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785017

10000/135/669

WAR REPARATIONS
SEPT. 1943;
OCT. 1945 - JUNE 1946

-R.1)

ENCLOSURE

TO: DIRECTOR

Today attended the conference called for in para 1 enclos 3a, together with representatives of A.F.S.C., Navy S/C and Economic S/C.

1. The decisions reached were to all practical purposes the same as stated in enclos 6a.

3. With reference to encl 3a - in the original request made to the A.F.S.C. in Oct/Nov 45 it had apparently not been made clear that information was only required about machinery and equipment that was not (r) not convertible to civilian industrial needs.

4. I stated that undoubtedly the vast majority of the several thousand machine tools listed in our return were not only convertible but were undoubtedly already being used in factories making urgently required civilian consumer products.

5. The Executive Commissioner's representative said that he would bring this to the notice of the interested parties and we need take no action pending further instructions.

14th June, 1946.

3/6/46

S. H. Smith
Director

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

8A

Ref: 5042/267/EC.

13 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Report on Italian Armaments Industry.

TO : Economic Section.
 Land Forces Sub-Commission (MCLA)
 Navy Sub-Commission
 Air Force Sub-Commission

WITH S.E.O.

1. Reference AMHQ signal No. 867352 dated 7 June 46 and this HQ signal No. 3983 dated 8 June 46.

2. A meeting will be held in Room 35, Third Floor, at 1200 hrs, 14 June 46, to discuss the possibility of providing further information as required in the AMHQ signal reference as above.

3. Will you please arrange for a representative who is fully conversant with the matter to attend this meeting.

BY COMMAND OF REAR ADMIRAL STONE:



L.B. Hunt Smith
 Lt. Col. R.G.

Chief Staff Officer,
 To the Executive Commissioner.

S.I.O. for action

14/6

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7A

HQ ALCOM CITE AORXC SIGNED LUSH

13/6

8 JUNE 1946

G-5, AFHQ.

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SECRET.

F. 67352

of 7 June

REFERENCE YOUR FOX SIX SEVEN THREE FIVE TWO OF SEVEN JUNE PD
 PENDING FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ITALIAN AUTHORITIES WHICH IN
 PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MUST TAKE TIME MY VIEWS ON INFORMATION
 REQUIRED ARE

ONE PD AT PRESENT NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE OTHER THAN THAT
 ALREADY GIVEN TO MAJOR TROUSON IN FEBRUARY LAST AND INFORMATION
 IS BASED ON HYPOTHETICAL FIGURES GIVEN IN YOUR TELETYPE UNDER
 REFERENCE PD

TWO PD I AM CALLING AN EARLY MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSIONS CONCERNED
 AND WILL REPORT RESULT OF THEIR LATEST ENQUIRIES IN A FEW DAYS PD
 THREE PD IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WITHOUT TECHNICAL STAFF AND A
 CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME ANY FURTHER USEFUL INFORMATION WILL COME
 TO LIGHT NOR CAN ANY ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE EQUIPMENT BE GIVEN

S.I.D. be
 prepared
 16/6/46.

COPY TO:

Navy S/C

Land Forces S/C(MIA) PRIORITY

Air Force S/C

Econ Sec

Executive Commissioner

300

Chief Staff Officer
 to Executive Commissioner

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO

CWO

USA

Asst

Adj

6342

Top SECRET

Pass to: -

SEO

DW. 12/6.

BF SSo 19/6

S.I.O. for filing

KR

12/6.

VZ 67465

JUNE 101747B

CIPHER



ROUTINE

CIVIL AFFAIRS COM

TROOPERS

SECRET

CIPHER TELEGRAM

INFO: ALCON BOMB C IN C MED

SECRET.

REUR 59725 GA 2 (B) AND OUR F 67346 OF 7 JUNE 46.

1. YOU WILL NOW HAVE RECEIVED LISTS OF EQUIPMENT FORWARDED WITH OUR LETTER G-5 963. 4-1 OF 14 MAY 46.
2. REGRET THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED IS NOT AVAILABLE IN FILES OF THIS CHQ OF ALLIED COMMISSION AND THAT QUALIFIED STAFF IS NOT NOW AVAILABLE IN THIS THEATRE FOR INSPECTING AND VALUING SURVIVED PLANT AND EQUIPMENT.
3. IN ANY EVENT ITALIANS ARE AS YET UNAWARE OF FINAL LIMITATIONS TO BE PLACED ON THEIR ARMED FORCES. THEY ARE THEREFORE NOT IN A POSITION TO FURNISH INFORMATION AS TO THE ARMAMENT MANUFACTURING CAPACITY THAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THEM.
4. LISTS ALREADY FORWARDED WERE FURNISHED BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO SERVICE SUB-COMMISSIONS WITHOUT REASON FOR OUR REQUIREMENT BEING DISCLOSED.
5. FEASIBILITY OF DEMANDING FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FURTHER INFORMATION NOW REQUIRED IS UNDER EXAMINATION. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE NECESSARY TO DISCLOSE THE HYPOTHETICAL CEILINGS SET FORTH IN YOUR SIGNAL AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD NOT GUESS THE REASON FOR THE DEMAND AND BIAS THEIR REPORT ACCORDINGLY. MOREOVER IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO FURNISH THE DETAILS REQUIRED IN LESS THAN 3 MONTHS.
6. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS THEATRE HAS NO DEMILITARIZATION ORGANIZATION SO THAT TECHNICAL DETAILS OF ITALIAN ARMAMENT INDUSTRY HAVE NOT BEEN RECORDED.
7. YOUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE FORGOING ARE REQUESTED.

SECRET

11/13/6

INFO ACTION:

INFO:

AC DIST
 EMC COMMISSIONER
 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
 NAVY S/C
 MMIA
 AIR FORCE S/C
 ECON SECTION

FILE

SERLETON

6540

TOP SECRET

H 67352

H/3730

JUN 071623B

CIPHER TELEGRAM

JUN 1000B

AFHQ
ALCOM

This message will not be distributed outside
British or U.S. Government Departments.
Headquarters and transmitted even in clear
Without being sent by radio. (Messages
S.T.P. need not be retransmitted)

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET. FOR BRIG IUSH FROM CIVIL AFFAIRS CMF.

1. Following is paraphrase of priority signal from TROOPERS reference a report on Italian armaments industry despatched by us 4 March based upon information supplied by service sub commissions and coordinated by you.

"As result of further discussions on settlement of Italian repatriations by deputy foreign ministers additional information is needed which can not repeat not be supplied here. United Kingdom delegation are anxious to have at early date estimate of approximate amount and approximate value (in dollars and sterling) of surplus plant and equipment. Equipment and plant for maintenance of Italian Armed Forces based on following hypothetical figures must of course be allowed for. Army 185000 Carabinieri 65000 Officers and men. Navy 18000 all ranks. Air Forces 12000 all ranks. Formula adopted by United States and United Kingdom delegates is as follows. "Factory and tool equipment in Italy designed for the manufacture of war implements which is not repeat not required for the permitted military establishments and is not repeat not readily susceptible to conversion for civilian purposes should be surrendered to the four powers for such disposal on ^{REPARATION} ~~reparation~~ account otherwise as they may determine." Please inform us urgently as to whether you can supply information required".

2. Please give your views on practicability of supplying information required.

ACTION Exec Comm(2) Info: Chief Commissioner, Navy S/C, Land Forces S/C, Air S/C, Economic Section. File, Skeleton 0639

TOP SECRET

AERO-ENGINES PRODUCTION.

1. According to my informations the maximum production of Aero-engines before the Armistice was of about 900 units per month (out of which about 75 were DB.601 and about 90 DB.605). These figures should be more or less correct if we compare them with the figures I produced in my previous report on the airframes production, and if we keep in mind that the Air Ministry policy was to manufacture engines 50 % more than the number of airframes.

In my previous report I said that the monthly aircraft production, before the Armistice, was of 380 aircraft; these were:

100 Training aircraft

160 Fighter aircraft, and

120 Multi-engined aircraft. If we assume that of the latter

90 were three-engined aircraft and 30 twin-engined aircraft, we have:
 $100 + 160 + 270 + 60 = 590$. And if we add now the 50 % on this figure, we have: $590 + 295 = 885$ engines.

2. Sometime during the Spring of 1943, a plan was made together with the Germans with a view to increasing as much as possible the output of "in-line" engines for the fighters (DAIMLER - BENZ 605). The production, according to the plan, should have reached 900 engines per month and it should have been achieved by means of a "ring system" involving several firms, such as: Fiat -Turin, Fiat-Florence, I.F.-Milan, Alfa Romeo-Pomigliano d'Arco etc.. (at the time and only until the Armistice the Fiat-Turin had the D.B.605 engines under production). This plan was never achieved owing to the fact that we never had received from the Germans the highly specialized and machine-tools required.

3. Our engines production has always been rather low in quantity as well as in quality. The reason of this lays not as much in bad organisation as in the lack of appropriate materials and extremely difficult condition of supplies.

4. With the informations in hand, it is almost impossible, if not definitely impossible, to make any accurate guessing on the hypothetical capacity of Aero-engines production at present or in a few months time.

120 Multi-engined aircraft. If we assume that of the latter 90 were three-engined aircraft and 30 twin-engined aircraft, we have: $100 + 160 + 270 + 60 = 590$. And if we add now the 50 % on this figure, we have: $590 + 295 = 885$ engines.

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4. With the informations in hand, it is almost impossible, if not definitely impossible, to make any accurate guessing on the hypothetical capacity of Aero-engines production at present or in a few months time. We don't know the real situation of the machinery belonging to each firm but, we only know, in percentage, the approximate damage suffered by them. We cannot guess by reducing the former production in proportion to the damage suffered because the lacking of a few specialized machine-tools, such as: cylinder grinders, crankshaft grinders etc., is more than enough not to allow any chain production. So far our inspections have been very superficial because the problem of resuming the Aero-engines production was never taken into consideration.

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At the moment our firms are only assembling and overhauling, and accurate inspections would take considerable time due to the fact also that some of our firms have their machinery scattered in various places. On the other hand, these firms are now making every possible effort in order to transform their production, thinking that there is very little future in the Aero-engine trade and not knowing as yet the United Nations' decision on this subject.

5. In spite of what said above, I think we can take almost for granted that, should we resume the production in question we could expect quite satisfactory results by reducing the lines of production to two only, and by taking from one firm to another some essential machine-tools and equipment. In this manner, I think that in a few months time we can probably be able to reach a production of, say, about 400 engines per month.

J. Brenta

J. BRENTA COL.

FROM: AIR FOR. 3 SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, A.C. HOME,
ATTENTION LT/COI, MOOREBURY.

DATE: 8TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/367/1/ORG.

TOP SECRET.

WAR REPARATIONS.

Reference your letter 616/EC dated 20th October, 1945, and our note AFSC/367/1/ORG of the 4th November, the attached information concerning the Italian Aircraft Industry is forwarded.

2. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding the Italian Air Ministry has not been directly and officially requested for information as it was not considered desirable to do so. Incidentally we have reason to believe that the Italian Air Ministry would only produce information on a direct official instruction from the Allied Commission because they fear eventual Russian requests of industrial equipment in the form of reparations, and naturally they wish to impart as little information as possible on the matter. However we have obtained the pre-armistice production figures and we have information on what the firms are already doing, and on which a potential now available for manufacture in Italy can be given - see the attached table. The figures concerning the potential of each firm are based upon the knowledge we have of the damage suffered by each firm.

3. It at any time it is the desire of the High Allied Authorities for aircraft production in Italy it should be noted that raw materials will be required, and there would inevitably be some delay in most of the firms because the majority of them have converted their plant to civilian uses.

4. It should also be noted that only two big firms, namely Fiat's, Turin, and S.I.A.I., Near Milan, are at present authorised to construct a limited number of aircraft, most of which were already in hand at the time of the liberation of the North, and which would be useful in replacing wastage in the Italian Military Courier Services. In addition there is a small firm, namely Avia at Vercelli, which is constructing a small number of two-seater light aircraft until such time as they can be turned over to civilian purposes.

5. Attachment "A" shows the maximum production of Italian Aircraft Industry prior to the 8th September 1943 and the workers employed, together with the damage sustained. Attachment "B" shows the maximum production of

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5. Attachment "A" shows the maximum production of Italian Aircraft Industry prior to the 8th September 1943 and the workers employed, together with the damage sustained. Attachment "B" shows the maximum production of Italian Aircraft Industry (Air Frames) pre-armistice by types and the estimate potential, ~~see~~ 3/4 months. Attachment "C" gives information on the Italian Aircraft Industry which may be of help to the War Office.

SSC
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I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

MAX PRODUCTION OF ITALIAN A/C INDUSTRY
PRIOR TO THE 8th OF SEPTEMBER, 1943 - (FRAMES)

380 A/C per month of which:
120 bombers and transport
160 fighters
100 training and light machines

WORKERS EMPLOYED BEFORE SEPTEMBER 8th AND THAT COULD BE NOW EMPLOYED.

FIRM & LOCATION	BOMBERS & TRANSPORT	FIGHTERS	TRAINING	POSITION
Fiat Turin	1,000	4,000 - 2800	-	30 dam
Caproni Predappio	500	900	-	requisitions
Sicula Palermo	650	-	-	50% destr.
Aer. Umbra Poligno	2,200	-	-	damaged
Augusta Cascina Costa	-	-	1300 - 1300	-
Caproni Castellmare	1,700	-	-	dam. req.
Beetetti Arcore	-	600	-	-
Ereda Milan	2,000	1700	-	damaged
C.A.B. Ponte S. Pietro	2,000	-	-	-
C.A.K.S.A. Cameri	600	900	-	-
Caproni Vizzola Ticino	1,300	-	-	-
Caproni Fabbio	5,000	-	-	-
C.M.A.S.A. Marina di Pisa	700	1300	-	-
C.N.A. Rome	-	-	500	damaged
C.A.N.T. Monfalcone	6,000	-	-	destroyed
Meridionali Napoli	2,100	-	-	damaged
Macchi Varese	-	2800	-	damaged
Mardi Linate	-	-	-	damaged
Mardi Loreto	-	-	200 - 200	requisition
Piaggio Pinalo	1,800	-	300	destroyed
Piaggio Pontedera	1,400	700	-	damaged
Reggiane Reggio Em.	1,000	-	-	badly dam.
S.A.C.A. Brindisi	-	2000	-	damaged
S.A.I. Passignano	-	-	500 - 500	-
S.A.I. M.A.M. Ostia	-	2000	-	dam. req.
San Giorgio Pistoia	700	-	500	destroyed
Off. Savigliano Savigliano	250	-	-	damaged
S.I.A.I. Vergiate	9,500	-	-	destroyed
S.I.A.I. Iesi	1,500	-	-	-
TOTALS	42,410	16,900	3100 - 2000	transferred

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	2,200	1100	-	-	1300 - 1300	damaged
Aer. Usbra Foligno	2,200	1100	-	-	1300 - 1300	damaged
Augusta Cascina Costa	-	-	-	-	-	dam. req.
Caproni Castellammare	1,700	850	-	-	-	-
Bentetti Arcore	-	-	600	-	-	damaged
Breda Milan	2,000	1100	-	-	-	-
C.A.B. Ponte S. Pietro	2,000	2000	-	-	-	-
C.A.M.S.A. Cameri	600	600	-	900	-	-
Caproni Vizzola Ticino	1,300	1300	-	-	-	-
Caproni Taliedo	5,000	5000	-	-	-	-
C.M.A.S.A. Marina di Pisa	1,200	700	1300	800	-	damaged destroyed
C.M.A. Rome	-	-	-	-	500	damaged
C.A.N.T. Montalcene	6,000	2000	-	-	-	damaged
Meridionali Naples	2,100	1000	-	-	-	damaged
Macci Varese	-	-	2800	1000	-	requisition
Nardi Linate	-	-	-	-	200 - 200	destroyed
Nardi Loreto	-	-	-	-	300	damaged
Piaggio Finale	1,800	1000	700	500	-	badly dam.
Piaggio Pontedera	1,400	700	-	-	-	damaged
Reggians Reggio Em.	1,000	500	2000	1000	-	damaged
S.A.C.A. Brindisi	-	-	-	-	500 - 500	-
S.A.I. Fossignano	-	-	2000	1000	-	dam. req.
S.A.I.M.A.M. Ostia	-	-	-	-	500	destroyed
San Giorgio Pistoia	700	400	-	-	-	damaged
Off. Savignano Savignano	250	-	-	-	-	destroyed
S.I.A.I. Vergiate	9,500	9500	-	-	-	-
S.I.A.I. Iesi	1,500	-	-	-	-	transferred
TOTALS	42,410	29,270	16,900	9,500	3100 - 2000	
	62,410	40,770				

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MAXIMUM PRODUCTION OF ITALIAN A/C INDUSTRY (FRAMES)

Firms & Locations	Pre-Armistice Production (Monthly)	Multi engined	Fighters	Training	Multi engined	Fighters	Training	Hypothetical Potencial Prod within 3-4 months
Fiat Turin	3	38	-	-	2	26	-	-
Caproni Predappio	1.5	8.5	-	-	1.5	8.5	-	-
Sicula Palermo	1.8	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	-
Aer. Umbra Foligno	6	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
Agusta Cascina Costa	-	-	41	-	-	-	41	-
Caproni Castellamer	4.2	-	-	-	2.1	-	-	-
Bentetti Arcore	-	5.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Breda Milan	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-
C.A.B. Ponte San Pietro	5.6	-	-	-	3.1	-	-	-
C.A.N.B.A. Cameri	5.6	-	-	-	5.6	-	-	-
Caproni Vizzola Ticino	1.7	8.5	-	-	1.7	-	-	-
Caproni Taliedo	5.6	-	-	-	3.6	-	-	-
C.M.A.S.A. Marina di Pisa	14.1	-	-	-	14.1	-	-	-
C.N.A. Roma	5.3	12.3	-	-	1.9	-	-	-
C.A.N.T. Montelapone	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-
Meridionali Naples	17	-	-	-	5.6	-	-	-
Macchi Varese	6	-	-	-	2.8	-	-	-
Fardì Minato	-	27	-	-	-	-	-	-
Meridi Loreto	-	-	6.4	-	-	-	-	-
Piaggio Piacenza	-	-	9.7	-	-	-	-	-
Piaggio Pontedera	5	6	-	-	2.8	-	-	-
Reggiane Reggio Emilia	3.7	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	-
S.A.C.A. Brindisi	2.8	-	-	-	1.4	-	-	-
S.A.I. Passignano	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-
S.A.I.M.A.N. Ostia	-	19	16	-	-	-	-	-
San Giorgio Pistoia	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Off. Savigliano Savignano	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
S.I.A.I. Vergiate S. Anna	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.I.A.I. Iesi	27	-	-	-	27	-	-	-
	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	115	149	124		72	84		79
		388				235		

Actually only Fiat - S.I.A.I. - AVIA are constructing
 " Agusta & S.A.C.A. repairing.

INFORMATION ON THE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY.

1	2	3	4	5
Name of Firm and location.	Types in production at 8 Sep. 1943.	No. of workers at 8 Sep. 1943.	Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	Damages
1. Aeronautica d'Italia TORIN (FIAT)	Fighters C.R. 42 G.55 - G.12	5,000	900	Damaged buildings serviceable machinery
2. Aeronautica - Predappio Predappio (Forli)	Fighters Re.2001 Transport. S.81.T.	1,400	500	N.N.
3. Aeronautica Sicula PALERMO	Reconnaissance C.A.N.T. - Z.501	650	100	50% destroyed
4. Aeronautica Umbra FOLIGNO	Bombers S.M. 79 bis	2,200	500	Damaged buildings serviceable machinery.
5. Agusta Cascina Costa (Gallarate)	Training A/C RO.41	1,300	420	none
6. Avio Industrie Stabionali Castellammare (Naples)	Reconnaissance Ca. 314 Transport ca. 148	1,700	150	50% destroyed
7. Bestetti Arcore (Milan)	Fighters S.A.S.207	600	120	none
8. Breda Sesto S. Giovanni (Milan) 6332	Fighters M.C.202 Bombers C.A.N.T.1018	3,700	570	Main works Brenno, de- stroyed 60% of serviceable

INFORMATION ON THE ITA IN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY.

	3	4	5	6	7
Location	No. of workers at 8 Sep. 1943.	Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	Damages	Plans for the future.	Reserves of material.
42	5,000	900	Damaged buildings serviceable machinery	Reduced A/C production. They are actually building 20. G.12	205 tons of steel - 316 al. 3 tons. cu 30 of tin.
001 S.L.T.	1,400	500	N.H.	N.H. They belong to the Caproni Group requisitioned.	No information presumably very small.
01	650	100	50% destroyed	No information (Caproni Group) furniture.	" "
	2,200	500	Damaged buildings serviceable machinery.	unknown	" "
	1,300	420	none	Repairing of R/R material general	Almost none
	1,700	150	50% destroyed	Caproni Group Rep. of M/T R/R mat naval. constr. requisitioned.	About 15 tons of as-copper alloys.
07	600	120	none	unknown	almost none
01.8	3,700	570	Main works at Bresso. destroyed 60% of others serviceable.	R/R material	presumably small reserve

1	2	3	4	5
Name of firm and location.	Machines in production at 8 Sep. 1943.	No. of works at 8 Sep. 1943.	Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	Damaged
9. Caproni Aer. Berg. Bergamo	Reconnaissance Ca. 3D; Training Ca. 309	2000	500	unknown
10. Costr. Aer. Novaresi S.A.	Fighters F.C. 20 bis	1500	370	"
11. C.A.N.S.A. Novara	Training C.R. 30			"
12. Caproni Fabbro (Milan)	Reconnaissance Ca. 3D	5000	1000	30% damaged
13. Caproni Vizzola (Gallarate)	Transport. Ca. 148.P.	1500	350	unknown
14. Costr. Mecc. Aer. S.A. Marina di Pisa	Fighters G. 50 bis Biplanes R.S. 14	2500	540	Building machines
15. Compagnia Nazionale Aeronautica C.N.A. Roma (Littorio Airf.)	Training A/C P.M. 1	500	-	destroyed
16. Cantieri Riuniti Aeronautici C.A.N.T. Monfalcone	Bombers C.A.N.T. 2 1007 ter. 1018	6000	800	Building machines
17. Industrie Aeronautiche Meridionali Naples	Fighters RO. 57	2100	100	60% damaged
18. Macchi Varese	Fighters M.C. 205 G. 55 (?)	2800	600	Building Machines

Location	3 No. of works at 3 Sep. 1943.	4 Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	5 Damages	6 Plans for the future.	7 Reserves of material
314	2000	500	unknown	Cars bodys bicycles tractors furniture.	almost none
bin	1500	370	"	R/R cars components	500 tons of steel
	5000	1000	30% damaged	cars bodys bicycles trac- tors furniture.	almost none
43.P.	1300	350	unknown	cars repairs furniture window frames	iron sheets for gas gen
bin 4.	2500	540	Buildings destr. machinery destr.	(Fiat) group	small rese- rve of she- ets & pro- filed of steel and du- ral.
	500	-	destroyed	-	-
2	6000	800	Buildings destr. machinery intact	No plans	Unknown amount of steel dural dopes etc.
	2100	100	60% destroyed	requisitio- ned presu- mably R/R material.	12 tons of steel 41 al & light al- loys 2 of various material
5	2800	600	Buildings destr. Machinery intact.	1/2 material inventory is be- ing general ing made. mechanical construction.	

1	2	3	4	5
Name of Firm and Location.	Types in production at 8 Sep. 1943.	No. of works at 8 Sep. 1943.	Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	Damage
19. } Nardi - Linata & Loreto 20. }	Training machines FN.305 315	200 300	140 -	undam dest
21. Piaggio - Finale Ligure	Bombers & Fighters Cant. z.1007 - G.55	2500	600	Built god undam
22. " Pontedera	Bombers & Transport P.108	1400	250	Built yed god
23. Reggiane Off.Mecco.Italiano Reggio Emilia	Fighters & Bombers Re:2002-2005 S.M.79	3000	600	damag 90%
24. S.A.O.A. Brindisi	Training Saiman 202	500	150	undam
25. Saunite Benevento	Fighters (repairs) M.C.200-202-205	700	50	Built mach
26. Societa' Aer. Italiana Passignano (Perugia)	Fighters MC.202 S.A.I.207	2000	450	Requ mach. at 2
27. Soc.An.Ind.Mec.Aer.Nav. Ostia	Training Saiman	500	-	dest
28. San Giorgio Pistoia	Transport S.81.T.	700	150	Destroyed
29. Officine di Savigliano Savigliano (Turin)	Transport S.81.T.	250	150	dest
30. S.I.A.I. Sesto Calende	Transport & Bomb. S.M.79-91-92-95	9500	2500	pratically except for w/s
31. S.I.A.I. Isola	Transport S.M.95 bis	1500	400	machinery

Location	3 No. of workers at 8 Sep. 1943.	4 Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	5 Damages	6 Plans for the future.	7 Reserves of material.
Alces	200	140	undamaged	requisitioned	unknown
	300	-	destroyed	-	-
Atorn G. 55	2500	600	Buildings dam- aged machinery undamaged.	R/R material mechanical constructions.	inventory is being made.
nsport	1400	250	Buildings destro- yed mach. undama- ged at Piella.	requisitioned	unknown
Alces M. 79	3000	600	damaged machinery 90% good.	R/R material agricultural machines.	enough for two months production.
an 202	500	150	undamaged	naval crafts	unknown
airs) 05	700	50	Buildings: dam. mach: undam.	R/R material & mecc. constr.	" "
02	2000	450	Requisitioned mach. at Fernate Varano.	unknown	unknown
an	500	-	destroyed	-	-
l.T.	700	150	Destroyed mach. 5% dam.	-	-
	250	150	destroyed	-	-
omb. 95	9500	2500	pratically undamaged except for the airplanes w/s	-	-
	1500	400	machinery at Sesto Calende	470 tons of steel - 140 al alloys - 1 copper 50 of copper alloys 1.4 of tin 36,000 sq.m. plywood 200 timber 80 t. of dope.	

AERO-ENGINE MANUFACTURERS.

ENGINE

1	2	3	4	5
Name of Firm and location.	Types in production at 8 Sep. 1943.	No. of workers at 8 Sep. 1943.	Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	Damage
32. Alfa Romeo S.A. Milan.	Alfa 128	6000	1900	Building machinery
33. Alfa Romeo Pomiglia No D'Arco (Naples)	Alfa 110-115 (Gipsy) D.B. 601	5700	2000	Building machinery
34. Compagnia Nazionale Aeronautica C.N.A. Rome	C.N.A. D.4	250	80	destroyed
35. Fiat Aviazione Turin	A. 74, A. 82 D.B. 605	2600	1200	Building mach. 15%
36. Isotta Fraschini Milan	Delta-Zeta D.B. 605	5000	1700	Building machinery
37. Officine Meccaniche "O.M." Brescia.	A. 74	500	450	undamaged
38. Piaggio Pontedera	P.XII-P.XV-P.XVI P.XIX	6000	1300	very badly ged requi
39. Reggiane Riggio Emilia	P.VII-P.XI bis A. 74	2000	650	Building machinery

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Location	No. of workers at 8 Sep. 1943.	Actual Number of Machine Tools held.	Damages	Plans for the future.	Reserves of material.
	6000	1900	Buildings 40% dam. machinery 20%	small aeronauti- cal activity trucks naval engines.	machined par- tial activity trucks for about 300 engines other materi- al in unknown quantity.
Italy)	5700	2000	Buildings 90% dam. machinery 65% lost.	very small aer. activity engines overhaul.	unknown
	250	30	destroyed	-	-
	2600	1200	Buildings 30% dam. mach. 15%	small aer. act. transfer to other departments.	no materials can be drawn partly from the cars department
	5000	1700	Buildings 20% dam. machinery 5%	(Caproni Group) trucks naval engi- ns.	for about 250 vehicles plus 11,500 tons of various steel.
	500	450	undamaged	Fiat Group Trucks	presumably no ns.
	6000	1300	very badly dama- ged requisitioned	R/R constructions motor bicycles cars repairs.	inventory is being made.
	2000	650	Buildings damag. machinery 10%	Presumably R/R material & agri- cultural machinery.	unknown

Note for the A.V.M.

1. The Chief of the Air Staff is willing and ready to hand over the accountability regarding the production he has himself, but he asks for an official, written request, having been instructed to do so by the Foreign Office. So far as I could ascertain the reason of this is due to the fact that everybody, fearing eventual Russian requests of industrial equipment in form of reparations, wishes to give away as little information as possible on the matter.

2. Approximately knowing the overall figures concerning the pre-armistice production, and with the help of those contained in the prospect you already know, I made the two attached, new prospects showing :

annex "A": 1. number of workers employed by the different firms before September the 8th, 1945.
2. Partition of these workers in the various firms and in the different departments constructing the different types of A/C - present possibility of employment of each firm after having considered its actual position.

annex "B": 1. pre-armistice production.
2. hypothetical capability of production of each firm within a short delay.

3. Not knowing:

the real partition of the workers in the different departments of each firm
the exact number of man-hours required for the construction of the different A/C
the real damages suffered by each firm ; I could only guess on the ground of my limited, personal experience. I think, however, that my figures should not be very far from the real ones.

4. To reach and keep the production I guessed in the second part of annex "B" it is of course essential that the firms be supplied with the necessary raw materials.

2nd November, 1945.

Col. J. Breton.

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2nd November, 1945.

Col. J. Drenta.

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2A

From: Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, ROME.

To: Executive Commissioner,
H.Q. Allied Commission, ROME.

Date: 4th November, 1945.

Ref: AFSC/367/1/Org.

With reference to your letter REF/616/EC dated 20th October, 1945, the information called for therein will be forwarded within the course of the next two or three days.


A. H. KNOWLES,
Wing Commander,
for Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding.

TOP SECRET.

19

20 October 1945.

70 : Air Forces Subcommittee.

Reference attached copy of Brigadier Parsons' DO letter of 3 October, which has already been shown to you (Wing Cdr KNOWLES) by my Chief Staff Officer, I understand that you will be able to obtain the information required at paragraph 5 (ii) within approximately two weeks. If this is so, I shall be glad if you would confirm and if in due course you would forward to me the information you have obtained for transmission to Brigadier Parsons, A.F.N.Q.

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Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.



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C O P YTOP SECRET

FROM: Brigadier F.G.A. Parsons

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

3 October 1945

Dear Lush,

1. I have just received the attached D.O. letter from French (C.A.2.) at the War Office.

2. What seems to be wanted are lists giving details of plants designed for the manufacture of war implements under the following headings:-

- (a) Those required by the Italians for the maintenance of an Army of 200,000 plus 65,000 Carabinieri.
- (b) Those which can readily be converted to civilian purposes.
- (c) The balance, which will be available for war reparations.

3. In regard to 2(a), it is of course most important that the Italians should not be given any idea that an increase of 60,000 in the ceiling of 140,000 for the Army is contemplated. If the Italians have to be consulted, presumably this difficulty could be got over by citing 200,000 as a round figure, giving a margin for eventualities.

As the Italian Government already know that the Army (140,000) and Carabinieri (65,000) are likely to be handed back to their control in the near future, it is to be hoped that they have already done some planning in regard to the manufacture of equipment, and may be able to supply us with the information we want comparatively easily. I think we can assume that the equipment of the Army will not be restricted, i.e. they will be allowed tanks, etc., appropriate to their strength and role.

4. In regard to 2(b), I should say that the formula "readily susceptible to conversion" given in French's letter was open to very wide interpretation. Presumably however, the Italians will already have earmarked those of their war factories which they intend to convert to civil use, which should serve as a guide.

5. French gives no indication as to the strength and equipment of the future Italian Navy and Air Force, nor of the extent to which commercial aircraft manufacture will be allowed.

I therefore suggest:-

- (1) That Naval Arsenals, etc. are shown as available for reparation purposes and are included under 2(c). When it is decided what size the Navy is to be, the Industrial

TOP SECRET

Planning Staff will have to assess the plant which will have to be retained for Italian use.

- (11) That we assume that the Italian aircraft industry will be allowed to continue, but include the plants under 2(b), noting which are already earmarked for conversion to some other purpose.

6. I can quite see why the Industrial Planning Staff want the information as soon as possible and I do not want to go back to them for further information if you can possibly manage with the terms of reference French has given us. No doubt they have not told us the proposed strengths of the Navy and Air Force because they do not yet know themselves.

7. I would like to send an interim reply to French, telling him what we can produce in the way of facts and figures and by what date.

I would be grateful if you could let me have your views on these points and also let me know if there is any further information which you must have to enable you to produce what is wanted.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ F.G.A. Parsons

PS-

If the Italians have to be consulted, it is of course most important that they are given no indication that we are doing so in connection with reparations.

(initialled) F.G.A.P.

(NOTE: PS in Brigadier Parsons handwriting)

Brig. M.S. Lush, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.,
Executive Commissioner
Headquarters, Allied Commission

TOP SECRET

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