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POLICY & ORGANIZATION, IAF
OCT. 1943 - JAN. 1945

287
AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
RMS.

TOP SECRET.

AFSC/R/S.1/AIP.

26th January, 1945.

Dear

I am attaching to this letter a copy of a letter which I have just received from General Airone-Cat. This is the first reaction to your letter JCS.1076 of the 15th January 1945.

2. You will see that in paragraphs 2 to 4 he says that he is unable to give a more detailed reply until he has examined some of the problems, and until the new Command of the Operational Group (Unita Aerea) has become effective. I am hoping that when this does happen matters will improve, as at the moment there does not seem to be anybody in effective command at Bari.

3. In paragraph 5 you will see that the General returns to the charge on the subject of using the fighters on the Italian front. He does not seem to have appreciated our point about lack of airfield accommodation, but I shall hammer this into him.

4. It has just been reported to us that three Baltimore crews refused to attack objectives at Pola on the grounds that they would not attack Italian civilians. I have taken this matter up strongly with the General and pointed out that such a state of mind would preclude the employment of the Baltimores on the Italian front. I have had a verbal reply from him in which he stated that he did not think that the Baltimore would be suitable for employment on this front, and I am going to take this matter up with him further.

5. I am still very concerned about the state of affairs in the Fighter Group. It is obvious that they still consider themselves as somewhat of a Republic. In spite of definite orders there has been an attempt to bring the much discussed 9th Gruppo into the line as a Unit. This is not only contrary to our orders, but to those of the Air Ministry, and the Unita Aerea, and the responsibility must rest with Colonel FALLAI. Under the circumstances it would be fatal to remove him, as the morale of the Wing could not, in my view, support the loss in action of Major MARIONI and the removal of FALLAI, but I hope that when Colonel FRANCES gets to Bari he may be able to improve matters. He has a tremendous influence with the fighters, and the mere fact of his appointment to his job should improve things. I have suggested to the General that we send for Colonel FALLAI to come to Rome, and give him a good dressing down.

3. In paragraph 5 you will see that the General returns to the charge on the subject of using the fighters on the Italian front. He does not seem to have appreciated our point about lack of airfield accommodation, but I shall hammer this into him.

4. It has just been reported to me that three Baltimore crews refused to attack objectives at POLA on the grounds that they would not attack Italian civilians. I have taken this matter up strongly with the General and pointed out that such a state of mind would preclude the employment of the Baltimores on the Italian front. I have had a verbal reply from him in which he stated that he did not think that the Baltimores would be suitable for employment on this front, and I am going to take this matter up with him further.

5. I am still very concerned about the state of affairs in the Fighter Group. It is obvious that they still consider themselves as somewhat of a Republic. In spite of definite orders there has been an attempt to bring the much discussed 9th Gruppo into the line as a Unit. This is not only contrary to our orders, but to those of the Air Ministry, and the United States, and the responsibility must rest with Colonel PAVALLI. Under the circumstances it would be fatal to remove him, as the morale of the Wing could not, in my view, support the loss in action of Major RACIOTTI and the removal of PAVALLI, but I hope that when Colonel PHILLIPS gets to Bari he may be able to improve matters. He has a tremendous influence with the fighters, and the mere fact of his appointment to his job should improve things. I have suggested to the General that we send for Colonel PAVALLI to come to Rome, and give him a good dressing down.

6. Meanwhile I have sent Flying Officer Novira to the Fighter Wing. He has spent a long time with them, and from my personal observations he gets on with them extremely well, and I hope that by his influence, and by talking to individuals, he will be able to get them out of their somewhat peculiar state of mind.

7. The last paragraph of the General's letter refers to increases in pay, about which I have no further news, and to any concessions that we may be able to make in the way of additional food, etc.

Yours

WB: J10.

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, MBE, DSO, MC,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.

C.M.F.

24A

From : THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. ALMOND CAT
 To : A.V.M. W.A.S. BOWEN-ENSCAPLET
 Date : 24th January 1945
 Ref. : 010231

93 ON FILE
 10/1/45

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Dear Air Vice Marshal,

In his letter of Jan. 15th, in answer to mine of the 7th and 10th Jan. which you delivered to him for me, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor has answered in detail all the points concerning matters depending from him which I referred to, also remarking upon some disadvantages and suggesting measures suited to avoid them.

2. The importance of some problems having a political and military nature, and the difficulties of solving them in the most practical manner, oblige me to ask the opinion of higher Authorities and carry out investigations which will require some time, before answering.

3. With regard to other problems, especially those concerning the smooth working of Unità Aerea, new measures will soon be effective, with the object of settling the Stato Maggiore of the of the Unità and its duties and relations with the Commander in Chief, and dealing with the Departments of the Unità (stores, transport, etc) as far as it is possible for the R. Aeronautica to do so.

4. As soon as these measures are published I will let you know. I am now waiting for the new Commanders and Chiefs of Staff to take up their duties.

5. Meanwhile, with regard to the possible employment of squadrons of the Unità on the Italian front, I would like to specify the reasons inducing me to consider the following possibilities for the Fighter Group :

(a) Their employment in offensive actions against fighting personnel both on land and in the air, and not against the Italian territory, except for special objectives having a strictly military nature, such as bridges, roads and depots.

2. The importance of some problems having a political and military nature, and the difficulties of solving them in the most practical manner, oblige me to ask the opinion of higher Authorities and carry out investigations which will require some time, before answering.

3. With regard to other problems, especially those concerning the smooth working of Unita Aerea, new measures will soon be effective, with the object of settling the Stato Maggiore of the of the Unita and its duties and relations with the Commander in Chief, and dealing with the Departments of the Unita (spres, transport, etc) as far as it is possible for the R.Aeronautica to do so.

4. As soon as these measures are published I will let you know. I am now waiting for the new Commanders and Chiefs of Staff to take up their duties.

5. Meanwhile, with regard to the possible employment of squadrons of the Unita on the Italian front, I would like to specify the reasons inducing me to consider the following possibilities for the Fighter Group:

(a) Their employment in offensive actions against fighting personnel both on land and in the air, and not against the Italian territory, except for special objectives having a strictly military nature, such as bridges, roads and depots (clear objectives)

(b) The possibility of using Macchi which, painted with National markings, are very different from the republican ones and would not cause any confusion in the battle sky and would have allowed us to contribute on a larger scale with our own means to the final operations for the liberation of Italian territory.

6. As Sir John Glessor, in his answer, insists on the inadvisability of using Fighter Groups on the Italian front, explaining the many reasons which have induced him to come to this decision, I will do my best, as he suggests, to set forth these reasons to the Fighter Group, though I cannot fail to express my disappointment at having to give up an

idea which all our hopes were set on, especially with regard to a more direct and substantial contribution to the liberation of our Country.

7. I am hoping that you will soon be able to give me some good news in connection with the matters which Sir John Slessor is dealing with.

Yours very truly

Signed) Gen. Mario Aimone Cat



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Roma, 12

24 GEN 1945

Prot. n.º 010231 Sg/V

AL VICE AMIRAGLIO DONA. BOSCHIANI

A.C. - A.F.S.C.

- ROMA -

Cano Mammiello,

nella sua lettera del 15 Gennaio, in risposta alle mie del 7 e del 10 Gennaio che lei gli ha trasmesso, il Maresciallo Sir John Slessor risponde in modo esauriente a tutte le questioni di sua competenza che io ho posto, rilevando inoltre inconvenienti e suggerendo provvedimenti atti ad eliminarli.

L'importanza di alcuni problemi a carattere politico-militare, e la difficoltà della loro impostazione per giungere alla migliore soluzione pratica, mi impongono di interpellare autorità superiori e condurre accertamenti che richiederanno un qualche tempo, prima che io possa rispondere.

Per citare problemi, quali specialmente quelli che interessano il riassetto dell'Unità Aerea, sono in corso di emanazione provvedimenti intesi a sistemare lo Stato Maggiore della Unità e le sue attribuzioni agli ordini del Comando in Capo, nonché i servizi logistici dell'Unità (Magazzini, Trasporti, ecc) per quanto è nella competenza e nelle possibilità della R. Aeronautica.

Di questi provvedimenti le darò conoscenza appena emanati. Attendo, per questo, che i nuovi Comandanti e Capo di Stato Maggiore dell'Unità inizino le loro funzioni.

Per intanto, per quanto concerne l'eventuale impiego di reparti dell'Unità, sul fronte italiano desideravo precisare le re-

competenza che le ho poste, rilevando inoltre inconvenienti e suggerendo provvedimenti atti ad eliminarli.-

L'importanza di alcuni problemi a carattere politico-militare, e la difficoltà della loro impostazione per giungere alla migliore soluzione pratica, mi impongono di interpellare autorità superiori e condurre accertamenti che richiederanno un qualche tempo, prima che io possa rispondere.-

Per altri problemi, quali specialmente quelli che interessano il funzionamento dell'Unità Aerea, sono in corso di emanazione provvedimenti intesi a sistemare lo Stato Maggiore della Unità e le sue attribuzioni agli organi del Comando in Capo, nonché i servizi logistici dell'Unità (Magazzini, Trasporti, ecc) per quanto è nella competenza e nelle possibilità della R. Aeronautica.-

Di questi provvedimenti io darò conoscenza appena emanati.-
Atteso, per questo, che i nuovi Comandanti e Capo di Stato Maggiore dell'Unità inizino le loro funzioni.-

Per intanto, per quanto concerne l'eventuale impiego di reparti dell'Unità, sul fronte italiano desideravo precisare le ragioni che mi avevano indotto a prospettare tale possibilità circa il raggruppamento Cecoslovacco;

- Impiego offensivo contro combattenti a terra ed in volo e non contro il territorio italiano, salvo per speciali collettivi di esclusivo interesse militare, quali ponti, strade, depositi bene individuati ecc.

- Possibilità d'impiego dei Macchi, che coperti da distintivi nazionali ben diversi da quelli della repubblica, non avrebbero dato luogo a confusione nel cielo della battaglia ed avrebbero

permesso un più largo contributo di nostri mezzi alle ultime operazioni per la liberazione del territorio italiano.--

Poiché Sir Jean Slessor, nella sua risposta ribadisce l'ineopportunità di agire con i reparti da caccia sul fronte italiano, per il compenso delle ragioni che mi ha esposte, io cercherò come egli suggerisce di spiegare tali ragioni al raggruppamento Caccia, pure esprimendo il rammarico di rinunciare ad una prospettiva che costituiva la nostra speranza; specie per quanto concerne un più diretto e solido contributo alla liberazione del territorio nazionale.--

Desprimo infine la speranza che lei abbia preste qualche buona notizia da trasmettermi circa le questioni di cui Sir Jean Slessor si sta interessando.--

Wm. M. M. M. M.

IL CAPO DI STAFFO MAGGIOR

cc 150
26A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME. ✓
CHIEF OF STAFF, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME. ✓

DATE: 17TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/S.1/AIR.

I think you will be interested in the attached letter from the Deputy/Air Commander-in-Chief.

2. It gives an idea of the immediate future of the Italian Air Force.
3. May I have it back as soon as possible please.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCALET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Noted.

WAB
cc

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HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

JCS. 1076

SECRET

15th January, 1945.

Dear General,

The object of this letter is to summarize and confirm the conclusions reached at our meeting in Rome on January 15th.

In your letter 010101/89.V. of 10th January to Air Vice Marshal Buncarlet you address yourself in a practical manner to certain questions of general policy governing the organization and employment of the Italian Air Force. I fully agree with you that it is time the situation was clarified, and that appropriate measures should be put in hand to dispense with superfluous organizations and personnel, and to retain and reorganize such organizations and personnel as are necessary.

2. In an early paragraph of your letter you refer to a point which unfortunately is necessarily obscure, and must remain so till the Peace Settlement, namely the question of "that part of the I.A.F. destined to continue after peace is concluded". As I told you, I am not in a position to give you any guidance on that subject. All I am authorized to do is to assist in the equipment, organization and maintenance of such units of the Italian Air Force as can be usefully employed during the present war in the fight against the common enemy. In that I include units for training of replacement airmen to meet wastage, and for essential transport services.

3. I think however that this does provide the necessary firm basis of policy on which to establish the reorganization of the Italian Air Force. The first factor is that, for reasons which I explained to you, I am unable to equip or maintain on Allied types more than the 5 squadrons at present so equipped - namely, 1 squadron Spitfires, 2 squadrons P-39 and 2 squadrons Baltimore.

4. Any other units that are retained must remain equipped with Italian aircraft. We agreed therefore that a review should be made of Italian resources by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and yourself, assisted by Staff Officers from this Headquarters, to determine what Italian equipped units can usefully be employed and can be maintained

Generalissimo Cat,
Chief of Staff,
Italian Air Force.

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/From Italian.....

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from Italian resources for a period of 12 months, which I think we can accept as a reasonable assumption to cover the duration of the war against Germany. An important factor in this review will be the work of the newly appointed Technical Commission; and I am instructing Group Captain Bailey, the Engineer Staff Officer representing this H.Q. on the Technical Commission, that the foregoing should be the basis of his work: and that he should recommend the immediate reduction to produce of all aircraft which are not likely to be useful for this purpose. This follows a precedent recently adopted for British aircraft in this theatre, and I am sure you will agree that it would be quite wrong to continue to occupy Italian Air Force personnel, equipment or other facilities in the repair or overhaul of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft the are never likely to be of any value for war purposes.

5. The exact composition of the reorganised Italian Air Force must await the outcome of the review referred to above, which should be pressed forward as expeditiously as possible; but it seems likely that it will be on the following lines:-

- (a) The three fighter and two light bomber squadrons referred to in para 3 above.
- (b) An operational training and refresher unit, to back the above squadrons and to keep in flying practice pilots of first line squadrons in between operational tours. I think this will be the best use to which we can put the MAORHS, which can no longer be regarded as first line types.
- (c) A Bomber Transport Unit for supply dropping operations in the Balkans and for essential maintenance transport.
- (d) A Gasplane Unit or units for Air Sea Rescue, mine-spotting patrols and essential maintenance transport.

- 3 -

(e) The Communications unit for internal courier services, and

(f) such training, maintenance and ancillary units as may be agreed upon as essential to support the units in (a) to (e) above.

6. It is of the first importance that this small Air Force should be based on a sound system of administration and internal organization. To this end it will be necessary to retain:-

(a) A small but carefully selected and soundly organized Air Ministry staff. I quite realise that the Air Ministry must be larger than would be necessary to administer only the Air Force outlined in para 5 above; but I would suggest that you should examine the possibility of organising the Air Ministry in two distinct sections:-

- (i) To deal with the Air Force as it exists today, and
- (ii) To deal with the many complicated questions of administration, finance, personnel policy, etc. that are the legacy of the past.

I realize that the work of these two sections must to some extent overlap, but feel that there is a great deal to be said for dealing with the two quite different problems as far as possible separately.

(b) It will also be necessary to retain a small operational Headquarters between the Air Ministry and the units, to deal with the current day-to-day problems of operations and administration of the units in the field.

7. I think you will agree that on the above basis there should be no question of any fresh recruitment of officers or other ranks. Indeed the problem becomes, as you have pointed out, one of the disposal of surplus personnel. I hope that, in this connection, you will give special consideration to the disposal of officers who have reached an age when they can no longer be profitably employed in their rank, and to the advancement of younger officers with good operational records. I am sure you will also give special

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- 4 -

attention to the disposal of those officers whose interest in the I.A.F. appears to be more political than professional.

8. The number of maintenance and specialist personnel that will be surplus to the needs of the Force in para 5 above will become apparent on the termination of the review referred to in para 4. As I told you, the I.A.F. may be able to make a valuable contribution to the war effort by making available such surplus personnel as can usefully be employed to replace, in the Maintenance organization behind the British and American Air Forces in the Mediterranean, Allied technical personnel who could be released to other theatres of war. I have instructed Air Vice-Marshal Cooke, the Director of Maintenance and Supply, to undertake at the appropriate time, and in conjunction with the A.F.M.C., an American technical officer and Italian Air Ministry, an investigation into the technical qualifications of I.A.F. ground personnel becoming surplus to the needs of the reorganised I.A.F., and to report on the numbers that could be absorbed in British and American Maintenance Units. In this connection I think we should not overlook the possibility that such personnel might usefully be employed after the defeat of Germany, in the Far Eastern theatre of war against our other common enemy Japan.

9. Turning to certain specific points raised in your letters of 7th and 10th January to Air Vice Marshal Trenchard, which we also discussed at our meeting.

First the question of the scale and standard of food, pay, clothing and equipment of the I.A.F. units serving with the R.A.F.

(a) As to food, the Air Force Sub-commission and this F.C. have devoted considerable efforts to obtaining a higher standard of rations for the operational squadrons; as I told you on Saturday we have been able to secure an increase in the ration which, while not as large as I should have liked, will nevertheless I hope constitute a marked improvement.

(b) I agree with you that an increase of pay is desirable, and will take up the case with the Chief Commissioner. This, however, is a complicated matter with the details of which I am not familiar and I am, of course, quite unable to promise that my attempt to obtain some increase of pay will meet with success.

(c).....5095

- 5 -

- (c) Clothing and equipment. We have recently been able to provide some help in this direction - for instance the provision of boots; and I will continue to give you such assistance as may be essential to the extent that is within my powers. I would like to emphasize, however, what I told you at our meeting, that this problem of clothing and equipment is one which I believe can to a considerable extent be solved by the Italian Air Force themselves. I am sure you will find, when you have had more time to investigate the problem, that the equipment system of the I.A.F. is extremely insufficient. The example you quote of the oxygen masks confirms me in my views that many of your troubles are due to an almost complete lack of any proper equipment organization comparable to that in the R.A.F. It is partly this lack of system which accounts to some extent for the difficulties and lack of faith with which demands for the supply of Allied material are sometimes met - as referred to in your letter of 7th January; it has been our experience that I.A.F. units are very liable to over-demand, and to turn to us for help in equipment problems which they could solve themselves if they had an efficient system.

I have arranged for an Equipment Commission, on the lines of the Technical Commission referred to in para. 4 above, to be set on foot as early as possible. And I hope you will instruct your Equipment Staff to collaborate fully with this Commission, to establish as quickly as possible in the I.A.F. a proper equipment system - including arrangements for stock taking and the establishment of unit equipment tables on R.A.F. lines. Only by such means can we determine what are the real needs of the units, what are the I.A.F. resources available to meet them and consequently the scale and nature of the deficiencies which we will endeavour as far as possible to make good.

10. I explained to you the reasons, mainly the already excessive congestion on forward airfields, why I.A.F. fighter squadrons can not be employed on the Italian front itself. I hope, however, you will explain to the fighter units that they are making a valuable contribution to the liberation of ITALY by operating in the BALKAN AIR FORCE against the enemy in YUGOSLAVIA.

But I understand the keenness of ITALIAN personnel to take some part in the war in their own country, and I will discuss with the Air Officer Commanding Desert Air Force the possibility of

5094

- 6 -

using the Baltimore squadrons against German targets in the Po Valley area.

11. I will at once discuss with Allied Force Headquarters the possibility of releasing the Italian Air Ministry building for your use, and will let you know if this proves possible.

12. I was not aware of the points raised in your letter of 7th January about the maltreatment of Italian officers in Albania. I am afraid this is to some extent inevitable, and it may be relevant to point out that we have also had examples of Allied aircrew personnel being maltreated after forced landing or bailing out in the Balkans. But we may possibly be able to be of some assistance in this matter - as also in the matter of obtaining information about I.A.F. personnel who are missing on operations - provided all such incidents are immediately reported, through A.P.S.C. Headquarters in Bari, to the Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force.

13. I am having the possibility examined of issuing some form of identity card to I.A.F. personnel serving with the A.A.F., to avoid such humiliating incidents as that of Major Valentini, which I much regret. We shall require your closest collaboration in the difficult matter of avoiding misuse of these identity cards, notably the most rigorous disciplinary action against any personnel convicted of such misuse. I will let you know in due course if it proves possible to come to some such arrangement.

14. I am not quite clear as to your meaning in referring, in your letter of 10th January, to the absence of a consultative body to discuss between the I.A.F. and Allied Commands certain problems of administration. The Air Forces Sub-Commission exists for just that purpose, and I am sure you will find that A.V.M. Muscatelli and his staff will continue to extend to you all possible assistance, within the bounds of the declared policy and of our available resources, in solving these and similar problems.

15. Finally, may I say how much I appreciate the practical and co-operative spirit in which you have approached the difficult problems of your new appointment, and assure you of my sympathetic understanding and assistance in solving them in the interest of the early defeat of our common enemies.

(Sgd.) J. C. SLESSOR

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COMANDO IN CAPO DELLE
AERONAUTICHE ALLEATE DEL MEDITERRANEO.

259
F. J. M.

JCS. 1075

SEGRETO

15 GENNAIO 1945

Caro Generale,

Lo scopo di questa lettera è quello di riassumere e riconfermare le conclusioni alle quali siamo giunti nel nostro incontro a Roma del 13 gennaio.

Nella lettera 010101/SC.V del 10 gennaio che avete indirizzata al Vice Maresciallo dell' Aria Buscarlet voi affrontate in modo pratico varie questioni di carattere generale sulle direttive di organizzazione e di impiego della Aeronautica Italiana. Concordo pienamente con voi quando dite che: a tempo che la situazione venga chiarita, che appropriati provvedimenti debbono essere adottati allo scopo di eliminare organizzazioni o personale superflui, e che vengano invece conservate e riorganizzate organizzazioni e personale necessari.

2. In uno dei primi paragrafi della vostra lettera voi toccate un argomento che, purtroppo, è necessariamente oscuro, e che dovrà rimanere tale fino alle trattative di pace, all' argomento cioè dell' avvenire dell' Aeronautica Italiana a pace conclusa. Come già vi ho detto non sono in grado di darvi alcuna luce sulla questione. Il mio incarico è limitato all' assistere ed agevolare l'equipaggiamento, la organizzazione e la manutenzione di quelle unità della Aeronautica Italiana che possono essere utilmente impiegate, nella guerra attuale, contro il nemico comune. Tra queste unità includo quelle destinate all' allenamento degli equipaggi con i quali coprire le perdite e di quelle destinate a coprire i trasporti essenziali.

3. Ritengo in ogni modo che quanto sopra dice gli elementi necessari a tracciare le direttive su cui basare la riorganizzazione dell' Aeronautica Italiana. Il primo fattore è quello che, per le ragioni che vi ho già illustrate, non sono nella possibilità di armare e di assicurare la manutenzione con materiale Alleato oltre ai 5 "Squadrons" già equipaggiati con questo e precisamente: 1 su Spitfires - 2 su P.39 - e 2 su Baltimore.

4. Le altre unità che sono conservate dovranno rimanere equipaggiate con apparecchi Italiani. Ci accordiamo in conseguenza sulla necessità di esaminare, con la Air Forces Sub-Commission, con rappresentanti vostri e di questo Comando

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(2)

in Capo, le risorse e possibilità Italiane allo scopo di determinare quali unità equipaggiate con materiale Italiano possano essere utilmente impiegate e mantenute in efficienza per un periodo di 12 mesi - periodo questo che ritengo possiamo ragionevolmente assumere come quello di ulteriore durata della guerra con la Germania. Il lavoro della Commissione Tecnica recentemente nominata è molto importante. Ho dato istruzioni al Group Captain Ediley, delegato tecnico di questo Comando in Capo, di attenersi a quanto detto più sopra e che deve essere la base del suo lavoro - di proporre cioè la immediata radiazione di tutti quegli apparecchi che non si possono ritenere atti ad essere impiegati ai nostri scopi. Questo segue analogo provvedimento da noi già adottato su questo teatro di operazioni nei confronti di apparecchi Britannici - e sono sicuro che sarete d'accordo nel ritenere assolutamente sbagliato l'impiego di personale, - materiale, attrezzature etc. nella riparazione e revisione di macchine già vecchie o che stanno invecchiando, e possono ritenersi di nessun valore bellico.

5. La esatta composizione della riorganizzata Aeronautica Italiana non potrà stabilirsi se non quando saranno noti i risultati dei lavori (che debbono essere affrontati ed ultimati il più rapidamente possibile) della Commissione di cui sopra. Sembra però verosimile che sarà presso a poco come segue:

- (a) Tre "Squadrons" da Caccia e due da Bombardamento Leggero come detto al paragrafo 3.
- (b) Una unità di allenamento e di addestramento a sostegno di quelle di cui sopra, ^{per} mantenere all' altezza i loro piloti negli intervalli tra le azioni di guerra. Ritengo essere questo il miglior impiego dei macchinisti che non possono essere ulteriormente considerati come apparecchi di prima linea.
- (c) Una unità da Bombardamento - trasporto per lanciare rifornimenti nel corso di operazioni nei Balcani - e per i trasporti indispensabili al mantenimento in efficienza della Unità.
- (d) Una Unità di Idrovolanti per operazioni di salvataggio, per localizzazione di mine, e per i trasporti indispensabili, come detto alla lettera che precede.
- (e) Una Unità per il traffico aereo interno.
- (f) Quelle Unità e reparti per allenamento, manutenzione e rifornimento sulle quali dovrà essere raggiunto un accordo - e che saranno giudicate essenziali per mantenere in attività quelle di cui dalla lettera (a) alla lettera (e) che precedono.

(3)

6. È di capitale importanza che questa piccola Forza Aerea sia impiantata sulla base di un solido sistema amministrativo e di organizzazione interna. Per raggiungere tanto sarà necessario trattenere in servizio:

- (a) Un piccolo, ma accuratamente selezionato e solidamente organizzato, Stato Maggiore. Mi rendo ben conto del fatto che il Ministero dell'Aeronautica debba avere solo maggiore di quella necessaria ad amministrare la piccola Aeronautica delineata al paragrafo 5 che precede - ma suggerirei che voi esaminaste la possibilità di organizzare il Ministero su due branche distinte di cui:
 - (i) Una per la gestione della Aeronautica così come è oggi.
 - (ii) Una per far fronte alle complicate questioni di amministrazione, finanza, personale ecc., che sono la eredità del passato.

Capisco che il lavoro di queste due branche possa fino ad un certo limite interferire, ma ritengo si possa dire molto per sostenere che i due problemi, molto diversi tra di loro, vadano per quanto possibile affrontati separatamente.

- (b) Sarà inoltre necessario lasciare un piccolo Comando Operativo tra il Ministero e la Unità che si occuperà delle giornaliere questioni di ordinaria amministrazione, operative ed amministrative, riguardanti le Unità in campo.

7. Ritengo siate d'accordo che con delle direttive come quelle di cui sopra non possa essera questione di nuovi reclutamenti, né di ufficiali, né di altri gradi. Il problema da risolvere sarà in fatti, come voi stesso avete notato, quello della liquidazione del personale in eccesso. Spero che sulla questione vorrete dare speciale considerazione alla necessità di far lasciare il servizio ad ufficiali che per ragioni di età non possono essere utilmente impiegati nei gradi che rivestono, e sulla necessità di fare invece avanzare nella carriera più giovani ufficiali con un buon passato operativo. Sono anche sicuro del fatto che non esiterete a liquidare quegli ufficiali che dimostrassero più interesse alla politica che non alla professione.

8. La eccedenza del personale specialista e di governo nei confronti delle linee di cui al paragrafo 5 emergerà al termine della ispezione condotta dalla Commissione di cui al paragrafo 4. Come vi ho detto la Aeronautica Italiana può portare un apprezzabile contributo allo sforzo di guerra mettendo a disposizione il suo personale in eccesso che può essere utilmente impiegato nel sostituire personale Alleato nelle organizzazioni che le Aeronautiche Britannica ed Americana hanno dietro di loro nel Mediterraneo, permettendo così l'impiego di questo ultimo personale in altri teatri di guerra. Ho dato istruzioni

(4)

al Direttore dei Servizi Tecnici di questo Comando in Capo Vice Maresciallo Cooke di intraprendere, a tempo opportuno, con la A.F.S.C., con un ufficiale tecnico Americano e con un delegato del Ministero dell'Aeronautica, una indagine sulle qualificazioni tecniche del personale, specialista e non di volo italiano, che risulterà eccedente alle necessità della riorganizzata Aeronautica Italiana, e di riferire sui valori di questa eccedenza che potrebbe essere assorbita da Unità di manutenzione Inglesi ed Americane. A questo riguardo aggiungo che non dovremo trascurare la possibilità di impiegare questo personale, nei teatri dell'Estremo Oriente e contro l'altro nostro comuneramico il Giappone, dopo la sconfitta della Germania.

9. Mi riferisco ora a certe specifiche questioni toccate nella vostre lettere del 7 e del 10 gennaio che avete indirizzate al Vice Maresciallo Muscarlet - questioni che abbiamo anche discusso in occasione del nostro incontro.

Prima di ogni altra la questione della quantità e qualità delle razioni, degli stipendi, del vestiario e dell'equipaggiamento del personale delle vostre Unità che servono con la R.A.F.

(a) Per quanto riguarda il cibo la Air Forces Sub-Commission è dedicato considerevoli sforzi nell'intento di ottenere un più alto standard di razioni per il personale delle Unità operanti. Come vi ha detto Sabato scorso abbiamo potuto ottenere un aumento nelle razioni che, per quanto non sia quello che avevo sperato, costituirà sempre un notevole miglioramento.

(b) Sono d'accordo con voi nel ritenere desiderabile un aumento negli stipendi e tratterò la questione con il Capo della A.C. Questo però è un argomento molto delicato e che non mi è familiare, ragione per cui mi trovo nella impossibilità di lasciarvi illusioni sul successo dei miei passi.

(c) Vestiario ed equipaggiamento. Abbiamo recentemente avuto la possibilità di darvi qualche aiuto fornendovi delle scarpe, e continuerò a fare quanto è nei miei mezzi per darvi l'assistenza che potrò nelle cose più essenziali. Vorrei però insistere su quanto vi ho già detto nella nostra riunione e cioè che questa questione ritengo possa, fino ad un notevole punto, essere risolta da voi stessi. Sono sicuro che constaterete, quando avrete avuto il tempo di studiare il problema, che la organizzazione della equipaggiamento della Aeronautica Italiana sia estremamente inefficiente. Il caso che voi stesso mi citate degli inalatori di ossigeno conferma la mia convinzione che molti dei vostri inconvenienti siano dovuti alla quasi

(5)

completa mancanza di una organizzazione per l'equipaggiamento che possa paragonarsi a quella della R.A.F. Sono in parte dovute a ciò le difficoltà ed i dubbi con cui sono accolte talvolta le richieste dell' Aeronautica Italiana, come da voi riferito nella vostra lettera in data 7 gennaio. Abbiamo infatti potuto constatare la tendenza da parte delle vostre Unità a richiedere in eccesso, ad rivolgersi a noi per aiuti nella soluzione di problemi che una migliore organizzazione potrebbe loro consentire.

Ho stabilito che una Commissione per l'equipaggiamento, costituita con lo stesso criterio di quella di cui al paragrafo 4, si metta all'opera appena possibile. Spero vorrete dare istruzioni ai vostri enti incaricati dell' equipaggiamento di dare tutta la loro collaborazione a questa Commissione, allo scopo di stabilire al più presto nell' Aeronautica Italiana un appropriato sistema che includa le misure per la preparazione di stocks e di tabelle per le Unità, sulla traccia di quanto viene fatto nella R.A.F. Soltanto così facendo potremo determinare quali siano le reali necessità delle Unità, quali sono le reali possibilità di coprirle con le risorse dell' Aeronautica Italiana e, di conseguenza, la natura ed entità delle deficienze che noi faremo del nostro meglio e per quanto ci sarà possibile di colmare.

10. Vi ho già spiegato le ragioni, principalmente dovute alla eccessiva congestione delle basi avanzate, per le quali la vostra caccia non può essere impiegata sul Fronte Italiano. Spero voi vorrete spiegare al personale di questa vostra Unità il contributo notevole che porta alla liberazione dell' Italia operando, con la Balkan Air Force, contro il nemico in Jugoslavia.

Capisco però il desiderio vivissimo del personale Italiano di prendere parte alle operazioni nel suo paese, e discuterò col Comandante della Desert Air Force la possibilità di impiegare gli "squadrone" di Baltimore contro obiettivi Germanici nella vallata del Po.

11. Discuterò immediatamente con il Comando in Capo delle Forze Alleate la possibilità di ottenere la restituzione del Ministero dell' Aria e vi farò sapere se la cosa risulterà possibile.

12. Non ero a conoscenza di quanto da voi segnalato, con la vostra lettera del 7 gennaio, sui maltrattamenti sofferti da ufficiali Italiani in Albania. Temo però che la cosa sia fino ad un certo punto inevitabile e potrà essere interessante per voi il sapere di maltrattamenti sofferti nei Balcani anche da equipaggi Alleati costretti ad atterrare ed a lanciarsi con paracadute. Ritengo potremo forse esservi di qualche aiuto tanto in questa questione quanto in quella di ottenervi informazioni

(6)

su equipaggi dispersi - a condizione però che siano date da voi immediate informazioni al Comando della Balkan Air Force per il tramite della A.F.S.C. di Bari.

13. Sto facendo esaminare la possibilità di rilasciare delle carte speciali di identità per il vostro personale che serve con la R.A.F. allo scopo di evitare penosi incidenti, che deploro vivamente, come quello accaduto al Maggiore Valentini. Avremo però bisogno della vostra più stretta collaborazione nel delicato problema di evitare che sia fatto cattivo uso di questi documenti e nella adozione di severe sanzioni disciplinari contro chi si rendesse colpevole di infrazioni. Vi farò sapere, a tempo opportuno, se sarà possibile giungere a questa soluzione.

14. Non ho potuto bene afferrare il significato di quanto affermato, nella vostra lettera in data 10 gennaio, sulle assenze di un Comitato Consultivo per discutere certi problemi di amministrazione tra l'Aeronautica Italiana ed i Comandi Alleati. La Air Forces Sub-Commission non ha altra ragione di esistere e sono sicuro voi troverete che il Vice Maresciallo Buscariet ed il suo Stato Maggiore continueranno a darvi ogni possibile assistenza, nei limiti delle direttive più sopra affermate e della disponibilità delle nostre risorse, per risolvere questi problemi ed altri consimili.

15. Tengo infine a dirvi quanto io abbia apprezzato lo spirito pratico e di collaborazione col quale avete affrontato i difficili problemi del vostro incarico, ed a darvi assicurazione della mia simpatia, comprensione ed assistenza per la loro soluzione, nell'interesse della rapida sconfitta dei nostri comuni nemici.

Firmato: AIR MARSHAL SIR JOHN SLESSOR

22A

FROM: AIR VICES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 17TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/S.1/AIR.

I think you will be interested in the attached letter from the Deputy/Air Commander-in-Chief.

2. It gives an idea of the immediate future of the Italian Air Force.
3. May I have it back as soon as possible please.

W.B.

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUSCARIET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED MISSION,
ROME.

TOP SECRET.

AFSC/R/S.1/AIR.

18th January, 1945.

Dear

I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter written by the D/A.O.C-in-C to General Aimone-Cat. This states clearly the future policy to be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force, and is full of useful information.

2. I do not want any Italians to see this letter, but Gladstone, Brookhead, and Chapman, must see it, and you can use your discretion about the others - I think probably Ollason also should see it.
3. Please return the letter as soon as it has gone the rounds.

Yours

Group Captain F.M. Donny,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

Handwritten:
F.M. Donny
18/1/45

5082

20A

AIR ACES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COM BEION,
ROME.

AFSC/R/3.1/AIR.

16th January, 1945.

I have just received the enclosed letter from Air
Marshal Sir John Slessor, and hasten to send it to you immediately
by hand of an Officer.

Wf

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

H.E. General Aimeo-Cat,
Chief of Staff,
Air Ministry,
Rome.

TO: W/CDR. W.B. ROYCE. *LER*
W/CDR. P. DE HAAN. *ST*
MAJOR ASS. *SH*
S/LDR. J. WALTON. */W*
S/LDR. H.L. MORROW. *W*
S/LDR. B.O.F. TOTT. *BoF*
F/LT. J.G. WHITE. *W*

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The attached letter is to be carefully read by all Officers of this Sub-Commission.

2. It is our directive for the immediate future, as well as being that for the Italian Air Force.

3. If any points are not quite clear, Officers are to consult me.

PLEASE PASS QUICKLY.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 16th January, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/R/S.1/AIR.

5087

From: Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

JCS.1077

SECRET

15th January 1945

Dear Buscarlet

1. I enclose herewith a letter from me to Aimone Cat which I think speaks for itself. I have agreed it with Mr. Macmillan and you should hand it to him as early as possible so that he may have had some chance of considering it before we meet on Wednesday evening, when he may like to discuss some points about it briefly and informally. I also enclose two copies which you may want to keep for record purposes in your own office.
2. I have discussed today with Mr. Macmillan the question of pay of the Italian operational personnel and the article in the Sunday's paper about Remondino.
3. As regards pay, you should take up the matter in the first instance with the Chief Commissioner, recommending such increase of pay as you think reasonable. Mr. Macmillan is anxious that the matter should be dealt with in this way as a matter of principle, but he will himself go into the matter with the Chief Commissioner as soon as he returns to Rome, and you should take the opportunity of reminding him on his return. It seems reasonable to hope that the considerable reduction in the numbers of serving Italian officers might make it possible to give more favourable pay to those who remain in the reorganized Air Force.
4. As regards the newspaper article, Mr. Macmillan is inclined to think that we might get the Italian Government to take some action in this matter, because it is definitely one which affects the military efficiency and morale of the Italian Air Force which is fighting with us against the Germans. He wishes you to have the article translated and, again in the first instance, to consult the Chief Commissioner on the action to be taken. You mentioned the possibility of getting the Italians to establish their own censorship to deal with this sort of thing, though I am in some doubt as to whether that would

Air Vice-Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, C.B.E., D.F.C.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

/be much good. 8082

File 17A

*Finance
Sub-Commission*

*See Lush
on Fuedon*

- 2 -

be much good. But I think the line we should stand on is that the Italian Government should make it clear that they will not tolerate this sort of personal attack in the Press upon serving officers of the Italian forces, because that is a military matter as affecting military efficiency.

I understand Mr. Macmillan will be back in Rome on Sunday and you will probably have had time to do some preliminary exploration of both these points in conjunction with the Chief Commissioner before he returns.

Following

McLellan

NOTES ON MEETING - 13th JANUARY, 1945.

The D/L.A.C.-in-C started by saying that the Italian Air Force has now been equipped with five squadrons of Allied aircraft, and that there was no prospect of re-equipping any more squadrons with Allied types. The job, therefore, was to utilize these five squadrons to best advantage against the Germans, taking it, for example, that the war in Europe would last another year. The General could rely on these five squadrons being maintained by the Allies. The reason given why no further Allied types could be supplied was that already the number of British squadrons in this theatre had been cut down, and we had also sent a lot of aircraft to France.

On enquiry, what would happen after the Peace, the General was told that at the present time no-one can tell. It appeared that the Italians will not be able to afford to buy aircraft when the war is over, and that it looks as if it will be many years before they are in a position to build aircraft again.

The General said that he would like some programme on which to base his future planning for the I.A.F. As regards the Allied squadrons he was told that they are to remain as they are already, i.e. 45 C/C per Squadron. In the near future a Technical Committee will be formed, which will go round to all the I.A.F. units and decide which aircraft can be accepted, and which can be maintained by the Italian Air Force. The General will then be able to plan on the number of personnel he thinks he will require in the Air Force of the size left. The aircraft not used operationally could be used for "refresher" purposes to keep the pilots in flying practice.

The General asked what would happen to any personnel which he might have to get rid of. The D/L.A.C.-in-C said that there was every probability that the Allies would be able to employ these in maintenance units behind the British and American Air Forces, but this would have to be thoroughly investigated.

The question of pay was discussed at some length, the General stating that at the present it was very poor indeed. He further stated that other Nations, for example Poland and Yugoslavia, were employing personnel at much higher rates of pay than the I.A.F. could give. This pay came from Allied sources. The D/L.A.C.-in-C said he didn't know anything about this, but it was a question which he would look into at an early date. The General stressed that he was particularly anxious about the pay of the Operational Group, and asked whether perhaps direct payment could be made by the Allies, the sum involved to be paid back after the war. The D/L.A.C.-in-C said he could hold out no hope of any payment from Allied sources, it was entirely a domestic matter for the Italian Government.

The General was informed that during the last few days information had been received about an increased ration scale. It was not so much as had originally been asked for, but there would definitely be some improvement. No news of this increase was to hand at A.F.S.C. on 13/1/45.

On the question of equipment, the D/L.A.C.-in-C said that the Italian Air Force

planning for the I.A.F. is regards the Allied squadrons he was told that they are to remain as they are already, i.e. 16 s/o per Squadron. In the near future a Technical Condition will be formed, which will go round to all the I.A.F. units and decide which aircraft can be scrapped, and which can be maintained by the Italian Air Force. The General will then be able to plan on the number of personnel he thinks he will require in the Air Force of the size left. The aircraft not used operationally could be used for "rehearsal" purposes to keep the pilots in flying practice.

The General asked what would happen to any personnel which he might have to get rid of. The D/A.C.-in-C said that there was every probability that the Allies would be able to employ them in maintenance units behind the British and American Air Forces, but this would have to be thoroughly investigated.

The question of pay was discussed at some length, the General stating that at the moment it was very poor indeed. He further stated that other Nations, for example Poland and Yugoslavia, were employing personnel at much higher rates of pay than the I.A.F. could give. This was done from Allied sources. The D/A.C.-in-C said he didn't know anything about this, but it was a question which he would look into at an early date. The General stressed that he was particularly anxious about the pay of the Operational Crews, and asked whether perhaps direct payment could be made by the Allies, the sum involved to be paid back after the war. The D/A.C.-in-C said he could hold out no hope of any payment from Allied sources, it was entirely a domestic matter for the Italian Government.

The General was informed that during the last few days information had been received about an increased ration scale. It was not as much as had originally been asked for, but there would definitely be some improvement. No news of this increase was to hand at A.P.S.C. on 13/1/45.

On the question of equipment, the D/A.C.-in-C said that the Italians should first of all organise a complete stock-taking just to see how much equipment they really have, and then after this had been done, if they made demands for items which they were short of, the Allies would see what could be done to meet some of their requirements. The General was told that the Allies consider that the Italians are rather inclined to over-demand - the question of the Oxygen Masks was given as an example. The Equipment Branch and its procedure should be organised on I.A.F. lines.

Italian units will be assisted with Technical and Administrative personnel through the A.P.S.C., and the staff of the A.P.S.C. might have to be increased in order to do this, but the I.A.F. should stand on its own feet, and organize itself on Royal Air Force lines.

The C.A.C. asked whether assistance would be given to the I.A.F. when squadrons had to be moved from one place to another. The A.C.C. A.P.S.C. said that this had been given previously, and the D/A.C.-in-C stated that S.A.F. Colours could be used.

Continued /2.....

-2-

The D/A.O.C-in-C stated that there were two main reasons why the Italians could not operate on the Italian front. The first reason given was the fact that there is a serious congestion on the airfields in the forward area, and we definitely cannot get any more squadrons in, particularly during the winter months. The second reason given was that the Republican Air Force have Macchi aircraft in use, and that therefore this type could not be used by the I.A.F. on the Italian front.

The mention of the recent incident involving Major Valeriani was dismissed. It was considered a grave matter. The Allies will go into the possibility of producing some kind of Identity Card for personnel of the I.A.F. but care would have to be taken that it was not abused. The question will be looked into at an early date.

The treatment of I.A.F. personnel shot down in Yugoslavia was discussed. Again inefficiency in the I.A.F. was considered to be the cause, and reports were not put through quickly enough. Reports must be made immediately to Group Captain Denny at Bari, and every incident will be looked in to.

The D/A.O.C-in-C asked the General if he had ever thought of employing Italian personnel against the Japanese. The General replied that, never having been approached on the subject, he had never given it thought.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the President
A.P.O. 394

11th January, 1945.

Air Vice-Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

Mr Macmillan has asked me to thank
you for your letter No. AFSC/R/S.1/AIR, of
the 11th January, the enclosures to which
he will read as soon as possible.

John Macmillan

Personal Assistant.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

AFSC/E/S.1/AIR.

11th January, 1944.

I was rung up this morning by the Personal Staff Officer to Sir John Slessor in connection with the attached letter from General Aimone Cat, and my letter to Sir John with comments on the General's letter.

2. The Air Marshal considers that it is high time that some definite future policy was arrived at as regards the Italian Air Force, and he wished me to discuss this letter with you so that you will be in the picture at some future date when he hopes to discuss it with you himself.

3. In the meantime, however, a much longer letter has arrived from the General which deals with the whole picture of the Italian Air Force, and not merely with the Fighter Wing as does this letter. I shall send a copy of this along to you as soon as it is translated, but perhaps you will then let me know when you can discuss the letters with me.

4. Sir John is coming to Rome on the morning of January 13th but leaving the following morning. I do not think that he intends to try and see you during this time.

W.A.E. BOWEN-BUSCALET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, MP.,
Acting President,
Headquarters, Allied Commission,
Rome.

5078

SECRET

13A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: W/CMR. J.S. ORME.
HEADQUARTERS,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

REF: AFSC/R/1/AIR.

DATE: JANUARY 11TH. 1945.

Dear


Herewith is the translation of the letter from General
Aimone Cat that I spoke to you about this morning.

I fear it is typically Italian and therefore very difficult
to understand, but when I have time to write my comments on it I
hope that it will appear clearer. The meat is really in para 4.

Yours



W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet.
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding.



SEGRETO

Roma 10 GEN 1945 19

W.A.R. -

BOWEN BUSCARLETT

Air Vice Marshal -

Air Officer Commanding - A.C.

A.F.S.C. - H.Q.

= R O M A =

STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Prot N 010101/Sg. f. Allegati

Risposte al Foglio del

Div.

Sez.

N.

OGGETTO Situazione attuale e futura della R. Aeronautica -

A seguito delle nostre conversazioni e come d'accordo, le prospettive le attività principali devolute alla mia carica di Capo di Stato Maggiore della R. Aeronautica, in rapporto alla situazione contingente ed a quella futura che è dato logicamente prevedere. -

Le principali attività che io devo impostare e risolvere, agli ordini e secondo le direttive di S.E. il Ministro delle R. Aeronautica, sono le seguenti:

- 1°)- Tenere in vita materialmente (per quanto di mia competenza e possibilità) e spiritualmente, le Unità operanti agli ordini del Comandi Alleati. -
- 2°)- Eliminare dalla R. Aeronautica, nel modo più decoroso ed umano, il personale di cui sia definitivamente escluso l'impiego nell'avvenire. -
- 3°)- Accantonare e mantenere addestrato al volo ed alla specializzazione il personale destinato ad alimentare la unità operanti ed a crearne, come auspicabile, delle nuove. -


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- 3°)- Accantonare e mantenere addestrato al volo ed alla specialità azione il personale destinato ad alimentare le unità operanti ed a crearne, come auspicabile, delle nuove.-
- 4°)- Predisporre in tempo e secondo un sano criterio organico, il reclutamento, l'inquadramento, l'istruzione e l'addestramento del personale necessario alla vita delle unità operanti e che dovranno o meno restare in vita, a pace conclusa.-

.../...

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STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Roma.

19

Prot. N.

Allegati

Risposte al foglio del

Div.

Sez.

N.

OGGETTO

Segue foglio n°

2

Date che:

- L'Aeronautica Italiana non potrà presto più vivere se non integralmente montata su materiale alleato;
 - le condizioni delle industrie elettriche, meccaniche e dei trasporti, non consentiranno all'Italia di riattivare le sue industrie aeronautiche e quelle ad esse accessorie, se non a lunga scadenza di tempo;
 - la durata della guerra mondiale e delle trattative di armistizio è tuttora imprevedibile;
- comunque è certo che la situazione attuale si protrarrà per molti anni e che per conseguire occorre impostare un piano organico di lavoro per la eliminazione delle organizzazioni e del personale in perflui e la conservazione o la messa in efficienza delle organizzazioni e del personale necessari.

Questo piano organico è indispensabile sia dal lato militare, sia da quello politico.

OCCETTO

Segue foglio n°

Div. Sez. N.

- 2 -

Dato che:

- l'Aeronautica Italiana non potrà presto più vivere se non integralmente montata su materiale alleato;
- le condizioni delle industrie elettriche, meccaniche e del trasporto, non consentiranno all'Italia di riflettere le sue industrie aeronautiche e quelle ed esse eccessaria, se non a lunga scadenza di tempo;
- la durata della guerra mondiale e delle trattative di armistizio è tuttora imprevedibile;
- comunque è certo che la situazione attuale si protrarrà per molti anni e che per conseguenza occorre impostare un piano organico di lavoro per la eliminazione delle organizzazioni e del personale superfluo e la conservazione o la messa in efficienza delle organizzazioni e del personale necessari.

Questo piano organico è indispensabile sia dal lato militare, sia da quello politico.

Dal lato militare, allo scopo:


- di utilizzare nel migliore modo tutte le energie e gli uomini già preparati e facilmente trasferibili sui serai e nelle organizzazioni aeree di tipo degli Alleati, fino ad un previsto reintegro di personale, mediante nuovi reclutamenti;

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Roma,

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STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Prot. N.

Allegati

Risposta al foglio del

Div.

Sez.

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OGGETTO

segue foglio n°

- 3 -

- di restituire almeno un congruo prestigio allo Stato Maggiore ed al Ministero, attraverso alla manifesta attuazione pratica di un programma anche modestissimo, se preciso e conclusivo.

Dal lato politico:

- per provvedere alle esasperazioni più' sollecite e convenienti del personale esuberante, così da evitare malcontenti e sbandamenti e, risentite dannosi alla già difficile vita del Paese e quindi pregiudizievole anche al migliore proseguimento delle attività belliche, da parte degli alleati;

- per escludere o prevenire le crisi spirituali cui il personale è fatalmente soggetto;

- per contribuire nella massima serenità e fermezza e quindi con la massima efficacia, alla lotta contro il comune nemico.-

Le le pregherei quindi di farmi avere notizie indicative che mi consentissero di organizzare il nostro piano di lavoro secondo più' precise direttive alleate:

OGGETTO

segue foglio n°

- 1 -

- di restituire almeno un congruo prestigio allo Stato Maggiore ed al Ministero, attraverso alla sanificata situazione pratica di un programma anche modestissimo, ma preciso e conclusivo.

Dal lato politico:

- per provvedere alla sistemazione più sollecita e conveniente del personale esuberante, così da evitare malcontenti e sbandamenti soprattutto dannosi alla già difficile vita del Paese e quindi pregiudizievoli anche al migliore proseguimento delle attività belliche, da parte degli Alleati;

- per escludere o prevenire la crisi spirituale cui il personale è fatalmente soggetto;

- per contribuire nella massima serenità e fermezza e quindi con la maggiore efficacia, alla lotta contro il comune nemico. -

Se la preghera quindi di farci avere notizie indicative che mi consentissero di organizzare il nostro piano di lavoro secondo più precise direttive alleate:


Tali notizie dovrebbero riguardare i seguenti argomenti:

- Se le Unità Aeree Italiane dovranno restare quelle che sono o quelle incremento o diminuzione dovranno subire ed a quali approssimative scadenze di tempo. (Questo elemento è indispensabile per stabilire un organico di massima, sul quale effettuare la riduzione del

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STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Prot. N.

Allegati

Risposte al Foglio del

Div.

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OGGETTO

Segue foglio n°

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quadri dell'Arma).-

- Se, data la scarsità o l'assenza di risorse italiane e data la impossibilità di provvedere da parte del Governo nazionale, si prevada, come sarebbe necessario, che la vita della Unità Aerea italiana sia assicurata nella stessa forma e misura di quella delle Unità di altre Nazioni in servizio nella R.A.F. (vestiario, equippaggio, viveri, assegnati, ecc.).-

- Se la Unità italiana dovranno avvantaggiarsi dall'assistenza teorica e logistica prevista dalla R.A.F. per le sue unità o se dovranno essere costituiti elementi tecnici e logistici analoghi, con mezzi forniti dagli Alloati, come avviene ed avverrà per aerei, equippaggio tecnico, attrezzature, ecc.-

In quest'ultimo caso sarebbe implicito che tutte le spese ricorse italiane disponibili, concorrerebbero per le prime alla costituzione di tali elementi, i quali sarebbero integrati e poi gradualmente alimentati, con mezzi e materiali allentati.

Nello stesso tempo la preparazione di personale in Italia.

OGGETTO

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quadri dell'arma).


- Se, data la scarsità o l'assenza di risorse italiane e data la impossibilità di provvedere da parte del Governo nazionale, si preveda, come sarebbe necessario, che la vita delle Unità Aeree italiane sia assicurata nello stesso forma e misura di quella delle Unità di altre Nazioni in servizio nella R.A.F. (vestiario, equipaggiamento, viveri, assegni, ecc.).
- Se le Unità italiane dovessero avvantaggiarsi dall'assistenza tecnica e logistica prevista dalla R.A.F. per la sue unità o se dovessero essere costituiti elementi tecnici e logistici analoghi, con mezzi forniti degli Alleati, come avviene ed avverrà per aerei, equipaggiamento tecnico, attrezzature, ecc.

In quest'ultimo caso sarebbe implicito che tutte le scarse risorse italiane disponibili, concorrerebbero per le prime alla costituzione di tali elementi, i quali sarebbero integrati e poi gradualmente alimentati, con mezzi e materiali alleati.

Nello stesso tempo le pregherei di prospettare la difficoltà e delicata situazione nella quale si trovano attualmente, e più ancora si troveranno in avvenire, il Comando e le Unità dell'Aeronautica italiana, a causa delle incertezze di funzionamento e di vita cui sono soggetti.

Il Comando, che deve rispondere alla disciplina e delle

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STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Roma,

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Prot. N.

Allegati

Risposta al Foglio del

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OGGETTO

Segue foglio n°

- 5 -

ni morali delle Unità, non dispone di mezzi per intervenire metarzialmente ed efficacemente, in quanto operazioni e servizi fanno capo, come logico ed inevitabile nelle presenti condizioni, agli Enti Alleati.

Le Unità hanno l'impressione di essere abbandonate e quasi del tutto prive di assistenza e di protezione, da parte del loro Comando italiano, al quale attribuiscono gran parte delle difficoltà e delle incomprensioni di cui si ritengono oggetto.

Inoltre, lo stato d'animo del personale è inevitabilmente influenzato dalle tragiche condizioni in cui versa il Paese ed è quindi portato ad una sensibilità che gli eventi hanno accentuato.

Lei stesse, che è già al corrente di qualche manifestazione di questa sensibilità, dovrà convenire che è ben difficile, ad un superiore, per quanto autorevole, di contrastare o contenere le conseguenze di simili manifestazioni, quando non abbia altra possibilità di intervento che quella della presenza e della parola. - Tale intervento, già ora di limitata efficacia, finirebbe, in seguito,

ai morali della Unità, non dispone di mezzi per intervenire realmente ed efficacemente, in quanto operazioni e servizi fanno capo, come logico ed inevitabile nelle presenti condizioni, agli Enti Alleati.


Le Unità hanno l'impressione di essere abbandonate e quasi del tutto prive di assistenza e di protezione, da parte del loro Comandante italiano, al quale attribuiscono gran parte della difficoltà e delle incomprensioni di cui si ritengono oggetto.

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Lei stesso, che è già al corrente di qualche manifestazione di questa sensibilità, dovrà convenire che è ben difficile, ed un superiore, per quanto autorevole, di contrastare e contenere le conseguenze di simili manifestazioni, quando non abbia altre possibilità di intervento che quelle della presenza e della parola. Tale intervento, già ora di limitata efficacia, finirebbe, in seguito, con il divenire più dannoso che utile.

Contribuiscono, d'altronde, a ridurre l'autorità del superiore ed il prestigio degli Enti Stato Maggiore e Ministero:

- le precarie condizioni in cui essi sono costretti a vivere, sistemati come attualmente, in locali insufficienti e sparsi per la capitale. - L'aeronautica è infatti l'unica Forza Armata che *non*...



STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Roma

19

Prot. N.

Allegati

Risposte al Foglio del

Div.

Sez.

N.

OGGETTO

Segue foglio N°

- 6 -

do contribuito subito, con la Marina, all'andare delle operazioni contro i tedeschi, non ha potuto fare ritorno al proprio Ministero od almeno a qualcuno dei propri edifici;

- la forte deficienza numerica, qualitativa ed anche estetica degli automezzi non bloccati o requisiti in tempo all'atto della liberazione delle Capitali;

- le notevoli difficoltà che si incontrano sovente nella risoluzione dei problemi relativamente modesti, quelli quelli, ad esempio, dell'esercizio di una linea aerea, o dell'utilizzazione di aeroplani non usati dagli Alleati; ecc.

- l'esclusione da consultazioni sia pure a solo titolo informativo, sui problemi di vita materiale e spirituale delle Unità Aeree, così da favorirne meglio la comprensione e l'utilizzazione da parte dei Comandi Alleati e da compensare, in qualche modo, l'impossibilità materiale di intervenire direttamente ad aiutare ed a migliorare le difficili condizioni di vite spirituali, materiali ed economiche del relativo personale.

OGGETTO

Segue foglio N° _____

- 6 -

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
- la forte deficienza numerica, qualitativa ed anche estetica degli automezzi non bloccati o requisiti in tempo all'atto della liberazione delle Capitali;

- le notevoli difficoltà che si incontrano sovente nella risoluzione di problemi relativamente modesti, quelli quelli, ad esempio, dell'esercizio di una linea aerea, o dell'utilizzazione di aeroporti non usati dagli Alleati; ecc.

- l'esclusione da consultazioni sia pure a solo titolo informativo, su problemi di vita materiale e spirituale delle Unità Aeree, così da favorirne meglio la comprensione e l'utilizzazione da parte dei Comandi Alleati e da compensare, in qualche modo, l'impossibilità materiale di intervenire direttamente ad aiutare ed a migliorare le difficili condizioni di vita spirituale, materiali ed economiche del relativo personale.-

All'inizio della mia opera, e nell'intento di spiegarla con la massima efficacia, nel quadro d'azione che ci è stato e ci sarà assegnato, ho ritenuto indispensabile farne conoscere il mio pensiero in merito alle mie attrizioni, nella speranza che possa essermi consentito, se possibile, di agire nel modo più decoroso ed efficace, agli

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STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Roma

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Allegati

Risposta al Foglio del

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Segue foglio n°

- 7 -

stessi fini che le Autorità Alleate si propongono.

Lei, Signor Maresciallo, che è già bene orientato sulla situazione, non potrà non apprezzare la onesta franchezza del soldato pienamente consapevole del duro difficile dovere che lo attende e del Comandante sollecito della vita spirituale e materiale dei propri dipendenti e della sorte della propria Anna.

La risorgente Aviazione Italiana crede di poter contare sulla comprensione degli Alleati, per essere in grado di offrire con sempre maggiore dedizione, il più ampio contributo alla guerra sulle rovine della Patria, illuminata dalla speranza o, meglio, dalla certezza per cui si può serenamente morire e non più troppo offuscata dalle nubi dell'umiliazione e dell'amarezza.

IL GENERALE DI SQUADRA AEREA
CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE R. A.

Luigi Spadolini

0938

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Translation

FROM : ITALIAN AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF

TO : AIR VICE MARSHAL BOMEN BUSCARLET

Ref. : 010101/Sq.v.

Date : 10th January 1945

Present Situation and Future of the I.A.F.

1. According to our conversations and agreements I, as Chief of Staff, have some observations to make with regard to the above :

My major responsibilities, according to orders and the Minister for Air's directive, are the following :

- (a) To hold together materially and morally the operational units under Allied Command in so far as I am able.
- (b) Tactfully to prevent employment by the I.A.F. of all undesirable personnel.
- (c) Organize and maintain a reserve of flying and specialist personnel for operational wings and wherever possible create new reserves.
- (d) Predispose in good time and on a sound basis the recruitment, unification and training of personnel necessary to that part of the I.A.F. destined to continue after peace is concluded.

2. In view of the fact that :-

- (a) The I.A.F. will not be able to continue for long if not entirely equipped with Allied material
- (b) The condition of transport and the electrical and machine industries will not permit Italy to reactivate her aeronautical industries for a long time

to the above :

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2. In view of the fact that : -
- (a) The I.A.F. will not be able to continue for long if not entirely equipped with Allied material
 - (b) The condition of transport and the electrical and machine industries will not permit Italy to reactivate her aeronautical industry (and its accessory industries) for a long time
 - (c) The duration of the war and the Armistice clauses is unpredictable

It is certain that the present situation will continue for many years, and in consequence it is necessary to devise an organic plan of work to dispense with superfluous organizations and personnel, and to retain and reorganize such organizations and personnel as are necessary.

3. Such organic planning is necessary by both as regards the military and political situation.

- (1) Concerning military planning, it will be necessary to utilize in so far as is possible men already trained and therefore easily adapted to Allied types of a/c, until new recruitment can provide a wider choice.
- (ii) to restore a precise and conclusive measure of prestige to IAF HQ and the Air Ministry, however modest their functions are to be.

- (3) Concerning political planning, it will be necessary (i) to devise a more satisfactory way of dealing with excess personnel, in such a manner as to avoid malcontentment inherent in present living conditions and prejudice to our mutual war effort.
- (ii) to prevent or anticipate crises of morale which from time to time affect personnel.
- (iii) to make the maximum effort against the common enemy in a spirit of serenity and without equivocation.

4. I therefore appeal to you to let me know to what degree the Allied directive will allow me to implement these proposals. The required information concerns the following arguments

- (a) Whether or not the IAF is to remain as it is, or what modifications are to take place in the near future. (This information is essential in order to establish an organic plan to carry out a reduction of the present set-up).
- (b) Whether, in view of the scarcity or non-existence of Italian resources and the inability of the Italian Government to provide, the IAF can be assured of equal treatment (clothes, equipment, food, pay etc) with other Nations serving with the RAF.

- (c) Whether Italian units will be assisted by technical and organisational personnel of the RAF (or whether the IAF is to provide its own) to deal with Allied supplies along lines such as adopted in the case of a/c supply.

In the last case all available Italian resources will be concentrated, and provision made for development with a view to supplies of Allied material.

5. At the same time I hope you will take into consideration the difficulties of the present situation in which the IAF Command finds itself, and also make allowances for possible further deterioration.

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In the last case all available Italian resources will be concentrated, and provision made for development with a view to supplies of Allied material.

5. At the same time I hope you will take into consideration the difficulties of the present situation in which the IAF Command finds itself, and also make allowances for possible further deterioration.

The Command, which is answerable for discipline and morale of the units, has not the power to intervene effectively on the material side since operations and services come under Allied control, which is logical and inevitable.

The units have the impression of being abandoned and almost entirely without assistance or protection by their Italian Command, and to this idea they attribute most of their difficulties and sufferings.

Furthermore, the condition of mind of personnel is inevitably aggravated by the tragic situation in which Italy finds herself, and for that reason they are more sensitive.

You yourself, aware of this sensitiveness, must admit that it is extremely difficult for a senior officer, no matter how high his rank, to explain away or counteract such manifestations when there is nothing to offer other than words. To continue to fight with words would be more damaging than useful.

6. From the point of view of Staff HQ and the Air Ministry the above problems are made worse by

(a) the precarious conditions under which HQ and Air Ministry personnel are forced to live; in inadequate quarters spread all over Rome. But, in fact, the IAF is the only branch of the Armed Forces which has not been allowed to return to its own establishment, in spite of the fact that the IAF was, with the Navy, the first to take up arms against the common enemy.

(b) the numerical and quality inferiority of transport vehicles.

(c) the notable difficulties often experienced in the solution of what should be simple problems, e.g. Air Lines, or the use of Airfields not required by the Allies.


(d) the absence of a consultative body (or even source of information) to discuss as between the IAF and Allied Commands problems which in such a way could be clarified and some measure of help or compensation supplied towards the relief of the more unpleasant living and moral conditions experienced by units in the field.

7. At the beginning of my work, with the intention of doing something positive within my limits, I have thought it necessary to make known to you the results of my deliberations in the hope that you will be able to help and perhaps hasten, tactfully and effectively, the aims proposed by the Allies themselves.

You, who are well informed of the situation, cannot but appreciate the honesty and forthrightness of a soldier whose duty demands sacrifices, nor the desires of his Commandant who is responsible to him and to the Air Force in general.

The new IAF believes it can count on the comprehension and understanding of the Allies, by which generosity it can be inspired to greater effort, but if there is no assurance forthcoming sacrifice is overshadowed by humiliation and bitterness.

(Signed) Aimone Cat. Gen.



Roma li 14 dicembre 1944

Ministero dell'Aeronautica

IL MINISTRO

Signor Maresciallo,

La ringrazio vivamente per le congratulazioni che Ella mi ha inviato in occasione della mia nomina a Ministro dell'Aeronautica del Governo d'Italia e, in particolare, per l'assicurazione che Ella ha voluto così gentilmente darmi della più completa collaborazione.

Dal mio canto tengo ad assicurarle, signor Maresciallo, che non mancherò di tener presente, nell'opera che mi accingo a compiere, quanto ha formato oggetto dei diversi punti della Sua lettera n. AFSC/R/3 1/Air. in data 12 dicembre corrente, nella certezza che dal lavoro svolto assieme potrà effettivamente svilupparsi e maggiormente affermarsi una forza aerea italiana sempre più efficiente per la lotta contro il comune nemico; certezza che è conseguenza sia dello spirito che anima il personale tutto della R.A., sia dei sentimenti nutriti dal popolo italiano verso la nobile e generosa Inghilterra e i suoi Alleati.

Nel ringraziarla, inoltre, signor Maresciallo, per avermi rammentato la promessa del Maresciallo dell'Armia Teddea e cioè che quanto l'Aeronautica italiana farà in collaborazione con gli Alleati sarà tenuto nel dovuto conto nelle trattative per la pace, le invio i saluti più distinti.

Air Vice-Marshal
W.A.B. BOWER-BUSSTARLET, CBE, DFC.

me D. M.

Caro Maresciallo

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AIR MINISTRY

R O M E

14th December 1944

To : A.V.M. W.A.B. FOWEN-BUSCARLET C.B.E., D.F.C.

Dear Air Vice Marshal,

I thank you profoundly for your congratulations sent to me on the occasion of my appointment as Minister for Air to the Italian Government, and in particular for your assurance if the most complete collaboration.

As far as I am concerned I want to assure you that I shall not fail to keep in mind in any work that I have to undertake, the various points you set forth in your AFSC/R/S 1/Air of December 12th in order that the work we undertake together will effectively produce, in the fight against the common enemy, greater developments and results in the Italian Air Force. This is made possible by the desire that animates the personnel of the Italian Air Force and by the sentiments inspired in the Italian People towards a noble and generous Great Britain and her Allies.

I want also to thank you for having reminded me of the promise made by Air Marshal Tedder to the effect that the measure of collaboration of the Italian Air Force in the common struggle will count in the Allied

for your assurance if the most complete collaboration.

As far as I am concerned I want to assure you that I shall not fail to keep in mind in any work that I have to undertake, the various points you set forth in your AFSC/R/S 1/Air of December 12th in order that the work we undertake together will effectively produce, in the fight against the common enemy, greater developments and results in the Italian Air Force. This is made possible by the desire that animates the personnel of the Italian Air Force and by the sentiments inspired in the Italian People towards a noble and generous Great Britain and her Allies.

I want also to thank you for having reminded me of the promise made by Air Marshal Tedder to the effect that the measure of collaboration of the Italian Air Force in the common struggle will count in the Allied Peace Treaties.

I am yours cordially

Sgd. Carlo Scialoja
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AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/P/S.1/AIR.

13th December, 1944.

I am attaching herewith copy of a letter which I have written to the Air Minister, for your information.

2. Later tonight I am being visited in my Office by the Minister, the Under Secretary, and the Chief of Staff, with the object of being introduced to the last named two.
3. I shall take the first opportunity of having a long talk with the Chief of Staff and telling him what our ideas are.
4. I propose to spend Christmas with the Operational Units, and I am going to suggest to the Chief of Staff that he might like to accompany me.

Yours

W.B.

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, KCB., DSO., MC.,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

ALL ROSES ARE COMMISSIONED, ALLIED CO. AIRMAN,
HIS.

SECRET.

APSC/AS.1/AID.

12th December, 1944.

Yours Excellency,

I have the honor to present my formal congratulations to you on your appointment as Air Minister to the Italian Government. I would like to take this opportunity of assuring you of my utmost co-operation, and that my wish is to build the Italian Air Force up into an efficient and happy organization which will always be fit to take its part beside the Allies against the common enemy. I shall be very willing to discuss any problems with you at any time and give you the best of my advice.

2. I should also like to take this opportunity of reminding you of three points in my directive from Allied Headquarters which may often be touched upon in our relations with each other. The first point is that the operational part of the Italian Air Force is to be placed unreservedly under the orders of the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. You will no doubt realize that this has always been the case up to the present, and that the operational units are now co-operating and are engaged in active operations against the enemy. Together with the Chief of Staff I shall use every effort to maintain, and if possible, improve their state of efficiency. I am convinced that there is room for improvement within these units, and particularly in their organization and administration, and I would remind you that up to the present it has been our aim to try to re-organise them on the lines of the Royal Air Force. I have never concealed my opinion that there is also room for improvement in the organization and administration within the Italian Air Ministry, and within the other higher formations.

3. My second point is that I am ordered to approve of the appointments or supersession of all Senior Officers to or from posts in the Air Ministry or the Italian Air Force. Up to the present I have laid down that this is to apply to all Officers over the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and to Officers who may be selected as heads of Departments or Services in the Air Ministry, or the higher formations if junior to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. I can assure you that I will do my utmost to co-operate with you in this matter to the best of my ability. In the past, it has unfortunately sometimes been the case that notification of these appointments has appeared in the Press before I have given my approval, and I must earnestly request that you will take steps to prevent this occurring again.

the common enemy. I shall be very willing to discuss any problems with you at any time and give you the best of my advice.

2. I should also like to take this opportunity of reminding you of three points in my directive from Allied Headquarters which may often be touched upon in our relations with each other. The first point is that the operational part of the Italian Air Force is to be placed unreservedly under the orders of the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. You will no doubt realize that this has always been the case up to the present, and that the operational units are now co-operating and are engaged in active operations against the enemy. Together with the Chief of Staff I shall use every effort to maintain, and if possible, improve their state of efficiency. I am convinced that there is room for improvement within these units, and particularly in their organization and administration, and I would remind you that up to the present it has been our aim to try to re-organize them on the lines of the Royal Air Force. I have never concealed my opinion that there is also room for an improvement in the organization and administration within the Italian Air Ministry, and within the other higher formations.

3. My second point is that I am ordered to approve of the appointments or supersession of all Senior Officers to or from posts in the Air Ministry or the Italian Air Force. Up to the present I have laid down that this is to apply to all Officers over the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and to Officers who may be selected as heads of Departments or Services in the Air Ministry, or the higher formations is junior to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. I can assure you that I will do my utmost to co-operate with you in this matter to the best of my ability. In the past, it has unfortunately sometimes been the case that notification of these appointments has appeared in the Press before I have given my approval, and I must earnestly request that you will take steps to prevent this occurring again.

4. My third point is that one of the most important functions of the Air Ministry is the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry in aid of the Allied war effort. This implies not only the use of personnel, material and industrial plant in support of the Italian Air Force, but also of use in support of the Allied Air Forces.

5. No doubt there are other points which will arise during the next months, and I can only repeat that I will do my best to give you my advice and to co-operate with you in every way. Please do not hesitate to call on me to visit you on any matter at all, however small.

6. Finally may I remind you of Air Chief Marshal Tedder's promise that whatever the Italian Air Force was able to do in active aid of the Allies would count in the favour of Italy at the Peace Conference table.

S. E. DOUGHER CASSO SCALLOJA,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

Yours sincerely,
W. A. B. NORMAN-SCOTT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR CHIEF OF STAFF.

SOTTOCOMMISSIONE AERONAUTICA - COMMISSIONE ALLEATA

R C M A

AFSC/R/S.1/AIR

S E C R E T O

12 Dicembre 1944

Ho l'onore di farVi le mie congratulazioni per la Vostra nomina a Ministro dell'Aeronautica del Governo d'Italia. Nel congratularmi con Voi colgo l'occasione per assicurarVi la mia più completa collaborazione e per dirVi che mi auguro di vedere nella Vostra aeronautica una organizzazione efficiente e felice, sempre pronta e preparata a prendere il suo posto a fianco degli Alleati contro il comune nemico.

2. Desidererei anche cogliere questa occasione per intrattenervi brevemente su tre punti che sono parte essenziale delle direttive che mi sono state impartite dal Comando in Capo Alleato, e che avremo occasione di frequentemente toccare nei nostri contatti. Il primo di questi punti stabilisce che la parte operante dell'Aeronautica Italiana debba esser messa senza riserva agli ordini del Comandante in Capo delle Forze Aeree Alleate del Mediterraneo. Voi Vi renderete conto che così è stato fino ad ora e che così deve essere in quanto le Vostre unità operanti stanno ora collaborando con le unità Alleate e sono attualmente impegnate contro il nemico. Assieme al Capo di Stato Maggiore farò ogni sforzo per mantenere e, se possibile, migliorare le loro condizioni di efficienza. Sono convinto che queste unità possono essere migliorate, particolarmente nella loro organizzazione ed amministrazione, e desidero mettere in evidenza il fatto che fino ad ora il nostro obiettivo è stato quello di tentarne la riorganizzazione sulle linee di quella della Royal Air Force. Non ho mai fatto mistero della mia opinione che anche nella organizzazione ed amministrazione del Ministero e degli altri Alti Comandi vi sia possibilità e necessità di miglioramento.

3. Il secondo punto viene degli ordini che ho avuto di dare

la vostra aeronautica una organizzazione efficiente e felice, sempre pronta e preparata a prendere il suo posto a fianco degli Alleati contro il comune nemico.

2. Desidererei anche cogliere questa occasione per intrattenervi brevemente su tre punti che sono parte essenziale delle direttive che mi sono state impartite dal Comando in Capo Alleato, e che avremo occasione di frequentemente toccare nei nostri contatti. Il primo di questi punti stabilisce che la parte operante dell'Aeronautica Italiana debba esser messa senza riserva agli ordini del Comandante in Capo delle Forze Aeree Alleate del Mediterraneo. Voi Vi renderete conto che così è stato fino ad ora e che così deve essere in quanto le Vostre unità operanti stanno ora collaborando con le unità Alleate e sono attualmente impegnate contro il nemico. Assieme al Capo di Stato Maggiore farò ogni sforzo per mantenere e, se possibile, migliorare le loro condizioni di efficienza. Sono convinto che queste unità possono essere migliorate, particolarmente nella loro organizzazione ed amministrazione, e desidero mettere in evidenza il fatto che fino ad ora il nostro obbiettivo è stato quello di tentarne la riorganizzazione sulle linee di quella della Royal Air Force. Non ho mai fatto mistero della mia opinione che anche nella organizzazione ed amministrazione del Ministero e degli altri Comandi vi sia possibilità e necessità di miglioramento.

3. Il secondo punto viene dagli ordini che ho avuto di dare la mia approvazione ai movimenti degli Ufficiali Superiori nelle loro destinazioni o sostituzioni al Ministero od alle unità, operanti o no. Fino ad oggi avevo stabilito che questo dovesse riguardare i movimenti degli ufficiali di grado superiore a quello di Tenente Colonnello ed, indipendentemente dal loro grado, i movimenti di quegli ufficiali destinati a capo delle varie direzioni del Ministero e delle formazioni più importanti. Vi posso assicurare che darò quanto potrò della mia esperienza per collaborare con Voi su questa questione. In passato si è però disgraziatamente verificato qualche caso di movimenti come quelli in discussione di cui la stampa ha dato notizia prima che io li avessi approvati, e Vi prego ora vivamente di dare disposizioni perchè la cosa non si ripeta in avvenire.

4. Il terzo punto viene dal fatto che una delle più importanti missioni del Ministero dell'Aria è quella della ri-organizzazione delle industrie aeronautiche in aiuto allo sforzo di guerra Alleata. Ciò porta con sé non solo tanto l'impiego di personale e di impianti per l'assistenza all'Aeronautica Italiana, ma può anche essere utile per l'assistenza che può dare alle Aeronautiche Alleate.

5. Non vi è dubbio che altre questioni sorgeranno nel corso dei prossimi mesi e non Vi posso per ora che ripetere che farò del mio meglio per consigliarVi e per cooperare in ogni senso con Voi.

6. Vi rammento in fine la promessa del Maresciallo dell'Aria Tedder e cioè che quanto l'Aeronautica Italiana farà in collaborazione con gli Alleati sarà tenuto nel dovuto conto nelle trattative per la pace.

WB

A. V. M. W. A. B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

A. S. E. DR. CARLO SCIALOJA
MINISTRO DELL'AERONAUTICA

0953

817.

To : Air Vice Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet, C.B.E., D.F.C.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

From : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Date : 7th December, 1944.

Ref. : JCS.1824.

SECRET

Your duties as senior officer of the Air Forces Sub-Commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 51,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

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3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.

5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.

6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of any Intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

J. H. D. S.

Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

CC 903
14 Nov 44

7A

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROSE.TO: COMMODORE ELMERY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q.
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROSE.

DATE: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1944.

REF: AFSC/R/S.1/AH.

SECRET.

I have now examined the papers which you kindly sent to me which show Air Commodore Dacre's views as to what directive this Sub-Commission should have. There is no trace at all of these papers on any of our files, but they were extremely helpful to me. I now attach a further draft of a proposed directive which embodies some of Air Commodore Dacre's points, together with others which I think should be included. You will see that I have dropped out the Control of Civil Aviation as I have a directive from A.F.H.Q. that nothing is to be discussed about this until the end of the war. I have also dropped the Air Force representative on the Inter Service Signal Board, as I gather that this Board is now defunct.

2. I should appreciate your comments on the directive, and would like to discuss it with you when you have had time to think it over.

W.A.B. Bown-Byscarr.

W.A.B. BOWN-BYSCARR,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

OK my

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6A

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: COMODORE ELLERY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q.,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1944.

REF: AFSC/R/S.1/AIR.

SECRET.

I have now examined the papers which you kindly sent to me which show Air Commodore Dacre's views as to what directive this Sub-Commission should have. There is no trace at all of these papers on any of our files, but they were extremely helpful to me. I now attach a further draft of a proposed directive which embodies some of Air Commodore Dacre's points, together with others which I think should be included. You will see that I have dropped out the Control of Civil Aviation as I have a directive from A.F.H.Q. that nothing is to be discussed about this until the end of the war. I have also dropped the Air Force representative on the Inter Service Signals Board, as I gather that this Board is now defunct.

2. I should appreciate your comments on the directive, and would like to discuss it with you when you have had time to think it over.



W.A.B. BOWEN-BUCARIET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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5A

DRAFT.DIRECTIVE FOR THE AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

It is suggested that the directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission should be as follows :

(1) To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Control Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of air matters.

(2) To form an Operational Force from existing material and personnel to give direct assistance to Allied operations, this force to be placed unreservedly under the Air Force Allied Commander in Italy.

(3) To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Operational Force may be organised and administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

- (1) To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Control Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of air matters.
- (2) To form an Operational Force from existing material and personnel to give direct assistance to Allied operations, this force to be placed unreservedly under the Air Force Allied Commander in Italy.
- (3) To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Operational Force may be organized and administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
- (4) To ensure the morale and efficiency of the above force by obtaining from Allied and other sources, equipment and material which is not available to the Italian Air Force.

Continued /2.....

(5) To keep the Allied Air Force Commander informed of the resources of the Italian aircraft industry, both in machinery and manpower, which may become available as the Allies move forward, so that maximum assistance can be given to Allied operations in this theatre of war.

(6) To re-organise the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy so that that part of the industry not required to assist the Allied war effort may be devoted to maintaining the efficiency of the Italian Air Force Operational Force.

(7) To organise the provision of manpower in substitution for Allied personnel, from the Italian Air Force sources within its ceiling of 31,000, out of those personnel not required to operate and administer the Operational Force.

(8) To keep the Allied Air Force Commander informed of any information

that part of the industry not required to assist the Allied war effort

may be devoted to maintaining the efficiency of the Italian Air Force

Operational Force.

- (7) To organize the provision of manpower in substitution for Allied personnel, from the Italian Air Force sources within its ceiling of 31,000, out of those personnel not required to operate and administer the Operational

Force.

- (8) To keep the Allied Air Force Commander informed of any information from Italian or Italian Air Force sources which may have any effect on the military situation of the Allies.

Continued /3.....

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(9) To keep the Allied Air Force Commander and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may affect the efficiency of the Italian Air Force in support of the

Allies.

(10) To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

COPY.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMINT
COMMISSION
AFC. 394

EWS/bjp

4A.

MB 322

6th February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane.

There is forwarded the attached letter from Air Commodore Dacre, Head of Air Forces Sub-Commission, setting forth the functions of his Sub-Commission as distinct from the operational functions of Air Commodore Foster, together with copy of signal from the Deputy Air C-in-C.

ELIERY W. STONE,
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff.

- 2 Encls:
Encl 1 - Ltr, Air Forces Subcom
Ref ASC/1/AIR, 2 Feb 44
Encl 2 - Message fr Rear MAAP
JCS/4, 31st Jan 1944.

5055

COPY.

4B.

FROM: Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission.

TO: Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission.

DATE: 2nd February 1944.

REF: MSC/1/ALR.

FUNCTION OF THE AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

A copy of the signal from the Deputy Air C in C to Air Commodore Foster and Air Commodore Dacre, in reply to one from the former, is attached for information.

The instructions of the Deputy Air C. in C. to the Air Sub-Commission, define its functions, pending a decision from the Air Ministry, London, to the following:

- ✓(a). Air Force representation on the Control Commission.
- ✓(b). Political liaison with the Italian Government.
- ✓(c). Reorganisation of the Italian Aircraft Industry.
- ✓(d). Policy of provisioning - airframes and engine spares, equipment, food, clothing, etc., for the Italian Air Force.
- ✓(e). Control of Civil Aviation projects.
- ✓(f). Agency.
- ✓(g). Public relations.
- ✓(h). Air Force representation on the Inter-Services Signal Board.

(Sgd). G. Bentley Dacre,
Air Commodore,
Head of Air Forces Sub-Commission.

50.54

COPY.

SECRET COVER MESSAGE.

4C

TO: AIR MINISTRY.
FROM: H.Q. N.A.A.F.

A

JANUARY 25TH

SECRET.

PERSONAL FOR V.C.A.S. FROM SIKKOR.

1. Before Tedder left he discussed with me the Dacre question of letters status and functions. I have since discussed it with General Mason Macfarlane and have talked to Foster and Dacre at Bari.
2. Can not (P) not see any case for keeping two Air Officers dealing with I.A.F. Before leaving Tedder eliminated I think rightly from Dacre's list of duties virtually the only ones which would have given him anything to do, namely supervision of supply, salvage and maintenance for I.A.F. What remains is totally inadequate to justify the retention of an Air Commodore, and the existence of two Air Officers dealing with the I.A.F. one of them with little or nothing will inevitably lead to friction.
3. It is bad luck on Dacre to find his job dying on him but this is in part due to the fact that the main object of his mission has changed since he was first appointed. I should be strongly opposed to removing Foster from the operational side, and although it will be a disappointment to Dacre he agrees that there is no room for two Air Commodores and I think the only answer is to recall him.

I therefore recommend the following with which General Macfarlane agrees :

4. (a) Dacre's appointment should be disestablished and Foster should double the role of head of the Air Section of Allied Control Commission and A.C.C. with I.A.F.
- (b) Group Captain Neville and Colonel Elliot N.S.A.A.F. should remain being located with the head of A.C.C. moving with him to Rome in due course to work with Italian Air Ministry on such questions as provisioning of equipment, food, clothing and personnel for I.A.F. control of civil aviation, public relations, and Air Force representation on inter service Signals Board. All this is much less than it sounds but these officers would also be responsible

list of duties virtually the only ones which would have given him anything to do, namely supervision of supply, salvage and maintenance for I.A.F. That remains is totally inadequate to justify the retention of an Air Commodore, and the existence of two Air Officers dealing with the I.A.F. one of them with little or nothing will inevitably lead to friction.

3. It is bad luck on Dacre to find his job dying on him but this is in part due to the fact that the main object of his mission has changed since he was first appointed. I should be strongly opposed to removing Foster from the operational side, and although it will be a disappointment to Dacre he agrees that there is no room for two Air Commodores and I think the only answer is to recall him.

I therefore recommend the following with which General MacFarlane agrees :

- 4. (a) Dacre's appointment should be disestablished and Foster should double the role of head of the Air Section of Allied Control Commission and A.O.C. with I.A.F.
- (b) Group Captain Neville and Colonel Elliot U.S.A.A.F. should remain being located with the head of A.O.C. moving with him to Rome in due course to work with Italian Air Ministry on such questions as provisioning of equipment, food, clothing and personnel for I.A.F., control of civil aviation, public relations, and Air Force representation on Inter Service Signals Board. All this is much less than it seems but these officers would also be responsible for liaison between General MacFarlane and Foster who would have to be prepared to come to Naples or Rome for consultation as necessary on major problems.

(c) Winter and De Haan would remain with Neville for intelligence duties.

(d) Sugden and possibly a Wing Commander or Squadron Leader Engineer should be added to Foster's Staff for equipment and maintenance organisation and policy.

5. You may wish to consult Tedder on this. I should be grateful for an early decision.

6. I will write to you shortly on future general policy for Italian Air Force.

(Sgd). Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

Dist:
Air C. in C.
Chief of Staff.
A/Gen. Staff.
G/Capt Board.

Draft

DIRECTIVE.

3A

1. To form an operational force from existing material and personnel, to give direct assistance to Allied operations, and to ensure the efficiency of the force by obtaining from Allied and other sources, equipment and material which is not available to the Italian Air Force. This force to be placed unreservedly under the Allied Air Force Commander in Italy.
2. To reorganise air resources in Italy as the Allies move forward. This *(limit to air)* implies the organisation and development of all industrial resources both in machinery and manpower, so that maximum assistance can be given to Allied operations in this theatre of war.
3. To organise the provision of manpower in substitution for Allied personnel, from Italian Air Force sources within its ceiling of 31,000 men, out of those personnel not required to operate and administer the operational force.
4. To keep the Allied Air Force Commander informed of any information from Italian or Italian Air Force sources, which may have any effect on the military

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(limit to air)

implies the organisation and development of all industrial resources both in machinery and manpower, so that maximum assistance can be given to Allied operations in this theatre of war.

3. To organise the provision of manpower in substitution for Allied personnel, from Italian Air Force sources within its ceiling of 34,000 men, out of those personnel not required to operate and administer the operational force.

4. To keep the Allied Air Force Commander informed of any information from Italian or Italian Air Force sources, which may have any effect on the military situation of the Allies.

5. To keep the Allied Air Force Commander and the ~~Joint~~ ^{Chief Commission} ~~Committee~~, Allied G.S.C. Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may affect the efficiency of the Italian Air Force in support of the Allies.

-2-

6. To advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission in respect of air matters.

09691

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

MOST SECRET.

2A

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission, BARI.

To : Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission, ROME.

Date : 8th November, 1944.

Ref. : AFSC/3.1/AIR.

ORGANISATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE
> POLICY.

Reference your signal RO.249 dated 5th November,
1944, attached hereto please find copy of letter S.549/ACMT/MAC.
dated 5th October, 1943, as requested.

F.M. Denny.
★ F.M. DENNY, G/CAPT.
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

DESPATCH BY AIR LETTER SERVICE.



5050

2B.

POST SECT VI.Headquarters,
Mediterranean Air Command.Reference:-
S.549/ADON/MAC.

5th October, 1943.

To :- Allied Mission to Italian Government.

I.A.M. Organisation.

1. I have now examined the proposals which have been made to me for the future organisation of the Italian Air Force. In my view the requirements are two:-

Firstly, to form an operational force from existing material and personnel to give direct assistance to Allied operations.

Secondly, to re-organise air resources in Italy as the Allies move Northward.

2. As regards the operational force, I propose to use it on the right flank of the Allied forces. From a review of the Italian Air Units available, I consider that it should be a composite force consisting of a fighter wing, bomber transport wing, and a marine wing. It will be subordinate to the Allied Air Command operating in Italy, and its headquarters should be composed of administrative as well as operational sections. The Italian Air Force Commander will come under the direct orders of the Allied Air Commander in the area concerned, and will have attached to each wing a suitable number of British or American officers. It is important that the Italian Commander and his subordinate officers should be young, energetic and of proved worth in this war. I will wish to review the nominations suggested by the Italian Air Command before the senior officers are actually appointed.

3. The second requirement of re-organisation can best be carried out by the Air Minister, supported by an appropriate staff. Although preliminary work can be done now, I do not recommend the setting up of any extensive organisation until the Italian Government is again functioning in Rome.

4. The first task to be undertaken by the Air Ministry should be the re-establishment of industrial organisations in order to provide a backing for existing I.A.M. units and to augment the base installations which the

Firstly, to form an operational force from existing material and personnel to give direct assistance to Allied operations.

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The first task to be undertaken by the Air Ministry should be the re-establishment of industrial organisations in order to provide a backing for existing I.A.F. units and to augment the base installations which the Allied Air Forces are now beginning to establish in Italy. I appreciate that until the industrial areas of Northern Italy are freed, only very limited output of Italian war equipment is possible: but it is important that energetic action should be taken to develop any resources, however slight, in the zones captured by us. In addition the re-organisation and the placing at my disposal of skilled technical labor, surplus to the limited needs of the Italian Air Force, will represent a sound contribution to the Allied cause.

The Air Ministry in Rome would, of course, also undertake the basic administration of the Italian Air Force on the lines on which it is at present constituted, and would be the channel through which demands from the operational command for equipment, men and material would pass.

- 2 -

In sum, I wish for :-

Firstly, a compact operational command to be formed out of the remnants of the Italian Air Force which is to be placed unreservedly under the Allied Air Force Commander in Italy.

Secondly, the establishment of a government department in Rome of which one of the main functions will be to re-organise and develop all industrial resources both in machinery and manpower so that maximum assistance can be given to the Allied operations in this theatre of war.

(Signed) A.W. TEDDER,
Air Chief Marshal,
Air Commander-in-Chief.

5048

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
TO: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, BARI.

SECRET RO.249 T.O.O 071030 NOVEMBER 1944 (.)
FOR DENNY FROM BUSCARLET (.)
PLEASE FORWARD TO ROME OFFICE. EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEANS COPY OF
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL TEDDER'S DIRECTIVE ON I.A.F TO AIR COMMODORE
FOSTER DATED OCTOBER 5TH 1943 TO BE FOUND ON FILE AFSC/S.4/AIR (.)
PLEASE TREAT AS URGENT (.)

TO BE ENCRYPTED
IF SENT BY W/T.

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE

W.A.B. DOWEN-BUSCARLET
W.A.B. DOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

S.11/air

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