

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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POLICY, RE-ORGANIZATION OF IAF
MAY 1944 - MAR. 1945

NOTE.

Reference to this file
now becomes (30/7/44)

S. 344 / ORG.

Letters for the next week or so
may bear reference:-

S. 15 / AIR 5900

The following Encls. have been
-extracted & re-allocated as shown:-

34A - on 22/AIR
35A - Eng.
36A - Eng.
37A - 22/AIR
38A - 22/AIR
39A - 345/Org.
HIA - 334/ORG.

24/8/46.

E. J. Gammag

5901 -

COPY.

SECRET.

REF. AG 334/111 IS-S-O. dated 6th March 1945.

DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION. ALLIED COMMISSION.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on 7th December 1944, under reference Number JGS.1301.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. As representative of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces you will be responsible to the Air Commander-in-Chief. As a member of the Allied Commission you are responsible to the Chief Commissioner on matters, which, under the Armistice Terms, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorised manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air Commander-in-Chief, within the limits of their authorised resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make it clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air Commander-in-Chief, and secondly, to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air Commander-in-Chief, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the Italian Air Force

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3899

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b. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate Air Officer Commanding and his Staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

6. Five (5) squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the Italian Air Force authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against GERMANY, in which should be included such Communications

units as may be esse. 1.1 for internal courier service; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is one for the Air Commander-in-Chief acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by the Air Commander-in-Chief.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air Commander-in-Chief who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate Mediterranean Allied Air Forces subordinate Commander.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the Operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, with decision on the proportion to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air Commander-in-Chief.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.

11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of the Commanding General Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

sgd. [Signature]
Colonel, AGP.
Adjutant General.

CIPHER MSGE 160/9 IMPORTANT
TO: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ALLIED COM. BARI (BAF PASS)
FROM: AIR FORCES SUB COMM ROME TOO 091410A FEB

ABLE 49 SECRET

FOR DENNY FROM BUSCARLET . YOUR 344 ORG OF 7 FEB. ONE. GENERAL

GAETA HAS GONE OUTSIDE HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE FROM AIMONE

CAT IN RAISING THIS POSSIBLE HE WILL BE ORDERED NOT TO RAISE IT

BUT WILL INFORM YOU ON THIS LATER . TWO. REQUEST YOU SEE ELLIOT

AND ASK HIM NOT TO MAKE DEFINITE DECISION TILL HE HAS SEEN ME

IN LATTER HALF NEXT WEEK. THREE. MY VIEWS ARE (A) BAF HAS NOT

EXPERIENCE OR CLOSE TOUCH WITH ITALIANS WE HAVE AND WILL HAVE

TO ASK OUR ADVICE OFTEN (B) TO ENSURE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY

OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SIDE MUST BE IN CLOSEST TOUCH WITH OPERATIONS

(C) ITALIANS HAVE NOT PROVED THEY CAN HANDLE OPERATIONAL SIDE

WITHOUT USUAL ITALIAN DELAYS, MISTAKES, AND GENERAL INEFFICIENCY

(D) PRESENT SCHEME OF BAF DEALING DIRECT WITH FIGHTER LIAISON

SECTION, 254 WING OR 334 WING SEEMS TO BE IDEAL AND TO CUT OUT

POSSIBILITIES OF DELAYS AND MISTAKES ~~CEQ~~ NO OBJECTION TO ITALIANS

HAVING THEIR OWN OPERATIONS ROOM AND MAINTAINING CLOSEST LIAISON

WITH BAF BUT THEIR COMMUNICATIONS ARE GOOD REASON FOR CUTTING OUT

UNITS AS ANOTHER STEP BETWEEN BAF AND UNITS ALSO WE MUST ALWAYS

BE RIGHT IN PICTURE. FOUR. DIRECTIVE TO GAETA WAS TO PUT HIS

KINGDOM IN ORDER NOT TO ENLARGE IT-AND SUGGEST HE FIRST GETS

DOWN TO SOME SEMBLANCE OF ORGANISATION IN HIS COMMAND. FIVE . LET

ME KNOW ELLIOTS REACTIONS

TOO 091605A DECPHD 092000A/12
C+ARM+2132+

DIST:- AFSC AC BARI

General Gaeta told not to raise matter.

SECRET

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Royal Air Force, BARI.

AFSC/344/OKC.

7th February, 1945.

Dear

ROC

To-day Smythe (D.A.F. Deputy S.A.S.C.) showed me the attached memorandum, and suggested you might like to express your views on it before his A.C.C. sees the General. He is probably seeing him on Monday.

2. It is quite obviously a matter for your decision, and a ticklish one at that. My comments are only made because I am here, and not available for any discussion with you should you desire.

3. Apart from the typically Italian way of going about such a matter of major policy it would appear on the surface to be a very logical and practical change. The A.F.S.C. is relieved of the buffer position which it at present holds between R.A.F. and the I.A.F. operational units; and direct liaison and cooperation between the two are simplified. It is also more in keeping with the decisive/administrative role which the A.F.S.C. is filling.

4. As against this, and apart from the question of whether B.A.F. desire any closer contact about current operations, it is doubtful even so whether any extra work or efficiency would be achieved by cutting out the A.F.S.C., who must after all be in the picture when moves take place.

5. The great weakness is that each command - Ministry, Units, Area and 40. I.A.F. - is 'watertight', and takes no interest in the units. If the C.O. of Units' Areas concentrated upon the weaknesses of 40. I.A.F., and saw that it attended to the needs and functions of the units, then he would be fulfilling a useful function. It would appear that he is widening his kingdom before putting it in order.

6. In conclusion, it is considered that this is an opportunity for establishing a clearer relationship between the commands; so that if fighter units in the Canne mud are crying for gun boots then Units' Areas become aware of the fact and see that they are issued by 40. I.A.F. When they have proved their ability to administer, then the question of operational control could be considered.

7. There are also of course the points that A.F.S.C. can be played off against B.A.F., and procrastination may be facilitated by putting any unwelcome matter through the wrong office.

2. It is quite obviously a matter for your decision, and a ticklish one at that. My comments are only made because I am here, and not available for any discussion with you should you desire.

3. Apart from the typically Italian way of going about such a matter of major policy it would appear on the surface to be a very logical and practical change. The A.V.S.C. is relieved of the buffer position which it at present holds between I.A.F. and the I.A.F. operational units; and direct liaison and cooperation between the two are simplified. It is also more in keeping with the divisive/administrative role which the A.V.S.C. is filling.

4. As against this, and apart from the question of whether I.A.F. desire any closer contact about current operations, it is doubtful even so whether any extra work or efficiency would be achieved by cutting out the A.V.S.C., who must after all be in the picture when moves take place.

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6. In conclusion, it is considered that this is an opportunity for establishing a clearer relationship between the commands; so that if fighter units in the Carne mud are crying for gun boots then Units' Aerea becomes aware of the fact and sees that they are issued by Co. 2.A.T.. When they have proved their ability to administer, then the question of operational control could be considered.

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MD
P.M. DUNN,
GROUP CAPTAIN.

AIR VICE MARSHAL W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET, C.B.E., D.F.C.,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.

Bari, February, 2nd., 1945.

MEMO FOR GROUP CHAIRMAN SMITH.

Ref. to our conversation this morning.

General GAETA is asking to be introduced to Air Vice Marshal ELLIOT. The General proposes to submit to him the following points regarding the practical functioning of UNITA' AREA H.Q., and the connection between the latter and B.A.F. H.Q.

It is General GAETA's opinion that all operational matters affecting the Italian Squadrons should be dealt with by both B.A.F. H.Q. and UNITA' AREA H.Q. in close cooperation.

The C.O. of the UNITA' AREA, under which the Italian Squadrons operating with B.A.F. are, should be directly responsible towards the A.O.C. B.A.F.

On the other hand, all general problems of an administrative nature should be the concern of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

At present, instead, operational matters are dealt with between B.A.F. H.Q. and the Italian Squadrons direct, or through the A.F.S.C., without the UNITA' AREA H.Q. coming into the picture or playing any active part at all and there is no real working contact between B.A.F. and UNITA' AREA H.Q.

This seems to be in contrast with the fact that the A.F.S.C. is not an operational body, while the UNITA' AREA is. The latter is supposed to have operational authority over the Italian Squadrons and be responsible to B.A.F.

General GAETA would therefore like to hear A.V.M. ELLIOT'S opinion on this matter, which entails delicate problems of cooperation, discipline and responsibility.

(signed) MAJOR M. RUCCI.
ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICER.

5895

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet.
Mr. Macmillan.
Admiral Stone.
Air Vice-Marshal Cooke.
Group Captain Bailey.
Group Captain Denny.
Air Vice-Marshal Elliot.
Major-General Beaumont-Nesbitt.
D.A.F.L., Air Ministry.

With the compliments of
Air Marshal Sir John Slessor.

**HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES**

JCS 1976

SECRET

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The object of this letter is to summarize and confirm the conclusions reached at our meeting in Rome on January 15th.

In your letter 840101/89.V. of 10th January to the Vice Marshal Sussarriet you address yourself in a practical manner to certain questions of general policy governing the organization and employment of the Italian Air Force. I fully agree with you that at this time the situation was clarified, and that appropriate measures should be put in hand to dispose with superfluous organizations and personnel, and to retain and reorganize such organizations and personnel as are necessary.

2. In an early paragraph of your letter you refer to a point which unfortunately is necessarily obscure, and must remain so 5897 the Peace Settlement, namely the question of that part of the force destined to continue after peace is concluded. As I told you, I am not in a position to give you any guidance on that subject. All I am authorized to do is to advise in the equipment, organization and maintenance of such units of the Italian Air Force as can be usefully employed during the present war in the fight against the common enemy. In that I include units for training of replacement aircrew in such matters, and for essential transport services.

3. I think however that this does provide the necessary firm basis of policy on which to establish the reorganization of the Italian Air Force. The first factor is that, for reasons which I explained to you, I am unable to equip or maintain or allied types more than the 3 squadrons at present so equipped - namely, Squadron Spitfires, 2 squadrons P-59 and 1 squadron Baltimore.

4. Any other units that are retained must remain equipped with Italian aircraft. We agreed therefore that a review should be made of Italian resources by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and yourself, assisted by Staff Officers from this Headquarters, to determine what Italian equipped units can usefully be employed and can be maintained.

General Almona Det,
Chief of Staff,
Italian Air Force.

(From Italian...)

- 2 -

From Italian resources for a period of 12 months, which I think we can accept as a reasonable assumption to cover the duration of the war against Germany. An important factor in this review will be the work of the newly appointed Technical Commission and I am instructing Group Captain Sadler, the Engineer Officer representing this H.Q. on the Technical Commission, that the foregoing should be the basis of his work; and that he should recommend the immediate reduction to production of all aircraft which are not likely to be useful for this purpose. This follows a precedent recently adopted for British aircraft in this theatre, and I am sure you will agree that it would be quite wrong to maintain to enemy Italian Air Force personnel, equipment or other facilities in the repair or overhaul of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft that are never likely to be of any value for our purposes.

2. The entire composition of the reorganized Italian Air Force must await the outcome of the review referred to above, which should be pressed forward as expeditiously as possible. But it seems likely that it will be on the following lines:-

- (a) The three fighter and two light bomber squadrons **5891** referred to in para 1 above.
- (b) An operational training and refresher unit, to train the above squadrons and to keep in flying condition pilots of first line squadrons in between operational tours. I think this will be the best unit in which to keep the MARSHES, which can no longer be regarded as first line types.
- (c) A Bomber Transport Unit for supply dropping operations in the Balkans and for essential maintenance transport.
- (d) A Seaplane Unit or units for Air Sea Rescue, mine-spotting patrols and essential maintenance transport.

Revised

(c) The Department will have a number of other services, etc.

(d) such training, maintenance and other services as may be agreed upon in connection with the units in (a) or (b) above.

6. It is of the first importance that this plan should be based on a sound system of administrative organization. To this end it will be necessary to

(a) a small but carefully selected staff, centrally located, to administer only the Air Force and not to administer the Army, Navy, etc. I would suggest that you should consider the possibility of organizing a new staff in the Ministry of Defense.

(b) To deal with the Air Force as a whole, today, and

(c) To deal with the many aspects of operations of administration, finance, personnel, etc. that are the responsibility of the Air Force.

5889

I realize that the work of these two groups is bound to have some overlap, but feel that there is a great deal to be said for dealing with the two quite different problems of Air as separate entities.

(d) It will also be necessary to establish a small operational headquarters between the Air Ministry and the Air Force, to deal with the day-to-day problems of operations and administration of the Air Force in the field.

7. I think you will agree that in the above plan there should be no question of any fresh recruitment of officers or other staff. Indeed the problem becomes, as you have pointed out, one of the disposal of surplus personnel. I hope that, in this connection, you will give special consideration to the disposal of officers who have reached an age when they are no longer be profitably employed in their work, and to the advancement of younger officers with good operational records. I am sure you will also give special

attention to the disposal of those officers whose names have been put forward by the I.A.F. appears to be more political than professional.

8. The number of maintenance and specialist personnel that will be surplus to the needs of the Force in para 5 above will become apparent on the termination of the review referred to in para 1. As I told you, the I.A.F. may be able to make a valuable contribution to the war effort by making available such surplus personnel as can usefully be employed on war work. In the maintenance organization behind the British and, to their far freedom in the New Territories, Allied technical personnel who could be put to other theatres of war. I have instructed Sir Vincent to ask the Director of Maintenance and Supply, to undertake the appropriate work, and in connection with the I.A.F., an American technical officer and Italian for handling, an investigation into the technical qualifications of I.A.F. ground personnel surplus to the needs of the recognized I.A.F., and to report on the numbers that could be absorbed in British and American maintenance units. In this connection I think we should not overlook the possibility that such personnel might usefully be employed after the defeat of Germany, in the far eastern theatre of war against our other common enemy Japan.

5887

9. Turning to certain specific points raised in your letters of 7th and 10th January to Sir Vice Marshal Buxton, which we also discussed at our meeting.

First the question of the scale and standard of food, pay, clothing and equipment of the I.A.F. while serving with the R.A.F.

(a) As to food, the Air Force Sub-committee and this Sub. have devoted considerable efforts to obtaining a higher standard of rationing for the operational squadrons; as I told you on Saturday we have been able to secure an increase in the ration which, while not as large as I should have liked, will nevertheless I hope constitute a marked improvement.

(b) I agree with you that as to scale of pay is inadequate, and will take up the case with the Chief Commissioner. This, however, is a complicated matter with the details of which I am not familiar and I am, of course, quite unable to promise that my attempt to obtain some increase of pay will meet with success.

/s/

- 5 -

- (c) Clothing and equipment. We have recently been able to provide some help in this direction - for instance the provision of boots; and I will continue to give you such assistance as may be essential to the extent that is within my powers. I would like to emphasize, however, what I told you at our meeting, that this problem of clothing and equipment is one which I believe can to a considerable extent be solved by the Italian Air Force themselves. I am sure you will find, when you have had more time to investigate the problem, that the equipment system of the I.A.F. is extremely inefficient. The example you quote of the oxygen mask continues to be an example that many of your troubles are due to an almost complete lack of any proper equipment organization comparable to that in the U.S.A. It is partly this lack of system which accounts to some extent for the difficulties and lack of faith with which demands for the supply of Allied material are sometimes met - as referred to in your letter of 7th January. It has been our experience that I.A.F. units are very liable to over-depend on us for help in equipment problems which they could solve themselves if they had an efficient system.

I have arranged for an Equipment Commission, on the lines of the Technical Commission referred to in para. 4 above, to be set on foot as early as possible. And I hope you will instruct your Equipment Staff to collaborate fully with this Commission, to establish as quickly as possible in the I.A.F. a proper equipment system - including arrangements for stock taking and the establishment of an equipment table on R.A.F. lines. Only by such means can we determine what are the real needs of the units, what are the resources available to meet them and consequently the scale and nature of the deficiencies which we will endeavour as far as possible to make good.

10. I explained to you the reasons, mainly the already excessive congestion on forward airfields, why I.A.F. fighter squadrons can not be employed on the Italian front itself. I hope, however, you will explain to the fighter units that they are making a valuable contribution to the liberation of ITALY by operations in the ITALIAN AIR FORCE against the enemy in YUGOSLAVIA.

But I understand the keenness of ITALIAN personnel to take some part in the war in their own country, and I will discuss with the Air Officer Commanding Desert Air Force the possibility of

/s/ [Signature]

- 6 -

using the Baltimore squadrons against German targets in the Po Valley area.

11. I will at once discuss with Allied Force Headquarters the possibility of releasing the Italian Air Ministry building for your use, and will let you know if this proves possible.

12. I was not aware of the points raised in your letter of 7th January about the maltreatment of Italian officers in Albania. I am afraid this is to some extent inevitable, and it may be relevant to point out that we have also had examples of Allied civilian personnel being maltreated after forced landing or being cut in the Balkans. But we may possibly be able to be of some assistance in this matter - as also in the matter of obtaining information about I.A.F. personnel who are missing or operations - provided all such incidents are immediately reported, through A.F.S.C. Headquarters in Bari, to the Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force.

13. I am having the possibility examined of issuing some form of identity card to I.A.F. personnel serving with the R.A.F., to avoid such humiliating incidents as that of Major Valentini, which I much regret. We shall require your closest collaboration in the difficult matter of avoiding misuse of these identity cards, notably the most rigorous disciplinary action against any personnel convicted of such misuse. I will let you know in due course if it proves possible to come to some such arrangement.

14. I am not quite clear as to your meaning in referring, in your letter of 10th January, to the absence of a consultative body to discuss between the I.A.F. and Allied Commands certain problems of administration. The Air Forces Sub-Commission exists for just that purpose, and I am sure you will find that A.F.M. Muscarlet and his staff will continue to extend to you all possible assistance, within the bounds of the declared policy and of our available resources, in solving these and similar problems.

15. Finally, may I say how much I appreciate the practical and co-operative spirit in which you have approached the difficult problems of your new appointment, and assure you of my sympathetic understanding and assistance in solving them in the interest of the early defeat of our common enemies.

(Sgd.) J. C. SLESSOR

(For information) 250A

TO: AIR CHIEF MARSHAL W.A.B. BOWEN-TUSCHKE, C.B.C., D.Z.C.,
AIR LIAISON SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION.

FROM: HEADQUARTERS, EXPEDIENT AIR FORCES.

DATE: 7TH DECEMBER, 1944.

REF: JCS.1824.



SECRET

Your duties as senior officer of the Air Forces Sub-Commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganise and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organise the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorised ceiling of 38,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 51,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.
8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.
9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

Sad copy to Rome.
J.

(Sgd). J.C. Slessor,
Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

3881

249A

FROM : AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ROME
TO : HEADQUARTERS, AAF/AFM 650 U.S. ARMY
DATE : 29th NOVEMBER 1944
REF. : AFSC/R/144/CMC.

PLAN FOR RECEPTION OF AIRCRAFT AND PARTS IN
HANDS OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Reference H. Army Air Service Command AG 45.1 dated 10th November 1944, the plan outlined is agreed to by this Sub-Commission and a copy has been forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry for their action.

W.B. Royce
W.B. ROYCE, WING COMMANDER,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.



248A

FROM : AIR FORCES SUE-COMMISSION, ROME
TO : ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY
DATE : 20th NOVEMBER 1944
REF. : AFSC/R/344/CHG

PLAN FOR POSSESSION OF AIRCRAFT AND PARTS IN
HANDS OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Attached letter from HQ Army Air Service Command is
forwarded for your attention.

The plan as outlined has been agreed to by this Sub-Com-
mission and your cooperation in compilation of the returns
required is requested.

W.B. ROYCE, WING COMMANDER,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Sir, Encls 2468g 247A-afes.

0034



249A

SECRET

TOP SECRET

In Reply
Refer to
AG. 430.1

HEADQUARTERS

AS-PA-2.

ARMY AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

AWO 546

10th NOVEMBER 1944

SUBJECT: Plan for repossession of Aircraft and Parts
in hands of Italian Air Force

TO : Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces Sub-Commission,
The Allied Commission, Rome

THRU : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, AWO 650

1 Information received in AAF/MTO Cable NY 34180 (also sent to your Headquarters) reveals that P-39 Aircraft presently in the Italian Air Force are not to be lend-lease ed, but merely loaned, and are to be returned to AAF/MTO immediately upon the cessation of hostilities with Germany. This Headquarters has been directed to make necessary arrangements to accomplish this action. In this end, the following plan is presented for your approval:

a. Prior to date for repossession of aircraft, immediately upon the crash and total loss of P-39 aircraft through enemy action or accident, a certificate to this effect from the Italian Air Force, approved by the Allied Commission will be furnished this Headquarters.

b. Upon cessation of hostilities with Germany or upon notification by AAF/MTO:

(1) The Allied Commission will inform the Headquarters of the serial numbers of aircraft in a flyable condition. AAF airdrome to which aircraft are to be turned in to will be furnished by this Command and arrangements will be made for reception thereof. It is suggested that present Italian pilots be used for this ferry work.

(2) The remainder of the Italian Air Force P-39 aircraft, which are non-flyable, will be reported to this Headquarters by the Allied Commission, by serial numbers and location in order that arrangements may be made for AAF inspectors to determine practicability

TO : Air Officer Commanding, Air Force Headquarters,
The Allied Commission, Rome

THRU : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, APO 650

1 Information received in AAF/AFHQ Cable HQ 34250 (also sent to your headquarters) reveals that P-39 Aircraft presently in the Italian Air Force are not to be lend-leased, but merely loaned, and are to be returned to AAF/AFHQ immediately upon the cessation of hostilities with Germany. This Headquarters has been directed to make necessary arrangements to accomplish this action. To this end, the following plan is presented for your approval:

a. Prior to date for repossession of aircraft, immediately upon the crash and total loss of P-39 aircraft through enemy action or accident, a certificate to this effect from the Italian Air Force, approved by the Allied Commission will be furnished this Headquarters.

b. Upon cessation of hostilities with Germany or upon notification by AAF/AFHQ:

(1) The Allied Commission will inform this Headquarters of the serial numbers of aircraft in a flyable condition. AAF airdrome to which aircraft are to be turned in to will be furnished by this Command and arrangements will be made for reception thereat. It is suggested that present Italian pilots be used for this ferry work.

(2) The remainder of the Italian Air Force P-39 aircraft, which are non-flyable, will be reported to this Headquarters by the Allied Commission, by serial numbers and location in order that arrangements may be made for AAF inspectors to determine practicability of repair and fly-away, trucking to AAF Depots, or on-the-spot salvage. It is requested that the Allied Commission instruct the affected Units to retain the Italian Guards on these aircraft until they are turned over to American personnel.

(3) All unused supplies, parts, tools, and equipment issued to service and paintain P-39 aircraft are to be turned in to the nearest Air Force General Depot. Copies of receipts given will be forwarded by the Depots concerned to this Headquarters for cancellation of outstanding obligations of the Italian Air Force.

2. After the accomplishment of plan set forth above, this Command will furnish list of AAF material consumed by the Italian Air Force during their period of operations to the Allied Commission and Army Air Force/AFHQ.

- 2 -

3. Your comments and/or occurrence to above plan is requested.

For the Commanding General:

Signed. W.P. BROWNE,
Lt.Col.A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

5876

247A

SECRET

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, BARI.

To : Air Forces Sub-Commission (Attention of A.O.C.)
Allied Commission, Rome.

Date : 21st November, 1944.

Ref. : AFAC/S.314/ORG.

Attached letter relating to the return of Airacobras to the United States after the war has been seen by W/Cdr. Gladstone and S/Ldr. Brownhead, both of whom consider the scheme to be satisfactory.

2. It is suggested that if the A.O.C. approves the plan, then a copy should be supplied to the Italian Air Force for information.

F.M. Denny

F.M. DENNY,
Group Captain,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
BARI.

Enclosures.

5074

W/Bd. Leadstone

Ref

Minute 1 and
folio 46A, I
fully concur in
the arrangements
outlined. Are
we to inform
the I. A. F. or
not?

18/11

 18/11

20.

SECRET

46A

452.09 1st Ind. ADS-HCH-mm
HEADQUARTERS, AAF/MTO, APO 650, U.S. Army, 15 NOV 1944

TO: Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces Sub-Commission,
The Allied Commission, Bari.

RB
18/11
29/11

For your comments and/or concurrence on the basic letter.

For the Commanding General:

C. O. Baird Jr.
C. O. BAIRD, Jr.,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.



5873

SECRET

SECRET

In Reply
Refer to:
AG 452.1

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
APO 528

SECRET

AUTH.

DATE 10 Nov 1944

AS-9A-INITIALS J. G. L.

10 November 1944. *452.07*

SUBJECT: Plan for Repossession of Aircraft and Parts in Hands
of Italian Air Force.

TO : Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces Sub-Commission,
The Allied Commission, Bari.

THRU : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, APO 650.

1. Information received in AAF/MTO Cable MX 34250 (also sent your Headquarters) reveals that P-39 Aircraft presently in the Italian Air Force are not to be lend-leased, but merely loaned, and are to be returned to AAF/MTO immediately upon the cessation of hostilities with Germany. This Headquarters has been directed to make necessary arrangements to accomplish this action. To this end, the following plan is presented for your approval: *4871*

a. Prior to date for repossession of aircraft, immediately upon the crash and total loss of P-39 aircraft through enemy action or accident, a certificate to this effect from the Italian Air Force, approved by The Allied Commission will be furnished this Headquarters.

b. Upon cessation of hostilities with Germany or upon notification by AAF/MTO:

(1) The allied Commission will inform this Headquarters of the serial numbers of aircraft in a flyable condition. AAF airdrome to which aircraft are to be turned in to will be furnished by this Command and arrangements will be made for reception thereat. It is suggested that present Italian pilots be used for this ferry work.

(2) The remainder of the Italian Air Force P-39 aircraft, which are non-flyable, will be reported to this Headquarters by the Allied Commission, by serial numbers and location in order that arrangements may be made for AAF inspectors to determine practicability of repair and fly-away, trucking to AAF Depots, or on-the-spot salvage. It is requested that The Allied Commission instruct the affected Units to retain the Italian guards on these aircraft until they are turned over to American personnel.

- 1 -
SECRET

S-49932

45-13-11

SECRET

452.1, Ltr AAFSC/MTO, 10 Nov '44 Cont'd.

(3) All unused supplies, parts, tools, and equipment issued to service and maintain P-39 aircraft are to be turned in to the nearest Air Force General Depot. Copies of receipts given will be forwarded by the Depot concerned to this Headquarters for cancellation of outstanding obligations of the Italian Air Force.

2. After the accomplishment of plan set forth above, this Command will furnish list of AAF material consumed by the Italian Air Force during their period of operations to The Allied Commission and Army Air Force/MTO.

3. Your comments and/or concurrence to above plan is requested.

For the Commanding General:



W. P. Browne
W. P. BROWNE,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

5669

SECRET

Report File

A.P.S.C. 457

HEADQUARTERS, ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Minutes of a Meeting held at Headquarters
Italian Air Force at 1500 hours on 30th October,
regarding Maintenance and Supply of I.A.F.
Squadrons under operational control of HQ, RAF.

PRESENT

Air Commodore Jackson (in the Chair)
Wing Commander Huntley
W/Cdr. Berkeley
Wing Commander Smith
Wing Commander Clouston
Squadron Leader Bloomfield
Squadron Leader Greenham
S/Lieut. Reid
S/Lieut. Colin

A.O.A. B.A.F.
W/Cdr. Org. RAF.
S.E.O. RAF.
S. Eng. O. RAF.
AFSC
AFSC
O.T. 1. RAF.
AFSC
AFSC

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1. In his opening remarks A.O. stated that the object of this conference was to put on paper, in the form of minutes, certain guiding principles which would serve to inform all concerned of the correct channels of supply and chain of maintenance vis-a-vis I.A.F. and the I.A.F. Squadrons assigned to the operational control of A.O.C. B.A.F. It was the intention to continue the conference to questions of policy leaving details to independent discussions between the Staff Officers, subsequent to the meeting.

General Administrative Policy

2. Units of the I.A.F. assigned to RAF for operational control would be administered by I.A.F. authorities through AFSC/AOS. As regards Nos. 28 and 132 Baltimore Squadrons, which were due to transfer to Biferno and operate under No. 254 Wing in the near future, these squadrons would continue to the orders laid down by the I.A.F. authority as regards local station discipline and control, security and safety.

3. The policy regarding the function of Fighter Liaison Section was defined as:-

" Operational control of Squadrons of the Italian Fighter Stormo
in conformity with the instructions of HQ, RAF. The Fighter
Liaison Section had no responsibility for administrative matters
connected with I.A.F. Squadrons. Administration of the Fighter
Liaison Section itself was the responsibility of HQ, RAF.

Channel of Supply - Italian Fighter Stormo

- (1) Technical Equipment

5067

1. In his opening remarks AGA stated that the object of this conference was to put on paper, in the form of minutes, certain guiding principles which would serve to inform all concerned of the correct channels of supply and chain of maintenance vis-a-vis HQ and the I.A.F. Squadrons transferred to the operational control of A.O.C., B.A.F. It was the intention to confine the conference to questions of policy leaving details to independent discussions between the Staff Officers, subsequent to the meeting.

General Administrative Policy

2. Units of the I.A.F. assigned to HQ for operational control would be administered by I.A.F. authorities through AFAC/AGC. As regards Nos. 25 and 132 Baltimore Squadrons, which were due to transfer to Birming and operate under No. 254 Wing in the near future, these squadrons would conform to the orders laid down by the B.A.F. authority as regards local station discipline and control, security, and safety.

3. The policy regarding the function of Fighter Liaison Section was defined as:-

- " Operational control of Squadrons of the Indian Fighter Stormo
- " in conformity with the directions of HQ. R.A.F. The Fighter
- " Liaison Section had no responsibility for administrative matters
- " connected with I.A.F. Squadrons. Administration of the Fighter
- " Liaison Section itself was the responsibility of HQ. R.A.F.

Channel of Supply - Indian Fighter Stormo

(1) Technical Requirement

- (a) Moschi Squadrons - Supply of Technical Equipment for Nos. 102 and 155 Squadrons is the responsibility of AFAC through IAF channels.
- (b) Spitfire Squadrons - The initiation of demands for the supply of technical equipment for No. 31 Squadron is the responsibility of AFAC who will place such demands on No. 136 IAF for satisfaction.
- (c) P.39 Squadrons - Supply of technical equipment for Nos. 10 and 42 Squadrons is the responsibility of IAF through IAF channels. (Note: Information has been received to the effect that these aircraft are not issued to I.A.F. in Europe-land, but

W/Odr. Berkeley
 Wing Commander Smith
 Wing Commander Gladstone
 Squadron Leader Bloomfield
 Squadron Leader Greenham
 P/Lieut. Reid
 P/Lieut. Colin

STRO. R.A.F.
 2. HQ. C. R.A.F.
 AFAC
 25 C
 Com. 1. R.A.F.
 AFAC
 AFAC

Page 2.

Para 3(i)(o) contd.

are on loan to be returned at some future date.

(ii) Non-Technical Equipment

So far as is known at present, the provisioning and supply of domestic equipment, tentage and camp equipment is the responsibility of the IAF and will be effective through AFSC. In cases of extreme shortage of supplies, which may have an adverse reaction on operational efficiency AFSC will approach IAF with a view to supplying through RAF channels.

(iii) Clothing

The provision of clothing is an I.A.F. responsibility.

(iv) Mechanical Transport

Supply of M.T. vehicles is an I.A.F. responsibility. In the event of inability to supply from that source, AFSC will approach HQ AFSC direct.

(v) Aviation F.O.L.

The requirements of aviation petrol and lubricants will be controlled through HQ. IAF.

(vi) M.T. F.O.L.

Demand for requirements in accordance with the authorized quota will be demanded through AFSC.

(vii) Evanescent

Requirements, with the exception of those in respect of aircraft Squadrons, will be demanded through HQ. IAF. Requirements for aircraft Squadrons, will be obtained through I.A.F. channels.

Chain of Maintenance - Italian Fighter Squadrons

5. The following chain of maintenance is in being and/or will be put into being:-

(i) 1st and 2nd line Maintenance - To be effected in Squadrons under arrangements to be supervised by AFSC. For this purpose an Engineer Officer and five Senior NCO's have been added to the establishment of AFSC.

(ii) 3rd Line Maintenance - AFSC will work on with the formation of a maintenance section, to undertake the duties of maintenance. Engineer Officer detached by AFSC to the Fighter Squadrons is invited to

(iii) Clothing

The provision of clothing is an I.A.F. responsibility.

(iv) Mechanical Transport

Supply of M.T. vehicles is an I.A.F. responsibility. In the event of inability to supply from that source, AFSC will approach HQ RAAF direct.

(v) Aviation P.O.L.

The requirements of Aviation petrol and lubricants will be controlled through HQ RAAF.

(vi) M.T. P.O.L.

Demands for requirements in accordance with the authorized quota will be forwarded through AFSC.

(vii) Explosives

Requirements, with the exception of those in respect of Masechi Squadrons, will be demanded through HQ RAAF. Requirements for Masechi Squadrons, will be obtained through I.A.F. channels.

Chain of Maintenance - Italian Engineer Squadrons

5. The following chain of maintenance is in being and/or will be put into being:-

(i) 1st and 2nd Line Maintenance - To be effected in Squadrons under arrangements to be supervised by AFSC. For this purpose an Engineer Officer and five Senior NCO's have been asked to the establishment of AFSC.

(ii) 3rd Line Maintenance - AFSC will work on with the formation of a maintenance section, to undertake this degree of maintenance. Engineer Officer detached by AFSC to the Fighter Stormo is invited to visit No. 284 Wing Maintenance Section to obtain latest information on the formation of such a section.

(iii) 4th Line Maintenance

- (a) Masechi Squadrons - Responsibility of AFSC.
- (b) Spitfire Squadrons - RAAF responsibility through RAAF Base Maintenance organisation.
- (c) P. 53 Squadrons - Responsibility of AFSC.

Page 3.

(iv) Replacement of Vantage

It was agreed that demands for replacement Spitfire aircraft should be channelled through HQ. RAF. Replacements for Mosell and P.39 aircraft would be controlled by AFSC.

Channel of Supply - Baltimore Squadron

6. It was agreed that the following channel of supply to these Squadrons was acceptable:-

- (i) Technical Equipment - Through No. 136 Wing.
- (ii) Non-Technical Equipment (includes domestic, tentage and camp) - through I.A.F. sources of supply.
- (iii) Clothing - I.A.F. sources of supply.
- (iv) Mechanical Transport - I.A.F. sources of supply - See second sentence of Para. 4(iv) above.
- (v) Aviation P.O.L. - Through No. 254 Wing.
- (vi) M.T. P.O.L. - Through I.A.F. in accordance with approved memo.
- (vii) Explosives - Through No. 254 Wing.

Chain of Maintenance - Baltimore Squadrons

7. The policy was for AFSC to arrange for the provision of equipment of IAF personnel for attachment to the Wing Maintenance Section of No. 254 Wing. Organisation Staff HQ. RAF are to inform AFSC of the requirements under this heading, detailing the trades required.

8. The technical control of maintenance of these Squadrons will be vested in O.C. 254 Wing through the Wing Engineer Officer.

9. In the above circumstances, 1st, 2nd and 3rd line maintenance of the IAF Baltimore Squadrons would conform to the procedure in force for other Squadrons in No. 254 Wing. Fourth line maintenance would be a RAF responsibility and on a line as for other Squadrons of No. 254 Wing.

Equipment Procedure Para. 136 Wing.

10. It was agreed that additional maintenance could be required in the two IAF Baltimore Squadrons in connection with the raising of demands on No. 136 Wing for equipment, bearing in mind the language difficulty. Organisation Staff HQ RAF to raise the question with HQ AFSC representing the full requirement and requesting that such personnel as are required for this purpose be added to the establishment of AFSC. AFSC, HQ RAF to investigate the question of personnel required at No. 136 Wing to meet the increase in establishment of that unit consequent upon the addition of the IAF Squadrons to the number of units to be served.

DISCUSSION

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ATTACHE

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- (i) Technical Equipment - Through No. 136 193.
- (ii) Non-Technical Equipment (includes domestic, tortoise and cargo)
 - through I.A.F. source of supply.
- (iii) Clothing - I.A.F. source of supply.
- (iv) Mechanical Transport - I.A.F. source of supply - See attached sentences of Para. 4(iv) above.
- (v) Aviation P.O.L. - Through No. 254 193.
- (vi) M.T. P.O.L. - Through I.A.F. source of supply.
- (vii) Explosives - Through No. 254 193.

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Staff of Maintenance - Baltimore Squads

7. The policy was for AFSC to arrange for the provision of an element of IAF personnel for attachment to the Line Maintenance Section of No. 254 Wing. Organization Staff No. 254 Wing are to inform AFSC of the requirements under this heading, detailing the tasks required.
8. The technical control of maintenance of these squadrons would be exercised in O.C. 254 Wing through the Wing Engineer Officer.
9. In the above circumstances, 1st, 2nd and 3rd line maintenance of the IAF Baltimore Squads would conform to the procedure in force for other Squadrons in No. 254 Wing. Fourth line maintenance would be a high priority and on same lines as for other Squadrons of No. 254 Wing.

Equipment Procedures via No. 136 193.

10. It was agreed that additional assistance would be required in the two IAF Baltimore Squadrons in connection with the raising of accounts on No. 136 193 for equipment, bearing in mind the language difficulty. Organization Staff No. 254 Wing are to raise the question with HQ IAF representing the full requirement and requesting that such personnel as are required for this purpose are added to the establishment of AFSC. AFSC, HQ IAF to investigate the question of personnel required at No. 136 193 to meet the increase in establishment of that unit consequent upon the addition of the IAF Squadrons to the number of units to be served.

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BEST COPY POSSIBLE

28 March 1964

1st Foreign Service Division

From: Mr. [Name] and Mr. [Name] (NY 100-100000)

Subject:

Re: [Name] (NY 100-100000)

Reference is made to [Name] (NY 100-100000)

On [Date] [Name] (NY 100-100000) advised that [Name] (NY 100-100000)

is currently in [Location] (NY 100-100000)

NY 100-100000

NY 100-100000

444

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM RABBIT (.) BEGINS (.) APLC MO (R) MATRADA
 COMMA TO ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION FOR AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION THROUGH 1500.
 AIR FORCE (.) WHEN MAY 25 (.) CURRENT IS P. 30 AIRCRAFT BEING USED BY ITALIAN
 AIR FORCE (.) MAY AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN RABBIT MO HAS INDICATED THAT THESE
 AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE USED DURING THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WAR AND HEAVY LOSS OF
 INFORMATION RESOURCES (.) IMMEDIATELY IF CE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITH CURRENT
 THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE RECOVERED BY AIR F.T.C. THE APLC MO (.) IT IS DESIRED
 THAT THIS AGREEMENT WITH NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH RECOVERY AND REPORT
 TO THIS INFORMATION (.) THIS (.)

TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

W. S. GENTRY C/CAPT.,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

1515434x

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

INCOMING ~~SECRET~~ MESSAGE

HQ FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

URGENT
OPT-PRIV
PRIORITY
ROUTINEMESSAGE RECEIVED IN (U. S.)
(SECRET)
(CLASSIFIED)
(REPRODUCTION)

CYPHER

TOO 141637A

DECODED BY

MC/MR

7564

TO AAFSC WFO APTAAFSD WFO CMA TO NATOSA CMA TO ALLIED CONTROL
COMMISSION FOR AIR CRYPT SUB COMMISSION CMA ONE FIVE AIR FORCE PLS
PASS TO LAST ADDRESSEE

FROM EAKER MIKE XRAY THREE FOUR TWO FIVE XRIO

5861

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT IS PETER DASH THREE NINE AIRCRAFT BEING USED BY ITALIAN AIR
FORCE PD ARMY AIR FORCES HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON HAS INDICATED THAT
THESE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE LEND LEASED TO ITALIAN AIR FORCE BUT ARE
MERELY LOANED ON MEMORANDUM RECEIPT PD IMMEDIATELY UPON CESSATION OF
HOSPITALITIES WITH GERMANY THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE REPOSSESSED BY AAO WFO
AFM AAF WFO PD IT IS DESIRED THAT FIRST ADDRESSEE MAKE NECESSARY
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH REPOSSESSION AND REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS



PASS TO LAST ADDRESSEE

FROM EAKER MIKE XRAY THREE FOUR TWO FIVE XRTD

5861

SECRET

SUBJECT IS PETER DASH THREE NINE AIRCRAFT BEING USED BY ITALIAN AIR FORCE PD ARMY AIR FORCES HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON HAS INDICATED THAT THESE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE LEND LEASED TO ITALIAN AIR FORCE BUT ARE MERELY LOANED ON MEMORANDUM RECEIPT PD IMMEDIATELY UPON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITH GERMANY THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE REPOSSESSED BY AAO MTO
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ART AAF WED PD IT IS DESIRED THAT FIRST ADDRESSEE MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH REPOSSESSION AND REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS



Prev. Ref.	
Next Ref.	

Copy signalled to Rome.
15/10/44

SECRET

(OVER)

LGPV V LEPT NR 282/14

T AFSC ACC BARI

FROM AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ROME

141700B

TO HQ BAF CMF

(R) AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION A C C BARI

(R) AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION A C C NAPLES

CONFIDENTIAL RA 153 14TH SEPTEMBER (.) FROM BUSCARLET(.)

HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH GENERAL PIACENTINI ~~W~~ QUESTION OF

ADVISABILITY OF HAVING GREEK AND ITALIAN SQUADRONS ON THE

SAME AIRFIELD (.) HIS VIEW IS THAT ITALIANS WILL NOT START ANY

TROUBLE AND THAT A GREAT DEAL WILL DEPEND ON HOW THEY GET ON AT

THE BEGINNING (.) IT WILL ALSO BE VERY MUCH ^{DEP. ON} ~~DEPENDENT~~ ON

THE PERSONALITY OF THE R A F OFFICER COMMANDING THE WING (.)

MY VIEW IS IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER IF THEY COULD BE SEPARATED BUT

I AM NOT IN A ~~POSITIVE~~ POSITION TO KNOW POSSIBILITY OF THIS (.)

BT 141705B

SENT AI AR KK

RD NR282/14 AT LGPV AT 14/2054 HDS AR

Prev. Ref.

Next Ref.

A880

XBW 15/9

ORDERLY ROOM

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A.F.S.C.(2)

SECRET

R.A.F. MEMORANDUM 6, AIR PROPOSED
RE-ORGANISATION OF BALKAN AIR FORCE CONSEQUENT
UPON THE FORMATION OF AN
ITALIAN STORMO.

Part 1 - Intro.

INTRODUCTION.

1. It has been suggested that Balkan Air Force should be divided into three British Wings and one Italian Fighter Stormo. For the purpose of this memo 374 Wing will not be considered.

COMPOSITION OF WINGS.

2. The composition of Wings will be as shown in Part 11 Admin para. 3.
3. The Italian Fighter Stormo will have a British Liaison Section commanded by a Wing Commander.
4. No. 254 Wing will have a Greek and an Italian Liaison Officer attached to Wing Headquarters.

OPERATIONS.

5. Operations will be controlled and according to operation orders and directions issued to Wing Headquarters by the Headquarters.

COMMAND.

6. Command will be exercised through the Officers Commanding each Wing in the normal way, with the exception that the Officer Commanding the Italian Fighter Stormo will receive orders from the British Liaison Section.

7. Officer Commanding, 354 Wing will have one Greek and one Italian Officer attached to his Headquarters as the air orders may be transmitted to Greek and Italian Squadrons through the Liaison Section.

FUNCTIONS OF O.C. R.A.F. LIAISON SQUADRON WITH ITALIAN FIGHTER STORMO.

8. The primary functions of the Officer Commanding the R.A.F. Liaison Sections are as follows:

- (i) to ensure that the Italian Stormo is an efficient fighting unit to an Italian Fighter Wing.

3858

to has been suggested that Italian Air Force should be divided into three British Wings and one Italian Fighter Stormo. For the purpose of this memo 374 Wing will not be considered.

COMPOSITION OF FORCES.

2. The composition of Wings will be as shown in Part 11 Admin para. 3.
3. The Italian Fighter Stormo will have a British Liaison Section commanded by a Wing Commander.
4. No. 254 Wing will have a Greek and an Italian Liaison Officer attached to Wing Headquarters.

OPERATIONS.

5. Operations will be carried out according to operation orders and directions issued to Wing Headquarters by British Headquarters.

COMMAND.

6. Command will be exercised through the Officers Commanding each Wing in the normal way, with the exception that the Officer Commanding the Italian Fighter Stormo will receive orders from the British Liaison Section.

7. Officer Commanding, 254 Wing will have one Greek and one Italian Officer attached to his Headquarters as Liaison Officers. Messages will be transmitted to Greek and Italian Headquarters through the British Liaison Section.

5858

FUNCTIONS OF O.C. R.A.F. LIAISON SECTION WITH ITALIAN FIGHTER STORMO.

8. The primary functions of the Officer Commanding the R.A.F. Liaison Sections are as follows:

- (i) to ensure that the Italian Stormo is run on efficient lines comparable to an R.A.F. Fighter Wing.
- (ii) that a high state of operational efficiency is maintained.
- (iii) that a high state of training is maintained.
- (iv) that flying control and flying disciplines are carried out according to R.A.F. standards.

Prev. Ref.
Next Ref.



(v) that there is effective liaison between his own Intelligence Section and that of the Italians.

(vi) that Liaison Section Ops. Room is maintained and is permanently manned.

(vii) that operational and other returns required by this Headquarters are correctly compiled and forwarded to this Headquarters.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ITALIAN FIGHTER STORMO.

9. Orders for operations will be issued from Balkan Air Force to Officer Commanding R.A.F. Liaison Section, who will in turn pass them on to Officer Commanding, Italian Fighter Stormo.

10. The Liaison Section Ops Room will be the medium through which all operation orders are passed to the Italians. Conversely all operational information required by Balkan Air Force H.Q. Ops. Room will be forwarded via the Liaison Section Ops. Room.

11. Officer Commanding Italian Fighter Stormo will be responsible for working out time of take-off so that aircraft reach targets at times stated in operation orders. This information is to be passed to Liaison Section Ops. Room. Times of briefing are to be similarly notified.

12. Officer Commanding R.A.F. Liaison Section is to ensure that his Intelligence Section maintains a close liaison with the Italian Intelligence Section in order that pilots receive correct and adequate briefing and also that results of interrogations are passed back immediately to this Headquarters.

TRAINING AND ACCIDENTS.

13. O.C. R.A.F. Liaison Section will be responsible for advising the O.C. Italian Fighter Stormo on matters relating to Squadron training. He is to keep H.Q., R.A.F. fully in the picture on the matter in order that H.Q., A.C.C. training instructions are in no way infringed.

FLYING CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE.

14. O.C. R.A.F. Liaison Section is to ensure that flying control and flying discipline is carried out according to R.A.F. standards. All breaches of flying discipline are to be reported to H.Q. B.A.F. O.C. R.A.F. Liaison Section will have no powers of disciplinary action against Italians.

PROPOSED RE-ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN AIR FORCE CONSEQUENT UPONTHE FORMATION OF AN ITALIAN FIGHTER STORMO.PART II - ADMINISTRATIVE.APPENDIX.

- A. Proposed establishment for R.A.F. Liaison and Signals Sections with Italian Fighter Stormo.

EXPLANATION.1. Future composition of the Force.

When all Squadrons allocated to B.A.F. are operational the composition of the Force will be as under:-

3	Spitfire Squadrons.	{ R.A.F. }
1	" "	{ Yugo. }
1	Hurricane (R.F.) Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
1	" "	{ Yugo. }
1	Mustang Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
1	Beaufighter(R.F.) Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
1	" "	{ S.A.A.F. }
1	Beaufighter (F) Squadron.	{ S.A.A.F. }
1	Ventura Squadron.	{ S.A.A.F. }
1	Baltimore Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
2	Baltimore Squadrons.	{ I.A.F. }
3	P.39 Squadrons.	{ I.A.F. }
2	Macchi Squadrons.	{ I.A.F. }

354 Wings and Squadrons (which are not affected by the re-organisation outlined in this paper).

5857

2. Existing Organisation.

As at present organised, B.A.F. has two fighter Wings and one Light Bomber Wing.

3. Suggested Re-Organisation.

The manning position does not permit the formation of a fourth R.A.F. Wing; the previous proposal, therefore, that a new Wing should be formed to control the Mustang and Beaufighter Squadrons, cannot be put into effect. It is suggested therefore that B.A.F. be re-organised as under:-

3 Baltimore Squadrons.
1 Ventura Squadron.

254 wing.
(Unchanged)

1 Spitfire Squadrons.

1. Future composition of the Force.

When all Squadrons allocated to B.A.F. are operational the composition of the Force will be as under:-

3	Spitfire Squadrons.	{ R.A.F. }
1	"	{ Vugo. }
1	Hurricane (R.P.) Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
1	"	{ Vugo. }
1	Mustang Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
1	Beaufighter (R.P.) Squadron.	{ R.A.F. }
1	"	{ Vugo. }
1	Beaufighter (F) Squadron.	{ S.A.A.F. }
1	Ventura Squadron.	{ S.A.A.F. }
1	Baltimore Squadron.	{ S.A.A.F. }
2	Baltimore Squadrons.	{ R.A.A.F. }
3	P.39 Squadrons.	{ I.A.F. }
2	Macchi Squadrons.	{ I.A.F. }

354 Wings and Squadrons (which are not affected by the re-organisation outlined in this paper).

3857

2. Existing Organisation.

As at present organised, B.A.F. has two fighter Wings and one Light Bomber Wing.

3. Suggested Re-Organisation.

The manning position does not permit the formation of a fourth R.A.F. Wing; the previous proposal, therefore, that a new Wing should be formed to control the Mustang and Beaufighter Squadrons, cannot be put into effect. It is suggested therefore that B.A.F. be re-organised as under:-

254 Wing.	3 Baltimore Squadrons.
(Unchanged)	1 Ventura Squadron.
264 Wing.	4 Spitfire Squadrons.
283 Wing.	3 Beaufighter Squadrons.
	1 Mustang Squadron.

Italian Fighter Stormo.

2 Macchi Squadrons.
3 P.39 Squadrons.

The two Hurricane (R.P.) Squadrons to be allocated to 284 or 283 Wing as considered desirable.

Cont'd/.....2.

APPENDIX 'A'.

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT FOR R.A.F. LIAISON AND SIGNALS SECTION WITH ITALIAN FIGHTER STATION

	Proposed Establishment.					From 283 Wing.					Not available in B.				
	G/C.	W/C.	S/L.	F/L.	F/O.	G/C.	W/C.	S/L.	F/L.	F/S.	G/C.	W/C.	S/L.	F/L.	
Detail.	TOTAL.					TOTAL.					TOTAL.				
	W/O.	F/S.	SGT.	Cpl.	AC's.	W/O.	F/S.	SGT.	Cpl.	AC's.	W/O.	F/S.	SGT.	Cpl.	
<u>LIAISON SECTION.</u>															
Officers.															
Flying	1			1	2								1	1	
Intelligence				1	1									1	
Engineer				1	1									1	
Equipment				1	1									1	
Communications		1		3	4						NIL		1	1	
TOTAL : OFFICERS.	1	1	4	3	9								1	4	
<u>Airmen.</u>															
Clerks (G.D.)				2	2									1	
Equipment Assistants		1			1									5(a)	
Fitter 1	1	5(a)			6	1					1				
Drivers M.T.				2	2										
Clerks S.D.				3	3									6	
TOTAL : AIRMEN	1	6		7	14	1					1				
<u>SIGNALS SECTION.</u>															
Officers.															
Signals (G)				1	1										
Admin (G) (C & C)				1	1										
TOTAL : OFFICERS				2	2						NIL				
<u>Airmen.</u>															
W/Op II			3	9	12									3	
W.C.M.		1	1	4	6								1	1	
Elect II.				2	2										
Clerk G.D. (C & C)		3			3								3		
Telephonists				3	3										
CH/GD				3	3										
TOTAL : AIRMEN.		4	4	21	29								4	4	

(a) 1 for each Squadron (1

ESTABLISHMENT FOR R.A.F. LIAISON AND SIGNALS SECTION WITH ITALIAN FIGHTER STORMO.

Establishment.			From 283 Wing.			Not available in B.A.F.		
L. F/L. F/O.			G/C. W/C. S/L. F/L. F/O.			G/C. W/C. S/L. F/L. F/O.		
TOTAL.			TOTAL.			TOTAL.		
Wt. Cpl. AC's.			W/O. F/S. SGT. Cpl. AC's.			W/O. F/S. SGT. Cpl. AC's.		
1	2					1	1	2
1	1					1	1	1
1	1					1	1	1
1	1					1	1	1
3	4					1	3	4
4	3	9		NIL		1	1	4
								9
2	2						2	2
1	1					1		1
6	6		1	1		5(a)		
2	2						2	2
3	3						3	3
7	14		1	1		6	7	13
1	1						1	1
1	1						1	1
2	2			NIL			2	2
3	9	12				3	9	12
1	4	6				1	4	6
	2	2					2	2
		3				3		3
	3	3					3	3
	3	3					3	3
4	21	29				4	4	21
								29

(a) 1 for each Squadron (I.A.P.)

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF M.T.Prime Movers 'A'.

Cars, Passenger, Utility

Vans, 15 Cwt.

Tenders, Signals Type M.E.1

" " " M.E.2

" " " M.E.3

" " " M.E.52

" " " M.E.53

TOTAL

7

Distribution:

Lists 'A' and 'B'.

H.Q. No 254 Wing.

H.Q. No 281 Wing.

H.Q. No 283 Wing.

H.Q. No 334 Wing.

File BAF/3015/ORG.

Spares (8).

A.F.S.C. (2)

SECRET

33 A

From:- HQ. Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
To:- Air Vice-Marshal, A.F.S.C., A.C.C. ✓
Date:- 29th July, 1944.
Ref:- MEDME/1606/Org.

OPERATIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE I.A.F.

This Headquarters letter of even reference and subject dated 24th July, 1944, is to be amended as follows:-

Para. 3 (ii)

152nd Squadron to read 132nd Squadron.

Para. 3 (iii)

80th Squadron to read 88th Squadron.

Para. 4 line 2

For "into a separate stormo in B.A.F." read
"into two separate stormi in B.A.F."

3853

W. Blair
Flight Lieutenant,
P.A. to C. of S.,
B.A.F. MEDME.

DISTRIBUTION:-

C. of S.
A.O.A.
D.D. Ops.
C.M.S.O.

Copy to HQ. B.A.F.

TOP SECRET.

From:- Headquarters, Balkan Air Force.
To:- Air Vice Marshal Bowen-Buscarlett,
Air Forces Sub Commission, EART.
Date:- 25th. July, 1944.
Ref:- DAF/3065/1/Org.

OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE I.A.F.

The draft memo. you prepared for General Piacentini is returned herewith approved for issue by the A.O.C. with whom I have discussed the subject. — 31A.

2. I also enclose a copy of H.Q. M.A.A.F. letter MEME/1606/Org. dated 24th. July, 1944.

H. D. Jackson

(H.D. JACKMAN),

Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
Headquarters, Balkan Air Force.

Will you please let me have a copy of your final paper.

ll

2001

1859.
32A

FROM: AIR FORCE COMMISSION,
AIR CONTROL COMMISSION,
BA...

31A

TO: THE MINISTER,
COPY: HEADQUARTERS, B.A.F. C.M.F.

DATE: 25th JULY 1944

REF: AFAC/C.15/AIR

SECRET

30A

I have to inform you that authority has been given by H.C. H.M.C.F. to regroup the Italian Air Force as follows :-

(1) ITALIAN FIGHTER WING

No. 155 I.A.F. Squadron.	16 a/c Bristol 20F.	Organised into one Squadron, the number of which can be chosen by the I.A.F.
No. 102 I.A.F. Squadron.	16 a/c Bristol 20M.	
No. 9 I.A.F. Squadron.	16 a/c Airacobra.	Misto.
No. 10 I.A.F. Squadron.	16 a/c Airacobra.	
No. 12 I.A.F. Squadron.	16 a/c Airacobra.	

This Wing is to come under the operational control of Headquarters, Italian Air Force, and for this purpose a British Liaison Section, consisting of a Wing Commander, Operational and Intelligence Officers, and an appropriate staff will be provided. This Wing will have to provide its own maintenance and equipment backing. To assist in the maintenance and equipment organisation to be set up by the I.A.F., a British Liaison Section (under the Command of A.W.S.C.) will be provided, consisting of a British Technical Officer and Technical H.C.O.'s and a British Equipment Officer and H.C.O. The Wing will be entirely responsible for its own organisation, administration and discipline, which, for the present, may be organised on Italian lines. It is, however, the intention of H.C.F. that all squadrons shall be fully mobile to British standards, and it is hoped, eventually, to allot sufficient transport from Allied sources for this purpose. A proposed establishment for the maintenance and equipment backing for the Wing will be forwarded to you very shortly.

(11) ITALIAN LIGHT BOMBARDMENT

No. 28 I.A.F. Squadron	16 a/c Baltimore.
No. 132 I.A.F. Squadron	16 a/c Baltimore.

This Sqn will come under the operational, technical and day-to-day administrative control of No. 234 Wing, Italian Air Force. The personnel, administration and discipline of the Sqn will come under the Italian Sqn Commander. Maintenance will be carried out through an H.C.O. and an A.S.F. These will be composite units named by Allied and Italian personnel. Details of the numbers of Italian personnel, by rank and trade, to form the Italian movement to these units will be forwarded to you very shortly. These personnel should be held in readiness to join the units as soon as H.C.F. can agree that, as they will acquire invaluable

No. 155 I.A.F. Squadron. 16 a/c Barchi 206.
 No. 102 I.A.F. Squadron. 16 a/c Barchi 202.

No. 9 I.A.F. Squadron. 16 a/c Almondo.
 No. 40 I.A.F. Squadron. 16 a/c Almondo.
 No. 12 I.A.F. Squadron. 16 a/c Almondo.

Notes.

This Wing is to come under the operational control of Headquarters, Italian Air Force, and for this purpose a British Liaison Section, consisting of a Wing Commander, Operational and Intelligence Officers, and an appropriate staff will be provided. This Wing will have to provide its own maintenance and equipment backing. To assist in the maintenance and equipment organization to be set up by the I.A.F., a British Liaison Section (under the Command of A.F.S.C.) will be provided, consisting of a British Technical Officer and Technical S.O.'s and a British Regiment Officer and "... The Wing will be entirely responsible for its own organization, administration and discipline, which, for the present, may be organized on Italian lines. It is, however, the intention of I.A.F. that all squadrons shall be fully mobile to British standards, and it is hoped, eventually, to allot sufficient transport from Allied sources for this purpose. A proposed establishment for the maintenance and equipment backing for the Wing will be forwarded to you very shortly.

(41) ITALIAN LIGHT BOMBING WING.

No. 26 I.A.F. Squadron 16 a/c Barchi.
 No. 132 I.A.F. Squadron 16 a/c Barchi.

This Wing will come under the operational, technical and day-to-day administrative control of No. 23 Wing, Italian Air Force. The personnel, administration and discipline of the Wing will come under the Italian Senior Commander. Maintenance will be carried out through an I.A.F. and an A.S.F. These will be organized units manned by Allied and Italian personnel. Details of the numbers of Italian personnel, by units and trades, to form the Italian increment to these units will be forwarded to you very shortly. These personnel should be held in readiness to join the units as soon as I.A.F. can accept them, as they will acquire invaluable experience in the maintenance and supply of Barchi aircraft while awaiting the arrival of the I.A.F. Barchi squadrons.

(42) ITALIAN BOMBING/TRANSPORT WING.

No. 23 I.A.F. Squadron 16 a/c Barchi 1007.
 No. 1 I.A.F. Squadron 16 a/c Barchi 1002.

This Wing will come under the operational control of No. 23 Wing, Italian Air Force. The administration, organization and discipline of the Wing will come under the Italian Senior Commander. Maintenance arrangements will continue as at present in the I.A.F. Barchi.

Continued /

-2-

(iv) ITALIAN SPANISH AIR.

This wing will remain unaltered, and will continue to operate under No. 242 Group, Royal Air Force.

(v) OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNIT - VANDERBILT.

This Unit is required for the conversion of Italian pilots and aircrew, onto the new types of aircraft. The unit will still be required after the 3 Aircochres and 2 Baltimore squadrons become operational, as a supply of pilots and aircrew, to replace wastage, will always be necessary.

The present establishment in aircraft of this Unit is :-

Baltimore	12 a/c
Aircochre	12 a/c

It can be considered later as to whether any further changes in the establishment of aircraft will be necessary when the Unit has to provide replacements for wastage only.

In addition to its C.I.C. commitments, this Unit will provide training for maintenance personnel on Aircochres and Baltimores. If large numbers of either type of aircraft are received, additional to those required for the Squadrons and the operational training unit, Reservists should become the holding unit for reserve aircraft.

It is possible that this Unit may be moved to Levenham or elsewhere, at a later date.

(vi) FACTORY FOR MAJOR OVERHAULS OF ALLISON ENGINES AND AIRCOCHRE AIRCRAFT.

A factory will be required for the major overhaul of Allison engines and Aircochre aircraft. It is understood that you are already considering a suitable factory in the home area. It is calculated that an output of 45 overhauled Allison engines and 24 overhauled Aircochre aircrafts per month will be required.

2. PROGRESS.

(1) It is understood that, except for bombing and air firing the first Fighter Squadron trained on Aircochres will be ready for operations as soon as equipment and spares are available. It is also understood that the remaining squadrons will successively be ready for operation at intervals of two weeks following the first squadron, subject always to the satisfactory provision of equipment and spares. Will you kindly confirm this.

(ii) Baltimore training is originally held up at the moment owing to the lack of tools, equipment and spares. Advantage is being taken of this period of inactivity to fit brakes and additional flying instruments into the front cockpits of dual Baltimores. It is understood that the first Baltimore squadron will be operationally ready within 6 weeks of the provision of adequate tools, and that the squadron will be operationally ready.

3849

It can be considered later as to whether any further changes in the establishment of aircraft will be necessary when the unit has to provide requirements for wastage only.

In addition to its O.I.A. commitments, this unit will provide training for maintenance personnel on aircrafts and Baltimore. If large numbers of either type of aircraft are received, additional to those required for the Squadrons and the operational training unit, Vessalus should become the holding unit for reserve aircraft.

It is possible that this Unit may be moved to Lorraine or elsewhere, at a later date.

(vi) FACTORY FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL OF ALLISON ENGINE AND AIRCRAFTS

A factory will be required for the major overhaul of Allison engines and Aircrafts aircrafts. It is understood that you are already considering a suitable factory in the home area. It is calculated that an output of 45 overhauled Allison engines and 24 overhauled Aircrafts aircrafts per week will be required.

2. ENGINEERS.

(1) It is understood that, except for bedding and air during the first Fighter Squadron trained on Aircrafts will be ready for operations as soon as equipment and spares are available. It is also understood that the remaining squadrons will successively be ready for operation at intervals of two weeks following the first squadron, subject always to the satisfactory provision of equipment and spares. Will you kindly confirm this.

(11) Baltimore training is entirely held up at the moment owing to the lack of tools, equipment and spares. Advantage is being taken of this period of inactivity to fit brakes and additional flying instruments into the front cockpits of dual Baltimore. It is understood that the first Baltimore squadron will be operationally ready within 6 weeks of the provision of adequate tools, equipment and spares, and that the second squadron will be operationally ready about 3 weeks after the first one. It is requested that you will confirm this.

3. GENERAL.

(4) The Italian increment to the R.C.A. and A.C.A. supporting No.254 Wing should be got ready at once.

(11) The Wing Maintenance and Equipment organization for the Italian Fighter Wing should be formed at once, so that it can be ready to take on the maintenance of the second and Aircrafts.

(11i) The factory for the overhaul of Allison engines and Aircrafts aircrafts should be got going without delay.

Continued/3.....

(iv) As agreed previously the establishment of all Italian Squadrons should be revised to bring them as closely as possible into line with Allied establishments. This is particularly important on the Maintenance side, but steps should also be taken to bring the logistical side of the Squadrons as far as possible onto Allied lines, in so far as lack of transport and other facilities will allow.

(v) It is agreed that Italian aircraft, whether of Italian or Allied types, may carry the distinguishing badges of their Squadrons.

(vi) It is agreed that Italian aircraft, whether of Italian or Allied types, may carry the I.A.F. Identification numbers.

(vii) It is agreed that the Italian flag may be flown at all Headquarters and Camps of the Italian Air Force, even though they may be stationed on Allied airfields.

(viii) Any alterations to the Italian organization or system of administration which may seem necessary to the Air Officer Commanding, Italian Air Force, or to his subordinate Commanders, are to be put up to the Italian Air Ministry, through the Air Force Sub-Commission.

4. It is requested that if any of the above points are not quite clear, I may be informed at once, as I shall be very pleased to answer any queries.

W. A. B. B. B. B.

W. A. B. B. B. B.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

5847

TOP SECRET

From : HQ MEDITERRAN AIR FORCES
To : Air Vice Marshal, A.F.S.C., A.C.G.
Date : 24th July, 1944.
Reference : MEME/1606/ORG

30A

See 23A

OPERATIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE I.A.F.

1. With reference to your letter AFSC 5.15/AIR dated 7 July 44, the arguments contained therein in favour of forming I.A.F. stormi as an integral part of R.A.F. Wings has been considered and the following decisions made.

2. It is appreciated that an organisation on the lines you propose would be desirable in order to obtain the maximum efficiency from the I.A.F. At the same time it is felt that it is unlikely that a high rate of efficiency will be obtained until such an organisation has been running for a considerable period of time and then only at a cost in R.A.F. personnel which in the present circumstances could hardly be justified. For this reason certain modifications have been made to your proposals as under.

3. ORGANISATION

The principle of the organisation of the I.A.F. into stormi and of granting privileges which will in a large degree meet their desire for expression of national entity is approved. It follows from this that :-

- (i) The 9th, 10th, 12th, 102nd and 155th Squadrons will be formed into two stormi, the numbers of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., under the operational control of HQ B.A.F. and under ITAMIN administrative control subject to supervision by the A.C.C.
- (ii) The 28th and ¹³¹2nd Squadrons to form a stormo, the number of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., to be under the operational command of HQ B.A.F. and allocated to No. 254 Wing.
- (iii) The 1st and ⁵⁸20th Squadrons to form a stormo, the number of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., to be under the operational command of HQ B.A.F. and allocated to No. 334 Wing.
- (iv) The seaplanes to form a stormo, the number of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., to be under the operational command of No. 242 Group.
- (v) The ITAMIN Air Minister may appoint two senior officers from the fighter and bomber organisations

Approved
See 33A

2. It is appreciated that an organisation on the lines you propose would be desirable in order to obtain the maximum efficiency from the I.A.F. At the same time it is felt that it is unlikely that a high rate of efficiency will be obtained until such an organisation has been running for a considerable period of time and then only at a cost in R.A.F. personnel which in the present circumstances could hardly be justified. For this reason certain modifications have been made to your proposals as under.

3. ORGANISATION

The principle of the organisation of the I.A.F. into stormi and of granting privileges which will in a large degree meet their desire for expression of national entity is approved. It follows from this that :-

- (i) The 9th, 10th, 12th, 102nd and 155th Squadrons will be formed into two stormi, the numbers of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., under the operational control of HQ R.A.F. and under ITALIAN administrative control subject to supervision by the A.C.C.
- (ii) The 28th and ¹³²12th Squadrons to form a stormi, the number of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., to be under the operational command of HQ R.A.F. and allocated to No. 254 Wing.
- (iii) The 1st and ⁵⁸20th Squadrons to form a stormi, the number of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., to be under the operational command of HQ R.A.F. and allocated to No. 254 Wing.
- (iv) The seaplanes to form a stormi, the number of which to be chosen by the I.A.F., to be under the operational command of No. 242 Group.
- (v) The ITALIAN Air Minister may appoint two senior officers from the fighter and bomber organisations with a small staff to be attached to HQ R.A.F.
- (vi) The stormi are to be allowed to retain their own distinguishing badges.
- (vii) ITALIAN aircraft are to be allowed to retain their identification roundels.
- (viii) The ITALIAN Flag will be flown at all HQs and Camps of the I.A.F. even though they may be stationed on ALLIED airfields.

4. I.A.F. FIGHTER SQUADRONS

As noted above, the two Macchi and three P. 39 squadrons are to be organised into ^{two} separate stormi in D.A.F. They will

be

Approved
see 33A

-2-

will /

be fully maintained and will be administered by the A.C.C. who will be responsible for their maintenance. The A.C.C. will be assisted in this by a Wing Liaison Section of R.A.F. specialist personnel estimated at 11 officers and 38 airmen.

The CO of the stormo will be responsible to the A.C.C. for the discipline, administration and maintenance of the ITALIAN squadrons under his command.

5. I.A.F. BOMBER AND TRANSPORT SQUADRONS

Owing to the few I.A.F. bomber and transport squadrons involved and their distribution between 254 Wing and 224 Wing it is not the intention to organise them separately but to integrate them with the R.A.F. Wings under whose operational control they will come.

It will be necessary therefore that the ITALIAN increment of the Wing maintenance and equipment units, R.S.Us and A.S.Ps of R.A.F. Wings under whom the I.A.F. stormi are operating must be provided at least until such time as experience has been obtained which will ensure that the I.A.F. can accept these responsibilities without prejudice to operational efficiency. Further, while commanders of the I.A.F. stormi are to be entirely responsible for the discipline and personnel administration of all ITALIAN personnel, HQ B.A.F. will exercise such control over other forms of administration as will be necessary to ensure operational efficiency.

6. In view of the change of policy contained in this letter it is considered that the submission of the draft letter to the acting Chief Commissioner, A.C.C., is no longer necessary. It is felt that the foregoing will prove acceptable to the ITALIAN Air Ministry and Government without invoking the aid of the A.C.C. Should you have any comments regarding this it is requested you will represent them.

W. J. D. J. D.

Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief,
EUROPEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES.

Copy to HQ B.A.F.

squadrons under his command.

5. I.A.F. BOMBER AND TRANSPORT SQUADRONS

Owing to the few I.A.F. bomber and transport squadrons involved and their distribution between 254 Wing and 334 Wing it is not the intention to organise them separately but to integrate them with the R.A.F. Wings under whose operational control they will come.

It will be necessary therefore that the ITALIAN increment of the Wing maintenance and equipment units, R.S.Ms and A.S.Ps of R.A.F. Wings under whom the I.A.F. stormi are operating must be provided at least until such time as experience has been obtained which will ensure that the I.A.F. can accept these responsibilities without prejudice to operational efficiency. Further, while commanders of the I.A.F. stormi are to be entirely responsible for the discipline and personnel administration of all ITALIAN personnel, HQ R.A.F. will exercise such control over other forms of administration as will be necessary to ensure operational efficiency.

6. In view of the change of policy contained in this letter it is considered that the submission of the draft letter to the acting Chief Commissioner, A.C.C., is no longer necessary. It is felt that the foregoing will prove acceptable to the ITALIAN Air Ministry and Government without invoking the aid of the A.C.C. Should you have any comments regarding this it is requested that you will represent them.

W. J. Jones

for Deputy Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief,
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES.

Copy to HQ R.A.F.

Internal distribution :

C of S
AOA
DE Ops
C/SO

S. B. D.

AIR FORCE'S SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,

BART.

29A

AFSC/S.15/AIR.

22nd July 1944.

Dear

24A
With reference to my letter S.15/AIR dated 7th July 1944, the matter has been under discussion with M.A.A.F. for some time, and their policy with regard to Italian Wings has now been altered. There will, therefore, be no need for any action by the A.C.C. in this matter.

2. I hope to be in Rome about Thursday when I will let you know exactly how the matter stands.

Yours

WB

Captain Ellery Stone,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission,
Rome.

508

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.C. DASH.
TO: H.Q. M.A.A.P. C.M.F. S.C.O.

A.781 CONFIDENTIAL 22ND JULY (.)

FOR BAKER FROM HUSCALET (.) 27A ~~27A~~
YOUR GEORGE BAKER 539 21 JULY SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION 22 JULY (.)

ONE (.) I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH BAF AND WAS FULLY AWARE
OF THEIR PROPOSALS (.) THEY WILL RELEASE ITALIANS AND SEPARATE
IAF FIGHTER WING WITH ITS OWN AUXILIARY UNIT. WILL, HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH
WE CANNOT EXPECT SAME EFFICIENCY AS UNDER PREVIOUS PROPOSAL. (.)
THEIR EFFICIENCY WILL RISE IN PROPORTION TO STRENGTH OF ITALIAN

SECTION (.)

TWO (.) PREPARE ITALIAN DOGGER OPERATIONS IN 254 AND 334 WINGS
MAY BE ORGANISED IN STRENGTH AND THAT BY OTHER PROPOSALS AS TO
BADGES (.) IDENTIFICATION ROUNDELS (.) AND THE WEAVING OF ITALIAN
FLAG REMAIN APPROVED (.)
THREE (.) IN MY VIEW LATTER TO AVOID CHANCE OF CHARLES RYT (R) NOT NOW
NECESSARY (.)

TO BE RECAPTURED
IF SENT BY W/T.

T.O.O. 2210453

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE.

28A

1843

11

25A

FOR BAKER FROM BUSCARLET (.) 27A ~~27~~

YOUR GUEST BAKER 539 21 JULY SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION 22 JULY (.)

ONE (.) I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH BAP AND WAS FULLY AWARE
OF THEIR PROPOSALS (.) THEY WILL RECALL ITALIANS AND SEPARATE
IAP FIGHTER WING WITH ITS OWN AUXILIARY BATTALIONS WILL BE
WE CANNOT EXPECT SAME EFFICIENCY AS UNDER PREVIOUS PROGRAM. (.)
THEIR EFFICIENCY WILL RISE IN PROPORTION TO STRENGTH OF LEADERS

SECTION (.)

TWO (.) PREPARE ITALIAN BOMBER SQUADRONS IN 254 AND 334 WINGS

MAY BE ORGANIZED IN SECRET AND THAT MY OTHER PROPOSALS AS TO

BADGES (.) IDENTIFICATION ROUTINES (.) AND THE FLYING OF ITALIAN

FLAG REMAIN APPROVED (.)

THESE (.) IN MY VIEW LATTER TO ABE CLARIFY CHARLIE NOT (2) NOT NOW

NECESSARY (.)

254

TO BE ENLIGHTENED
IF SEEN BY W/T.

T.O.O. 2210.53

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

1843

66

Prev. Ref.

Next Ref.

27A

CYPHER MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE 102/21

TO AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION ACC (11 SIGS CENTRE PASS)

FROM HQ MAAF SSO

GEORGE BAKER 539

21 JULY

SECRET



FOLLOWING FOR BOWEN -BUSCARLET FROM BAKER . PROPOSALS FOR IAF
SET-UP OUTLINED

25A

IN YOUR DRAFT LETTER TO ACC HAVE NOW BEEN CONSIDERABLY
MODIFIED THE INTENTION IS TO FORM A SELF-CONTAINED IAF FIGHTER

WING RUN BY YOU WITH A BRITISH WING LIAISON SECTION OF ABOUT 11
OFFICERS AND 38 MEN . TWO IAF BOMBER SQUADRONS WILL FORM PART
OF 254 WING ON THE LINES ENVISAGED IN YOUR DRAFT LETTER AS WILL
THE TWO SQUADRONS IN 334 WING . 2. THIS REDISTRIBUTION WILL
ENTAIL AN ENTIRE REDRAFTING OF THE LETTER TO ACC IF THIS IS NOW

NECESSARY I AM DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT IS . 3 . I HAVE BEEN UNFORTUNATE

IN ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CONTACT . WOULD YOU DO SO AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

DEC BY SGT HW/FE

TOO 211800B

5042

TOD 212300B

DIST AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ACC

2345B

SECRET

NOTES ON A MEETING TO DISCUSS MATTERS CONCERNING
THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE HELD IN CHIEF OF STAFF CAP
MEETING'S OFFICE, HQ MAZ, on 16th July, 1944

Present:-

C. of S. MEDME.
A.O.S.
C.M.S.O.

A.V.M. BOWEN-BUSCADET, A.C.O.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE I.A.F.

1. The draft letter to the Acting Chief Commissioner, A.C.O., at Enc. 49A on file GB/64, was discussed in the light of comments by A.O.A. and A.C.O. B.A.P. These latter are given at Enc. 50A of the same file. A.V.M. A.C.O. produced a copy of S.549/..C.M./L.O. dated 5th October, 1943 (Enc. 51A), the main point of which was the statement of policy ultimately agreed that "a compact operational command to be formed out of the remnants of the I.A.F. which is to be placed unreservedly under the Allied Air Force commander in Italy." The latter has been drafted because it has been felt that a marked tendency to deviate from this policy is imminent, and in order to redefine this policy in a way acceptable to Italian susceptibilities.

2. The proposals of B.A.P. at para. 3 (vi) and (vii) of Enc. 50A on file GB/64 were agreed for inclusion.

After discussion it was agreed that para. 4 should be amended to read "it should be made clear to the ITALIAN Government that the suggestion for the formation of independent ITALIAN wings cannot be entertained. The grouping of ITALIAN Storm in Allied wings in this plan was done deliberately....."

D.D. Ops. was not available for consultation, and his agreement is necessary before the letter is put to the C. in C. for signature.

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY.

3. C. of S. read AOC. B.A.P.'s signal O.114 of 13th July which expressed concern at the unsatisfactory state of the I.A.F. in relation to supply of aircraft and equipment.

4. Discussions at Vesuvius. It was agreed that of the ten Battalions at Vesuvius only one is serviceable, but C.M.S.O. pointed out that his investigation had disclosed that No. 114 B.U. had met all outstanding demands. There seemed to be a possibility, which A.V.M. A.C.O. undertook to investigate, that the I.A.F. were not demanding their full requirements in sufficient time.

5840

5840

at Enc. 10A on File GB/64, was discussed in the presence of the following: These latter are given at Enc. 10A of the same file. A.V.M. 20.0. produced a copy of S.549/10A/MAC dated 5th October, 1945 (Enc. 5A), the main point of which was the statement of policy ultimately agreed that "a compact operational command to be formed out of the remnants of the I.A.F. which is to be placed unreservedly under the Allied Air Force commander in Italy." The latter has been drafted because it has been felt that a marked tendency to deviate from this policy is apparent, and in order to reinforce this policy in a way acceptable to Italian susceptibilities.

2. The proposals of S.A.F. at para. 3 (vi) and (vii) of Enc. 50A on File GB/64 were agreed for inclusion.

After discussion it was agreed that para. 4 should be amended to read "it should be made clear to the ITALIAN Government that the suggestion for the formation of independent ITALIAN wings cannot be entertained. The grouping of ITALIAN Storm in Allied wings in this plan was done deliberately...."

P.D. Oyo. was not available for consultation, and his agreement is necessary before the letter is put to the C. in C. for signature.

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY.

3. C. of S. read ACC. B.A.F.'s signal G.114 of 15th July which expressed concern at the unsatisfactory state of the I.A.F. in relation to supply of aircraft and equipment.
4. Baltimore at Vesuvius. It was agreed that of the ten Baltimore at Vesuvius only one is serviceable, but CMSO. pointed out that his investigation had disclosed that No. 114 M.U. had met all outstanding demands. There seemed to be a possibility, which A.V.M. 20.0. undertook to investigate, that the I.A.F. were not demanding their full requirements in sufficient time.
5. A.V.M. 20.0. said that he was under the impression that all demands should be put through M.A.A.F. It was pointed out that so far as British supplies were concerned there was no question but that the I.A.F. should deal direct on such questions with the M.U. and only come to M.A.A.F. if they were in serious trouble.
6. In point of fact M.A.A.F. were doing all they could to assist the I.A.F. to obtain the necessary equipment for Baltimore, but CMSO. pointed out that No. 500 Squadron has first priority.

+ Finally despatched as LHM/1606/382
dated 17 July 44

/ Page 2.

7. So far as P. were concerned it was agreed that A.C.C. B.A.F. was in error in stating that there were only three P.39s at Vesuvius, and C.A.S.O. undertook to check the actual state today.

8. It was stated that the P.39s were an American supply, and that in point of actual fact the Americans were under no obligation to supply equipment. It was felt that the I.A.F. should deal direct with A.A.S.C./M.C. and it was decided that A.V.M. A.C.C. and C.A.S.O. should contact Gen. EDWARDS or Col. LONE with a view to straightening out the situation.

9. The question was raised of the status of A.C.C. B.A.F. in relation to the I.A.F. at the present juncture. It was appreciated that he had a strong interest but not a controlling one, and that while HQ M.A.A.F. and A.V.M. A.C.C. would do everything possible to speed the training of I.A.F. squadrons, and were fully prepared to deal sympathetically with any observations he might make he should be discouraged from taking executive action as, for example, in his signal of July 14th. C. of S. said he would write to A.V.M. ELLIOTT on the general situation and in reply to his signal.

10. C.A.S.O. said that a request had been received from the I.A.F. for M.F., and he had asked for details of their requirements. Some difference of opinion exists as to how far we are under obligation to supply transport. C.A.S.O. in conjunction with A.V.M. A.C.C. will clear this issue. Meanwhile C.A.S.O. has suspended action in view of the fact that considerable calls for M.F. are likely to be made for other purposes, which calls for a review of the whole M.F. situation.

MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

11. Engineer officers.

A.V.M. A.C.C. said that both his engineer officers (W/Osrs. Clay and Glaston) were in hospital seriously ill, and not likely to return for a considerable time. Their replacement by one officer is urgent. C.A.S.O. and A.C.C. will investigate.

12. LIVERIA airfield.

A.V.M. A.C.C. read a signal refusing permission for the use of LIVERIA airfield by the Italian Comm. Flight. The C. of S. stated that the reversal of this decision was very unlikely, and A.V.M. A.C.C. accepted this situation. He would investigate the possibility of using another airfield near Rome.

13. Staff of A.V.M. A.C.C.

A.V.M. A.C.C. raised the question of the replacement of one of his staff. It was decided that this would be best dealt with by him with the authorities concerned.

50334.

3838.

10. CMO. said that a request had been received from the I.A.F. for M.T., and he had asked for details of their requirements. Some difference of opinion exists as to how far we are under obligation to supply transport. CMO, in conjunction with A.V.M. A.C.C. will clear this issue. Meanwhile CMO has suspended action in view of the fact that considerable calls for M.T. are likely to be made for other purposes, which calls for a review of the whole M.T. situation.

MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

11. Engineer officers.

A.V.M. A.C.C. said that both his engineer officers (W/Care. Clay and Gladstone) were in hospital seriously ill, and not likely to return for a considerable time. Their replacement by one officer is urgent. CMO. and AOA. will investigate.

12. LITFORD airfield.

A.V.M. A.C.C. read a signal refusing permission for the use of LITFORD airfield by the ITALIAN Com. Air Lt. The C. of S. stated that the reversal of this decision was very unlikely, and A.V.M. A.C.C. accepted this situation. He would investigate the possibility of using another airfield near ROME.

13. Staff of A.V.M. A.C.C.

A.V.M. A.C.C. raised the question of the replacement of one of his staff. It was decided that this would be best dealt with by him with the authorities concerned.

14. Ceiling of I.A.F.

A.O.A. asked whether any further information had been received about the I.A.F. ceiling. He had not heard anything more himself despite inquiries to AFHQ. He pointed out that from his point of view there was a probability that in the near future the ratio strength of the I.A.F. would be cut down to 22,000 approximately while the actual strength stood at 32,000. A.O.A. agreed to make another effort to get a statement of policy from AFHQ. He stated that a ruling had been given that garris etc. could be found from ITALIAN Army personnel which would ease the situation of the I.A.F. in the event of a reduction.

DISTRIBUTION:-

C. of S. CMO. D.D. Ops.
A.O.A. A.V.M. A.C.C. PSO. to C. in C.

Probably only sent to M.A.A.F. for approval. See 27A + 28A, 29a
DRAFT

The Acting Chief Commissioner,
 Allied Control Commission, ROME.

~~1055~~
 25A

Operational and Administrative Control
Italian Air Force.

23A

1. With reference to the Air Forces Sub-Commission letter AFSC/S 15/Air, of 7th July, 1944, addressed to this Headquarters, a copy of which was forwarded to you.
2. It is clear from the letter from General Piacentini to the Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, which is attached to the letter referred to in para 1 above, that General Piacentini feels unable to carry out the orders of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, without reference to his Government. It is the view of this Headquarters that this has raised the matter above the level of the Sub-Commission, and that it is now a matter which should be taken up by the Allied Control Commission, direct with the Italian Government.
3. If you agree to this, it is suggested that it should be made quite clear to the Italian Government that the authority of the Allied Air Force Commander in Italy, as transmitted through the Air Forces Sub-Commission, is overriding. The directive for this was given by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, in his S.549/ACMT/MAC of 5th October 1943 which states a compact operational command to be formed out of the remnants of the Italian Air Force, which is to be placed unreservedly under the Allied Air Force Commander in Italy.
4. It should be made clear to the Italian Government that the suggestion for the formation of ^{independent units} separate Italian Wings cannot be entertained. The inclusion of Italian ^{groupings}

-2-

885017
Squadrons in Allied Wings in this plan was done deliberately and the Italians should realise that by this they will secure the following very material advantages:-

- (I) The direct support in battle of aircraft of superior performance to those which they are flying themselves.
- (II) The advantage of direct technical assistance and supervision. The Italian maintenance and equipment organisation is admittedly extremely bad, and this will be their golden opportunity to get it running on the right lines.
- (III) There will be no necessity for the I.A.F. to form separate Maintenance and Equipment units, a type of unit of which they have no experience at all.

5. The Italian Government should be informed that the Italian Air Force is to be, at once, organised as already agreed under the instructions of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, that is to say as follows:-

- (I) The 9th, 10th and 12th Squadrons to form the 4th Stormo, and to be under the operational command of the Officer Commanding No. 283 Wing.
- (II) The 102nd and 155th Squadrons to form a Stormo, the number of which can be chosen by the Italian Air Force, and to be under the operational command of the Officer Commanding No. 281 Wing. *5834*
- (III) The 28th and 152nd Squadrons to form a Stormo, the number of which can be chosen by the Italian Air Force, and to be under the operational command of the Officer Commanding No. 323 Wing.
- (IV) The 1st and 88th Squadrons to form a Stormo, the number of which can be chosen by the Italian Air Force and to be under the operational command of the Officer Commanding No. 334 Wing.

- 3 -

- (V) The Seaplanes to form a Stormo, the number of which can be chosen by the Italian Air Force, and to be under the operational control of the Officer Commanding No.242 Group.
- (VI) That the Italian Air Minister may appoint two Senior Officers from out of their Fighter and their Bomber Organisations, with small staffs, to be attached to Headquarters, Balkan Air Force.
- (VII) That the Italian increments to the Maintenance and Equipment Units attached to Nos 281, 283 and 323 Wings, as laid down in detail by the Air Forces Sub-Commission are to be provided at once.
- (VIII) That, apart from the operational control of Balkan Air Force, as exercised through the commanders of Nos.281 283 and 323 Wings, and the necessary control within the Maintenance and Equipment Units attached to these Wings, the Commanders of the Italian Stormi are to be entirely responsible for the organisation, administration and discipline of the Italian Air Forces.
- (IX) That any alterations to the Italian organisation or system of administration which may seem necessary to the Air Officer Commanding, Balkan Air Force, or his subordinate commanders, is to be put up to the Italian Air Minister through the Air Forces Sub-Commission. 383.?
- (X) That the Stormi are to be allowed to retain their own distinguishing badges.
- (XI) That the Italian Air flown aircraft are to be allowed to retain their Italian identification roundels.
- (XII) That the Italian Flag may be flown at all Headquarters and Camps of the Italian Air Force, even though they may be stationed on Allied airfields.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,

BARI.

~~45~~ 24A

AFSC/S. 15/AIR.

7th July 1944.

Dear

21, 23

I am forwarding herewith copies of some correspondence which I have had with M.A.A.F. Although this matter might well pass over without the Allied Control Commission being called into it, I feel that you should have this in case M.A.A.F. correspond with you direct.

Yours

W.B.

Captain Ellery Stone,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission.

5831

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED AIR FORCE COMMISSION,
BARI.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

COPY: ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, R.O. B.A.F.

DATE: 7th July 1944.

REF: AFSC/6.15/AIR.

SECRET.

OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL - ITALIAN
AIR FORCE.

See 22B & 1

1. Attached herewith is a translation of a letter received this morning from General Piacentini, who is Air Minister to the present Italian Government, and is also Chief of Staff to the Italian Air Ministry. This letter is attached as Appendix "A".

2. After the first conference on the Equipment and Organization of the Italian Air Force, held at H.Q. M.A.A.F. on 23rd May 1944, I returned to Bari and on May 27th I had a conversation with General Piacentini. For this conversation I prepared a series of notes, a copy of which I gave him as an aide-memoire, for his personal use only. He agreed absolutely to fall in with the plan suggested. A copy of these notes attached as Appendix "B" to this letter. On the same day I saw General Sandali, who was then Air Minister and Chief of Staff and explained shortly the general outlines of the plan. He agreed with it whole heartedly. Progress was reported to Air Marshal Sir John Linnell on 29th May by me personally.

3. On 2nd June I saw Air Commodore Jackson, and the question of the maintenance echelon for the Italian Squadrons was discussed. It was unanimously agreed that it would be far better for the Italians to provide an increment in our own R.S.U.'s and A.S.P.'s where they would have the advantage of the supervision and example of Allied personnel. On the first possible occasion subsequently, 6th June, I saw General Piacentini and explained the new proposals as regards R.S.U.'s and A.S.P.'s. He agreed with me enthusiastically and raised no objection at all.

4. On June 23rd I went to Salerno and went through the whole plan with General Piacentini and Mr. Casati who was Minister for War. No objections were then raised to the plan.

5. From 2nd June onwards work has gone ahead steadily on the lines of my aide-memoire at Appendix "B" as modified by the decision to form Wing Maintenance and Equipment Units. On 2nd July a letter was sent to the Italian Air Ministry showing the various and grades of all the Italian increment to the Maintenance and Equipment Units of each Wing. This letter is that referred to in para 1 of Appendix "A" (AFSC/7.3/AIR of 2nd July).

23A

23B

See 22B & A

23 B

1. Attached herewith is a translation of a letter received this morning from General Piacentini, who is Air Minister to the present Italian Government, and is also Chief of Staff to the Italian Air Ministry. This letter is attached as Appendix "A".
2. After the first conference on the Equipment and Organization of the Italian Air Force, held at H.Q. I.A.A.F. on 23rd May 1944, I returned to Bari and on May 27th I had a conversation with General Piacentini. For this conversation I prepared a series of notes, copy of which I gave him as an aide-memoire, for his personal use only. He agreed absolutely to fall in with the plan suggested. A copy of these notes attached as Appendix "B" to this letter. On the same day I saw General Sandali, who was then Air Minister and Chief of Staff and explained shortly the general outlines of the plan. He agreed with it whole heartedly. Progress was reported to Air Marshal Sir John Linnell on 29th May by me personally.
3. On 2nd June I saw Air Commodore Jackson, and the question of the maintenance echelon for the Italian Squadrons was discussed. It was unanimously agreed that it would be far better for the Italians to provide an increment in our own H.Q.'s and I.A.A.F.'s where they would have the advantage of the supervision and example of Allied personnel. On the first possible occasion subsequently, 6th June, I saw General Piacentini and explained the new proposals as regards H.Q.'s and I.A.A.F.'s. He agreed with me enthusiastically and raised no obstacles at all.
4. On June 23rd I went to Salerno and went through the whole plan with General Piacentini and Mr. Gaetani who was Minister for War. No objections were then raised to the plan.
5. From 2nd June onwards work has gone ahead steadily on the lines of my aide-memoire at Appendix "B" as modified by the decision to form Wing Maintenance and Equipment Units. On 2nd July a letter was sent to the Italian Air Ministry showing the ranks and grades of all the Italian inc. sent to the Maintenance and Equipment Units of each Wing. This letter is that referred to in para 1 of Appendix "A" (ARMS/7/3/ALC of 2nd July).
6. On 5th July I saw General Piacentini and got a first hint of the trouble which has resulted in the letter at Appendix "A". At the time of the conversation it clearly appeared that he was putting forward a somewhat uncompromising demand for the formation of quite separate Italian Wings, subject only to the operational control of I.A.A.F. I therefore feel that it is necessary to record my impressions of the conversation at some length, since the letter which followed it (Appendix "A") is more moderate in its tone, but I feel that if we exhibit any weakness, we may well be faced with greater demands. I told him quite plainly that he had already agreed, long ago, to the various plans suggested. I also said that if his proposals were forwarded by me to higher authority, I could not be answerable for the consequences which might well be the withdrawal of the offer to supply Allied aircraft to the I.A.A.F., if not worse. After a long discussion it was quite plain to me that, although he did not say so in as many words, the present Italian Government considered that he had exceeded his authority, and that they had refused to allow the Italian Air Force to take part in

the plan as agreed. I might also state that there is a possibility that some pressure has been brought to bear on him by a younger element in the Italian Fighter Wing, which has always had a tendency to regard the Fighters as being to some extent autonomous, and independent of the Italian Air Ministry. I talked him with this, and he denied it, but I am almost sure that this is a factor, if only a minor one. In Italy it is difficult, if not impossible, to know where political influence begins and ends, and it may well be that there is someone in the Fighter Wing who may exercise some of this influence.

7. I lost no opportunity of stressing the advantages of having combined Allied and Italian Wing Maintenance and Equipment Units. Although the General did not openly agree with me, there is no doubt that he, personally, did so. I told him that we regarded the Italian maintenance as being completely unorganised and ineffective, and that if he got his own R.S.U.'s I was certain that they would drift back into their customary state of inefficiency. Here again I am sure that inwardly General Piacentini agreed with me.

8. It will be observed from the aide-memoire at Appendix "B", para 15, 16 and 17, and from General Piacentini's letter at Appendix "A" para 7 that there is some misunderstanding about the question of "Wings". This is due to it being almost impossible to provide an Italian parallel to an R.A.F. Wing. I had thought that I had explained this sufficiently to the General, as witness my use of the word "Wing/Station" in para 16 of Appendix B, but apparently this is not so. There has never been any question of usurping the administrative control of the Italians over their own units. In order to avoid future misunderstandings, I suggest that the group of Italian aircraft within each of our Wings is referred to as the "Wing" element. This will give great pleasure to the Italians as they value their traditions highly, and will also do away with any impression that we are trying to assume administrative control and absorb the I.A.F. into the Allied forces.

9. With regard to the text and proposals in General Piacentini's letter at Appendix "A", paragraphs 1 to 4 are merely a recapitulation of the help given by the Italian Air Force to the Allies since the Armistice. Paragraph 5 is a location statement of the Operational and Non-Operational Flying Units of the I.A.F. These paragraphs call for no comment at this juncture.

10. Paragraph 6(a) means that these non-operational units are under the Command of the Italian Air Operational Command.

11. The units covered by Paragraph 6(b) are under Allied Operational control, but are otherwise under the Italian Air Operational Command.

12. Paragraph 6(c) states that the Macchi Squadrons and the new Squadrons to be equipped with Allied aircraft, would be under both the Operational and administrative control of the Allies. I have told General Piacentini that this is not so, repeatedly, and I feel that the core of the matter here is not as is stated, but that the putting of Italian Squadrons under Allied Wings is outside the authority of the General, as stated in his para 8. I have already pointed out in my para 8 above how the misunderstanding as regards "Wings" has arisen. I have also stated in para 5 above that I had fully explained the organisation of the Wing Maintenance and Equipment Units to the General, and that he had accepted this - the end of his para 7 does not, therefore, hold

inefficiency. Here again I am sure that inwardly General Piacentini agreed with me.

8. It will be observed from the side-scene at Appendix "a", para 16, and 17, and from General Piacentini's letter at Appendix "a", para 17 that there is some misunderstanding about the question of "wings". This is due to it being almost impossible to provide an Italian parallel to an R.A.F. wing. I had thought that I had explained this sufficiently to the General, as witness my use of the word "wing/station" in para 16 of Appendix B, but apparently this is not so. There has never been any question of usurping the Administrative control of the Italians over their own units. In order to avoid future misunderstandings, I suggest that the group of Italian aircraft within each of our wings is referred to as the "wings" group. This will give great pleasure to the Italians as they value their traditions highly, and will also do away with any impression that we are trying to assume administrative control and absorb the I.A.F. into the Allied forces.

9. With regard to the text and proposals in General Piacentini's letter at Appendix "a", paragraphs 1 to 4 are merely a recapitulation of the help given by the Italian Air Force to the Allies since the Armistice. Paragraph 5 is a laudatory statement of the Operational and Non-operational flying units of the I.A.F. These paragraphs call for no comment at this juncture.

10. Paragraph 6(a) means that these non-operational units are under the Command of the Italian Air Operational Command.

11. The units covered by Paragraph 6(b) are under Allied operational control, but are otherwise under the Italian Air Operational Command.

12. Paragraph 6(c) states that the Macchi Squadrons and the new Squadrons to be equipped with Allied Aircraft, would be under both the Operational and administrative control of the Allies. I have told General Piacentini that this is not so, repeatedly, and I feel that the core of the matter here is not as is stated, but that the putting of Italian Squadrons under Allied wings is outside the authority of the General, as stated in his para 8. I have already pointed out in my para 8 above how the misunderstanding as regards "wings" has arisen. I have also stated in para 3 above that I had fully explained the organization of the Wing Maintenance and Equipment Units to the General, and that he had accepted this - the end of his para 7 does not, therefore, hold water. It will be observed too that in his letter para 9(a) he accepts, in his first preference, Allied technical control up to a point.

13. Para 8 represents the whole crux of the matter, i.e., that Piacentini has been concerned for going too far by his Government. In my view his presentation of the case for a falling off in morale does not hold water. His personality is such that, if given authority by his Government, he could easily persuade his pilots and crews of the immense advantages to them and to Italy of their being brought into the Allied Operational and Maintenance organization.

14. As para 9 General Piacentini offers two solutions. I strongly recommend that the first proposition be turned down in the strongest possible terms. I have already informed the General that I could not possibly consider this proposal, but he is anxious to have it referred to the highest authority, so as to raise the matter to Government level. In replying to this I suggest that it should be made quite clear that if there is any further interference by the Government on these lines, we will withdraw all Allied support. No

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might even go far as to say that we would consider the disbanding of the Italian Air Force.

15. As regards the second proposal, I find this far more reasonable, and I think that, to clarify the situation, we should agree in writing as follows :-

- (a) That the three Airborne Squadrons, Nos. 9, 10 and 12, should be designated as being of the 4th Stormo.
- (b) That the two Assault Squadrons Nos. 155 and 101, should be designated as being of the 5th Stormo, whichever the Italians prefer.
- (c) That the two Balloon Squadrons, Nos. 152 and 28, should be given a Stormo number in accordance with Italian wishes.
- (d) That the operational control of the above Stormos, and of the Bomber/Transport Squadrons at Lecco should be under the sole operational control of R.A.F.
- (e) That, in order to save face, the present Commander of the Italian Fighter Force, and an Officer detailed by the Italian Air Ministry as the Commander of the Italian Bomber/Transport Force should be attached to Headquarters R.A.F. for liaison.
- (f) That it be made quite clear, in writing, that the Italian increments to the Wing Maintenance and Equipment Units of the three R.A.F. Wings, must be provided, as only under these conditions can proper maintenance be assured.
- (g) That it be made quite clear that apart from the operational control by R.A.F. and the necessary technical control of the Italian personnel in the Wing Maintenance and Repair Units, the Italian Stormo and their Squadron Commanders are entirely responsible for the discipline and administration of all Italian personnel. Any alterations to the Italian organisation or system of administration which may seem necessary to A.C.3. R.A.F. or his subordinate commanders to be put up to the Italian Air Ministry through the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

(h) That the Stormos be allowed to retain their own distinguishing marks, of which they are intensely proud.

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(i) That the Italian Flown aircraft should carry the Italian roundels, which are so like the British as to be practically indistinguishable.

(j) That the Italian flag may be flown at all Headquarters and Camps of the Italian Air Force, even though they may be stationed on Allied airfields.

16. I am confident that, if the relatively small concessions outlined in para 15 can be agreed to, the matter can be passed over. It might indeed be settled without reference to Higher Authority on the Allied side to the Italian Government. On the other hand, to save future argument, and to assert our position, I do feel most strongly that the first proposal mentioned in para 1 should be refused in an immediate sense. I might therefore be best to

CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL PIACENTINI.

23 B

1. Conversation is off the record and must be kept absolutely secret.
2. He is being told this so that he can make adequate preparations for the big changes which are about to come.
3. He will find himself in a very much stronger position shortly. I cannot say more than this, but assure him that it is true and that he must ask no questions at present.
4. When the time comes very radical changes will have to be made in the Italian Air Ministry. Go-along elements and dead wood will have to be ruthlessly cut away. Unless this is done we shall prove ourselves to be a failure in the eyes of the Allies. We have definite recommendations to make as to set-up in I.A.F.
5. Future set-up. Italians will lose the operational control. Control will be exercised by Allied Operational Headquarters.
6. Air Sub-Commission and Italian Air Forces will be responsible for Training, Supply, Maintenance and Administration of the I.A.F.
7. Problems arise as to when this control is best exercised from. It is a problem of communications, say why. (Only 1 line to Rome for 3 months).
8. Although the Italian Air Ministry must be in Rome, we consider that the Admin Control must be exercised from Bari.
9. It is up to General Piacentini to decide what set-up will be necessary in Rome and what in Bari. He will give all advice possible.
10. We on our part must decide what our set-up will have to be. Knowledge it as myself in dual capacity working between Rome and Bari. Small set-up in Rome perhaps Group Captain Eccles as my representative in my absence, and Wing Commander Winter and Squadron Leader De Haan. Signals will fade almost entirely out of the picture as this will probably be handled by the Operational Headquarters. The rest of the Air Sub-Commission, in particular Engineering, Maintenance and Supplies, with organization will have to remain in Bari.
11. The re-equipment of the I.A.F.

- 3 Squadrons P.39's aircraft 16 a/c each.
- 2 Squadrons Baltimore 16 a/c each.

On the part of the I.A.F. we must retain :-

- 2 Squadrons Me.209's, Me.202's with 16 a/c each.
 - 1 Squadron Cant 107's 16 a/c each.
 - 1 Squadron Su.32's 16 a/c each.
- The Seaplane Wing.

4. When the time comes very radical changes will have to be made in the Italian Air Ministry. Go-slow elements and dead wood will have to be ruthlessly cut away. Unless this is done we shall prove ourselves to be a failure in the eyes of the Allies. We have definite recommendations to make as to set-up in I.A.F.
5. Future set-up. Italians will lose the operational control. Control will be exercised by Allied Operational Headquarters.
6. Air Sub-Commission and Italian Air Force will be responsible for Training, Supply, Maintenance and Administration of the I.A.F.
7. Problems arise as to where this control is best exercised from. It is a problem of communications, say why. (Only 1 line to Rome for 3 months).
8. Although the Italian Air Ministry must be in Rome, we consider that the Admin Control must be exercised from Bari.
9. It is up to General MacArthur to decide what set-up will be necessary in Rome and what in Bari. We will give all advice possible.
10. We on our part must decide what our set-up will have to be. Perhaps it is myself in dual capacity working between Rome and Bari. Small set-up in Rome perhaps Group Captain Foulkes as my representative in my absence, and Wing Commander Minter and Squadron Leader De Haan. Signals will fade almost entirely out of the picture as this will probably be handled by the Operational Headquarters. The rest of the Air Sub-Commission, in particular Engineering, Maintenance and Supplies, with organisation will have to remain in Bari.
11. The re-equipment of the I.A.F.
 - 3 Squadrons P.39's Aircraft 16 a/c each.
 - 2 Squadrons Baltimore 16 a/c each.

On the part of the I.A.F. we must retain:-

 - 2 Squadrons Me.209's, Me.202's with 16 a/c each.
 - 1 Squadron Cant 1007's 16 a/c each.
 - 1 Squadron St.32's 16 a/c each.

The Seaplane Wing.
12. Long Range Bombs to disappear and to go into the ordinary squadrons.
13. All operations Cant 1007's and St.32's to be at night.
14. Essential that we must train every nerve, and allow no obstacles in the way of go-slow or red tape to stand in our way. The Allies will expect 42 serviceable a/c per day from each Squadron.
15. ORGANISATION.
 - (1) L.S. Wing at BIFFINO with other Allied Baltimore Squadrons.
 - (14) Fighter Wing of Italian Fighters with Allied Fighters at either TRIGNO or CUNELLA or CANI.
 - (14) Fighter Wing of Italian F4U's with Allied Fighters at either TRIGNO or CUNELLA or CANI.

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16. Operationally, wings will be under the R.A.F. Commander of the Wing/Station.

17. Administratively wings will be under their Italian Wing Commanders. But it is clear that very great assistance can be given to the Italian Squadrons by the technical, maintenance and administrative personnel of the Allied Squadrons in the same Wing/Station.

18. Necessity for Training and Conversion, both in actual flying and in Maintenance. Intention is to form only 1 Squadron of Fighters and 1 Squadron of Light bombers at a time.

19. Maintenance Training - (a) Baltimore.

A nucleus of Italian R.S.U.'s and technical personnel, with 1 or 2 engineer Officers to go at once to a Baltimore R.S.U. Then to the training and conversion airfield where there will be a small party of Allied technical personnel whose job it will be to train maintenance crews.

(14) P. 22a.

Not more than 60, i.e. 20 from each Squadron, of technical personnel to go to Capodachino to learn the Allison engine. Also a representative from Alfa-Romeo's. Remaining maintenance will be taught at MAUGH training airfield.

20. Flying Training - (a) Baltimore.

2 or 3 selected pilots, who will eventually form the basis of the Baltimore conversion Unit, to go to MAUGH at once in one of our own a/c's, do a few trips in Baltimores and return at once. Remaining conversion and further training at training airfield.

(14) P. 23a.

Aircraft are very easy to fly. Several selected pilots, with experience should fly them first and then conversion can proceed.

21. General Training. Only one Squadron will form at a time of (a) Fighters and (b) Baltimore. But training for wastage in the preceding squadrons will have to proceed concurrently with the training of additional squadrons.

22. We have to use R.S.U.'s and consider that Italians will have to do the same, except perhaps the Baltimores. Formation of a P.39 R.S.U. which should be formed at training airfield as first step.

23. Major overhauls of engines and airframes. We will certainly have to do Allison overhauls and suggest Packard's overhauls be cleared to concentrate on these. Will try to persuade Allies to undertake major overhauls of Baltimore engines, but if not successful we shall have to take these on as well. Alfa's should also do this.

24. It is for question where we can undertake major aircraft overhauls

conversion airfield where there will be a small party of Allied technical personnel whose job it will be to train maintenance crews.

(11) P.39's.

Not more than 60, i.e. 20 from each Squadron, of technical personnel to go to Capodachino to learn the Allison engine. Also a representative from Alfa-Romeo's. Remaining maintenance will be taught at MAGGI training airfield.

20.

Flying Training - (A) Baltimore.

2 or 3 selected pilots, who will eventually form the basis of the Baltimore conversion Unit, to go to MAGGI at once in one of our own a/c, do a few trips in Baltimore and return at once. Remaining conversion and further training at training airfield.

(11) P.39's.

Aircraft are very easy to fly. Several selected pilots, with experience should fly them first and then conversion can proceed.

21. General Training. Only one Squadron will form at a time of (a) Fighters and (b) Baltimore. But training for vintage in the preceding squadrons will have to proceed concurrently with the training of additional squadrons.

22. We have to use P.39's and consider that Italians will have to do the same, except perhaps the Baltimore. Formation of a P.39 S.S.U. which should be formed at training airfield as first step.

23. Major overhauls of engines and airframes. We will certainly have to do Allison overhauls and suggest Tomlinson's work be cleared to concentrate on these. Will try to persuade Allies to undertake major overhauls of Baltimore engines, but if not successful we shall have to take these on as well. Alfa's should also do this.

24. It is for question where we can undertake major airframe overhauls and repairs.

25. P.39's will be flown in from N. Africa as required, to training airfield.

26. Baltimore will be flown in from Middle East as required.

27. We have to use A.S.P's. What about Italians. We are getting a proposed establishment for a combined P.39 - Baltimore A.S.U.

28. We shall have to consider carefully the individual officers best fitted to fill the posts required under the re-organization. Apart from the reshuffle in the Air Ministry we will need someone very good indeed to take charge of training. Also we must have an English speaking Liaison Officer, with operations and operations room experience, for the new Operational H.Q.

29. All this is a tremendous job, which must be got on with quickly. These notes will be issued personally to General Placchini as an aide-memoire.

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for his use only, and must not be shown to anyone else at all.

30. The re-equipment of the I.A.F. with Allied types is wholly without prejudice to the status of the I.A.F. at the end of the war.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission,
27th May 1944.

(sgd). W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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Appendix "A" to AFSC/S.15/Air of 7.7.44.

SECRET.

TRANSMISSION OF LETTER FROM
S. A. BOWEN-BUESCHER.

TO THE MINISTER (GENERAL PLACEMENT) TO AIR VICE-CHIEF

95A

7th July 1944.

SUBJECT: ITALIAN AIR FORCE CO-OPERATION WITH THE
ALLIED AIR FORCE.

1. With reference to your letter AFSC/7/1/Air of the 2nd July 1944 and to our conversation of the 5th July 1944, I feel it necessary to bring to your attention certain points which will help to clear up the position of the I.A.F. and its operational units in connection with the abovementioned subject and on the basis of the Armistice clauses.

2. From the 8th September 1943 onwards, the I.A.F. has not only observed all the clauses laid down in the Armistice, but has also given, through the Air Forces Subcommittee, the maximum collaboration to the Allied Air Forces. The number of handicaps which had to be overcome, such as the scarcity of spare parts, salvaging and reconditioning, the adaptation of our organisation to that of the Allied, the operational activities carried out by aircraft of whose shortcomings you are well aware, the co-operation given to the Allies by aircraftmen, ground, specialists etc. only help to demonstrate the will and the ability of the I.A.F. to contribute its utmost to the Allied cause. The results obtained and the recognition received from high English authorities have given us hope.

3. The assignment of Allied aircraft to units of the I.A.F. has been the wish more than once expressed by all our pilots and will enable our Air Force to notably increase its contribution towards the common cause. This contribution, I can assure you, will increase in proportion to the number of aircraft assigned to us.

4. On many occasions, especially on the first few days following the Armistice, the Allies offered personnel of the I.A.F. work with their units under the same conditions as those existing for their own personnel. This, however, was turned down both by the crews and the Italian Air Minister, as the duty of the Italian pilot towards the Allies was that of collective and not individual help. In this way, it was Italy as a whole who intended participating, and has participated, in this war against the common enemy, and not just odd individuals.

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5. The present whereabouts of units is as follows :-

OPERATIONAL UNITS.

(a) 9th, 10th, 12th Groups of the 4th Storm using Alouettes are at Venissias under training and are intended to be incorporated with 283 Wing.

(b) 155th Group of the 51st Storm using Mosquito 205's are at Lucre and are intended to be incorporated with 284 Wing.

(c) 102nd Group of the 5th Storm using Mosquito 202 are at Lucre and are intended to be incorporated with 284 Wing.

operational units in connection with the above-mentioned subject and on the basis of the Armistice clauses.

2. From the 8th September 1943 onwards, the I.A.F. has not only observed all the clauses laid down in the Armistice, but has also given, through the Air Forces Sub-Commission, the maximum collaboration to the Allied Air Forces. The number of handicaps which had to be overcome, such as the scarcity of spare parts, salvaging and reconditioning, the adaptation of our organization to that of the Allied, the operational activities carried out by aircraft of mixed shortcomings you are well aware, the co-operation given to the Allies by aircraftmen, guards, specialists etc. only help to demonstrate the will and the ability of the I.A.F. to contribute its utmost to the Allied cause. The results obtained and the recognition received from high English authorities have given us hope.

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5. The present whereabouts of units is as follows :-

ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS.

(a) 9th, 10th, 12th Gruppo of the 4th Stormo using Alimodius are at Vesuvius under training and are intended to be incorporated with 283 Wing.

(b) 155th Gruppo of the 51st Stormo using Macchi 205's are at Muro and are intended to be incorporated with 281 Wing.

(c) 102nd Gruppo of the 5th Stormo using Macchi 202 are at Muro and are intended to be incorporated with 281 Wing.

(d) 132nd and 28th Gruppo, using Balboreas are at Venafra under training and are intended to be incorporated with 323 Wing.

(e) 88th Night Gruppo are using Cant Z.1007 at Lecce, and receive their orders from 334 Wing.

(f) 1st Night Gruppo are using S.82 at Lecce, and receive their orders from 334 Wing.

(g) The Seaplane base have 4 Groups at Taranto and receive their orders from 282 Group.

NON-ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS.

(h) 2nd and 3rd Gruppo are on S.79, S.82, S.84, S.75, S.12 at Lecce are under orders from the Comando Unità Aerea.

- (1) 20th 121st Gruppo of the 51st Storm using Macchi 205 at Nuova, is formed in no reserve Macchi 205 aircraft.
- (2) 101st Gruppo of the 5th Storm using Macchi 202 at Nuova, and is formed of the Macchi 202 reserve.
- (3) 8th Gruppo of the 5th Storm using Macchi 202 at Leverano, and is also formed of the Macchi 202 reserve.
- (4) All the Re.2004, 2002, Macchi 200 at the Leverano Training School.

6. From the above we can see that:

(a) The non-operational units depend on the Units Area Command.

(b) The sections under (c) (f) (g) depend on the Allied Command, but are organizationally autonomous: they are constituted solely of Italian Units and the Commander has under him the Maintenance Units and administrative units. He obtains his operational orders from the Allied Command but is otherwise wholly dependent on the Units Area Command.

(c) The sections under (a) (b) (c) (d) ^{in-hand} ~~should~~ be incorporated in British Units, ~~they~~ would therefore not only receive their orders directly from the British Command, but would also come under them organizationally and logistically.

7. For those sections under (c) of the preceding paragraph 6, it would entail not only the operational control being taken over by the Allied authorities, but also the whole organic structure. This is in direct contrast to the clauses of the Armistice, and to the status of a Co-belligerent, and in fact to the present position of the Italian Corps of Liberation and of the Naval Units who are operating with the Allies.

I feel it my duty to point out, as well, that in your memorandum of the 27th May, paragraph 5, it is clearly stated that the Italian Air Command operates under Allied Control, and in paras 15 and 16 it is clearly stated that the Wings would be Italian, which does not correspond with the facts you have now put before me.

In the abovementioned memorandum, and in the second one of the same date, it is stated that the Italians must undertake the constitution of the R.S.P. and A.S.P. which I took to signify the entire independence of the Italian Air Force Sections, except in as far as being under the direct control of the Allies for operational purposes.

8. I am afraid that the acceptance of the plan for the incorporation of Italian Sections in British Wings is beyond my authority, and thus the sanctioning would have to be undertaken by the Italian Government. It must be taken into consideration that such a plan, if put into operation, would greatly influence the morale of our pilots and also of our nation, as it would appear that the I.A.F. was to be absorbed by Allied Air Forces, and I foresee a falling off, not only of the cordial understanding which at present is increasing by leaps and bounds, but also in the current pro-British attitude which is growing daily.

9. It is my opinion, that this important question of principle can be solved to everyone's advantage, if one of the following solutions is adopted.

(b) The sections under (e) (f) (g) depend on the Allied Command, but are organically autonomous; they are constituted solely of Italian units and the Commander has under him the Maintenance Units and administrative units. He obtains his operational orders from the Allied Command but is otherwise wholly dependent on the Units Areas Command.

(c) The sections under (a) (b) (c) (d) ^{included} ~~should~~ be incorporated in British Units, ~~they~~ would therefore not only receive their orders directly from the British Command, but would also come under them organically and logistically.

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9. It is my opinion, that this important question of principle can be solved to everyone's advantage, if one of the following solutions is adopted.

(a) FIRST SOLUTION: (The best and most welcome which would increase rather than impede the war effort and still give the operational control to the Allies.)

Form a Wing with Italian Fighter Squadrons to be attached to R.A.F. under whose operational and technical orders they would be, and giving the Italian Commander of the Wing full executive "logistic", administrative and disciplinary responsibility.

Form the two Baltimore Squadrons into a Wing, ^{which} ~~who~~ would come under the operational and technical authority of the British Command with whom they are attached.

Continued 3....

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(b) SECOND SOLUTION:

To form (this was proposed in the memo of the 27th May paras 14, 15, 16), two Italian Fighter Wings who would be independent except for operational and technical orders.

The Commander of these two wings (Our present Fighter C.O) even though his powers may be reduced, should be attached to B.A.F.

The same procedure is suggested for the Baluchistan.

In either case, whether the first or the second proposal be accepted, the Wings should have their own distinguishing numbers and the aircraft should bear the Italian roundel and at the H.Q. the Italian flag should be flown.

I am sure that this important question will find a sympathetic ear in you, and in high Allied circles, as it is the only just reasoning of this problem.

I hope this will be perused by you in the spirit of cordiality which has characterised our work together during the past 7 months.

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S E R I A L

MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA

Segretario del Ministro

Bari, 11 V. Maggio 1944

All'Air Vice Marshal W.A.B. Brown
Air Forces Sub Commission A.O.C.

n. 234/S. di prot.

Oggetto: Programma di collaborazione della R. Aeronautica con la British Air Forces.

- S E R I A L -

1. Mi riferisco al foglio AF307/13/AM in data 2. V. 1944 ed alla nostra conversazione in data 5. V. 1944. Ritengo necessario prometterle, sig. Maresciallo, alcune questioni tendenti a definire con esattezza la posizione della R. Aeronautica e dei suoi rapporti di volo nei confronti dell'alleato, in collaborazione con le forze aeree alleate in base alle clausole d'armistizio e alla posizione "de jure" della R. Aeronautica.

2. La R. Aeronautica dall'8 settembre 1943 in poi, non solo ha adempiuto a tutte le clausole stabilite dall'armistizio, ma ha dato alle forze aeree alleate, attraverso la Air Forces Sub Commission la massima collaborazione possibile.

Le difficoltà superate per somministrare alla R. Aeronautica la parte del proprio, l'opera di riarmo e di ricostruzione, lo addebiamento delle nostre organizzazioni e quella filata, le azioni belliche compiute con successo le cui caratteristiche principali sono a lei note, la cooperazione attraverso le compagnie di manovalanza, guardia, sorveglianza ecc., stanno a dimostrare la volontà e la capacità della R. Aeronautica Italiana di contribuire con ogni mezzo possibile allo sforzo bellico degli Alleati.

Le siamo state i risultati raggiunti ed i riconoscimenti tributati da altre autorità inglesi.

3. L'assegnazione di velivoli alleati ai reparti della R. Aeronautica, spiega il desiderio già volte espresso da questa e nostri piloti a non l'Aeronautica nelle condizioni di aumentare notevolmente il contributo per la causa comune. Considero che - a rosso delle nostre assegnazioni di ciò - ancora non sono aumentando se verranno esserati ancora nuovi velivoli in relazione alle forze aeree organizzate per la R. Aeronautica.

4. Il personale della R. Aeronautica in più volte offerte, spiega nei loro immediatamente successivi all'armistizio, di ottenere alle dirette e complete dipendenze di reparti alleati, che sono stati oltre che i velivoli, anche la stessa organizzazione economica del proprio personale.

Ciò non è stato accettato né dai nostri equipaggi né, evidentemente, del Ministro dell'Aeronautica, in quanto l'opera che il pilota Italia no intendeva dare agli alleati doveva essere un apporto italiano ingiusto in una unica forza organicamente costituita.

Comitato: Programma di collaborazione della R. Aeronautica con la R. Air Forces.

1. Il riferisco al foglio 1050/13/1 in data 2.7.1944 ed alla nostra conversione in data 6.7.1944. divenne necessaria l'ispezione, sic. l'arrestato, alcune questioni tendenti a definire con esattezza la posizione della R. Aeronautica e dei suoi rapporti di volo nel confronto di tutti i programmi di collaborazione con la R. Aeronautica. In base alle conclusioni d'indagine si è alla riunione "de jure" della R. Aeronautica.
2. La R. Aeronautica dell'8 settembre 1943 in poi, non solo ha ampliato a tutte le classi stabilite dall'amministrazione, ma ha dato alle forze aeree alleate, attraverso la Air Force e la Commissione la massima collaborazione possibile.
3. La difficoltà superata per sopprimere alla R. Aeronautica la parte di vittoria, l'opera di ricostruzione è di ricostruzione. In conseguenza della nostra organizzazione è quella di essere, le azioni belliche con tutte le armi e mezzi le cui caratteristiche tecniche sono a lei note. La cooperazione attraverso la compagnia di manutenzione, servizio, materiali ecc., stanno a dimostrare la volontà e la capacità della R. Aeronautica Italiana di contribuire con ogni mezzo possibile allo sforzo bellico degli Alleati.
4. Non fanno fede i risultati raggiunti ed i riconoscimenti tributati da altre autorità inglesi.
5. L'assegnazione di velivoli alleati ai reparti della R. Aeronautica è un fatto di desiderio più volte espresso da tutti i nostri piloti e non l'Aeronautica nella condizione di aumentare notevolmente il proprio contributo per la causa comune. Contratto che - a poco delle prestazioni - ancora non sono aumentando se verranno assai guasti ancora nuovi velivoli in relazione alla forza organica esistente per la R. Aeronautica.
6. Il personale della R. Aeronautica da più volte offerto, specie nei giorni immediatamente successivi all'armistizio, di operare alle dirette e complete dipendenze dei reparti alleati, con ogni dato oltre che i velivoli, anche lo stesso trattamento economico del proprio personale. Ciò non è stato accettato né dai nostri esponenti né, evidentemente, dal Ministero della R. Aeronautica, in quanto l'opera che il pilota Italia non intendeva dare agli Alleati doveva essere un apporto italiano in grado di essere in una unica forza organicamente costituita.

1.1.1.

- 2 -

tra cioè l'Italia, che, con la R. Aeronautica, come forza armata, in
tendeva partecipare - ed ha partecipato - alla guerra contro il co-
mune nemico.

5. La situazione attuale dei reparti è la seguente:

Reparti operativi

- a) 90-100-120 Gruppo del 40 Stormo, su Aircobra, al Vesuvio in
addestramento: dovrebbero essere incorporati nel 2290 Wing;
- b) 1550 Gruppo del 410 Stormo, su Mc. 205, a Nuova: dovrebbe esse-
re incorporato nel 2410 Wing;
- c) 1020 Gruppo del 60 Stormo, su Mc. 202, a Nuova: dovrebbe essere
incorporato nel 2810 Wing;
- d) 1220 Gruppo a 200 Gruppo, su Baltimore, al Vesuvio: in addestra-
mento; dovrebbero essere incorporati nel 2290 Wing;
- e) 830 Gruppo notturno, su Cent. 2 100%, a Lecce: prende ordini di-
retti per l'impiego del 2340 Wing;
- f) 10 Gruppo notturno, su 3.82, a Lecce: prende ordini diretti per
l'impiego del 2340 Wing;
- g) Raggruppamento Idro, su 4 Gruppi, a Taranto: prende ordini di-
retti per l'impiego del 2400 Wing.

Reparti non operativi

- n) 20 e 30 Gruppo "1" su 3.79, 3.84, 3.61, 3.73, 4.12, a Lecce:
dipende dal Comando Unità Aerea;
- l) 200 e 210 Gruppo del 510 Stormo, su Mc. 205, a Nuova: costitui-
sca la riserva per i Mc. 205 dei reparti operativi;
- l) 1010 Gruppo del 40 Stormo, su Mc. 202, a Nuova: costituisce la
riserva per i Mc. 202 dei reparti operativi;
- m) 80 Gruppo del 60 Stormo su Mc. 202 a Leverano; costituisce il
servo per i Mc. 202 dei reparti operativi;
- n) tutti i velivoli No. 2001 - 2002 - 16.000 alla scuola di lever-
ano.

3814 ri-

6. Della predetta situazione risulta:

- a) I reparti in operaiva dipendono dal Comando Unità Aerea;
- b) I reparti di cui alla lettera e), f), g), dipendono per l'impie-
go da Comandi Alleati, ma sono originariamente autonomi: sono co-
stituiti unitariamente da reparti italiani ed il comandante di ba-
li reparti ha alle proprie dirette dipendenze i servizi tecnici
dipendenti per l'impiego del Comando

- a) 50-100-120- Gruppo del 40 Stormo, su Frecce, al Vesuvio in
escestramento: dovrebbero essere incorporati nel 2800 Wing;
- b) 1650 Gruppo del 510 Stormo, su Frecce, a nuova, dovrebbe esse-
re incorporato nel 2810 Wing;
- c) 1020 Gruppo del 50 Stormo, su Frecce, a nuova: dovrebbe essere
incorporato nel 2810 Wing;
- d) 1220 Gruppo e 2800 Stormo, su Frecce, al Vesuvio: in addestra-
mento; dovrebbero essere incorporati nel 2830 Wing;
- e) 280 Gruppo notturno, su Cent. 2 1007, a Lecce: prende ordini di-
retti per l'impiego del 2840 Wing;
- f) 10 Gruppo notturno, su Frecce, a Lecce: prende ordini diretti per
l'impiego del 2840 Wing;
- g) Dal Gruppo 1000, su Frecce, a Tarento: prende ordini di-
retti per l'impiego del 2840 Wing.

Reparti non operativi

- a) 20 e 30 Gruppo "1" su Frecce, 5.84, 5.81, 5.70, 6.12, a Lecce:
dipende dal Comando Unità Lecce;
- i) 200 e 210 Gruppo del 510 Stormo, su Frecce, a nuova: costitui-
sce la riserva per i 10.100 dei reparti operativi;
- l) 1010 Gruppo del 50 Stormo, su Frecce, a nuova: costituisce la
riserva per i 10.202 dei reparti operativi;
- m) 60 Gruppo del 50 Stormo su Frecce, a nuova: costituisce il
servo per i 10.202 dei reparti operativi;
- n) Tutti i velivoli No. 2001 - 2022 - No. 200 alla scuola di levera-
no.

b. Dalle predette suddivisione risulta:

- a) I reparti non operativi dipendono dal Comando Unità Lecce;
- b) I reparti di cui alla lettera e), f), g), dipendono per l'impie-
go dei Comandi Alleati, ma sono organicamente autonomi: sono co-
stituiti unicamente da reparti italiani ed il comandante di ta-
li reparti ha alle proprie dipendenze i servizi tecnici
logistici ed amministrativi. Risponde per l'impiego del Comando
Alleato di cui dipende, e risponde al Comando Unità Aerea per
ogni altra questione.
- c) I reparti di cui alla lettera e), f), g), dovrebbero essere in-
quadriati in unità inglesi. Dipenderebbero quindi, non solo per

- 3 -

l'impegno da talis fatta, ma i Comandanti di questa avrebbero diretta ingerenza anche nel campo organico e legislativo.

4. Per i reparti di cui alla lettera c), del precedente paragrafo 6, non si tratterebbe di passare il solo controllo operativo alle autorità Alleate, ma ne deriverebbe in definitiva un vero e proprio incorporamento organico. Ciò è in contrasto alle clausole dell'Armistizio, alla posizione "de jure" della coobelligeranza, ed in via di fatto, alla posizione del Corpo Italiano di Liberazione e nelle leggi da guerra Italiane che operano con gli Alleati.

Inoltre ritengo doveroso segnalare che nel suo memorandum del 27 maggio, al paragrafo 3, e chiaramente precisato che l'Aviazione Italiana avrebbe operato sotto il controllo operativo alleato, e nei paragrafi 15 e 16 è chiaramente precisato, trattarsi di Wings Italiani. Ciò è in contrasto con la situazione che mi viene ora presentata.

Così pure in detto memorandum, ed in quello aggiuntivo della stessa data, è detto che gli Italiani debbono provvedere alla costituzione del H.S.U. come pure del I.S.F. mettendo con ciò in chiara evidenza, la piena indipendenza dei reparti aerei Italiani, che non pertanto devono operare in base agli ordini degli Alleati e sotto il loro diretto controllo.

8. Sta di fatto che l'accettare di incorporare i reparti Italiani in Wings Inglesi è al di sopra della mia autorità e merita la sanzione del Governo Italiano. Indipendente da quanto precede tale incorporazione influirebbe grandemente sullo spirito dei nostri piloti e intascherebbe altresì i sentimenti del popolo Italiano, poiché sembrerebbe che la Aeronautica sia assorbita dalle Forze Aeree Alleate. Ciò esprime di momento sia per lo sforzo bellico che per i vincoli di coriaria comprensione stabiliti che stanno riempiendo aumentando, come per la forte corrente di simpatie che si sta sviluppando nei nostri riguardi.

9. 2' mia opinione, per tutto il complesso di ragioni che Le ho esposto a voce, che questa importante questione di principio possa ~~essere~~ risolta, con pieno vantaggio di un maggior potenziamento bellico e spirituale, se si adotta una delle due seguenti soluzioni:

a) Prima soluzione: (la migliore e la più gradita e che non diminuirebbe in nessun modo lo sforzo bellico, ma anzi lo aumenterebbe, lasciando intatto il controllo operativo alleato):

- Fornire un Wing con 5 squadriglie di Uccelli Italiani da inserirne nel H.S.U., ai diretti ordini di questi per le questioni operative e per le direttive tecniche, lasciando al Comandante Italiano del Wing la responsabilità operativa, quelle logistiche, amministrative e disciplinari.

- Fornire un Wing i due Squadriglie del Gruppo i quali continueranno ad essere la loro dipendenza organica-amministrativa

mento organico. Ciò è in contrasto alle clausole dell'Armistizio, alla posizione "de iure" della cockelligeranza, ed in via di fatto, alla posizione del Corpo Italiano di Liberazione e delle Aavi da guerra Italiane che operano con gli Alleati.

Inoltre ritengo doveroso segnalare che nel suo memorandum del 17 maggio, al paragrafo 5, è chiaramente precisato che l'Aviazione Italiana avrebbe operato sotto il controllo operativo alleato, e nei paragrafi 15 e 16 è chiaramente precisato l'attribuirsi di Wings Italiani. Ciò è in contrasto con la situazione che mi viene ora prospettata.

Così pure in detto memorandum, ed in quello aggiuntivo della stessa data, è detto che gli Italiani avrebbero provvedere alla costituzione del 1.3.8.0. come pure del 1.5.8.2. mettendo con ciò in chiara evidenza, la piena indipendenza dei reparti aerei Italiani, che non pertanto devono operare in base agli ordini degli Alleati e sotto il loro diretto controllo.

8. Sta di fatto che l'accettare di incorporare i reparti Italiani in Wings Inglesi è al di sopra della mia autorità e merita la sanzione del Governo Italiano. Indipendente da quanto precede vale incorporazione includerebbe grandemente sullo spirito dei nostri piloti e incoraggierebbe altresì i sentimenti del popolo Italiano, poiché sembrerebbe che la S. Aeronautica sia esecrata dalle forze Alleate. Ciò sarebbe un documento sia per lo sforzo bellico che per i vincoli di completa comprensione e simpatia che stanno sviluppando, come per la forte corrente di simpatia che si sta sviluppando nei vostri riguardi.

9. La mia opinione, per tutto il complesso di ragioni che ho esposto a voce, che questa importante questione di principio possa essere risolta, con pieno vantaggio di un maggior potenziamento bellico e strategico, se si accetta una delle due seguenti soluzioni:

a) Prima soluzione: (la migliore e la più gradita e che non diminuirebbe in nessun modo lo sforzo bellico, ma anzi lo aumenterebbe, lasciando intatto il controllo operativo all'alleato):

- Formare un Wing con 6 squadriglie di caccia Italiani da inserirne nel P.A.I., ai diretti ordini di questi per le questioni operative e per le direttive tecniche, lasciando al Comandante Italiano del Wing la responsabilità esecutive, mentre la legittima, amministrativa e disciplinare.

- Annuire a un Wing i cui squadrone abbiano i quali continuerebbero ad avere la loro dipendenza organico-amministrativa dal Gruppoamento Bombardamento ed avrebbero la dipendenza operativa e le direttive tecniche dal Comando Inglese presso il quale si trovano dislocati.

b) Seconda soluzione:

- Formare questa e anche le proposte contenute nel memorandum

1.1.1.

del 27 maggio, paragrafi 14, 15, 16) due wings Italiani da caccia che conservando tutte le loro prerogative ricevono gli ordini operativi e le direttive tecniche dal Comando Inglese che si trova nella stessa sede, ferma restando l'autonomia organica, amministrativa e disciplinare.

Il Comandante di questi due Wings (il nostro attuale Comandante di Raggruppamento Caccia) sia pure con Comando ridotto, dovrebbe aver sede presso il B.A.F.-

Per l'Wings Baltimore valgono le stesse considerazioni che per gli Wings da Caccia.

Sia adottando la prima che la seconda soluzione è naturale che gli Wings Italiani dovrebbero avere un proprio numero distintivo e i velivoli porteranno la coccarda tricolore. Sulla sede dei loro Comandi dovrà essere alzata la bandiera Italiana.

10. Io sono certo, sig. Maresciallo, che questa importante questione troverà in Lei e nelle superiori Autorità Alleate, la giusta e dovuta comprensione e risoluzione. Spero che questo avvenga nello spirito di grande cordialità che ha caratterizzato questi sette mesi di lavoro in comune.



IL MINISTRO

F. Lissandrini

5812

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.C. BARI.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES, C.M.F.

DATE: 30th June 1944.

REF: AFSC/S.15/AIR.

SECRET.

REORGANISATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

20A

1. With reference to MAAF/S.1545/ORG dated 26th June 1944, the following progress has been made in the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force.

2. FIGHTER WING.

(a) The 9^o, 10^o and 20^o Gruppi equipped with 31 Macchi 205 aircraft have been converted into one Squadron of 16 I.E. aircraft, now known as No.155 I.A.F. Squadron and located at NUOVA.

(b) The 12^o 21^o and 155^o Gruppi equipped with 36 Macchi 202 aircraft have been converted into one Squadron of 16 I.E. aircraft, now known as No.102 I.A.F. Squadron and located at NUOVA.

(c) The establishment of the above Squadrons is modelled on the standard R.A.F. Establishment for a S.E.F. Squadron.

(d) The 104^o Gruppo of Reggiani 2001 Dive Bombers and the 102^o Gruppo of Reggiani 2002 Dive Bombers have been disbanded as the engines in the Re.2002 are most unreliable and the Re.2001 is now considered obsolete.

(e) There has been a re-shuffle of all the fighter pilots and the most experienced have been earmarked for No.9, 10 and 12 Airacobra Squadrons now forming.

3. BOMBER AND BOMBER/TRANSPORT WING.

(a) No.88^o Gruppo equipped with 19 Cant 1007 aircraft has been reorganised on a 16 I.E. aircraft basis and modelled on the lines of an R.A.F. Light Bomber establishment.

The Gruppo is now known as No.88 I.A.F. Squadron and is located at Lecce.

(b) No.1^o Gruppo equipped with 23 Savoia Marchetti 82 aircraft has been reorganised on a 16 I.E. aircraft basis, and is also modelled on the lines of the establishment of a R.A.F. Light Bomber Squadron. The squadron is known as No.1 I.A.F. Squadron and is located at Lecce.

(c) The above squadrons continue to be employed on supply dropping operations over YUGOSLAVIA and are now operationally controlled by Headquarters, Balkan Air Force.

(d) The surplus personnel thrown up by this reorganisation will go into

2. FIGHTER WING.

- (a) The 9^o, 10^o and 20^o Gruppi equipped with 34 Macchi 205 aircraft have been converted into one Squadron of 16 I.E. aircraft, now known as No.155 I.A.F. Squadron and located at NUOVA.
- (b) The 12^o 21^o and 155^o Gruppi equipped with 36 Macchi 202 aircraft have been converted into one Squadron of 16 I.E. aircraft, now known as No.102 I.A.F. Squadron and located at NUOVA.
- (c) The establishment of the above Squadrons is modelled on the standard R.A.F. Establishment for a S.E.F. Squadron.
- (d) The 101^o Gruppo of Reggiani 2001 Dive Bombers and the 102^o Gruppo of Reggiani 2002 Dive Bombers have been disbanded as the engines in the Re.2002 are most unreliable and the Re.2001 is now considered obsolete.
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- (c) The above squadrons continue to be employed on supply dropping operations over YUGOSLAVIA and are now operationally controlled by Headquarters, Balkan Air Force.
- (d) The surplus personnel thrown up by this reorganisation will go into No.28 and No.132 I.A.F. Baltimore Squadrons which are forming.
- (e) There has been no change in the Courier and Transport services which are carried out with Savoia Marchetti 79 aircraft, there being a total of 28 of these aircraft on the strength of the I.A.F.

4. SEAPLANE WING.

There has been no reorganisation of the Sea-plane Wing which continues to function under the operational control of 242 Group. The different types of aircraft with which it is equipped, and the numbers of these held by the I.A.F. do not make this Wing adaptable for reorganisation of R.A.F. lines.

Continued 2.....

5. MAINTENANCE.

- (a) The Italian version of Form 700 has been printed, and introduced into the I.A.F.
- (b) Maintenance schedules and pilots handling notes for the Baltimore and Airacobra have been translated into Italian and are now being printed.
- (c) Maintenance schedules for Italian types of aircraft have been introduced.

6. HEADQUARTERS - ESTABLISHMENTS.

Under the new Minister for Air, the establishments of Headquarters and other non-operational formations is being revised, in an attempt to cut them down and bring them into line with similar R.A.F. formations. This will necessarily take some time.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

5809

POSTAGRAM.

SECRET.

20A

To:- Air Forces
Sub-Commission,
Allied Control
Commission.

Originator's Reference No:-
MAAF/S.1545/Org.
Date:- 26 June, 44.

From:- Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.F.

Reorganisation of Italian Air Force.

19A

Reference is made to the recent conference with regard to the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force on British pattern.

2. It is requested that this Headquarters be informed what progress has been made on these lines.

21A

Prev. Ref. _____

Next Ref. _____

Originator's
Signature:-

J. W. Clayton
Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer i/c Administration, R.A.F.,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.



5807

SECRET

BALKAN AIR FORCE

Meeting held at HQ MAAF 24 June 1944

Present:

Air Marshal Slessor.
 Air Marshal Linnell.
 Air Vice Marshal McEntegart.
 Air Commodore Slocumbe.
 Group Captain Sevastopulo.
 Wing Commander Case.
 Wing Commander Mason.
 Wing Commander Orme.

Air Vice Marshal Elliot.
 Air Vice Marshal Pown-Buscarlet.
 Air Commodore Jackman.
 Group Captain Eccles.



Action

1. C-in-C said that, with only a few exceptions the operational, maintenance and administrative requirements of Balkan Air Force could and should be met by the reallocation of existing resources in the Command. Apart from 352 Squadron, the formation of B.A.F. did not involve the addition of any squadrons to the Command; squadrons which already existed, had been operated and maintained on other duties were now regrouped for employment in Balkan Air Force. While he appreciated that a proportional regrouping of all the resources required to back these squadrons was not altogether a simple process in view of shortages of manpower, shipping and equipment, C-in-C said that was the principle upon which all concerned must act. The operational composition of the Force had already been determined; the implications of getting it into full working order must be accepted and energetic action taken to that end.

2. After general discussion it was noted that action was required regarding Wing H.Q. as follows:-

- (a) For 281 Wing, which is to become operational on June 28. Additional equipment and personnel have to be supplied to put this Wing onto a mobile basis providing full M.O.R.U. facilities as part of the Wing H.Q.

It was agreed that B.A.F. should provide detailed information on minimum requirements

B.A.F.

5806

Air Commodore Slocombe.
Group Captain Sevastopulo.
Wing Commander Case.
Wing Commander Mason.
Wing Commander Orme.

Air Vice Marshal Elliot.
Air Vice Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet.
Air Commodore Jackman.
Group Captain Eccles.

Action

1. C-in-C said that, with only a few exceptions the operational, maintenance and administrative requirements of Balkan Air Force could and should be met by the reallocation of existing resources in the Command. Apart from 352 Squadron, the formation of B.A.F. did not involve the addition of any squadrons to the Command; squadrons which already existed, had been operated and maintained on other bases were now regrouped for employment in Balkan Air Force. While he appreciated that a proportional regrouping of all the resources required to back these squadrons was not altogether a simple process in view of shortages of manpower, shipping and equipment, C-in-C said that was the principle upon which all concerned must act. The operational composition of the Force had already been determined; the implications of getting it into full working order must be accepted and energetic action taken to that end.

2. After general discussion it was noted that action was required regarding Wing H.Q. as follows:-

3006

(a) For 284 Wing, which is to become operational on June 28. Additional equipment and personnel have to be supplied to put this Wing onto a mobile basis providing full M.O.R.U. facilities as part of the Wing H.Q.

It was agreed that B.A.F. should provide detailed information on minimum requirements which should be rapidly confirmed and provided by MAAT.

B.A.F.
AOA MAAT.

(b) Medium Bomber Wing. C-in-C said he had decided that 252 Wing should remain with Desert Air Force and that the new Wing H.Q. to be formed should go to B.A.F. Improvising so far as necessary, the nucleus of this Wing must be in working order by July 10.

A.O.A.

/5. Squadrons.



- 2 -

Action

5. Squadrons.

(a) C-in-C confirmed that T.A.F. had accepted 10 July as the date for transfer of 13, 55, 260 and the German Flight of 6, squadrons to B.A.F.

(b) 13 (Bellard) squadron is available for transfer as soon as B.A.F. informs MAJF that it can be received.

B.A.F.

(c) 243 squadron is due to be operational in B.A.F. by mid-July.

(d) 252 squadron is due to be operational in B.A.F. by the end of July. The full pack-up for the squadron is to be shipped direct from Middle East for B.A.F., not to Berina; and the move of the squadron to Italy is not to await the arrival there of all equipment.

A.O.L.

(e) A second Yugoslav M.A.L. Squadron is to be formed on R.P. Hurricanes. Training arrangements will be made by Middle East. It is not expected that the squadron will be operational much before the end of 1944.

4. Air Supply. C-in-C said that preparations should be made for sufficient facilities to be available for 267 Squadron's employment in toto on supply duties in B.A.F. It was possible that the squadron, if so used, would be in substitution for a proportion of present resources, but plans should be made on the assumption that both the whole of 267 Squadron and 12 Russian aircraft were available in addition to the squadrons now employed.

A.O.L. B.A.F. said that, in that event, additional stores, packing facilities, parachutes and an aerodrome would be required. Stores are available; he would discuss with SOMO provision of packing facilities and personnel (which should be obtainable); and would confirm that all parachutes were regarded as a common stock to be allocated by AFHQ in the event of shortage.

B.A.F.

C-in-C instructed HQ to reserve a suitable airfield near Brindisi for the possible use of B.A.F. C-in-C said that if the main area for supply moved to the North of the Balkans, it might be assumed that a sea channel would have been opened across the Adriatic; he did not think that the reservation of airfields further North in Italy need be considered at present.

A.O.L.

5. Italian Air Force.

(a) D/DMS was instructed to confirm that the Allison-

5805

A.O.A.

(c) 215 Squadron is due to be operational in B.A.F. by mid-July.

(d) 252 Squadron is due to be operational in B.A.F. by the end of July. The full pack-up for the squadron is to be shipped direct from Middle East for B.A.F., not to Benina; and the move of the squadron to Italy is not to await the arrival there of all equipment.

(e) A second Tikonov N.A.L. Squadron is to be formed on R.P. Hurricanes. Training arrangements will be made by Middle East. It is not expected that the squadron will be operational much before the end of 1944.

4. Air Supply. C-in-C said that preparations should be made for sufficient facilities to be available for 267 Squadron's employment in toto on supply duties in B.A.F. It was possible that the squadron, if so used, would be in substitution for a proportion of present resources, but plans should be made on the assumption that both the whole of 267 Squadron and 12 Russian aircraft were available in addition to the squadrons now employed.

A.O.C. B.A.F. said that, in that event, additional stores, packing facilities, parachutes and an aerodrome would be required. Stores are available; he would discuss with SMTD provision of packing facilities and personnel (which should be obtainable); and would confirm that all parachutes were regarded as a common stock to be allocated by AFHQ in the event of shortage.

B.A.F.

C-in-C instructed HQ to reserve a suitable airfield near Brindisi for the possible use of B.A.F. C-in-C said that if the main area for supply moved to the North of the Balkans, it might be assumed that a sea channel would have been opened across the Adriatic; he did not think that the reservation of airfields further North in Italy need be considered at present.

A.O.A.

5. Italian Air Force.

(a) D/MS was instructed to confirm that the Allison engine instructors required from 214 Group, and nine additional P-39s for training are sent at once to Vesuvius airfield for No. 12 Squadron.

D/MS

(b) It was agreed that HQ should request MAT/MTO to accept additional IAF personnel for P-39 airframe training at Capodichino; and that A.F.S.C. should continually review the possibilities for accelerating the training of both the P-39 and Baltimore squadrons and maintenance personnel.

A.O.A.

A.F.S.C.

/(o) D/MS was instructed...

5805

Action

D/DMS

- (c) D/DMS was instructed to confirm on June 25 that 12 Baltimore were at Vosvius for training.

7. Maintenance backlog for B.A.F. C-in-C said that personnel and equipment must be taken proportionately from the organizations at present backing squadrons which were to go over to B.A.F.; and that Italian and Yugoslav personnel should be employed in a composite organization with the B.A.F. He considered that greater flexibility and economy in manpower might be obtained by the development of Wing Maintenance and Stores Units rather than by the creation of additional RSUs and ASUs. He asked AOA and D/DMS to examine this possibility, the main immediate requirement being that maintenance backlog in one form or another must be available for the squadrons as they became operational in B.A.F.

A.O.A.
D/DMS

C-in-C agreed that AOA should prepare a statement for submission to the Air Ministry on the increase in Command ceiling that would be necessary for B.A.F. to undertake operations across the Adriatic on a fully mobile basis.

A.O.A.

8. S.A.T. Column. It was agreed that D/DMS should examine the possibility of initially allocating one section of an M.T. company to B.A.F.

D/DMS

9. Vis. C-in-C confirmed that the former Fighter Control at Vis should remain as a 242 Group lodger unit. For all other purposes Vis is under B.A.F.

A.O.C., D.A.F. referred to the necessity for steel matting on the Vis strip. C-in-C instructed AOA to put in a priority bid for the necessary P.S.F., priority being based on the SACRED ruling regarding defence of Vis.

A.O.A.

10. Communication aircraft for B.A.F. C-in-C asked AOA to examine B.A.F. proposals and to arrange for early provision of aircraft up to the establishment agreed.

A.O.A.

25 June 1944

JCS.1034

Distribution:-

All Present.

2303

(o) D/DMS was instructed to confirm on June 25 that 12 Baltimore were at Vesuvius for training.

D/DMS

7. Maintenance backlog for B.A.F. C-in-C said that personnel and equipment must be taken proportionately from the organizations at present backing squadrons which were to go over to B.A.F.; and that Italian and Yugoslav personnel should be employed in a composite organization with the R.A.F. He considered that greater flexibility and economy in manpower might be obtained by the development of Wing Maintenance and Stores Units rather than by the creation of additional PSUs and ASBs. He asked A.O. and D/DMS to examine this possibility, the main immediate requirement being that maintenance backing in one form or another must be available for the squadrons as they became operational in B.A.F.

A.O.A.
D/DMS

C-in-C agreed that A.O. should prepare a statement for submission to the Air Ministry on the increase in Command ceiling that would be necessary for B.A.F. to undertake operations across the Adriatic on a fully mobile basis.

A.O.A.

8. S. & T. Column. It was agreed that : D/DMS should examine the possibility of initially allocating one section of an M.T. company to B.A.F.

D/DMS

9. Vis. C-in-C confirmed that the forward Fighter Control at Vis should remain as a 242 Group lodger unit. For all other purposes Vis is under B.A.F.

A.O.C., B.A.F. referred to the necessity for steel matting on the Vis strip. C-in-C instructed A.O. to put in a priority bid for the necessary P.S.F., priority being based on the SACRED ruling regarding defence of Vis.

A.O.A.

10. Communication aircraft for B.A.F. C-in-C asked A.O. to examine B.A.F. proposals and to arrange for early provision of aircraft up to the establishment agreed.

A.O.A.

5803

25 June 1944

JCS.1051

Distribution:-

All Present.
D. M. & S.

TRAINING SQUADRONS ARE BEING DROPPING

3. Considerable discussion took place regarding the acceptance by B.A.F. of No. 267 Transport Squadron equipped with Dakotas. It was agreed, finally, that B.A.F. would investigate the acceptance of this offer, as it was closely linked with the dropping programme and the capacity of airfields. A.O.C. B.A.F. laid stress on the necessity for concentrating the supply dropping Squadrons on airfields in one area and stated that he would prefer to have all dropping activities in the Brindisi area. The advantage of this move would be felt by the Army Packing Depots. The St. Pancras and Gioia airfields were suggested, and A.O.C. B.A.F. undertook to examine these aerodromes and render a report to A.A.I.F.

4. It is understood that there are some 10,000 parachutes under the control of A.A.I. Air Marshal Slessor stressed the fact that all parachutes are controlled under the control of A.F.H.Q. and if parachutes, said to be held by A.A.I., are required by S.C. (H), application should be made through A.F.H.Q. for their release. No subordinate formations held parachutes of their own.

ITALIAN RETURN OF B.A.F. - FIGHTER SQUADRONS.

5. The situation regarding state of readiness of the Italian Units was then discussed.

(i) It was stated that P.39 aircraft will be available for transfer to Balkan Air Force in the quantity first promised (i.e. 150). It was noted that three P.39 aircraft formerly at Lecce had not been removed to Vesuvius. A.V.M. McIntegart said that he would not be surprised if the American Authorities insisted on handing over the whole total of 150 P.39 aircraft immediately, and thereafter leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Italians; he did not think that the Americans wished to be bothered with the shuffling of small numbers of aircraft from North Africa to Italy. War. Org. M.A.A.F. was instructed to issue an immediate signal calling for nine P.39 aircraft to be moved to Vesuvius forthwith so that there will be a total of 12 aircraft with which to commence training of No. 12 I.A.F. Squadron. C/Capt. Eccles said that the flying instructors are available for training, but that the provision of interpreters for general training were gravely lacking and that there would be difficulty in obtaining them. As regards technical training of the Italian personnel it was stated that 20 Pittons and Biffers were at Capodichino on a month's course on P.39 airframes. Air Commodore Blocombe stated that No. 214 Group had earmarked British personnel for the training of the Squadron personnel at Vesuvius and only waited order for them to move to take over their duties; A.O.C. to keep in close touch with A.O.C., No. 214 Group on this matter, and ensure that the instructors are called forward when the Squadrons are ready to receive them. The personnel from Nos. 9 and 10 I.A.F. Squadrons are standing by ready to go for training to Vesuvius. It was agreed that the ground personnel of these two Squadrons should be given as much instruction as possible at their present location while waiting to receive flying training, in the maintenance of American type of aircraft and engines. It was suggested that the best method to achieve this was to bring a nucleus of her personnel at the British and American maintenance units, and when they were proficient to send them back to Nos. 9 and 10 Squadrons to carry on with the training there. After some discussion it was thought that the American maintenance unit at Capodichino could not increase the number of trainees being trained there, as it would hamper the American output. A.O.C. representatives estimated that the three P.39 Squadrons would be trained and ready to operate in two months from the commencement of training of the first Squadron.

No subordinate formations held parachutes of their own.

ITALIAN ELEMENT OF B.A.F. - FIGHTER SQUADRONS.

5. The situation regarding state of readiness of the Italian units was then discussed.

- (i) It was stated that P.39 aircraft will be available for transfer to Balkan Air Force in the quantity first promised (i.e. 150). It was noted that three P.39 aircraft formerly at Lecce had not been removed to Vesuvius. A V.M. McIntegart said that he would not be surprised if the American Authorities insisted on handling over the whole total of 150 P.39 aircraft immediately, and thereafter leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Italians; he did not think that the Americans wished to be bothered with the shuffle of small numbers of aircraft from North Africa to Italy. War. Org. M.A.A.F. was instructed to issue an immediate signal calling for nine P.39 aircraft to be moved to Vesuvius forthwith so that there will be a total of 12 aircraft with which to commence training of No. 12 I.A.F. Squadron. C/Capt. Reclus said that the flying instructors are available for training, but that the provision of interpreters for general training were greatly lacking and that there would be difficulty in obtaining them. As regards technical training of the Italian personnel it was stated that 20 Potters and Riggers were at Capodichino on a month's course on P.39 aircraft. Air Commodore Glouster stated that No. 214 Group had earmarked British personnel for the training of the Squadron personnel at Mugnyus and only waited order for them to move to take over their duties; A.C.O. to keep in close touch with A.C.O., No. 214 Group on this matter, and ensure that the instructors are called forward when the Squadron are ready to receive them. The personnel from Nos. 9 and 10 I.A.F. Squadrons are standing by ready to go for training to Vesuvius. It was agreed that the ground personnel of these two Squadrons should be given as much instruction as possible at their present location while waiting to receive flying training, in the maintenance of American type of aircraft and engines. It was suggested that the best method to achieve this was to train a nucleus of key personnel at the British and American maintenance units, and when they were proficient to send them back to Nos. 9 and 10 Squadrons to carry on with the training there. After some discussion it was decided that the American maintenance unit at Capodichino could not increase the number of trainees being trained there, as it would hamper the American output. A.C.O. representatives estimated that the three P.39 Squadrons would be trained and ready to operate in two months from the commencement of training of the first Squadron.

- (ii) Nos. 102 and 195 Fighter Squadrons were stated to be ready to join No. 231 Wing when that Wing is ready to commence.

ITALIAN ELEMENT OF B.A.F. - LIGHT BOMBARDMENT SQUADRONS.

6. One of the Baltimore Squadrons is ready to commence training as soon as the special crews, returned from Egypt, are at Vesuvius. Twelve Baltimore aircraft have been allotted to Vesuvius and M.A.A.F. were to hasten their arrival. The maintenance personnel for the second Baltimore Squadron should commence their training without waiting for the aircraft to receive training, in the same manner as outlined at para 5 (i) above. It was estimated by A.C.O. representatives that these two Squadrons would be ready to join their Wing by mid-August.

- 3 -

TRANSFERRING OF B.A.F. - TRANSPORT SQUADRONS.

7. Nos. 1 and 834 Transport Squadrons are at Lecce and more operating under the orders of No. 354 Wing.

ITALIAN ELEMENTS OF B.A.F. - MAINTENANCE POLICY.

8. Regarding the policy of maintenance of P.39 aircraft, A.V.M. Buscawlett agreed that the Italians would undertake full maintenance of this type then accept of aircraft and engine and that Italian Maintenance depots would be set up to undertake this type of repair. In these circumstances no Italian personnel would be required at either British or American depots to assist in the maintenance of P.39 aircraft and engines. A.V.M. Buscawlett requested that any serviceable Allison engines held by the R.A.F. or the Americans should be sent to the Italian repair unit at a fleet of serviceable engines. Regarding the maintenance of Baltimore, however, it was agreed that the depot repair of this type of aircraft would be undertaken under the same method as in other British Squadrons equipped with Baltimore aircraft, i.e. at an R.A.F. Maintenance Unit. A.C.C. representatives to ascertain from D.M. and S. the number of Italian personnel required by R.A.F. Maintenance Units to assist in the repair of the two Italian Baltimore Squadrons.

B.A.F. MAINTENANCE POLICY.

9. D.M. and S. in a letter to M.A.A.P. Caserta, said that he was relying on the use of Italians, Yugoslavs and British personnel to provide the maintenance organisation backing Balkan Air Force. After considerable discussion as to ways and means it was decided that the Wing maintenance scheme should be examined by Balkan Air Force, with a view to instituting that form of maintenance in that Command. A.O.A., B.A.F. pointed out that Wing maintenance would still call for additional personnel, but thought there would be an over-all saving in the number of personnel required if this form of maintenance is introduced, as opposed to the normal R.S.U. - A.S.P. procedure.

10. Pending the institution of Wing maintenance, Squadrons of B.A.F. will demand their requirements on No. 136 A.S.P. When, however, the new Maintenance Unit at Foggia is in being, that unit will supply all R.A.F. Formations on the east coast of Italy.

11. It was pointed out that when Squadrons are moved to the Balkans with the Forces working on a Wing maintenance basis, it would mean that a complete Wing, or the equivalent number of Squadrons in one Wing, would have to move as one formation. Unless this is done the Force will have to be re-formed and work under the R.S.U. - A.S.P. procedure. B.A.F. to give this matter consideration in their final review as to the maintenance policy to be adopted.

12. Regarding No. 54 R.S.U. it was stated that the policy was for No. 32 Wing R.Q. only to remain with D.A.F. and that its auxiliaries should be available for transfer to B.A.F. In these circumstances two-thirds of the personnel and equipment of No. 54 R.S.U., would, therefore, be available for transfer to Balkan Air Force to build up the Wing Maintenance organisation.

13. The need for an S. & T. Column was discussed and A.O.A., B.A.F. pointed out that so long as B.A.F. is to be dependent on an A.S.P. in the Grottaglie area to serve Squadrons in the Ternolet-San Severo area, there would be an extensive call on transport. In addition if the units of Balkan Air Force move to the Balkans an S. & T. Column will be a necessity. A.O.A. B.A.F. made a bid for an S. & T. Column to be allotted comprising at least one Section. This would be required as early as possible, and the column would

to ascertain from D.M. and S. the number of Italian personnel required by R.A.F. Maintenance Units to assist in the repair of the two Italian Baltimore Squadrons.

B.A.F. MAINTENANCE POLICY.

9. D.M. and S, in a letter to S.A.A.F. Caserta, said that he was relying on the use of Italians, Yugoslavs and British personnel to provide the maintenance organisation backing Balkan Air Force. After considerable discussion as to ways and means it was decided that the Wing maintenance scheme should be examined by Balkan Air Force, with a view to instituting that form of maintenance in that Command. A.O.A., B.A.F. pointed out that Wing maintenance would still call for additional personnel, but thought there would be an over-all saving in the number of personnel required if this form of maintenance is introduced, as opposed to the normal R.S.U. - A.S.P. procedure.
10. Pending the institution of Wing maintenance, Squadrons of B.A.F. will demand their requirements on No. 156 A.S.P. When, however, the new maintenance unit at Foggia is in being, that unit will supply all B.A.F. Functions on the east coast of Italy.
11. It was pointed out that when Squadrons are moved to the Balkans with the Force working on a Wing maintenance basis, it would mean that a complete Wing, or the equivalent number of Squadrons in one Wing, would have to move as one formation. Unless this is done the Force will have to be re-formed and run under the R.S.U. - A.S.P. procedure. B.A.F. to give this matter consideration in their final review as to the maintenance policy to be adopted.
12. Regarding No. 54 R.S.U. it was stated that the policy was for No. 32 Wing R.Q. only to remain with D.A.F. and that its facilities should be available for transfer to B.A.F. In these circumstances two-thirds of the personnel and equipment of No. 54 R.S.U., would, therefore, be available for transfer to Balkan Air Force to build up the Wing Maintenance organisation.
13. The need for an S. & T. Column was discussed and A.O.A., B.A.F. pointed out that so long as B.A.F. is to be dependent on an A.S.P. in the Crottaglie area to serve Squadrons in the Ternoli-San Severino area, there would be an extensive call on transport. In addition if the units of Balkan Air Force move to the Balkans an S. & T. Column will be a necessity. A.O.A. B.A.F. made a bid for an S. & T. Column to be allotted comprising at least one Section. This would be required as early as possible, and the column would be built up gradually to full strength as circumstances demanded.
14. It was agreed that No. 22 Group units based at Vis would be lodger units on the island which was the responsibility of B.A.F. The units themselves, however, will remain on the strength of No. 22 Group. It was stated by A.V.M. Elliott that it was imperative that pierced steel planking be laid on Vis landing strip, taxi ways and hard standings. Colonel Cassidy of the 24 Engineer Regiment had recently visited Vis and made this recommendation. Headquarters, B.A.F. to signal H.Q. M.A.A.F. on this matter and receipt. A.O.A. B.A.F. will take up the question with Colonel Colonna of A.A.P.E.C./MITO. (Prov) with a view to obtaining a high priority for the work.

BAT/3015/ORG. Dist: List "B". S.A.S.O., G/Ops. Spares(5).

TO: GROUP CAPTAIN R.Y. ECHES.

Sec 5A

17A

With reference to the signal for the Prime Minister which is due to leave on the 25th June, it is more than likely that I shall be away when this is sent, so I am now suggesting a suitable frame-work for the signal. I think it should be as follows :-

AIR. JUNE 25th

SECRET IMPORTANT

DRAFT

TO AIR MINISTRY, WHITEHALL FOR DIRECTION OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS.
FOR PRESSANCES FROM DISCARTED (.)

X
ONE SQUADRON
CANT 1007
BOMBERS (.)

(ONE) YOUR LETTER DO OPS/1393 OF 7TH MAY (.) EXISTING ITALIAN AIR FORCE CONSISTS OF EQUIVALENT TWO R.A.F. SQUADRONS BOMBERS (.) X ONE SQUADRON SAVOIA MARCHETTI 82 TRANSPORTS (.) ONE SEAFARER WING EQUIVALENT TO TWO SQUADRONS R.A.F. COASTAL (.)

(TWO) ABOVE SQUADRONS EMPLOYED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL ITALIAN AIR FORCE AS FOLLOWS (a) FIGHTERS - COMBUSTIVE SWEEPERS ON DROMEDARY COAST (b) BOMBERS/TRANSPORTS ARE DROPPING SUPPLIES TO PARTISANS (c) SEAFARER WING ARE CARRYING OUT CONVOY ESCORTS (.) ANTI-SUBMARINE SWEEPS AND AIR/SEA RESCUE (.)

(THREE) IT IS PLANNED TO ADD TO ABOVE THREE SQUADRONS AIRACOBAS AND TWO SQUADRONS BOMBERS EACH OF 16 AIRCRAFT (.) THESE WILL COME UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.)

(FOUR) RE-EQUIPMENT WITH ALLIED TYPES HAS MADE DISAPPOINTING PROGRESS (.) AT PRESENT NO (R) NO UNITS HAVE BEEN RE-EQUIPPED (.) AIRFIELD FOR CONVERSION TO ALLIED TYPES ONLY ALLOTTED ON 12 JUNE (.) FIRST THREE AIRACOBAS TO COMENCE CONVERSION ADVISED 19 JUNE (.) THREE LIGHT BOMBER CREWS HAVE BEEN IN EGYPT FOR CONVERSION TO GALLIENES AND

HAVE RETURNED (.) THESE WILL BE NUCLEUS INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF (.) 12 AIRACOBAS AND 12 GALLIENES HAVE BEEN CALLED FORWARD FOR DELIVERY AT CONVERSION AIRFIELD FOR CONVERSION FIRST SQUADRON EACH TYPE (.) ESTIMATED CONVERSION WILL COMMENCE 28TH JUNE AND WILL TAKE 2/3 WEEKS FOR EACH S.A.B. SQUADRONS AND 4 WEEKS EACH L/B SQUADRON (.) MAINTENANCE CREWS FOR FIRST SQUADRON EACH TYPE ALREADY AT CONVERSION AIRFIELD AND ALLIED INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL ARE CONCENTRATING ON THIS AIRFIELD (.) SPECIAL COURSE FOR CONVERSION TO ALLISON ENGINES COMPLETED 18 JUNE AT BATHURANCE UNIT (.) ONCE STARTED THINGS SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY (.) PERSONNEL THESE SQUADRONS ALREADY OPERATIONALLY TRAINED ON ITALIAN TYPES AND SHOULD BE OF AVERAGE STANDARD WHEN CONVERTED TO ALLIED TYPES (.)

(FIVE) ASPECT FROM EQUIPMENT WITH ALLIED TYPES WE HAVE SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT AS FOLLOWS (.) A (.) FOR AIRCRAFT TYPES SUCH AS MATERIALS (.) TYPES (.) INSTRUMENTS ETC TO VALUE £2,500 (.) B (.) TRANSPORT (.) 3 FOR CLASS TWO 60 LORRIES (.) 15 CWT CLASS TYPE 5 (.) HUNTER UTILITIES CLASS FIVE 2 (.) VANS 5/10 CWT CLASS FIVE 3 (.) C (.) OTHER EQUIPMENT CLOTHING COOKING UTENSILS ETC TO VALUE £5,500 (.) D (.) IN ADDITION DAILY RATIONS TO ALL RANKS SINCE THE AMBUSTICE (.) OXGEN 14,000 CUBIC FEET (.) FUEL AVIATION 87 OCTANE 54,000 GALLONS (.) 100 OCTANE 54,000 GALLONS (.) OIL LUBRICATING AIRCRAFT 15,200 GALLONS (.) FUEL H.D. 140,000 GALLONS (.) OIL DIESEL 57,000 GALLONS (.)

TO TWO SQUADRONS R.A.F. COASTAL (.)
 (TWO) ABOVE SQUADRONS EMPLOYED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL BALKAN AIR FORCE
 AS FOLLOWS (a) FIGHTERS - OFFENSIVE SHEEPS ON DALLATIAN COAST (b) BOMBER/
 TRANSPORTS ARE DROPPING SUPPLIES TO PARTISANS (c) SEAFARER WING ARE
 CARRYING OUT CONVOY ESCORTS (.) ANTI-SUBMARINE SHEEPS AND AIR/SEA
 RESCUE (.)

(THREE) IT IS PLANNED TO ADD TO ABOVE THREE SQUADRONS AIRACORRAS AND TWO
 SQUADRONS BALTICOPES EACH OF 16 AIRCRAFT (.) THESE WILL COME UNDER
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF BALKAN AIR FORCE (.)

(FOUR) RE-EQUIPMENT WITH ALLIED TYPES HAS MADE DISAPPOINTING PROGRESS (.)
 AT PRESENT NO (2) NO UNITS HAVE BEEN RE-EQUIPPED (.) AIRFIELD FOR
 CONVERSION TO ALLIED TYPES ONLY ALLOTTED ON 12 JUNE (.) FIRST THREE
 AIRACORRAS TO COMMENCE CONVERSION ARRIVED 19 JUNE (.) THREE LIGHT BOMBER
 CREWS HAVE BEEN IN EGYPT FOR CONVERSION TO ALLIED TYPES AND

HAVE RETURNED (.) THEY WILL BE NUCLEUS INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF (.) 12
 AIRACORRAS AND 12 BALTICOPES HAVE BEEN CALLED FORWARD FOR DELIVERY AT
 CONVERSION AIRFIELD FOR CONVERSION FIRST SQUADRON EACH TYPE (.) ESTIMATED
 CONVERSION WILL COMMENCE 20TH JUNE AND WILL TAKE 2/3 YEARS FOR EACH S.E.F.
 SQUADRONS AND 4 WEEKS EACH L/B SQUADRON (.) MAINTENANCE CREWS FOR FIRST
 SQUADRON EACH TYPE ALREADY AT CONVERSION AIRFIELD AND ALLIED INSTRUCTIONAL
 PERSONNEL ARE CONCENTRATING ON THIS AIR FIELD (.) SPECIAL COURSE FOR
 CONVERSION TO ALLISON ENGINES COMMENCED 18 JUNE AT MAINTENANCE

UNIT (.) ONCE STARTED THINGS SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY (.) PERSONS 37 96
 THESE SQUADRONS ALREADY OPERATIONALLY TRAINED ON ITALIAN TYPES AND SHOULD
 BE OF AVERAGE STANDARD WHEN CONVERTED TO ALLIED TYPES (.)

(FIVE) APART FROM EQUIPMENT WITH ALLIED TYPES WE HAVE SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
 AS FOLLOWS (.) A (.) FOR AIRCRAFT TYPES SUCH AS MATERIALS (.) TIRES
 (.) INSTRUMENTS ETC TO VALUE 28,500 (.) B (.) TRANSPORT (.) 5 TON
 CLASS TWO 60 LORRIES (.) 15 GWT CLASS THREE 5 (.) HUNTER UTILITIES
 CLASS FIVE 2 (.) VANS 5/10 GWT CLASS FIVE 5 (.) C (.) OTHER EQUIPMENT
 CLOTHING COOKING UTENSILS ETC TO VALUE 85,500 (.) D (.) IN ADDITION
 DAILY RATIONS TO ALL RANKS SINCE THE ARRIVAL (.) OXGEN 14,000 CUBIC
 FEET (.) FUEL AVIATION 87 OCTANE 51,000 GALLONS (.) 100 OCTANE 51,000
 GALLONS (.) OIL LUBRICATING AIRCRAFT 15,200 GALLONS (.) FUEL H.E.
 140,000 GALLONS (.) OIL DIESEL 57,000 GALLONS (.)

R. Y. Eccles.
~~CHIEF OF STAFF~~
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
 AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
 Allied Control Commission.
 Date: 21st June 1944.
 Ref: S.15/ATR.

FROM:- AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
BARI.

TO:- HEADQUARTERS, B.A.F. BARI.

DATE:- 13th June 1944.

REF:- AFSC/S.15/AIR.

TOP SECRET.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Consists of approximately 400 aircraft.

2. Operational types are as follows :-

FIGHTERS.

Macchi 205/S	13 a/c.
Macchi 205	18 a/c.
Macchi 202	36 a/c.
Reggiane 2002	14 a/c.
Reggiane 2001/S	4 a/c.
Reggiane 2001	7 a/c.

BOMBERS.

Cant 1007.	19 a/c.
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BOMBER/ TRANSPORT.

Savoia Marchetti 82	23 a/c.
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TRANSPORT.

Savoia Marchetti 79	28 a/c.
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SEAPLANES.

Cant. 506/B	17 a/c.
Cant. 506/S	4 a/c.
Cant. 501	18 a/c.
RS. 14	9 a/c.

3. Macchi 205/S and Reggiane 2001/S are long range versions of the 205 and 2001.

Reggiane 2002's are dive bombers and carry 1,000 lb bombs. Their engines are most unreliable, and at present they are considered as obsolescent. The Reggiane 2001 is now considered as obsolete.

The Cant 506/S are 506/B's with special passenger accommodation.

4. SERVICEABILITY.

As a rough guide, serviceability averaged over the past month

is :-

Mc.205/S and 205	12
Mc.202	14
Cant.1007	10
	12

FLIGHTERS.

Macchi 205/S	13 a/c.
Macchi 205	18 a/c.
Macchi 202	36 a/c.
Reggiane 2002	14 a/c.
Reggiane 2001/S	4 a/c.
Reggiane 2001	7 a/c.

BOMBERS.

Cant 1007.	19 a/c.
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BOMBER/
TRANSPORT.

Savoia Marchetti 82	23 a/c.
---------------------	---------

TRANSPORT.

Savoia Marchetti 79	28 a/c.
---------------------	---------

SEAPLANES.

Cant. 506/B	17 a/c.
Cant. 506/S	4 a/c.
Cant. 501	18 a/c.
RS. 1L	9 a/c.

3. Macchi 205/S and Reggiane 2001/S are long range versions of the 205 and 2001.

Reggiane 2002's are dive bombers and carry 1,000 lb bombs. Their engines are most unreliable, and at present they are considered as obsolescent. The Reggiane 2001 is now considered as obsolete.

LOCATION.

The Cant 506/S are 506/B's with special passenger accommo-

4. SERVICEABILITY.

As a rough guide, serviceability averaged over the past month is :-

Mc. 205/S and 205	12
Mc. 202	14
Cant. 1007	10
RS. 82	12

5. ORGANISATION.Group.

The Seaplane Wing is under the operational control of 242

The Bomber/Transport Wing is under the operational control of Force 266, through the Air Sub-Commission.

The Fighter Wing is under the operational control of 242 Group, through the Air Sub-Commission.

/Continued.....2.....

-2-

6. Order have been given to the Italian Ministry that the following Squadrons are to be formed out of the Italian aircraft now available :-

1 Squadron No. 205	16 a/c.
1 Squadron No. 202	16 a/c.
1 Squadron Cant. 1007	16 a/c.
1 Squadron SM.82.	16 a/c.

These Squadrons are to come under the operational control of B.A.F.

The S. 79's will continue to operate the various existing courier services, and the Seaplane Wing will continue to operate under 242 Group.

7. GENERAL.

It must be emphasised that all the Italian aircraft are old and are kept serviceable only with the very greatest difficulty. Nevertheless it is considered that with the re-organisation into Squadrons of 16 aircraft, coupled with certain measures now being introduced, the serviceability of fighters should improve.

8. At present the fighters are split between NUOVA and LEGGE, as 242 can find targets for them both in DALMATIA and ALBANIA. It is up to B.A.F. to decide how to operate them, but if they are to continue to be split, I strongly recommend that an early decision is made as to the location of the 205 Squadron and the 202 Squadron.

9. PILOTS.

Allied aircraft are being given to the Italians to form the following:

2 Squadrons Baltimore	16 a/c each.
3 Squadrons Airacobra	16 a/c each.

3 complete crews and 1 additional pilot are in Egypt learning to fly Baltimore's. They should be back at any time now.

We have asked for 3 Airacobra's to give the more experienced pilots some experience on them.

Our efforts to start the C.T.U. have been handicapped by the failure of W.A.A.F. to give us an airfield. They allotted VESUVIUS airfield yesterday, but the indications at present are that it is most unsuitable.

W/T training has commenced, and training in maintenance of Airacobra's is just about to commence.

W.A.B. LOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,

These Squadrons are to come under the operational control of B.A.F.

The S.79's will continue to operate the various existing courier services, and the Seaplane Wing will continue to operate under 242 Group.

7. GENERAL.

It must be emphasized that all the Italian aircraft are old and are kept serviceable only with the very greatest difficulty. Nevertheless it is considered that with the re-organisation into Squadrons of 16 aircraft, coupled with certain measures now being introduced, the serviceability of fighters should improve.

3. At present the fighters are split between NUOVA and LEGOS, as 242 can find targets for them both in DALMATIA and ALBANIA. It is up to B.A.F. to decide how to operate them, but if they are to continue to be split, I strongly recommend that an early decision is made as to the location of the 205 Squadron and the 202 Squadron.

9. FUTURE.

Allied aircraft are being given to the Italians to form the following:

2 Squadrons Baltimore	16 q/c each.
3 Squadrons Airoobra	16 q/c each.

3 complete crews and 1 additional pilot are in Egypt learning to fly Baltimore's. They should be back at any time now.

We have asked for 3 Airoobra's to give the more experienced pilots some experience on them.

Our efforts to start the C.T.U. have been handicapped by the failure of M.A.A.F. to give us an airfield. They allotted VESUVIUS airfield yesterday; but the indications at present are that it is most unsuitable.

W/T training has commenced, and training in maintenance of Airoobra's is just about to commence.

W.A.B. DOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

TO:- GENERAL P. F. TENTINI.

SECRET

12A

15A

I have received instructions from H.Q. M.A.A.F. to the effect that the Italian Squadrons which are shortly to come under the operational control of the H.Q. Balkans Air Force, are to be re-organised at once on a basis as follows :-

1 Squadron	Macchi 205	-	16 aircraft.
1 Squadron	Macchi 202	-	16 aircraft.
1 Squadron	Cant. 1007	-	16 aircraft.
1 Squadron	S.82	-	16 aircraft.

2. You will remember that we have discussed this, and I told you that the change was inevitable and necessary to conform with the standard strength of Allied Squadrons.

3. It will be necessary to allot a number to each Squadron, so that they can be designated as such by H.Q. B.A.F. when issuing instructions.

4. For the present the fighters at Lecce can remain there, but I anticipate that H.Q. B.A.F. will shortly issue orders for the whole Squadrons to form as complete entities at Nuova.

5. It would be a great help to me if you could produce an establishment table showing the strength of Italian Officers and Airmen in the various trades, something on the lines of the Single Engine Fighter and Light Bomber establishments which I have shown you.

6. Will you please inform me at once the date on which these Squadrons may be regarded as being on the 16 aircraft basis, and of the numbers which you are going to allot them.

5188

W.A.B. BOWEN-PUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

1 Squadron Cant. 1007 - 16 aircraft.

1 Squadron S.82 - 16 aircraft.

2. You will remember that we have discussed this, and I told you that the change was inevitable and necessary to conform with the standard strength of Allied Squadrons.

3. It will be necessary to allot a number to each Squadron, so that they can be designated as such by H.Q. B.A.F. when issuing instructions.

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5. It would be a great help to me if you could produce an establishment table showing the strength of Italian Officers and Airmen in the various trades, something on the lines of the Single Engine Fighter and Light Bomber establishments which I have shown you.

6. Will you please inform me at once the date on which these Squadrons may be regarded as being on the 16 aircraft basis, and of the numbers which you are going to allot them.

5189

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUSCARLEY,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission.
Ref: S.15/AIR.
Date: 12th June 1944.

TO: GROUP 1 IN A.Y. HOUSE.
 WING COMMANDER H.A. GALT.
 SQUADRON LEADER C.F. CHAPMAN.
 SQUADRON LEADER J. WALTON.

SECRET.

14A

SA

Please see Encl A. The signal is due to be sent on 25th June, and it may well be that we shall be extremely busy about that time, so that we should start work on the framework of the signal as soon as possible. At the same time there may well be various developments before then, such as the arrival of reinforcements and aircraft for training etc.

2. The signal will have to be very comprehensive, and will fall under the general headings as given in para 1 of Encl A, that is:-

(i) Allied equipment given to I.A.F.

- (a) Aircraft.
- (b) Equipment for aircraft.
- (c) Transport.
- (d) Other equipment, etc. etc.

(ii) Number of units on different types.

(iii) State of training.

(iv) General nature of employment of units.

3. I do not think it will be possible to form anything but the conversion units before June 25th, but we may by that time have reduced the Italian fighters to the ultimate 2 squadrons of 202's and 205's. I do not think it will be possible to acquire the Italian units in the signal, and we should say "equivalent of 1 I.A.F. Squadron 202's etc. etc."

4. I should like to discuss this signal at an early date, so after you have formed your ideas please come and see me. I shall be here until the afternoon of the 14th, except for a possible one day visit to A.A.F. from 14th onwards I may be away for 5 or 6 days.

W. A. D. BROWN-DUNSTON.

W. A. D. BROWN-DUNSTON.
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
 AIR OFFICE COMMANDING.

Aircraft for training etc.

2. The signal will have to be very comprehensive, and will fall under the general headings as given in para 1 of Intel SA, para 10:-

(i) Allied equipment given to I.A.F.

- (a) Aircraft.
- (b) Equipment for aircraft.
- (c) Transport.
- (d) Other equipment, etc. etc.

(ii) Number of Units on different types.

(iii) State of training.

(iv) General nature of employment of Units.

3. I do not think it will be possible to form anything but the conversion Units before June 25th, but we may by that time have reduced the Italian Fighters to the ultimate 2 squadrons of 202's and 205's. I do not think it will be possible to establish the Italian Units in the signal, and we should say "equivalent of I.A.I.F. Squadron 38.02's etc. etc."

4. I should like to discuss this signal at an early date, so after you have formed your ideas please come and see me. I shall be here until the afternoon of the 14th, except for a possible one day visit to H.A.A.F. from 14th onwards I may be away for 5 or 6 days.

William. Brown

F.A.F. DOVER-INSCALLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
CINCPACFLT COMMANDER.

Air Force Staff-Commission,
Allied Control Commission,
10th June 1944.
Ref: S.15/AIR.

*File
with any
1 79*

171



From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Force, G.I.F.
 To: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Algiers.
 Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force.
 Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force.
 Headquarters, "W" Force.
 Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Control Commission.

Date: 3 Jan, 44.

Ref: 121/1515/orig.

SECRET

Training of Italian Air Force.

It has been decided to train three fighter squadrons of the Italian Air Force with P-59's and two Light Bomber Squadrons with P-40's.

2. Each squadron is to train on the standard British basis of 16 F.E. aircraft.

3. Further, aircraft for the training of the fighter squadrons are being supplied under arrangements made by this Headquarters with A.A.P./M.T.F. who have been requested to select and hold in readiness in North Africa, 150 aircraft for the purpose.

→ SEE ENC. 13A.

4. Light Bombers, aircraft for the training of the fighter squadrons are being supplied under arrangements made by this Headquarters with A.A.P./M.T.F. who have been requested to select and hold in readiness in North Africa, 150 aircraft for the purpose.

5. Training, A.O.C., Allied Control Commission is examining the suitability of CENOT as a training centre for both the P-59's and the P-40's. When a decision has been made upon the location at which training is to be undertaken, Headquarters, A.A.P./M.T.F. will arrange for experienced Italian pilots to be familiarised with the P-59 and P-40, after which it is considered that these pilots will be able to undertake the conversion of the remainder.

6. A.O.C., Allied Control Commission will arrange to notify this Headquarters when he requires to make initial drawings on the stock of P-59's and P-40's for training of the Italian Air Force.

7. Headquarters, A.A.P./M.T.F. will have been asked to arrange for the provision of fuel on request training for us to have Italian crews in Egypt. When these crews have received their training in Italy East they will then proceed to the airfields selected for training in Italy. It has been decided that the squadrons to be converted at a time and arrangements are therefore to be made by Headquarters, A.A.P./M.T.F. for 12 squadrons to be sent individually to the training base together with a small P.A.F. instructional party.

→ SEE ENC. 13A.

8. Headquarters, A.A.P./M.T.F. will have been asked to arrange for the provision of fuel on request training for us to have Italian crews in Egypt. When these crews have received their training in Italy East they will then proceed to the airfields selected for training in Italy. It has been decided that the squadrons to be converted at a time and arrangements are therefore to be made by Headquarters, A.A.P./M.T.F. for 12 squadrons to be sent individually to the training base together with a small P.A.F. instructional party.

Italian Air Force with P-39's and two Light Bomber Squadrons with P-40's.

2. Each squadron is to operate on the standard British basis of 16 T.E. aircraft.

3. The aircraft for the running of the Fighter Squadrons are being supplied under arrangements made by this Command with the A.A.D./A.C. who have been requested to assist, and hold in readiness in North Africa, 150 fighters for the purpose.

→ SEE ENC. 13A.

4. Light Bombers → SEE ENC. 13A.

5. Training. A.C.C., Allied Control Commission is examining the suitability of CEAGM as a training centre for both the P-39's and the P-40's. When a decision has been made upon the location at which training is to be undertaken, Headquarters, A.A.D./A.C. will arrange for experienced Italian pilots to be familiarised with the P-39 and P-40, after which it is expected that these pilots will be able to undertake the conversion of the remainder.

6. A.C.C., Allied Control Commission will arrange to notify this Headquarters when he requires to have initial drawings on the stock of P-39's and P-40's for recording of the Italian Air Force.

7. Headquarters, R.A.F., Middle East has been asked to arrange for the provision of P-39's for retraining for two to three Italian crews in Egypt. When these crews have received their training in Middle East they will then proceed to the aircraft selected for training in Italy. It has been decided that no squadron is to be converted at a time and arrangements are therefore to be made by Headquarters, R.A.F., for 12 squadrons to be sent initially to the training base together with a small R.A.F. instructional party.

→ SEE ENC. 13A.

8. The Italian Air Force will operate under the orders of the Air C. in C. and the Italian Squadrons will, when operational, be assigned to A.A.C., Air Force.

9. The Italian Air Force will operate under the orders of the Air C. in C. and the Italian Squadrons will, when operational, be assigned to A.A.C., Air Force.

Distribution:-

Air C. in C.,
D/Air C. in C.,
D/C. in C., Medna.

D. of Ops.

A.A.D./A.C.,
Principal Advisor,
Command Headquarters.

Senior Adjutant Representative
S.P.S.O.
S.P.S.O.

Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer i/o Administration, R.A.F.,
Headquarters Allied Air Forces.

7. Training. Deputy Air C. in C. confirmed that there should be no restriction on the type of aircraft personnel, H.C. 101 Force, D...F. and 212 Group.

8. A/C maintenance. Deputy Air C. in C. confirmed that there should be no restriction on the type of aircraft personnel, H.C. 101 Force, D...F. and 212 Group.

9. Base facilities. Deputy Air C. in C. confirmed that there should be no restriction on the type of aircraft personnel, H.C. 101 Force, D...F. and 212 Group.

(a) Air Vice Marshal Deputy Air C. in C. confirmed that there should be no restriction on the type of aircraft personnel, H.C. 101 Force, D...F. and 212 Group.

(b) Air Vice Marshal Deputy Air C. in C. confirmed that there should be no restriction on the type of aircraft personnel, H.C. 101 Force, D...F. and 212 Group.

(c) It was noted that airframe maintenance should be provided by R.A.F. 4.0.0. would therefore request 4.0.0. for the temporary loan of a small instructional party which should be sent to the command selected for advanced training (S. 3 (c)).

(d) Supply of aircraft. Deputy Air C. in C. said that since the airframe availability available for P-39 in Italy, A.C. 101 should request 4.0.0. to hold for the I.A.F. P-39 to a total of 12, the aircraft to be based from North Africa to Italy as and when indicated by Air Force 30.

(e) Maintenance. On operation as training, Air Vice Marshal Deputy Air C. in C. said that he could have the A.C. 101 command to Italy, under supervision, the operation in the base command in the A.C. 101 at Comms.

10. Religious training. Deputy Air C. in C. confirmed that there should be no restriction on the type of aircraft personnel, H.C. 101 Force, D...F. and 212 Group.

(a) It was agreed to develop I.A.F. airframe maintenance in the base way in the P-39 operation outside Italy; Italian airframe personnel could be sent to 4.0.0. for training as provided between Air Force 30 and C. 101 at Comms.

(b) Air training. It was agreed that one airframe should be converted to the base way in the P-39 operation outside Italy; Italian airframe personnel could be sent to 4.0.0. for training as provided between Air Force 30 and C. 101 at Comms.

(c) Supply.

SECRET

(c) Summary. It was noted that direct support for the three operations, U.S. and reinforcements should be furnished as needed by the station in M.E. . 4 block allocation of aircraft is not required.

11. D.D. One underway to examine the possibility of carrying two 500 lb bombs on the F-39.

JCS. 1677.

26.5.44.

H.Q. U.S.A.F.Distribution

Deputy Air C.-in-C.

Deputy C.-in-C. R.A.F.M.E.

A.C. (3)

A.S.C.-in-C.

D.D. One

D/4.C.4.

G/Capt. One

D/4.S.C.-in-C.

C.M.S.C. Rep.

Lt. Colonel Leon Macfarlane. (2)

Mr. Vice Admiral Penn-Tuohet (2) ✓

Lieutenant E. Patten.

5782

TO:- GENERAL PIACENTINI.

TOP SECRET.

I have put down a few of my thoughts on the subject of the training of the I.A.F. on the P.39's and Baltimores. These do not cover the whole field by any means, but they will help to keep our minds clear on the subject.

Until we know to the contrary, we must continue to plan for both P.39 and Baltimore R.S.U.'s (Repair and Salvage Units); and I think we should continue to bear in mind the probability of having to do the radial engine overhauls to the Baltimores at Alfa-Romeo's, as well as the Allison engines.

The notes cover only the initial stage of the training.

AT GAUDO.

- (i) R.S.U. for P.39's.
- (ii) Conversion of first I.A.F. Squadron to P.39's.
- (iii) Conversion of 8 reserve pilots for (ii) to P.39's.
- (iv) R.S.U. for Baltimores.
- (v) Conversion of first I.A.F. Squadron to Baltimores.
- (vi) Conversion of 8 reserve pilots and crews for (v) to Baltimores.

NOTES.

- 1. 60 Allison trained personnel from Capodachino to Gaudo when ready. These to include Technical Officers, M.C.O.'s and engine fitters, and to be nucleus for R.S.U. and for 3 Squadrons. A representative from Alfa-Romeo also to attend this course.
- 2. Whole of remaining Technical personnel of first I.A.F. Squadron to get P.39's to be at Gaudo.
- 3. 60 Italian personnel to go to Baltimore R.S.U. to include Technical Officers, M.C.O.'s and engine and aircraft mechanics, to be a nucleus for Baltimore R.S.U. and the 2 Baltimore Squadrons. 318.
- 4. Whole of remaining technical personnel of first I.A.F. Squadron to get Baltimores to be at Gaudo.
- 5. The 3 pilots who have been to Egypt to fly Baltimores to go to Gaudo permanently to be the nucleus of instructors there.
- 6. How is gunnery, navigational and wireless training to be carried out and supervised?
- 7. Who is going to be in Command of the training at Gaudo?
- 8. We must think of the airfield equipment for Gaudo, such as tents,

- (i) R.S.U. for P.39's.
- (ii) Conversion of first I.A.F. Squadron to P.39's.
- (iii) Conversion of 8 reserve pilots for (ii) to P.39's.
- (iv) R.S.U. for Baltimore.
- (v) Conversion of first I.A.F. Squadron to Baltimore.
- (vi) Conversion of 8 reserve pilots and crews for (v) to Baltimore.

NOTES.

1. 60 Allison trained personnel from Capodachino to Gaudio when ready. These to include Technical Officers, M.O.'s and engine fitters, and to be nucleus for R.S.U. and for 3 Squadrons. A representative from Alfa-Romeo also to attend this course.
2. Whole of remaining Technical personnel of first I.A.F. Squadron to get P.39's to be at Gaudio.
3. 60 Italian personnel to go to Baltimore R.S.U., to include Technical Officers, M.O.'s and engine and airplane mechanics, to be a nucleus for Baltimore R.S.U. and the 2 Baltimore Squadrons. 3/8/
4. Whole of remaining technical personnel of first I.A.F. Squadron to get Baltimore to be at Gaudio.
5. The 3 pilots who have been to Egypt to fly Baltimore to go to Gaudio permanently to be the nucleus of instructors there.
6. How is gunnery, navigational and wireless training to be carried out and supervised?
7. Who is going to be in Command of the training at Gaudio?
8. We must think of the airfield equipment for Gaudio, such as tentage, refuellers etc. etc. I do not know how much, if anything, that there is there, but I will try to have a look at it from the air on my way back from Naples.

W.A.B. Lowen-Buscalet

W.A.B. LOWEN-BUSCALET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission.
Allied Control Commission.
27th May 1944.
Ref: S.15/AIR.

TOP SECRET.

CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL PIACENTINI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. Conversation is off the record and must be kept absolutely secret.
2. He is only being told this so that he can make adequate preparations for the big changes which are about to come.
3. He will find himself in a very much stronger position ^{shortly} ~~within a few days~~. I cannot say more than this, but assure him that it is true and that he must ask no questions at present.
4. When the time comes very radical changes will have to be made in the Italian Air Ministry. Go-slow elements and dead wood will have to be ruthlessly cut away. Unless this is done we shall prove ourselves to be a failure in the eyes of the Allies. We have definite recommendations to make as to set-up in I.A.M.
5. Future set-up. Italians will lose the operational control. Control will be exercised by Allied Operational Headquarters. ~~They are to be responsible for Training, Supply, Maintenance and Administration of the I.A.F.~~
6. Air Sub-Commission and Italian Air Force will be responsible for Training, Supply, Maintenance ^{and} Administration of the I.A.F.
7. Problem arises as to where this control is best exercised from. It is a problem of communications, say ~~via~~ ^(Only 2 Cues to Rome for 3 months).
8. Although the Italian Air Ministry must be in Rome, we consider that the Admin Control must be exercised from Bari.
9. It is up to General Piacentini to decide what set-up will be necessary in Rome and what in Bari. We will give all advice possible.
10. We on our part must decide what our set-up will have to be. Envisage it as myself in dual capacity working between Rome and Bari. Small set-up in Rome perhaps Group Captain Eccles as my representative in my absence, and Wing Commander Winter and Squadron Leader De Haan. Signals will fade almost entirely out of the picture as this will probably be handled by the Operational Headquarters. The rest of the Air Sub-Commission, in particular Engineering, Maintenance and Supplies, with organisation will have to remain in Bari.

11. The re-equipment of the I.A.F.

3 Squadrons P.59's. Airacobra 15 a/c each.
2 Squadrons Baltimore 15 a/c each.

On the part of the I.A.F. we must retain :-

2 Squadrons Me.205's, Me.202's, ~~Me.202's~~ with 15 a/c each.
1 Squadron Cant 1007's. 16 a/c each.
1 Squadron Se.32's. 16 a/c each.
The Seaplane Wing.

12. Long Range Kaccis to disappear and to go into the ordinary squadrons.

I.A.M.
5. Future set-up. Italians will lose the operational control. Control will be exercised by Allied Operational Headquarters. ~~It is necessary that the control be exercised by the I.A.F.~~

6. Air Sub-Commission and Italian Air Force will be responsible for Training, Supply, Maintenance Administration of the I.A.F.

7. Problem arises as to where this control is best exercised from. It is a problem of communications, say why. (Only 1 wire to Rome for 3 months)

8. Although the Italian Air Ministry must be in Rome, we consider that the Admin Control must be exercised from Bari.

9. It is up to General Piacentini to decide what set-up will be necessary in Rome and what in Bari. We will give all advice possible.

10. We on our part must decide what our set-up will have to be. Envisage it as myself in dual capacity working between Rome and Bari. Small set-up in Rome perhaps Group Captain Eccles as my representative in my absence, and Wing Commander Minter and Squadron Leader De Haan. Signals will fade almost entirely out of the picture as this will probably be handled by the Operational Headquarters. The rest of the Air Sub-Commission, in particular Engineering, Maintenance and Supplies, with organization will have to remain in Bari.

11. The re-equipment of the I.A.F.

3 Squadrons P.39's. Airacobra 16 a/c each.
2 Squadrons Baltimore 16 a/c each.

On the part of the I.A.F. we must retain :-

2 Squadrons Me.205's, Me.202's, ~~Me.202's~~ with 16 a/c each.
1 Squadron Cent 1007's. 16 a/c each.
1 Squadron SM.82's. 16 a/c each.
The Seaplane Wing.

12. Long Range Maccis to disappear and to go into the ordinary squadrons.

13. All operations Cent 1007's and SM.82's be at night.

14. Essential that we must strain every nerve, and allow no obstacles in the way of go-slow or red tape to stand in our way. The Allies will expect 12 serviceable a/c per day from each Squadron.

Organisation :-

(i) L.B. Wing at BIFFERNO with other Allied Baltimore Squadrons.

(ii) Fighter Wing of Italian Fighters with Allied Fighters at either TRIGNO or CUTELLA or CANNE.

(iii) Fighter Wing of Italian flown P.39's with Allied Fighters at either TRIGNO or CUTELLA or CANNE.

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16. Operations , Wings will be under the R.A. Commander of the Wing/Station.
17. Administratively Wings will be under their Italian Wing Commanders. But it is clear that very great assistance can be given to the Italian Squadrons by the technical, maintenance and administrative personnel of the Allied Squadrons in the same Wing/Station.
18. Necessity for Training and Conversion, both in actual Flying and in Maintenance. Intention is to form only 1 Squadron of fighters and 1 Squadron of light bombers at a time.
19. Maintenance Training - (i) Baltimore.
A nucleus of Italian M.O.'s and technical personnel, with 1 or 2 engineer Officers to go at once to a Baltimore R.S.U. Then to the training and conversion airfield (G4450) where there will be a small party of Allied technical personnel whose job it will be to train maintenance crews.
- (ii) P.39's.
- Not more than 60, i.e. 20 from each Squadron, of technical personnel to go to Capodachino to learn the Allison engine. Also a representative from Alfa-Romeo's. Remaining maintenance will be taught at G4450. *From airfield.*
20. Flying Training - (i) Baltimore.
2 or 3 selected pilots, who will eventually form the basis of the Baltimore conversion unit, to go to SHANDUR at once in one of our own a/c, do a few trips in Baltimore, and return at once. Remaining conversion and further training at G4450. *From airfield.*
- (ii) P.39's.
- Aircrafts are very easy to fly. Several selected pilots, with experience should fly them first and then conversion can proceed.
21. General Training. Only one Squadron will form at a time of (a) Fighters and (b) Baltimore. But training for wreckage in the preceding squadrons will have to proceed concurrently with the training of additional squadrons.
22. We have to use R.S.U.'s and consider that Italians will have to do the same, except perhaps the Baltimore. Formation of a P.39 R.S.U. which should be formed at G4450 as first step. *From airfield.*
23. Major overhauls of engines and airframes. We will certainly have to do Allison overhauls and suggest Pomigliano Works be cleared to concentrate on these. Will try to persuade allies to undertake major overhauls of Allison engines, but if not successful we shall have to take these on as well. Alfa's should also do this.
24. It is for question where we can undertake major airframe overhauls and repairs. ~~G4450?~~
25. P.39's will be flown in from N. Africa as required, to G4450. *From airfield.*

engineer officers to go at once to a Baltimore P.S.U. Then to the training and conversion airfield (~~where~~) where there will be a small party of Allied technical personnel whose job it will be to train maintenance crews.

(ii) P.39's.

Not more than 60, i.e. 20 from each Squadron, of technical personnel to go to Capodachino to learn the Allison engine. Also a representative from Alfa-Romeo's. Remaining maintenance will be taught at GAUDO. *(Training cancelled)*

20. Flying Training - (i) Baltimore.

2 or 3 selected pilots, who will eventually form the basis of the Baltimore conversion unit, to go to SHADWY at once in one of our own s/c, do a few trips in Baltimores, and return at once. Remaining conversion and further training at ~~GAUDO~~. *(Training cancelled)*

(ii) P.39's.

Aircraft are very easy to fly. Several selected pilots, with experience should fly them first and then conversion can proceed.

21. General Training. Only one Squadron will form at a time of (a) Fighters and (b) Baltimores. But training for wastage in the preceding squadrons will have to proceed concurrently with the training of additional squadrons.

22. We have to use R.S.U's and consider that Italians will have ~~to~~ the same, except perhaps the Baltimores. Formation of a P.39 R.S.U. which should be formed at ~~GAUDO~~ as first step. *(Training cancelled)*

23. Major overhauls of engines and airframes. We will certainly have to do Allison overhauls and suggest Pomigliano Works be cleared to concentrate on these. Will try to persuade Allies to undertake major overhauls of Baltimore engines, but if not successful we shall have to take these on as well. Alfa's should also do this.

24. It is for question where we can undertake major airframe overhauls and repairs. ~~GAUDO?~~ *(Training cancelled)*

25. P.39's will be flown in from N. Africa as required, to ~~GAUDO~~.

26. Baltimore will be flown in from Middle East as required.

27. We have to use A.S.P's. What about Italians. We are getting a proposed establishment for a combined P.39 - Baltimore A.S.P.

28. We have to consider carefully the individual Officers best fitted to fill the posts required under the re-organisation. Apart from the reshuffle in the Air Ministry we will need someone very good indeed to take charge of training. Also we must have an English speaking liaison officer, with operations and operations room experience, for the new Operational H.Q.

29. All this is a tremendous job, which must be got on with quickly. These notes will be issued personally to General Piacentini as an aide-memoire, but are

-3-

for his use only, and must not be shown to anyone else at all.

30. The re-equipment of the I.A.F. with Allied types is wholly without prejudice to the status of the I.A.F. at the end of the war.

W.A.B.

W.A.B. LOWEN-BOUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission.
27th May 1944.

3778

SECRET

8A

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

POLICY FOR RE-EQUIPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT.

AGENDA FOR MEETING AT HQ MAAP, MAY 25TH

1. Replacement of Sandali.
2. ^{7A} NAF 709. Discussion of:-
 - (a) Allocation and maintenance of Allied types.

A decision is required on the method of allocating aircraft to Italians which can be either:-

 - (i) en bloc, leaving I.A.F. maintenance organization to back the agreed U.E. to the best of its ability with assistance from GISO as necessary, or
 - (ii) provision of agreed U.E. plus I.R. with arrangements for major servicing and repair by GISO.
 - (b) Arrangements to be made for training and conversion to Allied types.
 - (c) Italian types. How long will these run on?
 - (d) Control of I.A.F. to obtain maximum efficiency from re-equipped force.
3. Method of informing Italian Government of decisions taken under Item 2.
4. Detailed operational and administrative requirements for I.A.F. working under G Force.

3087

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS
25 MAY 1944
A.C.C.284
Air Staff
78A

TO: TO ACWAR FOR COM AND TO USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF REFERRED TO SHAPE, HQ MAIF
AND ACC MAIF, FAIRBANKS, UNIFY LONDON FOR ISIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N 14/25

FROM: ~~SECRET~~ FREEDOM SIGNED WILSON CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REFERENCE No: F 50324 PRECEDENCE: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: MAY 24/2051 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE FMAIR

PARA ONE. YOUR PAN 358. THIS IS N709. AIR CINC MEDITERRANEAN CONSIDERS THAT THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE CAN MAKE A WORTH WHILE CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY IF IT IS EQUIPPED AND ORGANIZED AS BELOW. PARA TWO. THE IAF CAN MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING SQUADRONS:-(A) FIGHTERS: AND ALLIED TYPES-THREE SQUADRONS, ON ITALIAN TYPES-THREE SQUADRONS. (B) LIGHT BOMBERS: ON ALLIED TYPES-TWO SQUADRONS. ALL THE ABOVE ON BRITISH WAR ESTABLISHMENTS OF 1600 AIRCRAFT. PARA THREE. AND IN ADDITION THE TRANSPORT AND SEAPLANE WINGS CAN CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON ITALIAN TYPES FOR SOME TIME BUT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED LONGER THAN THEIR PRESENT EQUIPMENT WILL LAST. PARA FOUR. AIR CINC PROPOSES TO RE-EQUIP THE FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRONS SELECTED FOR ALLIED TYPES AS DETAILED IN PARA TWO ABOVE WITH P-39'S AND BALTIMORES RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE BOTH TYPES WHICH ARE IN COURSE OF BEING SUPPLIED IN US AND BRITISH SQUADRONS IN THIS THEATRE AND THE NECESSARY STOCKS AND SPARE PARTS TO MAINTAIN THE SQUADRONS ON THESE TYPES ARE AVAILABLE IN THE THEATRE. THIS REEQUIPMENT WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAINING, CONVERSION AND MAINTENANCE ARE COMPLETE. PARA FIVE. ALL ITALIAN AIR FORCES UNITS WILL OPERATE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE APPROPRIATE FORMATION HEADQUARTERS OF MAIF. THE AIR OFFICER COMMANDING THE AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ACC WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ADMINISTRATION, ORGANISATION, TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN ALLIED TYPES. PARA SIX. IT WILL BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS DECISION IS WHOLLY WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY EVENTUAL DECISION ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE IAF AFTER THE END OF THE WAR.

DATE and Time of RECEIPT: MAY 25/0150

Distribution:

SECRET

Info - Air S.C. 2
Section
occ
File
float

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,

BARI.

SECRET.

S.15/AIR.

18th May 1944.

Dear

Thank you for your letter DO/OPS/13393 of the 7th May 1944. I will let you have the information which you require by signal about the 25th June.

I think you seem to be one jump ahead of us as regards the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force with British or American Aircraft. The signal from the Chiefs of Staff distinctly said that we could only be re-equipped with "superseded but battleworthy aircraft", and this has caused some discussion among the powers that be at this end. For instance, there is a body of the opinion that the Spitfire V is not yet a superseded aircraft. At the moment there seems to be two schools of thought, one of which is in favour of giving us the whole available aircraft of one particular type, say the P.39, together with all spares, spare engines, etc. etc, and telling us to get on with it as best we can. The other group advise washing out the whole of the Italian fighters and re-equipping us with an American group of fighters with an American Servicing Squadron. The re-equipment with Bombers follows on similar lines.

Either of these alternatives will be quite acceptable, although naturally we would prefer the second. In either case I think the I.A.F. will put up a good show with whatever they are given.

We certainly have plenty of fighter pilots as we can call on 250 operationally trained pilots with 100 more not quite fully trained. The bomber position is not so rosy, but we should be able to muster 150 fully trained crews with a further 50 not yet fully trained.

Nobody seems to consider the possibility of re-equipping the Seaplane Wing, and for the moment I do not think that it is at all necessary to do this, as they have quite a number of aircraft, excellent workshop facilities, and are by far the best organised wing. At the moment they are doing the equivalent of two Allied Coastal Squadrons to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Apart from any re-equipment which may have taken place by the time I send you the signal, there will be very little to report as we have only received very minor assistance in the way of odd items of equipment, fuel and oil, and a transport column of 70 vehicles which we have picked up off salvage dumps and made reasonably serviceable ourselves.

Yours

25th June.

I think you seem to be one jump ahead of us as regards the re-equipment of the Italian Air Force with British or American Aircraft. The signal from the Chiefs of Staff distinctly said that we could only be re-equipped with "superseded but battleworthy aircraft", and this has caused some discussion among the powers that be at this end. For instance, there is a body of the opinion that the Spitfire V is not yet a superseded aircraft. At the moment there seems to be two schools of thought, one of which is in favour of giving us the whole available aircraft of one particular type, say the P.50, together with all spares, spare engines, etc. etc, and telling us to get on with it as best we can. The other group advise washing out the whole of the Italian fighters and re-equipping us with ex American group of fighters with an American Servicing Squadron. The re-equipment with Bombers follows on similar lines.

Either of these alternatives will be quite acceptable, although naturally we would prefer the second. In either case I think the I.A.F. will put up a good show with whatever they are given.

We certainly have plenty of fighter pilots as we can call on 250 operationally trained pilots with 100 more not quite fully trained. The bomber position is not so rosy, but we should be able to muster 150 fully trained crews with a further 50 not yet fully trained.

Nobody seems to consider the possibility of re-equipping the 389th plane Wing, and for the moment I do not think that it is at all necessary to do this, as they have quite a number of aircraft, excellent workshop facilities, and are by far the best organised Wing. At the moment they are doing the equivalent of two Allied Coastal Squadrons to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Apart from any re-equipment which may have taken place by the time I send you the signal, there will be very little to report as we have only received very minor assistance in the way of odd items of equipment, fuel and oil, and a transport column of 70 vehicles which we have picked up off salvage dumps and made reasonably serviceable ourselves.

Yours

Group Captain F.J. Fressanges,
Directorate of Overseas Operations,
Air Ministry,
King Charles Street,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

D.O. Op. 13393.

SECRET

Directorate of Overseas Operations
Air Ministry,
King Charles Street,
Whitehall,
S.W.1. **5A**

BY AIR
IMMEDIATE

7th May, 1944.

Dear *Buscarlet*,

The Prime Minister has asked C.A.S. for a report showing the extent to which the Italian Air Force has been given Allied equipment, the number of units on the different types, the state of training and the general nature of the employment of the different units.

We have to submit our information by 1st July.

Now that agreement has been reached to re-equip certain squadrons of the Italian Air Force with British or American aircraft, considerable progress should have been made in this respect by the end of June.

Would you therefore be good enough to signal us about the 25th June, giving the information asked for by the C.A.S. Meanwhile if any queries arise ample time has been given for you to let me know so that we can clear any outstanding points.

Yours

A. J. L. Luanange

3884

*"Superiority of the
worthy aircraft"*

Air Vice Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, C.B.E., D.F.C.,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Force Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

AL FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, ^{5B}

REMI.

3.15/AIR.

17th May 1944.

SECRET.

Dear

5A

I am attaching a copy of a letter received this morning from Fressanges. I thought you would like to have it as it seems to show that at home they are almost thinking faster than we are.

Yours

Air Marshal Sir F. John Linnell, K.B.E., C.B.,
Headquarters,
M.A.A.F.
C.M.F.

3772

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

RAIL.

SECRET.

Sc
He

S.15/AIR.

17th May 1944.

Dear

5A

I have just received the attached letter from the Air Ministry, which I think shows that they are a jump ahead of us.

I thought you would like to know about this as it may help your scheme to give us a bigger and better Air Force.

Yours

Major General J.K. Canon,
Commanding General,
H.Q.
Tactical Air Force,
C.M.F.

5771

I.A.F.

1. Present role of I.A.F.

Fighters.
Bomber/Transport
Seaplanes.

Last month.

259 sorties
474 sorties
157 sorties

143 tons.

Graves as 262.

Also air lines and communication flights.

2. Serviceability. Average daily about :-

	7/17	205/5	2001/5
L.R. Fighters.	26/70	205	2001
S.R. Fighters.	8/17	2002	
Fighter/Bombers.	15/25	51.82	
Bomber/Transport.	15/25	0ant.1007	
Bombers.	23/46	0ant.506,	501 Rs.14.
Seaplanes.			

There is also a large number of various types, some of which can be used as transports. (About 45 in all, of which about half are any use).

In addition there is a large number of aircraft, mainly fighters, in various stages of overhaul.

I have recommended that all aircraft which cannot be repaired economically, and within a reasonable time, should be scrapped. I have given orders that no workshop repairs are to be carried out on anything but operational aircraft, and the S.79's.

3. Proposals.

(a) FIGHTERS.

(2 Squadrons of 12 each Mc.205 to become 1 Squadron of 12 I.E. 12 I.R.
NUOVA { 2 " " " " " " 1 Squadron of 12 I.E. 12 I.R.
2 " " " " " " 1 Squadron of 12 I.E. 12 I.R.

LECCO (1 Squadron 12 Mc.205/S and 1 Squadron 12 Mc.202 and 4 Re.2001/S to form escort Squadron with I.E. of 16 and I.R. of 12.

This will result in considerable increase in serviceability of Fighter Squadrons armed with Italian Aircraft, and will release roughly half the Pilots at present employed in the Italian Fighter Squadrons. (About 50). The I.A.F. have at present 250 fully trained fighter pilots, so that with the above re-organisation there would be 200 pilots available at once. There are a further 100 fighter pilots who are not operationally trained.

My estimate is that we could be quite certain of getting 100 fully operational fighter pilots at once, still leaving an effective I.A.F. equipped fighter force in operation.

(b) BOMBERS AND BOMBER TRANSPORTS.

-2-

(c) SEAPLANES AND FLYING BOATS.

This is our most flourishing and best organized Branch. What types would be available for replacement or addition?

All present types employed should be able to continue their operations for some time.

Italians say they have 65 fully trained Seaplane Crews, and if we leave them 45 crews to operate their present 46 aircraft, we should have 20 crews available for conversion to Allied types.

Furthermore, there are 25 crews partly trained and not yet fully operational.

4. ROLE.

What would role of existing and future Allied a/c in I.A.F. be?

Presume Bomber/Transport and Seaplane Wings would continue with their present activities.

At present fighters do not like operating over the sea, they have little faith in their engines and no V.H.F. Reggians have particularly noisy engines and ~~no V.H.F.~~ On the other hand they are very accurate dive bombers.

If Allied bombers or bomber/transports are supplied, what would be their roles by day and by night?

5. TRAINING.

A training organisation will have to be set up, with a number of a/c used specifically for training. The training units will also train maintenance personnel. What airfields are available?

Armament training will be easy as the Italians are very good at this.

The organisation will depend on the scale of Allied equipment supplied.

6. MAINTENANCE.

Presume major overhauls would be undertaken by R.A.F. Units both to engines and airframes? What about R.S.U. organisation? At present Squadrons save and repair when possible. *No. We may have to change one of our 1200s over to Whiston engine and overhaul.*

Some technical help will be required, but consider this would be of nature of 1 Technical N.C.O. for each squadron, and 1 more at H.Q. Tool kits would be required.

Where and how will supplies and equipment be drawn? *All over!*

If Night or Day bombers are supplied, the Squadrons will need some help with Armourers B and Wireless personnel. They are already qualified to fit and maintain V.H.F.

present activities.

At present fighters do not like operating over the sea, they have little faith in their engines and no V.H.F. Reggians have particularly ropey engines and ~~no V.H.F.~~. On the other hand they are very accurate dive bombers.

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Armament training will be easy as the Italians are very good at this.

The organisation will depend on the scale of Allied equipment supplied.

6. MAINTENANCE.

Presume major overhauls would be undertaken by R.A.F. Units both to engines and airframes? What about R.S.U. organisation? At present Squadrons salve and repair when possible. *No. we may have to change one of our 1200ms over to workshop engines and equipment.*

Some technical help will be required, but consider this would be of nature of 1 Technical M.C.O. for each squadron, and 1 more at H.Q. Tool kits would be required.

Where and how will supplies and equipment be drawn?

all ours!

If Night or Day bombers are supplied, the Squadrons will need some help with Armourers B and Wireless personnel. They are already qualified to fit and maintain V.H.F.

Why no V.H.F. for I.A.F? They have a bad time operating over the sea. Presume our a/c for I.A.F. will have V.H.F.

7. FURTHER RESOURCES.

If P.O.W's were combed we would get about 500 more good pilots and 500 more specialist personnel.

8. SPEED OF ASSIGNMENT OF ALLIED SQUADRONS.

1 at a time only. Perhaps 2 for fighters. Gradual anyway.

If it shows signs of paying a reason able return they will be prepared to put more into it.

Continued.....

-3-

9.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Examination of these.

10.

EXTENDISI KUNWAY.

I have given authorisation for work to start.

11.

PAPER.

Through REC.

Form 700 for the Italian Air Force are being held up for lack of paper which we cannot obtain from any source. This also affects other work in hand.

12.

MINISTERIAL CONTROL.

Must involve that Piccinini becomes minister as he will give us more information. Government or we cannot afford to lose him.

13.

BENEVENTO AIRFIELD.

14.

Board of Insurance. - MAAF decision
1651/21/orig. b/s. LWE/MAAF/2162.

15.

Signals. Information on present HF channels. We are hoping to get a new channel, but in not the answer.

16.

American D/SASO.

70 ASD (orig). G/C orig.

266 - Garibaldi Dim - Manned.

17.

94 series in 8 days using 16 drops, and using 16 drops in all. Further consider.

18.

P.C.W's. Technicians, sent to work in this country with I.P.C's. 4 Filters, 1 Electrician. Case of encephalitis.

19.

Duplicator. W/ld Monitor. 214 ft.

20.

HQ AAAI.

AAI/3072/2/A(6). 30/4.

D.A.G.

12. MINISTERIAL CONTROL. Most involve New Riverine personnel. Government or not. cannot afford to lose them.
13. REVENUE AIRFIELD.
14. Board of Insurance. - MRAF decision 1651/21/0rg. b/s. LWE/MRAF/2162.
15. Signals. Participation on present HF channels. We are hoping to get a new channel, but in not the answer.
16. American D/SASO. No ASD(0rg). G/C org.
17. Lile & Gaudreault Dim - Manned. 94 series in 8 days using 16 days, not any ^{7 engine} _{fuel} power at all. Quite another.
18. P.O.W's. Technicians, sentaged in this country with I.P.C's. 4 Filters, 1 Electrician. Care of evacuees.
19. Duplicator. W/Eden Monitor. 214 ft.
20. HQ AAAI. AAII/3072/2/A(0). 30/4. Lt Col. for Brig D.A.G. Return back to original decision.
21. Mason. Manufacturing says that nothing could be better from his point of view & would like personally, but a statement that 184 were being recovered with all the care would be enough.

3082

MILITARY AND NAVAL.

Output from Marignano - how many in how long.

Wages in factories and S.P.A.M.S.

Benevento airfield.

RAILWAY AND LINES.

Rates of pay of cive in I.A.P. S.P.A.M.S.

Taranto Cricket Pitch.

I.A.P. Lorries in Sicily.

Aircraft for Government officials.

Ministerial control.

COMANDO UNITÀ AEREA

UFFICIO OPERAZIONI

UFFICIO STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R.A.

Bari, lì 8 maggio 1944 -

TO :- AIR VICE MARSHAL W.A.B.

BOWEN-BUSCARLET

SECRET

= LOCAL =

Ref.: n° 00742/3

SUBJECT : Details concerning the possible concession of Allied Aircraft to the Italian Air Force.

I have the honour to answer to the questions which you have been so kind to put under my consideration by Group Capt. Eccles.

a) - Question : Which types of aircraft you think should be replaced first?

a) - Answer : All the Italian A/C should be replaced because they are old and worn out. Furthermore the upkeep of these aircraft is onerous and it is often impossible to supply the spare parts. Anyhow the necessity of using the aircraft in the most convenient way, also with the arrival of Allied material, is obvious so that a gradual substitution in the following order of priority is suggested:

FIGHTERS : Re.2001 - Re.2002 - Mc.202 - Mc.205.

BOMBERS : All the various types of A/C which not being standard and few in number can not be grouped in squadrons or flights as S.73 - S.75 - S.81 - G.12 - G.18 - S.84 - Br.20;

Then S.82 - Cant.Z.1007 - S.79.

SEAPLANES : Cant.Z.501 - Rs.14 - Cant.Z.506.

b) - Question : Can you provide ~~crews~~ ^{planes} in addition to the existing I.A.F. Squadrons and Bombers?

b) - Answer : FIGHTER UNIT: Now it has about 100 A/C with 250 trained pilots and about 100 not trained.

The Unit could then be supplied in addition to the 100 Italian A/C with: 150 A/C at once and 100 later. With the complete substitution of the

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b) - Answer : FIGHTER UNIT: Now it has about 100 A/C with 250 trained pilots and about 100 not trained.
The Unit could then be supplied in addition to the 100 Italian A/C with: 150 A/C at once and 100 later.
With the complete substitution of the Italian A/C : 250 A/C at once and 100 later.

BOMBER UNIT : Now it has about 100 A/C with 300 trained pilots and 100 not trained.
This Unit could be equipped, in addition to the existing 100 Italian A/C, with 50 Allied A/C at once and 50 later.
With the complete substitution of the Italian A/C : 150 at once and 50 later.

/.....

SF PLANE UNIT : Actually it has 46 A/C with 132 trained pilots and 30 to be trained. It could be equipped, in addition to the 46 Italian A/C : at once with 20 A/C and later with 25. With the complete substitution of the Italian A/C: at once 65 and later 25.

- c) - Question : What are your views about the Seaplanes?
- c) - Answer : I think they are very useful so that the Units could be given similar or amphibian Allied A/C. Otherwise land based coastal planes, now used by the Allies, could eventually replace the seaplanes.
- d) - Question : What would you think about putting all the I.A.F. fighters into one Unit, or two, with a large "immediate reserve" ?.
- d) - Answer : I think that such a proposal is a good one though it requires a reform of our organization with the consequential modification of the existing mental make up. To deal with this matter it would be necessary to have more data concerning the allotment and the types of Allied A/C.
- e) - Question : What are your suggestions about training, and where could the conversion take place?
- e) - Answer : At Leverano airfield for the Fighter Unit but only for the first period; then on two Sicilian aerodromes, preferably Comiso and Castelvetro, one for the fighters and one for the bombers.

S U M M A R Y

UNIT	Number of Italian A/C	Trained Pilots	Pilots to be Trained	Number of A/C which could be accepted from the Allied		
				With complete substitution of Italian A/C at once	Later at once	over end above the Italian A/C at once later
FIGHTER	100	250	100	250	100	150 150
				150	50	50 50

Otherwise land based coastal planes, now used by the Allies, could eventually replace the seaplanes.

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S U M M A R Y

UNIT	Number of Italian A/C	Trained Pilots	Pilots to be Trained	Number of A/C which could be accepted from the Allied		
				With complete substitution of Italian A/C		
				at once	Later	at once later
FIGHTER	100	250	100	250	100	150 150
BOMBER	100	300	100	150	50	50 50
SEAPLANE	46	132	50	65	25	20 25
Total	246	680	250	465	175	219 175

./.....

NOTES :

- 1 - In the number of the required A/C the reserve is not taken into account and therefore should be increased by 20%.
- 2 - The number of the aircraft could be considerably increased (about 50%) if the Italian pilots at the moment P.Ws were repatriated.
- 3 - Each eventual assignment of Allied A/C should be made gradually ^{or one} ly about two squadrons for each type of Fighter and Bomber unit and one squadron for the Seaplane unit.
- 4 - There are 500 pilots who are P.Ws and the relative specialist personnel most of which are the best types of professional technicians. Their repatriation would be a big contribution, above all for as far as concerns the political, spiritual and moral sides.

With official reference to the Italian copy.

IL COMANDANTE
(Gen. S. A. - PIRELLA GENTINI)

P. Pirella

3362

Bari li, 7 Maggio 1944

COMANDO UNITA' AEREA

UFFICIO CHIAVIONI

GRUPPO STAFFO MACCHIELE 40° R. A.

- AL VICE MARESCIALLO DELL'ARIA

BOWEN BUSCARLET

Prot.n.00742/3

= S E D E =

SEGRETO

OCCETTO : Dati riferentisi alla possibile concessione di apparecchi Alleati all'Aviazione italiana.--

Qui di seguito rispondo ai quesiti che Vi siete compiaciuto di mandarmi tramite C/C ECCLES.

- a - Domanda : quali tipi richiedete debbono essere rimpiazzati per primi ?
- a - Risposta: tutti gli apparecchi italiani dovrebbero essere sostituiti perchè vecchi e molto usurati. ^{La loro} ~~La loro~~ manutenzione è onerosa e le parti di ricambio, qualche volta, sono di impossibile rifornimento. E' evidente però la necessità di farne l'uso più conveniente anche con l'arrivo del materiale Alleato e quindi si impone una situazione graduale nell'ordine di precedenza ~~sotto~~ ^{sotto}indicato:
- CACCIA : Re.2001 - Re.2002 - Mc.202 - Mc.205
- BOMBARDAMENTO : tutti i più disparati tipi di imposable riunione organica come: S.73 - S.75 - S.81 - G.12 - G.18 - S.84 - Br.20 - e, quindi S.82 - Cant.Z.1007 - S.79; IDRO : Cant.Z.501 - Rs.14 - Cant.Z.506.

- b - Domanda : potete provvedere ad aumentare gli equipaggi attualmente esistenti presso il Raggruppamento Caccia e Bombardamento ?

Qui di seguito rispondo ai quesiti che Vi siete compiaciuto di mandarmi tramite G/C ECCLES.

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IDRO : Cant.Z.501 - Rs.14 - Cent.Z.506.

b - Domanda : potete provvedere ad aumentare gli equipaggi attualmente esistenti presso il Raggruppamento Caccia e Bombardamento ?

b - Risposta :

CACCIA : attualmente ha circa 100 apparecchi in linea con 250 piloti addestrati e 100 non addestrati.

Potrebbe quindi ricevere:

- in aggiunta ai 100 apparecchi italiani: 150 apparecchi subito e 100 più tardi;
- totale sostituzione apparecchi italiani: 250 apparecchi subito e 100 più tardi.

- : 2 : -

BOMBARDAMENTO : attualmente ha circa 100 apparecchi in linea con 300 piloti addestrati e 100 non addestrati.

Potrebbe quindi ricevere:

- in aggiunta ai 100 apparecchi italiani: 50 apparecchi subito e 50 più tardi;
- totale sostituzione apparecchi italiani : 150 subito e 50 in prosieguo di tempo.

IDRO : attualmente ha 46 apparecchi in linea con 132 piloti addestrati e 50 da addestrare:

Potrebbe quindi ricevere:

- in aggiunta ai 46 apparecchi italiani: 20 apparecchi subito e 25 più tardi;
- totale sostituzione apparecchi italiani : 65 subito e 25 più tardi.

c - Domanda : quali sono le vostre vedute circa gli idrovolanti?

c - Risposta: Ritengo siano molto utili e quindi i Reparti potrebbero essere dotati di apparecchi Alleati similari od anfibi oppure di apparecchi terrestri che attualmente sono impiegati dai Comandi Alleati costieri.

d - Domanda : che cosa pensereste circa il riunire in una o due Unità la Caccia Italiana avente una grande "Pronta Riserva"?

d - Risposta: ritengo sia una cosa possibile ed utile sebbene richieda una riforma al nostro ordinamento e quindi modificare una mentalità in atto. Sarebbe opportuno concertare disposizioni esecutive con sicuri elementi di fatto in merito all'assegnazione degli apparecchi Alleati e dei tipi di essi.

e - Domanda : quali sono i vostri suggerimenti circa l'allenamento e dove date possa aver luogo ?

Risposta: sul campo di Laverano per la Caccia e solo in un primo tempo: per

in prosieguo di tempo.

IDRO : attualmente ha 46 apparecchi in linea con 132 piloti addestrati e 50 da addestrare.

Potrebbe quindi ricevere:

- in aggiunta ai 46 apparecchi italiani: 20 apparecchi subito e 25 più tardi;
- totale sostituzione apparecchi italiani : 65 subito e 25 più tardi.

c - Domanda : quali sono le vostre vedute circa gli idrovolanti?

c - Risposta: Ritengo siano molto utili e quindi i Reparti potrebbero essere dotati di apparecchi Alleati similari od anfibi oppure di apparecchi terrestri che attualmente sono impiegati dai Comandi Alleati costieri.

d - Domanda : che cosa pensereste circa il riunire in una o due Unità la Caccia Italiana avente una grande "Pronta Riserva"?

d - Risposta: ritengo sia una cosa possibile ed utile sebbene richieda una riforma al nostro ordinamento e quindi modificare una mentalità in atto. Sarebbe opportuno concretare disposizioni esecutive con sicuri elementi di fatto in merito all'assegnazione degli apparecchi Alleati e dei tipi di essi.

e - Domanda : quali sono i vostri suggerimenti circa l'allenamento e dove volete possa aver luogo ?

e - Risposta: sul campo di Leverano per la Caccia e solo in un primo tempo; poi su due campi della Sicilia, preferibilmente Comiso e Castelfidardo, uno per il Bombardamento e la Caccia.

- : 3 : -

RIEPILOGO CAPACITA' DOTAZIONE APPARECCHI ALLEATI AVI. IONE ITALIANA

Specie lità	n°appa. ital.in linea	Piloti adestr.	Piloti non adestr.	Capacità dotazione apparecchi Alleati con sostituzione totale con assegnazione apparecchi italiani più degli app. Ital. immediata ritardata immediata ritardata
CACCIA	100	250	100	250 100 150 150
BOMB.to	100	300	100	150 50 50 50
IDRO	48	132	50	65 25 20 25
Totale	246	680	250	465 175 219 175

NOTE :

1°) - il numero degli apparecchi richiesti è quello di linea e quindi va aumentato della riserva di linea che dovrebbe essere del 20%.

2°) - il numero degli apparecchi potrebbe essere notevolmente ~~completato~~ aumentato (circa il 50%) tenendo conto del rimpatrio dei piloti italiani attualmente prigionieri.

3°) - ogni eventuale assegnazione di aerei Alleati dovrebbe avere un carattere graduale della entità di circa 2 Squadroni per ogni Specialità da Caccia e Bombardamento e di 1 per gli Idro.

4°) - ci sono prigionieri di guerra 500 piloti, più gli specialisti relativi tra i quali la massa è fra i migliori elementi tecnici professionali. Il loro rientro in Patria sarebbe un cospicuo apporto soprattutto quanto concerne il lato politico, spirituale e morale.

IL COMANDANTE

CAUCIA	100	250	100	250	100	150	150
BOMB.to	100	300	100	150	50	50	50
IDRO	46	132	50	65	25	20	25
Totale	246	680	250	465	175	219	175

NOTE:

- 1°) - il numero degli apparecchi richiesti è quello di linea e quindi va aumentato della riserva di linea che dovrebbe essere del 20%.
- 2°) - il numero degli apparecchi potrebbe essere notevolmente ~~accoppiato~~ aumentato (circa il 50%) tenendo conto del rimpatrio dei piloti italiani attualmente prigionieri.
- 3°) - ogni eventuale assegnazione di aerei Alleati dovrebbe avere un carattere graduale della entità di circa 2 Squadroni per ogni Specialità da Caccia e Bombardamento e di 1 per gli Idro.
- 4°) - ci sono prigionieri di guerra 500 piloti, più gli specialisti relativi tra i quali la massa è fra i migliori elementi tecnici professionali. Il loro rientro in Patria sarebbe un cospicuo apporto soprattutto quanto concerne il lato politico, spirituale e morale.-



IL COMANDANTE
(Generale B.A. - P. PIACENTINI)

P. Piacentini

MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL FIACENTINI.

TOP SECRET. 4A

With reference to our conversation this afternoon regarding the consideration which is being given to the possibility of equipping the Italian Air Force with some Allied Aircraft, the Air Vice-Marshal would like you to consider this matter.

2. He is returning mid-day on Sunday when he will wish to discuss the matter with you, and asks you to consider the following points:

- (a) Which types require replacing first?
- (b) Can you provide crews in addition to the existing I.A.F. Squadrons in (i) Fighters (ii) Bombers.
- (c) What are your views about the Seaplanes?
- (d) What would you think about putting all the I.A.F. Fighters into one Unit, or two, with a large "Immediate Reserve"?
- (e) What are your suggestions about training, and where could the conversion take place?

3. The A.V.-M. also requires a statement regarding the Trained Crew position.

R. Hughes
R. Z. HUGHES, GROUP CAPTAIN,
S.A.S.O.

5758

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission.
5th May 1944.
AFSC/S.15/AIR.

SECRET CYPHER MESSAGE

427/5

TO:- AIR SECTION ALLIED CONROL COMMISSION

FROM:- HQ MAAF *24 May*

A254 MAF 1944 TOP SECRET.

PERSONAL FOR A.V.M. NOWEN-BUSCARLET. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE AIR
COMMANDER_IN_CHIEF MAY CONSIDER THE EQUIPPING OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE
WITH SUPERSEDED TYPES OF COMBAT-WORTHY AIRCRAFT. REQUEST YOU VISIT THIS
HQRS IN REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS VALUE OF THE WORK WHICH IS
BEING OR COULD BE DONE BY THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IT IS DECIDED TO RELEASE AIRCRAFT.
REQUEST YOU SIGNAL DATE AND TIME OF YOUR VISIT.

DIST:- A.S.A.C.C. BARI.

DECYPHE ED SGT R /WN.

TOO 041927B

TCR 050448B

TOD 050708B



3757

Cat. 3^a INTENDENZA DI FINANZA - UFFICIO PROVINCIALE DEL TRO-DI

Mod. 57 C. G.

DEBITO VITALIZIO DELLO STATO

ORDINE DI PAGAMENTO N.º _____

PER LA PENSIONE N.º _____

MINISTERO _____

CAPITOLO _____

LOCALITÀ _____

Si paghi al Sig. _____

o per esso al _____

la rata dal _____

al _____

Importo
netto per

Pensione soggetta a ritenuta _____ % per R. M.	
Assegno non reversibile soggetto a ritenuta del _____ % per R. M.	
Assegno di caro-viveri _____	

Totale _____ L.

Somma da pagarsi _____ L.

LIRE**PER QUIETANZA**

Dichiaro di essere tutt'ora vedova
Dichiaro che i suddetti minorenni a
tutt'oggi ha conservato lo stato libero.


 Bollo
d'Ufficio

li _____

IL DIRETTORE DEL TESORO

Registrato in uscita al N. _____