1015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/135/628
(III)

ALLIED LIAI
APR. 1945 - A
(1 OF 2)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/135/628
(III)

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION, ITALIAN AIR FORCE, POLICY
APR. 1945 – APR. 1946
(1 OF 2)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 1851017

3

1233
1043-

IL 7. 45

YAKIMA AIR FORCE
R.A.F.

135

10000 / 135 / 628
THIS FO
CONTAINS PAPERS
FROM APR - 1945
TO APR - 1946

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 1.3/NND

Minute 5.

TO : Chief of Air Plans, MTOTC.
A-5. AAS/1750.

1. Reference is made to the correspondence at Enclosure 50.

2. Your comments on the basic letter and particularly Para.4 would be welcomed.

3. It is, however, in the opinion of the undersigned, premature at this moment to formulate a policy for the Italian Air Force until such time as an answer is received to General McNarney's letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (See TAB B, Para. 1b).

H. M. Fisher.
Wing Commander,
Secretariat,
Med. Allied Air Committee.

30th August, 1945.

Encls 10 + 46 extracted + placed on file 4214/1 2210.

Enclosures 62 + 70 - Attachment of 1 AF Flights to AHQ Comm Sqdn transferred to file 4214. 22/1/46 QMS.
71.

Encls. 92, 94 + 95 re attachment of 3 SM82's to Perugino for communication works have been extracted and placed on file 4214/AFHQ as instructed by S/Ldr. Ward. Klein Lt Col 9/2.

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MINUTE 1.

M. 1. AIR/837/SAS/1.

1. Your attention is drawn to Enclosure 10 which is forwarded for your information and comments.

(T. W. WARD)
Squadron Leader,
for Group Captain,
Allied Liaison Section.

24th July, 1945.

26/7/45

Minute 2

To: A.L.S.

Your minute 1 above and enclosure 10 refer.

2. I am going to re-open the question of transferring certain marine craft to the Italians with Air Ministry. G/C Rump has gone to U.K. and will raise the question with D.D. Rescue. I will keep you informed as to the result of this particular point on G/C Rump's return.

3. The information in para 3(i) is of interest and will strengthen the case of para 2 above.

4. The question of the Walrus has been brought up before and was emphatically turned down. Comments by C.-in-C. after his recent visit to U.K. amplify the reason why A.V.M. Brodie's request was turned down by this Headquarters.

5. It is not considered advisable/to allot Italian personnel to our ASC's or necessary and their existing CAV organisation will have to be developed until it reaches the standard of our A.S.C. This will have to be handled by the A.F.S.C. through the medium of their Air Staff.

6. It is not proposed to take any action on the above until some of the issues involved have been clarified - later on I hope to produce a document covering the complete participation of the Italians in air rescue.

J.A.D. STURGES W/Cdr.,
Aircraft Safety Section

26th July, 1945.

Minute 3.

TO : A.L.S.

1. Please see Encl's 17 and 17A for information.

2. Do you wish this Section to contact the C.C. of 2677 OSS (Prov) consider that the matter comes more within the scope of Intelligence ?

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To : A.D.S. A/

Your minute 1 above and enclosure 10 refer.

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J.A.D. STURGES W/Cdr.,
Aircraft Safety Section

26th July, 1945.

1332

Minute 3.

TO : A.D.S.

1. Please see Encl's 17 and 17A for information.

2. Do you wish this Section to contact the C.O. of 2677 OSS (Prov) or do you consider that the matter comes more within the scope of Intelligence ?

(H. M. FISHER)
Wing Commander,
for Group Captain,
Allied Liaison Section.

MAF/H200/AIS.

Minute 4.

Ans. It seems to me OSS want knocking down on this, presumably through AAF/MTO. Perhaps you would take this up as a Policy matter.

I cannot judge the wisdom but can send a copy to A.V.M. who can contact the wisdom being OSS if they desire. Why don't they give the a pair of legs.

2/7

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SECRET

5. With regard to civil aviation, the Air Ministry agrees that this should be started internally, but state that external civil aviation cannot be permitted until Italy has become a member of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation (P.I.C.A.O.), or whatever body succeeds it. This means Italy would have to be sponsored by two member states before being admitted. It is for consideration that at a later date Italian civil aviation should be removed from the control of the Italian Air Ministry, and placed under some civil ministry, so that it cannot be used as a reserve for the Italian Air Force, and possibly to by-pass some of the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The Air Ministry also wish to define more closely what private aviation may be permitted, and are opposed to any club flying or gliding.

6. Air Ministry are prepared to allow the Italian manufacture of all types of aircraft subject to the specifications being approved by the Allied Inspectorate which is to be formed to ensure that the provisions of the Peace Treaty are complied with. In effect this would mean that the Italian aircraft industry would only be allowed to produce combat aircraft that were inferior in performance to Anglo-U.S. aircraft. Air Ministry agree that it is desirable for the Italian Air Force to be equipped from British and U.S. sources, but pointed out that equipment for the Italian Air Force must be of very low priority, since our present surplus of equipment and M.T. pursuit is continually shrinking as the result of supplying the needs of the Dominions and the fully-fledged allies. They require the needs of the Italian Air Force to be worked out and passed over to them, and then will do their best to meet them.

7. The American Chiefs of Staff have signalled the British Chiefs of Staff that they are in general agreement with SACMED's signal, and asked for the British comments. Air Ministry have forwarded their views to the Foreign Office and await the latter's comment, and it is expected that a reply can be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the near future, and their reply to SACMED may be expected within the next two to three weeks.

R.B. Peirse-Duncombe

(R.B. PEIRSE-DUNCOMBE)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

16th January 1944.

Copies to : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, CMED. 2.
Allied Liaison Section, A.H.Q., PAF, Italy. 2.
Secretariat, Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. 2.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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R. B. Pakenham

(R.B. PAKENHAM)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

16th January 1946.

Copies to : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, FMED. 2.
Allied Liaison Section, AHQ, MAF, Italy. 2.
Secretariat, Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. 2.

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Mediterranean Allied Air Committee
Secretariat.

Air Headquarters Italy,

F.A.A., C.M.F.

Reference:
M.A.C/1.200/D0307

4th April, 1946.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal Troile,

With further reference to my letter of even number dated 27th February 1946, I have now received the attachments M.A.C from A.F.H.Q. Greece and am forwarding herewith the attachments in duplicate for your information and retention.

Yours ever,

Secretary to the
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE.

Air Vice-Marshal I. . Troile,
The Director,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
ROME.

Encl:

1025

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From : Subcommission, Allied Air Position Secretariat.

To : Air Force Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date : 6th April, 1946.

Ref : AAPS/4209/APASS.

Italian Aircraft - ex Old Air Force.

Reference is made to your letter AAPS/825/Inf., dated 23rd January 1946.

2. You are informed that the correspondence and diagrams of the S.205 aircraft have been carefully studied by Air Ministry who state they have no special interest in this aircraft. Air Ministry are, however, retaining the 3 view G.A. drawing.

3. Authority is therefore given for this plane to be dismantled for salvage purposes.

(SAMUEL STONE)
Wing Commander,
Secretary to the
SUBCOMMISSION ALLIED AIR POSITION.

Copy to: Intelligence, A.M.G. Italy.

1323

SECRET.

To: Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q., . . .

From: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

Date: 2nd April, 1946.

Ref. AAI/0.24/A.P.

REORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

A meeting was held at the Italian Air Ministry on 1st April, 1946. The Allied representatives were Air Vice Marshal Poparty, Brigadier General Lee and Air Vice Marshal Brodie. The Italians were represented by the Italian Air Minister and Chief of Air Staff and other Italian Air Ministry representatives. The reorganisation of the Italian Air Force as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in FAN 149 and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee's plan for this was discussed.

2. The Italian Air Minister opened the meeting by asking whether the Italian Air Ministry was being ordered to carry out this reorganisation. Air Vice Marshal Poparty pointed out that this was not an order but a basis for discussion and we were suggesting this plan as a means for forming a hard core round which an Air Force could be built at a later date, should the Italian Government desire to have any Air Force at all. The Air Minister stated that Italy would require a defensive Air Force.

3. The Chief of the Italian Air Staff then pointed out that owing to the following difficulties it would be impossible for them to undertake any major reorganisation at present. Currently the Italian Air Force has over 200,000 men on its pay roll, of which only approximately 30,000 are at active duty. The remainder had been either in the Italian Republican Fascist Air Force or were returned Prisoners of War, but the Italian system does not permit the Italian Air Ministry to discharge these men to civil life unless a decree law has been passed by the Italian Government. The Italian Government were not in a position to do this at present.

4. The Chief of the Italian Air Staff then stated that he had been asked by the Council of Foreign Ministers through the Embassies in Rome to provide a statement as to what he considered would be necessary to supply an adequate air defence for Italy and that his estimate was higher than that provided in the plan produced by the A.F.H.Q. In this connection it should be pointed out that the A.F.H.Q. had no information that the Council of Foreign Ministers had in fact approached the Italian Air Ministry through their Embassies for their appreciation of Italy's air defence requirements. The Italians pointed out that financially they could not undertake any large scale reorganisation because the pay of officers and N.C.O's was so low that it was impossible for married officers and N.C.O's to be posted from one station to another owing to the expense of transport. They also felt that with the Peace Treaty there would be need for further reorganisation and did not seem to grasp the idea that the current suggested reorganisation was the beginning of the execution of a policy that would leave

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Air Minister and Chief of Air Staff and other Italian Air Ministry representatives. The reorganisation of the Italian Air Force as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in FAN 619 and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee's plan for this was discussed.

2. The Italian Air Minister opened the meeting by asking whether the Italian Air Ministry was being ordered to carry out this reorganisation. Air Vice Marshal Dowerty pointed out that this was not in order but a basis for discussion and we were suggesting this plan as a means for forming a hard core round which an Air Force could be built at a later date, should the Italian government desire to have any air force at all. The Air Minister stated that Italy would require a defensive air force.

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/5. It was.....

A[illegible] SECTION
[illegible]

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5. It was pointed out to the Italian Air Minister that the Allied restriction on flying which confined fighter pilots to 6 hours flying per month could now be lifted and they could carry out adequate flying training. The Chief of the Italian Air Staff replied that, in fact, unserviceability of aircraft and financial stringency had confined the flying practice of fighter pilots to 2 hours a month.

6. It appears obvious that so long as the Italian Government and Air Force is burdened with the necessity of paying every man who was in the Italian Air Force at the time of the Armistice, that it will be impossible for the Italian Air Force to carry out any expenditure on reorganisation or re-equipping. It is further obvious that should the Italian Air Force postpone their reorganisation, training and re-equipment until the Peace Treaty is ratified that they will in fact have no air defence at all for a very long period after the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

7. After the Meeting Air Vice Marshal Pomarty had an interview with Admiral Stone and informed him of the current position of the Italian Air Force. Admiral Stone stated that he had not been aware of the personnel position of the Italian Air Force and that he would investigate further to see if the 200,000 could be reduced.

R.B. Pakenham

(R. B. PAKENHAM),
GROUP CAPTAIN,
for the MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE.

COPIES TO: A.C.C.
AIR PLANS.
AIR C in C. M. A. A. F., MED/M.
A.F.A.A.S.
AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ACMB.
C.C.S. SECRETARIAT, A.F.H.Q..

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1029

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date : 2nd April, 1946.

Ref : MAAC/1200/AFAIS.

AIRFIELD INFORMATION - ITALY.

It is desired to obtain accurate and up-to-date information on the airfields listed below and it is thought that you may be in a position to supply such information.

2. As will be seen, six of the attached Forms 103A (in duplicate) have already been filled in, but it is requested that the information may be checked and amendments made where necessary.

3. Little information is held concerning the remaining nine airfields and it would accordingly be appreciated if the appropriate Forms 103A could be completed, giving as much accurate data as possible, preferably obtained from the airfields themselves, where this is available, to ensure complete accuracy.

4. If any diagrams and photographs (vertical and oblique) are available, they would to a great extent enhance the value of the information given on the Forms 103A, and it is asked that any that are so available may be returned along with the completed Forms.

5. It would be appreciated if you could ensure that these Forms are fully and accurately compiled, since it is essential that they present an accurate description of conditions existing on these airfields.

6. Forms 103A for amendment.

AVIANO
FLORENCE/PERETOLA
TURIN
VENICE
VILLAFRANCA/CALTSORI
VILLAORBA

Forms 103A for completion.

AMENDOLA
BRINDISI
CENTOCELLE
PALOMBARA
PRESINONE
GIOIA DEL COLLE
GUIDONIA
LETTORIA
PERUGIA.

Basil E. de Lough.

for (MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander,
Air Member for Personnel.

MEDITERRANEAN

1326

1030

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



From : G.A.A.F.I. (Intermediate Allied Air Composition Headquarters).

To : U.S.S.A.S.A.F.E. (Air Advisory Section).

Date : 2nd April, 1946.

Ref : AAG/2207/AFALS.

RESTRICTED INFORMATION -- ITALY.

It is desired to obtain accurate and up to date information on the three airfields listed below, which it is understood are controlled by the U.S.A.A.F.

2. It would be appreciated, therefore, if the attached Forms 103L (in duplicate) could be forwarded to the appropriate authorities for checking and amending where necessary, and completed from information available at the airfields themselves, and then returned to this Secretariat.

3. If any diagrams and photographs (vertical and oblique) are available, they would to a great extent enhance the value of the information given on the Form 103L, and it is asked that any that are so available be returned along with the completed forms.

4. It would be appreciated if you could ensure that these forms are fully and accurately compiled, since it is essential that they present an accurate description of conditions existing on these airfields.

CAMPOMINO.
POGGIO RAIS.
PISA/SAN GIUSTO.

B/F 11.

1325

B.E. de Lough F/L

for (MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.

LOOSE MINUTE

TO: A.F.H.Q.L.S.

AIRFIELD INFORMATION - ITALY.

Enclosed herewith completed copies of R.E. Form 1034 (in duplicate), in respect of the airfields mentioned on the attached list. It is requested that these Forms 1034 may be forwarded to the appropriate authorities for checking and amendment where necessary, and completed from information available from the airfields themselves.

2. For your information the policy relating to the supply of airfield information throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East Command is as follows:-

" (a) Reports on airfields are submitted on Middle East Form 1034 (amended January, 1945) and those for Flying Boat Bases on R.A.F. Form 30.

(b) Air and Group Headquarters render these Forms in duplicate to Headquarters, Med/ME through this Headquarters as follows:-

(i) For occupied operational airfields: every six months after the initial return.

(ii) For unoccupied, or airfields used by the R.A.F. in emergency every 12 months.

(iii) For Flying Boat Bases and Emergency Alighting Areas at least 12 months after the initial return.

(c) Initial returns are submitted as follows:-

(i) For every airfield or Flying Boat Base for which no Form 1034 or Form 30 has been submitted.

(ii) Upon completion of the construction of every new airfield on the date the airfield becomes operational.

(iii) Upon completion of the development programme on any airfield at which extensive devlopment takes place.

3. May the authorities concerned be asked to ensure these Forms are fully and accurately compiled. It is essential these forms should give an accurate description of conditions. It is not sufficient to compile the return from existing office records.

4. Diagrams and photographs (vertical and oblique) is

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(ii) Upon completion of the construction of every new airfield on the date the airfield becomes operational.

(iii) Upon completion of the development programme on any airfield at which extensive development takes place.

3. May the authorities concerned be asked to ensure these Forms are fully and accurately compiled. It is essential these Forms should give an accurate description of conditions. It is not sufficient to compile the return from existing office records.

4. Diagrams and photographs (vertical and oblique) if available, are to be rendered in all cases in accordance with the foot-note to Form 1034.

5. Headquarters Med/Me are calling for as much reliable, up-to-date information as possible upon airfields maintained by Italian personnel (Military and Civil). Can this information be supplied from A.F.S.C. Rome?

6. Enclosed herewith also are sufficient blank Forms 1034. It is requested that these be forwarded to the controlling authorities of the airfields, as per paragraph 2 of the attached list. It would be appreciated if all these Forms could be returned to this branch for onward transmission to Headquarters, Med/Me.

FOR COMPLETION IN DUPLICATE.

22nd March, 1946.
Med/5030/7/Org.

[redacted]

W. M. Sedan.
Squadron Leader,
Organisation 1.

1324

F 0 3 2

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83A

AIRFIELDS IN ITALY.

LIST OF FORMS 1034 FOR AMENDMENT

1.

AIRFIELD NAME	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY.
AVIANO	ITALIAN AIR FORCE.
✓ CAPODICHINO	U.S.A.A.F.
FLORENCE / PERETOLA	I.A.F.
✓ FOGGIA MAIN	U.S.A.A.F.
✓ PISA / SAN GIUSTO	U.S.A.A.F. / M.T.O.
TURIN	I.A.F.
VENICE	I.A.F.
VILLAOREA	I.A.F.
VILLAFRANCA / CALZONI	I.A.F.

LIST OF FORMS 1034 FOR COMPLETION

2.

AIRFIELD NAME	POSITION	
AMENDOLA	41°32'34"N.	15°42'25"E.
BERGAMO	45°40'18"N.	90°42'07"E.
CENTOCELLE.	41°52'10"N.	12°33'30"E.
FALCONARA.	43°37'23"N.	13°22'16"E.
FROSINONE.	41°38'53"N.	13°17'38"E.
GIOIA DEL COLLE.	40°46'52"N.	16°56'12"E.
GUIDONIA.	41°59'24"N.	12°44'06"E.
LITTORIA.	41°57'15"N.	12°29'55"E.
PERUGIA.	43°05'59"N.	12°30'13"E.

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VENICE	I.A.F.
VILLAORBA	I.A.F.
VILLAFRANCA / CALZONI	I.A.F.
	I.A.F.

LIST OF FORMS 1034 FOR COMPLETION

2.

AIRFIELD NAME	POSITION	
AMENDOLA	41°32'34"N.	15°42'25"E.
BERGAMO	45°40'18"N.	90°42'07"E.
CENTOCELLE.	41°52'10"N.	12°33'30"E.
FALCONARA.	43°37'23"N.	13°22'16"E.
FROSINONE.	41°38'53"N.	13°17'38"E.
GIOIA DEL COLLE.	40°46'52"N.	16°56'12"E.
GUIDONIA.	41°59'24"N.	12°44'06"E.
LITTORIA.	41°57'15"N.	12°29'55"E.
PERUGIA.	43°05'59"N.	12°30'13"E.

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1034

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1035

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785012

OUTGOING MESSAGE COPY.

SECRET. OP PRIORITY.

ACTION: PLANS
A.O.C.
A.O.C IN C.
INT.
AIR.

TO FOR ACTION: AIRCOM

REF NO. F. 63896.

SIGNED SACMED CITE FHCOS

Your 2091 of 25th March, paragraph 4.

1. Supreme Allied Commander is required by Combined Chiefs of Staff to provide them with full details of any proposed reorganisation of Italian Air Force prior to implementation.

2. He must therefore examine any proposal for establishment of Civil Airlines in the light of its possible effect on re-equipment and reorganisation of the Italian Air Force.

3. For this reason do NOT agree with Air Minister's contention that it is NO longer necessary to ask approval of Allied Force Headquarters regarding text of agreement between Air Ministry and TWA.

4. You should therefore inform him that Supreme Allied Commander cannot consider withdrawn Air Minister's letter of 9th March. Agreement should therefore be submitted for approval to Supreme Allied Commander.

ORIGINATOR: C/S AUTH: D.C. CURME, LT. COL.

1036

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

122

FROM :- Air Headquarters Greece, R.A.F.

TO :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

DATE :- 20th March, 1946.

REF :- 519/AIR.

106

RE-ORGANISATION OF THE GREEK AIR FORCE
REPORT OF AIR VICE-MARSHAL THOROLD.

With reference to your letter MAAC/4200/AFALS dated 27th February, 1946, three copies of Attachments "B.1.", "B" and "C" to Air Vice-Marshal Thorold's report on the re-organisation of the Greek Air Ministry are now forwarded. It is regretted that there has been some delay due to difficulty in obtaining copies of the diagramatic layout.

Air Commodore,
Air Officer Commanding,
ROYAL AIR FORCE GREECE.

Encs.

4200

1321

1037

THE PROPOSED ORGANISATION OF THE GREEK AIR MINISTRY

1. The object of this paper is to give a short account of the proposed powers and position of the Minister for Air and the Air Council, and the suggested organisation of the Greek Ministry for Air.

2. The Air Council to consist of the following members :-

i. The Minister for Air who would be President of the Air Council and a member of the Supreme National Defence Council.

The Chief of the Air Staff.)
The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.)
The Air Member for Personnel.) Air
The Air Member for Organisation and Works.) Members
The Air Member for Maintenance.)

The Director General of Finance (additional member)

ii. The Minister for Air to be responsible to the Council of Ministers for all business of the Air Council.

iii. The Air Members of the Air Council and the Director General of Finance to be constituted as Departmental Heads among whom the various duties of the Ministry for Air are to be divided.

iv. The powers of the Air Council could be exercised and performed by any three notwith-standing any temporary vacancy.

3. The following sections set out in detail the business of each Member of the Council and his chief officials. Appendix "A" shows this allocation in diagramatic form.

Minister for Air

4. The Minister for Air to be President of the Air Council

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The Minister for Air who would be President of the Air Council and a member of the Supreme National Defence Council.

The Chief of the Air Staff.)
The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.)
The Air Member for Personnel.) Air
The Air Member for Organisation and Works.) Members
The Air Member for Maintenance.)

The Director General of Finance (additional member)

ii. The Minister for Air to be responsible to the Council of Ministers for all business of the Air Council.

iii. The Air Members of the Air Council and the Director General of Finance to be constituted as Departmental Heads among whom the various duties of the Ministry for Air are to be divided.

iv. The powers of the Air Council could be exercised and performed by any three notwithstanding any temporary vacancy.

3. The following sections set out in detail the business of each Member of the Council and his chief officials. Appendix "A" shows this allocation in diagrammatic form.

Minister for Air

4. The Minister for Air to be President of the Air Council and responsible to the Council of Ministers for all the business of the Air Council. He would represent the Department in the Council of Ministers. Important questions of policy and all matters requiring reference to the Council of Ministers to be submitted to him by the Air Council Member or members concerned before action is taken. All matters of policy should be referred by him to the Air Council for discussion and decision before he meets the Council of Ministers.

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Department of the Chief of Air Staff
(C.A.S.)

5. The Chief of the Air Staff to be the first and senior Air Member of the Council and principal adviser to the Minister in the direction of the Royal Hellenic Air Force. This provision entitles the C.A.S. to be made aware of, and to express his opinion on any important question of Air Force policy in whatever department of the Ministry of Air it may arise. It thus ensures not only that the more important work of the Royal Hellenic Air Force administration in the several departments of the Ministry of Air will be effectively co-ordinated, but also that it will be inspired by a single Air Staff policy aimed at maintaining the Force in the highest state of efficiency.

6. The C.A.S. would be a member of the Defence Committee and of any other of its important sub-committees which may be formed.

7. In addition to the general responsibility previously referred to, the C.A.S. to be in particular responsible to the Minister of Air for the administration of so much of the business relating to the policy, planning, disposition, command, training and communications of the Royal Hellenic Air Force as might be assigned to him from time to time by the Minister of Air. The business assigned to the C.A.S. under these provisions can be summarised as follows :-

i. All questions of Air Force policy.
ii. Advice on the conduct of air operations and issue of orders in regard to these.
iii. Fighting efficiency and training of the Royal Hellenic Air Force.
iv. Collection of Intelligence.
v. Royal Hellenic Air Force communications.

8. The work to be divided between the following Directorates :-

i. The Directorate of Operations and Intelligence to be responsible for policy for the R.H.A.F.

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policy in whatever department of the Ministry of Air it may arise. It thus ensures not only that the more important work of the Royal Hellenic Air Force administration in the several departments of the Ministry of Air will be effective-ly co-ordinated, but also that it will be inspired by a single Air Staff policy aimed at maintaining the Force in the highest state of efficiency.

6. The C.A.S. would be a member of the Defence Committee and of any other of its important sub-committees which may be formed.

7. In addition to the general responsibility previously referred to, the C.A.S. to be in particular responsible to the Minister of Air for the administration of so much of the business relating to the policy, planning, disposition, command, training and communications of the Royal Hellenic Air Force as might be assigned to him from time to time by the Minister of Air. The business assigned to the C.A.S. under these provisions can be summarised as follows :-

i. All questions of Air Force policy.
ii. Advice on the conduct of air operations and issue of orders in regard to these.
iii. Fighting efficiency and training of the Royal Hellenic Air Force.
iv. Collection of Intelligence.
v. Royal Hellenic Air Force communications.

8. The work to be divided between the following Directorates :-

i. The Directorate of Operations and Intelligence to be responsible for policy for the R.H.A.F. as a whole, plans and orders for air operations, the development of air tactics, operational requirements for aircraft and other equipment, collection of Intelligence, dealings with Air Attaches, Greek and foreign.

This Directorate to be sub-divided into two as follows :-

a. Plans and Operations.
b. Intelligence.

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ii. The Directorate of Training and Staff duties to deal with the Training of the Royal Hellenic Air Force, flying accidents, tactical developments, combined exercises, displays, liaison with departments of the Navy and War Office on training requirements, Staff College matters, promotion examinations and scrutiny of matter for publication.

This Directorate to be subdivided into two as follows :-

a. Training.
b. Staff duties.

iii. The Directorate of Signals to deal with all questions of communications for the Royal Hellenic Air Force and liaison with other Government departments on signals questions. One section of this Directorate to deal with signals work for Civil Aviation.

iv. Armament, Navigation, Photographic, Meteorological Sections to be directed by the Department of the C.A.S. Their duties to be mainly concerned with technical advice on the upkeep and repair of their specialist equipment and for giving assistance and advice to the training and operational branches. They would also be responsible for the supervision and reporting of service trials on new equipment.

9. A Deputy to the Chief of the Air Staff to be known as the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (D.C.A.S.) to assume so much of the responsibility of the functions of the Department of the Chief of the Air Staff in regard to operations, intelligence, training, staff duties, signals as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Chief of the Air Staff.

Department of the Air Member for Personnel
(A.M.P.)

T.O.A.I.

Declassified E.O. 12356, Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

This Directorate to be subdivided into two as follows :-

a. Training.
b. Staff duties.

iii. The Directorate of Signals to deal with all questions of communications for the Royal Hellenic Air Force and liaison with other Government departments on signals questions. One section of this Directorate to deal with signals work for Civil Aviation.

iv. Armament, Navigation, Photographic, Meteorological Sections to be directed by the Department of the C.A.S. Their duties to be mainly concerned with technical advice on the upkeep and repair of their specialist equipment and for giving assistance and advice to the training and operational branches. They would also be responsible for the supervision and reporting of service trials on new equipment.

9. A Deputy to the Chief of the Air Staff to be known as the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (D.C.A.S.) to assume so much of the responsibility of the functions of the Department of the Chief of the Air Staff in regard to operations, intelligence, training, staff duties, signals as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Chief of the Air Staff.

Department of the Air Member for Personnel (A.M.P.)

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10. The Air Member for Personnel to be responsible to the Minister for Air for so much of the business relating to personnel and discipline of the Air Force as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Minister for Air.

11. The business so assigned to him can be summarised as follows :-

i. Entry of personnel in all branches of the Royal Hellenic Air Force - both officers and airmen - and the provision of reserves of personnel.

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ii. Appointments, promotions, and postings.
iii. Discipline.
iv. Records of officers and airmen.
v. Honours and awards.
vi. Ceremonial.
vii. Liaison with other Government departments on personnel questions.
viii. Welfare.

12. This work to be divided between the following Directorates :

i. The Directorate of Postings to deal with the postings and careers of all officers, the selection of officers for specialist training and postings of aircrew.

ii. The Directorate of Welfare to deal with policy matters directly affecting the personal welfare and morale of officers and airmen - This to include the co-ordination of Welfare services, leisure time activities on Stations (cinemas, Libraries, reading rooms, sports and games), education and cultural activities, religious welfare.

iii. The Directorate of Personnel Services to deal with all personal questions (other than postings or selection for specialist courses) affecting officers, cadets and airmen. The Directorate also to deal with recruiting policy, manning and to control Recruiting Offices and the Record Office.

iv. The Department of Medical Services to be responsible for all medical dental and hospital services for the Royal Hellenic Air Force, including hygiene and sanitation. This Department also to advise the Department of Civil Aviation on questions such as the assessment of the standard of physical fitness for civil pilots.

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Directorates :

i. The Directorate of Postings to deal with the postings and careers of all officers, the selection of officers for specialist training and postings of aircrew.

ii. The Directorate of Welfare to deal with policy matters directly affecting the personal welfare and morale of officers and airmen - This to include the co-ordination of Welfare services, leisure time activities on Stations (cinemas, Libraries, reading rooms, sports and games), education and cultural activities, religious welfare.

iii. The Directorate of Personnel Services to deal with all personal questions (other than postings or selection for specialist courses) affecting officers, cadets and airmen. The Directorate also to deal with recruiting policy, manning and to control Recruiting Offices and the Record Office.

iv. The Department of Medical Services to be responsible for all medical dental and hospital services for the Royal Hellenic Air Force, including hygiene and sanitation. This Department also to advise the Department of Civil Aviation on questions such as the assessment of the standard of physical fitness for civil pilots.

Department of the Air Member for Organisation and Works (A.M.O.W.)

13. The Air Member for Organisation and Works to be responsible for such of the business relating to the Organisation, Works Services and Transportation of the R.H.A.F. as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Minister for Air.

14. The business so assigned may be summarised as follows :-

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i. Organisation of the R.A.F. in peace and war.
ii. Transportation and moves.
iii. Works Services.

15. The work to be divided between the following Directorates :-

i. The Directorate of Organisation to deal with the organisation of the R.A.F. in peace and war; establishments of personnel and equipment; formation of Units; preparation of administrative plans for operational schemes; mobilisation arrangements, and orders for movements.

ii. The Directorate of Works to deal with the construction and maintenance of works and airfields for the R.A.F., including the acquisition of land, Wirings and the provision, operation and maintenance of electrical and mechanical plants. It is also to advise the Department of Civil Aviation on Works Services carried out by, or on behalf of the Air Ministry.

Department of the Air Member for Maintenance (A.M.M.)

16. The Air Member for Maintenance to be responsible for so much of the business relating to the Maintenance of the R.A.F. in material as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Minister for Air.

17. The business so assigned is summarised below :-

i. The direction and co-ordination of research, production, experimental and development work on aircraft, aero engines, instruments, ground equipment and accessories.

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formation of Units; preparation of administrative plans for operational schemes; mobilisation arrangements, and orders for movements.

ii. The Directorate of Works to deal with the construction and maintenance of works and airfields for the R.H.A.F., including the acquisition of land, hirings and the provision, operation and maintenance of electrical and mechanical plants. It is also to advise the Department of Civil Aviation on Works Services carried out by, or on behalf of the Air Ministry.

Department of the Air Member for Maintenance (A.M.M.)

16. The Air Member for Maintenance to be responsible for so much of the business relating to the Maintenance of the R.H.A.F. in material as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Minister for Air.

17. The business so assigned is summarised below :-

i. The direction and co-ordination of research, production, experimental and development work on aircraft, aero engines, instruments, ground equipment and accessories.

ii. Technical questions relating to aircraft, engines, accessories and other equipment.

iii. Inspection of aeronautical and other stores and equipment for the R.H.A.F., for experimental purposes and for civil aviation.

iv. Provision of all standard technical and war-like equipment of the R.H.A.F.

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v. Provision of all non-technical supplies and food-stuffs.

vi. Repair and servicing of the technical and war-like equipment of the R.H.A.F.

vii. Salvage.

viii. Technical control of Maintenance Units.

18. This work to be divided between the following Directorates :-

i. The Directorate of Engineering to deal with the technical development, research and production of new and improved types of equipment, technical publications, inspection prior to acceptance of all aeronautical supplies including, airframes, aero-engines other spares and material.

It is also to deal with all questions relating to the repair and servicing of all technical and war-like equipment of the R.H.A.F., including workshop organisation, processes and equipment, modifications and defect reports, salvage, and the technical control of the engineering sections of Maintenance Units.

ii. The Directorate of Equipment to deal primarily with the provision, receipt and issue of equipment stores and food stuffs for the R.H.A.F. It is also responsible for the supply system in peace and war and the technical control of the equipment sections of Maintenance Units.

Department of the Director General of Finance

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18. This work to be divided between the following Directorates :-

i. The Directorate of Engineering to deal with the technical development, research and production of new and improved types of equipment, technical publications, inspection prior to acceptance of all aeronautical supplies including, airframes, aero-engines other spares and material.

It is also to deal with all questions relating to the repair and servicing of all technical and war-like equipment of the R.A.F., including workshop organisation, processes and equipment, modifications and defect reports, salvage, and the technical control of the engineering sections of Maintenance Units.

ii. The Directorate of Equipment to deal primarily with the provision, receipt and issue of equipment stores and food stuffs for the R.A.F. It is also responsible for the supply system in peace and war and the technical control of the equipment sections of Maintenance Units.

Department of the Director General of Finance

19. The Director General of Finance to be responsible to the Minister for Air for financial advice and the control of all expenditure. He is also to be responsible for the supervision of Contracts organisation. As Accounting Officer of the Department he has to account to the Government for the expenditure of public monies on Air Services including Civil Aviation and for the public accounts of the Department of the R.A.F.

20. The work to be divided between the following :-

i. The Section of Estimates and Finance to

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December 1945.

undertake overall supervision of the financial side of the Department including costings and accounting. The head of the Department to exercise a general supervision of the financial section dealing with estimates and supplies and transportation.

He is also to be responsible for the supervision of the R.N.W.A.F. duty section. In addition, all financial proposals involving new expenditure of magnitude should be submitted to him.

(12) The section of Contracts to be responsible for the supervision of the financial arrangements re required contracts.

This section is also responsible for issue of tenders, negotiation of private and accounting investigations of costs and placing of contracts on behalf of the Ministry for Air.

The section is also responsible for accounting for all expenditure, for the location of the accounting system and for no audit of all R.N.A.F. accounts for cash and stores.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759817

NOTES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROPOSED ORGANISATION OF THE GREEK MINISTRY OF AIR

The following notes and recommendations are in amplific-ation of the main paper on the organisation of the Greek Ministry of Air and should be read and studied in conjunction with it and the diagramatic "lay out" at Appendix "A" attached thereto.

2. The primary need is that there should be a properly constituted Air Council under the Presidency of the Minister for Air and that the duties and responsibilities of the Minister and the various Members of the Air Council together with their Directors should be clearly defined. Where possible the titles and functions should correspond with those of the British Air Ministry.

3. In order that all concerned should be aware of the organisation of the Ministry of Air, it is recommended that a memorandum on the lines of the paper on the suggested organisation of the Ministry of Air together with the diagramatic "lay out" of its organisation should be compiled and issued as a publication to the personnel of the Ministry of Air and for the information of the R.H.A.F. generally and other Greek Ministries.

4. The Chief of the Air Staff has two main functions - one of a general nature as principal adviser to the Minister of Air and secondly as the Head of a department. Owing to the special conditions at present prevailing in Greece there is a natural tendency to give more emphasis to his general responsibility rather than to the departmental duties. It is recommended that when political conditions change efforts should be made to effect a more even balance between his functions.

5. To ensure that full consideration is given to Personnel matters, particularly the posting of officers and airmen, it is recommended that Personnel matters should be dealt with under a separate Department and that the Air Member should be an experienced and reliable officer if possible with Staff qualifications.

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6. To ensure that Maintenance of the R.H.A.F. in material is dealt with adequately and consider[illegible]

Air and that the duties and responsibilities of the Minister and the various Members of the Air Council together with their Directors should be clearly defined. Where possible the titles and functions should correspond with those of the British Air Ministry.

3. In order that all concerned should be aware of the organisation of the Ministry of Air, it is recommended that a memorandum on the lines of the paper on the suggested organisation of the Ministry of Air together with the diagrammatic "lay out" of its organisation should be compiled and issued as a publication to the personnel of the Ministry of Air and for the information of the R.H.A.F. generally and other Greek Ministries.

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5. To ensure that full consideration is given to Personnel matters, particularly the posting of officers and airmen, it is recommended that Personnel matters should be dealt with under a separate Department and that the Air Member should be an experienced and reliable officer if possible with Staff qualifications.

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6. To ensure that Maintenance of the R.H.A.F. in material is dealt with adequately and considered as a whole, it is recommended that the Engineer and Equipment Services should function under one co-ordinating head. The present division between technical and non-technical supplies and equipment should cease and be combined under one Director of Equipment.

7. In view of the size of the R.H.A.F. and the need for economy and the close association between Equipment and the functions of the Organisation branch, there would be good reason for placing Maintenance and Organisation under one and same Air Member, however, in view of the special conditions now existing, it is agreed that Maintenance could be retained as a separate Department.

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It is recommended, however, that the desirability of placing Maintenance and Organisation under one Air Council head should be kept in view and when conditions permit, adopted

8. At present there seems to be no special branch to deal with all matters of finance and the financial aspect of the R.H.A.F. may in consequency be neglected. It is strongly recommended that every effort be made to organise a special financial branch to deal adequately with financial matters which affect not only the Ministry of Air but the R.H.A.F. as a whole.

9. Since the Chief of the Air Staff has not time and opportunity to devote adequate attention himself to the Department for Air, it is agreed that a Deputy Chief of the Air Staff should be responsible under the C.A.S. for the day to day direction and co-ordination of the work of the Air Branch. In view of the nature of his duties this officer should be a Member of the Air Council. When, however, effect has been given to the recommendations in paragraph 4, consideration should be given as to whether there is need for a Deputy to the C.A.S.

10. While there should always be the closest co-operation between Operations and Intelligence, it is recommended that these branches be organised seperately and their work co-ordinated under one Director.

11. In view of the importance of developing and maintaining a high standard of Welfare and morale in a young Air Force such as the Greek, it is recommended that a separate Directorate to deal solely with Welfare be established under the Air Member for Personnel. The setting up of a special Directorate for this purpose is something in the nature of an experiment and its success will depend largely on the initiative and imagination of the Director himself. If, however, it is found as a result of experience that a separate Directorate for Welfare cannot be fully justified or that there are not sufficient personnel available at present to man the Directorate, Welfare should then become a sub-section of the Directorate

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but the R.A.F. as a whole.

9. Since the Chief of the Air Staff has not time and opportunity to devote adequate attention himself to the Department for Air, it is agreed that a Deputy Chief of the Air Staff should be responsible under the C.A.S. for the day to day direction and co-ordination of the work of the Air Branch. In view of the nature of his duties this officer should be a Member of the Air Council. When, however, effect has been given to the recommendations in paragraph 4, consideration should be given as to whether there is need for a Deputy to the C.A.S.

10. While there should always be the closest co-operation between Operations and Intelligence, it is recommended that these branches be organised separately and their work co-ordinated under one Director.

11. In view of the importance of developing and maintaining a high standard of Welfare and morale in a young Air Force such as the Greek, it is recommended that a separate Directorate to deal solely with Welfare be established under the Air Member for Personnel. The setting up of a special Directorate for this purpose is something in the nature of an experiment and its success will depend largely on the initiative and imagination of the Director himself. If, however, it is found as a result of experience that a separate Directorate for Welfare cannot be fully justified or that there are not sufficient personnel available at present to man the Directorate, Welfare should then become a sub-section of the Directorate of Personnel Services.

12. It appears that there is no form of Education service; this important aspect of Air Force training and welfare should not be neglected and it is recommended that some form of Education organisation should be started within the Welfare Directorate.

13. It is important that the posting of airmen, their attestation discharge etc. should be properly dealt with and that consideration be given to the need for some form of Personnel Administrative Office (Record Office). The posting of officers and the study of the "career aspect" must be properly organised.

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14. When the papers and the recommendations on the suggested organisation of the Greek Ministry for Air have been officially approved, it is recommended that a start on the re-organisation of the Ministry should be made as soon as possible. It is recommended that the first step should be the separation of Personnel from Organisation and its formation into a seperate department.

15. R.A.F. Officers with experience of the detailed work within the British Air Ministry should be attached to the Greek Ministry of Air in an advisory capacity until such time as the various departments are properly organised and are functioning satisfactorily. Specialist advice will be required particularly on such matters as training, officers and airmens records and finance.

16. It is important that the duties of each officer in the Ministry of Air should be clearly defined and a list showing the distribution of duties in detail within the Ministry should be compiled and kept up to date.

17. When once the organisation of the Ministry has been completed, the internal office, work, filing system and method of dealing with correspondence should conform as closely as possible with that of the British Air Ministry.

18. Progress reports on the re-organisation of the Ministry of Air should be rendered periodically to the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, GREECE.

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LOOSE MINUTE

TO: A. & F. A. L. S.

R.E. 2006 Aircraft

1. With reference to your loose minute MEDME/4200/AFALS dated 28th January 1946 regarding the RE-2006 aircraft, notification has now been received from Air Ministry that they have no special interest in this aircraft, and that so far as they are concerned, it can be dismantled. They are, however, retaining the 3-view G.A. drawing for their files.

2. Would you please notify A.F.S.C. to this effect ?

R. N. BALDWYN, F/Lt.,
for: Wing Commander,
Senior Intelligence Officer.

AHQI/S.2010/INT,
30 March, 1946.

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LOOSE MINUTE

To. Organisation (through Intelligence)

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Attached for your information and retention is a list giving details of Italian Air Force installations in Sardinia & Sicily. 119.

3 del.

25th March 1946.

H. F. de IONGH.
Flight Lieutenant.
FOREIGN LIAISON SECTION.

AIR/MF/4200/AFALS.

1313

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. ROME.

To : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat
Attention : S/Ldr. WARD

Date : 19th March, 1946.

Ref. : AFSC/55/AIR.

STATUS OF I.A.F. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SARDINIA AND SICILY
1st March, 1946

With reference to the conversation S/Ldr. Ward - S/Ldr. Smith, A.F.S.C. on the 18-3-46.

Enclosed please find three copies of a return submitted by the Italian Air Ministry in reply to request by this Sub-Commission.

D. M. G. SMITH, S/LDR.,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

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8769

SECRET

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SECRET

Copy No 3

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AFHQ/Rear/A/JOINT PLANNING STAFF

20 March 1946

File :- G-3 AFHQ/131/1

SUBJECT :- Cancellation of Terms of Reference.

1. Terms of reference as contained in P/352 (1st draft) "Revision of Italian Armistice Terms" 13 Dec 1945 have been cancelled by the Coin of draft.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Terms draft, as modification of the Armistice Terms is currently under discussion between the State Department and the Foreign Office, NO further action is required by AFHQ on their original instructions as contained in F.M 629.

Allied Liaison Section
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
ARTE
MRAM ...4200/...

H. Paul Yates,
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

HB/ore.

Distribution:-

List "D" plus
G-5
BR FOLAD
U.S FOLAD

Distr: Plans
Air Comd.
AOC.
AFALS

1511

SECRET

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BY HAND
SECRET

117

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 21st March, 1946.

Ref :- MAAC/4200/AFALS.

Airfields in Italy, Sicily, Corsica & Sardinia

Forwarded herewith are Air Ministry (A.I.2(b)) booklets being a list of airfields, landing grounds and seaplane bases as follows :-

(a) ITALY: amendments incorporated up to No. 71. Amendment List No. 70 not yet incorporated but attached.

(b) SICILY: amendments incorporated up to No. 3.

(c) SARDINIA: amendments incorporated up to No. 3

(d) CORSICA: amendments incorporated up to No. 4.

and these are to be returned to this Secretariat as soon as possible.

2. Copies of these booklets should, of course, be held by your Intelligence Section, and if not held, application should be made to obtain them, complete with amendment lists up to date. Action should also be taken to ensure the Sub-Commission is included for any future amendment lists.

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

1510

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

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FROM: Intelligence Section, Air Headquarters, R.A.F., ITALY.

TO: A.F.H.Q., Rome.
(Copy to A.F.A.L.S.)

DATE: 19th March, 1946.

REF: AHQI/2059/6/1/Int.

ITALIAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Air Ministry A.I.3(b) are requesting information on the Italian Aircraft Industry and your assistance in supplying their requirements would be appreciated. The type of thing they want is:-

(a) Number and location of airframe and engine factories at present in production or likely to be in production soon.

(b) Type of aircraft, etc., being produced.

(c) Production figures.

(d) Personalities in the industry.

(e) (Most important) General policy regarding the future of the industry.

2. In this connection your comments on the enclosed notes on the Italian aircraft industry will be appreciated.

3. Can you also forward to us a copy of the "Italian Royal Air Force Strength State" which should also be of considerable interest to them.

ACTION
INFO
FILE

for F.N. MORRIS
Squadron Leader
Wing Commander
Senior Intelligence Officer
AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F., ITALY

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LM.

TOP SECRET.

115

A.F.H.Q. MESSAGE CENTER.

INCOMING MESSAGE.

FILED 1645332 PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY.
FROMUTEL TOP SECRET

AFSC H 12/0/16

FROM: AGWAR WDGS OCS

TO: AFHQ FOR MORGAN ETC. TWO CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

16 March 1946

REF NO THIS MESSAGE W 80094

see Min 508

Ends in MAP 649

The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the re-organization of the Italian Air Force to the extent recommended in MAP 1103, subject to the provision that a detailed plan as to the recommended equipping of the units, including aircraft types, be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval, prior to implementing action, and with the understanding that arrangements made at present for the development of the Italian Air Force will not prejudice final decision on limitations to be imposed by the Treaty of Peace with ITALY. They further approve the establishment of Interned Civil Air Lines by the Italian Government.

The approvals noted above are to be considered as positive only and are not to be transmitted to the Italian Government as requirements for the establishment of an Air Force of the size and composition delineated in MAP 1103.

NOTE: MAP 1103 is FX 56901 RE SHAPE 1124 21/12/45 C/S — 73
WAS ALSO REFERRED TO C in C MED

ACTION G-3 (AFHQ)

INFORMATION SACSA G-3 (AFHQ) PAAF ES ETOUSA ERT/ CLAD
CAC G-5 USAF G-2
C-in-C MLC

2/3 IN 2452 16 March 1946 TOR 2303GCT 2155A ROF FX 80894

Action
Info.

Plans
Air
MGS
SMSO
G-2 GPO
G-3
A-1
PWB

OUTGOING SIGNAL

114

TO : AIR MINISTRY LONDON

112
113

FROM : MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

UX.990 SECRET ROUTINE 20th March, 1945

FOR DEPT. A.I.2(b) (.) Subject airfields in Italy (.)
Your 205/76/46 March 6th and 209/118/46 March 8th refer (.)
Information required by Air Ministry signal MS.2629 JANUARY
and provided by Air Forces Sub-Commission vide my AP.395 JANUARY
was only stating airfields and seaplane bases in use by Italian
Air Force (.) Action now taken to bring airfield booklets up
to date which will be forwarded by fast air mail soonest (.)

13

20th March, 1945.

(F. W. WARD)
Squadron Leader,
M. A. A. C.

T.O.O. 2016/5.

MAAC/4200/AFALS.

(2165) Wt.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

and provided by Air Forces Sub-Commission vide my AP.395 JANUARY was only stating airfields and seaplane bases in use by Italian Air Force (.) Action now taken to bring airfield booklets up to date which will be forwarded by fast air mail soonest (.)

20th March, 1946.

(F. W. WARD)
Squadron Leader,
M. A. A. C.

T.O.O. 20164.

MAAC/4200/AFALS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1064

SECRET. 113

From : Air Ministry, A.I.2(b) Whitehall.

To : Allied and Foreign Air Liaison Section,
(MEDME Detachment)
Air Headquarters, Italy. R.A.F. C.M.F.

Date : 8th March 1946.

Ref : 209/118/46.

112 AIRFIELDS IN ITALY.

Further to our minute of 6th March 1946, (our ref. 209/78/46) we enclose (1) Gazetteer of airfields etc. in Italy, and (2) a list of abandoned airfields in Italy (Appendix III). Some of the airfields in the Gazetteer have since been abandoned by Allied Air Forces but the two documents together give a complete list of airfields and flying boat bases past and present as recorded by us.

2. We have marked those named by you with a red cross, and one would infer from A.H.Q. Italy signal MS 11429 of 31st January that all the others have ceased to exist. This seems very sweeping. We know that many former airfields may now be unserviceable and abandoned but your list rules out, for example, such important or formerly important airfields (inter alia) as the following:

CERCOLA
CANERI
CASCINA/MALPENSA
CELONE
FLORENCE/PERETOLA
FANO
FORLI
GENOA/SANPIERDARENA
GROSSETO
GROTTAGLIE
LEVALDIGI CENTALLO
LONATE POZZOLO
LUCCA
LUCERA
MANDURIA
MANIAGO
MONDOLFO
MONDOVI
NOVI LIGURE
PANTANELLA
PARMA
PIACENZA
PISTOIA
POGGIO RENATICO
PONTEDERA
REGGIO EMILIA
RIMINI
SALUZZO
SAN GIOVANNI
RAVENNA CLASSE
SAN PANCRAZIO
SAN SEVERO
SAVIGLIANO
SPINAZZOLA
STEPAGNE
STORNARA
TORTORELLA
TORRETTA
TURIN/CASELLE
TURIN/VENARIA REALE
VENEGONO
VERCIATE
VERONA
VICENZA
VILLANOVA D'ALBENGA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785019

Further to our minute of 6th March 1946, (our ref. 205/76/46) we enclose (1) Gazetteer of airfields etc. in Italy, and (2) a list of abandoned airfields in Italy (Appendix III). Some of the airfields in the Gazetteer have since been abandoned by Allied Air Forces but the two documents together give a complete list of airfields and flying boat bases past and present as recorded by us.

2. We have marked those named by you with a red cross, and one would infer from A.H.Q. Italy signal MS 11429 of 31st January that all the others have ceased to exist. This seems very sweeping. We know that many former airfields may now be unserviceable and abandoned but your list rules out, for example, such important or formerly important airfields (inter alia) as the following:

CERCOLA
CAMERI
CASCINA/MALPENSA
CELONE
FLORENCE/PERETOLA
FANO
FORLI
GENOA/SANPIERDARENA
GROSSETO
GROTTAGLIE
LEVALDIGI CENTALLO
LONATE POZZOLO
LUCCA
LUCERA
MANDURIA
MANIAGO
MONDOLFO
MONDOVI
NOVI LIGURE
PANTANELLA
PARMA
PIACENZA
PISTOIA
POGGIO RENATICO
PONTEDERA
REGGIO EMILIA
RIMINI
SALUZZO
SAN GIOVANNI
RAVENNA CLASSE
SAN PANCRAZIO
SAN SEVERO
SAVIGLIANO
SPINAZZOLA
STEPARONE
STORNARA
TORTORELLA
TORRETTA
TURIN/CASELLE
TURIN/VENARIA REALE
VENEGONO
VERGIATE
VERONA
VICENZA
VILLANOVA D'ALBENGA
VILLAORBA.

3. The important airfield BRINDISI/CAMPO CASALE which is still in use is not mentioned by you at all.

4. The names you give in respect of the 80 "~~proposed~~ prepared landing strip airfields" which are said to have emergency landing strips available show such a curious selection that we cannot help wondering from what source they were obtained.

5. We notice also the following discrepancies:

(a) Some of the airfields you mention are in CORSICA which was outside the enquiry altogether.

(b) LEGHORN and LIVORNO are mentioned as distinct and separate airfields. Are they not the same place?

(c) LA SPEZIA is mentioned as an airfield. We have no record of it, and the co-ordinates you give put it in hilly country 12½ miles NNE of the town.

(d) LIDO DI ROMA and OSTIA are mentioned as separate /airfields.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

airfields. There were two airfields (see our List) but the co-ordinates you give do not fit.

(e) PIAN DEL LAGO is counted twice. (Nos. 49 and 68).

(f) Your No. 74 is "TORINO". We should like to know what this means. There are several airfields round TURIN.

(g) You mention BERGAMO but there are two airfields of present or former importance there, BERGAMO/ORIO AL SERIO and BERGAMO/PONTE S. PIETRO, and you do not say which you mean.

6. Other questions may arise on SARDINIA and SICILY but we will defer them for the time being.

7. We have been obliged to point out to A.A.F.H. who initiated the enquiry in their signal to A.H.Q. Italy M.S.26 of 29th January, that a check on the figures which you supplied appears to be desirable.

Wing Commander.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(c) You mention BERGAMO but there are [illegible] present or former importance there, BERGAMO/ORIO AL SERIO and BERGAMO/PONTE S. PIETRO, and you do not say which you mean.

6. Other questions may arise on SARDINIA and SICILY but we will defer them for the time being.

7. We have been obliged to point out to A.S.P.S who initiated the enquiry in their signal to A.H.Q. Italy MS.36 of 29th January, that a check on the figures which you supplied appears to be desirable.

Wing Commander.

ISU.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1068

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

From: Air Ministry A.I.2(b)

To .: Allied and Foreign Air Liaison Section.
(MED.ME Detachment)
Air Headquarters, Italy. R.A.F. C.M.F.

Date: 6th March, 1946.

Ref : 205/76/46.

AIRFIELDS in ITALY etc.

Reference your letter of 22nd February 1946 (Your Ref. MED.ME/4200/AFALS.) the list of 80 derequisitioned airfields which you enclosed presumably relates to the 80 "prepared landing strip airfields" mentioned in A.H.Q. Italy signal MS 11429 of 31st January 1946.

2. In that signal it was stated that emergency landing strips were available on those 80 airfields. Please state whether emergency landing strips are in fact now available on the 80 derequisitioned airfields named by you.

3. The total number of airfields and flying boat bases named by you in your enclosures represents only a fraction of the total number of airfields or former airfields in Italy, Sardinia and Sicily. (See A.I.2(b) Lists held by A.H.Q., Italy). Please state whether all those not mentioned by you in your enclosures are completely and finally abandoned and unusable even in emergency.

4. In addition to the above information, may we please be informed which airfields and flying boat bases in Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Pantelleria and Lampedusa are in use by the Italians (civil and military)?

Wing Commander.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BROWNE, CBE.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

AFSC/368/CBE. 5th March, 1946.

Dear Fisher,

Thank you for your letter MAAC/4200/DCMF of the 27th February. I have returned the report of Air Vice-Marshal Therold under cover of my letter of even reference dated 23rd February, and I return herewith Appendix "A" which shows in diagrammatic form the re-organisation of the Greek Air Ministry.

2. Thank you for applying to Air Headquarters, Greece, for attachments "B" and "C".

Yours

Wing Commander Maxwell Fisher,
Secretary,
M.A.A.C. Secretariat,
Caserta.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
U.S. M.A.A.F.
APO 9/3:0.
FILE 4200.

1070

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To : Brig. General W.L. Lee,
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date : 5th March, 1945.

Ref : MAAC/4200/ATA&S.

R.A.F. TRADING SYLLABI.

Reference is made to A.F.H.Q., letter dated 20th February 1946, which asks for certain training syllabi for use by the A.F.H.Q. to make out a training programme for the Italian Air Force.

2. The British Member of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee has considered this proposal and states he thinks it would be a better plan to wait until the I.A.F., is a little more sorted out and have more detailed information as to what they will have in the way of Squadrons and aircraft.

3. It is proposed, therefore, to leave this matter in abeyance for the time being and your comments thereon are accordingly awaited.

for Basil Fisher.

(BASIL FISHER)
Wing Commander,
Secretary to the
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE.

1302

1071

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1159

97

Reading | 4200 | AFHQ
Date 3/3/46

No reference
Possibly related
to Sorrento Hall

1072

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

408

From : Air Headquarters, A.A.F. Italy.
(Allied Forces Air Liaison Section).

To : Headquarters, MEDITERRANEAN, Cairo.

Date : 28th February, 1946.

Ref : G/S.8/1409/AFLS.

101

ITALIAN AIRFIELDS.

Reference is made to this Headquarters' letter of even number dated 22nd February 1946, to Air Ministry, (copy to you). 97

2. Enclosed for your information is the list referred to in the above letter, of airfields and seaplane bases in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

3. Non-evacuated airfields are shown separately at enclosure 5.

B E de Lingh

(B.E. de LINGH)
Flight Lieutenant,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
AIR HEADQUARTERS, A.A.F. ITALY.

130

1073

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOOSE MINUTE

To: A.F.A.L.S.

R.A.F. TRAINING SYLLABI

Spoke A.O.C. Two great minds thought alike.

2. He says wait until the Italian Air Force is more sorted out and know what they are going to have and have got it.

27th February, 1946.

Group Captain, Operations

Released Sec 11c 107 Sec 100

1074

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778017

106

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Headquarters GREECE.

Date:- 27th February, 1946.

Ref :- MAAC/4200/AFAIS.

See 104 & 105

Re-organisation of the Greek Air Force
Report of Air Vice-Marshal THOMAS.

Reference the above report, Air Vice-Marshal Brodie, of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, has requested that copies of Attachments "B.1.", "B" and "C" of the report be forwarded to him for guidance in re-organising the Italian Air Force.

2. It would be appreciated if copies of these attachments could be forwarded to this Secretariat for onward transmission to the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

Maxwell Fisher.

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

1294

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

105

Mediterranean Allied Air Committee
Secretariat,

Air Headquarters Italy,

R.A.F., C.M.F.

Reference :-
MAAC/4.200/DOMF.

27th February, 1946.

104

Dear A.V.M.

Thank you for your letter refe once AFSC/368/ORG dated 23rd February, 1946:

Attached is the organisation, in diagrammatic form, of the Greek Air Ministry as requested in your letter. It would be appreciated if this could be returned along with the Report of Air Vice-Marshal Therold, at your convenience.

It is regretted that the attachments "B" and "C" mentioned in your letter, are not held by Air Headquarters Italy, the originals being returned to Air Headquarters Greece, to whom I am writing, requesting further copies. These will be forwarded to you as soon as received.

Yours

Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

Air Vice-Marshal I.F. Brodie,
The Director,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
ROME.

1237

1076

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, FCHE.

104

AFSC/368/CMC.

Returned see 105

23rd February, 1946.

Bedell

Dear Fisher,

Reference the report on the Re-organisation of the Greek Air Ministry, a copy of which you kindly loaned me, (and which I will be returning), the most important part of the report is not attached, namely the detailed organisation in diagramtic form marked attachment "B.1". Might I also have a copy of attachment "B" and attachment "C"?

2. From the report itself, I think the only radical difference between this, and the suggestions which I gave to the Air Ministry some months ago, is the separate Directorate to deal solely with Welfare, and I think that is a good idea.

3. For your information there is a hold up in the Italian Air Ministry in getting the Air Council going on R.A.F. lines, because the Council of Ministers wishes to get all three Service Ministries on a similar basis, and I know that there is going to be some delay in the formation and initiation of the Army Council, and probably also in the Ministry of Marine; however, the Air Minister has promised to convene conferences under the existing Decree of 1937 which, as I have pointed out to the Air Minister, will serve a useful purpose provided the meetings are held in a democratic spirit, and on the lines on which I have suggested that the Air Council shall work. The Italian Air Ministry has promised to invite General Lee and myself to the first meeting of the substitute Air Council - it should be interesting to see how they run it!

Yours

Sincerely

Ian P. Scott.

Wing Commander Maxwell Fisher,
Secretary,
M.A.A.C. Secretariat.
Caserta.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
A.H. 26/2
FILE 4200

1290

1077

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

193

From : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.

Date : 23rd February, 1946.

Ref : MAAC/420/.FAIR.

96

FIAT G.55 Aircraft.

Please refer to your letter AFSC/826/SEC., dated 18th February, 1946.

2. Authority is granted for the allocation of 12 G.55 aircraft to the Italian Air Force Flying School at Lecce providing it is clearly conveyed to the Italian Air Force that these aircraft would be used for the sole purpose of advanced training.

3. The suggestion made in para.5 of your above quoted letter is to be carried out. It is, therefore, requested that the Italian Air Ministry be instructed to break up an equivalent number of obsolescent aircraft which are now in the School, and reduce them to produce. A copy of your letter AFSC/826/SEC. dated 18th February 1946 is enclosed as requested in your letter of even number dated 21st February, 1946.

16

Maxwell Fisher

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander,
Secretary to the,
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE.

129

1078

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

102

From: Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, ROME.

To: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

Date: 21st February, 1946.

Ref: AFSC/826/ENG.

FIAT G.55 AIRCRAFT.

96

1. We refer to our letter of even reference dated 18th February, 1946.

2. It is regretted that all copies of the letter were inadvertently dispatched to your Headquarters.

3. It would be appreciated if you can return one copy of the letter to this Sub-Commission at your earliest convenience, for the purpose of filing.

WILLIAM L. LEE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Director.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
APO 242
FO 4200.

1294

10791

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

101

SECRET

Reference
AIR/4200/A/A.A.

22nd February, 1926.

Sir,

MANDATED AREAS

I have the honour to refer to your Minute A.4200 dated 13th February, 1926:

2. In compliance with your instructions, herewith a list of the airfields and emplanement bases on the Italian mainland, in Sicily, Sardinia, Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

Marshall Tisdall.

N.B. No copy sent to
Nead MP. Have phoned AFSC
for 5 further copies, one of
which will be sent to Nead MP.
B del.

(MARSHALL TISDALL)
Acting Commander
Air Vice-Marshal
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Headquarters Italy.

The Under Secretary of State for Air,
Air Ministry,
WHITEHALL.

1291

Copy to: Headquarters Italy, R.A.F., ITALY.

1080

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

190

TO : S.A.S.O.

R.A.F. Training Syllabi

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a request from the Air Forces Sub-Commission for certain Royal Air Force training syllabi, which are required for use as a guide for the proposed re-organisation of the Italian Air Force.

2. The American member of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee has no objection to their use in this capacity; may we have your comments from the R.A.F. point of view, please ?

B. de I. See 107

(D. E. de IORIO)
Flight Lieutenant,
for Wing Commander,
Allied & Foreign Air Liaison Section

MISC/4200/AFALS.

22nd February, 1946.

1392

1081

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

99

FROM : Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

TO : Air Headquarters, R.A.F., Italy.

DATE : 20 February 1946

See 110

R.A.F. Training Syllabi

1. In view of the proposed reorganization of the Italian Air Force, in which it is recommended that one Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and five Fighter Interceptor Squadrons be organized, it is requested that the following training syllabi be procured for the Air Forces Sub-Commission:

(a) Fighter Reconnaissance OTU

(b) Fighter Bomber OTU

(c) Fighter Interceptor OTU

2. It is intended that these syllabi will be used as a basis for the training program which will be initiated upon the organization of the above-mentioned squadrons.

ROBERT P. [illegible]
Colonel, AC
Assistant Deputy Director

SECRET

1082

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOOSE MINUTE

98

TO : AIR PLANS.

SECRET

ITALIAN AIRFIELDS

13

1. Reference is made to your Signal AP.395 of 31st January, 1946:

2. Attached for your information and retention is a copy of the list of airfields and seaplane bases in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Pantelleria and Lampedusa, compiled by the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

3. This list has been sent to Air Ministry, copy to Headquarters MEDME on their request in signal AI.3730 dated 13th February, 1946.

B del.

14

(R. E. de [illegible])
Flight Lieutenant,
for Wing Commander,
Allied & Foreign Air Liaison Section

22nd February, 1946.

MEDME/4200/AWALS.

1290

1083

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

97

From : Air Forces Sub Commission, Rome.

To : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, Secretariat.

Date : 20th February, 1946.

Ref : AF36/22/Air.

95

LIST OF AIRFIELDS AND SEAPLANE BASES.

In compliance with your Signal U 508 dated 14th February 1946, attached are list of airfields and seaplane bases referred to in AHQ (Italy) Signal AP 395 January 1946.

193

Only 2 copies sent by AFSC.
One forwarded to A.M (101)
one to Air Plans (98). Please
phoned AFSC for 5 additional
copies, distribution to be: AFHQ Org.
SHAEF
SEO.
MRPME (See note on 101) Bdel.

Frank R. Brand
Frank R. MAHER
Lt.Col., Air Corps,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Director,
Air Forces Sub Commission.

3 Incl:

Incl. #1 - List of airfields on Italian Mainland.
#2 - " " " " Sicily.
#3 - " " " " Sardinia.
#4 - " " " " Pantelleria & Lampedusa.
#5 - " " Derequisitioned Airfields.
#6 - " " Seaplane bases in Italy.
#7 - " " " " in Sicily.
#8 - " " " " in Sardinia.

1204

1084

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

97A

LIST OF AIRFIELDS ON ITALIAN MAINLAND

	AIRFIELD NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1.	Amendola	41 32' 34"	15 42' 25"
2.	Aviano	46 01' 52"	12 36' 13"
3.	Bari	41 08' 26"	16 47' 03"
4.	Bergamo	45 40' 16"	09 42' 07"
5.	Bologna	44 31' 52"	11 17' 21"
6.	Brindisi-Caputi	40 39' 22"	17 56' 53"
7.	Campoformido	46 01' 54"	13 10' 15"
8.	Capodichino	40 52' 55"	14 16' 55"
9.	Centocelle	41 52' 10"	12 33' 30"
10.	Ciampino	41 47' 55"	12 35' 30"
11.	Falconara	43 37' 23"	13 22' 16"
12.	Foggia	43 26'	15 32' 25"
13.	Frosinone	41 38' 53"	13 17' 36"
14.	Gioia del Colle	40 46' 52"	16 56' 13"
15.	Gorizia	45 54' 27"	13 36' 06"
16.	Guidonia	41 59' 24"	12 44' 06"
17.	Jesi	43 32' 26"	13 16' 17"
18.	Lecce	40 14' 30"	18 08' 09"
19.	Littoria	41 57' 15"	12 39' 55"
20.	Marcianise	41 01' 35"	14 19' 50"
21.	Milano-Linate	45 27' 21"	9 16' 07"
22.	Perugia	43 05' 59"	12 30' 13"
23.	Pisa	43 41' 10"	10 25' 30"
24.	Pomigliano	40 55' 40"	14 23' 20"

1284

1085

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

	NORTH	EAST
25. Tirsano	45 58' 08"	13 13' 53"
26. Torino-Aerobalia	45 04' 58"	7 36' 12"
27. Treviso	45 39' 05"	12 11' 54"
28. Venice-Lido	45 26'	12 23'

1086

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1

LIST OF AIRFIELDS ON SICILY

	NAME OF AIRFIELD	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1.	Borizzo	37° 53'	12° 32'
2.	Catania	37° 27' 52"	15° 03' 37"
3.	Castelvetrano	37° 40' 18"	12° 46' 36"
4.	Palermo	38° 06' 32"	13° 18' 49"

Incl.#2

1087

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIST OF AIRFIELDS ON SARDINIA

	AIRFIELD NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1.	Alghero	40° 38' 03"	08° 17' 15"
2.	Cagliari-Elmas	09° 14' 41"	09° 03' 35"

Incl. #3

1088

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIST OF AIRFIELDS ON LAMPEDUSA & PANTELLERIA

	AIRFIELD NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1.	Lampedusa	35° 31' 18"	12° 36' 54"
2.	Pantelleria	36° 48' 38"	11° 58' 00"

Incl. #4

1089

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIST OF DEREQUISITIONED AIRFIELD.

	AIRFILED NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1.	Aiello	45°51'	13°24'
2.	Agrigento	37°17'	13°35'
3.	Albinia	42°30'58"	11°16'19"
4.	Alezan		
5.	Aosta	45°44'19"	07°20'41"
6.	Aquila	42°19'23"	13°25'50"
7.	Biferno	41°58'00"	15°02'55"
8.	Bolzano	46°27'35"	11°19'30"
9.	Borghetto	43°39'00"	13°08'20"
10.	Bresso	45°32'28"	09°12'27"
11.	Capua	41°06'50"	14°10'37"
12.	Casale-Monferrato	45°06'38"	08°27'21"
13.	Cassandro	43°56'00"	12°43'30"
14.	Castel Volturno	41°00'36"	13°58'10"
15.	Castiglione del Lago	43°08'16"	12°01'09"
16.	Cecina North	43°17'15"	10°32'00"
17.	Cecina South	43°15'25"	10°32'00"
18.	Cerveteri	41°58'22"	12°04'07"
19.	Cesenatico (Near Rimini)	44°12'	12°23'
20.	Cisterna Littoria	41°32'30"	12°54'50"
21.	Crotone	38°59'00"	17°02'07"
22.	Fermo	43°09'10"	13°48'44"
23.	Foligno	42°55'57"	12°42'34"
24.	Furbara	41°59'37"	12°00'59"
25.	Galeria	41°48'40"	12°22'10"
26.	Gardolo (near Trento)		
27.	Ghedi	45°25'38"	10°19'49"

10901

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

	NORT	EAST
28. GMisonaccia	41°03'45"	14°05'35"
29. Grazzanise	44°16'10"	9° 49'20"
30. La Spezia	45°57'	13°14'
31. Lavariano	43°55'58"	10°22'43"
32. Leghorn	40°17'35"	18°58'34"
33. Leverano	41°44'36"	12°14'40"
34. Lido di Roma	43°36'	10°23'
35. Livorno	43°14'44"	13°23'24"
36. Macerata	44°53'	12°20'
37. Madna		
38. Malaventini	45°49'	13°29'
39. Monfalcone Ronchi	41°27'10"	12°41'24"
40. Nettuno	42°44'08"	11°59'29"
41. Orvieto	46°15'	13°05'
42. Osoppo	41°44'36"	12°14'40"
43. Ostia	45°23'47"	11°50'49"
44. Padua	41°56'30"	12°06'55"
45. Palo	41°29'35"	15°47'35"
46. Palata	40°58'18"	15°59'37"
47. Pallazzo	41°53'37"	14°04'41"
48. Pecostanzo	43°18'	11°12'
49. Pian del Lago	41°57'	15°3' 50"
50. Ramitelli	38°04'32"	15°38'50"
51. Reggio C.	41°37'	15°23'
52. Regina	42°25'29"	12°51'03"
53. Rieti	45°53'	12°57'
54. Rivis	45°57'00"	13°05'
55. Rivolto	43°20'40"	10°29'25"
56. Rosignano (Leghorn)	15°22'	41°31'
57. Salsola	38°57'56"	16°56'54"
58. San Leonardo		

T 0 9 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

	NORTH	EAST
59. San Vito	42° [illegible]'	14°28'
60. San Vito dei Normanni	40°39'	17°51'
61. S.Vito Taranto	40°25'05"	17°13'50"
62. S.Maria	41°03'	14°13'
63. Sarzana	44°05'15"	09°59'06"
64. Scanzano	40°16'30"	16°44'10"
65. Sessa Aurunca	41°14'	13°47'
66. Sezze Littoria	41°29'11"	13°01'50"
67. Siena Ampugnano	43°15'24"	11°16'19"
68. Siena Pian del Lago	43°20'35"	11°16'28"
69. Sinello	42°10'25"	14°39'45"
70. Solenzara	42°45'16"	12°43'53"
71. Spoleto	42°17'09"	12°33'47"
72. Stimigliano	42°13'05"	11°44'05"
73. Tarquinia	45°01'	07°38'
74. Torino	42°04'00"	14°46'
75. Trigno	46°08'	12°53'
76. Vacile	38°38'20"	16°02'49"
77. Vasto	43°36'50"	10°26'01"
78. Vibo Valentia	45°22'	10°52'
79. Vicarello		
80. Villafranca Main (Verona)		

1251

1092

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIST OF SEAPLANE BASES IN ITALY

SEAPLANE BASE NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1. Ancona	43° 36' 58"	13° 30' 04"
2. Bracciano	42° 05'	12° 17'
3. Brindisi	40°339'	17° 53'
4. Castiglione del Lago	43° 08'	12° 09'
5. Como	45° 48' 53"	9° 04' 07"
6. Finale Ligure	44° 09' 53"	8° 20' 17"
7. La Spezia Cadimare	44° 04'	9° 51'
8. Napoli-Nisida	40° 47' 58"	14° 09' 53"
9. Orbetello	42° 25'	11° 22'
10. San Nicola Varano	41° 52' 18"	15° 41' 07"
11. Taranto	40° 28'	17° 17'
12. Venezia S.Andrea	45° 26' 21"	12° 22' 50"
13. Vigna Di Valle	42° 05' 19"	12° 13' 21"

Incl. #6

12880

1093

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIST OF SEAPLANE BASES IN SICILY

SEAPLANE BASE NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1. Augusta	37° 14' 27"	15° 12' 22"
2. Palermo	38° 09'	13° 24'
3. Siracusa	37° 03' 45"	15° 16' 47"
4. Stagnone	37° 48' 46"	12° 27' 12"

Incl. #7

1094

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIST OF SEAPLANE BASES IN SARDINIA

SEAPLANE BASE NAME	POSITION NORTH	POSITION EAST
1. Alghero	40° 33'	08° 20'
2. Cagliari-Elmas	39° 14' 32"	09° 03' 07"
3. Olbia	40° 55' 37"	09° 30' 37"

Incl. #8

1274

96

12 attach
See
102

From: Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, ROME.

To: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, Secretariat.

Date: 18th February, 1946.

Ref: AFSC/826/ENG.

FIAT G.55 AIRCRAFT.

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence on this subject, AFSC/826/ENG. dated 25th July, 1945, - "Maintenance and Supply of Italian Type Fighter Aircraft".

2. The Italian Air Force flying school, Lecce, is now almost at a complete standstill through lack of suitable advanced training aircraft. It is faced with an impossible task in attempting its commitment over the next few months, and is in need of immediate assistance.

3. In order to cover the interim period of the coming months, and in an effort to lay down the basis for a definite standard of pilot training, it is requested that permission be granted for the allocation of 12 G.55 aircraft to the school. Of these, six should be converted for dual instruction. The aircraft would be used for the sole purpose of advanced training.

4. It is understood that these aircraft are available at the Fiat works, backed by a reasonably good supply of spares.

5. It is suggested that if these aircraft be allocated, it may be wise to request the Italian Air Ministry to break up an equivalent number of obsolescent aircraft which are now in the school.

William L. Lee
WILLIAM L. LEE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Director.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence on this subject, AFSC/826/ENG. dated 25th July, 1945, - "Maintenance and Supply of Italian Type Fighter Aircraft".

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WILLIAM L. LEE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Director.

1277

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
21/2
4206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From: Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, ROME.

To: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, Secretariat.

Date: 18th February, 1946.

Ref: AFSC/826/ENG.

FIAT G.55 AIRCRAFT.

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence on this subject, AFSC/826/ENG. dated 25th July, 1945, - "Maintenance and Supply of Italian Type Fighter Aircraft".

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William L. Lee

WILLIAM L. LEE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Director.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788017

1097

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William L. Lee

WILLIAM L. LEE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Director.

1276

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1095

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

95

CYPHERING FINAL.

FROM : HEADQUARTERS ALLIED AIR FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE SECRETARIAT.

TO : A.F.H.Q. .AG. MORE.

U. 908 (.) FEB 14 (.) SECRET.

REFERENCE AM I SIGNAL U395 JANUARY VOTE TO YOU(.) I

EXPECTED NOW TO BE IN POSSESSION OF SUFFICIENT RESERVE TROOPS AND

THE NIGHTLY LANDING CRAFT REQUIRED TO(.) REQUEST YOU FORWARD

THIS INFORMATION TO THE SECRETARIAT(.) PLEASE ACKT &

ADVISE(.)=====

B/F 18/2. Phoned Lt. Branch will have reply by 20/2.

T.O.O. 151900A

SECRETARY.

(B.N. deIONGH)
FLIGHT LIEUT.
A.F.H.Q.

Copy to: A.C.S.
A.C.S.
S.A.C.S.
G.S.O.
Air Plans.

File : AFHQ S/h200/AIR.

1500

1273

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

54

For Info

SECRET CYPHER MESSAGE.
T.O.R. IN R AND D OFFICE 140645.

TO: AHQ ITALY (R) MEDME.
FROM: AM KINGSWAY AI/3780 13TH FEB. SECRET.

ACTION: AFLS.
AOC.
AOA
SASO
SEO
AIR PLANS ✓

REFERENCE YOUR AP. 395 31ST JAN.
SO ASP 8 REGARDING AIRFIELDS ITALY SICILY SARDINIA LAMPEDUSA.
PLEASE SEND AIR MAIL SOONEST NAMES OF AIRFIELDS SEAPLANE BASES AND THE EIGHTY LANDING STRIPS REFERRED TO.

ROUTINE.

T.O.O. 131215Z.
T. O.R. 140415A.

Actioned - see 95, action not Air Plans - their AP 395 was sent from AFSC by G/C.

G/2
4200

94

1284

1101

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OPTOUTS MESSAGE.

FROM: A.H.Q. ITALY.

TO: AIR MINISTRY, KINGSWAY (R) H.Q. MEDIT.

93

TOP SECRET AF.335 T.O.O 311645 JANUARY 1946 (.)

YOUR 98.26 JANUARY 29 (.)

PARA ONE AIRFIELDS (A) 28 (B) 4 (C) 2 (D) 2 LANDING STRIPS (.) THOSE AIR SO MARKED LANDING STRIP AIRFIELDS WHICH HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO AGRICULTURE BUT LEASED AT REDUCED LANDING STRIP (.) ALL UNDEVELOPED GRASS AIRFIELDS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO AGRICULTURE (.)

PARA TWO SCALLAN BASES (A) 13 (B) 4 (C) 3 (D) NIL (.)

PARA THREE MAINTENANCE UNITS (A) 5 (B) 2 (C) 2 (D) NIL (.)

PARA FOUR FORMATION HEADQUARTERS (A) 5 (B) 1 (C) 1 (D) NIL (.)

PARA FIVE CUTS OF REDUCTION 12 MONTHS (.)

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE

A.D. PREMRAM, GROUP CAPTAIN.

COPY: A.F.H.Q. (OPS).
6 COPIES FOR AIR STAFF, A.H.Q.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
APO 512.
FILE #200.

Section AFHQ
Auto Rec
RofA
SHAEF
SCO
Gen Files

1271

CYPHER MESSAGE

TO : AIR MINISTRY (R) ROME GRMS.

FROM : AIR HEADQUARTERS ITALY.

B. del.

G. 873 SECRET IMMEDIATE 1st February, 1945

Your AFX.3143 JAN (.) Subject Italian Air Force aircraft strength (.) Strength of Italian Air Force as at 31 Jan 45 is 424 (R) 424 aircraft of which 139 (R) 139 are either under repair or awaiting spares (.) Of complete total 197 (R) 197 are serviceable (.) Information required by you is (A) Present front line strength of 285 (R) 285 aircraft made up as follows (.)

NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE
37	R.39	XXX 17	M.C.202	13	SPITFIRES
18	M.C.205	31	Baltimores	22	S.M.82
27	S.M.79	5	G.12	1	S.M.73
3	S.M.75	1	S.M.83	2	S.M.84
9	CR.506/BT	4	CR.506/T	1	CR.506/C
13	CR.501	6	CR.506/B.	7	R.S.14
4	CR.1007	4	CA.314	1	CA.310
4	CA.309	12	SAI.202	5	RS.2001
9	CR.42	1	SAI.204	1	F.L.3.
1	FW.156	1	CA.313	16	M.C.200
3	F.W.305	2	G.50	7	G.A.164
2	G.8.	1	S.A.I.200		

(R) Effective aircraft reserves total 139 (R) 139 made up as follows :

NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE
20	R.39	1	Spitfire	16	M.C.205
9	M.C.202	7	SAI.202	2	Ju.87
1	F.L.3.	1	RE.20	7	S.M.79
1	CR.1007	2	C.A.314	1	G.A.310
1	R.S.14	12	CR.502/BT	4	CR.506/B.
11	CR.501	2	R.S.14	7	R.S.2001
15	F.W.2002	16	M.C.200	1	C.R.42

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

which 139 (R) 139 are either under repair or awaiting spares (.) Of complete total 197 (R) 197 are serviceable (.) Information required by you is (A) present front line strength of 285 (R) 285 aircraft made up as follows (.)

NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE
37	P.39	XXX 17	N.C.202	13	SPITFIRES
18	N.C.205	31	Baltimores	22	S.M.82
27	S.M.79	5	G.12	1	S.M.73
3	S.M.75	1	S.M.83	2	S.M.84
9	CR.506/TR	4	CR.506/T	1	CR.506/C
13	CR.501	6	CR.506/S.	7	R.S.14
4	CR.1007	4	CA.314	1	CA.310
4	CA.309	12	SAI.202	5	RE.2001
9	CR.42	1	SAI.204	1	F.L.3.
1	FJ.156	1	CA.313	10	N.C.200
3	F.M.305	2	G.50	7	C.A.164
2	G.8.	1	S.A.L.200		

(B) Effective aircraft reserves total 139 (R) 139 made up as follows :

NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE	NUMBER	TYPE
20	P.39	1	Spitfire	15	N.C.205
9	N.C.202	7	SAI.202	2	Ju.87
1	F.L.3.	1	RE.20	7	S.M.79
1	CR.1007	2	C.A.314	1	C.A.310
1	S.M.82	12	CR.502/TC	4	CR.506/R.
11	CR.501	2	R.S.14	7	R.E.2001
15	R.E.2002	16	N.C.200	1	C.R.42

This information received on 1/2/46 in answer to our 89A. Original should state sent to G/C Plans (through Org) on ~~4/2/46~~ 2/2/46

W Cdr [illegible]

(T. B. HARD)
Squadron Leader,
ALLIED AND FOREIGN AID LIAISON SECTION.

Bdel.

DISTRIBUTION:

A.A.S.O. ORG. EQUIPMENT AIR STAFF.

T.O.O. 1.00 of 1st Feb. 46.

AHQRAF/4.200/AFALS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 780017

103

1104

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

404.

Allied & Foreign Air Liaison Section,
Air Headquarters,
I.T.L.

Bdl.

Date : 5/1 P.M.S. Ford.
Ref: AHES/4200/A.F.L.

31st January, 1946.

Italian Air Force.

Dear Sir,

Reference Air Ministry Signal [illegible]
M.2629( ) dated 29th January, 1946, I am attaching herewith details of Sea Time taken as provided by Aircraft Safety.

2. I regret the delay in this, but I.G.H. had a bit trouble and had to be chased for an answer.

Yours very truly,

[illegible]

Encl:

To: Group Captain Pakenham.

1271.

105

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

-47-

3dal

89A

(1)

47

OPERATIONS SERIAL

FROM : AIR ITALY.

TO : A.A.I.C. MOSC. (R) HQ SOUTH.

U. 169 (.) WAR 30 (.) SECRET (.)

ITALIAN AIR MOSC (.) DELETE UP TO PARA I (.)

UNCERTAIN WHETHER (.)

(A) ATTEMPT MADE LAST AFTERNOON BY ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO

SEND UP MIG FIGHT (.)

(B) NUMBERS OF MOSC OR ALTERNATIVE AERODROME REQUIRED (.)

TO BE INFORMED AS SOON AS (A) CAN BE ASCERTAINED.

See 91A.

T.O.O. 50

W/CDR.

SENIOR.

RECEIVER

COPIES TO: A.A.I.C.
G.H.Q.
SOUTH.
AIR PLANS.

B/F 2/2

(4200/)

1270

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY

INCOMING CYPHER MESSAGE

FOR I.N.R & D (R) IOF 290639

AIR ITALY (R) 29SEP.

FROM AIR MINISTRY LONDON. APY. 3143. 28 SEP AIR

SECRET. ITALIAN AIR FORCE FOLLOWING INFORMATION URGENTLY REQUIRED (A) PRESENT FRONT LINE STRENGTH OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE IN NUMBERS BY TYPES. (B) NUMBERS BY TYPES OF EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT RESERVES.

IMPORTANT. TOO. 2817222

G.R.T.

Note:- This is a copy for Staff Ref.

1369

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Ref only. 88

TO : AIR MINISTRY, KINGSWAY (P) NO DAF MESSAGE : AFHQ. (By hand)

FROM : AMG, RAF, ITALY.

AF3ew 30th January 1946. TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-79- -86

Your AFX 3035 January 24 and AFX 3178 January 29

(a) Italian Air Force Fighter Airfields MILAN, TREVISIO, TURIN, SPEZIA (.) Tactical Support BOLOGNA (.) Advanced Landing fields SIENNA, FOGGIA (.) Transport Squadrons ROME operating to Italian Air Force and civil airfields (.) Air Sea Rescue floatplane detachments VENICE, BRINDISI, TARANTO, PALERMO, NAPLES, CAGLIARI, GENOA (.) Flying School LECCE (.) Maintenance Depots LECCE, NAPLES, ROME, MILAN (.) Formation Headquarters : Interceptor Fighters MILAN, Tactical Support BOLOGNA, Transport ROME, Air Sea Rescue NAPLES, Training LECCE (.) (b) Civil airfields (.) Terminal Airfields PALERMO, BRINDISI, NAPLES, ROME, FLORENCE, TREVISIO, MILAN, TURIN, SPEZIA (.) Landing Grounds CATANIA, BARI, ANCONA, VILLAFRANCA (VERONA), UDINE, LEGHORN, ELMAS (.)

Para Two (.) You will appreciate that this is a rough estimate since this matter cannot yet be discussed with the Italian Air Ministry pending authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and we have little idea on what lines the Italians are thinking for civil aviation (.)

Para Three (.) Your MS 26 January 29 is being answered separately (.)

187

(E.D.PARNHAM)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

PRIORITY : IMMEDIATE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759817

[illegible], TREVISIO, TURIN, SPEZIA (.) Tactical Support BOLOGNA (.) Advanced Landing fields SIENNA, FOGGIA (.) Transport Squadrons ROME operating to Italian Air Force and civil airfields (.) Air Sea Rescue floatplane detachments VENICE, BRINDISI, TARANTO, PALERMO, NAPLES, CAGLIARI, GENOA (.) Flying School LECCE (.) Maintenance Depots LECCE, NAPLES, ROME, MILAN (.) Formation Headquarters : Interceptor Fighters MILAN, Tactical Support BOLOGNA, Transport ROME, Air Sea Rescue NAPLES, Training LECCE (.) (b) Civil airfields (.) Terminal airfields PALERMO, BRINDISI, NAPLES, ROME, FLORENCE, TREVISIO, MILAN, TURIN, SPEZIA (.) Landing Grounds CATANIA, BARI, ANCONA, VILLAFRANCA (VERONA), UDINE, LEGHORN, MENAS (.)

Para Two (.) You will appreciate that this is a rough estimate since this matter cannot yet be discussed with the Italian Air Ministry pending authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and we have little idea on what lines the Italians are thinking for civil aviation (.)

Para Three (.) Your WS 26 January 29 is being answered seperately (.)

187

(R.B.FARNHAM)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

PRIORITY : IMMEDIATE

SECURITY : TOP SECRET

Dist: Air Plans File. S21.
Signals (1)

Info : A.O.C.
A.C.A.
S.A.S.O.
S.Z.O.
A.F.L.O.

TOP SECRET

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
ADJTS
FILE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

PRIORITY CYPHER MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE

10/29.

87 B.M.

TOP SECRET

TO : AHQ ITALY (R) HQ MEDME

FROM: AIR MINISTRY KINGSWAY.

ME.2029(Query) 29th JANUARY.

TOP SECRET - TOP SECRET.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE. Following information urgently required as information available here is out of date. Total numbers under separate headings, Airfields, Sea plane Bases, Maintenance Depots and separate Formation Headquarters in (A) Italian Mainland (B) Sicily (C) Sardinia (D) Lampedusa and Pantelleria.

Para. 2. Above information required to assess amount of destruction to be carried out under terms proposed Italian Peace Treaty therefore figures should include only installations which would require destruction I.E. permanent or semi-permanent installations still in existence information called for my AFX3035 24th January required separately.

Para. 3. Please also give us estimate in broad terms I.E. 6 or 12 or 18 (Months) of time to reduce from para.1. and 2 above to estimate asked for by AFX3035 assuming Italians put reasonable resources into destruction of surplus.

Para. 4. Can you let us have this information by 5th February.-

(DELAY DUE TO CORRECTIONS IN MESSAGE)

T.C.C.: 29/0462

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ITALIAN AIR FORCE. Following information urgently required as information available here is out of date. Total numbers under separate headings, Airfields, Sea Plane Bases, Maintenance Depots and separate Formation Headquarters in (A) Italian Mainland (B) Sicily (C) Sardinia (D) Lampedusa and Pantellaria. See 90A

Para. 2. Above information required to assess amount of destruction to be carried out under terms proposed Italian Peace Treaty therefore figures should include only installations which would require destruction I.E. permanent or semi-permanent installations still in existence information called for my AFX3035 24th January required separately.

Para. 3. Please also give us estimate in broad terms I.E. 6 or 12 or 18 (Months) of time to reduce from para.1. and 2 above to estimate asked for my AFX3035 assuming Italians put reasonable resources into destruction of surplus.

Para. 4. Can you let us have this information by 5th February.-

(DELAY DUE TO CORRECTIONS IN MESSAGE)

T.O.O.: 2910462

T.O.R. IN AIR PLANS REGISTRY : 300900B

ACTION : A.F.L.S.
INFO : A.C.C.
S.A.S.O.
A.C.A.
S.E.C.
AIR PLANS.

Note:- All action in hand by Details in respect of para one being supplied in conjunction with A.F.S.C.

Phoned AFSC & told 'em of para one & intended visit of C/S Pakenham

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DISPATCHED OVER USSAGE.

SERIAL NO. 1/30

QUESTAGE:

TO : A.H.Q. R.A.F. ITALY (S) H.Q. CAIRO.

FROM : AIR MINISTRY KINGSWAY.

TOP SECRET

REF: EX/76(1175?

DATE 29TH JANUARY

TOP SECRET.

YOUR AFHQ/JAN 28 REQUEST DID NOT GIVE CLEAR OBJECT OF OUR REQUEST INFORMATION REQUIRED IN DELEGATION TO COUNCIL FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSSING ITALIAN PEACE TREATY WE CANNOT WAIT FOR FULL CONSIDERATION OF REPLY RAF1103 AT ESTIMATE BASED ON SACMED'S PROPOSALS IN THAT SIGNAL WILL BE SATISFACTORY AS PROBABLE FINAL AIR FORCE FIGURES WILL NOT DIVERGE MUCH FROM THESE PROPOSALS WE CAN ADJUST FOR ANY DIVERGENCE.

2. INFORMATION ASKED FOR IN OUR 1826 JAN 29 ALL REQUIRED FOR COUNCIL FOREIGN MINISTERS.

DIST:
ACTION: A.F.H.Q.
INFO: S.A.S.C.
A.C.C.
A.C.A.
S.E.C.
AIR PLANS.

T.O.O. 2915302
T.C.R. IN AIR PLANS REGISTRY 30 1900

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
U.S. M.A.A.F.
DATE
FILE

1206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

85

TO : A.F.H.Q. ROME.

FROM : AIR FOR ITALY.

Wkst. Bdel.

AP. 393 24th January 1946.

SECRET

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ (.) For A.V.M. SMITH (.)

A.C.A., M.A.A.F. ITALY will hold a meeting to discuss reorganisation of the Italian Air Force at 11.30 hours 4 February 1946 (.)

You are requested to attend or be represented (.)

I attended 4/2

PRIORITY : ROUTINE.

SECURITY : ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
SECRET

(C.C. PARKINSON)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

DIST: AIR PLANS File. Sqn.
Signals (1)
M.A.A.F. (2)

Info copies to : A.C.A.
D.A.C.A.
C.A.C.
D.A.A.
C.A.C.C.
A.F.H.Q.

ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
RECEIVED
28
4200

1205

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE

84

TO : AIR MINISTRY KINGSWAY (I) H.Q., MEDME.

FROM : A.H.Q. NAF ITALY.

AP. 392 28th January 1944 SECRET

Your APX 3035 24 January on Italian Air Force (.) Unable provide information until the matter has been thoroughly examined in the light of C.C.S. reply to EACHED's signal NAF 1107 which has not yet been received (.)

Para Two (.) Wing Commander FIELD visiting Air Ministry on 29 January will explain (.)

R.B. Parkinham

(R.B. PARKINHAM)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

PRIORITY : IMPORTANT

SECURITY : SECRET

List : Air Plans file. 821.
Signals (1)
P.&.O. (2)
A.F.H.Q. (1)
A.O.C.
S.A.S.O.
S.A.C.
A.D.A.

Received
[illegible]
Time 2400

1264

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOOSE MINUTE

83

TO : INTELLIGENCE

81

1. Please see the attached correspondence from the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

2. Are your interested ? If no, I can arrange for the aircraft to be seen by one of your technical experts.

Maxwell Fisher.

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander
ALLIED & FOREIGN AIR LIAISON SECTION

LONDON/1,200/AFAL3.

28th January, 1946.

Encl. 81. retained to send to Int with the loose minute 28/1/46

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET CYPHER MESSAGE
T.O.O. IN HQ MEDME OFFICE. 260940

TO : AIR ITALY.
FROM: HQ MEDME U.652 JAN 25TH SECRET.

FOLLOWING COPY OF AIR MINISTRY SIGNAL AFX.3035 JAN 24 TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

PARA 2. QUOTE ITALIAN AIR FORCE. GRATEFUL IF YOU CAN SUPPLY FOLLOWING INFORMATION URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR DISCUSSIONS HERE.
(A) NAMES AND LOCATIONS OR AIRFIELDS SEA PLANE BASES MAINTENANCE DEPOTS AND SEPERATE FORMATION HEADQUARTERS TOU CONSIDER SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR FUTURE ITALIAN AIR FORCES.
(B) NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF AIRFIELDS YOU CONSIDER SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION.
PARA 3. REQUEST YOU SIGNAL AIR MINISTRY KINGSWAY DIRECT COPY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

IMPORTANT (DELAYED BY CORRUPTION).
E.W.

ACTION:

T.O.O. 251001 Z

See 84

See 84

Allied Force Headquarters
AG 26/1
H200

1263

NOT RELEASABLE OUTSIDE U.S. MILITARY AGENCIES

DECODING MESSAGE.

DECYPHER

TO SENIOR CA/FD (H) AIR MINISTRY

UNCLASSIFIED

U. 255

FROM HEADQUARTERS ALLIED AIR FORCES

25th January, 1945.

ACC 82.

FOR A.T.S.H.Q.

Para.1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN AIR MINISTRY SIGNAL A/M.3035 DATED (.)

Para.2. PRESUME THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DECISIONS TO MEET WHICH BRITISH MEMBER OF A.C.C. A.H.Q. STAFF YOU WILL REPORT ACTION ON THIS MATTER TO ORIGINATOR FROM HQAC (.)

Para.3. SUPREME FIELD DIRECTIVE THIS ITEM A.C.A.S. (P) REFERS POSSESSING VEHICLE TO U.K. (.) YOUR AP.106 JANUARY TO AIR SECURITY OFFICER (.)

(SIGNED HERE)
Wing Commander
ALLIED AIR FORCES LIAISON SECTION

File A/CC/AFLS.

Copy to AMSO (Passed direct)

Copy to:-

BIF/112

1202

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788017

JAINAGE (.)

PARA 2. PROCEED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIRECTIVE TO MEAD WORKS BUTTERY HOUSES IN A.C.S. A.M.S. ITALY YOU WILL EXPEDE ACTION ON THIS MATTER TO ORDINANCE FROM MEAD (.)

PARA 3. ADVISE FIELD DIRECTIVE WILL WITH A.C.A.S. (2) REGARD POSTPONEMENT VISIT TO U.K. (.) YOUR AP.106 CANCELS TO AIR MINISTRY MESSAGE (.)

(MICHAEL FOSTER)
Wing Commander
ALLIED & NORTHERN AIR LIAISON SECTION

File A/20/APALS.

BIF/112

Copy to AHQ (Passed direct) 1202

Copies to:-

AOC.
AOA.
SASO.
PEO.

Passed 1900 26/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1118

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

(110)

79

FILED :24 NFT
PRIORITY

SECRET

AFSC N 164/25

Distribution as below

B. del Zue

FROM : AIR MINISTRY KINGSWAY

TO : HQ MEDME CAIRO, INFO : AFHQ.

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : AFX-3035

24 January 1946.

Italian Air Force. Grateful if you can supply following information urgently required for discussions here:

(A) Names and locations of airfields, sea plane bases, maintenance depots and separate formation Headquarters you consider should be retained for future Italian Air Forces.

(B) Names and locations of airfields you consider should be retained for Italian Civil Aviation.

For reply see 88.

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS "A" G(SD) RAF G-5 **

80

See 54 + 86

Dist
AOC.
ROA.
SASO.
SEO.

1261

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
FILE

HC IN 4061 25 Jan 46 SECRET 0845A Ref No AFX 3035 ~~to A~~

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TKU

(69)

LDIL V PCER NR19/89 R O U T I N E

QVR - 2

FROM POMIG 21 1101Z

TO AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ROME

(R) AHQ ITALY

AF 2092 21/1 UNCLASS

DETACHMENT OF THREE

SM82'S ARRIVED THIS AIRFIELD

AT 1100 HOURS 'A' TODAY

BT 21 1101Z

SENT W W VA TKS

TOR: 1240

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
AIR
FILE 1024 4 BMD

T 1201

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ADDRESSED

77

From : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To : Commanding General, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, United States Army.

Date : 21st January, 1946.

Ref : MAAC/4200/AFALS.

76

Italian Air Force.

The attached report, AHQI/321/AP dated 16th January, 1946, ondiscussions, held at Air Ministry, London, between The Director of Policy (Air Staff), his staff and representatives of the Royal Air Force and Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission from Italy is forwarded for your information.

2. For your information the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission representatives at the discussions were Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Brodie (Royal Air Force) and Colonel R.F. Worden (USAAF)

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.
Secretary to The
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1253

LOOSE MINUTE.

4 copies received AHQI/S21/AP.

TOP SECRET

To:- A.O.C., R.A.F., Italy. and 2 copies sent to HTOUSA

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Discussions were held at the Air Ministry between the Director of Policy (AS), his staff, and representatives of the R.A.F. and USAAF in ITALY on the 4th, 5th, and 7th January 1946 on the subject of the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force as a result of SACMED's signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (NAF 1103). Opportunity was given to the staff of D.of Pol (AS) to study the paper that led up to the signal.

2. This paper was compared with the comments sent by the Supreme Allied Commander on the draft headings of the military clauses of the proposed Peace Treaty with Italy, and it was noted that the suggested reorganisation of the Italian Air Force as an interim measure was based on this. It is understood that these draft headings were tabled at the abortive London Conference.

3. It was pointed out by the Air Ministry that the future of the Italian Air Force could only be considered in conjunction with the future of other ex-enemy co-belligerent air forces that were being sponsored by the Russians. The British and U.S.Governments desired to keep these at a low strength and had made every endeavour to persuade the Russians not to build them into large air forces, and with this in view the Italian Air Force would have to be of approximately the same size. It was therefore necessary to state the strength of the Italian Air Force in numbers of combat and non-combat aircraft as opposed to a first line strength of squadrons since the organisation of the Russian Air Force is so different from those of the Anglo-U.S. Air Forces, and for the same reason it would be essential to fix a personnel ceiling. The Roumanian, Bulgarian, and Finnish Air Forces, being based on the Russian model, are part of the Army, and the Russians work to an approximate figure of between four to six men to each aircraft, and they are likely to object to a much larger figure for the Italians. The A.C.A.S.(P), however, has asked the Foreign Office to ask for a ceiling of 20,000, since the R.A.F. work to a yardstick of 2,000 men per squadron, but it is generally expected that this will be reduced to a ceiling of 15,000 for the Italian Air Force as the result of bargaining with the Russians. It is not considered that a ceiling need be placed upon the interim Italian Air Force, but there is no doubt that efforts should be made to reduce the present size of the Italian Air Force to a figure approximating the post-Peace Treaty ceiling, so that there will not have to be a heavy reduction suddenly imposed.

1254

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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1254

4. The Air Ministry considers that the first line strength of the Peace Treaty Italian Air Force will be limited to 100 Fighter aircraft, 40 military transport aircraft, and 30 Air Sea Rescue aircraft, both the latter categories to be unarmed, and the whole to be backed with the necessary communications and training aircraft, and marine craft. They feel that it is undesirable for the Air Sea Rescue aircraft to be given a G.R.role, and therefore armed, because that would mean raising the ceiling of aircraft for Roumania, Bulgaria, and Finland.

5. With regard ...../2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759019

5. With regard to civil aviation, the Air Ministry agrees that this should be started internally, but state that external civil aviation cannot be permitted until Italy has become a member of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation (P.I.C.A.O.), or whatever body succeeds it. This means Italy would have to be sponsored by two member states before being admitted. It is for consideration that at a later date Italian civil aviation should be removed from the control of the Italian Air Ministry, and placed under some civil ministry, so that it cannot be used as a reserve for the Italian Air Force, and possibly to by-pass some of the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The Air Ministry also wish to define more closely what private aviation may be permitted, and are opposed to any club flying or gliding.

6. Air Ministry are prepared to allow the Italian manufacture of all types of aircraft subject to the specifications being approved by the Allied Inspectorate which is to be formed to ensure that the provisions of the Peace Treaty are complied with. In effect this would mean that the Italian aircraft industry would only be allowed to produce combat aircraft that were inferior in performance to Anglo-U.S. aircraft. Air Ministry agreed that it is desirable for the Italian Air Force to be equipped from British and U.S. sources, but pointed out that equipment for the Italian Air Force must be of very low priority, since our present surplus of equipment and aircraft is continually shrinking as the result of supplying the needs of the Dominions and the fully-fledged allies. They require the needs of the Italian Air Force to be worked out and passed over to them, and then will do their best to meet them.

7. The American Chiefs of Staff have signalled the British Chiefs of Staff that they are in general agreement with SACMED's signal, and asked for the British comments. Air Ministry have forwarded their views to the Foreign Office and await the latter's comment, and it is expected that a reply can be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the near future, and their reply to SACMED may be expected within the next two to three weeks.

R.B. Pakenham

(R.B.PAKENHAM)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

16th January 1946.

Copies to : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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opposed to any club flying or gliding.

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R.B. Pakenham

(R.B.PAKENHAM)
Group Captain,
Chief of Air Plans.

16th January 1946.

Copies to : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME. 2.
Allied Liaison Section, AHQ, RAF, Italy. 2.
Secretariat, Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. 2.✓

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNO No. 785017

1125

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Loose Minute.

(10)

G/Capn. Air Plans.

Italian Armaments Industry.

Reference is made to conversation of this date and AFHQ staff study on this subject.

2. Whilst the information contained in the discussion is generally ~~agreed~~ agreed with by this Section, the following comments are made :-

Para "3".

Para 1 (a). With particular reference to aircraft, as most of the aircraft factories are situated in the Northern sector of Italy it is considered imperative that a sound means of reporting any unauthorised warnings are in force.

Para 2 (a). It is considered that a survey must be made.

3. In support of para. 2 hereof the following information is submitted :-

During May, 1945, AFHQ reported that at the SIAI (Savoia Marchetti) factory at Vergiate near Sesto Calende, there were a number of aircraft in an advanced state of completion, and on which work was continuing. Similarly, numerous engines were found at the Aeritalia factory at Turin.

During October, 1945, AFHQ reported that at the Breda factory at Milan it was discovered that Caproni were still continueing to work on the production of a large four-engined aircraft known as Ca.308, and this work was being done unbeknown to any Allied authority.

During September, 1945, AFHQ reported that following the landing of a light aircraft at Centocelle and investigation revealed that the firm of Anonima Vemelliese Industrie Aeronautiche was still working on the construction of a small civil machine known as AVIA FL5.

13th January, 1945.
Melae/4200/A.S.

J.W.C. Wardle
(F. . . .),
(Squadron Leader,
A.P.A.I.S.

See 77 / 4204
137

1126

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

74

Sec 48 Encl

69

LOOSE MINUTE

From : Group Captain Operations.

To : A.L.S.

LAKE BRACCIANO

With reference to your Loose Minute dated 22nd December, 1945, it has been decided that the Italian Cant Squadron, which was to operate from VIGNA DI VALLE, will not operate from that place but will now operate from SPEZIA. VIGNA DI VALLE will be used as Squadron Headquarters.

2. SPEZIA is now being connected by telephone with Aircraft Safety Centre, Northern ITALY, by whom they will be operationally controlled.

Group Captain

29th December, 1945.
AHQI/4/Air

31/12.
1250

AHS.

Dist. : Plans (Actions)
Info: A.O.C.
Air C-in-C Mediterr.
A.H.S.

COPY.

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY.

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER OUTGOING MESSAGE.

73

TO : FOR ACTION : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CABINET OFFICES LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR INFO : ALCOM ROME.

REF NO. FX 56901

SIGNED : SACMED CITE FHCOS

This is NAF 1103.

I have been examining whether it is desirable or feasible to return the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, as has been done in the case of the Italian Army.

The armistice terms grounded the Italian Air Force, but this policy has been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force, which is now employed in the working of courier services and on air sea rescue duties. Certain personnel are employed with RAF and USAAF units and on guard duties on Allied airfields and installations.

Immediate operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are NOT under Allied control. Italian Air Force fighter squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of ITALY against air attack.

As a long term policy, I consider that the post-war Italian Air Force should be organised on a defensive basis, and that it should be large enough to provide air defence to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganised forthwith into the following flying units :

5 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons.
1 Tac/R Squadron.
2 Air Sea Rescue and General Reconnaissance Squadrons.
2 Transport Squadrons.
1 Training School (flying and technical)
1 Communication Squadron.

This will form a basis on which the expansion of the Italian Air Force to meet the commitments described in para.4 above can take place if permitted by the peace treaty.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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2 Transport Squadrons.
1 Training School (flying and technical)
1 Communication Squadron.

This will form a basis on which the expansion of the Italian Air Force to meet the commitments described in para.4 above can take place if permitted by the peace treaty.

An Italian Air Ministry already exists and it is proposed that the Italian Air Force should be operated by the Air Ministry under my direction through functional sub commands.

The ceiling of the Italian Air Force must depend on the requirements for and strength of units necessary to command, administer, and maintain the flying units described above, and ANGLO-UNITED STATES Air Force requirements.

If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganised into an efficient operational service, it should be relieved of its present commitment in running courier services to meet largely Civil Government commitments. I therefore recommend that internal Italian Civil Aviation, including limited private flying, should be permitted both to relieve the Italian Air Force of internal air line commitments, and to serve as an aid to internal transport

in the ...../2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

in the economic rehabilitation of ITALY, and that it should be regulated by the Italian Government under the supervision of the Air Forces Sub Commission. External air lines will NOT be permitted until Italian Civil Aircraft Safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

With regard to the supply of aircraft, spare parts and equipment, I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be procured from either the UNITED STATES or GREAT BRITAIN so that the Allies retain full control over the first-line strength of the Italian Air Force. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the UNITED STATES or GREAT BRITAIN should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a Civil Aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that the Italian armament industry can provide efficient Radar and signal equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the UNITED STATES or GREAT BRITAIN.

I do not consider that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control until a sufficiently high standard of organisation and training has been reached in the use of certain modern equipment, Radar, etc. I therefore request your authority to proceed with the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force as described above, and to permit the Italian Government to start internal Civil Air Lines.

ORIGINATOR : C. of S. AUTH : William M. HAAS Major.

INFORMATION. : SACS G-4 USN. CAO. G-3 MTO. G-2
G-5 RESMIN. RAF G-3 AFHQ.
C-in-C MED. US POLAD.

MC. OUT. 1194. 21 Dec 45. TOP SECRET 1223A Ref No. FX 56901 mmg/s

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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ORIGINATOR : C. of S. AUTH : William M. HAAS Major.

INFORMATION. : SACS G-4 USN. CAO. G-3 MTO. G-2
G-5 RESMIN. RAF G-3 AFHQ.
C-in-C MED. US POLAD.

MC. OUT. 1194. 21 Dec 45. TOP SECRET 1223A Ref No. FX 56901 mmg/s

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
DATE .....
FILE .....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, TWELFTH AIR FORCE TACTICAL COMMISSIONER,
HEAD QUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 18th DECEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/367/2/G.G.

TOP SECRET.

INTENT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to A.F.H.Q. Joint Planning Staff Paper J.P.S.319 (Final) of December, 1945, I agree in general but make the following comments:-

(i) Paragraph 11. In the last two sentences it is stated that "... the creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of A.F.H.Q. ". General Lee and I both feel that a limited amount of gliding and of private flying could well be permitted under the general authority of A.F.H.Q. and under the detailed supervision of A.C.C.S. Therefore, it is suggested that the draft cable attached to P.319, paragraph 10 should have added at the end of the last sentence "and limited private flying and gliding".

(ii) Appendix "A" to P.319 does not include Light Bomber Squadrons (of which the Italians now have two), because the A.C.C.S. think that with one such squadron the Italian Air Force would not be a purely defensive force. It is, however, strongly recommended that the Italian Air Force be allowed one Light Bomber Squadron (of the Baltimore/Mosquito type) in order to make the Italian Air Force more balanced in support of its Army, and to allow of a nucleus on which to build should the Peace Treaty allow Light Bombers. Therefore, in the draft cable to C.C.S. paragraph 5, it is recommended that one Light Bomber Squadron be added to the list of flying units.

(iii) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 2, I am still of the opinion that Bomber/Fighter Squadrons should be permitted training in the use of aircraft rockets as they are the best air weapon in the case of a civil disturbance and also useful in support of the Italian Army and Navy. Civil disturbance or trouble on a certain frontier seem to us to be far more likely events than the Italians attacking Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. On the other hand if the Italians are allowed to undertake aircraft rocket training in the near future, Italy's neighbours may be encouraged to do the same. However, this matter could be settled on an A.F.H.Q. level at a later date because rocket training is not mentioned in the draft cable to C.C.S.

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(iv) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 8 second sentence - this states that "It

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With reference to A.F.H.Q. Joint Planning Staff Paper P.319 (Final) of December, [illegible], I agree in general but make the following comments:-

(i) Paragraph 1. In the last two sentences it is stated that ".... the creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of [illegible]. " General Lee and I both feel that a limited amount of gliding and of private flying could well be permitted under the general authority of [illegible] and under the detailed supervision of [illegible]. Therefore, it is suggested that the draft cable attached to P.319, paragraph 10 should have added at the end of the last sentence "and limited private flying and gliding".

(ii) Appendix "A" to P.319 does not include light bomber squadrons (of which the Italians now have two), because the [illegible] think that with one such squadron the Italian Air Force would not be a purely defensive force. It is, however, strongly recommended that the Italian Air Force is allowed one light bomber squadron (of the Wellington/Mosquito type) in order to make the Italian Air Force more balanced in support of its Army, and to allow of a nucleus on which to build should the peace treaty allow light bombers. Therefore, in the draft cable to C.C.S. paragraph 2, it is recommended that one light bomber squadron be added to the list of flying units.

(iii) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 2, I am still of the opinion that Spitfire/Fighter Squadrons should be permitted training in the use of aircraft rockets as they are the best air weapon in the case of a civil disturbance and also useful in support of the Italian Army and Navy. Civil disturbance or trouble on a certain frontier seem to us to be far more likely events than the Italians attacking Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. On the other hand if the Italians are allowed to undertake aircraft rocket training in the near future, Italy's neighbours may be encouraged to do the same. However, this matter could be settled on an A.F.H.Q. level at a later date because rocket training is not referred to in the draft cable to C.C.S.

(iv) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 3 second sentence - this states that "It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify four Territorial Headquarters, but until matters left over from the late war are liquidated, these Headquarters will have to remain". I wish to record at this stage, that without consulting the Italian War Ministry we are not justified in commenting the statement that four Territorial Headquarters will not be required in the future; the Italian Air Force always has had Territorial Headquarters, and if they are dispensed with, severe complications in their organisation and administration are possible. Therefore instead of "will justify four Territorial Headquarters", I recommend that the wording be changed to "may not justify four Territorial Headquarters".

Copy:
A.V.M. [illegible],
General [illegible],
H.Q.A.C. [illegible].

[illegible]
H.Q. M[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

I.E. MACKAY,
[illegible],

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NND No. 1[illegible]

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(69)

SECRET.

TO : AIR STAFF.

SEE 74

48

LAND FRANCHISE.

Reference is made to your Locsto Minute AIR/35/2/Air dated 5th November, 1945 and it will be appreciated if further information can now be given.

See 74.

(W. D. Ramsay)
Squadron Leader.
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

AIR/1,200/AIR
22nd December, 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

68

Air Headquarters,
Royal Air Force,
C.M.F.

MAG/1200/AIR

22nd December, 1945.

PERSONAL.

67

Dear Air Vice-Marshal Brodie

Wing Commander Fisher has asked me to reply to your letter AF30/16/AIR dated 18th December, 1945.

2. The paragraph of the letter in question has been read again and on our copy the word "not" (one line four after the word "Secret" AF30/16/AIR dated 15th November 1945) had not been deleted, which of course altered the context of the paragraph.

3. The action has been mentioned tactfully to S.A.S. Secretariat who immediately realised how any misunderstanding had arisen.

Yours sincerely

J.F. Hardy

Best wishes for Xmas & the New Year

Air Vice-Marshal I.F. Brodie, C.B.E.
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Coordination Staff

F350

1135

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL E.S. BROOKE, CBE.

Seen by Mr/C to Mr Fisher, who instructed reply to be sent See 68.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.

67

AFSC/46/AIR.

11th December, 1945.

58

Dear Fisher,

With reference to your letter MAAC/4200/A.S paragraph three, we realise that GENERAL MIDDLEAY is Deputy to GENERAL MORGAN as Supreme Allied Commander, and if any misunderstanding has arisen in S.A.C.Secretariat I would like you to apologise for me, but I would also like you to read again the first paragraph of my letter of even reference dated 15th November; I believe I am still correct in saying that the Chief Commissioner is Deputy to General Morgan as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, although in General Morgan's absence, in practice, General Midgeley would be President of the Allied Commission.

2. I trust that you will take this up [illegible] so as not to raise any hairs. I re-emphasise that I am referring to the job of President of the Allied Commission, and not the job known as SAC/ISCD.

Yours

Wing Commander Maxwell Fisher,
Secretary to The S.A.A.C.,
Caserta.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
ADTR
FILE A200/
7243

A.L.S.
W/c FISHER

66

P/329 (Final) (Revised)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 9

ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, subject: "Italian Navy and Air Force", the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff has prepared the attached final revised paper on the Italian Air Force. The Italian Navy is the subject of P/328 (Final) (Revised) distributed at the same time as this paper.

2. A draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached to the paper for approval.

for D. Hall Wilcox.
Brigadier, GS.,
Chairman

ENCLOSURE:

"A"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, subject: "Italian Navy and Air Force", the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff has prepared the attached final revised paper on the Italian Air Force. The Italian Navy is the subject of J/320 (Final) (Revised) distributed at the same time as this paper.

2. A draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached to the paper for approval.

for D. Reed W.T.S.
Brigadier, GS.,
Chairman

ENCLOSURES:

'A'

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1 3 6 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 758017

[illegible] Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, [illegible] to examine the desirability, or otherwise, of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

Allied Considerations

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in JCS 551/2, CCS 452/3 of 23 September 1943 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present emergency period, Mr. Eden in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three considerations:

a. They must be restricted in size, for Italy's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic [illegible] her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with Jugoslavia.

c. They must NOT be strong enough to offer Italy any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interest of the principal Allied powers.

3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as the U.S., France, Greece, Holland and Norway. When the Allies finally withdraw from Italy, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers. The successful equipping and training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organisation of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be allowed at the Peace Treaty, in order to make it capable of carrying out its functions as a part of the Italian Armed Forces with effect from the date of withdrawal of Allied Forces from Italy.

CURRENT POSSIBILITY

4. At the end of hostilities in which the Italian Air Force as an operational force ceased to exist. On the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, certain units were, however, kept in employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment. The employment of these units is at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has been the intention that the Italian Air Force (within the authorised ceiling, as it may from time to time be determined), shall be self-supporting in all respects with the following exceptions - types, rations and such technical equipment as is necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft in their possession. Tools

1247

and an interim policy directive referred to in paragraph 2 was given to the ...O.C. ..ir Forces Sub-Commission. ..ll ..llied aircraft handed over to the Italians, either to assist their participation in the war against GER..NY, or to help them carry out various post-hostility functions for the ..llies; are to be considered as a loan.

PR..SENT CEILING OF THE IT..LI..N ..IR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian ..ir Force as authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under:-

Operational ..ir Force	22,000
Employed by the R.F	2,500
Employed by the US..F	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the R.F and US..F.

PR..S..T FUNCTIONS OF THE IT..LI..N ..IR FORCE

6. Operational ..ir Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on ..ir Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would otherwise have been carried out by the ..llied ..ir Forces. Use of the Italian ..ir Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the ..llied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian ..ir Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative service, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, R/T school and several Engineering establishments in the L.of C. area. Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons assist the Italian courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for ..ir Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian ..ir Force are employed in substitution of R.F manpower as follows:-

a. To fill existing R.F establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to R.F Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian ..ir Force employed by the US..F are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the R.F.

FUTU.. ..ILI.. ..ND IT..LI..N REQUIREMENTS FOR IT..LI..N ..IR FORCE

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Operational Air Force	22,000
Employed by the R.F	2,500
Employed by the USAAF	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the R.F and USAAF.

SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would otherwise have been carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative service, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, W/T school and several engineering establishments in the L.of C. area. Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons assist the Italian courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of R.F manpower as follows:-

a. To fill existing R.F establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to R.F Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the R.F.

FUTURE ALLIED AND ITALIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term policy

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force are limited to air assistance to the Land Forces in the maintenance of internal security and air support for the Army in the guarding of such frontiers as are not already guaranteed by the Allies. Since the only frontiers not so guarded are with SWITZERLAND and FRANCE it is not considered that this latter requirement is a very formidable one. However, to permit of these requirements being properly satisfied, it will be necessary to modify in favour of the Italian Air Force certain of the regulations regarding its organization and training.

b. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary

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that the re-organisation of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

c. It is envisaged that we shall continue to make use of the Air Courier service and that we shall possibly extend it to take over some of the internal Allied Air Transport Services in ITALY. Exc. Italian courier services would not be allowed to operate in the vicinity of the disputed territories, nor to demilitarised zones except with the authority of AFHQ. The Italian Air Force will continue to take over responsibility for Air Sea Rescue operations around the shores of ITALY (SARDINIA and SICILY) with the intention that it will ultimately be the sole organisation undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for RAF and USAAF personnel in all possible trades. This would assist us to fill larger gaps created in our own organisation occasioned by accelerated release. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained may be used by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack emanating from areas outside her frontiers.

10. Long-term policy

a. The strength of the Italian Air Force must depend on a compromise between two opposing factors :

(i) ITALY must not be in a position to threaten sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.

(ii) ITALY should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.

b. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible reoccurrence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a deterrent to her neighbours. During the immediate post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of erecting an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. Such an in-

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[illegible] will inevitably be the sole organisation undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. personnel in all possible trades. This would assist us to build a larger shape created in our own organisation occasioned by special retard release. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as much as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force fighter squadrons if adequately trained may be used by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack emanating from areas outside her frontiers.

10. Long-term policy

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(i) ITALY must not be in a position to threaten Sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.

(ii) ITALY should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.

b. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recondescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the immediate post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 21,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. S.C.A.E.D. in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the Italian Air Force should be a maximum of 12,000, but this was an arbitrary figure as no examination had been made of the establishments necessary to support the first line Squadrons to be permitted. However, since ITALY is to be allowed a post-war Army it is clear that she must be allowed an Air Force commensurate with the former. The size of the post-war Italian Air Force must depend partially on the economic ability of ITALY to maintain fighting forces. There will also be a requirement for Air Sea Rescue and Coastal reconnaissance aircraft in view of ITALY's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be combined in General Reconnaissance Squadrons. Assuming that Italian civil aviation is permitted there will also be a requirement for Air Force Transport Squadrons to enable Air Forces and Italian Army Forces

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to be moved rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that are a serious menace to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "A".

11. Air Transport.

In order to assist in the rehabilitation of Italy all forms of internal transport are needed and at the present time the Italian Air Force is running a courier service with its bomber transport and sea plane squadrons. These squadrons are in effect fulfilling tasks that would normally be done by civil aviation. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganised into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of this duty and the transport squadrons should be trained and used in their proper Air Force role which would be transportation of troops, stores and equipment. In order to build up the Italian Air Force of its current air transport commitments it would be necessary to restart Italian civil aviation. This could be done by transferring transport aircraft and aircrews to civil aviation. In the present state of Italy civil aviation should be government controlled so that the Air Forces Sub-Commission may keep it under observation and see that it is not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which it is desired to operate. This organisation of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of AFHQ.

D. LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

12. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retain complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by regulating the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force and civil aviation is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, signals and radar equipment, etc..

[illegible] reserve aircraft for operational

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transport squadrons should be trained and used in their proper Air Force role which would be transportation of troops, stores and equipment. In order to fulfil to the Italian Air Force of its current air transport commitments it would be necessary to restart Italian Civil Aviation. This could be done by transferring transport aircraft and aircrews to civil aviation. In the present state of Italy civil aviation should be government controlled so that the Air Force Sub-Commission may keep it under observation and see that it is not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which as is desired to operate. This organisation of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of AMG.

ADMINISTRATIVE QUALIFICATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

12. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retain complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by regulating the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force envisaged is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, signals and radar equipment, etc..

b. It is considered that immediate reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced immediate reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the necessary signals and certain radar organisation are provided. It is unlikely that Italian armament industry can provide sufficient radar and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain. There will be a need for the Air Sea Rescue squadrons to be provided with certain modern Anglo-American wireless equipment if they are to perform their Air Sea Rescue duties efficiently in combination with other nations operating Air Sea Rescue in the Mediterranean.

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4b. Clothing and other requirements.

Provision of clothing, ..T tyres and other day to day requirements should be the responsibility of the Italian Government.

4c. Rations.

a. The provision of the military element of the rations for the Italian ..r Force is at present a CMF and AFHQS responsibility. The present strength of the Italian ..r Force is approximately as follows :-

Type of Personnel	Strength	Nation responsible for military element of ration.
Iti/Iti	25,000	
Br/Iti	4,000	British
US/Iti	2,000	British
		US

The increase of numbers above the authorised ceiling of 21,000 is caused by the Italian ..r Force cooperator - companies being added to the strength of the Italian ..r Force during the period of their disbandment which is currently taking place. (P.M 621 refers).

b. It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian ..r Force. The Italian Government will shortly assume responsibility for the provision of the whole ration for Iti/Iti ..ry personnel. The handling and accounting for supplies for Italian ..r Force personnel involves a manpower commitment for the British and US ..rades which it will become increasingly more difficult to meet, particularly in respect of the larger British commitment, owing to diminishing manpower ceiling. From an ..my point of view, it is therefore essential that they are relieved of this commitment at the earliest possible date.

c. Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working wit.. B.F and US..F units scattered throughout Italy. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not considered possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations. The practicability of substituting Italian civilians or possibly German PW should be considered.

d. It should be noted that on assuming full responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into

Type of Personnel	Strength	Nation responsible for military element of ration.
It/Itd	25,300	British
Br/Itd	4,000	British
US/Itd	2,000	US

(a) Increase of numbers above the authorised ceiling of 31,000 is caused by the Italian Air Force co-operator - companies being added to the strength of the Italian Air Force during the period of their disbandment which is currently taking place (Para 6(a) refers).

b. It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Air Force. The Italian Government will shortly assume responsibility for the provision of the whole ration for It/Itd Army personnel. The handling and accounting for supplies for Italian Air Force personnel involves a manpower commitment for the British and US Armies which it will become increasingly more difficult to meet, particularly in respect of the larger British commitment, owing to diminishing manpower ceilings. From an Army point of view, it is therefore essential that they are relieved of this commitment at the earliest possible date.

c. Br/Itd and US/Itd personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working with R.A.F and U.S.A.F units scattered throughout I.T.O.T. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not considered possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations. The practicability of substituting Italian civilians or possibly German P/W should be considered.

d. It should be noted that on assuming responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration. It is important that, if the Italian Air Force is to be organised into an efficient force, the Italian Government should maintain the ration scale at a satisfactory level.

5. Capability of Italian Economy.

For some time to come, in order to maintain the Italian Air Force in equipment, it would be necessary, as in the case of the Italian Army, to augment, from Allied stocks, the material and supplies which could be provided from Italian sources. The Italian civil aircraft industry, subject to receiving raw material, should be fully capable of maintaining any civil aviation organisation permitted, provided that the Italian Government considered it economical to do so.

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FUTURE OF AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

16. The Air Forces Sub-Commission is the vehicle set up under Article 37 of the Armistice Terms with ITALY as the Allied Organisation to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that it should remain in its present form until a Peace Treaty is concluded, as the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian Air matters, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being. In the event of the Italian Air Force being reorganised and eventually handed over to the control of the Italian Government it should undertake parallel duties to the Military Mission of the Italian Army and that part of it which performs mission duties should be known as the Air Mission to the Italian Air Force (AMIAF).

CONCLUSIONS

17. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganised to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces in frustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organisation and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control.

e. Italian civil aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.

f. That the responsibility for the rations of all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel must be assumed by the Italian government as it is essential that C.A.F. be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible.

g. Also solely from the aspect of rationing, SACMED and USAAF ITALY should release Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel and they should be replaced by Italian civilians or possibly by German

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...should be known as the Air Mission to the Italian Air Force (AMIAF).

CONCLUSIONS

17. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganised to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces in frustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organisation and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control.

e. Italian Civil Aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.

f. That the responsibility for the rations of all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel must be assumed by the Italian government as it is essential that C.M.F. be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible.

g. That solely from the aspect of rationing, RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should release Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel and they should be replaced by Italian civilians or possibly by German PW so that CMF and ATOUSA can be relieved of their responsibility for the supply of rations to Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. a. That the Italian Air Force should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time, but that the reorganisation and training of the Italian Air Force should begin forthwith to the Order of Battle and organisation outlined at Appendix "A" in order to form a basis for a well organised and efficient Air Force that can be used for defence in cooperation with the other services; that, when a sufficiently high standard of organisation and training has been reached the Italian Air Force should be handed back to Italian Government control.

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b. That the Italian Government be permitted to start internal civil aviation and that the necessary aircraft, [illegible] and maintenance personnel should be discharged from the Italian Air Force to form the civil aviation organisation.

c. That the Italian Government assume responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel at as early a date as possible on a scale equivalent to that provided for the other Italian Armed Forces in order that G...F. may be relieved of its present responsibility and that the Allied Commission be instructed to inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the earliest date on which the Italian Government can assume this responsibility. Only those Italian Air Force personnel who are serving as an integral part of RAF and USAAF units should be regarded as Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

d. That RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should examine the possibility of replacing Br/Iti and US/Iti Air Force personnel by Italian civilians or possibly German PW at the earliest possible date in order that CCF and AFHQ can be relieved of their responsibility for providing rations for Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

e. That the Air Forces Sub-Commission should remain in its present form until the Peace Treaty and Second Corresponding Responsibilities to those of AMIA.

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APPENDIX 'A'
TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

10 December 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE - ORGANIZATION AND CEILING

1. Type of Sqdn	Aircraft	No. of Sqdns.	A.A. per Sqdn.
Fighter/Bomber	P-38	5	16
Int/D.	Spitfire	1	16
Adm & Ch.	Flying Boat	1	16
Transport Sqdns	Civil Type	2	10
Training School	Elementary & Service Types	1	16
Communication	Obsolescent Service & Civil Types	1	30

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organised into a Interceptor fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the USAAF should sell a number of P-38 and P-5 aircraft to the Italian Government. The P-5 is a photographic version of the P-38 and by changing the nose can be converted to P-38 which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The Interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons following will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a severe menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R squadron for administrative purposes may form part of the Fighter/Bomber Wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever Air Headquarters would work in parallel with the Italian Army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the Italian Air Force is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be mobile. It will need photographic and adequate R/T equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

4. Air Sea Rescue and G.R. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats or seaplanes so that in performance of their Air Sea Rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One Squadron should be based to cover the West Coast of ITALY and one the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and capable of working in conjunction with the A/F operating from MALTA and the French Air Force from the South Coast of FRANCE.

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Fighter/Bomber	P-38	6	16
Tac/R.	Spitfire	1	16
Air Sea Rescue	Flying Boat	2	16
Transport Squns	Civil Type	2	16
Training School	Elementary & Service Types	1	30
Communication	Obsolescent Service & Civil Types	1	16

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5. Transport Squadrons. These should be equipped with a normal civil type of aircraft and their normal use should be to provide mobility for the Italian Air Force and to lift Italian Army Forces where necessary. Until such time as civil aviation is working in ITALY they should have an establishment of 30 aircraft per squadron. When, however, Italian civil aviation begins they should be reduced to an initial equipment of 16 aircraft per squadron and the balance of aircrews and aircraft could be transferred to Italian civil aviation and completely discharged, without any reserve obligation, to civil life.

6. Flying Training. There will be a need for a flying training school for the Italian Air Force as there must be a continuous small new intake. This training school should consist of 2 branches, elementary and service training

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and it will require approximately 15 elementary training aircraft and 15 service type aircraft. Operational training should take place in the squadrons.

7. Italian Air Ministry. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and employs a relatively large number of Italian Air Force personnel, a rather higher proportion than is normal in British Service Ministries, in view of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry use officers in many cases where British Service Ministries would use civil servants.

8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are organised on a territorial basis. It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify 4 Territorial Headquarters, but until matters left over from the late war are liquidated these Headquarters will have to remain. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct through:

(a) An interceptor fighter sector with 3 squadrons.

(b) A Fighter/Bomber Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R Squadron.

(c) A Transport Wing of 2 squadrons.

(d) A G.R./M.R. Wing of 2 squadrons.

(e) A Training Wing responsible for flying and technical training.

(f) A Maintenance Wing.

The above Wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

9. Ceiling. The current ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 51,000 which is approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when ITALY surrendered. Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishment required to operate an Air Force of such nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any expansion permitted by the Peace Treaty must lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing certain functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the U.S.A.F and RAF and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by Allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave ITALY this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling, pending the Peace Treaty must depend on these requirements and the establishment for any Italian Air Force permitted and until these establishments are worked out it is impossible to make an arbitrary ceiling of 50,000.

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TOP SECRET

D R A F T C A B L E

TOP SECRET

ADDRESS: ~~AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO CABINET OFFICES~~
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is MAP_____.

1. I have been examining whether it is desirable or feasible to return the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, as has been done in the case of the Italian Army.

2. The Armistice Terms grounded the Italian Air Force, but this policy has been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force, which is now employed in the working of courier services and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Certain personnel are employed within RAF and USAAF units and on guard duties on Allied air fields and installations.

3. Immediate Operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are not under Allied control. Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of Italy against air attack.

4. As a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force, and that it should be large enough to provide air defence to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

5. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized forthwith into the following flying units:

5 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons
1 Tank Squadron

Declassified E.O. 12356, Section 3.3/NND No. 798017

of the Italian Army.

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6. As a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force, and that it should be large enough to provide air defence to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

7. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized forthwith into the following flying units:

5 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons
1 Tac/R Squadron
2 Air Sea Rescue & Ground Reconnaissance Squadrons
2 Transport Squadrons
1 Training School
1 Communication Squadron

This will form a basis on which the expansion of the Italian Air Forces to meet the commitments described in paragraph 4 above can take place if permitted by the Peace Treaty.

8. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and it is proposed that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct, through functional sub-commands, under my overall direction.

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TOP SECRET

7. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force must depend on the requirements for and strength of units necessary to command, administer and maintain the flying units described above, and Anglo - U.S. Air Force requirements.

8. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganized into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of its present commitment in running courier services to meet largely civil government commitments. I therefore recommend that Italian civil aviation should be permitted to the extent necessary to relieve the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and that it should be controlled by the Italian Government so that the Air Forces Sub Commission may keep it under observation. External air-lines will not be permitted until Italian civil aircraft safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

9. In regard to the supply of aircraft, spare parts and equipment, I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be procured from either the United States or Great Britain so that the Allies retain full control over the first line strength of the Italian air forces. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that the Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and signal equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain.

10. I do not consider that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control until a sufficiently high standard of operation

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[illegible] and that Italian civil aviation should be permitted to the extent necessary to relieve the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and that it should be controlled by the Italian Government so that the Air Forces Sub Commission may keep it under observation. External air-lines will not be permitted until Italian civil aircraft safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

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10. I do not consider that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control until a sufficiently high standard of organisation and training has been reached in the use of certain modern equipment, radar, etc. - therefore request your authority to proceed with the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force as described above, and to permit the Italian Government to start internal civil air lines.

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A.L.S. W/C. FISHER.

F/320 (Final) (Revised)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 10

AIR FOR FORCE HEAD QUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY

In accordance with terms of reference received fro. the Chief of Staff, subject: "Italian Navy and Air Force", the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff has prepared the attached final revised paper on the Italian Navy. The Italian Air Force is the subject of F/319 (Final) (Revised) distributed at the same time as this paper.

for D. [illegible] Y. MEB.
Brigadier, GS.
Chairman

F/326 (TIW) (Revise)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Navy pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Navy.

ITALIAN NAVY - DIRECTIVE FOR CONTROL

2. The Italian Navy is employed in accordance with the Cunningham-de Courten agreement and the Appendix to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Paper 515/1 dated 19th March 1944.

3. Under these orders such of the Italian ships as are of use to the Allies are kept running and the others laid up.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that the Admiralty, in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, through the head of the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D.C., will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Action by the executive agency will conform with the policies laid down in this directive or such specific instructions as may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

5. This directive then proceeds to lay down that the Allied Naval Commander will have the responsibility for operational control and administration of the Italian Navy.

6. It is to be noted that the area under the command of the Allied Naval Area Commander in the Mediterranean (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) is not co-terminous with the area under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive does not specify that the Italian Navy shall be employed within the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean's command.

PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY

7. The present strength of the Italian Navy is:

5 Battleships
9 Cruisers

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PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY

7. The present strength of the Italian Navy is:

5 Battleships
9 Cruisers
1 Aircraft Tender
11 Destroyers
22 Torpedo Boats
19 Corvettes, including 2 being converted for minesweeping.
1 Sloop
38 Submarines

A number of auxiliaries and small surface craft including four groups of minesweepers.

Personnel at present total 55,000.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

8. In accordance with the terms of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive

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the Italian ships are employed under the operational command of the Allied Naval Area Commander. The two newer battleships "ITALIA" and "VITTORIO VENETO" are laid up in the BITTER lakes; of the other three, two are at TARANTO and one at BIZERTA, but these three have reduced complements and only two are capable of steaming. Four of the cruisers and one destroyer are operated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean direct as required for the carriage of Naval drafts or other services. The Italian ships in the Mediterranean except those mentioned above are operated by the Italians under the overall control of the Flag Officer, ITALY and Liaison subject to the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. These ships are used to a large extent in the carriage of ex POW's and displaced persons and are almost entirely operated on duties of direct benefit to the Italians; their use is of assistance to the Allied shipping programme.

9. Italian Naval personnel are being used to replace British personnel in part in duties in Italian ports as the use of the ports permits.

10. In general, the administration of the Italian Navy is under Italian Naval Authorities subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean which is normally only exercised to the minimum extent necessary.

11. The Italian Navy has operated satisfactorily under the present system of control and has proved of value to the United Nations and to ITALY. The retention of the present control will ensure the continued use of this service to the best advantage.

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS UNTIL CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY

12. Until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty the requirements of the United Nations and of ITALY will necessitate the employment of the Italian Navy on duties similar to those which it now performs. It can be expected, however, that the Allied requirements will decrease to some extent and that certain of the Italian requirements, notably minesweeping, will increase. Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive vessels for which no immediate employment has already been, or can be, found will be laid up as arranged by the Allied Naval Area Commander. Decreases in requirements will permit of ships being laid up and reductions being made in the personnel of the Italian Navy.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

13. Repair, Maintenance and Supply.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that in the Mediterranean is an area of British operational responsibility the United Kingdom is primarily responsible, on behalf of the United Nations, for the necessary repair, maintenance and supply of Italian Naval vessels in that area. Maintenance of Italian Naval vessels is in all cases subject to the provisos that:

a. Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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a. Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

b. No facilities or stores are used which would prejudice United States or British operational requirements.

A considerable quantity of stores of all kinds has been supplied to the Italian Navy to bring it to an efficient state and to permit of its operation in the interests of the United Nations and of ITALY.

14. Rations.

It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Navy. It is therefore desirable that the responsibility for provision of victuals should be assumed by the Italian Government as soon as possible. It

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It is at present a British commitment to provide the Allied Military element of the ration. The Italian Navy is now a reasonably efficient force and is considered to be a stabilising factor in the country. If the Navy is to remain in an efficient state, it is important that a satisfactory scale of rations should be maintained. It should be noted that on assuming ration responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration. It is important that the Italian Government should maintain the ration scale of the Armed Forces at a satisfactory level. The handling and accounting for supplies for the Italian Navy involve a manpower commitment for the British army which can no longer be met owing to the British Army's diminishing manpower ceiling. It is also likely that the British Army will shortly have to move out of their area in S. Italy on which the bulk of the Italian Navy is based. The British Army must, therefore, be relieved of this commitment as soon as possible, which however cannot be assumed by any other Allied Force.

SUMMARY

15. The present system of Allied control of the Italian Navy has functioned satisfactorily. The control now exercised is no more than that required for the proper operation and administration of this service.

CONCLUSIONS

16. a. No change in the present system of control of the Italian Navy is required.

b. That the responsibility for the rations of the Italian Navy must be assumed by the Italian Government as it is essential that C.F be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17 a. No change should be made in the present system of control of the Italian Navy.

b. That the Italian Government assume responsibility for the supply of rations for the Italian Navy at as early a date as possible on a scale equivalent to that provided for the other Italian Armed Forces in order that C.F may be relieved of its present responsibility and that the Allied Commission be instructed to inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the earliest date on which the Italian Government can assume this responsibility.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ch. Sec. C RAF Italy.

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AFHQ/66

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

14 December 1945

Italian Navy and Air Force

1. It has been found necessary to revise P/319 (Final) and P/320 (Final) as to affect the rationing of the Italian Navy and Air Force, and holders of these papers are requested to return them to G-3, AFHQ for destruction.

2. Minor alterations have been made in paragraphs 14 (d), 17(f) and 18(c) and (e) in P/319 (Final) and paragraphs 14, 16(b) and 17(b) in P/320 (Final).

3. P/319 (Final) (Revised) and P/320 (Final) (Revised) will be circulated shortly.

D. HALL YATES
Brigadier, U. S.
Chairman

DISTRIBUTION:
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ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Encl 63

A.F.H.Q. Letter

CAO/205/8

dated

14/12/45

Subject:

Dissolution of Allied Forces Food & Resource Board (AFFRB)

Passed to CMSC Hdqrs for action

WL

20/12/45

TOP SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No. 3

13 December 1945

REVISION OF ITALIAN ARMISTICE TERMS

1. The following terms of reference have been received from the Chief of Staff:

(1) The Joint Planning Staff are directed to report which clauses of the Armistice Terms can now, without prejudice to Allied military requirements or to any questions that will fall to be decided in the eventual peace settlement, be abrogated or modified, and to prepare a draft of the NAF signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff called for by FAN 629.

(2) You will conduct your examination in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and Deputy British Resident Minister, and as far as possible you will draft your report in accordance with their advice. Where, however, you consider that this political advice is at variance with Allied military requirement you will draft your recommendations on the assumption that the military requirement are paramount.

(3) It is realized that your report is likely, in substance, to make similar recommendations on matters of policy to those contained in your earlier paper P/310 (Final). It will however be based on the idea of abrogating or modifying certain of the clauses of the existing armistice terms, and not on the basis of producing a fresh document to replace those terms.

(4) Your draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should therefore be in the following form :-

(a) A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can be abrogated,

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the Armistice Terms can now, without prejudice to Allied military requirements or to any questions that will fall to be decided in the eventual peace settlement, be abrogated or modified, and to prepare a draft of the NAF signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff called for by FAN 629.

(2) You will conduct your examination in conjunction with the U.S. Political Advisor and Deputy British Resident Minister, and as far as possible you will draft your report in accordance with their advice. Where, however, you consider that this political advice is at variance with Allied military requirement you will draft your recommendations on the assumption that the military requirement are paramount.

(3) It is realized that your report is likely, in substance, to make similar recommendations on matters of policy to those contained in your earlier paper F/310 (Final). It will however be based on the idea of abrogating or modifying certain of the clauses of the existing armistice terms, and not on the basis of producing a fresh document to replace those terms.

(4) Your draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should therefore be in the following form :-

(a) A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can now be abrogated.

(b) A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can be modified.

(c) A statement of the military reasons why, in such major instances as may in your view arise, the Supreme Allied Commander cannot accept the political advice.

2. A meeting will be held in the War Room at 1430 hours on Friday 14 December to discuss the attached first draft.

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3. Addressees are requested to bring to the meeting a copy of the armistice terms issued with P/310.

4. Also attached is a copy of P/310. In view of the fact that all copies of this paper were collected after the previous meeting on this subject, it is requested that special care be taken to safeguard all these papers.

H. T. H. SMITH
Captain, U.S.
Secretary

Inst 5
plus 5-5
by RHAPP
US POLAD

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F/322 (1st Draft) TOP SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

REVISION OF ITALIAN ARMISTICE TERMS

Object:

1. To examine the Italian Armistice Terms and to report which clauses can now, without prejudice to Allied military requirements or to any questions that will fall to be decided in the final peace settlement, be abrogated or modified and to prepare a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reply to FAN 629.

Procedure:

2. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the examination be conducted in conjunction with the US Political Advisor and Deputy British Resident Minister and that a draft be prepared as far as possible in accordance with their advice, that if this advice is at variance with Allied military requirements that the recommendation be made that military requirements are paramount. In addition, it was directed that this study be based on the idea of abrogating or modifying certain clauses of the existing terms of armistice, and not on the basis of producing a new document to replace these terms. It was further directed that the draft signal take the following form:

a. A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can now be abrogated.

b. A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can be modified.

c. A statement of the military reasons why, in such major instances as may in our view arise, the Supreme Allied Commander cannot accept the political advice.

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and to prepare a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reply to FAN 629.

Procedure:

2. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the examination be conducted in conjunction with the US Political Adviser and Deputy British Resident Minister and that a draft is prepared as far as possible in accordance with their advice, that if this advice is at variance with Allied military requirements that the assumption be made that military requirements are paramount. In addition, it was directed that this study be based on the idea of abrogating or modifying certain clauses of the existing terms of armistice, and not on the basis of producing a new document to replace those terms. It was further directed that the draft signal take the following form:

a. A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can now be abrogated.

b. A statement, with reasons where necessary, of which clauses can be modified.

c. A statement of the military reasons why, in such major instances as may in our view arise, the Supreme Allied Commander cannot accept the political advice.

Allied JCS studies:

3. The following AJPS papers, subject matter of which is closely allied to but contained in the present terms of reference, were reviewed in connection with this paper.

a. P/310 "Interim Document to Replace existing Armistice Terms", 2 October 1945.

b. P/316 "Publication of Italian Armistice Terms", 1 November 1945.

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Discussion:

4. In the examination of P/310, we attempted to draw up recommended interim armistice terms by eliminating clauses of the Armistice which could be abrogated and changing the phraseology of those clauses which could be modified. This procedure proved impossible, as the resulting document was incoherent and appeared more restrictive upon Italy than the original Armistice terms themselves. The same procedure was again attempted when P/310 was examined and again the same conclusion was reached. As two attempts to comply with the substance of the present terms of reference had proved unsuccessful, Allied Commission was requested to draw up a first draft of a suggested Reply to FAN 629. The Allied Commission however have also been unable to segregate clauses for abrogation or modification without producing an "instrument so tattered and unbalanced as to be quite unsuitable". The Allied Commission has actually gone beyond their terms of reference in offering a new agreement to replace the armistice. We have already submitted our recommendations regarding such an agreement in P/310. In any event our terms of reference appear to exclude expressly an alternative agreement and the Allied Commission draft has not therefore been examined in detail.

Political Implications:

5. Both the United States Political Adviser and the Deputy British Resident Minister have expressed the view that a document which contains all the military measures which the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff believe are required will not be a document of political value and will be unacceptable to the Italian Government and people.

International Implications:

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conclusion was reached. As the attempts to comply with the substance of the present terms of reference had proved unsuccessful, Allied Commission was requested to draw up a first draft of a suggested reply to FAN 629. The Allied Commission however have also been unable to segregate clauses for derogation or modification without producing an instrument so tattered and unbalanced as to be quite unsuitable". The Allied Commission has actually gone beyond their terms of reference in offering a new agreement to replace the armistice. We have already submitted our recommendations regarding such an agreement in P/310. In any event our terms of reference appear to exclude expressly an alternative agreement and the Allied Commission draft has not therefore been examined in detail.

Political Implications:

5. Both the United States political adviser and the Deputy British Resident Minister have expressed the view that a document which contains all the military safeguards which the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff believe are required will not be a document of political value and will be unpalatable to the Italian Government and people.

International Implications:

6. It is our opinion that any abrogation or modification of clauses in the present instrument would require approval of the other United Nations, and might well result in a demand from Allied Governments other than the United States and United Kingdom to have an active part in the affairs of Italy, and in any case, would probably take as long to finalise as the Peace Treaty.

Conclusion:

7. In view of the above, we conclude that it is not possible to alter the armistice terms by abrogation or modification of specific clauses to produce a concurrent document reserving the safeguards essential to the Supreme Allied Command and still suitable for publication from the political point of view.

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P/B-2 (1st Draft) (Cont'd)

Recommendation:

8. It is recommended that the attached draft cable be dispatched by SACMED in reply to Para 6a).

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DRAFT Cable

This is the _____.

In reply to FAN only.

In consultation with my Political Advisors, I have examined the feasibility of revising the Armistice Terms by urgent action or modification of clauses which could be abrogated or modified without prejudice to Allied military requirements or to any questions which will fall to be decided in the eventual peace settlement. If I am to maintain the safeguards I deem essential, my political advisors inform me that the resulting document would not be acceptable politically and would be much less palatable to the Italian Government and people than the present status of the published Armistice Terms with agreed commentary thereon. I can not therefore at this stage recommend any further abrogation or modification of the Armistice Terms other than that indicated in my commentary on the Armistice Terms forwarded in AFHQ 1063. In addition, any effort to obtain agreement of nations other than United States and United Kingdom to such changes or to completely revise interim Armistice Terms might well result in a demand of their nations for the right to take an active part in affairs in Italy, which I deem most undesirable.

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[illegible] by requirements or to any questions which will fall to be decided in the eventual peace settlement. If I am to maintain the safeguards I deem essential, my political advisers inform me that the resulting document would not be acceptable politically and would be much less palatable to the Italian Government and people than the present status of the Mediterranean Armistice Terms with agreed commentary thereon. I can not therefore at this stage recommend any further change or modification of the Armistice Terms than that indicated in my commentary on the Armistice Terms forwarded on AFP 1085. In addition, any effort to obtain agreement of nations other than United States and United Kingdom to such changes or to completely revise Italian Armistice Terms might well result in a demand of other nations for the right to intervene fully, not as drafters in Italy, which I deem most undesirable.

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F/310(Final) TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

3 October 1945

Copy No. 8

INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACE EXISTING ARMISTICE TERMS

1. In accordance with their terms of reference, the MJPS have prepared the attached draft Memorandum of Agreement as an interim document to replace the existing Italian Armistice Terms.

2. In conformity with the specific direction that no fresh political background should be assumed, primary emphasis in preparing this document has been laid upon present or potential Allied military requirements. To this extent the Agreement is at considerable variance with the views expressed by the U.S. Political Adviser, which are themselves based upon recent developments in U.S. political policy as reported to his office. Additionally, the necessity for making adequate provision to meet the various Service requirements which must be guaranteed to the Supreme Allied Commander, has made it impossible to conform to the direction that this document should be in the form of a "short summary".

3. It should be noted that the term "United Nations" where used in this Agreement, places the Russians, French and other Governments upon an equal footing with the British and U.S.

4. In this connection, the JMTS wish to record their opinion that the conclusion, by the Supreme Allied Commander, of an Agreement of the nature provided for in this Memorandum without the prior concurrence of the Soviet Union might be interpreted as a condonation of the recent unilateral modification to the Rumanian Armistice agreement, and as a precedent for similar unilateral action by the Soviet Union with other Balkan nations.

5. Reference to the size of the Italian Army and Air Force, recently approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, has been purposely omitted from the draft Memorandum of Agreement for security reasons in view of the possibility that this information might be of value to Italy's potential enemies.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACE EXISTING ARMISTICE TERMS

1. In accordance with their terms of reference, the MJPS have prepared the attached draft Memorandum of Agreement as an interim document to replace the existing Italian Armistice Terms.

2. In conformity with the specific direction that no fresh political background should be assumed, primary emphasis in preparing this document has been laid upon present or potential Allied military requirements. To this extent the Agreement is at considerable variance with the views expressed by the U.S. Political Adviser, which are themselves based upon recent developments in U.S. political policy as reported to his office. Additionally, the necessity for making adequate provision to meet the various Service requirements which must be guaranteed to the Supreme Allied Commander, has made it impossible to conform to the direction that this document should be in the form of a "short summary".

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4. In this connection, the JMPS wish to record their opinion that the conclusion, by the Supreme Allied Commander, of an Agreement of the nature provided for in this Memorandum without the prior concurrence of the Soviet Union might be interpreted as a condonation of the recent unilateral modification to the Rumanian Armistice Agreement, and as a precedent for similar unilateral action by the Soviet Union with other Balkan Nations.

5. Reference to the size of the Italian Army and Air Force, recently approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, has been purposely omitted from the draft Memorandum of Agreement for security reasons in view of the possibility that this information might be of value to Italy's potential enemies.

for Pomeroy Smith
D. [illegible], Col GSC
Brigadier, U.S.
Chairman, U.S.J.P.S. 1232 -

DISTRIBUTION:
Limit 12?

Dist: Air Plans.

TSR.3382.

(Copies 7, 8, 9 + 10)

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P/320(Final)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTER

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No. _____

INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACE EXISTING ARMISTICE TERMS

This Memorandum of Agreement is entered into between the undersigned , etc., Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre acting on behalf of the United States of America and the United Kingdom governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations and the undersigned _____ representing the Italian Government and duly authorised to sign on its behalf.

Whereas in the course of the conduct of their war against the Axis powers which at that time included Italy, then subject to Fascist domination, it became necessary for Allied Forces to invade and occupy certain portions of Italy and set up Allied Military Government therein,

And whereas after the fall of the Fascist Ministry formerly in power, the Italian Government surrendered unconditionally and applied to the Allies for an Armistice and an Agreement of Armistice was executed on 3 September 1943 at Fairfield Camp in Sicily, the provisions of which were subsequently supplied by a document executed in Malta on 29 September 1943 and known, in accordance with a protocol executed at Brindisi on 9 November 1943, as "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy".

And whereas in pursuance of the provisions of the "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy" above referred to, the Allied Commission (originally described as the Allied Control Commission) was established in Italy with the object of regulating and executing the terms of such conditions of

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Mediterranean Theatre acting on behalf of the United States of America and the United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations and the undersigned _____ representing the Italian Government and duly authorised to sign on its behalf.

Whereas in the course of the conduct of their war against the Axis powers which at that time included Italy, then subject to Fascist domination, it became necessary for Allied Forces to invade and occupy certain portions of Italy and set up Allied Military Government therein,

And Whereas after the fall of the Fascist Ministry formerly in power, the Italian Government surrendered unconditionally and applied to the Allies for an Armistice and an Agreement of Armistice was executed on 3 September 1943 at Fairfield Camp in Sicily, the provisions of which were subsequently amplified by a document executed in Malta on 29 September 1943 and known, in accordance with a protocol executed at Brindisi on 9 November 1943, as "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy".

And Whereas in pursuance of the provisions of the "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy" above referred to, the Allied Commission (originally designated the Allied Control Commission) was established in Italy with the object of regulating and executing the terms of such conditions of Armistice under the orders and general direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

And Whereas the Italian Government declared war on Germany on 13 October 1943,

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And Whereas the Italian Government has cooperated with the Allies and has been of assistance to them in the prosecution of the War against Germany.

And Whereas, because of the increased ability of the Italian Government to re-create their administrative machinery and to resume the functions of government, it has been possible successively to hand back territory to their

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jurisdiction subject to the reservation to the Allies within such territory of certain rights and powers,

and whereas it is now the desire and intention of the Allies to assist the Italian Government in the difficult tasks which lie before it and, pending the signing of a Treaty of Peace between the Italian Government and the United Nations, to encourage the Italians in the light of the declaration made 26 September 1944 by Prime Minister Churchill and the late President Roosevelt,

and whereas it has not thus far proved possible to publish the terms of the additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy above referred to or to specify them, but in view of the overthrow of German forces, it is now possible to set forth and publish the rights and powers which, pending a Peace Treaty with Italy, shall be allowed to the Italian Government and those which shall be reserved to the Allies.

Now therefore, it is agreed

I. Prior Agreements

The Agreement of Armistice executed at Pantelleria on in Sicily dated 3 September 1943, and the document executed in Malta on 29 October 1943 and known in accordance with the protocol executed at Brindisi on 9 November 1943, as "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy", and the Terms of Restoration of Italian Territory effective 11 February 1944 no similar documents executed thereafter restoring the restoration of specified areas of Italian territory shall from the date of execution of this Agreement be inoperative so long as the Italian Government complies with the provisions set

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made 29 September 1943 by Prime Minister Churchill and the President Roosevelt,

and whereas it has not thus far proved possible to publish the terms of the Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy above referred to or to modify them, but in view of the evacuation of German forces, it is now possible to set forth and publish the rights and powers which, pending a Peace Treaty with Italy, shall be allowed to the Italian Government and those which shall be reserved to the Allies.

Now therefore, it is agreed

I. Prior Agreements

The Agreement of Armistice executed at Pantelleria and Malta on 3 September 1943, and the document executed in Malta on 29 October 1943 and known in accord and with the protocol executed at Brindisi on 9 November 1943, a "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy", and the Terms of Restoration of Italian Territory effective 31 January 1944 and similar documents executed there after affecting the restoration of specified areas of Italian territory and all from the date of execution of this Agreement to remain in force so long as the Italian Government complies with the provisions set forth therein.

II. Allied Mission to Italy

1. The Allied Commission, established in order to enforce and execute the provisions of the Agreement on 29 September 1943, will in future under the orders and general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander concern itself primarily with the provision of assistance and advice to the Italian Government. It will exercise its functions of control only to the minimum extent necessary to insure the proper implementation of the present Agreement.

2. In order to facilitate the normal development of Italian

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economic life, the Allied Commission will have among others the following economic functions:

a. to facilitate the transfer of Italian import and export trade to normal commercial channels and practices as rapidly as possible.

b. to aid the Italian Government in planning imports into Italy, in processing such imports and in fostering Italian export trade.

c. to assist UNRRA, (Italy), or any other non-Italian relief or relief to agency which may require information or assistance, upon its request or that of the Italian Government.

d. to assist in the solution by the Italian Government of any economic problem brought to its attention by the Italian Government, and to make such recommendations as the case may require.

3. It is the intention of the United States and British Governments that, subject to the provisions of Article III c of the present agreement, which refer to the matter of war criminals, Italian personnel of war under their jurisdiction will be liberated from the status or rights and responsibilities pertaining to it.

III. Italian aid to the Allies

1. a. Italian Government and people will do all in their power to aid the interests of the United Nations.

b. The Italian Government shall take all necessary measures to ensure law and order in those parts of Italy under their control, and shall ensure that there is no disturbance due to work by, or presence of Allied forces in the areas, and also shall ensure prompt and exact compliance with the provisions of this present agreement.

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c. to assist UNRRA, (Italy), or any other non-Italian relief or relief recovery agency in any measures it may require, upon its request or that of the Italian Government.

d. to assist in the solution by the Italian Government of any economic problem brought to its attention by the Italian Government, and to make such recommendations as they may require.

3. It is the intention of the United States and British Governments that, subject to the provisions of Article III 6 of the present agreement, which refer to the matter of war criminals, Italian prisoners of war under their jurisdiction will be liberated from internment or repatriated as expeditiously as transportation facilities permit.

III. Italian aid to the Allies

1. a. Italian Government and people will do all in their power to aid the interests of the United Nations.

b. The Italian Government shall take all necessary measures to ensure law and order in those parts of Italy under their control, and shall ensure that there is no disturbance to work of, or passage of Allied forces in the said areas, and also shall ensure prompt and exact compliance with the provisions of this present agreement.

2. Allied forces requirements in Italy

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Allied forces required to be stationed in Italy for a period not yet determined. During such time as members of the Allied forces are stationed in Italian territory, the Italian Government will accord to the duly accredited Allied Commander the rights and powers which were hitherto held by conquest, occupation or agreement. These include but are not limited to the following:

a. the right to have at its disposal such areas, facilities, utilities, resources, supplies, installations and services as may be required

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for such disposition, use or operation as he may determine together with the necessary personnel to work them.

b. The right to maintain and quarter troops in Italian territory.

c. The right to declare any area to be a Military Zone and to exercise therein the rights of an Occupying Power or enforce such other controls as may be determined by him.

d. The right for warships, auxiliaries, transport and merchant and other vessels or aircraft in the service of the United Nations freely to use the territorial waters around and the air over Italian territory.

e. The right to convene Allied Military Tribunals and try any person violating any order or regulation issued by the Allied Military Authorities and of any person otherwise doing any hostile act to the Allied Forces or any members thereof and to inflict such punishment upon such person as such Tribunals may direct.

f. The right to requisition such property and services as the Supreme Allied Commander may deem necessary.

g. The right to obtain priority of contracts for raw materials and manufactured items.

h. No member of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be brought to trial in any Italian court for any cause whatsoever, either civil or criminal, without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander.

i. No tax shall be levied against the Allied Governments or any of their agencies, property or activities, and no members of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be required to pay any tax, impost, charge or duty, nor shall any transactions or property of any such person b[illegible]

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vessels or aircraft in the service of the United Nations freely to use the territorial waters around and the air over Italian territory.

e. The right to convene Allied Military Tribunals and try any person violating any order or regulation issued by the Allied Military Authorities and of any person otherwise doing any hostile act to the Allied Forces or any members thereof and to inflict such punishment upon such person as such Tribunals may direct.

f. The right to requisition such property and services as the Supreme Allied Commander may deem necessary.

g. The right to obtain priority of contracts for raw materials and manufactured items.

h. No member of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be brought to trial in any Italian court for any cause whatsoever, either civil or criminal, without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander.

i. No tax shall be levied against the Allied Governments or any of their agencies, property or activities, and no members of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be required to pay any tax, impost, charge or duty, nor shall any transactions or property of any such person be subject to any tax, impost, charge or duty by the Italian Government or any of its sub-divisions or agencies, without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander.

3. a. Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.

b. The Italian authorities will make available on Italian territory all transport facilities required by the Supreme Allied Commander including free transit for personnel, war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions

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issued by the Supreme Allied Commander regarding the use and control of inter-communication systems, airfields, ports, port facilities, shipping, transport facilities, oil stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as the Supreme Allied Commander may specify and all repair and construction facilities connected therewith.

4. The Italian Government will make available to the Supreme Allied Commander all information about naval, military and air devices, installations and defences, equipment, stocks, material and any other information which could be of value to the United Nations in any military operations whether such installations, equipment or information be publicly or privately owned.

5. The Italian Government will carry out such clearance of minefields and other obstructions as may be required by the Supreme Allied Commander.

6. The Italian Government will cooperate in facilitating the return to their homes of all displaced and stateless persons in, from or through Italy. The Italian Government will be prepared to take over responsibility for the repatriation, movement and care of displaced and stateless persons in Italy upon the request of the Supreme Allied Commander.

7. The Italian Government will cooperate in the apprehension, detention and trial of persons accused of war crimes, whatever their nationality and release to the Supreme Allied Commander such of these persons as he may request.

8. Such Italian merchant shipping and other craft as are required by the Supreme Allied Commander for use in the interests of the United Nations, will be made available, wherever they may be, to the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be handed over in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the Italian Government at such places and for such purposes and periods as the Allied Authorities may prescribe. In accordance with any directions issued by the Supreme Allied Commander,

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be of value to the United Nations in any military operations whether such installations, equipment or information be publicly or privately owned.

5. The Italian Government will carry out such clearance of minefields and other obstructions as may be required by the Supreme Allied Commander.

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7. The Italian Government will cooperate in the apprehension, detention and trial of persons accused of war crimes, whatever their nationality and release to the Supreme Allied Commander such of these persons as he may request.

8. Such Italian merchant shipping and other craft as are required by the Supreme Allied Commander for use in the interests of the United Nations, will be made available, wherever they may be, to the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be handed over in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the Italian Government at such places and for such purposes and periods as the Allied Authorities may prescribe. In accordance with any directions issued by the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government will exercise any outstanding options to purchase or reacquire, or to resume control of, Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war, and the above provisions will apply to such vessels.

9. There may be commercial intercourse, or dealings, with any foreign country, subject however to the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander.

10. The Italian Government will establish and maintain an effective foreign exchange control agency for the purpose of implementing the international

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economic objectives of the United Nations Governments and to assure the most effective use of Italy's foreign exchange resources. The Italian Government will work out, in consultation with the appropriate United Nations diplomatic missions in Rome, measures to be adopted in support of the international economic objectives of the United Nations.

11. The Italian Government recognises that it has been and is the issuing authority for the Allied Military Lire now in circulation in Italy or which may hereafter be expended by the Allied Forces in Italy. The Italian Government will continue to make available to the Allied Forces in Italy such lire currency or credit as they may need, and recognises the right of the Allied Forces to hold and use Allied Military Lire as may be necessary to supplement such lire currency or credit.

12. The Italian Government recognises its obligation to make payment for the supplies imported into Italy by the Allied Forces for the use and benefit of the Italian Government or people, and for all services rendered by, and supplies, materials, facilities and installations furnished or installed by the Allied Forces to or for the benefit of the Italian Government or people.

13. Except as directed or authorised by the Supreme Allied Commander the manufacture, production and construction of, research and experimentation upon, war material and its import, export and transit are prohibited. The Italian Government will comply with any directions given by the Supreme Allied Commander for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

14. The Italian Government will make available to the Allied Authorities such Italian war material or such war material of any country lately at war with the United Nations now in, or to come into, their possession as may be required. Such war material as is not required by the Allied Authorities, nor is permitted to be retained by the Italian Government for the equipping or maintenance of their armed

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hereafter be expended by the Allied Forces in Italy. The Italian Government will continue to make available to the Allied Forces in Italy such lire currency or credit as they may need, and recognises the right of the Allied Forces to hold and use Allied Military Lire as may be necessary to supplement such lire currency or credit.

12. The Italian Government recognises its obligation to make payment for the supplies imported into Italy by the Allied Forces for the use and benefit of the Italian Government or people, and for all services rendered by, and supplies, materials, facilities and installations furnished or installed by the Allied Forces to or for the benefit of the Italian Government or people.

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14. The Italian Government will make available to the Allied Authorities such Italian war material or such war material of any country lately at war with the United Nations now in, or to come into, their possession as may be required. Such war material as is not required by the Allied Authorities, nor is permitted to be retained by the Italian Government for the equipping or maintenance of their armed forces, shall be disposed of as prescribed by the Supreme Allied Commander.

IV. The Italian Armed Forces.

1. a. The strength and organization of the Italian army under control of the Italian Government will be subject to such limitations as the Supreme Allied Commander may impose.

b. The existing Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army will be charged with the supervision of the reorganization of the Italian army and with assisting in its operational and administrative training.

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c. The Supreme Allied Commander retains the right to reassume command of all or part of the Italian Army mentioned in subpara a above, should he consider such a course necessary.

d. Subject to the functions of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army as defined in subpara b above, the Italian Government will have full administrative control of and supply responsibility for the Italian Army mentioned in subpara a above, subject to such Allied assistance as the Supreme Allied Commander may deem necessary.

e. The Supreme Allied Commander shall continue to have the right to employ Italian Troops for such purposes as he may consider necessary. Troops so employed will be additional to the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government mentioned in para a above.

f. All Italian Armed Land Forces (except Carabinieri) in excess of the strengths permitted in accordance with subpara a and which are not required for employment by the Allies in accordance with subpara e above, will be disbanded in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Italian Navy will continue to be controlled by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Italian Air Force will continue to remain under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander. There will be no Italian civil aviation without the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

4. a. In order to ensure an efficient and adequate national police force authority is given for an initial strength of 65,000 Carabinieri, separate and distinct from the Italian Army referred to in paragraph 1 above.

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may deem necessary.

f. The Supreme Allied Commander shall continue to have the right to employ Italian Troops for such purposes as he may consider necessary. Troops so employed will be additional to the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government mentioned in para a above.

f. All Italian Armed Land Forces (except Carabinieri) in excess of the strengths permitted in accordance with subpara a and which are not required for employment by the Allies in accordance with subpara e above, will be disbanded in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Italian Navy will continue to be controlled by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Italian Air Force will continue to remain under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander. There will be no Italian civil aviation without the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

4. a. In order to ensure an efficient and adequate national police force authority is given for an initial strength of 65,000 Carabinieri, separate and distinct from the Italian Army referred to in paragraph 1 above.

b. The Italian Government will have full operational and administrative control of, and supply responsibility for, the Carabinieri, subject to such Allied assistance as the Supreme Allied Commander may deem necessary.

c. The Supreme Allied Commander retains the right to reassume control 1228 of all or part of the Carabinieri should he consider such a course necessary.

5. Such fortifications and military installations as the Supreme Allied Commander may direct shall be destroyed. No new fortifications, airfields, or military installations shall be constructed and no new armaments or other defences added to existing fortifications without permission of the Supreme Allied Commander.

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V. Political Status of Italy.

1. All territory restored to Italian jurisdiction will be administered by the Italian Government free of control by the Allied Forces except as set forth in this agreement or in case of military necessity or when assistance or advice may be requested by the Italian Government.

2. Italian diplomatic relations with other states will be solely within the competence of the Government of Italy.

3. The Italian Government will continue to carry out the programme of defascistization.

4. The Italian Government undertakes to submit the question of the choice of their form of government to the Italian people. To ensure the fullest possible expression of the wishes of the Italian people on this important question, the Italian Government undertakes to submit it to the Italian people in the form of a plebiscite or a national referendum, notwithstanding previous Italian legislation to the contrary.

VI. Limitations of this Agreement.

1. The Allied rights under the terms of this agreement will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to over-riding military needs.

2. This agreement is entirely without prejudice to the rights of the Allied Forces to continue to occupy any Italian territory now governed by Allied Military Government or otherwise under Allied control, and to continue in the use and possession of all property and facilities now under requisition or otherwise under Allied control. It is the intention of the United States and British Governments to return such property and facilities to Italian control as expeditiously as

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 770048

3. The Italian Government will continue to carry out the programme of defascistization.

4. The Italian Government undertakes to submit the question of the choice of their form of government to the Italian people. To ensure the fullest possible expression of the wishes of the Italian people on this important question, the Italian Government undertakes to submit it to the Italian people in the form of a plebiscite or a national referendum, notwithstanding previous Italian legislation to the contrary.

VI. Limitations of this Agreement.

1. The Allied rights under the terms of this agreement will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to over-riding military needs.

2. This agreement is entirely without prejudice to the rights of the Allied Forces to continue to occupy any Italian territory now governed by Allied Military Government or otherwise under Allied control, and to continue in the use and possession of all property and facilities now under requisition or otherwise under Allied control. It is the intention of the United States and British Governments to return such property and facilities to Italian control as expeditiously as possible consistent with military requirements.

3. It is not intended in this agreement to dispose of any question or predetermine any controversy which may arise respecting the ultimate disposition of any territory heretofore Italian, nor to adjudicate upon any matter relating to any boundary which may hereafter be in dispute. All such questions are for disposition by and between the United Nations and the Italian Government.

4. Nothing in this document is to be construed as constituting a final settlement of or impairing the full rights of the Allied Forces and of the United Nations to reparations from the Italian Government for war damage suffered by them

TOP SECRET

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at the hands of the Italian people or Government or settlement by the Italian Government for the full cost of Allied occupation of Italy and the Italian campaigns, including the cost of all facilities and services rendered to the United Nations in Italian territory, whether or not such territory has been returned to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

5. In the event of the Italian Government's failure to observe or comply with any of the terms contained in this agreement, the Supreme Allied Commander reserves the right to take such action, including the re-imposition of restrictions and control and the use of armed force, as he deems necessary.

6. a. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" in the present agreement includes the Allied Commission and such other officers, representatives and organisations as the Supreme Allied Commander may designate.

b. The term "United Nations" in the present agreement includes the Supreme Allied Commander, the Allied Forces, the Allied Commission and any other authority which the United Nations may designate.

c. The term 'Allied Commission' in the present agreement includes any other authority which the United Nations may designate to take over all or part of its functions.

d. The term "War material" in the present agreement is deemed to include any material which may be specified in any lists or definitions which may from time to time be issued by the Supreme Allied Commander.

e. The term "Allied Forces" in the present agreement is deemed to include government organisations and accredited agencies operating under or in conjunction with such forces.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander may at his discretion

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reserves the right to take such action, including the re-imposition of restrictions and control and the use of armed force, as he deems necessary.

6. a. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" in the present agreement includes the Allied Commission and such other officers, representatives and organisations as the Supreme Allied Commander may designate.

b. The term "United Nations" in the present agreement includes the Supreme Allied Commander, the Allied Forces, the Allied Commission and any other authority which the United Nations may designate.

c. The term 'Allied Commission' in the present agreement includes any other authority which the United Nations may designate to take over all or part of its functions.

d. The term "War material" in the present agreement is deemed to include any material which may be specified in any lists or definitions which may from time to time be issued by the Supreme Allied Commander.

e. The term "Allied Forces" in the present agreement is deemed to include government organisations and accredited agencies operating under or in conjunction with such forces.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander may at his discretion authorize the exercise or enjoyment, of any or all rights, powers, privileges or immunities which he may have under this agreement, severally by the US or British Commands with the same force and effect as such rights, powers, privileges or immunities might have been exercised by him.

8. The present instrument shall enter into force at once. It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangement or until the coming into force of the peace treaty with Italy, or otherwise as may be prescribed in this agreement.

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

9. All agreements or arrangements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Italian Government, its agencies or representatives and the Allied Forces, their agencies or representatives, shall remain in full force and effect except as to those arrangements herein specifically referred to as being rendered inoperative.

10. The present agreement is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic and in the case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander shall be final.

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1981

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Asst Dir Training

Asst Dir Inspection

Asst Dir Intelligence

Asst Dir Laboratory

Asst Dir Legal Counsel

Asst Dir Records Management

Asst Dir Technical Services

Asst Dir Training

Asst Dir Public Affairs

Inspector

Legal Counsel

Director's Secretary

12-17-45

1199

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Jul 54 157

56

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.

Date :- 12th December, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/1,200/AIR.

Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force.

Please refer to your AFSC/45/AIR dated 15th November 1945.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander does not for the present wish the present interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat desires to point out that Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway is the Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander and not Admiral Stone the Chief Commissioner as stated in paragraph 1 of your above mentioned letter.

Maxwell Fisher

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1225

1200

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SACS 1547

INFORMAL ROUTING SLIP Log:

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FILE: Actioned see 53 Suspense:

SUBJECT: Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force.

No.	From	To	Date	
1.	SACS	MAAG	10 Dec 45	1. Our memorandum of 18 September, subject: "Directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission", was approved by the Supreme Allied Commander before dispatch to you. It is not proposed to alter the instructions contained therein and you are requested to so advise the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. 2. Your letter to A.F.S.C. dated 22 Sep also refers. 3. You are correct that the telegram to A.F.S.C. did not

Incl: None.
Ltr fr MAAG, subj
as above, MAAG/AFSC/
AIS, dtd 5 Dec 45,
w/incl.

J. C. Pugsley, Jr.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to SAC.

1324

1201

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force.

1.	SACS	MAAC	10 Dec 45	Our memorandum of 18 September, subject: "Directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission", was approved by the Supreme Allied Commander before dispatch to you. It is not proposed to alter the instructions contained therein and you are requested to so advise the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Incls:
Ltr fr MAAC, subj
as above, MAAC/4200/
AIS, dtd 5 Dec 45,
w/incl.

J. E. EASTON, JR.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to SAC.

CONFIDENTIAL

1202

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5/11

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Supreme Allied Commanders Secretariat.

Date :- 5th December, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/4200/ALS.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Attached is a copy letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, reference AFSC/46/AIR dated 15th November, 1945.

2. As the future policy for the Italian Air Force is now being discussed by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff it is not recommended that this request be granted.

3. It has always been the impression of this Secretariat that the Deputy to SACMED is Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway and not Admiral Stone as stated in the attached letter.

Maxwell Fisher

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.
Secretary to The
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1323

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT.

DATE: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

5/14

CONFIDENTIAL.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED ~~and~~ as President of the Allied Commission has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

F 2 0 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED ~~and~~ as President of the Allied Commission has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3c. - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that you will inform the Allied Commission whether or not it is intended that the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as amended above may be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, either in the form of a directive from A.F.H.Q. or in the form of a letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission to the Italian Air Ministry.

I.E. BROWN,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789017

1205

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET.

LOOSE MINUTE.

To: A.O.C.

PROJECTED SALE OF LIGHTNINGS TO THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to the above subject A.L.S. have been asked if they had any information. They replied that there had been no official intimation of any such sale but the matter had been mentioned in D.C. correspondence. A.L.S. telephoned the A.O.C., A.F.S.C. who stated that he had no official information on this subject, but that he would investigate. In view of the fact that this matter has been published in the "Stars and Stripes" it is submitted that the M.A.A.C. should inform SACMED with a view to obtaining direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff since the Italian Air Force is under control of SACMED, while their equipment, operations and all other activities are a matter of joint U.S. and British concern.

2. The following points appear to require investigation:-

(a) The Italian Air Ministry have been preparing to purchase aircraft without consulting the Air Force Sub-Commission officially.

(b) If the A.F.S.C. knew of this matter unofficially it would appear that they should have investigated immediately and asked for direction from the M.A.A.C.

(c) On whose authority has the U.S. Army Liquidating Agency negotiated with the Italian Air Force and Air Ministry, who are supposed to be under Allied control?

(d) It would appear possible that the British and U.S. components of the A.F.S.C. are not fully integrated and therefore not working fully under the control of the Director (A.O.C.)

AH/I/S.21/A.P.
20th November, 1945.

H.B. PARKINSON,
GROUP CAPTAIN,
CHIEF OF AIR PLANS.

Copy to A.L.S.

1220

6/12
H200

1206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET.

LOOSE MINUTE.

To: Squadron Leader Walmsley.

Ref. 55

Reference telecon WALMSLEY/FIELD a.m. 24th November, attached please find 3 copies of Terms of Reference handed to HQTS by Chief of Staff. Squadron Leader Walmsley should retain one copy and give another copy to both Group Captain Fakenham and Wing Commander Slessor.

2. It is thought that preliminary discussions around the Air Force portion of the required paper could with advantage take place in Rome.

3. A copy of a loose minute to Group Captain Fakenham regarding meeting with Air Vice Marshal Brody is also attached.

Richard Field

R.A. FIELD,
WING COMMANDER,
AIR PLANS.

AHQT/S.55/A.P.
24th November, 1945.

Air Historical Branch
File 6/12. 1213
H200.

SECRET.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

MEDITERRANEAN JOINT PLANNING STAFF.

MJPS/66 23 November 1945

TO: S.O.P., C-in-C Med.
Chief Air Plans, Air HQ ITALY.
Log Plans
G-5

1. The following terms of reference have been received by the MJPS from the Chief of Staff:-

1. The Joint Planning Staff are directed to examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force and to make recommendations, as to the future policy which would be adopted in respect of these services, pending conclusion of the peace treaty.

2. Your examination and recommendations should in particular cover the desirability or otherwise of returning these Italian armed forces to Italian Government control, as is being done with the Italian Army.

3. Your study should also deal with the question of administrative responsibility for the Italian Navy and Air Force, on which subject you have already received separate terms of reference.

2. Your attention is invited to MJPS Paper 306 (Final) and MAF 1051, which led up to the approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the hand-back of the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

3. It is suggested that the first draft of the present study should be prepared on the lines of P/306 (Final) under the following headings:-

a. Object.

b. General Considerations.

c. Italian Navy - Current Directive, strength, functions.

d. Italian Air Force - Current Directives, strength, functions.

e. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Navy.

f. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Air Force.

g. Italian Government Naval and Air Force needs - present and post-war.

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1. The Joint Planning Staff are directed to examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force and to make recommendations, as to the future policy which would be adopted in respect of these services, pending conclusion of the peace treaty.

2. Your examination and recommendations should in particular cover the desirability or otherwise of returning these Italian armed forces to Italian Government control, as is being done with the Italian Army.

3. Your study should also deal with the question of administrative responsibility for the Italian Navy and Air Force, on which subject you have already received separate terms of reference.

2. Your attention is invited to MJPS Paper 306 (Final) and NAF 1051, which led up to the approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the handback of the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

3. It is suggested that the first draft of the present study should be prepared on the lines of P/306 (Final) under the following headings:-

a. Object.

b. General Considerations.

c. Italian Navy - Current Directive, strength, functions.

d. Italian Air Force - Current Directives, strength, functions.

e. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Navy.

f. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Air Force.

g. Italian Government Naval and Air Force needs - present and post-war.

h. Future of Naval and Air Sub-Commissions.

i. Administrative considerations including supplies and equipment.

4. It is requested that addressees prepare paragraphs under these headings and any other headings considered necessary as follows, for consolidation by G-3 AFHQ in a first draft:-

C-in-C Med - headings under para 3e, 3e, 3g, 3h and 3i above.
Air HQ ITALY - headings under para 3d, 3f, 3g, 3h and 3i above.
G-5 - headings under para 3g and 3h above. Suggested paragraph for 3i has already been received.
Log Plans - heading under para 3i above.

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5. A first draft will be prepared by this Section in two parts, one dealing with the Italian Navy and one with the Italian Air Force. It would therefore assist this Section if G-5 and Log Plans prepared separate papers for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force.

6. Reference para 3 of the terms of reference, this paper will also incorporate the terms of reference received on 16 November, copy to all, on the subject of the rationing of the Italian Navy and Air Force.

7. It is requested that addressees forward their paragraphs to this Section by Wednesday November 28th.

Sd. ??????????
For J. HEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.S.,
AC of S, G-5.

HTHS/tsp

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. ROME.

To : Italian Air Ministry - Direction of Personnel.

Date : 7th November, 1945.

Ref. : AFSC/360/3/Org.

I.A.F. STRENGTH FIGURES

With reference to the Strength State of the I.A.F. as on 1st October, 1945, it is noted that the grand total is 31.930.

2. The rationing commitments are as follows -

-	22,000	ITI-ITI	British Commitment
	2,500	BR -ITI	
	6,500	US - ITI	American Commitment

It is noted however, that the number of US-ITI is now only 2632, the difference (3868) having been added to the I.A.F.

3. It is clear, that with increasing ration difficulties, the I.A.F., for feeding purposes, must consist of 22,000 plus 2,500 - 24,500 together with the US-ITI complement.

4. The presence of the Italian Air Force Companies has been purposely ignored, which, whilst swelling the BR-ITI total to 4991 at the moment, will eventually disappear.

5. It is requested, therefore, that further classes be discharged in order that the BR-ITI Section can be reduced to the authorized figure of 24,500.

F. L. BRAESHAW, S/LDR.,
FOR AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

SECRET

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Includes Utah Surface to go on to Utah section

RR-ITI 2,500 authorized — actual 3977

US-ITI 6,500 " " 2278

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Sec 57.

54

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Supreme Allied Commanders Secretariat.

Date :- 5th December, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/1200/ALS.

Sec 49

49.

ITALIAN POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Attached is a copy letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, reference AFSC/45/AIR dated 15th November, 1945.

2. As the future policy for the Italian Air Force is now being discussed by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff it is not recommended that this request be granted.

3. It has always been the impression of the Secretariat that the Deputy to SACMED is Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway and not Admiral Stone as stated in the attached letter.

Maxwell Fisher.

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

53

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

To :- Supreme Allied Commanders Secretariat.

Date :- 3rd. December, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/4200/ALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

This Section has been informed by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces Sub- Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, that the Chief Commissioner in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED as President of the Allied Commission has no objection to the interim policy dated 23rd September, 1945, reference AG091.711/231 SACMED being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made :-

(a) Paragraph 3a - delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "the Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service".

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3f, and g, - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters"

(d) Paragraph 4c,- delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5,- del te entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6, - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "the following subjects are recommended for discussion" (Deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a.- First line delete "without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft holding Unit" for

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1213

This Section has been informed by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces Sub- Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, that the Chief Commissioner in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED as President of the Allied Commission has no objection to the interim policy dated 25rd September, 1945, reference AC091.711/231 SACS-6 being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made :-

(a) Paragraph 3e - delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service".

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3f, and g, - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters"

(d) Paragraph 4c,- delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5,- del to entirely; as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6, - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Salvage Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that this Secretariat may be informed whether or not the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as amended above should be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry in the form of a Directive from Allied Force Headquarters, or in the form of a letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Rome, to the Italian Air Ministry.

(MAXWELL FRIEND)
Wing Commander,
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

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[illegible]

LOOSE MINUTE 52

TO : AIR PLANS (attn. G/C. Pakenham)

Future of the Italian
Air Force

Attached is copy letter and enclosures from Air Forces Sub-Commission, Rome, reference AFSC/367/2/ORG dated 27th November, 1945, for your information and retention.

(P. WALMSLEY)
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section

MEDME/S.4200/ALS.

29th November, 1945.

1216

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES [illegible]-DIRECTION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT. (3 COPIES).

DATE: 27TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AF3C/367/2/OPS.

TOP SECRET.

FUTURE OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference conversation with Group Captain Pakenham, Wing Commander Glessor and Squadron Leader Walmsley on the 26th November, and with Colonel Parsons (G5) on the 27th November, attached are:

(i) First draft of the A.F.S.C. suggested Order of Battle for the Post-War Italian Air Force - Long Term Allied Requirements (As foundation for I.A.F. allowed by Peace Terms.

(ii) The aircraft position in the Italian Air Force as at 31st October, 1945, which shows the provisional establishments laid down by A.F.S.C. together with the proposed establishments by A.H.Q and also A.F.S.C, in amplification of (i) above.

2. It will be noted from (i) above that no suggestion has been made to include Bomber aircraft as it is understood that such a suggestion would be ruled out by the Navy in this theatre, on the grounds that Bomber Aircraft would be a threat to sea communications. However, should it be found that the Navy has no objection, it is suggested that the addition of two Light Bomber Squadrons be made to balance the force, particularly with regard to the defence of the frontiers in the North East.

3. A copy of (i) above was sent by hand of Colonel Parsons to G/Capt. Pakenham on the 27th November, 1945.

I.E. MCGUIRE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

A.H.Q. 24/11 1200

T/P SECRET.

ORDER OF BATTLE

for

POST WAR I.A.F. - LONG TERM ALLIED REQUIREMENT.

(As foundation for I.A.F. allowed by Peace Terms).

		No. of Sqdns.	Establishment. A/C.	Crews.
Serial Nos.1	Fighters - Guns/bombs/rockets - (Lightnings etc).	4	16	
2	Rec/R - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Photos and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).	2	16	
3	Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): current types of D/T a/c will continue to be used until worn out.	2	16 (approx)	
4	ASR/GR - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with Flying boats or landplanes).	2	16	
5	Communication - Obsolescent type GR and Military & civil landplanes.	1	16 (approx)	
6	Flying Training School - Including O.T.U.	1	30 (approx)	

CONDITIONS:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Rec/R Role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqns until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqns will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for Allies) and as available.

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50%, at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

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	Fighters - Guns/bombs/rockets - (Lightnings etc).	4	16
2	Rec/R - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Photos and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).	2	16
3	Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): current types of R/T a/c will continue to be used until worn out.	2	16 (approx)
4	ASR/SR - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with Flying boats or landplanes).	2	16
5	Communication - Obsolescent type GR and Military & civil landplanes.	1	16 (approx)
6	Flying Training School - Including O.T.U.	1	30 (approx)

CONDITIONS:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Rec/R Role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqns until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqns will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for Allies) and as available.

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50%, at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

(i) Combat aircraft - from British or American sources.
(ii) Civil and Transport a/c - from Italian sources with option to Italian Government to obtain them from U.S. or British sources.
(iii) P.C.L. To be provided (on payment by the Italian Government) in such quantities as to maintain and train an efficient I.A.F, international A.S.R. service and a courier service until civil aviation is permitted.

(e) The Order of Battle shows the maximum to be permitted for training and Allied supply purposes, but may be reduced to a limited extent (after consultation with the Allies), if the Italian economy cannot support such a force. Flying Units and aircraft retained by the I.A.F. in excess of this Order of Battle will not be given authority for training except pure flying to a limited extent.

26 Nov 45

For P. Broad AV.M.
AFSC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759017

12191

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I.A.F. POSITION AS AT 31ST OCT. 1945.

Serial No.	A/c type.	Establishment Italian type.	A/c make and strength.	Allied a/c strength.	Seaplane strength.	Provisional establishment. (c, e & f).
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	Fighters (190 Crews).	180	Mc.202 - 30 Mc.205 - 32 X Mc.200 - 10 Ø Cr. 42 - 20 X G. 50 - 2 Total non-obsolete. 62	P.39 - 102 Spit - 14 Total: 116	AHQ Proposal AFSC Proposal	256 115 144
	Note: X = obsolete types. Ø = obsolete & used for Training.					
2	Light Bombers (Baltimores).	-	-	Balte - 35	-	35 AHQ & AFSC Nil
3	Seaplanes (58 Crews).	-	-	-	Cant.506 - 62 RS.14 - 9 Total: 71	71 19 AHQ 48 AFSC
4	B/Transport (Crews with Balts - 137).	85	SM. 79 - 47 SM. 84 - 8 SM. 82 - 32 SM. 75 - 3 SM. 73 - 1 G. 12 - 4 X Cant.1007- 7 Total non-obsolete. 88			85 38 AHQ 48 AFSC ult 96 AFSC unt Aviation

Continued

1220

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I.A.F. POSITION AS AT 31ST OCT. 1945.

inal	A/c type. (b)	Establishment Italian type. (c)	A/c make and strength. (d)	Allied a/c strength. (e)	Seaplane strength. (f)	Provisional establishment. (c, e & f). (g)	Actual strength. (h)
	Fighters (150 Crews).	180	Mc.202 - 30 Mc.205 - 32 X Mc.200 - 10 Ø Cr. 42 - 20 X G. 50 - 2 Total non-obsolete 62	P.39 - 102 Spit - 14 Total: 116	AHQ Proposal 115 AFSC Proposal 144	296	229
	Note: X = obsolete types. Ø = obsolete & used for Training.						
	Light Bombers (Baltimores).	-	-	Balts - 55	- AHQ & AFSC	35 Nil	35
	Seaplanes (58 Crews).	-	-	-	Cant.506 - 62 IS.14 - 9 Total: 71	71 19 AHQ 48 AFSC	71
	B/Transport (Crews with Balts - 137).	85	SM. 79 - 47 SM. 84 - 8 SM. 82 - 32 SM. 75 - 3 SM. 73 - 1 G. 12 - 4 X Cant.1007- 7 Total non-obsolete. 88			85 38 AHQ 48 AFSC ultimate 96 AFSC until Civil Aviation permitted.	88

1210

Continued/2.....

1221

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 985017

Serial No.	A/c type.	Establishment Italian type.	A/c make and strength.	Allied a/c strength.	Seaplane strength.	Provisional establishment (c, e & f).
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
5	Misc. (Communications and Training). (65 crews).	69			AHQ AFSC	69 Nil 50 approx.
61	Total:					556

Notes:
(a) No Establishment laid down by Caserta.
(b) Provisional establishment laid down by A.F.S.C. in June 45 based end of hostilities figures (approx).
(c) AHQ Proposed Basis including 20% reserve. (SACMED signal G/4258 of 25/Nov/45.
(d) AFSC Proposed Order of Battle dated for 26th Nov, 45, including 50% res

1222

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Serial No.	A/c type.	Establishment Italian type.	A/c make and strength.	Allied a/c strength.	Seaplane strength.	Provisional establishment (c, d & f).	Actual strength.
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
5	Misc. (Communications and Training). (65 crews).	69			AHQ AFSC	69 Nil 50 approx.	50
6	Total:					556	473

Notes:

(a) No Establishment laid down by Caserta.

(b) Provisional establishment laid down by A.F.S.C. in June 45 based on end of hostilities figures (approx).

(c) AHQ Proposed Basis including 20% reserve. (SACMED signal G/4258 of 25/Nov/45.

(d) AFSC Proposed Order of Battle dated for 26th Nov, 45, including 50% reserve.

1(f) SECRET.

ORDER OF BATTLE

for

POST WAR I.A.F. - LONG TERM ALLIED REQUIREMENT.

(As foundation for I.A.F. allowed by Peace Terms).

		No. of Units.	Establishment. A/C.	Crews.
Serial No.1	Fighters - Guns/bombs/rockets - (Lightnings etc).	4	16	
2	Rec/F - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Photos and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).	2	16	
3	Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): current types of T/P a/c will continue to be used until worn out.	2	16 (approx)	
4	AS/SR - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with Flying boats or landplanes).	2	16	
5	Communication - Obsolescent type GR and Military & civil landplanes.	1	16 (approx)	
6	Flying Training School - including G.T.S.	1	30 (approx)	

CONDITIONS:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Rec/F role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqns until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqns will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for Allies) and as available.

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50 , at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

1223

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Serial Nos.			
1	Fighters - Gang/bomb/rocket - (Lightnings etc).	4	16
2	Rec/L - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Photos and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).	2	16
3	Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): current types of G/T a/c will continue to be used until worn out.	2	16 (approx)
4	MR/SR - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with flying boats or landplanes).	2	16
5	Communication - Obsolescent type G and military & civil landplanes.	1	16 (approx)
6	Flying Training School - including C.F.S.	1	30 (approx)

Conditions:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Rec/L Role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqns until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqns will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for pilots) and as available.

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50 , at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

(i) Combat aircraft - from British or American sources.
(ii) Civil and Transport a/c - from Italian sources with option to Italian Government to obtain these from U.S. or British sources.
(iii) P.O.L. To be provided (on payment by the Italian Government) in such quantities as to maintain and train an efficient I.A.F, international A.T.S. service and a courier service until civil aviation is permitted.

(e) The Order of Battle shows the maximum to be permitted for training and Allied supply purposes, but may be reduced to a limited extent (after consultation with the Allies), if the Italian economy cannot support such a force. Flying Units and aircraft retained by the I.A.F. in excess of this Order of Battle will not be given authority for training except pure flying to a limited extent.

Lt Woods

Lt Col/London AFSC
AFSC

1224

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 780017

SECRET.

ORDER OF BATTLE

for

POST WAR I.A.F. - LONG TERM ALLIED REQUIREMENT.

(As foundation for I.A.F. allowed by Peace Terms).

Serial Nos.		No. of Sqdns.	Establishment. A/C.	Crews.
1	Fighters - Guns/bombs/rockets - (Jaghtnings etc).	4	16	
2	Tac/R - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Photos and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).	2	16	
3	Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): current types of M/T a/c will continue to be used until worn out.	2	16 (approx)	
4	ASR/GR - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with Flying boats or landplanes).	2	16	
5	Communication - Obsolescent type GR and Military & civil landplanes.	1	16 (approx)	
6	Flying Training School - Including O.T.U.	1	30 (approx)	

CONDITIONS:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Tac/R Role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqns until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqns will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for Allies) and as available.

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50%, at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

(i) Cadet aircraft e.g. from British or American sources.

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Serial Nos.			
	Fighters - Guns/bombs/rockets - (Lightnings etc).	4	16
2	Tac/R - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Photos and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).	2	16
3	Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): current types of D/T a/c will continue to be used until worn out.	2	16 (approx)
4	ASR/GR - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with flying boats or landplanes).	2	16
5	Communication - Obsolescent type GR and Military & civil landplanes.	1	16 (approx)
6	Flying Training School - Including O.T.U.	1	30 (approx)

CONDITIONS:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Tac/R Role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqns until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqns will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for Allies) and as available.

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50%, at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

(i) Combat aircraft - from British or American sources.
(ii) Civil and Transport a/c - from Italian sources with option to Italian Government to obtain them from U.S. or British sources.
(iii) P.O.L. To be provided (on payment by the Italian Government) in such quantities as to maintain and train an efficient I.A.F, international A.S.R. service and a courier service until civil aviation is permitted.

(e) The Order of Battle shows the maximum to be permitted for training and Allied supply purposes, but may be reduced to a limited extent (after consultation with the Allies), if the Italian economy cannot support such a force. Flying Units and aircraft retained by the I.A.F. in excess of this Order of Battle will not be given authority for training except pure flying to a limited extent.

F/L U F [illegible]
AFSC

26 Nov 45

I 2 2 6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759019

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES [illegible]-OBSERVER,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. RECRUITMENT. (3 COPIES).

DATE: 27TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFHQ/367/2/OPS.

TOP SECRET.

FUTURE OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference conversation with Group Captain Pakenham, Wing Commander Slessor and Squadron Leader Halsley on the 26th November, and with Colonel Parsons (G5) on the 27th November, attached are:

(i) First draft of the A.F.S.C. suggested Order of Battle for the Post-War Italian Air Force - Long Term Allied Requirements (as foundation for I.A.F. allowed by Peace Terms.

(ii) The Aircraft position in the Italian Air Force as at 31st October, 1945, which shows the provisional establishments laid down by A.F.S.C. together with the proposed establishments by A.H.Q. and also A.F.S.C, in amplification of (i) above.

2. It will be noted from (i) above that no suggestion has been made to include Bomber Aircraft as it is understood that such a suggestion would be ruled out by the Navy in this theatre, on the grounds that Bomber Aircraft would be a threat to sea communications. However, should it be found that the Navy has no objection, it is suggested that the addition of two Light Bomber Squadrons be made to balance the force, particularly with regard to the defence of the frontiers in the North East.

3. A copy of (i) above was sent by hand of Colonel Parsons to G/Capt. Pakenham on the 27th November, 1945.

I.M. BOOTH,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

T&P

I.A.F. POSITION AS AT 31ST OCT. 1943.

Serial No.	A/c type.	Establishment Italian type.	A/c make and strength.	Allied a/c strength.	Complete strength.	Provisional establishment. (c, e & f).
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	Fighters (190 Crews).	190	No.202 - 30 No.205 - 32 X No.200 - 10 β Cr. 42 - 20 X G. 50 - 2 Total non-obsolete. 62	P.39 - 102 Spit - 14 Total: 116		296
					AHQ Proposal	115
					AFSC Proposal	144
	Note: X = obsolete types. β = obsolete & used for Training.					
2	Light Bombers (Baltimores).	-	-	Balta - 35	- AHQ & AFSC	35 Nil
3	Seaplanes (58 Crews).	-	-	-	Cant.506 - 62 MS.14 - 9 Total: 71	71 19 AHQ 48 AFSC
4	A/Transport (Crews with Balta - 137).	85	SM. 79 - 47 SM. 84 - 8 SM. 82 - 32 SM. 75 - 3 SM. 73 - 1 C. 12 - 4 X Cant.1007- 7 Total non-obsolete. 88		85	38 AHQ 48 AFSC until 96 AFSC until Aviation

Continued

1229

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I.A.F. POSITION AS AT 31ST OCT. 1945.

Top SECRET.

nd	A/c type. (b)	Establishment Italian type. (c)	A/c make and strength. (d)	Allied a/c strength. (e)	Seaplane strength. (f)	Provisional establishment. (c, e & f). (g)	Actual strength. (h)
	Fighters (190 Crews).	190	Mc.202 - 30 Mc.205 - 32 X Mc.200 - 10 ϕ Cr. 42 - 20 X G. 50 - 2 Total non-obsolete. 62	P.39 - 102 Spit - 14 Total: 116	AHQ Proposal AFSC Proposal	296 115 144	229
	Light Bombers (Baltimores).	-	-	Baltis - 35	- AHQ & AFSC	35 Nil	35
	Seaplanes (58 Crews).	-	-	-	Cant.506 - 62 MB.14 - 9 Total: 71	71 19 AHQ 48 AFSC	71
	B/Transport (Crews with Baltic - 137).	85	SM. 79 - 47 SM. 84 - 8 SM. 82 - 32 SM. 75 - 3 SM. 73 - 1 G. 12 - 4 X Cant.1007 - 7 Total non-obsolete. 86		85	88 38 AHQ 48 AFSC ultimate 96 AFSC until Civil Aviation permitted.	

Note: X = obsolete types.
ϕ = obsolete & used for Training.

Continued/2.....

1230

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

Serial No.	A/c type.	Establishment Italian type.	A/c unserviceable strength.	Allied a/c strength.	Complete strength.	Provisional establishment (c, e & f).
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
5	Misc. (Communications and Training). (65 crews).	69			AAI AFSC	111 50 approx.
6	Total:					556

Notes:

(a) No Establishment laid down by Cmsarts.

(b) Provisional establishment laid down by A.F.H.Q. in June 45 based on end of hostilities figures (approx).

(c) AAI Proposed Basin including 20% reserve. (NACMED signal C/4258 of 25/11

(d) AFSC Proposed Order of Battle for 26th Nov, 45, including 50% Reserve.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

c type.	Retailment Italian type.	A/c mtn and strength.	Allied a/c strength.	Complete strength.	Provisional establishment (e, e & f).	Actual strength.
)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
ec.	69				69	50
mmunt- ions and Training).				AHQ AFSC	Nil 50 approx.	
6 crews).						
tal:					556	473

Notes: (a) No Establishment laid down by Caserta.

(b) Provisional establishment laid down by A.F.S.C. in June 45 based on end of hostilities figures (approx).

(c) AHQ Proposed Basis including 20% reserve. (SACMED signal C/4258 of 25/Nov/45).

(d) AFSC Proposed Order of Battle ~~for~~ dated 26th Nov, 45, including 50% Reserve.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTRE

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO FOR ACTION: ALCOM ROME

REF NO : F 54366

SIGNED : SACMED CITE: FHCEG

Future of Italian Navy and Italian Air Forces.

1. Under examination are the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Forces with a view to determining future policy to be adopted in respect of these services pending peace treaty. In particular, desirability or otherwise of restoring these services to Italian Government control and administrative responsibility is being examined. Comments contained in your 8593 regarding feeding of these services are noted.

2. SACMED recommendations in connection with draft peace treaty considered here in August are summarised as follows.

A. Navy.

(1). Personnel ceiling approximately 18,000.

(2). Fleet to be limited to two (2) old battleships; 5,6-inch cruisers; two (2) Fleet destroyers; 20 torpedoboats; 20 corvettes.

(3). Such number of small surface craft as can be manned and maintained in commission within a ceiling allocation of 3,000.

B. Air Forces.

(1). Personnel ceiling approximately 12,000.

(2). Air force to be limited to six squadrons of s/e fighter

MC OUT 1868 24 Nov 45 TOP SECRET

-1-

ALLIED LIAISON
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
DATE 26/11
FILE 4200

TOP SECRET COPY NO. 20

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

1233

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

aircraft and two (2) squadrons of transport aircraft.

(3). Each squadron to consist of 16 aircraft with an overall reserve of 20% of the types in the squadrons.

(4). One (1) air-sea rescue squadron.

(5). Training school with sufficient training aircraft.

3. To assist in preparation of MJPS paper your views required by 0900 hours November 28 on following points.

A. Desirability of handing over to Italian control and administration forces as in paragraph two (2).

B. Capability of Italian economy to support those forces.

C. If you consider Italian economy not yet capable of this your views as to a phased programme of handover are requested.

D. Your recommendations as to future of naval and air forces subcommissions in event of handover being approved.

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTH: MARTIN E. DAVY, MAJOR AC

INFORMATION: SACS G-3 AFHQ CAO CINC MED RAF C/S MTO

##

MC OUT 1868 24 Nov 45 1719A REF NO F54366 eh/s

FROM: AIR FORCES S COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT.

DATE: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "Without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

1234

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 25rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "Without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that you will inform the Allied Commission whether or not it is intended that the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as amended above may be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, either in the form of a directive from A.F.H.Q. or in the form of a letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission to the Italian Air Ministry.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

1202

Forwarded 19/11/45

Sec. 19/11 4200.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT.

DATE: 19TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/LG/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED ~~xxx~~ as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

(b) Paragraph 3c, - insert the word "hitherto" after Aircraft in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".

(c) Paragraph 3 f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".

(d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".

(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

(f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").

(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words

1236
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 758017

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACMED and as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

(a) Paragraph 3a- delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service."

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(e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.

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(g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "Without going much into detail".

(h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that you will inform the Allied Commission whether or not it is intended that the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as amended above may be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, either in the form of a directive from A.F.H.Q. or in the form of a letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission to the Italian Air Ministry.

I.H. BROWN,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

(20)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017


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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(III)

ALLIED
APR. 194
(2 OF 2

1240

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/135/628
(III)

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION, ITALIAN AIR FORCE, POLICY
APR. 1945 – APR. 1946
(2 OF 2)

1241

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOOSE MINUTE

From : Group Captain Operations.

To : Allied Liaison Section.

Date : 5th November, 1945.

LAGO BRACCIANO

Herewith correspondence concerning Lake Bracciano, as requested by you over the telephone.

We are taking no further action until a reply from MED/SA to our AIQI/35/Air dated 24th October has been received.

Group Captain

File: AIQI/35/2/Air.

Allied Liaison Section
R.A.A.F.
7/16
4244/1

1242

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

A.S.D/428

26 Oct. 1945.

SUBJECT : LAKE BRACCIANO

TO : Air Headquarters, ITALY.

Ref. your AFHQ/35/2/Air of 17 Oct. 45

A reply to H$_q$ MAAF/3.44/1/Air of 28 July 45 was despatched to H$_q$ MAAF under reference ASD/248 of 4 Aug. to the effect that the restriction could not be modified before 30 Nov. 1945.

2. The RAC training programme in the area VICNA DI VALLE was, however, completed earlier than expected and the restriction on the area was raised on 11 Oct.45: - (this HQ letter G2A.7/3/4(Maint) of 11 Oct. 45 to Rome Area Allied Command and Air Force Sub Commission AC refers).

(SGD) D.M. AMOS ????? (Lt. Col.
for A.D. WARD
Major General
Chief of General Staff.

SHM/je/G(SD)

Copy to: G-Trg. (your DET/118/MP2 of 22 Oct. refers).

1191

1243

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

48 B

COPY

From : Air Headquarters, ITALY.

To : Headquarters, MEDME, CAIRO.

Dated: 24th October, 1945.

Ref : AF21/35/Air.

MAFF/4214/1/ALS.
Enc. 18.

AIR/SEA RESCUE COMMITMENTS, I.A.F.

Attached is a copy of letter reference AF32/48/1/Air, dated 20th October, 1945, forwarded by Allied Liaison Section.

2. As reference is made to correspondence not held by this Headquarters, it is forwarded to you for information and necessary action.

(SGD) A. RAWLING (S/Ldr.)

for Air Commodore,
Senior Air Staff Officer,
Air Headquarters, ITALY.

1241

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY

From : Air Headquarters, MMMF.

To : A.P.M. 1. - G.3. Section, C.M.F.

Date : 17th October, 1945.

Ref : AHQ1/35/2"Air

LAKE BRACCIANO

Correspondence concerning Lake Braccinno has been forwarded on to this Headquarters for action as Headquarters MMMF has moved.

2. A letter MAAF/3.44/1/Air dated 28th July, 1945, was sent to you requesting a definite date to be given as to when R.A.C. Training Establishment would move and when the restrictions imposed on the use of the Lake could be withdrawn.

3. An immediate reply would be appreciated.

(HGD) G.S.O. 1. TAFT S/O.

for Air Commodore,
Senior Air Staff Officer,
Air Headquarters, MMMF.

SECRET

P/516 (Final)

SECRET 47

Copy No.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 November 1945

PUBLICATION OF ITALIAN ARMISTICE TERMS

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff the MJPS have prepared the attached draft commentary in signal form.

2. It is recommended that this signal be accompanied by a reference signal from SACMED to Combined Chiefs of Staff. Such a signal in draft form is also attached.

Refer to

for D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman.

DISTRIBUTION:

List A

Plans Distribution

A. D. C

Air Staff

C Air Plans

A. A.S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785019

MJPS have prepared the attached draft commentary in signal form.

2. It is recommended that this signal be accompanied by a reference signal from SACMED to Combined Chiefs of Staff. Such a signal in draft form is also attached.

for D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman.

DISTRIBUTION

List A

Plans Distribution

A. O. C

Air Staff

C Air Plans

A. L.S.

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
H.Q. M.A.A.F.
DATE 4/11.
FILE 4200

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

P/926 (Final)

SECRET

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 November 1945

PUBLICATION OF ITALIAN ARMISTICE TERMS

FROM: COMGENMED

TO : WARCOS

INFO: ALCOM, TROOPERS, COMNAVNAV

W 79485 and FX 49611 refer.

SACMED's comments on Additional Conditions of Armistice with ITALY and the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement are given below. It is recommended that these two documents with SACMED's comments should be released for publication in the forms shown below. It is again stressed that the Cunningham-de Courten agreement should be published in its entirety. FX 49611 of 20 Oct refers. It is not considered that any comments on other papers under consideration for release are necessary.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF ARMISTICE WITH ITALY

COMMENT: The extent to which certain clauses of the following agreement signed on behalf of the United Nations on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other have been implemented or modified is shown in italics under the relevant clauses. The remaining clauses have either been superceded by events and are therefore dormant, or are still in force. These clauses are not commented upon.

(NOTE: Clauses of armistice terms to be inserted above each applicable comment)

CLAUSES

1 - 5 Were complied with.

6 - 12 With the cooperation of the Italian Government, the Italian Armed Forces have been used to the maximum useful extent in the services of the United Nations and have contributed towards final victory. In particular the Italian Navy has been employed in accordance with the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement.

14 While Italian merchant ships have been employed in the general interests of the United Nations they have been primarily employed [illegible] Italian inland traffic

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

W 79485 and FX 49611 refer.

SACMED's comments on Additional Conditions of Armistice with ITALY and the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement are given below. It is recommended that these two documents with SACMED's comments should be released for publication in the forms shown below. It is again stressed that the Cunningham-de Courtn agreement should be published in its entirety. FX 49611 of 20 Oct refers. It is not considered that any comments on other papers under consideration for release are necessary.

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14 While Italian merchant ships have been employed in the general interests of the United Nations they have been primarily employed in the Italian interest Italian inland transport and ports have now been largely returned to Italian administration except in so far as redeployment and maintenance of Allied forces has had to be effected.

15 The provisions of this clause, as regards small vessels and craft, have not been fully satisfied owing to the difficulty of locating and identifying the vessels and craft concerned.

16 Control of radio has been returned to the Italian Government. All military and rehabilitated civilian telecommunications have been and will continue to be handed over to the Italians as military requirements decrease. Internal censorship has been abolished in the areas under Italian Government control.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

18 The second sentence of this clause has never been invoked, except in two frontier areas.

19 Care has been taken to conserve wherever possible Italian resources for the use of the civil economy and to utilise local goods and services only when military necessity demanded. The Allied Forces Local Resources Board, on the committees of which Italian representatives have sat, was established as the allocation agency. While the legal rights of the Allied Forces under this clause have not been modified, in practice it has been administered with as much regard as possible for Italian needs. With the redeployment of Allied troops from ITALY, the utilisation of local resources and facilities is diminishing rapidly. In addition, substential quantities of food, coal, clothing and other commodities have been imported into ITALY by the United Nations largely in United Nations ships to supplement local resources and to alleviate distress.

20 Allied Military Government was rigorously enforced in Combat Zones for obvious operational reasons. This was progressively relaxed as the battle moved forward until territories were handed over wholly to Italian Administration.

21 As Allied forces are redeployed, facilities are progressively being handed back to Italian control.

22 With the declaration of war upon the Germans by the Italian Government in October 1943 and the cooperation and loyalty of the Italian people to the Allied cause, there has never been any necessity to invoke this clause.

23 The Italian Government has been informed that the Allied Commission will no longer intervene in Italian internal financial affairs (except in cases of Allied Military necessity) and that, with certain exceptions, the Italian Government need no longer obtain the approval of the Allied Commission prior to the execution of external financial transactions. The Italian Government is now free to fix or negotiate exchange rates for the lira without prior consultation with the Allied Commission.

24 Private export trade may now be resumed and all types of commercial and financial correspondence may now go forward from ITALY to the non-enemy world, subject to the Italian Government putting into force certain trade control measures similar to those employed by the United Nations.

26 This clause is no longer enforced, and provided an individual has the necessary civil documents, such as passport, visas, etc there is nothing to prevent him leaving Italian territory, subject of course to the immigration laws and regulations of the countries of intended destination.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

under this clause have not been modified, in practice it has been administered with as much regard as possible for Italian needs. With the redeployment of Allied troops from ITALY, the utilisation of local resources and facilities is diminishing rapidly. In addition, substantial quantities of food, coal, clothing and other commodities have been imported into ITALY by the United Nations largely in United Nations ships to supplement local resources and to alleviate distress.

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26 This clause is no longer enforced, and provided an individual has the necessary civil documents, such as passport, visas, etc there is nothing to prevent him leaving Italian territory, subject of course to the immigration laws and regulations of the countries of intended destination.

30) 31) The Italian Government has of its own volition done all that would have been required.

32 This clause has been complied with and is, in the case of sub-clauses A and B, no longer applicable. As regards sub-clause C the Italian Government has cooperated loyally in carrying out such instructions as have been given concerning the preservation and administration of United Nations property in ITALY, previously sequestered by the Italian Government.

33 The part of sub-clause 33 (B) that deals with the disposal of foreign assets has been modified in favour of the Italian Government.

36) 37) The execution of these clauses has been modified by the MacMillan aide memoire of 24 February 1945.

41 In practice ALBANIA is no longer included in the definition of Italian Territory.

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Declassified E.O. 12356, Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(Final)

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CUNNINGHAM-de COURTEN AGREEMENT

The following general comments show the extent to which certain clauses have been implemented or modified.

1. As explained in the document this Agreement was produced in modification of the Armistice Terms so that the Italian fleet and Mercantile Marine could assist in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers.

2. The provisions of this Agreement have been carried out and those provisions that remain operative with the cessation of hostilities are still being carried out.

3. While the employment of Italian ships has been of use to the United Nations it is pointed out that considerable United Nations resources have been expended in ITALY to help the Italian Government in keeping the Italian ships running and their crews fed and clothed.

4. In addition to the use of Italian Mercantile shipping under this Agreement a number of the smaller Italian merchant ships has been returned to the control of the Italian authorities.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 SECTION

November 1945

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: ALCOM

FROM: SACMED

This is NAF _____.

Further to NAF 1083.

_____ COMGENMED to MARCOS copy to Troopers contains my comments on papers relating to armistice conditions with Italy now under consideration for release.

I recommend that these comments accompany publication of Armistice papers.

I consider it of the utmost importance that these comments be agreed by the Italian Government prior to publication of Armistice papers. Copy of _____ and this signal being furnished ALCOM, who are prepared to take up with Italian Government immediately upon receipt of instructions from you to do so.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

G-3 SECTION

November 1945

TO : ADVANCE FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: AFHQ

FROM: EISENHOWER

This is NAF _____.

Further to NAF 1033.

_____ EISENHOWER to AMMOS copy to Troopers contains my comments on papers relating to armistice conditions with Italy now under consideration for release.

I recommend that these comments accompany publication of Armistice papers.

I consider it of the utmost importance that these comments be agreed by the Italian Government prior to publication of Armistice papers. Copy of _____ and this signal being furnished AFHQ, who are prepared to take up with Italian Government immediately upon receipt of instructions from you to do so.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET.

Copy no II

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4b (PW

NOTES ON COMMENTARY FOR PUBLICATION WITH ARMISTICE TERMS.

Introduction.

Since this commentary is being prepared for publication in the Italian Press alongside the Armistice Terms, with the intention of demonstrating to the Italians that their co-belligerent status has been of benefit to them and as a palliative to the unnecessarily harsh conditions of surrender, it is felt that it should be worded in such a way that it is readily understandable to the man in the street. In general I do not think that has been done.

Detailed criticism of Commentary by Paragraph.

Para. 6. I am not quite clear what C.C. and R.H. is.
The last sentence is not clear.

Para. 8. Last sentence. I consider this a most dangerous insertion as it may well prejudice the Peace Treaty. Furthermore, it will make the work of the Air Forces Sub-Commission extremely difficult.

Para.10. The last sentence may require amplification as it is not readily clear why this is in the best interests of the Italian Government.

Para.26. In the Armistice Terms this paragraph is not sub-divided into (a) and (b) as it is in the commentary.

AHCI/S.51/AP.
30th October, 1945.

R.A.F.

Distribution.

Chief of Air Plans.
Wing Commander Fisher. A.L.S.
File: AHCI/S.51/AP.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Secret

MEMORANDUM

Ref: 2608/EC

14th October, 1945

PUBLICATION LONG ARMISTICE TERMS

The last official demand we have received from the Italian Government for publication of Long Armistice Terms was in August 1944 from Bonomi.

2. AFHQ, in their letter of 3 November 1944, directed delaying action and added that when publication is made responsibility for initiative in the matter should lie with the Italian Government.

3. The present Government accepted the "Armistice and surrender instrument" but requested successfully that the title be changed to "Armistice and Additional Conditions of Armistice".

4. There have been demands made in the various political newspapers and the Prime Minister in his latest speech did not demand publication but rather enumerated the various limitations imposed on Italy by the Armistice.

There has, however, been no official request since 1944 from the Italians.

5. Unless the Allied Governments wish to publish the terms by way of reply to Parri's speech it is suggested that before publishing them at the initiative of the Allies it would be wise to consult the Italian Government as to their real wishes, pointing out to them that many of the clauses are now inoperative since hostilities have ceased and many have been modified in practice either as a result of directives from Allied Governments or because it was unnecessary to invoke the full force of the clauses.

6. If it is decided by the Italian and the Allied Governments that publication is desirable then we should insert a simultaneous publication of Mr. Macmillan's aide memoire of 24 February 45 (FAN 407) and a summary of FAN 583, 640 and other modifying directives. There should also be published an agreed commentary on the progressive modification of existing procedure adopted in implementation of the terms.

7. Unless this is done the publication will give an entirely distorted view of the effect of these terms, some of which have never been implemented and many of which have been implemented only partially.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2,344 from Bonomi.

6. AFHQ, in their letter of 3 November 1944, directed delaying action and added that when publication is made responsibility for initiative in the matter should lie with the Italian Government.

7. The present Government accepted the "Armistice and surrender instruments" but requested successfully that the title be changed to "Armistice and Additional Conditions of Armistice".

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There has, however, been no official request since 1944 from the Italians.

5. Unless the Allied Governments wish to publish the text by way of reply to Parri's speech it is suggested that before publishing them at the initiative of the Allies it would be wise to consult the Italian Government as to their real wishes, pointing out to them that many of the clauses are now inoperative since hostilities have ceased and many have been modified in practice either as a result of directives from Allied Governments or because it was unnecessary to invoke the full force of the clauses.

6. If it is decided by the Italian and the Allied Governments that publication is desirable then we should insert a simultaneous publication of Mr. Macmillan's aide memoire of 24 February 45 (FAN 487) and a summary of FAN 583, 640 and other modifying directives. There should also be published an agreed commentary on the progressive modification of existing procedure adopted in implementation of the terms.

7. Unless this is done the publication will give an entirely distorted view of the effect of these terms, some of which have never been implemented and many of which have been implemented only partially.

8. We should also consider, subject to assent of C in C Mediterranean the publication of the Cunningham de Courtens agreement. Allied Commission sees no objection to publication on the same lines as in para 6 above.

9. Detailed comments on the clauses of the document are attached.

P H S L.L

BRIGADIER
Executive Commissioner

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4200.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMISSIONER

A P O 394

14th October, 1945

ADDENDUM TO ALLIED COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM

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1. It is also fair to state that the Long Armistice Terms have in fact been progressively modified by each Document A (Terms of Restoration of Italian Territory) signed by SACMED and agreed by the Italian government as each portion of territory has been restored to the Italian Government.

2. These Terms of Restoration, although made without prejudice to the Armistice Terms which remain in force to specify the requirements of the Allied Forces in virtual modification of the Armistice Terms themselves.

W.D. CADLIP
Executive Commissioner

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

SECRET

PROPOSAL FOR PUBLICATION OF LONG ARMISTICE TERMS.

Clause No.	Remarks.
1 - 5	Obsolete. Superseded by events.
6	At the time of the German surrender the Army numbered 313,000 plus 65,000 CC.RR. This figure included troops serving with the Allies. It is anticipated that the interim Army will number about 140,000 plus 65,000 CC.RR, when the demobilization of the older classes is completed. The present strength of the CC.RR, 65,000, was requested by the first Prime Minister and later by Bonomi and is believed to be the Metropolitan pre-war strength. The maximum ceiling for the Italian Air Force prior to and since the cessation of hostilities has been fixed at 31,000. The established maximum strength of the Italian Royal Navy has never been formally laid down, but it was agreed, soon after the armistice, that victuals would not be provided for more than 75,000 officers and men. The present strength is about 64,000. In effect no demobilization took place but on the contrary recruitment up to the strengths above was effected.
7	Stands.
8	Has been modified in favour of the Italian Air Force, as it was intended to ground all aircraft at the end of hostilities. Restriction of flying has been based on scarcity of aircraft and POL. Not only were the Italian Air Force not completely grounded but they were permitted to use all available aircraft. In addition Allied aircraft was made available to them. Italian civil aviation is not permitted, but consideration is being given to the re-establishment of civil aviation.
9	This has been considerably relaxed.
10	The Italian Ministry of Marine continue to provide such information as is demanded and personnel and material are disposed where necessary at the direction of the Flag Officer, Italy and Liaison, and the Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. The same is being done with Land Forces and Air

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788017

about 140,000 plus 65,000 CC.RR, when the demobilization of the older classes is completed. The present strength of the CC.RR, 65,000, was requested by the first Prime Minister and later by Bonomi and is believed to be the Metropolitan pre-war strength. The maximum ceiling for the Italian Air Force prior to and since the cessation of hostilities has been fixed at 31,000. The established maximum strength of the Italian Royal Navy has never been formally laid down, but it was agreed, soon after the armistice, that victuals would not be provided for more than 75,000 officers and men. The present strength is about 64,000. In effect no demobilization took place but on the contrary recruitment up to the strengths above was effected.

7 Stands.

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9 This has been considerably relaxed.

10 The Italian Ministry of Marine continue to provide such information as is demanded and personnel and material are disposed where necessary at the direction of the Flag Officer, Italy and Liaison, and the Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. The same is being done with Land Forces and Air Forces. It is entirely in the interests of the Italian Government that they continue to do so.

11 The requirements of this clause have been complied with by the Italian Ministry of Marine although it has been impossible to provide complete detail of the war materials formerly at its disposal. More recently authority has been given for the return of all Italian navy materials and equipment to the Italian Royal Navy subject to any specific requirements of the Allies. Information has been provided by the Italian Government in its own interests.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78547

12 Largely carried out.

13 Stands. No comment.

14A It has been impossible for the Ministry of Marine to ensure that all merchant shipping, fishing vessels and other craft were made available in good repair and a seaworthy condition as priorities at all dockyards have, until recently, been accorded to the repair of Allied vessels. Italian ships have been repaired from time to time only as this priority arrangement for Allied vessels permitted.

14B Allied controls over Italian inland transport have been relaxed and such transport has now for the most part been returned to normal Italian administration, except insofar as the redeployment and maintenance of the Allied Forces have to be affected.

15 The provisions of this clause, as regards small vessels and craft, have not yet been fully satisfied owing to the difficulty of locating and identifying the vessels and craft concerned. Their recovery when established as Allied property has been regarded as a matter for representation by the Governments concerned to the Italian Government through diplomatic channels where these exist.

16 Control of radio has been returned to Italian Government. Only restriction remaining is necessity to apply for frequency allocation to Allied Military authorities who coordinate such requests on an International basis. A delegation from the Italian Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications attended the meeting of the European Radio Conference in London in September 1945. Other telecommunications facilities have been progressively passed to the control of the Italian Government. At the present all telecommunications facilities not needed for military purposes are under the control of the Italian Government; facilities not being used by the military are being returned to Italian control. Censorship has been abolished; operation of radio is in the hands of the Italian Government or parastatal companies; in AMG territory radio emission is subject to the requirements of AMG. Censorship has been military rather than political and has only been operated as military necessity dictated.

It has always been the policy to have such censorship carried

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14B Allied controls over Italian inland transport have been relaxed and such transport has now for the most part been returned to normal Italian administration, except insofar as the redeployment and maintenance of the Allied Forces have to be affected.

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It has always been the policy to have such censorship carried out by Italian personnel, and early in 1944 the direct operation of such censorship was turned over to the Italian General Staff with Allied control being reduced to a minimum. Censorship of external mails, telephone and telegraph has been continued as the only means of insuring to the Italian Government the control of foreign exchange and foreign commerce which is economically necessary. Such censorship is carried out by Italian personnel under general policy direction of a small Liaison Group of Allied Officers.

17 Stands.

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18 The second sentence of this paragraph has never been invoked, except in two frontier areas.

19 This article stands without modification, as it is one of the bases for Allied payments policy in Italy. All local goods and services procured by the Allied Forces in Italy are paid for by the Italian Government, either directly or by the Allied Forces in Allied military lire which is charged to the Italian Government as an occupation cost. Care has been taken to conserve wherever possible Italian resources for the use of the civil economy, and to utilise local goods and services only when military necessity demanded. The Allied Forces Local Resources Board* was established as an allocation agency, before which the military agencies stated their needs and the Allied Commission appeared as a claimant for Italian civil needs. In other words, while the legal rights of the Allied Forces under Article 19 have not been modified, in practice it has been administered with as much regard as possible for Italian needs. With the redeployment of Allied Troops from Italy, the utilisation of local resources and facilities is diminishing rapidly.

* on the committee of which Italian representatives have sat.

20 Article 20 refers to the governance of AMG; Article 21 distinguished Italian Government territory. Article 20 was never fully enforced; no instruction issued for removal of Italian forces. It was the invariable practice to use Italian troops, e.g. CC.RR. The enforcement of Armistice terms was most rigorous in Army areas where at times for operational reasons there was considerable restriction of movement, and offences against Allied troops, property or security were more frequently dealt with by Allied Courts.

This was progressively released in AMG Regional areas; the administration was almost entirely by Italian officials under AMG direction, restrictions were largely removed and cases except those of greater importance transferred to Italian Courts.

The third phase of relaxation was the handing over of the territory to Italian administration freed from AMG direction; on the handing over the Allied reserved rights necessary for the maintenance and security of its armies including rights of trial but this latter was seldom enforced. AC officers left in Italian Government territory areas are not even advisers but have merely functions of observation and liaison.

At the time that Italy became a cobelligerent there was territory in all three phases of administrion; in all three there were relaxations suitable to the new station of Italy as a cooperator.

Then came FAN 487 and the Macmillan aide memoire by which the functions of AC itself were in day to day matters of administration changed and it had in such matters no powers even to advise unless its advice was sought.

This aide memoire stated that

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This aide memoire stated that in matters of ordinary day to day administration we would not enforce our rights but would leave the Italians to administer as they thought fit.

21A Stands.

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21B This article still stands, particularly the first part which deals with the availability of free transit for Allied Nations war materials and supplies. Although the latter part must still stand, with the departure of a large number of troops from Italy, and the handover of the greater part of Italy to the Italian Government, for some time past the powers conferred in this have rarely been exercised. It has been the function of ALRB to effect the progressive handing back of plant and stocks as much as possible.

22 This article must clearly be contained in any Armistice terms. However, with the early declaration of war upon the Germans by the Italian Government, the cooperation and loyalty of the Italian people to the Allied cause, there has never been any necessity to invoke it.

23 The first two sentences of this Article stand without modification. We are preparing to negotiate with the Italian Government a currency agreement whereby the Italian Government or its designated agency would be recognised as the issuing authority for all AM lire.

The last sentence of Article 23 has been substantially modified and modification explained to the Italian Government. AC informed the Italian Government that the Allied Commission will no longer intervene in Italian internal financial affairs (except in cases of Allied military necessity) and that, with two exceptions, the Italian Government no longer needed to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission prior to the execution of external financial transactions. The Minister of the Treasury was informed that the Italian Government was now free to fix or negotiate exchange rates for the lira without prior consultation with the Allied Commission. The cooperation of the Italian Government in the execution of this Article is considered to have been very good.

24 Modified by informing the Italian Government that private export trade may now be resumed and that all types of non-transactional and transactional commercial and financial correspondence may now go forward from Italy to the non-enemy world.

25A Obsolete

25B Obsolete

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25A Obsolete

25B Obsolete

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26A This has been modified so far as individuals are concerned to the extent that no Military Travel authorization is now required. Provided an individual has the necessary civil documents such as passport visa, etc. there is nothing to prevent him leaving Italian territory. If leaving Italy by land, movement is virtually unrestricted even though an AMG pass must be obtained before passing through the frontier Northern zone. Movement by air or sea is restricted by the fact that the United Nations control the transport services and an Allied travel order must be obtained before the journey can be made. As regards any mass movement of Italian subjects this continues to be controlled by AFHQ.

26B In effect obsolete.

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27 Obsolete

28A Obsolete

28B Stands

28C Stands

28D Stands

29 Stands

30 First part carried out; second part revoked.
This article has never been enforced as expressed: the Commander-in-Chief has not issued any instruction. The Italian Government has of its own volition done all that would have been required. The Government does in fact keep AC informed.

31 Stands. All Italian laws involving discrimination on ground ofe race, colour, creed, or political opinion, have at the instance of the Italian Government been repealed. It is believed that all persons detained on any such grounds have been released, and those suffering any legal disability have been relieved therefrom It has not been necessary for the Allied Commander in Chief to issue any "further directions" under the Article.

32A Obsolete

32B Carried out and now obsolete

32C The Italian Government has cooperated loyally in carrying

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28D Stands

29 Stands

30 First part carried out; second part revoked.
This article has never been enforced as expressed: the Commander-in-Chief has not issued any instruction. The Italian Government has of its own volition done all that would have been required. The Government does in fact keep AC informed.

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32A Obsolete

32B Carried out and now obsolete

32C The Italian Government has cooperated loyally in carrying out such instructions as have been given concerning the preservation and administration of United Nations property in Italy, previously sequestrated by the Italian Government.

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33A Stands with explanation

33B Stands. The part relating to the furnishing of information stands. The part that deals with the disposal of foreign assets has been modified by FAN+ 383, in that prior approval of the Allied Commission for such disposal is no longer necessary.

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34 Stands. No comments.

35 Stands. No comments.

36 Stands, but modified by Macmillan aide memoire of 24 February 1945.

37 Control has been dropped in Italian Government territory. See Macmillan aide memoire.

38 No comments.

39 No comments.

40 No comments.

41 Stands, with the exception of Albania.

42 No comments.

43 No comments.

44 No comments.

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37 Control has been dropped in Italian Government territory. See Macmillan aide memoire.

38 No comments.

39 No comments.

40 No comments.

41 Stands, with the exception of Albania.

42 No comments.

43 No comments.

44 No comments.

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Loose Minute

TO : AIR STAFF, AIR HEADQUARTERS ITALY

44

Use of Lake Bracciano as a Seaplane Base

The Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, on behalf of the Italian Air Ministry, has for some time past been endeavouring to secure full use of Lake Bracciano as a Seaplane Base for the Italian Air Force.

2. Until recently, unrestricted use was not permissible because the R.A.C. Training Establishment was using it as a secret training area; but the Air Forces Sub-Commission have now verbally informed us that this unit is withdrawing and that consequently these restrictions imposed on the use of the Lake could be withdrawn.

3. In view of this, request that you let us know the present position and whether it will be possible to use the Lake as an Italian Air Force Seaplane Base.

4. This matter was raised with Air Staff, MIDDLE EAST who in their Loose Minute S.H./1/AIR dated 13th October, 1945, referred us to you for information.

5. Would appreciate an early reply to this Loose Minute.

B.A.1

(B. H. de LaWAR)
Flying Officer,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

15th October, 1945.

1940/E/4203/ALS.

1271

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

43

LOOSE MINUTE

To : A.L.S. Ref: S.44/1/Air.

Use of Lake Bracciano as a Seaplane Base.

42

1. Your Loose Minute, MEDME/~~4200~~/ALS of 13th October 1945, on the above subject, refers.

2. As this Section will be closing down in the near future, will you ask Air Staff, H.Q., R.A.F., Italy, to take up this matter with A.F.H.Q., for you.

G.E.F.GOODE
Wing Commander,
for Senior Air Staff Officer.

13th October, 1945.

13/10
4200/-

1272

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Loose Minute

42

TO : S.A.S.O.

Use of Lake Braccinno as a Seaplane Base — 14

1. Reference is made to your Loose Minute HQMAAF/S.44/1/AIR dated 28th July, 1945.

2. The Air Forces Sub-Commission in Rome has now informed us verbally that it is believed that the R.A.C. Training Establishment which has been using Lake Braccinno as a secret training area, is now evacuating and that consequently the restrictions imposed on the use of the Lake could be withdrawn.

3. In view of this, request that you let us know the present position and whether it will be possible to use the Lake as a Seaplane Base.

B. de L

(B. E. de LORME)
Flying Officer
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section

13th October, 1945.

MEDMED/4.200/AIR.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

41

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Headquarters M.T.O.U.S.A., A.P.O.512.

Date:- 20th September, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/4200/ALS.

Signer HELLERIO

Reference is made to your letter AG.452.1/414 D-O dated 21st August, 1945. 129.

2. Herewith are copies of the two letters referred to.

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander.
for The Secretaries.
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

11 September 1945

SUBJECT: Supervision and Operations of Italian Air Force Courier Service.

TO : Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Air Transport Service.

Air Officer Commanding, 216 Group.

1. The Air Officer Commanding, A.F.S.C. Allied Commission, Rome, is charged with supervising the operations of the Italian Air Force Courier Service. As a general guide the Italian Air Force Courier Service will conform to the operational and signals procedure of No. 216 Group, R.A.F.

2. The Air Officer Commanding, A.F.S.C. is responsible for ensuring that Italian Air Force crews engaged on the Courier Service reach the correct standards of efficiency. For the time being, passengers on the Italian Air Force Courier Service will be limited to Allied Commission Personnel, Italian Government officials, and such military personnel as are necessary for operation of the aircraft. After a period in which the I.A.F. Courier Service has demonstrated its attainment of sufficiently high operating standards of efficiency, this policy will be reviewed in order to decide whether the above restrictive limitations may be lifted and other passengers carried.

3. The Italian Air Force will establish Staging Posts on all airfields that are used by their scheduled services. Such Staging Posts on U.A.F. airfields will have the status of lodger units and the Senior R.A.F. Transport Control Officer will be responsible for supervising the work of the Italian Staging Posts. On U.S. Army Air Force airfields the Italian Air Force Staging Posts will be lodger units and the Senior U.S. Army Air Force officer will be responsible for supervising the work of the Italian Staging Posts. On airfields that are not under control of the U.S. A.A.F. or R.A.F. the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be responsible for the supervision of Italian Air Force Staging Posts.

4. All instructions and directives for the Italian Air Force Courier Service will be issued by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and these instructions shall be sent through the Italian Air Ministry who will establish a directorate at the Italian Air Ministry to be in charge of Italian Air Transport Operations. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will require that this Directorate will revise and maintain I.A.F. Courier

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Service schedules on a recognized Air Transport basis, and develop proper procedure for screening, booking, priorities, transportation and all operational, production, maintenance and supply problems of the service. The Italian Air Force is to provide an adequate staff of Italian Air Force personnel at all terminals used by the Italian Air Force Courier Service.

5. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will organize an Air Priorities Board to govern traffic on Italian Airforce Courier Service. This board will be known as Headquarters, Allied Commission Air Priorities Board, and will be under the chairmanship of the A.O.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission Allied Commission.

6. At all U.S. and R.A.F. airfields used by scheduled Courier Services of the Italian Air Force, the Italian Air Force is to provide an English speaking Italian Air Force officer in the Control tower to assist in the flying control of Italian Air Force Courier Service.

7. On U.S. and R.A.F. airfields petrol and oil will be supplied to Italian Air Force Transport aircraft. Such petrol and oil will be signed for by the Italian pilot on the necessary vouchers and marked "Italian Air Force". Such vouchers ad receipts will be sent not later than the 7th of the succeeding month to Headquarters, Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, to be passed to the Italian Air Ministry for payment.

For the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

JACK F. ALSTON,
Lt. Col., AC.

MAXWELL FISHER
Wing Commander, RAF.

Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat

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TOP SECRET.

LOOSE MINUTE.

To :- A-5 AIR/ARO.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

Herewith my amended version of Tab "A" in the attached file. You will note that I have incorporated some of your suggested amendments from Tab "B" and others made necessary by the cessation of hostilities against Japan. Reference para. 2 of the Draft Directive I have cut out "rather than to become more efficient in war-like exercises" because this Directive is to be handed to the Italian Air Ministry and I consider that phrase somewhat undiplomatic. With reference to your Memorandum to Major General Lemnitzer (Tab "B") para. 3 (iii) I have altered the flat statement in the directive about replacement to the more palatable one "wastage is unlikely to be replaced" and cut out the word "British" with reference to spare parts and components since this paragraph refers to Allied type aircraft.

2. With reference to restriction of flying to 6 hours per month this was done quite deliberately when the interim policy was first mooted. Those pilots engaged in scheduled Courier Services will obviously carry out an adequate number of hours by their normal tasks. The idea was to keep down the efficiency of the Italian Air Force as a whole for those not so engaged and to conserve petrol and oil which must be supplied from Allied sources and I would recommend that we maintain this restriction until we reach a final decision as to the future of the I.A.F. when presumably all restrictions of flying hours will be lifted in the final settlement. I have considerably altered paragraph 3 (v) and cut out all reference as to training because I believe authority has been given for Italian fighter pilots to carry out a certain amount of air firing and if this is the case it is not an opportune moment to place further restrictions upon their training since the general tendency is to ease things for the Italians.

3. I have inserted the words "or primary" after "ab-initio" in order to make this document Allied ! I have reworded paragraph 3 (x) to cover all ground training subjects.

4. I suggest that when we have agreed the Directive we should send it with a covering letter to S.A.C.S. stating that the interim policy has been working in effect for at least 2 months and informing them of the history. We should also state our reluctance to produce a further interim policy especially in view of the fact that our views on the post-war Italian Air Force have been represented in S.A.C.S. paper to the British Chiefs of Staff which was done by the J.P.S. and a copy of which has already been received in Washington. We should also state in this letter the principles of the interim policy pointing out that the original intention of the Armistice Terms was to ground the Italian Air Force at the end of hostilities with Germany but as a reward for their efforts against Germany we have been

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R.B. Lakeman

(R.B. LAKEMAN)
GROUP CAPTAIN,
AIR PLANS.
R.A.F., MEDME.

3rd September, 1945.

MEDME/S.21/A.P.

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COPY.

H.Q., M.A.A.F., C.M.F. FOR APPROVAL
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, M.A., A.C.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

PART I - POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircrew to keep in flying practise and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows :-

(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of ROME are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from ROME are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission,

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(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of ROME are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from ROME are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied Officers of the Allied Forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the I.A.F., such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission (hereafter referred to as A.F.S.C.) may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

(ii) The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats crews and marine craft as will be made available to the I.A.F.

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(iii) Allied type aircraft will be allotted as required by the Allies on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P.39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the I.A.F., but aircraft wastage is unlikely to be replaced; ~~British~~ spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practise will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of ~~six~~ 10 hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

(v) ~~Italian~~ fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, ~~and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying;~~ ~~Fighter~~ pilots will be restricted to a maximum of ~~six~~ 10 hours flying per month.

(vi) The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin

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existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practise will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of ~~six~~ 10 hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

(v) ~~Italian~~ fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, ~~and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying;~~ ~~their~~ pilots will be restricted to a maximum of ~~six~~ 10 hours flying per month.

(vi) The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the I.A.F. until such time as authorisation from the A.F.S.C. for its use by the I.A.F. is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/30 of the 30th June.

(vii) The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22nd June, 1945.

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(viii) Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as practicable, all air material, whether in the North or South of Italy, will be concentrated in as few Depots as possible.

(ix) Ab-initio or primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for Officers and Flying personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the Fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derequisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

(xiii) Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not

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[illegible] in the Fighter Squadrons, should be started, [illegible]

individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

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(xiii) Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 51,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the I.A.F. are to be declared to the A.F.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.

4. (i) It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that International standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organisation and meteorological organisation.

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(ii) No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but as soon as possible the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated separately.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda :

(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

(a) the organisation of the Air Ministry down to the ZONE/AREA TERRITORIALE level, [another reference is 65 2.1f], with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Units Areas and redisposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to [illegible]

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(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

(a) the organisation of the Air Ministry down to the NORD AFRICA TERRITORIALE level, [illegible] with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Units Areas and redisposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th T.A.T.;

(b) formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to co-ordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(c) the retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

(ii) Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorised ceiling of 31,000.

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(iii) Closing down of PHOSINONE O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

(iv) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organised maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

For C/S

J.H.T.

I 2 8 6

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(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

For C in C

J. H. F.

M. F.

1172

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[2 8 8]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: U.S. MAF HOME CASERTA. (ATTENTION A.I.G).

DATE: 14TH SEPTEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/INT/10C. I.564-5/631/730.

With reference to your letter MX MF/1200/ALS dated 23rd August 1945 enclosed please find copies of two letters of authorisation issued to SIGNOR G.M. BADOGLIO by Headquarters 2677th REGT OSS (USCT).

2. The originals of the two letters are still in SIGNOR BADOGLIO's possession.

One Copy.

T.S.A. Brance
T.S.A. BRANCE, W/CDR.,
for AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

MX
1819
1096
A L S.

10/7
4200

1289

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CODE: 39

HEADQUARTERS, 267TH SQD. U.S.A. (PROV)
APO 512 U.S. ARMY
BRITAIN DEPT.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

11 June, 1945.

It is requested that an aircraft L-5 be delivered to Mr. Gloume Marie Ballerio from the Fordanini airport.

Mr. Ballerio is authorized to bring this aircraft to the factory where necessary experimental alterations will be made.

2 Copies.

DAVID E. ADDISON,
CAPTAIN, CAC,
CHIEF R AND D DEPT.

1120

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COPY

HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGT U.S.E. (PROV)
APO 512 U.S.
ARMY,
MILLS FIELD.

9 June, 1945.

Mr. Ginseo Maria Bullerio is carrying out a mission for this Command. He is authorized to visit airports in order to choose an aircraft fit for his purpose and to visit aircraft factories for negotiations concerning the use on his patent.

2 copies.

DAVIS ALLISON
Captain, CAC
Chief S and D - HEADQ.

1463

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

Date:- 14th September, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/4200/ALS.

Interim Policy for Italian Air Force

Enclosed herewith is revised copy of the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force, prepared jointly by RAF MEDME and AAF/MTO.

2. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Major General Lemnitzer's letter dated 26th August requests a detailed study made on the Italian Air Force in order that recommendation could be made for Allied requirements and an interim policy recommended.

3. A detailed study has been made on the Italian Air Force which has resulted in the proposed Interim Policy. It is the desire of the Commanding General AAF/MTO and C. in C. RAF MEDME to continue the interim policy which has been in effect for the last two months. The intention of the Italian Armistice terms was to ground the Italian Air Force at the end of hostilities but as a reward for the efforts against Germany, the interim policy has provided for a continuation of the Italian Air Force on a small scale until such time as the Combined Chiefs of Staff provide a firm post war policy for the Italian Air Force to be incorporated into the final peace treaty.

4. Recommendations for the size and composition of the post war Italian Air Force have been presented to the British Chiefs of Staff in a SAC's paper prepared by the J.P.S., and a copy of which has been received in Washington.

5. In view of the recommendations previously given to the British Chiefs of Staff and the likelihood of a Final Peace Treaty with Italy in the near future, the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee feels that further changes should not be made now that might have to be rescinded as a result of Combined Chiefs of Staff policy at a later date.

6. Approval is requested, therefore, for the forwarding of the attached interim policy to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, instructing him that this policy be carried out until such time as the peace treaty with Italy be concluded.

For the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

1291

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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For the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

1105

Maxwell Fisher

JACK H. ALSTON,
Lieutenant Colonel, A.C.

MAXWELL FISHER,
Wing Commander, RAF.

Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat

1292

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 760017

1293

Italian Air Force Interim Policy

PART I - Policy.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential Air Transport Services and Air/Sea Rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircrew to keep in flying practice and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:

(a) The Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier services. The Courier Services to the South of Rome are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied Officers of the Allied Forces, and thirdly for Italian Government Officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the I.A.F., such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission, hereinafter referred to as the A.F.S.C., may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

(b) The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats crews and marine craft as will be made available to the I.A.F.

(c) Aircraft allotted by the Allies will be on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P.39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the I.A.F. but aircraft wastage is unlikely to be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(d) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore Squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practice will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759047

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((e) Fighter aircraft will be concentrated, as far as is practicable, in one place. Fighter pilots will be restricted to a maximum of [illegible] hours flying per month.

(f) The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the I.A.F. until such time as authorisation from the A.F.S.C. for its use by the I.A.F. is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/BQ of the 30th June.

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(g) The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22nd June, 1945.

(h) Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as practicable, all air material, whether in the South or North of Italy, will be concentrated in as few depots as possible.

(i) Ab-initio or primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(j) Ground Courses for officers and flying personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(k) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(l) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is de-requisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

(m) Surplus Personnel. within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the I.A.F. are to be declared to the A.F.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.

4. (a) It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that International standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organisation and meteorological organisation.

(b) No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but the decisions of the High Allied authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government in due course. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated separately.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor

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but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

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5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - Implications arising from the Interim Policy Stated above.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you inform the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. The following subjects are recommended for discussion as part of a proposed agenda:

1100

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

(a) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to :

(i) The organisation of the Air Ministry down to the ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE level (hereinafter referred to as Z.A.T.), with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Unita Area and redisposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th Z.A.T.

(ii) Formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to co-ordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(iii) The retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

(b) Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorised ceiling of 31,000.

(c) Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

(d) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organised maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(e) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(f) Salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel, although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

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For the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

JACK H. ALSTON,
Lieutenant Colonel, A.C.

MAXWELL FISHER,
Wing Commander, RAF.

Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

26th August, 1945.

SUBJECT : Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

TO : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1. Action on the attached correspondence has been deferred, pending the implementation of decisions taken at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference of 23rd August.

2. For your information, the following is the history of this correspondence so far as it is known to me.

(a) The Chief Commissioner issued instructions to the Air Forces Sub-Commission to prepare a directive to the Italian Government on interim policy for the Italian Air Force. The directive was to be submitted to the Chief Commissioner for approval prior to despatch to the Italian Government.

(b) The Air Forces Sub-Commission referred the matter to MAAF where the draft at TAB "A" was prepared.

(c) The draft was prepared in the RAF side of MAAF in accordance with previous procedure, but was not referred to AAF/MTO before despatch to ROME. This however, was not realised until the draft reached the Allied Commission.

(d) The Chief Commissioner then referred the draft to AFHQ to obtain the comments of AAF/MTO.

(e) The comments of AAF/MTO were obtained (see TAB "B") and furnished Chief Commissioner by AFHQ.

(f) The Chief Commissioner returned the correspondence to AFHQ and requested that a revised draft be prepared jointly by RAF MEDME and AAF/MTO rather than in the Air Force Sub-Commission.

2. I believe the matter is now one to be dealt with appropiately by the newly formed Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Indeed I consider the formation of that Committee will eliminate difficulties in dealing with this subject in the future.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander desires, that as the subject of the Italian Air Force was only lightly touched on in NAF 1051 a detailed study should now be made so as to recommend, in relation to Italian and Allied requirements, an interim policy for the Italian Air Force.

4. It is believed the question should be approached on the same lines as those on which the Joint Planning Staff dealt with the Italian Army. Provision should, therefore, now be made for :-

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(c) The Chief Commissioner issued instructions to the Air Forces Sub-Commission to prepare a directive to the Italian Government on interim policy for the Italian Air Force. The directive was to be submitted to the Chief Commissioner for approval prior to despatch to the Italian Government.

(b) The Air Forces Sub-Commission referred the matter to MAAF where the draft at TAB "A" was prepared.

(c) The draft was prepared in the RAF side of MAAF in accordance with previous procedure, but was not referred to AAF/MTO before despatch to ROME. This however, was not realised until the draft reached the Allied Commission.

(d) The Chief Commissioner then referred the draft to AFHQ to obtain the comments of AAF/MTO.

(e) The comments of AAF/MTO were obtained (see TAB "B") and furnished Chief Commissioner by AFHQ.

(f) The Chief Commissioner returned the correspondence to AFHQ and requested that a revised draft be prepared jointly by RAF MEDME and AAF/MTO rather than in the Air Force Sub-Commission.

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4. It is believed the question should be approached on the same lines as those on which the Joint Planning Staff dealt with the Italian Army. Provision should, therefore, now be made for :-

a. Allied requirements.
b. Reasonable Italian Government requirements.
c. Method of administration and maintenance.

1104

5. In assessing the Allied and Italian Government requirements, the broad division of duties required of the Italian Air Force should be supported by an estimate of the number of personnel needed to undertake these duties.

6. If further information is required in your consideration of this matter, I suggest that you consult the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Major General, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff.

1300

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Loose Minute.

TO : C.M.S.O.

1. Attached is a copy of a letter received from the Air Forces Sub-Commission which should be of interest to you.

2. You will note that this has been sent to the Italian Air Ministry.

(C. CONROY)
Squadron Leader,
for Wing Commander,
Allied Liaison Section.

MMIAT/1200/ALS.

18th September, 1945.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

Reference : AFSC/SC/Air. Date : 30th August, 1945.

List of Appendices :

Appendix A : Consumption Figures for Italian Military Aircraft.

ASSESSMENT OF CEILING INDENT FOR P.O.L. TO ENABLE ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO FULFIL EXISTING COMMITMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Previous Arrangements for I.A.F. P.O.L. - Since the I.A.F. came under Allied Control, P. O.L. have been provided for Italian Military aircraft in accordance with unrestricted indents from the Italian Air Ministry.

2. Intention. - With the progressive resumption of peace time economic arrangements, it has been found necessary to scrutinize the issue of P.O.L. to the I.A.F., and impose a ceiling indent commensurate with the maximum consumption practicable in relation to authorised commitments.

3. Authorised Commitments. - These commitments consist of air transport work on scheduled services and special missions as authorised by this Sub-Commission, air sea rescue operations on behalf of Mediterranean Coastal Air Force, flying training at two flying schools, and flying practice for pilots in operational units at the rate of six hours per pilot per month.

4. Consumption Figures. - Consumption figures for Italian military aircraft are shown at Appendix A.

5. Class of P.O.L. - This paper deals solely with P.O.L. for use in aircraft.

EXECUTION.

6. As from the 1st September, 1945, monthly indents by the I.A.F. for aircraft P.O.L. are not to exceed the totals shown at the end of the following assessment.

ASSESSMENT.

Transport Squadrons - Scheduled Services.

7. Rome - Naples - Bari - Rome.	Petrol.	Oil.
Distance 390 miles. Aircraft SM. 79 Flying time 2 hrs 15'. Services 12 per week. Consumption per week 16,000 litres		

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Allied Control, P. .s have been provided for Italian Military aircraft in accordance with unrestricted indents from the Italian Air Ministry.

2. Intention. - With the progressive resumption of peace time economic arrangements, it has been found necessary to scrutinise the issue of P.O.L. to the I.A.F., and impose a ceiling indent commensurate with the maximum consumption practicable in relation to authorised commitments.

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RESTRICTION.

6. As from the 1st September, 1945, monthly indents by the I.A.F. for aircraft P.O.L. are not to exceed the totals shown at the end of the following assessment.

ASSESSMENT.

Transport Aircraft - Scheduled Services.

	Petrol.	Oil.
7. Rome - Naples - Bari - Lecce. Distance 390 miles. Aircraft SM. 79 Flying time 2 hrs 15'. Services 12 per week. Consumption per week 16.200 ltrs of petrol plus 576 ltrs oil x 0.948 = Monthly total in Imperial Gallons:	15.360	559
8. Rome - Palermo. Distance 300 miles. Aircraft SM.79. Flying Time 1 hr. 45'. Services 6. Weekly Consumption in litres 6,300 petrol plus 216 oil. Monthly total in imperial gallons:	5.970	209
9. Rome - Cagliari. Distance 300 miles. Aircraft SM. 79. Remaining data as in para 6 above. Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons :	5.970	209
10. Rome - Lake Bracciano (Rome). Distance 30 miles. Aircraft SM. 506. Flying Time 2 hrs. Services 6. Consumption per week 6,1 6 litres plus 200 oil. Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	1919	5.960

1102

+200

1309

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	Petrol.	Oil.
11. Rome - Milan - Turin. Distance 430 miles. Aircraft SM.79. Flying Time 3 hrs. Services 12 per week. Consumption per week 21,600 + 1,584 lt. Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	20.470	1.500
12. Rome - Palermo - Trapani. Distance 300 miles. Aircraft SM.79. Flying Time 1 hr 45'. Services 12 weekly. Consumption per week 12600 + 432. Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	11.940	410
Transport Squadrons - Special Services.		
13. No. 1 Squadron, Lecce. Aircraft SM. 82. Daily Average for last half of July 5 hrs 30'. Weekly Consumption in litres 27,950 + 950. Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	26.500	900
14. CR. 1007 Flight. Lecce. Aircraft CR1007. Daily average for last half of July 1 hr 15'. Weekly Consumption 2,694 + 266 Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	5.406	253
15. Baltimore Squadrons. In addition to the practice flying allowed for, these aircraft are called upon for special missions. In view of the difficulties of fitting in these in the practice flying scheme at short notice, it is considered justifiable to make any allowance of 5 hrs flying per week extra weekly consumption, 3,250 + 100. Monthly consumption, 3,250 + 100.	3.000	95
16. Test Flights. The average daily flying time on miscellaneous flights for the whole of the IAF during the last half of July was approximately 3 hrs 30' weekly consumption in litres: 12,250 + 490. Monthly Total in Imp. Gallons:	11.600	460
Flying Practice.		
17. Pilots of the Baltimore and Fighter Wings and those of the Autonomous Squadron are authorised to fly up to six hours a month.		
(a) Fighter Wing. No. of pilots 216. Flying hours per month 1296. Consumption in litres per month 388,800 + 19,440. Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	84.500	4.230
(b) Baltimore Wing. No. of pilots 96. Flying hours per month 576. Consumption in litres per month 335,400 + 7,740.		

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Consumption in litres 27,950 + 950.
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons. 26.500 900

14. Cr. 1007 Flight. Decca. Aircraft CR1007.
Daily average for last half of July 1 hr 15'.
Weekly Consumption 5,691 + 266
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons. 5.406 253

15. Baltimore Bomb gang. In addition to the practice flying allowed for, these aircraft are called upon for special missions. In view of the difficulties of fitting in these in the practice flying scheme at short notice, it is considered justifiable to make any allowance of 5 hrs flying per week extra
Weekly consumption, 3,250 + 100.
Monthly consumption, 3,250 + 100. 3.080 95

16. Test Flights. The average daily flying time on miscellaneous flights for the whole of the IAF during the last half of July was approximately 3 hrs 30' weekly consumption in litres:
12,250 + 490. Monthly Total in Imp. Gallons: 11.600 460

Flying Practice.

17. Pilots of the Baltimore and Fighter Wings and those of the Autonomous Squadron are authorised to fly up to six hours a month.

(a) Fighter Wing. No. of pilots 216. Flying hours per month 1296. Consumption in litres per month 388,800 + 19,440.
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons. 84.500 4.230

(b) Baltimore Wing. No. of pilots 86. Flying hours per month 516. Consumption in litres per month 335,400 + 7,740.
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons. 72.910 1.680

(c) Autonomous Squadron. No. of pilots 60. Flying hours per month 360. Consumption in litres per month at 500 + 20 = 180,000 + 7,200.
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons. 39.130 1.783

Training.

18. There are two Flying Training units, one at Frosinone and the other at Leverano.

(a) Frosinone. Average flying per month 150 hrs.
Consumption in litres per month 90,000 + 3,000
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons. 19.560 650

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	Petrol.	Oil.
(b) Leverano. Average flying per month 180 hrs. Estimate 75% of Brosinone.		
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	23.472	780
Air Sea Rescue.		
19. Estimate by O.C. A.S.R.U. Detachment Seaplane Wing based on previous months.		
Monthly Total in Imperial Gallons.	40.000	1.350
GRAND TOTAL.	324.758	15.091

CONCLUSION.

20. The figures shown against the GRAND TOTAL above represent the maximum quantities of P.O.L. that may be intented for the T.A.F. to fulfil their present commitments.

21. It is not claimed that the above assessment is totally accurate but it is considered that the resultant of any inaccuracies is not prejudicial from an I.A.F. point of view. The figures are liberal insofar as a margin has in the case of each commitment been given in favour of allowing some P.O.L. rather than less than should be required for strictly economical engine handling.

22. If minor commitments such as supply of P.O.L. to factories for ground testing have been omitted, the quantities alloted for authorised flying practice are in very considerable excess of quantities previously used for this purpose.

23. Although the monthly indents for P.O.L. have exceeded the figures in the assessment, the actual quantities drawn have been far less than these figures. Monthly totals of aircraft petrol drawn to date have not exceeded 200,000 gallons. It is not therefore expected that the above mentioned quantities will necessarily be supplied for T.A.F. use.

(T.P. [illegible], G/Capt),
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Distribution:

Italian Air Ministry	1 copy
MED/AR (A.C.S.)	2 copies

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(L.F. JARMAN, C/Capt),
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Distribution:

Italian Air Ministry	1 copy
MEMFSK (A.H.Q.)	2 copies
A.F.H.Q. Petroleum Section F.A.A.F.	1 copy
File	1 copy

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APPENDIX "A".

AVERAGE P.O.L. CONSUMPTION FIGURES FOR ITALIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

Serial No.	Aircraft Type.	Average hourly consumption of petrol in litres.	Average hourly consumption of oil in litres.
a	b	c	d
1.	SM. 79	600	20
2.	SM. 82	650	25
3.	CR.306	500	20
4.	Baltimore	650	15
5.	Average Fighter	300	15
6.	CR 1007	650	30

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Xerox Micro

35

TO : A.C.A.
AIR PLANS.
LT. COL. ALSTON.

Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force

Forwarded herewith for your information and retention are copies of correspondence on the interim policy for the Italian Air Force, which have been passed to the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat, for approval.

(W. W. WARD)
Squadron Leader.
for Group Captain.
Allied Liaison Section.

16th September, 1945.

SECRET/ULTRA.

1310

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34

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.
(for attention of F/Lt. SMITH, Intelligence Section)

Date:- 18th September, 1945.

Ref :- MAAC/1.200/ALS.

Herewith, as requested by you, is a copy of the letter from Mr. Bellario re his invention, forwarded to this Headquarters under cover of your letter AFSC/INT/100 dated 28th July, 1945.

Maxwell Fisher

(MAXWELL FISHER)
Wing Commander, for
The Secretaries,
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1157

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

33

COPY.

TO: MEDME

FROM: A.M. WHITEHALL

MSW.884 8 SEPTEMBER TOP SECRET

YOUR GB.174 AUGUST 14.

REGRET DELAY.

REARMAMENT TO EXTENT REQUESTED APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE PROVIDED AIRCRAFT ARE USED FOR REPLACEMENT ONLY.

ACTION: CHIEF OF STAFF.
C-in-C.
A.L.S.

1312

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOOSE MINUTE

TO : Allied Liaison Section. Ref : MED/ME/5121/1/Maint.Plans.

Italian Air Force.

Reference your loose minute MAAF/4200/ALS July 12th, in which you state that sufficient spares may be issued to keep aircraft, already held by the Italians, serviceable.

2. This does not really cover the policy as to whether engines, due for major inspections, are to be replaced from R.A.F. stocks.

3. It would seem sensible in view of the fact that no further aircraft will be issued on loan to the Italian Air Force, and that their present aircraft are to be maintained as long as possible, that engines for aircraft already held should be exchanged as and when the requirement arises.

4. It is anticipated that the number of engines which will be due for overhaul will considerably increase in the near future. It is requested therefore that you obtain a ruling from the Chief of Staff on this matter.

(D. C. WALKER) W/CDR.,
for Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer.

14th Sept 1945.

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AIR MINISTRY WHITEHALL

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS NOTES.

ROUTINE

S.66 SECRET - ROUTINE 7th September, 1945

Can a reply now be given to our G.M.174 August 14th relative to G.55 aircraft of Italian Air Force (.)

071220

A.I.1.

4200/ALS W. W. H. WARD, SQUADRON LEADER.

Chief of Staff, MEDME.
C. in C.
Air Staff Registry

1154

13.14

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SECRET

30.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
A. P. O. 512

26 August 1945

SUBJECT: Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

TO : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1. Action on the attached correspondence has been deferred, pending the implementation of decisions taken at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference of 23 August.

2. For your information, the following is the history of this correspondence so far as it is known to me:

a. The Chief Commissioner issued instructions to the Air Force Sub Commission to prepare a directive to the Italian Government on interim policy for Italian Air Force. The directive was to be submitted to the Chief Commissioner for approval prior to despatch to the Italian Government.

b. The Air Force Sub Commission referred the matter to MAAF where the draft at TAB 'A' was prepared.

c. The draft was prepared in the RAF side of MAAF in accordance with previous procedure, but was not referred to AAF/MTO before despatch to ROME. This however, was not realised until the draft reached the Allied Commission.

d. The Chief Commissioner then referred the draft to AFHQ to obtain the comments of AAF/MTO.

e. The comments of AAF/MTO were obtained (see TAB 'B') and furnished Chief Commissioner by AFHQ.

f. The Chief Commissioner returned the correspondence to AFHQ and requested that a revised draft be prepared jointly by RAF MEDME and AAF/MTO rather than in the Air Force Sub Commission.

2. I believe the matter is now one to be dealt with appropriately by the newly formed Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Indeed I consider the formation of that Committee will eliminate difficulties in dealing with this subject in the future.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander desires, that as the subject of the Italian Air Force was only lightly touched on in NAF 1051 a detailed study should now be made so as to recommend, in relation to Italian and Allied requirements, an interim policy for the Italian Air Force.

SECRET - 1 -

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1315

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4. It is believed the question should be approached on the same lines as those on which the Joint Planning Staff dealt with the Italian Army. Provision should, therefore, now be made for:

a. Allied requirements.
b. Reasonable Italian Government requirements.
c. Method of administration and maintenance.

5. In assessing the Allied and Italian Government requirements, the broad division of duties required of the Italian Air Force should be supported by an estimate of the number of personnel needed to undertake these duties.

6. If further information is required in your consideration of this matter, I suggest that you consult the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

L. L. LEMNITZER
Major General, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff

2 Incls:
TAB A - Dr fr MAAF.
TAB B - Ltr fr AAF/MTO
dtd 4 Aug 45.

1152 -

C O P Y

H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F. FOR APPROVAL.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

PART I - POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircrew to keep in flying practise rather than to become more efficient in war-like exercises, and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:- 1151 -

(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of ROME are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied

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A

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(ii) The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue

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services, together with such boats crews and marine craft as will be made available to the I.A.F.

(iii) Allied type aircraft will be allotted as required by the Allies on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, andindeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P.39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to theI.A.F., but aircraft wastage will not be replaced; British spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practise will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of six hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their high efficiency in flying and navigation.

(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

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(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

(vi) The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the I.A.F. until such time as authorisation from the A.F.S.C. for its use by the I.A.F. is given: the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/2Q of the 30th June.

(vii) The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small

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amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22nd June, 1945.

(viii) Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as possible, all air material, whether in the North or South of Italy, will be concentrated in as few Depots as possible.

(ix) Ab-initio flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for Officers and flying personnel.

Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield

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flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for officers and flying personnel.

Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

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(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derequisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

(xiii) Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the I.A.F. are to be declared to the A.F.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy and possibly overseas, and so help in the war against Japan.

4. (i) It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-

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supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that International standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organization and meteorological organisation.

(ii) No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but as soon as possible the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda:

(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in

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given, but as soon as possible the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

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7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda:

(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

(a) the organisation of the Air Ministry down to the Z.A.T. level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Unita Aeree and redisposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th Z.A.T.;

(b) formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to co-ordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

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(c) the retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

(ii) Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, with a view to forming companies to work for the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean theatre, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorised ceiling of 31,000.

(iii) Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U., as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

(iv) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organised maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

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for decision by the Italian Government.

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this review is the authorised ceiling of 31,000.

(iii) Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U., as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

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(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

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(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

(vii) Discuss advantages and disadvantages of enlistment on a voluntary, as opposed to, a conscription basis.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 9th July, 1945.
Ref : AFSC/46/AIR

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: C.G. AAFMTO
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 4 Aug 45

4 August 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Major General [illegible]

SUBJECT : Italian Air Force Interim Policy.

1. The proposed interim policy for the Italian Air Force has been carefully reviewed and compared to the many recent papers pertaining to this subject, which have been handled in the Joint Planning Staff of the Allied Command Level. There are three general comments applicable to the paper as a whole:

a. The paper is basically correct and in general agreement with other documents just referred to.

b. On 2/ July General Mahoney addressed a letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning their future policy toward Italy. The anticipated reply to this letter should materially clarify our general policy toward Italy and therefore affect the interim policy for the Italian Air Force.

c. The paper in question is so important that it is not considered proper to use abbreviations therein. Many of the abbreviations used lend themselves to more than one interpretation and others will be understood by an extremely limited number of people. Examples are AFSC appearing in paragraph 3 (iii), which could be interpreted as meaning the Air Force Service Command as well as the Air Force Sub-Commission; and ZAF, appearing in paragraph 7 (i) (a), which is not understood by this office.

2. Referring to paragraph 2. The basic principle stated in paragraph 2 is correct; however, the amount of flying time per month to keep air crews in flying practice is discussed below:

3. Referring to paragraph 3 (iii). This paragraph contains a positive statement that [redacted] aircraft will not be replaced. It is considered preferable to say that the Allies are not obligated to replace aircraft. This paragraph also indicates that only limited spare parts and components will be supplied to the Italian Air Force. Since many of the airplanes in question are of U.S. manufacture, it is believed this paragraph should be changed to indicate that spare parts and components for Allied type aircraft loaned the Italian Air Force will be provided as required through the Air Force Sub-Commission in accordance with existing arrangements.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

SECRET

Auth: J.C.S. dtd 11 NOV 70
Initials: SWB
Date: 4 Aug 45

4 August 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Major General [illegible]

SUBJECT : Italian Air Force interim policy.

1. The proposed interim policy for the Italian Air Force has been carefully reviewed and compared to the many recent papers pertaining to this subject, which have been included in the Joint Planning Staff as the subject progressed. There are three general comments applicable to the paper as a whole:

a. The paper is basically correct and in general agreement with other documents just referred to.

b. On 2 July General McNarney addressed a letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the future policy toward Italy. The anticipated reply to this letter should materially clarify our general policy toward Italy and therefore affect the interim policy for the Italian Air Force.

c. The paper in question is so important that it is not considered proper to use abbreviations therein. Many of the abbreviations used lend themselves to more than one interpretation and others will be understood by an extremely limited number of people. Examples are AASC appearing in paragraph 3 (iii), which could be interpreted as meaning the Air Force Service Command as well as the Air Force Sub-Commission; and MAP, appearing in paragraph 7 (1) (a), which is not understood by this office.

2. Referring to paragraph 2. The basic principle stated in paragraph 2 is correct; however, the amount of flying time per month to keep air crews in flying practice is discussed below.

3. Referring to paragraph 3 (iii). This paragraph contains a positive statement that [redacted] aircraft will not be replaced. It is considered preferable to say that the Allies are not obligated to replace aircraft. This paragraph also indicates that only limited spare parts and components will be supplied to the Italian Air Force. Since many of the airplanes in question are of U.S. manufacture, it is believed this paragraph should be amended to indicate that spare parts and components for Allied type aircraft loaned the Italian Air Force will be provided as required through the Air Force Sub-Commission in accordance with existing arrangements.

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Auth: CG. AAF/MTO
Initials:
Date:

4. Referring to paragraph 2 (iv). It is appreciated that possible can all must be conserved, but it is desired to point out that a maximum of six hours flying per crew per month will not maintain a very high level of proficiency. About twenty hours per month is required to maintain a fairly high level of proficiency and ten hours per month would maintain a possible degree of proficiency and safety. If the war is to continue to be limited over a period of a year or more, the proficiency of the pilots will deteriorate.

5. Referring to paragraph 2 (v). There are approximately 250 fighter type aircraft in the Italian Air Force, of which still more than 100 are in repair or storage depots, leaving about 150 available for flying units. It is not considered practicable to station all or those fighters on the fields as would be required by paragraph 2 (v). It is suggested that this be changed to say that a maximum of 90 fighters will be located on any one flying field authorized as a fighter field. It is pointed out here that paragraph 2 (xiii) indicates that Sub-Commission will pass upon each flying field authorized the Italian Air Force and hence the suggested revision will not unconditionally authorize additional airfields.

6. This same paragraph, 2 (v), authorizes "air firing", which is contrary to the principles stated in paragraph 2, and it is recommended that this authorization be deleted.

7. Referring to paragraph 2 (viii). Whereas it might be "possible" to concentrate all air material in a single depot, this might be both inefficient and impracticable. Therefore, recommend the word "practicable" be substituted for the word "possible" in the two instances the latter appears in this paragraph.

8. Referring to paragraph 2 (xi). Recommend the phrase "Ab-Initio Flying Training" ~~should~~ be replaced by a more readily understood expression. Recommend this paragraph be reworded as follows: "Refresher flying training to maintain previously acquired proficiency may be carried out at the discretion of the Air Force Sub-Commission, but the training of unqualified personnel will not be initiated."

9. Referring to paragraph 2 (x). This paragraph could be interpreted as authorizing only three Ground School courses--Administration, Meteorology and Flying Control. Paragraph 4 (11) refers to bringing the Italian Air Force up to international standards in aircraft maintenance, signals and intercept; therefore, recommend that paragraph 2 (x) be reworded so as to authorize all appropriate within Ground School subjects.

10. Referring to paragraph 2 (xiii). This paragraph is ambiguous and needs to be rewritten entirely so as to include following principles:

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c. The stipulated ceiling of 31,000 personnel in the Italian Air Force will not be altered until there has been an amendment of the armistice terms or a settlement of the peace treaty with Italy.

b. Italian Air Force personnel no longer required in connection with the Allied or the Italian Air Forces will be used outside Italian frontiers to assist in the war against Japan.

c. Those not required for purposes indicated in the preceding paragraph will be turned over to the Italian government.

10. Referring to paragraph 4 (c). It is highly desirable for the Italian Air Force to become entirely self-supporting as soon as possible. At the present time some personnel are intermingled on Allied fields throughout Italy in support of Allied requirements, and therefore it will be to our interests to feed these people and to provide critical supplies such as wines, fuel, lubricants and technical supplies until they can be obtained through Italian sources.

11. Referring to paragraph 7 (iv). It is considered more economical and efficient to place reserve aircraft in the tactical squadrons than to form a special "air stores park" for this purpose. Aircraft deteriorate as rapidly in dead storage as they do under careful use. A squadron normally equipped with 18 fighters could be given a 25% reserve, thus increasing its equipment to 20 aircraft. Each of these aeroplanes can be flown one day while the maintenance crews maintain the second ten. The next day the second group of ten can be flown while the normal maintenance crews work on the first ten. This would keep the aircraft in better condition and simultaneously eliminate the personnel and facilities required for the proposed "air stores park".

J. L. Burwell
Colonel, Air Corps

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LOOSE MINUTE.

To :- Wing Commander Misher, Allied Liaison Section.

FUTURE POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference the attached correspondence, Chief of Air Plans, M.A.A.F., prepared a review of the future of the Italian Air Force for D.D. Ops on 31st May, 1945. This paper was submitted to D.D. Ops, M.A.A.F. and Chief of Staff, R.A.F. and a copy was sent to Air Vice-Marshal BRODIE.

2. Pag "A" which is dated 9th July, 1945, appears to have been based on this appreciation. It has never been seen in Plans office until today. It should be noted that the original paper and the Draft Directive were prepared while M.A.A.F. was still in existence and as such would not be referred to SAFHQ or CCSM except that the Air Commander-in-Chief directed that the Italian Air Force should be the responsibility of the R.A.F. through the Chief of Staff and the A.L.S. It is not clear to me why the Chief Commissioner has taken on himself the responsibility for querying the instructions of the Air Commander-in-Chief, and it should have been obvious to A.F.H.Q. that this matter was properly a M.A.A.F. matter and that M.A.A.F. Plans who produced the original paper was ALLIED.

(R.B. PAKENHAM)
Group Captain,
Air Plans,
R.A.F., MEDME.

20th August, 1945.

MEMO/S.24/A.P.

S/S
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From:- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters MEDME, Caserta, C.M.F.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 23rd August, 1945.

Ref :- MEDME/4200/AS.

Reference is made to telephone conversation between Chief of Staff, MEDME and Air Vice-Marshal MEDME on Friday, 17th August, and Group Captain KEMP and A.V.M. Brodie on 23rd August.

2. It is now confirmed that pending the promulgation of the future policy concerning the reconstruction and reassembly of Italian aircraft, that henceforth, if requests of this nature are received from the Italian Air Force they will first be referred to this Headquarters.

3. It is also confirmed that when these requests are forwarded to this Headquarters, they are to be accompanied by the recommendations of both yourself, and the Chief Commissioner.

(H. McLaren KEMP)
Group Captain,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff, RAF/MEDME.

Copy to : S.A.C.C.

1 3 3 2!

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From:- Allied Liaison Section,
Headquarters MEDME, Caserta, CMF.

To :- Air Force Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 23rd August, 1945.

Ref :- MEDME/4200/ALS.

Reference is made to your letter AFSC/IMT/10C dated 20th July, 1945.

2. Investigation is proceeding, and it is requested that Mr. Ballerio produces the two letters referred to, which are to be sent to this Headquarters.

(C. CONROY)
Squadron Leader,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff, RAF/MEDME.

3.3.3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

At a meeting held at Caserta on 5th June, between the Chief-of-Staff and the A.O.C. of the Air Forces Sub-Commission ACSC, the following was agreed :-

(i) Italian Air Force material discovered in Italy should be centralised and placed under the control of the A.O.C. A.F.S.C. He is authorised to make issues of such material as is necessary to maintain the authorised Italian Air Force, and should encourage the use of such materials so as to reduce to a minimum the issues required from R.A.F. sources.

(ii) Repair facilities in Northern Italy may be utilised to overhaul the aircraft and engines which are to be used on the Italian Courier Service subject to concurrence of Chief Commissioner.

(iii) Only such quantities of petrol as are necessary to meet the approved flying commitment of the Italian Air Force will be issued.

(iv) Provided the Chief Commissioner agrees, new aircraft and engines discovered in Northern Italy may be made available to the Italian Air Force as replacements or to bring Italian Air Force up to establishment, but not to increase the new holding of aircraft above the authorised establishment.

(v) Lists of major items of Italian equipment discovered, e.g. aircraft, M.T. engines etc, are to be submitted to this Headquarters for re-submission to the Air Ministry.

L. P. Brodie
AOC.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

COPY:

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

DATE: 26TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/826/ENG.

ITALIAN AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION.

With reference to our conversation of the 25th July, do you approve the construction of a further 8 Fiat G.12 aircraft and a further 6 SM.95s. As regards the SM.95s I think I should also get M.A.A.F's covering approval as these aircraft are a new type.

2. I attach a summary of aircraft construction which has already been approved and which is proposed.

3. As an aide memoir the following is a relevent extract concerning this subject from a directive obtained at Headquarters, M.A.A.F:

"Provided the Chief Commissioner agrees, new aircraft and engines discovered in Northern Italy may be made available to the Italian Air Force as replacements, or to bring Italian Air Force up to establishment, but not to increase the new holding of aircraft above the authorised establishment".

4. With the additional construction for which I ask approval, an appreciable part of both the S.M. and Fiat Works should be kept busy until at least December 1945 and April 1946 respectively. Whilst at Fiat's on a recent visit I was told by the Directing Manager that as soon as they got a firm order for a few aeroplanes the morale of the workers noticeably improved, and everyone there is now comparatively happy.

5. With the construction of all these aircraft I think we would obtain a larger number than is required to replace wastage, in which event we will form an Aircraft Holding Unit under strict supervision of the Allied authorities, and might even dismantle an equivalent number of old crocks; I do not think, however, that it is necessary at this stage to come to a definite decision as I hope that we shall get some information as regards the future of the Italian Air Force and Civil Aviation before the necessity to make a decision occurs.

6. Depending upon the Peace terms and the wishes of the Italian Government a number of these aircraft will, no doubt, be apportioned to both the Italian Air Force and Italian Civil Aviation.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 780017

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6. Depending upon the Peace terms and the wishes of the Italian Government a number of these aircraft will, no doubt, be apportioned to both the Italian Air Force and Italian Civil Aviation.

7. For your information some materials will be required by the Firms, but these are not much and I expect no difficulty in arranging for the allotment of raw material.

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(SGD) I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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COPY.

SUMMARY OF ITALIAN AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN ITALY - 26TH JULY 1945

1. A/C type.	2. No. under authorised constr'n.	3. No. for approval.	4. Total colms 3 & 4.	5. No of passen-gers carried.	6. Approx date to which firm employed Colm 4.	7. Remarks.
BOMBER/ TRANSPORT						
SM.84	1	-	1	8	??	All 3 engine a/c except SM.95 which has 4 engines.
SM.79	19	-	19	7	Sept 45	
SM.82	6	4 ø	10	20	Sept 45	Underengined
SM.95	2	6	8	18 +	Dec 45 ?	1 Civil and 1 Military version. Prototypes - going to England.
G.12	12	8	20	12	April 46	
TOTAL:	40	18	58	-	SM Works Dec 45. Fiat Works April 46.	1139
FIGHTERS.						
G.55		21	21	-	Dec 45.	Probably an additional 23 later - first 21 are up for covering approval by M.A.A.F.
GRAND TOTAL:	40	39	79			

Notes: (i) 'SM' a/c are SAVOIA MARCHETTI, Near MILAN.
'G' a/c are FIAT, Turin.

(ii) G.12, SM.95 and G.55 a/c are comparatively modern and except SM.95 are all metal a/c.

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SM.84	1	-	1	8	27	All 3 engine s/c except SM.95 which has 4 engines.
SM.79	19	-	19	7	Sept 45	
SM.82	6	4 ø	10	20	Sept 45	Underengined
SM.95	2	6	8	18 +	Dec 45 ?	1 Civil and 1 Military version. Prototypes - going to England.
G.12	12	8	20	12	April 46	
TOTAL:	40	18	58	-	SM Works Dec 45. Fiat Works April 46.	
FIGHTERS.						
G.55		21	21	-	Dec 45.	Probably an additional 23 later - first 21 are up for covering approval by M.A.A.F.
GRAND TOTAL:	40	39	79			

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Notes: (i) 'SM' a/c are SAVOIA MARCHETTI, Near MILAN.
'G' a/c are FIAT, Turin.

(ii) G.12, SM.95 and G.55 a/c are comparatively modern and except SM.95 are all metal a/c.

(iii) Both SM and FIAT works are planning to turn over large part of factories to Civil industry purposes.

(iv) As SM.79 and 82 types come out of SM factory, so will equivalent number of existing I.A.F. a/c be put in for complete overhauls.

(v) G.12 and SM.95 a/c will be suitable for Italian Civil Aviation if and when permitted.

(vi) Construction will replace wastage, but later there may be a small surplus over and above existing I.A.F. establishments, in which event an Aircraft Holding Unit under Allied supervision will be formed. (It is the policy not to permit of expansion of the I.A.F.)

(vii) No material is required for the first 21 G.55 as they only need reassembly. A little raw material will have to be supplied for G.12s and probably SM.95s, but this is available in the North.

Continued/2.

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(viii) If only to give workmen some useful work to do approval for construction of aircraft in Coln' 3 is strongly recommended.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
DATE: 26th July, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/826/ENG.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785019

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4th Ind to Ltr, Allied Liaison Section, Hq RAF/MEDME, Ref: MEDME/4200/AIS, dtd 1 August 1945, Subj: Return of L5 Aircraft

AG 452.1/414 D-O 4th Ind RAS/1jn

HEADQUARTERS MTOUSA, APO 512, 21 August 1945

TO: General Officer Commanding, RAF/MEDME
FOR: Allied Liaison Section

It is requested that the two letters from the 2677 Regiment OSS (Prov) be secured from Mr. Ballereo and forwarded to this headquarters.

FOR THE THEATER COMMANDER:

R. A. STUKEY
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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CMT.
22/7
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(Ltr Allied Liaison Section, Hqs RAF/MEDME, ref: MEDME/4200/AIS, 1 Aug 45, cont'd.)

452.02 1st Ind. ADS
HEADQUARTERS AAF/MTO, APO 650, U: S. Army, 7 AUG 45

TO: Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512, U. S. Army.

1. Attention is invited to basic letter. The facts stated in paragraph 4 thereof are confirmed.

2. It is requested that this correspondence be forwarded to the 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov) with a request that the subject aircraft be promptly returned to Air Force control if no longer required in the regular activities of OSS.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Thomas M. Lowe

THOMAS M. LOWE,
Brigadier General, USA,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Asm

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2d Ind to Ltr Allied Liaison Section, Hq RAF/MEDME, Ref: MEDME/4200/ALS, dtd 1 Aug 45.

RHF/gs

AG 452.1/414 D-O 2d Ind

HEADQUARTERS MTOUSA, APO 512, 14 August 1945

TO: Commanding Officer, 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov), APO 512

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 2 of 1st Indorsement.

2. Request subject aircraft be returned to Air Force control promptly if no longer required for OSS activities.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MCNARNEY:

R. H. 'FRESE
Major, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

3rd Ind
HQS, 2677TH REGT, OSS (PROV.), APO 512, U.S. ARMY, 16 AUG 45

TO: Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512, U.S. Army
Attn: Major R.H. Frese, Asst. Adjutant General

1. Attention is invited to para. 1 of basic communication.

2. In order that proper disciplinary action may be taken, it is requested that the communication referred to, authorizing Lt. Ballerio to procure, modify and experiment with an L5 aircraft, be forwarded to this Command.

3. According to our records, no L5 aircraft has been procured for OSS activities.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

DAVID G. CRACKNELL
Captain, A.C.
Executive Officer

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Loose Minute

TO : P.S.O. to C. in C. (through C. of S.)

1. The attached draft at Appendix "A", is based largely upon the previous directif issued by the S.A.C., revised where necessary to fit in with the dissolution of M.A.A.F., co-ordinated between Air Plans, A.I.S., and the representatives of the AAF/MTO.

2. The Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will be the Allied Liaison Section of this Headquarters, whose work will be similar to that which the Section performed in the past.

(K. McLaren Reid)
Group Captain,
Allied Liaison Section

MAPMF/4200/ALS.

22nd August, 1945.

1137

1343

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY.

DATE: 10TH AUGUST, 1945.

REF: AFSC/826/MIG.

CONSTRUCTION OF FIAT G.12 AIRCRAFT.

Authority is hereby given for the construction of a further eight Fiat G.12 aircraft (by Fiat's TURIN), which makes the total number of this type of aircraft which may be constructed twenty. This should give employment to that part of the Fiat Factory engaged upon construction of G.12 aircraft work until approximately April 1946, and will, it is considered, be a great help in finding work for the factory hands.

2. I have, however, to remind you that this authority is without prejudice to the Allied Peace negotiations with Italy.

3. I also have to remind you that it is still the Allied policy not to allow an increase in the number of aircraft held in the Italian Air Force, and therefore it may be necessary when these aircraft are completed to place some of them, or some of the other Bomber Transport Aircraft into an Aircraft Holding Unit which will be under Allied supervision if it is found necessary to form such a Unit for this purpose.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

COPY:
H.Q. RAF MEDME C.M.F. A.L.S. (2)
INDUSTRY SUB-COMMISSION.

MILAN OFFICE, A.F.S.C.

1344

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY.

DATE: 10TH AUGUST, 1945.

REF: AFSC/626/SEC.

CONSTRUCTION OF FIAT G.12 AIRCRAFT.

Authority is hereby given for the construction of a further eight Fiat G.12 aircraft (by Fiat's [illegible]), which makes the total number of this type of aircraft which may be constructed twenty. This should give employment to that part of the Fiat Factory engaged upon construction of G.12 aircraft work until approximately April 1946, and will, it is considered, be a great help in finding work for the factory hands.

2. I have, however, to remind you that this authority is without prejudice to the Allied Peace negotiations with Italy.

3. I also have to remind you that it is still the Allied policy not to allow an increase in the number of aircraft held in the Italian Air Force, and therefore it may be necessary when these aircraft are completed to place some of them, or some of the other Bomber Transport Aircraft into an Aircraft Holding Unit which will be under Allied supervision if it is found necessary to form such a Unit for this purpose.

I.M. BROOKS,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

COPY:
H.Q. RAF MEDME C.M.F. A.L.S. (2)
INDUSTRY SUB-COMMISSION.
MILAN OFFICE, A.F.S.C.

1132

22

OUTGOING CIPHER MESSAGE

To :- Air Ministry Whitehall

From :- [redacted]

TOP SECRET

GR.174. [redacted] 14th August 1945

From Chief of Staff (.)

It is reported that the Fiat aircraft factory at Turin has

(a) components for the re-assembly of 21 - G.55 fighter aircraft and

(b) also the majority of components for a further 21 (.)

All aircraft are virtually new (.)

2. We are in favour of moving the aircraft in 1(a) for the following reasons:

(a) The MACCHI aircraft which it is proposed to replace are in poor condition (.)

(b) The G.55 is preferred to the MACCHI as a better aircraft for training and operational training purposes (.)

(c) They will serve as replacements for normal aircraft wastage (.)

(d) Backing is available (.)

3. The intention is that all MACCHI aircraft replaced by G.55s should be stored in an Italian Holding Unit without maintenance (,) and under the strict supervision of the Allied Authorities (.)

4. It is probable that a further proposal will be raised to build up the aircraft in 1(b) in due course (.)

5. Will you say whether you approve this re-armament (.) If you do then presumably the question of placing Italian factories to undertake this

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(a) components for the re-assembly of 21 - G.55 fighter aircraft and

(b) also the majority of components for a further 21 (.)

All aircraft are virtually new (.)

2. We are in favour of moving the aircraft in 1(a) for the following reasons:

(a) The MACCHI aircraft which it is proposed to replace are in poor condition (.)

(b) The G.55 is preferred to the MACCHI as a better aircraft for training and operational training purposes (.)

(c) They will serve as replacements for normal aircraft wastage (.)

(d) Backing is available (.)

3. The intention is that all MACCHI aircraft replaced by G.55s should be stored in an Italian Holding Unit without maintenance (,) and under the strict supervision of the Allied Authorities (.)

4. It is probable that a further proposal will be raised to build up the aircraft in 1(b) in due course (.)

5. Will you say whether you approve this re-armament (.) If you do then presumably the question of allowing Italian factories to undertake this limited production can be cleared here through Commission and Political channels (.) The general desire is to reallocate Italian industry [illegible] the above proposal will help in providing employment (.) It is pretty certain that the Commission would welcome this from an economic point of view while as you know the draft treaty envisages a certain possible output of aircraft from Italian factories (.) I feel however that these are points which are not directly our concern and that the main consideration is whether you agree the principle of re-armament (.)

Priority:

Distribution: C.O.S. 2 (Orig)(Gp.61/1)
C-in-C; A.C.S. (MAAF/1,200/ALS)

Air Vice-Marshal
Chief of Staff.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

21

From:- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters MAF MedME CMF.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 4th. Aug. 1945.

Ref:- MEDME/4200/ALS.

Manufacture and Supply - Italian Type Fighter Aircraft.

1. Reference is made to your letter AFSC/826/ELS dated 25th. July, 1945.

2. The C-in-C/RAF.MedME has ruled that the aircraft referred to must not be re-assembled, neither is any work to be carried out on them.

(C. CONROY),
Squadron Leader,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF.MedME.

1348

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1

Loose Minute.

To:- P.S.O. to C-in-C/RAF Medme.

Italian Air Force Ceiling.

1. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force as agreed by the combined Chiefs of Staff, was originally 31,000.

2. On July, 1st., 1945, however, some 3,000 Italian Co-operator Prisoners of War, employed on RAF units in Italy, were released from their P.W. Status on the instuctions of Allied Force Headquarters.

3. Allied Force Headquarters informed this Headquarters that the ceiling of the Italian Air Force was 'temporarily' raised to 34,000 to include this personnel.

4. For information a brief breakdown of actual strength of the Italian Air Force is given:-

Personnel employed with the USAAF.....	6,500
Personnel employed with the RAF.....	5,500
Personnel other than directly with the Allied Air Forces.....	20,229
Total strength.....	32,229.

(H. McLaren Reid),
Group Captain,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 3rd. Aug. 1945.

Ref:- MM/4200/ALS.

1123

1349

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From:- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters MAP/MTO.

To:- Headquarters. MAP/MTO.

Date:- 1st August, 1945.

Ref:- MAP/A200/ALS.

Mr. G.M. Ballerio an Italian inventor, holds two letters from the 2677 Regt. QMC (Prov) authorising him to procure, modify, and experiment with a L-5 aircraft which was located at Forlanini, and to visit factories and airports for the purpose of making negotiations for the use of his invention.

2. It is desired to point out that the Airforces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission in Rome, is the only authority charged with the responsibility of authorizing any activities effecting Italians. Furthermore, it is understood, that in the U.S./A.A.F. no experiments of any kind are authorised without the approval of Wright Field.

3. It would be appreciated if this information could be brought to the notice of the Commanding Officer, 2677 Regt QMC (Prov).

4. For your information Colonel Beaumm, Chief of Staff, 12th Air Force who had a conference with Mr. Ballerio on the 25th July at Florence, has subsequently informed the Air Forces Sub-Commission that tentatively, at least, the U.S.A.A.F. is not interested.

Minutes

(H. M. FISHER)
Wing Commander.
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/MAP/MTO.

Copy to:-

A.F.H.Q.
CIO. [illegible].

1350

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

135

Italian Air Force.

1. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force, as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000 with an addition of 5,000 which has been added to allow for the ex-co-operator companies now released from P.W. status, the division of such ceiling being:- as under, there still remaining an Allied operational requirement for the following purposes :-

Operational Air Force.	22,000
Employed by the R.A.F.	5,500
Employed by the U.S.A.A.F.	6,500

The extent to which the above ceiling figures will be implemented at any given time, will be subject to the requirements of the R.A.F. and these will decrease as the commitments of the R.A.F. decrease.

(a) OPERATIONAL AIR FORCE (22,000)

At the end of hostilities in EUROPE, the Italian Air Force as an operational force, ceased to exist. Certain units were, however, kept in being for employment under Allied Control in order to save R.A.F. manpower and equipment. These personnel are employed on the workings of a Transport and Courier Service and Air/Sea Rescue duties, which work would normally be carried out by the R.A.F., therefore using of the Italian Air Force on these services results in a saving of manpower and equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staffing of the Italian Air Ministry, providing the necessary administrative services, providing the necessary maintenance backing and training (including Refresher Schools, A Cadet College, Flying Control School, W/T School and several engineering establishments in the LEECE area). Personnel are also being employed on Guard duties in the North of Italy on aircraft factories and installations etc. The former Bomber squadrons are now used for the Courier and Transport services; the Seaplane squadrons are now used for the AIR/SEA rescue duties; the fighter squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month are authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

(b) EMPLOYED BY THE R.A.F. (5,500).

These personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for RAF manpower as follows :-

(i) To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies.
(ii) To replace personnel who are required to return to U.K. or proceed to another theatre of war.
(iii) To give further assistance to RAF Units who by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and/or labour.

(c) EMPLOYED BY THE U.S.A.A.F. (6,500)

The personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the R.A.F.

2. With regard to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force, it is the intention that the I.A.F. shall be self-supporting in all respects, with the following exceptions:-

POL and tyres.
Rations.
Technical equipment necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759049

At the end of hostilities in EUROPE, the Italian Air Force as an operational force, ceased to exist. Certain units were, however, kept in being for employment under Allied Control in order to save R.A.F. manpower and equipment. These personnel are employed on the workings of a Transport and Courier Service and Air/Sea Rescue duties, which work would normally be carried out by the R.A.F., therefore using of the Italian Air Force on these services results in a saving of manpower and equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staffing of the Italian Air Ministry, providing the necessary administrative services, providing the necessary maintenance backing and training (including Refresher Schools, Air Cadet College, Flying Control School, W/T School and several engineering establishments in the LECCE area). Personnel are also being employed on Guard duties in the North of Italy on aircraft factories and installations etc. The former Bomber squadrons are now used for the Courier and Transport services; the Seaplane squadrons are now used for the AIR/SEA rescue duties; the fighter squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month are authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

(b) EMPLOYED BY THE R.A.F. (5,500).

These personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for RAF manpower as follows :-

(i) To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies.
(ii) To replace personnel who are required to return to U.K. or proceed to another theatre of war.
(iii) To give further assistance to RAF Units who by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and/or labour.

(c) EMPLOYED BY THE U.S.A.A.F. (6,500)

The personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the R.A.F.

2. With regard to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force, it is the intention that the I.A.F. shall be self-supporting in all respects, with the following exceptions :-

POL and tyres.
Rations.
Technical equipment, necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft loan to the Italian Air Force, plus provision of electric goods, such as and dry batteries, on a small scale, until conditions within the country easier.

Reference is also made to clothing and providing the present bid for clothing, etc is fully met, it is stated that the Italian Air Force will be self-supporting in respect of clothing thereafter.

1127

MAAF/4200/AAS
30/6/45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778017

1353

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

17

FROM: AIR DEPUTY-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, PORTS.

TO: H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F.
ATTENTION A.I.S.

DATE: 28TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AD5C/INT/100

See M 784
+ Enc 19

The attached letter from MR. G.M. BALLERIO is forwarded for your inspection. The albums referred to have been returned to the owner as he was proceeding to FLORENCE on 25th July for a conference with COL. SESSUMS, G/S, 12 A.F. COL. SESSUMS has subsequently informed this Sub-Commission that tentatively, at least, the U.S.A.A.F. is not interested.

2. MR. BALLERIO holds two letters from the 2677 Regt. CSS (PROV) authorising him to procure, modify, and experiment with an L.5 aircraft which was located at FOGGIA, and to visit factories and airports for the purpose of making negotiations for the use of his invention. It is pointed out that this Sub-Commission is charged with the responsibility of authorising all air activities affecting Italians. Further, in the U.S.A.A.F. no experiments of any kind are authorised without the approval of WRIGHT FIELD. Request this information be brought to the attention of the C.O. 2677 Regt. CSS (PROV).

3. If MR. BALLERIO is needed for interview or further information, this Sub-Commission will be glad to make necessary arrangements.

I.N. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

20/1
JL220

1128

FROM : G. M. BALLERIO.
PELLI D'INTELVI, COMO.

T O : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION. A.C. ROME.

DATE : 18. 7. 45.

REF. : ---

Further to the meeting in your offices in Via Veneto on the 17th instant, I would like to furnish you with further information on my offers and requests regarding my inventions and their developments.

I am specialised, as you know, in aerodinamic brakes in general. My invention helps to stabiliza the aircraft and enables the pilot to control it at a very slow speed, with an absolute new phenomenon in flying technique, especially when, at a low speed and consequent support, the aircraft would normally overturn.

The importance of this phenomenon due to its very strong wind brake is such, that, as I shall practically demonstrate it, we are certain to have invented an apparatus which no technicians had yet thought of.

The practical results applied on many types of aircraft of various structure (low, medium and high winged), with different take-off characteristics, speed, weight and power, gave the following identical results :

- Landing at a speed slightly lower than the theorical minimum,
- The landing run, according to the type of aircraft is reduced of more than 60%. This is proved even further if the landing is made after an obstacle on a very limited space of ground.

I shall not linger on technical and theoretical details as practical demonstrations have proved to be more fruitful.

This invention, when applied on gliders, avoiding the dangerous use of the lift spoilers, enables the glider to land exactly on the spot desired without handicaping the glider's stability and any eventual slip streams. This invention can be very quickly applied on any type of glider now in use, and it is therefore very useful for operations in the Far East. I would like to

1354

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 183017

on my offers and requests regarding my inventions and their developments.

I am specialised, as you know, in aerodinamic brakes in general. My invention helps to stabilize the aircraft and enables the pilot to control it at a very slow speed, with an absolute new phenomenon in flying technique, especially when, at a low speed and consequent support, the aircraft would normally overturn.

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This invention, when applied on gliders, avoiding the dangerous use of the lift spoilers, enables the glider to land exactly on the spot desired without handicaping the glider's stability and any eventual slip streams. This invention can be very quickly applied on any type of glider now in use, and it is therefore very useful for operations in the Far East. I would like to make a test flight with the AL. 12 P. transport glider, property of the I.A.F. and held by the I.A.F. in Lombarda di Cantù (Como). After the test flights, I shall be ready to personally inspect the modifications on the aircraft already based in that theatre of war.

Another important invention is the wind brake for dive bombing, which stabilises and keeps the aircraft on a straight course during the dive. An aircraft fitted with wind brakes under the wings can dive, with the brakes fully opened, at 70°-80° with a speed varieting between the normal maximum and minimum speed of the a/c. My third invention, which was secretly experimented in August 1943 and destroyed immediately after, enables any aircraft to leave the ground after a run 40% less of the usual take-off run. If we are prepared to sacrifice for a few minutes the take-off speed (by approx. a quarter) the aircraft will be able to rapidly gain a height of over 25% of the normal height.

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The above mentioned figures are so high that they are not reached in aeronautics where every improvement usually consists in extremely low percentage of the basic performances. I would not have mentioned these figures unless I was perfectly sure of them after rigorous successful test flights.

For these last two tests, I would like to have the L. 5 aircraft already assigned to me by the Allied Command, as per letter attached.

The request for this type of aircraft or a similar type must not surprise you, as it is my custom to test the prototypes on safe aircraft in order to enable the pilots to get used to the new inventions.

I shall be ready in the near future to modify any aircraft, even the difficult Baltimore or a similar type, or naval planes on aircraft carriers.

All the above mentioned fittings will not alter the aircraft characteristics and can be applied to every type of aircraft now in use.

The experimental alterations should be carried out by the Ambrosini Firm, Aeronautica Lombarda di Cantu, already visited by the Allied Commission, who authorised me the use of one L5 aircraft.

All the expenses to manufacture the prototypes will be met by me. I do not intend to ask for any refunds until my tests fully d demonstrate the great importance of this invention.

When the aircraft will be completed, petrol and other such requirements will have to be provided from Allied sources, in order to effect test flights, if you have no objections, on Venegono airfield, near the constructing firm.

During the period of work I would like to be supplied with M.T. petrol as it is indispensable that I use my car to cover the long distances from the Aeronautical Firms and the Airfields.

The construction expenses will be refunded to me when the importance of my inventions will be ascertained.

I left the lonely valley where I was hiding to refuse all collaboration with the nazi-fascists as soon as I was asked by the Allied Authorities to work for them. I accepted and am prepared to work with a very strong good will, thus fulfilling my duty as an

1356

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778041

The request for this type of aircraft or a similar type must not surprise you, as it is my custom to test the prototypes on safe aircraft in order to enable the pilots to get used to the new inventions.

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The construction expenses will be refunded to me when the importance of my inventions will be ascertained.

I left the lonely valley where I was hiding to refuse all collaboration with the nazi-fascists as soon as I was asked by the Allied Authorities to work for them. I accepted and am prepared to work with a very strong good will, thus fulfilling my duty as an Italian.

Best regards,

(s) G. M. BAILLRIC.

1124

N.B. Enclosed herewith are two albums with photographs and newspapers cuttings which I would like you to return after perusal.

TRANSLATED by Sgt. CUMBO.

1357

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1358

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Loose Minute.

10

TO : G/C. Palembang
And ~~Advn. Kiang.~~

AC

Future of Italian Armed Forces Enc 15

1. Reference is made to your verbal request for amplification of Paras. 6 and 7 of APPENDIX D of the A.F.H.Q. (M.J.P.S.) paper on the future of the Italian Armed Forces Issued as F/306/2nd Draft) dated 22nd July, 1945.

2. A breakdown of I.A.F. personnel employed within the ceiling is attached herewith, together with further remarks on the maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

Enc 7

H M F

(H. M. FISHER)
Wing Commander,
for Group Captain,
Allied Liaison Section.

26th July, 1945.

AAAF/A.200/A18.

13561

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

1. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force, as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000, with an addition of 3,000 which has been added to allow for the ex-co-operator companies now released from P.O.W. status, the division of such ceiling being :-

		31,000 ceiling	34,000 ceiling.
(a)	22,000	Operational Air Force	22,000
(b)	2,500	Employed by the R.A.F.	5,500
(c)	6,500	Employed by the U.S.A.A.F.	6,500

(a) OPERATIONAL AIR FORCE (22,000)

At the end of hostilities in Europe, the Italian Air Force as an operational force, ceased to exist. Certain units were, however, kept in being for employment under Allied Control in order to save R.A.F. manpower and equipment.

(b) Employed by the R.A.F. (2,500) + (3,000)

These personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for and supplementation of R.A.F. manpower as follows :-

(i) To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies.
(ii) To replace personnel who are required to return to U.K. or proceed to another theatre of war.
(iii) To give further assistance to R.A.F. Units who by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and/or labourers.

(c) Employed by the U.S.A.A.F.

It can be presumed the personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the U.S.A.A.F. are being employed on similar lines and circumstances as those employed by the R.A.F.

2. A breakdown of personnel based upon returns rendered as at 1st July, 1945, is as follows :-

ORGANISATION.	OFFICERS	NCO's.	TROOPS	TOTAL.
1. Air Ministry	561	481	467	1509
2. Unit Area which consists mainly of the operational side of the I.A.F. i.e. - Fighters - Bomber transport seaplanes & hydroplanes - Servicing Groups plus all backing thereof.	733	1711	4383	6827
3. Administrative Commands which consists of four Z.A.T.'s in various parts of the country				
No. 1 Z.A.T. Milan.	17	288	247	552
No. 2 Z.A.T. Padua	26	(Total of NCO's & trps. =669)		695
No. 3 Z.A.T. Rome	403	807	2568	3778
No. 4 Z.A.T. Bari.	532	1223	9193	10948
(which includes most of I.A.F. employed by U.S.A.A.F.)				

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(b) Employed by the R.A.F. (2,500) + (3,000)

These personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for and supplementation of R.A.F. manpower as follows :-

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No. 4 Z.A.T. Bari.	532	1223	9193	10948
(which includes most of I.A.F. employed by U.S.A.A.F.)				
4. Campania (Naples District)	119	294	1517	1930
5. Sicily Command (Palermo)	82	210	980	1272
6. Sardinia Command (Cagliari)	104	171	1443	1718
GRAND TOTALS	2577	5185	20798	29287

Note :- The above quoted figures do not include the Italian Air Force Companies (ex P.W. co-operator companies) transferred to the I.A.F. w.e.f. 1st July,1945, for which the additional ceiling of 3,000 was created. There are eleven of these Companies in Italy having an approximate strength of 3113 personnel.

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3. A further breakdown of Unit Area (item 2) can be given as follows:-

FIGHTERS — No. 4 Stormo or Wings — 647 personnel.
No. 5 " " " — 509 "
No. 51 " " " — 583 "

BOMBER-TRANSPORTS. — 2275 personnel.

SEAPLANES & HYDROPLANES
Used on air/sea rescue etc.
No. 82 Gruppo or Sqdn. — 198 personnel.
83 " " " — 165 "
84 " " " — 204 "
85 " " " — 167 "
Hydroplanes — 145 "

TECHNICAL SERVICING GROUPS - LECCE. — Fighters — 404 "
Bombers — 219 "

O.T.U's. — Leverano — 320 "
Frosinone — 516 "

MINISTER'S FLIGHT. — Bari — 108 "

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4. With regard to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force, it is the intention that the I.A.F. shall be self-supporting in all respects, with the following exceptions :-

P.O.L. and tyres.
Rations.
Technical Equipment: necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft which are on loan to the Italian Air Force, plus provision of electric goods, such as wet and dry batteries, on a small scale, until conditions within the country become easier.

Reference is also made to clothing and providing the present bid for clothing etc., is fully met, it is stated that the Italian Air Force will be self-supporting in respect of clothing thereafter.

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Room Minute.

15

War Cabinet. Tirpitz.

Encl

Indian Ship Tirpitz.

1. The attached memorandum has been sent by Combined Bureau.

2. During meeting this was held study various have been raised on Appendix B (provided by Admiralty) information supplied by ADSEC (See Encls 5 of A261/1/45.):-

Para. 6 - Personnel.

It is stated to have a breakdown of personnel to show engagement thereof.

Para. 7 - Maintenance of E.A.F.

"To be self-supporting in every way except Fuel".

Query - The with Naval Stores.
Who will provide them.

3. Fuel is to be required direct to S/S.

Refueling.

4. Portland meeting will be held on Monday morning.

F. Warbsle
(P.A.C.)
Naval Secretary.
Allied Liaison Section.

(Encl 5)

ATM 202/1.10.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LOOSE MINUTE

To : A.F.I.S.

Ref: HQMAAF/S.44/1/Air.

Use of Lake Bracciano as a Seaplane Base.

1. Reference is made to your loose minute MAAF/4200/AIS dated 21st July, 1945.

2. A.F.H.Q. now state that the restrictions imposed on the use of Lake Bracciano cannot be withdrawn, as yet.

3. We do not accept this and have gone back to A.F.H.Q. demanding that they withdraw their restrictions.

P.C. WEBB,+
Wing Commander,
Operations.

28th July, 1945.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

13

From : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

To : Allied Force Headquarters, G-3, Operations.

Date : 28th July, 1945.

Ref. : HQMAAF/S.44/1/Air.

Use of Lake Bracciano as a Seaplane Base.

1. Reference our HQMEDAF/S.44/1/Air dated 25th July and your reply 236/1 dated 27th July 1945.

2. Your reply is unacceptable to this Headquarters. This matter has been under discussion since November 1944.

3. It will be realised that the present situation is most unsatisfactory. We have always met you in this matter, but it is now essential that a firm policy be laid down, and it is requested that you give this Headquarters a definite date in the immediate future when we may use Lake Bracciano unconditionally as a seaplane base for the Italian Air Force.

P.C. WEBB,
Wing Commander,
for Air Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief,
R.A.F. MED.M.E.

Copy to: A.L.S.

1365

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FROM: AIR PORCES [illegible] COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F. (A.L.S.)

DATE: 25TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/826/ITG.

RESTRICTED.

MANUFACTURE AND SUPPLY OF ITALIAN TYPE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

It has been reported that FIAT have all components for the reassembly of 21 G.55 fighter aircraft, and that they have the majority of components for a further 21 aircraft. These aircraft are built with DB.605A engines, of which there are also a quantity available. For your information these were manufactured in Italy under license, although they are a German type engine. These aircraft were at one time assembled, but apparently the Germans ordered that they were to be broken down.

2. As there appears to be no possibility of replacing aircraft wastage in the 6 Fighter squadrons at present in the Italian Air Force, it is requested that permission be allowed to reassemble 21 G.55's, and that a decision on the further 23 be made when more details are known, and when perhaps the future policy is better known. The assembly of these 21 aircraft will help materially in providing badly needed employment for the workers in the North. It may be wise to inform the Italian Air Ministry that authority to reassemble these aircraft is given provided an equivalent number of Macchi 202 and 205 aircraft be stored without maintenance.

3. The G.55 aircraft seem to have had a better performance than the existing Macchi 205, but on British standards might be considered as obsolescent. A comparative table showing specifications of Italian type fighter aircraft is attached herewith.

I. S. BIGGLES,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF RIVAL AIRCRAFT.

Specifications and performances.	A/c No.205.	A/C G.55.	A/C Re.2005.	ITALY
Description:	Monoplane - Low wing. Cantilever. Single engine. Single seater. Metallic construction. Retractable landing gear. Flaps.	-	-	
Engine:	DB.605. 1250 HP at 19,000 feet. 2,600 r.p.m.	-	-	
Max speed:	378 mph at 16.400 feet. 385 " at 22,960 " 376 " at 26,240 "	384 mph at 16,400 feet. 403 " at 19,690 "	365 mph at 13,120 feet 385 " at 19,690 " 397 " at 22,960 "	
Landing speed:	90 mph			
Climbing:	At 16,400 feet in 4'6" At 26,240 feet in 8'10"	At 19,690 feet in 5'	At 13,120 feet in 3'29" At 26,246 feet in 7'56"	
Range:	At 312 mph and at the height of 19,500 feet - 415 miles 1h 24'	849 miles - 2 hours 40'	At 320 mph and at a height of 21,450 ft: 775 miles. 2h 24'	
Em. weight:	5,660 lbs	5,208 lbs	4,950 lbs	
Useful load:	1,170 lbs	1,514 lbs	1,914 lbs	
Total weight:	6,820 lbs	6,720 lbs	6,864 lbs	
Dimensions:	Span 34.44 feet Length 29.19 " Height 10 "	Span 36.86 feet Length 30.14 " Height 10.59 "	Span 36.68 feet Length 28.63 "	
Surface:	180.7 sq feet	225.96 sq feet.	219.5 sq feet.	

Specifications and performances.	a/c Hc.205.	a/c G.55.	a/c He.2005
Wing load and load per H.P.	37 lbs per sq ft. 1.12 H.P. per lb.	29.8 lbs per sq ft. 1.11 H.P. per lb.	31.4 lbs per sq ft. 1.13 H.P. per lb.
Bomb load:	Small torpedo of about 750 lbs at the experimental stage.		

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Loose Minute.

9

see Ene 13414.

To:- D/D. Ops.

56 Pt 2

Use of Iolo Procedure as a Semplane Base.

1. Reference is made to your loose minute MEDIAP/S.44/1/Air dated 18th. May, 1945. in which you state that Allied Force Headquarters have agreed that Iolo Procedure is no longer required as a training area and that 6 weeks would elapse before the R.A.F. establishment would be closed down and the area evacuated.

2. This decision is not known at Headquarters No.1. Training Establishment R.A.F. who in fact are working on a programme which may not be completed until October.

3. Allied Force Headquarters should be asked to clarify the position as the Air Forces Sub-Commission have had no notification of the change of policy and are ready to take over Vigna di Valle as the terminus of their Semplane Courier Service and also as a Base for their Air/Sea Rescue commitments in the Gulf of Genoa.

(H.M. Fisher),
Wing Commander,
for Group Captain,
Allied Liaison Section.

Date:- 21st. July, 1945.

Ref:- MAAF/APOO/AIR.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8

From : Air Forces Sub Commission, A.C., Rome.

To : H.Q. M.A.A.F.
(Copy to R.A.A.C.).

Date : 18th July 1945

Ref. : AFSC/47/AIR.

67
P-2

BRACCIANO LAKE. SEAPLANE BASE

Reference is made to your letter MAAF/4200/AIR, dated 24 May 1945 in which you state that Allied Force Headquarters have agreed that Lake Bracciano is no longer required as a training area and that six weeks would elapse before the R.A.C. establishment would be closed down and the area evacuated.

2. This decision is not known at Headquarters No 1 Training Establishment R.A.C. who in fact are working on a programme which may not be completed until November.

3. Allied Force Headquarters should be asked to clarify the position as we have had no notification of the change of policy and are ready to take over Virgo if valle at the termination of our Seaplane Courier Service, and also as a base for our Air Sea Rescue commitments in the Gulf of Genoa.

SENIOR STAFF OFFICER,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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P/306 (1st draft)

D R A F T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES 17 July 1945

OBJECT

1. To examine the present constitution of the Italian armed forces in the light of the proposal to hand over responsibility for the administration of Northern ITALY, less disputed territory (VENEZIA GIULIA, TARVISIO and BOLZANO) to the Italian Government by 30 September, and, pending a final settlement at the Peace Conference, to make recommendations regarding the policy which should be adopted towards these forces and the method by which they should be supplied and equipped.

INTERNAL SITUATION IN ITALY

2. a. The Italian Government

Although the Italian Government is ostensibly representative of the six major political parties in the country its authority in fact at present rests on the presence of Allied troops. Neither the Italian army at present at the disposal of the Government nor the Carabinieri are able to cope with even local distrubances. The economic situation is rapidly deteriorating and with or without the intervention of the political parties, is likely soon to develop into labor disturbances beyond the Government's power to control.

b. Italian Frontiers

ITALY will shortly become responsible for her own frontiers except for the special areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, TARVISIO, BOLZANO and the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier. In the latter case we are committed to retaining Allied troops

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b. Italian Frontiers

ITALY will shortly become responsible for her own frontiers except for the special areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, TARVISIO, BOLZANO and the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier. In the latter case we are committed to retaining Allied troops on the frontier as long as such troops are available. They will probably no longer be available by the end of the year. These areas are being retained as an Allied commitment until the final Peace Treaty. ITALY's remaining frontiers, however, do not involve her in any serious commitment because they are guaranteed by the Allies until a final settlement is made at the Peace Conference.

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c. Internal Security

The industrial cities of MILAN, TURIN and GENOA will be the scenes of labor disturbances arising in the first instance from economic causes but liable at any time to be used by political parties for their ends. These disturbances have already begun. They may within two months and certainly with the onset of winter reach serious proportions.

PRESENT STATE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

3. Italian Navy.

A summary of the present state of the Italian navy is given at Appendix A.

4. Italian Army including Carabinieri

a. Italian Army

The Italian army at present consists nominally of three categories, BRITI'S, USITI'S and ITI-ITI's. The BRITI's and USITI's are under the complete control of the Allies. The ITI*ITI'S were intended for employment under the Italian Government but a proportion of this category is now also under complete Allied control. Practically the whole of the Italian army is therefore under Allied control. Details of its present composition are given in Appendix B.

b. Carabinieri

The Carabinieri with the strength of about 65,000 has never, even in pre Fascist days been either popular or efficient. It is unreliable, corrupt and quite incapable of dealing with any serious disturbances which may arise. With the Carabinieri may be taken the Italian Intelligence Service (SIM). It is incurably tainted with Fascism and now strongly supports the monarchy. Its present strength is 3123 of which approx 700 are officers.

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5. Italian Air Force.

A summary of the present state of the Italian air force is given at Appendix C.

FUTURE OF ITALIAN ~~ARMED~~ FORCES

6. In MAF 1013 the Combined Chiefs of Staff were urgently asked to state their policy regarding the future of the Italian army. It is understood that the provisions of final peace treaty with ITALY are now under consideration but a

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early decision on the military terms to be imposed is unlikely. It is generally believed however that

a. The Italian Navy will be utilized to the fullest extent during the war against JAPAN. Its eventual disposal is uncertain.

b. The Italian army will be limited eventually to a ceiling of approximately 200,000 men, plus 65,000 Carabinieri.

c. The Italian air force will be drastically reduced, but its eventual size is unknown.

7. ITALIAN NAVY

The turn over of territory to the Italian Government does not necessitate any corresponding transfer of the Italian Navy. In view of the many uses to which it can be usefully put during the Japanese war, it is considered that the Italian Navy should be maintained at its present strength pending instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

8. ITALIAN ARMY

a. Upon the handover of the Northern provinces of ITALY to the Italian Government, probably by 30 September, the Italian Government will be faced with the necessity of maintaining internal security, law and order, and the integrity of certain of her frontiers. In order to carry out these functions, she must necessarily have at her disposal an adequate force of combat and service troops and of Carabinieri. It therefore follows that such forces should be turned over to the Italian Government at approximately the same date, i.e., 30 September, or as soon thereafter as practicable. This is also in conformity with the established policy of handing over to the Italian Government as many of her national responsibilities as possible, as expeditiously as she is able to reassume them.

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b. The governing factors in such a handover are:

(1) The Allied requirements for service and guard units.

(2) The requirements of the Italian Government.

(3) The administrative implications

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9. ALLIED REQUIREMENTS

With the turn over of all Italian Metropoliten territory, except disputed areas, to the Italian Government, the only troops we shall require to retain under Allied control are:

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a. Service troops, which will be progressively reduced as they are replaced by German POW Units, as follows:

(1) BR-ITI - 86,000 (Adm units in direct support of British forces)

(2) US-ITI - 83,000 (Adm units in direct support of US forces)

b. Guard units, which will gradually be reduced as Allied dumps, installation etc., are eaten up or closed down:

(1) BR-ITI - 24,800 (guard units on British installations etc)

10. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS

a. In order to carry out its functions, the Italian Government must have at its disposal

(1) Combat troops.

(2) Control machinery.

(3) Administrative and training machinery.

The transfer of operational control of these units need not be delayed by an inability on the part of the Italian Government to assume administrative responsibility for their maintenance. This should however follow as soon as possible.

b. It is considered that in order to assume its operational responsibilities the Italian Government will require a combat force of 99,000 men. The layout on which this is based is shown below. It must be remembered that the actual troops involved at present are not of great military value and in particular should not be relied on toohighly in political or economic disturbances. There will be however a diminishing Allied force available to back up the Italian Government in case of necessity.

(1) Control

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(1) Control

S.A.C. and H of W - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	2,000
Territorial Regional Hqs.- - - - - - - - - -	7,000

(2) Troops

Five Combat Gps and Garibaldi Regt- - - - -	50,000
SICILY (as now) two IS Divisions - - - - - -	10,000
SARDINIA (as now) one IS Division - - - - -	5,000
Ten IS Bdes (one per Terr. Region - - - - - excl SICILY	25,000
	99,000

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c. Carabinieri

The establishment for Carabinieri has been 65,000 for some years. There appears to be no reason for any alteration at present to this figure. In view of its extreme unpopularity and inefficiency, it is most desirable that this force be thoroughly overhauled at once.

d. At the same time as it assumes Op responsibilities, the Italian Government should assume Adm responsibility for the forces in Sub-para (b) above. This may not be possible but it should take place as soon thereafter as possible. The requirements for Adm responsibility is estimated as:

Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	31,000
Trng & Rfts - - - - - - - - - - - - -	10,000
	41,000

11. a. It is considered that the interim force should be handed over to the Italian Government in two stages, as follows:

(1) Stage I, which should take effect at the same time as the bulk of the northern provinces are handed back (i.e. by 30 Sept.) During this stage the Italian Government will assume operational responsibility for command and combat troops (99,000).

(2) Stage II, which should take place as soon after Stage I as possible. During this stage the Italian Government will assume administrative responsibility for command, combat, and administrative troops, and the Carabinieri (205,000).

b. Specifically, this interim force can be provided as follows:

Present Units	Strength
Combat forces (BG-ITI) - - - - - - - - - - - -	64,000

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Present Units	Strength
Combat forces (BR-ITI) - - - - - - - - - - - -	64,000
Security Divisions (ITI-ITI) - - - - - - - - -	15,000
Italian Command, Adm. Control Machinery - - - - - - - - - - - -	3,000
Italian Adm Services (ITI-ITI) - - - - - - - - -	24,000
Carabinieri (ITI-ITI) - - - - - - - - - - - - -	65,000
Necessary recruitments - - - - - - - - - - - - -	34,000
TOTAL	205,000

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12. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

13. ITALIAN AIR FORCE

It is considered that the Italian air force should continue to be supplied and maintained at its present strength.

14. CONCLUSIONS

There is every indication that the Italian Government will be faced with considerable problems of unrest during the next few months from both political and economic causes.

15. The Allied requirements for service and guard troops will continue for some time and must continue to be met by the provision of BRI-ITI and US-ITI.

16. It is considered that the force outlined in para 11 when it is handed back to them should be sufficient for the Italian Government to maintain law and order. It must be remembered however that these are not first class troops and they may require backing from Allied forces initially. It is recommended that an active Allied Military Mission should be maintained with the Italian Army to supervize its reorganization and to assist in its operational and administrative training.

17. The Carabinieri and Italian Intelligence Service are corrupt, inefficient and and these forces in their present form are not to be relied on in dealing with

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17. The Carabinieri and Italian Intelligence Service are corrupt, inefficient and and these forces in their present form are not to be relied on in dealing with internal disturbances. It is recommended that they should be abolished and replaced by other more efficient organizations, similar in fucntion. This should be supervized by an Allied Police Mission, similar to that now in CAIRO. Until such time as the reorganization can be effective, Allied control should be established on the Carabinieri and Italian Intelligence Service to ensure their efficient operation during the next difficult months.

18. The Italian Navy and Air Force should continue to be supplied and maintained at their present strengths, pending further instructions from the CCS.

19. Administration, supplies and equipment.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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APPENDIX A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

ITALIAN NAVY

1. Personnel.

Accurate figures are impossible to obtain but estimated figures are:

74,000 Officers and Men

2. Warships.

The present strength of Italian warships is given below. These refer to ships either in use or which could be commissioned if necessary.

Battleships	5	
Cruisers	9	
Destroyers	10	
Torpedo Boats	21	
Corvettes	19	(of which 6 are now being converted to minesweepers)
Submarines	30	

3. Of the above, 3 Cruisers and 1 Destroyer are operating under CINC MED, who has operational call on all Italian ships.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNB No. 785017

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P/306 (1st Draft)

APPENDIX B

PRESENT STATUS OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

GENERAL

1. The Italian Army is largely under Allied operational control and is dependent on a major measure of Allied administrative assistance to perform its operational role.

PRESENT POSITION

2. Composition of the Italian Army

a. There is no clear cut definition of the various categories of the Italian forces which together form the present Italian Army. These categories have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which it is maintained are now matters of considerable complexity.

b. The Italian Army can be divided into the following general categories :-

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/ Iti Iti/Iti	Numbers (round figures)	Remarks
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garibaldi Regt and certain auxiliary combat units and ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance.

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P/306 (1st Draft)

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b. The Italian Army can be divided into the following general categories :-

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/ Iti Iti/Iti	Numbers (round figures)	Remarks
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garibaldi Regt and certain auxiliary combat units and ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance.

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PRESENT POSITION

2. Composition of the Italian Army

a. There is no clear cut definition of the various categories of the Italian forces which together form the present Italian Army. These categories have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which it is maintained are now matters of considerable complexity.

b. The Italian Army can be divided into the following general categories :-

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/ Iti Iti/Iti	Numbers (round figures)	Remarks
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garibaldi Regt and certain auxiliary combat units and ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance.
2	Service units and personnel in support of Allied requirements	Br/Iti	86,000	Consisting of administrative units on Allied WE/TO employed in direct support of British and US forces in the theatre. They are under complete Allied control though their administration is largely effected through the Italian administrative organisation (Serials 5 and 6). In this category are included the Italian Administrative Division Headquarters which in some degree are responsible for the administration of these service units.
		US/Iti	83,000	

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Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti Iti/Iti	Numbers (round figures)	Remarks
3	Italian security divisions	Iti/Iti	15,000	Comprising two divisions in SICILY and one division in SARDINIA. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
4	Italian units under Allied operational comd.	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising guard units on Allied installations, intelligence units, certain AC transport units, mine clearance and "refugee" units. These units, while Iti/Iti, are in effect borrowed from the Italian Government and are under Allied operational control.
5	Italian Command adm control machinery.	Iti/Iti	3,000	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
6	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army units and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	These are under the control of the Italian Government where territory has been handed back to the government, and under Allied Military Government control where the territory is

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				SARDINIA. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
4	Italian units under Allied operational comd.	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising guard units on Allied installations, intelligence units, certain AC transport units, mine clearance and "refugee" units. These units, while Iti/Iti, are in effect borrowed from the Italian Government and are under Allied operational control.
5	Italian Command adm control machinery.	Iti/Iti	3,000	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
6	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army units and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	These are under the control of the Italian Government where territory has been handed back to the government, and under Allied Military Government control where the territory is still administered by Allied Military Government.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785019

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APPENDIX C

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

See Enc 3.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

1. On the termination of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force, on the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ceased to exist, and a new policy was necessary, covering the interim period between the present and the Peace Conference, as to the manner in which the IAF could be used to the advantage of the Allies.

2. The following policy was suggested to, and approved by, the Air Ministry.

a. That an internal Air Transport Service should be initiated and operated by the IAF, under the supervision of Headquarters MAAF, of a size sufficient to meet the needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian Civil Administration.

b. That the Baltimores, on loan from the RAF should be converted to passenger transport under Italian industrial arrangements. These aircraft will still be on loan and not transferred to the IAF.

c. That the IAF be allowed to retain the Spitfire V's, P-39's and Macchis for the time being and the pilots allowed to fly to keep in practice. (The USAAF agreed that the P-39's could be so used, pending settlement of final policy for these aircraft).

d. That a certain number of seaplanes could be used for an Air Sea Rescue Servi

AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE.

3. The Air Transport Service, which for the present consists of a hetrogeneous collection of old passenger and bomber types listed below, is now operating on the following lines:

a. Landplanes.

Rome - Naples - Bari - Lecce.
Rome - Palermo.
Rome - Bologna - Milan - Treviso - Bologna - Rome.

b. Seaplanes.

Bracciano - Cagliari - (with Naples as a secondary port of call)
Taranto - Augusta.

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a. That an internal Air Transport Service should be initiated and operated by the IAF, under the supervision of Headquarters MAAF, of a size sufficient to meet the needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian Civil Administration.

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b. Seaplanes.

Bracciano - Cagliari - (with Naples as a secondary port of call)
Taranto - Augusta.

It is proposed to extend this service to include Genoa, Leghorn and Venice.

Consideration is being given at the present time, as to the possibility of placing these services under the operational control, and within the framework of, MATS OR No. 216 Group. Such a step would ensure a greater measure of efficiency and control over the Italian air lines. Furthermore, practically all personnel employed on the Staging Posts would be drawn from the IAF, thus a considerable saving in British manpower would be effected. RAF officers and a minimum of RAF OR's would supervise the Staging Posts.

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The Baltimores, when converted, will provide another 32 aircraft for transport work, but will be a dying commitment as no bulk spares will be supplied.

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AIR/SEA RESCUE.

4. Seaplane Squadrons of the IAF continue to operate around the lower leg of ITALY, under the operational control of MEDAF. It is the intention to utilise to the greatest extent, the IAF for Air/Sea Rescue services. Proposals have been put forward that the IAF operate over the whole of the ADRIATIC, as well as, if the number of aircraft permit, the Western Coast of ITALY. For the moment about 35 aircraft are being used on these duties.

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

5. The fighter aircraft, have no further operational role to perform, and are being concentrated at Lecce.

Fighter pilots are being allowed to keep in flying practice, but this has been reduced to a maximum of 6 hours per mensum.

TRAINING.

6. The Italian OTU is being used for conversion of pilots and other members of aircrews, to Courier Transport work.

Although there is no Flying Control School, Italian officers are being trained by working alongside RAF Flying Control officers on stations where the IAF and RAF operate.

Instruction in Administration is being considered, and the Italian Air Ministry are endeavouring to organise courses for Italian officers.

MAN-POWER.

7. The strength of the IAF is below the authorised ceiling of 31,000. This is explained by reason of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry is discharging various call up classes, according to the Italian Law, whilst recruiting, on the other hand is proceeding at a slightly slower pace. This will balance itself in the near future.

8. Below is a list of the total amount of aircraft possessed by the Italian Air Force at the moment:

Aircraft	Type	Quantity	Total
British and American types	P/39	100	
	Baltimore	45	
	Spitfire	13	158
Italian types	Macchi 205	33	
	Macchi 202	38	
	Macchi 200	26	

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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	Macchi 202	38	
	Macchi 200	26	
	R.E. 2002	15	
	R.E. 2001	13	
	S.M. 84	7	
	S.M. 82	21	
	S.M. 81	1	
	S.M. 79	28	
	Cant Z	11	
	Cant Z 506B	24	
	Cant Z 506F	13	
	Cant Z 501	24	
	R.S. 14	11	
	C.R. 42	10	
Other types (non-operational)		71	346

Approx. 240 serviceable

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From:- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters M.A.A.F., C.M.F.

To :- A.F.H.Q.

Date:- 19th July, 1945.

Ref :- MAAF/4220/ALS.

Italian Air Force Interim Policy

Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy has been put forward by Headquarters M.A.A.F., and approved by the British Air Ministry. The policy is in direct support of the Allied Air Forces efforts and will result in a considerable saving of Allied manpower.

The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-

1. Italian Air Force Courier Services :

In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the Italian Air Force will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on courier services. These services are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly, for Allied officials of Allied Forces and, thirdly, for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on government service. The aircraft to be used on these services are any Italian aircraft as approved by the Air Forces Sub-Commission for this work, together with the two Baltimore Squadrons on loan to the Italian Air Force from the Allies; such aircraft being converted for passenger carrying.

Spares and components to back the Italian aircraft will be handed over to the Italian Air Force as required at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. British spares and components will continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force through the A.F.S.C. in order to permit the Baltimores to have a useful life.

2. Italian Seaplanes.

These will be primarily employed for AIR/SEA Rescue services together with such boats crews and Marine Craft as are in possession of the Italian Air Force.

The intention of this is to replace Allied Air Sea Rescue Services on their withdrawal from these areas.

3. Fighter Aircraft.

Italian fighter aircraft, Spitfire V's, P.39's will be concentrated in one place. The Allied fighter aircraft will continue to be on loan to the I.A.F. Fighter pilots to be allowed to keep in flying skill, each pilot restricted to a maximum of 6 hours per month. The intention being that the fighter pilot may be [illegible] aircraft when the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 18587

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4. Ground Courses for Officers and Flying Personnel.

Administrative and Disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. should be commenced in order to improve the individual standards.

Engine Handling Courses in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil.

Flying Control Courses in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline.

These courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without material assistance from the Allies in personnel

110. Aircraft Factories...../

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NND No. 759017

5. Aircraft Factories and Material in the North.

These to be permitted to complete manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space allotted to the Italian Air Force for the overhaul of Italian aircraft already in use.

6. PERSONNEL.

Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (~~34,000~~ 31000) and not essential to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force, to be declared to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy and possibly overseas. At present approximately 20,000 are being employed within the programme outlined above and approximately 12,000 are working directly with the U.S.A.A.F. and the R.A.F. formations. It is the intention to reduce the operational ceiling as and when the size of the force outlined above has been determined.

7. Maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in P.O.L. Each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that international standards may be attained; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organisation and meteorological organisation.

8. Control.

The Air Forces Sub-Commission is vested in the operational control of the Italian Air Force; the administrative responsibility being that of the Italian Air Force.

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It will be seen that in the outline of the above policy, that in the event of further territories being handed over to the administrative control of the Italian Government, it is not intended to place any part of the Italian Air Force under the operational control of the Italian Government.

(H. K. FISHER)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788017

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(H. M. FISHER)
Wing Commander,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/SAF, MAAF.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

From:- Allied Liaison Section, Headquarters M.A.A.F., C.M.F.

To :- G.4. (Log Plans), A.F.H.Q.

Date:- 17th July, 1945.

Ref :- MAAF/4200/ALS

Italian Air Force

1. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force, as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is 31,000.
The division of this total is as follows :-

22,000 Operational Air Force (in process of being reduced)
6,500 Employed by the U.S.A.A.F.
2,500 Employed by the R.A.F.

Non-Operational Personnel (2,500) - Policy.

2. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for, and implementation of, R.A.F. man-power.
(a) } To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies.
(b) } To replace personnel who are required to return to the United Kingdom or proceed to another theatre of war.
(c) To give further assistance to Units who, by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and labourers.

Skilled personnel are employed in workshops of M.U's., whilst the rest are employed as labourers, guards and general duties men.

3. The responsibility for the administration of these Italians remains that of the Italian Air Force, in everything but the provision of accommodation and domestic requirements.

4. Where there are 25 to 30 personnel, an Italian officer is in charge.

5. All Italian Air Force personnel are subject to the Italian Military Law, which is administered by the Italian officers in accordance with the Italian code.

Operational (22,000) - Policy.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff decreed that, at the end of hostilities in Europe, the Italian Air Force as an operational force would cease to exist. However, permission was obtained to keep certain units in being in order to save R.A.F. manpower and aircraft.

7. These Units consist of 3 Air Sea Rescue Squadrons comprising approximately 35 aircraft, and a heterogeneous collection of obsolete Italian transport and bomber types for transport work. There are also

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

22,000 Operational Air Force (Appendix "A")
6,500 Employed by the U.S.A.A.F.
2,500 Employed by the R.A.F.

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7. These Units consist of 3 Air Sea Rescue Squadrons comprising approximately 35 aircraft, and a heterogeneous collection of obsolete Italian transport and bomber types for transport work. There are also two squadrons of Baltimores now being converted to a transport role, but these will be a dying commitment as it has been decided that no bulk spares will be supplied. In order to back these Units, an O.T.U. carries on the training of pilots, navigators and wireless operators. Fighter pilots are allowed to do 5 hours flying per month for training purposes.

Man-Power.

8. The strength of the I.A.F. is below the authorised ceiling of 31,000. This is explained by reason of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry is discharging various call up classes, according to the Italian Law, whilst recruiting, on the other hand is proceeding at a slightly slower pace. This will balance itself in the near future.

(H. M. FISHER)
Wing Commander,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/R&P, MedSAC.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNB No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782017

From : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (M.A.A.F.

To : Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.

Date : 12th July 1945.

Ref : MAAF/5130/1/Maint.Plans.

13 Pt 2

Utilisation of Italian Factories in Northern Italy

Reference your AFSC/829/ENG dated May 25th 1945, the suggested utilisation of Italian Factories in Northern Italy has been given considerable thought by D. of M.&.S. The conclusion reached is that there is no useful purpose to be served in applying it to the repair or manufacture of R.A.F. equipment.

2. The main reasons for this decision are as follows :

(i) The reduction in both size and intensity of use of our aircraft and vehicles imposed by current and forward requirements have resulted in our own capacity for repair being equal to the task.

(ii) The manpower (BOR) shortage dictates that supervisory personnel could only be made available at the expense of existing R.A.F. repair facilities.

(iii) It would be six months before such factories would show any return.

(iv) Throughout the Italian campaign numerous suggestions to employ Italian factories under Italian management have been made. The Local Resources Board of A.F.H.Q. considers bids for these facilities, and in each case it has been found, on more detailed investigation, that the R.A.F. would not benefit. The conditions imposed would make the factory a liability rather than an asset.

J.J. Tilson

Air Commodore,
Chief Maintenance Staff Officer,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.F.

Copy to : A.L.S.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788017

S E C R E T
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From:- Allied ...ison Section, Headquarters M... .F., C.M.F.

To :- G.S. Ops, A.F.H.Q.

Date:- 16th July, 1945.

Ref :- MAAF/4200/ALS.

Note. This comprises Appendix "C" to Enclosure 7 [illegible]

Italian Air Force

On the termination of hostilities in Europe the Italian Air Force, on the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ceased to exist, and a new policy was necessary, covering the interim period between the present and the Peace Conference, as to the manner in which the I.A.F. could be used to the advantage of the Allies.

2. The following policy was suggested to, and approved by, the Air Ministry.

(a) That an internal Air Transport Service should be initiated and operated by the IAF, under the supervision of Headquarters MAAF, of a size sufficient to meet the needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian Civil Administration.

(b) That the Baltimores, on loan from the RAF should be converted to passenger transport under Italian industrial arrangements. These aircraft will still be on loan and not transferred to the IAF.

(c) That the IAF be allowed to retain the Spitfire V's, P.39's and Macchis for the time being and the pilots allowed to fly to keep in practice. (The USAAF agreed that the P.39's could be so used, pending settlement of final policy for these aircraft).

(d) That a certain number of seaplanes could be used for an Air Sea Rescue Service.

Air Transport Service.

3. The Air Transport Service, which for the present consists of a heterogeneous collection of old passenger and bomber types listed below, is now operating on the following lines:

(a) Landplanes.
Rome - Naples - Bari - Lecce.
Rome - Palermo.
Rome - Bologna - Milan - Treviso - Bologna - Rome.

(b) Seaplanes.
Brindisi - Cagliari - (with Naples as a secondary port of call)
Taranto - Augusta.

could be used to the advantage of the Allies.

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It is proposed to extend this service to include Genoa, Leghorn and Venice.

Consideration is being given at the present time, as to the possibility of placing these services under the operational control, and within the framework of, M.A.I.S. OR No. 216 Group. Such a step would ensure a greater measure of efficiency and control over the Italian air lines. Furthermore, practically all personnel employed on the Staging Posts would be drawn from the IAF, thus a considerable saving in British manpower would be effected. RAF officers and a minimum of RAF OR's would supervise the Staging Posts.

The Baltimores, when converted, will provide another 32 aircraft for Transport work, but will be a dying commitment as no bulk spares will be supplied.

Air/Sea Rescue.

4. Seaplane squadrons of the IAF continue to operate around the lower leg of Italy, under the operational control of M.A.C.A.F.

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It is the intent to utilise to the greatest extent, the IAF for Air/Sea Rescue services. Proposals have been put forward that the IAF operate over the whole of the Adriatic, as well as, if the number of aircraft permit, the Western Coast of Italy. For the moment about 35 aircraft are being used on these duties.

Fighter Aircraft.

5. The Fighter aircraft, have no further operational role to perform, and are being concentrated at Lecce.

Fighter pilots are being allowed to keep in flying practice, but this has been reduced to a maximum of 6 hours per mensum.

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Man-Power.

7. The strength of the IAF is below the authorised ceiling of 31,000. This is explained by reason of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry is discharging various call up classes, according to the Italian Law, whilst recruiting, on the other hand is proceeding at a slightly slower pace. This will balance itself in the near future.

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	S.M. 81	1	

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The Italian C.R.D. is being used for conversion of pilots and other members of aircrews, to Courier Transport work.

Although there is no Flying Control School, Italian officers are being trained by working alongside RAF Flying Control officers on stations where the IAF and RAF operate.

Instruction in Administration is being considered, and the Italian Air Ministry are endeavouring to organise courses for Italian officers.

Man-Power.

The strength of the IAF is below the authorised ceiling of 31,000. This is explained by reason of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry in discharging various call up classes, according to the Italian Law, whilst recruiting, on the other hand is proceeding at a slightly slower pace. This will balance itself in the near future.

8. Below is a list of the total amount of aircraft possessed by the Italian Air Force at the moment.:

Aircraft	Type	Quantity.	Total.
British and American types.	P.39	100	
	Baltimore	45	
	Spitfire	13	
	Total		158
Italian types.	Macchi 205	33	
	Macchi 202	38	
	Macchi 200	26	
	R.S. 2002	15	
	R.S. 2001	13	
	S.M. 84	7	
	S.M. 82	21	
	S.M. 81	1	
	S.M. 79	28	
	Cant Z	11	110
	Cant Z 506B	24	
	Cant Z 506F	13	
	Cant Z 501	24	
	R.S. 14	11	
	C.R. 42	10	
Other Types - (non-operational)		71	
	Total		346

Approx. 240 Serviceable.

(E. M. FISHER)
Wing Commander,
for Air Vice-Marshal,
Chief of Staff/RAF, MedME.

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Loose Minute

TO : W/Cdr. H.M. Fisher.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY

1. Reference the attached proposed draft received from the Airforces Sub-Commission; fundamentally, this draft appears to fit the bill and I think we can agree to it being sent to the Italian Air Ministry, subject to the deletion of the following words :-

(a) Para. 2. Sub-Para. (iii) "will be allotted as required by the Allies on loan".

Sub-Para. (xiii) "and possibly overseas and so help in the war against Japan".

Para. 4. Sub-Para. (i) "and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft".

2. Reference PART II.

A conference should be called to discuss the various implications referred to. The agenda should be prepared by the A.F.S.C., after comments have been submitted by this Headquarters.

(C. CONROY)
Squadron Leader.

11th July, 1945.

HQAF/1200/A.S.

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FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F. C.M.F. (A.L.S.) ✓
COPY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

DATE: 9TH JULY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

With reference to the conversation between AIR VICE-MARSHAL BAKER, AIR VICE-MARSHAL BRODIE and GROUP CAPTAIN REID at CASERTA on the 5th July, the attached draft of a letter which it is proposed to send to the Italian Air Ministry is forwarded for approval.

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

File on
W 200.

W/T.
W 200.

DRAFT.

[redacted]

[redacted] H.Q. M.A.A.F. C.M.F. FOR APPROVAL.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.

PART I - POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircrew to keep in flying practise rather than to become more efficient in war-like exercises, and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-

(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of ROME are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and

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3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-

(i) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of ROME are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from ROME are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied Officers of the Allied Forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the I.A.F, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

(ii) The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue

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services, together with such boats crews and marine craft as will be made available to the I.A.F.

(iii) Allied type aircraft will be allotted as required by the Allies on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P.39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the I.A.F, but aircraft wastage will not be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practise will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of six hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

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(vi) The Air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the I.A.F. until such time as authorisation from the A.F.S.C. for its use by the I.A.F. is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/EQ of the 30th June.

(vii) The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small

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amount of fa[illegible]ory space will be allotted to t[illegible] Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22nd June, 1945.

(viii) Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as possible, all air material, whether in the North or South of Italy, will be concentrated in as few Depots as possible.

(ix) Ab-initio flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.F.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for Officers and flying personnel.

Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied.

Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organised and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organisation and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derequisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to

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(xii) Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derequisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly. 109.

(xiii) Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the I.A.F. are to be declared to the A.F.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in overseas, Italy and possibly/ and so help in the war against Japan.

4. (i) It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in Petrol & Oil, & perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each

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Branch will be superv d by the Allied authorities in order that International standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organisation and meteorological organisation.

(ii) No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but as soon as possible the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda:

(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

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(i) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorised units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

(a) the organisation at the Air Ministry down to the Z.A.T. level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Unità Aerea and redisposing some of their duties to - the Air Ministry and others to 4th Z.A.T;

(b) formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to co-ordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(c) the retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners

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and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

(ii) Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, with a view to forming companies to work for the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean theatre, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorised ceiling of 31,000.

(iii) Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U, as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

(iv) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organised maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, discuss salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

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(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, discuss salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

(vii) Discuss advantages and disadvantages of enlistment on a voluntary, as opposed to, a conscription basis.

109.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 9th July, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/46/AIR.

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