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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No.

785017

10000/135/653

POLICY & ORGANIZATION, AFSC, IN RELATION TO IAF
FEB. 1945 - DEC. 1946

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From:- Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.
To :- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, ROME.
Date:- 17th December, 1946.
Ref :- AFSC/23/AIR.

SECRET.DIRECTIVE FOR THE AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

By verbal agreement with M.A.A.C. Secretariat we have written a new draft Directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, because the current one is now out of date, as a result of recent C.C.S. and A.F.H.Q. policy decisions. The draft is submitted herewith for your approval.

2. I have checked through the current Directive and can confirm that the major points have been included in the draft to which is also added a civil aviation section.
3. It is questionable as to whether at this stage it is worthwhile having a Directive for the A.F.S.C. and I have discussed the principle with Major General Airey and we have agreed that an up to date Directive would be a good thing.
4. When forwarding the draft Directive to M.A.A.C. Secretariat I propose saying that you have agreed the draft and that in practice we are working to the instructions contained in the draft.
5. Do you please agree.

I.E.B.
I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

See copy D before despatch

S.S.O. — 19/12
Org. — 19/12

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SECRET.

D R A F T .

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

AFO 512.

13th December, 1946.

Subject: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

To : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, O.B.E.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
THRU: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on ^{29 August 1945} ~~5th March, 1945~~ under reference number ~~334/10~~ AG 334 / III | SACS - O .
2. Your duty is to represent the ^{Air} Allied Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. As representative of A.F.H.Q. you will be responsible ^{to the Chief Commissioner} ~~to the Chief Commissioner~~ on matters, which, under the Armistice Terms and the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force, ^{and Italian aviation} are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. Italian Air Force.

- (a) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty be allowed an authorised manpower of 25,000. But pending the bringing into force of the terms of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that an upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-ITF's and US-ITF's) is not exceeded.

- (b) Your primary function, in general, is to advise and assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to organise and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with the policy laid down by the Supreme Allied Commander with, so far as is practicable,

and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
to the Draft Allied Air Committee and
As representative of A.P.H.C. you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner
on matters, which, under the Armistice Terms and the Interim Policy for the Italian
Air Force, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. Italian Air Force.

(a) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty be allowed an authorised manpower of 25,000. But pending the bringing into force of the terms of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that an upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-IMI's and US-IMI's) is not exceeded.

(b) Your primary function, in general, is to advise and assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to organise and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with the policy laid down by the Supreme Allied Commander with, so far as is practicable, their own authorised resources and such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should encourage the Italians gradually to reduce their Air Force down to the limits imposed by the Draft Peace Treaty. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above-mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies.

...../If in your view.....

3. (c) All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CMT; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Ministry puts at his disposal their maximum effort both in military air forces and civil aviation. 8180 -

If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Supreme Allied Commander and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. (a) Your functions is thus a professional and not a political one.

In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any political Secretary or Under-Secretary of State for Air and you will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointments of Colonels and above in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under or since the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of the Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which the Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is

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Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any political Secretary or Under-Secretary of State for Air and you will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointments of Colonels and above in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under or since the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of the Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which the Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the Italian authorities themselves.

(b) Thus you and your Staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters, whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your Staff, through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee (MAAC) Secretariat, may call on the Staff Branches of MTOUSA, AFHQ and RAF MED/AF for advice and assistance on matters concerning organisation, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

...../Para. 6.....

6. Under the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force, the Italian Air Ministry may, if they so desire, re-organise an Air Force with a maximum limit of 200 fighter aircraft and 150 non-combatant aircraft (i.e. training, reconnaissance, air sea rescue, drogue towing and A.O.P.). It will be your responsibility to ensure that they receive advice on the re-organisation and disposition of their Air Force and if Allied type aircraft are supplied and Allied ground equipment, including Signals and Radar, are requested, you will ensure that they receive efficient/backing and as much technical ^{spares} and training advice and help as is possible.

7. You will make effective plans which will ensure that the upper limit of aircraft is not exceeded, that existing multi-engined bomber aircraft now used for transport and courier flights are effectively demilitarised, and that all other surplus aircraft are reduced to components. A target date of the 1st August, 1947, by which time all redundant aircraft above the maximum limits set (para. 6) must be destroyed, will, however, be permitted but the actual date will be as stipulated in the eventual Peace Treaty.

8. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAC Secretariat and any special reports called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief Commissioner and as directed by him within the Allied Commission and to MAC Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary.
Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

9. / You will ensure that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by FICAO or other international authorities, so far as you are able. This will assist in the inauguration of external air lines, when authorised. You

aircraft is not exceeded, that existing multi-engined bomber aircraft now used for transport and courier flights are effectively demilitarised, and that all other surplus aircraft are reduced to components. A target date of the 1st August, 1947, by which time all redundant aircraft above the maximum limits set (para. 6) must be destroyed, will, however, be permitted but the actual date will be as stipulated in the eventual Peace Treaty.

8. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAAC Secretariat and any special reports called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief Commissioner and as directed by him within the Allied Commission and to MAAC Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary.

Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

9. / You will ensure that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by PICAO or other international authorities, so far as you are able. This will assist in the inauguration of external air lines, when authorised. You will ensure that the amount of civil aviation in Italy is reasonable for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is operated.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged and, as far as possible, assisted in the re-organisation and rehabilitation of the Italian Aircraft Industry so that it may be an effective and reasonable backing for authorised Italian Civil Aviation.

11. Intelligence. You should make certain that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry makes available to you, for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Forces, any information that they may obtain and which may affect the political situation or may be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at Allied Force Headquarters.

SECRET

Handwritten: Chief of Staff - *cpd 14/4/45*
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RAD/1ja. **30A**

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 334/111 SACOS-0

28 August 1945

Subject: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Thru : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394.

To : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, O.B.E.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6 March 1945, under reference AG 334/111 IS&PS-0.
2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Advisor on the Allied Commission and in particular to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:
 - a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDWE, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.
 - b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, until a final policy is determined either by revision of the armistice terms, or by a peace treaty with ITALY, the Italian Air Force will be permitted to remain within the ceiling which was authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when hostilities against the Germans were continuing. You will receive direction from time to time as to the exact strength at which this

in particular to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.

b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, until a final policy is determined either by revision of the armistice terms, or by a peace treaty with ITALY, the Italian Air Force will be permitted to remain within the ceiling which was authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when hostilities against the Germans were continuing. You will receive direction from time to time as to the exact strength at which this air force is to be maintained within that ceiling. All Italian Air Force units will for the present remain unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander and authorization for the employment of these units as may be thought fit will be given to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee on his behalf. In consequence:

a. Your primary function is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorized resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit Allied policy instructions to the Italian Air Ministry and, secondly, to assist that Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies.

over

3. (cont). a. (cont) If, in your view, the Italian Air Force ^{and our knowledge} authorities are failing in their duty you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

b. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

c. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present

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qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is ^{it} your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

c. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, will call on the staff branches of RAF MEDWE and AAF/MTO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organisation, maintenance supply, training and equipment.

5. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The Allied ~~decision~~ on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained will be conveyed to you, from time to time, by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You will also receive from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee instructions in regard to the maintenance of these units. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in ~~excess~~ ^{of} those authorised.

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6. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters affecting organization, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioners. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF MEDAE and AAF/MTO.

7. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this theatre. The decision as to the proportion ~~of~~ to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively will be conveyed to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

8. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of RAF MEDAE and AAF/MTO.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

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New paragraph 5 for inclusion in the directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

5. You and your Staff through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, may call on the Staff Branches of AAF/MTO and RAF MEDME for advice and assistance on matters concerning organisation, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

D.D. *[Signature]* 21/4
agru *[Signature]* 25/8/45

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EWS/hjp

19 April 1945

8501/63/DE

*Primo - delay reflects retention of this letter etc.
(under review for previous)* JWS 2/4

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In my letter CC 8503 of 8 March 1945 I informed you that I was passing on to the Allied military authorities your plea against the reduction of the Italian Air Forces.

I am glad to be able to tell you that I have just heard that a decision has been taken whereby the reduction is substantially modified. Details will of course be transmitted to the Air Ministry by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and I feel sure that they will prove satisfactory to your Government.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Via Eccellenza Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: Exec Comm'r
Air Forces S/C
CC Files



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NOTES ON CONFERENCE ON ITALIAN AIR FORCE HELD AT HOME
ON 10TH APRIL, 1945.

Present: A.V.N. T.J. FOCART.
A.V.M. W.A. BACHEL-BONCARRE.
A.V.M. I.E. HEDDES.
G/C. L.B. JARREAU.
S/L. F.L. BRADSHAW.
W/C. R.D. BARKAS.
S/L. MORGAN.
A.O.A. P.A.A.N.
A.O.G. A.F.S.O. A.E.
A.O.C. Designate A.F.S.O.
G/C. CEC. A.F.S.O.
S/L. CEC. A.F.S.O.
O/C. ESTIMES. P.A.A.F.
P.A. TO A.O.A. P.A.A.F.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF I.A.F.

The Italian Air Force is organized under the Air Ministry into the Unita Aerea, which is the Operational Command, and four Z.A.F.'s which are geographical administrative areas. Two of these are only in existence on paper, as they are in enemy occupied territory. The Unita Aerea has no administrative function.

The Fighter Wing at CAMB consists of 2 P.39 and 1 Spitfire Squadron and operates with the R.A.F. Wing. With them is part of the Fighter Liaison Section which was established when the Fighter Wing was operating as an independent Italian Wing. The operational part of the Fighter Liaison Section belongs to Balkan Air Force, and the Technical and Equipment part of it belongs to the Air Forces Sub-Commission. At LECE are 2 MACCHI Squadrons which were part of the Fighter Wing, and are now waiting to go into reserve.

The Bomber Transport Wing at LECE consists of one SM.82 Squadron and one CAM.1007 Squadron. These operate under Balkan Air Force and are engaged in supply dropping over YUGOSLAVIA. The CAM.1007's are dying out rapidly. At LECE there is a Group Captain (Acting Unpaid) who was given this rank to be on an equal footing to the American Commander of the station. There is also a Squadron Leader Engineer who was placed at LECE as this is the centre of the work-shop activity of the Italian Air Force.

At FIERMO is the Light/Bomber Wing consisting of 2 Baltimore Squadrons. This is an integral part of No.254 Wing and there is only one Liaison Officer there belonging to the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

At TAPATO is the Bomber Wing with a detachment at BRINDISI. This is equivalent to about 3 R.A.F. Squadrons, and they have CAM.506, 501 and HS.14 aircraft. They are engaged in Air/Sea Rescue, mine spotting and a small amount of courier work. One Wing Commander belonging to the Air Forces Sub-Commission is the Liaison Officer with this Wing.

At LECE is the Courier Transport Squadron which operates an internal air line with a daily service LECE, FARI, FORT and a service three times a week each way, LECE, SICILY, SARDINIA. Their main function is to carry Government Officials who

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crany occupied territory. The Unita Aerea has no administrative function.

The Fighter Wing at CATI consists of 2 F.39 and 1 Spitfire Squadron and operates with 1 P.A.A. Wing. With this is part of the Fighter Liaison Section which was established when the Fighter Wing was operating as an independent Italian Wing. The operational part of the Fighter Liaison Section belongs to Balkan Air Force, and the Technical and Equipment part of it belongs to the Air Forces Sub-Commission. At IBOX are 2 MACHII Squadrons which were part of the Fighter Wing, and are now waiting to go into reserve.

The Bomber Transport Wing at IBOX consists of one SM.82 Squadron and one CAT.1017 Squadron. These operate under Balkan Air Force and are engaged in supply dropping over YUGOSLAVIA. The CAT.1007's are dying out rapidly. At IBOX there is a Group Captain (Acting Unpaid) who was given this rank to be on an equal footing to the American Commander of the station. There is also a Squadron Leader Engineer who was placed at IBOX as this is the centre of the work-shop activity of the Italian Air Force.

At BIPERO is the Light/Bomber Wing consisting of 2 Baltimore Squadrons. This is an integral part of No.254 Wing and there is only one Liaison Officer there belonging to the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

At TARANTO is the Seaplane Wing with a detachment at BRINDISI. This is equivalent to about 3 P.A.A. Squadrons, and they have CAT.506, 501 and 28.14 aircraft. They are engaged in Air/Sea Rescue, mine spotting and a small amount of courier work. One Wing Commander belonging to the Air Forces Sub-Commission is the Liaison Officer with this wing.

At INOC is the Courier Transport Squadron which operates on internal air line with a daily service INOC, BARI, ROMA and a service three times a week each way, INOC, SICILY, SARINIA. Their main function is to carry Government officials who otherwise have no means of rapid transport about the country.

At LEVERANO is a flying refresher unit, and there is no representative of the Air Forces Sub-Commission there as it is alongside INOC.

At FROSINONE is the C.T.U. with one Wing Commander as C.I.

At NAPLES is a Wing Commander Admin. who looks after the factories which are working for the I.A.F. in the Naples Area, and is also liaison between the Sub-Commission, the Italian Air Force, 244 Group and AAFSC/NO. There is also one Flight Lieutenant Equipment held at NAPLES.

At BARI there is one Wing Commander Air Staff whose duty it is to run the BARI detachment and to provide liaison between the H.Q. of the Unita Aerea and Balkan Air Force. There is also one Wing Commander Engineer who is C.T.O. of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Up to the present he has been held at Bari as it was necessary for him to carry out day-to-day work with the Italian Air Force without which the operations

Continued

effort would have suffered. There is also a Squadron Leader and Flying Officer Equipment who are mainly employed in day-to-day tasks and the M.T. Staff Officer of the Air Forces Sub-Commission who again is largely employed on day-to-day matters. It is the intention to withdraw the C.T.O. and the M.T.S.O. to ROCE as soon as the Italian Air Force in the BARI area can stand on its own feet.

The new organization as laid out in the appendix to Air Marshal Sir John Slessor's letter JCS.1379 dated 23rd February, 1945, is almost in being with the exception of the fact that the 2 MACCHI squadrons have not yet been moved to the C.T.U. as, in the first place the airfield has only just been repaired and made fit to land on, and secondly the training of Baltimore replacement crews has first priority. Instructions have been given to the Italian Air Ministry to break-down the aircraft not required for first flying or reserve, of all types given in that table.

The ceiling of 31,000 is split up into 9,000 in substitution for Allied manpower and 22,000 for the Italian Air Force. The 22,000 for the Italian Air Force are allocated roughly as follows:-

UNITA AEREA (Operational Command)	
AIR MINISTRY WORKSHOP SERVICE	6,000
3RD ZONE	900
4TH ZONE	2,000
CAMPANIA DISTRICT	5,300
SICILY	700
SARDINIA	900
	2,000

The Sardinian contingent is being reduced to 1,036 when sea transport is available.

The 5,300 in the 4th Zone are being reduced to 3,400.

The reductions will release a total of roughly 5,000 men, most of which the Italian Air Ministry wish to earmark for the 2 Northern zones when these are liberated.

There is definitely a case for a large number of men in the Northern area in view of the fact that such installations as are left will have to be guarded against looting by the civilian population.

It has been agreed with Wing Commander BAVIAS that he will review these figures in the light of future commitments and the new establishments which have been produced by the Italian Air Ministry are still awaiting agreement, and H.Q. M.A.A.F. will then instruct the Italian Air Ministry to produce a definite number of personnel to add to those already employed in substitution of Allied manpower, and that if he left to the Italian Air Ministry how this can be done.

There are 1,600 Fitters and 1,200 Fitters (airframe) in the Italian Air Force who are skilled men (equivalent to E.A.F. Fitter IIA). The position of the Italian Air Force should be clarified on the cessation of hostilities to see how many of these men can be employed by the Allies.

4th Zone
CAMPANIA DISTRICT
BICLIN
SARDINIA

2,200
700
900
2,000

The Sardinian contingent is being reduced to 1,036 when sea transport is available.

The 5,300 in the 4th Zone are being reduced to 3,400.

The reductions will release a total of roughly 5,000 men, most of which the Italian Air Ministry wish to earmark for the 2 Northern zones when these are liberated.

There is definitely a case for a large number of men in the Northern area in view of the fact that such installations as are left will have to be guarded against looting by the civilian population.

It has been agreed with Wing Commander DAVIES that he will review these figures in the light of future commitments and the new establishments which have been produced by the Italian Air Ministry are still awaiting agreement, and H.Q. M.A.A.F. will then instruct the Italian Air Ministry to produce a definite number of personnel to add to those already employed in substitution of Allied manpower, and that if be left to the Italian Air Ministry how this can be done.

There are 1,600 Fittore and 1,200 Fittore (airframe) in the Italian Air Force who are skilled men (equivalent to R.A.F. Fitter IIA). The position of the Italian Air Force should be clarified on the cessation of hostilities to see how many of these men can be employed by the Allies.

In the event of a decision being arrived at that the front line aircraft should not be flown after the cessation of hostilities, the first-line squadrons would not, no doubt, continue to operate at their present intensive scale of effort. It is, however, suggested that we would have to operate the 15 M.79 aircraft, 12 SM.82 aircraft and approximately 15 Fiat Planes for essential communication and transport work within Italy - all these are 3 engine aircraft - especially as communications with the North are likely to be bad.

If, after the cessation of hostilities, H.Q. M.A.A.F. decide to use groups of I.A.F. skilled tradesmen, there should be no objection on the part of the Italian Air Ministry to send Italian Officers with each group.

As regards the problem of establishing a section in R.P.S.O. M.A.A.F. to deal with I.A.F. matters, Air Forces Sub-Commission is at present examining the personnel side of this, and will contact H.Q. M.A.A.F. on the subject. The suggestion of establishing an Italian Officer on the staff of A.I.S. might lead to some complications and confusion, and is not thought desirable.

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As far as the establishment for the Air Forces Sub-Commission is concerned, (reference LAF/AAE/24620 dated 12th March 1945,) this appears to be satisfactory at the moment, although there is some reshuffling going on. It was pointed out that if A.F.S.C. required any Admin Staff to go into the North with an Intelligence Staff, these personnel would be extremely difficult to find, if, in fact, they could be found at all.

As far as training is concerned, the Fighters and Transport aircraft have sufficient fat to feed themselves for some 3-6 months. As regards the Baltimore they are in a poor state for crews, and A.F.S.C. is trying to organise some training for them so that they will not fold-up for crews. This is being done at PROSINONE under the supervision of a Royal Air Force Wing Commander. It was proposed to ask for some assistance from R.A.F. Operational Groups, in the shape of specialist leaders, to advise on aircrew training.

GROUP CAPTAIN L.E. JARMAN, Air Forces Sub-Commission, thought that his job should include the "Air" side as well as the "Organisation" side. It was suggested that as A.F.S.C. were now in the stage where a certain amount of re-organisation of staff was going on, the "Air" and "Org" side could be tied up together, and there would be no call for additional staff, at the moment.

Receipt is acknowledged at Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, of copy of letter reference LAF/AAE/1654/24/OPG addressed to Colonel REMONDINO, Deputy Chief of Staff, Italian Air Ministry dated 8th March, also copy of report by Wing Commander E.D. Barlas on visit to A.F.S.C. to negotiate the construction and issue of Establishments for the Italian Air Force", dated 12th March, 1945.

William Harvey

W.A.B. BROWN-BECCALLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

re-organization of staff was going on, the "Air" and "Org" side could be tied up together, and there would be no call for additional staff, at the moment.

Receipt is acknowledged at Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome, of copy of letter reference MAAP/4651/21/ORG addressed to Colonel REMONDINO, Deputy Chief of Staff, Italian Air Ministry dated 8th March, also copy of report by King Commander R.D. Barlas on visit to A.F.S.C. to negotiate the construction and issue of Establishments for the Italian Air Force, dated 12th March, 1945.

William Henry

W.A.B. BOWEN-BISCARLINT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 10th April, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/23/AIR.

5174

1012

31A

REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONER R.D. HALLAS ON HIS VISIT TO
AIR FORCE'S SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, TO
RECOGNIZE THE CONTRIBUTION AND ISSUE OF RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Date: 7th-8th March.

+++++

In an endeavour to discover the present situation with
regard to the establishment of the Italian Air Force I had discussions
with both the Air Force Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, and
Commission, and Colonel BERNARDI, A.O.C. Air Force Sub-
Commission, and Colonel BERNARDI, Deputy Chief of Staff Italian Air
Ministry. It is quite apparent that the body of Order of Battle was
not known either at the Italian Air Ministry or at the Air Force Sub-
Commission.

2. No up-to-date establishment was in existence for any Italian
Air Force units with the exception of the Infantry Squadrons whose
establishments were maintained at the Headquarters and despatched to
the Air Force Sub-Commission now in use. All Italian establishments
were also (as Colonel BERNARDI suggested mainly by it) ~~was~~ before
9th September, 1943, and it was not, however, applicable to the force as
it present constituted.

3. Furthermore, no clearly defined policy has been laid down for
the majority of the units with the exception of the Squadrons whose
U.S. is not fixed as a result of the C.I.A.'s recent decision.

4. Under two circumstances, however, it was not possible to
conceive of the construction or discussion of any establishments since
the establishments are not known in sufficient detail. After discussions
with Air Force Sub-Commission I requested Colonel BERNARDI to
prepare the necessary details in order that the establishment could be
formed at an early date. I required from him:-

- (i) A complete Order of Battle of the Italian Air Force,
- (ii) Detailed policy for each unit.
- (iii) Draft establishments in their own construction
which would serve as a basis for discussion on the
final establishments.

I suggest that the Italian Air Force be supplied within three

2. No up-to-date establishments are in existence for any Italian Air Force Unit with the exception of the Italian Squadrons whose establishments are being converted to the American type and designated as the Air Force Sub-Commission units etc. All Italian establishments are down (as Colonel BELLINGHAM mentioned previously) and it is before 9th September, 1945, and are now, therefore, applicable to the force as at present constituted.

3. Furthermore no clearly defined policy has been laid down for the majority of the units with the exception of the Squadrons whose U.E. is now fixed as a result of the C.I.C.'s recent decision.

4. Under the circumstances, stated so, it is not possible to consider either construction or discussion of any establishments since the requirements are not known in sufficient detail. After discussions with Air Vice Marshal BOWEN-BUSFIELD I recommended Colonel BELLINGHAM to prepare the necessary details in order that the establishments could be fixed at an early date. I required from him:-

(1) A complete Order of Battle of the Italian Air Force,

(2) Detailed policy for each Unit,

(3) How's establishments in they wish to construct any; these would serve as a basis for discussion on the final establishments.

I stated that the information must be supplied within three weeks. If it was not supplied he would proceed to write the establishments on purely R.A.F. service. This would probably reduce the numbers of personnel in the operational side of the Italian Air Force considerably, since they would not take local conditions into account. However, there was no alternative if the Italian Air Ministry was not prepared to give us the information we want. He asked the Italian Air Ministry if promised, and have subsequently sent, copies of R.A.F. establishments which may serve as a guide in the preparation of their own establishments.

5. At the same time I requested the C.I.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission to get this done to discover the detailed Order of Battle of the Italian Air Force. This would be necessary:-

(1) To check against the Italian Air Ministry proposals.

(2) As a guide to myself should the Italian Air Ministry not have indicated their own suggestions by 29th March, 1945, thereby necessitating the drawing of establishments by myself.

....6.

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6. The Italian Air Ministry officials promised to have complete details within three weeks and stated that it was likely that they would have interim proposals within 7 to 10 days and would discuss a further conference to discuss proposals. I subsequently confirmed the agreement reached in a letter to Colonel RUCCHIO, which I attach at Appendix "A" to this report.

FACTORS AFFECTING ITALIAN AIR FORCE REARMAMENT.

7. My discussions brought to light certain factors which will undoubtedly have to be taken into account in assessing Italian Air Force establishments.

(i) The C.-in-C. instructed that establishments were to be prepared for the Italian Air Force on R.A.F. lines. I feel, however, that this will not be practicable, in its strictest interpretation, without turning the organization of the Italian Air Force completely upside down. At the moment the Italian Air Force is organized on German Air Force Staff system i.e. with separate administrative and operational controls. Administration is organized on an area basis by means of four zones (A.D.I.) while operational control is vested in the UFFA A.D.I. This organization is reflected at the highest level in the Air Ministry where the STAFF MAJOR, or Air Staff, is completely separate from the Air Ministry proper which consists solely of administrative branches. I am assuming that this organization should continue.

(ii) It is going to be difficult to calculate exact maintenance needs on R.A.F. lines since:-

- (a) We have no figures of numbers for repair of Italian types of aircraft. Needless to say we have the Italians.
- (b) It is estimated that the Italians are very much slower workers than British other ranks.

I therefore propose to be generous in maintenance service and give the Italian Air Force the benefit of any reasonable doubt that may arise.

(iii) The present strength of the Air Ministry includes 524 officers and approximately 550 Senior P.O.s. Although allowances have been made for the fact that

I feel, however, that this will not be prejudicial, in its attempt at reconstruction, without unduly taxing the capabilities of the Italian Air Force completely while that. As the means the Italian Air Force is organized on German Air Force 8000 aircraft A.3, with complete administrative and operational controls.

Kindly, (a) is organized on an even basis by means of four zones (A, B, C, D) which operationally is divided in the Italian Air Force. This organization is reflected at the highest level in the Air Ministry where the STAFF DIRECTOR, or Air Staff, is completely separate from the Air Ministry proper which consists solely of administrative functions. I am prepared that this organization should continue.

(11) It is going to be difficult to calculate exact maintenance costs in R.E.F. lines since:-

(a) No more no figures of resources for repairs of Italian types of aircraft. Needless to say not have the Italians.

(b) It is an undoubted fact that the Italians are very much slower workers than British other ranks.

I therefore propose to be generous on maintenance costs and give the Italian Air Force the benefit of any reasonable doubt that may arise.

(12) The present strength of the Air Ministry includes 541 officers and approximately 350 Senior N.C.O's. Although allowances will be paid for the fact that serving officers are responsible for numerous duties which are laid on Civil Servants at the British Air Ministry, the figure is nevertheless enormous when one considers that they are only controlling the equivalent of 18 squadrons. I cannot expect to make a satisfactory establishment for the Italian Air Ministry which is a small institution in its complete re-organization; these losses are, I suspect, really a task for this Government. I think we should issue an instruction to the Air Force Sub-Commission to review completely the administration of the Italian Air Ministry and advise that the establishment will be smaller than the organization is currently satisfactory by the Air Force Sub-Commission. In the meantime I would write an establishment merely to cover the existing situation.

(13) The Italian Air Force has numerous small Companies which could as well be taken of the Italian Air Force operational units. These companies, however, are

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- 3 -

being employed in the care and maintenance of airfields not in use at the moment. If they were withdrawn, all installations and fittings would be stolen very quickly by the local civilians. It seems rather hard on the Italian Air Force to dis-establish these companies and I therefore propose to leave them in being.

8. It will be seen, therefore, that the Italian Air Force establishments should be kept within a period of one month. As a conclusion to my report I suggest that the immediate conclusion to be reached is that the establishments should be removed to an area as soon as possible without necessarily having regard to great reductions in the number. We cannot get anywhere without having written establishments; and if we try to make them as strict and severe as possible at the present moment it is likely that delays arising from protracted arguments and discussion with the Italian Air Ministry will preclude the establishments from being re-established within a reasonable space of time.

9. My recommendations in the Italian Air Force are, therefore:-

(i) That speed in the preparation of establishments should be the overriding principle; and that in the event of any attempt to stall into the Italian Air Force the benefit of any economic doubt in our assessment.

(ii) That immediately the establishments are committed to writing, further efforts are to be made to reduce their personnel ceiling.

(iii) That no increase should be allowed to their establishments in the future without authority from the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION.

10. I reviewed proposals for the revised establishments of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. The proposals merely result in re-organization of the existing establishments and do not involve any increase. I must, however, have about this establishment since I consider that it is excessive for the following reasons:-

(i) There is at the moment insufficient co-ordination of the administrative branches. Better co-ordination and

proceeding the establishment of the Italian Air Force will
space of time.

9. My recent visit to the Italian Air Force was, however:-

(i) This aspect in the preparation of establishments
should be the overriding principle; and that in the event
of any agreement we should give the Italian Air Force the
benefit of a very reasonable doubt in our assessment.

(ii) That immediately the establishments are committed
to writing, further efforts are to be made to reduce their
personnel ceiling.

(iii) That in business should be allowed to their
establishments in the future without authority from the Air
Force Sub-Commission.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION.

10. I reviewed the establishment of the revised establishment of the Air
Force Sub-Commission. The review was largely a result in a re-organisation
of the existing establishments and to involve any increase. I cannot,
however, have done this without since I consider that it is
necessary for the following reasons:-

(a) There is at the present insufficient co-ordination
of the administrative branches. Better co-ordination and
control would result in economy of effort and staff
reduction in the Administrative staff.

(b) There are, in my view, too many officers on
attachment to various Italian Air Force Headquarters. With
the closing of a number of the Italian Air Force commands,
I feel that an effort should be made to centralise the staff
so far as is possible at HQ, thereby enabling a reduction in
staff.

11. In view, however, of the fact that the Air Force Sub-Commission
has been completely re-organised I am unwilling to recommend a reduction
in establishment now. I placed my views before the Vice-Chief of the
Staff who agreed in principle. It was decided that a review of the
establishment should be made in six weeks time when the organisation had
settled down and their reductions should be aimed at then.

R P R (w)

12th March 1945.
R P R (w)

(R. P. R. (w)) No. 102. 31. 45.
J. R. R. (w), 2.

30A

From : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.A.F.
Appendix "B".

To : Colonel RICHARDINO, Deputy Chief of Staff, Italian Air Ministry, Rome
Copy to: Air Force Subcommittee, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date : 8th March, 1945.

Ref. : MAE/1651/21/032.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

You will be aware of the contents of Air Force Sub-Commission's letter AFSC/23/AFR dated 27th February, 1945. It is desired to elaborate on those paragraphs dealing with the establishments of the Italian Air Force and to confirm the agreement reached between yourself and Wing Commander R.D. BARNES of this Headquarters on 8th March, 1945.

2. It is the wish of the Air Commander-in-Chief that establishments should be proposed for inclusion in respect of Italian Air Force Units. There are two methods of accomplishing this:-

(i) Submit the Order of Battle and establishments to be prepared by the Italian Air Ministry and submitted to Headquarters, C.M.A.F. for final approval.

(ii) Or for the establishments to be prepared by Headquarters, C.M.A.F. without assistance from the Italian Air Ministry.

3. If the procedure suggested in para. 2(ii) is adopted and the establishments proposed directly to C.M.A.F. then without taking into consideration any local factors or any difficulties peculiar to the Italian Air Force, the resultant ceiling for the operational squadrons, their controlling formations and auxiliary units would not be likely to exceed a total figure of 16,000. Any such personnel surplus to that figure would, under existing instructions, be handed over for employment with the R.A.F. or U.S.A.A.F.

4. It is not desired to limit the extent mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, if this can be achieved. On the other hand there will be no alternative if we do not receive proposals from you at an early date in view of the pressing necessity for speed in preparation of the establishment. The extent to which local difficulties can be taken into account in allowing us generous margin is possible for the operational ceiling of the Italian Air Force will depend entirely upon the limitations which is

2. It is the wish of the Air Command-in-Chief that establishments should be prepared for mobilization in support of Italian Air Force Units. There are two methods of accomplishing this:-

(i) Establish for the Order of Battle and establishments to be prepared by the Italian Air Ministry and submitted to Headquarters, R.A.F., for final approval.

(ii) Or the establishments to be prepared by Headquarters, R.A.F., without assistance from the Italian Air Ministry.

3. If the procedure suggested in para. 2(ii) is adopted and the establishments prepared solely at R.A.F. time without taking into consideration any local factors or any difficulties peculiar to the Italian Air Force, the inevitable conflict for the Air Ministry, their controlling formations and auxiliary units would not be likely to exceed a total figure of 16,000. Any such personnel surplus to that figure would, under existing instructions, be handed over for employment with the R.A.F. or U.S.A.A.F.

4. It is not difficult to understand the basis suggested in the foregoing paragraph, if this can be justified. On the other hand there will be no alternative if we do not receive personnel from you at an early date in view of the pressing necessity for speed in preparation of the establishments. The extent to which local difficulties can be taken into account in allowing for surplusage is possible if the Operational Ceiling of the Italian Air Force will be known entirely upon the 1st January which is provided by your Air Ministry or unless it is agreed that requirements.

5. It is, therefore, to request that you will forward by 29th March 1945, the following information:-

(i) The complete Order of Battle showing the travelling formations (including the Air Ministry) and auxiliary units required to back the revised operational target; this target is shown as appendix 'A' to the Air Force Staff Committee letter quoted above.

(ii) The policy for each individual unit included in the Order of Battle.

6. The requirement as set out in para. 5(i) above is self-explanatory and does not require further clarification. It is, however, desired to state exactly what is meant by the term "Policy" for each unit. **WB POLICY**

The policy is to include statement of the task which each Unit will be required to perform; any possible difficulties that are likely to be met in the performance of this task should also be mentioned. An example is given below of the information which a Unit require to be told in respect of certain Units:-

(1) In the case of Aircrew, Flights, Units we shall require to know how many aircraft of each type that you require to remain each week and the year on account of work anticipated for each year. This may be requested in various requirements. Details of this is to be given if the difficulty does to be included in General Engineering, Signals Service etc.

(2) In the case of Equipment Depot details should be given of the location and the quantity of items supplied by the Depot.

(3) You should state in the case of each establishment the number of Units are to be placed under its administrative and operational control. The layout of the Staff Branches should also be stated.

7. With this information this Headquarters will be in a position to draft establishments which should completely reflect your needs. If, however, you desire to have establishments drawn, the amount will be taken of your detailed proposals in assessing the final figures for each Unit. You should also note that if you are at all likely necessary for you to prepare these establishments, it will be in your interests to do so.

8. It is suggested that a further meeting should be held on or about 29th March, 1945, to discuss your final proposals. If these proposals are not completed by that date, action will be taken as stated in para. 2 to prepare the final. If you are unable to attend on purely H.M.F. series.

9. In the interim until this is completed with satisfactory results any assistance that you may require. If you wish, an interim meeting before 29th March, 1945, to discuss the progress of your proposals.

Report given with the other members of the committee for each region. This may be converted in many circumstances. Details are in the diary of the committee which is to be included in the General Enquiry, which is being done.

(ii) In the case of Management Director, the title should be given of the institution and the Secretary in this supplied by the D.C.C.

(iii) You are all aware, in the case of each controlling institution which is in the 50 on the list under the administrative and financial control. The layout of the Staff Director should also be done.

7. With this in mind, the Headquarters will be in a position to have established the whole of the necessary records. If, however, you desire to have a full list of the records, the amount will be taken of your detailed programme in assessing the field in view for each unit. You should also note that planning is in a strictly necessary for you to prepare these establishments, it will be your interests to do so.

8. It is suggested that a further meeting should be held on or about 29th March, 1945, to discuss the final proposals. If these proposals are not complete by that time, action will be taken as stated in para. 2 to prepare the final list of establishments and on purely R.A.F. lines.

9. In the interim period this has been agreed and will be provided by assistance that you may require. If you wish to have a meeting before 29th March, 1945, to discuss the progress of your revised organisation, it is suggested that you will contact the Air Forces Sub-Committee and will arrange for an officer of the Headquarters Branch of this Headquarters to be present.

(Signed) M.D. DAVIS W/CTR

FOR THE Vice President,
Air Officer in Charge Administration,
CENTRAL AIR FORCE.

516.

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Cyflwr Message

310/16

To - A.F.S.E. A.C.C. Rome

FROM - HQ MAAF



SSO GB 36 April 16 Secret

Personal for Bowen Buscaden from Baker

Air Marshal Gurned is proposing to have a meeting on Thursday April 17th to discuss the position and policy regarding the Italian Air force principally to inform the Air Commander in Chief and himself on the background in this connection.

2/ Will you and Budie arrange to come here during the morning of the 17th for the meeting which will be held in the afternoon.

IMPORTANT

TOD 161249B
TOD 161445B
TOD 161515B

[Handwritten signature]

Dist - AFSC ACC Rome 310/16

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

29A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
TO: H.Q. M.A.A.F. S.S.O.

SECRET P.171 T.O.O 170915B APRIL 1945 (.)
PERSONAL FOR BAKER FROM BUSCARIET (.)
YOUR GB.36 APRIL 16TH ACKNOWLEDGED (.)

TO BE ENCRYPTED
IF SENT BY W/T.

PRIORITY: Important.

W.A.B. Bowen-B

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARIET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

28A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL MELBY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

DATE: 7TH APRIL, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

I have seen H.E. GASPAROTTO with reference to the attached papers. He is in complete agreement with the decree, and with the amendment which cancels "Marshals of Italy".

2. He says that it is exactly the measure that he would have liked to have put through when he was Minister for War in 1921.



W.A.B. BOWEN-BRUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Ugates Message



84/5

27A

To A.F.S.C. A.C. Rome.

From A.F.S.C. A.C. Bari, B.O. 125.

April 4. Received

Item with copy of signal received from H/Q B.A.F. D.745 3/April repeated to Fighter Liaison Section and R.A.F. VLS. Message continues -

H/Q MAF now indicate that project to equip No. 9. IAF SQDN with P 39 aircraft can not be proceeded with. Reason given is the fact that present shortage of types and tubes cannot be made good out of the type(?) resources now can items concerned be supplied in sufficient time. Priority Important: T.O.O. 03/627A. Message ends.

IMPORTANT

To 041100Z

On 05/11/78

By 0006Z

264

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/23/AIR.

4th April, 1945.

22A

With further reference to my letter AFSC/23/AIR of the 31st
March, 1945.

2. I have to inform you that the question of permitting No.9
Squadron to go into the line has been thoroughly discussed at H.Q. M.A.A.F.
and H.Q. Italian Air Force. While wishing to accede to your request, it
is with regret that this has not been found possible. This is due entirely
to the lack of spare parts available for these aircraft, in particular
tyres and inner tubes.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCALET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

H.E. General M. Aisone Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

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From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 3rd. April, 1945.

Ref:- MAAF/4200/ALS.

20A.

1. Further to my MAAF/4200/ALS of the 28th. March, 1945.
2. The question of re-arming No.9. Squadron, Italian Air Force with P.39's has now been thoroughly discussed. While wishing to accede to this request from the Italians, it is with regret that this has not been found possible, due entirely to the lack of spare parts available for these aircraft, in particular tyres and inner tubes.
3. It would be appreciated if this decision could be conveyed to General Aimone Cat.

(F. D. Fogarty),
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer i/o Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Copy to:- C-in-C/RAF. Med. E.
A. O. A.

External: A.F.H.Q. (S.G.S.).



0100

DRAFT

24A.

From: A.F.S.C. A.C. One.

To: Executive Commissioner.

Your minute 59. The letter from A.F.H.Q. at folio 58 does not alter my view that the destruction of the obsolescent aircraft may well cause an entire collapse in the morale and efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

2. At folio 60 is a draft letter to HM for C.C.'s signature, but this of course does not represent my views.

3. I still feel that we should hold out for the storage, for the few remaining months of the war, of the obsolescent aircraft. Incidentally these are not war like aircraft, and are of no fighting value.

3rd April, 1945.

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

315N

25B

DRAFT.

FOR SIGNATURE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Further to my letter CC.8503 of 8th March 1945, I have now received a reply to your plea against the reduction of the Italian Air Forces, from Allied Force Headquarters.

2. You will realise that, at the present time, no discussions can be entered into with regard to the size of the post-war Italian Air Force. For the remainder of the war in Europe the Air Force must be organised so that, having regard to the limited availability of Allied aircraft and equipment, it is best able to make an effective contribution to the prosecution of the war against Germany.

3. In order to do this it must be organised into a small and efficient force, and no elements must be left in it which do not contribute directly to our war effort against the enemy. Nor must there be any waste of Allied or Italian equipment, material or man-power to any other end. In the view of Allied Force Headquarters this end will best be achieved by following the directive given by the Air Commander-in-Chief.

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SECRET.

25C

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF.

31st March, 1945.

SUBJECT: Reduction of the Italian Air Force.

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum 3501/54/EC dated 10 March 1945, in which you request directions as to the reply to be made to Signor Bonomi's letter on the subject of the reduction of the Italian Air Force.
2. As you will be aware, H. C. M.A.A.F. have now replied direct to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in regard to the technical points raised by the Italian Air Force Authorities.
3. It is, therefore, felt that your reply to Signor Bonomi should take the line that no discussions can at present be entered into with regard to the size of the post-war Italian Air Force. In the meantime that force must be organised so that, having regard to the limited availability of Allied aircraft and equipment, it is best able to make an effective contribution to the prosecution of the war against Germany. This end will be achieved by reorganising it into a small efficient force, as the Air Commander-in-Chief has directed.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

(Sgd) W.D. Morgan
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

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FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL EILEY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEAD-QUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

DATE: 2ND APRIL, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

SECRET.

209

You will remember that I passed you copies of the correspondence with reference to the reduction of the Italian Air Force under the reference number AFSC/23/AIR, my last letter to you being dated the 8th March.

2. At long last I have received a reply from M. G. M. A. A. F., a copy of which is attached to this letter.

3. On the 21st March I visited M. A. A. F. and had a conversation with the A. O. C.-in-C and the Chief of Staff about this question, and they led me to suppose that the storage of the obsolescent aircraft would be agreed to. As you will see from paragraph 3 (ii) of the M. A. A. F. letter, this is not the case. Unfortunately I had had a conversation with Mr. Macmillan just before my visit to Caserta and on my return I sent him a note which gave him to understand that I was more-or-less satisfied with what I had got out of them.

4. This is very far from being the case. The decision in paragraph 3 (i), (ii) and (iv) do not cause me any uneasiness, but I am still very strongly opposed to the destruction of the obsolescent aircraft.

5. I feel that this decision at such a late stage in the war leaves us open to a charge of breach of faith. We have always told the Italians that whatever they did to help us would count in their favour. My view is that according to their lights the Italian Air Force has put up a very good show, and to have this bitter blow aimed at them at the eleventh hour is carrying things too far.

6. It may well be that it is our policy to leave them without any aircraft at all, but I feel that this is a decision which can never be taken except at the Peace Conference table. If, however, this decision has been arrived at, I think we should be honest about it and come into the open and tell them so.

2. At long last I have received a reply from H.Q. W.A.A.F., a copy of which is attached to this letter.

3. On the 21st March I visited W.A.A.F. and had a conversation with the A.O.C.-in-C and the Chief of Staff about this question, and they led me to suppose that the storage of the obsolescent aircraft would be agreed to. As you will see from paragraph 3 (ii) of the W.A.A.F. letter, this is not the case. Unfortunately I had had a conversation with Mr. Macmillan just before my visit to Caserta and on my return I sent him a note which gave him to understand that I was more-or-less satisfied with what I had got out of them.

4. This is very far from being the case. The decisions in paragraph 3 (i), (iii) and (iv) do not cause me any uneasiness, but I am still very strongly opposed to the destruction of the obsolescent aircraft.

5. I feel that this decision at such a late stage in the war leaves us open to a charge of breach of faith. We have always told the Italians that whatever they did to help us would count in their favour. My view is that according to their lights the Italian Air Force has put up a very good show, and to have this bitter blow aimed at them at the eleventh hour is carrying things too far.

6. It may well be that it is our policy to leave them without any aircraft at all, but I feel that this is a decision which can never be taken except at the Peace Conference table. If, however, this decision has been arrived at, I think we should be honest about it and come into the open and tell them so.

7. I gather that you will be receiving some very strong protests from the Prime Minister, and the matter has certainly now reached a stage at which I am powerless, and it will have to be carried on at a higher level. If you agree, I will mention it at Wednesday's Vice President's Conference.

W.A.A.F. COMEN-BUSCAPIET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
NOTE.

SECRET.

AFSC/23/AIR.

31st March, 1945.

With further reference to my letters AFSC/23/AIR dated February 27th, 1945 and 3rd March 1945, I have to inform you that I submitted your letter reference 010686/SG.1/2168/Col dated 10th March to the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, and he has now made the following decisions:

- (i) The 2 MACCHI Squadrons may be retained at the operational training unit under their squadron numbers. The authorized establishment of pilots may be held for the two squadrons, and these may be used as a pool to replace casualties and battle-tired personnel in the front line squadrons.
- (ii) It is regretted that the storage of the old aircraft cannot be agreed to, and they must, therefore, be reduced to produce.
- (iii) It is regretted that it is not possible to provide any further SPITFIREs to re-equip additional Italian squadrons.
- (iv) The question of permitting No. 9 Airacobra Squadron to go into the first line is now under consideration, and a ruling on this will be made very shortly. If agreed this would have the effect of increasing the number of first line fighter squadrons to 4.

2. I am to request that you will submit your proposals as to the breaking-down of the old aircraft to produce, as soon as possible.

W.B.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUCARANT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

H.E. General M. Amoretti,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

5154

219

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT.
COPY: ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY.

DATE: 31ST MARCH, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

SECRET.

With reference to your application to transfer the control of Civil Aviation from the Air Ministry and place it under the Ministry of Transport, I have to inform you that the matter has been referred to the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, who has ruled that he cannot approve the Italian Government's proposal for this transfer.

2. The control of Civil Aviation is, therefore, to remain under the Air Ministry.



W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCAULENT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

5153

From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.E.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 28th. March, 1945.

Ref:- MAAP/4200/AS.

SECRET

1. Reference is made to your letter APSC/23/AIR dated 28th. March, 1945, together with the letters of the Italian Minister for Air and the Italian Chief of the Air Staff. The C-in-C has given full consideration to the views expressed in your letter and has asked me to inform you that he fully realises, and appreciates, that your task in keeping up the morale of the Italian Air Force, and in attempting to satisfy the aspirations of General Aimonio is both a difficult and delicate one.

2. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force Authorities is one which would naturally arise from existing conditions. As you are aware there is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and meanwhile, Italy is allowed such an Air Force as will make an effective contribution to the war effort as possible.

3. However, you will agree that existing difficulties in supply of aircraft and equipment, together with deficiencies of trained personnel ready to take their place in operational units, makes it difficult at this stage of the war, fully to meet the requests enumerated in your letter. We have gone as far as we possibly can, and the decisions on these are as follows:-

(i) Para. 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number planes of the Macchi Squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which those aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Para. 12 (b).

The storage of obsolescent aircraft cannot be agreed to, as the rate of deterioration would be too rapid without proper maintenance. These aircraft must therefore be reduced to produce.

(iii) Para. 15 (a).

It is not possible to provide Spitfire V's for the replacement of Italian Squadrons as there are



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3. However, you will agree that existing difficulties in supply of aircraft and equipment, together with deficiencies of trained personnel ready to take their place in operational units, makes it difficult at this stage of the war, fully to meet the requests enumerated in your letter. We have gone as far as we possibly can, and the decisions on these are as follows:-

(i) Para. 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number places of the Macchi Squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which those aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Para. 12 (b).

The storage of obsolescent aircraft cannot be agreed to, as the rate of deterioration would be too rapid without proper maintenance. These aircraft must therefore be reduced to produce.

(iii) Para. 15 (a).

It is not possible to provide Spitfire Vb for the re-equipment of Italian Squadrons as there are prior claims on any such aircraft that may be thrown up in the future.

(iv) Para. 15 (b).

A Conference is being held to-day at Headquarters Balkan Air Force to discuss the re-arming of No. 9 Squadron. Until the recommendations of this conference have been submitted to the C-in-C for his consideration, no ruling can be laid down at this stage.

D. P. Smith
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer in Charge Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Copy to:-

A.C.A. - C-in-C/R.A.P. Med.E.
A.F.H.Q. (S.G.S.).



From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.F.

To:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date:- 28th. March, 1945.

Ref:- MAFF/4200/AIS.

19A
SECRET

1. Reference is made to your letter AFSC/23/AIR dated 2nd. March, 1945.
2. There has been no policy laid down as to any development of Italian Civil Air Transport. It is impossible to find the resources either in aircraft or in suitably trained personnel, without detriment to the war effort.
3. In view of the ruling contained in A.F.H.Q. signal, reference FX.25720 dated 12th. February, 1945, the C-in-C feels that he cannot, at this stage, advise you to approve the Italian Government's proposal to transfer Civil Aviation from the Air Ministry to the Ministry of Transport.

Monte
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer i/c Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.



5151

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/23/AIF.

28th March, 1945.

With reference to our conversation the other day, M.A.A.F. hope to send me a directive on the lines which I described to you within the next 48 hours. I do not, therefore, think that the matter will be much longer delayed.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCAINT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, MP.,
Office of the President,
Headquarters,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

5150

1040

17A

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROMA.

TO: GROUP CAPTAIN P.C. COLLASON,
AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
LEXOE INTACHEN.

DATE: 26TH MARCH, 1945.

REF: ARAC/25/AF.

SECRET.

Your appointment is that of the Group Captain representing the Air Force Sub-Commission at the Italian Air Force station HQAC.

2. The Italian Air Force Units, with the exception of the Carrier aircraft are all operating under the operational command of Royal Air Force formations. You are to maintain liaison with these formations and to ensure that the Italian Air Force Units operate with the maximum efficiency.

3. In cases where Units of the I.A.F. are operating under a separate formation, such as the Fighter Liaison Section, you have no responsibility except for the maintenance of airfield discipline and in maintaining amicable relations between the Italians and the American Units on the airfield.

4. It is your duty to maintain the best possible relations between the British Units, Italian Units and American Units. It must be remembered that the American Units are operating as part of a major strategical plan, and that all other operations must be sacrificed to the timing of their take off and return from operations.

5. You are to report to the Air Force Sub-Commission Detachment Bari any failure on the part of the Italians to maintain their aircraft properly, or to make proper provision for equipping them or their personnel.

6. As regards the Italians your capacity is principally an advisory one (see the latest directive from A.F.H.Q. reference AG.334/44 ISSAS-0 dated 6th March, 1945.)

7. You are also to supervise in an advisory capacity the I.A.F. workshops at PRINIST, GALLERIA and the stores at ALATONE, and the school at LIVERANO.

8. With regard to the latter this is about to be substantially reduced to something like workable proportions, but it should be borne in mind that this is a refresher and practice unit only, and you should report at once to A.F.H.Q. Bari any attempt to carry out an initial instruction which you may detect, for onward transmission to this H.Q.

9. It is particularly necessary to make certain that no important Italian

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6. As regards the Italians your capacity is principally an advisory one (see the latest directive from A.F.H.Q. reference AG.334/111 ISMB-0 dated 6th March, 1945.)

7. You are also to supervise in an advisory capacity the I.A.F. workshops at SESTO SAN GIOVANNI, GALATINA and the stores at ALATONE, and the school at LECORNO.

8. With regard to the latter this is about to be substantially reduced to something like warlike proportions, but it should be borne in mind that this is a refresher and practice unit only, and you should report at once to A.F.H.Q. Bari any attempt to carry out an initial instruction which you may detect, for onward transmission to this H.Q.

9. It is particularly necessary to make certain that no important Italian personnel are carried from the mainland out of Italy, and while the responsibility of this cannot rest entirely on your shoulders, it is necessary for you to keep a close watch on this and to intervene if any attempt is made.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCAFLE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

COPY:
Air Forces Sub-Commander,
Allied Command, Bari.
For attention of Cdr. F.H. Joyce.

5149

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1041

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/23/AIR.

8th March, 1945.

DIRECTIVE FOR A.F.S.C.

Attached herewith is copy No. 44 of the new Directive issued by the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief for this Sub-Commission.

2. The directive should be shown to your junior Officers, and if any points are not quite clear, you are to communicate with me on the subject.

3. Copies of the directive may be made if required, but care is to be taken that these have no possibility of falling into Italian hands. I suggest that, except for one each at Bari and Naples, copies should not be necessary.

4. The directive should be passed in the order shown below, as a Secret document, and should be returned to Rome as soon as possible.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCALET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Wing Commander W.B. Royce, Bari.
Group Captain W.C. Ollason, Lecce.
Wing Commander W.L. Winter, Naples.

1512

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS,

M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

COPY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.C. ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 8TH MARCH, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIN.

SECRET.

1012

With reference to this Sub-Commission's letter AFSC/23/AIN of the 27th February, 1945, addressed to General Almone Gat, Chief of Italian Air Staff, copies of which were forwarded to your Headquarters, and to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

4A ON 28/1/45.

2. A reply from General Almone Gat has now been received, and a literal translation of this is attached as Appendix "A" to this letter. The General's letter is written in the usual flowery Italian manner, and I feel that I should attempt to put the Italian point of view to you as clearly as possible, as I see it. Through my constant contact with them I feel that I appreciate their angle, and can explain it in English better than any translation of an Italian letter can do.

3. They know they have lost the war and at the time of the Armistice they would have had no complaint if the Allies had insisted on complete disarmament of the I.A.F. Since, however, the Allies have allowed them to share in the fight against Germany, even if only as co-belligerents, they feel that they are entitled to some recognition. They point out, and no one can deny them this, that they have almost achieved miracles in the reconstruction of their aircraft from salvage and by improvisation, and they feel that this too must be taken into consideration. They point out that what they have done has been achieved in face of inadequate food and pay, and poor clothing and accommodation.

4. The tangible recognition which they want is:-

(a) To be allowed to fight on the Italian front

and (b) To have further Allied types given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.

5. With the typical Italian inability to take a practical point of view, they pay no consideration to the facts as given by Sir John Slessor to General Almone Gat, and repeated to him and other I.A.F. officers by me on many occasions: that the Macchi is no longer an operational type, that airfields to accommodate them on the Italian front do not exist, and that we simply have no Allied types of aircraft with which to re-equip them. The General's reference in paragraph 3 of his letter to the "meeting held at LECOR" is a typical example of his point of view. The meeting was, in fact,

possible, as I see it. Through my constant contact with them I feel that I appreciate their angle, and can explain it in English better than any translation of an Italian letter can do.

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6. I feel that it will with difficulty be possible to explain to the Italian pilots that we cannot let them fight on the Italian front, and that further re-armament with Allied types, is literally impossible. I believe that this could be put over without causing any considerable loss of morale. I would, however, call particular attention to a belief which was, at one time, current in the Italian Air Force, and is now current again. This is that, having promised Italy that whatever she can do in aid of the Allies

Continued /2..

count in her favour at the Peace Conference, the allies are deliberately restricting supplies of aircraft and materials, so as to keep the Italian effort down to a minimum. This rumour started at the time when difficulties as regards the supply of ground equipment and spares slowed down the re-armament with Airacobras and Maltineros. It has now resurrected itself over our most recent proposals.

6. Having realised that there can be no question of fighting on the Italian Front, and no question of any further re-arming with Allied types, the I.A.F. is asked to survive the double blow of the relegation of the Macchis to training, and the breaking up of their surplus and obsolete aircraft which cannot be devoted to the immediate war effort.

7. Logically there can be no case for the retention of either the Macchis or the obsolete aircraft, if the furtherance of the war against Germany is the only consideration. The Macchis are no longer a first line aircraft, and the obsolete aircraft are far beyond economical maintenance. The Italian pilot, however, cannot see it from this point of view, and, having done his best according to his lights, now finds the greater part of what little remains of his Air Force being irrevocably taken away from him. This may be difficult to understand from our point of view, but it must be appreciated that Italians have a totally different mental outlook, and place a far greater value on sentiment. Added to this I know that they feel that they are being unfairly treated.

8. General Almondo Cat feels that the morale of the I.A.F. will be unable to survive these blows, and that nothing that he can do can avert a complete collapse. This would, very naturally, have serious political repercussions, and the matter has now been raised to the political plane, by a letter from the Air Minister to the President of the Council of Ministers (H.R. BOSCHI), a translation of which is attached.

9. I do not feel that the General is exaggerating unduly when he warns us of a probable collapse of the I.A.F. The aircrews are exceedingly temperamental, and as stated above are highly sensitive to real or imaginary loss of prestige. Added to this is the fact that our instructions must inevitably mean the retirement of a number of pilots, if not of other aircrew.

10. The General himself has expressed his feelings to me by saying that he cannot see why even the risk of the collapse of the I.A.F. should be taken at this stage, when, we all hope, there are only a few more months of war in Europe left.

11. Except for the suggestion to store the obsolete aircraft, made in paragraph 6 of the General's letter, he has nothing to propose of a constructive nature. I have, however, had several discussions with him, and the following represents his line of thought.

12. (a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchis to training, could they not retain their entity as squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The

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54 on file 23/1/41

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12. (a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchia to training, could they not retain their entity as squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.T.U. The pool could be located at the C.T.U.

(b) That the varied and obsolete aircraft, of no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

13. I should like to recommend that we agree to the proposals at 12 (a) and (b) above. As regards (b) the material salvaged by the reduction of the aircraft to produce would be of practically no value to the war effort. I consider that we should, however, insist on the reduction to produce for spares of all aircraft of types which we are to retain in service and which are beyond economical repair. I suggest that the remaining obsolete aircraft should be inhibited and stored. As regards place of storage I suggest PALAZA, which is adequate in size and of little agricultural value. It is, moreover, well out of the way, there are no Italian units in the neighbourhood, and a small guard would suffice to safeguard them from pilferage. Several S.A.F. units are in

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are immediate vicinity and it would be easy to ensure that no clandestine work or flying took place on these aircraft.

14. I consider that this represents the minimum possible concessions that we can make to avert a probable collapse. The position would be made far more secure if we could grant some further small concessions.

15. I would therefore suggest that consideration be given to the following:-

(a) No. 9 Squadron is in complete existence, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield space for it exists at MUOVA. Would it be possible:-

(i) To re-equip it with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or if that is not possible

(ii) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of Airacobras should suffice to see three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Cant 1007 squadron with Baltimores. The Baltimore Wing has, I submit, proved its worth, and the Cant 1007 crews are all fully operational and very experienced. I believe that there is a large number of Baltimores in reserve, for which there are few operational commitments. The drawback of this proposal is that the airfield at PROSINON, which would be required for training the squadron is not yet fit for flying. The granting of this concession might well have the effect of speeding up the work at PROSINON, as well as being a real tonic to morale.

16. As the General states in paragraph 2 of his letter, he is perfectly in accord with our wish to transform the I.A.F. into a small and efficient Air Force, and during recent transactions he has shown practically that he is sincere in this. It is not felt that our agreement to any of the proposals set out in paragraphs 12 and 14 above would be contrary to the aim of a small efficient Force.

W.A.B. Bowen-Muhammad

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUHAMMAD,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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AG 334/132 ISAFS-0

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:Initials :
:6 March 1945 :
:.....: 6 March 1945

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SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

TO: Mr Vice-Marshal T.A.S. Bowen-Buscarlet, C.B.E., D.F.C.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission
FROM: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this headquarters on 7 December 1944, under reference Number JCS.1021.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. As representative of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces you will be responsible to the Air Commander-in-Chief. As a member of the Allied Commission you are responsible to the Chief Commissioner on matters which, under the Armistice Terms, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air Commander-in-Chief, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air Commander-in-Chief, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air Commander-in-Chief, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or

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Ltr. Hq. AFM, CG 334/111 ISAFS-O,
 dtd 6 March 1945 (Cont'd)

Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves.

4. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of (Mediterranean Allied Air Forces) concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate Air Officer Commanding and his staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

6. Five (5) squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the Italian Air Force authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against GERMANY, in which should be included such Communications units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is one for the Air Commander-in-Chief acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by the Air Commander-in-Chief.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air Commander-in-Chief who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate Mediterranean Allied Air Forces subordinate Commander.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except

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SECRET

Ltr, HQ AFHQ, CG 334/111 IS&PS-O,
 10 March 1945 (Cont'd)

the Chief Commissioner and this headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such nonoperational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air Commander-in-Chief.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganize and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.

11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Robert L. Murray
 Colonel, USA
 Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- | | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| 2 - Addressee | 3 - Psychological Warfare Branch |
| 4 - Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 1 - G-1 |
| 1 - Supreme Allied Commander | 1 - G-2 |
| 1 - Deputy Supreme Allied Commander | 1 - G-3 |
| 1 - Secretary General Staff | 1 - G-4 |
| 2 - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 1 - G-5 |
| 2 - Commander, 8th Fleet | 2 - AG Records |
| 10 - Ltr (Send under informal cover to Wing Commander ORME, office of the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief) | 1 - AG M & D |
| 1 - CG, AFHQ | |
| 2 - Chief Administrative Officer | |
| 2 - 15th Army Gp | |
| 2 - US Political Advisor | |
| 2 - Br Roy Min | |
| 2 - IS-1200 | |

DIST
 1-CHIEF Comm
 1-EXEC Comm
 1-POLITICAL DIV
 1-AGNA SEC
 5143

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RHF/1ja

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

14

AG 134/111 15718-0

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 : S E C R E T :
 : Auth: SAC MT :
 : Initials :
 : 6 March 1945 :
 : : : : :
 : 6 March 1945 :

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

TO: Air Vice-Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, C.B.E., D.F.C.
 Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission
 FROM: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this headquarters on 7 December 1944, under reference Number JCA.1821.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. As representative of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces you will be responsible to the Air Commander-in-Chief. As a member of the Allied Commission you are responsible to the Chief Commissioner on matters which, under the Armistice Terms, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air Commander-in-Chief, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air Commander-in-Chief, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air Commander-in-Chief, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or

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Ltr. Ho AFHQ, AG 334/111 IS&PS-O,
 dtd 6 March 1945 (Cont'd)

the Chief Commissioner and this headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such nonoperational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air Commander-in-Chief.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganize and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.

11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Robert Stupp
 Colonel, AG
 Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- | | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 2 - Adressoo | 2 - Psychological Warfare Branch |
| 4 - Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 1 - G-1 |
| 1 - Supreme Allied Commander | 1 - G-2 |
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| 1 - Secretary General Staff | 1 - G-4 |
| 2 - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 1 - G-5 |
| 2 - Commander, 8th Fleet | 2 - AG Records |
| 10 - Ltr (Send under informal cover to
The Commander CMAF, office of
the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief) | 1 - AG M & D |
| 1 - CG, AFHQ | |
| 2 - Chief Administrative Officer | |
| 2 - 15th Army Gp | |
| 1 - US Political Advisor | |
| 2 - Mr. Roy Min | |
| 2 - Liaison | |

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COPY

U.S.A.F. C.M.F.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

AFSC/23/AIR.

COPIES: AFSC/326/ENG.

5th March 1945.

Very clear General,

With reference to my letter AFSC/23/AIR dated 27th February 1945, paragraphs 5 and 6, and to the Appendix to this letter. The Appendix showed the actual first line strength of each squadron, and the object of this letter to you is to amplify the Appendix and show the recommendations as regards the aircraft to be held in reserve to back the front line aircraft.

2. As you know, in the R.A.F., practically all squadrons have a Unit Equipment of 16 aircraft, and in so far as possible this number of aircraft has been adhered to for the Italian squadrons. All reserve aircraft are to be kept in a reserve pool, and only when a first line aircraft becomes unserviceable beyond the capacity of the mobile Squadron (Gruppo) S.F.A.M. should it be returned to the Wing (Stormo) S.F.A.M. for repair and one of the reserve aircraft issued in lieu.

3. As stated in my letter referred to above, the Technical Commission has prepared a list of individual aircraft with recommendations as to their ultimate disposal. This need not be referred to at this stage, but there follows a list of aircraft, by types, showing how many are to go in the front line, how many to be held in reserve, and how many reduced to produce as a source of spares:-

4. AIRCRAFT TYPE.	IN USE.	HELD AS RESERVE.	REDUCE TO PRODUCE AS SOURCE OF SPARES.
MACCHI 202	16	11	11
MACCHI 205	16	10	8 + 21 fuselages.
SM.82	12	6	6
CANT. 506	16	4	-
PS.14	6	4	-
CANT. 504	10	-	(a)
SM.79	15	5	9
CANT. 1007	5	-	(b)
CR. 314	2	-	8
Sai. 202	5	1	2
CR. 164	5	2	3
CR. 42	5	2	2
MACCHI 200	12	7	9

1054

returned to the Wing (Stormo) S.R.A.M. for repair and one of the reserve aircraft issued in lieu.

3. As stated in my letter referred to above, the Technical Commission has prepared a list of individual aircraft with recommendations as to their ultimate disposal. This need not be referred to at this stage, but there follows a list of aircraft, by types, showing how many are to go in the front line, how many to be held in reserve, and how many reduced to produce as a source of spares:-

AIRCRAFT TYPE.	IN USE.	HELD AS RESERVE.	REDUCE TO PRODUCE AS SOURCE OF SPARES.
MACCHI 202	16	11	11
MACCHI 205	16	10	8 + 21 fuselages.
SM.82	12	6	6
CANT. 506	16	4	-
BS. 14	6	4	-
CANT. 501	10	-	(a)
SM. 79	15	5	9
CANT. 1007	5	-	(b)
Ca. 314	2	-	8
Sci. 202	5	1	2
Ca. 164	3	2	2
Gr. 42	3	2	2
MACCHI 200	12	7	9

Notes (a) Remainder to be held in reserve, but as the aircraft become unserviceable and require material in short supply to effect repairs, they are to be reduced to produce for spares.

(b) Remainder to be held in reserve provided they require no more than 600 man hours or material in short supply to make them serviceable. As they pass these limits they are to be reduced to produce for spares.

5. With regard to the Air Commander-in-Chief's orders that the remaining aircraft be reduced to produce for spares, I regret that I must press you to send me your suggestions for the number, composition and location of the parties which are to carry out this work. It is suggested that, as far as practicable, the first work of reducing to produce should be carried out on those types which are still to be retained in the I.A.P. This will result in a large supply of spare parts, readily available, and thus improve the position as regards serviceability of the first-line aircraft.

H.E. General M. Almona Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry, Rome.

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUSCAULT,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

W.A.B. Bowen-Muscault

12F1

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

DATE: 2ND MARCH, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

This Sub-Commission has been approached by the Ministry of Transport asking that Civil Aviation should be taken out of the hands of the Air Ministry and placed under the Ministry of Transport.

2. A.F.H.Q. signal FX.25720 of the 13th February 1945 states that it is not possible to authorise any development of Italian Civil Aviation during the war.

3. Although this is obviously entirely a matter for the Italian Government itself to settle, I feel that I cannot either approve or otherwise the proposal without the authority of the Air Commander-in-Chief MEDAF.

W.B.

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

11A
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

SECRET.

AFSC/23/AIR.

28th February, 1945.

1. You are to proceed to Bari forthwith and you are to take over command of the Bari detachment of this Sub-Commission from Group Captain Denny.

2. You are to be responsible for the command and administration of the Bari detachment and for the general co-ordination and supervision of the Technical, Equipment, Signals and Motor Transport branches of the Bari detachment.

3. The Bari Headquarters is responsible for the general direction and administration as a Headquarters of the detachments of this Sub-Commission at Lecce, Taranto, Melfo and Canosa.

4. You are to be responsible for giving advice and assistance to the Headquarters of the Unita Aerea, within the limits of the policy laid down in the Air/C-in-C's new directive, which will shortly be issued to you.

5. You are to be responsible for liaison between the Headquarters of the Unita Aerea and Headquarters B.A.F. on both operational matters, and in connection with any administrative, supply or maintenance matters in which B.A.F. may call upon you to take action. You are to take great pains to preserve good relations between the Staffs of H.Q. Unita Aerea and H.Q. B.A.F.

6. You are to pay frequent visits to the units of the Unita Aerea, with the exception of Freccione which is geographically too far away from you, and give all possible help to the liaison officers of this Sub-Commission who may be with these Units.

7. You are to pay frequent visits to H.Q. B.A.F. and establish close contact with both the operational and administrative staffs of that H.Q.

8. You are to take particular pains to insist that the Unita Aerea maintains flying discipline among its units, particularly in those units stationed on airfields which also accommodate Allied squadrons.

9. You are to render reports to me on your visits to I.A.F. units. These reports need not be long, but should include information as to morale, efficiency, shortage of clothing or equipment, and any other matters in which you can help the I.A.F.

3. The Bari Headquarters is responsible for the general direction and administration as a Headquarters of the detachments of this Sub-Commission at Lecce, Taranto, Biferme and Canne.

4. You are to be responsible for giving advice and assistance to the Headquarters of the Unita Aerea, within the limits of the policy laid down in the Air/C-in-C's new directive, which will shortly be issued to you.

5. You are to be responsible for liaison between the Headquarters of the Unita Aerea and Headquarters B.A.F. on both operational matters, and in connection with any administrative, supply or maintenance matters in which H.Q. B.A.F. may call upon you to take action. You are to take great pains to preserve good relations between the Staffs of H.Q. Unita Aerea and H.Q. B.A.F.

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9. You are to render reports to me on your visits to I.A.F. units. These reports need not be long, but should include information as to morale, efficiency, shortage of clothing or equipment, and any other matters in which we can help the I.A.F.

10. You are responsible for rendering to me as early as possible in the month the information required to write the Monthly Air Report. (As a guide, the paragraphs in the January Report for which I would have required information are 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9.) In addition you are to ensure that the Technical, Equipment, Signals and M.T. Staff Officers render their monthly reports at the same time.

11. At present I am kept almost entirely in the dark as regards the operations carried out by the I.A.F., and I must ask you to frame some standard daily signal which will let me know the number of sorties carried out by each squadron, any outstanding results, and any casualties. Owing to the unreliability of I.A.F. channels, these signals should be passed through B.A.F. channels.

Wing Commander W.B. Royce,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
A.C. Bari.

W.B. Royce
AIR VICE-MARSHAL
AIR CHIEF OF STAFF

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

10A

SECRET.

AFSC/23/AIR.

27th February, 1945.

1. I have to inform you that in accordance with the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing control over the Italian Government's Institutions, I have been instructed that the responsibility of this Sub-Commission is first to submit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air/C-in-C, and secondly to assist you with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. Under this new directive you will see that this Sub-Commission will take far less a part in the actual running of the Italian Air Force than heretofore. In the past it has often been made necessary for Officers of my Staff to carry out the duties of Italian Air Force Officers to a great extent, in order that your Force should continue to function efficiently. This has been particularly so in the case of the Engineering and Technical Branches.
2. The efficiency of the Italian Air Force is therefore entirely the responsibility of the Italian Air Ministry, and the Italian Air Force must stand or fall by the efforts of the Air Ministry to turn it into an efficient and well organised Force. While the staff of this Sub-Commission is no longer to take upon itself the duties of Italian Officers, our function is to assist the Italian Air Minister, yourself, and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run as efficient an Air Force as possible in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air/C-in-C. To this end various changes are to be made to my staff, to which officers will be posted whose duty it will be to advise and assist you to the greatest possible extent.
3. I must emphasise again that the Air/C-in-C has laid the responsibility for the efficiency of the Italian Air Force upon the shoulders of the Italian Air Ministry. I can only assure you that I will do everything possible to help you to maintain and improve that efficiency, and will be only too glad to offer you my advice at any time, should you require it.
4. The broad outlines of the Air/C-in-C's policy as regards the Italian Air Force were passed to you in Sir John Blesser's letter JCS.1076 of the 15th January 1945, which was written following the discussions with you on the 14th January 1945. In the following paragraphs I shall set forth the application of this policy in accordance with instructions which I have received from the Air/C-in-C.
5. In paragraph 4 of the above quoted letter the Air/C-in-C informed you of his intention to appoint a Technical Commission to determine what Italian Equipped Units could be employed usefully, and could be maintained from Italian resources for a period of 12 months. The report of this Technical Commission has now been

that your Force should continue to function efficiently. This has been particularly so in the case of the Engineering and Technical Branches.

2. The efficiency of the Italian Air Force is therefore entirely the responsibility of the Italian Air Ministry, and the Italian Air Force must stand or fall by the efforts of the Air Ministry to turn it into an efficient and well organized Force. While the staff of this Sub-Commission is no longer to take upon itself the duties of Italian Officers, our function is to assist the Italian Air Minister, yourself, and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run as efficient an Air Force as possible in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air/C-in-C. To this end various changes are to be made to my staff, to which officers will be posted whose duty it will be to advise and assist you to the greatest possible extent.

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5. In paragraph 4 of the above quoted letter the Air/C-in-C informed you of his intention to appoint a Technical Commission to determine what Italian Equipped Units could be employed usefully, and could be maintained from Italian resources for a period of 12 months. The report of this Technical Commission has now been examined and approved at Headquarters R.A.A.F., and a decision has been arrived at as to the future composition of the Italian Air Force, until the conclusion of the war against Germany. This is set out in the Appendix attached to this letter. To the units shown may be added the minimum necessary repair and maintenance units, the Air Ministry, and the essential administrative and Operational Headquarters and depots. I am to instruct you to take immediate steps to implement this policy.

6. The first step is to select the individual aircraft to be retained in the front line, and immediate reserve, and those to be cannibalised in order to back the front line and reserve aircraft. In this connection the Technical Commission has prepared a very valuable list of individual aircraft showing their state of serviceability, and with recommendations as to their disposal. All remaining aircraft are to have the A.C.S. equipment, instruments, etc. removed from them, and are then to be reduced to produce under Allied supervision. I am to instruct you to organise working parties with Italian Air Force labour, and I must request you to forward to me, as soon as possible, your proposals as to the number of these parties, their composition and location, so that I may approve the scheme and call for the necessary R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. engineer Officers to supervise the work.

Continued 12.....
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7. In paragraph 5 of the D/AD-ops-C's letter referred to above you will see that it is his opinion that the *MACCHIS* can no longer be regarded as first line types. This has been confirmed by the Technical Commission, and these aircraft must now be relegated to training, as shown in the Appendix to this letter. It is realised that these aircraft are particularly dear to the hearts of your operational pilots, and that their removal from the front line will be a sad blow to them. I must count on you to keep their morale up in spite of this, and I shall be only too pleased to help you in every possible way by visiting the units, or in any other way, if you consider that it would be of any help.
8. You will see from the Appendix that the great mass of aircraft of very diverse types and very high unserviceability, which are to be found in the Antennas Squadrons, the Communications Squadron, the school at Leverano, and elsewhere, will have to be scrapped. I fully realise that this will be a blow to many pilots who will otherwise have no opportunity to fly, but I must point out that these aircraft have been using Allied petrol and oil, and to a great extent Allied material in order to be kept serviceable, and that they have not, and cannot contribute in any way whatever to the Allied war effort, and that the Allies therefore cannot afford to continue to maintain them.
9. All Italian Headquarters and Units - including the Air Ministry, squadrons, depots and maintenance units, must have proper establishments of officers and other ranks, and no officers or other ranks over and above the authorized establishments can be allowed. All personnel surplus to these establishments, within the ceiling of 31,000 are to be made available for employment with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.
10. I have been instructed to have these establishments drawn up at once, and to assist your Staff and mine in this an experienced establishment Staff officer from Headquarters M.A.A.F. will be sent to us.
11. I have also been instructed to obtain from you, at once, a complete return of all officers and other ranks on the strength of the Italian Air Force, and this return is to show where and how the personnel are employed. I should be grateful if you would give instructions for this return to be prepared as soon as possible.
12. I have also been instructed to request that you take immediate steps to bring the Italian Air Force up to its full strength of 31,000, by recruitment or other means. According to my information the actual strength is about 23,000, so that the deficiency is in the neighbourhood of 3,000 men.
13. I know that the above proposals will appear to you to be somewhat drastic, but I am sure that you will agree that this will result in a small but efficient force which will be fit to assist the Allied Air Forces in their defeat of the Germans. I have the greatest confidence in your ability to implement these instructions quickly, and without causing any lowering of the morale and efficiency of the operational squadrons.
14. I can only repeat that I and my Staff are most anxious to give you all possible help and advice in carrying out the tasks detailed above.

9. All Italian Headquarters and Units - including the Air Ministry, squadrons, depots and maintenance units, must have proper establishments of officers and other ranks, and no officers or other ranks over and above the authorized establishments can be allowed. All personnel surplus to these establishments, within the ceiling of 31,000 are to be made available for employment with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.

10. I have been instructed to have these establishments drawn up at once, and to assist your Staff and mine in this an experienced establishment Staff officer from Headquarters M.A.A.F. will be lent to us.

11. I have also been instructed to obtain from you, at once, a complete return of all officers and other ranks on the strength of the Italian Air Force, and this return is to state where and how the personnel are employed. I should be grateful if you would give instructions for this return to be prepared as soon as possible.

12. I have also been instructed to request that you take immediate steps to bring the Italian Air Force up to its full strength of 31,000, by recruitment or other means. According to my information the actual strength is about 20,000, so that the deficiency is in the neighbourhood of 11,000 men.

13. I know that the above proposals will appear to you to be somewhat drastic, but I am sure that you will agree that this will result in a small but efficient Force which will be fit to assist the Allied Air Forces in their defeat of the Germans. I have the greatest confidence in your ability to implement these instructions quickly, and without causing any lowering of the morale and efficiency of the operational squadrons.

14. I can only repeat that I and my Staff are most anxious to give you all possible help and advice in carrying out the tasks detailed above.

WB

W.A.R. BOWEN-THOMAS,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

R.E. General M. Aimeo Cat,
Chief of Air Staff,
Italian Air Ministry,
Rome.

Copy:

R.E. Doctor Indigi Casparetto, Minister for Air, Italian Air Ministry, Rome.
Headquarters, M.A.A.F. C.M.F.
Chief Commissioner, Headquarters, Allied Commission, Rome.

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Aircraft	Present Italian Number	Aircraft U.S.	Present Controlling Formation
S.N.F.	P. 39 P. 39 Spit V	Gruppen 10 " 12 " 20	B.A.F. " "
SEAFLANE	CZ. 506 CZ. 501 Bl. 14	Gruppen 83 " 85 " 85	M.A.C.A.F. " "
LIGHT BOMBERS	Balts Balts	Gruppen 23 Gruppen 132	B.A.F. B.A.F.
TRANSPORT	SM. 82 CZ. 1007 SAI. 202	Gruppen 1 " 88 " "	B.A.F. B.A.F. B.A.F.
COMMUNICATION	SM. 79 CA. 314 SAI. 202	" " " " " "	I.A.F. I.A.F. I.A.F.
F.T.S.	MAC. 200 CA. 184 CP. 42	12 3 3	I.A.F. I.A.F. I.A.F.
O.S.U. and P.F.U.	MAC. 202 MAC. 205 SAI. P. 39 Balt. Spit.	16 16 1 Present holdings Allied types " " " " " "	8) 8) 4) subject to confirmation

ALLIED FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

SECRET.

AFSC/23/AIR.

27th February, 1945.

Dear

With reference to your letter JCS.1379 dated 23rd February 1945, this arrived just before I paid a visit to General Aime Cat, and I put over a number of the points verbally so as to prepare him for my letter which I will write to him based on yours.

2. With regard to paragraph 3 of your letter, the General is just about to go down to Bari for a few days with the main object in view of establishing his H.Q. and Units down there on the lines of ~~the~~ standard R.A.F. establishment. You have promised me the assistance of an establishment Staff officer from M.A.A.F., and I would like to suggest that if possible he should come up here at once so that he can tackle the problems of the Air Ministry and higher formations, before taking on the lower ones. It might then be advantageous if he went to Bari at the same time that the General is there, which would be in about a week or ten days time.

3. With regard to paragraph 5, it is hoped that the 3,000 odd men will be ready by the 5th March, in fact General Aime Cat has promised me that they will be. The Americans, through M.M.I.A., have promised to fit them out with equipment and clothing, provided that they are sent to them not entirely naked. I hope that arrangements are now complete to transport the men from wherever they have been collected, (probably in the Rome area,) direct to their places of employment. The task of moving them all to Bari would be an impossible one with the very limited transport at the disposal of the I.A.F.

4. The above points are the only ones on which I can make comment at the moment, but I am getting ahead at once with telling the General what he has got to do, and I will get on with the other points immediately.

Yours

WB

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, KCB, DSO, MC,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

5434

From : Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, K.C.B., O.S.D., M.C.

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

JCS. 1379

SECRET

23rd February 1945

Dear Buscaillet

1 The object of this letter is to confirm the conclusions arrived at during the conference in my office on 14th February. The report of the Technical Commission under Group Captain Bailey was examined and approved with some modifications. In accordance with the policy summarized in paras. 4 and 5 of my letter to General Admons Cat, JCS.1076 of 15th January, the Italian Air Force to be retained is summarized in the Appendix to this letter - to which you should add the minimum necessary repair and maintenance units, the Air Ministry, the essential administrative and operational Headquarters and depots. You should instruct the Italian Air Ministry accordingly, and initiate action to implement this policy. The immediate steps to be taken are as follows.

2 The first step is to select the aircraft to be retained in first line, and immediate reserve, and those to be cannibalized under the recommendations of the Bailey report to back the others. Concurrently, arrangements should be made to remove A.G.S. equipment, instruments, etc. from the remainder, which should then be reduced to produce under same vision. Working parties must be organized with Italian Air Force labour, but you should inform this Headquarters early as to the assistance you require in the form of R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. engineer officers.

3 It is essential to ensure that the Italian Headquarters Units - including the Air Ministry - squadrons, depots, and maintenance units, are properly established in officers and other ranks, but have no more than their establishments. (Tables of organization). All personnel surplus to these establishments are to be made available for employment with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.

With the assistance of an establishment Staff officer from this Headquarters, you are to draw up, in conjunction with the Italian Air Ministry, establishments for all I.A.F. units and headquarters, on lines similar to R.A.F. establishments.

/ s ✓

Air Vice-Marshal W.A.P. Townen-Buscaillet, C.B.E., D.F.C.
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,
ROME.

6133

In June a week

- 2 -

4 It is clear from Group Captain Mitchell's report that the personnel administration of the I.A.F. is, to put it mildly, rudimentary. As a preliminary to reposting to fill the new establishments, you should obtain from the Italian Air Ministry a complete return of all officers and other ranks on the strength of the I.A.F., which should be checked with the Commissariat to ensure that it tallies with the ration strength. This return should show how and where the personnel are employed, and you should check the accuracy of the return by snap inspections.

5 The authorized ration strength of the I.A.F. is 34,000 men. It is understood that the actual strength is only about 28,000. This deficiency is now entirely borne by the U.S.A.A.F., who are 3,026 men short of their quota of 6,500.

You are to instruct the Italian Air Ministry

5. March
- (a) that the 3,026 men mentioned above (less those mentioned in para. 6 below) are to be produced without fail by March 15th, and made available to the U.S.A.A.F. at RAFI. They should either be recruited or drawn from existing units and establishments; if the latter, you should ensure that they are found in a way that will least affect the operational effort of Air Force squadrons equipped with Allied types.
 - (b) immediately to take steps to recruit for the I.A.F. up to the full authorized strength of 34,000.

If there are any difficulties in the way of equipment or clothing, they should be reported at once to this Headquarters.

6 The personnel for the headquarters of the four Z.A.T. have to be found from the surplus available after the needs of the rest of the I.A.F. have been met. Z.A.T. establishments should be drawn up on the minimum essential scale and the necessary personnel posted.

/ 7

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- 3 -

7 No I.A.F. personnel should be employed anywhere except in authorized established Headquarters and units, and the strength in the depots should be kept to the essential minimum. All the remainder are to be made available to the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F., in proportions to be decided by this Headquarters.

8 It will be necessary for you to make a comprehensive review of your organization and the staff of A.F.S.C., viewed in the light of the foregoing. In doing this, you should bear in mind that the primary responsibility for the efficiency of the Italian Air Force must rest upon the Italian Air Minister and Air Ministry, and that it is not part of your duty specifically to do for them what they should be able to do for themselves. You are to advise and to provide such assistance as the Italians may in the present circumstances reasonably expect, and without which their own efforts are bound to fail.

You should therefore draw up a proposed establishment, to meet the needs of the situation as you see it, for discussion with the Org. 2 (Establishments) Branch at this Headquarters. You should inform A.C.A., U.S.A.A.F. as soon as this is done, so that the talks can be begun and your establishment reviewed without delay.

Young

J. H. Slessor

Copy to : Deputy Commanding General, U.S.A.A.F./M.T.O.

5131

SECRET

ITALIAN AIR FORCE : (Recommended by the Bailey Report and amended by instructions of the C-in-C, MEDITERRANEAN)

Aircraft		Present Italian Number.	Aircraft U.S.	Present Controlling Formation.
S.E.F.	P.39	Gruppo 10	16	B.A.F.
	P.39	" 12	16	"
	Spit. V	" 20	16	"
SEAFARER	CZ.506	Gruppo 83	16	M.A.C.A.F.
	CZ.501	" 85	10	"
	CS. 11	" 85	6	"
LIGHT BOMBERS	Falco.	Gruppo 28	16	B.A.F.
	Belts.	" 132	16	"
TRANSPORT	SM. 82	Gruppo 1	12	B.A.F.
	CZ.1007	" 88	5	"
	SAI.202	" -	1	"
COMMUNICATION.	SM. 79	- -	15	I.A.F.
	CA. 314	- -	2	"
	SAI.202	- -	3	"
F.T.S.	MAC.200	- -	12	I.A.F.
	CA. 164	- -	3	"
	CR. 42	- -	3	"
O.P.U. and R.F.U.	MAC.202	- -	16	I.A.F.
	MAC.205	- -	16	"
	SAI.	- -	1	"
		Present holdings	Allied Types	8 } subject to confirmation.
		"	"	8 }
		"	"	4 }

S. 1000

5430

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
 APO 391
 Office of the Executive Commissioner.
 ++++++



Ref: 8501/17/EC.

26 February 1945.

SUBJECT: New Directive - Air Force ✓
 Sub-Commission.

TO : Director, Air Force Sub-Commission.

1. I refer to Paper No. SAC(P)(45) 3 dated 16 February 1945, on the above subject, copy of which was forwarded you by this office.

2. Herewith for your information an extract from the Minutes of SACMRD's Political Conference of 20 February 1945 at which this paper was discussed.

/50.

E. Gordon
 for Chief Staff Officer
 Executive Commissioner.

TOP SECRETEXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 77

SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
20th February, 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(Political)

* * *

6. REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, revised in accordance with the new policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR explained that the Italian Air Force was undergoing reorganization and all elements were being eliminated which could not be used in the war against GERMANY. This would reduce the size of the force and would free personnel for Allied maintenance establishments. The object of the new directive was to lay the responsibility for running the Italian Air Force on the Italian Government's own shoulders. He felt that the risk should be accepted that the administration of the Italian Air Force might in this case break down through inefficiency. He added that the Sub-Commission had hitherto examined the political tendencies of officers whom it was proposed to appoint to important positions and enquired whether any alternative machinery for effecting this existed.

PEAR ABNETHAL STONE replied that this function might appropriately be exercised by the Security section of the Allied Commission. He suggested that a paragraph should be inserted stating that the Head of the Sub-Commission was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on all matters not connected with the operation of the Italian Air Force, or with its administration.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that the third sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft directive should be modified to make it clear that "political reasons" rendering an officer unsuitable for an appointment referred

X

Y

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, revised in accordance with the new policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR explained that the Italian Air Force was undergoing reorganization and all elements were being eliminated which could not be used in the war against GERMANY. This would reduce the size of the force and would free personnel for Allied maintenance establishments. The object of the new directive was to lay the responsibility for running the Italian Air Force on the Italian Government's own shoulders. He felt that the risk should be accepted that the administration of the Italian Air Force might in this case break down through inefficiency. He added that the Sub-Commission had hitherto examined the political tendencies of officers whom it was proposed to appoint to important positions and enquired whether any alternative machinery for effecting this existed.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that this function might appropriately be exercised by the Security section of the Allied Commission. He suggested that a paragraph should be inserted stating that the Head of the Sub-Commission was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on all matters not connected with the operation of the Italian Air Force, or with its administration.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that the third sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft directive should be modified to make it clear that "political reasons" rendering an officer unsuitable for an appointment referred only to his previous Fascist sympathies.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON enquired whether, since the revised directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission had been stated to be necessary on account of the new directive in respect of the functions of the Allied Commission, it was also implied that a fresh directive for the Land Forces Sub-Commission was desirable. He did not himself read into telegram No. FAN 487 the implication that fresh service directives were in fact necessary.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING expressed the view that any tendency to redefine the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, or otherwise to interfere with the organization of the Italian land forces at present, should be resisted.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM observed that the arrangements in respect of the Naval Sub-Commission were somewhat different from those in respect of the Air Force Sub-Commission, but did not conflict with them.

MR. KIRK enquired whether it was proposed to appoint a Deputy to Air Vice Marshal Bowen Buscarlet as Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY added that he would put forward the name of an American officer for this appointment.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR replied that this appointment would be welcome and added that he had asked for certain other American officers to assist in the work of the Sub-Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved the draft directives to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, as circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3, subject to its amendment to cover the suggestions at 'X' and 'Y' above, and directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for its issue as amended.
- (b) Directed that no amendment be made at present to the directive of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.
- (c) Took note with approval that it was the intention to appoint an American Deputy to the Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

1 0 7 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

6A

AFSC/23/AIR.

26th February 1945.

Dear

With reference to my letter of even reference dated 23rd February 1945, on re-reading it I find a small error which might make a great deal of difference. In line four of the third paragraph would you insert "would" between "I" and "find", thus reading "that I would find it quite impossible to carry on".

Yours

Air Vice-Marshal G. Baker, CB, CBE, MC,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

3126

AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

5A

AF/C/23/AIR.

26th February 1945.

Dear

With further reference to my letter of even reference dated 23rd February 1945, I have devoted some considerable thought to Admiral Stone's proposed amendment, and I have also discussed the matter with the G.O.C, Land Forces Sub-Commission whose job is very much more parallel to mine than is that of the Naval Sub-Commission.

2. As I see it we have a dual function. Under the Armistice terms, to disarm the Italian Air Force, and under the directives issued by you to arm and make efficient the Italian Air Force in aid of the Allied war effort. In practice perhaps 1% of our work is devoted to the former, and 99% to the latter. To my mind the crux of the matter is put in paragraph 5 of the Deputy/Air Commander-in-Chief's proposed new directive, and if we stick to our guns as regards that, we should not go far wrong.

3. I would suggest, therefore, that we might, if Admiral Stone still wants his new paragraph, amend it as follows:-

"On operational matters (including organisation, personnel, maintenance, supply, training, and equipment, etc), the Director....."

the remainder of the paragraph to read as suggested by Admiral Stone. I think the etcetera is probably a good thing to have as it leaves some room for latitude.

4. It might be of interest to you to see the Army directive which is issued in a document called "Status and functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA)", the reference number being AFHQ/AG.091.112/079.GCT.O. dated 25th October 1944. The Land Forces Sub-Commission set great store by the continued use of the initials MMIA, since these describe their functions in relation to the operational role of the Italian Army as distinct from their obligations under the Armistice terms.

5. I have been unable to discuss the matter with Stone as he is not here at present.

Yours

WB.

Air Vice-Marshal G. Baker, CB, CBE, MC,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.SECRET.

AFSC/23/AIR.

23rd February, 1945.

Dear

With reference to our conversation of yesterday, you will now have received the proposal by the Chief Commissioner for an additional paragraph for the proposed new directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission under the reference number CC.100 of the 21st February, 1945.

2. I must say I really fail to understand it as it is so vague, but I will take the first opportunity of discussing the matter with the Chief Commissioner.

would

3. I would, however, like to stress that no man can efficiently serve two masters, and that the matters which Admiral Stone suggests we should be responsible to him for are so wide and overlap to such an extent with what I think he means by operational matters, that I find it quite impossible to carry on. I do feel that this is an Air Forces Sub-Commission with a M.A.A.F. establishment and that we should be, once and for all, responsible to M.A.A.F., although as I explained to you, we are only too willing to tie in with the Allied Commission, and receive help from and give help to them.

Yours

W.B.

Air Vice-Marshal G. Baker, CB, CBE, MC,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

3A

CC 100

21 February 1945

In connection with the proposed new directive for the Air Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, I suggest that a paragraph be added reading substantially as follows:

"On operational matters, the Director of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be under the direction of MAAF. On all matters which come under the cognizance of the Air Forces Sub-Commission under the armistice terms, the Director of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be directly responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission."

15/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, CBE, DSO, MC,
Deputy Commander in Chief,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,
APO 512.

cc: Air Forces S/C
Ex. Comm.
CC files

Status and functions
of the Land Forces Sub-
Commission of the Allied Commission
(MMAA)

AG 091. 112 / 079 GCT-O

25 October 1944
5127

2A

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: VICE PRESIDENT, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION,
H.Q. A.C. ROME.
COPY: LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.
COPY: NAVY SUB-COMMISSION.

DATE: 23RD FEBRUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/357/ORG.

SECRET.

2A 357/ORG

With reference to your 4/32 A/CA dated 22nd February 1945, it is confirmed that the views of this Sub-Commission are:

(a) That the posts of Air Minister, Under Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Staff should be subject to the approval of SACARD, through the Allied Commission.

(b) The Heads of Branches in the Italian Air Ministry and Officers Commanding and Chiefs of Staff of the Unita Aerea (Operational Headquarters) and four Zones, should be subject to the approval of the Allied Commission.

2. In this connection will you please note the new directive which has been issued by Allied Force Headquarters under reference SAC(A) (45)3 dated 16th February. From this it will be seen that it is the intention to interfere to a far less extent than heretofore with the appointment of Officers in the Italian Air Force. The directive has, however, not yet become effective as it has not been approved, and it is considered advisable to retain the provisions set forth in paragraph 1 above, pending the final issue of the directive.

WB.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

23/2/45

3122

SECRET

SAC (P) (45) 3
16th February, 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-60

SECRET
COPY NO. 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION
OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Deputy Air Commander - in - Chief

1. In accordance with what I understand to be the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions and giving the Italians themselves more responsibility, it has been thought necessary to revise the directive (Annex II) to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.
2. The revised directive (Annex I) which it is proposed to issue is attached hereto for the consideration of the Political Committee who, I suggest should be asked to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-
 - (a) Whether the underlying conception is in accordance with the general policy now being followed by the Allied Commission.
 - (b) Whether this directive in any way conflicts with the policy under which the Italian Army and Navy are controlled, and
 - (c) Whether it provides for adequate safeguards against the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, such as it is, being ruined by political activities among Italian Air Force officers.

Distribution

(Intd) J.C.S.

Copy No.

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- (c) Whether it provides for adequate safeguards against the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, such as it is, being ruined by political activities among Italian Air Force officers.

(Intd) J.C.S.

Distribution

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
- Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
- Chief, G-3 Operations Section
- Chief, G-3 Plans Section
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAP
- U.S. Political Adviser
- British Resident Minister
- Director, PWR
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Secretary, General Staff
- Inter Service and Political Secretariat
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- 1-cc Copy No 32
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- 1- Air Force SC - Copy No 34



SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

K-60

ANNEX I

SECRET

TO : Air Vice-Marshal V.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet, C.B.E., D.F.C.
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

FROM : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on 7th December 1944, under reference No. JCS.1821.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

As representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows :-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

Your primary function, in general is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State.

As representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows :-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

Your primary function, in general is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the I.A.F.; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any I.A.F. personnel unless they intrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the I.A.F.; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which I.A.F. personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the I.A.F. authorities themselves.

Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under ARHC whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

SECRET

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785017

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5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of MAIF concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate AGC and his staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

6. Five squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the I.A.F. authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against Germany, in which should be included such Communications units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is one for the Air C-in-C acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry do not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by the Air C-in-C.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate MAIF subordinate Commander.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ, MAIF. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the MAIF Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F. manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the I.A.F. and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the theatre.

- or those authorized by the Air C-in-C.
7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate I.A.F. subordinate Commander.
 8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ, I.A.F. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the I.A.F. Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.
 9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F. manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the portion to be employed in the I.A.F. and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.
 10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.
 11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of HQ, I.A.F., any information that they may obtain that may effect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at HQ I.A.F.

Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

SECRET

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1084

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

K-60
SECRET

TO: Air Vice Marshal W.A.S. Bowen-Buscalet, CBE, DFC.
Air Force Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Date: 7th December, 1944.

Ref: JCS.1831.

Your duties as senior officer of the Air Forces Sub-commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To recognize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

1083

2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.

5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.

6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

(sgd) J.C. SLESSOR,
Air Marshal

Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief

5117
SECRET

DRAFTSECRETDIRECTIVE TO THE HEAD OF THE AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,ALLIED COMMISSION.

1. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

As representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows:-

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of Germany.

Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, within the limits of their authorised resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, ~~the~~ the efficiency of the Italian

Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first ^{to} ~~to~~ *transmit to the Italian Air Minister the policy instructions of the A.C.M.C.* to assist them with advice and with such material resources as

are ~~can be~~ made available by the Allies, ~~and~~ ^{you will} ~~essentially~~, If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, ~~to~~ make

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Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 34,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of Germany.

Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, ~~the~~ the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to

Presumed to be the Italian Air Minister, the policy is to assist them with advice and with such material resources as are

~~can be~~ made available by the Allies, ~~and~~ *if* in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, ~~to~~ *you will* make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

3. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. You should actively discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice, ~~and in no circumstances should you or your staff become involved in any form of political activity.~~ In the event of a change of Government in Italy you will be responsible for

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advising the Air C-in-C in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission - as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the I.A.F.; in doing so, however, ^{as far as possible} you should consult the appropriate branch of the Allied Commission. ~~also~~ ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political background of any I.A.F. personnel; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which I.A.F. personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the I.A.F. authorities themselves.

Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, those branches of the Allied Commission and other bodies under A.F.W.Q. whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of M.A.A.F. concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate A.O.C. and his staff. You should keep these branches fully

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ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political background of any I.A.F. personnel; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which I.A.F. personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the I.A.F. authorities themselves.

Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, those branches of the Allied Commission and other bodies under A.F.V.Q. whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of M.A.A.F. concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate A.O.C. and his staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

5. Five squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the I.A.F. authorities retain in the Service only such Italian - equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against Germany, in which should be included such Communication units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under

/ this.....

this category is one for the Air C-in-C acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry do not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by Air C-in-C.

6. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate M.A.A.F. subordinate Commander.

7. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to H.Q., M.A.A.F. All reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the M.A.A.F. commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters, which will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

8. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F.

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Air Force to H.Q., M.A.A.F. All reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the M.A.A.F. commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time such as on matters of organisation, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters, ^{the latter} which will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

8. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorised, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F. manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the I.A.F. and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the

Air C-in-C.

9. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is

/occupied,

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occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against Germany.

10. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of H.Q., M.A.A.F., any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at H.Q., M.A.A.F.

13 February 1945

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