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ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
SEPT. 1945 – SEPT. 1947

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ALLIED LIAISON SECTION, ITALIAN AIR FORCE, POLICY
SEPT. 1945 – SEPT. 1947

TOP SECRET

SECRET.	ROYAL AIR FORCE.	PART...5
Reference:- HOME/4200/AFA/3	BRANCH. ALLIED MISSION SECTION.	
Date of opening:- 3 1 47	SUBJECT. ITALIAN AIR FORCE POLICY	
Ref. other papers.		

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HQ/4020/AFAC3

ALLIED CASES

Date of opening:-

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SUBJECT

ITALIAN AIR FORCE POLICY

Ref. other papers.

1562 1689

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THIS FOLDER CONTAINS PAPERS

FROM SEPT - 1945

TO SEPT - 1947

CATALOGUE -

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AF 750

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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AG 391.711/231 3.03-C

23 September 1945

SUBJECT: Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

TO: Air Vice-Marshal I. N. BRODIE, OBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

PART I. POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy; i.e., the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential Air Transport Services and Air/Sea Rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favor of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian air crew to keep in flying practice and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:

a. The Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the Italian Air Force will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of Rome are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied officers of the Allied forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the Italian Air Force, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission, may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

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b. The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats, crews and caring craft as will be made available to the Italian Air Force.

c. Aircraft allotted by the Allies will be on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P-39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the Italian Air Force but aircraft wastage is unlikely to be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the Air Force Sub-Commission as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the Italian Air Force having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

d. The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore Squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practice will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of 10 hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

e. Fighter aircraft will be concentrated, as far as is practicable, in one place. Fighter pilots will be restricted to a maximum of 6 hours flying per month.

f. The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the Italian Air Force as required and at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the Italian Air Force until such time as authorization from the Air Forces Sub-Commission for its use by the Italian Air Force is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/EX of the 20th June.

g. The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22d June, 1945.

h. Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as practicable, all air material, whether in the South or North of Italy, will be concentrated in as few depots as possible.

i. Re-initiation primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

j. Ground Courses for Officers and Flying Personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the Italian Air Force, especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly, Flying Control Courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the Air Forces Sub-Commission will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

k. On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will also assist the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

l. Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is de-requisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

m. Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force are to be declared to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.

4. a. It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that international standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, airfield organization and meteorological organization.

b. No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government in due course. A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II. IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is desired that, as soon as you are ready, the various implications should be discussed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission with representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. The following subjects are recommended for discussion as part of a proposed agenda:

a. Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorized units, bases, and depots, with special reference to:

(1) The organization of the Air Ministry down to the ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Units Area and redisposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE.

(2) Formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to coordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(3) The retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

b. Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorized ceiling of 31,000.

c. Closing down of FROSINONE O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrew for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

d. Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

e. Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians [illegible] it may be recommended to lease any such buildings to civilians [illegible]

f. Salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel, although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. [illegible] CONTENTHEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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F/319 (1st Draft)

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COPY NO. 1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

1. The following terms of reference have been received from the Chief of Staff :-

a. The Joint Planning Staff are directed to examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force and to make recommendations, as to the future policy which would be adopted in respect of these services, pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

b. Your examination and recommendations should in particular cover the desirability or otherwise of returning these Italian armed forces to Italian government control, as is being done with the Italian Army.

c. Your study should also deal with the question of administrative responsibility for the Italian Navy and Air Force, on which subject you have already received separate terms of reference.

2. The first draft has been prepared in two parts, Part A dealing with the Italian Air Force, and Part B with the Italian Navy.

3. Part A, with annex "A", is attached herewith. Part B is in the process of preparation and will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. A meeting will be held in the Air Room at 0930 hours on Tuesday, 4th December to discuss the first draft, Parts A and B.

H.P.H. SNOWDEN,
Captain
Secretary

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H.T.H. SNOWDEN,
Captain
Secretary

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F/319 (1st Draft)(A)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AB 091.711/231 SACS-U of 23 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, ~~except for essential Air Transport Service and Air Sea Rescue;~~ that policy has, however been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present Armistice period, S.CHAD in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with JUGOSLAVIA.

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.

3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers. The successful equipping and training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organization of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be allowed at the Peace Treaty, in order to make it capable of carrying out its functions as a part of the Italian Armed Forces within [illegible] from the date of withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY.

CURRENT DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force as an operational [illegible] authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff [illegible]

ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AG 091.711/231 SACMED of 23 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, ~~except for essential air transport service and air sea rescue;~~ that policy has, however been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present armistice period, S.CMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

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3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as BELGIUM, POLAND, ROMANIA, HOLLAND and NORWAY. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers. The successful equipping and training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organization of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be allowed at the Peace Treaty, in order to make it capable of carrying out its functions as a part of the Italian Armed Forces with effect from the date of withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY.

CURRENT DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force as an operational force ceased to exist. On the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, certain units were, however, kept in employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment. The employment of these units is at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has been the intention that the Italian Air Force (within the authorised ceiling, as it may from time to time be determined), shall be self-supporting in all respects with the following

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exceptions - POL and tyres, rations and such technical equipment as is necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft in their possession. To this end an interim policy directive was given to the A.C.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission. All Allied aircraft handed over to the Italians, either to assist their participation in the war against GERMANY, or to help them carry out various post-hostility functions for the Allies, are to be considered as a loan.

PRESENT ~~STRENGTH AND~~ CEILING OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under :-

Operational Air Force	22,000
Employed by the RAF	2,500
Employed by the USAAF	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the RAF and USAAF.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. These functions would normally be carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative services, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, staff college, flying control school, W/T school and several Engineering establishments in the LECCE area). Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons are now used for the courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of RAF manpower as follows :-

a. To fill existing RAF establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to RAF Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the RAF.

FUTURE ALLIED ~~AIR~~ [illegible] REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term Aims.

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force is limited to air assistance to

5. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 21,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under :-

Operational Air Force	12,000
Employed by the RAF	2,500
Employed by the USAAF	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the RAF and USAAF.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. These functions would normally be carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative services, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, W/T school and several engineering establishments in the ZONE area). Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons are now used for the courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of R.F manpower as follows :-

a. To fill existing R.F establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to R.F Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the RAF.

FUTURE ALLIED AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term Policy.

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force is limited to air assistance to the Land Forces in the maintenance of internal security and air support for the Army in the guarding of such frontiers as are not already guaranteed by the Allies. Since the only frontiers not so guarded are

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with Switzerland and France it is not considered that this latter requirement is a very formidable one. However, to permit of these requirements being properly satisfied, it will be necessary to modify in favour of the Italian Air Force certain of the regulations regarding ~~the type and amount of~~ training ~~the force is permitted to undertake.~~

b. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary that the re-organisation of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

c. Consideration must also be given to the ill effect of discharging a large number of Italian Air Force personnel to the labour market until they can be absorbed into industry. The duration of this will be dependent on the speed with which industry is rehabilitated.

d. It is envisaged that we shall continue to make use of the Air Courier Service and that we shall possibly extend it to take over some of the internal Allied ~~courier~~ Services in ITALY. Such courier services would not be allowed to operate in the vicinity of the disputed territories. The Italian Air Force will continue to take over responsibility for Air Sea Rescue operations around the shores of ITALY (SARDINIA and SICILY) with the intention that it will ultimately be the sole organisation undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for RAF and USAAF personnel in all possible trades. This would assist us to fill larger gaps created in our own organisation occasioned by accelerated release. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is [illegible] that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons may be required by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack.

[illegible].

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10. Long-term policy.

a. The extent to which the Italian Air Force can be used in furthering Allied aims must necessarily be limited by the amount of influence it will be capable of exercising on Allied intentions.

b. In view of ITALY's position across our communications it is important that she should not again come under control of a hostile power. Strategically therefore, it is required that she should remain on friendly terms with us and should be encouraged to look to Western EUROPE for support. Further she should not be so weak that she would fall readily a prey to a hostile power. We cannot risk trouble from ITALY during the post-war period when our resources will be fully employed in occupational and rehabilitation duties throughout the world.

c. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. SACMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff expressed the

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depend on several factors including the economic ability of ITALY to maintain fighting forces, ~~tighter defensive requirements to guard vital areas from air attack and air support to the land forces both in internal security duties and repelling external aggression.~~ There will also be a requirement for Air Sea Rescue and Coastal reconnaissance aircraft in view of ITALY's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be combined in General Reconnaissance Squadrons. There will also be a requirement for Air Force Transport Squadrons ~~to provide air force support services~~ to enable Air Forces and Italian Army forces to be moved rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that pose a serious menace to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "A".

~~DETAILS OF OPTIMUM FORCE STRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT~~

11. Aircraft and Equipment

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. ~~In this connection it should be noted that a proposal may exist to equip the Italian Air Force with a certain number of US~~ Fighter aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomic to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, POL, signals and radar equipment etc.,

b. It is considered that reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the

[illegible] of Italian Company for costs. These duties can be combined in [illegible] squadrons. There will also be a requirement for an Air Force Transport Squadron ~~to provide air force [illegible]~~ to enable Air Forces and Italian Army Forces to be moved rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that are a serious threat to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "A".

[illegible] AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

11. Aircraft Development

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. ~~In this connection it should be noted that a proposal already exists to equip the Italian Air Force with a certain number of US~~ Fighter aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomic to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, POL, signals and radar equipment etc.,

b. It is considered that reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the necessary signals and radar organization is provided. It is unlikely that Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and the Italians should be encouraged to buy this from the United States or Great Britain. There will be a need for the Air Sea Rescue squadrons to be provided with modern Anglo-American wireless equipment if they are to perform their Air Sea Rescue duties efficiently in [illegible]

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other Nations operating Air Sea Rescue in the Mediterranean.

12. Provision of clothing, and day to day requirements should be the responsibility of the Italian Government and the Italian Government should be responsible for purchasing all the equipment and supplies ~~that are~~ necessary ~~to operate a small modern Air Force~~.

13. Rations.

a. Under COSMED 231 the ceiling of the Italian Air Force was fixed at 34,000, of which the British were responsible for meeting the Allied Military element of the ration for 27,500 and the U.S. were responsible for meeting the Allied Military element of the ration for 6,500. Present strengths which are being provided with the Allied Military Element of the ration are as follows :-

British	-	27,000
U.S.	-	4,800

Rations are delivered daily in bulk to Italian depots at TARANTO, and are thereafter an Italian responsibility.

b. The Allied Military Element of the ration is as follows :-

Provided from Allied Sources.	Scale in ozs per day.
Flour	15
Dried Vegetables (i.e. Peas/Beans/ Lentils)	2
Meat Canned or Fish Canned	3
Cheese	6/7
Sugar	1
Macaroni or Flour	3
Flour (in lieu of Rice)	1
Vegetables Dehydrated (or Vegetables Fresh, in lieu 8 ozs)	
Catsup or Tomato Paste	1/2
Coffee	1/2
Pepper	1/200
Fruit Fresh	4

xx

Fish issued	per month
Sardines 2 ozs	10 days
Herrings 4 ozs	3 days
Salmon 3 ozs	2 days

12. Rations.

a. Under COSMED 231 the ceiling of the Italian Air Force was fixed at 34,000, of which the British were responsible for meeting the Allied Military Element of the ration for 27,500 and the U.S. were responsible for meeting the Allied Military Element of the ration for 6,500. Present strengths which are being provided with the Allied Military Element of the ration are as follows :-

British	-	27,000
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Flour	15
Dried Vegetables (i.e. Peas/Beans/ Lentils)	2
Meat Canned or Fish Canned	3
Cheese	6/7
Sugar	1
Macaroni or Flour	3
Flour (in lieu of Rice)	1
Vegetables Dehydrated (or Vegetables Fresh, in lieu 8 ozs)	
Catsup or Tomato Paste	1/2
Coffee	1/2
Pepper	1/200
Fruit Fresh	4
Vegetables Fresh	8

xx

Fish issued		per month
Sardines	2 ozs	10 days
Herrings	4 ozs	3 days
Salmon	3 ozs	2 days

13. Capability of Italian Economy.

a. During the present Armistice period, in order to maintain the Italian Air Force in equipment, it would be necessary, as in the

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case of the Italian Army, to augment, from Allied stocks, the material and supplies which could be provided from indigenous sources. During the post-peace Treaty period, however, the Italian aircraft industry should be fully capable of maintaining any Air Force likely to be permitted under the Peace Terms, provided that the Italian Government considered it economical for it to do so.

b. Rations. Monthly metric tonnages, at present being supplied from Allied stocks, are:

(1)	Meat	1885 tons
(2)	Preserved meat or fish	278 tons
(3)	Dried vegetables	158 tons
(4)	Sugar	92 tons
(5)	Coffee	46 tons
(6)	Pepper	0.46 tons

These tonnages can NOT be met out of existing stocks held in Italian Army depots and earmarked for the Italian Navy and Air Force until after 1 February 1946, nor from existing civil imports. It is desirable for the Italian Government to assume full responsibility for rationing their Navy and Air Force w.e.f. 1 February 1946, but their ability to do so will depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports as stated above. Financial commitment is 358,000 dollars monthly, or 4,296,792 dollars a year.

FUTURE OF AIR SUB-COMMISSION

14. The Air Sub-Commission is the vehicle set up under Article 37 of the Armistice Terms with Italy as the Allied Organization to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that it should remain in its present form until a Peace Treaty is concluded, as the Head of the Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian Air matters, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being. In the event of the Italian Air Force being reorganized and eventually handed over to the control of the Italian Government it should

considered it economical for it to do so.

b. Rations. Monthly metric tonnages, at present being supplied from Allied stocks, are:

(1)	Meat	1885 tons
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CONCLUSIONS

15. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces infrustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the size of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organization and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, the Italian Air Force cannot be returned to Italian Government control.

e. That the Italian economy does not permit the assumption by the Italian Government of the Allied Military element of the ration prior to 1 February 1946, and that further study is necessary to examine whether it will be capable of doing so after that date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. a. That an immediate examination should be made to see if the Italian Government is willing and capable of undertaking full responsibility for rationing the Italian Air Force with effect from 1 February 1946.

b. That the Air Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the Peace Treaty.

c. That the Italian Air Force should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time, but that a gradual reorganization and training of the Italian Air Force should begin forthwith to the suggested ceiling of 12,000 in order to form a well-organized and efficient Air Force that can be used for defence in cooperation with the other services when the Allies finally withdraw from Italy.

forces infiltrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the size of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organization and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, the Italian Air Force cannot be returned to Italian Government control.

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civil aviation is working in Italy they should have an establishment of 30 aircraft per squadron. When, however, Italian civil aviation begins they should be reduced to an initial establishment of 16 aircraft per squadron and the balance of airmen and aircraft could be transferred to Italian civil aviation and completely discharged, without any reserve obligation, to civil life.

6. Training. There will be a need for a training school for the Italian Air Force as there must be a continuous small new intake. This training school should consist of 2 branches, elementary and service training and it will require approximately 15 elementary training aircraft and 15 service type aircraft. Operational training should take place in the squadrons.

7. Italian Air Ministry. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and employs a relatively large number of Italian Air Force personnel, a rather higher proportion than is normal in British Service Ministries, in view of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry use officers in many cases where British Service Ministries would use civil servants.

8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are manned on a territorial basis. It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged justifies 4 Territorial Headquarters. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry through:-

(a) An Interceptor Fighter sector with 3 squadrons.
(b) A Fighter/Bomber Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Dec/T Squadron.
(c) A Transport Wing of 2 squadrons.
(d) A G.R/A.S.R. Wing of 2 squadrons.
(e) A Training Wing responsible for flying and technical training.
(f) Maintenance Units.

The above Wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

9. Maintenance and Administration. It will be necessary to form and maintain necessary maintenance and administrative units to give backing to the Italian Air Force described in the Order of Battle.

10. Ceiling. The current ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 31000 which is approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when Italy surrendered. ~~It is assumed that the balance were demobilised in the Germany and formed the Italian Republican Air Force.~~ Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishments required to operate an Air Force of such a nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any amendment permitted by the Peace Treaty must lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing certain functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F., and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave Italy this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling pending the Peace Treaty must depend on future requirements and the establishment for any Italian Air Force permitted and until these establishments are worked out to be no better than a ceiling of 12000.

[illegible] training should take place in the squadrons.

7. Italian Air Ministry. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and employs a relatively large number of Italian Air Force personnel, a rather higher proportion than is normal in British Service Ministries, in view of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry use officers in many cases where British Service Ministries would use civil servants.

8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are manned on a territorial basis. It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force warrant 3 Air Forces and 4 Territorial Headquarters. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry through:-

(a) An Interceptor Fighter sector with 3 squadrons.
(b) A Fighter/Bomber Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R Squadron.
(c) A Transport Wing of 2 squadrons.
(d) A G.R/A.S.R. Wing of 2 squadrons.
(e) A Training Wing responsible for flying and technical training.
(f) Maintenance wing.

The above Wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

9. Maintenance and Administration. It will be necessary to form and transfer necessary maintenance and administrative units to give backing to the Italian Air Force described in the Order of Battle.

10. Ceiling. The current ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 31000 which is approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when Italy surrendered. ~~It is assumed that the balance were incorporated in the Germany Air Force or joined the Italian Republican Air Force.~~ Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishments required to operate an Air Force of such a nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any amendment permitted by the Peace Treaty may lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing certain functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F., and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by Allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave Italy this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling pending the Peace Treaty must depend on these requirements and the establishment for any Italian Air Force mentioned and until these establishments are worked out it is impossible to make an arbitrary ceiling of 12000.

Appendix 'A' (contd)

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APPENDIX A
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COPY NO.____

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 December 1945

Subject: Italian - Organization and Equipment

1.

Type of Sqdn	Aircraft	No. of Sqdns.	I.E per Sqdn
Fighter/Bomber	P-38	5	16
Tac/R.	Spitfire	1	16
ASR & GR.	Flying boat	3	10
Transport Sqdns.	Civil Type	2	16
Training School.	Elementary and Service Types.	1	30
Communication	Convalescent Service	1	16
	Civil types.		

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organized into an Interceptor Leader Sector of 3 squadrons and a Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the U.S.A.A.F. should sell a number of P-38 and F.5. aircraft to the Italian Government. The F.5. is a photographic reconnaissance version of the P.38 and on changing the nose can be converted to P.38 which can be used as an Interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The Interceptor fighters will need radar, night flying and adequate navigation equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons like ise will need mobile radar and airfield equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets and rocket firing fighters provide a severe menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R squadron for administrative purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber Wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever air transport is bodily can be attached into the Italian army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the I.A.A.F. is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be mobile. It will need photographic and adequate R/T equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

4. Air Sea Rescue and G.R. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats so that in performance of their air sea rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One squadron should be based to cover the West Coast of Italy and one the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and facilities of working in conjunction with the A.A.A.F. operating from Malta and French Air Force from the South Coast of France.

5. Transport Squadrons. These should be equipped with a normal civil type of aircraft and their normal use should be to provide mobility for the Italian Air Force and to lift Italian Army Forces where necessary. Until such time as

/civil aviation.....

Type of Sqdn	Aircraft	No. of Sqdns.	A.C per Sqdn
Fighter/Bomber	F-32	5	16
Tac/R.	Spitfire	1	16
A/S & GR.	Flying boat	2	12
Transport Sqdns.	Civil Type	2	16
Training Sqdns.	Elementary and Service Types.	1	30
Communication	Air Rescue Service Civil Types.	1	16

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organized into an Interceptor Fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the U.S.A.F. should sell a number of F-32 and F.5. aircraft to the Italian Government. The F.5. is a photographic reconnaissance version of the F.32 and by changing the nose can be converted to F.32 which can be used as an Interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The Interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons like use will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a severe menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R Squadron for reconnaissance purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber Wing but considerable training is necessary and it should be operated or whatever air transport it would have in parallel with the Italian Army. It should be equipped with Spitfire aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the I.A.F. is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron is shortly to be mobile. It will need photographic and adequate I/T equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

4. Air Sea Rescue and G.R. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats so that in performance of their air sea rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One squadron should be based to cover the West Coast of Italy and the [illegible] the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and capable of working in conjunction with the R.A.F. operating from Malta and Pianosa or force from the South Coast of France.

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/civil aviation.....

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CONCLUSIONS

15. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces infrustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the size of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organization and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, the Italian Air Force ~~cannot~~ be returned to Italian Government control.

e. That the Italian economy does not permit the assumption by the Italian Government of the Allied Military element of the ration prior to 1 February 1946, and that further study is necessary to examine whether it will be capable of doing so after that date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. a. That an immediate examination should be made to see if the Italian Government is willing and capable of undertaking full responsibility for rationing the Italian Air Force with effect from 1 February 1946.

b. That the Air Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the Peace Treaty.

c. That the Italian Air Force should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time, but that ~~a~~ the gradual reorganization and training of the Italian Air Force should begin forthwith to the suggested ceiling of 12,000 in order to form a well-organized and efficient Air Force that can be used for defence in cooperation with the other services when the Allied [illegible]

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b. That the size of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

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case of the Italian Army, to augment, from Allied stocks, the material and supplies which could be provided from indigenous sources. During the post-peace treaty period, however, the Italian aircraft industry should be fully capable of maintaining any Air Force likely to be permitted under the Peace Terms, provided that the Italian Government considered it economical for it to do so.

b. Rations. Monthly metric tonnages, at present being supplied from Allied stocks, are:

(1) Meat	1825 tons
(2) Preserved meat or fish	278 tons
(3) Dried vegetables	158 tons
(4) Sugar	92 tons
(5) Coffee	46 tons
(6) Jaggery	9.46 tons

These tonnages can NOT be met out of existing stocks held in Italian Army depots and earmarked for the Italian Navy and Air Force until after 1 February 1946, nor from existing civil imports. It is desirable for the Italian Government to assume full responsibility for rationing their Navy and Air Force w.e.f. 1 February 1946, but their ability to do so will depend upon their ability to provide the additional imports as stated above. Financial commitment is 358,000 dollars monthly, or 4,296,000 dollars a year.

Duties of the Sub-Commission

14. The Air Sub-Commission is the vehicle set up under Article 37 of the Armistice Terms with Italy as the Allied Organization to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that it should remain in its present form until a peace treaty is concluded, as the head of the Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian Air Matters, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being. In the event of the Italian Air Force being reorganized and eventually handed over to the control of the Italian Government, it should

considered it economical for it to do so.

b. Rations. Monthly metric tonnages, at present being supplied from Allied stocks, are:

(1) Meat	1685 tons
(2) Preserved meat or fish	278 tons
(3) Dried Vegetables	298 tons
(4) Sugar	92 tons
(5) Coffee	46 tons
(6) Paper	9.5 tons

These tonnages CAN NOT be met out of existing stocks held in Italian Army depots and earmarked for the Italian Navy and Air Force until after 1 February 1946, nor from existing civil imports. It is desirable for the Italian Government to assume full responsibility for rationing their Navy and Air Force w.e.f. 1 February 1946, but their ability to do so will depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports as stated above. Financial commitment is 358,000 dollars monthly, or 4,296,792 dollars a year.

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other Nations operating Air Sea Rescue in the Mediterranean.

12. CLOTHING & OTHER EQUIPMENT, ETC.

a. Provision of clothing, and day to day requirements should be the responsibility of the Italian Government and the Italian Government should be responsible for purchasing all the equipment and supplies that are necessary to operate a small modern Air Force.

13. Rations.

a. Under COSMED 231 the ceiling of the Italian Air Force was fixed at 34,000, of which the British were responsible for meeting the Allied Military Element of the ration for 27,500 and the U.S. were responsible for meeting the Allied Military Element of the ration for 6,500. Present strengths which are being provided with the Allied Military Element of the ration are as follows :-

British	-	27,000
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Rations are delivered daily in bulk to Italian depots at TARANTO, and are thereafter an Italian responsibility.

b. The Allied Military Element of the ration is as follows :-

Provided from Allied Sources.	Scale in ozs per day.
Flour	15
Dried Vegetables (i.e. Peas/Beans/Lentils)	2
Meat Canned or Fish Canned	3
Cheese	4/7
Sugar	1
Macaroni or Flour	3
Flour (in lieu of Rice)	1
Vegetable Dehydrated (or Vegetables Fresh, in lieu 8 ozs)	
Catsup or Tomato Paste	1/2
Coffee	1/2
Pepper	1/200
Fruit Fresh	4

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Fish issued		per month
Sardines	2 ozs	10 days
Herrings	4 ozs	3 days
Salmon	3 ozs	2 days

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Cheese	6/7
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Catsup or Tomato Paste	1/2
Coffee	1/2
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Fruit Fresh	4
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Sardines	2 ozs	10 days
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Salmon	3 ozs	2 days

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13. Capability of Italian Economy.

a. During the present Armistice period, in order to maintain the Italian Air Force in equipment, it would be necessary, as in the

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partly

~~on several factors including~~ the economic ability of Italy to maintain fighting forces, ~~Italy's defensive requirements to guard its area from air attack and air support to the land forces both in internal security duties and repelling external aggression.~~ There will also be a requirement for air sea rescue and Coastal Reconnaissance aircraft in view of Italy's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be combined in General Reconnaissance squadrons. There will also be a requirement for an Air Force Transport Squadron to provide ~~air force control's requirement~~ to the Italian Air Force and Italian Army forces to be served rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that are a serious threat to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at appendix "A".

~~[illegible]~~

11. Aircraft Requirement

a. It is considered that aircraft should be of allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. ~~In this connection it should be noted that a proposal by Italy to send the Italian Air Force a certain number of US Fighter aircraft.~~ It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomic to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, POL, signals and radar equipment etc.,

b. It is considered that reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 40% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the

[illegible] of Italy's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be [illegible] in small reconnaissance squadrons. There will also be a requirement for air force transport squadrons to provide ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] to enable air forces and Italian army forces to be moved rapidly. In Italian air force should not count on aircraft that are a serious threat to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "A".

~~[illegible]~~

11. Aircraft Equipment

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture, and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. ~~In this connection it should be noted that a proposal [illegible] the Italian Air Force a certain number of German Richter aircraft.~~ It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain, should they feel that it would be uneconomic to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, POL, signals and radar equipment etc.,

b. It is considered that certain reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the necessary signals and radar organization is provided. It is unlikely that Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and the Italians should be encouraged to buy this from the United States or Great Britain. There will be a need for the Air Sea Rescue Squadrons to be provided with certain modern Anglo-American wireless equipment if they are to perform their Air Sea Rescue duties effectively in combination with

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New Para for (a)(b)(c)

10. Long-term policy.

a. The extent to which the Italian Air Force can be used in furthering Allied aims must necessarily be limited by the amount of influence it will be capable of exercising on Allied intentions.

b. In view of ITALY's position across our communications it is important that she should not again come under control of a hostile power. Strategically therefore, it is required that she should remain on friendly terms with us and should be encouraged to look to Western EUROPE for support. Further she should not be so weak that she would fall readily a prey to a hostile power. We cannot risk trouble from ITALY during the post-war period when our resources will be fully employed in occupational and rehabilitation duties throughout the world.

c. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied air forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 51,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. SACMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the Italian Air Force should be a

b. In view of ITALY's position across our communications it is important that she should not again come under control of a hostile power. Strategically therefore, it is required that she should remain on friendly terms with us and should be encouraged to look to Western UNION for support. Further she should not be so weak that she would fall readily a prey to a hostile power. We cannot risk trouble from ITALY during the post-war period when our resources will be fully employed in occupational and rehabilitation duties throughout the world.

2. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. SACMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the Italian Air Force should be a maximum of 12,000. However, since ITALY is to be allowed a post-war Army it is clear that she must be allowed an Air Force commensurate with the former. The size of the post-war Italian Air Force must

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with Switzerland and France it is not considered that this latter requirement is a very formidable one. However, to permit of these requirements being properly satisfied, it will be necessary to modify in favour of the Italian Air Force certain of the regulations regarding ~~the~~ as ORGANISATION & TRAINING ~~type and amount of training the force be permitted to undertake~~.

b. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary that the recruitment of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

c. Consideration must also be given to the all effort of discharging a large number of Italian Air Force personnel to the labour market until they can be absorbed into industry. The duration of this will be dependent on the speed with which industry is rehabilitated.

d. It is envisaged that we shall continue to make use of the Air ~~Courier~~ TRANSPORT Service and that we shall possibly extend it to take over some of the internal allied ~~Civil~~ AIR TRANSPORT Services in ITALY. Such courier services would not be allowed to operate in the vicinity of the disputed no to demilitarized zone except with AFHQ Check territories. The Italian Air Force will continue to take over responsibility for air sea rescue operations round the shores of ITALY (SARDINIA and SICILY) with the intention that it will ultimately be the sole organisation undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for RAF and USAAF personnel in all possible trades. This would assist us to fill larger gaps created in our own organisation occasioned by repatriation relief. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons may be ~~manned~~ manned by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack as the property stationed

1. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary that the reorganization of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

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exceptions - POL and tyres, rations and such technical equipment as is necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft in their possession. To this end an interim policy directive was given to the A.C.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission. All Allied aircraft handed over to the Italians, either to assist their participation in the war against GERMANY, or to help them carry out various post-hostility functions for the Allies, are to be considered as a loan.

PRESENT ~~STRENGTH AND~~ CEILING OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under :-

Operational Air Force	22,000
Employed by the RAF	2,500
Employed by the USAAF	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the RAF and USAAF.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the manning of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. These functions would normally be carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative services, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, G/I school and several engineering establishments in the LECCE area). Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons ~~are now used~~ RETAINED THEIR IN for the courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of R.F manpower as follows :-

a. To fill existing R.F establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to R.F Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the RAF.

FUTURE ALLIED AND ITALIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term Allied :-

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Allied Commission for an Air Force is limited to air assistance to

PRESENT ~~STRENGTH OF~~ CEILING OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 21,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under :-

Operational Air Force	23,000
Employed by the R.A.F	2,500
Employed by the USAAF	2,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the RAF and USAAF.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the handling of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. These functions would normally be carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative services, maintenance building and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, A/T school and several Engineering establishments in the LANDE area). Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons are now used for the courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of R.A.F manpower as follows :-

a. To fill existing R.A.F establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to R.A.F Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the RAF.

FUTURE ALLIED AND ITALIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term policy.

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force is limited to air assistance to the Land Forces in the maintenance of internal security and air support for the Army in the guarding of such frontiers as are not already guaranteed by the Allies. Since the only frontiers not so guarded are

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AG 091.711/231 S.CS-0 of 23 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Restricted to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, ~~except for essential Air Transport Service and Air Sea Rescue;~~ that policy has, however been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present armistice period, S.CHED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with JUGOSLAVIA.

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.

3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers. The successful equipping and training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organization of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be allowed in the Peace Treaty, in order to make it capable of carrying out its functions as a part of the Italian Armed Forces with effect from the date of withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY.

CURRENT DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force as an operational

OBJECT

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CURRENT DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force as an operational force ceased to exist. On the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, certain units were, however, kept in employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment. The employment of these units is at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has been the intention that the Italian Air Force (within the authorised ceiling, as it may from time to time be determined), shall be self-supporting in all respects with the following

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

1 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

1. The following terms of reference have been received from the Chief of Staff :-

a. The Joint Planning Staff are directed to examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force and to make recommendations, as to the future policy which would be adopted in respect of these services, pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

b. Your examination and recommendations should in particular cover the desirability or otherwise of returning these Italian armed forces to Italian government control, as is being done with the Italian Army.

c. Your study should also deal with the question of administrative responsibility for the Italian Navy and Air Force, on which subject you have already received separate terms of reference.

2. The first draft has been prepared in two parts, Part A dealing with the Italian Air Force, and Part B with the Italian Navy.

3. Part A, with Appendix "A", is attached herewith. Part B is in the process of preparation and will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. A meeting will be held in the War Room at 0930 hours on Tuesday, 4th December to discuss the first draft, Parts A and B.

H.T.H. Snowden

H.T.H. SNOWDEN,
Captain
Secretary

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b. That SCF be relieved of their present responsibility for the supply of rations to the Italian Navy and that an alternative method of supply be produced by the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean in consultation with the Allied Commission.

c. That the Allied Commission be instructed to examine the practicability of the Italian Government assuming responsibility for the supply of rations for the Italian Navy at as early a date as possible without a material reduction in the present standard of rations.

capable of doing so, but their ability to do so will depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports necessary. It is at present a British commitment to provide the Allied military element of the ration. The Italian Navy is now a reasonably efficient force and is considered to be a stabilising factor in the country. If the Navy is to remain in an efficient state, it is important that a satisfactory scale of rations should be maintained. It should be noted that on assuming ration responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration. The Italian Government should therefore only assume the responsibility for the victualling of the Navy if supply on a satisfactory scale can be assumed. The handling and accounting for supplies for the Italian Navy involve a manpower commitment for the British Army which can no longer be met owing to the British Army's diminishing manpower ceiling. It is also likely that the British Army will shortly have to move out of their areas in S. ITALY on which the bulk of the Italian Navy is based. The British Army must, therefore, be relieved of this commitment as soon as possible.

SUMMARY

15. The present system of Allied control of the Italian Navy has functioned satisfactorily. The control now exercised is no more that that required for the proper operation and administration of this service.

CONCLUSIONS

a. a. No change in the present system of control of the Italian Navy is required.

b. It is essential that CMF be relieved of its responsibility for the supply of rations to the Italian Navy as soon as possible, and it is desirable that this responsibility should be assumed by the Italian Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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CONCLUSIONS

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b. It is essential that CMF be relieved of its responsibility for the supply of rations to the Italian Navy as soon as possible, and it is desirable that this responsibility should be assumed by the Italian Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17. a. No change should be made in the present system of control of the Italian Navy.

ITALY. The retention of the present control will ensure the continued use of this service to the best advantage.

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS UNTIL CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY

12. Until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty the requirements of the United Nations and of ITALY will necessitate the employment of the Italian Navy on duties similar to those which it now performs. It can be expected, however, that the Allied requirements will decrease to some extent and that certain of the Italian requirements notably minesweeping will increase. Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive vessels for which no immediate employment has already been, or can be found, will be laid up as arranged by the Allied Naval Area Commander. Decreases in requirements will permit of ships being laid up and reductions being made in the personnel of the Italian Navy.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

13. Repair, Maintenance and Supply.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that as the Mediterranean is an area of British operational responsibility the United Kingdom is primarily responsible, on behalf of the United Nations for the necessary repair, maintenance and supply of Italian Naval vessels in that area. Maintenance of Italian Naval vessels is in all cases subject to the provisos that :

a. Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

b. No facilities or stores are used which would prejudice United States or British operational requirements.

A considerable quantity of stores of all kinds has been supplied to the Italian Navy to bring it to an efficient state and to permit of its operation in the interests of the United Nations and of ITALY.

14. Rations.

It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive [illegible] to the maximum possible extent in the

Navy on duties similar to those which it now performs. It can be expected, however, that the Allied requirements will decrease to some extent and that certain of the Italian requirements notably minesweeping will increase. Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive vessels for which no immediate employment has already been, or can be found, will be laid up as arranged by the Allied Naval Area Commander. Decreases in requirements will permit of ships being laid up and reductions being made in the personnel of the Italian Navy.

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that as the Mediterranean is an area of British operational responsibility the United Kingdom is primarily responsible, on behalf of the United Nations for the necessary repair, maintenance and supply of Italian Naval vessels in that area. Maintenance of Italian Naval vessels is in all cases subject to the provisos that :

a. Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

b. No facilities or stores are used which would prejudice United States or British operational requirements.

A considerable quantity of stores of all kinds has been supplied to the Italian Navy to bring it to an efficient state and to permit of its operation in the interests of the United Nations and of ITALY.

14. Rations.

It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Navy. It is therefore desirable that the responsibility for provision of victuals should be assumed by the Italian Government as it is

PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY

7. The present strength of the Italian Navy is:

5 Battleships

9 Cruisers

11 Destroyers

22 Torpedo Boats

19 Corvettes, including 8 being converted for minesweeping

38 Submarines

a number of auxiliaries and small surface craft including four groups of minesweepers.

Personnel at present total 53,000.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

8. In accordance with the terms of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive the Italian ships are employed under the operational command of the Allied Naval Area Commander. The two newer battleships "ITALIA" and "VITTORIO VENETO" are laid up in the BITTER Lakes; of the other three, two are at TARANTO and one at SYRACUSE. Four of the cruisers and one destroyer are operated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean direct as required for the carriage of Naval drafts or other services. The remainder of the Italian ships in the Mediterranean are operated by the Italians under the overall control of the Flag Officer, ITALY and Liaison subject to the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. These ships are used to a large extent in the carriage of ex POW's and displaced persons and are almost entirely operated on duties of direct benefit to the Italians.

9. Italian Naval personnel are being used to replace British personnel in certain duties in Italian ports as the use of the ports increases.

10. In general, the administration of the Italian Navy is under Italian Naval Authorities subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean which is normally only exercised to the minimum

12 Destroyers

22 Torpedo Boats

19 Corvettes, including 8 being converted for minesweeping

38 Submarines

A number of auxiliaries and small surface craft including four groups of minesweepers.

Personnel at present total 53,000.

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9. Italian Naval personnel are being used to replace British personnel in certain duties in Italian ports as the use of the ports permits.

10. In general, the administration of the Italian Navy is under Italian Naval Authorities subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean which is normally only exercised to the minimum extent necessary.

11. The Italian Navy has operated satisfactorily under the present system of control and has proved of value to the United Nations and to

J/320 (2nd Draft)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

7 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Navy pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Navy.

ITALIAN NAVY - DIRECTIVE FOR CONTROL

2. The Italian Navy is employed in accordance with the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement and the Appendix to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Paper 515/1 dated 19th March 1944.

3. Under these orders such of the Italian ships as are of use to the Allies are kept running and the others laid up.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that the Admiralty, in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, through the head of the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D.C., will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Action by the executive agency will conform with the policies laid down in this directive or such specific instructions as may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

5. This directive then proceeds to lay down that the Allied Naval Area Commander will have the responsibility for operational control and administration of the Italian Navy.

6. It is to be noted that the area under the command of the Allied Naval Area Commander (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) is not co-terminous

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Navy, pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Navy.

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5. This directive then proceeds to lay down that the Allied Naval Area Commander will have the responsibility for operational control and administration of the Italian Navy.

6. It is to be noted that the area under the command of the Allied Naval Area Commander (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) is not co-terminous with the area under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive does not specify that the Italian Navy shall be employed within the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean's command.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 3

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

7 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY

1. The attached 2nd Draft has been prepared and will be discussed at a meeting to be held in the War Room at 1000 hours on Tuesday, 11 December.

2. It will be noted that this paper has been renumbered P/320.

H.T.H. LANG DEN,
Captain,
Secretary.

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TO: ACSAR FOR C.C.S.

FROM: A.F.H.Q.

FROM MORGAN INFO: CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

REFERENCE TO THIS MESSAGE FAN 649 (.)

THIS IS NAF ?

PARA. 1. I PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING INTAILED PLAN FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.) THIS FORCE TO BE RE-ORGANISED UNDER THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY INTO THE FOLLOWING:

(a) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS

(b) AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS.

(c) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS.

(d) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS.

(e) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS

(f) DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY

(g) DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION (.)

PARA. 2. FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THREE SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE INTERCEPTOR, 2 FIGHTER FORCE AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THE UNIT EQUIPMENT OF EACH SQUADRON TO BE 14 AIRCRAFT (.) ADDITIONALLY 1 AIRCRAFT IS ESTABLISHED FOR EACH OF THE 3 WING LEADERS (.) GRAND TOTAL 101 AIRCRAFT (.) 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS TO BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P-38 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SPITFIRE IX AIRCRAFT (.) A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES THROUGHOUT THE COMMAND (.)

PARA. 3. AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 16 U.E.(.) THESE TO BE S.M.79'S, S.M. 82'S, S.M. 95'S or similar types (.) AN AIR MINISTRY COMMUNICATION SQUADRON OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE TO INCLUDE MULTI ENGINE AND LIGHT PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT IS ALSO NECESSARY (.) A METEOROLOGICAL FLIGHT OF 6 SINGLE ENGINE AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE IS REQUIRED (.)

1571

PARA. 4. GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.E. (.) 1 SQUADRON TO BE EQUIPPED WITH CATALINA OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI ENGINE SEAPLANES (.) A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT IS ALSO REQUIRED (.)

[illegible] HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THE FOLLOWING FLYING UNITS COMPRISING A

THE FORCE TO BE RE-ORGANISED UNDER THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY INTO THE FOLLOWING:

(a) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS

(b) AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS.

(c) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS.

(d) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS.

(e) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS

(f) DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY

(g) DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION (.)

PARA. 2. FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THREE GROUPS OF FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE INTERCEPTOR, 2 FIGHTER BOMBER AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THE UNIT EQUIPMENT OF EACH SQUADRON TO BE 14 AIRCRAFT (.) ADDITIONALLY 1 AIRCRAFT IS ESTABLISHED FOR EACH OF THE 3 WING LEADERS (.) GRAND TOTAL 101 AIRCRAFT (.) 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS TO BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P-38 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SPITFIRE IX AIRCRAFT (.) A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES THROUGHOUT THE COMMAND (.)

PARA. 3. AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 16 U.E(.) THESE TO BE S.M.79'S, S.M. 82'S, S.M. 95'S or similar types (.) AN AIR MINISTRY COMMUNICATION SQUADRON OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE TO INCLUDE MULTI ENGINE AND LIGHT PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT IS ALSO NECESSARY (.) A METEOROLOGICAL FLIGHT OF 6 SINGLE ENGINE AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE IS REQUIRED (.)

1571

PARA. 4. GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.E. (.) 1 SQUADRON TO BE EQUIPPED WITH C.ITALIA OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI ENGINE SEAPLANES (.) A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT IS ALSO REQUIRED (.)

PARA. 5. TRAINING HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THE FOLLOWING FLYING UNITS COMPRISING A FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL (.)

(i) ELEMENTARY SQUADRON EQUIPPED WITH 12 MONITE OR MAGISTER OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

(ii) AN ADVANCED SQUADRON COMPRISING 1 SINGLE ENGINE FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH 15

CONTINUED/2.....

ITALIAN TYPE G.55 OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 TWIN ENGINED FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH 15 CANTOS OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

(iii) A NAVIGATION AND WEATHER OBSERVATORS TRAINING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 6 BALTIMORES OR SIMILAR ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

ADDITIONALLY A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 4 ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT WILL BE REQUIRED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING HEADQUARTERS AS A WHOLE (.)

PARA. 6. GROUND TRAINING UNITS CONTROLLED BY TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPRISE:-

(i) CADET COLLEGE

(ii) RECEPTION DEPOT

(iii) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

(iv) FLYING CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

PARA. 7. MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUIRE A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT COMPRISING 8 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE SM. 82s OR SIMILAR TYPE AND 4 LIGHT TYPE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

PARA. 8. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNEXION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF METEOROLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE (.)

PARA. 9. ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT COVERED IN THIS SIGNAL AS THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN TO US (.)

PARA. 10. ALTHOUGH NOT COVERED BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS IN MAP.1103 THE FOLLOWING ARE NOW CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL:-

(i) A TARGET TOWING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 8 MAR ITAL AIRCRAFT (.)

(ii) AN A.O.P. SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 14 U.S. ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT (L.M. 5 OR SIMILAR TYPE) (.)

PARA. 11. ALL FIGURES FOR NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT QUOTED ABOVE ARE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO RESERVES (.) THESE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING SCALES AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS A PERCENTAGE ASTACK OF UNIT EQUIPMENT PER MONTH:-

(i) SPITFIRE (MODE MARKER 1.4 (.)

(ii) DAUPHINT 2 (.)

(iii) GENERAL PURPOSE AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

(iv) TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4 (.)

(v) COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

PARA. 12. IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PRO VISIONS OF SUPPLEMENT

1070

PARA. 6. GROUND TRAINING UNITS COMMANDED BY PARENT HEADQUARTERS WILL CONSIST:-

(i) CADET COLLEGE

(ii) TECHNICAL DEPOT

(iii) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

(iv) FLYING CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

PARA. 7. PARENT FRENCH HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUIRE A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT COMPRISING 6 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE THE 82s OR SIMILAR TYPE AND 4 LIGHT TYPE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

PARA. 8. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNEXION WITH THE SEC INTERPRETATION OF METEOROLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE (.)

PARA. 9. ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION REPAIR BASES ARE NOT CONSIDERED IN THIS REPORT AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN TO ME (.)

PARA. 10. ALTHOUGH NOT COVERED BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS IN MAP.1103 THE FOLLOWING ARE NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL:-

(i) A TARGET TOWING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 8 MAR TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

(ii) AN A.O.P. SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 14 U.S. ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT (L.M. 5 OR SIMILAR TYPE) (.)

PARA. 11. ALL FIGURES FOR NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT QUOTED ABOVE ARE VERBATIM REPRODUCTION TO REFERENCE (.) THESE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING SCALES AND ARE BASED ONLY AS A PERCENTAGE LANDAGE OF UNIT EQUIPMENT FOR NOTED:-

(i) SERIES FIGHTER FLIGHTER 1.4 (.)

(ii) BOMBERS 2 (.)

(iii) GENERAL REPRESENTATIVES 1 (.)

(iv) TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4 (.)

(v) COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

PARA. 12. IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MODERN RADAR AND VHF EQUIPMENT TO EQUIP TWO STATIONS AND 1 MOBILE SECTIONS AND OTHER ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT (.)

PARA. 13. AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF ALL ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT

CONTINUED/3.....

1570

AND DRAWS INCLUDING TOMBS AND AMMUNITION TO A SCALE COMMENSURATE WITH THE ROLE OF THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.)

PARA. 14. IT IS CONFIRMED THAT I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY THAT THIS CEILING APPROVAL FOR THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE IS PRELIMINARY AND THAT IT IS NOT OBLIGATORY TO THEM TO RE-ORGANISE THEIR FORCE UP TO THIS CEILING (.)

DRAFT SIGNAL.

TO: AGWAR FOR C.C.S.

FROM: A.F.H.Q.

FROM MORGAN INFO: CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

REFERENCE TO THIS MESSAGE FAN 649 (.)

THIS IS MAF ?

PARA. 1. I FORWARD THE FOLLOWING DETAILED PLAN FOR THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.) THIS FORCE TO BE RE-ORGANISED UNDER THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY INTO THE FOLLOWING:

(a) FIGHTER HEAD QUARTERS

(b) AIR TRANSPORT HEAD QUARTERS.

(c) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEAD QUARTERS.

(d) TRAINING HEAD QUARTERS.

(e) MAINTENANCE HEAD QUARTERS

(f) DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY

(g) DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION (.)

PARA. 2. FIGHTER HEAD QUARTERS TO COMMAND THREE SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE INTERCEPTOR, 2 FIGHTER BOMBER AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THE UNIT EQUIPMENT OF EACH SQUADRON TO BE 14 AIRCRAFT (.) ADDITIONALLY 1 AIRCRAFT IS ESTABLISHED FOR EACH OF THE 3 WING LEADERS (.) GRAND TOTAL 101 AIRCRAFT (.) 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS TO BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P-38 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SPITFIRE IX AIRCRAFT (.) A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES THROUGHOUT THE COMMAND (.)

PARA. 3. AIR TRANSPORT HEAD QUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 16 U.E.(.) THESE TO BE S.M.79'S, S.M. 82'S, S.M. 95'S or similar types (.) AN AIR MINISTRY COMMUNICATION SQUADRON OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE TO INCLUDE MULTI ENGINE AND LIGHT PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT IS ALSO NECESSARY (.) A METEOROLOGICAL FLIGHT OF 6 SINGLE ENGINE AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE IS REQUIRED (.)

PARA. 4. GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEAD QUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.E. (.) 1 SQUADRON TO BE EQUIPPED WITH CATALINA OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI ENGINE SEAPLANES (.) A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT IS ALSO REQUIRED (.)

PARA. 5. TRAINING HEAD QUARTERS TO COMMAND THE FOLLOWING FLYING UNITS COMPRISING A

THIS FORCE TO BE RE-ORGANISED UNDER THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY INTO THE FOLLOWING:

(a) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS

(b) AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS.

(c) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS.

(d) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS.

(e) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS

(f) DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY

(g) DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION (.)

PARA. 2. FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THROUGH SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE INTERCEPTOR, 2 FIGHTER BOMBER AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THE UNIT EQUIPMENT OF EACH SQUADRON TO BE 14 AIRCRAFT (.) ADDITIONALLY 1 AIRCRAFT IS ESTABLISHED FOR EACH OF THE 3 WING LEADERS (.) GRAND TOTAL 101 AIRCRAFT (.) 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS TO BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P-38 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SPITFIRE IX AIRCRAFT (.) A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES THROUGHOUT THE COMMAND (.)

PARA. 3. AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 16 U.E(.) THESE TO BE S.M.79'S, S.M. 82'S, S.M. 95'S or similar types (.) AN AIR MINISTRY 1562 COMMUNICATION SQUADRON OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE TO INCLUDE MULTI ENGINE AND LIGHT PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT IS ALSO NECESSARY (.) A METEOROLOGICAL FLIGHT OF 6 SINGLE ENGINE AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE IS REQUIRED (.)

PARA. 4. GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.E. (.) 1 SQUADRON TO BE EQUIPPED WITH CATALINA OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI ENGINE SEAPLANES (.) A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT IS ALSO REQUIRED (.)

PARA. 5. TRAINING HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THE FOLLOWING FLYING UNITS COMPRISING A FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL (.)

(i) ELEMENTARY SQUADRON EQUIPPED WITH 12 MONITH OR MAGISTER OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

(ii) AN ADVANCED SQUADRON COMPRISING 1 SINGLE ENGINE FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH 15

CONTINUED/2...

ITALIAN TYPE G.55 OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 TWIN ENGINED FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH 15 OXFORD OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

(iii) A NAVIGATOR AND WIRELESS OPERATORS TRAINING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 6 BALTIMORE OR SIMILAR ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

ADDITIONALLY A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 4 ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT WILL BE REQUIRED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING HEADQUARTERS AS A WHOLE (.)

PARA. 6. GROUND TRAINING UNITS COMMANDED BY TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPRISE:-

(i) CADET COLLEGE

(ii) RECRUIT DEPOT

(iii) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

(iv) FLYING CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

PARA. 7. MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUIRE A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT COMPRISING 8 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE SM. 82s OR SIMILAR TYPE AND 4 LIGHT TYPE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

PARA. 8. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE (.)

PARA. 9. ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT COVERED IN THIS SIGNAL AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN TO ME (.)

PARA. 10. ALTHOUGH NOT COVERED BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS IN MAF.1103 THE FOLLOWING ARE NOW CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL:-

(i) A TARGET TOWING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 8 MARINET AIRCRAFT (.)

(ii) AN A.O.P. SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 14 U.S. ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT (L.M. 5 OR SIMILAR TYPE) (.)

1067

PARA. 11. ALL FIGURES FOR NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT QUOTED ABOVE ARE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO RESERVES (.) THESE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING SCALES AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS A PERCENTAGE WASTAGE OF UNIT EQUIPMENT PER MONTH:-

(i) SINGLE ENGINE FIGHTER 1.4 (.)

(ii) TRANSPORT 2 (.)

(iii) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE 1 (.)

(iv) TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4 (.)

(v) COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

PARA. 12. IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF SUFFICIENT

PARA. 6. GROUND TRAINING UNITS COMMANDED BY TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPRISE:-

(i) CADET COLLEGE

(ii) RECRUIT DEPOT

(iii) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL

(iv) FLYING CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

PARA. 7. MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUIRE A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT COMPRISING 8 U.E. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE SM. 82s OR SIMILAR TYPE AND 4 LIGHT TYPE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

PARA. 8. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE (.)

PARA. 9. ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT COVERED IN THIS SIGNAL AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN TO ME (.)

PARA. 10. ALTHOUGH NOT COVERED BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS IN MAF.1103 THE FOLLOWING ARE NOW CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL:-

(i) A TARGET TOWING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 8 MARCHETTI AIRCRAFT (.)

(ii) AN A.O.P. SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 14 U.E. ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT (L.M. 5 OR SIMILAR TYPE) (.)

PARA. 11. ALL FIGURES FOR NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT QUOTED ABOVE ARE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO RESERVES (.) THESE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING SCALES AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS A PERCENTAGE WASTAGE OF UNIT EQUIPMENT PER MONTH:- 1367

(i) SINGLE ENGINE FIGHTER 1.4 (.)

(ii) TRANSPORT 2 (.)

(iii) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE 1 (.)

(iv) TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4 (.)

(v) COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

PARA. 12. IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF SUFFICIENT MODERN RADAR AND VHF EQUIPMENT TO EQUIP TWO STATIC AND 1 MOBILE SECTIONS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT (.)

PARA. 13. AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF ALL ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT

CONTINUED/3.....

AND SPARES INCLUDING BOMBS AND AMMUNITION TO A SCALE COMMENSURATE WITH THE ROLE OF THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.)

PARA. 14. IT IS CONFIRMED THAT I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY THAT THE CEILING APPROVAL FOR THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE IS PERMISSIVE AND THAT IT IS NOT OBLIGATORY TO THEM TO RE-ORGANISE THEIR FORCE UP TO THIS CEILING (.)

1566

TOP SECRET

Approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when Italy surrendered. Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishments required to operate an Air Force of such nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any expansion permitted by the Peace Treaty must lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing part in functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the U.S..... and R....F., and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by Allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave Italy this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling pending the Peace Treaty must depend on the requirements and the establishment for any Italian Air Force permitted and until these establishments are worked out it is impossible to make an arbitrary ceiling of 12000.

Appendix 1.1 (Cont'd)

Italy and one the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and capable of working in conjunction with the R.A.F. operating from Malta and the French Air Force from the South Coast of France.

5. Transport Squadrons. These should be equipped with a normal civil type of aircraft and their normal use should be to provide mobility for the Italian Air Force and to lift Italian Army forces where necessary. Until such time as civil aviation is working in Italy they should have an establishment of 30 aircraft per squadron. However, Italian civil aviation begins they should be reduced to an initial equipment of 15 aircraft per squadron and the balance of aircrews and aircraft could be transferred to Italian civil aviation and completely discharged, without any reserve obligation, to civil life.

6. Flying Training. There will be a need for a flying training school for the Italian Air Force as there must be a continuous small new intake. This training school should consist of 2 branches, elementary and service training and it will require approximately 15 elementary training aircraft and 15 service type aircraft. Operational training should take place in the squadrons.

7. Italian Air Ministry. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and employs a relatively large number of Italian Air Force personnel, a rather higher proportion than is found in British Service Ministries, in view of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry has officers in many cases where British Service Ministries would use civil servants.

8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are organized on a territorial basis. It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify 4 Territorial Headquarters, but until matters left over from the 2 to war are liquidated these Headquarters will have to remain. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct through:

(a) [illegible] for fighter sector with 3 squadrons.

(b) [illegible] ing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R. Squadron.

(c) [illegible] Transport [illegible] ing of 2 squadrons.

(d) [illegible] C.R./A.S.R. [illegible] ding of 2 squadrons.

(e) [illegible] Training [illegible] responsible for flying and technical training.

to be kept reasonably perfect where necessary. Until such time as civil aviation is working in Italy they should have an establishment of 30 aircraft per squadron. However, in Italian civil aviation begins they should be reduced to an initial equipment of 15 aircraft per squadron and the balance of aircrews and aircraft could be transferred to Italian civil aviation and completely discharged, without any reserve obligation, to civil life.

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8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are organized on a territorial basis. It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify 4 Territorial Headquarters, but until matters left over from the last war are liquidated these Headquarters will have to remain. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct through:

(a) An inner zone fighter sector with 3 squadrons.

(b) A Fighter/Bomber Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 T.B./A. squadron.

(c) A Transport Wing of 2 squadrons.

(d) A G.R./A.S.R. Wing of 2 squadrons.

(e) A Training Wing responsible for flying and technical training.

(f) A Maintenance Wing.

The above Wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted under Peace Treaty.

Civilian. The current building of the Italian Air Force is 31000 which is

/civil aviation.....

P/319 (2nd Draft)

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX A
TOP SECRET

COPY NO_____

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

7 December 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE - ORGANIZATION AND CEILING

1.

Type of Sqdn	Aircraft	No. of Sqdns.	I.E per Sqdn
Fighter/Bomber	P-38	5	16
Tac/R.	Spitfire	1	16
SAR & GR.	Flying Boat	2	10
Transport Sqdns	Civil Type	2	16
Training School	Elementary and Service Types	1	30
Communication	Obsolescent Service and Civil Types	1	16

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organized into an Interceptor Fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the U.S.....F. should sell a number of P-38 and F.5. aircraft to the Italian Government. The F.5. is a photographic reconnaissance version of the P.38 and by changing the nose can be converted to P.38 which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons likewise will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a severe menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R squadron for administrative purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber Wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever Air Headquarters would work in parallel with the Italian Army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the I....F. is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be mobile. It will need photographic and ade-

Type of Sqdn	Aircraft	No. of Sqdns.	I.E per Sqdn
Fighter/Bomber	P-38	5	16
Tac/R.	Spitfire	1	15
SAR & GR.	Flying Boat	2	10
Transport Sqdns	Civil Type	2	16
Training School	Elementary and Service Types	1	30
Communication	Gosslescent Service and Civil Types	1	16

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organized into an interceptor fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the U.S.....F. should sell a number of P-38 and F.5. aircraft to the Italian Government. The F.5. is a photographic reconnaissance version of the P.38 and by changing the lens can be converted to P.38 which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons likewise will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a severe menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R squadron for administrative purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber Wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever Air Headquarters would work in parallel with the Italian Army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the I....F. is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be mobile. It will need photographic and adequate R/T equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

4. Air Sea Rescue and G. R. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats or seaplanes so that in performance of their Air Sea Rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One Squadron should be based to cover the East Coast of

/civil aviation.....

training of the Italian Air Force should begin forthwith to the strength and composition shown at appendix "A" in order to form a well-organised and efficient Air Force that can be used for defence in cooperation with the other services; that, when a sufficiently high enough standard of organisation and training has been reached the Italian Air Force should be handed back to Italian Government control.

g. That the Italian Government be permitted to start internal civil aviation and that the necessary aircraft and aircrews and maintenance personnel should be discharged from the Italian Air Force to form civil aviation organisations.

h. That HQ be relieved of their present responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel. Only those Italian Air Force personnel who are serving as an integral part of RAF and USAAF units should be regarded as Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel.

i. That the Allied Commission be instructed to examine the practicability of the Italian Government assuming responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel at as early a date as possible without a material reduction in the present standard of the ration.

j. That RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should examine the feasibility of replacing Br/Itl and US/Itl Air Force personnel by German PW and Italian civilians at the earliest possible date in order that GOC and COUS can be relieved of their responsibility for providing rations for Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel.

k. That the Air Force Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the Peace Treaty and assume corresponding responsibilities

defence in cooperation with the other services; that, when a sufficiently high enough standard of organisation and training has been reached the Italian Air Force should be handed back to Italian Government control.

b. That the Italian Government be permitted to start internal civil aviation and that the necessary aircraft and aircrews and maintenance personnel should be discharged from the Italian Air Force to found civil aviation organisations.

c. That BAF be relieved of their present responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel. Only those Italian Air Force personnel who are serving as an integral part of RAF and USAAF units should be regarded as Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel.

d. That the Allied Commission be instructed to examine the practicability of the Italian Government assuming responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel at as early a date as possible without a material reduction in the present standard of the ration.

e. That RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should examine the feasibility of replacing Br/Itl and US/Itl Air Force personnel by German PW and Italian civilians at the earliest possible date in order that GOF and TOUSA can be relieved of their responsibility for providing rations for Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel.

f. That the Air Force Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the Peace Treaty and assume corresponding responsibilities parallel to AMA.

TOP SECRET

CONCLUSIONS

IV. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganised to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces in frustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as Greece, France, Belgium, Holland and Norway.

d. That until such time as the training, reorganisation and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to the Italian Government control.

e. Italian civil aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of this commitment, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and duties.

f. That it is essential for SACMED to be relieved of his responsibility for the provision of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Ital and US/Ital personnel as soon as possible, and it is desirable that this responsibility should be assumed by the Italian Government.

g. That solely from the aspect of rationing, RAF (Italy) and NAAF (Italy) should release Br/Ital and US/Ital personnel and these should be employed as much as possible by German PW and civilians so that CMF and NAAF can be relieved of their responsibility for the

maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces in deterring any attempt to encroach her frontiers.

b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more favorable treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is accorded for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and CHINA.

d. That until such time as the organization, reorganization and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to the Italian Government's control.

e. Italian Civil Aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of this commitment, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.

f. That it is essential for CAF to be relieved of its responsibility for the provision of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel as soon as possible, and it is desirable that this responsibility should be assumed by the Italian Government.

g. That a help from the aspect of rationing, BAF ITALY and USAF ITALY should release Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel and they should be replaced as soon as possible by German PW and civilians so that CAF and TOUSA may be relieved of their responsibility for the supply of rations to Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. a. That the Italian Air Force should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time, but that the reorganization and

possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations.

(b) The ability of the Italian Government to assume responsibility for the provision of rations for Iti/Iti Air Force personnel will to a large extent depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports necessary. If the Italian Air Force is to be organised into an efficient force, it is important that a satisfactory scale of rations should be maintained. It should be noted that on assuming ration responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration.

15. Capability of Italian Economy.

During the present Armistice period, in order to maintain the Italian Air Force in equipment, it would be necessary, as in the case of the Italian Army, to augment, from Allied stocks, the material and supplies which could be provided from indigenous sources. During the post-peace Treaty period, however, the Italian civil aircraft industry should be fully capable of maintaining any civil aviation organisation likely to be permitted under the Peace Terms, provided that the Italian Government considered it economical for it to do so.

FUTURE OF AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

16. The Air Forces Sub-Commission is the vehicle set up under Article 27 of the Armistice Terms with Italy as the Allied Organisation to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that it should remain in its present form until a Peace Treaty is concluded, as the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian Air matters, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being. In the event of the Italian Air Force being reorganised and eventually handed over to the control of the

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FUTURE OF AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

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States or Great Britain. There will be a need for the Air Sea Rescue squadrons to be provided with certain modern Anglo-American wireless equipment if they are to perform their Air Sea Rescue duties efficiently in combination with other Nations operating Air Sea Rescue in the Mediterranean.

13. Clothing and other requirements.

The provision of clothing, MT tyres and other day to day requirements should be the responsibility of the Italian Government and the Italian Government should be responsible for purchasing all the equipment and supplies necessary.

14. Rations.

a. The provision of the military element of the rations for the Italian Air Force is at present a CMF and MTOUSA responsibility. The present strength of the Italian Air Force is approximately as follows :-

Type of personnel	Strength	Nation responsible for military element of rations
Itl/Itl	25,000	British
Br/Itl	4,000	British
US/Itl	2,600	US

b. It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Air Force. The Italian Government will shortly assume responsibility for the provision of the whole ration for Itl/Itl Army personnel. The handling and accounting for supplies for Italian Air Force personnel involves a manpower commitment for the British and US Armies which it will become increasingly more difficult to meet, particularly in respect of the larger British commitment, owing to diminishing manpower ceilings. From an Army point of view, it is therefore essential that they are relieved of this commitment at the earliest possible date.

c. Br/Itl and US/Itl personnel are being used in lieu of British and

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Type of personnel	Strength	Nation responsible for military element of rations.
Ital/Ital	25,000	British
Br/Ital	4,000	British
US/Ital	4,800	US

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c. Br/Ital and US/Ital Personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working with RAF and USAAF units scattered throughout Italy. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not consider-

not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which it is desired to operate. This reorganisation of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation commission will not in any way permit private flying or gliding.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

10. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retained complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by cutting off the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force envisaged is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, aviation P.O.L., signals and radar equipment, etc..

b. It is considered that immediate reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until the late and the descent Italian aircraft are replaced reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

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b. It is considered that immediate reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the necessary signals and certain radar organisation is provided. It is unlikely that Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and the Italians should be encouraged to buy this from the United

necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. S/CMRD in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the Italian Air Force should be a maximum of 12,000. However, since ITALY is to be allowed a post-war Army it is clear that she must be allowed an Air Force commensurate with the former. The size of the post-war Italian Air Force must depend partially on the economic ability of ITALY to maintain fighting forces. There will also be a requirement for Air Sea Rescue and Coastal reconnaissance aircraft in view of ITALY's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be combined in General Reconnaissance Squadrons. Assuming that Italian civil aviation is permitted there will also be a requirement for Air Force Transport Squadrons to enable Air Forces and Italian Army Forces to be moved rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that are a serious menace to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "A".

11. Air Transport.

In order to assist in the rehabilitation of ITALY all forms of internal transport are needed and at the present time the Italian Air Force is running a courier service with its bomber transport and sea plane squadrons. These squadrons are in effect fulfilling tasks that would normally be done by civil aviation. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganised into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of this duty and the transport squadrons should be trained and used in their proper Air Force role which would be transportation of troops, stores and equipment. In order to relieve the Italian Air Force of its current civil air transport commitments it would

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services would not be allowed to operate in the vicinity of the disputed territories, nor to demilitarized zones except with the authority of AFHQ. The Italian Air Force will continue to take over responsibility for Air Sea Rescue operations around the shores of ITALY (SARDINIA and SICILY) with the intention that it will ultimately be the sole organization undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for RAF and USAAF personnel in all possible trades. This would assist us to fill larger gaps created in our own organization occasioned by accelerated release. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained may be used by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack emanating from areas outside her frontier.

10. Long-term policy

a. The strength of the Italian Air Force must depend on a compromise between two opposing factors:

(i) ITALY must not be in a position to threaten sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.

(ii) ITALY should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.

b. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her

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control school, A/T school and several engineering establishments in the LEGHORN area. Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons assist the Italian courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorized to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of RAF manpower as follows:-

a. To fill existing RAF establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to RAF Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the US AF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the RAF.

FUTURE ALLIED AND ITALIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term policy

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force are limited to air assistance to the Land Forces in the maintenance of internal security and air support for the CMO in the guarding of such frontiers as are not already guaranteed by the Allies. Since the only frontiers not so guarded are with Switzerland and France it is not considered that this latter requirement is a very formidable one. Novertheless, to permit of these requirements being properly satisfied, it will be necessary to modify in favour of the Italian Air Force certain of the regulations regarding its organization and training.

b. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary that the re-organization of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

c. Consideration must also be given to the ill effect of discharging a large number of Italian Air Force personnel to the labour market until they can be absorbed into industry. The duration of this will be dependent on the

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c. Consideration must also be given to the ill effect of discharging a large number of Italian Air Force personnel to the labour market until they can be absorbed into industry. The duration of this will be dependent on the speed with which the industry is rehabilitated.

d. It is envisaged that we shall continue to make use of the Air Courier Service and that we shall possibly extend it to take over some of the internal Allied Air Transport Services in ITALY. Such Italian courier

training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organization of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be allowed at the Peace Treaty, in order to make it capable of carrying out its functions as a part of the Italian Armed Forces with effect from the date of withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY.

GENERAL DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in ALBORB the Italian Air Force as an operational force ceased to exist. On the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, certain units were, however, kept in employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment. The employment of these units is at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has been the intention that the Italian Air Force (within the authorized ceiling, as it may from time to time be determined), shall be self-supporting in all respects with the following exceptions - POL and tyres, rations and such technical equipment as is necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft in their possession. To this end an interim policy directive was given to the A.M.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission. All Allied aircraft handed over to the Italians, either to assist their participation in the war against GERMANY, or to help them carry out various post-hostility functions for the Allies, are to be considered as on loan.

PRESENT CEILING OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under:-

Operational Air Force	22,000
Employed by the RAF	2,500
Employed by the USAAF	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the RAF and USAAF.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would [illegible] carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air

Chief of Staff, AFHQ

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PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would normally have been carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative service, maintenance of bases and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying

P/319 (2nd Draft)

ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

TOP SECRET

COPY NO._____

7 December 1945

TOP SECRET

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability, and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in GREECE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AG 091.711 (2) SACMED of 29 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present armistice period, SACMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with JUGOSLAVIA.

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal allied powers.

It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations and

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability, and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

<u>POLICY TO BE ADOPTED</u>

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in MEDITERRANEAN and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AC 091.711/232 (AFHQ) of 28 September 1943 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force; that policy was, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present Armistice period, SACMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

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c. They must <u>not</u> be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.

It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as CANADA, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND NORWAY. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain her internal security and to defend her frontiers. The successful equipping and

P/319 (2nd Draft)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 3

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

7 December 1943

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

1. The attached Second Draft has been prepared and will be discussed at a meeting to be held in the Air Room at 0930 hours on Monday, 10 December 1943.

H.T.H. SNOWDEN,
Captain
Secretary

DISTRIBUTION:

Plus "B" plus
P-5
Fr. Rosmin
Lt. Polen

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H.T.H. SMO DEN,
Captain
Secretary

DISTRIBUTION:

List "B" plus
1-5
Mr. Vosmin
OS Folder

TOP SECRET

From:- Director, Air Forces Branch, Allied Force Headquarters, A.P.O. 794.

To :- Allied Force Headquarters, A.P.O. 512. (Attn. V.A.A.C. Secretariat).

Date:- 8th September, 1947.

Ref :- AFB/367/2/Org.

SECRET.

IN-EMBARGO OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Herewith a copy of my letter AFB/367/2/Org., dated 4th September, 1947, which I have sent to the Air Ministry on the above subject, for your information.

A.G. Dixon

A.G. DIXON,
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
A.F.H.Q., APO 794.

1557

ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS,

AIR FORCES BRANCH,

APO 794, U.S. ARMY.

9th September, 1947.

AFB/567/2/Org.

Sir,

Re-equipment of the Italian Air Force.

I have the honour to refer to the one outstanding question on the above subject, viz. the purchase by the Italians of the necessary spares backing to maintain their Air Force. I was informed by the Italian Air Ministry that they had taken all steps which lay within their power with the Minister of Defence to settle this question, but that they were quite sure no decision would be given unless pressure was exercised through diplomatic channels. As a result U.S. Ambassador in Rome sent to the Foreign Minister a Note on the 18th June, 1947 and followed it by a further Note on the 18th August, 1947. So far no reply has been received.

2. I still feel very doubtful whether or not they will purchase any spares. I have been reliably informed by the Italian Air Ministry that, in addition to the 50 P.51's which are being supplied by the Americans with three years' spares backing, the Italian Air Force desire to retain :-

(a) Some 40 odd P.38 aircraft; the remainder being cannibalised for spares.

(b) 6 Squadrons of Spitfire Aircraft of 12 each; of the remaining Spitfires some will be held in reserve and some for cannibalisation for spare parts.

3. You will note that the Italian Air Force has increased the number of fighter squadrons for retention over and above the number advocated in the Air Ministry Plan. The reason underlying their policy is that the Italian Air Staff feel it advisable to maintain a large number of smaller units. They argue that by this means the expansion of their Air Force in due course will be facilitated. Similarly they intend to disperse the wings somewhat amongst the aerodromes so as to keep a large number of aerodromes in commission; again their reason for this is expansion of their own Air Force combined with maintaining facilities for re-inforcement by the Allies.

4. In the meantime the Chief of the Italian Air Staff is trying to make the Government face up to a decision as to whether they intend to maintain an efficient Air Force or not. He has prepared a memorandum on the subject which he is hoping will receive early consideration from the Government Full Joint Defence Committee. He is putting to them that either they must make up their minds to the inevitable expense of an efficient Air Force or disband it; he is emphasising most strongly to them that the present situation of the Air Force, which is underpaid and starved of essentials, is so unsatisfactory that it cannot be prolonged indefinitely.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

AM/367/2/Gen.

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I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.G. Birch.

A.G. BIRCH,
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
ALLIED POWER H.Q.

Under Secretary of State for Air,
(Attention A.O.A.S.(P).),
Air Ministry,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

SECRET

From : MAAC Secretariat

To : Chief of Staff AFHQ

Date : 18 August 1947

RADAR DEFENSIVE NETWORK - ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Enclosed for your information is copy of the Italian Air Forces intended Plan for the disposition of the radar equipment handed over to them by the Royal Air Force.

T.S. RIVETT-CARNAC
Wing Commander
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

COPY

From:- Director, Air Forces Branch, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 794

To :- Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512 (Attn. MAAC Secretariat).

Date:- 12th August, 1947

Ref :- AFB/367/2/Org.

S E C R E T

RADAR DEFENSIVE NETWORK - I.A.F.

Attached herewith are two copies of the Italian Air Force Intended Plan for the disposition of the radar equipment handed over to them by the Royal Air Force. It is hoped that this Plan will be fully implemented and operative in the very early New Year. The Plan was got out by the Tele-Communication Section of the Italian Air Ministry in conjunction withSquadron Leader Ray, Signals Officer of this Branch, and it appears to me to be a sound disposition of the equipment at their disposal.

2. I am sending a copy of this report to the Air Attache at the United States Embassy in Rome.

/s/ A. G. Bishop

A. G. BISHOP
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
A.F.H.Q., APO 794

From:- Director, Air Forces Branch, Allied Force Headquarters, A.P.O. 794

To :- Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512 (Attn. MAAC Secretariat).

Date:- 12th August, 1947

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A. G. BISHOP
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
A.F.H.Q., APO 794

APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF THE WORK OF THE

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION WITH THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

RADAR DEFENSIVE NETWORK - I.A.F.

It is the intention of the Italian Air Ministry to dispose of the Radar equipment held be them in such a way as to provide maximum cover against hostile approaching from the east, especially for the industrial north and, in the south, for the naval base at Taranto. The attached maps show the proposed sites of Radar and Ground V.H.F. equipment. In addition each fighter airfield will have a V.H.F. Homer.

2. The R.A.F. has handed over to the I.A.M. sufficient V.H.F. and Radar equipment to set up one mobile and two static Sectors. The majority of the equipment was handed over in an unserviceable condition but R.A.F. trained I.A.F. personnel are carrying out maintenance and repair. It is anticipated that the three sectors will be operating by February 1948 and the additional units at Ancona, Lescere and Termoli by the following summer. The mobile sectors whilst held in readiness in Rome will be used for training purposes. The attached list shows all Ground V.H.F. and Radar equipment handed over to the I.A.M.

3. Sites for Air Headquarters Static Wing Headquarters and Sector Operations have been definitively fixed. Air Headquarters will most probably be in Rome, Wing Headquarters and Sector Operations at Treviso or Vicenza for thenorthern Sector and at Bari or Foggia for the southern Sector, the first named place in each Sector being the more probable choice.

4. All W/T, teleprinter and telephonic communications equipment will be supplied from Italian sources. This equipment is very suitable, being well made, reliable and efficient.

5. Selected I.A.F. personnel were trained by the R.A.F. at Frosinicoo andMestre as Controllers, Radar Mechanics and Radar Operators. This nucleus is training sufficient I.A.F. personnel to man the Radar Network. The attached lists show the I.A.M.'s estimates of personnel required.

6. Full use will be made of all the equipment even though the I.A.F. will not possess night fighters, and full G.C.I. training will be carried out.

7. The Italian Air Ministry intends to create a Defensive Organisation which will incorporate all present warning channels such as mountain guides, ships, carabinieri, alpini, police and Rescue Organisation. The Radar Network will function within this Defence Organisation under the control of the Italian Air Ministry.

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1552 -

5th August 1947.

R.A.F. AND U.S.A.A.F. EQUIPMENT HANDED OVER TO THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY BY THE A.M.G.

Type of Vehicle	Type AMSD	Descript.	Handed over at Caserta now held at Terricola	Handed over at Frosini co now held at Padova	Handed over at Bogliano Lido now held at Padova.	Handed over at 357 M.U. Now held at Treviso A/F	Totals
S.V.405	8/15	Trans.	7	1	1	2	11
S.V.409	"	Rec.	8	1	1	1	11
S.V.457	"	Antenna	6	1	1	3	11
S.V.456	"	Gen.	39	2	2	=	43
S.V.430	6	Trans./Rec.	7	1	1	4	13
S.V.411	9	Trans.	5	=	=	=	5
S.V.412	"	Rec.	5	=	=	=	5
S.V.451	"	Antenna	9	=	=	=	9
S.V.460	"	Mast	6	=	=	=	6
S.V.100	VHF	Trans. 1 Channel	13	1	1	=	15
S.V.150	"	Rec. 2 Channel	12	1	1	7	~~12~~ 21
S.V.105	"	D/F	=	=	=	13	13
S.V.583	"	Trans/rec.	=	=	=	3	3
MS.4	"	Trans. 2 Channel	=	=	=	2	2
MS.5	"	Rec. 2 Channels	=	=	=	1	1

			Portable		Re-Issue.	Service S/B	
S.V.405	8/15	Trans.	7	1	1	2	11
S.V.409	"	Rec.	8	1	1	1	11
S.V.3457	"	Antenna	6	1	1	3	11
S.V.456	"	Gen.	30	2	2	=	43
S.V.430	6	Trans/Rec.	7	1	1	4	13
S.V.411	9	Trans.	5	=	=	=	5
S.V.412	"	Rec.	5	=	=	=	5
S.V.451	"	Antenna	9	=	=	=	9
S.V.460	"	Mech	6	=	=	=	6
S.V.100	VHF	Trans. 1 Channel	13	1	1	=	15
S.V.150	"	Rec. 2 Channel	12	1	1	7	~~12~~ 21
S.V.105	"	D/F	=	=	=	15	15
S.V.385	"	Trans/rec.	=	=	=	3	3
MS.4	"	Trans.2 Channel	=	=	=	2	2
MS.5	"	Rec. 2 Channels	=	=	=	1	1

[illegible] FOR [illegible] RADAR UNITS.

(Down to [illegible] Divide)

		Operation Room Fighter (+)	Installation G.C.I.	Light Warning	Totals
Chief Sector Officer		1	=	=	1
Pilot Officer		=	2	=	4
Technical Officer		=	1	=	2
Radar Mechanics	N.C.O.	=	1	1	4
	Corporals	=	2	1	8
Radar Operat.	N.C.O.	1	1	=	5
	Corporals	2	6	3	20
VHF Mechanics - Corporals		2	2	1	8
R.T. Operators - Corporals		=	2	(+2)	4 (+4)
Motorists - Corporals		=	2	=	4
Regular (++)	N.C.O.	=	2	1	6
	Corporals, Airmen.	=	18	8	32
Armourer - Corporals.		=	2	1	6
Electricians - Corporals		=	2	1	6
Driver, Corporals or Airmen (+++)		=	2	1	10
	Totals.	6	45	18 (+2)	13 (+4)

Note;

(+) The above listed personnel are necessary for Radar employment.

(++) Needed personnel for night guard to the Radar trucks and for logistic services (Offices, Barracks, Kitchens, Rations, etc.)

(+++) Drivers necessary for the transfer of trucks.

Chief Sector Officer		1	=	=	1
Pilot Officer		=	2	=	4
Technical Officer		=	1	=	2
Radar Mechanics	N.C.O.	=	1	1	4
	Corporals	=	2	1	3
Radar Operat.	N.C.O.	1	1	=	3
	Corporals	2	6	3	20
VHF Mechanics - Corporals		2	2	1	3
R.T. Operators - Corporals		=	2	(+2)	4 (+4)
Motorists - Corporals		=	2	=	4
Regular (++)	N.C.O.	=	2	1	3
	Corporals, Airmen	=	18	8	52
Armourer - Corporals.		=	2	1	5
Electricians - Corporals		=	2	1	6
Driver, Corporals or Airmen (+++)		=	2	1	10
	Totals.	6	45	18 (+2)	13 (+4)

Note:

(+) The above listed personnel are necessary for Radar deployment.

(++) Required personnel for night guard to the Radar trucks and for logistic services (offices, barracks, kitchens, Rations, etc.)

(+++) Drivers necessary for the transfer of trucks.

1550 -

PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR GRA STATIC RADAR SECTOR.

(Dawn to Dusk working)

		Operation Room Fighter (+)	Installation G.C.I.	Light Warning	Totals
Chief Sector Officer		1	=	=	1
Pilot Officers		=	2	=	4
Technical Officers		=	1	=	2
Radar Mechanics	N.C.O.	=	1	1	6
	Corporals.	=	2	1	6
Radar Operat.	N.C.O.	1	1	=	3
	Corporals.	2	6	3	25
V.H.F. Mechanics - Corporals.		2	2	1	10
R.T. Operators - Corporals		=	2	(+2)	4 (+2)
Drivers - Corporals.		=	2	=	4
Regular (++)	N.C.O.	=	2	1	8
	Corporals.	=	18	5	36
Armourer - Corporals		=	2	2	4
Electricians - Corporals		=	2	=	4
Driver - Corporals or Airmen		=	2	1	3
Totals.		6	45	15 (+2)	148 (+8)

Note:

(+) The above listed personnel are necessary for Radar employment.

(++) Required personnel for night guard to the Radar trucks and for logistic services (Offices, Barracks, Kitchens, Rations, etc.-)

148

ITALIAN AIR FORCE - DEFENSIVE RADAR NETWORK

LOCATION OF UNITS



ITALIAN AIR FORCE DEFENSIVE RADAR NETWORK

N.E. STATIO SECTOR

LOCATION OF A.M.R.S. TYPE S/15





ITALIAN AIR FORCE DEFENSIVE RADAR NETWORK

N.E. STATIC SECTOR.

LOCATION OF A.M.S.S TYPE 6.

- Lignano
- Lido Venezia
- Marina di Ravenna



1540



1640

LIGHT WARNING A.M.S.S. TYPE 6 LOCATIONS

S.E. STATIC SECTOR

- OTRANTO
- BRINDISI
- BARI
- TARANTO
- VIESTE
- TERMOLI





ITALIAN AIR FORCE - D[redacted]IVE RADAR NETWORK

A.M.R.S. TYPE 8/15 LOCATIONS

S.E. STATIC SECTOR

- [redacted]rmoli
- Foggia
- S.Pancrazio



3.2. STATIC MOTOR



1903

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : 0619452 PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 7/07
ROUTINE SECRET

FROM : USAFE

TO : USMA ITALY INFO : AGWAR COMGENMED CINCEUR

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : UAX 5771 6 August 1947

Cite EAFDC.

Representatives from this Command will arrive ROME, ITALY on or about 11 August 1947 to discuss plans for transfer of P-51 aircraft to Italian Government as stated in your MAR 231 message.

NOTE : MAR 231 MC IN 95 5/8/47 G-3(MTO)

ACTION : G-3(MTO)

INFORMATION : SACS G-5LO AG(REC) C/S MTO RAFLO G-2 NLO G-3(AFHQ) US POLAD G-4 BRIT POLAD

1543

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
MC IN 139 7 Aug 47 SECRET 0807B Ref No UAX 5771 ra/1

SECRET COPY No. 54

1904

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : 041830B PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSO N 14/05
PRIORITY SECRET

FROM : USMA ITALY SIGNED WILLEMS

TO : USAFE INFO : AGWAR COMGENMED

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : MAR 231 4 August 1947

Sale and agreement for transfer of P-51's to Italians concluded on 21 July Surplus Property Agreement signed Italian Government and FLC ROME. " 50 aircraft to be designated by the United States Army together with maintenance equipment and spare parts for said aircraft for 3 years which property is presently located in the United States occupied zone of GERMANY".

Agreement ready for implementation.

Request Major VAN ETTEN and Captain SAM F ROGERS your Headquarters be sent ROME soonest for conference with FLC, Italians, MTOUSA and this Office to finalize equipment list and arrange transfer to ITALY (Reference UAX-5371 May 30.)

Estimate 10 days temporary duty for initial arrangements. Extended temporary duty will be determined then.

Recommendation that small cadre Italians be sent appropriate station GERMANY for P-51 instruction awaits discussion and your decision.

Italians anxious but lack of funds prevents payment messing and billets.

NOTE : UAX-5371 MC IN 1222 31/5/47 G-3(MTO)

ACTION : G-3(MTO)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(AFHQ) G-4
G-5 LO RAFLO NLO US POLAD BRIT POLAD
AG(REC)

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
MC IN 95 5 Aug 47 SECRET 2319B Ref No MAR 231 ss/H

COPY NO. 23

From : MAAC AFHQ

To : Chief of Staff AFHQ

Date : 1 August 1947

Ref : MAAC 4200

Re-equipment of the Italian Air Force

Enclosed for your information is a further report on the progress made on the British side of the re-equipment plan.

1544 -

S.J.B. HAMILTON
Wing Commander
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

From : MAAC AFHQ

To : Chief of Staff AFHQ

Date : 1 August 1947

Ref : MAAC 4200

Re-equipment of the Italian Air Force

Enclosed for your information is a further report from the Director of the Air Forces Branch on the above subject.

It is requested that this report be returned when perused.

1540

S.J.B. HAMILTON

Wing Commander
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

SECRET

From : MAAC Secretariat

To : Chief of Staff AFHQ

Date : 30 June 1947

Re-equipment of the Italian Air Force

Enclosed for your information is copy of a report from the Director of the Air Forces Branch on the progress being made on the British side of the re-equipment plan.

S.J.E. Hamilton
Wing Commander
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

From:- Air Forces Branch, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 794.

To :- Allied Force Headquarters, Leghorn (For M.A.A.C. Secretariat).(3)

Date:- 23rd June, 1947.

Ref :- AFB/367/2/Grz.

51

SECRET.

RE-EQUIPMENT OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

On the 20th June a further Note on the British side of the Plan for the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force was handed to the Foreign Minister by the British Ambassador; copies were also given by me personally to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Air Staff.

2. This Note briefly reviewed the Plan and the progress made on the British side to date and then requested the Italian Government to answer certain questions in order that finality might be reached.

3. The relevant part of the Note reads as follows :-

"5. The acceptance only of Category "A" equipment will not however result in the Italian Air Force being that efficient force which it is the desire of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be left in Italy when the Allied Troops withdraw. It is essential that the Air Force should be backed by adequate spares, certain technical vehicles and effective training units, and it is suggested that a reasonable period for which this backing be provided, should be three years.

"6. It is therefore requested that a reply be provided urgently to the two following questions :-

(a) How much spares backing for the Spitfire Squadrons do the Italian Government wish to purchase, i.e. Category "C" equipment.

and (b) How much of the equipment detailed in Category "B" do the Italian Government wish to purchase ?

In the event of a negative answer being given to either of these questions, it would be much appreciated if information could be given as to how the Italian Air Force is to be maintained in the next two or three years, as it is estimated that it will take this time for the Aviation Industry to be reconstructed and be in a position to accept the responsibility of providing the Air Force from national resources only."

A.G. Bishop.
AIR COMMODORE.

SECRET.

RE-EQUIPMENT OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

On the 20th June a further Note on the British side of the Plan for the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force was handed to the Foreign Minister by the British Ambassador; copies were also given by me personally to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Air Staff.

2. This Note briefly reviewed the Plan and the progress made on the British side to date and then requested the Italian Government to answer certain questions in order that finality might be reached.

3. The relevant part of the Note reads as follows :-

"5. The acceptance only of Category "A" equipment will not however result in the Italian Air Force being that efficient force which it is the desire of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be left in Italy when the Allied Troops withdraw. It is essential that the Air Force should be backed by adequate spares, certain technical vehicles and effective training units, and it is suggested that a reasonable period for which this backing be provided, should be three years.

"6. It is therefore requested that a reply be provided urgently to the two following questions :-

(a) How much spares backing for the Spitfire Squadrons do the Italian Government wish to purchase, i.e. Category "B" equipment.

and (b) How much of the equipment detailed in Category "B" do the Italian Government wish to purchase ?

In the event of a negative answer being given to either of these questions, it would be much appreciated if information could be given as to how the Italian Air Force is to be maintained in the next two or three years, as it is estimated that it will take this time for the Aviation Industry to be reconstructed and be in a position to accept the responsibility of provisioning the Air Force from national resources only."

A.G. Bishop

A.G. BISHOP,
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH.
A.P.H.Q., AFO 784.

From:- Air Forces Branch, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 794.

To :- Allied Force Headquarters, Leghorn (For M.A.A.C. Secretariat).

Date:- 23rd June, 1947.

Ref :- AFB/367/2/Org.

SECRET.

RE-EQUIPMENT OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

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"6. It is therefore requested that a reply be provided urgently to the two following questions :-

(a) How much spares backing for the Spitfire Squadrons do the Italian Government wish to purchase, i.e. Category "C" equipment.

and (b) How much of the equipment detailed in Category "B" do the Italian Government wish to purchase ?

In the event of a negative answer being given to either of these questions, it would be much appreciated if information could be given as to how the Italian Air Force is to be maintained in the next two or three years, as it is estimated that it will take this time for the Aviation Industry to be reconstructed and be in a position to accept the responsibility of provisioning the Air Force from national resources only."

A.G. BISHOP,
AIR COMMODORE,

SECRET.

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(a) How much spares backing for the Spitfire Squadrons do the Italian Government wish to purchase, i.e. Category "C" equipment.

and (b) How much of the equipment detailed in Category "D" do the Italian Government wish to purchase ?

In the event of a negative answer being given to either of these questions, it would be much appreciated if information could be given as to how the Italian Air Force is to be maintained in the next two or three years, as it is estimated that it will take this time for the Aviation Industry to be reconstructed and be in a position to accept the responsibility of provisioning the Air Force from national resources only."

A.G. Bishop

A.G. BISHOP,
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
A.F.H.Q., APO 794.

FROM : AIR COMMODORE A.C. BISHOP, C.B.E, A.F.C.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

AIR FORCES BRANCH,

A P O 794.

13th June, 1947.

E/O/AGB/6/16.

Dear Hamilton

Further to my letter dated 4th June, 1947.

I am now informed by the Air Ministry that the Foreign Office have ruled that, technically, no transfer of equipment to the Italians should take place during the Armistice Regime without the consent of all the Allies.

However in view of the imminence of "R" day, the Foreign Office have agreed to waive this formality provided no publicity is given to the transaction.

Our projected party is therefore squashed.

Yours Sincerely
Alan S. Bishop

Wing Commander S.J.B. Hamilton, D.F.C.
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee
Secretariat,
Allied Force Headquarters,
L E G H O R N.

1030

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

AIR FORCES BRANCH,

A.P.O. 794.

SECRET

AFB/367/2/ORG.

5th June, 1947.

RE-EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

I gather there is a most understandable feeling at A.F.H.Q. that the possible Italian reaction to the re-equipment plan of only accepting the "free" category of equipment will not result in "a small but efficient Air Force".

2. I feel convinced that political and economical factors will compel the Government to create an all Italian Air Force as soon as maybe; impossible for some time to come as regards first line aircraft but definitely possible now, to a large degree, as regards non-operational aircraft. For this reason I am sure that the Italians will mainly utilise their own resources as backing for their re-equipment plan, and only purchase the very minimum equipment abroad to meet essential current needs.

3. A very possible substitution of Italian types for British aircraft in the non-operational Units is as follows:-

Unit.	Type.
E.F.T.S.	L.4 and L.5 (American) CA 164.
S.F.T.S.	G.55. S.M. 79. S.M. 84.
Air Navigation & Radio School	S.M. 79. S.M. 84.
A.G. school	S.M. 79.
A.S.R. & G.R.	C.Z. 506. Baltimore IV & V (British type already held)

4. Not until TREVISO is handed over can any forecast be made of the Spitfire spares and other technical equipment they may wish to purchase, as not until then will the Italians know exactly what they are getting. I have informed them that I shall expect that information quickly but the fact remains that in their forthcoming budget little provision is made for the purchase of equipment. It may well be that if it is desired to achieve the aim, further financial concessions will have to be offered to them.

AFB/367/2/ORG.

5th June, 1947.

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A.G. BISHOP,
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
A.F.H.Q. APO.794.

Allied Force Headquarters,
for M.A.A.C. Secretariat,
L E G H O R N.

FROM : AIR COMMODORE A.S. BISHOP, C.B.E., A.F.C.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

AIR FORCES BRANCH,

A P O 794.

4th June, 1947.

DO/ACB/6/8.

Dear Hamilton

This is to let you know that the Italian Air Force personnel have started arriving at TREVISO with a view to taking over aircraft, spares, ammunition and vehicles. It will take about a month to complete as everything has to be listed and checked.

2. About the 25th June however we anticipate being in a position to make a formal hand over of the control of TREVISO reserving a Hangar for the completion of listing stores.

3. Somewhere about that date therefore I have suggested to the A.O.C. Italy that we should have a public ceremony when the A.O.C. formally hands over the field to the C.A.S. Air Ministry. Guards of Honour, band etc., and full publicity. I think he will agree and I know our Ambassador thinks it a good idea.

4. Will you please let the necessary authorities know and perhaps, when the date is firmly fixed, you might consider coming over yourself as representing A.F.H.Q. Anyway I will let you know all the details when the plan is confirmed and settled.

Yours Sincerely
Alan S. Bishop

Wing Commander S.J.B. Hamilton, D.F.C.
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat,
c/o Allied Force Headquarters,
L E G H O R N.

1037

A P O 794.

4th June, 1947.

DO/ACP/6/8.

Dear Hamilton

This is to let you know that the Italian Air Force personnel have started arriving at TREVISO with a view to taking over aircraft, spares, ammunition and vehicles. It will take about a month to complete as everything has to be listed and checked.

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Yours sincerely

Alan S. Bilsh

Wing Commander S.J.D. Hamilton, D.F.C.
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat,
c/o Allied Force Headquarters,
L E G H O R N.

1034

1917

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET OP PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : GHQ CMF TAC GHQ DUINO AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ ROME US EMBASSY ROME BRITISH EMBASSY ROME EUCOM USAFE AHQ ITALY

REF NO : FX 76465

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FHGCT

This is NAF 1330.

1. Director Italian Air Forces Branch AFHQ acting in his capacity as representative of Air Ministry has requested and received approval for transfer of all free category Royal Air Force equipment in ITALY to Italian Air Force. This transfer to begin 2 June and the greater part to be completed by 25 June.

2. Due to existing Italian political changes I have received NO official acceptance of combined plan. I consider moreover that it may be an appreciable time before I do receive any such acceptance.

3. In view of the urgency stressed in both COS (W) 481 and WX 97755 I do NOT feel justified in waiting for an official acceptance, as this will only further delay the rundown of the Royal Air Force in ITALY and the equipping of the Italian Air Force.

4. I have therefore agreed to the transfer of British equipment as approved by the Air Ministry.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH Colonel

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4 G-5 LO RAFLO NLO US POLAD BRIT POLAD AG(REC) **

MC OUT 65 4 June 47 SECRET 1122B Ref No FX 76465 ra/G

RAFLO

OTP

46

RASMED ROME

2045 1/6/47

No. 149 1/6/47

Addressed to ROME telegram No. 149 of 1st June.

Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 208.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 206.

General Lee is not available to-day, but I would assure you that the instruction to hold hard with the piecemeal delivery to the Italian Government of such items of British equipment as cost nothing was issued with the intention of giving time for fresh reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose present orders to A/SACMED are designed to build up an efficient Italian air force. In the view of A.F.H.Q. it is by no means certain that this object will be achieved by permitting the Italians to take what they like from the material offered by the British and U.S. Air Forces and refuse the rest.

SCARLETT

OFFLO

45

[illegible] [illegible]

2515 31.5.47. 1015 1.6.47.

No. 235 31.5.47. Dec. 1215 1.6.47.

ADDRESSED.

Addressed to Lahore telegram No.234, repeated to Foreign Office.

Your despatch No.40.

Equipment for Air Force.

In accordance with arrangements outlined in GOC 481 of May 16th to AFHQ's reply 600 of May 18th Head of Air Forces Branch of Allied Force Headquarters Rome has been discussing with Italians details for the handover of British equipment, it being understood that corresponding work on the American side was being conducted by U.S. Air Attache. In the absence of any intimation to the contrary Air Commodore Bishop has assumed that this procedure was agreeable to AFHQ. Negotiations have now reached the stage where the Italian Air authorities are due to send representatives HERSVIRE in the course of the next week to take over equipment there. This cannot be delayed beyond next week without great inconvenience as the RAF at Hervise are scheduled to withdraw majority of personnel by the 10th and the remainder by the end of June.

2. This morning however Air Commodore Bishop was informed by telephone from AHQ Teghran that General Lee had issued orders that no equipment was to be transferred to the Italian Air Force until further notice. General Lee took the line that as SACMED he had been charged by CCS (see paragraph 5(a) of telegram WAR 97,755 of May 8th) to secure the Italian Government's formal agreement to the plan. This has not yet been forthcoming and until it is he states that no part of the plan may be implemented.

3. I hope it will be possible for you to induce General Lee to revise this decision. I suggest that in speaking to him you should use the following argument along (grounds) that may suggest themselves to you:

(a)/

(a) The extreme inconvenience which will now be caused by further delays in handing over free RAF equipment (paragraph 1 above) (I understand there is a RAF officer at AFHQ Leghorn who can give you all necessary details).

(b) In the absence of any properly constituted Italian Government we may have still to wait several weeks before it is possible to secure their agreement re equipment plan as a whole.

4. Meanwhile Bishop has informed the Air Ministry of the position and will doubtless be receiving further instructions.

CHARLES

INFLD

OTP

44

RESMED ROME

1130 2/6/47

No. 150 2/6/47

Addressed to ROME telegram No. 150 of 2nd June.

Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 209.

IMPORTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 149.

Staff study was submitted to A/SACMED this morning when he ruled that deliveries of R.A.F. equipment should proceed.

SCARLETT

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET OP PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ ROME AHQ ITALY

FROM : MAAC

REF NO : FX 76450

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FHGCT

Our F 76439 dated 30 May 1947 NOT to Air Headquarters is now cancelled.

Transfer of equipment to Italian Air Force may now proceed as authorized by Air Ministry.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH Colonel.

INFORMATION : SACS G-5 LO

MC OUT 7 2 June 47 SECRET 0959B Ref No FX 76450 1329 ra/E

SECRET COPY NO. 2

1923

SECRET

0450

SECRET

0 2 8 June 47

AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ ROME : ARC ITALY.

Y76486

SECRET PD FROM MTEE ARIA ARIE CHARLIE PD PARA PD CUB F REPEAT FOX BRAVO SIX FOUR THREE NINE DATED THREE ZERO MAY CUB NINE FOUR SEVEN NOT TO AIR HEADQUARTERS IS NOW CANCELLED PD SIGNED SAUNDERS GITS PRIOY PD TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT TO ITALIAN AIR FORCE MAY NOT PROCEED AS AUTHORIZED BY AIR MINISTRY

SECRET

OF PRIORITY

EACS : G-5 LO : G-5 AFHQ

G-5 AFHQ

1328

PERRY McC. SMITH
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3.

REF

1924

AHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

CORRECTED COPY DESTROY ALL OTHERS

FILED : 291915B PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 103/29
PRIORITY UNCLASSIFIED

FROM : AHQ ITALY

TO : AFHQ

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : NONE 29 May 1947

Cancel our T.O.O. 291000Z.

NOTE : 291000Z IS QX 3 NE IN 1179 29/5/47 G-3(MTO)
HAS BEEN RELAYED TO G-5 SECTION AFHQ ROME FOR INFORMATION

ACTION : G-3(MTO)

INFORMATION : SACS / C/S MTO G-3(AFHQ) G-4 G-5 LO
NAAC / AG(REC)

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
NE IN 1155A 29 May 47 UNCLASSIFIED 2300B Ref No NONE
amn/H

1627
17

1925

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 87/29
PRIORITY SECRET

41

FROM : AIR HQ ITALY

TO : AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ AFHQ

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : QX-3 29 May 1947

Subject transfer of American equipment to the Italian Air Force.

Further to our AHQI/11516/1/E1 dated April 17 and your AFB/665/FQ dated April 29.

Request you conclude arrangements with OFLC for transfer to the Italian Air Force of 87 (half 174) American .5 Browning guns. These guns are fitted to Spitfire Aircraft to be transferred to the Italians next week. NO further Lend-Lease equipment so far selected for transfer but any future arisings will be notified your branch.

ACTION : G-3(MTO)

INFORMATION : SACS ✓ MAAC ✓ C/S MTO AG(REC) G-3(AFHQ) G-4 G-5 D

MC IN 1179 30 May 47 PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY SECRET 11458 REF NO QX-3 JM/M

1526 17

SECRET COPY No.

1926

SECRET
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ ROME

REF NO : F-76439

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FHGCT

From MAAC.

Reference your OA 298 dated 29 May.

NO action to be taken on transfer of Royal Air Force equipment to Italian Air Force without SACMED authority.

Further instructions follow.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel

INFORMATION : SACS G-5 LO

MC OUT 568 30 May 47 SECRET 1207B REF NO F-76439 jsw/A

SECRET COPY NO 1020

SECRET

SECRET

30 1145 B MAY 47

39

AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ ROME

785499

SECRET PD FROM SIXER ABLE ABLE CHARLIE PD REFERENCE YOUR CIRE ABLE TWO NINE EIGHT DATED TWO NINE MAY PD SIGNED SACEUR CIRE FIGHT PD NO ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON TRANSFER OF ROYAL AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT TO ITALIAN AIR FORCE WITHOUT SUGAR ABLE CHARLIE MIKE EASY DOG AUTHORITY PD FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW

AIR

SECRET

PRIORITY
G-3 AFHQ (MAAC)

1524

SACE
G-3 AFHQ
G-5 LO

PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel GSC,
AC of S, G-3 AFHQ.

276

SECRET

30 1145 B MAY 47

SECRET

AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ NAMS

- 76429

SECRET PD FROM NINE ARMY ABLE CHARLIE PD REFERENCE YOUR ONE ABLE TWO NINE EIGHT
DATED TWO NINE MAY PD SIGNED SACMED SUBJ FORCE PD NO ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON TRANSFER OF RETAIL AIR FORCE
EQUIPMENT TO ITALIAN AIR FORCE NINE UT SUGAR ARMY CHARLIE NINE EASY DOG AUTHORITY PD
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW

SECRET

PRIORITY
G-3 AFHQ (MAAC)

SACMD
G-3 AFHQ
G-5 IC

1024

PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel GSC,
AC of S, G-3 AFHQ.

276

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : 291100B CRYPTO-SECURITY APPLIES AFSC N 85/29
PRIORITY SECRET

38

FROM : AIR FORCES BRANCH AFHQ

TO : AFHQ

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : 0244 29 May 1947

For MAAC Secretariat.

OA.298.

Air Ministry have approved the transfer to the Italian Air Force of all RAF equipment earmarked for them. Transfer will commence on 2nd and proceed by stages up till 25th June approximately on which date control of TREVISO will be handed over to Italians.

NOTE : HAS BEEN RELAYED TO G-5 SECTION AFHQ ROME FOR INFORMATION

ACTION : MAAC

INFORMATION : SACS G-3(AFHQ) G-5 LO

CRYPTO-SECURITY APPLIES

MC IN 1153 29 May 47 SECRET 2215B Ref No 0244 Ra/H

1522

SECRET

COPY No.

1930

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : GHQ CMF TAC HQ DUINO AIR FORCES BRANCH ROME US EMBASSY ROME BR EMBASSY ROME EUCOM USAFE

REF NO : FX-76415

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FHGCT

This is NAF 1328.

FAN 749 (NOT to all), NAF 1317, AGWAR WX 97755 and COMGENMED FX-76292 (NOT to all) refer.

Equipment for Italian Air Force is subject.

1. In order that all concerned may be cognizant of the current status of this subject a resume is hereby submitted.

2. The agreed Anglo-American plan for equipping the Italian Air Force as contained in FAN 749 was submitted to the Italian Prime Minister personally by me on 2 May 1947. The current Cabinet crisis and lack of complete information by UNITED STATES Embassy and FLC ROME are delaying a decision on the plan by the Italians.

3. Negotiations for the US portion of the plan are now in the hands of the UNITED STATES Embassy ROME and FLC ROME. The British portion of the plan will be negotiated by Director, Italian Air Forces Branch, AFHQ, ROME, acting as representative for the Air Ministry.

MC OUT 528

SECRET

1521

COPY NO 19

REF NO : FX-76415 (Cont'd)

4. Upon completion of these negotiations and the reaching of a decision by the Italians I will communicate the results to you.

5. Commanding General EUCOM has been charged by the US War Department with responsibility for the training of Italian Air and Ground Crews on the P-51 aircraft to be furnished under the US portion of the plan.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4 G-5 LO
RAFLO NLO US POLAD BRIT POLAD AG(REC)

C O P Y

207/31/47

BRITISH EMBASSY,
ROME.

May 20th, 1947.

Dear Department,

Your letter Z 4216/135/22 of 9th May about the plan for the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force crossed our despatch No. 199 of 12th May, in which we sent you a report of the action which has been taken in connection with FAN 749. The present position is that we are awaiting the reactions of the Italians to the financial details of the plan, (which was practically the only part of it they were not already aware of). We believe there is some likelihood that while they will gladly accept what we give them free of charge (e.g. the Spitfires) they will turn up their nose at most of the remainder - mainly because they are believed to be harbouring the intention of ripping the engines out of the Spitfires and incorporating them in one of their own models. But we shall see.

If only because of this we doubt whether we could make very effective use of the re-equipment plan as proposed in FAN 749 as an inducement to the Italians to accept an Air Mission, until at least they have shown signs that they will accept the plan.

We are sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Scarlett at Leghorn.

Yours ever,

Chancery.

Western Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

1320

35

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

AIR FORCES BRANCH,

A P O 794.

SECRET.

AFB/367/2/ORG.

21st May, 1947.

RE-EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Attached for your information is a copy of my Telegram to the Air Ministry dated 21st May, 1947.

A.G. Bishop

A.G. BISHOP,
AIR COMMODORE,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES BRANCH,
A.F.H.Q. APO. 794.

Allied Force Headquarters,
for Mediterranean Allied Air Committee
Secretariat,
LEGHORN.

1934

GS OPERATIONS

CS	
DEPUTY	
GO I	
GO II	
GO III	
FILE	

ENCL 34

with Col HM

AIR FORCES BRANCH, ALLIED FORCE H.Q. APO. 794. 21. B. May.

AIR MINISTRY, LONDON.

(R) A.H.Q. R.A.F. ITALY. (R) H.Q. R.A.F. MED/ME.

S E C R E T.

OA 284. FOR A.C.A.S. (P) (.) SUBJECT ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.) ITALIANS GRATEFULLY ACCEPT ALL EQUIPMENT IN THE FREE CATEGORY (.) THEY ALSO ACCEPT REMAINDER OF PLAN IN PRINCIPLE BUT OWING TO POLITICAL CHAOS CAN GET NO AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE (.) CONSIDER IT MOST PROBABLE THAT ITALIAN TROPS AND RESOURCES WILL BE UTILISED TO THE UTMOST AS BACKING TO THE PLAN AND THAT ONLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL BRITISH EQUIPMENT WILL BE PURCHASED (.) ON THAT BASIS REQUEST YOU AUTHORISE TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT IN ITALY ON PROGRAMME ARRANGED TO SUIT CONVENIENCE OF A.C.C. ITALY (.) WILL AMPLIFY DETAILS BY AIR MAIL (.)

MTI/367 /2/ORG.

IMPORTANT.

DIRECTOR. A.F.B.

426. A.C. BISHOP, A/CDRE. A.C. BISHOP, A/CDRE.

NAFLO

COPY

(Z 4216/135/22)

Confidential.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9th May, 1947.

Dear Chancery,

Your telegram No. 974 of the 28th April about the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force.

You will see from the enclosed copy of FAN 749 that S.A.C.M.E.D. has now received his instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to approach the Italian authorities.

We have also seen a copy of NAF 1317, a copy of which we enclose for convenience of reference, in which S.A.C.M.E.D. asks various supplementary questions to do with this question. We would only like to add that any action which you can take with the Air Forces Branch Rome or with A.F.H.Q. itself to get this matter put forward to the Italians with speed, would be extremely helpful from our point of view and from that of the Air Ministry.

We are writing to you separately about the R.A.F. Mission, but directly S.A.C.M.E.D. has approached the Italians on the question of the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force, you will no doubt consider using this argument as an additional inducement for the Italians to accept an R.A.F. Mission.

We are sending a copy of this letter to Scarlett at Leghorn.

Yours ever,
WESTERN DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

1117

32

FROM : AIR COMMODORE A.G. BISHOP, C.B.E., A.F.C.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

AIR FORCES BRANCH,

A P O 794.

17th May, 1947.

DO/AGB/5/9.

Dear Hamilton.

In accordance with verbal ~~arrangements~~ arrangement made with you, I have handed over to the U.S. Embassy a list of the Lease and Lend Equipment included in the British transfer to the Italian Air Force.

Yours sincerely,

A.G. Bishop

Wing Commander S.J.B. Hamilton, D.F.C.
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat,
c/o Allied Force Headquarters,
L E G H O R N.

SECRET

From: Air Forces Branch
Allied Force Headquarters

To: Allied Force Headquarters ~~A.I.O.~~
(For the attention of MAAC Secretariat)

Date: May 14th 1947

Ref: AFB/685/EQ

INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE

The attached copy of a minute addressed to Lt. Col. MAREK is forwarded for your information in accordance with verbal arrangements made.

W.A.D. COLLINGWOOD
Wing Commander
For Air Commodore
Director,
A.F.B., A.F.HQ.

LOOSE MINUTE

31

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

LEASE-LEND EQUIPMENT FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Air Headquarters R.A.F. Italy, have been asked to state how much American Lease-lend equipment is included in the equipment being scheduled for transfer from the R.A.F. to the I.A.F. under the re-equipment plan.

2. They reply that at the moment this equipment is limited to what has already been notified, viz.

GROUND EQUIPMENT			
(i)	142C/2	Onan 10 KVA P.E. Sets	QTY.2
(ii)	142C/1	Onan 500 Watt P.E. sets	" 2
(iii)	142A/1	Kohler P.E. 2000 Watt Sets	" 1
SIGNALS EQUIPMENT			
(i)	110D/275	Transmitter Collins	QTY.2
(ii)	110D/326	Receiver Collins	" 2
(iii)	110D/145	Transmitter Receiver TR.5043	" 6
(iv)	110D/426	Receivers Helliorafter	" 2
(v)	110D/342	Receiver RBK	" 17
ARMAMENT			
(i)	107K/02	Guns Browning (fitted in aircraft	" 100

3. The British Air Ministry schedules do not include any lease-lend equipment and although substitution may be necessary in the case of a few further items, there is no indication that it will be so.

4. Can you get the above items included as part of the overall costing of the American side of the re-equipment plan.

W.A.D. COLLINGWOOD
Wing Commander

1014

TOP SECRET

FILED : 1914 AFHQ PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 5/20
PRIORITY TOP SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

FROM : USAFE

TO : EUCOM INFO : COMGENMED

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : UAX-5345 19 May 1947

Reference 97755 and USAFE UA-5311.

After reconsidering the plan for training Italian pilots and ground crewmen, it is recommended that if the training will be accomplished in the next 3 months, it be performed in GERMANY at one of our fighter stations instead of in ITALY as recommended in our TWX 5311.

Maintenance training and maintenance of aircraft appear to be determining features and can be accomplished more easily at an established base than at a temporary location. Reasonable number of personnel based on number of aircraft involved can be accommodated at NEUBIGERG, the base selected.

NOTE : 97755 BELIEVED TO BE WX-97755 MC IN 374A 11/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)
UA-5311 MC IN 290 7/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4
G-5 LO (RAFLO) NLO US POLAD
BRIT POLAD AG(REC)

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
MC IN 761 20 May 47 TOP SECRET 1430B Ref No UAX-5345
djc/E

TOP SECRET COPY NO. 25

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

SECRET PRIORITY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

29

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR WDGPO

INFO : EUCOM USAFE US EMBASSY ROME GHQ CMF
TAC HQ DUINO ITALIAN AIR FORCES BRANCH ROME

REF NO : FX-76292

SIGNED : COMGENMED

CITE : NAGCT

Equipment for Italian Air Force is subject. AGWAR WX-97755 and USAFE UAX-5311 refer.

1. Decision of Italian Government being delayed by Cabinet crisis and lack of detailed information. Reference paras 3, 5A and 5E of WX-97755. FLC ROME has had NO information or instructions regarding this matter. US Embassy ROME has requested detailed instructions from State Department and upon receipt will, together with FLC ROME, negotiate sales price and financial arrangements with Italian Government. Embassy states they will keep this Hq informed of progress.

2. Strongly recommend Italians be trained in GERMANY. It will be impossible for MTOUSA to support a training group after R Day. The airfield at PISA can NOT be used for training due to lack of facilities and already overcrowded condition. Furthermore Military Attache ROME reluctant to accept assignment of training group to his office.

3. For EUCOM: In accordance with authority contained in para 4 of WX-97755 it is requested that appropriate Air Personnel be furnished by CG USAFE for temporary duty with US Military Attache ROME to provide liaison with USAFE and to advise on selection of Italian personnel to be trained in GERMANY should that course be adopted. Suggest 1 Staff Officer qualified to advise on training problems and 1 Technical Officer to assist in planning for physical handover of aircraft. Due to crowded conditions in ROME such personnel should be kept to a minimum. This Headquarters will make accommodation arrangements in ROME upon receipt of names and arrival date.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(MTO) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(AFHQ) G-4 G-5 LO
RAFLO NLO US POLAD BRIT POLAD AG(REC)

MC OUT 276 15 May 47 SECRET 1734B Ref No : FX-76292

SECRET COPY NO. 10 of 12

1942

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : NFT PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 25/15
PRIORITY SECRET

2-8

FROM : JSM WASHINGTON

TO : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LONDON INFO : AFHQ

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : JSM 400 UNDATED

Subject equipment for Italian Air Force.

1. Your COS(W) 481 appears to have crossed our JSM 399 containing copy of War Department reply WX 97755 of 8 May to NAF 1317.

2. As instructions sent to SACMED by War Department correspond with views expressed in COS(W) 481 we do NOT propose to take any action on your telegram which we note has been repeated to SACMED.

NOTE : COS(W) 481 MC IN 583 15/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)
JSM 399 NOT IDENTIFIED IN AFHQ MC FILES
WX-97755 MC IN 374A 11/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)
NAF 1317 IS PX 76165 MC OUT 22 1/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)
HAS BEEN RELAYED TO LACAB FOR INFORMATION

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4 G-5 LO
RAFLO NLO US POLAD BRIT POLAD AG(REC)

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
MC IN 574 15 May 1947 SECRET 1700B Ref No : JSM 400 dw/H

SECRET COPY 25

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

CORRECTED COPY DESTROY ALL OTHERS

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : 140127Z
OP PRIORITY

CRYPTO-SECURITY APPLIES
TOP SECRET

AFSC N 8/15 TOP SECRET

FROM : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LONDON

TO : JSM WASHINGTON AFHQ

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : COS (W) 481 14 May 1947

For SACMED.

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference NAF 1317.

1. We agree that until "R" Day SACMED is technically responsible for the re-organisation and re-equipment of the Italian Air Force and that consequently the Anglo-American Plan given in FAN 749 should be presented to the Italian Government by him. The time available before "R" Day is however short and we consider that in the interests of speed it is essential that detailed arrangements for the supply of the necessary British and American equipment within the agreed plan and discussions on the financial terms involved should be handled directly by the Representative of the British and US Governments. If they were handled through the medium of SACMED and the Combined Chiefs of Staff there would be inevitable delays and little if anything would be accomplished before "R" Day.

2. With regard to the particular question of the British authority in ROME responsible for discussing with the Italians details concerning British equipment and the financial implications of their transfer we propose to nominate the present head of the Italian Air Forces Branch of AFHQ. We intend however that he should deal with the Italians as the Representative of the Air Ministry and NOT of SACMED.

3. We consider that the various questions of detail raised in NAF 1317 and other questions which will NOT be presented by the Italians themselves should be dealt with in the course of detailed discussions with the Italian Government so far as British

CRYPTO-SECURITY APPLIES
TOP SECRET

MC IN 583A

financial terms are concerned, the cost of British equipment for which payment is required will have to be met according to present treasury policy from Italian current sterling balance.

4. We consider it most important that the agreed Anglo-American plan given in FAN 749 should be presented to the Italian Government by SACMED without further delay. You should therefore take early opportunity of communicating sense of foregoing to US Chiefs of Staff and should press them to reply to SACMED on the above lines.

NOTE : NAF 1317 IS FX-76165 MC OUT 22 1/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)
FAN 749 IS W-97147 MC IN 1114 30/4/47 G-3(AFHQ)
HAS BEEN RELAYED TO TACAB FOR INFORMATION

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS, G-5 LO, AG(REC), C/S MTO, RAFLO, G-2, NLO, G-3(MTO), US POLAD, G-4, BRIT POLAD

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

CORRECTED COPY DESTROY ALL OTHER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : 091112Z PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 61/9
PRIORITY SECRET

FROM : AGWAR FROM WDGPO

TO : COMGENMED EUCOM INFO : USAFE US EMBASSY ROME

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : WX 97755 9 May 1947

1. Reference FX 76068, WX 96927, FX 73001, 1 November, WX 85125, 9 November, FX 76165, (NAF 1317), SX 4630, and UAX 5311 NOT to all, recommendation in paragraph 2, FX 76068 considered answered by WX 96927 and FAN 749.

2. As regards desirability of early implementation, Italians should be advised that proposal you present in your role as SACMED in consequence of FAN 749 is an agreed Anglo-American plan. Italians help themselves by immediately taking advantage of US-UK offer.

3. Every effort should be made to accelerate implementation. Report soonest any obstacles which are insurmountable by you. Keep EUCOM fully informed. Note that EUCOM reports in SX 4630 that aircraft and associated equipment have been reported to FLC, GERMANY in accordance with WX 96927.

4. Participation of USAAF personnel along with RAF representatives in discussions with Italian Air Force appears essential on air technical aspects of US equipment and our arrangements of details as to delivery and handover of equipment and indoctrination training. For these purposes you are authorized to call on EUCOM as in WX 85215 to provide required air personnel.

5. With reference to NAF 1317, following is guidance, paragraphs correspond:

(A) Reference paragraph 3, your assumption that you as SACMED are responsible until R Day is correct. Your responsibilities in this matter are confined however to presenting the agreed Anglo-American plan to the Italian Government and securing a decision as to whether that

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
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MC IN 374A

SECRET

Government in fact desires to take advantage of the offer. You should make it clear that it will remain for FLC in the case of the US to negotiate sales price and financial arrangements. It will be for the parallel British Agency to negotiate Anglo-Italian arrangements. Closest coordination should be maintained with British and US Embassies, ROME, to facilitate handover of responsibility on R Day.

(B) Paragraph 4, indoctrination flying and maintenance training requirement is recognized. War Department is inclined because of possible public reaction to favor your third proposal to send a small group (refers to party as "group" and NOT "mission") of Italian flying and maintenance personnel to GERMANY for training with USAFE and then return to ITALY to train their own personnel. However, this may NOT be practicable according to recommendations of CG USAFE in 65311. In any event training of Italian Instructor Cadre is EUCOM responsibility to be accomplished in GERMANY or ITALY by USAFE personnel, bearing in mind coming into force of Italian Peace Treaty now estimated for early June. This would require accomplishment of task in short time probably on short notice. Considered here that operational cost of training should be absorbed as normal operating expense unless this proves impracticable for reasons NOT now received.

(C) Paragraph 5 sub paragraph A and B, 92000 dollars is the tentative approximate normal cost, subject to determination by FLC. The figure is all inclusive, including 50,000 dollars for packing, crating and transportation of spares and other equipment, 40,000 dollars for rehabilitation of aircraft to operational serviceability plus whatever FLC is to charge for the aircraft and spares.

(D) Paragraph 5 sub paragraph C, NO credit can be made for payments made on P-38 nor are the aircraft to revert to US ownership. Disposition of P-38 is an Italian Problem.

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

REF NO THIS MESSAGE WX 97755 (contd) 9 May 47

Further, on P-38, discourage any consideration of future use. While arrangement your request might be found for surplus disposal, P-38 parts and spares would be difficult if NOT impossible. Continued use of P-38 might ultimately reflect adversely in US in view of US inability to sustain such operation. Considered preferable to let Italians continue use of Spitfires with which 2 Squadrons now equipped (FX 73001) plus additional Spitfires as related equipment offered free to Italians under agreed Anglo-American plan.

(E) Paragraph 5 D, FLC, ROME, will be instructed.

(F) Paragraph 6 and 7, NO authorization exists for a NO-cost transfer of ammunition, armament or other equipment.

(G) NO COS reply to NAF 1317 will be sent.

6. If Italian budgetary limitations, requested modifications of offered financial bases, or other matters beyond Military province arise, you should request Embassy ROME, to report fully since such consideration will be primarily for State.

7. JCS are proposing down grading to Secret correspondence this subject. To facilitate handling every effort should be made to avoid over classification messages.

NOTE : FX 76068 MC OUT 363 25/4/47 G-3(MTO)
WX 96927 MC IN 1022A 29/4/47 G-3(MTO)
FX 73001 MC OUT 9 1/11/46 G-3(MTO)
WX 85125 NOT IDENTIFIED IN AFHQ MC FILES
FX 76165 IS NAF 1317 MC OUT 22 1/5/45 G-3 (AFHQ)
SX 4630 NOT IDENTIFIED IN AFHQ MC FILES
UAX 5311 MC IN 290 7/5/47 G-3(AFHQ)
FAN 749 IS W 97147 MC IN 1114 30/4/47 G-3(AFHQ)
65311 BELIEVED TO BE UAX 5311
CORRECTED BY SERVICE

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4
G-5 LO RAFLO NIO US POLAD BRIT POLAD
AG(REC)

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY

MC IN 374A 11 May 47 SECRET 1730B Ref No WX 97755

ss/dac/dtw/H

SECRET

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1948

TOP SECRET
AFIGO MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

FROM : USAFE

TO : ASWAR FOR ASACS INFO : EUCOM CONCERNED

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : UAX-5311 7 May 1947

Cite RAFDA

Concerning your WX-97593.

1. During recent visit of USAFE representatives to your headquarters this subject was discussed with the Operations Section of the A-3 Division of your Headquarters. Stated as a possible solution was to assign a small unit from the ZI to the Staff of the Military Attache, ROME to train the Italian Air Force personnel.

2. In order to prevent interference with present USAFE rehabilitation program and to insure the assignment of personnel highly qualified in the conduct of training programs, the above plan appears here to be logical solution.

3. It is, however, within our capabilities to supply a Training Mission to ITALY in event plan mentioned in paragraph 2 above is NOT considered feasible at this time. Training Unit sent from this Command would be under supervision of European Air Transport Service Installation at PISA ITALY.

4. If decision is to supply Training Mission from this Command, it is felt here that the most feasible plan would be to deliver aircraft to ITALY, assign a Training Mission to PISA, ITALY, train a group of experienced Italian pilots as instructors, and then withdraw the Training Mission, permitting the Italian instructors thus trained to complete training of the remainder of the Italian Air Force personnel involved.

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
TOP SECRET
- 1 -

WJ IN 290

SECRET

Notes from Conference at Palazzo Quirinale - 1210 - 1225, 2 May 1947:

Present at Conference were:	Dr Alcide De Gasperi	Prime Minister for Italy
	Lt Gen. John C.H. Lee	A/SAC
	Col. Perry McC Smith	AC/S, G-3 AFHQ
	Maj. V.A. Abrignani	ADC to A/SAC

1. A/SAC offered proposal from the British and American Governments on the subject of equipping Italian Air Force to Dr. De Gasperi. The Prime Minister after reading the proposal replied that he was grateful for U.S. and British interest in the post-war Italian Air Force, but due to the technicalities of the subject proposal, he would have to confer with his Air Advisors and Financial Minister before giving a definite reply.

2. General Lee stressed that the proposal was the best and final offer from the British and American Governments; that the communication is regarded secret by these Headquarters and is to remain secret until Italian decision is reached; that quick action is deemed necessary.

3.

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3.

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AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

23

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CP--PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
SECRET

AFSC N 44/3

FROM : AGWAR FROM AFACE SIGNED SPAATZ

TO : USAFE EUCOM COMGENMED

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : WX 97393 2 May 47

Modernization of Italian Air Force is subject.

Concerning implementation of modernization program for Italian Air Force SACMED raises question: Who will provide instructor personnel in event task assigned your Headquarters? Request your views earliest how you would desire to accomplish above.

Possible methods include sending Italian personnel to GERMANY for training, or a small Italian Mission could be trained there and subsequently returned to ITALY to train their own personnel, or personnel from your Headquarters could remain in ITALY after delivery of aircraft for purpose of training.

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3 MTO G-4 G-5 LO
RAFLO NLO US POLAD BRIT POLAD AG(REC)

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
MC IN 118 3 May 47 SECRET 0500B REF NO WX 97393 wb/E

1604

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COPY No. 23

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

22

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET OP PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : AIR FORCES BRANCH ROME GHQ CMF TAC GHQ

REF NO : FX 76165

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FHGCT

This is NAF 1317.

Equipment for Italian Air Force is subject. FAN 749 refers.

1. I will present revised Anglo-American plan for equipment of Italian Air Force to the Italian Prime Minister as soon as a meeting can be arranged.

2. An examination of this plan indicates the probability that, before they will be able to make a final decision, the Italians will require information additional to that contained in FAN 749.

3. Responsibility for the reorganization and equipping of the Italian Air Force is mine as SACMED until R Day. I therefore assume that by the British and American authorities in ROME with whom Italians should discuss details including costs as referred to in paragraph 3 of FAN 749 is meant the Italian Air Forces Branch, AFHQ which is located in ROME and which is my Agency for dealing with the Italian Air Force.

4. As the P-51 aircraft to be supplied under this program is an unfamiliar type to the Italians I consider that a training mission will be required to insure the proper utilization and maintenance of the equipment by the Italians. The question arises: who will provide instructor personnel and who will bear the cost? There are several alterrative methods of providing the requisite flying and ground instruction. A US mission could be sent to ITALY

by CG USAFE. Italian personnel could be sent to GERMANY for training by USAFE or a small Italian mission could be trained there and subsequently returned to ITALY to train their own personnel.

5. Financial questions.

A. FAN 749 in paragraph 5 refers to a nominal sum to be charged for the US aircraft. Is this nominal sum the 92,000 dollars referred to in paragraph 2 C of War Department WX 96927, 25 April?

B. What are the estimated additional costs for placing US aircraft in operational status and delivery thereof, packing, crating and transporting of spares and equipment?

C. If the present program is accepted 100 P-38's now in Italian hands must be scrapped. I recommend that any payment which they may have already made for these 100 P-38's be creditied against the cost of 50 P-51's and other costs incident thereto. If this recommendation is approved I request disposal instructions for P-38's which would revert to US ownership.

D. Type of payment for sterling and dollar costs of program must be known. Must Italians pay from current dollar and sterling balances from current credits or will new loans be negotiated?

6. Ammunition requirements are NOT mentioned in this plan. COMGENMED was authorized by War Department WX 95052, 28 March, to turn over to the Italian Air Force certain surplus US Air Force ammunition in an undemilitarized state. The Italian Air Force has been unable accept such offer due to lack of funds. This revised plan may well result in increased training and combat requirements for P-51's. As it appears the only way in which the Italian Air Force will be able to obtain the necessary ammunition I recommend the foregoing US ammunition and any additional requirements be turned over on a NO cost basis.

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

REF NO : FX 76165 (cont'd)

TOP SECRET

7. If Italians find themselves unable to accept this revised program it is important that I know status of availability and cost of guns and equipment referred to in COMGENMED FX 76068, 25 April, as necessary for conversion of P-38's.

8. The foregoing questions are those which have been raised by my staff. Subsequent to presentation of plan to Italians they may raise additional questions. In the meantime I request urgent instructions as detailed above.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH Col.

INFORMATION : SACS, G-5 LO, AG(REC), C/S MTO, RAFLO, **, G-2, NLO, G-3(MTO), US POLAD, G-4, BRIT POLAD

MC OUT 22 1 May 47 TOP SECRET 1923E Ref No FX 76165 d1/A

TOP SECRET COPY NO

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET URGENT 21

TO FOR ACTION : AIR FORCES BRANCH ROME

REF NO : F 76155

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : PHOCP

Personal for Air Commodore BISHOP.

1. Wing Commander HAMILTON now on route to ROME with copy of FAN 749. He is prepared to discuss complete history of this subject.

2. It is proposed that acting SACMED will present broad plan to Italian Prime Minister 2 May or as soon thereafter as meeting can be arranged. He desires that you accompany him in your capacity as Director, Air Forces Branch, and to insure that Allied nature of proposal is understood. The exact time and place of meeting will be notified you as soon as known.

3. It is proposed that your Deputy Director simultaneously will present the broad plan in confidence to the appropriate Italian authorities at your level.

4. The Italian Government will be informed that they should discuss details, including cost, with British and UNITED STATES authorities in ROME through the medium of your Branch. Combined Chiefs of Staffs are being queried as to who these authorities are, as well as other questions raised by FAN 749. Their replies will be immediately transmitted to you.

ORIGINATOR : G-3 (AFHQ) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-3 (MTO) G-4 G-5 LO
RAFLO AG (REC)

MC OUT 8 1 May 47 SECRET 1352B Ref No : F-76155
Jt/H

1001

COPY NO 21

SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FILED : 300036Z PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC N 81/30
ROUTINE SECRET

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS BOOK MESSAGE

TO : AFHQ FOR LEE INFO : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LONDON FOR BCS

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : W-97147 30 April 1947

This is FAN 749.

Modernization of Italian Air Force is subject.

Reference NAFs 1235 and 1258.

1. After careful consideration including financial aspect of proposals for reorganization of Italian Air Force put forward by British Air Ministry and US War Department and bearing in mind that our object is to build up an efficient Italian Air Force within the limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty, we have decided that following is the best plan from all points of view.

2. 5 Fighter-type Squadrons to be equipped with Spitfire IXs and 2 with P-51's all complete to operational role. Supply of 50 P-51 aircraft and specific-to-type aircraft maintenance equipment and spare parts for 3 years for the P-51's will be the only responsibility of American Government. British Government will assume entire responsibility for provision of all British equipment including ancillary aircraft, ground equipment specialist vehicles, etc, required by the Italian Air Force. Plan will be in essence that prepared by Air Ministry and already submitted to Italian Government with exception that P-51's are substituted for P-38's.

3. You should inform Italian Government that this is agreed Anglo-American plan and that they should discuss details including cost with the British and American authorities in ROME. In view of the early withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY, a decision by the Italian Government is urgently required.

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
SECRET

MC IN 1114

1600

SECRET COPY NO 21

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

4. For your guidance as regards British equipment, the cost of the Spitfires will be nil, cost of spares and other equipment will be nil so far as these are available from stocks in ITALY, 1-6th cost price so far as they are available from surpluses outside ITALY and full price for such equipment and spare parts as have to be supplied from new production. Air Ministry estimate that about 3 month's aircraft spares plus a considerable proportion of the other equipment required such as MT, special equipment, ammunition, etc can be provided from surpluses either in ITALY or elsewhere but that major part of the spares required for 3 years backing would have to come from new production. Range and quantity of spares required would of course be for decision by Italians. According to Air Ministry scales of provision of spares total original sterling cost of British equipment is estimated to amount to pounds sterling 4,417,300 of which 2,149,000 worth (including all the Spitfires and a proportion of spares and other equipment) would be supplied free: 1,410,800 worth would be supplied for 305,000 and the remainder would be charged for at full price i.e., roughly about 857,500.

5. With regard to United States equipment, the over-all cost will include a nominal price for aircraft spares for 3 years, and associated aircraft maintenance equipment, plus the actual costs incurred in placing the aircraft in operational standard and delivery thereof, and packing, crating, and transporting 3 years supply of spares and aircraft maintenance equipment. Due to deterioration in storage, if resolution of arrangements is long delayed, an increase in cost of placing aircraft in operational standard may be expected.

NOTE : NAF 1235 IS FX-73372 MC OUT 579 21/11/46 G-3(AFHQ)
NAF 1258 IS FX-74126 MC OUT 76 6/1/47 G-3(AFHQ)
HAS BEEN RELAYED TO LACAB FOR INFORMATION

ACTION : G-3(AFHQ)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4 G-5 LO
US POLAD BRIT POLAD RAFLO NLO AG(REC)**

19

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat,
R.A.F. Liaison Section with S.A.C.Med.,
A.F.H.Q., Caserta, C.M.F.

To :- G.H.Q., C.M.F.

Date :- 28th March, 1947.

Ref :- MEDMAC/4200/APAIR.

ITALIAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL IN ZONE "A"
OF VENEZIA GIULIA

Reference is made to the enclosed correspondence from Air Forces Sub Section, Rome.

2. It is requested that this application be considered and a reply forwarded direct to Air Forces Sub Section, copy to this Secretariat.

(S.J.B. HAMILTON)
Wing Commander,
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

1099

1959

18

FORM 1 ROUTING SLIP

Log: D 2754

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

File

Suspense

SUBJECT: Aerial Photographs for Italian Air Ministry.

No.	From	Symb.	To	Date	
1	G-4 AIR	394 JWB	MAAC SEC	27 Mar 47	1. Reference your letter 24 March 47, MEDME/4200/AFHLS, and accompanying AFSC letter 8 March 47. 2. The only suggestion this office can make to assist the Air Ministry in obtaining these aerial photographs, is that direct application might be made to the War Department in Washington for the negatives, and if that is not possible - prints could be asked for. J. W. BROWN Colonel, GSC Air Advisor, G-4

JWB/hrp/bbm

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION
4200

1598

1960

Aerial Photographs for Italian Air Ministry.

1	G-4 AIR	394 JWB	MAAC SEC	27 Mar 47	1. Reference your letter 24 March 47, MEIME/4200/AFHLC, and accompanying AFSC letter 8 March 47.

2. The only suggestion this office can make to assist the Air Ministry in obtaining these aerial photographs, is that direct application might be made to the War Department in Washington for the negatives, and if that is not possible - prints could be asked for.

J. W. BROWN
Colonel, GSC
Air Advisor, G-4

JWB/hrp/bbm

1961

Aerial Photographs for Italian Air Ministry.

1	G-4 AIR	394 JWB	MAAC SEC	27 Mar 47	1. Reference your letter 24 March 47, MEDME/4200/AFHLS, and accompanying AFSC letter 8 March 47.

2. The only suggestion this office can make to assist the Air Ministry in obtaining these aerial photographs, is that direct application might be made to the War Department in Washington for the negatives, and if that is not possible - prints could be asked for.

J. W. BROWN
Colonel, GSC
Air Adviser, G-4

JWB/hrp/bbm

16

SUBJECT:- Accounts of Italian E.T. Personnel.

G. GF
2163/1
20 Mar '47

O.C.
RF Accounts Office, GHQ,CMF.

Reference your 603/1 dated 12 March '47.

After consultation with Financial Adviser it is agreed that the amounts shown on the list attached to your above quoted letter should be added to the final credit balance of the persons concerned.

J.B. ROBINSON, OBE,
Colonel
FO/a.jo.

Copy to:- AFHQ (Air Liaison Section for H. Rep. Italy)
F.A.

1992

15

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat,
R.A.F. Liaison Section with S.A.C.Med.,
A.F.H.Q., Caserta, C.M.F.

To :- Air Headquarters, R.A.F., Italy, C.M.F.

G - 4 M.T.O.U.S.A., (Air Advisory),
A.F.H.Q., Caserta, C.M.F.

Date :- 24th March, 1947.

Ref :- MMMAS/4200/AFAIS.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

Enclosed is forwarded a copy of a letter from the Air Force Sub Section, Rome, for your consideration.

2. It is felt in this Secretariat that there can be no objection to the supply of the above-mentioned photographs to the Italian Air Ministry but it is not known if and where these are available.

3. It would be appreciated if you can assist in the matter.

(R.J.B. HAMILTON)
Wing Commander,
Secretary to the
Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1 [illegible]

12

From : Allied Force Headquarters, Italian Military Affairs Section.
Air Forces Sub Section, APO. 794.

To : Headquarters R.A.F., MTO/RE.

Date : 11th March 1947.

Ref. : IMAS/AIR/551B/AF.

RADIO FREQUENCIES - IWA I/A AIR FORCE.

N/T

Reference is made to your letter S209954/S1GS1 dated 16th November 1946 which authorises frequencies to be used by the Italian Air Force.

2. Application has been made by the Italian Air Ministry to this Unit requesting that authority be given for the changing of I.A.F. frequencies to conform to those agreed upon at the P.T.C.A.O. European-Mediterranean Communication Meeting held in Brussels on January 28th to 30th 1947.

3. It is understood that this meeting was convened in order to examine the report of the Conference held in Paris on May 1946 with a view to its implementation. It was decided that the target date for frequency changes conforming to their decision should be April 1st 1947.

4. The attached Appendix "A" shows the affected services of the I.A.F. with proposed frequency changes conforming to the Brussels Conference.

5. The I.A.F. consists only of fighter aircraft and consequently the majority of I.A.F. radio facilities are inextricably bound up with international civil aviation. In view of this fact and the proximity of the Ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty this Unit strongly recommends that the Italian Air Ministry's request for the frequency changes detailed in Appendix "A" be authorised.

6. In view of the nearness of the target date it is requested that your decision be sent to this Unit by signal, especially if favourable, in order that changes may be completed by the date fixed by P.T.C.A.O. for the change-over.-

A.V.M.

A. A. RAY, S/Ldr
for Air Vice Marshall, Director.
Air Forces Sub Section,
I.M.A.S., A.F.H.Q.

Copy to:-
A.H.Q., R.A.F. Italy.

Ref: [illegible]/AOR/S18/A1.

RADIO FREQUENCIES - ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference is made to your letter [illegible]/[illegible]31 dated 15th November 1946 which authorises frequencies to be used by the Italian Air Force.

2. Application has been made by the Italian Air Ministry to this Unit requesting that authority be given for the changing of I.A.F. frequencies to conform to those agreed upon at the E.U.C.A.O. European-Mediterranean Communication Meeting held in Brussels on January 28th to 30th 1947.

3. It is understood that this meeting was convened in order to examine the report of the Conference held in Paris on May 1946 with a view to its implementation. It was decided that the target date for frequency changes conforming to their decision should be April 1st 1947.

4. The attached Appendix "A" shows the affected services of the I.A.F. with proposed frequency changes conforming to the Brussels Conference.

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6. In view of the nearness of the target date it is requested that your decision be sent to this Unit, by signal, especially if favourable, in order that changes may be completed by the date fixed by E.U.C.A.O. for the change-over.-

A.V. HAY, S/Ldr
Air Vice Marshall, Director.
Air Forces Sub Section,
I.M.A.C., A.F.H.Q.

for

Copy to:-
A.H.Q., R.A.F. Italy.
M.A.A.C. Secretariat, A.F.H.Q.

1966

1217

APPENDIX "A"

DEVICE	FIXED FREQUENCIES		PRESCRIBED IN ICAO		NOTES
Control Tower Service No.5.	118,1 119,7 119,1 122,1 283 6440	K c/s " " " K c/s "	118,1 6440	K c/s K c/s	The frequencies of 118,1 Kc/s wi airfield where they are at prese aerodrome will have these frequ apparatus is available.
Service No. 1. (D/F assistance in H/F) zone control.	333 339 from 326,5) to 331 from 335 to 337 from 341 to 343	K c/s " air/ground ground/air	333 336	K c/s K c/s	The Italian stations functioning ought to use the frequency of the queenies plant be used according and exactly as follows:- 1st S.A.T. zone 333 and 330,5 2nd S.A.T. " 339 " 341,5 3rd S.A.T. " 333 " 328 4th S.A.T. " 333 " 328 Sardinia 333 and 331 Kc/s Sicily 333 and 343 " Near the approach and aerodrome c frequencies will be used.
Approach Control.	348 Kc/s from 343) to 354 (	air/ground ground/air	340 340	K c/s K c/s	
Aerodrome Control.	322 Kc/s air/ground from 320) ground/air to 326 (		NIL. NIL.		

1967

[illegible]		[illegible]		NOTE
116,1 119,7 119,1 122,1 283 6000	Kc/s " " " Kc/s	116,1	Kc/s	The frequencies of 116,1 Kc/s will be kept on the airfield where they are at present in force. Other aerodrome will have these frequencies when aerodrome is available.
333 339	Kc/s air/ground	333	Kc/s	The Italian Stations functioning on each service, ought to use the frequency of the 2nd Channel. Frequencies just be used according to their location and exactly as follows:-
from 326,5 to 331 from 333 to 337 from 341 to 343	ground/air	335	Kc/s	1st A.A.T. zone 333 and 330,5 Kc/s 2nd A.A.T. " 339 " 341,5 " 3rd A.A.T. " 333 " 328 " 4th A.A.T. " 333 " 328 " Bordinin 333 and 331 Kc/s Ghedly 333 and 341 "
340 Kc/s	air/ground	340	Kc/s	For the approach and aerodrome control the FIXED frequencies will be used.
from 345) to 354 (	ground/air	340	Kc/s	
322 Kc/s air/ground from 320) ground/air to 326 (		NIL. NIL.		

1968

SERVICE	FIXED FREQUENCIES	FREQUENCIES IN USE	NOTE
Service No. 3 H/F R/T Assistance. Dawn to Dusk.	3985 K c/s 3993 " 3981 K c/s 3989 " 3993 " 3997 "	4781 K c/s 4781 K c/s	The Italian Stations ought to use frequencies as follows :- 1st R.A.T. 3985 2nd R.A.T. 3989 3rd R.A.T. 3997 4th R.A.T. 3981 Sicily 3989 Sardinia 3989 In reception the main frequency is alternative one 3993 Kc/s. The Ita apparatus will not be able to offe frequencies, must use 4781 Kc/s.
Service No. 6 (Radio beacon for approach)	See note No. 1	320 Kc/s 421 "	The Radio beacons (Italian) ought frequencies (Note No. 1) according
Service No. 7 (Radio beacons for Navigation)	See note No. 2	222 Kc/s 320 " 403 " 421 " 455 "	The Italian Radio beacons ought to frequencies (Note No. 2) according Also the Allied radio and radio ran use the PTOMO frequencies (note No. their location.

1969

1969

FREQUENCIES ENCODED	FREQUENCIES IN USE	NOTE
3985 K c/s 3993 "	4781 K c/s	The Italian Stations ought to use the PICAO frequencies as follows :- 1st S.A.T. 3985 2nd S.A.T. 3989 3rd S.A.T. 3997 4th S.A.T. 3981 Sicily 3989 Sardinia 3989 In reception the main frequency is 3985 Kc/s, the alternative one 3993 Kc/s. The Italian aircraft whose apparatus will not be able to effect the PICAO frequencies, must use 4781 Kc/s.
3981 K c/s 3989 " 3993 " 3997 "	4781 K c/s	
See note No. 1	320 Kc/s 421 "	The Radio beacons (Italian) ought to use the PICAO frequencies (Note No. 1) according to their location.
See note No. 2	222 Kc/s 320 " 403 " 421 " 455 "	The Italian Radio beacons ought to use the PICAO frequencies (Note No. 2) according to their location. Also the Allied radio and radio range beacon ought to use the PICAO frequencies (note No. 2) according to their location.

1970

SERVICE	PICAO FREQUENCIES	FREQUENCIES IN USE	NOTES
New Service No. 18 (point-to-point)	4110 Kc/s 6583 " 10800 "	10800 Kc/s 6517 "	Aircraft control.
New Service No. 19 (point-to-point)	2940 Kc/s 5680 " 8520 " (reserve)	5656 Kc/s	Aircraft control.
Radio Service for regional bulletins in M/F. The service is made every half an hour.	281 Kc/s 285 "	NIL	From the station of Milan, Venice Brindisi and Catania.
	3961 Kc/s 8515 "	3235 Kc/s Sicily 5785 " Sardinia (4th ZAT 6230 "	At present the above mentioned st every hour and every three hours.
	3377 " 8600 "	2860 " 1st ZAT 4445 " 2nd ZAT 6370 " 3rd ZAT	
[illegible]tional bulletins every 3 hours.	3957 Kc/s 6975 " 12813 "		These services ought to be transf

1971

FIXED FREQUENCIES	FREQUENCIES IN USE	NOTES
4410 Kc/s 6585 " 10800 "	10800 Kc/s 6517 "	Aircraft control.
2940 Kc/s 5680 " 8520 " (reserve)	5656 Kc/s	Aircraft control.
281 Kc/s 285 "	NIL	From the station of Milan, Venice, Rome, Cagliari, Brindisi and Catania.
3361 Kc/s 8515 "	3235 Kc/s Sicily 5785 " Sardinia (4th ZAT 6230 ") 2860 " 1st ZAT 4445 " 2nd ZAT 6370 " 3rd ZAT	At present the above mentioned stations are on duty every hour and every three hours.
3377 " 8600 "		
3957 Kc/s 6975 " 12013 "		Those services ought to be transmitted by Rome.

1972

1989

N O T E (1)

Kc/s	355,5	356	356,5	357	357,5	358	358,5
	359	359,5	360	360,5	361	361,5	362
	362,5	363	363,5	364	364,5	364	

N O T E (2)

Kc/s	256	257	258	259	260	261	262
	263	264	265	266	267	268	269
	270	271	272	273	274	275	396
	397	398	399	400	401	402	403
	404	405	406	407	408	409	410
	411	412	413	414	415		

From : Allied Force Headquarters, Italian Military Affairs Section.
Air Forces Sub Section, APO. 794.

To : Headquarters R.A.F., MTO/ETO.

Date : 11th March 1947.

Ref. : [illegible]/AIR/8518/AF.

RADIO FREQUENCIES - ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference is made to your letter [illegible]/[illegible] dated 16th November 1946 which authorises frequencies to be used by the Italian Air Force.

2. Application has been made by the Italian Air Ministry to this Unit requesting that authority be given for the changing of I.A.F. frequencies to conform to those agreed upon at the I.C.A.O. European-Mediterranean Communication Meeting held in Brussels on January 28th to 30th 1947.

3. It is understood that this meeting was convened in order to examine the report of the Conference held in Paris on May 1946 with a view to its implementation. It was decided that the target date for frequency changes conforming to their decision should be April 1st 1947.

4. The attached Appendix "A" shows the affected services of the I.A.F. with proposed frequency changes conforming to the Brussels Conference.

5. The I.A.F. consists only of fighter aircraft and consequently the majority of I.A.F. radio facilities are inextricably bound up with international civil aviation. In view of this fact and the proximity of the Ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty this Unit strongly recommends that the Italian Air Ministry's request for the frequency changes detailed in Appendix "A" be authorised.

6. In view of the nearness of the target date it is requested that your decision be sent to this Unit, by signal, especially if favourable, in order that changes may be completed by the date fixed by I.C.A.O. for the change-over.-

1088

Copy to:-
A.H.Q., R.A.F. Italy.

for Air Vice Marshall, Director.
Air Forces Sub Section,
Military A.H.Q.

RADIO FREQUENCIES - ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference is made to your letter [illegible]/[illegible] dated 5th December 1946 which authorises frequencies to be used by the Italian Air Force.

2. Application has been made by the Italian Air Ministry to this Unit requesting that authority be given for the changing of I.A.F. frequencies to conform to those agreed upon at the P.I.C.A.O. European-Mediterranean Communication Meeting held in Brussels on January 20th to 30th 1947.

3. It is understood that this meeting was convened in order to examine the report of the Conference held in Paris on May 1946 with a view to its implementation. It was decided that the target date for frequency changes conforming to their decision should be April 1st 1947.

4. The attached Appendix "A" shows the affected services of the I.A.F. with proposed frequency changes conforming to the Brussels Conference.

5. The I.A.F. consists only of fighter aircraft and consequently the majority of I.A.F. radio facilities are inextricably bound up with international civil aviation. In view of this fact and the proximity of the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty this Unit strongly recommends that the Italian Air Ministry's request for the frequency changes detailed in Appendix "A" be authorised.

6. In view of the nearness of the target date it is requested that your decision be sent to this Unit by signal, especially if favourable, in order that changes may be completed by the date fixed by P.I.C.A.O. for the change-over.-

1588

Air Lanyck

[illegible] RAF, S/Ldr
for Air Vice Marshall, Director,
Air Forces Sub Section,
S.H.A.E., A.P.O. [illegible].

Copy to:-
A.H.Q., R.A.F. Italy.
M.A.A.C. Secretariat, A.P.O. [illegible]

1973

APPENDIX "A"

SERVICE	FREQUENCIES	FREQUENCIES IN USE	NOTE
Central Tower Service No.5.	118.1 Mc/s 119.7 " 119.1 " 122.1 " 235 Mc/s 6440 "	118.1 Mc/s 6440 "	The frequencies of 118.1 Mc/s will be afforded where they are at present in existence will have them if requested. Frequencies is available.
Service No. 1. (A/T Maintenance in W/W) zone control.	333 Mc/s air/ground 339 " air/ground from 326.5 to 334 ground/air from 337 to 337 ground/air from 343 to 343 ground/air	333 Mc/s 336 Mc/s	The Italian stations functioning on should be use the frequency of the Zed quencies part be used according to the and exactly as follows:- 1st K.A.E. zone 333 and 330.5 Mc/s 2nd " " 339 " 341.5 " 3rd " " 333 " 328 " 4th " " 333 " 320 " Gardinia 333 and 334 Mc/s Sicily 333 and 343 " For the approach and aerodrome control frequencies will be used.
Approach Control.	338 Mc/s air/ground from 345 to 334 ground/air	340 Mc/s 340 Mc/s	
Aerodrome Control.	334 Mc/s air/ground from 320 to 326 ground/air	NIL. Nil.	

1976

785017

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	NOTE
116.1 119.7 121.1 122.1 [illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] c/s [illegible] c/s	116.1 [illegible] c/s [illegible] [illegible] c/s	The frequencies of 116.1 kc/s will be kept on the airfield where they are at present in force. Other aerodromes will have their frequencies when a change is available.
[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] kc/s air/ground	333 [illegible] c/s	The Italian stations functioning on each service, ought to use the frequency of the 2nd channel. Frequencies just be used according to their location and country as follows:-
from 326.[illegible] to 334 from 335 to 337 from 341 to 343	ground/air	336 [illegible] c/s	1st [illegible] zone 333 and 330.5 [illegible] c/s 2nd [illegible] " 330 " 341.5 " 3rd [illegible] " 333 " 328 " 4th [illegible] " 333 " 328 "
343 kc/s	air/ground	340 [illegible] c/s	Sardinia 333 and 334 kc/s Sicily 333 and 343 "
from 343 to 344	ground/air	340 [illegible] c/s	When the approach and aerodrome control the ATCAO frequency will be used.
325 kc/s air/ground from 320 ground/air to 326		320. 326.	

1977

SERVICE	FIXED FREQUENCIES	PRESCRIBED FREQUENCIES	NOTE
Service No. 3 (L/F D/F Assistance. Down to Rank.	3085 Kc/s 3093 " 3081 Kc/s 3089 " 3093 " 3097 "	4781 Kc/s 4784 Kc/s	The Italian Stations ought to use frequencies as follows :- 1st S.A.T. 3085 2nd S.A.T. 3089 3rd S.A.T. 3097 4th S.A.T. 3081 Sicily 3093 Sardinia 3093 In reception the main frequency is alternative one 3093 Kc/s. The Ita apparatus will not be able to effe frequencies, must use 4781 Kc/s.
Service No. 6 (Radio beacon for approach)	See note No. 1	320 Kc/s 421 "	The Radio beacons (Italian) ought t frequencies (Note No. 1) according
Service No. 7 (Radio beacons for Navigation)	See note No. 2	222 Kc/s 320 " 403 " 421 " 475 "	The Italian Radio beacons ought to frequencies (Note No. 2) according Also the Allied radio and radio re use the FIXED frequencies (note No. their location.

1978

PICAO Frequencies	Frequencies in use		NOTE
3985 3993	Kc/s "	4781 Kc/s	The Italian Stations ought to use the PICAO frequencies as follows :-
3981 3989 3993 3997	Kc/s " " "	4781 Kc/s	1st A.A.T. 3985 2nd A.A.T. 3989 3rd A.A.T. 3997 4th A.A.T. 3981 Sicily 3993 Sardinia 3989 In reception the main frequency is 3985 Kc/s, the alternative one 3993 Kc/s. The Italian aircraft whose apparatus will not be able to effect the PICAO frequencies, must use 4781 Kc/s.
See note No. 1	320 421	Kc/s "	The Radio beacons (Italian) ought to use the PICAO frequencies (Note No. 1) according to their location.
See note No. 2	222 320 403 421 485	Kc/s " " " "	The Italian Radio beacons ought to use the PICAO frequencies (Note No. 2) according to their location. Also the Allied radio and radio range beacon ought to use the PICAO frequencies (note No. 2) according to their location.

1979

SERVICE	FREQUENCIES	FREQUENCIES IN USE	NOTE
New Service No. 18 (point-to-point)	4040 Kc/s 6583 " 10800 "	10800 Kc/s 6917 "	Aircraft control.
New Service No. 19 (point-to-point)	2840 Kc/s 5680 " 8520 " (reserve)	5656 Kc/s	Aircraft control.
Radio Service for regional bulletins in M/F. The service is made every half an hour.	281 Kc/s 285 "	NIL	From the station of Milan, Genoa, Brindisi and Catania.
	3961 Kc/s 8515 "	3235 Kc/s Sicily 5785 " Sardinia (4th SAT 6830 ") 2960 " 1st SAT 4445 " 2nd SAT 6370 " 3rd SAT	At present the above mentioned every hour and every three hou
	3377 " 8600 "		
(gional bulletins very 3 hours.	3957 Kc/s 6975 " 12813 "		These services ought to be tra

1980

FROM RECEIVING	FROM SENDING STATION	NOTE
4110 Kc/s 6583 " 10800 "	10800 Kc/s 6517 "	Aircraft control.
2040 Kc/s 5600 " 8520 " (reserve)	5656 Kc/s	Aircraft control.
281 Kc/s 285 "	NIL	From the station of Milan, Venice, Rome, Cagliari, Brindisi and Catania.
3361 Kc/s 8519 "	3235 Kc/s Sicily 5705 " Sardinia 6230 " 4th SAT	At present the above mentioned stations are on duty every hour and every three hours.
3377 " 8600 "	2860 " 1st SAT 4145 " 2nd SAT 6370 " 3rd SAT	
3957 Kc/s 6975 " 12213 "		These services ought to be transmitted by Rome.

1064

NOTE (1)

Ko/s	355,5	356	356,5	357	357,5	358	358,5
	359	359,5	360	360,5	361	361,5	362
	362,5	363	363,5	364	364,5	364	

NOTE (2)

Ko/s	256	257	258	259	260	261	262
	263	264	265	266	267	268	269
	270	271	272	273	274	275	396
	397	398	399	400	401	402	403
	404	405	406	407	408	409	410
	411	412	413	414	415		

11

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Italian Military Affairs Section
Air Forces Sub Section
APO 794

To: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

Ref: IMAS/52/1/AIR/AF.
Ext.546.

Date: 8th March 1947.

Subject: Aerial Photographs.

The Italian Air Ministry has notified this Headquarters that it is receiving frequent requests from Municipalities and private Companies for aerial photographs of different locations in Italy.

2. Due to the severe limitations on service flying which are necessarily imposed by the shortage of petrol and of serviceable aircraft the Italian Air Force finds it impossible to meet these requests.

3. The Italian Air Ministry has now asked this Headquarters whether the aerial survey of Italy which was made by the Allies during the war could be made available to them so that prints may be obtained and kept for record purposes. These would then be used to keep maps up to date, and also to supply municipalities and private corporations who might be in need of photographs. They have asked if the negatives could be loaned for these purposes.

4. The request of the Italian Air Ministry is submitted to you for your consideration, and if the Supreme Allied Commander is prepared to agree, you are asked to notify this Sub Section as soon as possible.

C.M.M. GREGE W/Cdr.,
for Air Vice Marshal,
Director,
Air Forces Sub Section.

1983

1983

TO : Brigadier [illegible] C. COOPER
THROUGH : Colonel P. McC SMITH

RETURN TO:
W/CMDR HAMILTON
MAAC
W/ thanks

MAR 12 1943

58

GSP 1582

FROM: AIR VICE MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E.

A10

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

ITALIAN MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION,

AIR FORCES SUB-SECTION,

A. P. O. 794.

17th February, 1947.

DO/IEB.

My dear Hamilton

For your information I have received an official letter from the Chief of the Italian Air Force saying that the Italian Air Force Air Staff is in agreement, on a general basis, with the proposals contained in the British Air Ministry Plan of re-organisation of the Italian Air Force (copy of this letter to Wing Commander Hamilton who please treat this as officially transmitted from A.F.S.S. to M.A.A.C.). This official notification from the Chief of the Italian Air Staff does not, however, signify that the Italian Government is in agreement but only that the Air Staff is.

A few days ago a Director of FIAT called upon me and informed me that at his instigation the Air Ministry has asked FIAT to submit a plan for the provision of about 60 G.55 fighter aircraft for the Italian Air Force. For your information I attach a Note, which should be treated as intelligence, and as emanating from the aforementioned Director, Dr. Pecoi, but I think he was really feeling the ground. I understood from Dr. Pecoi that FIAT would be able to begin construction of G.55's in June and that their output would be about 6 a month but could be stepped up.

When a suitable opportunity occurs I will approach the Italian Chief of Air Staff on this matter.

The G.55 looks quite an efficient fighter and we think is probably the equivalent of the Spitfire V.

Yours

Squadron Leader Thompson,
Assistant Director Organisation,
Foreign Air Forces,
Air Ministry,
L O N D O N .

1581

C O P Y

FROM: Italian Air Force Stato Maggiore,
3rd Services Direction,
Technical Section.

To :- A.F.H.Q., A.G.

Ref :- 370200/ST.1 1/2/249 Coll.

Date:- 8th February 1947.

BRITISH AIR MINISTRY PLAN OF RE-ORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

The Italian Air Force "Stato Maggiore" after perusal of the "British Air Ministry Plan of Re-organisation of the Italian Air Force" is in agreement, on a general basis, with the proposals contained in the above mentioned plan.

(UGO) ARONCA CAT

CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF.

INTELLIGENCE - NOTE OF CONVERSATION OF DR. PECCEI (A DIRECTOR OF FIAT) WITH AIR VICE MARSHAL BRODIE ON 14TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

Dr. Peccei stated that -

1. That there are very few chances, not to say none, that the British proposition of rearming and re-equipping a certain number of Italian fighter squadrons will be accepted.

2. That at the Italian Air Ministry they are more inclined to take into consideration the American offer (Mustangs) because (a) this aircraft has a better performance than the Spitfire and (b) that the financial conditions are, or seem to be, by far more favourable (surplus prices and 30 years terms).

3. That FIAT have been asked to submit an offer for 50 - 60 G.55's.

4. At the Italian Air Ministry they are evidently worried with the unemployment problem and with the reactions which they expect from the press and labour organisations when it is known that they are buying abroad instead of giving work to the Italian industry. Their idea seems, therefore, to be of re-equipping the advanced training school and two squadrons with G.55's.

5. Dr. Peccei, who has been in contact with Rolls Royce representatives, wants to submit to the Italian Air Ministry an offer of G.55's fitted with Rolls Royce engines, and would like to know whether it would be possible for FIAT to purchase these engines from R.A.F. Surpluses in Italy or elsewhere.

6. Dr. Peccei and apparently the Rolls Royce representatives, see an excellent chance of collaboration in a good number of foreign markets, for the dual control G.55, because this is probably the best existing advanced training aircraft.

14th February, 1947.

A.F.S.S., I.M.A.S.,
A.F.H.Q., A.P.O. 794.

1987

AFSC SECRET CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

B 9.

TYPIST dsb

AFSC NO. N 49/10

CIPHER SERIAL NO.

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PRIORITY ROUTINE

FROM AIR HQ ITALY

TO RAF LIAISON SECT AFHQ

TIME OF ORIGIN 101021Z

REF REFERENCE NO. OX-1086.

TIME OF RECEIPT

7.

Following repeat this HQ signal O-1066 March 5th.

Following signal from AIR MARSHAL [illegible] to Air Marshal Sub Commission ROME (Rptd AHQ ITALY,).

1. "Following information urgently required in connection with scaling of commitments under tentative type plan for interim Italian Air Force.

"(A) Details of voltage and type of current power for all units.

"(B) Length of runways and whether of grass, concrete, or steel strip construction (construction for all airfields).

"(C) Is snow clearance and defrosting equipment required?

"(D) Is ground telephone equipment required?

2. "Would appreciate your assistance in obtaining information paragraph (1) earliest possible".

MAR 11 47 AM

ALLIED LIAISON SECTION

413.00

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Italian Military Affairs Section
Air Forces Sub Section
APO 794

8

To: M.A.A.C. Secretariat - A.M.G. - Italy.

Ref: IMAS/360/CMC/A.F.

Subject: Italian Armed Forces Personnel in Zone 'A' of Venezia Giulia.

Date: 4th March, 1947.

On the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Air Ministry was informed to withdraw all personnel from Zone 'A', Venezia Giulia, our letter AFSC/300/CMC, dated 9th January refers. (Copy attached, Appendix A).

2. The Italian Air Ministry requested an increase of personnel (see Appendix B).

3. Please inform this H.Q. whether G.M.G. will authorise this increase so that the Italian Air Ministry may be informed.

A. G. SALTER, S/LDR.,
For AIR VICE MARSHAL, DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB SECTION,
I.M.A.S. - A.F.H.Q.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Italian Military Affairs Section
Air Forces Sub Section
APO 794

To: M.A.A.C. Secretariat - A.HQ - Italy.

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A. G. SALTER, S/LDR.,
For AIR VICE MARSHAL, DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB SECTION,
I.M.A.S. - A.F.H.Q.

APPENDIX "A"

8A

COPY

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. ROME.

To : Italian Air Ministry.

Date : 9th January, 1947.

Ref. : AFSC/360/OEG.

I.A.F. PERSONNEL - VENEZIA GIULIA

Reference my conversation with General COPPI on the 8th January, 1947.

2. G.HQ, C.M.F. inform us that they consider that essential Welfare Work for Italian services in Zone 'A' of Venezia Giulia could reasonably be undertaken by the following numbers of personnel: -

	Officers	Other Ranks
Army	10	25
Air Force	2	4
Navy	4	10

3. They state that the Total Numbers of personnel believed to be employed on these duties at present is: -

Officers on Active List	38
ORs on Active List	104
Officers on Reserve	20
ORs on Reserve	14
Civilians	110

A grand total of 286 instead of 55.

4. (a) It is requested that the requisite numbers of personnel as suggested in para 1, above, be nominated from Men NOT on the Active List.

(b) To withdraw all personnel now on the Active List in Zone 'A' of Venezia Giulia forthwith or to strike them off the Active lists or to discharge them.

5. It is requested therefore that the necessary plans for implementing the requirements in para 3 above, be actioned and this HQ be informed of the result, at your earliest convenience.

6. For your information the Italian Army have been requested by I.A.F.A. to carry out these instructions as soon as possible.

1375

A. G. SALTER, S/Ldr.,
FOR AIR VICE MARSHAL.

Date : 9th January, 1947.

Ref. : APSO/360/ORC.

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Reference my conversation with General CORTI on the 8th January, 1947.

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	Officers	Other Ranks
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Air Force	2	4
Navy	4	10

3. They state that the Total Numbers of personnel believed to be employed on these duties at present is: -

Officers on Active List	32
ORs on Active List	104
Officers on Reserve	20
ORs on Reserve	14
Civilians	110

A grand total of 286 instead of 55.

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1575

A. G. SALMER, S/LDR.,
For AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
A.F.S.C.

Copy to : M.M.I.A., A.C. ROME.
A.F.S.C., A.C. MILAN.

APPENDIX "A"

COPY

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. ROME.

To : Italian Air Ministry.

Date : 9th January, 1947.

Ref. : AFSC/360/ORC.

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For AIR VICE MARSHAL.

Date : 9th January, 1947.

Ref. : AFSC/360/ORG.

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A. G. SALTER, S/LDR.,
For AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR.
AIR FORCES SUB SECTION,
H.M.A.S. - A.F.H.Q.

Copy to: M.M.I.A., A.C. ROME,
A.F.M.C., A.C. MILAN.

1994

OBJC URR 277/45

CIP Serial No. 65776

M/C No. MCS/63

AFHQ SIGNAL CENTRE

INCOMING MESSAGE

From AIR HEADQUARTERS ITALY(ITALY.

Time of Origin

To RAF LIAISON SECTION WITH SACMED(AFHQ PLEASE PASS)

Ref. No. | Precedence | Classification

OBOE XRAY 1566(1566(1566 5(5 MARCH SECRET.-

FOLLOWING SIGNAL FROM ABIENNE HARROGATE TO AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION ROME (ROME REPEATED AIR HEADQUARTERS ITALY (ITALY. QUOTE : FOLLOWING INFORMATION URGENTLY REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH SCALING OF COMMITMENTS UNDER TENTATIVE TYPE PLAN FOR INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE. ABLE : DETAILS OF VOLTAGE AND TYPE OF CURRENT POWER FOR ALL UNITS. BAKER. 3 LENGTH OF RUNWAYS AND METHOD OF GRASS CONCRETE OR STEEL STRIP CONSTRUCTION FOR ALL AIRFIELDS. CHARLIE. IS SNOW CLEARANCE AND DEFROSTING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED. DOG. IS GROUND TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED. TWO. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING INFORMATION REQUESTED PARAGRAPH ONE EARLIEST POSSIBLE. UNQUOTE

CRYPTO - SECURITY APPLIES

THIS MESSAGE WILL NOT BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE BRITISH OR U.S.A. GOVERNMENTS OR HEADQUARTERS OR RETRANSMITTED EVEN IN CIPHER WITHOUT BEING PARAPHRASED. (MESSAGES MARKED O.T.P. NEED NOT BE PARAPHRASED.)

RAF LIAISON SECTION

Form A 5354 30M 11-45

3551

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION : AHQ ITALY

INFO : USFET USAFE OFLC ROME

REF NO : FX 74458

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FEGCT

3

Your QX-69, 10 January to OFLC ROME refers.

UNITED STATES War Department advises surplus Mustangs NOT desired.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : K. C. COOPER, Brigadier

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-3(MTO) G-4
US POLAD RAFLO

Dist:
RAFLO
MAAL
9/1

LIAISON SECTION
22/1
4200

FC OUT 389 21 Jan 47 TOP SECRET 1501A Ref No FX 74458

1577

TOP SECRET COPY NO. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

1996

TOP SECRET

AF HQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TIME : 171752 PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY AFSC # 202
URGENT TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM : USAFE

TO : TAC XII INFO: COMGENMED USFET

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : UX 4869 17 January 1947

See 4

Cite AAFDE.

Offered by British are 65 Mustang IIIs and IVs for use in meeting commitment to re-equip Italian Air Force.

We have informed War Department we do NOT concur in acceptance of offer.

Desire to know, however, whether subject aircraft are suitable for purpose offered. Request you have representative contact Group Captain GORE, Air Headquarters, ITALY, UDINE to determine current condition of subject aircraft as regards flying status, similarity of instrument panel and cockpit controls to those of P-51D and interchangeability of parts with P-51D.

By 21 January reply must be received here.

ACTION : G-3(MTO)

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-3(AFHQ) G-4 G-5
RAFLO US POLAD

Dist.
RAFLO
MAR 6
91/1

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
HC IN 725 18 Jan 47 TOP SECRET 0100A Ref No UX 4869 gs/2

Signal Section
2/1
L20

1572

TOP SECRET COPY NO. 19

THE MAKING OF ANY EXTRA COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

3545

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET URGENT

TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION : USAFE

FOR INFO : AHQ ITALY USFET AGWAR FOR AFACE

REF NO : FX-74333

SIGNED : COMGENMED CITE : NAGCT

AGWAR WX-89769 refers.

1. RAF advise that disposition decision on 65 surplus Mustangs must be known by 23 January as rundown will have exhausted guard personnel by that date.

2. Suggest your representative contact Group Captain CORE, Air Headquarters ITALY, UDINE soonest to ascertain suitability of subject aircraft.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(MTO) AUTH : PERRY McC SMITH, Colonel

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(AFHQ) G-4 G-5
RAFLO US POLAD

MC OUT 285 16 Jan 47 TOP SECRET 1414A REF NO FX-74333 61/6

1971

TOP SECRET COPY NO. 24

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

1998

Form 247 (Revised)

ROYAL AIR FORCE.

Receipt No. .....

RECEIPT FOR SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION
(See R.A.F. and A.C.I. para. [illegible] Chapter [illegible])
OR UNNUMBERED SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATION
(See R.A.F. and A.C.I. para. [illegible] Chapter [illegible])

(This receipt should be returned on a SECRET* / NON SECRET letter.)

From MAACS

To S-3, AFHQ.

Receipt is acknowledged of

Signal QX 69 3. 10th Jan 47.

Date 1/13/47 19 Signature [illegible]

Rank US Cas. G.S.C.

*This receipt may be returned on a Non-Secret letter unless the reference detailed above to the communication or publication is such as might convey useful information to unauthorised persons.

The officer who fills in the reference to the communication or publication is responsible for deciding, in consultation with one of The Service Secretaries, the category of treatment of this form.

NOTE.—This form is not to be used in respect of Secret and Confidential NUMBERED Publications, receipts for which are to be given on Form 70.

*[illegible] TK 20000—[illegible] [illegible] Wt. [illegible] Ft. 793
*[illegible] Wt. [illegible]—[illegible] [illegible] Wt. [illegible] Ft. 793

1999

TOP SECRET

FHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

3

FILED : 101430Z
PRIORITY

CRYPTO-SECURITY APPLIES
TOP SECRET

AFSC

TOP SECRET

13/1 Spoke to Field. Told me to take it to Col Ulmer, who will return the memo to us. Col Ulmer asked if we gave to OKLC. Answer was no. Said that would tell OKLC to 10 January 1944. Take no action.

FROM : AHQI

TO : OPLC ROME AFHQ

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : WX-69

For RAFEO

1. Following information received from AM in their [illegible] 8 January.

"Although my CCS 4247 23 February gave you authority to scrap Mustangs and spares you should in this meantime instance offer your surplus Mustang aircraft and spares back to the Americans who may find them a useful contribution in meeting their commitments to the Italians. If offer accepted UNITED STATES Authorities must accept responsibility for custody of the equipment and aircraft. If offer refused aircraft and spares to be scrapped".

2. All aircraft will be located at CAMPO FORMIDO. Anticipate number available to be Mustang III quantity 20 Mustang IV quantity 45.

3. Appreciate early decision in order to assist cloting down RAF commitment in this theatre.

MAAC -
RATLO
G-3 - for action with bearing to -

NC IN 423

CRYPTO-SECURITY APPLIES
TOP SECRET

-1-

Allied Liaison Section
13/1
4200
1070

3

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NOTE : MSX 478 NOT IDENTIFIED IN AFEC MC FILES
OOX 4247 NO LONGER HELD IN AFEC M/C FILES

ACTION : NAFLO

INFORMATION : G-4

SECRET

INFORMAL ROUTING SLIP Log: 2

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

File AF 580 Suspense:

SUBJECT: letter from ALCOM

No.	From	Phone	To	Date	
1.	SACS	571	MAAC	31 Dec 46.	The attached letter No. CC 8503 dated 23 December, 1946 has been seen and noted by the Chief of Staff and is passed to you for information and retention. B.L. Tinsley B.L. Tinsley, Major, G.S., Sec to SAC.

885

2002

Letter from ALCOM

1.	SACS	571	MAAC	31 Dec 46.	The attached letter No. CC 8503 dated 23 December, 1946 has been seen and noted by the Chief of Staff and is passed to you for information and retention.

B.L. Tinsley,
Major, G.S.,
Sec to SAC.

C/S 159 31/XII

D C/S

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 794

AIT
31 Dec

CC 8503 23 December 1946

SUBJECT: Report on Anglo-American - Italian Air Relations.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
ATTENTION: Chief of Staff.

Tab 'A'

1. Reference your undated letter AF 148, above subject, (received in the Allied Commission on 20 December) concerning the article which appeared in the Italian newspaper "UNITA" on 4 December 1946 which revealed a leakage of information, it is believed that the leak occurred in the Italian Air Ministry. The following is the sequence of events in connection with this matter.

2. On 2 December a conference was held at the Italian Air Ministry, at which the following officers were present: The Director, Deputy Director and Senior Equipment Officer together with two Officer Interpreters of the Air Forces Sub-Commission and Squadron Leader Thompson of the British Air Ministry, Generals Aimone Cat, Brigante, Monte, Coppi and Biffi and Colonel Bramanti of the Italian Air Force. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the reorganization and re-equipment of the Italian Air Force. It is apparent from the wording of the article in "UNITA" (of 4 December) that one of the officers present at this conference actually communicated information to the offices of the newspaper "UNITA".

3. On 4 December (the day on which the "UNITA" article appeared) the head of the Italian Intelligence section informed the Air Forces Sub-Commission that the Chief of Air Staff (General Aimone Cat) was intending to reply to the article and that he was considerably concerned at the leak of information. Subsequently two further articles were published in "UNITA" dated 6 and 7 December and another article appeared in "CORRIERE DELLA SERA" on 7 December; copies of these three subsequent articles are forwarded herewith for your information. From them it will be observed that the Air Minister took the matter seriously and his answers seem to have satisfied the Italian Press because no further articles on this subject have appeared.

4. It will also be observed that the names of the Italian officers present at the Conference are given in a "UNITA" article, General Porro was not present ("UNITA" admitted that he was not present in an article of 14 December), but as was pointed out at the time by the Intelligence Section of the Italian Air Ministry, it is significant that the name of General Biffi was not mentioned.

5. On 11 December and 13 December respectively, both the Italian Chief of Staff and the Italian Air Minister verbally admitted to the Director and Deputy Director Air Forces Sub-Commission that they suspect that General Biffi was responsible for this serious leak of in-

1567

SECRET

formation. The Air Minister himself is already conducting an inquiry, the results of which are not yet known to the A.F.S.C. However, the Director A.F.S.C. is still pursuing the matter and you will be informed of the ultimate result of the inquiry and of any disciplinary action which the Italian Air Ministry may decide to take.

6. I am assured by the Director A.F.S.C. that all precautions possible have been taken in the A.F.S.C. to keep these matters secret, for example: -

(i) Soon after your signal UK.473 dated 15 November was received, the Director and Deputy Director A.F.S.C. went to the Italian Air Ministry on 22 November to discuss verbally the implications resulting from that signal, which approved the notions organisation of the Interim Italian Air Force under certain conditions. At the meeting (on 22 November) the Director opened by saying that the subject to be discussed should be treated as "SECRET" and when confirming the information verbally released to the Italian Air Ministry, the A.F.S.C. letter (dated 26 November 1945) was marked "ITALIAN AIRLIFT SECRET". At a meeting on 2 December it was again impressed upon all present that the subject matter under discussion should be treated as "Secret".

(ii) On 4 December and as a result of the extract in "L'Italia" dated 4 December it was decided at an A.F.S.C. Weekly Staff Meeting that the attention of all ranks was to be drawn to a serious leak of information and that they were to be reminded not to divulge secret information.

7. I am satisfied that the leak did not occur from Allied Commission personnel.

8. For your information, the Director A.F.S.C. brought to my attention the series of articles in the Italian Press as soon as they had been translated and I am satisfied that he has taken all action possible to trace the source of the leakage and that his actions subsequent to the leakage, in his relations with the Italian Air Ministry, have been correct.

Ulrey M. Stone
Brigadier, USAF
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:
AC, Allied Italy
Director AF S/O AC

1566

EXTRACT FROM L'UNITA 6TH DECEMBER, 1946.

TELL US

on. CINGOLANI.

We have not been given a reply on the part of Minister Cingolani to our suspicions expressed regarding the meeting between some Italian Generals and Colonel Thompson of the R.A.F. for the 're-organisation' of Italian civil and military aviation.

Yesterday we expressed doubts and requested explanations on the subject of this meeting that we would not like to have been destined to open up new horizons to the development of the R.A.F. in Italy, closing down others to our own aviation at the same time.

Today we are able to detail for the Minister (in case he does not know them) the names of some of the Generals taking part in the delightful re-union with the high ranking officer of His Brittanic Majesty. Here they are: General Aimone Cat, General Porro, General Briganti, General Monti, General Coppi.

Would the Air Ministry Press Office be good enough to inform the Press of the results of the meeting ? The re-organisation of the services and of the establishment of the Air Force is of some interest to everybody.

We would not like to do Minister Cingolani an injustice, in thinking that he does not read, even if as a political duty, our press. And neither would we even like to thin that he, having read it, would not interest himself in the question that we reported. We return therefore to the charge reposing the question. What intentions have the Directors of the Air Ministry regarding our aerial fleet ? And what intentions have the R.A.F. on the same subject?

Tell us this, please, Minister Cingolani. He must be informed, given his high office, of a few things.

EXTRACT FROM L'UNITA 7TH DECEMBER, 1946.

OKEY.

on. CINGOLANI.

The Air Ministry Press Office has put out a statement concerning the meeting which took place between some of our Air Force Generals and high ranking officers of the R.A.F. for the 're-organisation of the Italian Air Force' in reply to the question asked in our paper.

The statement says that the meeting was concerned with 'the normal contacts' for the application of the armistice clauses; and affirms that the questions of establishment were dealt with 'only so far as they connected with the necessary substitution and integration of flying material and auxiliary services, destined to maintain in being the Air Forces allowed by the Peace Treaty', until Italy is in a position to provide for them herself. Which possibility, the statement adds, is excluded for some time yet by the limitations imposed by the armistice.

We thank Minister Cingolani for having given us the details which we had requested. The Air Minister has in fact confirmed that which, from the very beginning we had feared, that the Allied Anglo-Americans are taking particular care not to let the building up of our aviation out of their hands.

What else could explain this 're-organising' zeal on the bases of the armistice clauses, on the eve of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty ?

But then why not opportunely inform public opinion on the meeting of December 2nd ? It would have been so much space saved for L' Unità and so much less annoyance for the much occupied hon. Cingolani.

'In any case ---- says the statement ----- no provision has been or ever will be attempted, either in the field of organisation or finance, without the decisions of the Republican Government, and therefore without the agreement of the Nation's representatives.'

We have never asked anything else.

EXTRACT FROM GIORNALE DELLA SERA 7TH DECEMBER, 1946.

CINGOLANI.

Our whole aviation will not exceed 200 militaty aircraft, and 150 civil, necessarily of English and American origin.

A propos of some recent questions put to the Air Minister on the re-organisation of the services and of the establishment of the Air Arm we requested some details from the Hon. Cingolani.

After having shown us a communique from the Press Office that covers the problem, the Minister said:

-The news published through the enflamed caprice of L'Unità has been replied to in the communique. As always I want to make everyone understand the limitations that the armistice, be it however attenuated, has imposed on the functioning of the Italian Military Force.

The war of liberation - in which the Air Arm heroically participated with the sacrifice of human lives and material and with at least 25,000 operational flying hours to its credit - has left our air force strong and proud in spirit but almost destroyed materially.

The Allies since the 8th September, have supplied our forces with aircraft, instruments and ground organisations. So that at the end of the war of liberation our combatant groups were largely furnished with Anglo-American donations.

-DO THE ALLIES CONTROL THE AIR ARM?

-The armament and the functioning of the Air Force are controlled by the Allied Sub-Commission, foreseen by the armistice, headed by Air Vice Marshal Brodie.

-SO THAT CONTACTS ARE NECESSARY.....

-Naturally, with me and with the General Staff. And it is exactly for such contacts - to which it has been desired to attribute the distant object of incorporating the Italian Air Force in the English one - that the meeting took place.

-WHAT WILL BE THE STRENGTH OF THE AIR ARM?

-By the Peace Treaty the Italian Air Forces will be reduced to 350 aircraft of which 200 only will be combatant and 150 for transport and training; which we cannot construct ourselves through the limitations already mentioned and also through the necessity for a period of adjustment for our industry to the enormous technical progress made in recent years during which world-wide changes have taken place in the field of military and civil aviation.

For the purpose of our aeronautical re-construction it is necessary and our duty to keep our military air force serviceable making use of means and aircraft that only the Allies are in a position to give us.

-ALL THE ALLIES?

-Let us put it this way; that the Allies who supply us are American and English only is an actual fact having the acquiescence of the other Allies who are supplied from the same sources, and find it therefore impossible to help us.

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-The news published through the enflamed caprice of L'Unità has been replied to in the communique. As always I want to make everyone understand the limitations that the armistice, be it however attenuated, has imposed on the functioning of the Italian Military Force.

The war of liberation - in which the Air Arm heroically participated with the sacrifice of human lives and material and with at least 25,000 operational flying hours to its credit - has left our air force strong and proud in spirit but almost destroyed materially.

The Allies since the 8th September, have supplied our forces with aircraft, instruments and ground organisations. So that at the end of the war of liberation our combatant groups were largely furnished with Anglo-American donations.

-DO THE ALLIES CONTROL THE AIR ARM?

-The armament and the functioning of the Air Force are controlled by the Allied Sub-Commission, foreseen by the armistice, headed by Air Vice Marshal Brodie.

-SO THAT CONTACTS ARE NECESSARY.....

-Naturally, with me and with the General Staff. And it is exactly for such contacts - to which it has been desired to attribute the distant object of incorporating the Italian Air Force in the English one - that the meeting took place.

-WHAT WILL BE THE STRENGTH OF THE AIR ARM?

-By the Peace Treaty the Italian Air Forces will be reduced to 350 aircraft of which 200 only will be combatant and 150 for transport and training; which we cannot construct ourselves through the limitations already mentioned and also through the necessity for a period of adjustment for our industry to the enormous technical progress made in recent years during which world-wide changes have taken place in the field of military and civil aviation.

For the purpose of our aeronautical re-construction it is necessary and our duty to keep our military air force serviceable making use of means and aircraft that only the Allies are in a position to give us.

-ALL THE ALLIES?

-Let us put it this way; that the Allies who supply us are American and English only is an actual fact having the acquiescence of the other Allies who are supplied from the same sources, and find it therefore impossible to help us.

NICOLA CUPI.

TOP SECRET

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TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : AGWAR FOR WIGPO TROOPERS FOR AIR MINISTRY
USFET AMG ITALY (ADV)

REF NO : FX 74126

SIGNED : SACMED CITE : FHOOT

This is NAF 1258.

Equipment for Italian Air Force is subject.

NAF 1235 refers.

1. Believing that possibility existed of United States furnishing more modern type Fighter aircraft than was proposed in British Air Ministry plan based on my NAF 1169 Chief of Italian Air Staff withheld acceptance of British plan until details of United States proposal became known. Furthermore conversion by Italians of P-38's already on hand has been discontinued. In effect reorganization of Italian Air Force is currently at a standstill.

2. I consider fulfillment of Combined Chiefs of Staff policy, which is to leave behind an efficient Italian Air Force, is being jeopardized by delay in obtaining United States plan. COMGENMED is so advising the United States War Department and urgently requesting instructions.

ORIGINATOR : G-3(AFHQ) AUTH : K G COOLER, Brig

INFORMATION : SACS C/S MTO G-2 G-3(MTO) G-4 G-5
US POLAD BRIT POLAD RAFLO NLO

MC OUT 76 6 Aug 47 TOP SECRET 1638A Ref No FX 74126

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