

ACC

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10000/135/668

ITALIAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
AUG. 1945 - SEPT. 1946

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

Ref: 2623/241/30

26 November 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

You are no doubt aware of the amendment to Article 52 of the draft Italian Peace Treaty which was discussed by the Military Commission in Paris about 3 September. I have been informed that it was agreed to insert a new Article No. 45 (A) to the effect that in no case shall any officer or non-commissioned officer of the former Fascist Militia or the former Fascist Legionary Army be admitted with Officer's or non-commissioned officer's rank to the Italian Army, Navy, Air Forces or Carabinieri with the exception of such persons as have been exonerated by the appropriate body in accordance with Italian law.

I am not aware, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, to what extent this new clause may affect the Italian mad persons, but I feel sure that you will want to take such action as may be advisable at this stage.

Yours very truly,

W. E. D. Webb
General Secretary
United Nations

Doroteo Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.

I am not aware, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, to what extent this new clause may affect the Italian and Germans, but I feel sure that you will want to take such action as may be advisable at this stage.

7625 2/9
367/07

Yours very truly,

W. E. D. W. Stone
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.

Copy to: C-5, AFHQ
Paled A
Paled B
Land Forces 3/C
Navy 3/C
Air Forces 3/C
Legal 3/C

6624

8/11

8/11

8/11

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16A

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION. ALLIED COM. ROME. 24.16353.

AIR MINISTRY, LONDON.

A.H.Q. ITALY, R.Q. R.A.F. HEADQ. H.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT.

TOP SECRET.

HIVE SUGAR EIGHT NINE SEVEN TO FROM JAPANESE TO ASSISTANT CHIEF AIR STAFF PARRY
ESTER PARRY TO REFERENCE YOUR HIVE SUGAR XRAY TWO EIGHT SEVEN DATED ONE ZERO
AUGUST TO AIR VICE MARSHAL BROOKS CMA ORIGINAL SIGNAL NOT RECEIVED BUT COPY
OBTAINED FROM HQ QUEEN HIVE EASY DOG HIVE EASY TWO THREE SEPTEMBER ONE HIVE
FOUR SIX TOO LATE FOR THIS HEADQUARTERS TO TAKE ACTION TO DISSEMINATE THE ITALIAN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF FROM SPEAKING AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE TO

11M

FOUR SEVEN EIGHT NINE SEVEN ED FROM JAMMAN TO ASSISTANT CHIEF AIR STAFF PARENT
ESTER PARENT ED REFERENCE YOUR MIKE SUGAR XRAY TWO EIGHT SEVEN DATED ONE ZERO
AUGUST TO AIR VICE MARSHAL DUNOIN CEA ORIGINAL SIGNAL NOT RECEIVED BUT COPY
OBTAINED FROM HQ QUIN MIKE EASY DOG MIKE EASY TWO THREE SEPTEMBER ONE NINE
YOUR SIX TOO LATE FOR THIS HEADQUARTERS TO TAKE ACTION TO DISEMPOWER THE ITALIAN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF FROM SPEAKING AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ED

W34
27/9

6623

AFSC/367/CRC.

TELETYPE.

ADMINISTRATION.

490.

A.C. HERLEN. E/O.

L.E. JAMMAN, C/CAFT.

1988/11

0612

785017

11-646 GH/OP/10,000 FADS/1-46

MEMORANDUM

ISA
Army Form 639
(E.O. 12812)

Sender's Reference 295. 1000 / 254	Receiver's Reference	Date 17 Sept 46
From: MAT ACIC		TO: AFSC - 4C. Rome attn: Lt Col GREEK

Reference your postgram AFSC/24/6/MR dated September 46, attached is a copy of HM signal MSX 281 dated 10 August, which you requested in your para 2.

This signal was originated 39 days ago and its importance will have dwindled considerably - it is being sent by S.O.S. rather than by repeat signal.

CRG. Miller

0622

FM
PAT ACIC.

COPY

CS. 601/11.

14A

AIR MINISTRY, LONDON.

IMMEDIATE.

AESC. AC. ROME, (R) HQ. MEDAE, AMO. ITALY (MAAC.) SECRETARIAT AMO. ADV. ITALY.

MSX. 287.

10 August.

TOP SECRET.

TO AIR VICE MARSHAL RHODE FROM A.C.A.S. (P).

1. Italian Peace Treaty. Reference your unnumbered signal 3 August. Subject

2. From British view point there are the strongest political and military reasons against making any substantial changes in the agreed military clauses of the Draft Treaty for Italy. These clauses have been agreed only after most prolonged discussions between the four Foreign Ministers and any substantial alterations to these clauses must necessarily hold up the agreement of the Conference to the Treaty as a whole.

3. However, should the points you mention come up for consideration by the Peace Conference they will be referred back as necessary to the Chiefs of Staff for guidance and decision.

4. You should note however that :-

(a) The present agreed figure of 350 aircraft is considerably larger than the Chiefs of Staff recommended for the Italian Air Force although it is true that our recommendations were limited to some extent to what we thought the other powers would agree to.

(b) No prohibition exists against purchase or manufacture of modern air force weapons provided these are of a defensive nature for example fighter aircraft and do not differ in type or exceed in quantity the weapons to be allowed to Italy under the Peace Treaty.

(c) With regard to demilitarised bombers this is a matter which we consider the four Ambassadors who will form the machinery for enforcement of the Peace Treaty terms for they should consider where satisfactory demilitarisation can be effected no difficulties should arise. In any case as the Italians have a twelve month period of grace after the Peace Treaty has been signed to dispose of these excess aircraft which you will note are mostly obsolescent no great difficulties should arise.

The Italian Chief of Mr Staff has not yet left for Paris

10 August.

TOP SECRET.

TO AIR VICE MARSHAL RODIE FROM A.C.A.S. (P).

Reference your unnumbered signal 3 August. Subject

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5. If the Italian Chief of Air Staff has not yet left for Paris you might attempt to dissuade him from raising these points which we feel would not elicit much response from the Peace Conference and in any case could only hold up matters with which we are anxious to press on. You might for this purpose use the points at 4 (B) and (C) but not repeat not 4 (A) which is for your own information.

6. We have already notified the British Air Representative at Paris that points may be raised.

Wm 22/9. Jk in 23/9

T.O.O. 1016352.

13A

[Handwritten signature]

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION. ALLIED COM. HOME. 23.1030B.

AIR MINISTRY, LONDON.

UNCLASSIFIED.

MIKE SUGAR EIGHT NINE ONE PD HEREWITH RECEPTION OF OUR MIKE SUGAR EIGHT
FIVE NINE PD QUOTE PD INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM HQS THAT YOUR SIGNAL,
MIKE SUGAR TWO EIGHT SEVEN DATED ONE ZERO AUGUST WAS SENT TO AIR VICE MARSHAL,
BRADIS FROM ASSISTANT CHIEF AIR STAFF PAPER PAPER PD REQUEST RECEPTION
PAPER PAPER PAPER RECEPTION AND SIGNALS SECTION REPORT ON NOW RECEIPT THIS SUB
COMMISSION PD UNQUOTE PD PLEASE ADVISE REPLY PD

0618

785017

FIVE NINE PD QUOTE PD HEREWITH REPEITION OF OUR MIKE EUGAR EIGHT
MIKE SQUAD TWO EIGHT SEVEN DATED ONE ZERO AUGUST WAS SENT TO AIR VICE MARSHAL,
BRITAIN FROM ASSISTANT CHIEF AIR STAFF PAVEN PETER PAVEN PD REQUEST REINSTITUTION
COMMISSION PD UNQUOTE PD PLEASE EXPEDITE REPLY PD

6619

AFSC/367/ORG.

LABORATORY.

ADMINISTRATION.

Chiribreen

W/CTR. C.N.M. GIBBS.

A.C. MERRIN. E/O.

0617

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

AIR 12450

4/6/55

On

5 LROF V UNK T13/22 R/R

T ADD

FROM AM LONLON 211150Z

TO AFSC ROME

BT

AMC5357 21/3 UNCLASSIFIED.

REF YOUR SIGNAL MS835 399 271040Z LAST SENTENCE.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM T.M.E. BEGINS YOUR TOC 131635Z

AUGUST WAS TRANSMITTED BY US TO HQ HELME

AND AMO ITALY AS PER INSTRUCTIONS STOP IT WAS ALSO TRANSMITTED

TO AFSC AC ROME IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM

6617

3 LROP V MICH T13/22 7/1

T ADD

FROM AM LONDON 211150Z
TO AFSC ROME .

BT

WMCS957 21/9 UNCLASSIFIED.

REF YOUR SIGNAL MSG59 599 071040B LAST SENTENCE .

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM T.M.E. BEGINS YOUR TOO 131635Z

AUGUST WAS TRANSMITTED BY US TO HQ MEDNE

AND WHO ITALY AS PER INSTRUCTIONS STOP IT WAS ALSO TRANSMITTED

TO AFSC AC ROME IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM

CSC CONTAINED IN THEIR 57852

BT 211150Z

CA CNA ALSO TRANSMITTED

S. REAMAN AR N

ED NR 13 BREN 1000B AR TKS

but 23/9
D122

367/009

22/9/1945
-5781/6/EC

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0619
WAR AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION. ALLIED COM. ROME.125
07.1040 B.

AIR MINISTRY. LONDON-

UNCLASSIFIED.

MIKE SUGAR EIGHT FIVE NINE PD INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MEDM THAT YOUR SIGNAL
MIKE SUGAR TWO EIGHT SEVEN DATED ONE ZERO AUGUST WAS SENT TO AIR VICE MARSHAL
BRODIE FROM ABLE CHARLIE ABLE SUGAR PAREN PETER PAREN PD REQUEST REPETITION
PAREN ROGER PAREN REPETITION AND SIGNALS SECTION REPORT ON NON RECEIPT THIS
SUB COMMISSION PD

6616

AFSC/367/ORG.

IMPORTANT.

ADMINISTRATION.

490.

W/CDR. C.M.M. GRECE.

A.C. Merrien
A.C. MERRIEN. F/O.

0 6 2 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

R.A.F. Form 1924

POSTAGRAM.

Originator's Reference Number:—

To: HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F. MEDME.

Date. - 6th September, 1946.

PFSS/160

From:

2. FORCES SUB COMMISSION. ALLIED COMMISSION. ROME.

Reference our Postagram of even reference dated 5th September, 1946.
Amend paragraph 2 to read :-

"Air Ministry Signal MS.287 dated 10th August, 1946 has never been received here
and it is requested that a copy be sent as soon as possible".

JKM
16/9

6615

Chickitren

Originator's
Signature WING COMMANDER C.M.M. GRECE. D.F.C.

Time of
Origin 06.1720 B

0621

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

R.A.F. Form 1924

POSTAGRAM.

Originator's Reference Number:—

To: R.A.F. MEDITERRANEAN/MIDDLE EAST, MEF

AFSC/24/6/AIR
Date:— 5th September, 1946.

FF35/159

From:

AIR HOUSES AND COMMISSION, A.C., NCEC.

(1017)
54A

Reference is made to your postagram AC-in-C-295 dated 22nd August 1946 and it is noted that this Sub Commission unnumbered signal dated 3rd August is no longer required (.)

2. Air Ministry signal MS 289 dated 10th August has never been received here and it is requested that a copy be sent as soon as possible (.)

3. Reason for non receipt of secret signal is being investigated.

(1017)

6614

J/km
16/9

Chibibaru

Originator's
Signature

C.M.M. GIBBE, W/Cdr, ATR I.

Time of
Origin

051730 Sept 46

(9A) SEA AIR S/C

R.A.F. Form 1924

POSTAGRAM. Origin or's Reference Number:—To: Allied Forces Sub Commission,
R O M E.

AC-in-C/295.

Date:— 22nd August, 1946.

PVRB/167

H/6079

From: Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Mediterranean/Middle East, M.E.F.

1. With reference to your signal A.789 dated 21st August, the signal which was required is an unnumbered signal dated 3rd August, sent by you to the Air Ministry and to which Air Ministry referred in their signal to Air Vice-Marshal Brodie from A.C.A.S.(P), reference number MS.287 dated 10th repeat 10th August. Your signal A.762 of 3rd August is not the one required.

2. However, a copy of the signal you sent to Air Ministry on 3rd August is now no longer required.



6613

Originator's
Signature

A. P. M. J.

Wing Commander,
P.S.O. to Air C-in-C.Time of
Origin

220955B

0 6 2 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

LRL V MXX NR MXX T190/16 R/R QVR

FROM HQ MED/WE

TO AFSC A C ROME

BT

ACC560 16AUG UNCLASSIFIED . REQUEST COPY YOUR UNNUMBERED

SIGNAL 3 AUGUST REFERRED TO IN AIR MINISTRY LONDON SIGNAL

MS287 AUGUST

BT 161002Z

ESSENT TR B K

RD NR 190 FN AT 0545 KR

fk m
16/9

429
8A
H/576L

23 A (?)
4A.

Not to
be



Me 6/18 0012

18-1000

H/A

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.
 To :- Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission, ROME.
 Date:- 3rd September, 1946.
 Ref :- AFSC/367/CRG.

TOP SECRET.


Reference our conversation of 3rd September, concerning reply to signal F.71346 of 2nd September, we have consulted the Director of Personnel, at the Italian Air Ministry who confirms that no Fascist Militia and no ex-Republican Air Force personnel (officers or N.C.O's) are at present employed on the active list of the Italian Air Force. Nor is it the intention of the Italian Air Ministry to employ these people in the Italian Air Force in the future.

2. For your information there are about 230 officers and 470 N.C.O's and other ranks ex-Republican Airforce pending demobilisation action; a large number have already been demobilised.

3. The above does not affect the part of the agreed reply to the above mentioned signal, in which we want to omit those personnel who acted as agents to be retained in the Italian Air Force; I would be glad if that part of your reply remains as agreed.

S.L.O. M
 Org.

B.F. D.D. 12/9 JEM 10/9
 B.F. SSO 13/9 WJ 14/9



I.E. BRODIE,
 AIR VICE MARSHAL,
 DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

6611

INCOMING MESSAGECOPY

6A.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F 71346

Message Centre No. H/6209

Date/Time of Origin: Sep 02 NPT

Date Time Rec'd: SEP 030830B

Precedence: URGENT

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FIGOT

TO : ALCOM

TOP SECRET.

Understand from telephone conversation today with War Office that Yugoslavs have submitted an amendment to article 52 of Italian Peace Treaty which may be discussed at PARIS conference tomorrow 3 September.

Amendment is to the effect that no officer or non-commissioned Officer of the Fascist Militia or the Fascist Republican Army shall be admitted with Officer or non-commissioned Officer rank to the Italian Army, Navy or Air Force.

Request by 1200 hours 3 September your views as to the effect of such an amendment if accepted, on the efficiency of the Italian Armed Forces.

Supreme Allied Commanders views required PARIS soonest.

Note: Conference convened by Ex Comm & reply agreed.

I sent S.O. to Mr Drieder Personnel at I.A.D. to

confirm as at Encl 7A

done 4/9

KB 3/9

AC Dist

6610

Action: Executive Commissioner (2)

Info: Chief Commissioner
File
Skeleton

*filed
16/9*

TOP SECRET

0 6 2 6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No.

785017

Par. to J.D. JEM 26/1
SSO Aug 26/8
S/O. [Signature] 24/8
Org [Signature]
Air 1 EMU 25/8.

(P.A. to file in "Peace Negotiations")

Obtained from CAS by
Director AFSC on 23 Aug 46.
[Signature] 23/8

Italian

PEACE TREATY 1946.MILITARY AIR FORCECOMMENTS.

by Italian Delegation & delivered
to the Secretary of the Peace Conference
(given 20 May 46)

1. The articles of the treaty which concern Military Aviation - a part from the disposition of a general nature in article 39 (change of status following admission into O.N.U.) are as follows:

articles 41 - 44 - 46 which define common obligations to the Armed Forces:

- art. 41 - demilitarisation of the "Puglie";
- art. 44 - forbidding the possession of arms with automatic projectiles;
- art. 46 - limitation on construction and possession - of any kind - of war material

and articles 55 - 56 - 57 which define in complete terms the limitation imposed on the Italian Air Force.

The specific term "Italian Air Force" applies to the Military Air Force.

2. If, following the formulation of the requests contained in the memorandum presented to the United Nations, it was explicitly affirmed that they were completely inadequate for the most restricted and most elementary exigencies of the national defence, it shows in an obvious and fundamental manner that limitations established by articles 55 - 56 - 57 have created conditions which make the existence of the Air Forces permitted completely different from the problem of national defence, in no matter what manner they are considered.

These limitations are so serious and heavy, that non General Staff could possibly accept them, while taking towards its country and government the responsibility for preparation which could satisfy, even in a relative fashion, and for a very brief period, the ends of national defence, even though one envisages with the greatest optimism, future intervention of the international Air Forces foreseen by O.N.U.

3. The clauses of the treaty could at the most consent, after a few substantial amendments, to the existence of an Air Arm which would allow for further development in the future provided for by article 39 and relating to the active participation of Italian Air Forces in a collective Air Organisation, which would find it perfectly capable of fulfilling

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000X

4. The immediate effects for the Air Force of conditions established by treaty are aggravated because of the geo-political structure of Italy, which centralises most of its industrial resources in the area which would be the subject of an invasion, without the least chance of resistance.

The suppression of any possibility for defence, brief and sporadic though it may be, is only the more evident if one compares the inconsistency of our Forces with the complete facilities and ample possibilities for the development of armaments, possessed by possible invaders.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 55.

1. Article 55 establishes the limit of a total figure of 350 aircraft, of which 200 are to be armed with considerable restrictions, and 150 transport aircraft, air sea rescue, training, and liaison aircraft. This figure of 350 aircraft must also include all the reserves.

If one takes into consideration the functioning of a peace time Air Force which has to regularly fulfill its functions of training and organisation, the reserve must be calculated at 60% of front line strength

0 6 2 9

One must add to this about 100 unarmed aircraft, with various duties.

It is not even possible to say that future supplies and replacements of foreign origin could - in a similar situation - replace insufficient industrial capacity of the country, because possible suppliers would be bound inevitably to the past arising from the situation of their own military preparation, and that of their more influential associates.

It is not understood what these tasks "of an internal character" would be which would have to be satisfied by the organisation, armaments and distribution on our territory, of the Air Forces, if not to use them for future maintenance of public order; but, in this case, the only aircraft usable are transport and liaison aircraft; that is to say specifically civil aircraft.

The impossibility of this is confirmed by the prepondering importance of the air factor, such as it was clearly shown during the course of the last war, on all fronts.

It is suggested that the same figure should suffice to fulfill the different tasks which the Air Force - it is admitted - must carry out in support of Naval Forces along the enormous length of the coast (8500 kms.) which have deliberately been deprived of works and installations capable of making defence less difficult.

For the strictly air task provided for in article 55, "defence against enemy air attack", only 60 to 70 fighter aircraft as a minimum

It is not understood what these tasks "of an internal character" would be which would have to be satisfied by the organisation, armaments and distribution on our territory, of the Air Forces, if not to use them for future maintenance of public order; but, in this case, the only aircraft usable are transport and liaison aircraft; that is to say specifically civil aircraft.

The two other tasks mentioned in article 55 are that of "national defence" which should make it possible to await the intervention of the international organisation, and it is absurd to think that it could be carried out by strength of 120 armed aircraft.

The impossibility of this is confirmed by the preponderance importance of the air factor, such as it was clearly shown during the course of the last war, on all fronts.

"Local defence of frontiers", evidently with the support of land forces could not be entrusted to more than 20 - 30 aircraft.

It is suggested that the same figure should suffice to fulfill the different tasks which the Air Force - it is admitted - must carry out in support of Naval Forces along the enormous length of the coast (8500 kms.) which have deliberately been deprived of works and installations capable of making defence less difficult.

For the strictly air task provided for in article 55: "defence against enemy air attack", only 60 to 70 fighter aircraft as a minimum could be employed.

The industrial limitations (article 46) do not even permit an acceptable perfection of the quality of material, nor a rapid renewal which would assure intensive employment especially with regard to the possibilities of others in this field.

It follows that the number of defence aircraft, compared with the broad field of action, shows up the enormous disproportion in view of the requirements, even when reduced to the minimum logically necessary.

The limitations of article 56, para 2, also exclude qualified and trained personnel from ~~the~~ being ready in sufficient numbers to satisfy, even in part, the exigencies of front line strength. Therefore article 55 alone demonstrates the absolute impossibility of the Air Forces permitted being able to fulfill now and for some years to come, the most elementary tasks of national defence.

The details in article 56 and 57 must be regarded as of no substantial importance in relation to the concrete provisions of article 55.

VARIOUS REMARKS

CIVIL AND PRIVATE AVIATION

In the treaty there is no mention either of civil aviation or private aviation, which makes it appear that no limitation is to be imposed here.

CONSTRUCTIONS.

Article 46 forbids the construction and possession of war material which is different to, or in excess of, that strictly necessary to the armament of authorised units.

Even when the consequences of such a disposition on the serviceability of front line strength is not considered - this point already having been dealt with - it is noted that this has a serious bearing on Italian industrial possibilities which would not even be able to work for other nations.

The prejudice to national economy, which could no longer take advantage of orders from third parties, is quite evident.

PROPOSALS

While recognizing the obvious impossibility for the Italian Air Force, reduced to the figure laid down by the peace treaty, of being in any manner an appreciable element in national defence, it is always possible that, - even reduced to this point - it could be a fundamental element in the future re-activation, foreseen by article 30, as long as the terms of the peace treaty are modified and that at least the following proposals are accepted.

1. That the figure of 350 aircraft should relate to operational strength while excluding the proportional reserve necessary to the functioning of this strength.

2. That the 150 aircraft should ^{not} include transport, air sea rescue, training and liaison aircraft.

The liaison aircraft are actually indistinguishable with private aircraft used for tourist traffic.

The air sea rescue aircraft fulfill a completely humanitarian function, going to the aid of navigators of all nations in the whole of the Mediterranean area. This activity therefore, is not at all military in character and its

not handed in.

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The air sea rescue aircraft fulfill a completely humanitarian function, going to the aid of navigators of all nations in the whole of the Mediterranean area. This activity therefore, is not at all military and could be brought under the international red cross and carry its insignia. Personnel used for this activity could even be demilitarised.

3. That it should be agreed that part of the three hundred and fifty operational aircraft be formed of reconnaissance and light bomber aircraft in order to be able to complete even in a limited fashion, in the "local defence of frontiers" both land and sea and in the support of naval forces.

It is also conceivable that one could, in any manner, carry out the defensive action, given the impossibility of combatting the aggressor with such modest arms and not even being partially adequate for the means available to the invaders.

CONCLUSION.

The eventual refusal of the above proposals could and must lead to consideration of the advisability and suitability for Italy of completely abolishing the Air Forces, and of declaring itself an unarmed neutral state which would not certainly be respected, but which would at least

Not handed in

put it in a position of greater political liberty towards future belligerence which would obviously fight on its territory.

An Air Force such as foreseen by the treaty constitutes purely a formal apparent defence element which, when employed, although not able to stop the aggressor even for a brief lapse of time, would certainly give a pretext for carrying out destructive operations much more waste and wide spread than in the case of an invasion which was not countered.

By this clause declaring itself an unarmed neutral Italy would better be able to guarantee in its internal integrity in view of the fact that, having been put in a position where it is impossible to carry out its personal defence, it can only count on the organisation of the United Nations, which, in any case, could only intervene for its protection with delay.

[TOP](#) [SEARCH](#)

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

14th. August, 1945.

2002

15,000 instead of 12,000 as planned in a low level, plus
11th, with 15,000 & 2000

Figure 1

Vice Marshal,

25

Very thanks for your letter ~~dated 11th August,~~ dated 11th August, 1945. I note the contents and possible necessity for raising the ceiling of the post-war Italian Air Force. As you suggest in your last paragraph I shall not take any action as everything at the moment is so uncertain. I feel that this matter could be adjusted by the Allied Inspectorate if and when that is set up.

2. As I told you in our conversation on the 9th August we are referring the matter of Italian Civil Aviation to a S.A.C. Meeting, because I feel that it involves many controversial questions including the future of the aircraft factories which must be considered in relation to the whole of the Italian Armament Industry. My personal view is that there should not be any Italian Civil Aviation until we are clear on what the final peace settlement will be and until we have clarified Anglo-American Civil Aviation in Italy which again would entail the future of airfields such as Ciampino. It appears to me that when Italy is allowed to start up Civil Aviation she will have recovered almost all her sovereignty and will wish to establish civil customs airports, including Ciampino, Naples, Pisa, Bari, etc.)

I am going away tomorrow and shall not be back in the office much before the 25th of August but Wing Commander P.A. Field will be acting for me and I am instructing him to inform you when Italian Civil Aviation is discussed by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff as you said that you would like to be present or represented.

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3. I am going away tomorrow and shall not be back in the office much before the 25th of August but King Commander R.A. Field will be acting for me and I am instructing him to inform you when Italian Civil Aviation is discussed by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff as you said that you would like to be present or represented.

Yours

Sincerely,
R.B. Lakenham

Air Vice-Marshal I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E.
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission,
ROME.

Seen by
General
18/8/45
G.E.

29
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
 ROME.

AFSC/351/ORG.

TOP SECRET.

11th August, 1945.

Dear

119
 With reference to our conversation on the 9th August, SQUADRON
 LEADER BRADSHAW of my Org Staff has worked out a very rough estimate of the
 bodies required for the ultimate Italian Air Force as now planned in your
 Department.

2. Bearing in mind that one has to be a little more generous in
 establishments of Italian Units than British ones (as acknowledged by your
 Establishments Branch,) and with some reshuffling of the organisation at the
 Italian Air Ministry and elsewhere with a view to higher efficiency and also
 economy in personnel, we find that about 15,000 bodies will be required
 which is some 3,000 more than you expect.

3. That figure does not include civilians who are frequently employed
 by the Italian Air Force in domestic trades and maintenance units; pre-war
 the Italian Air Force found that it was cheaper to employ civilians where
 possible than uniformed personnel, in spite of the fact that the uniformed
 people get very low pay.

4. It should also be borne in mind that whereas we employ a large
 number of civilians at the Air Ministry, London, it has been the custom of
 the Italian Air Force to employ a large number of uniformed Officers, and the
 Italians hate changes even more than we do.

5. It has also to be borne in mind that the overheads take up much
 more personnel than those established in squadrons, and therefore if the
 number of Squadrons were ~~reduced~~, it would make for an increase of not
 more than about 4,000 extra bodies.

6. I am passing you this information as a background more than as a
 request for action at this time.

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Yours

[Signature]

6001

* 9 Jan + Parnin Craft

Group Captain R.B. Pakenham,
E.Q.
RAF MEDMERE, CASELATA.

Orig 1

August 9th
1945.

Establishments - I.A.F.

19

Memo to
A.O.C.

In order to provide a reasonable establishment for the Italian Air Force to cover all the organizations necessary, both administrative and operational, certain changes from the present system are inevitable.

② A large amount of duplication exists because UNITA AEREA, on the Operations side, contains administrative organizations whose function are repeated by the Z.A.T.s.

③ To avoid this, it is suggested on broad lines to —

(a) Delete the Stato Maggiore and Unita Aerea.

(b) Establish an Air Staff, or Directorate, in the Italian Air Ministry. Its Director can still be the personal adviser on Operations to the Minister, and, in cooperation with the other Directorates, arrange administrative matters with them.

④ The four ZAT HQs, plus HQs Carabinieri in Sicily, Sardegna should have miniature

contains administrative organizations whose function are repeated by the Z.A.16.

③ To avoid this, it is suggested on broad lines to —

(a) Delete the Stato Maggiore and Limita Aerea.

(b) Establish an Air Staff or Directorate, in the Italian Air Ministry. Its Director can still be the personal adviser on Operations to the Minister, and, in cooperation with the other Directorates, arrange administrative matters with them.

(c) The four RATT HQs, plus HQs Campidoglio Sicily, Sardegna should have miniature representation of each Ministry Directorate plus a small Air Staff in each HQ.

This Air Staff, which could be composed of 3 to 4 officers, plus clerks etc. would be responsible for relaying to wings or Squadrons, geographically under their control, any Ministry Operational orders, and Air Staff matters.

④ Worked out on the above lines, a rough estimate of strengths required is given on Page 2. Page 3 shows the proposed order of Battle.

ZB
27/1

The Minister
Upde 217.

Page 2.

Cabinet

150

Service Unit for I.A.M.

250

Italian Air Ministry

(Based on present interim establishments, the Air Staff bears a relation to the present state (raggiunta).)

Directorate of Personnel Schools	220
" Service (M.T. etc)	67
" Administration	37
" Real Estate	61
" Communications	164
" Aeroplane Construction	50
" Armament	40
" Medical Services	40
" Civilian Personnel	100
" Civil Aviation ?	23
" Air Staff	220

	<u>Present Figures Est.</u>
H/Q 1st ZAT.	2620
" " 2nd ZAT.	2416
" " 3rd (Rome) ZAT	1798
" " 4th ZAT.	3773

includes Airfield grounds & other depots etc.

(The present figures are small for 3rd ZAT. change for 4th ZAT. but until aviation of units is decided, no accurate figure is available).

H/Q 8-Campagna (Napoli)

750

6344

" Real Estate 61
 " Communications 164
 " Aeroplane Construction 50
 " Ammunition 40
 " Medical Services 40
 " Civilian Personnel 100
 " Air Aviation? 23
 " Air Staff 220

	<u>Personnel Figures Est.</u>
HQ 1st ZAT.	2620
" 2nd ZAT.	2416
" 3rd (Rome) ZAT	1798
" 4th ZAT.	3773

includes
 assigned ground &
 562m displaced

(The previous figures are small for 3rd ZAT, change for 4th ZAT, but until destination of units is decided, no accurate figure is available).

HQ 8-Campania (Naples) 750
 HQ 8 Sicily where? Palermo? 750
 HQ 8 Sardegna. (Cagliari) 750

Lighter Squadrons. 6 2000
 Bomber/Transport Squadrons. 2 630
 A.S.R. Squadrons. 2 + 100m Corp. 700 - 380 (100m + 100)

Dependence upon locations
 R.S.U.s would be required
 (May 3X 300 men)
 Schooners etc.


500
 16,402. 15052

Add Italian Gov. to RPT & USAPP & Guidelines

6544

Page 3.

0042



0645

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

6592

IAF. MINISTER.

U/SECRETARY

P.A.

CABINET

-150

SERVICE UNIT. I.A.M.

-250

AIR MINISTRY

DIRECTORATE OF COMMUNICATIONS 164	DIRECTORATE OF AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTION 52	DIRECTORATE OF ARMAMENT 40	DIRECTORATE OF MEDICAL SERVICES 40	DIRECTORATE OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 200	DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION 23	AIR STAFF 220	Mark
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H/Q 1st ZAT 2000	H/Q 3rd ZAT 2000	H/Q 4th ZAT 2000	H/Q COMPAANIA 750	H/Q SICILY 750	H/Q SARDINIA 750
F S	F S	F S	B/T S	HYDRO PLANE A.S.R.	

What does a ZAT do - family tree

