Squadron, Rome S.79.

Sp. Ops.	"	Lecce	S.M. 82.	} Sp. Ops.
1. "	"	"	C.Z. 1007	
83 "	"	"		

Under the Operational Command of M.A.C.A.F.

82 L.A.P. Squadron	Taranto	C.Z. 506	} Seaplanes.
83 "	Brindisi	C.Z. 501 - 506	
84 "	Taranto		
	Det. Elmas.	C.Z. 506	
85 "	Taranto	C.Z. 501 - 506	
		P.S. 14.	

Under the control of the Italian Air Ministry.

2 L.A.P. Courier Squadron, Rome S.72.

10th. March, 1945.

File 200
12-200

811

64

From:- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.F. R.A.F. C.M.F.
 To:- Allied Force Headquarters.
 Date:- 10th. March, 1945.
 Ref:- WAF/4200/ALS. ✓

C.S.A. Firm.

1. The attached correspondence has been received at this Headquarters, through the Air Forces Sub-Commission, from:-

Leopoldo De Lieto, Inc.,
 Subsidiary Aviation Workshops,
 (Officina Subsidiaria Aviazione), Naples.

The letter is self-explanatory.

2. It is requested that this Headquarters be informed on the policy governing such a request, political or otherwise.

3. Should the present policy rule that such a proposal may be accepted if it is in the interests of the war effort, this Headquarters will proceed to carry out the necessary investigations.

4. It would be appreciated if the attached correspondence may be returned with your ruling.

G. Conroy

for
 (G. Conroy),
 Squadron Leader,
 Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/R.F. HQ.

Encl: WAF/4200/15/ENG. d/d 5th. March, 1945.
 Leopoldo De Lieto, Inc., letter dated 23rd. Feb. 1945.

Loose Minute.

63

To:- D/P. Ops.

1. Reference is made to Minute 9. on file MAF/4200/ALS dated 14th. March, 1945, signed by the Chief of Staff. (Copy to you).
2. C.M.S.C. informs us that there are insufficient reserves to arm No.9. Squadron with P.39's and consequently action is being taken to inform the I.A.M. that No.9. Squadron will not be armed with P.39's.
3. Before this Section takes action to inform the I.A.M. of the ruling given by the Chief of Staff, we would appreciate any comments you have to make.

Conroy

for

(C. Conroy),
Squadron Leader,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 18th. March, 1945.

Ref:- MAF/4200/ALS. ✓


LOOSE MINUTE

To : A.L.S.

Ref : MAAF/5130/1/M.Plans.

Reference the attached correspondence
we should like to have your comments on this matter
before we make an investigation.

E.J. Smith
(E.J. SMITH) W/CDR.
for Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.

Date : 17th March, 1945.

SECRET

61

1st Ind to Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, AG 322, dtd 21 February 1945,
 subj: Constitution and Establishment of Italian Air Force Zone Commands
 No. 1 and No. 2.

AG 323/111-0 1st Ind
 ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, APO 512, 13 March 1945

JC/11a

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 THRU: Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,
 APO 650

1. This headquarters has been informed by Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces that the questions raised and the requests made in the foregoing correspondence are being taken up directly between Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission and Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

2. Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces is requested to furnish this headquarters and Headquarters, 15th Army Group with copies of correspondence on this matter if considered appropriate.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

1 Incl
 n/c

JACK CARTER
 Captain, AGD
 Asst Adjutant General

4200

ALLIED LEADS SECTION
H.Q. No. 15/3
DATE 4-2-45

SECRET

807

Loose Minute.

To:- Organisation 2.

1. Reference is made to your loose minute MAAP/1681/Org dated 15th. March, 1945.
2. I have read with interest the report on your visit to the Air Forces Sub-Commission.
3. As regards para.9. (iii), I would suggest that the Air Forces Sub-Commission refer to this Section, all applications for increase in establishment. This Section could then, obtain advice from you, before such authority is granted.

C. Conroy

(C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 15th. March. 1945.

Ref:- MAAP/4200/ALS.

From:- All Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.F. M.A.F. C.M.F. 59
 To:- Allied Force Headquarters.
 Date:- 15th. March, 1945.
 Ref:- MAAF/4200/ALS.

Future Policy in North Italy.

1. The Italian Air Ministry (through the A.F.S.C.) are anxious to know whether, in view of the possible liberation of N. Italy, they will be allowed to form two further Headquarters.

- (a) No. 1. Z.A.T. at Milan.
- (b) No. 2. Z.A.T. at Padova.

Their function would be administrative, dealing with:-

- (i) Mustering of Personnel.
- (ii) Reclaiming salvage.

2. They are particularly anxious to know whether, in the event of the above mentioned towns becoming free, they will be permitted and freely authorized to occupy buildings previously belonging to them, and if so whether documents will be necessary to prove that such were I.A.F. properties.

3. This Headquarters is of the opinion that they will not be allowed any building which is required by the Allies, and it appears premature to state which buildings will not be needed by the Allied Forces.

4. It is requested that guidance be given to this Headquarters in its reply to the A.F.S.C. on this matter.

G. Conroy

(G. CONROY),
 Squadron Leader,
 Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/R.A.F. Medway.

for

58

From:- Allied Liaison Section, U.S. M.A.A.F. R.A.F. C.M.F.

To:- Commanding General, 15th. Army Group, A.P.O.777.

Date:- 15th. March, 1945.

Ref:- WMAF/4200/ALS.

1. The attached correspondence is passed to you.
2. Your letter AG.322 of 21st. February, 1945, (para.3.) has been noted.
3. The question as regards buildings etc. in Milan and Padova being given over to the I.A.F., has been referred to A.P.H. . for decision.

Cheney

(C. CHENEY),
Squadron Leader,
for Air Vice Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF. Kedue.

YOUNG, JILL

Ref: HA07/1609/LET.

30 :-

~~THOMAS G. BENTON, CHAIRMAN~~

Please see the attached copy of the report on my visit to the Air Forceon Sub-Commission. I need not elaborate on the report which I feel explains itself.

2. I should, however, like to have a ruling that such recommendations submitted in paragraphs 9 and 11 are in order.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/93 BY 4702

(R.D. BARNES)
Wing Commander,
ORANGE COUNTY, 2.

1. 10. 1963. 29.6.5.

Couples for C.H.S.O.
S.V.S.O.
S.V.S.O.
S.V.S.O.

A.L.S.

Loose Minute MAAF/1606/Org of the 7th March was written purely to suggest a means of getting this matter back into the proper channels. I do not consider that it is the function of my Section to work out the answers required by the Control Commission in the attached letter although we shall be pleased to give you any assistance you may require.

2. With regard to the question of accommodation raised in para 4 (a), the answer is that the same conditions will pertain as hitherto, viz., that the Italians will not be permitted to re-occupy any buildings without the sanction of the appropriate British Authorities.

AMUSE	
H.S.	
ADTE	14/3
FILE	4200

(I.H.M. MASON)
Group Captain,
Organisation.

13 March 1945.

807
turn over

Loose Minute.To: Organisation.

1. Reference is made to your loose minute MAAF/1606/OM dated 7th. March, 1945.

2. The attached letter has been received from the A.F.S.C. (reference AFSC/655/Co. dated 9th. March, 1945), in reply to the telephonic conversation from this Section as suggested in para. 5. of the minute referred to above.

Schmayer

(C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date: 12th. March, 1945.

Ref: MAAF/4200/ALB.

1606/-

ORGANISATION + REG No.	441
DATE	12 MAR 1945
FILED BY	Date
ACTIONED	Date

56A 21B

From : Air Forces Sub Commission, AC. Rome.

To : HQ MAAP Allied Liaison Section.

Date : 9th March 1945.

Ref. : AFSC/655/EQ.

10/3
AL5 100

FUTURE POLICY IN NORTH ITALY

A letter has been received from IAF Stato Maggiore, ref. 30416/Od.3/1748Coll., 8th February, a copy of which was forwarded to HQ 15th Army Group, on the 14th February, ref. AFSC/R/655/EQ and is understood to be now in your possession.

2. Below is given a brief resume' of their intentions and requests.

The IAF Stato Maggiore, in view of the possible liberation of N. Italy, wish to form two further HQ.

(1) No. 1 Z.A.T. at Milan.

(2) No. 2 Z.A.T. at Padova.

Their function would be as administrative HQ to deal with

- (a) Mustering of personnel.
- (b) Reclamation of salvage.

3. The number of personnel for each Z.A.T. to perform all duties is approximately 90 Officers and O.R.s.

4. The IAF are particularly anxious to know whether, in the event of the a/m towns becoming free

(a) they will be permitted and freely authorised to occupy buildings previously belonging to them.

(b) if the personnel required will also be thus authorised.

5. As this matter seems to be one of major policy, your comments and decisions are requested.

F.L. Bradshaw
F.L. BRADSHAW, S/LDR
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

10/3
420 1/11/45

441
802

Loose Minute.

55

For Organisation.

1. Reference is made to your loose minute MAP/1606/ORG dated 7th. March, 1945.
2. The attached letter has been received from the A.F.S.C. (reference AFSC/655/Eq. dated 9th. March, 1945), in reply to the telephonic conversation from this Section as suggested in para.5. of the minute referred to above.

Chenoy

for (C. CHENOY),
Squadron Leader,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 12th. March, 1945.

Ref:- MAP/1200/ALS.

Loose Minutes.

To: Chief of Staff, Air Force.

SWA
CWS
DASH
CASH
HSE
9/1/44
Rosen
Haley

1. I have carefully studied the attached correspondence, which represents in considerable detail, the reactions of the Italian authorities, as a result of the C-in-C's instructions regarding the reduction of the Italian Air Force.

2. The letter from the Air Force Sub-Commission is an attempt to put the Italian point of view to the C-in-C, as well as the sentiments as expressed by the Italian Chief of Air Staff and the Minister for Air.

3. Briefly summarized, the gist of all this is as follows:-

(a) If the C-in-C insists on the reduction of the Italian Air Force as per his instructions, the effect upon the morale of the Italian Air Force will be bordering on disaster.

(b) Whilst in agreement that the Italian Air Force must be re-organized into a small but efficient Air Force, capable of fighting the Allied War Effort, it is an injustice to force Italians to fight against a common enemy, when the fruits of victory, however small, cannot be offered to them.

(c) Since the Allies have allowed the Italians to fight against Germans, if only as co-belligerents, they are entitled to some recognition, since they have achieved miracles in the reconstruction and improvisation of their aircraft, and this in face of inadequate food and pay, poor clothing and accommodation.

(d) The recognition the Italians want, are,
(i) to be allowed to fight on the Italian Front.
(ii) to have further killed planes given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.

(e) The Macchi aircraft is the most efficient plane of their wreckage, and the Italians have become desperately attached to them in the belief that they would be used against the enemy. The storage and breaking up of about 200 aircraft will be a bitter blow to the hearts of the pilots, many of whom, if this is carried out, will never be able to fly again.

(f) The Italian Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility which the C-in-C's order must attribute to it for maintaining the efficiency of its own Air Force, since not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on, with an alternative between existence and non-existence, it would appear that complete collapse would result.

3. Briefly summarized, the gist of all this is as follows:-

(a) If the 3-in-1. insists on the reduction of the Italian Air Force as per his instructions, the effect upon the morale of the Italian Air Force will be bordering on disaster.

(b) Whilst in agreement that the Italian Air Force must be re-organized into a small but efficient Air Force, capable of assisting the Allied war effort, it is an injustice to force Italians to fight against a common enemy, when the fruits of victory, however small, cannot be offered to them.

(c) Since the Allies have allowed the Italians to fight against Germany, if only as co-belligerents, they are entitled to some recognition, since they have achieved miracles in the reconstruction and improvisation of their aircraft, and this in face of inadequate food and pay, poor clothing and accommodation.

(d) The recognition the Italians want, are,
(i) to be allowed to fight on the Italian front.

(ii) to have further Allied planes given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.

(e) The Macchi aircraft is the most efficient plane of their wreckage, and the Italians have become desperately attached to them in the belief that they would be used against the enemy. The storage and breaking up of about 200 aircraft will be a bitter blow to the hearts of the pilots, many of whom, if this is carried out, will never be able to fly again.

(f) The Italian Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility which the C-in-C's order must attribute to it for maintaining the efficiency of its own Air Force, since not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on, with an alternative between existence and non-existence, it would appear that complete collapse would result.

(g) The Italians ask to fight as fiercely as possible, no matter what the sacrifice or risk, in the belief that their efforts will be recognized, and they and Italy will be assured of a place, however modest, in a future Air Force.

4. An impression is current in the Italian Air Force that having promised Italy that whatever she can do in aid of the Allies, will count in her favour at the Peace Conference, the Allies are deliberately restricting supplies and aircraft so as to keep the Italian effort to a minimum.

5. The Minister for Air, raises the issue to a political plane, and states that such reduction would have serious political repercussions.

1 para. 6.

See 1/

6. The effect on the public opinion of the country would be extremely serious. Not only would the authority of the Government be diminished but the dignity of the country would be struck, and the faithful trust which it has had in the United Nations, endangered.

7. The Minister for Air asks the President of the Council of Ministers to appeal to London expressing the Italian wish for a recognition permitting them to participate with renewed warlike spirit in the last phases of the war.

8. The Chief of Air Staff has nothing to propose of a constructive nature, but discussion with the Air Force Sub-Commission reveals the following line of thought:-

(a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchi to training, could they not retain their entire squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.I.V. The pool could be located at the C.I.V.

(b) That the various complete aircraft, if no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

9. The Air Force Sub-Commission recommends that we agree to the above proposals (a) and (b) and suggests the position would be all the more secure if we grant the following concessions:-

(a) No. 9. Squadron is in complete existence, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield space for it exists at MUVA. Would it be possible:-

(i) To re-equip it with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, No 10 or 11 that is not possible.

(ii) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources if aircrafts should suffice to get three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Vent 1007 Squadron with Baltimore.

10. I record my own impression as Appendix 'A'.

could they not retain their entire air squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little or excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.T.U. The pool could be located at the C.T.U.

(b) That the varied and obsolete aircraft, of no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

5. The Air Corps School of Maintenance recommends that we agree to the above proposals (a) and (b) and suggest the position would be no more secure if we grant the following concessions:-

(a) No. 2 Squadron is in complete existence, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield space for it exists at NUYA. Would it be possible:-

(d) To re-equip it with some obsolete marks of Spitfire, No 10 or if that is not possible.

To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of aircraft should suffice to re-equip three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the diving Cent 1007 Squadron with Baltimore.

10. I record my own impressions at Appendix A.

L. Lennoy Esq.

(G. CORRY),
Squadron Leader,
Wing Commander,
Allied Mission Section.

Date:- 11th. March, 1945.

Ref:- 102X/120X/515.

APPENDIX 'A'.

1. There are my impression of the position, given as briefly as possible, in order not to confuse the issue.

(i) The C-in-C's instructions regarding the pruning of the Italian Air Force, have been received with alarm.

(ii) The Italians, having lost the war, are determined to make mighty efforts to retain what remains of their Air Force and if possible to obtain Allied assistance in the way of aircraft.

(iii) They are desperately anxious to secure an opportunity to prove their worth in fighting the Germans, in order that the future of their Air Force can be assured. They have one eye perpetually on the post-war Air Force, notwithstanding the C-in-C's statement that nothing has been decided on this question.

(iv) To achieve this end, they ask to be given Allied types.

(v) They bring pressure to bear from a humane point of view and play on this to the extreme.

(vi) The political angle and the effect on public opinion is also stressed. (I cannot visualise the man in the street being very worried at present about the size of the Italian Air Force).

(vii) Should they fail in their effort to obtain further Allied types, they are not willing to lose their old wreckage. The Italian Chief of Staff states:-

"If it is true that our flying material is too much of a burden in proportion to the results it gives and it is no longer to be used, then can it not be replaced as soon as possible even when the war is over? or, let it be stored without demolishing it, if it is all that we can count upon during the long and obscure after-war future".

(viii) The above statement brings us back to the question of the future of the Italian Air Force (if any). If a ruling could be obtained on this, the problem would be considerably clarified.

(ix) The Italians do not realize that the only way of keeping many of their aircraft in the air, is by producing spares through cannibalization.

craft.

- (iii) They are desperately anxious to secure an opportunity to prove their worth in fighting the German, in order that the future of their Air Force can be assured. They have one eye perpetually on the post-war Air Force, notwithstanding the C-in-C's statement that nothing has been decided on this question.
- (iv) To achieve this end, they ask to be given Allied types.
- (v) They bring pressure to bear from a humane point of view and play on this to the extreme.
- (vi) The political angle and the effect on public opinion is also stressed. (I cannot visualize the man in the street being very worried at present about the size of the Italian Air Force).
- (vii) Should they fall in their effort to obtain further Allied types, they are not willing to lose their old wreckage. The Italian Chief of Staff states:-
"If it is true that our flying material is too much of a burden in proportion to the results it gives and it is no longer to be used, then can it not be replaced as soon as possible even when the war is over? or, let it be stored without demolishing it, if it is all that we can count upon during the long and obscure after-war future".
- (viii) The above statement brings us back to the question of the future of the Italian Air Force (if any). If a ruling could be obtained on this, the problem would be considerably clarified.
- (ix) The Italians do not realize that the only way of keeping many of their aircraft in the air, is by producing spares through cannibalization.
- (x) Should the recommendation in AFSO/23/AIN para. 12(b) attached, be considered, I feel that no units should be placed upon the "several R.A.F. units in the immediate vicinity" as is suggested.
- (xi) Finally, whatever the C-in-C's decision is on this matter, I think it should be made perfectly clear to the Italian Air Ministry, that R.A.F. units require as many Italian Air Force personnel as can be spared from the operational Air Force. This total should be governed by R.A.F. advice, as we urgently need many personnel as possible, immediately.

Henry G.

(C. GONSOY)
Squadron Leader.

FROM: AIR STAFFS SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COM. STAFF, MILK.

TO: HEADQUARTERS,
MILK, 5.1.1.
COST: ARMY COMMISSIONER, M.G. ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 25th March, 1945.

REF: 12356/23/45.

SECRET.

With reference to this Sub-Commission's letter 12356/23/45 of the 17th February, 1945, addressed to Generalissime Cat, Chief of Italian Air Staff, copies of which were forwarded to your Headquarters, and to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

2. A reply from Generalissimo Cat has now been received, with a literal translation of this is attached as Appendix "A" to this letter. The General's letter is written in the usual flowery Italian manner, and I feel that I should attempt to put the Italian point of view to you as clearly as possible, so I see it. Through my constant contact with them I feel that I appreciate their attitude, and can explain it in English better than any translation of an Italian letter can do.

3. They claim they have lost the war and at the time of the Armistice they would have had no complaint if the Allies had insisted on complete disarmament of the I.A.S. Since, however, the Allies have allowed them to carry on the fight against Germany, even if only as co-belligerents, they feel that they are entitled to some recognition. They insist on, and are one can say them this, that they have almost achieved victories in the reconstruction of their aircraft from salvage and by improvisation, and they feel that this too must be taken into consideration. They point out that what they have done has been achieved in face of inadequate food and pay, and poor clothing and accommodation.

4. The tangible recognition which they want is:-

(a) To be allowed to fight on the Italian front

and (b) To have further Allied types given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.

5. With the typical Italian inability to take a practical point of view, they say no consideration is to be made as given by Sir John Blenkinsop to Generalissimo Cat, and repeated to him and other I.A.S. officials by me on many occasions. That the Macchi is no longer an operational type, that aircrafts to succumbulate them on the Italian front do not exist, and that we simply have no Allied types of aircraft with which to replace them. The General's reference in paragraph 3 of his letter to the "fighting field at 12356" is a typical example of his point of view. The negotiations, in fact, a chance conversation which occurred during one of my visits of inspection to the operational units. It took place in the office of the Italian Officer Commanding the 1st Transport Wing. The Italians themselves had noticed

2. A reply from Generalissimo Cat has now been received, and a literal translation of this is attached as Appendix "A" to this letter. The General's letter is written in the usual clumsy Italian manner, and I feel that I should attempt to put the Italian point of view to you as clearly as possible, as I see it. Through my constant contact with them I feel that I appreciate their motives, and our overall situation is in English better than any translation of any other letter can be.
3. They know they have lost the war and at the time of the Armistice they would have had no complaint if the Allies had insisted on complete elimination of the Axis. Since, however, the Allies have allowed them to remain in the fight against Germany, even if only as co-belligerents, they feel that they are entitled to some recognition. They point out, and as our army men know, that they have almost achieved miracles in the reconstruction of their aircraft from salvaged and by improvisation, and they feel that this too must be taken into consideration. They point out that what they have done has been achieved in face of inadequate food and pay, and poor clothing and accommodation.
4. The tangible recognition which they want is:
 - (a) To be allowed to fight on the Italian front
 - (b) To have further Allied types given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.
5. With the typical Italian inability to take a practical point of view, they pay no consideration to the facts as given by Sir John Slawson to Generalissimo Cat, and repeated to him and other I.A.F. officers by me on many occasions: that the Macchi is no longer an operational type, that aircrafts to accommodate them on the Italian front do not exist, and that we simply have no Allied types of aircraft with which to re-equip them. The General's reference in paragraph 3 of his letter to the "newest Macchi" is a typical example of his point of view. The meeting was, in fact, a charge conversation which occurred during one of my visits of inspection to the operational units. It took place in the office of the Italian Officer Commanding the Bomber Transport Wing. The Italians themselves had noticed the re-assembly of the 205 group, and informed that Wellington aircraft would be turned up. There was some discussion as to how quickly Italian crews could become operational on Wellingtons, and D.C.3's were also mentioned. I was at some pains to point out that any type of aircraft which could be absorbed by G.I.'s would be very unlikely to become available, and that the Wellington was a type particularly suited to the G.I.'s. This seems to have been conserved into some sort of promise that the I.A.F. would be given Wellingtons.
6. I feel that it will with difficulty be possible to explain to Italian pilots that we cannot let them fight on the Italian front, and that further re-assembly with Allied types, is literally impossible. I believe that this could be put over without causing any considerable loss of morale. I would, however, call particular attention to a belief which was, at one time, current in the Italian Air Force, and is now current again. This is that, having promised Italy that whatever she can do in aid of the Allies

-2-

will count in our favor at the Peace Conference, the Allies are deliberately restricting supplies of aircraft and materials, so as to keep the Italian effort down to a minimum. This program started at the time when difficulties as regards the supply of ground equipment and spare parts slowed down the re-arming with aircraft and personnel. It has now intensified itself over our most recent proposals.

Having realized that there can be no question of fighting on the Italian front, and no question of any further re-arming with Allied types, the I.A.S. is asked to survive the terrible blow of the relegation of the Italians to training, and the breaking up of their curricula and obsolete aircraft which cannot be devoted to the immediate war effort.

Logically there can be no case for the retention of either the Macchi or the obsolete aircraft, in the furtherance of the war against Germany, is the only consideration. The Macchis are no longer a first line aircraft, and the obsolete aircraft are far beyond economical maintenance. The Italian pilot, however, cannot see it from this point of view, and, moving down his best according to his lights, now finds the greater part of what little remains of his air force being irrevocably taken away from him. This may be difficult to understand from our point of view, but it must be appreciated that Italians have a totally different mental outlook, and place a far greater value on sentiment. Asked to this I know that they feel that they are being unfairly treated.

General Airone Cat feels that the morale of the I.A.S. will be unable to survive these blows, and that nothing that he can do can avert a complete collapse. This would, very naturally, have serious political repercussions, and the matter has now been raised to the political plane by a letter from the Air Minister to the President of the Council of Ministers (M. S. SCHULI), a translation of which is attached.

I do not feel that the General is exaggerating unduly when he warns us of a probable collapse of the I.A.S. The aircrews are exceedingly temperamental, and as stated above are highly sensitive to real or imaginary loss of prestige. Added to this is the fact that our instructions must inevitably meet the resistance of a number of pilots, if not of other aircrew.

The General himself has expressed his feelings to me by saying that he cannot see any way out of the collapse of the I.A.S. should he meet at this stage, when, in all honesty, there are only a few more months of war in Europe left.

Except for the suggestion to store the obsolete aircraft, made in paragraph 6 of the General's letter, he has nothing to propose of a constructive nature. I have, however, had several discussions with him, and the following represents his line of thought.

12. (a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchis to training, could they not retain their identity as squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and third pilots in the first line squadrons. The aircrew absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.E.U. The pool could be located at the C.E.U.

13. (a) In view of the above, could the pool be used to the immediate

the obsolete aircraft are far beyond economical maintenance. The Italian pilot, however, cannot see it from this point of view, and, having done his best according to his lights, now finds the greater part of what little remains of his Air Force being irretrievably taken away from him. This may be difficult to understand from our point of view, and it must be appreciated that Italians have a totally different mental outlook, and place a far greater value on sentiment. Added to this, some may say that they feel that they are being unfairly treated.

2. General Almonet Galt feels that the morale of the I.A.F. will be unable to survive these blows, and that nothing that he can do can avert a complete collapse. This would, very naturally, have serious political repercussions, and the matter has now been raised to the political plane, by a letter from the Air Minister to the President of the Council of Ministers (M. L. BASTIEN), a translation of which is attached.

3. I do not feel that the General is exaggerating unduly when he speaks of a probable collapse of the I.A.F. The aircrews are exceedingly temperamental, and as stated above are highly sensitive to real or imaginary loss of prestige. Added to this is the fact that our instructions must inevitably seem the result of a number of blunders, if not of other aircrew.

10. The General himself has expressed his feelings to me by saying that he cannot see any way out of the risk of the collapse of the I.A.F. should be taken at this stage, when, we all hope, there are only a few more months of war in Europe left.

11. Except for the suggestion to store the obsolete aircraft, made in paragraph 6 of the General's letter, he has nothing to propose of a constructive nature. I have, however, had several discussions with him, and the following represents his line of thought.

12. (a) Instead of simply relegating the machines to training, could they not retain their envy squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.I.F. The pool could be located at the C.I.F.

(b) What the varied and obsolete aircraft, of no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

13. I should like to recommend that we agree to the proposals at 12 (a) and (b) above. As regards (b) the material solved by the reduction of the aircraft to produce would be of particularly no value to the war effort. I consider that we should, however, insist on the reduction to produce for spare of all aircraft of types which we are to retain in service and which are beyond economical repair. I suggest that the remaining obsolete aircraft should be inhibited and stored. As regards (a) the suggestion of storage, which is adequate in size and of little agricultural value. It is, moreover, well out of the way, there are no British units in the neighbourhood, and a small guard would suffice to safeguard them from pilferage. Several I.A.F. units are in

the immediate vicinity in it would be easy to ensure ~~that~~ no disintegration work or flying took place on these aircraft.

14. I consider that this represents the minimum possible concessions that we can make to avert a possible collapse. The position would be made far more secure if we could grant some further small concessions.

15. I would therefore suggest that consideration be given to the following:-

(a) No. 9 Squadron is in complete confusion, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield number for it exists at 1000. Could it be possible:-

(i) To re-equip it with some obsolete models of Spitfires, or if that is not possible

(ii) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of aircrafts should suffice to see three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the flying unit 1007 squadron at Baltimore. The Baltimore flying unit, I submit, proved to be worth, and the unit 1007 crew are all fully trained and very experienced. I believe that there is a large number of Baltimore in reserve, for which there are few operational commitments. The drawback of this proposal is that the aircraft at BALTIMORE, which would be required for training the squadron is not yet fit for flying. The granting of this concession might well have the effect of speeding up the work at BALTIMORE, as well as being a real tonic to morale.

16. As the General states in paragraph 2 of his letter, he is perfectly in accord with our wish to transform the I.A.F. into a small and efficient Air Force, and during recent transactions he has shown practically that he is sincere in this. It is for felt that our agreement to any of the proposals set out in paragraphs 12 and 14 above would be contrary to the aim of a small efficient Force.

W. A. B. Bunker.

W. A. B. BUNKER-BUNKER,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

53A

FROM: H.E. DYCER to CHAMONIC,
MINISTER OF AIR

TO: H.E. IVANUS ROBERT,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

REF NO: 152R.

DATE: 6TH MARCH 1945.

My dear President,

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter that the Chief of Italian Air Staff has today forwarded to the Air Vice-Marshal in reply to a grave communication received from him.

From the document in question it is seen that, in accordance with orders given to the A.V.M., and submitted by him to the Chief of Air Staff, the Italian Air Force is to be reduced so that it will be comprised of 124 Italian aircraft (fighters, light bombers and transport) and 30 (or perhaps 122) Allied aircraft, and even these without any assurance that they will be used in combat.

Now I believe that our Air Force cannot stand this fierce blow, which Italy is prepared to constitute a notable contribution to the contribution. It would be a disaster to make for the common cause, but it would mean that the pilots would be continuing to fight without any hope of the Italian Air Force surviving the war. The pilots, although they may be revolted by the thought that they are bombing Italian territory and cities, are proud and happy to attack on any soil, and preferably on Italian, German troops in combat or in retreat. But if the fighters are reduced to a minimum, what outlet can our pilots' ardent desire to fight have?

During my recent visit to the units in PRIMA, living in close contact with them I learned that they ask for nothing more than to fight and to fight as unashamedly as formerly as possible, no matter what the risk, in the belief that their efforts will be recognized, and that they and Italy will be ensured of a place, even though a modest one, in a future Air Force. Consequently, this problem arises from the technical plane to the political one, and it is necessary that the voice of our Government goes out and reaches the high authorities who are able to take definite decisions.

Apart from the aforementioned reasons of a military character, it is unnecessary for me to point out to you the grave repercussions which this unexpected blow to our Air Force would have on the public opinion of our country. Not only would the authority of our Government be diminished, but the dignity of the country would be struck, and the faithful trust which it has in the United Nations would be diminished. I call your particular attention to this point.

You know better than I do that Italy is united in its sympathy

Air Staff has today forwarded to the Air Vice-Marshal in reply to a grave communication received from him.

From the document in question it is seen that, in accordance with orders given to the A.V.M., and submitted by him to the Chief of Air Staff, the Italian Air Force is to be reduced so that it will be comprised of 121 Italian aircraft (fighters, light bombers and transport), and 50 (or perhaps 120) Allied aircraft, and even these without any assurance that they will be used in combat.

Now I believe that our Air Force cannot stand this drastic blow, that blow would not only constitute a notable diminution to the contribution which Italy is prepared to make for the common cause, but it would mean that the allies would be continuing to fight without any hope of the Italian Air Force surviving the war. The pilots, although they may be recruited by the thought that they are bombing Italian territory and cities, are proud and happy to attack an air base, and preferably an Italian. German troops in combat or in retreat, but if the fighters are reduced to a minimum, what outlet can our pilots find and desire to fight have?

During my recent visit to the units in the A.V.M., living in close contact with them I learned that they look for nothing more than to fight and to fight as successfully and fearfully as possible, no matter what the risk, in the belief that their efforts will be recognized, and that they and Italy will be assured of a peace, even though a painful one, in a future Air Force. Consequently, this problem arises from the technical view to the political one, and it is necessary that the value of our Government goes out and reaches the high authorities who are able to take definite decisions.

Apart from the aforementioned reasons of a military character, it is unnecessary for me to point out to you the grave repercussions which this unexpected blow to our Air Force would have on the public opinion of our country. Not only would the authority of our Government be diminished, but the dignity of the country would be struck, and the faithful trust which it has in the United Nations would be diminished. I call your particular attention to this point.

You know better than I do that Italy is united in its sympathy for the great British Nation to whom it owes gratitude for the stand which it took during the vicissitudes, and for the help received during the war of 1914-1918. Italy has borne the Allies devastating bombardments without protest. I myself in August 1943 witnessed the destruction of my home and also of a large part of Milan, and I never heard a voice of resentment; all the hatred of the people was directed only against Mussolini and Hitler. I consider therefore, that in this moment when victory is in sight you should convey to London the expression of our wish for a recognition which will permit us to participate with renewed war-like spirit in the last phases of the war.

I have placed my expectations sincerely in front of you before the demoralising news reaches the country, confident in your immediate intervention.

Believe me,
Yours devotedly,

L. CASTAGNOLI.

+ Over.

-2-

With reference to the asterisk, I would remind you with that asterisk we received the news of the statement made by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on the 24th May 1944 - "The loyal Italian Air Force has fought so well that I am making special efforts to equip it with modern planes of British make".

TRANSLATION.

FROM: H.Q. GENERAL E. AMICO CAT,
CHIEF OF AIR ST,
ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY, ROME.

TO: AIR VICE-MARSHAL M.A.B. NO 100-10000000,
AIR MARCHES SUPER-INTENDENT,
ARMED COMMISSION, ROME.

REF: 0100009/2000.

DATE: 6TH MARCH, 1945.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

I have delayed my reply to your letter reference AIRC/23/ALP of the 27th February 1945 for the following reasons:

(a) The gravity of the consequences of the orders you have commissioned to be in the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief M.A.B. are such as to necessitate such serious reflection concerning the opportunity and the manner of transmitting these orders to the dependent organizations, and they compel me to examine carefully my own position of responsibility as regards the actual situation of the Force which seems now to have become unsustainable and incurable, and the future situation in which appears to be irretrievably compromised.

(b) The immediacy with which it is requested that all the orders be carried out cannot be realized because of a complexity of reasons which must be within the cognizance of M.A.B. and yourself and which are derived from the living conditions and functions of the Force and the actual situation in the country, already several times pointed out by us both verbally and in writing.

On the other hand a brief delay will have no influence on the activities of the combat units and will not influence, for the moment, their efficiency, while a hasty or unwise step could lead to grave consequences for which I do not wish at any cost to assume the responsibility.

I consider therefore that it is indispensable that I frankly lay before you my thoughts on the subject before taking steps to execute the more drastic part of the orders which have reached me, whilst I will certainly put into process of execution the part which concerns the establishment and control of the personnel.

2. I am perfectly in agreement with the C-in-C of M.A.B. and with yourself when you say it is necessary to organize our Air Force in a small but efficient Force that is capable of assisting the Allied Forces in their defeat of the Germans, but I consider that ~~you~~ must agree with us on the injustice and impossibility of forcing the men to fight in order to meet and defeat the ^{only} for them to finish up without any of the fruits of victory, no matter how limited and modest they may be.

And this is to be our case, since, when the German coming 12 months of fighting against Germany are at an end the Italian Air Force is to be reduced to 60 Allied aircraft for combat, perhaps 20 Allied aircraft for training, and 40 Italian aircraft, dismantling and storing the others, and without hope of concessions

(a) The gravity of the consequences of the orders you have communicated to me by the instructions of the President-in-Chief of the U.S.A. are such as to necessitate much serious reflection concerning the opportunities and the manner of transmitting these orders to the dependent organizations, and they compel me to examine carefully my composition of responsibility as regards the normal situation of this force which must not have become unstable and incoherent, and the future situation which seems to be increasingly compromised.

(b) The immediacy with which it is requested that all the orders be carried out cannot be realized because of a complexity of reasons which must be within the competence of the U.S.A. and yourself, and which are derived from the living conditions and functions of the force and the actual situation in the country, already several times pointed out by me both verbally and in writing.

On the other hand a brief delay will have no influence on the activities of the combat units and will not influence, for the moment, their efficiency, while a heavy or undue strain could lead to grave consequences for which I do not wish to accept the responsibility.

I consider therefore that it is inadvisable that I transmit before you my thoughts on the subject before taking steps to execute the more drastic parts of the orders which have been issued, whilst I will certainly put into process of execution the part which concerns the establishment and control of the personnel.

2. I am perfectly in agreement with the C-in-C of the U.S.A. and with yourself when you say it is necessary to organize our air force for a well but efficient force that is capable of assisting the Allied Forces in their defeat of the Germans, but I consider that you must agree with us on the impossibility of forcing the men to fight in order to meet and defeat the only force to which we without any of the faults of victory, no matter how limited and modest they may be.

And this is to be our case, since, when the fourteen coming 12 months of fighting against Germany are at an end the Italian Air Force is to be reduced to 50 Allied aircraft for combat, perhaps 10 Allied aircraft for training, and 121 Italian aircraft, demolishing and storing the others, and of these none of considerable importance of that present future for which it is attempted to reconstruct itself, and for which it has lived and fought through a year of sacrifices, bitterness and humiliation, and during which time it has expended all its healthiest and best energies, that future in the name of which today one can only continue to demand further sacrifices and dedications, and which is the only way one is able to impose order and discipline.

3. This astonishing victory will only be the direct consequence of the actual events laid down by the U.S.A. It might be opportune to take a look back at the preceding circumstances. The eventual allocation of replacements in substitution for our most damaged bombers, if this was used for, was due to no initiative taken by us and it is also necessary to admit that the men in the field at present, not through our initiative, justified us in believing, more than hoping, that something would be done for us in the very near future.

Instead, not only is there no more talk of replacements, but that I should send out to the front replacements in necessity that the small new Italian Air Force would have to wait until the rehabilitation of the national industry.

are therefore for my ears. -- I received the reply last "it was not known whether Italy would have any money to purchase Allied aircraft after the war; or whether the Allies would wait to give their material", as though there did not exist other possibilities of political economy for delivery and problems.

The same subject was again brought up a few days later by Sir John Slessor in his letter reference number 22, 1076 of the 13th January 1945, in which he informed us that it was his duty to utilize and therefore assist the Italian Air Force in its use in the war now in progress, but that he could give us no information concerning the future state of our force, this being something which would be decided when peace came.

Nevertheless, in spite of suffering unduly bitterness through these replies, there was not yet any reason to lose last hope which now these new orders from A.A.A.F. have shattered.

4. The actual orders are to be executed immediately and with the full knowledge of the hard blow which will be inflicted on the hearts of our fighting pilots, and to many other pilots who, with the stering and demolishing of about 800 aircraft, will no longer have the possibility of flying.

Our pilots feel no particular tenderness for the MACCHI, and if the MACCHI were substituted by other aircraft, this would very soon be seen.

The pilots have desperately attached themselves to the MACCHI because of the fear that they would not be given any other aircraft and that the end of the MACCHI would coincide with first reduction, and then the liquidation of the Italian Air Force, for the MACCHI is the most efficient aircraft for combat that we have amongst our wreckage. The pilots ~~del~~ would operate on the belief that the MACCHI aircraft piloted by them, would operate on the Italian front.

And their illusion was not entirely unjustified because there are no similar aircraft on the other side, and also because it would have been possible to adopt Allied markings for them, but a different decision has been taken, and it is our duty to abide by it. Nevertheless, how can the pilots believe that the disbanding of the few glorious units which have stood up to the National catastrophe and collaborated with the Allies to an extent and under conditions which do not deserve to be forgotten, is to be erased upon them.

5. The Union which has disappeared today, and those which must cease to exist tomorrow when the war is brought to a conclusion, were, after the fatal 8th of September 1943, torn between their sense of military honour and their instinct to fight against the traditional enemy. They rapidly overcame their spiritual crisis and spontaneously arrayed themselves by the side of the Allies. The human efforts with which they gave proof of their efficiency, assembling aircraft and engines from wreckage and stores which no other Air Force in the world would have had the courage to use for flying, earned for them the respect and consideration of the Allies.

For yourself are aware of and have witnessed what was done at RANDOLI for the 32.605 engines.

They took part in combat operations, attempting to emulate, with full and ample success, and as a frequent and unconditional recognition on the part of the Allies, the units of the Allied Nations with A.A.F.

I feel it is my duty to forward with this letter a summary of the activities carried out since the 8th September 1943 up to today, thus showing the losses incurred, amongst them two Commanding Officers at the head of their respective formations, and I must remind you of the recognized effort the Italians have made and achieved to overcome difficulties of every kind, both in the air and on the ground, in order to give the maximum results.

Our pilots feel that this would very soon be seen.

The MACCHIS were substituted by other aircraft. This would very soon be seen. The pilots have deservately attacked themselves to the MACCHIS because of the fact that they would not be given any other aircraft and that the end of the MACCHIS would coincide with first reduction, and then the liquidation of the Italian Air Force, for the MACCHI is the most efficient aircraft for combat that we have amongst our enemies. The pilots **del** used themselves with the belief that the MACCHI aircraft **del** by them. would operate on the Italian front. And their illusions are not entirely unfounded because there are no similar aircraft on the other side, and also because it would have been possible to adopt Allied machines for them, but a different decision has been taken, and it is our duty to abide by it. Nevertheless, how can the pilots believe that the disbanding of the few glorious units which have stood up to the National catastrophe and collaborated with the Allies to an extent and under conditions which do not deserve to be forgotten, is to be imposed upon them.

5. The facts which must disappear today, and those which must cease to exist tomorrow when the war is brought to a conclusion, were, after the fatal day of September 1943, torn between their sense of military honour and their instinct to fight against the traditional enemy. They readily overcome their spiritual crisis and spontaneously arrayed themselves by the side of the Allies. The super-human efforts with which they gave proof of their efficiency, assembling aircraft and engines from wreckage and scrap which no other Air Force in the world would have had the courage to use for flying, carried for them the respect and consideration of the Allies.

You yourselves are aware of and have witnessed what was done at

SPINDEI for the D.E. 605 engines.

They took part in combat operations, attempting to emulate, with full and ample success, and with frequent and unconditional recognition on the part of the Allies, the units of the Allied Nations with B.E.F.

I feel it is my duty to furnish with this letter a summary of the activities carried out since the 5th September 1943 up to today. This shows the losses undergone, amongst them two Commanding Officers at the head of their respective formations, and I must remind you of the recognised effort the Italians have made and achieved to overcome difficulties of every kind, both in the air and on the ground, in order to give the maximum results.

All this they have done under hard and discouraging conditions, such as insufficient food, ridiculously low pay, and a grave lack of clothing and equipment.

You have remarked and lamented on the miserable pay and have asked the Minister for concessions, some of which he has obtained, but in a measure still inadequate to our needs because of our impossibility to provide for ourselves.

Your own officers have pointed out the insufficiency of the food in comparison with the amount of the work carried out by the men, and they have proposed compensations for the best workers who work beyond the scheduled hours.

These points have been brought to our attention in order that action be taken, knowing at the same time, that it is quite impossible for us to do anything ourselves, as we would wholeheartedly do if we were able.

Since I first took over my present post I have been asking for the same conditions for our fighting pilots as those given to the soldiers of the least favoured of the Allied Nations. I have not obtained my point because this is a problem which must be decided at Washington. If there is no other way, the problem

Continued 13.....

-3-

ought therefore to be represented to Washington and let us give the fighters that material and moral loss which will put him on the necessary level in keeping with his dignity as a man and a soldier.

Instead no considerable help has been given to fight that sense of desolation and demoralization that the personnel have -- and which regrettably the majority of the Italian population also have -- and which will end by sliding the fighters to the belief that the cause is lost and the sacrifice is in vain.

6. If it is true that our flying material is too much of a burden in proportion to the results it gives and it is no longer to be used, then can it not be replaced as soon as possible over when the war is over, or, let it be stored without demoralizing it, if it is all that we can count upon during the long and obscure after-war future.

The efforts which must follow in order to keep in the fighting line the aircraft to be used, could be made with the consent of the Allies and a little aid from them.

We do beg at least the right to conserve our old wreckage if we cannot have the certitude of other help no matter how modest and limited.

7. I am relied upon -- and you have great faith in my capacity to carry out my task -- to put into execution the demobilization and reduction without causing a lowering in the morale and the efficiency of the operational units, and without any ensilage regarding this in offered to me.

In my letter reference number 010104, 30 of the 10th January 1945 I explicitly said how difficult it was for me D.C. no matter what his authority, to sustain the then existing situation by only personally intervening and with words. I said that such intervention even then of limited effectiveness would and by becoming more damaging than useful, and I suggested that could be done to improve the situation, also in order to give sufficient authority to myself.

I do not know what collective and efficacious advice can be given to me today in order to help me face the new situation.

The only thing would be to communicate to the Allies the complete and integral truth regarding the future destiny of the Italian Air Force, and to attempt to promote in the personnel a species of ecstatic and transcendental state of mind, a procedure so far never attempted on the scale of the fighters of my country.

Since, in the noble human aim of the fighters of my country, is left to us but the sacrifice for the conquest of an aim beyond this world, nothing however, would be an apostolic mission, not one of war. I do not know how with results any Commander or Armed Forces could resort to these means.

8. It is clear that under such conditions the Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility, which you would attribute to it, for the maintaining of the efficiency of its own Air Force, since, not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on with an alternative between existence and non-existence it could appear that the result is to be the collapse of the Italian Air Force.

On the other hand, a positive and acquiescent attitude would prejudice the solidarity and the discipline of our Force, fatally contributing to future situations, which it in our precise duty to foresee and provide for, in order not to allow ourselves responsible before the country and the Allies.

9. I regret to have been forced to be so painfully frank, but whatever is destined to happen to me personally is of no consequence, but that which I consider is of great importance is the survival of the Italian Air Force.

7. We do not at least the right to conserve our old wreckage if we cannot have the confidence of other help no matter how modest and limited.

I am relieved when -- you have great faith in my capacity to carry out my task -- to get into execution the demolition and reduction without causing a lowering in the morale and the efficiency of the operational units, and advice in maintenance regarding this is of great value.

In my letter reference number 6100/1, of the 10th January, 1945, I explicitly said how difficult it was for me C.O. no matter what his authority, to sustain the then existing situation or only personally intervening and with words. I said that such intervention over them of limited effectiveness would end by becoming more damaging than useful, and I suggested that could be done to improve the situation, also in order to play a sufficient authority to myself.

I do not know what objective and efficacious advice can be given to me today in order to help me face the new situation.

The only thing would be to communicate to the units the complete and integral truth regarding the future destiny of the Italian Air Force, and to attempt to promote in the personnel a sense of action and transcendental state of mind, a procedure so far never attempted on the basis of the fighters of my country.

Since, if the noble human aim of the struggle -- in to come to exist, nothing is left to us but the sacrifice for the conquest of an aim beyond this world. with However, would be an apostolic mission, not one of war. I do not know how with what results any Commander of Armed Forces could resort to these means.

6. It is clear that under such conditions the Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility, which you would attribute to it, for the maintaining of the efficiency of its own Air Force, since, not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on with an alternative between existence and non-existence it would appear that the result is to be the collapse of the Italian Air Force.

On the other hand, a passive and acquiescent attitude would prejudice the solidarity and the discipline of our Force. Fatally contributing to future situations, which it is our precise duty to foresee and provide for, in order not to make ourselves responsible before the country and the Allies.

9. I regret to have been forced to be so painfully frank, but whatever is destined to happen to me personally it is my sacred duty to safeguard that which I consider to be the just recognition due to our Force, to the memory of our Fallen and those who have yet to fall, to its identity which has been injured by the conditions which have been imposed upon it up to now, and for the sake of that hoped-for, small, but merited future which constitutes its sad and modest aim.

I beg you therefore to place the situation before the competent authorities so that they may judge whether the cruel adventure undergone, the efforts made in order to rise up again, and the unconditional offer of new efforts are not deserving of more understanding and comprehension.

GENERAL. M. ANTONIO GAT
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF.

* Forwarded to W/Gen Ome, under our RFSC/R/1/Air of 11 Jan 1945.

53c

ADDITIONS OF THE I.A.F. FROM SEPTEMBER 9TH 1943
TO THE 28TH OF FEBRUARY 1945.

OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS.	4,140
ALTERNATE USED ON OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS. (Sooties)	7,700
ADDITIONAL USED ON NON-OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS, (TRANSPORT, LIAISON, ETC.),	31,400
FLIGHT HOURS ON OPERATIONS	18,300
TOTAL OF FLIGHT HOURS	39,000
BOMBS DROPPED	NBS 641,000
SUPPLIES DROPPED OR FLIGHT	NBS 3,492,000
PASSENGERS CARRIED	No. 23,300
EMPTY TRANSPORT OR INSTALLATION'S DESTROYED	370
EMPTY TRANSPORT OR INSTALLATION'S DAMAGED	1,000
A.A. MISSILE HATHINGS DESTROYED	5
REPAIR HATHINGS (Coastal shipping.)	10
REPAIR FLIGHTS SUBSIDIES ON DESTROYED OR DAMAGED	26
ITALIAN LOSSES IN ACTION (FLIGHTS)	64
ITALIAN LOSSES FOR OTHER REASONS (CRASHES ETC)	62
FLIGHTS ABANDONED LOST (KILLED OR MISSING)	124
OPERATIONS N.C.O.'s O.P.'s	38 39 53
Air/Sea Rescue AND BOMBING PREPARED	130

SEVERAL HUNDRED AND THOUSAND FLIGHTS BY U.S.A.A.F., S.A.F., AND ONE BY MARSHAL KING.

From : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION

To : ALLIED LIAISON SECTION, H.Q. I.A.A.F.

Date : 9th March 1945

Ref. : AFSC/INT/2

RECEIVED	4
11.0. 2.0. 1.0.	

I.A.A.F. Reception Centres and Salvage Units.-

1.- Following a change of personnel in this Sub Commission, it has been found from a perusal of the files that a portion of a scheme for the setting up and establishing of the units indicated above has been partly carried out, but without adequate authority from your H.Q. or from A.F. H.Q. It is therefore intended to acquaint you with the full proposals in order that proper authorisations may be given to put the project into operation, and to regularise that portion of it which has already been accomplished. It is to be emphasised that a similar scheme has received official sanction and is already in operation for Italian army personnel, and that the present memorandum deals solely with I.A.A.F. personnel.

2.- As and when northern Italy is liberated, a not inconsiderable number of I.A.A.F. personnel (whether of the Italian Republican Air Force or of other formations) will fall into Allied hands or will disperse into hiding. The former will pass into P.C.W. cages while the latter will probably attempt to lie low until their location is no longer of concern to the Allies. There is also a large number of ex-I.A.A.F. personnel in northern Italy who deserted at the time of the Armistice, and who ever since managed to escape the attention of the German military authorities.

3.- There is also, scattered all over northern Italy, a considerable quantity of I.A.A.F. material which, once it has been examined by technical intelligence officers, will be of no further use for the Allies, but will be of the utmost value to the Italians to assist them in the re-habilitation of their Air Force.

4.- In order that the Italian Air Ministry may be enabled more expeditiously to deal with the personnel and material

1.- Following a change of personnel in this Sub Commission, it has been found from a perusal of the files that a portion of a scheme for the setting up and establishing of the units indicated above has been partly carried out, but without adequate authority from your H.Q. or from A.F. H.Q. It is therefore intended to acquaint you with the full proposals in order that proper authorisations may be given to put the project into operation, and to regularise that portion of it which has already been accomplished. It is to be emphasised that a similar scheme has received official sanction and is already in operation for Italian army personnel, and that the present memorandum deals solely with I.A.F. personnel.

2.- As and when northern Italy is liberated, a not inconsiderable number of I.A.F. personnel (whether of the Italian Republican Air Force or of other formations) will fall into Allied hands or will disperse into hiding. The former will pass into P.C.W. cages while the latter will probably attempt to lie low until their location is no longer of concern to the Allies. There is also a large number of ex-I.A.F. personnel in northern Italy who deserted at the time of the Armistice, and who ever since managed to escape the attention of the German military authorities.

3.- There is also, scattered all over northern Italy, a considerable quantity of I.A.F. material which, once it has been examined by technical intelligence officers, will be of no further use for the Allies, but will be of the utmost value to the Italians to assist them in the re-habilitation of their Air Force.

4.- In order that the Italian Air Ministry may be enabled more expeditiously to deal with the personnel and material listed above, they have planned and organised a number of small self contained units, consisting of six to ten officers and W.C.O's, with sufficient transport for their needs, whom it is proposed should be stationed at certain localities corresponding to pre-war I.A.F. depots, and whose task will be

- a) to track down evading or dispersed I.A.F. personnel, and to administer and control them and to screen such personnel for fascist activities, and
- b) to locate and subsequently salvage material belonging to the I.A.F., and of which the Allies have no further need.

5.- At the present time such units are already established at Florence, Lucca, Pistoia, Leghorn and Ancona. It is desired to set up immediately two additional units, one at Forlì and the other at Ravenna. The personnel for these units were in fact dispatched, but were turned back by the 8th Army authorities, who furthermore detained one of the Italian officers. It must here be explained that all these units in the past were sent up with credentials issued for the purpose by this Sub Commission. These credentials were accepted by 8th Army but (it is considered) properly refused by 8th Army because no clearance had been given to the units to enter the army area by any higher military authority.

6.- In order to clarify and regularise the whole position it is therefore requested that authority may be given by AF HQ or AAI

- a) for two units to be set up immediately, one at Forlì and one at Ravenna, and for a third to be set up at Bologna shortly after its liberation;
- b) for the continuance of the existing units already established (as set out in paragraph 5) where this is territorially necessary;
- c) for further units to be set up in locations agreeable to Allied authorities as further territory is liberated, proposals for which will be shortly sent to you;
- d) that a directive may be issued defining the powers and freedom which may be granted to these units for the carrying out of their duties.

7.- It is emphasised that these units are entirely self supporting except for P.O.I., and that their personnel consists of competent officers who have satisfied the Italian security authorities. It is also considered by this Sub Commission that the activities of these units are solely beneficial, inasmuch as they will considerably assist the military authorities in preventing the uncontrolled movement of potentially dangerous or unreliable persons. Finally, it is stressed that the matter has now assumed some urgency, and consequently it is requested that it may be given immediate attention.

clearance had been given to the units to enter the army area by any higher military authority.

6.- In order to clarify and regularise the whole position it is therefore requested that authority may be given by AF HQ or AAI

- a) for two units to be set up immediately, one at Forlì and one at Ravenna, and for a third to be set up at Bologna shortly after its liberation;
- b) for the continuance of the existing units already established (as set out in paragraph 5) where this is territorially necessary;
- c) for further units to be set up in locations agreeable to Allied authorities as further territory is liberated, proposals for which will be shortly sent to you;
- d) that a directive may be issued defining the powers and freedom which may be granted to these units for the carrying out of their duties.

7.- It is emphasised that these units are entirely self supporting except for P.O.L., and that their personnel consists of competent officers who have satisfied the Italian security authorities. It is also considered by this Sub Commission that the activities of these units are solely beneficial, inasmuch as they will considerably assist the military authorities in preventing the uncontrolled movement of potentially dangerous or unreliable persons. Finally, it is stressed that the matter has now assumed some urgency, and consequently it is requested that it may be given immediate attention.

W. A. B. Bown-Buscabiet

W.A.B. BOWN-BUSCABLET
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

RECEIVED	1/13
4-1-43	

Loose Minute.

To: Chief of Staff/RAF, MESE.

1. I have carefully studied the attached correspondence, which represents in considerable detail, the reactions of the Italian authorities, as a result of the C-in-C's instructions regarding the reduction of the Italian Air Force.
2. The letter from the Air Force Sub-Commission is an attempt to put the Italian point of view to the C-in-C, as well as the sentiments as expressed by the Italian Chief of Air Staff and the Minister for Air.
3. Briefly summarised, the gist of all this is as follows:-
 - (a) If the C-in-C, insists on the reduction of the Italian Air Force as per his instructions, the effect upon the morale of the Italian Air Force will be bordering on disaster.
 - (b) whilst in agreement that the Italian Air Force must be re-organised into a small but efficient Air Force, capable of resisting the Allied War Effort, it is an injustice to force Italians to fight against a common enemy, when the fruits of victory, however small, cannot be offered to them.
 - (c) Since the Allies have allowed the Italians to fight against Germans, if only as co-belligerents, they are entitled to some recognition, since they have achieved miracles in the reconstruction and improvisation of their aircraft, and this in face of inadequate food and pay, poor clothing and accommodation.
 - (d) The recognitions the Italians want, are,
 - (i) to be allowed to fight on the Italian front.
 - (ii) to have further Allied planes given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.
 - (e) The Macchi aircraft is the most efficient plane of their wreckage, and the Italians have become desperately attached to them in the belief that they would be used against the enemy. The storage and breaking up of about 200 aircraft will be a bitter blow to the hearts of the pilots, many of whom, if this is carried out, will never be able to fly again.
 - (f) The Italian Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility which the C-in-C's order must attribute to it for maintaining the efficiency of its own Air Force, since not but

for Air.

3. Briefly summarised, the gist of all this is as follows:-

(a) If the C-in-C, insists on the reduction of the Italian Air Force as per his instructions, the effect upon the morale of the Italian Air Force will be bordering on disaster.

(b) Whilst in agreement that the Italian Air Force must be re-organised into a small but efficient Air Force, capable of assisting the Allied War Effort, it is an injustice to force Italians to fight against a common enemy, when the fruits of victory, however small, cannot be offered to them.

(c) Since the Allies have allowed the Italians to fight against Germans, if only as co-belligerents, they are entitled to some recognition, since they have achieved miracles in the reconstruction and improvisation of their aircraft, and this in face of inadequate food and pay, poor clothing and accommodation.

(d) The recognitions the Italians want, are,
(i) to be allowed to fight on the Italian Front.

(ii) to have further Allied planes given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.

(e) The Macchi aircraft is the most efficient plane of their wreckage, and the Italians have become desperately attached to them in the belief that they would be used against the enemy. The storage and breaking up of about 200 aircraft will be a bitter blow to the hearts of the pilots, many of whom, if this is carried out, will never be able to fly again.

(f) The Italian Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility which the C-in-C's order must attribute to it for maintaining the efficiency of its own Air Force, since not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on, with an alternative between existence and non-existence, it would appear that complete collapse would result.

(g) The Italians ask to fight as fiercely as possible, no matter what the sacrifice or risk, in the belief that their efforts will be recognised, and they are Italy will be assured of a place, however modest, in a future Air Force.

4. An impression is current in the Italian Air Force that having promised Italy that whatever she can do in aid of the Allies, will count in her favour at the Peace Conference, the Allies are deliberately restricting supplies and aircraft so as to keep the Italian effort to a minimum.

5. The Minister for Air, raises the issue to a political plane, and states that such reduction would have serious political repercussions.

/ m.6.

5. The effect on the public opinion of the country would be extremely serious. Not only would the authority of the Government be diminished but the dignity of the country would be struck, and the faithful trust which it has had in the United Nations, endangered.

7. The Minister for Air asks the President of the Council of Ministers to appeal to London expressing the Italian wish for a recognition permitting them to participate with renewed warlike spirit in the last phases of the war.

8. The Chief of Air Staff has nothing to propose of a constructive nature, but discussion with the Air Force Sub-Commission reveals the following line of thought:-

(a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchi to training, could they not retain their entire squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.T.U. The pool could be located at the C.T.U.

(b) That the varied and obsolete aircraft, of no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

9. The Air Force Sub-Commission recommends that we agree to the above proposals (a) and (b) and suggests the position would be made more secure if we grant the following concessions:-

(a) No. 9. Squadron is in complete existence, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield space for it exists at MUOVA, would it be possible:-

(i) To re-equip it with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or if that is not possible,

(ii) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of Airacobras should suffice to see three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Cent 1007 Squadron with Baltimore.

10. I record my own impressions at Appendix 'A'.

(a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchis to training, could they not retain their entity as squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.T.U. The pool could be located at the C.T.U.

(b) That the varied and obsolete aircraft, of no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

9. The Air Force Sub-Commission recommends that we agree to the above proposals (a) and (b) and suggests the position would be made more secure if we grant the following concessions:-

(a) No. 9. Squadron is in complete existence, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield space for it exists at NUOVA. would it be possible:-

(i) To re-equip it with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or if that is not possible,

(ii) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of Airacobras should suffice to see three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Cant 1007 Squadron with Baltimores.

10. I record my own impressions at Appendix 'A'.

Keeney Jr.
(C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 11th, March, 1945.

Ref:- MAP/4200/ALS.

APPENDIX 'A'.

1. These are my impressions of the position, given as briefly as possible, in order not to confuse the issue.

(i) The C-in-C's instructions regarding the pruning of the Italian Air Force, have been received with alarm.

(ii) The Italians, having lost the war, are determined to make mighty efforts to retain what remains of their Air Force and if possible to obtain Allied assistance in the way of aircraft.

(iii) They are desperately anxious to secure an opportunity to prove their worth in fighting the German, in order that the future of their Air Force can be assured. They have one eye perpetually on the post-war Air Force, notwithstanding the C-in-C's statement that nothing has been decided on this question.

(iv) To achieve this end, they ask to be given Allied types.

(v) They bring pressure to bear from a humane point of view and play on this to the extreme.

(vi) The political angle and the effect on public opinion is also stressed. (I cannot visualise the man in the street being very worried at present about the size of the Italian Air Force).

(vii) Should they fall in their effort to obtain further Allied types, they are not willing to lose their old wreckage. The Italian Chief of Staff states:-

"If it is true that our flying material is too much of a burden in proportion to the results it gives and it is no longer to be used, then can it not be replaced as soon as possible even when the war is over, or, let it be stored without demolishing it, if it is all that we can count upon during the long and obscure after-war future".

(viii) The above statement brings us back to the question of the future of the Italian Air Force (if any). If a ruling could be obtained on this, the problem would be considerably clarified.

(ix) The Italians do not realise that the only way of keeping many of their aircraft in the air, is by producing spares through cannibalisation.

and if possible to obtain Allied assistance in the way of aircraft.

(iii) They are desperately anxious to secure an opportunity to prove their worth in fighting the German, in order that the future of their Air Force can be assured. They have one eye perpetually on the post-war Air Force, notwithstanding the C-in-C's statement that nothing has been decided on this question.

(iv) To achieve this end, they ask to be given Allied types.

(v) They bring pressure to bear from a humane point of view and play on this to the extreme.

(vi) The political angle and the effect on public opinion is also stressed. (I cannot visualise the man in the street being very worried at present about the size of the Italian Air Force).

(vii) Should they fail in their effort to obtain further Allied types, they are not willing to lose their old wreckage. The Italian Chief of Staff states:-

"If it is true that our flying material is too much of a burden in proportion to the results it gives and it is no longer to be used, then can it not be replaced as soon as possible even when the war is over, or, let it be stored without demolishing it, if it is all that we can count upon during the long and obscure after-war future".

(viii) The above statement brings us back to the question of the future of the Italian Air Force (if any). If a ruling could be obtained on this, the problem would be considerably clarified.

(ix) The Italians do not realise that the only way of keeping many of their aircraft in the air, is by producing spares through cannibalisation.

(x) Should the recommendation in AFPC/23/AIR para. 12(b) attached, be considered, I feel that no units should be placed upon the "several R.A.F. units in the immediate vicinity" as is suggested.

(xi) Finally, whatever the C-in-C's decision is on this matter, I think it should be made perfectly clear to the Italian Air Ministry, that M.A.A.F. require as many Italian Air Force personnel as can be spared from the operational Air Force. This total should be governed by R.A.F. advice, as we urgently need as many personnel as possible, immediately.

Deane
(C. JORDON)
Squadron Leader.

50

2. C-5 AG Op. 26 Feb. 1. Request inclosures be forwarded to C-in-C Air (Med) for comment upon question raised by para 3 of I.A.F. 30416/ed. 3/1743 coll., and para. 2 of HQ 15th Army Group of 21 February.

2. Please return papers to this section.

3 Incl:

ltr HQ 15 A.G. - AG 322, 21 Feb. W. P. SEAGRAVE,
 ltr AFSC, A.C. AFSC/R/655/EQ, 14 Feb. Major, G.S.C.,
 ltr. IAF 30416/ed. 3/1758 coll, 8 Feb. Executive Officer.

NPS/JB/mls

28 FEB 1946

4. HQ. AG. 9/3.
 WAFB Op.
 ALS.

APPROVED	16/3
42-2	

The question raised in para. 3. of I.A.F. 30416/ed. 3/1743 Coll, and para. 2. of H.Q. 15th. Army Group of 21st. February, is being put up separately to this Headquarters in detail, by the Air Forces Sub Commission. Action will be taken immediately.

for

(G. CONROY),
 Squadron Leader, 181
 Wing Commander,
 Allied Liaison Section.

SECRET

SECRET.

MAAG/1606/OPS.

LOOSE MINUTE.A.L.S.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE - POLICY.
Described as "Constellation and Establishment of
Italian Air Force Zone Commands Nos. 1 and 2."

Following papers attached :-

- (i) Letter Hic/1p of 24 February from Headquarters 15 Army Group to Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Forces, A.F.S.O. 542, U.S. Army. (Original and copy)
- (ii) Letter 30416/od. 3/1745 Coll of 8 February from I.A.F. Stato Maggiore to A.F.S.O.
- (iii) Letter AFSC/R/695/22 of 14 February from Air Forces Sub Commission Rome to Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, H.Q. 15 Army Group.
- (iv) Informal Routeing Slip: Lef O. 3522. Ref. 323/111 of 24 February.

- 2. I regret that this Section is not in a position to handle the papers, which you have passed to us for action, until a policy ruling in the main point at issue has been obtained.
- 3. It appears to me that had this matter been correctly channeled at the outset, the question as to whether or not the Allied Air Forces wish to reserve Italian installations in the North of Italy for our own operational use, should have come up to the level of this Headquarters from the Allied Forces Sub Commission of the Allied Commission.

- 4. I note however, that the A.F.S.O. wrote direct to 15 Army Group who are clearly not in a position to give the requisite authority; hence the confusion which has

Following papers attached :-

- (i) Letter HIO/19 of 21 February from Headquarters 15 Army Group to Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Forces, A.P.O. 544, U.S. Army. (Original and copy)
- (ii) Letter JOM/6/51.3/1745 Coll of 8 February from I.A.F. Staff Headquarters to A.F.S.C.
- (iii) Letter AFSC/8/555/20 of 14 February from Air Forces Sub Commission Zone to Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Off'cer, H.Q. 15 Army Group.
- (iv) Informal Routing Slip: Log O. 3525. Ref. 325/411 of 21 February.

2. I regret that this Section is not in a position to handle the papers, which you have passed to us for action, until a policy ruling in the main point at issue has been obtained.
3. It appears to me that had this matter been correctly channelled at the outset, the question as to whether or not the Allied Air Forces wish to reserve Italian installations in the North of Italy for our own operational use, should have come up to the level of this Headquarters from the Allied Forces Sub Commission of the Allied Commission.
4. I note however, that the A.F.S.C. wrote direct to 15 Army Group who are clearly not in a position to give the requisite authority; hence the confusion which has arisen.
5. In order to obviate further unnecessary delay I suggest that telephonic contact should be made with S/Lt. J. Walton who should be asked to resubmit the case in a lucid form and not merely to send an indifferent translation of what appears to be a somewhat illiterate letter.



(I.M.A.S.C.)
Group Captain,
Organisation.

7 March 1955

SECRETARY'S MESSAGE

To A.P.S.O. NAME

From HQ MAY 1945

23.11 March 7th 1945

Following personnel for B.M.L. PROCTOR from B.A.M.

You A.P. March 6th. President Minister is aware of the terms of your last directive. There is no reason why the general provisions should not be referred to. As far as political repercussions are concerned, the position regarding the Italian Air Force is quite clear, namely that as long as they maintain an efficient Air Force which makes an effective contribution to the war effort, it can remain in being, and the chances of Italy being allowed to have a post war Air Force will be proportionately enhanced. The present Air Force is likely to become efficient only if drastic action is taken to bring it to a size which can be maintained satisfactorily.

2 I do not see that we need be unduly concerned at the consequences which quite may quite arise. Then the matter has been fully appreciated, and if as a result of this it seems certain that repercussions will occur, no doubt the Air Minister will make a formal and considered statement. But I suggest that it is to the advantage of the Italian Air Force to set down to making the best of their chance to make a come-back in some form or other, and not take counsel of their fears, nor impede a very necessary re-organization from political motives.

3 This is a personal opinion, based on...

provisions should not be reserved to. As far as political repercussions are concerned, the position regarding the Italian Air Force is quite clear, namely that as long as they maintain an efficient Air Force which makes an effective contribution to the war effort, it can remain in being, and the chances of ITALY being allowed to have a post war Air Force will be proportionately enhanced. The present Air Force is likely to become efficient only if drastic action is taken to bring it to a mass which can be maintained satisfactorily.

2 I do not see that we need be unduly concerned at the consequences which quite may quite arise. When the matter has been fully appreciated, and if as a result of this it seems certain that repercussions will occur, no doubt the Air Minister will make a formal and considered statement. But I suggest that it is to the advantage of the Italian Air Force to get down to making the best of their chance to make a come-back in some form or other, and not take counsel of their fears, nor impede a very necessary re-organization from political motives.

3 This is a personal opinion, reached after discussion with Air Marshal GLENNON, and is in the form of advice to you, and not repeat not for verbatim quotation. It represents the line which you can follow if necessary.

Priority:

URGENT

Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

C of S (Orig) 02.16

A.I.S.



003961

785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCE

46

C/R

MSG CTR NO: 8173

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

DATE: 6 MAR 45

SECURITY: SECRET

TO: HQ MAAF SSO

FROM: AF SUB COMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION ROME

WHEN ANSWERING CITE: A 82 TO 061130A MARCH

SECRET: ALLIED COMMISSION ARE HOLDING CONFERENCE UNDER PRESIDENCY
MACMILLAN 1000 HRS MAR 8 AND HAVE ASKED IF I HAVE ANY POLICY MATTERS
TO RAISE. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH AM AND C OF S I FEEL I SHOULD
MAKE STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS.

BEGINS. C IN C MEDME HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL RESULT IN
RELEGATION OF MACCHI FIGHTERS TO TRNG AND THE REDUCTION OF THE IAF
FROM ABOUT 520 A/C TO ABOUT 300 A/C INCLUDING ALLIED TYPES. THIS
MUST RESULT IN RETIREMENT OF A NBR OF PILOTS. AM HAS WARNED ME THAT
THIS MAY HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. ENDX I WOULD NOT OFFER
ANY COMMENT WHATEVER BUT FEEL I SHOULD GIVE THIS WARNING. GRATEFUL
FOR YOUR CONCURRENCE OR OTHERWISE.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION

HQ. MAAF

4200

RETURN 000 FOR SSO

ACTION: ~~ALS~~ ALS

INFO: ~~ALS~~ ARA

TOO: 061335A

DISTRIBUTION

SMS

	CINC	DEP CINC	DEP ADM	C/S	D/O	W/R	OPNS	INT	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-5	SIG	AG	SCU	ORS	LIA	AFHQ
ACT																			
INFO																			

ORGANISATION REG No 87
DATE REC'D 6 MAR 1945
FILED BY
ACTIONED

SECRET

Col's RAF
A.C.A.
C.I.O.
D.D. Ops.
C.M.S.O.
A.L.S. ✓

45A

 hb
 Muf.

I attach for your information and action a copy of JCS.1076 dated 15th January 1945.

2. I think that the action necessary on the C-in-C's letter to General Ainslie Cat has already been agreed with all concerned as is self-evident from the text of the letter.

3. In addition to my distribution, the letter has also been sent to the following:-

Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet.	Group Captain Bailey.
Mr. Macmillan.	Group Captain Denny.
Admiral Stone.	Air Vice-Marshal Elliot.
Air Vice-Marshal Cooke.	Major General Beaumont-Newbitt.

D.A.F.L., Air Ministry.

J. S. CRME.
 Wing Commander
 PSO to Air Marshal
 C-in-C RAF Medway

779

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

JCS-1076

SECRET

15th January 1945

The object of this letter is to summarize and confirm the conclusions reached at our meeting in Rome on January 13th.

In your letter 010101/89.V. of 10th January to Air Vice Marshal Bascariot you address yourself in a practical manner to certain questions of general policy governing the organization and employment of the Italian Air Force. I fully agree with you that it is time the situation was clarified, and that appropriate measures should be put in hand to dispose with superfluous organizations and personnel, and to retain and reorganize such organizations and personnel as are necessary.

2. In an early paragraph of your letter you refer to a point which unfortunately is necessarily obscure, and must remain so till the Peace Settlement, namely the question of "that part of the I.A.F. destined to continue after peace is concluded". As I told you, I am not in a position to give you any guidance on that subject. All I am authorized to do is to assist in the equipment, organization and maintenance of such units of the Italian Air Force as can be usefully employed during the present war in the fight against the common enemy. In that I include units for training of replacement aircraft to meet wastage, and for essential transport services.

3. I think however that this does provide the necessary firm basis of policy on which to establish the reorganization of the Italian Air Force. The first factor in that, for reasons which I explained to you, I am unable to equip or maintain on Allied types more than the 5 squadrons at present so equipped - namely, 1 squadron Spitfires, 2 squadrons P-39 and 2 squadrons Baltimore.

4. Any other units that are retained must remain equipped with Italian aircraft. We agreed therefore that a review should be made of Italian resources by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and yourself, assisted by Staff Officers from this Headquarters, to determine what Italian equipped units can usefully be employed and how be maintained.

General Almon Galt,
Chief of Staff,
Italian Air Force.

/from Italian....

- 2 -

From Italian resources for a period of 12 months, which I think we can accept as a reasonable assumption for our war effort of the war against Germany. An important factor in this matter will be the work of the newly appointed Technical Commission and I am instructing Group Captain Bailey, the British Air Officer representing this staff of the Technical Commission, that the foregoing should be the basis of his work; and that he should recommend the immediate requisitioning of all of these items are not likely to be needed for this purpose. This follows a precedent recently adopted for British aircraft in this respect, and I am sure you will agree that it would be quite wrong to withhold to supply Italian Air Force personnel, equipment or other facilities in the repair or operation of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft that are never likely to be of any value for our purposes.

The exact composition of the reorganized Italian Air Force will depend on the outcome of the matter referred to above, which should be pursued through an expeditionary representative but it is very likely that it will be on the following lines:

- (A) The Heavy Fighters and the Light Bomber squadrons referred to in part 3 above.
- (B) An operational training and refresher unit, to keep the above squadrons and to keep in flying condition pilots of front line squadrons in between operational tours. I think this will be the best use to which we can put the MACCHI, which can no longer be regarded as first line types.
- (C) A smaller transport unit for supply dropping operations in the Balkans and for essential maintenance transport.
- (D) A Squadron C-47 or better for Air Sea Rescue, mine-sweeping patrols and essential anti-submarine operations.

- 3 -

(c) The Communications unit for internal courier services, and

(d) such training, maintenance and auxiliary units as may be agreed upon as essential to support the units in (a) to (c) above.

6. It is of the first importance that this small Air Force should be based on a sound system of administration and internal organization. To this end it will be necessary to retain:-

(a) A small but carefully selected and soundly organized Air Ministry staff. I quite realize that the Air Ministry must be larger than would be necessary to administer only the Air Force outlined in para 5 above, but I would suggest that you should examine the possibility of organizing the Air Ministry in two distinct sections:-

- (i) To deal with the Air Force as it exists today, and
- (ii) To deal with the very complicated questions of administration, finance, personnel policy, etc. that are the legacy of the past.

I realize that the work of these two sections must to some extent overlap, but feel that there is a great deal to be said for dealing with the two quite different problems as far as possible separately.

(b) It will also be necessary to retain a small operational Headquarters between the Air Ministry and the units, to deal with the current day-to-day problems of operations and administration of the units in the field.

7. I think you will agree that on the above basis there should be no question of any fresh recruitment of officers or other ranks. Indeed the problem becomes, as you have pointed out, one of the disposal of surplus personnel. I hope that in this connection, you will give special consideration to the disposal of officers who have reached an age when they can no longer be profitably employed in their rank, and to the advancement of younger officers with good operational records. I am sure you will also give special

attention to the disposal of those officers whose interest in the I.A.F. appears to be more political than professional.

8. The number of maintenance and specialist personnel that will be surplus to the needs of the force in para 5 above will become apparent on the termination of the review referred to in para 4. As I told you, the I.A.F. may be able to make a valuable contribution to the war effort by making available such surplus personnel as can usefully be employed to replace, in the Maintenance organization behind the British and American Air Forces in the Mediterranean, Allied technical personnel who could be released to other theatres of war. I have instructed Air Vice-Marshal Goss, the Director of Maintenance and Supply, to undertake at the appropriate time, and in conjunction with the A.E.S.C., an American technical officer and Italian Air Ministry, an investigation into the technical qualifications of I.A.F. ground personnel becoming surplus to the needs of the reorganized I.A.F., and to report on the numbers that could be absorbed in British and American Maintenance Units. In this connection I think we should not overlook the possibility that such personnel might usefully be employed, after the defeat of Germany, in the Far Eastern theatre of war against our other common enemy Japan.

9. Turning to certain specific points raised in your letters of 7th and 10th January to Air Vice-Marshal Boscawen, which we also discussed at our meeting.

Please the question of the scale and standard of food, pay, clothing and equipment of the I.A.F. units serving with the R.A.F.

(a) As to food, the Air Force sub-committee and this H.Q. have devoted considerable efforts to obtaining a higher standard of rations for the operational squadrons; as I told you on Saturday we have been able to secure an increase in the ration which, while not as large as I should have liked, will nevertheless I hope constitute a marked improvement.

(b) I agree with you that an increase of pay is desirable and will take up the case with the Chief Commissioner. This, however, is a complicated matter with the details of which I am not familiar and I am, of course, quite unable to promise that my attempt to obtain such increase of pay will meet with success.

- 5 -

- (c) Clothing and equipment. We have recently been able to provide some help in this direction - for instance the provision of boots; and I will continue to give you such assistance as may be essential to the extent that is within my powers. I would like to emphasize, however, what I told you at our meeting, that this problem of clothing and equipment is one which I believe can to a considerable extent be solved by the Italian Air Force themselves. I am sure you will find, when you have had more time to investigate the problem, that the equipment system of the I.A.F. is extremely inefficient. The example you quote of the oxygen masks confirms me in my view that many of your troubles are due to an almost complete lack of any proper equipment organization comparable to that in the R.A.F. It is partly this lack of system which accounts to some extent for the difficulties and lack of faith with which demands for the supply of Allied material are sometimes met - as referred to in your letter of 7th January; it has been our experience that I.A.F. units are very liable to over-demand, and to turn to us for help in equipment problems which they could solve themselves if they had an efficient system.

I have arranged for an Equipment Commission, on the lines of the Technical Commission referred to in para. 4 above, to be set on foot as early as possible. And I hope you will instruct your Equipment Staff to collaborate fully with this Commission, to establish as quickly as possible in the I.A.F. a proper equipment system - including arrangements for stock taking and the establishment of unit equipment tables on R.A.F. lines. Only by such means can we determine what are the real needs of the units, what are the I.A.F. resources available to meet them and consequently the scale and nature of the deficiencies which we will endeavour as far as possible to make good.

10. I explained to you the reasons, mainly the already excessive congestion on forward airfields, why I.A.F. fighter squadrons can not be employed on the Italian front itself. I hope, however, you will explain to the fighter units that they are making a valuable contribution to the liberation of ITALY by operating in the BALKAN AIR FORCE against the enemy in YUGOSLAVIA.

But I understand the keenness of ITALIAN personnel to take some part in the war in their own country, and I will discuss with the Air Officer Commanding Desert Air Force the possibility of

/s/ 785017

G

using the Baltimore squadrons against German targets in the Po Valley area.

11. I will at once discuss with Allied Force Headquarters the possibility of releasing the Italian Air Ministry building for your use, and will let you know if this proves possible.

12. I was not aware of the points raised in your letter of 7th January about the maltreatment of Italian officers in Albania. I am afraid this is to some extent inevitable, and it may be relevant to point out that we have also had examples of Allied aircrew personnel being maltreated after forced landing or being out in the Balkans. But we may possibly be able to be of some assistance in this matter - as also in the matter of obtaining information about I.A.F. personnel who are missing or operations - provided all such incidents are immediately reported, through A.F.M.O. Headquarters in Bari, to the Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force.

13. I am having the possibility examined of issuing some form of identity card to I.A.F. personnel serving with the R.A.F., to avoid such humiliating incidents as that of Major Valentini, which I much regret. We shall require your closest collaboration in the difficult matter of avoiding abuse of these identity cards, notably the most rigorous disciplinary action against any personnel convicted of such abuse. I will let you know in due course if it proves possible to come to some such arrangement.

14. I am not quite clear as to your meaning in referring, in your letter of 10th January, to the absence of a consultative body to discuss between the I.A.F. and Allied Commands certain problems of administration. The Air Forces Sub-Commission exists for just that purpose, and I am sure you will find that A.V.N. Ducrest and his staff will continue to extend to you all possible assistance, within the bounds of the declared policy and of our available resources, in solving these and similar problems.

15. Finally, may I say how much I appreciate the practical and co-operative spirit in which you have approached the difficult problems of your new appointment, and assure you of my sympathetic understanding and assistance in solving them in the interest of the early defeat of our common enemies.

(Sgd.) J. O. GLESSOR

173

785017

44A

STATION 150

151

TOD. 1216544

TO... HQ MAAP ISO

FROM AIR MINISTRY WITTMALL

AK 747 12 JANUARY

332/12

S/O ROBERTSON

TCR. 121515A

Wm F.

100

2000 151

PERSONAL FOR BLESSOR FROM DETROIT.

YOUR JOB 157 7 JANUARY

NO POLICY REGARDING POST WAR ITALIAN AIR FORCE HAS YET BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN FOREIGN OFFICE AND CHIEFS OF STAFF AND IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO AVOID BEING DRAWN ON THIS AT PRESENT.

DISTRIBUTION... ~~4 COPIES~~ 1/M HUNTER

COS RAR

A.C.S.

ADTE
FILE 4200

TO : AIR MINISTRY WHITEHALL.

FROM : HQ MAAF S.S.O.

JOS. 157. 7th JANUARY. SECRET.

Personal for V.C.A.S. from SLESSOR.


I shall probably be seeing SCIAJOJA and the Italian C.A.S. Saturday next. They are likely to ask about the future of the Italian Air Force after the end of the German war. Has any policy been settled and is there anything I can say to them about it?

T.O.O. 071910A.

S.S. 11/7.

Distribution:

C-in-C MadAGB.
COS RAF.
A.L.S. _____



Loose M. Lte. 42A

To:- Air Staff.
(attention S/Capt. Lawson)

1. Attached is a Draft Report received from the Air Forces Sub-Commission for the approval of this Headquarters.

2. May we have your comments please.

66
for (O. CONROY),
Flight Lieutenant,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison
Section.

Date:- 9th. January, 1945.

Ref:- MAAF/4200/ALS. ✓

41A

From: Mediterranean Establishments Committee,
c/o Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Royal Air Force, M.A.F.

To: Air Force Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, M.A.F.

Date: 24 January, 1945.

Ref: MWD/13/2544

Air Force Sub-Commission
Establishment of Technical and Research Sections

1. arising out of your letter AFHQ/1/305A/CAS dated 19th December, 1944, the Committee have been asked to undertake a review of your establishment on the technical and equipment side at the earliest opportunity.

2. It is regretted that we are unable to undertake this immediately, owing to other commitments, and it would therefore be appreciated if you would prepare specific proposals for amendments to the establishment and submit them to Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

3. On account of the acute shortage of manpower, particularly in the Equipment and Engineer branches, it is essential, when considering proposals for increases to establishment, to consider also the relation of the duties of the proposed posts to the increased war effort which it is anticipated can be obtained from the Italian Air Force.

(J.H.D. BLAKE), Wing Commander,
for Group Captain,
Air Ministry, M.A.F.,
Mediterranean Establishments Committee.

Copy to: C.A.F.C., Headquarters, M.A.F.
Org. 2, Headquarters, M.A.F.
A.L.C., Headquarters, M.A.F.

RECEIVED	9/1
420070	

SECRET.

LONG MINUTE.To :- MED. RETAINMENTS COMMITTEE.O.M.S.O.

With reference to MED/RS/2111 dated 4th January, 1945, I did not intend that the review should necessarily be a personal one, but I feel that one way or another the A.P.S.O. situation on the maintenance side should be brought under the microscope.

2. Will you please do this in the best way possible in consultation with O.M.S.O. and, if necessary, with Org. 2. If this is as suggested in para. 2 of your Minute, I am in full agreement.

4th January, 1945.Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff.GR.85.

Copy to :- A.L.S. (for info. only).

ADDED	LEAFON	FORMER
H.Q.	M.A.A.F.	
NOTE		5/1
FILE	4200	

769

14/DEC/55/1/10/12/42

39A
H.A.F.
66Chief of Staff.
H.A.F.

I refer to your letter number 48. I dated 31st December, 1944, and have already had short discussions on this matter with both W. F. Brown Humberston and Air Commodore Blodgett. I have just had a talk to Wing Commander Faith, Lieutenant Flinn, and feel that, a Committee appointed on the spot, which would involve considerable time and investigation, is rather out of the question at the moment, in view of the importance of these important transport command conferences and by mail to them for conference with Headquarters and other matters at the end of this month.

I suggest the simplest way of dealing with the matter would be for the head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission to make definite proposals, no matter of which I am in the line of the month. This way of dealing the matter would give us a basis upon which to conduct our investigations and materially reduce the preliminary time expended upon deciding what matters were vital to the achievement of the needs of transport that could be usefully diverted from the war effort, questions of immediate importance, through the action of the Italian Air Force units.

As soon as we received these proposals I would visit any necessary units, assess the present organization and make recommendations as to what additions are vitally necessary to meet the Italian economic use of this force.

If, on the other hand, you feel this matter could wait until early next month I will continue visits with other work in the same affected and put up suggestions to you as soon as possible after that.

Could you please tell me which you would like done.

H.A.F.

Group Captain.

Air Ministry, S.W. 1.

Mediterranean Airbase, Gibraltar.

Attn: Transport Section

S. A. F.

4/1

4200

4th January 1945.

130/4/2141

Copies to: C.M.S.C., A.C.F.

14/000.23.../140/234121

34 A
Maf.
68

Chief of Staff,
Mediterranean Command.

I refer to your letter dated 15.5 dated 31st December, 1944, and have already had short discussions on this matter with both A.V. J. Brown Macdonald and Air Commander Bloembergen. I have just had a talk to Major General Smith, Maintenance Plans, and feel that, a Committee investigation on the spot, which would involve somewhat lengthy travel and investigation, is rather out of the question at the moment, in view of the importance of these important transport command conferences and of recall to D.R. for conferences on reconstruction and other matters at the end of this month.

2. I suggest the quickest way of dealing with the matter would be for the head of the Air Forces Sub Commission to make definite proposals, no signs of which I see in the line of the present. This way of tackling the problem would give us a basis upon which to conduct our investigations and materially reduce the preliminary time expended upon deciding what factors were vital to the recovery of the amount of equipment that could be usefully diverted from the war effort. Immediate assistance, through the action of the Italian Air Force units.

3. As soon as we received these proposals I would visit any necessary units, under the present organization and make recommendations as to what facilities are vitally necessary to make the maximum operational use of this force.

4. If, on the other hand, you feel this matter could wait until early next month I will continue visits with other work in the area affected and put my suggestions to you as soon as possible afterwards.

5. Could you please tell me when you would like to go.

J. Hay
J. Hay

Group Captain.

Air Officer, No. 20 S.A.

Mediterranean Coastal Command.

Air Force 8.1.1. 4/1 4200

14th January 1945.

14/2/2141

Copies to: C.I.S.O., A.S.S.

500

0611

785017

LOOSE MINUTE

To : M.E.D.E.C.
: C.W.S.O.

Copy to : A.L.S. ✓

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

ESTABLISHMENT OF TECHNICAL & EQUIPMENT OFFICERS.

Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet, in AFSC/R/303/1/Org dated 19th December 1944, draws attention to certain difficulties which he is experiencing on the technical and equipment side of his Headquarters.

2 I have good reason to believe that this side of his work has not been altogether satisfactory, and I think the time is due for a review of his establishment, with a view to producing one better suited to meet the requirements.

3 Will MEDOC look into this at an early opportunity ? Air Commodore Slocombe should be consulted, as he has personal knowledge of the problem, and Air Commodore Titmas should be brought into the picture on his arrival.


4 Will you please let me know your recommendations ?

GB.85

Air Vice-Marshal,
CHIEF OF STAFF.

31st December 1944.

Copy to : GB.64.



304

CONFIDENTIAL

From:- Headquarters, M.A.A.F., R.A.F., C.M.F.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.

Date:- 26th December 1944.

Ref :- MAAF/4200/ALS.

"IL LAVORO AERONAUTICO"

Your AFSC/R/334/Org. dated 6th December, 1944.
It is not considered advisable to permit Italian journalists to have access to any classified document published by the Allies. There appears to exist ample material, passed by censorship for general publication, for inclusion in the above periodical. This should be obtained through normal P.R.O. channels.

T.H.C.

T.H.C. WARDLAW
Wing Commander
for Chief Intelligence Officer,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

LOCAL MINUTE.

From: C.P.R.O., H.O., M.A.A.F., C.M.F.
To: Chief of Staff, H.O., M.A.A.F., C.M.F.
Copy
to: A.L.S.

Date: 14th December, 1944.

Your minute GR 64 of 10th December. It appears there is little we can do for "Il Lavoro Aeronautico" but at the same time it is felt desirable that good relations should be established.

2. We have no organisation issuing highly specialised technical articles other than the occasional summary of new types of aircraft. Our own technical papers at Home rely, of course, on their staff journalists.

3. There are, however, certain ways in which we can give the paper practical assistance:

- (a) Articles on strategy and the general development of the air war are issued from time to time both by this theatre and Air Ministry and these could be made available.
- (b) In addition all articles on operations, and feature articles, could be inspected by a representative of the paper at our Headquarters in Rome, where he could be given copies of anything required.
- (c) Similarly with photographs.
- (d) Permission could be given to a representative - after examination by Security - to visit Italian squadrons in this country. The condition would be imposed that articles arising from such facility visits would be passed through C.P.R.O. to the relevant A.O.C. for inspection for suitability and then to Censorship.
- (e) Liaison could be effected through Air Ministry with our own technical press. It would then be up to the Editor of Il Lavoro Aeronautico to come to some arrangement whereby he would be permitted to use articles from these papers. We receive copies here within a few days of publication and I could arrange to have another set and pass these on to the Editor.

4. That, I think, is the limit to which we should go and since the periodicals main interest would be civil rather than war aviation, they should be satisfied.

2. We have no organisation issuing highly specialised technical articles other than the occasional summary of new types of aircraft. Our own technical papers at Home rely, of course, on their staff journalists.

3. There are, however, certain ways in which we can give the paper practical assistance:

- (a) Articles on strategy and the general development of the air war are issued from time to time both by this theatre and Air Ministry and these could be made available.
- (b) In addition all articles on operations, and feature articles, could be inspected by a representative of the paper at our Headquarters in Rome, where he could be given copies of anything required.
- (c) Similarly with photographs.
- (d) Permission could be given to a representative - after examination by Security - to visit Italian squadrons in this country. The condition would be imposed that articles arising from such facility visits would be passed through C.P.R.O. to the relevant A.O.C. for inspection for suitability and then to Censorship.
- (e) Liaison could be effected through Air Ministry with our own technical press. It would then be up to the Editor of *Il Lavoro Aeronautico* to come to some arrangement whereby he would be permitted to use articles from these papers. We receive copies here within a few days of publication and I could arrange to have another set and pass these on to the Editor.

4. That, I think, is the limit to which we should go and since the periodical's main interest would be civil rather than war aviation, they should be satisfied.

L. K.

W/Cdr.
C.P.R.O.

403

Air Ministry Section
File No. 11.1.11.11
4200

Loose Minute.

To: Chief of Staff/RAF Medway.

1. Reference is made to A.V.M. Bowen-Puscarlet's letter, AFSC/A/334/ORG., dated 6th. December, 1944.

2. The question as to whether any information, and if so, of what it should consist, appears to be a matter which will rest with the Command Security Officer of this Headquarters, to whom I am sending this file with the relative correspondence.

(H.M. FISHER),
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date: 13th. December, 1944.

Ref: RAF/A200/AIA. ✓

Copy to: Command Security Officer.

Copy to

To: Air Vice Marshal R.A.M. Bowen Sub-Commissioner,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Date: 7th. December, 1944.

Ref: JCS.1021.

SECRET.

Your duties as Senior Officer of the Air Forces Sub-Commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows :-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander in Chief Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganize and to rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources

785012

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander in Chief Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and man-power, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganize and to rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 3,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.
8. To keep the Air Commander in Chief Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.
9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

Dist.
Air 3-in-3.
W/Air 3-in-3.
A.D. 1.
P. 2. Cray
4. 2. 0

(SOL). J. J. Stasov.

Deputy Air Commodore in the RAF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

49. 12

06181

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES-
(Office of the Chief of Staff)

A.L.S. ✓

C.P.R.O.

The Chief of Staff has directed me
to send copies of the attached correspondence
for your information.

2. Your comments are requested.

10.12.44.

GB. 64.

N.K. FRICE
N.K. FRICE, S/Ldr.
P.S.O. to C.O.S./R.A.F..

11/10

ADDED 11/10	11/10
H.Q. M.A.A.F.	11/10
NOTE	11/10
FILE	11/10

FROM: ALL FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS,
M.A.A.F. C.I.F.

DATE: 6th., December, 1944.

REF: AFSC/R/334/CRS.

received

Herewith translation of a letter from the Director of Il Lavoro Aeronautico, which is a journal concerning itself with information and problems of aeronautics. Apparently this journal has been authorized to be published by P.M.S.

2. This Sub-Commission has no machinery for handling out information of the kind required, nor has it any authorization to do so. It is suggested that this should be dealt with through the normal censorship channels.

3. As regards an interview in order to discuss the presentation of the Allied point of view with regard to Italian aviation or to obtain a message to the Italian Aviation Technicians, I propose to reply that we can say nothing on this point until the Peace Conference has concluded.

4. I should be glad if you would confirm your approval of these two points.

5. Meanwhile I have written to the Director stating that I am not in a position to reply until I have submitted the matter to higher authority, and that this Sub-Commission has no authority either to release or withhold information.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCAULT,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

information and problems of aeronautics. Apparently this journal has been authorized to be published by R.A.S.

2. This Sub-Commission has no machinery for handing out information of the kind required, nor has it any authorization to do so. It is suggested that this should be dealt with through the normal censorship channels.

3. As regards an interview in order to discuss the presentation of the Allied point of view with regard to Italian aviation or to obtain a message to the Italian Aviation Technicians, I propose to reply that we can say nothing on this point until the Peace Conference has concluded.

4. I should be glad if you would confirm your approval of these two points.

5. Meanwhile I have written to the Director stating that I am not in a position to reply until I have submitted the matter to higher authority, and that this Sub-Commission has no authority either to release or withhold information.

S.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

33

Translation by F/O. J.J. Rovina.

I have the honour to communicate that within the next few days the periodical "Il Lavoro Aeronautico", already authorized, will go into publication.

This publication fills a much needed gap in the Italian press world, which has never interested itself specifically in the many problems of aviation.

Today seems to open to those Italians interested in aviation an excellent possibility for collaborating - for their part, in the work of reconstruction undertaken by the Allies; today the many Italian aviation specialists and technicians feel the growing necessity for receiving information on the technical progress achieved by the Allied Air Forces and to know which programmes the Allies are preparing as well as the prospects which will be open to their profession.

Our periodical considers its precise duty to be the compilation of the aforementioned information and of the encouragement of the Italian aviation specialists, but it is indispensable that these articles contain ample information on the progress and future of world aviation.

To this end, I would be grateful if you would kindly consent to one of our reporters consulting from time to time the Allied periodicals and that he be authorized to extract therefrom the information which the Air Forces Sub Commission deem fit for bringing to the public knowledge.

I would also be glad of an interview in order to discuss the presentation of the Allied point of view with regard to Italian aviation or at least to obtain your message to the Italian aviation technicians who are perturbed as to their future.

32A

FROM: AIR FORCES COMMISSION,
ARMED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS,
M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

DATE: 7TH DECEMBER, 1944.

REF: ASSE/INT/2.

I have to inform you that 5 Italian Air Force Officers and a number of other Italian Officers were decorated by General Mark Clark at Headquarters 5th Army on the 11th November. The ceremony is reported to have been very impressive, the troops forming a square and Allied banners as well as the Italian flag were flown. General Mark Clark spoke personally to all of the Officers decorated.

2. I have seen a copy of the citation in the case of one of the Italian Officers. It states that the award is given for meritorious services in support of combat operations, in that during the period of German occupation of Rome the officer held an important and perilous post in serving the Allied cause within the city. This particular officer submitted a great deal of information to the Allies from Rome, and his reports, with the other Air Force Officers, were embodied in reports which were passed to Air Intelligence, Air Forces Sub-Commission, which in turn submitted it to C.I.C. M.A.A.F. It contained a considerable amount of information concerning the state of German lines of communication South and North of Rome, which information was undoubtedly of considerable value to the Allied Forces.

3. I have no intention of suggesting that we should start an interchange of British and Italian decorations, but there is no doubt, and my Intelligence Department has heard this expressed, that the Italian Air Force is wondering why they get decorated by the Americans and not by the British. The Air Forces Sub-Commission, which controls the Italian Air Force, is an entirely British organization, and they undoubtedly feel that their efforts merit some recognition from British sources, if they have already been acknowledged by the Americans.

W.A.B. BURNETT.

W.A.B. BURNETT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION

H.Q. M.A.A.F.

DATE 9.12.44
REF 4200

100

ALC

From: - Allied Liaison Section,
H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

To: - Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.

Date: - 8th. December, 1944.

Ref: - MAAF/4200/ALS.

1. With reference to your letter
AFSC/R/S.20/Air dated 4th. December, 44,
report on the Italian Air Force for the
month of November, is returned herewith.
Air Staff have no comments to make.

(J. S. BAKER),
Flight Lieutenant,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

for

30A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, HOME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, W.A.A.F. C.M.F.
FOR ATTENTION OF ~~CHIEF OF STAFF~~

Allied Liaison Section.

DATE: 4TH DECEMBER, 1944.



REF: AFSC/R/S.20/AIR.

Reference my AFSC/R/S.20/AIR dated 19th November (returned to you herein), herewith a draft of the short report on the Italian Air Force for the month of November, for the circulation shown in the Appendix to that letter.

2. It would be appreciated if this could be returned, if approved, as soon as possible, as the Allied Commission has laid down that these reports should be in by the tenth day of the month.

W.A.B. Bowen-Bueckert

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUECKERT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.



30B

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/E/S.20/ALP.

19th November, 1944.

Dear Baker,

With reference to our conversation on the 17th, I am attaching herewith a draft of the Short Report for wide distribution. I should be very grateful for your views as to whether I have said too much or not enough.

2. Attached also is a suggested distribution for the Long Report and for the Short Report. Could you also let me know whether you agree with this.

3. Would you like to see my draft for the Short Report in future, or will you let me write it and issue it providing I stick more-or-less to the same lines? As the reports are required by the 10th of each month, it might make the time factor rather tight if I have to ~~submit~~ submit the report to you in each case.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. Burns-Burnett.

Air Vice-Marshal G. Baker, C.B., D.F.C.,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.I.B.

Note:

This letter enclosed with M.A.A.F.'s MAF/200/ALS dated 29th November 1944, which was sent to Air Forces Sub-Commission Rome returning approved draft of short report for October. It is now returned for H.Q. M.A.A.F.'s file.

24A

Allied Liaison Section,
Headquarters, M.A.A.F.,
Royal Air Force,
C.A.F.

Reference:-
M.C./4233/ALB.

29th November, 1944.

Sir,

Before leaving for a short visit to the United Kingdom, the Chief of Staff asked this Section to deal with your D/O. letter to him, reference M.C./R/S.24/ALB dated 19th November, 1944.

In the absence of Brigadier Commander Fisher I took the matter up with Group Captain Dawson of OPERATIONS, who is of the opinion that the draft should be submitted to this Headquarters in the future. This should cause only a few hours delay.

Group Captain Dawson also felt that as we controlled the operations of the Italian Air Force you would readily appreciate our interest in knowing what is being written about them.

The Chief of Staff was doubtful about giving too much publicity to the I.A.F. effort, but if it was deemed advisable by you would not oppose it. The draft you enclosed is returned herewith.

Yours

Air Vice-Marshal J. A. M. Kew-McCormick C.B.E. D.F.C.
Air Force Sub-Commission, C.A.F.
C.A.F.

28A

Allied Liaison Section,
Headquarters, R.A.A.F.
Royal Air Force,
C.M.F.

29th November, 1944.

Reference:-
RSP/1220/115.

Dear

Before leaving for a short visit to the United Kingdom, the Chief of Staff asked this Section to deal with your P/O. letter to him, reference RSP/1220/115.20/115 dated 19th November, 1944.

In the absence of Wing Commander Fisher I took the matter up with Group Captain Dawson of OPERATIONS, who is of the opinion that the draft should be submitted to this Headquarters in the future. This should cause only a few hours delay.

Group Captain Dawson also felt that as we controlled the operations of the British Air Force you would readily appreciate our interest in knowing what is being written about them.

Yours

Air Vice-Marshal J. A. B. Brown-Foster R.A.A.F.
Air Force Sub-Commission, ...
Rene.

0 6 2 8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

From:- ALGHERS GARRISON

TOO 241750A

To:-

ACTION

ALL UNITS

204/3A (.) ALL ITALIANS WILL wear the flashes "I" and
Coy Flashes forthwith

This message may be
sent AS WRITTEN by
any means
Except

Orimate
INSTRUCT

204/3A

241750A SECTION

H.Q. B. A.E.

NOTE 28/4

FILE 16200

755

26A

Italian Air Force Units and Personnel Employed with the Royal Air Force.

1. The Italian Air Force, with a ceiling of 31,000 is divided into two sections:-
 - (a) 22,000 Italian Air Force personnel form the operational force assisting the Allies, I.A.F. Fighter and Bomber Wings working in conjunction with British Air Force.
 - (b) 9,000 non operational are employed by the U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F.
2. This Section is concerned with matter of major policy and notes an a link between the Air Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission and Headquarters, I.A.F.
3. The Section controls the distribution of the R.A.F. quota of non-operational personnel.
4. An agreement has been reached between U.S.A.A.F. and the R.A.F. that the 9,000 non-operational bodies will be allocated as follows:-
 - 6,500 to the U.S.A.A.F.
 - 2,500 to the R.A.F.
5. This quota of Italian Air Force personnel are employed as guards, drivers and general labourers on the various units in this command. The maintenance units have the greater number, most of whom act as guards.
6. Priority of Employment.
Units of the Italian Air Force are employed:-
 - (a) To complete the existing R.A.F. order of battle.
 - (b) To replace R.A.F. units which are required to return or to proceed to another theatre of war.
 Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed:-
 - (a) To fill existing R.A.F. establishments vacancies.
 - (b) To replace personnel who are required to return to the U.S.A. or proceed to another theatre of war.

7. The ideas advanced in para. 6. above is apt to give a false impression, as it has been repeatedly proved, that the Italians do not completely replace R.A.F. personnel. They are very efficient, extremely useful as guards and labourers, but their capacity for work and discipline is not all that could be desired. The treatment received at the hands of the R.A.F. authorities, as well as the food and clothing supplied, is valued by them. They seem anxious to work with the Allies, but not

(a) 22,000 Italian Air Force personnel form the operational force assisting the Allies; i. e. Fighter and Bomber Wings working in conjunction with Balkan Air Force.

(b) 9,000 non-operational are employed by the U.S.A.F. and

2. This section is concerned with matter of major policy and acts as a link between the Air Forces and the Air Force Command and Headquarters, U.S.A.F.

3. The section contains the distribution of the U.S.A.F. quota of non-operational personnel.

4. An agreement has been reached between U.S.A.F. and the U.S.A.F. the 5,000 non-operational bodies will be allocated as follows:-
5,000 to the U.S.A.F.
2,500 to the U.S.A.F.

5. This quota of Italian Air Force personnel are employed as guards, drivers and general laborers on the various units this Command. The maintenance units have the greater number, most of whom act as guards.

6. Priority of Employment.

Units of the Italian Air Force are employed:-

(a) To complete the existing U.S.A.F. order of battle.

(b) To replace U.S.A.F. units which are required to return it to process to another theatre of war.

Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed:-

(a) To fill existing U.S.A.F. non-battle vacancies.

(b) To replace personnel who are required to return to the U.S.A. or proceed to another theatre of war.

7. The ideal situation in para. 6. above is not to give a false impression, as it has been repeatedly proved, that the Italians do not adequately replace U.S.A.F. personnel. They are very efficient, extremely useful as guards and laborers, but they are not very well disciplined in all that could be desired. The treatment received at the hands of the U.S.A.F. authorities, as well as the food and clothing supplies, is valued by them. They are anxious to work with the Allies, but not too hard.

2. This Section is concerned with matter of major policy and acts as a link between the Air Corps Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission and Headquarters, I.I.I.I.

3. The Section controls the distribution of the I.I.I.I. quota of non-operational personnel.

4. An agreement has been reached between I.I.I.I. and the U.S. that the 9,000 non-operational bodies will be allocated as follows:-
6,500 to the U.S.A.I.I.
2,500 to the I.I.I.I.

5. This quota of Italian Air Force personnel are employed as guards, drivers and general labourers on the various sites. This covers 6. The maintenance staff have the greater number, most of whom act as guards.

6. Priority of Employment.

Under the Italian Air Force are employed:-

(a) To complete the existing I.I.I.I. order of battle.

(b) To replace I.I.I.I. units which are required to return or to proceed to another theatre of war.

Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed:-

(a) To fill existing I.I.I.I. establishment vacancies.

(b) To replace personnel who are required to return to the U.S. or proceed to another theatre of war.

7. The ideal aimed at in para. 6. above is not to give a false impression, as it has been repeatedly proved, that the Italians do not adequately replace I.I.I.I. personnel. They are very efficient, extremely useful as guards and labourers, but they are not as good as the discipline of the I.I.I.I. authorities, as well as the food and clothing supplied, is valued by them. They are anxious to work with the Allies, but not too hard.

634

File:-NAV/4210/US.

Date:- 26th November, 1944.

H.M. H.A.I.I. C.H.F.

0632

785017

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Administration of Italian Air Force Units by HQ 205 Div.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. 3D/47
14 Nov 48

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. Arrangements have been made for HQ 205 Div to administer all Italian Air Force Units serving with AEF/MTO.

2. The following procedure will pertain:

(a) 205 Div will carry out the usual functions of a normal Italian ADM. Div. HQ as set out in Appendix "A" etc.

(b) Air Corps Units serving under the ADM. Comd. of this Div. will be paid through Italian Air Ministry channels by 205 Div.

(c) Disciplinary and court martial matters relating to these Air Corps Units which cannot be dealt with by HQ 205 Div will be referred to the Italian Air Ministry in the same way as similar Army matters are referred to the Ministry of War.

L. M. J. R. L. L.
for Major General M. M. I. A.

Copy to: AEF 50/MTO
CC AEF/MTO
ARMED LIAISON SEC HQ MAF
AFHQ
and
AC for Air Forces A.C.
MMA 10 REG
MMA 10 3 DISTRICT

Internal: 2 d/c
AQ
61

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
By

0633

785017

LAND FORCES SUB-CON. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. 32/47
14 Nov 44

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. Arrangements have been made for HQ 205 Div to administer all Italian Air Force Units serving with AIF/MTO.

2. The following procedure will pertain:

- (a) 205 Div will carry out the usual functions of a normal Italian Adm. Div. HQ as set out in Appendix "A" etc.
- (b) Air Corps Units serving under the Adm. Comd. of this Div. will be paid through Italian Air Ministry channels by 205 Div.
- (c) Disciplinary and court martial matters relating to these Air Corps Units which cannot be dealt with by HQ 205 Div will be referred to the Italian Air Ministry in the same way as similar Army matters are referred to the Ministry of War.

L. M. J. L. L. L.
for Major General
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: MAP SC/MTO
CG AIF/MTO
ALLIED LIAISON SEC HQ MAP
AFHQ
and
HQ for Air Forces S.C.
MIA LO PES
MIA LC 3 DISTRICT

Internal: 2 i/c

- AQ
- G 1
- G 11
- G 12 (L) SMIT
- G 11 (L) M of W
- War Diary (2)

RECEIVED
R.G. by
DATE 17/11
FILE 1200

17/11 1547
ALS

FUNCTIONS OF ITALIAN TERRITORIAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE HQ.

1. Italian Adm Div HQ will have the following responsibilities :-

(a) Org of sups of all kinds (rations, clothing, POL, med sups, soon stores) for all Italian tps under comd of the parent Allied fm, with the assistance of MMIA LO and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA. In all such matters the Adm Div HQ will deal direct with the Italian War Ministry, keeping the MMIA LO informed, or direct with parent Allied fm, through MMIA LO.

(b) Distributions of sups of all kinds to all Italian tps under comd of the parent Allied fm under the direction of MMIA LO, and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA.

(c) Discipline and welfare and all purely Italian Army Adm matters for all tps placed under its comd. On all such matters, the Adm HQ will deal with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ and War Ministry.

(d) Maintenance of all ITI-III tps under its comd by arrangement with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ except when otherwise directed by MMIA.

(e) Function as the recognized Italian Mil Authority with whom the parent Allied fm will deal on all local matters concerning the Italian tps under its comd.

(f) G.O.C Italian Adm HQ is the rep of the War Ministry in the area under his comd and is there to be consulted on and give every assistance in all matters of major issue.

(a) Italian Adm Div HQ will be under Italian Adm comd of an Italian Territorial HQ. The Territorial HQ is responsible to the War Ministry for the proper functioning of all fmns, units within its area, inc the Adm Div HQ. This responsibility is particularly concerned with adm and discipline, and control of funds and stores. In the case of the Adm Div HQ, the Territorial HQ is responsible for ensuring that the terms of ref detailed in 1 above are properly carried out, but it will not interfere with the org of sups for the under Allied comd, nor move or transfer such personnel without prior agreement of the parent Allied fm and/or MMIA.

- (a) Org of sups of all kinds (rations, clothing, fuel, and sups, acc stores) for all Italian tps under cmd of the parent Allied fm, with the assistance of MMIA LO and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA. In all such matters the Adm Div HQ will deal direct with the Italian War Minister. Moving the MMIA LO informed, or direct with parent allied fm, through MMIA LO.
- (b) Distributions of sups of all kinds to all Italian tps under cmd of the parent Allied fm under the direction of MMIA LO, and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA.
- (c) Discipline and welfare and all purely Italian Army Adm matters for all tps placed under its cmd. On all such matters, the Adm HQ will deal with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ and NOT direct with the War Ministry.
- (d) Maintenance of all ITL-ILI tps under its cmd by arrangement with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ except when otherwise directed by MMIA.
- (e) Function as the recognized Italian Mil Authority with whom the parent allied fm will deal on all local matters concerning the Italian tps under its cmd.
- (f) C O C Italian Adm HQ is the rep of the War Ministry in the area under his cmd and is there to be consulted on and give every assistance in all matters of major issue.
- (g) Italian Adm Div HQ will be under Italian Adm cmd of an Italian Territorial HQ. The Territorial HQ is responsible to the War Ministry for the proper functioning of all fms, units within its area, and the Adm Div HQ. This responsibility is jointly concerned with adm and discipline, and control of funds and stores. In the case of the Adm Div HQ, the Territorial HQ is responsible for ensuring that the terms of ref detailed in I above are properly carried out, but it will NOT interfere with the org of sups for tps under allied cmd, nor move or transfer such personnel without prior agreement of the parent allied fm and/or MMIA.
- (h) Should the tps of an Adm Div HQ be spread over more than one region, the channel of communication will be from units to Adm Div HQ to Territorial HQ in which the HQ of the Adm Div is situated

785017

HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCE

CFR

DATE: NOV 14 1964

REG. CTR. NO. 20696
(For file use)
PRECEDENCE

SECURITY:

ROUT
AFSC ACC BARI R HQ MA F R MAAF ALGIERS

FROM: HQ DAF
WHEN ANSWERING CITE 0 873 NOV 9


GEO; OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF 28 AND 132 IAF BALT STUNS
ASSUMED BY THIS HQ AS FROM TODAY AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL TODAY DELEGATED
TO 251 WING LOCATION TO BE BIFERNO

ORGANIZATION

OP8KINFO

ALS INFO

FILE



091759

CHEN

DISTRIBUTION

451

[illegible]

23A

From:- Allied Liaison Section, H.Q. M.A.A.P. C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.G. Rome.

Date:- 2nd. November, 1944.

Ref:- MAF/4290/ALS.

Italian Air Force at Vigna di Valle.

Reference your AFSS/2/22/ALR dated 28th. October, 1944, the Unit (No. 6010 A.M.E.S.) in question is now in Greece and they have not been replaced by any other R.A.F. Unit.

for (J. S. BAKER,) Flying Officer,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

SECRET

APC9

RHF/wp

: : : : :
 : **SECRET** :
 : Auth: SAC, MT :
 : Initials: *213K* :
 : Date: 30 October 44 :
 : : : : :

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 APO 512

30 October 1944

AG 091.711/169 GCT-0

SUBJECT: Transfer From AAI to AFHQ of Responsibility for Control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

TO : All Concerned.

1. OBJECT:

The object of this letter is to define the changes in the responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI as the result of the handing over to AFHQ by AAI of the control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

2. DATE OF HANDOVER:

AFHQ will assume the responsibilities set out in the following paragraphs with effect from 1 NOVEMBER 1944.

3. CEILING OF THE ITALIAN ARMY:

AFHQ will decide the distribution of personnel to categories within the ceiling laid down from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. PROVISION OF PERSONNEL:

a. Through the agency of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMA), The Allied Commission, AFHQ will undertake the provision of personnel to meet the Allied requirements within the categories of the ceiling.

b. The present proportionate distribution, i.e.:

	<u>Specialist Personnel</u>	<u>Non-Specialist Personnel</u>
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3)	
Combat Groups	1/3)	2/3

will continue in force until amended by AFHQ, and the personnel made available will be allotted between US and British in these proportions.

c. AFHQ will take over control of Priority List 8 - British Requirements of Italian Army personnel for Service Units, and Priority List 7 - Priority of shipment of personnel and units from SARDINIA to ITALY.

5. FORMATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will undertake the formation of all units of the relevant Formation Orders, for all units to be formed from Italian Army personnel to operate under Allied Command. - 1 -

SECRET**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

9 OCT-0,
 dtd 30 October 1944 (Cont'd)

6. WAR ESTABLISHMENTS:

AFHQ will publish War Establishments for British controlled units where necessary, but AAL is authorized to publish or amend and implement War Establishments for British controlled units peculiar to the Operational Zone.

7. ALLOCATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will allot units as between the Operational Zone and L of C Area.

8. TRAINING OF ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS:

AFHQ, being responsible for training facilities and equipment of Combat Groups, will supervise the training of these formations.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. Roberts
 H. V. ROBERTS,
 Colonel, AGD,
 Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - HQ AAL	1 - Ord (B)
5 - The Allied Commission	1 - Ord (A)
5 - Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFA)	1 - S & T
2 - Number 1 District	1 - Engrs
2 - Number 2 District	2 - Medical
2 - Number 3 District	1 - Signals
2 - PBS	1 - Provost
2 - COMZONE/NAFOUSA	1 - CWS
2 - RAC	1 - OZE, CMT
2 - MAFV (31-32)	1 - AA & CD
1 - C/S NATO	1 - Director of Labour
1 - SGS	1 - Financial Adviser
1 - G-1(A)	1 - Fiscal Director
3 - G-1(B)	11 - Spares (G-3)
1 - G-2	2 - AG Records
10 - G-3	1 - AG M & D
1 - G-4(A)	
1 - G-4(B)	
2 - G-4(M & Tn)	
1 - G-5	
1 - CAO	
1 - Q(AE)	
1 - Q(Maint)	
1 - REMF	
1 - OM	

~~SECRET~~

21A

FROM : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, ROME

TO : HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F.

DATE : 25th OCTOBER 1944

REF : AFSC/R/22/ALB

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION

H.Q. M.A.A.F.

NOTE 30/10/44

100 4200

ITALIAN AIR FORCE PROPERTY AT VIGNA DI VARE

Lake Bracciano

The enclosed is a translation of a letter received from the Italian Air Ministry.

2. This Sub Commission respectfully requests that permission be obtained from the Station Commander for the Italian guard to have access to the Meteorological Station on the Airport.

3. If this is impossible may permission be granted for the removal of the I.A.F. property till such time as this station is returned to them.

R. Thomson

R. THOMSON, WING COMMANDER,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

RECEIVED

29/10

029

142 266

Translated by Sgt G. Mwin ^{5/10}

FROM : STATO MAGGIORE R. AERONAUTICA
TO : AFSC
DATE : 25th OCTOBER 1944
REF : N° 1797/ed.3

Subject: VIGNA DI VALLE AIRPORT

- 1°) The commander of the Allied forces at present resident at Vigna di Valle Airport, has prohibited personnel from this Garrison from entering the Airport itself.
- 2°) It is necessary that the I.R.F. material etc., to be found on the said Airport and particularly that of the Meteorological Centre be placed in the care of the Garrison personnel.
- 3°) To beg the Commission to please arrange that the surveillance be carried out by personnel from the Garrison, or, if this is not possible, have the surveillance guaranteed by the Allied Command itself.

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE

From :- Allied Liaison Section,
H.Q. M.A.A.F. G.M.F. 20

To :- G.S. A.F.H.Q.
(Attention Col. Jackson).

Date :- 27th. October, 1944.

Ref :- MAAF/4200/ALS. —

Italian Officers visiting the
Balkans.

It would be appreciated if a
reply could now be given to this
Headquarters letter of ~~reference~~ 5
dated 30th. September, 1944.

Cherry M

(G. Conroy,
Flight Lieutenant,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

19A

From : Air Vice-Marshal G. B. A. Baker C.B., C.B.E., M.C.
 Chief of Staff/R.A.F. Home

1200/1200/1200

22nd October, 1944.

Dear

With reference to your 1200/904/2/7, 4 dated 28th September, 1944, the return of General Castaldi and his 240 pilots was as much a surprise to us as to you. We first heard of their despatch to Middle East through a V.O. letter from Turkey to the S.I. and were much surprised as to why they had been sent.

It was too late to stop their despatch but we issued a standstill order very promptly. There was no need for this personnel being sent, and partly because having been in East Africa they might be carriers of a particular malignant form of malaria which it was most desirable not to disseminate here. In addition to the 240 (or 240) Italian Air Force aircraft there were also 248 ex L.A.I. co-operators awaiting shipment to Italy in Middle East. A signal was sent from the Headquarters in reply to one from S.I. dated 8th August 1944 saying (a) that this 248 personnel were not to be sent to Italy and (b) that the disposal of the 207 must rest between S.I., S.E. and S.A.S. Signal 10.721 23rd August, 1944 repeated to S.I., S.E. and S.A.S. for reference.

The reason for this last direction was that it appeared from our records here that in fact Air Force Sub-Commission had asked for this personnel to be repatriated in a letter 1200/904/2/7, 4 dated 19th April, 1944, addressed to S.I., S.E. and S.A.S.

It seems to me clear that this personnel were asked for by S.I., S.E., about six months ago and that the request was overlooked by the Sub-Commission although action was proceeding in its own time in East Africa. The personnel arrived in Middle East and a standstill order, particularly on medical grounds, it seems probable that this was not communicated to you when signal 10.721 was sent, with the result that you probably agreed with Middle East to the repatriation. On the other hand, Middle East were aware of this aspect of the case and should have advised you.

As the position now stands these personnel have been

With reference to your WFO/901/2/5, dated 28th September, 1944, the return of General Castaldi and his 210 pilots was a surprise to us as to you. We first heard of their departure to Middle East through a letter from London to the C.I.A. and were much surprised as to why they had been sent.

It was too late to stop their departure but we learned a startling story because clearly there was no need for this personnel here, and partly because having been in East Africa they might be surplused of a particular skill set. It was clear that it was most desirable not to disperse them in addition to the 210 or 210 Italian in force already there were also 210 ex C.I.A. co-operators awaiting assignment to Italy in Middle East. I might add that this was mentioned in reply to one from C.I.A. dated 18th August 1944 saying (a) that this 210 personnel were not to be sent to Italy and (b) that the disposal of the 210 must rest between C.I.A. and U.S.A. General C.I.A. dated 22nd August, 1944 repeated to C.I.A. that personnel.

The reason for this last direction was that it appeared from our records here that in fact Air Forces sub-commission had asked for this personnel to be repatriated in a letter WFO/901/2/5, dated 19th April, 1944, addressed to C.I.A. U.S.A.

It seems to me clear that this personnel were asked for by C.I.A., about six months ago and that the request was overlooked by the sub-commission although action was proceeding in its own time in East Africa. The personnel arrived in Middle East and a standard order, particularly in medical grounds. It seems probable that this was not communicated to you when signal C.724 was sent, with the result that you probably agreed with Middle East to the repatriation. On the other hand, Middle East were aware of this aspect of the case and should have advised you.

As the position now stands these personnel have been admitted to this country and it seems to me that all that can be done is to make the best of the situation which I gather you are doing. I have no idea why East Africa and Middle East gave them such encouragement - you may care to take this up with the latter. Certainly it was not on our inspiration.

Yours

WFO: and cover reference on file 1631/072.

Air Vice-Marshal T.A.B. Brown-Buscarlet C.I.A., U.S.A.
Air Forces Sub-commission U.S.A.
HOME.

0 6 4 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

18 A

transferred to

4200/ALS

Loose Minute

17A

To : Chief of Staff/R.A.F. MedE. (through D/A.O.A.)

1. Further to my loose minute, ref. MAF/4200/ALS. dated 6th. October 1944.
2. It would appear that there was some confusion as to whether these personnel sent from M.E. to Bari were co-operators or co-belligerents and which particular batch of Italians they were. In order to ascertain beyond all doubt, I signalled H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. to clarify the position.
3. The reply from H.Q. R.A.F. M.E., at enclosure 9A states that these personnel were "209 aircrew despatched upon the request contained in Air Forces Sub-Commission letter, AFSC/901/2/P.4, April 19th." (encl. 6B appendix A.)
4. In view of this reply, it appears that there has been some misunderstanding on the part of A.F.S.C. A.C.C. ROME.
5. Do you wish this Section to draft a reply to A.V.M. Bowen-Buscarlet's letter (encl. A).

H.M. Fisher.

H.M. Fisher
 Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section

MAF/4200/ALS.
17 Oc. 1944

785017

DATE: 10-10-44

9A

0: HQ MAAF

FROM: HQ RAF ME
WHEN ANSWERING CITE

0342 OCT 17

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION

SECURITY: CONF

W.A. M.A.A.T.

ADTE 19-10-99

FILE 4200

YOUR U178 12 OCTOBER SEE LAST SENTENCE OF OUR 0319 13 OCTOBER
PERSONNEL IN QUESTION WERE LEFT BEHIND THROUGH SICKNESS BUT
HAVE NOW EMBARKED

DIST A.L.S.
FILE

LMT

171752Z

442


DISTRIBUTION

[illegible]

Subject: Inspection Report - Italian Unit.

Military Mission Italian Army.
Rome.
G/24/B
12 Oct 44

To: H.Q. MAAF.



1. Herewith copy of inspection report on Italian Increment
to MAAF.

Lyth R. R. Major
Maj Gen
Military Mission Italian Army.

14/10
1262
ALO

543

0651

785017

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION REPORT OF ITALIAN UNIT

1. Unit: Italian Air Force Personnel 2. Location: Cagliari

3. Serial: 210 & 230 4. Required for: MAINT

5. Strength: 5 offrs 256 ORs
Animals Carts Vehicles
Horses Mules (by type)

N O R E

6. Name of Commanding Officer:

7. Origin: (Whether formed from an existing unit or from depots, re-organization camps, etc.)

8. State of Clothing and Personal Equipment:

Fair.

9. Tentage:

None.

10. Cooking Equipment:

None.

6. Name of Commanding Officer: _____

7. Origin: (Whether formed from an existing unit or from derobts, re-
organization camps, etc.) _____

8. State of Clothing and Personal Equipment:

Pair. _____

9. Tentage:

None. _____

10. Cooking Equipment:

None. _____

/Sheet 2.....

Sheet 2

CONFIDENTIAL

11. Technical Equipment and Vehicles:

None.

12. Condition of Animals:

No animals.

13. Arms and Ammunition: (incl number of rounds per arm)

None.

14. Command & Discipline: (Whether officers & NCOs appeared to have control of their men)

Unknown as group not a regular unit.

15. State of training (Particularly in regard to job for which required incl any remarks of lack of tradesmen)

Unknown.

16. Interpreters (Names of)

None.

12. Condition of Animals:

No animals.

13. Arms and Ammunition: (incl number of rounds per arm)

None.

14. Command & Discipline: (Whether officers & NCOs appeared to have control of their men)

Unknown as group not a regular unit.

15. State of training (Particularly in regard to job for which required incl any remarks of lack of tradesmen)

Unknown.

16. Interpreters (Names of)

None.

17. Date Unit is to move (or did move) to Destination:

18. General Remarks: (Appearance, fitness, keenness)

62 men are going home. 40 are carabinieri. 22 on leave for illness.

Date: 25 Sept 44

Station: Sardinia

Signed: *LL Martin*

S. D. MARTIN

Major, C.M.P.

Army Sub Commission

Enclosure 14A

passed to DRG 1.13

for Action

Glenn H. H.

HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCE CR

16/10/11

CON F

10A

H. C. M. A. A. F.

ADTR 16-10-464
FILE 4200

WHEN ANSWERING CITE

U 766 OCT 15

FISHER FROM DUKE- WOOLLEY. YOUR U.183 OCT 14 ITALIAN AIR FORCE MATTERS ARE NOT HANDLED BY AFALS BUT BY ORG WHO HAVE REPLIED. YOUR AIRGRAM U.170 OCT 9 REPLIED BY AFALS AIRGRAM U.761 OCT 14. YOUR D/GB MAAF/4027/4/ALS OF OCT 4 AND P.642 OCT 8 ANSWERED BY P- STAFF THIS HQ.

Copies of the signed
on files 4020/1
4027/4

4027/4

FILE

T00 : - 151621Z

DISTRIBUTION

MS

332

[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCE

MSC. CTR. NO. 1167
(For file use)
PRECEDENCE

ANALYTICAL SECTION

DATE: 11/10/91

SECURITY : SECRET

TO: HAF RUSC BARI

FROM: RAF ME 11 STSS CENTRE PASS TO AFSC AGG GARI
WHEN ANSWERING CITE *BA* 0319

YOUR WAGE OCTOBER 5

PARA 1. REF PARA 1 YES. 209 AIRCREW WERE DESPATCHED UPON REQUEST
CONTAINED IN AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION LETTER AFSC/901/2/PL APRIL 19
PARA 2. REF PARA 2 YES *70A in para 1*
PARA 3 REF PARA 3 YES. SEEN SECOND PARA OUR 035 AUGUST 26. *70A in para 1*
PARA 4 FIRST PARA OUR 035 AUGUST 26 CLEARLY EXPLAINS.
POSITION GIVING TOTALS 240 PERSONNEL HANDED OVER BY GHQ MEF AND
209 BY EAST AFRICA COMMAND EQUALS GRAND TOTAL 449 OF WHOM GRAND TOTAL
425 DISEMBARKED TARANTO. DIFFERENCE OF 22 ACCOUNTED FOR BY PERSONNEL
PREVENTED FROM EMBARKING THROUGH SICKNESS AND OTHER CAUSES.

DISTALS.

120462

AND

DISTRIBUTION

[illegible]

Outgoing Message.

H.Q. H.A.F. R.E.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H.Q. H.A.A.F. C.M.F.

ROUTINE

U. 163

14 Oct.

(CONFIDENTIAL) Personal for Duke-Woolley from Fisher (.)

Request replies soonest possible to our U.163 and U.170 Oct.9

and D/G. letter MAP/1027/4/ALS of 4 Oct. (.) Have you seen this

Headquarters P.462 of 8 Oct. regarding discharge of Yugoslav

personnel from R.A.F.V.R. and to which no (R) no reply yet received (.)

1130

Allied Liaison Section.

1027/4/ALS.

E.C. Van Dyke P/Lt.,

Files MAP/1020/ALS.

MAP/1020/1/ALS.

Cyphers 2 copies.

1130

AIRMAIL

To H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.

From H.Q. M.A.A.P.

T00.1715

U.178 12 Oct. Confidential

Your CM. 577 11 Oct. (.)
 (Confidential) Please consider full implications our U.168
 9 Oct. before moving 5 (R) 3 Italian co-operators (.)

for W.C. Van Wyck, W/Lt.,
 Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Dist. : A.I.S. (orig) HAW/4200/AL.

D/A.C.A.

U.M.V.S.O.

Sign. Reg. 2 copies.

Outgoing Cypher Message

To H.Q. S.A.F. W.R. (R) A.F.S.C. A.C.C. BARI
From H.Q. M.A.A.F.

U.168 9 Oct. Confidential ABUDIS

For A.M.A.L.S. and S.M.V.S.O.

Para. 1 Please contact G.V.D. M.S.P. and ascertain from them whether the Italian A.P. personnel whose release from internment for repatriation was requested by Air Forces Sub-Commission HMI A.C.C. BARI in letter AFSC/501/2/PK of 19 April 1944 are in fact the 209 (R) 209 Italian airmen who left M.E. for Italy on 10 (R) 10 Sept.

Para. 2 Movement this Headquarters state that 124 (R) 124 officers and 214 (R) 214 CRs. "CO-OPERATORS" INSURE ex M.E. disembarked TARANTO 15 (R) 15 Sept. (Your O.M. 142 Sept. 12 refers) (.) Are these the personnel referred to in paras. 4 and 5 of your signal .575 of 8 August this Headquarters (.)

Para. 3 See also part 2 signal O.724 of 23 August to you (.)
The action taken as requested (?)

Para. 4 Signal reply as soon as possible (.)

for
S. J. van Eyck, Lt.,
King Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

Dist. :-

For A.P.A.L.S. and S.M.V.S.O.

Para. 1 Please contact G.H.Q. M.E.P. and ascertain from them whether the Italian A.P. personnel whose release from internment for repatriation was requested by Air Forces Sub-Commission MUKI A.C.G. DALL in letter AFSC/901/2/PA of 19 April 1944 are in fact the 209 (R) 205 Italian aircrew who left M.E. for Italy on 10 (R) 10 Sept.

Para. 2 Movements this Headquarters state that 124 (R) 124 Officers and 514 (R) 514 G.Rs. QUOTE "Co-operators" UNQUOTE ex M.E. disembarked DEPARTO 15 (R) 15 Sept. (Your O.M. 142 Sept. 12 refers) (.) Are these the personnel referred to in paras. 4 and 5 of your signal 375 of 8 August this Headquarters (.)

Para. 3 See also part 2 Signal C. 724 of 23 August to you (.)
What action taken as requested (?)

Para. 4 Signal reply as soon as possible (.)

Dist. 1:-

A.I.S. (Orig) MA7/4300/ALS. ✓

D/A.C.A.

S. Nov 5, 44

Cyphers 2 copies.

W. C. Van York W/Lt.
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

831

785017

2038

93912

DATE: 5 OCT 64

SECURITY: ~~SECRET~~

111

HQ MAAT CMB.

4200

6/10

FROM:

FROM: HQ MACAF
WHEN ANSWERING CITE

0.184 OCT 5TH.

DIST ORG ACTION
A.L.S. INFO
FILE.

T.O.

TGO 051115A

DISTRIBUTION

[illegible]

Loose Minute

280

To: Chief of Staff/R.A.E.

1. Reference is made to your query regarding the attached D/O. letter from A.V.M. Bowen-Dunbarlet concerning the 210 Italian airmen ex East Africa recently sent by H.Q. R.A.F.M.E. to Bari.
2. From a perusal of Air Ministry signal IX.2519 of July 20th to this Headquarters it is evident that these Italians should never have been moved to Italy. They are pre-mistake POW, and as such cannot be used as co-operators in their own country as long as they retain P.O.W. status.
3. The onus for this mistake would appear to be with Org. 3 of this Headquarters who gave the authority for the move (signal O.261 of 23 July to H.Q. M.E. refers) in spite of H.Q. M.E. having stressed that these personnel were co-operators not co-belligerents. A signal from H.Q. to this Headquarters (ref. O.267 July 24) stated:

"the party being despatched as arranged would point out, however, according to definition given in signal 97769 P.W. 2 May 26th from Troopers to Mideast Prison state these Italians co-operators and not co-belligerents"

No action appears to have been taken on this signal to stop the party from leaving H.Q.

H. M. Fisher

H. M. Fisher,
Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

IRAS/4200/ALS.
6th October 1944.

From :- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied
Air Forces, C.M.F.
To :- G.5. (att.Col Jackman.)
Date :- 30 September, 1944.
Ref :- MAAP/4200/ALS. ✓

Italian Officers visiting the Balkans.

1. The enclosed is a copy of a letter referred to in telephone conversation this morning between Col Jackman and F/Lt Conroy.
2. This Section would greatly appreciate confirmation or otherwise as to whether the information given in para.1, is correct.

Clonroy. W.
(C. Conroy).
Flight Lieutenant.
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS,
N.A.A.F. C.M.F.
FOR THE ATTENTION OF AIR VICE-MARSHAL C. BAKER, C.B., DFC.

DATE: 26TH SEPTEMBER 1944.

REF: AMSC/2/1/1/AIR.

TOP SECRET.

4200

2/10

The Italian Air Ministry has received information that Italian Officers of the other two services are going to be permitted to visit the Balkans as observers, when the time is ripe.

2. If this is so the Italian Air Ministry would like to send a party of Italian Air Force Officers, the strength to be between 5 and 10.

3. May this Sub-Commission be informed whether this is approved or not.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscault

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCAULT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

125
 From : Air Forces Sub Commission, AGC. Rome

To : Italian Air Ministry, for the Directorate of Personnel

Date : 19th September 1944

Ref. : AFSC/R/7/ATR.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE MANPOWER

4200
 20/9

In future all questions relative to manpower will be dealt with from the Rome Office of this Sub Commission.

2. Internal domestic or local arrangements with the 4th 2.A.T. will continue to be dealt with from the Bari Office and local arrangements in the Naples area will continue to be handled by the Naples Office of this Sub Commission.
3. It is requested that HQ M.A.A.P. in future directs all correspondence of the subject to this Rome Office.

WAB: Bussell

ITALIAN AIR FORCE MANPOWER4203
22/9

In future all questions relative to manpower will be dealt with from the Rome Office of this Sub Commission.

2. Internal domestic or local arrangements with the 4th I.A.F. will continue to be dealt with from the Bari Office and local arrangements in the Naples area will continue to be handled by the Naples Office of this Sub Commission.

3. It is requested that HQ M.A.A.F. in future directs all correspondence of the subject to this Rome Office.

W.A.B. Bowen - EUGARLEY

W.A.B. BOWEN - EUGARLEY

AIR VICE MARSHAL, 12/4

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Copies to:

Air Forces Sub Commission, ACC. Bari.

for Group Captain Penny.

HQ M.A.A.F. R.A.F. for Org 5, S/L Palmer. ✓

212

21 SEP 1944

12/4/44
12/4/44
12/4/44

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,

BARI.

AFSC/901/2/PL.

26th September 1944.

Dear

Baker,

I seem to be constantly troubling you with most frightful questions in connection with the Italian Air Force. Here is a brand new one, but it is none of our doing and it appears to me to be due to the over-exuberance on the part of East Africa and Middle East.

The other day a General Gastaldi and 210 pilots arrived in Bari complete in British battledress with the word "Italy" on the shoulder. They are members of what they called "The Volunteer Italian Air Force", which has apparently been brought into being and encouraged by A.O.C. East Africa, and would also appear to have the blessing of Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.

These unfortunate chaps had apparently been led to hope that they would be accepted in the Royal Air Force Squadrons as pilots, and that they would receive a warm welcome from their fellow countrymen on their arrival here. What actually happened was that the Minister had a look at them and asked what the hell they were doing in foreign uniform, and that they had better take it off quickly. I am afraid that they met with little sympathy from him and I am sorry about this as they have obviously been encouraged in the Middle East.

From what General Gastaldi says he was actually at work in the Middle East Headquarters, and the whole thing was sponsored by them.

It really is a most frightful headache as we have already far too many pilots even assuming the war is going to stop in the reasonably near future, and we are more or less up to our ceiling. On the other hand I feel that their keenness in volunteering and the fact that they have been led up the garden path by Middle East entitles them to some form of recognition.

General Gastaldi was anxious to have an interview with General Baker and Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, but I pointed out that even the Minister had not yet met the A.O.C-in-C or the Deputy, and that they were both extremely busy men and could hardly be expected to grant him an interview, but I did promise to take the matter up on his behalf.

I will do my best to get my Minister to take a rather more kind view of them and will try to get them absorbed into the I.A.F. in some way or another so that they will not join the already over-swollen ranks of the unemployed, but seriously I think Middle East might be a bit of a problem.

I seem to be constantly troubling you with most frightful questions in connection with the Italian Air Force. Here is a brand new one, but it is none of our doing and it appears to me to be due to the over-exuberance on the part of East Africa and Middle East.

The other day a General Gastaldi and 210 pilots arrived in Bari complete in British battledress with the word "Italy" on the shoulder. They are members of what they called "The Volunteer Italian Air Force", which has apparently been brought into being and encouraged by A.O.C. East Africa, and would also appear to have the blessing of Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.

These unfortunate chaps had apparently been led to hope that they would be accepted in the Royal Air Force Squadrons as pilots, and that they would receive a warm welcome from their fellow countrymen on their arrival here. What actually happened was that the Minister had a look at them and asked what the hell they were doing in foreign uniform, and that they had better take it off quickly. I am afraid that they met with little sympathy from him and I am sorry about this as they have obviously been encouraged in the Middle East.

From what General Gastaldi says he was actually at work in the Middle East Headquarters, and the whole thing was sponsored by them.

It really is a most frightful headache as we have already far too many pilots even assuming the war is going to stop in the reasonably near future, and we are more or less up to our ceiling. On the other hand I feel that their keenness in volunteering and the fact that they have been led up the garden path by Middle East entitles them to some form of recognition.

General Gastaldi was anxious to have an interview with General Baker and Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, but I pointed out that even the Minister had not yet met the A.O.C-in-C or the Deputy, and that they were both extremely busy men and could hardly be expected to grant him an interview, but I did promise to take the matter up on his behalf.

I will do my best to get my Minister to take a rather more kind view of them and will try to get them absorbed into the I.A.F. in some way or another so that they will not join the already over-swollen ranks of the unemployed, but seriously I think Middle East might have told us something about this scheme before they sent these chaps over. J.C.M.

To show the extent to which they were encouraged, I attach a copy of a farewell speech given by A.V-M Kerbey on their departure from Nairobi.

Air Vice-Marshal G. Baker, CB., DFC.,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

Yours

W. G. Baker, Bursar.

SPEECH HELD BY AIR VICE-MARSHAL R.S. KERBEY ON THE EVEN
OF THE DEPARTURE OF THE FIRST GROUP OF
VOLUNTEERS.

Officers and Men of the Italian Air Force now serving with the Royal Air Force as Volunteers, I have come here today to wish you good luck on the eve of your departure, to take active share in the liberation of Italy.

Some of you will be going direct to Italy others to England or Egypt but all of you will, I hope, before long be back once again in Italy.

Wherever you are sent you will be working alongside the Allied Air Forces in our common effort to make the world a place where all the nations can live at peace.

Your services to the Royal Air Force in East Africa have been much appreciated by all of us and in your Commanding Officer, General Gastaldi, you have an Officer and leader of proved ability. I am therefore glad to have this opportunity of thanking you for the help you have given to the R.A.F. in this area.

Wherever you serve until the enemy has been defeated I ask you all to do your utmost to assist the Allied war effort. The harder we all work the sooner the enemy will capitulate and peace will again return to the world.

Good-bye and good luck to you wherever you may be called upon to serve.

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCE CR 0330

MSC. CTR. NO. 82324
(for the use of) IMPORTANT
PRECEDENCE

DATE: 20/9/41

SECURITY: SECRET

TO: SACRED (R) AFSC ACC BARI AFSC ACC MAPLES MAAF CASERTA PLEASE PASS TO
BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AFHQ FOR SOMED BAF PASS SECOND ADDRESSEE 12
FROM: SIGNALS CENTRE PASS 3RD ADDRESSEE
WHEN ANSWERING CITE AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ROME
RA164 SEPT 19

YOUR FHGG SUBJECT ITALIAN AIR EQUIPMENT IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL POSITION IS THAT ~~XXX~~ MATS DO NOT WANT THIS EQUIPMENT IT IS NOT WORTH TRANSFERRING THE EQUIPMENT TO ITALY AND ITALUAN AIR MINISTER HAS REQUESTED THAT THE MATERIALS SHOULD BE SOLD IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL AND THE SUM OBTAINED USED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ~~XXX~~ ITALIAN? OFFICE IN MADRID. OUR 0840 AUGUST 6 TO BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AFHQ GAVE THIS INFORMATION. DO YOU REQUIRE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

DIST: PASS BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER, AFHQ (FOR SACMED)

INFO: ALS C

FILE

T00 190940B

FN

DISTRIBUTION

420

[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No

HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCE

DATE: 12.2/44

SECURITY CONF-

TO: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION BARI R HQ MAAF CMF.
R AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED CO TROL COMMISSION, NAPLES
FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ROME.
WHEN ANSWERING CITE RA. 158 4200

4200
18/9

PLEASE ALSO CONTACT A.U.C. B.A.F. AND GIVE HIM OUR VIEW THAT SHORT PERIOD OF TRAINING IS DESIRABLE AT OPERATIONAL BASE. INFORM ME WHICH BASE SELECTED.

ACTION ORG
ALS

AIR TRAINING INFO
AOA

TOD: 1814508

DISTRIBUTION

MRG

122

UNC	DEP CNSL	DEP ADMIN	CAZ	DOR OP	DEP DOR CNSL	WAR ARMY	AIR STAFF	INT	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	SGT	AO	ORG	SCN RU	ESUP STAFF	SPEC GPS	UNIT	PRO	ORG	P STAFF
-----	-------------	--------------	-----	-----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	-----	-----------	---------------	-------------	------	-----	-----	------------

ACTION

ICP-O

SUBJECT: Plans to Italian Armed Forces

CC FIFTH ARMY
CC FIFTH ARMY (Br Increment)

EIGHTH ARMY

1 District

2 District

3 District

AFHQ

ACC

MAAF

RAMC

CC FTS

DMER

FWIT

FOCAL

AFSC

214 GROUP

COMER SARDINIA GARRISON

FORTE 266

Copy to DCAG

G(SD)

A

Q2

Q(AE)

G-1

ST

RED

ORD

FA

The Guardia Finanza is no longer considered part of the Italian Armed Forces no far as rations, clothing, medical stores and petroleum products are concerned. Of these items should be issued in future to that organization - not from IMIA or Allied stocks.

The necessary amendments to Administrative Instructions affected will be issued in due course.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel: FILPOT 210

1025/1/31

12 Sep 44

4200

0674

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

4200

D-1
 FOWIT
 POTAT
 AAFSC/...
 214 XEOP
 COMER SARDINIA GARRISON
 FORCE 266

COPY to DCAG

C(SD)

A

Q2

Q(AE)

C-2

ST

MED

ORD

FA

The Guardia Finanza is no longer considered part of the Italian Armed Forces so far as rations, clothing, medical stores and petroleum products are concerned. Some of these items should be issued in future to that organization rather than from MILA or Allied stocks.

The necessary amendments to Administrative Instructions affected will be issued in due course.

221

General,
Commander in Chief.

200

13/9 1170
Gvg

0675