

785017

ACC

10000/135/671
(PART II)

INTER
AUG. 19

0000/135/671
PART II)

INTERIM POLICY & ITALIAN PEACE TERMS
AUG. 1946 - JAN. 1947

24^A

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ARMED COMMISSION,
R O M E .

24th January, 1947.

AFSC/367/2/ORG.

Sir,

TRAINING COURSES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

The A.F.S.C. Engineer Staff Officer, Wing Commander Thompson, discussed with you, during his recent visit to the Air Ministry, our request for Training Courses for Italian Air Force personnel and gained the impression that a reply had been sent to our letter AFSC/367/2/ORG., dated 28th June, 1946.

2. To date no communication has reached this Headquarters from your department but it is understood from Wing Commander Bradshaw, Directorate of Policy (Air Staff), that an official reply is on its way.

3. If, in fact, you had replied, and from the date of this letter it would appear that your letter had not reached us, it is requested that you forward a copy for our information.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,


I.E. JARMAN, G/CAPT.,
for AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

Under Secretary of State for Air,
Adastal House,
Kingsway, London. S.W.1.
(Attention Wing Commander S.B. Grant, D.F.C. (Policy A.S. 3A)).

6891

FROM: AIR VICE MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
R O M E .

23rd January, 1947.

AFSC/367/2/ORG.

January, 1947.

Thank you for your letter 137/2/47 dated 21st

2. There is no objection from this Sub-Commission's point of view for you to bring the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs into the picture.

3. I will inform the Italian Air Ministry that it is your intention to do so and will suggest that if they have not done so already, they should take similar action.

4. Though I have taken official and unofficial action to expedite a decision, I have had no official reply to my letter AFSC/367/2/ORG., dated 20th June, 1946, but have just been told that a favourable answer is on its way.

5. In the meantime the Italian Air Ministry have given us the names of 18 officers and other ranks for Engineering and Signals Courses, and those for Flying Training Courses are being considered.

6. I will keep you informed of future developments.

Yours

Mr. H.A. Hankey,
British Embassy,
R O M E .

filed
24/1

24/1

6890

22A

137/2/47

21st January, 1947.

To: Air Vice-Marshal I.G. Brodie, Air Forces
Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

From: British Embassy, Rome.

The Foreign Office have sent us copies of correspondence between them, the Air Ministry and you (your ref. AFSC/367/2/ORG. of June 20th, 1946) about the proposal to send some Italian Air Force officers and N.C.O.'s to the United Kingdom for flying and training courses.

The Foreign Office have suggested that we might wish at some stage to bring the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs into the picture and have therefore suggested to the Air Ministry in London that they should advise you to keep in touch with us. I should be grateful if you could in due course let us know the present position in this matter.

for Hankey.

H. A. Hankey.

*Asst SSO.
draft Reply pt. for my
signature. HKS
22/Jan*

*HKS
24/1*

6089

21B

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, COME.
 To :- Italian Air Ministry, COME.
 Date:- 15th January, 1947.
 Ref :- AFSC/367/2/CMG.

ITALIAN & ALLIED SECRET.

BRITISH AIR MINISTRY PLAN FOR RE-ORGANISATION
 OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

On 2nd and 3rd December, 1946 discussions on the above-mentioned plan were held at your Ministry. It was stated that it would be necessary to reduce the number of aircraft stipulated in the plan in order to conform with the terms of the Peace Treaty, so that the cost of the material could be made by the British Air Ministry.

2. The reduction suggested by the British Air Ministry (in consultation with Wing Commander Thompson of the A.P.S.C.) is as under and includes a reduction of the Unit Equipment in Squadrons, plus reserve aircraft and wastage for one year.
3. The suggested reduced figures are as follows :-

Combat Types		Non-Combat Types	
<u>Unit Equipment + Reserve.</u>		<u>Unit Equipment + Reserve.</u>	
S.E. Day Fighter	81	Training Aircraft	68
Fighter Bomber	42	Transport	35
Tac/R.	24	Met. Flight	6
C.M. & Air Sea Rescue	23	Communications	33
Artillery Observation	15		
	<u>192</u>		<u>142</u>
Combat Types		Non-Combat Types	
<u>Wastage.</u>		<u>Wastage.</u>	
S.E. Day Fighter	10	Training Aircraft	8

2. The reduction suggested by the Air Staff (A.F.S.C.) is as under and includes a reduction with Wing Commander Thompson of the A.F.S.C.) in as under and includes a reduction of the Unit Equipment in Squadrons, plus reserve aircraft and wastage for one year.

3. The suggested reduced figures are as follows :-

<u>Combat Types</u>		<u>Non-Combat Types</u>	
<u>Unit Equipment + Reserve.</u>		<u>Unit Equipment + Reserve.</u>	
S.E. Day Fighter	84	Training Aircraft	68
Fighter Bomber	42	Transport	35
Tac/R.	24	Met. Flight	6
G.I. & Air Sea Rescue	23	Communications	33
Artillery Observation	15		
	<u>192</u>		<u>142</u>

<u>Combat Types</u>		<u>Non-Combat Types</u>	
<u>Wastage.</u>		<u>Wastage.</u>	
S.E. Day Fighter	10	Training Aircraft	8
Fighter Bomber	5	Transport	-
Tac/R.	2	Met. Flight	-
G.I. & Air Sea Rescue	1	Communications	-
Artillery Observation	-		
	<u>18</u>		<u>8</u>
			<u>6088</u>
			<u>TOTAL: 350</u>

4. Your comments on these reductions will be required in due course.

for m
24/1
16/1
16/1
H. Thompson
 H. THOMPSON,
 WING COMMANDER
 for AIR VICE MARSHAL,
 DIRECTOR,
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

SECRET

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
APO 794

20A

Subject: Report on Speech Made by C.A.S. at Lecce on 11th December, 1946.

File No: AFSC/367/2/ORG.

Date : 16th Dec. '46.

To :- ~~The British Embassy, ROME.~~
~~The American Embassy, ROME.~~
~~Air Headquarters, Italy.~~
M.A.A.C. Secretariat. (Please show to Lt. Col. Hewitt, G-3 AFHQ)
~~S/Ldr. Thompson, A.D.O. (RAF);~~
~~Air Ministry, London.~~

Attached ~~copy~~ ^{three (3) copies} of report on speech made by the Chief of Staff, Italian Air Force, at Lecce on 11th December, 1946, ~~is~~ forwarded for your information and guidance.

Frank E. Marek
Frank E. Marek,
Lt/Col., Air Corps,
Deputy Director,
Air Forces Sub-Commission.

6087

COPY.

SECRET

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
BARI.

13th December, 1946.

Ref: AMSC/B/25/AD.

REPORT ON SPEECH MADE BY G.A.S. AT LECCE ON 11th DECEMBER, 1946.

The speech was made to all officers assembled at Lecce, after the departure of the British and American Inspecting Officers. I was unable to attend but received the following information from reliable sources.

2. The speech contained four main themes:

(a) An expression of satisfaction displayed by visiting Allied officers, their regret that the weather did not permit of a full flying programme, and sympathy with the pilots who had trained so hard and were unable to show their qualities to better advantage.

(b) A request to all officers for better co-operation between seniors and juniors both officers and formations, pointing out that unless a good esprit de corps was established and maintained any attempt at efficiency would end in failure. (This may refer to the recent transfer of two officers from the 51st Stormo, Majors Leoncini and Spaniolini. Both seem to have been handled badly and were transferred while Col. Zappetta was the Fighter Commander).

(c) The transfer to the North of certain Stormo's. He pointed out that after a long and dreary wait their reward for patience was at last in sight and that the 5th, 51st Stormo's would be transferred as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. The announcement was received by these Stormo's with hilarious enthusiasm, but the 4th Stormo were not over enthusiastic about remaining in the South. (The possibility of their being moved to Bari, however, is under discussion, and I would recommend that this be authorised to leave Lecce free for all forms of training activity).

(d) The possibility of being re-equipped with new aircraft. He stated that he had been asked his views on re-equipping the Fighters with Mustangs or Spitfires and after his staff had studied the problem he had told the Allied Commission that that they would prefer Mustangs. (This is not the generally accepted view of the Fighters at Lecce, as they are very pleased with their Spit's at present. Also they point out that the source of supply, Britain, is nearer and more accessible to Italy. Also the I.A.F. have had Spit's now for three years and know the aircraft both from the flying and maintenance points of view, thus they feel that Spit's would be a better proposition.))

3. The G.A.S. also referred to the excellent co-operation/enjoyed between the I.A.F. and the Allies.

(SGD) W.C. GELSON, W/CIR.

1081

785017

SECRET

SECRET

208.

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION
ALLIED COMMISSION
BARI

Ref:- AFSC/B/25/Air

13th December, 1946

REPORT ON SPEECH MADE BY C.A.S. AT LECCE ON 11th DECEMBER, 1946

The speech was made to all officers assembled at Lecce, after the departure of the British and American Inspecting Officers. I was unable to attend but received the following information from reliable sources.

2. The speech contained four main themes.

(a) An expression of satisfaction displayed by visiting Allied Officers, their regret that the weather did not permit of a full flying programme, and sympathy with the pilots who had trained so hard and were unable to show their qualities to better advantage.

Good / (b) A request to all officers for better co-operation between seniors and juniors both officers and formations, pointing out that unless a good esprit de corps was established and maintained any attempt at efficiency would end in failure. (This may refer to the recent transfer of two officers from the 51st Stormo, Major's Lancini and Spaniolini. Both seem to have been handled badly and were transferred while Col. Zappetta was the Fighter Commander).

Indistinct / (c) The transfer to the North of certain Stormo's. He pointed out that after a long and dreary wait their reward for patience was at last in sight and that the 5th, 51st Stormo's would be transferred as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. The announcement was received by these Stormo's with hilarious enthusiasm, but the 4th Stormo were not over enthusiastic about remaining in the South. (The possibility of their being moved to Bari however is under discussion, and I would recommend that this be authorised to leave Lecce free for all forms of training activity).

φ // (d) The possibility of being re-equipped with new aircraft. He stated that he had been asked his views on re-equipping the Fighters with Mustangs or Spitfires and after his staff had studied the problem he had told the Allied Commission that they would prefer Mustangs. (This is not the generally accepted view of the Fighters at Lecce, as they are very pleased with their Spits at present. Also they point out that the source of supply, Britain, is nearer and more accessible to Italy. Also the I.A.F. have had Spits now for three years and know the aircraft both from the flying and maintenance points of view, thus they feel that Spits would be a better proposition).

Good / 3. The C.A.S. also referred to the excellent co-operation enjoyed between the I.A.F. and the Allies.

W.C. Useful gen here (2 & 3 particularly) for a para.

in words of the I.A.F. for next Air Report. A good job done

by C.A.S.

φ is a point to bear in mind. I think you might press a copy of this to the I.A.F. also if you agree to 5/12. I have pointed out to the I.A.F. that the I.A.F. should be able to take action there to see (Cancelled by agreement with D.D.R.M.)

W.C. OLLASON, W/O.

Group Captain

16/12

19A

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ROME.

14 1050H DEC. 46.

AIR MINISTRY, LONDON.

REBNAT AIR HEAD QUARTERS, ITALY.

REBNAT MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

SECRET.

CBOS ONE THREE FOUR ID FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ORGANIZATION FOREIGN AIR FORCES ID
 ITALIAN AIR MINISTER STATES PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER INTERESTED MINISTERS VERBALLY
 AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO PLANS DISCUSSED WITH THOMPSON CMA SUBJECT TO MUTUAL FINANCIAL
 AGREEMENT ID THEREFORE SUGGEST YOU CONTINUE DISCUSSION WITH FINANCE AS WELL AS
 WASHINGTON ON MUSTANG QUESTION ID EXPECT NO POSITIVE REPLY FROM ITALIANS UNTIL
 ANSWERS TO THESE TWO QUESTIONS ARE COMMUNICATED TO US ID AIR MINISTER VERY
 APPRECIATIVE OF WORK ALREADY DONE AND SO ARE WE =====

AFSC/367/2/ORG.

D.D. 15m 16/12
 S.S.O. 16/12
 S.I.O. 16/12
 S.E.O. 16/12

IMPORTANT

DIRECTOR, AFSC.

I.E. Brodie

I.E. BRODIE, A.V.M.

6884

SECRET.

CYPHER MESSAGE.

18A
No. 3657/3140. 0004 (12/4). L.P. (Ldn) Ltd. 31/1/44

To—	AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ROME		
From—	AIR MINISTRY LONDON		
	Date	Receipt	Despatch
	Time of	070900	071200A
	System	A/T	E.

Serial No. 661

TTX 2019 4 DEC SECRET.
FOR AVM BRODIE FROM EMBRY
YOUR 2070 21 NOV. — HA
MATTER NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY DIRECTOR OF POLICY.
WILL KEEP WATCH ON YOUR BEHALF.

===== 051158 ++

DISTRIBUTION AFSC ROME

DECYPHERED BY A/O MCETWEN.

ROUTINE

UNPARAPHRASED LITERAL TEXT
OF CYPHER MESSAGE

D.D. 12m. 3/12

1084

MATTER NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY DIRECTOR OF POLICY.
WILL KEEP WATCH ON YOUR BEHALF.

===== 051158 ++

DISTRIBUTION AFSC ROME

ROUTINE

DECYPHERED BY W/O MCHEWEN.

UNPARAPHRASED LITERAL TEXT
OF CYPHER MESSAGE

D.D. 12m 13/12
S.S.C. 13/12
A41
Am 3 PF 17/12
P.S.O. 10/12
C.T.O. 16/12

[Handwritten signature]

13/12

6883

17A

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.
 To :- Italian Air Ministry.
 Copy: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.
 Date:- 4th December, 1946.
 Ref :- AFMC/367/2/ENG.

ITALIAN SECRET.GROUND ENGINEER BRANCH.

With reference to our conversation at a conference held at the Italian Air Ministry on the 2nd December, it is desired to confirm that Allied authorities strongly recommend incorporation of a Ground Engineer Group within the Plan of re-organisation for the Interim Italian Air Force but that for the time being only the Group Headquarters and one of the three battalions be activated in the near future. It is understood that you agree to this modification of the general Plan and that in fact you have already initiated action.

2. The sooner the battalion is formed the more likely is it that you will obtain from American sources a quantity of heavy equipment which may be loaned to the Italian Air Force for the purpose of training personnel in the work of maintaining airfields and running heavy construction equipment. It is confirmed that it is not permitted by the American Army to train civilian personnel.

3. It is recommended that in the general Plan we will add one Ground Engineer Group composed of :-

- (1) Group Headquarters.
- (ii) Three Ground Engineer Battalions (Only one to be activated at this time), and composed of :-

- (a) One Heavy Equipment operating Company.
- (b) One Equipment Maintenance Company.
- (c) One Construction Company.
- (d) One Training Company.

DD fcm 6/12

SSO 6/12

Org Action on f, also add 2 AT, Supply & Services in Cds.

SIO fcm 6/12

Done 6/12/46

I.E. BROOK,
 AIR VICE MARSHAL,
 DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

Distribution.

Italian Air Ministry	2 Copies.
M.A.A.C. Secretariat	3 Copies.
File	1 Copy.

6082

16A.

From :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Director A.F.S.C., Allied Commission (Through Chief Commissioner, AC)

Date :- 27th November, 1946.

Ref :- MEDAE/4203/1/AFALS.

GROUND ENGINEER UNITS ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

Information available here indicates that the proposed Italian Air Force organization provides for NO ground engineer units.

2. It is considered essential that the Air Force have units capable of maintaining airfields if not actually capable of building them.

3. It is further understood that a quantity of heavy United States construction equipment might be loaned the Italian Air Force for the purpose of training personnel in this work. It is not permissible for civilian personnel to be trained by the Army.

4. It is recommended that there be included in the reorganized Italian Air Force the following engineer structure.

- 1 Ground Engineer Group of:
- 3 identical Ground Engineer Bns each of:
- 1 Heavy equipment operating Co.
- 1 Equipment Maintenance Co.
- 1 Construction Co.
- 1 Training Co.

Only the group headquarters and one of the Bns to be activated, the others to be on paper only. The Bn would be approximately 750 in strength.

5. Your comments are requested.

See 17th Feb 3/12

Distribution:
Chief Engr. AFHQ
G-3 AFHQ

8794

JLM
4/12

S. J. B. Hamilton
(S.J.B. HAMILTON
Wing Commander
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE)

0381

1087

785017

15A

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ROR.

1460A
03

DEC 46.

AIR MINISTRY, LONDON

SECRET.

OROE ONE ZERO FIVE ID FOR FROM ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ORGANISATION FOREIGN AIR FORCES
FROM THOMSON ID MUSTANG PROBLEM INVOLVED ID AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN ITALY
ARE NOT FULLY IN THE PICTURE ID QUESTION WITH WAR DEPARTMENT AT VERY HIGH LEVEL. ID
SIGNAL UNDER XRAY FOUR SIX THREE DATED NINE NOVEMBER REFERS ID SUGGEST ROYAL AIR
FORCE DELEGATION WASH NOTON BE REQUESTED TO APPROACH WAR DEPARTMENT AT HIGH LEVEL. ID
PARA TWO ID MEETING WITH ITALIAN CHIEF OF AIR STAFF CMA AIR MEMBER FOR SUPPLY AND
ORGANISATION CMA VICE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF CMA AIR MEMBER FOR PERSONNEL AND DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF SIGNALS ON ~~156~~ TWO DECEMBER ID PLAN ACCEPTABLE IN OUTLINE FROM MILITARY
VIEWPOINT ID MAIN DIFFICULTY FINANCIAL ID REFERENCE EXPRESSED FOR MUSTANGS IF
BACKING AVAILABLE ID DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALIAN STAFF ON PLAN NOW PROCEEDING ID
ISSUE COMPLICATED BY HOLDINGS OF ITALIAN EQUIPMENT THAT ITALIANS WISH TO OFFSET
AGAINST PACK UPS ID EXPECT TO RETURN FRIDAY OR SATURDAY XE BY WHICH TIME ITALIAN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF HOPES TO BE ABLE TO GIVE MORE DEFINITE ANSWERS AFTER CONSULTATION
WITH AIR MINISTER ID MUSTANG QUESTION HAS MADE DISCUSSIONS DIFFICULT AND LENGTHY ID
HAVE FOLLOWED AIR VICE MARSHAL BRODIE'S ADVICE IN DELICATE SITUATION =====

AFSC/367/2/ORG.

IMMEDIATE.

DIRECTOR, AFSC.

426

fk m
6/12

6/12

Barleyat 7-11

6880

5/2

3. S/L Thompson, of the British Air Ministry, has arrived from the offices of reorganization of foreign nation air forces with a complete Plan of organization for the Italian Air Force. This plan has already been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Air Ministry ways and means of helping the IAF is at their disposition. The reorganization does not go further than the Interim Plan of the Italian Air Minister. This plan does not only consist

GEN	Ajmone-Cat	G.S.	IAF
GEN	Riffle		IAF
GEN	Brigante		IAF
GEN	Monte		IAF
LT.COL.	Marek	Deputy Director, AFSC	
W/C	Collingwood	S.E.O.	AFSC
COL.	Giansanti		IAF
S/L	Thompson	British Air Ministry, RAF	
F/O	Beneducchi	P.A.	AFSC
IST.IT.	Favaro	Air III, AFSC	

AMENDOLA AIRFIELD.

2. Gen. Ajmone-Cat has written to the Air Minister giving the complete details and requesting an immediate answer within the first ten days of December.

BRITISH AIR MINISTRY PLAN FOR IAF ORGANIZATION.

3. S/L Thompson, of the British Air Ministry, has arrived from the offices of reorganization of foreign nation air forces with a complete Plan of organization for the Italian Air Force. This plan has already been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Air Ministry ways and means of helping the IAF is at their disposition. The reorganization does not go further than the Interim Plan already presented to the Italian Air Minister. This plan does not only consist of aircraft but of IAF organization, Equipment, M.T., Signals and Communications, and Training, etc.

6074

4. In view of the aid that the British Air Ministry is prepared to give the Italian Air Force, the following questions were put to the IAF so that the British Air Ministry will be prepared and will work out the details before the plan is put up to the Ministry of Finance. When the financial part is settled the IAM will be informed and they will be committed to go to U.K. to discuss the details as have other Foreign countries.

5. The following questions were discussed by the Director, AFSC and Gen. Ajmone-Cat.

Director : To what extent ^{does} the IAM desire an Air force either from U.K. or the U.S.?

Gen. Ajmone-Cat : The maximum ability to the Italian financial capabilities. The IAM has always been in account to the Italian Government and it is the first time they have been confronted with the problem of making out a balance and presenting it to the treasury. It will present more of a political than economical problem since the IAF has always been guided by the treasury. The treasury of course request a small Air Force.

Director : The British Air Ministry and the War Department in Washington have been informed of the Italian economical condition, and the plan considers the IAM to depend principally on Italian Industry.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat : Informed that the Italian Industries are already dependent on material from U.S. and U.K. Industries.

Director : Request is made of the Italian Economical situation towards the IAF.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat : Would not commit himself - The Air Minister will have to discuss this question.

Director : If a mission is sent to U.K. to discuss the financial accord, a representative of the Italian Treasury will have to be present as well as representatives of Finance, Stato Maggiore, Technical and Training offices, including Gen. Monte.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat : The mission will consist of an inter-ministry commission.

Col. Marek: The War Department instructions are not yet final and their propositions will not be presented since the War Department has thus far been interested in private Aviation.

Director : It is not expected at present to receive full answers but only an idea so that the details of the organization plan can be worked out at the British Air Ministry.

QUESTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE HELD IN A.C., ROME, 6 OCT 46
29 NOV..1946, ON REORGANIZATION OF IAF.

Director : Request is made of the Italian Economical situation towards the IAF.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat : Would not commit himself - The Air Minister will have to discuss this question.

Director : If a mission is sent to U.K. to discuss the financial accord, a representative of the Italian Treasury will have to be present as well as representatives of Finance, Stato Maggiore, Technical and Training offices, including Gen. Monte.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat : The mission will consist of an inter-ministry commission.

Col. Marek : The War Department instructions are not yet final and their propositions will not be presented since the War Department has thus far been interested in private Aviation.

Director : It is not expected at present to receive full answers but only an idea so that the details of the organization plan can be worked out at the British Air Ministry.

QUESTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE HELD IN A.C., ROME, 29 NOV., 1946, ON REORGANIZATION OF IAF. 6874

6. The following answers and discussions refer to the conference held at the Allied Commission, Rome, 29 November on Re-organization of the IAF. Reference to para.3, question (a):

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: We do accept, in principal, the whole plan. The organization will be the same but the Establishments will have to be changed to suit the requirements and problems of the IAF. Once the number of aircraft is known, we will be allowed to place the aircraft depending of requirements and in accordance with the proposed plan.

Director: Informed that the maximum plan will have to comply with the Interim Air Force Plans. The details of the Organization and Establishment will be given to the IAM and they will be able to change the Establishment to suit the IAF Organization. The equipment for the IAF can be found in ARARor by the British Air Ministry.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: If the equipment found in ARAR complies with the needs of the IAM they will certainly use it.

Director: On the problem of transportation, Civil Aviation will need fire tenders, etc. This total can be included in Establishment of IAF but must be kept separate from the demands of IAF.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Will do as suggested of Civil Transportation. Returning to the plan, he will allow his aircraft strength to coincide with the plan, but a definite answer will be given after a discussion with his staff. He points out that the situation is different with Italy since other countries are not in the same strangled position. For this reason part of the Plan may not be adaptable to the IAF but for their own interest they will keep as close as possible to the plan.

S/L Thompson: Stated that if the plan is accepted it will include the complete organization of Training Staff, Technical Staff, etc., and it does comply with the conditions of Italy and its geographical position.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: He is pleased to hear that the plan is complete to all details and his staff will examine it with that knowledge.

S/L Thompson: If the plan is accepted the equipment must be demanded immediately. The British Air Ministry will not be able to retain the men in the service capable of carrying out the plan and other countries shall be demanding this equipment.

SPARE PARTS FOR EXISTING AIR FORCE.

Director: He will do all possible to get all parts needed for the existing Spitfire Wing of IAF, to permit operational training immediately. Does the IAM want these parts right away?

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Yes, especially the Tyres needed.

Director: W/C Collingwood is already working on a plan to supply these parts so that training may be carried out. S/L Thompson will return to U.K. immediately to give the general impression of Italian needs to the British Air Ministry. If the parts needed

complete organization of training staff, technical staff, and it does comply with the conditions of Italy and its geographical position.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: He is pleased to hear that the plan is complete to all details and his staff will examine it with that knowledge.

S/L Thompson: If the plan is accepted the equipment must be demanded immediately. The British Air Ministry will not be able to retain the men in the service capable of carrying out the plan and other countries shall be demanding this equipment.

SPARE PARTS FOR EXISTING AIR FORCE.

Director: He will do all possible to get all parts needed for the existing Spitfire Wing of IAF, to permit operational training immediately. Does the IAF want these parts right away?

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Yes, especially the Tyres needed.

Director: W/C Collingwood is already working on a plan to supply these parts so that training may be carried out. S/L Thompson will return to U.K. immediately to give the general impression of Italian needs to the British Air Ministry. If the parts needed for the existing Air Force arrive is it guaranteed that the IAF will pay?

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: He cannot guarantee for the Italian Government but he has hopes that they will be capable. He will act immediately so as to get an answer to the plan for S/L Thompson's return to U.K.

QUESTION (b) OF MEETING HELD AT A.C.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Yes, he does prefer the P-51 Mustang for the Italian Air Force. The geographical situation of Italy will need an aircraft as capable as the Mustang. O.K.

QUESTION (c)

9. Gen. Ajmone-Cat: He does concur of changing all of the P-38 Lightning for P-51 Mustangs since it is more economical and they prefer aircraft that are completely armed since only sixteen P-38 are armed. It will be more economical. For their Fighter Group they prefer to have all P-51 Mustangs instead of five squadrons of Spitfires. However, they will comply with Allied orders. If an all Mustang Fighter Group is practicable they prefer it but if it is not possible they prefer a Mixed Fighter Group of Mustangs and Spits.

QUESTION (d)

10. Gen. Ajmone-Cat: The type of aircraft does not influence their discussion of the plan. The Italian Government is not interested in the type of aircraft to be used in the IAF. Since there is no difference in the Establishment of the plan if they use twin or single engine fighter aircraft, they will not postpone the decision.

QUESTION (d) - PART II.

11. Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Their decision will not be retarded since the Organization Plan does not depend on the type of aircraft and the precise decision will be given as soon as possible. However, they would like to know an opinion of the total cost to the Italian Government.

Director: A personal guess would be one million pounds sterling for a period of three years. The method of payment and time will be made by negotiations of the Italian Treasury and the British Ministry of Finance. The cost of this program to the RAF would be about five million pound sterling and a large part of this material would be unused and surplus stock in England. This is the reason that the cost to the IAF would be less. *The*

Director gave this guess only on an assumption that it would not be recorded nor be used in evidence against him!

10. Gen. Ajmone-Cat: The type of aircraft does not influence their discussion of the plan. The Italian Government is not interested in the type of aircraft to be used in the IAF. Since there is no difference in the Establishment of the plan if they use twin or single engine fighter aircraft, they will not postpone the decision.

QUESTION (d) - PART II.

11. Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Their decision will not be retarded since the Organization Plan does not depend on the type of aircraft and the precise decision will be given as soon as possible. However, they would like to know an opinion of the total cost to the Italian Government.

Amount and
Director: A personal guess would be one million pounds sterling for a period of three years. The method of payment and time will be made by negotiations of the Italian Treasury and the British Ministry of Finance. The cost of this program to the RAF would be about five million pound sterling and a large part of this material would be unused and surplus stock in England. This is the reason that the cost to the IAF would be less. *The Director gave this guess only on an assumption that it would not be recorded nor be used in evidence against him!*

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT FOR AOP AND MISCELLANEOUS.

12. Director: Would the IAM want to discuss the AOP squadrons with the CTO of AFSC? Would the IAM want Italian type aircraft or Allied type aircraft for AOP? Should the training type aircraft be Italian or Allied?

S.R.
Gen. Ajmone-Cat: If the AOP aircraft are to be armed he has only 200 Fighter aircraft at his disposition, but if he can use other armed type aircraft he does prefer Allied types. However, if the A/c are to be unarmed, he prefers to use Italian Sea Planes rather than unarmed Mosquito A/c. As to training aircraft, he prefers Allied types that will refer to the type of Allied A/c he will have.

6886

OTHER TOPICS REFERRING TO THE ORGANIZATION PLAN.

13.

Director: In reference to the Plan, the American Authorities at Caserta have suggested additional topics in particular an Engineering branch to the IAF.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: They do accept this plan and it already has been discussed.

Director: Another topic of the plan that would limit the number of personnel of the IAF is the turning over of the Anti-Aircraft branch to the IAF.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: It would be best to have this branch in the Army and then necessary under the ~~present~~ ^{new} ~~and attached to~~ ^{to retain} this branch as a Civilian Observation Corp.

Director: The intention at the moment is not to attach the anti-aircraft branch to the IAF.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Since the anti-aircraft branch is used more for Army Cooperation, it should go to the Italian Army, but another conference will be held of his staff and the general intention is that the IAF will have operational control of this branch.

(Gen. Ajmone-Cat has approved
actually 1943 3/12)

CONCLUSION.

14.

Gen. Ajmone-Cat:

As soon as his staff is informed of the Plan they will present any existing questions to AFSC and S/L Thompson.

He wished to add that it will be a problem to the Italian Government to accept an Air Force as large as the Peace Treaty allows and they may have to consider a smaller Air Force because of the financial situation of Italy.

1097

Director: The intention at the moment is not to attach the anti-aircraft branch to the IAF?

Gen. Ajmone-Cat: Since the anti-aircraft branch is used more for Army Cooperation, it should go to the Italian Army, but another conference will be held of his staff and the general intention is that the IAF will have operational control of this branch.

(S.O.C. 15/11/11 has been reported actually 15/12/11)

CONCLUSION.

14. Gen. Ajmone-Cat: As soon as his staff is informed of the Plan they will present any existing questions to AFSC and S/L Thompson. He wished to add that it will be a problem to the Italian Government to accept an Air Force as large as the Peace Treaty allows and they may have to consider a smaller Air Force because of the financial situation of Italy.

Pattavano
PATT FAVANO 1st Lt. A.C.
Air III, AFSC.

6875

TOP SECRET.

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD IN ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME, 29TH NOV., 1946.

ON RE-ORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

The Director opened the Meeting by introducing Colonel HEWITT, U.S.A.A.F. (G-3 at Caserta).

Those present - W/C. Hardison, S/L. Marriot, (HQ Equipment), S/L. Thompson (Air Ministry), and A.F.S.C. Staff Officers.

2. Colonel Hewitt stated there was no further news from the War Department concerning the Mustangs proposition for the Italian Air Force. Copies of signals from U.S. authority at Caserta were handed to the Director for information.

3. After considerable discussion it was finally agreed that after a conference this afternoon, the Director with D/D., S/L. Thompson, and S.R.O. would visit the Italian Air Ministry on Monday 2nd December and ask them the following questions:-

Subject to final financial agreement as between the British Government and the Italian Government -

- (a) Do you accept the British Air Ministry Plan (DD.Pol(AS)3/71 of September, 1946) and the re-organization shown in the diagram attached to letter AMI/S.21/A.F. of 20th March, 1946
(i) in part or (ii) in whole?
 - (b) If available would you accept P-51's (Mustangs) or P-47's (Thunderbolts) as equipment for all the I.A.F. Fighter Squadrons?
 - (c) Would you accept P-51's or P-47's in place of P-38's and ~~P-47's~~ P-4's Spitfire IX's? (The remaining 5 Squadrons to be)
 - (d) Do you wish to postpone making a decision on the acceptance of the whole British Air Ministry Plan, etc., until the Allied answer about the practicability of supplying P-51's or P-47's together with spares for three years, ground equipment and publications is available, or do you wish to postpone the decision only on that part of the Plan as it affects the type of aircraft for re-equipment of all the Fighter Squadrons?
- In considering this you must bear in mind that the British Air Ministry cannot await your decision for more than about two or three weeks and nor can the Italian Air Force itself afford to lose more time in coming to a decision now. (The British Air

Action
by

conference this afternoon, the Director with D/D., S/L Thompson, and S.E.C. would visit the Italian Air Ministry on Monday 2nd December and ask them the following questions:-

Subject to final financial agreement as between the British Government and the Italian Government -

- (a) Do you accept the British Air Ministry Plan (D.Pol(AS)3/71 of September, 1946) and the re-organisation shown in the diagram attached to letter ABOL/S.21/A.P. of 20th March, 1946
(i) in part or (ii) in whole?
- (b) If available would you accept P-51's (Mustangs) or P-47's (Thunderbolts) as equipment for all the I.A.F. Fighter Squadrons?
- (c) Would you accept P-51's or P-47's in place of P-39's and P-40's *P-51's* with or without extra payment? (The remaining 5 Squadrons to be Spitfire IX's).
- (d) Do you wish to postpone making a decision on the acceptance of the whole British Air Ministry Plan, etc., until the Allied answer about the practicability of supplying P-51's or P-47's together with spares for three years, ground equipment and publications is available, or do you wish to postpone the decision only on that part of the Plan as it affects the type of aircraft for re-equipment of all the Fighter Squadrons?
In considering this you must bear in mind that the British Air Ministry cannot await your decision for more than about two or three weeks and nor can the Italian Air Force itself afford to lose more time in coming to a decision now. (The British Air Ministry hopes for a decision this week, 2nd - 7th December).

4. The next step after receiving the Italian Air Ministry's answer will be for S/L Thompson to report back to the Air Ministry and if the answer is favourable to go into the financial side of the whole question.

5. The Director asked names of Air Commodore Bates D. of E. (D) at Air Ministry; to be recorded in these minutes. (C/C Gore's contact at British A.M.).

6. The Director after discussion with W/C Hamilton stated that letters from this Sub-Commission, concerning the re-organisation of the Italian Air Force to the Air Ministry, London, and War Department, Washington should be sent direct to those Departments concerned, copy only to M.A.A.C., but if Anglo-American interests were both involved, the letter should pass through MAC in the first place for their external transmission to London & Washington respectively. This was agreed; also demands for I.A.F. equipment for I.A.F. to go direct to M.U. and not to M.A.A.C., who are interested only in policy. (S.E.C. to ensure that MAC aware their instructions).

...../Para 6 p 23.....

22
S.E.C.
S.E.C.

1099

- 2 -

7. Colonel Hewitt told the Director that a letter was on its way to us suggesting the formation of Engineer Groups in the Italian Air Force, these are composed of three Battalions (750 men in each Battalion) consisting of four Companies, of which :-

- (1) H.Q. Company.
- (ii) Equipment Company.
- (iii) Construction Company.
- (iv) Maintenance Company.

These Groups will be essential to handle heavy ground equipment, the Americans propose to hand over to the Italian Air Force. The Americans do not want inexperienced personnel handling the equipment. Agreed - to be added to Re-organisation of I.A.F. diagram.

After further discussion it was agreed to hold another conference in the afternoon on civil aviation.

Conference closed at 13.15 hours.

[Signature]
I.E. BODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

Reference: AFSC/367/2/30G. 2nd December, 1946.

Distribution.

M.A.A.C. Secretariat - W/Cdr. Hamilton please show to Colonel Hewitt.
S/Ldr. Thomson - British Air Ministry.
Director, A.F.S.C.
File.

D.D. 22m 4/12
S.E.O. 1000 3/12
Org. 1000 3/12
S.S.O. 1000 3/12
C.T.O. 1000 3/12

...on civil aviation.

Conference closed at 13.15 hours.

Reference: AIRC/367/2/ONG.

2nd December, 1946.

Distribution.

M.A.A.O. Secretariat - W/Cdr. Hamilton please show to Colonel Hewitt.
S/Ldr. Thompson - British Air Ministry.
Director, A.P.S.C.
File.

D.D. 12m 4/12
S.E.O. 100 4/12

Org. 100 4/12
S.S.O. 100 4/12

C.T.O. 100 4/12
C.S.O. 100 4/12

I.E. BODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCE'S SUB-COMMISSION.

6879

14B

SPEDIZIONE (A) Allenti e Allenti.

ARMISTIZIO ITALIANO - RIFORMAZIONE E RINNOVAMENTO

QUESTO HA RAPPRESENTATO AL MINISTERO DELL'ARMISTIZIO AD UNA CONFERENZA

INTEGRA PER IL 20 IL 3 DICEMBRE.

Sottoposto ad un finale secondo l'incarico del Il Governo Inglese
e quello Italiano -

- (a) Accettato il Piano del Ministero dell'Armistizio Inglese (M. Pol
(M) 3/74 del settembre 1946) e la riformazione progettata nel
diagramma concluso alla lettera M. 21/A. P. del 20 marzo 1946
(1) in parte o (41) per intero?
- (b) Accettando che tutti i gruppi della Armistizio fossero
equipagati con P-54 (Mustang) e P-47 (Thunderbolt), qualora
questi fossero disponibili?
- (c) Accettando del P-54 o P-47 al posto del P-36 e ~~P-47~~, con o senza
un pagamento extra? I cinque gruppi rimanenti dovrebbero essere
equipagati con Spitfire 9.

FS

- (d) Desidero ritardare nel prendere la decisione se accettare o no per
intero il Piano del Ministero dell'Armistizio Inglese, ecc., fino
a che non riceviate una risposta degli Allenti riguardo alla possi-
bilità di fornire P-54 o P-47, insieme al peso di rimborso per
tre anni, equipaggiamento di terra e pubblicitari, o preferito ri-
tardare soltanto la decisione di quella parte del piano concernente
il tipo di apparecchi da usare per il riequipaggiamento di tutti

1102

(1) in parte o (2) per intero?

(b) Accetterebbe che tutti i Gruppi Guida dell'Aeronautica fossero equipaggiati con P-51 (Mustang) o P-47 (Thunderbolt), qualora questi fossero disponibili?

(c) Accetterebbe dei P-51 o P-47 al posto dei P-36 o ~~P-40~~, con o senza un pagamento extra? I cinque Gruppi rimanenti dovrebbero essere equipaggiati con Spitfire?

(d) Desidera ritardare nel prendere la decisione se accettare o no per intero il Piano del Ministero dell'Aeronautica Inglese, con., fino a che non riceva una risposta degli Alleati riguardo alla possibilità di fornire P-51 o P-47, insieme al costo di rimborso per tre anni, equipaggiamento di terra e pubblicitari, o preferito ritardare soltanto la decisione di quella parte del piano concernente il tipo di apparecchi da usare per il riequipaggiamento di tutti

i Gruppi Guida?

Prendendo in considerazione questa proposta deve riflettere sul fatto, che il Ministero dell'Aeronautica Inglese non può attendere le nostre decisioni per più di due o tre settimane oltre, noi l'Aeronautica Italiana può prendere altro tempo nel prendere una decisione ora. Il Ministero dell'Aeronautica Inglese deve di avere una risposta entro questa settimana.

AMSG/367/2/AMG.

2 dicembre 1946.

6072

QUESTIONS TO BE PUT TO I.A.M. AT CONFERENCE PROPOSED FOR 2ND OR 3RD DECEMBER.

Financial

Subject to final agreement as between the British Government and

the Italian Government -

- (a) Do you accept the British Air Ministry Plan (DD.Pol(AS)3/71 of September, 1946) and the re-organisation shown in the diagram attached to letter AHQI/S.21/A.P. of 20th March, 1946

(i) In part or (ii) in whole?

- (b) If available would you accept P-51's (Mustangs) or P-47's (Thunderbolts) as equipment for ^{Fighter} all the I.A.F. Squadrons?

- (c) Would you accept P-51's or P-47's in place of P-38's and P-39's with or without extra payment? *The remaining 5 Sqn 5th Spitfire 189.*

- (d) Do you wish to postpone making a decision on the acceptance of

the whole British Air Ministry Plan, etc., until the Allied

answer about the practicability of supplying P-51's or P-47's

together with spares for three years, ground equipment and

publications is available, or do you wish to postpone the

decision only on that part of the Plan as it affects the type

of aircraft for re-equipment of all the ^{Fighter} Spitfire Squadrons?

In considering this you must bear in mind that the British

Air Ministry cannot await your decision for more than about three

^{three} or ~~four~~ ^{four} weeks and nor can the Italian Air Force itself

afford to lose more time in coming to a decision now. *The*

British Air Ministry expects a decision this week.

*Attaching Allied Squad.
Re-organisation & Re-equipment. 14 B(7)*

with or without extra payment? The remaining 58,000 to be supplied.

- (a) Do you wish to postpone making a decision on the acceptance of the whole British Air Ministry Plan, etc., until the Allied answer about the practicability of supplying P-51's or P-47's together with spares for three years, ground equipment and publications is available, or do you wish to postpone the decision only on that part of the Plan as it affects the type of aircraft for re-equipment of all the ^{Fighter} Spitfire Squadrons?
- In considering this you must bear in mind that the British Air Ministry cannot await your decisions for more than about ^{two} ~~three~~ or ~~four~~ ^{three} ~~months~~ weeks and nor can the Italian Air Force itself afford to lose more time in coming to a decision now. The

British Air Ministry hopes for a decision this week.

AFSC/367/2/005

2 December 1946

6871

Serial No 649

INCOMING CYPHER MESSAGE.

TO AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION ROME
FROM AIR MINISTRY LONDON.

APX 1763 22 NOVEMBER. SECRET

PERSONAL FOR AIR VICE MARSHAL BRODIE FROM DIRECTOR OF POLICY (AIR STAFF)
REFERENCE YOUR AFSC/367/2/ORG DATED 8 NOVEMBER. MEMBER OF DGO'S
STAFF IS LEAVING ~~XXXX~~ FOR ITALY ON 26 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS DETAILS
OF REORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE. AIR MINISTRY SIGNAL OOX 1584

19 NOVEMBER REFERS.

PARAGRAPH 2. WE WILL ENSURE THAT THIS OFFICER IS APPRISED SUCH ???
IN YOUR LETTER AS ARE LIKELY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIM IN THE
FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS. IN THE MEANTIME WE ARE EXAMINING THE
VARIOUS POINTS RAISED IN YOUR LETTER AND WILLKEEP YOU INFORMED
OF DEVELOPMENTS.

TOO 222039Z.

DECYPHERED BY F/SGT WILMOTT.

DISTRIBUTION AFSC ROME.

ROUTINE.

~~(PLEASE INFORM THIS SIGNALS IF REPETITION OF CORRUPT GROUPS ARE~~

~~REQUIRED)~~

*Repetition of corrupt groups has been
requested from AM London New 7*

UNPARAPHRASED LITERAL TEXT.
OF CYPHER MESSAGE

1 1 0 7

FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS. IN THE MEANTIME WE ARE EXAMINING THE
VARIOUS POINTS RAISED IN YOUR LETTER AND WILLKEEP YOU INFORMED
OF DEVELOPMENTS.

TOO 222039Z.

DECYPHERED BY F/SGT WILMOTT.

DISTRIBUTION AFSC ROME.
ROUTINE.

~~(PLEASE INFORM THIS SIGNALS IF REPEITION OF CORRUPT GROUPS ARE~~

~~REQUIRED)~~ *Repetition of corrupt groups has been
requested from AM London New York*

UNPARAPHRASED LITERAL TEXT
OF CYTHER MESSAGE

W 29/11

SECRET

05311

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

To :- Italian Air Ministry.

Date:- 26th November, 1946.

Ref :- MSC/367/2/400.

Urgent.

ITALIAN & ALLIED
SECRET

RE-ORGANISATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE.

With reference to a meeting in the Office of the Capo di Stato Maggiore at the Italian Air Ministry on the 22nd November, it is desired to confirm the information given by the Director and Deputy Director of the A.F.S.C.

2. Authority has been received for activating the re-organisation of the Interim Italian Air Force to the extent which the Italian Government wishes, but within the maximum limits laid down in the most recent plan, namely the British Air Ministry Plan (See para. 7 below). The figures will require some adjustment in detail because:

(1) the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force as more recently agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers (Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, Clause 5 Part 4) must be complied with both now and later and

(2) because it is understood that certain existing Italian transport aircraft may be turned over from the I.A.F. to Italian civil aviation.

3. You are reminded, however, that the current plan refers to the Interim Italian Air Force as distinct from the Italian Air Force after the Peace Treaty is signed, but the Plan is so devised as to make the best strategic use, so as think, of the limited force which is now and which will be at your disposal and as a means for expansion if and when it is permitted and desirable.

4. As pointed out in para. 4 of my letter MSC/367/2/400. of the 25th March, 1946, (copy attached) addressed to the then Minister of Air, Dr. Cevolotto, the Italian Government, so far as the Allies are concerned, need have no Air Force at all.

5. The main provisions of the previous plan reference MSC/3.21/A.P. of the 20th March, 1946 forwarded to you under cover of that letter (MSC/367/2/400. of 25th March, 1946) hold good so far as the recommended organisation is concerned, though the numbers shown need some revision; additional units have since also been agreed, e.g. the A.G.F. Squadron and Target Towing Flight.

The meeting between the C.A.S., D.C.A.S. and myself on the

within the maximum limits laid down in the most recent plan, namely the British Air Ministry Plan (see para. 7 below). The figures will require some adjustment in detail because:

- (1) the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force as more recently agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers (Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, Clause 5 Part I.) must be complied with both now and later and

(11) because it is understood that certain existing Italian transport aircraft may be turned over from the I.A.F. to Italian civil aviation.

5. You are reminded, however, that the current plan refers to the Interim Italian Air Force as distinct from the Italian Air Force after the Peace Treaty is signed, but the plan is so devised as to make the best strategic use, as we think, of the limited forces which is now and which will be at your disposal and as a rationale for expansion if and when it is permitted and desirable.

4. As pointed out in para. 4 of my letter AFM/367/2/400. of the 25th March, 1946, (copy attached) addressed to the then Minister of Air, Dr. Cevolotto, the Italian Government, so far as the Allies are concerned, need have no Air Force at all.

5. The main provisions of the previous plan reference AFM/3.21/4.P. of the 20th March, 1946 forwarded to you under cover of that letter (AFM/367/2/400. of 25th March, 1946) hold good so far as the recommended organisation is concerned, though the numbers shown need some revision; additional units have since also been agreed, e.g. the A.O.F. Squadron and Target Towing Flight.

6. The Notes on the meeting between the C.A.S., D.C.A.S. and myself on the 4th April, 1946 and which were handed by me to Colonel Rosenthal and verbally agreed by the C.A.S. is a true statement of the conversation also refer, as does the Stato Maggiore letter reference AFM/2/1797/00.2., dated 25th April, 1946.

7. During the above mentioned meeting (on the 2nd November, 1946) the Director A.F.M.C. handed to the Capo di Stato Maggiore a copy of the British Air Ministry Plan referred to in paras. 2 & 3 above) and named "Order of Battle, Interim Italian Air Force" together with a copy of the British Air Ministry "Outline Signals Plan for the Italian Air Force". These have been prepared in order to facilitate the necessary re-organisation and re-equipment.

8. The Order of Battle (submitted by the British Air Ministry) is based upon the final recommendations made to and since approved by High Allied military but requires some modification because it is necessary to ensure that the totals are within the limits agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, not only as to the overall total number of aircraft which may be held but also as to types. Therefore, in order adequately to back the flying units it may be necessary to amend the figures of unit equipment (U.S.) in order to provide for aircraft wastage for three years; you will note that the total number of aircraft in the Order of Battle, including reserves and wastage, amounts to 433, which is 83 aircraft more than agreed by the Foreign Ministers.

...../3. British type aircraft.....

- 2 -

9. British Type Aircraft. I can confirm that the aircraft of British type mentioned in the Order of Battle are not yet procured and are available but this statement must not be construed as being a definite promise or commitment of the British Government; indeed this authority for re-organization and re-equipment is not to be construed as a commitment to furnish either United States or British equipment.
10. British Aircraft Spares. The availability of British aircraft spares for three years preceding from P.A.F. sources has not yet been determined by the British Air Ministry as it depends in part on holdings in Italy and the situation generally. However, it is probable that the full range of spares for three years could be made available by going to new production where necessary, either in the United Kingdom or possibly in Italy; if large repairs are undertaken in the Italian aircraft industry it is probable that supplies of appropriate engine strips and assembly kits and jigs will be made from the United Kingdom; the quantity will depend upon the equipment available in the Italian Air Force and the Italian aircraft industry.
11. Types of Fighter Aircraft. It is possible that fighter aircraft of a more recent date than the Spitfire IX may be made available from allied sources. It is confirmed that it is and always has been A.F.S.O. policy to try to obtain for the L.A.F. the most modern aircraft of any standard type that may be available from either British or American sources. We understand, however, that you agree that unless at least one years spares and preferably three years spares can be made available it is undesirable to procure such aircraft. Furthermore it is understood that you agree that all the fighter aircraft in the L.A.F. should if possible be of one type or at most not more than two types.
12. Manpower. On P.A.F. scales, the manpower required to run the units shown in the Order of Battle will amount approximately to 600 officers and 7,600 other ranks.
13. Re-organization of Headquarters. Higher authority has also approved and recommended re-organization of the following Headquarters under or within the Italian Air Ministry:-- Fighter Headquarters, Air Transport Headquarters, General Reconnaissance and Aircraft Safety Headquarters, Training Headquarters, Maintenance Headquarters, a Directorate of Meteorology, and also a Directorate of Civil Aviation which may be transferred to another Ministry if the Italian Government so desires. Details of the chain of command from the Air Ministry downwards were shown in the Plan mentioned in para. 5 above (and referred to as APO/5.21/5.1., of 26th March, 1945).
14. British Air Ministry "Outline Signals Plan" Arrangements have recently been made for the supply of some obsolete radio equipment and for certain radio training courses within Italy and therefore the Signals Plan, so far as supply from the U.K. is concerned, will require modification.
15. Visit of British Air Ministry Staff Offices. A Staff Officer from the British Air Ministry will shortly be visiting Rome to discuss proposals with you and with us.
16. Training Courses in the United Kingdom were previously discussed and extracts

for the I.A.F. the most modern aircraft of any functional type that may be available from either British or American sources. No understatement, however, that you agree that unless at least one year's spare and preferably three years' spares can be made available it is undesirable to procure such aircraft. Further, one it is understood that you agree that all the fighter aircraft in the I.A.F. should if possible be of one type or at most not more than two types.

12. Manpower. On I.A.F. scales, the manpower required to man the units shown in the Order of Battle will amount approximately to 600 officers and 7,600 other ranks.

13. Re-organization of Headquarters. Higher authority has also approved and recommended re-organization of the following Headquarters under or within the Italian Air Ministry:-- Fighter Headquarters, Air Transport Headquarters, General Reconnaissance and Aircraft Safety Headquarters, Training Headquarters, Maintenance Headquarters, a Directorate of Meteorology, and also a Directorate of Civil Aviation which may be transferred to another Ministry if the Italian Government so desires. Details of the chain of command from the Air Ministry down to those shown in the Plan mentioned in para. 5 above (and referred to as A.M./S.21/A.P., of 20th March, 1946).

14. British Air Ministry "Outline Signals Plan" Arrangements have recently been made for the supply of some signals radar equipment and for certain radar training courses within Italy and therefore the Signals Plan, so far as supply from the U.K. is concerned, will require modification.

15. Visit of British Air Ministry Staff Officer. A Staff Officer from the British Air Ministry will shortly be visiting Rome to discuss proposals with you and with us.

16. Training Courses in the United Kingdom were previously discussed and extracts from A.P.S.C. Letter A.P.C/57/2/46, dated 20th June, 1946, together with an Appendix giving details were handed to the C.A.S. at the meeting on the 20th November. It is requested that you will review the suggestions made in that letter and pencil, bearing in mind that the signals radar courses in Northern Italy were arranged after the training courses in the U.K. now discussed by the Director of A.P.S.C. in England in April, 1946.

17. Equipment & Spares for British Type Aircraft at Paderborn The Charge of the Italian Air Force. Having now obtained authority for the re-organization of the Italian Air Force as above, it is hoped to be able to obtain spares for three British aircraft now held by the Italian Air Force from regular sources, such as the Middle East or the United Kingdom. You should, however, not be over-optimistic in expecting equipment and spares to be provided quickly because if the equipment and spares are not available in Italy, and it is known that there are few surpluses in Italy, it will take an appreciable time actually to receive them from elsewhere. However, I assure you that every effort will be made by A.P.S.C. to obtain the equipment and spares as quickly as possible, even to the extent of trying to obtain permission for Italian aircraft to fetch these most urgently needed from Egypt, the U.K. or elsewhere.

...../21. SAC/AFM's Overriding Powers.....

- 3 -

12. SAC/ADP's Overriding Powers. Finally I am to add that the limitations imposed upon the Italian Air Force are always subject to the Supreme Allied Commander's overriding responsibilities and instructions should any operational commitment arise.

PS

L.E. HODGE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

Distribution:-

Italian Air Ministry 2.
Director, A.F.S.C. 1.
Dep. Director, A.F.S.C. 1.
File 1

See by DD. before despatch

file
27/11

not
27/11

chubb
17/12

11131

785017

C O P Y .

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION,
R O M E .

AFSC/363/2/110.

SECRET.

25th March, 1946.

Dear

I attach hereto a copy of the interim policy for the re-organisation of the Italian Air Force which has just been approved by higher authorities.

2. It is desired that you will treat this memorandum as an agenda for a conference which, subject to your convenience, it is proposed to hold on the 29th March, 1946 at 10.30 hours, and which will be attended by Air Vice Marshal Sogaerty, General Lee, Group Captain Takemura and myself.
3. It is requested that the memorandum be treated as 'Secret' until such time as the conference has taken place and details worked out between us. There is, however, no objection to your consulting your Senior Staff Officers, but what we wish to avoid is that this matter shall not receive publicity until mutual agreement between us has been reached.

4. I wish to emphasise that the permissive plan shown in the attached memorandum is only obligatory in so far as the maximum ceilings are concerned, and as indicated in the paper; the lower extreme would be that if the Italian Government so desired there need be no Italian Air Force at all.
5. A few further explanations may be of assistance to you :-

- (1) Where the word "will" occurs, it should be read in the sense of the English future tense rather than in an executive and obligatory sense.
- (11) Where the word "indispensable" is used it is used in its widest sense; it is intended to cover Engineering, Signals, Equipment Depots and M.F. etc.
- (111) The term US means aircraft in use, plus immediate reserve in squadrons.
- (12) The term EE means external reserve, not in squadrons.

6. A question which will arise will be the desirability of maintaining the Baltimore Squadrons temporarily, especially during the period of transition from Military Courier Services to Civil Aviation.

time as the conference has taken place and details worked out between us. There is, however, no objection to your consulting your Senior Staff Officers, but what we wish to avoid is that this matter shall not receive publicity until mutual agreement between us has been reached.

4. I wish to emphasize that the permissive plan shown in the attached memorandum is only obligatory in so far as the maximum ceilings are concerned, and as indicated in the paper; the lower extreme would be that if the Italian Government so desired there need be no Italian Air Force at all.

5. A few further explanations may be of assistance to you :-

(1) Where the word "will" occurs, it should be read in the sense of the English future tense rather than in an expositive and obligatory sense.

(11) Where the word "maintenance" is used it is used in its widest sense; it is intended to cover Engineering, Signals, Equipment Depots and M.F. etc.

(11i) The term US means aircraft in use, plus immediate reserve in squadrons.

(1v) The term ER means external reserve, not in squadron.

6. A question which will arise will be the desirability of maintaining the Baltimore Squadrons temporarily, especially during the period of transition from Military Carrier Services to Civil Aviation.

Yours

(SGD) LAW E. BROWN.

8 Charged to let April, 12.00 hrs.

To: Doctor M. Cevolotto,
Minister for Air,
Italian Air Ministry,
ROME.

6066

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ROME.

21 1645H NOV. 46.

AIR MINISTRY LONDON

(R) MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT.

SECRET.

OBOE SEVEN ZERO PD FOR AIR VICE MARSHAL EMBRY FROM BRODIE PD SUBJECT
 TRAINING COURSES IN UNITED KINGDOM FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE/REFERENCE MY
~~XXXX~~ ABLE FOX SUGAR CHARLIE SLASH THREE SIX SEVEN SLASH TWO SLASH OBOE
 ROGER GEORGE OF TWO ZERO JUNE PARA FIVE WILL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD
 SIGNAL CHARGE HER HEAD WHICH WOULD BE MADE AGAINST ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD
 COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF IN FOX ABLE NAN SIX NINE SEVEN HAVE APPROVED
 REORGANISATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND THEREFORE WE CAN NOW GO AHEAD
 OBTAINING COURSES AND EQUIPMENT.

FILE: AFSC/367/2/ORG.

ROUTINE

DIRECTOR A.F.S.C.

426

 I.E. BRODIE
 A.V.M.

 I.E. BRODIE
 A.V.M.

ARMY FORM C 2136 (Large)

MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

644

Serial No.

Priority

Transmission Instructions

UNPARAPHRASED LITERAL TEXT
OF CYPHER MESSAGE

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

Office Date Stamp

Date-Time of Origin

Originator

FROM

Mediterranean Subhead

(A) Air Force (Through)

For Action



TO

Air Force (Through)

(W) For Information (INFO)

(Through Chief Liaison)

TOP SECRET

Message Instructions

GR

Originator's No.

UX 1273

15 NOV

TOP SECRET

GR

FAN 697

continued belief of staff in (FAN 697)

have appeared in the reports contained in NAF 1169

concluding in principle the various and proposed

of NAF 1103. (3)

proved with organization. The entire station

Air Force. The entire station Government

desires further limit set by NAF 1109 and in

comparatively with limitation. It is expected in

station. Air Force as agreed by General Rogers

minutes (Action 11-10-69) British Queen Elizabeth

could Italy. (A) This is not to be (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z) (AA) (AB) (AC) (AD) (AE) (AF) (AG) (AH) (AI) (AJ) (AK) (AL) (AM) (AN) (AO) (AP) (AQ) (AR) (AS) (AT) (AU) (AV) (AW) (AX) (AY) (AZ) (BA) (BB) (BC) (BD) (BE) (BF) (BG) (BH) (BI) (BJ) (BK) (BL) (BM) (BN) (BO) (BP) (BQ) (BR) (BS) (BT) (BU) (BV) (BW) (BX) (BY) (BZ) (CA) (CB) (CC) (CD) (CE) (CF) (CG) (CH) (CI) (CJ) (CK) (CL) (CM) (CN) (CO) (CP) (CQ) (CR) (CS) (CT) (CU) (CV) (CW) (CX) (CY) (CZ) (DA) (DB) (DC) (DD) (DE) (DF) (DG) (DH) (DI) (DJ) (DK) (DL) (DM) (DN) (DO) (DP) (DQ) (DR) (DS) (DT) (DU) (DV) (DW) (DX) (DY) (DZ) (EA) (EB) (EC) (ED) (EE) (EF) (EG) (EH) (EI) (EJ) (EK) (EL) (EM) (EN) (EO) (EP) (EQ) (ER) (ES) (ET) (EU) (EV) (EW) (EX) (EY) (EZ) (FA) (FB) (FC) (FD) (FE) (FF) (FG) (FH) (FI) (FJ) (FK) (FL) (FM) (FN) (FO) (FP) (FQ) (FR) (FS) (FT) (FU) (FV) (FW) (FX) (FY) (FZ) (GA) (GB) (GC) (GD) (GE) (GF) (GG) (GH) (GI) (GJ) (GK) (GL) (GM) (GN) (GO) (GP) (GQ) (GR) (GS) (GT) (GU) (GV) (GW) (GX) (GY) (GZ) (HA) (HB) (HC) (HD) (HE) (HF) (HG) (HH) (HI) (HJ) (HK) (HL) (HM) (HN) (HO) (HP) (HQ) (HR) (HS) (HT) (HU) (HV) (HW) (HX) (HY) (HZ) (IA) (IB) (IC) (ID) (IE) (IF) (IG) (IH) (II) (IJ) (IK) (IL) (IM) (IN) (IO) (IP) (IQ) (IR) (IS) (IT) (IU) (IV) (IW) (IX) (IY) (IZ) (JA) (JB) (JC) (JD) (JE) (JF) (JG) (JH) (JI) (JJ) (JK) (JL) (JM) (JN) (JO) (JP) (JQ) (JR) (JS) (JT) (JU) (JV) (JW) (JX) (JY) (JZ) (KA) (KB) (KC) (KD) (KE) (KF) (KG) (KH) (KI) (KJ) (KK) (KL) (KM) (KN) (KO) (KP) (KQ) (KR) (KS) (KT) (KU) (KV) (KW) (KX) (KY) (KZ) (LA) (LB) (LC) (LD) (LE) (LF) (LG) (LH) (LI) (LJ) (LK) (LL) (LM) (LN) (LO) (LP) (LQ) (LR) (LS) (LT) (LU) (LV) (LW) (LX) (LY) (LZ) (MA) (MB) (MC) (MD) (ME) (MF) (MG) (MH) (MI) (MJ) (MK) (ML) (MM) (MN) (MO) (MP) (MQ) (MR) (MS) (MT) (MU) (MV) (MW) (MX) (MY) (MZ) (NA) (NB) (NC) (ND) (NE) (NF) (NG) (NH) (NI) (NJ) (NK) (NL) (NM) (NN) (NO) (NP) (NQ) (NR) (NS) (NT) (NU) (NV) (NW) (NX) (NY) (NZ) (OA) (OB) (OC) (OD) (OE) (OF) (OG) (OH) (OI) (OJ) (OK) (OL) (OM) (ON) (OO) (OP) (OQ) (OR) (OS) (OT) (OU) (OV) (OW) (OX) (OY) (OZ) (PA) (PB) (PC) (PD) (PE) (PF) (PG) (PH) (PI) (PJ) (PK) (PL) (PM) (PN) (PO) (PP) (PQ) (PR) (PS) (PT) (PU) (PV) (PW) (PX) (PY) (PZ) (QA) (QB) (QC) (QD) (QE) (QF) (QG) (QH) (QI) (QJ) (QK) (QL) (QM) (QN) (QO) (QP) (QQ) (QR) (QS) (QT) (QU) (QV) (QW) (QX) (QY) (QZ) (RA) (RB) (RC) (RD) (RE) (RF) (RG) (RH) (RI) (RJ) (RK) (RL) (RM) (RN) (RO) (RP) (RQ) (RR) (RS) (RT) (RU) (RV) (RW) (RX) (RY) (RZ) (SA) (SB) (SC) (SD) (SE) (SF) (SG) (SH) (SI) (SJ) (SK) (SL) (SM) (SN) (SO) (SP) (SQ) (SR) (SS) (ST) (SU) (SV) (SW) (SX) (SY) (SZ) (TA) (TB) (TC) (TD) (TE) (TF) (TG) (TH) (TI) (TJ) (TK) (TL) (TM) (TN) (TO) (TP) (TQ) (TR) (TS) (TT) (TU) (TV) (TW) (TX) (TY) (TZ) (UA) (UB) (UC) (UD) (UE) (UF) (UG) (UH) (UI) (UJ) (UK) (UL) (UM) (UN) (UO) (UP) (UQ) (UR) (US) (UT) (UU) (UV) (UW) (UX) (UY) (UZ) (VA) (VB) (VC) (VD) (VE) (VF) (VG) (VH) (VI) (VJ) (VK) (VL) (VM) (VN) (VO) (VP) (VQ) (VR) (VS) (VT) (VU) (VV) (VW) (VX) (VY) (VZ) (WA) (WB) (WC) (WD) (WE) (WF) (WG) (WH) (WI) (WJ) (WK) (WL) (WM) (WN) (WO) (WP) (WQ) (WR) (WS) (WT) (WU) (WV) (WW) (WX) (WY) (WZ) (XA) (XB) (XC) (XD) (XE) (XF) (XG) (XH) (XI) (XJ) (XK) (XL) (XM) (XN) (XO) (XP) (XQ) (XR) (XS) (XT) (XU) (XV) (XW) (XX) (XY) (XZ) (YA) (YB) (YC) (YD) (YE) (YF) (YG) (YH) (YI) (YJ) (YK) (YL) (YM) (YN) (YO) (YP) (YQ) (YR) (YS) (YT) (YU) (YV) (YW) (YX) (YY) (YZ) (ZA) (ZB) (ZC) (ZD) (ZE) (ZF) (ZG) (ZH) (ZI) (ZJ) (ZK) (ZL) (ZM) (ZN) (ZO) (ZP) (ZQ) (ZR) (ZS) (ZT) (ZU) (ZV) (ZW) (ZX) (ZY) (ZZ)

equipment

UX 4773 15 NOV TOP SECRET *UK* **\$AN 697**
 continue brief of Staff in (**\$AN 697**
 been approved of the proposals contained in NAT 1169
 involving in principle the various air paragraph
 of NAT 1163. ~~1163~~ If you are therefore
 pleased with recommendation the original Station
 Air Force is the subject Station Government
 there could be limit set by NAT 1169 and in
 conformity with limitation of it be imposed on
 Station Air Force as agreed by General Force
 meeting (London 3-4 Nov 44) Staff Force Trade
 and Study) 12 is in order to be (continued 1169)
 as a commitment to propose limited state and
 British equipment. It is desired to send
 out that modification to some of those proposals
 will be necessary to ensure detail not only as
 to overall total aircraft but also as to
 types on which limits agreed by General
 Force meeting in Paris to be particularly
 make more aircraft and aircraft equipment
 training to both the force will probably need
 modification in light of experience gained by RAF
 and US Army and Army. In early stages
 matter of detail and in equipment, technical and
 administration, and in other areas the Government and
 the Government will work in connection as appropriate
 through Mediterranean Allied Air Force as appropriate
 effort given above it will always be subject to
 the Japanese Allied Air Force in making material
 check any operational commitment. **Combers**

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except	If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER	Originator's Instructions Degree of Priority.	Time THI or TOR	System Op.
Signed <i>YRM</i> 20	Signed <i>YRM</i> 20	<i>AM 100</i>	<i>606</i> Time cleared	

Information to staff members will be provided
 as required. *YRM*

FROM: AIR VICE MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,

ALLIED COMMISSION,

R O M E .

20th November, 1946.

AFSC/367/2/CHE.

I am sorry to worry you again, but I am afraid I misunderstood Lt/Colonel Hewitt with regard to the statement made in my letter of even reference dated 8th November, 1946, last paragraph on the first page, which I would be glad if you would delete and substitute :-

"I am informed by Lt/Colonel Hewitt (American) of G.3. Ops at A.F.H.Q. Caserta that all concerned had begun to take an interest in the quality of the equipment being supplied the Italian Army in the same way the War Department was taking an interest in the quality of the aircraft being supplied the Italian Air Force. The United States War Department has expressed no opinion, so far as is known here (Caserta), on the Italian Army equipment nor has there been any suggestion, again in so far as is known here, of supplying the Italian Army from United States European sources."

I.E.B.
I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

Air Commodore W.A.D. Brook, C.B.E.,
Air Ministry,
King Charles Street,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Copy to A.V.M. Darvall, A.H.Q., R.A.F., Italy.
" W/Cdr. Hamilton, M.A.A.C.
" Lt/Col. Hewitt, G.3., A.F.H.Q.

f/km
22/11

6663

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

14 November 1946

Dear Air Vice Marshal BRODIE,

Thank you for the copy of your letter to the Air Ministry and of the minutes of our 5 November meeting.

There is one point I would like to clarify. In your letter to the Air Ministry (last para on first page) you referred to my comment regarding equipment of the Italian Army. I apparently did not make myself clear. What was intended to be conveyed was that all concerned had begun to take an interest in the quality of the equipment being supplied the Italian Army in the same way the War Department was taking an interest in the quality of the aircraft being supplied the Italian Air Force. The United States War Department has expressed no opinion, so far as known here, on the Italian Army equipment nor has there been any suggestion, again insofar as known here, of supplying the Italian Army from United States European sources.

Thank you also for the courtesies extended W/Cdr Hamilton and myself during our recent visit.

Sincerely

H. HEWITT
Lt Col GSCAVM I. E. BRODIE CBE
Director AFSC, AC
ROME.

See 9A

JkM
27/11

6062

- 2 -

Thank you very much for the interest you are taking in the Italian Air Force; I am sure that our strategic policy should be to encourage the Italians to have efficient though small armed forces and this is also the opinion of the A.O.C. Italy, who has seen our previous correspondence.

Yours

Gen. P. P. Indino

Air Commodore W.A.D. Brook, C.B.E., (2 copies).
Air Ministry,
King Charles Street,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Copy to: A.F.M. Darvall, A.H.Q. Italy.
" W/Cdr. Hamilton, H.A.A.C.
" L/Col. Hewitt, G.S., A.F.H.Q.

D.D. (seen in draft form) 18m 9/11

S.S.O. 1m 9/11

S.E.O. 18m 9/11

S.I.O.

Orig - 18m 9/11

TOP SECRET

77

FROM: AIR VICE MARSHAL J.E. BRODER, O.B.E.

AIR POLICE SUB-COMMISSION,

ALLIED COMMISSION,

R. C. M. E.

AFSC/567/2/000.

8th November, 1946.

6A

Many thanks for your letter D.A. Policy (A.S.) 3/463, dated 5th October, 1946; it is a great blessing to us out here to know that the British Air Ministry is taking a real and active interest in the future of the Italian Air Force. It is my opinion and that of Air Vice Marshal Duvall (A.O.C., Italy) that the Italian Air Force should be assisted in every way possible to become an efficient fighting force to act as a backup to the U.S. squadrons in the North East, and in order to ensure that the Italians have an efficient fighting force before the Allies pull out. We have not enough time left so far as we can foresee really to finish the job properly therefore the sooner we can get the Italian Air Force re-equipped and trained the better. There is no time to lose.

I would be very glad to see one of A.O.C.'s staff officers visit this Headquarters: in which connection it will be of interest to you to know that the Senior Equipment Staff Officer at A.E.C. Italy (Group Captain Gore) has written, we think, to A/Odre. Bates, D. of E. (D), to try and get an equipment policy that will enable the Italians at least to obtain ammunition, spares and such like essential materials, with which the existing Italian Air Force will be able to do some operational training; I am afraid I can't send you a copy because I haven't got it.

Your letter D.D. Pol (45) 3/71 (united), containing the British Air Ministry Order of Battle for the Italian Air Force and the Outline Signals Plan, is most helpful. A complication has, however, arisen because the War Department, Washington has suddenly woken up to the fact that it is in the Anglo-American interest to re-equip and train the Italian Air Force that it will be an efficient force and they have communicated to General Lee (American Commander in Italy) offering 200 Mustangs. As to whether or not the Italian Air Force should be re-equipped with British or American aircraft seems to be for C.F.C. to settle at a high level rather than for ourselves. Our policy is to get the best we can for the Italian Air Force provided spares and reserve backing will be available for any the next three years. We have just agreed that the Americans at A.E.C. (Cavaria) will signal the War Department to send a representative to this country and so to time the visit that it will coincide with a visit of the A.O.C.'s representative. This business may take some time to settle and therefore I would much prefer not to wait for decisions from the War Department (through C.F.C.) and would ask you to send the D.G.C. Staff Officer here to find out, on the spot, what is really going on.

get the Italian Air Force re-equipped and trained the better. There is no time to lose.

I would be very glad to see one of D.C.O.'s staff officers visit this Headquarters: in which connection it will be of interest to you to know that the Senior Equipment Staff Officer at A.F.H. Italy (Group Captain Gore) has written, we think, to V/Admiral, Bates, D. of H. (D), to try and get an equipment policy that will enable the Italian at least to obtain ammunition, spares and such like essential materials, with which the existing Italian Air Force will be able to do some operational trainings; I am afraid I can't send you a copy because I haven't got it.

Your letter D.D.col(43)3/72 (undated), containing the British Air Ministry Order of Battle for the Italian Air Force and the Outline Signals Plan, is most helpful. A complication here, however, arises because the War Department, Washington has suddenly woken up to the fact that it is in the Anglo-American interest to re-equip and train the Italian Air Force that it will be an efficient force and they have contributed to General Lee (American Commander in Italy) offering 200 British or American aircraft seems to be for C.C.S. to settle at a high level rather than for ourselves. Our policy is to get the best we can for the Italian Air Force provided spares and reserves backing will be available for say the next three years. We have just agreed that the Americans at A.F.H. (Caserta) will signal the War Department to send a representative to this country and so to time the visit that it will coincide with a visit of the D.C.O.'s representative. This business may then come time to settle and therefore I would much prefer not to wait for decisions from the War Department (through C.C.S.) and would ask you to send the D.C.O. Staff Officer here to find out, on the spot, what is really required and to advise us what is likely to be available from U.K. and then we would like him again to visit us when the American War Department representative comes, so that decisions may be taken the more effectively here in Rome. Incidentally the Italians are willing to send administrators and pilots to England to prepare aircraft and fly them to Italy.

The point I wish to emphasize particularly is that the I.A.F. is potentially an efficient air force within the limitations imposed by the Allies and these limitations are lack of modern equipment, ammunition and bombs, and training. Tentative arrangements for certain training courses for a limited number of Italians in England (especially Naples) have been agreed with D.C.S. but no executive action has yet been taken.

As regards mater changes in the I.A.F. Order of Battle, the general state of I.A.F. efficiency I will keep you informed, but suggest that A.F.H.C. Monthly Air Report will go a long way in providing you with detail, (indeed too much detail); a copy of this should be available in your department every month but I am taking steps to send you a copy direct in the future instead of through A.A.A.C. at Caserta. *try to*

It will be of interest to you to know that the War Department, Washington is, according to Lt Colonel Hewitt (American) of C.J. Ops at A.F.H.C., also seeking a bigger interest in the Italian way in that they are suggesting supplying more efficient equipment from American sources as in the case with the Mustangs.

From: Air Commodore W.A.D. Brook, C.B.E.



AIR MINISTRY

KING CHARLES STREET,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

31st October, 1946.

D. D. POLICY (AS) 3/863

TOP SECRET.

1. Dear A.V.M.

Thank you for your letter AFSC/360/3/Org. of the 21st October, 1946 and for the enlightening report on the Italian Air Force which was delivered to me by Flight Lieutenant Cartinal. This information will be most useful in assessing the actual value of the Italian Air Force; it would help still further if you could keep us informed from time to time of any major changes in the I.A.F. Order of Battle or in the general state of efficiency of the force as a whole.

2. With regard to para. 10 of your letter. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now approved generally the proposals contained in SACMED's telegram NAF 1169 and arrangements are already in train for one of D.G.O.'s staff officers to visit your H.Q. at an early date to discuss details of the suggested Order of Battle for the Italian Air Force. We will let you know of the final arrangements for this visit as soon as we get a firm date from D.G.O. as to when his representative will be leaving for Italy.

Yours sincerely,

J/km
9/11

W.A.D. Brook

Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, O.B.E.
Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,
ROME.



6859

5A

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

To :- Air Ministry, Kingston. (Personal for Director of Policy Air Staff).
 Copy to: Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.
 Air Headquarters, ITALY.
 Headquarters, Royal Air Force, HND/MS.

Date:- 21st October, 1946.

Ref :- AFSC/360/3/40G.

TOP SECRET.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

-4A

With reference to your signal ISX 360 dated 13th October, 1946, the
 Order of Battle of the Italian Air Force is as follows :-

FIGHER GROUP - LXXX.

4 th WING.	9 th SQUADRON	73 Flight	No. of Pilots	57
		96 Flight		
		97 Flight	Lightning A/C P.35	29
	10 th SQUADRON	84 Flight	P.39	21
		90 Flight		
		91 Flight		
5 th WING	8 th SQUADRON	92 Flight	No. of Pilots	68
		93 Flight		
	101 st SQUADRON	208 Flight	Macchi 205 A/C.	27
		209 Flight	Macchi 202 A/C.	13
	102 nd SQUADRON	203 Flight		
		239 Flight.		
51 st WING	20 th SQUADRON	356 Flight	No. of Pilots	70
		360 Flight		
	21 st SQUADRON	371 Flight	Spartaco IX A/C.	33
		376 Flight		
	199 th SQUADRON	361 Flight		
		376 Flight		

TRAINING GROUP - LXXX (INFORM).

BALTIUM WING	132 nd SQUADRON	251 Flight	No. of Crews	29
		251 Flight		
	20 th SQUADRON	13 Flight	Baltimore M.181 A/C.	24

TRAFFIC GROUP - 1000.

4' WING	9' SQUADRON	75 Flight	No. of Pilots	57
		96 Flight		
		97 Flight	Lightning V/C R. 33	29
		98 Flight	R. 39	21
	10' SQUADRON	99 Flight		
		91 Flight		

5' WING	8' SQUADRON	92 Flight	No. of Pilots	68
		93 Flight		
	101' SQUADRON	208 Flight	Macchi 205 A/C.	27
		209 Flight	Macchi 202 A/C.	13
	102' SQUADRON	203 Flight		
		209 Flight		

51' WING	20' SQUADRON	356 Flight	No. of Pilots	70
		360 Flight		
	21' SQUADRON	351 Flight	Spitfire IX A/C.	35
		366 Flight		
	305' SQUADRON	361 Flight		
		378 Flight		

TRAFFIC GROUP - 1000 (LIVE/10).

BALTIMORE WING	132' SQUADRON	253 Flight	No. of Crews	29
		261 Flight		
	20' SQUADRON	13 Flight	Baltimore II. 187 A/C.	24
		260 Flight		

NIGHT FIGHTING WING - 1000.

1' SQUADRON	2 Flight	No. of Crews	44
	3 Flight	S. 32 A/C.	27
83' SQUADRON	190 Flight		
	265 Flight		

TRAFFIC WING - 1000.

2' SQUADRON	102 Flight	No. of Crews	55
	103 Flight	S. 73/1. 75/3. 83/3. 84/3.	
90' SQUADRON	240 Flight	S. 93/3. 12 A/C.	60
	241 Flight		

SEA KING GROUP.

82' SQUADRON	239 Flight	No. of Crews	16
(Toronto)	249 Flight	Ca. 5 1/2 TB - Ca. 506 A/C.	7

pkm
23/10

85' 3 SQUADRON (Brindisi)	241 Flight	No. of Crews	24
84' SQUADRON (Vigna di Valle)	247 Flight	Cs. 5/3 - Cs. 5/1	20
85' SQUADRON (Taranto)	240 Flight	No. of Crews	19
	228 Flight	Cs. 5 6/13 - Cs. 5 6/8	8
	253 Flight	No. of Crews	11
	267 Flight	Cs. 501 - R. 8.14	12

2. Aircraft.

The Fighter Pilots of both Spitfire and P.38 Squadrons are in full flying training on their types but have had no operational training due to lack of ammunition, bombs, bomb gear and photographic reconnaissance equipment. The Baltimore crews are fully trained to operational standards for reconnaissance and photography. The Night Flying Wing is equipped with obsolescent Italian S.M.82 aircraft whose crews are not in night flying practice. The Seaplane crews are employed effectively in Air Sea Rescue and Courier Services. The Transport Wing crews are efficient on military courier duties, but neither they nor the Seaplane crews have been allowed to do any operational training since hostilities ended.

3. Airfields and Seaplane Bases.

The Airfields and Seaplane Bases being used by the I.A.P. are shown hereunder :-

- (a) Those controlled by I.A.P. - Bracciano, Centocelle, Prosinone, Lovenasco, Monzerrato, Maida, Perugia, Urie, Taranto, (seaplanes), Turin, Venice, Bologna, Brindisi, Cagliari, (seaplanes), Gaidonia, Lecce, Milan, Idarte, Palermo, Padiglione, Bergamo.

- (b) Allied Bases used by I.A.P. - Bari, Elmas, Treviso, Ciampino, Capodichino.

4. Training Schools.

- (1) Prosinone. There is a navigation school at Prosinone. Courses last for three months and are attended by 36 officers Pilots on each course. Pupils are either navigators or pilots. The standard of training is quite good, photographic exercises and land rescue reporting are good, but D.M. navigation over the sea, square searches and other exercises of a G/A nature are rather inadequate. There is no night flying training and no Astro. The school uses Baltimore and each pupil does about 35 hours flying training.

- (11) Lecce. There is a refresher flying school at Lecce, where Macchi 200 and 202 aircraft are used. Training is on a separated primary and secondary basis.

(111) Cagliari. This is a purely academic training college with an intake of 15 students training in refresher training.

The Airfields and Seaplane Bases being used by the I.A.P. are shown hereunder:-

(a) Those controlled by I.A.P. - Bracciano, Cantocello, Prosinone, Livorno, Montecarlo, Milano, Perugia, Orbe, Taranto, (Seaplanes), Turin, Venice, Bologna, Brindisi, Cagliari, (Seaplanes), Guidonia, Lecce, Milan, Idrato, Palermo, Podigliano, Vercelli.

(b) Allied Bases used by I.A.P. - Bari, Elmas, Treviso, Ciampino, Capodichino.

4. Training Schools.

(i) Prosinone. There is a navigation school at Prosinone. Courses last for three months and are attended by 36 officers Pilots on each course. Pupils are either navigators or pilots. The standard of training is quite good, photographic exercises and land lecture reporting are good, but B.R. navigation over the sea, square searches and other exercises of a G/A nature are rather inadequate. There is no night flying training and no Astro. The school uses Baltimore and each pupil does about 35 hours flying training.

(ii) Lecce.

There is a refresher flying school at Lecce, where Mach 200 and 202 aircraft are used. Training is on a separated primary and secondary basis.

(iii) Cadet College.

This is a purely academic training college with an intake of 15 cadets a year, for a three years course. Flying training is not permitted.

5. Aircraft Serviceability and General Efficiency of Maintenance Organisation.

The maintenance on I.A.P. types of aircraft is good, spares being obtainable but with difficulty. The serviceability state on 30th September, 1946 was as follows:-

Fighters	60%
Transport	70%
Seaplanes (50%)	50%

On British and American types, the maintenance is also good when repairs are not delayed by lack of spares and tools. The serviceability state for these aircraft on 30th September, 1946 was:-

U.S. Aircraft	P.39	62%
	P.39	35%

British Aircraft Spitfire V.
Spitfire IX.
Baltimore

(MIL) 0%
30% (Believed optimistic)
85%

6057

The I.A.F. maintenance organization in Squadrons and Wings is good and is backed by few but efficient repair depots. These could be expanded or increased in number. There is also the commercial industry to back the maintenance organization if necessary.

6. Aircraft Strength.

The I.A.F. issue monthly a secret publication "The Italian Military Air Force Strength State". The figures given in the September issue for aircraft are as follows:-

Pilots	1390
Navigators	124
Wireless Operators	987
Air Gunners	693

These figures include those already given against Squadrons on the Order of Battle.

7. State of Training.

The purely flying training of all aircraft is average according to R.A.F. standards, although shortage of petrol and lack of spares has cut the monthly flying hours per pilot well below the authorized six hours per month.

Operationally however, these pilots and aircraft are out of practice as they have not been permitted any training in an offensive or defensive role since the end of the European War. Their operational efficiency is therefore low although a short period of training, following the provision of spares for aircraft and engines and the supply of offensive and defensive equipment would suffice to make a force as effective and perhaps more so than they were under Italian Air Force during the war.

8. Morale.

The morale of the I.A.F. particularly in flying units is good, due to setbacks due to the recommendations at the Peace Conference, the change over from a Monarchy to a Republic and to the uncertainty of the future of their Air Force with the exception of the Spitfire Squadrons which have been grounded for over two months for lack of spares. In these squadrons the morale of flying personnel and ground crews is low but will recover once the aircraft are airborne again.

9. Conclusion.

(1) If at any time it is desired to employ the I.A.F. operationally, and ensuring that the R.A.F. would countermand existing instructions and supply the I.A.F. with spares and possibly such backing as is practicable, the I.A.F. could be employed to a limited extent in minor operational roles. In coming to this conclusion it

7. State of Training.

The purely flying training of all aircrew is average according to I.A.F. standards, although shortage of petrol and lack of spares has cut the monthly flying hours per pilot well below the authorized air hours per month.

Operationally however, these pilots and aircrews are out of practice as they have not been permitted any training in an offensive or defensive role since the end of the European War. Their operational efficiency is therefore low although a short period of training, following the provision of spares for aircraft and engines and the supply of offensive and defensive equipment would suffice to make a force as effective and perhaps more so than they were under Italian Air Force during the war.

8. Morale.

The morale of the I.A.F. particularly in flying units is good, despite setbacks due to the recommendations at the Peace Conference, the change over from a Monarchy to a Republic and to the uncertainty of the future of their Air Force with the exception of the Spitfire Squadrons which have been provided for over two months for lack of spares. In these squadrons the morale of flying personnel and ground crew is low but will recover once the aircraft are airborne again.

9. Conclusion.

(i) If at any time it is desired to employ the I.A.F. operationally, and assuming that the R.A.F. would countermand existing instructions and apply the I.A.F. with spares and possibly such backing as is practicable, the I.A.F. could be employed to a limited extent in minor operational roles. In coming to this conclusion it is borne in mind that almost all the Italian aircrews and a large number of the ground crew are fully trained in their respective operational roles and were employed on operations during the war in the Balkan Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force Commands. For the most part they operated from R.A.F. operational stations. Since the end of hostilities, however, severe restrictions have been placed by the Allies on the I.A.F. in training, supply of equipment, etc., and consequently the experienced Italian aircrews are out of practice except in actual flying.

(ii) If the I.A.F. were called upon for active operations, some notice would be required for strategic moves to be made, preferably to R.A.F. Stations in order to facilitate supplies and operational instructions.

(iii) The following could be employed in the operational roles indicated :-

(a) Fighters - Escorts to bombers, local air defence and low strafing with guns only unless supplied with bomb capacity and bombs by the R.A.F.

Spitfire IX's	35
P.3's	29
Messerschmitt 205's	2725 (Not fitted for bomb carriers)

- 4 -

- (b) Seaplanes - Air Sea Rescue and constrise reconnaissance.
- (c) Bomber Transport - At the expense of existing Military Courier Services to help move units, e.g. Fighter Squadrons to the North, and dropping of supplies and paratroopers.
- (d) Baltimore Light Bombers - Medium Bombing but with about a week's notice in order to refit aircraft (changing over from a transport role).

10. I assure that you will read this in conjunction with SAC/AM's signal M.P. 1169 which lays out his proposed detailed re-organization of the Italian Air Force and which also requests procurement of Radar and V.L.P. equipment, spares, and ancillary equipment for aircraft, including bombs, and S.A.A. It is believed that Combined Chiefs of Staff have now approved M.P. 1169, and with perhaps a few amendments, therefore, it would be appreciated if arrangements could soon be made for an Air Ministry Staff Officer to visit this H.Q. (Subject to concurrence from M.A.A.C. Caracas) as was suggested in para. 9 of Air Ministry letter DD.Pol(AS 3/71.

11. Please acknowledge.

for P. P. Rodin.

L.E. BODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
HUNTER,
AIR FORCE SUPPLY COMMISSION.

INC. ING CYPHER MESSAGE.

SERIAL NO. 630.

FROM:- AIR MINISTRY, KINGSWAY.

TO :- AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION, ROME.

REPEATED:- H. Q. MED/ME.

MSX 360

18th OCTOBER

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL FOR AIR VICE MARSHAL BRODIE FROM DIRECTOR OF POLICY (AIR STAFF).
QUESTION OF THE RE-EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WILL BE
CONSIDERED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. *340 spare + additional spares etc.*

PARA. 2 I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR SHORT STATEMENT FROM YOU AS A MATTER OF
URGENCY ON THE PRESENT STATE OF READINESS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE FOR ACTIVE
OPERATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE PARTICULARLY INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON FOLLOWING
POINTS. (A) PRESENT ORDER OF BATTLE

(B) AIRCRAFT SERVICEABILITY STATE AND GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATION

(C) AIRCREW STRENGTH, STATE OF TRAINING, MORALE AND GENERAL OPERATIONAL
EFFICIENCY OF UNITS

PARA. 3 WE ARE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING AVAILABLE SUFFICIENT
SPARES TO ENABLE SEITFIRE SQUADRONS AT LECCE TO OPERATE. CANNOT SAY WHETHER THIS
WILL BE POSSIBLE BUT WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ESTIMATE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE OF THESE
SQUADRONS ON ASSUMPTION THAT SPARES POSITION RECTIFIED.

PARA. 4 WOULD YOU PLEASE TREAT THIS MATTER AS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL. UNDER
NO REPEAT NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THIS SUBJECT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE ITALIAN
AUTHORITIES.

OPERATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE PARTICULARLY INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON FOLLOWING POINTS. (A) PRESENT ORDER OF BATTLE

(B) AIRCRAFT SERVICEABILITY STATE AND GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION

(C) AIRCREW STRENGTH, STATE OF TRAINING, MORALE AND GENERAL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF UNITS

PARA. 3 WE ARE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING AVAILABLE SUFFICIENT SPARES TO ENABLE SEITFIRE SQUADRONS AT LECCE TO OPERATE. CANNOT SAY WHETHER THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE BUT WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ESTIMATE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE OF THESE SQUADRONS ON ASSUMPTION THAT SPARES POSITION RECTIFIED.

PARA. 4 WOULD YOU PLEASE TREAT THIS MATTER AS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL. UNDER NO REPEAT NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THIS SUBJECT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES.

IMMEDIATE.

TOO 181127 Z
TOR 191400 A
TOD 191700 A

DECRYPTED BY:- F/LT PEARCE. - *Confidential*

DISTRIBUTION:- A.F.S.C., RMCE.

UNPARADED AND ORIGINAL TEXT
OF CIPHER MESSAGE

S.S.O. - Please Report to N.A.A.C. & A.H.Q. Italy for information & add
Donner 10/10 *we will forward copy of reply to B.O.B. and also to H.Q. Naples.*
J.K.M. 20/10 1. Program Reply pt. - we spoke. *4/10*
2. We could send reply by Messrs Strong & Tonger. *21/10*

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

To :- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat, c/o Rear A.H.Q., Italy.
Air Headquarters, Italy, C.M.F. (UDINE).

Date:- 2nd September, 1946.

Ref :- AFSC/360/3/ORG.

SECRET.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE - ORDER OF BATTLE.

In amplification of our letter AFSC/360/3/ORG., dated 30th August, 1946, it is desired to add a conclusion, which is as follows :-

"Conclusion.

(1) If at any time it is desired to employ the Italian Air Force operationally, and assuming that the R.A.F. would countermand existing instructions and supply the I.A.F. with spares and possibly such backing as is practicable, the I.A.F. could be employed to a limited extent in minor operational roles. In coming to this conclusion it is borne in mind that almost all the Italian aircrews and a large number of the ground crews are fully trained in their respective operational roles and were employed on operations during the War in the Balkan Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces Commands. For the most part they operated from R.A.F. operations stations. Since the end of hostilities, however, severe restrictions have been placed by the Allies on the I.A.F. in training, supply of equipment, etc., and consequently the experienced Italian aircrews are out of practice except in actual flying.

(11) If the I.A.F. is called upon for active operations, a few days notice would be required for strategic moves to be made, preferably to R.A.F. Stations in order to facilitate supplies and operational instructions.

(111) The following could be employed on the operational roles indicated :

(a) Fighters & Escorts to bombers, local air defence and low strafing with guns only unless supplied with bombcarriers by the R.A.F.:

Spitfire IX's - 48.

16.

Conclusion.

(1)

If at any time it is desired to employ the Italian Air Force operationally, and assuming that the I.A.F. would countermand existing instructions and supply the I.A.F. with spares and possibly such backing as is practicable, the I.A.F. could be employed to a limited extent in minor operational roles. In coming to this conclusion it is borne in mind that almost all the Italian aircrews and a large number of the ground crews are fully trained in their respective operational roles and were employed on operations during the War in the Balkan Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force Commands. For the most part they operated from I.A.F. operations stations. Since the end of hostilities, however, severe restrictions have been placed by the Allies on the I.A.F. in training, supply of equipment, etc., and consequently the experienced Italian aircrews are out of practice except in actual flying.

(ii) If the I.A.F. is called upon for active operations, a few days notice would be required for strategic moves to be made, preferably to R.A.F. Stations in order to facilitate supplies and operational instructions.

(iii) The following could be employed on the operational roles indicated:

- (a) Fighters & Escorts to bombers, local air defence and low strafing with guns only unless supplied with bomb carriers by the R.A.F.:
- | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| Spitfire IX's - | 48. |
| P.38's - | 16. |
| Macchi 205's - | 25 (Not fitted for bomb carriers). |

(b) Seaplanes - Air Sea Rescue and coastwise reconnaissance.

(c) Bomber Transports - At the expense of the existing military courier services, to help move units, e.g. Italian Fighter Squadrons to the North, and dropping of supplies and paratroopers.

(d) Baltimore Light Bombers - Medium Bombing but with about a week's notice in order to refit armament (changing over from a transport role)."

Org. *Chalk*
 Apr 1 *319.*
 S.S.O. (in den) *17/9*
 Apr 2 *Adm 3/9*
 C.I.O. *20-IX*
 R.F.D.D. *16/9*
 S.I.O. *17/9*

I.E. Brodie
 I.E. BRODIE,
 AIR VICE MARSHAL,
 60 DIRECTOR,
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

~~9/11~~
2B

From : Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. Rome.
To : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee's Secretariat,
A.HQ, ITALY.
Date : 30th August, 1946.
Ref. : AFSC/360/3/ORG.

SECRET

I.A.F. ORDER OF BATTLE
AT 29 Aug. 1946

FIGHTER GROUP - LEGGE:

4 th WING.	9 th SQUADRON	73 Flight	No. of Pilots 57	Lightning A/C	P.38 - - - 19	21/25
		96 Flight				
		97 Flight				
	10 th SQUADRON	84 Flight				
		90 Flight				
		91 Flight			P.39 - - - 16	21
5 th WING	8 th SQUADRON	92 Flight	No. of Pilots 68	Macchi 205 A/C - - - - - 25	Macchi 202 A/C - - - - - 16	17 13
		93 Flight				
	101 st SQUADRON	208 Flight				
		238 Flight				
	102 nd SQUADRON	203 Flight				
51 st WING	20 th SQUADRON	356 Flight	No. of Pilots 70	Spitfire 9 A/C - - - - - 34		35
		360 Flight				
	21 st SQUADRON	351 Flight				
		386 Flight				
	155 th SQUADRON	361 Flight				
		378 Flight				

BOMBER AND TRANSPORT GROUP - GUERCHIAI

BALTIMORE Wing (Urbe Airfield)	132 nd SQUADRON	253 Flight	No. of Pilots and crews 29	Baltimore M.187 A/C - - - 24
	28 th SQUADRON	281 Flight		
		13 Flight		
		260 Flight		

11/8.

cll.
1/9.

- 2 -

NIGHT WING (Guidonia Airfield)	1 st SQUADRON	1 Flight	No. of crews 44
		3 Flight	8.82 A/C - - - - 27
	88 th SQUADRON	190 Flight	
		265 Flight	
TRANSPORT WING (Centocelle Airfield)	2 nd SQUADRON	102 Flight	No. of crews 55
		103 Flight	8.73/8.75/8.79/8.83/8.84
	98 th SQUADRON	240 Flight	8.92/8.12 A/C - - - - 40
		241 Flight	
<u>SEA PLANE GROUP -</u>			
	82 nd SQUADRON (Toranto)	139 Flight	No. of crews 16.
		449 Flight	Cs. 506/EB - Cs. 506/O - - - 7
	83 rd SQUADRON (Brindisi)	141 Flight	No. of crews 14
		147 Flight	Cs. 506 - Cs. 501 - - - - 10
	84 th SQUADRON (Vigna di Valle)	140 Flight	No. of crews 12.
		238 Flight	Cs. 506/EB - Cs. 506/S - - - 8
	85 th SQUADRON (Toranto)	143 Flight	No. of crews 11.
		287 Flight	Cs. 501 - L.S. 14 - - - - 12

2. The Fighter Pilots of both Spitfire and P.38 Squadrons are now fully trained on their types. No operations have been carried out to date. The Baltimore crews are fully trained to operational standards for reconnaissance and photography. The Night Wing at Guidonia is composed of obsolescent Italian B.U.62 Aircraft, these crews are not in Night flying practice.

3. Airfields and Sea Plane Bases:

Only Airfields and Sea-Plane Bases actually being used by the I.A.F. are shown hereunder: -

- a) Those controlled by I.A.F. - Bracciano, Centocelle, Frosinone, Livorno, Montecorvate, Risda, Perugia, Urbino, Taranto, (sea planes) Turin, Venice, Bologna, Brindisi, Cagliari (sea planes), Catania, Lecce, Milan, Linate, Palermo, Poniglione.
- b) Allied Bases used by I.A.F. - Bari, Kinna, Treviso, Ciampino, Capodichino.

4. Training Schools:

- a) Frosinone. There is a navigation school at Frosinone. Courses last for three months and are attended by 36 officers Pilots on each course. Pupils are either navigators or pilots. The standard of training is quite good, photographic exercises and land scene reporting are good, but D.R. navigation over the sea, square

- 3 -

searches and other exercises of a G/R nature are rather inadequate. There is no night flying training and no Astro. The school uses Baltimores and each pupil does about 35 hours flying training.

- b) Lecce. There is a refresher flying school at Lecce, where Macchi 200 and 202 aircraft are used. Training is on a separated primary and secondary bases.
- c) Cadet College. This is a purely academic training college and is in process of moving to Florence. *with an intake of 15 cadets a year. In a few years come.*
- 5. Strength of Italian Air Force:

This is shown in the Secret Publication "Italian Military Air Force Strength State", issued by the Italian Air Ministry on the 1st of each month.

6. Fighter Aircraft Spares:

Except for breaking down of other aircraft there are no spare available for the P.38 or P.39 aircraft. The position as regards Spitfire is also very unsatisfactory. There are certain amount of spares on hand for the Italian Fighters.

7. Transport and Sea Plane Aircraft Spares:

The transport spares (apart from the Baltimore aircraft) position is normal. The Sea Plane spares position is very unsatisfactory and the majority of the machines are awaiting complete overhaul.

8. General:

Only 16 P.38s are fitted with guns, the remainder of this type having photographic reconnaissance aircraft; 14 of the Baltimore aircraft have been converted to passenger carrying. Further it must be noted that since May, 1945 no operationally serviceable aircraft have been handed over to the Italians, while of the 57 Spitfire IX aircraft recently handed over it is anticipated that approximately 40 only will be made serviceable, i.e. engines and airframes. No guarantee was given as to the condition of ancillary equipment, i.e. radio gear etc. No calibrating gear has been handed over to the Italians.

9. In the event of the Italian Air Force being called on to carry out any operational roll, it is felt that from an equipment point of view they would be little or no assistance on active operations. At the present moment although re-equipping is being carried out with Spitfire aircraft, the bulk of aircraft issued have already had a long life and require considerable overhaul. For this work although the R.A.F. promised a considerable spares backing i.e. about one year's maintenance, all of which equipment was authorised for issue, and is at present being collected, we are now informed that it will almost a hundred per cent be required back by the R.A.F. within the next 2 or 3 months. This leaves the Italian Air Force with 57 aircraft all of which require overhaul and there-

6850

- 4 -

fore they must revert to cannibalisation which will reduce the front line strength of aircraft to a figure which will be of no operational value.

10. Again in the case of Baltimore aircraft, spares have been promised for these aircraft but they are being shipped from the Middle East, they cover air frame spares only. As regards to the supply of any equipment other than engines or air frame spares for either these or Spitfire aircraft, no definite policy has been laid down as to what this Sub-Commission should supply and in fact although the I.A.F. raise many demands for general equipment required, for day to day maintenance and a working reserve, little or nothing is issued.

11. As far as ammunition and bombs are concerned, the position is that although the I.A.F. have certain quantities of bombs in their own depots, no authority has been given for their use (See MAC/4208/APALS/ dtd 7-8-46), the same applies to ammunition, aircraft are fitted with British and American Type of guns, but no ammunition is held neither is any being issued by sources (see MEIME/4208/APALS, dated the 12th of July, 1946).

Allied

A. G. Salter
A. G. SALTER, S/Lt.,
NE AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR PERSONS S/C.

6049

TOP SECRET

62

(1A)

MESSAGEFORM		MESSAGE CENTER NO.	TRANSMITTING MEANS	CRYPTOGRAPH OR CLEAR TEXT	
		M/C 2509			
CALLS	STA. SEC. NO.	PRECEDENCE	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS		DATE-TIME GROUP
V					
ACTION		EXEMPT	OPERATING SIGNALS		GROUP COUNT
					GR
FROM: (Originator)					
WBS FROM GERARD SIGNED LEWIS					
ACTION TO:					
MILITARY ATTACHE ROME ITALY - PASS TO					
AIR VICE MARSHAL BRODIE ALLIED COMMISSION					
INFORMATION TO:					
NUMBER		WB 1237			
DATE		SEPT 17, 1946			
REFERENCE NUMBER MAR 366 ACTION STARTED BY STATE AND M IDYOKK (AS SENT IN TEXT) HERE IN PARIS ON SEPTEMBER 10 TO HASTEN ACTION BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON ORGANIZATION AND MODERIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE. BELIEVE EMPHASIS FROM HERE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH DECISION SOONEST. <i>Copies of NAF 1169 & NAF 1197.</i> INFORMATION REQUESTED IN MY DTG 050939Z HAS BEEN RECEIVED. WILL ADVISE WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH SIGNAL ON CIVIL AVIATION NAF 1197 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. <i>Good show by General Gendreau (USARP). Informed Lt Hamilton NAF of this arrangement verbally on 16/9</i> <i>J/S 18/9</i> D.D. <i>J/LM</i> 18/9 S.S.O. <i>Copy placed on file AFSC/39/AR. at 2B.</i>					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
TOP SECRET					
AUTHORIZATION					
6848					
ORIGINATING AGENCY					
TOP SECRET					
DATE-TIME GROUP					
OFFICIAL TITLE					
PAGE 1 OF 1					

