

2046

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/135/680  
(VOL. II)

2047

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/RND No. 785017

10000/135/680  
(VOL. II)

ITALIAN AIR FORCE, POLICY  
NOV. 1945 - FEB. 1947

This file received from Chief Commissioner's  
 clerks with request that it be  
 retained by RVM. Brooke

Minute No. 216

18th January 1947

To: Chief Commissioner.

Draft directive at Folio 213 is submitted for consideration.

This new draft resulted from a verbal discussion which took place at AFHQ as explained in para 1. of Folio 209.

I am informing the Air Force Sub-Commission that the matter of ~~new~~ directive will almost certainly arise in connection with the new organization under consideration.

*M. C. Carey*  
M. C. CAREY Brigadier.  
Executive Commissioner.

Minute No 217.

15 Feb 47.

To Chief I.M.A.S.

*Reference our conversation of 14 Feb concerning Folio 213 please see Folio 214 which incorporates the amendments*

*I have made a couple of marginal notes for your information and there are several additions in the draft - in pencil because they are for further consideration.*

*Gen. P. P. Smith*

Minute No 217.

15 Feb 47.

To Chief I.M.A.S.

Reference our conversation of 14 Feb concerning Folio 213 please see Folio 214 which incorporates the amendments

I have made a copy of marginal notes for your information and three pencil additions in his draft - in pencil because they are for further consideration.

L. P. P. Smith

Dir. AFSS

7834

Minute No 218.

To Chief I.M.A.S.

19 Feb.

Folio to Min 217, Folio 216 is submitted for approval together with Revised Draft Division of Folio 215 (3 copies for AFSS)

Min. No. 219

Dir. AFSS

Approved

Ans  
CS

19/II

S.S.O.214

Secret.

Ex Comm.

Ref proposed new directive for A.F. S/C.

1. para 1 is incorrect as last directive issued was on dated 28 Aug 45 (see folio 78 in file)
2. New draft is substantially the same as that issued on 28 Aug 45 except that it has ~~an~~ additional paras (9 + 10) on Civil Aviation & aircraft ~~cost~~ construction. Para's 3 (c) and 6 + 7 are also new.

H.S. 2112

215

and letter to be sent

Ex Comm. Ref. above minute paras 1 and 2 of the attached revised draft have been amended. Though some wording (right names) will become necessary I suggest we forward a draft as soon as possible to Casella. Do you agree pt? Tom P. Brodie AFSC  
10/1/47

202.

CSO Ex Comm.

File 201 for info, please. AWB 23/12  
H. 23/12

Chief Commissioner.

201

Attached is submitted for your <sup>approval</sup> signature information  
MC ✓ 27/10/68

Look  
McLan. Bay  
E.C.

205

CSO Ex Comm.

File 204 for info. please. We have none of the Refs mentioned, but I do not consider that they are necessary for this file.

AWB 3/1/47. H. 3/11 MC 3/11

C.S.O. Ex. Comm. 196.

Please see folios 194 & 5 for info.

The Chief Commissioner may also wish to see

Att 39/8

He has agreed.

W 30/11/11

Att 39/8

C.S.O. Ex. Comm. 200

Folio 199 is of interest. I think that either the CC or ~~the Ex. Comm.~~ yourself may have asked for this.

Att 24/10

NE 21/8 24/10



E.C. No-

201

*J. J. J.* Chief Commissioner

not. *MS*

199  
is submitted for your ~~signature~~ approval  
information

25/x LL

If you called for this Report you may want to exhibit it  
from this file. *Mr. Cam Biyadik Ex. Comm 25/x.*

-100-

TO: C.C. THORPE

Reference minutes 178 and 179, I think I should have informed you (in folio 176) that the draft signal at folio 175 was conceived at a joint meeting of A.S.S.C. and A.F.S.C. in Rome for convenience. I asked for a meeting with A.S.S.C. because on my return from the U.K. (18th May) I found that A.S.S.C. had not completed a task upon which A.F.S.C. had briefed them just before I went to the U.K. (30th April).

2. As regards procedure, in view of folio 162 (now amended to 146) the signal in question had never have been drafted with A.S.S.C. although that is the procedure I prefer in order to give the right answer.

3. I understand that a memorandum is now being written around the draft signal for submission by A.S.S.C. to S.A.S.

4. As regards Civil Aviation coming under the Ministry of Transport instead of the Air Ministry, I understood that the Italian Government has not yet considered the point. Also I am told that the Ministry of Transport is very illiberal as for that reason alone - there are others - I do not recommend that we should press for the change yet, but I agree that if we make provision with CCS now it should save time.

5. Please see folio 184.

29th Nov, 1946.

*K. P. P. ...*  
Director, ANSO. *18.2.16*  
*41\**

186.

Chief Commission

*18.2.16*

1. Your objection as to procedure has now been overcome.

2. Please see ANSO's minute above of 15.7.

*18.2.16*

186.  
OK

FL.

*hwd*

the signal in question need never have been drafted with A.S.S. although that is the procedure I prefer in order to give the right number.

3. I understand that a new number is now being written around the draft signal for submission by U.S.A.S. to C.A.S.

4. As regards Civil Aviation coming under the Ministry of Transport instead of the Air Ministry, I understand that the Italian Government has not yet considered the point. Also I am told that the Ministry of Transport is very cautious and for that reason slow - there are some objections - I do not know what they should press for the change yet, but I agree that it would make provision with CCA new it should save time.

5. Please see folio 184.

2030 File, 1946.

*K. P. Shodi.*  
 Director. ANSO. *MS 2016*  
*MS*

185.

Chief Commissioner  
 Message

1. Your objection as to procedure has now been overcome.
2. Please see ANSO's minute about 187.

*MS 2016*

186.  
 OR

FL.

*MS 2016*  
 27/VI  
 MS 2016  
 GMD cc

ExComm

AI

Please see folios 187-9 for info. *MS 2016*

*MS 2016*

177

Chief Commissioner.

176

approval  
Attached is submitted for signature  
It seems elec. to hr. information

MV Conf

IB

F.C. As a matter of procedure, should it  
be equal go, in the first instance  
by letter or dispatch from AC (AFSK)  
to SAC? I do not like the idea, for  
the record, of its originating with  
AFHQ.

I think also that para one (g)  
might be expanded to show that  
had Govt prefers this (if it does)  
rather than leaving it separated from  
the military, as we do in U.S.O. for  
this military, it would be under the

F.C. As a matter of procedure, should it  
 be signed by the first instance  
 by letter or Dispatel from AC (AFSK)  
 to SAC? I do not like the idea, for  
 the record, of its originating with  
 AFHQ.

I think also that para one (g)  
 might be expanded to show that  
 the Govt prefers this (if it does)  
 rather than leaving it separated from  
 the military, as we do in U.S.O. for  
 do in U.K. It could be under Him.

Jus  
 cc  
 15/VI

*[Faint handwritten notes]*

179

7027

Dispatel AFSC  
 (for AFHQ Broder)

Do you take action on the lines of C.C.'s  
 minutes?  
 M.Y. 12/16

167

DD. Air Force S/C

Ref to the fact that it is requested that you  
 draft a letter to the <sup>Prime Minister</sup> ~~Colonial~~ <sup>Air Ministry</sup>  
 requesting them to place the matter  
 before the President of the Council and  
 to forward a copy of the new election  
 legal S/C before it is implemented.  
 The a.c.c. will sign this letter

auth copy  
13/4

\* 168

I agree letter should go to P.M.

128/219

\* 169

Draft of suggested letter is enclosed.

DD 27/4

\* 170

Esso by Comm.

Attached is a draft from Air Force S/C  
 for the Comm's approval. Please see

The a.c.c. will sign this letter

cut by eye  
13/4

\* 168

I agree letter should go to P.M.

178/27/4

\* 169

Draft of suggested letter is enclosed.

WLB RD 27/4

\* 170

CSO by Comm.

Attached is a draft from Air Force S/C for the Comm approval, please. I have amended it slightly. Folio 166 and minus 167 and to refer. <sup>194</sup> AUB 29/4. M. 27/4

171

7828

As enclosed. WLB/30/4

Chief Commissioner.

147

Attached is submitted for your information/return/approval.

This seems in order.

F.C. I am quite MS (x6/5) of the  
impressed at the tone of the approval we  
attached. For a Penicillin writing sheet. No  
MAR 28 RECD

148  
A.M. Fagan

A.V.M. - What thank you & please to AMM. Fagan.

Dr. spoke. - Would you take note of  
pencil corrections by C.C. in discussion  
with the PIC. of Air.

MS (28/3)

163

Ex Comm: See 149-162 H. 28/4

Chief Commissioner.

164

APR 29 RECD  
4:35



A.V.M.

Wanted to thank you for the 3013.

Despise. Would you take note of pencil corrections by C.C. in discussion with the Ric. Staff. WV 25/13

163;

to Commissioner; see 149-162 M. 28/4

164

Chief Commissioner.

163

Attached is submitted for your ~~signature~~ approval information

WV 25/14

E.C. Noted this cc

APR 29 1964  
4:35

7824

164A

7823

2062

Chief Commissioner.

130

Attached is submitted for your signature approval information

137 (25/Jan)

Noted by CC Feb

DEC 29 1950  
C.E. 0915

7022

Ex. linn.

136

135 to wife - own 127 refers.  
Succeed <sup>son</sup> a A.F. S/C would like to see - will  
send a copy of them. ~~137~~ 3/1/12.

Chief Commissioner.

135

Attached is submitted for your signature approval information!

E.C. 175 (2/Jan)

7021

JAN 10 1951

140

Suggest SAC & A.F. S/C would like to see - will send a copy of them. 3/1/12

137

Chief Commissioner. (139)

Attached is submitted for your signature information!

7021

EC. *Shindell* MS/2/12

~~MS/2/12~~ JAN 10 REC'D 1997

140

Chief Commissioner. (139)

Attached is submitted for your signature information

7020

✓ *[Signature]*

FC

M. S. LUSH  $\frac{11}{3}$

7819

110

Attache, Ex Comm

Ex. Com. You will probably like to see 117

213 26/11

129

Ex. Com. Collier 111-117 - AVM Brodie has a copy of  
He is preparing a brief for C.C. - August 15/12. 358

121

Chief Commissioner

I submit MTPs papers for Italian  
Air Force (111-116) & AVB Brodie's comments  
thereon. I understand this will be before SACCOM's  
next conference. You may wish (1) to discuss  
with AVM (2) take him with you to the meeting

117 (19/12)

122

Discussed - DW (15/12)

117 (19/12)

2 submit NTPS papers for Nabein

Air Force (111-110) & AVB Brodie's comments  
thereon. I understand this will be before Secmed's  
next conference. You may wish (1) to discuss  
with AV M. (2) take him with you to the meeting

128 (19/11)

1-11-12

Discard. <sup>122</sup> DW (15/11)

131

Ex.com P. 128-130 for inf. 1011 -

132. 27/12.

Esso Saabye NOI has been omitted  
from the recommendation - P. 128.

133 (27/11)

Yes. Amended accordingly.

1-11-12 28/12.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Italian Military Affairs Section  
A P O 794.

Reference: IMAS/23/AIR/A.F.

21 February 1947.

Subject : Directive for Air Forces Sub-Section.

TO : Chief of Staff,  
Allied Force Headquarters.  
(For attention M.A.A.C. Secretariat).

1. In view of F.M. 697 approving the re-organisation of the Interim Italian Air Force as recommended by SAC/IED in MAF. 1103 and 1169 (with certain provisos) and in view of F.M. 694 and F.M. 649 approving certain Italian civil aviation and aircraft construction, it is recommended that the Directive for the Air Forces Sub-Section (ex-Air Forces Sub-Commission) be amended and brought up to date.

2. The new set up on the closing down of the Allied Commission and the merging of the three Italian services under one Minister of Defence also necessitate amendments.

3. A draft directive is accordingly forwarded herewith for consideration and approval.

/s/ Emory W. Stone

Chief, I.M.A.S.  
Copies: Air Forces Sub-Section. ✓  
File.  
- Float.

EMORY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief  
Italian Military Affairs Section.

7816 ..

213

MEMORANDUM

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
AFC 312

Reference:

February 1947.

Subject : Directive for Air Forces Sub-Section, I.M.A.S.  
To : Air Vice Marshal I.S. BARRIE, C.M.B., Director,  
Air Forces Sub-Section, I.M.A.S.  
TMB: Chief, I.M.A.S.

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 28 th. August 1945 under reference AG 334/111/AFCS-0.

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Advisor on the Italian Military Affairs Section of A.M.C. and in particular to advise the Chief of I.M.A.S. on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently :

- a. As head of the Air Forces Sub-Section you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEA/AFS, and Senior Officer US, Army Air Forces, Italy, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.
- b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief of I.M.A.S.

3. Italian Air Force.

3013

a. The Italian Air Force under the terms of the peace treaty will be allowed an authorized manpower of 25,000. Pending the

bringing into force of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that the

on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

- a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Section you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEHQ/AF, and Senior Officer US, Army Air Forces, Italy, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such Air force matters.
- b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief of I.M.A.S.

3. Italian Air Force.

7815

- a. The Italian Air Force under the terms of the peace treaty will be allowed an authorized manpower of 25,000. Pending the bringing into force of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that the interim authorized upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-III's and US-III's) is not exceeded.
- b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Minister of Defence, the Chief of Air Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to re-organise and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with the directives issued by the Supreme Allied Commander with, so far as is practicable, their own authorized resources and such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should

...../mabc



make clear to the aforementioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit Allied policy instructions to the Italian Ministry of Defense (Air) or on major policy matters to the Italian Ministry of Defense through the Chief I.M.A.S. and, secondly, to assist that Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Ministry for Defense (Air) or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, or to the Chief of I.M.A.S. as appropriate, including if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers; this clause also applies in respect of Italian civil aviation authorities.

C. All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CEAF; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Force put at his disposal their maximum effort in military air forces.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Chief of I.M.A.S. and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as member of the A.P.S.S., as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Under-Secretary of State for Air. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointment of Colonels and

I.M.A.S. as appropriate, including if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers; this clause also applies in respect of Italian civil aviation authorities.

c. All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CEAF; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Force put at his disposal their maximum effort in military air forces.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Chief of I.M.A.S. and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as member of the A.F.S.S., as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Under-Secretary of State for Air. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointment of Colonels and above in the Italian Air Force in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. It is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtain themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter

...../for

For the Italian authorities themselves.

b. That you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters, whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee (MAMC) Secretariat, will call on the Staff branches of RAF MED/AF and competent USAAF authorities for advice, assistance and authority on matters concerning organization, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

6. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAMC Secretariat and any special report called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief of I.M.A.S. and as directed by him within I.M.A.S. and to the American and British Ambassadors, Rome, and to MAMC Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alterations in the distribution which may become necessary.

7. Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

You will ensure, so far as is practicable, that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation generally are organized efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO and other International authorities. You will ensure that the operation of civil aviation in Italy is responsible for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is

organization, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

6. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to NACG Secretariat and any special report called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief of I.M.A.S. and as directed by him within I.M.A.S. and to the American and British Ambassadors, Rome, and to NACG Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary.

7. Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

You will ensure, so far as is practicable, that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation generally are organized efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO. You will ensure that the operations of civil aviation in Italy is responsible for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is operated.

8. The Italian Ministry of Defense (Air) should be encouraged and, as far as possible, assisted in the re-organization and rehabilitation of the Italian Aircraft Industry so that it may be an effective and reasonable backing for authorized Italian Civil Aviation.

9. Intelligence.

You should ensure that the Intelligence staff of the Italian Ministry of Defense (Air) makes available to you, for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Forces any information that they may obtain and which may affect the political situation or may be in anyway of value to the Intelligence Staff of RAP, MED/AF and competent USARP formations.

2074

785017

214.

2nd REVISED DRAFT.

SECRET.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
A P O 512.

Reference: February 1947.

Subject : Directive for Air Forces Sub-Section, I.M.A.S.

TO : Air Vice Marshal I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E., *Director*  
Air Forces Sub-Section, I.M.A.S.,  
THRU: Chief, I.M.A.S.

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 28th August 1945 under reference AG 334/111/SACS-0.

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Advisor on the Italian Military Affairs Section of A.F.H.Q. and in particular to advise the Chief of I.M.A.S. on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

- a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Section you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MED/AF, and Senior Officer, Army Air Forces, Italy, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.
- b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief of I.M.A.S.

\*  
12.  
Col. Kenneth BRAT  
G.A. H. H. H.

the Chief of I.M.A.S. (81)

3. Italian Air Force.

a. The Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty 1947

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Advisor on the Italian Military Affairs Section of A.F.H.Q. and in particular to advise the Chief of I.M.A.S. on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

- a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Section you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MED/AF, and Senior Officer US, Army Air Forces, Italy, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.
- b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief of I.M.A.S.

(89)

3. Italian Air Force.

- a. The Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty will be allowed an authorized manpower of 25,000. Pending the bringing into force of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that the interim authorized upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-ITI's and US-ITI's) is not exceeded.
- b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Minister of Defence, the Chief of Air Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to re-organise and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with the directives issued by the Supreme Allied Commander with, so far as is practicable, their own authorized resources and such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should

...../make

\*  
1.2  
John Brown - USAAF  
3-4-44

make clear to the above-mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit Allied policy instructions to the Italian Ministry of Defence (Air) and, secondly, to assist that Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force ~~authorities~~ <sup>authorities</sup> are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Ministry for Defence (Air) or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, ~~(Info)~~ <sup>or to</sup> the Chief of I.M.A.S. as appropriate, including if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers: *this clause also applies in respect of Italian civil aviation authorities.*

c. All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CEM; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Force ~~is available for the disposal of~~ <sup>is available for the disposal of</sup> at his disposal their maximum effort in military air forces ~~and in civil aviation.~~

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief of I.M.A.S. and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, in the light of your ~~own~~ <sup>own</sup> and official contacts as member of the A.P.S.S., as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any

2076

ing if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers: *This clause also applies in respect of Italian civil aviation authorities.*

c. All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CEF; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Force ~~is in the direct control of the Supreme Allied Commander~~ put at his disposal their maximum effort in military air forces ~~and civil aviation~~

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief of I.M.A.S. and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, in the light of your ~~high~~ ~~high~~ and official contacts as member of the A.F.S.S., as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Under-Secretary of State for Air. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointment of Colonels and above in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. It is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter



- 3 -

for the Italian authorities themselves.

b. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters, whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of Italian service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee (MAAC) Secretariat, will call on the Staff Branches of RAF MED/ME and competent USAF authorities for advice, assistance and authority on matters concerning organisation, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

6. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAAC Secretariat and any special report called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief of I.M.A.S. and as directed by him within I.M.A.S. <sup>and to the American and British Embassies</sup> and to MAAC Secretariat for <sup>Rome</sup> external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary.

7. Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

You will ensure, so far as is practicable, that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO or other international authorities. You will ensure that the operation of civil aviation in Italy is reasonable for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is operated.

8. The Italian Ministry of Defence (Air) should be encouraged and, as far

organization, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

6. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAAC Secretariat and any special report called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief of I.M.A.S. and as directed by him within I.M.A.S. <sup>and to the American and British Embassies</sup> and to MAAC Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary. *RMS*

7. Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

You will ensure, so far as is practicable, that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation <sup>generally</sup> are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO or other international authorities. You will ensure that the operation of civil aviation in Italy is reasonable for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is operated.

6. The Italian Ministry of Defence (Air) should be encouraged and, as far as possible, assisted in the re-organisation and rehabilitation of the Italian Aircraft Industry so that it may be an effective and reasonable backing for authorised Italian Civil Aviation.

*Not done  
page 10  
by staff  
on form*

9. *Should the necessary arise you are to ensure that the Italian Department of Civil Aviation fulfils all the*

10. *Intelligence.*  
*of the Supreme Allied Command, C.M.F., their maximum effort in civil aviation*

You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Ministry of Defence (Air) makes available to you, for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Forces, any information that they may obtain and which may affect the political situation or may be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff of RAF, HED/ME and authorised USAF formations. *compulsory*

*OK M  
J. 6/1/51*

1st Board

213

D R A F T

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.  
AFC 512.

17th January 1947.

Subject :- Directive for Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

To :- Air Vice Marshal BRODIE, O.B.E.,  
Air Forces Sub-~~Section, Allied Commission~~ **IMAS**  
THRU: Chief ~~Commissioner, Allied Commission~~ **IMAS**.

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 28th August 1945 under reference AG 334/111/SACS-O.   
*to act as Allied Air Advisor on the ~~Allied Commission~~ <sup>Italian Military Affairs Section of AFHQ</sup> and ~~Section~~ <sup>of IMAS</sup>*
  2. Your duty is to advise the Chief ~~Commissioner~~ on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:
    - a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-~~Commission~~ <sup>Section</sup> you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF ~~MEDM, and ~~Commanding General~~ <sup>Senior Officer US</sup>, Army Air Forces, ~~Mediterranean Theatre of Operations~~, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.~~
    - b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief ~~Commissioner~~ <sup>of IMAS</sup>.
- ~~Allied Commission~~ **7807 -**
3. Italian Air Force.
    - a. ~~The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an~~ <sup>The</sup> Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty <sup>will</sup> be allowed an authorised manpower of 25,000.   
~~But Pending the bringing into force of the ~~terms~~ of the Peace Treaty it~~

in particular to advise the Chief ~~Commissioner~~ on matters affecting the Italian

Air Force. Consequently:

a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-<sup>Section</sup>Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF <sup>Italy</sup> MIDE, and <sup>Service Office in US.</sup> ~~Commander~~, Army Air Forces, ~~Mediterranean Theatre of Operations~~, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.

b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or <sup>of I.M.A.S.</sup> ~~which affect the other services~~, you will be responsible to the Chief ~~Commissioner~~,

1802 -

3. Italian Air Force.

a. ~~The Combined Chiefs of Staff will~~ <sup>The</sup> Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty be allowed an authorized manpower of 25,000. ~~Not~~ Pending the bringing into force ~~of the terms~~ <sup>of the terms</sup> of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that <sup>the interim advised</sup> ~~an~~ upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-ITF's and US-ITF's) is not exceeded.

b. Your primary function, in general, is ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> assist the Italian ~~Minister of Defense, the~~ <sup>Minister of Defense, the</sup> Chief of ~~Staff~~ <sup>Staff</sup> and Italian Air Force authorities generally, <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ organize and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with <sup>the directives issued</sup> ~~the policies laid down~~ by the Supreme Allied Commander with, so far as is practicable, their own authorized resources and such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear, and

...../.

212

- 2 -

*copy  
for present  
subject*

should make clear to the above-mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first, to transmit to the <sup>Minister of Defense (Air)</sup> Italian Air Ministry the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as may be available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Supreme Allied Commander and the Chief <sup>of IMA's</sup> ~~of IMA's~~ including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

c. All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CWP; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air <sup>Force and the Directorate of Civil Aviation</sup> Ministry puts at his disposal their maximum effort both in military air forces and civil aviation.

e. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. <sup>in 1941</sup> In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief <sup>of IMA's and the Italian Air Force</sup> ~~Commissioner~~ in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as member of the <sup>A F S S</sup> ~~Allied Commission~~, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any <sup>Potential</sup> ~~potential~~ <sup>Secretary of State for Air</sup> ~~Secretary of State for Air~~ you will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointments of Colonels and above in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you

officers.

c. All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CEF; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Force <sup>Force and the Disposal of Air Assets</sup> Ministry acts at his disposal their maximum effort both in military air forces and civil aviation.

4.

a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. <sup>7/10/43</sup>  
 event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for <sup>AFSS and its predecessor as the Air Committee</sup> advising the Chief <sup>AFSS</sup> ~~Commissioner~~, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as member of the ~~Allied Commission~~, <sup>as to the qualifications,</sup> from the Air Force point of view, of any ~~potential~~ <sup>Potential</sup> ~~Secretary of State for Air~~ <sup>Secretary</sup>. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of professional suitability the appointments of Colonels and above in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under ~~(or since)~~ the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. ~~You should encourage any political activities on the part of the Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice.~~ ~~It is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which the Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the Italian authorities themselves.~~

...../.

b. Thus you and your Staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters, whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your Staff, through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee (MAC) Secretariat <sup>will</sup> call on the Staff Branches of RAF MED/AF <sup>compulsory USAF authorities</sup> and <sup>and authority</sup> ~~RAF MED/AF and MAC~~ for advice, ~~and~~ assistance on matters concerning organization, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

6. Under the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force, the Italian Air Ministry may, if they so desire, re-organise an Air Force with a maximum limit of 200 fighter aircraft and 150 non-combatant aircraft (i.e. training, reconnaissance, air sea rescue, <sup>target</sup> ~~or other~~ towing ~~aircraft~~). It will be your responsibility to ensure that they receive advice on the re-organization and disposition of their Air Force and if Allied type aircraft are supplied and Allied ground equipment, including Signals and Radar, are requested, you will ensure that they receive efficient spares backing and as much technical and training advice and help as is possible.

7. You will make effective plans which will ensure that the upper limit of aircraft is not exceeded, that existing multi-engine bomber aircraft now used for transport and courier flights are effectively demilitarised, and that all other surplus aircraft are reduced to components or scrap. A target date of the 1st August, 1947, by which time all redundant aircraft above the maximum limits set (para.6) must be destroyed, will, however, be permitted but the actual date will be as stipulated in the eventual Peace Treaty.

Re-write

6. Under the interim policy for the Italian Air Force, the Italian Air Ministry may, if they so desire, re-organise an Air Force with a maximum limit of 200 fighter aircraft and 150 non-combatant aircraft (i.e. training, reconnaissance, air sea rescue, <sup>Target</sup> ~~and other~~ towing ~~missions~~). It will be your responsibility to ensure that they receive advice on the re-organisation and disposition of their Air Force and if Allied type aircraft are supplied and Allied ground equipment, including signals and Radar, are requested, you will ensure that they receive efficient spares backing and as much technical and training advice and help as is possible.

7. You will make effective plans which will ensure that the upper limit of aircraft is not exceeded, that existing multi-engined bomber aircraft now used for transport and courier flights are effectively demilitarised, and that all other surplus aircraft are reduced to components or scrap. A target date of the 1st August, 1947, by which ~~that~~ all redundant aircraft above the maximum limits set (para.6) must be destroyed, will, however, be permitted but the actual date will be as stipulated in the eventual Peace Treaty.

Re-write

8. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAC Secretariat and any special report called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief <sup>of IMAAS</sup> ~~of IMAAS~~ ~~and as directed by him within the Commission~~ and to MAC Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alternation in the distribution which may become necessary.

9. Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction. You will ensure <sup>so far as practicable</sup> that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO or other international authorities, ~~as far as possible~~.

...../.



210

-4-

This will assist in the inauguration of external air lines, when authorized. You will ensure that the <sup>operation</sup> ~~movement~~ of civil aviation in Italy is reasonable for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is operated.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged and, as far as possible, assisted in the re-organization and rehabilitation of the Italian Aircraft Industry so that it may be an effective and reasonable backing for authorized Italian Civil Aviation.

11. Intelligence.

*Italian Ministry of Defense (Am)*

You should <sup>ensure</sup> ~~make certain~~ that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry makes available to you, for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Forces, any information that they may obtain and which may affect the political situation or may be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff of P.A.F. MEDAF and <sup>authorized</sup> ~~staff~~ USAAF <sup>formation</sup>.

QEC 19 1946

209

From:- Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.  
 To :- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, ROME.  
 Date:- 17th December, 1946.  
 Ref :- AFSC/23/AIR.

SECRET.DIRECTIVE FOR THE AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

1. By verbal agreement with M.A.A.C. Secretariat we have written a new draft Directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, because the current one is now out of date, as a result of recent C.C.S. and A.P.H.Q. policy decisions. The draft is submitted herewith for your approval.
2. I have checked through the current Directive and can confirm that the major points have been included in the draft to which is also added a civil aviation section.
3. It is questionable as to whether at this stage it is worthwhile having a Directive for the A.P.S.C. and I have discussed the principle with Major General Airey and we have agreed that an up to-date Directive would be a good thing.
4. When forwarding the draft Directive to M.A.A.C. Secretariat I propose saying that you have agreed the draft and that in practice we are working to the instructions contained in the draft.
5. Do you please agree.



I.E. BRODIE,  
 AIR VICE MARSHAL,  
 DIRECTOR,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

7797

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.  
AFC 512.

13th December, 1946.

Subject: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

To : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, O.B.E.,  
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.  
TFEU: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

14 A Refer. ↓

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on 6th March, 1945 under reference number RHP/lje.

43 not real  
7% for action  
25/18

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. As representative of A.F.H.C. you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner on matters, which, under the Armistice Terms and the Interim Policy for the Italian and Italian Civil Aviation Air Forces, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. Italian Air Force.

(a) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty be allowed an authorised manpower of 25,000. But pending the bringing into force of the terms of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that an upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-ITI's and US-ITI's) is not exceeded.

(b) Your primary function, in general, is to advise and assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to organise and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with the policy laid down by

179

As representative of A.F.H.Q. you will be responsible/to the Chief Commissioner to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and on matters, which, under the Armistice Terms and the Interim Policy for the Italian and Italian Civil Aviation Air Force, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. Italian Air Force.

(a) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force under the terms of the Peace Treaty be allowed an authorised manpower of 25,000. But pending the bringing into force of the terms of the Peace Treaty it is your duty to ensure that an upper limit of 31,000 (including Br-ITF's and US-ITF's) is not exceeded.

(b) Your primary function, in general, is to advise and assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to organise and run an efficient Interim Air Force in accordance with the policy laid down by the Supreme Allied Commander with, so far as is practicable, their own authorised resources and such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should encourage the Italians gradually to reduce their Air Force down to the limits imposed by the Draft Peace Treaty. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above-mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies.

...../If in your view.....

If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Supreme Allied Commander and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. (a) Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner, in the light

5. (c) All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CIFT; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Ministry puts at his disposal their maximum effort both in military air forces and civil aviation. 79?

Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of the Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities

in which the Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that in

3.

(c) All Italian operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, CMT; should the necessity arise, it will be your duty to ensure that the Italian Air Ministry puts at his disposal their maximum effort both in military air forces and civil aviation. **79**

Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment.

You should discourage any political activities on the part of the Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice.

Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by effecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which the Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the Italian authorities themselves.

(b) Thus you and your Staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters, whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your Staff, through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee (MAAC) Secretariat, may call on the Staff Branches of ~~RAF~~ <sup>and CAAF</sup> ~~RAF MED/ME~~ for advice and assistance on matters concerning organisation, maintenance and supply, training and equipment.

...../Para. 6.....

6. Under the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force, the Italian Air Ministry may, if they so desire, re-organise an Air Force with a maximum limit of 200 fighter aircraft and 150 non-combatant aircraft (i.e. training, reconnaissance, air sea rescue, drogue towing and A.O.P.). It will be your responsibility to ensure that they receive advice on the re-organisation and disposition of their Air Force and if Allied type aircraft are supplied and Allied ground equipment, including Signals and Radar, are requested, you will ensure that they receive efficient/backing and as much technical spares and training advice and help as is possible.
7. You will make effective plans which will ensure that the upper limit of aircraft is not exceeded, that existing multi-engined bomber aircraft now used for transport and courier flights are effectively demilitarised, and that all other surplus aircraft are reduced to components <sup>or scrap.</sup> A target date of the 1st August, 1947, by which time all redundant aircraft above the maximum limits set (para. 6) must be destroyed, will, however, be permitted but the actual date will be as stipulated in the eventual Peace Treaty.
8. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAAC Secretariat and any special reports called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief Commissioner and as directed by him within the Allied Commission and to MAAC Secretariat for external distribution; the latter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary.  
Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.
9.  You will ensure that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO or other international authorities, so far as you are able. This will assist in the inauguration of external air lines, when authorised. You

aircraft is not exceeded, that existing multi-engined bomber aircraft now used for transport and courier flights are effectively demilitarised, and that all other surplus aircraft are reduced to components <sup>or scrap.</sup> A target date of the 1st August, 1947, by which time all redundant aircraft above the maximum limits set (para. 6) must be destroyed, will, however, be permitted but the actual date will be as stipulated in the eventual Peace Treaty.

8. You will submit Monthly Air Reports to MAAC Secretariat and any special reports called for by competent authorities; they will be forwarded to the Chief Commissioner and as directed by him within the Allied Commission and to MAAC Secretariat for external distribution; the letter will be responsible for determining any alteration in the distribution which may become necessary.

Civil Aviation and Aircraft Construction.

9. You will ensure that Italian Internal Civil Air Lines and Italian Civil Aviation are organised efficiently and operate under the International standards of safety laid down by ICAO or other international authorities, so far as you are able. This will assist in the inauguration of external air lines, when authorised. You will ensure that the amount of civil aviation in Italy is reasonable for civil purposes and that no para-military aviation is operated.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged and, as far as possible, assisted in the re-organisation and rehabilitation of the Italian Aircraft Industry so that it may be an effective and reasonable backing for authorised Italian Civil Aviation.

11. Intelligence. You should make certain that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry makes available to you, for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Forces, any information that they may obtain and which may affect the political situation or may be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at Allied Force Headquarters. *of Staff Mediterranean and DAF/AFM*



85014  
SECRET

CC 8503

23 December 1946

SUBJECT: Report on Anglo-American - Italian Air Relations.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.  
ATTENTION: Chief of Staff.

1. Reference your undated letter AF 148, above subject, (received in the Allied Commission on 20 December) concerning the article which appeared in the Italian newspaper "UNITA" on 4 December 1946 which revealed a leakage of information, it is believed that the leak occurred in the Italian Air Ministry. The following is the sequence of events in connection with this matter.

2. On 2 December a conference was held at the Italian Air Ministry, at which the following officers were present: The Director, Deputy Director and Senior Equipment Officer together with two Officer Interpreters of the Air Forces Sub-Commission and Squadron Leader Thompson of the British Air Ministry, Generals Aimone Cat, Brigante, Monte, Coppi and Biffi and Colonel Gransanti of the Italian Air Force. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the reorganization and re-equipment of the Italian Air Force. It is apparent from the wording of the article in "UNITA" (of 4 December) that one of the officers present at this conference actually communicated information to the offices of the newspaper "UNITA".

3. On 4 December (the day on which the "UNITA" article appeared) the Head of the Italian Intelligence Section informed the Air Forces Sub-Commission that the Chief of Air Staff (General Aimone Cat) was intending to reply to the article and that he was considerably concerned at the leak of information. Subsequently two further articles were published in "UNITA" dated 6 and 7 December and another article appeared in "GIORNALE DELLA SERA" on 7 December; copies of these three subsequent articles are forwarded herewith for your information. From them it will be observed that the Air Minister took the matter seriously and his answers seem to have satisfied the Italian Press because no further articles on this subject have appeared.

4. It will also be observed that the names of the Italian Officers present at the Conference are given in a "UNITA" article, General Porro was not present ("UNITA" admitted that he was not present in an article of 14 December), but as was pointed out at the time by the Intelligence Section of the Italian Air Ministry, it is significant that the name of General Biffi was not mentioned.

5. On 11 December and 13 December respectively, both the Italian Chief of Staff and the Italian Air Minister verbally admitted to the Director and Deputy Director Air Forces Sub-Commission that they suspect that General Biffi was responsible for this serious leak of in-

SECRET

203

formation. The Air Minister himself is already conducting an inquiry, the results of which are not yet known in the A.F.S.C. However, the Director A.F.S.C. is still pursuing the matter and you will be informed of the ultimate result of the inquiry and of any disciplinary action which the Italian Air Ministry may decide to take.

6. I am assured by the Director A.F.S.C. that all precautions possible have been taken in the A.F.S.C. to keep these matters secret, for example: -

(1) Soon after your signal UX.473 dated 15 November was received, the Director and Deputy Director A.F.S.C. went to the Italian Air Ministry on 22 November to discuss verbally the implications resulting from that signal, which approved the re-organization of the Interim Italian Air Force under certain conditions. At the meeting (on 22 November) the Director opened by saying that the subject to be discussed should be treated as "SECRET" and when confirming the information verbally released to the Italian Air Ministry, the A.F.S.C. letter (dated 26 November 1946) was marked "ITALIAN & ALLIED SECRET". At a meeting on 2 December it was again impressed upon all present that the subject matter under discussion should be treated as "Secret".

(11) On 4 December and as a result of the extract in "UNITA" dated 4 December it was decided at an A.F.S.C. Weekly Staff Meeting that the attention of all ranks was to be drawn to a serious leak of information and that they were to be reminded not to divulge secret information.

7. I am satisfied that the leak did not occur from Allied Commission personnel.

8. For your information, the Director A.F.S.C. brought to my attention the series of articles in the Italian Press as soon as they had been translated and I am satisfied that he has taken all action possible to trace the source of the leakage and that his actions subsequent to the leakage, in his relations with the Italian Air Ministry, have been correct.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

2786

Copy to:  
AOC, AIR RAF Italy  
Director AF S/C AC

Ex Commr  
CC Files

SECRET

2098

785017

DEC 23 1946

Ex-1000

850/9/4/533

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ROME.

To :- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, ROME. ✓  
 Copies: Political Advisor (British).  
 Political Advisor (American).

Date:- 19th December, 1946.

Ref :- AFSC/558/30RG.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND CIVIL AVIATION.

The following extracts from a Weekly A.F.S.C. Staff Conference held in Rome on 15th December, 1946 are forwarded for your information.

"1. Director's Visit to the I.A.M. - The Director opened the meeting informing all officers he had visited the Italian Air Ministry this morning (15th December) with Deputy Director. Various items were discussed.

a) F.I.C.A.O. - To begin with the Director told the Air Ministry that he had written to higher authorities suggesting that Italy should become a member of P.I.C.A.O.

b) Construction of Civil Aircraft for Sale Overseas - The Director asked the Air Minister if he wished to ask authority to build civil aircraft for sale overseas. The reply was in the negative but the Air Minister said he would let us know later after discussing the matter with his technical advisor.

c) Internal Air Lines. - The Air Minister is having a final meeting on the 17th December to determine the details of the introduction of internal civil air lines; those present will include Ministers from various branches of the Government, Industry, Finance, Transport, etc. The main items for discussion will be licences, routes and fares. There are 15 companies to be considered, two of which are semi-state that is the American-Italian and British-Italian Companies.

d) Overseas Routes - The Director told the Air Minister that until Internal Air Lines were running satisfactorily and we were satisfied that everything possible was being done for the safety of the passengers and aircraft, no overseas routes will be allowed. The Director emphasised to the Air Minister that the section working on International Safety Measures, that the Italians will have to adopt, should speed up the work and recommend amendments to obsolete laws as soon as possible. The Director also informed the Air Minister that when other countries wish to run air lines to Italy, the Italian Air Minister was within his rights to insist on reciprocal routes for Italy, pending authority to operate them.

e) Civil Aeronautics Board - The Air Minister was informed that the Deputy

788?

20971  
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

a) F.I.C.A.C. - To begin with the Director told the Air Ministry that he had written to higher authorities suggesting that Italy should become a member of F.I.C.A.C.

b) Construction of Civil Aircraft for Sale Overseas - The Director asked the Air Minister if he wished to ask authority to build civil aircraft for sale overseas. The reply was in the negative but the Air Minister said he would let us know later after discussing the matter with his technical advisor.

c) Internal Air Lines. - The Air Minister is having a final meeting on the 17th December to determine the details of the introduction of internal civil air lines; those present will include Ministers from various branches of the Government, Industry, Finance, Transport, etc. The main items for discussion will be licences, routes and fares. There are 15 companies to be considered, two of which are semi-state that is the American-Italian and British-Italian Companies.

d) Overseas Routes - The Director told the Air Minister that until Internal Air Lines were running satisfactorily and we were satisfied that everything possible was being done for the safety of the passengers and aircraft, no overseas routes will be allowed. The Director emphasised to the Air Minister that the section working on International Safety Measures, that the Italians will have to adopt, should speed up the work and recommend amendments to obsolete laws as soon as possible. The Director also informed the Air Minister that when other countries wish to run air lines to Italy, the Italian Air Minister was within his rights to insist on reciprocal routes for Italy, pending authority to operate them.

7881  
e) Civil Aeronautics Board - The Air Minister was informed that the Deputy Director was trying to get full information about the C.A.E. (from F.W.A. Officials in Rome). D.D. to write to the Air Ministry giving them full particulars and stating that the Air Ministry may like to inaugurate a similar thing for civil aviation in Italy.

f) Ciampino, Capodichino and Bari - The Director told the Air Minister that as Ciampino is unlikely to accept Italian civil air training by day or by night, Bari is the best place now and soon it would be possible at Capodichino (subject to confirmation) on hand over on 31st January, 1947. Agreed to reply to 27A in 39/2/Air in that sense. D.D. to send a letter to M.A.A.C. informing them that it is understood that the position at Capodichino is that the Americans intend to hand back the Aerodrome by the end of January '47 as requested and to ask the C.O. that P.S.B. runway and terminal buildings are handed over to the Italians intact. Will M.A.A.C. let us have an official report on what the Americans are going to do so that we may inform the Italian Air Ministry and save them considerable expense repairing buildings on the other side of the Aerodrome. D.D. also to inform the Air Ministry verbally that the terminal buildings may be left to them in the near future.

.....E).....

4

- g) Rome Airport - The Air Minister told the Director that a conference had been held with several interested Government Department Representatives. The Director advised the Air Minister that they should have British and/or American Consultants with recent experience in civil airport design. The Italian Air Ministry will keep in touch with British and American Consultants and any further action so far as the A.F.S.C. are concerned should be between the British and Americans on the one hand and Italians on the other through the two Embassies.
- h) Genoa - The Air Minister then told the Director that the Municipality propose to build a large airport for land aircraft and seaplanes into the sea at Genoa for International Civil Aviation, he may need British and/or American Consultants advice. It is a long term project estimated to cost 3 Milliard Lire.
- i) Italian Air Force Re-organisation - The Italian Air Minister said that he had discussed the plan with various Ministers including the Prime Minister, whose attitude is favourable towards it. The Director said that he would signal British Air Ministry London, informing them that the general reaction in principle to the British Plan is favourable.
- j) Amendola Project - The Air Minister had already held a meeting with the various Ministers and their reactions towards the taking over of this Base was favourable. A Meeting is due to take place on the 16th or 17th December, 1946 at Amendola. D.D. will arrange American Staff Representation. The Italian plea for taking over is to make it an International Civil Airport. When decision is reached as to what exactly it will be, British and American Embassies should be informed as various International Civil Air Lines with aircraft to large to land at Ciampino are interested in knowing whether they can use Amendola instead. D.D. agreed to inform Caserta with verbal request to stop evacuation of material from Amendola."

*Ian P. Brodie*

I.E. BRODIE,  
AIR VICE MARSHAL,  
DIRECTOR,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

199

8501 R.

From : Air Forces Sub Commission, A.C., Rome.

To : Chief Commissioner (Through Executive Commissioner). **OCT 24 1946**

Date : 22nd October, 1946.

Ref : AFSC/357/Org.

SECRET

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION - ALLIED COMMISSION

ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION

The Air Forces Sub Commission, Headquarters Allied Commission is responsible for all matters relating to policy in connection with the Italian Air Ministry under the Armistice terms as laid down in AFHQ Directive for the A.F.S.C. A.C. 334/111/SACS dated 28th August 1945 as amplified by A.G. 091.711/231/SACS-O of the 23rd September, 1945, which was the interim Policy of the Italian Air Force. This policy is now in the process of modification.

2. The officers appointed to this Sub Commission and their duties are indicated below.

DIRECTOR - AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E.

3. (i) Responsible on Technical and Administrative Air Force matters to the C-in-C R.A.F. MED/AF and the Commanding General Army Air Forces Mediterranean Theatre of operations in Committee (herein called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee). On matters of Policy such as those which present political issues including Italian Civil Aviation and which affect the other services, the Director is responsible to the Chief Commissioner.

(ii) The Director is responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry complies with the Directives which are received from time to time from the Supreme Allied Commander and to assist and advise the Italian Air Minister and Italian Air Force authorities generally to have as efficient an Air Force as possible in accordance with the policy laid down by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. (The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee now consists of the Air Officer Commanding R.A.F. Italy, and the Chief Air Advisory Section M.T.O. U.S.A.).

The Air Forces Sub Commission, Headquarters Allied Commission is responsible for all matters relating to policy in connection with the Italian Air Ministry under the Armistice terms as laid down in AFHQ Directive for the A.F.S.C. A.G. 334/111/SACS dated 28th August 1945 as amplified by A.G. 091.711/231/SACS-0 of the 23rd September, 1945, which was the interim Policy of the Italian Air Force. This policy is now in the process of modification.

2. The officers appointed to this Sub Commission and their duties are indicated below.

DIRECTOR - AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE, O.B.E.

3. (i) Responsible on Technical and Administrative Air Force matters to the C-in-C R.A.F. MED/IE and the Commanding General Army Air Forces Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee (herein called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee). On matters of Policy such as those which present political issues including Italian Civil Aviation and which affect the other services, the Director is responsible to the Chief Commissioner.

(ii) The Director is responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry complies with the Directives which are received from time to time from the Supreme Allied Commander and to assist and advise the Italian Air Minister and Italian Air Force authorities generally to have as efficient an Air Force as possible in accordance with the policy laid down by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. (The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee now consists of the Air Officer Commanding R.A.F. Italy, and the Chief Air Advisory Section M.T.O. U.S.A.).

DEPUTY DIRECTOR - LT. COL. F.E. MAREK.

4. (i) Assistant to the Director in his duties as defined above.  
(ii) O.C. American element of the A.F.S.C.

SENIOR STAFF OFFICER - G/CAPT. L.E. JARMAN, D.F.C.

5. (i) O.C. H.Q. A.F.S.C. Unit and British element of the A.F.S.C.  
(ii) Italian Civilian Aviation in conjunction with the Director, Deputy Director and Org. III.  
(iii) Coordination and allocation of all Air Staff and Organisation duties.

AIR STAFF

AIR I - W/CDR. C.M.M. GREECE, D.F.C.

6. 1. Air Staff Policy in conjunction with S.S.O. and D.D.

See M 200, 201

PA 25  
10  
MR

(CAPT K)

198

-2-

- 2. Training and operations of the Fighter Stormos, Seaplane, Bomber and Transport Wings.
- 3. Flying Training Schools and Navigation Schools.
- 4. Inspection of Flying Stations, Schools and recruit centres.
- 5. Monthly air report.
- 6. Accident investigations.

AIR II - F/LT. REID.

- 7. 1. Flying Control.
- 2. Air Sea Rescue, Mountain Rescue and Aircraft Safety.
- 3. Training Italian Air Force on new R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. aircraft safety equipment and Marine Craft.
- 4. Liaison officer on American and British aircraft safety matters.
- 5. Supervising the efficiency of the C.A.V.s.

AIR III - LT. FAVANO.

- 8. 1. Training in I.A.F. and disposition of training aircraft.
- 2. Supervision of Flying and Ground Training.
- 3. Advice to C.T.O. on American Aircraft.
- 4. British and American Training information to Italian Air Ministry.

ORGANISATION

ORG. I. - S/LDR. SALTER, D.F.C.

- 9. 1. Control of Air Movements in I.A.F.
- 2. Air Passages on Italian Military Air Courier Service, for Allied Personnel - Policy.
- 3. Requisitioning and Derequisitioning Italian Air Force.
- 4. Utilisation of I.A.F. Manpower - Prisoners of War, Welfare, Courses, Personnel matters etc.
- 5. Re-organisation of Air Council and Air Ministry.
- 6. Selection of Interpreters for Liaison with R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.
- 7. Minutes of Staff Conferences.

ORG. II. - LT. WEISS.

- 10. 1. Assisting Org. I.
- 2. Airfields.
- 3. Organisation of Italian Military Air Courier Service (77)

ORG. III. - LT. HAGAN.

- 11. 1. Booking Air Passages on Italian Military Courier Services for Allied personnel.

Foreign Civilian Air Lines.



2. Supervision of Flying and Ground Training.
3. Advice to C.T.O. on American Aircraft.
4. British and American Training information to Italian Air Ministry.

ORGANISATION

ORG. I. - S/LDR. SALTER, D.F.C.

9. 1. Control of Air Movements in I.A.F.
2. Air Passages on Italian Military Air Courier Service, for Allied Personnel - Policy.
3. Requisitioning and Derequisitioning Italian Air Force.
4. Utilisation of I.A.F. Manpower - Prisoners of War, Welfare, Courses, Personnel matters etc.
5. Re-organisation of Air Council and Air Ministry.
6. Selection of Interpreters for Liaison with R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.
7. Minutes of Staff Conferences.

ORG. II. - LT. NEISS.

10. 1. Assisting Org. I.
2. Airfields.
3. Organisation of Italian Military Air Courier Services *77y*

ORG. III. - LT. HAGAN.

11. 1. Booking Air Passages on Italian Military Courier Services for Allied personnel.
2. Correspondence on Foreign Civilian Air Lines.
3. Clearance of Foreign Aircraft.
4. Pilot for maintenance of American A.F.S.C. aircraft.

SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER -

FFT/OFF. LEGAT (W.A.A.F.)

12. 1. Receiving and translating Intelligence Reports for distribution to Allied Intelligence Departments.
2. Press reports reading and extracting comments from the press and official publications.
3. Collation of inventions.
4. Security.
5. Tracing of Prisoners of War.
6. Tracing of shot down Allied Aircrews.
7. Preparing Int. Reports and maintaining records on I.A.F. Personnel.
8. Reporting on I.A.F. Morale.
9. Reports on Foreign Aviation.

197

CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER - W/CDR. THOMPSON.

F/LT. TURNER.

- 13. 1. Liaison Duties I.A.F.
- 2. Maintenance I.A.F.
- 3. Advice on Allied Maintenance methods.
- 4. Supervision of types of aircraft and numbers in use by I.A.F.
- 5. Control of I.A.F. Aircraft Industry - Manufacture - Assembly - Repairs.
- 6. Examination of Inventions.
- 7. Maintenance of A.F.S.C. (R.A.F.) aircraft.

SENIOR EQUIPMENT OFFICER - W/CDR. COLLINGWOOD.

F/LT. CARTNER.

- 14. 1. Liaison with the I.A.F. on all equipment matters.
- 2. Supply of Allied Equipment to the I.A.F.
- 3. Maintenance of records of Equipment supplied to the I.A.F.
- 4. Supply of Allied aircraft to I.A.F.
- 5. Transportation I.A.F.
- 6. All R.A.F. equipment matters in H.Q. A.F.S.C. Units.
- 7. Supervision of captured enemy material.

SIGNAL OFFICER - S/LDR. RAY.

- 15. 1. Liaison with the Italian Air Ministry on signals and telecommunications.
- 2. Organisation of Italian Air Force Signals.
- 3. International Civilian Aviation Communications.

METEOROLOGICAL - SGT. ROGERS.

- 16. 1. Liaison on all matters pertaining to Met. Italian Air Force.

MOTOR TRANSPORT. - F/O. BECWL.

- 17. 1. Responsible for A.F.S.C. Motor Transport and advising I.A.F. on Allied M.T. methods.

P.A. - F/O. DE BENEDEUCCI.

- 18. 1. Personal Assistant to the Director & Interpreter.

ADJUTANT - F/O MERRIEN.

- 19. 1. Camp Commandant.
- 2. Requisitioning and Derequisitioning A.F.S.C. (R.A.F.) properties.
- 3. Units Records and Returns.

1327 -

2. Supply of Allied Equipment to the I.A.F.
3. Maintenance of records of Equipment supplied to the I.A.F.
4. Supply of Allied aircraft to I.A.F.
5. Transportation I.A.F.
6. All R.A.F. equipment matters in H.Q. A.F.S.C. Units.
7. Supervision of captured enemy material.

SIGNAL OFFICER - S/LDR. RAY.

15. 1. Liaison with the Italian Air Ministry on signals and telecommunications.
2. Organisation of Italian Air Force Signals.
3. International Civilian Aviation Communications.

METEOROLOGICAL - SGT. ROGERS.

16. 1. Liaison on all matters pertaining to Met. Italian Air Force.

MOTOR TRANSPORT. - F/O. BROWN.

17. 1. Responsible for A.F.S.C. Motor Transport and advising I.A.F. on Allied M.T. methods.

P.A. - F/O. DE BENEDEUCCI.

16. 1. Personal Assistant to the Director & Interpreter.

ADJUTANT - F/O HERRIEN.

19. 1. Camp Commandant.
2. Requisitioning and Derequisitioning A.F.S.C. (R.A.F.) properties.
3. Units Records and Returns.
4. Supervision of Italian Civilian Staff.
5. Unit Welfare and E.V.T.
6. Ration, Lighting, Fuel, Servant and Accommodation Returns for Married Families (R.A.F.).
7. Control of Interpreters Pool.

*L. E. JARMAN*  
 L. E. JARMAN, G/C,  
 Air Vice-Marshal,  
 Director,  
 Air Forces Sub Commission.

Copy to : Mediterranean Allied Air Committee  
 (letter MAAC/4018/1/AFALS of 1st Oct. 46 refers)

8. 71  
D  
K

195

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ROME.

29 1948

MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE.

REPEAT AIR HEADQUARTERS, ITALY.

197

TOP SECRET.

ABLE EIGHT TWO ONE PD REFERENCE MY ABLE FOX SUGAR CHARLIE SLASH THREE FIVE EIGHT  
SLASH ORG DATED ONE NINE AUGUST PD AIR VICE MARSHAL DARVAL FAVOURS TWO ITALIAN  
SPITFIRE WINGS MOVING FROM LEOCE TO VICENZA AND BERGAMO RESPECTIVELY PROVIDED NO  
POLITICAL OBJECTION FROM ABLE FOX HOW QUEEN PD REQUEST YOU INVESTIGATE AND REPLY PD  
MOVES UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTED IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE PENDING REBUILDING OF ACCOMODATION PD  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER AGREES AND SEES NO REPEAT NO POLITICAL OBJECTION =====

*Copy to Chief Commissioners (thru E. Comm.) with letter referred to above.*

IMPORTANT  
DIRECTOR, A.F.S.C.

*[Handwritten initials]*  
426

*[Handwritten signature]*

A.V.M.

*[Handwritten signature]* A.V.M.

PA 30/8  
AS.

8501-1058

194

SECRET

From: Air Force Commission, Allied Commission C.M.E.

To: Mediterranean Allied Air Secretariat, c/o Base A.H.C., Italy, C.M.E. COPY to Air Headquarters, Italy (V.M.E.).

Date: 19th August, 1946.

Ref: AFSC/357/CME.

AUG 29 1946

TOP SECRET

VISIT OF INTERCOM AND STAFF DIRECTOR, A.H.C., SO A.H.C., ITALY (JUDITH) ON 20TH AUGUST, 1946.

Subject is the approval of A.O.C., Italy, the Deputy Director and I propose to visit Saluzzo, Vercelli, Alessandria and Udine between 24th and 28th August, inclusive.

2. We will be arriving at Udine (Capporomido) at about 10.00 hours on Wednesday, 28th August, and it would be appreciated if transport could be provided by A.H.C.

Re-Commitment of Italian Fighter Squadrons.

3. It is desired to obtain approval for the employing of the majority of Italian fighter squadrons to the North, taking into account the political aspect and also any plans you may have for using certain airfields in the event of Allied re-increments being sent to Italy should there be any trouble on the North-Eastern frontier. I have spoken briefly with the A.O.C. Italy about this.

4. I have discussed with the Italian Chief, Vice Chief and Deputy Chief of Air Staff. For several reasons they are hoping to have two wings of fighters to the North, largely so that the personnel will be nearer their homes and in order to show the Italians in the North that Italy still has an Air Force. Furthermore, if it is still SACBY's intention to use the I.A.F. as backing to Allied Air Forces in N.E. Italy, some Italian squadrons should be stationed in the North. The general idea is - (a) to move three Spitfire Squadrons of the

Mobile Tactical Wing to an area immediately to the West of that occupied by the P.A.F. squadrons of this type.

(14) to have the Static Interceptor Wing of two Spitfire Squadrons to the Milan area (when or before they are re-equipped).

5. When the moves are completed, all the Spitfire squadrons will be in the North, leaving my Static Wing of two Interceptor Lightning squadrons at Lecce. It is therefore proposed to have a Spitfire Maintenance Unit in the North, which should present no difficulties politically or otherwise.

Monday, 28th August, and it would be appreciated if transport could be provided by A.S.C.

Re-deployment of Italian Fighter Squadrons.

It is desired to obtain answers for the following of the majority of Italian fighter squadrons to the North, taking into account the political aspect and also any ideas you may have for using certain squadrons in the event of Allied re-inforcements being sent to Italy should there be any trouble on the North-Eastern Frontier. I have spoken briefly with the A.S.C. Italy about this.

I have discussed with the Italian Chief, Vice Chief and Deputy Chief of Air Staff. For several reasons they are having to move two wings of fighters to the North, largely so that the operational will be nearer their home and in order to show the Italians in the North that Italy still has an Air Force. Another more, as it is still expected in the I.A.F. as backing to Allied Air Forces in N.E. Italy, one Italian squadron should be stationed in the North.

The general idea is - (i) to have three Spitfire Squadrons of the Mobile Tactical Wing to an area immediately to the West of that controlled by the R.A.F. squadrons of this type.

7773

(ii) to have the Static Interceptor Wing of two Spitfire Squadrons to the Milan area (when or before they are re-equipped).

When the moves are completed, all the Spitfire squadrons will be in the North, leaving one static wing of two Interceptor Lightning squadrons at Lecce. It is therefore proposed to have a Synthetic Mediterranean Unit in the North, which should present no difficulties politically or otherwise.

As regards (1) above the airfield which the Italians would like to re-build and occupy is situated near Vicenza, where the buildings are in ruins but the airfield itself (including a concrete strip) is serviceable. It is hoped that there will be room at Vicenza for two Allied squadrons as well as the three Italian squadrons in the event of re-inforcements flying in. During the war it was the custom for Italian squadrons to occupy the same airports as British Squadrons and largely for that reason the Italian Squadrons obtained a very good write-up from the A.S.C. Italian Air Force and the I.A.F. Station Commanders.

An advantage of Vicenza over any other vacant airfields in the North is that it is comparatively free from fog in the winter. The alternatives to Vicenza are Villafraanca (Verona), where there are no buildings, or Bologna which has no runway and no buildings.

Supposing the three Italian squadrons move into Vicenza it will be necessary to locate air and ground air firing ranges and a bombing range, preferably at the North of the Piave valley arrangements to be made by the Italian Air Force with those who will be moved; the Italians would also like to have target towing aircraft and such time as they themselves are able to supply their own target towing aircraft.

(Capt R. ... see 195)

PA 3018  
HS

193

- 5. As regards (a) above, the best solution in the Milan area for the static interceptor fighter wing (two Spitfire squadrons) is C15, near Bergamo. C15 has a reasonable concrete runway, 10" deep, not re-inforced but on gravel sub-soil.
- 10. It has the advantage over all other solutions in the Milan area in that it hardly ever becomes fog-bound and it could, therefore, also be used as a diversion base for civil and other air traffic normally using Linate; it was, in fact, used for this purpose with success last winter, though the facilities were very meagre. C15 already has radio facilities both for air traffic and point-to-point, the alternative to Bergamo is Bocco's, which is at present being used as a large A.T.A.R. camp and air base from for in the winter.
- 11. The Italian Air Ministry has plans for putting its modern fighter squadrons at C15; they desire to get on with it as soon as possible so as to finish it before the winter sets in. However, I am giving the Italian Air Ministry verbal authority to complete their preparations. As soon as we receive your approval it is proposed to give written authority for the building programme to be put into operation.
- 12. It would be appreciated if you would consider this matter so that decisions may be arrived at on this subject. For your information I have told the Italian Air Ministry that it would be unwise to move the Spitfire squadrons to the North until they are fully trained individually, in flying the aircraft, air sitting, and banking. In the case of the T15/B squadron of the 101st wing, the ground work in arriving should also be completed before the move to the North takes place.
- 13. Interference.  
.....
- 14. Personnel matters.  
.....

7000

(SND) IAN T. BROWN,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
DIRECTOR.

Station at Cairo; they desire to get on with it as soon as possible. For your information I have told the Indian Air Ministry that it would be unwise to move the Spitfire squadron to the North until they are fully trained individually, in flying the aircraft, air firing, and bombing. In the case of the T-62 squadron of the mobile wing, the ground work in training should also be completed before this move to the West takes place.

12. It would be suggested if you would consider this matter this morning so that a decision may be arrived at on 27th March. For your information I have told the Indian Air Ministry that it would be unwise to move the Spitfire squadron to the North until they are fully trained individually, in flying the aircraft, air firing, and bombing. In the case of the T-62 squadron of the mobile wing, the ground work in training should also be completed before this move to the West takes place.

13. Intelligence.

.....

14. Personnel matters.

.....

1001

(Sgd) LIAISON OFFICER,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
DIPLOMA,  
AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION.



21101

8501  
R/R

192  
E. Commr

FX 68954  
101230B

H/4543  
JULY 11 0900  
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SAOMEL CITE TNGOT

JUL 11 1946

AG-AR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF CABINET OFFICE WHITEHALL FOR

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: C IN C MED ALCOM

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ 189

THIS IS NAF 1175. REFERENCE NAF 1169 (DR-11657) THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENT SHOULD BE MADE.

1. PARA 1 LINE 6 AFTER DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION INSERT, WHICH IS AT PRESENT UNDER AIR MINISTRY BUT MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO A SEPARATE OTHER MINISTRY SUCH AS MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT IF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SO DESIRES

M/C THIS REFERS TO NAF 1169 M/C NUMBER H/4228 DATED 26 JUNE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

AC DIST

INFO: ACTION: AIR S/C  
 INFO: ACTION: CHIEF COMM  
 EX COMM  
 FOIAD (A)  
 FOIAD (B)  
 FILE 7769 -  
 SKEL TON

**CIPHER TELEGRAM**

These messages will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters and will be transmitted even in Cipher without being deciphered. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

HEADQUARTERS  
11 JUL 1946

N.S. 147

See 190

12/7  
PPA

2111

190

HQ ALCOM FROM ADMIRAL STONE CITE ACSCOO

JUNE 281200 468

AFHQ FOR SACRED

3925

119

TOP SECRET

THE COMMENTS OF YOUR NAF ONE ONE SIX NINE PAREN FOX EKKER XRAY SIX EIGHT THREE  
 FOUR FOUR OF TWO SIX JUNE PAREN WERE DRAFTED BY MAAC AND THE AIR FORCES  
 SUBCOMMISSION JOINTLY AND SUBMITTED TO ME AFTER SUCH CONSULTATION PD IN HIS  
 LETTER ABLE FOX SUGAR CHARLIE SLASH THREE SIX SEVEN SLASH TWO SLASH ORG OF  
 TWO ZERO JUNE THE DIRECTOR AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION SUBMITTED AN AMENDMENT TO  
 PARA ONE PAREN GEORGE PAREN AT MY DIRECTION PD I NOTICE THIS PARA HAS NOT  
 BEEN INCLUDED IN NAF ONE ONE SIX NINE PD IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE  
 WHICH I ATTACH TO THIS POINT CMA PARTICULARLY SINCE IN BOTH UNCLE KING AND  
 UNCLE SUGAR CIVIL AVIATION IS DIRECTED BY CIVIL AUTHORITY CMA I SHOULD BE  
 GRATEFUL IF PARA ONE PAREN GEORGE PAREN <sup>WERE</sup> AMENDED BY SUPPLEMENTARY NAF TO  
 READ CMA QUOTE DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION WHICH IS AT PRESENT UNDER AIR  
 MINISTRY BUT MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO A SEPARATE OR OTHER MINISTRY SUCH AS MINISTRY  
 OF TRANSPORT IF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SO DESIRES UNQUOTE

Distribution: Chief Commissioner      Folded (A)  
                   Air Forces S/C                Folded (B)

192  
2768

PRIORITY  
 EX.COM FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

343

M.S. LUSH, BRIGADIER,  
 EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER.

PAJ 29/6  
 9

9

<sup>8501</sup>  
~~TOP SECRET~~

*Exp. Comms*  
*109*

FX 68344  
JUNE 261805B

H/4228  
JUNE 271145

ROUTINE

JUN 27 1945

SIGNED SACRED CITE FHCIC

AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, CABINET OFFICES

WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF. INFO: ALCOM ROME & C IN C  
MED.

TOP SECRET.

THIS IS NAF 1169.

1. I FORWARD THE FOLLOWING DETAILED PLAN FOR THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE. THIS FORCE TO BE REORGANIZED UNDER THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY INTO THE FOLLOWING: FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS, AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS, ~~GENERAL RE-CONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS~~, TRAINING HEADQUARTERS, MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS, DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY, DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION.
2. FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THROUGH SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE INTERCEPTOR, TWO FIGHTER BOMBER AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THE UNIT EQUIPMENT OF EACH SQUADRON TO BE 14 AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY 1 AIRCRAFT IS ESTABLISHED FOR EACH OF THE 3 WING-LEADERS. GRAND TOTAL 101 AIRCRAFT. 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON TO BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P-38 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SPITFIRE 9 AIRCRAFT. A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES THROUGHOUT THE COMMAND.
3. AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 16 U.S. THESE TO BE; S.M. 95 OR SIMILAR TYPES. AN AIR MINISTRY COMMUNICATION SQUADRON OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE TO INCLUDE MULTI-ENGINE AND LIGHT PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT IS ALSO NECESSARY. AN METEOROLOGICAL FLIGHT OF 6 SINGLE ENGINE AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE IS REQUIRED. *Lu 191*
4. GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.S. 1 SQUADRON TO BE EQUIPPED WITH CATALINA OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI-ENGINE SEAPLANES. A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT IS ALSO REQUIRED.

*(cc)*

*Lu 7-192*

~~TOP SECRET~~ *Lu 190*

2 1 1 3

FX 68344

H/4228

188

PAGE 2

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

5. TRAINING HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND THE FOLLOWING FLYING UNITS COMPRISING A FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL. ELEMENTARY SQUADRON EQUIPPED WITH 12 MONTH OR MAGISTER OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT. AN ADVANCED SQUADRON COMPRISING 1 SINGLE ENGINE FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH 15 ITALIAN TYPE G.55 OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND 1 TWIN ENGINED FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH 15 OXFORD OR SIMILAR TYPE AIRCRAFT. A NAVIGATOR AND WIRELESS OPERATORS TRAINING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 6 BALTIMORE OR SIMILAR ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 4 ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT WILL BE REQUIRED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING HEADQUARTERS AS A WHOLE.
6. GROUND TRAINING UNITS COMMANDED BY TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPRISE; CADET COLLEGE, RECRUIT DEPOT, TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL, FLYING CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT.
7. MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUIRE A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT COMPRISING 8 U.E. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE. 4 OF THESE TO BE S.M. 829 OR SIMILAR TYPE AND 4 LIGHT TYPE OF ITALIAN AIRCRAFT.
8. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE.
9. ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT COVERED IN THIS SIGNAL AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN TO ME.
10. ALTHOUGH NOT COVERED BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS IN NAF 1103 THE FOLLOWING ARE NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL; A TARGET TOWING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 8 MARTINET AIRCRAFT. AN A.O.P. SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 14 U.E. ITALIAN FLIGHT AIRCRAFT (L.M. 5 OR SIMILAR TYPE).
11. ALL FIGURES FOR NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT QUOTED ABOVE ARE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO RESERVES. THESE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING SCALES AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS A PERCENTAGE WASTAGE OF UNIT EQUIPMENT PER MONTH: SINGLE

276

187

EX 68344

H/4228

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE 3

TOP SECRET

ENGINE FIGHTER 1.4. TRANSPORT 2. GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE 1. TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4. COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1.

- 12. IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF SUFFICIENT SQUADRON RADAR AND V H F EQUIPMENT TO EQUIP 2 STATIC AND 1 MOBILE SECTIONS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT.
- 13. AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF ALL ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT AND SPARETS INCLUDING BOMBS AND AMMUNITION TO A SCALE COMMENCING WITH THE ROLE OF THE INTERIM ~~ITALIAN~~ AIRFORCE.
- 14. IT IS CONFIRMED THAT I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY THAT THE CEILING APPROVAL FOR THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE IS PERMISSIVE AND THAT IT IS NOT OBLIGATORY TO THEM TO REORGANIZE THEIR FORCE UP TO THIS CEILING.

AC/DIST

INFO ACTION: AIR FORCE S/C  
 INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
 EXEC COMMISSIONER  
 POLAD (A)  
 POLAD (B)  
 FILE  
 SKELETON

RECORDED

27 JUN 1946

7763

**TOP SECRET**

2115

8501  
e

184  
/

FROM: AIR FORCES 1-COMMISSION,  
 ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: BRITISH/FRANCAIS ALLIED AIR COMMISSIONS SUPERSTAFF,  
 C/O A.F.C. S.A.F. ITALY, CASERTA.

CC: CHINESE COMMISSIONS, N.O. A.C. FORM THROUGH  
 EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONS.

DATE: 20TH JUNE, 1946.

REF: AFCC/367/2/018.

JUN 20 1946

ITALIAN AIR FORCES - INTERIM POLICY.

181A

Attached is a draft AF signal concerning PAM. 619 which was agreed by Air Vice-Marshal Fogarty, Air Vice-Marshal Brodie, Lt/Col. Marek (Acting DO, S.F.S.O), Group Captain James and Wing Commander Field (N.J.P.S), at A.F.C. S.A.F. Rome on the 7th June.

- 2. The draft was sent to the Chief Commissioner for information and comment. He suggests that para 1 (g) be amplified, otherwise no comment.
- 3. I therefore suggest para 1 (g) be amended to read:

"(g) Directorate of Civil Aviation which is at present under Air Ministry but may be transferred to a separate or other Ministry such as Ministry of Transport if the Italian Government so desires".

See h. 180-186

*I. D. Brodie*

I. D. BRODIE,  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL, 7761 -  
 DIRECTOR,  
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

*Handwritten signature/initials*

*Handwritten mark*

182

FOUR (.) GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIRCRAFT SERVICE HEADQUARTERS WILL  
 COMMAND 2 SQUADRON OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.S. (.) 1 SQUADRON WILL BE  
 EQUIPPED WITH CAPALPA AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI ENGINE SEAPLANES (.)  
 ADDITIONALLY A COMBINATION FLEET OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TYPE AIRCRAFT IS  
 REQUIRED (.)

FIVE (.) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING MIXED UNITS  
 CONSISTING A FLYING TRAINING SQUADRON:-

- (I) ELEMENTARY SQUADRON EQUIPPED WITH 12 UNITS OF FACETS AIRCRAFT (.)
- (II) AN ADVANCED SQUADRON COMPRISING 4 BOMBING UNITS FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH  
 15 ITALIAN TYPE C.55 AIRCRAFT AND 1 TRAIN ENGINE FLIGHT EQUIPPED WITH  
 15 GAVRO AIRCRAFT (.)

(III) A NAVIGATOR AND WINGMAN OPERATIONS SQUADRON MIXED COMPOSITION OF 6  
 BOMBING OF ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

ADDITIONALLY A COMBINATION FLEET OF 4 ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT WILL BE  
 REQUIRED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING HEADQUARTERS AS A WHOLE (.)

SIX (.) GROUND TRAINING UNITS UNDER TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPOSE:-

- (1) GUNNY SCHOOL (.)
- (II) WRECK DETECT (.)
- (III) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL (.)
- (IV) FLYING CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

7728

SEVEN (.) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL INCLUDE A COMBINATION MIXED  
 EQUIPPING 8 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE MIL. ENG. AND 4  
 LIKE THE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

EIGHT (.) AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE AIRCRAFT ARE OF  
 WHICH ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE (.)

13 COUNTRIES AIRCRAFT (.)

(144) A NAVIGATOR AND SIXTEEN OTHERS INCLUDING FIVE CREW MEMBERS OF 6 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.)

ADDITIONALLY A COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF 4 ITALIAN AIRCRAFT WILL BE ASSIGNED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING OPERATIONS AS A HOST (.)

(1) GUNNY COACHES (.)

(14) TECHNICAL DETAIL (.)

(141) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL (.)

(147) FLYING COMMAND TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

7739

SEVEN (.) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL INCLUDE A COMMUNICATIONS PLANT CONSISTING OF 3 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE SP.808 AND 4 LIGHT THE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

ALSO (.) AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AIRCRAFT AND THE AIRCRAFT ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE (.)

AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS HAVE OF THE NEW YORK PORT TO BE (.) THE (.) AIRCRAFT BE COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1103 THE AIRCRAFT ARE NOW COVERED INDIVIDUALLY--

(1) A TANKER BOILING ALONG COURSE OF 6 MAJOR AIRCRAFT (.)

(14) AT A.O.P. RANGE CONSISTING OF 14 U.S. ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT THIS IS (.)

SEVEN (.) ALL RIGHTS OF AIRCRAFT (.) ABOVE ARE WITHIN COMMUNICATION TO PERSONNEL (.) THESE SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS A REFERENCE SOURCE OF THE AIRCRAFT ARE

NOTE:--



181

-3-

- (4) BOMBING EXPLOSIONS 1,4 (.)
- (11) TRANSPORT 2 (.)
- (144) GENERAL INFORMATION 1 (.)
- (14) TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4 (.)
- (V) COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

TRAIN (.) IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PROGRESS OF SUFFICIENT NUMBER BOMB AND THE EQUIPMENT TO SUPPLY THE STAFF AND 1 BOMB SQUAD AND THEIR ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT (.)

TRAIN (.) AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR THE PROGRESS OF ALL AIRCRAFT BOMBING AND SPARES INCLUDING BOMBS AND AMMUNITION TO A SCALE COMPATIBLE WITH THE MOBS OF THE ITALIAN ITALIAN AIR FORCES (.)

TRAIN (.) IT IS REQUESTED THAT I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ITALIAN AIR FORCES THAT THE ONE APPROVAL IS PERMISSIVE ONLY AND THAT IT IS NOT THEREFORE OBLIGATORY TO THEM TO RE-QUALIFY THEIR PERSONNEL TO THE OFFICE REQUESTED (.) I HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO REJECT THE OFFICE (.)

8501  
AB

176

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,  
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER THROUGH EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 7TH JUNE, 1946.

REF: AFSC/367/2/ORG.

TOP SECRET.

JUN 7 1946

175

The attached draft signal was worked out by us with Air Vice-Marshal Fogarty (A.H.Q. Italy) today, and is passed to you for information and comment.

2. Lt/Col. Marek, the Senior American Officer in the Air Forces Sub-Commission, was present during the discussion.

*J. P. Brodie*

J. P. BRODIE,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
MISSION,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

See No 177-819 - 180-182-183.  
7. 180-03

7850 -

*AB 26/6*

*9*  
(130)

TOP SECRET.

175

PLAIN SIGNAL.

TO: ACMAF FOR CCS  
FROM: A.F.H.Q.

FROM MORGAN INFO: CABLED OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

149A

REFERENCE TO MESSAGE FAN. 649 THIS IS WAF (.)

ONE (.) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUEST COMPLETED IN FAN. 649 AND AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTER I FORWARD THE FOLLOWING DETAILED PLAN FOR THE ENTIRE ITALIAN AIR FORCE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AND RECOMMEND ITS REORGANISATION THROUGH THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY UNDER THE FOLLOWING:-

- (a) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS
- (b) AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS
- (c) GENERAL MAINTENANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS
- (d) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS
- (e) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS
- (f) DIRECTORATE OF TECHNOLOGY
- (g) DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION (.)

AND (.) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS TO COMAND THROUGH SUBSIDIARY FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE INTERCEPTOR, 2 FIGHTER BOMBER, AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE (.) THE UNIT EQUIPMENT OF EACH SQUADRON WILL BE 14 AIRCRAFT (.) ADDITIONALLY IT IS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH 1 AIRCRAFT FOR EACH OF THE 5 WING HEADQUARTERS A GRAND TOTAL OF 101 AIRCRAFT (.) 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P.56 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SETTERS IN AIRCRAFT (.) IT IS INTENDED

175

THAT A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 LIGHT ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT

2121

785017

- (a) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS
- (b) AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS
- (c) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY HEADQUARTERS
- (d) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS
- (e) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS
- (f) DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGY
- (g) DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION (.)

THE (.) FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS TO COMAND THROUGH SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS A TOTAL OF 7 SQUADRONS 4 OF THESE TO BE LIGHTNING, 2 FIGHTER ROYAL, AND 1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE (.) THE UNIT STRENGTH OF EACH SQUADRON WILL BE 14 AIRCRAFT (.) ADDITIONALLY IT IS INTENDED TO DETACH 1 AIRCRAFT FOR EACH OF THE 3 WING LEADERS MAKING A GRAND TOTAL OF 101 AIRCRAFT (.) 2 OF THE INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN P-38 AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINING 5 SQUADRONS WITH BRITISH SUPERIOR IX AIRCRAFT (.) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A COMMUNICATION SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 12 LIGHT ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES IN THE COMMAND AND SUBORDINATE UNITS (.)

THREE (.) AIR TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS WILL COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT EACH OF 16 UB (.) THESE WILL NORMALLY BE SM.79s, SM.82s OR SM.95s (.) AN AIR MINISTRY COMMUNICATION SQUADRON OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE TO INCLUDE MULTI ENGINES AND LIGHT PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT WILL BE NECESSARY (.) A METEOROLOGICAL FLIGHT OF 6 WING ENGINE AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN TYPE WILL BE REQUIRED (.)

CONTINUED/2.....

*See 176*

174

FOR (.) GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND AIRCRAFT STAFF HEADQUARTERS WILL  
 COMMAND 2 SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT EACH OF 15 U.S. (.) 1 SQUADRON WILL BE  
 EQUIPPED WITH CASUALTY AIRCRAFT AND 1 WITH ITALIAN MULTI ENGINE AIRCRAFTS (.)  
 ADDITIONAL A COMMUNICATION BATTALION OF 3 ITALIAN LIGHT TWIN AIRCRAFT IS  
 REQUIRED (.)

FIVE (.) TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL CONSIST OF 15 FOLLOWING MILITARY UNITS  
 COMPRISING A FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL:-

- (i) ELEMENTARY SQUADRON EQUIPPED WITH 12 MOCH OR MAGISTER AIRCRAFT (.)
- (ii) AN ADVANCED SQUADRON CONSISTING 1 SINGLE ENGINE NIGHT EQUIPPED WITH  
 15 ITALIAN TYPE G.55 AIRCRAFT AND 1 TWIN ENGINE NIGHT EQUIPPED WITH  
 15 CASPER AIRCRAFT (.)

(iii) A NAVIGATOR AND WEATHER OBSERVERS TRAINING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 6

MAINTENANCE OR REPAIR TWIN AIRCRAFT (.)

ADDITIONAL A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 4 ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT WILL BE  
 REQUIRED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING HEADQUARTERS AS A WHOLE (.)

SIX (.) GROUND TRAINING UNITS WHEN TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPRISE:-

- (1) CASPER SCHOOL (.)
- (ii) RECRUIT DETACH (.)
- (iii) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL (.)
- (iv) FLIGHT CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

SEVEN (.) MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUIRE COMMUNICATION FLIGHT  
 COMPRISING 8 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE SM.82s AND 4  
 LIGHT TWIN ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

EIGHT (.) AIRCRAFT REPAIRMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEMONSTRATION OF

TECHNOLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS 3 ABOVE (.)

(111) A NAVIGATOR AND WINGMAN OPERATORS TRAINING FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 6  
MULTIPURPOSE OR ITALIAN TYPE AIRCRAFT (.)

ADDITIONALLY A COMMUNICATION FLIGHT OF 4 ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT WILL BE  
REQUIRED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE TRAINING HEADQUARTERS AS A WHOLE (.)

SIX (.) GROUND TRAINING UNITS UNDER TRAINING HEADQUARTERS WILL CONSIST:-

(1) CAUSE COLLECT (.)

(2) RECONSTRUCT DETACH (.)

(3) TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL (.)

(4) FLIGHT CONTROL TRAINING FLIGHT (.)

SEVEN (.) HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS WILL BE THE ACCOMMODATION FLIGHT  
CONSISTING OF 6 U.S. AIRCRAFT OF ITALIAN MAKE (.) 4 OF THESE TO BE SU.82s AND 4

LIGHT TYPE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT (.)

EIGHT (.) AIRCRAFT REQUIRMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DIRECTIONAL  
HYDROLOGY ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE (.)

NINE (.) ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION EQUIPMENTS ARE NOT COVERED IN THIS SIGNAL  
AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE KNOWN TO US (.)

TEN (.) ALTHOUGH NOT COVERED BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS IN REF. 1103 THE FOLLOWING  
ARE NOW CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL:-

(1) A TARGET TOWNE FLIGHT CONSISTING OF 6 MULTIPURPOSE AIRCRAFT (.)

(2) AN A.O.F. SQUADRON CONSISTING OF 14 U.S. ITALIAN LIGHT AIRCRAFT TYPE  
125 (.)

ELEVEN (.) ALL FIGURES FOR NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT QUOTED ABOVE ARE WITHOUT  
CONSIDERATION TO RESERVES (.) THESE SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING  
SCALES AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS A PERCENTAGE WASTAGE OF UNIT EQUIPMENT PER  
MONTH:-

CONTINUED/3.....

2 1 2 3

173

- (i) SERVICE BATTALION NUMBER 1.4 (.)
- (ii) TRAINING 2 (.)
- (iii) GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE 1 (.)
- (iv) TRAINING AIRCRAFT 4 (.)
- (v) COMMUNICATION AIRCRAFT 1 (.)

THEME (.) IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN FOR THE PROMPMENT OF SUFFICIENT VEHICLE PARK AND THE EQUIPMENT TO EQUIP TWO STATION AND 1 MOBILE SECTOR AND THEIR ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT (.)

THEME (.) AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED FOR THE PROMPMENT OF ALL AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT AND SPARES INCLUDING TOOLS AND AMMUNITION TO A SCALE CORRESPONDING WITH THE ROLE OF THE INTERIM ITALIAN AIR FORCE (.)

THEME (.) IT IS CONTAINED THAT I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY THAT THE CCS APPROVAL IS PERMISSIVE ONLY AND THAT IT IS NOT THEREFORE OBLIGATORY TO THEM TO RE-ORGANISE THEIR FORCE UP TO THE CEILING PERMITTED (.) I HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO EXCEED THIS CEILING (.)

## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

172

Ref: 8501/EC.2 May 1946.

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to bring to your attention an unsatisfactory state of affairs existing within the Italian Air Force. This condition is apparently caused by former established laws compelling the Italian Air Ministry to administer 11,528 inactive personnel besides the present ceiling of 31,000 personnel on the active list. According to the Italian Air Ministry, most of the 11,528 are receiving full pay except those who are being scrutinized to determine whether they belonged to any pro-German organization, Fascists, etc., and who get three-fourths pay. This, of course, in effect raises the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to a figure in excess of that laid down by the C.C.S.

In order to enable the Italian Air Ministry to eliminate this state of affairs, I would urge that legislative action be taken to abrogate the current laws and that new laws be enacted authorizing the separation of surplus and undesirable personnel from the Italian Air Force.

You will no doubt wish to instruct your Minister for Air to consult the Air Force Sub-Commission in the preparation of this decree.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

7848 -

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,  
President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
R O M E.

6 Communique  
Copy to: Air Force Sub-Com.  
CA Sec (for Legal S/C).

11  
2/5/46



8501 90

k66

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSST  
APO 394  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

WLL/etl

11 April 1946

SUBJECT: I.A.F. Personnel Situation.

APR 11 1946

TO : Executive Commissioner,  
Navy Sub-Commission,  
~~Ground~~<sup>land</sup> Forces Sub-Commission.


The Italian Air Force at present has a ceiling of 31,000 personnel on the active list. However, by law they are still administering an additional 11,328, according to the best information obtained from the Italian Air Ministry. The 11,328 are being paid either full pay or three-fourths of their regular pay, but receive no rations. Most of the 11,328 are being paid full pay except those who are being scrutinized by the authorities to determine whether they belonged to any Pro-German organization, Fascists, etc., who get three-fourths pay.

The situation mentioned above will probably exist until a law for the reduction of personnel of all the Italian Armed Forces is passed. It is not expected this law will be considered until after the Peace Treaty, when the future of Italy is clearer, or until after the Costituente.

The Air Ministry, therefore, has its hands tied as far as reducing personnel and improving the position as a whole is concerned. The situation does not appear to be a serious one, and will probably work itself out in time. However, it is believed that some immediate action should be taken to get a law passed which will authorize the Italian Air Ministry to discharge surplus and unwanted personnel.

By law, the Italian Air Force is still regarded as having 2,000 planes, and promotions are still worked out on that assumption. Relief of the present situation does not lie with the Italian Air Force but with the Italian Government which should alter the Air Force establishment. This situation is nevertheless likely to continue until after political stability has been restored.

8847

  
WILLIAM L. LEE,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Deputy Director

✓  
(250)

see 1167-171.  
47172

162

I.A.F. PERSONNEL SITUATION.

The I.A.F. at present has a ceiling of 31,000 personnel on the active list. However, by law they are still administering the pre-armistice strength of 200,000. All personnel continue to be paid the normal salary, but these not employed receive no rations.

The only exception is ex-Republican Air Force personnel, mainly of senior rank, which have been discriminated and dismissed the service. However, there are many exceptions to this general policy. Generally speaking only those who have definite, serious, responsibility are treated in this way. Thus N.C.O.'s and airmen are hardly affected.

This state of affairs will continue until the law for reduction of personnel of all the Italian Armed Forces is passed. There will have to be a general policy for all state employees to decide the terms and conditions of release. It is not expected that this law will be considered (a) until after the Peace Treaty, when the future of Italy is clearer, and (b) until after the Constituent. In the latter case there will also be many other more important matters on the agenda before the present question comes up for discussion.

The Air Ministry, therefore, has its hands completely tied as far as reducing personnel, and therefore, improving the position as a whole is concerned. However, it is their wish to press forward as quickly as possible with Commissions for Discrimination and Expiration. To this end, the more high-ranking officers called back for this work, the sooner it will be completed. Then, when the law for reduction of personnel is passed, it can be carried out immediately. 6 Commissions <sup>to be appointed</sup> ~~in respect of officers'~~ military and naval records <sup>have been approved by ARCC and should begin their work shortly.</sup>

Another point is that by Italian Law the I.A.F. is still regarded as having 3,000 planes and personnel and promotions are worked out on this basis and, in fact, about 50 (Generals and Colonels) have recently ~~been promoted~~ <sup>been promoted</sup>.

Thus the question of reducing personnel is purely a Government affair in which the Services Ministries are powerless to act, although the present situation is a crippling one.

By law, the I.A.F. is still regarded as having 2,000 planes, with the corresponding great number of personnel, and promotions are still worked out on that assumption. None of the present inflationary situation does not lie with the I.A.F. but with the Government which should alter the Air Force establishment. This situation is nevertheless likely to continue until ~~of a~~ political stability has been restored.

X

X

the Peace Treaty, when the future of Italy is clearer, and (b) until after the Costituente. In the latter case there will also be many other more important matters on the agenda before the present question comes up for discussion.

The Air Ministry, therefore, has its hands completely tied as far as reducing personnel, and therefore, improving the position as a whole is concerned. However, it is their wish to press forward as quickly as possible with Commissions for Discrimination and Expiration. To this end, the more high-ranking officers called back for this work, the sooner it will be completed. Then, when the law for reduction of personnel is passed, it can be carried out immediately. 6 Commissions <sup>to be appointed</sup> in respect of officers' military and moral records <sup>have been approved by AFSC and should begin their work almost at once.</sup>

Another point is that by Italian Law the I.A.F. is still regarded as having 3,000 planes and personnel and promotions are worked out on this basis and, in fact, about 50 (Generals and Colonels) have recently <sup>been promoted</sup> ~~been promoted~~.

Thus the question of reducing personnel is purely a Government affair in which the Service Ministries are powerless to act, although the present situation is a crippling one.

By law, the I.A.F. is still regarded as having 2,000 planes, with the corresponding great number of personnel, and promotions are still worked out on that assumption. Belief of the present inflationary situation does not lie with the I.A.F. but with the Government which should alter the Air Force establishment. This situation is nevertheless likely to continue until ~~AFSC~~ political stability has been restored.

1st April 1946.

*AFSC*

*Bring up to date account of AFSC for the detailed investigation. That the old law to be known applies to AFSC, AFSC, AFSC.*

X

X

8501 *916*

162

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,  
 AIR FORCE COMMISSION, ROMA.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, THROUGH DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,  
 HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE COMMISSION, ROMA.

DATE: 26TH APRIL, 1946.

REF: AFSC/367/2/085.

APR 27 1946

Italian Air Force. *att*

With reference to the plan for the interim reorganisation of the Italian Air Force (copy attached for ready reference), you may be interested in the reply received from the Italian Chief of Air Staff after several conferences and discussions, notes of which are also attached.

2. A staff study will now be made by M.A.A.C., ~~with~~ Caserta, for transmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

*I. B. Brodie*

I. B. BRODIE, AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
 DIRECTOR,  
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

*See lv. 163. 164. 165A*

*8843 -*

*96*  
(150)

*PA*  
*3/15*  
*92*

161

85015

SENATO MAGGIORE PELLA ANTONIATICA.

Organization Section.

Ref: FAGE/20/1797/OA.2.

AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION,  
ALLIED COMMISSION, FOCE.

25th April, 1946.

Subject: REORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN  
AIR FORCE.

We must refer to your letter AFSC/367/2/ONG dated 25th March and to the proposals attached to the Pro-memoria MFI/S.24/AP of the 20th March.

The reply which follows adheres in principle to the proposals notified in the above-mentioned Pro-memoria and subsequently dealt with verbally between the I.A. and the A.F.S.C.

1. There is no doubt that the Italian Government intends to maintain a Military Air Force adequate to the exigencies required for national defence, and which will be governed by the peace treaty, by the consensus of the United Nations regarding armament, and by the existing economic financial resources.

As it is impossible to draw up a definite organic programme which corresponds to the actual requirements of national defence, and which, at the same time, satisfies the above-mentioned conditions - up to now ill-defined and not defined - the Government intends to maintain the present operational air force units, pending their inclusion and eventual adaptation to the air programme which will be defined as seen as the fundamental and indispensable to its smooth running is now known.

2. In principle we agree to the adoption of the general directives proposed in your Pro-memoria.

The I.A. is, in fact, very keen on a re-adjustment of its reorganisation as far as possible on allied lines, a policy of reorganisation

2131

We must refer to your letter AFSC/367/2/ONS dated 25th March and to the proposals attached to the Pre-memorandum of 21/3/47 of the 20th March.

The reply which follows adheres in principle to the proposals notified in the above-mentioned Pre-memorandum and subsequently dealt with verbally between the I.A.A. and the A.F.C.C.

1. There is no doubt that the Italian Government intends to maintain a Military Air Force adequate to the exigencies required for national defence, and which will be governed by the peace treaty, by the consequent decisions of the United Nations regarding armaments, and by the existing economic financial resources.

As it is impossible to draw up a definite organic programme which corresponds to the actual requirements of national defence, and which, at the same time, satisfies the above-mentioned conditions - up to now framed and not defined - the Government intends to maintain the present operational air force units, pending their inclusion and eventual adaptation to the air programme which will be defined as soon as the fundamental data indisputable to its month running is made known.

2. In principle we agree to the adoption of the general directives proposed in your memorandum.

The I.A.A. is, in fact, very keen on a re-adjustment of its reorganisation as far as possible on Allied lines, a policy of reconstruction which, in spite of prevailing conditions, it has done its utmost to follow.

This, however, has often been handicapped and obstructed by the absolute necessity of solving very important and urgent problems imposed by the past Air Force regulations with which the Air Force Administration has had, and still has, to comply until such time as they are entirely abolished.

These problems which constitute a serious menace to the re-organisation, can neither be ignored nor under estimated, and impose a great part of the activity which could otherwise have been put to a better use.

Nevertheless, we will endeavour to carry out the aforementioned programme of reconstruction within the limits of power accorded to the Italian Air Force.

Continued/2.....

-2-

3. Additional unconnected remarks are also detailed below:

- (a) According to the allotted number of aircraft foreseen, the Italian Air Force would be strategically insufficient and inefficient. Again, as regards the authorised number of personnel, it would be of the utmost importance to allow, until the peace treaty is signed, a strength equal to 25,500 men already requested in our letter 34347/00.15 dated 22/11/45 from the Stato Maggiore, in addition to the personnel at the disposal of the Allies (including those employed on Allied Air Bases).
- (b) With regard to air sea rescue, which as agreed will be carried out solely by the R.A., we think it opportune that the I.A.F. should be supplied with seaplanes so as to increase the present shortage of Italian manufactured seaplanes.
- (c) We entirely agree that fighter aircraft should be reduced to a limited number of types so as to preserve a low balance sheet and a high degree of maintenance. If the allocation of fighters is conceded, we would appreciate an eventual supply of Spitfire IX. If this request could be met, we could immediately initiate the training of the 20th Spitfire "Gruppo" for tactical reconnaissance. This "Gruppo" would be the first one to receive the allocation of Spitfire IX.
- (d) It is indisputable that Radar apparatus be supplied in order to ensure a smooth running C.A.V. organisation.
- The intention of using target towing aircraft is at present under examination. We are of the opinion, however, that the best and quickest solution would be to supply the I.A.F. with suitable aircraft and equipment.
- (e) The reorganisation of the transport Stormil will be dealt with and completed as soon as Civil Aviation resumes the services at present carried out by the Military Air Carrier Service.
- It is probable that the R.A. will maintain the major part of the 38.62 and all the 61.79 aircraft.
- Regarding the Baltimore Storms, we would like to certify / / to employ the aircraft in reconnaissance and light bomber activities.

a limited number of types so as to preserve a low balance sheet and a high degree of maintenance. If the allocation of fighters is conceded, we would appreciate an eventual supply of Spitfire IX. If this request could be met, we could immediately initiate the training of the 20th Spitfire "Gruppen" for tactical reconnaissance. This "Gruppe" would be the first one to receive the allocation of Spitfire IX.

(d) It is indispensable that Radar apparatus be supplied in order to ensure a smooth running C.A.V. organisation.

The intention of using target towing aircraft is at present under examination. We are of the opinion, however, that the best and quickest solution would be to supply the I.A.F. with suitable aircraft and equipment.

(e) The reorganisation of the transport Stornil will be dealt with and completed as soon as Civil Aviation resumes the services at present carried out by the Military Air Courier Service.

It is probable that the R.A. will maintain the major part of the SL.62 and all the SL.79 aircraft.

Regarding the Baltimore Storno, we would like to continue to employ the aircraft in reconnaissance and light bomber activities.

Continued/3.....



757

The Groupi this Stern, if the number of titanos is reduced could be gradually reinforced with S.79s and eventually take part in the Military Air Courier Service. On the question of the reorganisation of the Night Bomber Stern at Guisarda it is intended to proceed in a similar fashion to that of the Baltimore Stern.

These arrangements of a moral nature would satisfy obvious and important considerations.

Finally, subject to the favourable opinion of the A.F.O.C. the following is foreseen in the near future:

- 2 Heoco and Light Bomber Sterns
- 1 Transport Stern.

2) it is necessary to build up ample reserves of superfluous aircraft for demolition or dismantling for use as spare parts. It is in fact known that the present services is run in the main on aircraft which are old and in a precarious condition of serviceability. This state of things makes it necessary to maintain a reserve of aircraft superior to that foreseen by you.

It is obvious that with the cancellation of Spitfire aircraft it will be possible to carry out the suggested demolition with the exception of those aircraft which could still be usefully and economically employed for training, meteorological services, drop practice etc.

3) The Army has investigated the necessity for purchasing 20-30 aircraft (aster or similar type) to be used by the artillery (firing observation) and has asked the Aeronautica to supply a suitable number of P.C.O. Pilots and specialists to use this material immediately without the control of the central Air Units.

This procedure would be in direct contrast with the law now in force, according to which Air forces to cooperate with the Army are to be supplied by the P.C. and are to come under the command of other Army Units solely during operations. In the operational field they come under the command of Army Units through Army Officer Observers.

As no law has modified this procedure it seems neither advisable nor possible to accede to the Army request, also because of technical and juridical problems which the new system would leave unresolved.

It is also considered, as the State Maggiore of the Army has been advised that it is wise to shelve all innovations of this kind until it becomes possible to view the whole problem of land air forces and naval air forces.

Furthermore, if these Army requirements are regarded favourably, it will be necessary to constitute, within the P.C., the Units requested by the State Maggiore of the Army, equipped with material chosen by the latter.

It is envisaged that with the commitment of Spitfire aircraft it will be possible to carry out the suggested demolition with the exception of those aircraft which could still be usefully and economically employed for training, meteorological services, drop practice etc.

g) The Army has investigated the necessity for purchasing 20-30 aircraft (uster or similar type) to be used by the artillery (firing observation) and has asked the Aeronautical to supply a suitable number of M.C.C. Pilots and specialists to use this material immediately without the control of the central Air Units.

This procedure would be in direct contrast with the law now in force, excepting to which Air Force to operate with the Army are to be supplied by the R.A. and are to come under the command of Major Army Units solely during operations. In the operational field they come under the command of Army Units through Army Officer (Observers).

As no law has modified this procedure it seems neither advisable nor possible to accede to the Army request, also because of technical and juridical problems which the new system would leave unsolved.

It is also considered, as the State Maggiore of the Army has been informed that it is wise to shelve all innovations of this kind until it becomes possible to view the whole problem of land air forces and reveal air forces.

Furthermore, if these Army requirements are regarded favourably, it will be necessary to constitute, within the R.A., the Units requested by the State Maggiore of the Army, equipped with material chosen by the latter.

The matter is put to the A.F.S.C. in this sense for further agreement with M.M.I.A. and the relative consequences to the organisation of the Aeronautics.

h) The reduction of superfluous departments and units and personnel will be carried out according to the opinion expressed by the A.F.S.C. It is, however, necessary to consider the advisability and suitability of proceeding gradually with these reductions in order not to prejudice these activities still in progress which are mentioned in the second paragraph and which have to be carried to a conclusion.

To this end it is inadvisable to proceed with a certain amount of independence in this reorganisation, which should also be gradual, of the central and territorial units, with the object of carrying out the liquidation of the old Air Force without this having a damaging effect on the Administration and the Services.

Continued/ .....

158

Finally, with the aim of accelerating the cycle of reconstruction of the Services, the A.P.S.C. is requested to bring its own interest to bear in order to request the assignment of flying material which is in the course of being coded (Spitz IX-link Trainer) as well as other remaining material which is indispensable to the Services.

THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF  
COMMANDE DI RIJAYA ANGKA  
(MARIO ALMOND-GAT).

7030

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE - DEFENSE POLICY

Notes on meeting with CAS and DCAS and Director A.P.S.C. on the 14th April 1946.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force based on memorandum AMI/S.21/A.7. dated 20th. March 1946. That memorandum was discussed on the 1st April with the Air Vice-Marshal leading the team, but no definite conclusions were then reached, other than that the Italian CAS said that he agreed with the paper in principle, but was faced with very many difficulties, and I think he had not had time properly to consider the air plan mentioned above.

2. At today's meeting general discussion first took place, and then the memorandum mentioned above was discussed in detail from paragraph 15 onwards. 3. It appears that before our suggested plan was received by the Air Ministry, a request from the Deputy Foreign Minister was received by the Italian Government for the Italian view upon their defence services - presumably in connection with the drafting of the Peace Treaty. After conferring with the Chiefs of the Italian Army and Italian Navy, a paper was prepared by the C.A.S. (not yet available to A.P.S.C.) in which the Italian Air Force view was expressed to the Italian Government.

- 4. The Italian Air Force has asked its Government for:
  - (i) 2 Fighter Squadrons with a front line aircraft strength of 150, partly to protect the Italian Navy and its bases, and largely for the defence of Italy.
  - (ii) 6 Squadrons (2 Wings) of Light Bombers with a front line strength of 96 aircraft for recon with the Army and the Navy, and night recon generally. When asked what type the Italian Air Force envisaged, the D.C.A.S. mentioned Mosquitos.
  - (iii) 4 Squadrons (2 Wings) of Seaplanes with a front line strength of 64 aircraft - for A.S.B. - not for CR purposes because their existing aircraft are obsolete for that purpose. The C.A.S. is, however, willing to follow R.A.F. policy in folding up A.S.B. provided he can convert these aircraft to CR.

(iv) No transport aircraft were asked for, because should the situation so demand, Civil Aviation could be called upon to supply the necessary transport aircraft. The Italian Air Force did not consider that transport

3. It appears that before our suggested plan was received by the Air Ministry, a request from the Deputy Foreign Minister was received by the Italian Government for the Italian view upon their defence services - particularly in connection with the drafting of the Peace Treaty. After conferring with the Chiefs of the Italian Army and Italian Navy, a paper was prepared by the C.A.S. (not yet available to I.A.F.C.), in which the Italian Air Force view was expressed to the Italian Government.

4. The Italian Air Force has asked its Government for:

- (i) 9 Fighter Squadrons with a front line aircraft strength of 198, partly to protect the Italian Navy and its bases, and largely for the defence of Italy.
- (ii) 6 Squadrons (2 Wings) of Light Bombers with a front line strength of 36 aircraft for recon with the Army and the Navy, and night recon generally. Then asked what type the Italian Air Force envisaged, the D.C.A.S. mentioned Macquitos.

(iii) 4 Squadrons (2 Wings) of Bombers with a front line strength of 44 aircraft - for A.B.R. - not for CR purposes because their existing aircraft are obsolete for that purpose. The C.A.S. is, however, willing to follow I.A.F. policy in folding in A.B.R. provided he can convert these aircraft to CR.

(iv) No transport aircraft were asked for, because should the situation so demand, Civil Aviation could be called upon to supply the necessary transport aircraft. The Italian Air Force did not consider that transport squadrons were justified in view of the country's economic situation.

5. It was stressed that these estimates were based upon wanting an air force as big as any other Eastern neighbour may produce - for defence pending the arrival of United Nation Air Forces.

6. The C.A.S. however, agreed in principle with our plan. He said his suggestions could be fitted into ours, and he commented that in our plan the I.A.F. would be insufficient, strategically. He also said that the I.A.F. would already have begun reorganising had they not been tied down politically and economically - in fact not such reorganisation is necessary except in the Air Ministry and at Command level.

7. The statement made below refers to paragraphs in the memorandum A/MI/S.21 /A.F. dated the 20th March, 1946;

Continued/2.....

8. PANA 6. Although C.A.S. realises that British policy is to fold up A.S.R. in the Mediterranean, he would accept 14 H.S.L.'s primarily for A.S.R. work in support of the Italian A.S.R. aircraft, but he maintains an open mind on the necessity for them. Should these marine craft be supplied, and if so on what terms?
9. PANA 15 AND 17. C.A.S. stated that the ideal would be to have only one type of modern fighter. However, he has now agreed to purchase 23 x P.30s and 78 x P.3s from the USAF at 1% of cost. An equal number of Aerocobras will be turned back to the Americans and it is in the contract that they should buy the remaining 49, but the C.A.S. would prefer, if he can get other Allied types, to turn back all the Aerocobras and not pay for any of them. The two existing Aerocobra Squadrons will be re-equipped with lightnings (10 x P.30 plus 5 x P.35 for training, per squadron).
10. The Italian Air Force will gratefully accept Spitfire IIs, or preferably Spitfire XIVs, if they can be supplied, but the matter of payment is a difficult problem as the Italian Air Force has no money. Would it be possible to provide Spitfire IIs or XIVs on loan for the time being, and to be paid for at a later date at about 1% of cost? The same principle applies to all other equipment required by the Italians with which to make them into an efficient and properly equipped, although small, force.
11. The C.A.S. welcomed the possibility of training their existing Spitfire V squadron in Tac.7 forthwith, and to be the first squadron to be re-equipped with Spitfire IIs (if possible complete with all Tac.7 and specialist equipment). Can authority be granted for Tac.7 training of one Spitfire squadron, to begin forthwith, as already discussed between the Director A.S.C. and the A.O.C. D.A.F?
12. C.A.S. stated that the Italian Army has asked (Deputy Foreign Ministers through Italian Government), for small Artillery Observation Aircraft - say 20 to 30 - (presumably Anster type), and I.A.S. to provide I.A.S. N.C.O. pilots and maintenance crews, whilst Army produces (Officer Observers. This requirement is met in our plan and might well be favourably considered. If agreed by Allies, A.S.C. will advise Army pilot plus enemy fighter lookout).
13. PANA 16 was agreed, with progressive application.
- I.A.S. will accept one or more ground Hazer Sector equipment and is prepared to take over from D.A.F. if permitted. Can this be done?
- Provision of testing aircraft is under review. The probability is that the I.A.S. will require towing equipment and possibly towing aircraft. Can we provide Vengeance aircraft or other aircraft, and/or towing equipment?
- I.A.S. will require some help in the provision of Mobile Operations and

at a later date at about 1% of cost? The same principle applies to all other equipment required by the Italians with which to make them into an efficient and properly equipped, although small, force.

11. The C.A.S. welcomed the possibility of training their existing Spitfire V squadron in Tac. II forthwith, and to be the first squadron to be re-equipped with Spitfire IIs (if possible complete with all Tac. II and specialist equipment). Can authority be granted for Tac. II training of one Spitfire squadron, to begin forthwith, as already discussed between the Director A.F.S.C. and the A.C.C. D.A.F.?

12. C.A.S. stated that the Italian Army has asked (Deputy Foreign Ministers through Italian Government), for small Artillery Observation Aircraft - say 20 to 30 - (invariably Luster type), and I.A.M. to provide I.A.F. H.C.O. pilots and maintenance crews, whilst Army produces Officer Observers. This requirement is met met in our plan and might well be favourably considered. If agreed by Allies, A.F.S.C. will advise Army pilot plus enemy fighter lookout).

13. PAPA 16 was agreed, with progressive application.

I.A.F. will accept one or more ground Radar Sector equipment and is prepared to take over from D.A.F. if permitted. Can this be done?

Provision of towing aircraft is under review. The probability is that the I.A.F. will require towing equipment and possibly towing aircraft. Can we provide Vengeance aircraft or other aircraft, and/or towing equipment?

I.A.F. will require some help in the provision of Mobile Operations and Control rooms. Can we show D.A.F.'s Mobile Ops Room and Controlling methods to the I.A.F.

On his visit to England to take part in A.A.F.C. Radar demonstrations, Colonel de Vincenzi (Italian Air Force) was asked by the President and a British Civil Contractor, whether the Italians would require air radar, and if so how much; he gave a spot answer of 200 sets for Intruder fighters which in principle has the backing of the Italian C.A.S. Is this desirable (for night fighters), and if so could non secret A.I be applied?

14. PAPA 17 - agreed.

15. PAPA 18 (a) agreed.

Aircraft to be those which remain after Italian Civil Aviation has taken its choice - probably SM.82s, SM.75s, and C.123 would go to Civil Aviation, but the I.A.F. may be able to retain all the SM.75s and most of the SM.82s.

Continued/.....

C.A.S. ~~is~~ to be allowed to retain the two existing Baltimore Light Bomber Squadrons at least until the Peace Treaty; he proposes bolatering these squadrons with SN. 798. C.A.S. would accept no bombing training, but wishes to concentrate on sea navigation. He wishes to retain those squadrons for reasons of moral and in order to avoid unhealthy reverussions. These aircraft could also be used by Allied Commission on Military Courier Services, if required by A.C. and when Italian Civil Aviation takes over those services. Can this be agreed by the Allies?

16. PANA 18 (d). Director A.P.S.C. agreed to the withdrawal of CR.425 for flying training and substituting Mc.200 or P.200C15 for jet duties. (This suggestion was previously mentioned to P/Lt. Lawrence (AIR MHP) in view of Radiosonde now being taken over by Italian Jet Services).

17. PANA 19 (e). Agreed with one Squadron Headquarters at Lake Bracciano, leading after U.S.F. detachments to the North of Rome; and another Squadron Headquarters at Taranto leading after the North and Sarinile.

18. PANA 20 - agreed to have a training Headquarters subdivided into flying plus Search Training Section and a Technical Training Section.

19. PANA 23 - agreed, although this requires further investigation. The I.A.M. has agreed to purchase 80 x L-4 light aircraft from the Americans, a good number of which will be broken down for spares. No further help from the Allies appears necessary. (Note - L-4 A/C are suitable for A.C.P. Units).

20. PANA 24 - agreed.

21. PANA 26 - first sentence agreed. The I.A.M. could maintain all combat type aircraft, but in all probability would have to place big repairs and rebuilds in the hands of civilian aircraft firms in Italy; being further investigated by I.A.M.

22. PANA 27 - agreed. I.A.P. will require V.S.F. equipment for three ground sectors, and probably air and ground for A.S.R. aircraft and E.S.IE.

23. PANA 30 (i). I.A.P. not yet in a position to agree to reduce all surplus aircraft to produce, because existing aircraft are old and ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~useful~~ <sup>not</sup> and, therefore, the front line requires large reserves. C.A.S. is, however, willing to reduce to produce their ancient aircraft when Spitfire Mk are provided, except for a few obsolescent types for training, not and possibly ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> get testing.

(ii). Disbandment of certain units and personnel depends on political and international situation. Senior Officers are gradually being retired without reserve obligations. Junior Officers are all required so that the question does not arise. I.A.M. does not wish for, nor have they the means, to give training each year to discharged personnel (Officers and other ranks alike).



19. PARA 23 - agreed, although this requires further investigation. The number of which will be broken down for spares. No further help from the Allies appears necessary. (Note - I.A.M. a/c are suitable for A.C.S. units).

20. PARA 24 - agreed.

21. PARA 26 - first sentence agreed. The I.A.F. could maintain all combat type aircraft, but in all probability would have to place big repairs and rebuilds in the hands of civilian aircraft firms in Italy; being further investigated by I.A.M.

22. PARA 27 - agreed. I.A.F. will require V.H.F. equipment for three ground sectors, and probably air and ground for A.S.R. aircraft and V.S.Ls.

23. PARA 30 (1). I.A.F. not yet in a position to agree to reduce all surplus aircraft to produce, because existing aircraft are old and deteriorating, and, therefore, the front line requires large reserves. C.A.S. is, however, willing to reduce to produce their aviation aircraft when Spitfire IIs are provided, except for a few obsolescent types for training, not and possibly get towing.

(14). Disbandment of certain units and personnel depends on political and international situations. Senior Officers are gradually being retired without reserve obligations. Junior Officers are all required so that the question does not arise. I.A.M. does not wish for, nor have they the means, to give training each year to discharged personnel (Officers and Other ranks alike).

ADDITIONAL REMARKS.

24. C.A.S. would welcome selected English speaking Italian personnel being given training on all appropriate courses in the U.K. or America. Can this be arranged? If so, in the long run, better results would be obtained than if A.F.S.C. or its successor, were responsible for all training, and manpower in the A.F.S.C. would thereby be saved.

25. C.A.S. agreed that a system of interchangeability of personnel within squadrons of a type, would be substituted for officers remaining in one squadron almost for life.

5th April, 1946.

Distribution:  
A.C.C. Italy.  
Director, A.F.S.C.  
(File and General use).  
Spare (2).

(300) IAN F. HOOKER,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
INSPECTOR, AIR FORCES SUPPLY  
COMMISSION.

Note: Italian C.A.S. verbally confirmed that these notes are a true statement of the conversations which took place on 4th April, 1946.

SECRET

DEFENSE POLICYRE-ORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCEINTRODUCTION

In reply to a signal from the Supreme Allied Commander the Combined Chiefs of Staff have given permission for the Italian Air Force to be re-organised on the lines suggested in the above mentioned signal, subject to agreement with the Italian Government and a detailed plan being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval. This reorganisation is to be without prejudice to the final provisions and limitations of the Peace Treaty.

INTENTION

2. The intention is to reorganise the Italian Air Force without prejudice to the final provisions of the Peace Treaty.

CONSIDERATIONS

3. The Order of Battle permitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff consists of 100 fighter/bomber aircraft, 40 unarmed military transport aircraft, 30 unarmed air sea rescue aircraft, the necessary communication and training and marine craft with a 20% reserve.

Fighter/Bomber Aircraft

4. ITALY has two needs for fighter aircraft.

(a) For interceptor work

and

(b) For tactical support to the Italian Land Forces.

It is considered that the 100 fighter aircraft should be divided into 3 sectors supported by 2 interceptor and one tactical support wing. The 2 interceptor sectors should each consist of 2 squadrons each with 12 aircraft U.S. and the tactical support sector to consist of 2 fighter/bomber squadrons and one Tac/R squadron each of 12 aircraft. Each wing will have 1 aircraft U.S. for the Wing Leader. These squadrons will require R/T and Radar if they are to operate efficiently.

Transport Squadrons

5. When civil aviation is operating in ITALY the Italian Air Forces can be relieved of its civil courier responsibilities and the transport units should be organized into 2 transport squadrons with U.S. of 16 aircraft per squadron. These squadrons should be commanded by a transport Headquarters. The transport units should be trained to carry out supply dropping, parachute dropping and normal military air transport duties. They should be equipped

2144

3. The Order of Battle permitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff consists of 100 fighter/bomber aircraft, 40 unarmed military transport aircraft, 30 unarmed air sea rescue aircraft, the necessary communication and training and marine craft with a 20% reserve.

Fighter/Bomber Aircraft

4. ITALY has two needs for fighter aircraft.

(a) For interceptor work  
and

(b) For tactical support to the Italian Land Force.  
It is considered that the 100 fighter aircraft should be divided into 3 sectors supported by 2 interceptor and one tactical support wing. The 2 interceptor sectors should each consist of 2 squadrons each with 12 aircraft U.S. and the tactical support sector to consist of 2 fighter/bomber squadrons and one Tac/R squadron each of 12 aircraft. Each wing will have 1 aircraft U.S. for the Wing Leader. These squadrons will require R/T and Radar if they are to operate efficiently.

Transport Squadrons

5. When civil aviation is operating in ITALY the Italian Air Force can be relieved of its civil courier responsibilities and the transport units should be organized into 2 transport squadrons with U.S. of 16 aircraft per squadron. These squadrons should be commanded by a transport Headquarters. The transport units should be trained to carry out supply dropping, parachute dropping and normal military air transport duties. They should be equipped with transport aircraft of reasonable load carrying capacity and must be unarmed.

Air Sea Rescue

6. The present sea plane units of the Italian Air Force should be reorganized into 2 air sea rescue squadrons with a U.S. of 12 aircraft per squadron and commanded by an Aircraft Safety Headquarters. These aircraft are to be unarmed and are not to be trained in the use of guns, bombs or depth charges. They will need to have modern radio equipment and navigational aids so that they can assist in the performance of the international task of air sea rescue. These squadrons must be supported by the necessary marine craft.

Training

7. In order to make good normal use of the Italian Air Force it will be necessary to operate a Flying Training School and a Technical and Administrative Training School. It is considered that this training should

/cme under.....

153

SECRET

come under the command of a Training Headquarters and that this Headquarters should also be responsible for the Cadet College and an Italian Air Force Depot where recruits would make their first entry into the Italian Air Force.

Maintenance

8. The small number of aircraft and eventually the small number of different types would make it possible for the maintenance of the Italian Air Force to be carried out by a Maintenance Headquarters.

Communication Aircraft

9. No figure for the number of communication aircraft to be permitted has been laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, this should be maintained within a reasonable proportion to the over-all strength of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that each Headquarters should have a communication flight of 3 aircraft and that a central communication flight of 10 aircraft should be held in ROMM for the use of the Italian Air Ministry. Such communication aircraft to be either civil transport types or obsolescent unarmed military types.

Construction

10. It is questionable whether such a small air force and civil aviation will be economical proposition for an Italian aircraft industry and it is considered that combat types must be obtained from British and U.S. sources. However, if they so desire, the Italian Government may construct civil transport types of aircraft. It is, however, considered that even if the Italian Government desires to purchase both their combat and non-combat aircraft from Great Britain and the U.S.A., aircraft factory space should be maintained for the repair and overhaul of Italian Air Force non-combat and civilian aircraft. All combat types must be overhauled by Italian Air Force Units.

Command and Control.

11. At the present time command of the Italian Air Force is vested in the Supreme Allied Commander who exercises it through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Air Forces Sub-Commission and thence through the Italian Air Ministry. On the purely Italian side command and control is exercised through four Zone Area Territoriale (Z.A.T.) and Unita Aerea and Hq. I.A.F. Sardinia and Sicily.

12. Prior to the Armistice the Italian Air Force consisted of approximately 200,000 men. A reduction to the strength authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff makes it necessary to reorganise the command and control of the Italian Air Force which should be exercised by the Italian Air Ministry, through functional Headquarters which would consist of:

Such communication aircraft to be either civil transport types or obsolescent unarmed military types.

#### Construction

10. It is questionable whether such a small air force and civil aviation will be economical proposition for an Italian aircraft industry and it is considered that combat types must be obtained from British and U.S. sources. However, if they so desire, the Italian Government may construct civil transport types of aircraft. It is, however, considered that even if the Italian Government desires to purchase both their combat and non-combat aircraft from Great Britain and the U.S.A., aircraft factory space should be maintained for the repair and overhaul of Italian Air Force non-combat and civilian aircraft. All combat types must be overhauled by Italian Air Force Units.

#### Command and Control

11. At the present time command of the Italian Air Force is vested in the Supreme Allied Commander who exercises it through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Air Forces Sub-Commission and thence through the Italian Air Ministry. On the purely Italian side command and control is exercised through four Zone Area Territoriali (Z.A.T.) and Unita Aerea and Hq. I.A.F. Sardinia and Sicily.

12. Prior to the Armistice the Italian Air Force consisted of approximately 200,000 men. A reduction to the strength authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff makes it necessary to reorganise the command and control of the Italian Air Force which should be exercised by the Italian Air Ministry, through functional Headquarters which would consist of:

- 1 Fighter Headquarters (commanding 2 interceptor and 1 ~~support~~ <sup>support wing</sup> ~~support wing~~)
- 1 Air Transport Headquarters
- 1 Aircraft Safety Headquarters (which would be responsible for <sup>Air Sea Rescue</sup>)
- 1 Training Headquarters (which would command the Flying Training and Technical and Administrative Training Schools, the Cadet College and Recruits Depot)
- 1 Maintenance Headquarters (which would be responsible for the maintenance of the Italian Air Force).

13. The Italian Air Ministry itself was designed to control a large Air Force and the reduction in strength of the Italian Air Force from its pre-war size allows the Air Ministry to be greatly reduced in members.

#### Ceiling

14. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 22,000 Itri-Iti. This will continue to be permitted until the Peace Treaty, but every effort should

/be made.....

SECRET

152  
be made to operate well below this figure. Considerable saving in service personnel can be made if the Italian Air Force are prepared to civilianise certain of their units such as the Meteorological Service and certain departments of the Italian Air Ministry which are at present named entirely by Italian Officers. For instance a department which deals with civil aviation when formed should obviously be named by civilians so that at a later date that Branch can be transferred to another Ministry if that should be desirable.

PLAN

Fighter/Bombers

15. The 100 fighter/bomber aircraft will be reorganised into Interceptor fighters and tactical support fighters, all under the command of a Fighter Headquarters.

16. The Fighter Headquarters will have under it 2 static and one mobile sector. The Interceptor sectors will have as support two wings of 2 squadrons each and the mobile tactical support sector will have a wing consisting of 2 fighter/bomber and 1 Tac/R Squadrons. All squadrons will be of 12 U.S. aircraft strength. Each sector will incorporate the necessary Operations Room, Control and Early Warning facilities. One U.S. aircraft will be established on Wing Headquarters for the use of Wing Leaders in addition to those aircraft already within squadron establishment. Each Interceptor Wing Headquarters will hold 4 aircraft in reserve and the Tactical Support Wing Headquarters will hold 5 aircraft in reserve.

General

17. In the interests of economic and maintenance efficiency every effort will be made to ensure that each Wing is armed with one type of aircraft. The reorganisation of the Italian fighters as described above is to proceed forthwith and the Interceptor aircraft and tactical support aircraft should be separated at an early date so that their training in their specialist tasks may begin as soon as possible. Each Wing Headquarters is to be equipped with 3 unarmed communication aircraft.

AIR TRANSPORT

18. (a) The 40 unarmed transport aircraft will be organised into two squadrons of 20 U.S. aircraft each. The Air Transport Headquarters will also command the Central Communication Flight of 10 aircraft for the use of the Italian Air Ministry and Government. The Headquarters will have three communication aircraft for its own use, and will also hold 3 B.R. aircraft for the Transport Squadrons and 4 B.R. Communications aircraft for its own Communication Flight and that of the Air Ministry.

(b) Maintenance will be by means of Wing Servicing and Maintenance

Lighter/bomber and 1 Tac/R Squadrons. All squadrons will be of 12 U.S. aircraft strength. Each sector will incorporate the necessary Operations Room, Control and Early Warning facilities. One U.S. aircraft will be established on Wing Headquarters for the use of Wing Leaders in addition to those aircraft already within squadron establishment. Each Interceptor Wing Headquarters will hold 4 aircraft in reserve and the Tactical Support Wing Headquarters will hold 5 aircraft in reserve.

#### General

17. In the interests of economic and maintenance efficiency every effort will be made to ensure that each Wing is armed with one type of aircraft. The reorganisation of the Italian fighters as described above is to proceed forthwith and the interceptor aircraft and tactical support aircraft should be separated at an early date so that their training in their specialist tasks may begin as soon as possible. Each Wing Headquarters is to be equipped with 3 unarmed communication aircraft.

#### AIR TRANSPORT

18. (a) The 40 unarmed transport aircraft will be organised into two squadrons of 20 U.S. aircraft each. The Air Transport Headquarters will also command the Central Communication Flight of 10 aircraft for the use of the Italian Air Ministry and Government. The Headquarters will have three communication aircraft for its own use, and will also hold 8 R.R. aircraft for the Transport Squadrons and 4 R.R. Communications aircraft for its own Communication Flight and that of the Air Ministry.

(b) Maintenance will be by means of Wing Servicing and Maintenance Bachelors. 726

(c) The reorganisation of Transport Squadrons will start as soon as possible and will be completed when Italian civil aviation has taken over the current military courier services. In any event, within two months of the beginning of Italian civil aviation.

(d) There will be a requirement for a Net Flight of 6 aircraft.

#### AIRCRAFT SQUADRY

19. (a) The 30 Air Sea Rescue aircraft will be organised under a Headquarters commanding such aircraft safety centres as may be considered necessary in ITALY, and two A.S.R. seaplane squadrons consisting of 12 U.S. aircraft each. Each squadron will carry 3 R.R. aircraft and the Headquarters will have a

151

SECRET

Communication Flight of three unarmed aircraft.

(b) The Headquarters will Command all the signals and navigational aids and marine craft for efficient air sea rescue and aircraft safety.

(c) Servicing and maintenance will be by a wing servicing and maintenance Squadron modified as necessary to meet the peculiar situation of widely scattered air sea rescue detachments.

(d) The reorganisation of the Italian Seaplane Squadrons and their training in air sea rescue duties will proceed forthwith.

TRAINING

20. All training will be placed under command of one Headquarters and will be carried out in the Cadet College, Recruits Depot, Flying Training School, Technical Training School and Administrative Training School.

Cadet College

21. The Cadet College will continue and must be situated in the vicinity of the Flying Training School so that flying training can be given to the cadets.

22. Recruit Depot

The Recruits Depot will receive airmen entry (E.M.) in the Italian Air Force and should perform the functions of an Initial Training Wing for potential N.C.O. pilots, and initial disciplinary training and documentation of tradesmen.

Flying Training School

23. The Flying Training School will consist of an ab initio (Primary) Flying Training Flight of 10 aircraft; a single engine fighter flight consisting of 6 S.E. fighters and three dual fighter type aircraft (Harvard type), and a twin-engine flight of 6 aircraft. There will also be a Navigation and Wireless Operator training flight consisting of 6 twin-engined aircraft. No advanced flying training is to be carried out in the Flying Training School. All operational training will be carried out in the Squadrons.

24. The object of flying training should be to turn out fully qualified aircrews up to a standard where they can begin operational training in the Squadrons. The Training Headquarters will hold the reserve aircraft of the Flying Training School and a Communication Flight of 4 aircraft.

Technical Training and Administrative Schools

25. The Technical Training and Administrative Schools will deal with the training of all tradesmen including signals and radar operators. A number of aircraft will be maintained by the Technical Training School for instructional



21. The Cadet College will continue and must be situated in the vicinity of the Flying Training School so that flying training can be given to the cadets.

#### 22. Recruit Depot

The Recruits Depot will receive airmen entry (R.M.) in the Italian Air Force and should perform the functions of an Initial Training Wing for potential M.C.O. pilots, and initial disciplinary training and documentation of tradesmen.

#### Flying Training School

23. The Flying Training School will consist of an ab initio (Primary) Flying Training Flight of 10 aircraft; a single engine fighter Flight consisting of 6 S.M. fighters and three dual engine type aircraft (Harvard type), and a twin-engine flight of 6 aircraft. There will also be a Navigation and Wireless Operator training flight consisting of 6 twin-engined aircraft. No armament flying training is to be carried out in the Flying Training School. All operational training will be carried out in the Squadrons.

24. The object of flying training should be to turn out fully qualified airmen up to a standard where they can begin operational training in the Squadrons. The Training Headquarters will hold the reserve aircraft of the Flying Training School and a Communication Flight of 4 aircraft.

#### Technical Training and Administrative Schools

25. The Technical Training and Administrative Schools will deal with the training of all tradesmen including signals and radar operators. A number of aircraft will be maintained by the Technical Training School for instructional purposes but will not be flown.

#### MAINTENANCE

26. Servicing and maintenance in the Italian Air Force will be carried out on the principle of Wing maintenance modified to meet local requirements where necessary. Third and fourth line maintenance will be carried out under command of the Maintenance Wing, and aircraft factory space may be taken over for the Italian Air Force to carry out repairs and overhauls that are beyond the capacity of the Wing. This factory may employ a large proportion of civilians. The Maintenance Wing Headquarters will be responsible for the inhibited reserve aircraft, if any, that are held in Italy to replace write-offs. ~~Over~~ Flight of six aircraft.

#### SIGNALS

27. The Italian Air Force needs to be equipped with VHF for use in the control of fighters, flying control, aircraft safety, and air sea rescue. This

/will have.....

4

2151

150

SECRET

will have to be supplied from Anglo/U.S. sources. There is also the need for Radar both for use with the fighter and tactical support wings, and to assist in aircraft safety and navigation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- 28. Command of the Italian Air Force should be exercised by the Italian Air Ministry in accordance with diagram at Appendix "A".
- 29. A survey of the Italian Air Ministry and Air Council, will be carried out and it will be reorganised and reduced in size as far as possible and certain branches will be civilianised.

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL

- 30. (i) When the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force is completed there should be no surplus aircraft left, as when each type of wing is formed surplus aircraft will be reduced to produce for spares. (ii) Surplus units will be disbanded and personnel surplus to the establishments (T.O.) of the reorganised Italian Air Force will be discharged to civil life without reserve obligation. (iii) The reduction to produce of surplus aircraft will start at the earliest possible moment, and the discharge of surplus personnel will begin in the same way.

AM 2/S. 21/A.F.  
20 March 1945

R.B.F.

882

FVI

FIGHTER HEADQUARTERS  
(3 Comm a/c.)

SECTOR

WING  
(1 a/c.)  
(4 Res. a/c.)

SECTOR

WING  
(1 a/c.)  
(4 Res. a/c.)

MOBILE TACTICAL SUPPORT SECTOR

(1 A/c)  
(5 Res. a/c.)

WING

1 Sqn (12 a/c.)    1 Sqn (12 a/c.)    Com Flt (3 a/c.)

1 Sqn (12 a/c)    1 Sqn (12 A/c)    Com Flt (3 a/c)

Com Flt (3 a/c)    Tac/R (12 a/c)    1 Sqn F/B (12 a/c)



TOTAL: 50 Interceptor A.C.  
6 Comm. a/c.  
8 Res. Interceptor a/c.

TOTAL: 12 Tac/R a/c  
25 F/B a/c  
5 Reserve a/c  
6 Comm. a/c

REORGANISED ITALIAN AIR FORCE  
AIR MINISTRY

AIRCRAFT SAFETY  
HEADQUARTERS  
(6 E.R. a/c)

TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS  
(8 E.R. a/c)



OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECTOR

(1 a/c)  
5 Res. a/c.)

WING

Tac/R (12 a/c)	1 Sqdn F/B (12 a/c)	1 Sqdn F/B (12 a/c)
-------------------	------------------------	------------------------

12 Tac/R a/c  
25 F/B a/c  
5 Reserve a/c  
6 Com. a/c

TOTAL: 24 Seaplanes  
3 Com. a/c  
6 E.R. Sea-planes

TOTAL: 38 I.E. a/c  
15 Com. a/c  
8 E.R. a/c

ITALIAN AIR FORCE  
MINISTRY

TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS  
(8 E.R. a/c)

MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS

TRAINING HEADQUARTERS

A.M.	VEIC	SQDN	SQDN
COM PIE (10 a/c.)	COM PIE (5 a/c)	(16 a/c)	(16 a/c)

COM FLT  
(6 I.E. a/c)  
(7 E.R. a/c)

Comm Flight. (4 a/c)	Cadet College	Flying Training School (1 E. 2 EPT a/c) (3 T.E. a/c) (1 dual S.E.)	Recruit Depot
B.F.T. (Primary) Flight (10 a/c.)	S.F.T. (Basic & Advanced)	Navigator & V/Ops Training Flight (6 a/c)	Fly Com Trn

S.E. Flt. (6 a/c) (3 dual)	T.E. Flt. (6 a/c)
-------------------------------------	-------------------------

38 I.E. a/c  
13 Comm. a/c  
8 E.R. a/c

TOTAL: 10 Elementary Trainer a/c.  
6 S.E. a/c.  
3 dual S.E. a/c.  
12 T.E. a/c.  
4 Comm. a/c.

SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

TRAINING HEADQUARTERS

METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES

CIVIL AVIATION

Gadet College	Flying Training School	Recruit Depot	Aviation Training School
	(I.E. 2 RPT a/c)		
	(3 T.E. a/c)		
	(1 dual S.E.)		

S.P.T. (Basic & Advanced)	Navigators & W/Ops Training Flight (6 a/c)	Flying Control Training
---------------------------	--	-------------------------

T.E. Flt. (6 a/c)

Elementary Trainer a/c.  
 6 S.E. a/c.  
 3 dual S.E. a/c.  
 2 T.E. a/c.  
 1 Comm. a/c.

GRAND TOTAL I.A.F. I.E. & E.R. AIRCRAFT

Interceptor Fighter	I.E.	50
	E.R.	8
Tac. Support Fighter	I.E.	37
	E.R.	5
Air Sea Rescue	I.E.	24
	E.R.	6
Transport	I.E.	32
	E.R.	8
Comm. Aircraft	I.E.	35
	E.R.	7
Elementary Training	I.E.	10
	E.R.	2
S.E.S. P.T.	I.E.	9
	E.R.	2
T.E.S. P.T.	I.E.	12
	E.R.	3
MST.	I.E.	6

TOTAL AIRCRAFT: I.E. 207 E.R. 52

2156

850181

MAR 26 1946

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,  
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, THROUGH EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, TONS.

DATE: 25TH MARCH, 1946.

REF: AFSC/367/2/CEG.

SECRET.

140-145.

I think you will be interested to see the attached papers. If you have any comments to make I would be grateful if I may receive them before 10.30 on the 1st April at the latest.

*I. E. Brodie*

I. E. BRODIE,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
DIRECTOR,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

1111

see M. 147 + 148

*(EC)*

seen by  
CSO  
6/4  
*[Signature]*

PA  
6/4  
*[Signature]*

AIR FORCES SUP-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION  
ROME.

115

SECRET

AFSC/367/2/ORG.

25th March 1946.

Dear

I attach hereto a copy of the interim policy for the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force which has just been approved by higher authorities.

2. It is desired that you will treat this memorandum as an agenda for a conference which, subject to your convenience, it is proposed to hold on the 29th March at 10.30 hours, and which will be attended by Air Vice-Marshal Peggarty, General Lee, Group Captain Pakenham and myself.

3. It is requested that the memorandum be treated as 'Secret' until such time as the conference has taken place and details have been worked out between us. There is, however, no objection to your consulting your Senior Staff Officers, but what we wish to avoid is ~~the possibility~~ that this matter shall not receive publicity until mutual agreement between us has been reached.

4. I wish to emphasise that the permissive plan shown in the attached memorandum is only obligatory in so far as the maximum ceilings are concerned, and as indicated in the paper; the lower extremes would be that if the Italian Government so desired there need be no Italian Air Force at all.

5. A few further explanations may be of assistance to you:

- (i) Where the word 'will' occurs, it should be read in the sense of the English future tense rather than in an executive and obligatory sense.
- (ii) Where the word 'maintenance' is used it is used in its widest sense; it is intended to cover Engineering, Signale, Equipment Depot and S.I. etc.
- (iii) The term US means aircraft in use, plus immediate reserve in squadrons.
- (iv) The term ER means external reserve, not in squadrons. **6.11**
- 6. A question which will arise will be the desirability of maintaining the ~~existing~~ Squadrons temporarily, especially during the period of transition



2158  
Fogarty, General Lee, Group Captain Palenhas and myself.

3. It is requested that the memorandum be treated as 'Secret' until such time as the conference has taken place and details have been worked out between us. There is, however, no objection to your consulting your Senior Staff Officers, but what we wish to avoid is ~~the possibility~~ that this matter shall not receive publicity until actual agreement between us has been reached.
4. I wish to emphasize that the permissive plan shown in the attached memorandum is only obligatory in so far as the maximum ceilings are concerned, and as indicated in the paper; the lower extreme would be that if the Italian Government so desired there need be no Italian Air Force at all.
5. A few further explanations may be of assistance to you:
- (i) Where the word 'will' occurs, it should be read in the sense of the English future tense rather than in an executive and obligatory sense.
  - (ii) Where the word 'maintenance' is used it is used in its widest sense; it is intended to cover Engineering, Signals, Equipment Depots and W.F. etc.
  - (iii) The term UE means aircraft in use, plus immediate reserve in squadrons.
  - (iv) The term EE means external reserve, not in squadrons. 711
6. A question which will arise will be the desirability of maintaining the Baltimore Squadrons temporarily, especially during the period of transition from Military Courier Services to Civil Aviation.

Yours



*φ Changed to 1100 hrs on Monday 1st April.*

Doctor M. Cevillotto,  
Minister for Air,  
Italian Air Ministry,  
Rome.

Allied & Italian

INTERIM POLICY.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

INTRODUCTION.

In reply to a signal from the Supreme Allied Commanding the Combined Chiefs of Staff have given permission for the Italian Air Force to be re-organized on the lines suggested in the above mentioned signal, subject to agreement with the Italian Government and a detailed plan being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval. This reorganization is to be without prejudice to the final provisions and limitations of the peace treaty.

REVISION.

2. The intention is to reorganize the Italian Air Force without prejudice to the final provisions of the peace treaty.

CONSIDERATIONS.

3. The Order of Battle permitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff consists of 100 fighter/bomber aircraft, 40 unarmed military transport aircraft, 40 unarmed air sea rescue aircraft, the necessary communication and training and marine craft with a 20% reserve.

Fighter/Bomber Aircraft.

4. Italy has two needs for fighter aircraft.

- (a) For interceptor work.
- and
- (b) For tactical support to the Italian land forces.

It is considered that the 100 fighter aircraft should be divided into 3 sectors. Sectors should each consist of 2 squadrons each with 12 aircraft U.S., and the tactical support sector to consist of 2 fighter/bomber squadrons and one tactical squadron each of 12 aircraft. Each wing will have 1 aircraft U.S. for the air sea rescue. These squadrons will require 70% man power if they are to operate efficiently.

Transport Squadrons.

5. When civil aviation is operating in Italy the Italian Air Force should be relieved of its civilian air transport units responsibilities and the transport units should be organized into 2 transport squadrons with a total of 16 aircraft per squadron. These squadrons should be commanded by a transport headquarters. The transport units should be trained to carry out supply dropping paratroops dropping and normal military air transport duties. They should be equipped with transport aircraft of reasonable load carrying capacity and must be insured.

*military*

144

MAY 16 1945

consists of 100 fighter/bomber aircraft, 40 unarmed military transport aircraft, 20 unarmed air sea rescue aircraft, the necessary communication and training and marine craft with a 20% reserve.

Air-sea rescue aircraft.

4. ICBM has two needs for fighter aircraft.

(a) For interceptor work and

(b) for tactical support to the Italian land forces.

It is considered that the 100 fighter aircraft would be divided into 2 sectors supported by 2 interceptors and one tactical support wing. The 2 interceptor sectors should each consist of 2 squadrons each with 12 aircraft each and the tactical support sector to consist of 2 fighter/bomber squadrons and one transport squadron each of 12 aircraft. Each wing will have 1 aircraft i.e. for the wing commander. These squadrons will require 70% and more if they are to operate efficiently.

Transport squadrons.

*military*

5. Non civil aviation is operating in Italy and the Italian air force should be relieved of its *civil* military carrier responsibilities and the transport units should be organized into 2 transport squadrons each with a total of 16 aircraft per squadron. These squadrons should be organized by a transport headquarters. The transport units should be trained to carry out supply dropping, parachute dropping and normal military air transport duties. They should be equipped with transport aircraft of reasonable load carrying capacity and must be unarmed.

Air sea rescue.

6. The present sea plane units of the Italian air force should be reorganized into 2 air sea rescue squadrons with a total of 12 aircraft per squadron and equipped by an aircraft safety headquarters. These aircraft are to be unarmed and are not to be trained in the use of guns, bombs or depth charges. They will need to have modern radio equipment and navigational aids so that they can assist in the performance of the international task of air sea rescue. These squadrons must be supported by the necessary marine craft.

Training.

7. In order to have good naval assistance in the Italian air force it will be necessary to operate a flying training school and a school and administrative training school. It is considered that this training should

/cont under.....

come under the command of a Training Headquarters and that this Headquarters should also be responsible for the Cadet College and an Italian Air Force depot where recruits would take their first entry into the Italian Air Force.

Maintenance.

The small number of aircraft and eventually the small number of different types would make it possible for the maintenance of the Italian Air Force to be carried out by a Maintenance Headquarters.

Communication Aircraft.

No figure for the number of communication aircraft to be permitted has been laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, this should be maintained within a reasonable proportion to the overall strength of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that each Headquarters should have a communication flight of 3 aircraft and that a central communication flight of 10 aircraft should be held in HQ for the use of the Italian Air Ministry. Two communication aircraft to be either civil transport types or obsolete/unarmed military types.

*→ I think should be to be preferred*

Construction.

It is questionable whether such a small air force and civil aviation will be an economical proposition for an Italian aircraft industry and it is considered that combat types must be obtained from British and U.S. sources. However, if they so desire, the Italian Government may construct civil transport types of aircraft. It is, however, considered that even if the Italian Government desire to purchase both their combat and non-combat aircraft from Great Britain and the U.S., aircraft factory space should be maintained for the repair and overhaul of Italian Air Force non-combat and civilian aircraft. All combat types must be overhauled by Italian Air Force units.

Command and Control.

At the present time command of the Italian Air Force is vested in the Supreme Allied Commander who exercises it through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Air Forces Sub-Committee and thence through the Italian Air Ministry. On the purely Italian side command and control is exercised through four Zona Aerea Territoriale (Z.A.T.) and units based at HQ, IAF Sardinia & Sicily.

*It is recommended*

Prior to the arrival of the Italian Air Force consisted of approximately 200,000 men. A reduction to the strength authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff seems it necessary to reorganise the command and control of the Italian Air Force which should be exercised by the Italian Air Ministry, through functional Headquarters which would consist of:

- 1 Fighter Headquarters (comprising 2 Interceptor and 1 tactical support wings)
- 1 Air Transport Headquarters

Conclusions.

10. It is questionable whether such a small air force and civil aviation will be an operational proposition for an Italian aircraft industry and it is considered that combat types *must* be obtained from British and U.S. sources. However, if they so desire, the Italian Government may construct civil transport types of aircraft. It is, however, considered that even if the Italian Government desire to purchase both their combat and non-combat aircraft from Great Britain and the U.S., air-raft factory space should be maintained for the repair and overhaul of Italian air force non-combat and civilian aircraft. All combat types must be overhauled by Italian air force units.

→ *Think should be taken*

Command and Control.

11. At the present time command of the Italian air force is vested in the Supreme Allied Commander who exercises it through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Air Forces Sub-Committee and thence through the Italian Air Ministry. On the purely Italian side command and control is exercised through four *zona aerea* *territoriale* (Sardinia, Sicily, Calabria & Puglia) and units *aviazione* and *HQ - IAF Sardinia & Sicily*. *It is recommended*

12. Prior to the armistice the Italian Air Force consisted of approximately 2,000,000 men. A reduction to the strength authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff makes it necessary to reorganise the command and control of the Italian Air Force which should be exercised by the Italian Air Ministry, through functional headquarters which would consist of:

- 1 Fighter Headquarters (comprising 2 interceptor and 1 tactical support wing)
- 1 Air Transport Headquarters
- 1 Aircraft Fleet Headquarters (which would be responsible for Air Sea Buses)
- 1 Training Headquarters (which would examine the flying training and technical and administrative training schools, the Cadet College and recruits Depot)
- 1 Maintenance Headquarters (which would be responsible for the maintenance of the Italian Air Force).

7712

Colling.

13. The Italian Air Ministry itself was assigned to control a large air force and the reduction in strength of the Italian Air Force from its present size allows the Air Ministry to be greatly reduced in numbers.

14. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 225,000 *ITL-173*. This will continue to be permitted until the Peace Treaty, but every effort should

/be made.....

SECRET

143

Why?

be made to operate as below this figure. Considerable saving in service personnel can be made if the Italian Air Force are prepared to civilise certain of their units such as the meteorological service and certain departments of the Italian Air Ministry which are at present manned entirely by Italian Officers. For instance a department which deals with civil aviation which formed should originally be manned by civilians so that at a later date that branch can be transferred to another Ministry if that should be desirable.

*This is too presumptuous to make  
"Confidential" in this sense - - -"*

*Begin "It is suggested"*

Fighter/Bombers.

15. The 100 fighter/bomber aircraft will be reorganised into interceptor fighters and tactical support fighters, all under the command of a Fighter Headquarters.

16. The Fighter Headquarters will have under it 2 static and one mobile sector. The interceptor sectors will have as support two wings of 2 squadrons each and the mobile tactical support sector will have a wing consisting of 2 fighter/bomber and 1 Tac/FB Squadron. All squadrons will be of 12 U.S. aircraft strength. Each sector will incorporate the necessary Operations room, Control and early warning facilities. One U.S. aircraft will be established on Ring Headquarters for the use of Wing Leaders in addition to those aircraft already within Squadron establishment. Each interceptor wing headquarters will hold 4 aircraft in reserve and the original Supper since Wing Headquarters will hold 3 aircraft in reserve. *a target towing flight will be provided.*

General.

17. In the interests of command and maintenance efficiency every effort will be made to ensure that each wing is armed with one type of aircraft. The reorganisation of the Italian fighters as described above will proceed forthwith and the interceptor aircraft and tactical support aircraft should be separated at an early date so that their training in their specialist tasks may begin as soon as possible. Each Wing Headquarters will be equipped with increased communication aircraft.

*(Too mandatory)*

AIR TRANSPORT.

18. (a) The 40 unarmed transport aircraft will be organised into two squadrons of 20 U.S. aircraft each. The Air Transport Headquarters will also command the Central Communication Flight of 10 aircraft for the use of the Italian Air Ministry and Government. The Headquarters will have three communication aircraft for its own use, and will also hold 5 E.S. aircraft for the 1st and 2nd Squadrons and 4 E.F. Communications aircraft for its own Communication Flight and that of the Air Ministry.

each and the mobile tactical support sector will have a wing consisting of 2 fighter/bomber and 1 Tech Sq. squadrons. All squadrons will be of 12 F-4 aircraft strength. Each sector will incorporate the necessary operations comm. control and early warning facilities. One U.S. aircraft will be established on the Headquarters for the use of the leaders in addition to those aircraft already within squadron establishment. Each interceptor wing headquarter will hold 4 aircraft in reserve and the tactical Support Force in Headquarters will hold 3 aircraft in reserve. *A target towing flight will be provided.*

General.

17. In the interests of economy and maintenance efficiency every effort will be made to ensure that each wing is armed with one type of aircraft. The reorganization of the Italian fighters as described above *will proceed* forthwith and the interceptor aircraft and tactical support aircraft should be separated at an early date so that their training in their specialist tasks may begin as soon as possible. Each wing headquarter *will* be equipped with 3 unarmed communication aircraft.

*(Too mandatory)*

AIR TRAINING.

18. (a) The 40 unarmed transport aircraft *will* be organized into two squadrons of 20 U.S. aircraft each. The Air Transport Headquarters will also command the Central Communication Flight of 10 aircraft for the use of the Italian Air Ministry and Government. The Headquarters will have three communication aircraft for its own use, and will also hold 3 E.R. aircraft for the ~~training~~ squadrons and 4 E.R. Communications aircraft for its own communication flight and that of the Air Ministry.

(b) Maintenance will be by means of wing servicing and maintenance ~~echelons~~.

(c) The reorganization of Transport Squadrons *will* start as soon as possible and ~~will~~ be completed when Italian civil aviation has taken over the current military courier services. In any event, within two months of the beginning of Italian civil aviation.

(d) There will be a requirement for a Net Flight of 6 aircraft.

AIRCRAFT CAPACITY.

11

19. (a) The 30 Air Sea Rescue aircraft *will* be organized under a headquarters commanding such aircraft safety centres as may be considered necessary in Italy, and two A.S.R. seaplane squadrons consisting of 12 U.S. aircraft each. ~~Each~~

/s/parson.....

5. Operations will carry J.E. aircraft without minimum, and the headquarters will have a communication flight of three unarmed aircraft.

(b) The headquarters will command all the signals and navigational aids and marine craft for efficient air sea rescue and aircraft safety.

(c) Servicing and maintenance will be by a wing servicing and maintenance squadron modified as necessary to meet the peculiar situation of widely scattered air sea rescue detachments.

(d) The reorganization of the Italian airplane squadrons and their training in air sea rescue duties will proceed forthwith.

"It is suggested --"

TRAINERS.

20. All training will be placed under command of one Headquarters and will be carried out in the Cadet College, Recruits Depot, Flying Training School, Technical Training School and Administrative Training School.

Cadet College.

21. The Cadet College will continue and must be situated in the vicinity of the Flying Training School so that flying training can be given to the cadets.

Recruits Depot.

22. The Recruits Depot will receive airman entry (S.M.) in the Italian Air Force and should perform the functions of an initial training base for potential W.D.G. pilots, and initial disciplinary training and indoctrination of trainees.

Flying Training School.

23. The Flying Training School will consist of an obsolete (Primary) Flying Training Flight of 10 aircraft; a single engine fighter flight consisting of 6 S.E. fighters and three dual fighter type aircraft (Harvard type), and a twin-engine flight of 6 aircraft. There will also be a Navigation and Wireless Operator training flight consisting of 6 twin-engine aircraft. No advanced flying training is to be carried out in the Flying Training School. All operational training will be carried out in the Squadron.

24. The object of flying training should be to turn out fully qualified aircrew up to a standard where they can begin operational training in the Squadrons. The Training Headquarters will hold the main reserve aircraft of the Flying Training School and a communication flight of 4 aircraft.

Technical Training and Administrative Schools.

25. The Technical Training and Administrative Schools will be situated in the



Cadet College.

21. The Cadet College will continue and must be situated in the vicinity of the flying training school so that flying training can be given to the cadets.

General Notes.

22. By Security Note will receive direct entry (D.E.) in the Italian Air Force and should perform the functions of an initial training unit for potential S.O.'s. Policy and initial disciplinary training and indoctrination of cadets.

Flying Training School.

23. The flying training school will consist of an ab initio (Primary) flying training flight of 10 aircraft; a single engine fighter flight consisting of 5 S.E. fighters and three dual fighter type aircraft (Harvard type), and a twin-engine flight of 6 aircraft. There will also be a Navigation and Wireless Operator training flight consisting of 6 twin-engine aircraft. An advanced flying training unit to be carried out in the flying training school. All operational training will be carried out in the 3 squadrons.

24. The object of flying training should be to turn out fully qualified aircrews up to a standard where they can begin operational training in the squadrons. The training headquarters will hold the ~~main~~ reserve aircraft of the flying training school and a communication flight of 4 aircraft.

Technical Training and Administrative Schools.

7808 -

25. The Technical Training and Administrative Schools will deal with the training of all tradesmen including signaller and radar operators. A number of aircraft will be maintained by the Technical Training School for instructional purposes but will not be flown.

MAINTENANCE.

26. Servicing and maintenance in the Italian Air Force will be carried out on the principle of the maintenance method to meet local requirements where necessary. Third and fourth line maintenance will be carried out under command of the maintenance wing, and aircraft factory space may be taken over for the Italian Air Force to carry out major repair and overhauls that are beyond the capacity of the wing. This factory may carry a large proportion of civilian aircraft. The maintenance wing headquarters will be responsible for the inhibited reserve aircraft that are held in Italy to replace write-offs. (See flight of six aircraft.)

Non combat aircraft

SECRET

AIMS.

27. The Italian Air Force needs to be equipped with VFP for use in the control of fighters, flying control, aircraft safety, and air sea rescue. This will have to be supplied from Anglo-U.S. sources. There is also the need for radar both for use with the fighter and tactical support wings, and to assist in aircraft safety and navigation.

COMMANO AND CONTROL.

28. Command of the Italian Air Force will be exercised by the Italian Air Ministry in accordance with diagram A appendix A.

29. A survey of the Italian Air Ministry and Air Council will be carried out and it will be reorganised and reduced in size as far as possible and certain branches will be civilianised.


DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL.

30. When the reorganisation of the Italian Air Force is completed there should be no surplus aircraft left, as when each type of type is found surplus aircraft will be reduced to produce for spares. Surplus units will be dismantled and personnel surplus to the establishments (A.S.) of the reorganised Italian Air Force will be discharged to civil life without reserve obligation. The reduction to produce of surplus aircraft will start at the earliest possible moment, and the discharge of surplus personnel will begin in the same way.

*Who says so?*

APP/5.21/A.1.  
26th March, 1946.

7700.



REORGANISED ITALIAN AIR FORCE  
AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT SAFETY  
HEADQUARTERS  
(6 E.R. a/c)

TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS  
(8 E.R. a/c)

TACTICAL SUPPORT CENTER

(1 A/c)  
(5 Res. a/c.)

WING

1 3rd F/B (12 a/c)    1 3rd F/E (12 a/c)

12 Tac/R a/c.  
25 F/B a/c.  
5 Reserve a/c.  
6 Com. a/c.

A.S.C.

COM FLT  
(3 a/c)

WING HQ

3rd W (12 a/c)    3rd W (12 a/c)

MEP FLT  
(6 a/c)

A.M.

COM FLT  
(10 a/c.)

WING

COM FLT  
(3 a/c)

3rd W

(16 a/c)

3rd W

(16 a/c)

TOTAL: 24 Seaplanes  
3 Com. a/c  
6 E.R. Sea-planes

TOTAL: 38 I.R. a/c  
13 Com. a/c  
8 E.R. a/c

MAINTENANCE HEADQUARTERS

COE FLT  
(6 I.E. a/c)  
(7 E.R. a/c)

TRAINING HEADQUARTERS

Comm Flight. (4 a/c)    Cadet College    Flying Training School    Recruit Depot    Technical Training School

(1 R. 2 KFT a/c)  
(3 T.E. a/c)  
(1 dual S.E.)

S.F.T. (Primary) Flight. (10 a/c.)    S.F.T. (Basic & Advanced)    Navigators & W/Ops Training Flight (6 a/c)    Flying Control Eng. Flt


S.E. Flt. (6 a/c) (3 dual)    T.E. Flt. (6 a/c)

TOTAL : 10 Elementary Trainer a/c.  
6 S.E. a/c.  
3 dual S.E. a/c.  
12 T.E. a/c.  
4 Comm. a/c.

1011

**SECRET**

*Appendix A*



Flying Training School  
 (1.R. 2 RT a/c)  
 (3 T.E. a/c)  
 (1 dual S.B.)

Recruit Depot

Medical Training School

Navigator & W/Op Training Flight  
 (6 a/c)

Flying Control Unit

T.E. Flt. (6 a/c)

Elementary Trainer a/c  
 (6 S.B. a/c)  
 (1 dual S.B. a/c)  
 (2 T.E. a/c)  
 (1 dual a/c)

GRAND TOTAL I.A.P.	I.E. & E.R. AIRCRAFT	
Interceptor Fighter	I.E.	50
	E.R.	8
Tac. Support Fighter	I.E.	37
	E.R.	5
Air Sea Rescue	I.E.	24
	E.R.	6
Transport	I.E.	32
	E.R.	8
Comm. Aircraft	I.E.	30
	E.R.	7
Elementary Training	I.E.	10
	E.R.	2
S.E.S. P.T.	I.E.	9
	E.R.	2
T.E.S. P.T.	I.E.	12
	E.R.	3
MET.	I.E.	6
<hr/>		
TOTAL AIRCRAFT:	I.E.	207.
	E.R.	52.

~~825~~

COPIES: 140A

COPY OF SIGNAL FROM AUSTRIA TO AFHQ.

Reference No. 000094, 16th March, 1946.

SECRET:

130

FMV. 619

The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the re-organization of the Italian Air Force to the extent recommended in IAF 1103, subject to the provision that a detailed plan as to the recommended equipping of the units, including aircraft types, be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval, prior to implementing action, and with the understanding that arrangements made at present for the development of the Italian Air Force will not prejudice final decision on limitations to be imposed by the Treaty of Peace with Italy. They further approve the establishment of internal Civil Air Lines by the Italian Government.

The approvals noted above are to be considered as permissive only and are not to be transmitted to the Italian Government as requirements for the establishment of an Air Force of the size and composition delineated in IAF 1103.

5910

8501 *2/6*

MAR 8 REC

139

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,  
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, THROUGH EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 7TH MARCH, 1946.

REF: AFSC/39/1/AIR.

MAR 9 1946

Reference your enquiry about the TWA agreement being sent to the Allied Commission officially by the Italian Air Ministry, General Lee and I took the opportunity this morning of asking Doctor Cevolotto what procedure he was proposing to adopt. It was agreed that the Draft Decree Law based on the TWA agreement should be submitted to the Council of Ministers and simultaneously a copy sent to the Air Forces Sub-Commission. I will pass this copy to you when it arrives in order that you can send a copy to SACMED with a covering letter.

2. For your information I attended the first meeting of the so-called Air Council this morning. It was ably conducted - not in a dictatorial fashion. Everyone was allowed to say his piece, and it was not often that more than one person was talking at the same time; no decisions were arrived at, and it seemed to be very obvious to me that until the Italian Air Ministry get some sort of policy for the future of the Italian Air Force (which we have been hoping for for some two months), it is exceedingly difficult for any major decisions to be taken by the Italian Air Ministry itself. However, I hope to hear something as soon as Air Vice-Marshal Fogarty arrives back from London on or about the 12th March 1946.

*Commander*

*I. E. Brodie*

I. E. BRODIE,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
DIRECTOR,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

*MW/6/3*

7703

*See No. 140*

*(EC)*

*PA 1/3*



2-17-41

785017

138

Ref: 8501/138/WO

14 January 1946

SUBJECT: Attacks in Italian Press on  
Italian Air Force Officers

TO : Air Forces Sub-Commission

127

1. Reference our 8501/80 of 22 December 1945 to G-5 AFHQ copy to you.

135

2. Attached please find copy of their reply under ref G-51337-12 of 24 December 1945.

B. SAMPSON

Brigadier  
Executive Commissioner

86

7694A  
14/1  
1/1

21751

785017

1883

8501  
RA

135

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

G-5: 337-12

24 December 1945

DEC 28 1945

SUBJECT: Attacks in Italian Press on  
Italian Air Force Officers

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission  
APO 394

127

Reference your 8501/23 of 22 December 1945.

1. It would not be appropriate for the Allied Military  
authorities to make representations or interfere in a matter  
action upon which lies within the competence of the Italian  
authorities themselves.

2. The incidents raised in your above quoted letter dif-  
fer from those referred to in our cable F-44035 of 17 September  
1945 and Minute 2 of SACMED's Conference (6th Meeting) of 27  
September 1945. In the latter case the Italian Government might  
not have been disposed to take any action without representations  
being made by the Allied Military Authorities.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

A. I. HUMBLET,  
Brigadier General, CSC,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

28 DEC 1945

see 17/136/1372  
F.138

(MISS 5)

21701

785017

8501

By *cmr*  
Copies 4  
130

EX56901  
DEC 211223A

G/6135  
DEC 231030A

FREEDOM SIGNED SACRED SITE PHOS

PRIORITY  
DEC 21 1945

ACTION: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, CABINET OFFICES LONDON  
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
INFO: ALCOM ROME

TOP SECRET.

This is NAF 1103.

Have been examining whether it is desirable or feasible to return the Italian Air Force to Italian Government Control, as has been done in the case of the Italian Army.

The armistice terms grounded the Italian Air Force, but this policy has been considerably modified in favor of the Italian Air Force, which is now employed in the working of courier services and on air sea rescue duties of certain personnel are employed with RAF and USAAF units and on guard duties on Allied air fields and installations.

Immediate operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are not under Allied Control. Italian Air Force fighter squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of Italy against air attack.

As a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be organized on a defensive basis and that it should be large enough to provide air defense to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

See In. 131-4

*[Handwritten signature]* 30/12

I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized forthwith into the following flying units 5 fighter/bomber squadrons. 1 tac/r squadron. 2 air sea rescue and general reconnaissance squadrons. 2 transport squadrons. 1 training school (flying and technical). 1 communication squadron. This will form a basis on which the

CONT. PAGE 2

129  
G/6135

Continued.

Page 2.

expansion of the Italian Air Force to meet the commitments described in para 4 above ~~can~~ take place if permitted by the peace treaty.

An Italian Air Ministry already exists and it is proposed that the Italian Air Force should be operated by the Air Ministry under my direction through functional sub commands.

The ceiling of the Italian Air Force must depend on the requirements for and strength of units necessary to command, administer and maintain the flying duties described above, and Anglo-United States requirements.

If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganized into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of its present commitments in running courier services to meet largely civic government commitments. I therefore recommend that internal Italian Civil Aviation, including limited private flying, should be permitted both to relieve the Italian Air Force of internal air line commitments and to serve as an aid to internal transport in the economic rehabilitation of Italy and that it should be regulated by the Italian Government under the supervision of the Airforces Sub-Commission. External air lines will not be permitted until Italian Civil Aircraft safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

7094  
With regard to the supply of aircraft spare parts and equipment, I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be procured from either the United States or Great Britain so that the Allies retain full

(188)

6/6135

Page 3.

Continued.

control over the first line strength of the Italian Air Force. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that the Italian Armament Industry can provide efficient radar and signal equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should <sup>not</sup> be returned to Italian Government control until sufficiently high standard of organization and training has been reached in the use of certain modern equipment, radar, etc. I therefore request your authority to proceed with the reorganization of the Italian Air Force as described above, and to permit the Italian Government to start internal <sup>civil</sup> air lines.

DISTRIBUTION

	Copies
INFO ACTION: AIR FORCES S/C (2)	1-2
	3
INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER	
EXEC COMM (2)	4-5
POLAD (A)	6
POLAD (B)	7
ECON SECTION	8
FILE (SKELETON)	9

21791

785017

S E C R E T.

(124)

Ref: 8501/EG.

22. December 1945.

SUBJECT: Attacks in Italian Press on  
Italian Air Force Officers.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.  
Attn: G-5 Section.

*126 refers*

1. Certain papers of the Italian press have recently carried malicious articles directed against senior staff officers of the Italian Air Ministry. The Minister of Air appears unwilling to take action in their support.

2. May I take it that the instruction given to me at SACMED's Conference (6th Meeting), Minute 8, 27 Sep 45, that "deliberate attempts by any organisation to undermine the morale and discipline of troops under your command could not be tolerated" apply equally to attacks against senior Italian officers of the Services which are still under SACMED's command, and address the Prime Minister accordingly.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

*Copy to: Air Force S/C  
to Commissioner.*

*B/W 3  
Jan  
Noted R.P.*

*See 135.  
134.*

126

FROM: AIR FORCES SUP COMMISSION, 880/4  
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, THROUGH EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 19TH DECEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/INE/25.

*Nota 2/2*

TOP SECRET.

That I have been fearing within the Italian Air Ministry seems to be coming to a head, and I would be glad of your advice and actual help if you consider that desirable.

2. The Air Minister, Doctor Cevelotto, does not appear to be working in the best interests of the Italian Air Force, but seems to be more mixed up in Party Politics to the extent of being subversive to military discipline, at the expense of the well-being of the Italian Air Force. He seems to be giving no backing, or at least not helping, the Senior Staff Officers at the Air Ministry. The attached reports from my Senior Intelligence Officer ~~are~~, so far as I can judge, unbiased and true.

3. General Lee and Colonel Warden have read the papers in connection with this subject and we have all come to the same conclusion (without collusion) that some pretty strong action will have to be taken in respect of Doctor Cevelotto. At first I hoped that Doctor Cevelotto would be a good Air Minister, but I am afraid that as a Service Minister he is not a success in that he does not support his officers against malicious slandering, and that he is extremely slow to put into action certain important suggestions we have made, e.g. the formation and regular meetings of the Air Council, and in fact I strongly suspect him of being unduly influenced by bad types, because I know that often he does not consult the correct Italian serving officers on military matters. Regular meetings of the Air Council would go a long way to harness such bad influence.

4. We very much fear that Doctor Cevelotto's collaborators (some suspected of being outside the Italian Air Ministry) would like to get rid of General Almone Gat, Colonel Remondino and possibly Colonel Santini, and frankly we would much prefer to lose Doctor Cevelotto because the three officers named are good officers, are honest, have a sense of humour, and appear to have the respect of the Italian Air Force generally, whereas I cannot say the same for Doctor Cevelotto.

5. I would ask you to consider the following courses of action, and to advise me as to what you wish to be done:-

...preferably in my offices,

in Party Politics to the extent of being subversive to military discipline, at the expense of the well-being of the Italian Air Force. He seems to be giving no backing, or at least not helping, the Senior Staff Officers at the Air Ministry. The attached reports from my Senior Intelligence Officer are, so far as I can judge, unbiased and true.

3. General Lee and Colonel Warden have read the papers in connection with this subject and we have all come to the same conclusion (without collusion) that some pretty strong action will have to be taken in respect of Doctor Cevolotto. At first I hoped that Doctor Cevolotto would be a good Air Minister, but I am afraid that as a Service Minister he is not a success in that he does not support his officers against malicious slandering, and that he is extremely slow to put into action certain important suggestions we have made, e.g. the formation and regular meetings of the Air Council, and in fact I strongly suspect him of being unduly influenced by bad types, because I know that often he does not consult the correct Italian serving officers on military matters. Regular meetings of the Air Council would go a long way to harness such bad influence.

4. We very much fear that Doctor Cevolotto's collaborators (some suspected of being outside the Italian Air Ministry) would like to get rid of General Aimone Cat, Colonel Remondino and possibly Colonel Santini, and frankly we would much prefer to lose Doctor Cevolotto because the three officers named are good officers, are honest, have a sense of humour, and appear to have the respect of the Italian Air Force generally, whereas I cannot say the same for Doctor Cevolotto.

5. I would ask you to consider the following courses of action, and to advise me as to what you wish to be done:-

- (i) Myself and General Lee to see Doctor Cevolotto, preferably in my office, and to politely, but clearly state our views on these particular incidents and get an assurance from Doctor Cevolotto that in future cases, as well as the current ones, he will take severe action with the writers of the articles (some of whom are known to us), or against the newspaper proprietors themselves.
- (ii) For the Chief Commissioner himself to send for Doctor Cevolotto with a similar object in view, and to press for regular weekly meetings of the Air Council.
- (iii) For the Chief Commissioner to discuss the matter with the President of the Council, and, as an extreme measure, to suggest to the President of the Council that Doctor Cevolotto be taken out of the Italian Air Ministry in exchange for Doctor Gasparotto who holds a portfolio in the present Government and who was Air Minister previous to Doctor Cevolotto, and is still respected at the Air Ministry.

See 124.

*I. E. Brodie*

I. E. BRODIE,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.



(125)

TOP SECRET.

To: Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie.

CAMPAIGN FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF I.A.M. STAFF OFFICERS.

1. In the past six months during the time that the present Air Minister has held office there have been several attempts to by persons mostly unknown to us to remove Italian Staff officers from the posts they have been occupying satisfactorily. (e.g: the cases of Gen. Aimone Cat, Col. Forru, Col. Remondino etc.). Each case has been preceded by a smear campaign and their political opponents have endeavoured to use the epuration system together with accusations of either past or present totalitarian activities or sympathies and in each case we have been convinced that all allegations have been unfounded.
2. The movement against these officers recently published a series of articles entitled "Vivisezione dell'Ambiente Aeronautica" (Vivisection in Air Force Circles) in the Italian newspaper L'Intransigente on the following dates 11th October, 25th October and 1st November. (Appendices A,B,C). The articles were malicious, biased, untruthful and personal in their accusations and they named and slandered serving officers e.g. Gen. Aimone Cat, Cols. Remondino, François, Santini etc. In no other country could this have occurred without an action for slander backed up by the Air Ministry.
3. The articles signed by a "nom de plume" FIIT have definitely been brought home to Colonel Spartaco BACCARI, a regular officer who was on the reserve at the time. (See appendix D).

Colonel François.

- 708x -
4. The officers slandered in the articles awaited in vain for some official action to be taken by the Air Minister. Finally Col. François visited Col. Baccari and gave him the option of a duel or a denial of the allegations. (This involved Baccari's face being slapped). The denial was printed in L'Intransigente dated 20th November (Appendix E).

or sympathies and in each case we have been convinced that all allegations have been unfounded.

2. The movement against these officers recently published a series of articles entitled "Vivisezione dell'Ambiente Aeronautica" (Vivisection in Air Force Circles) in the Italian newspaper L'Intransigente on the following dates 11th October, 25th October and 1st November. (Appendices A,B,C). The articles were malicious, biased, untruthful and personal in their accusations and they named and slandered serving officers e.g. Gen. Aimone Cat, Cols. Remondino, François, Santini etc. In no other country could this have occurred without an action for slander backed up by the Air Ministry.

3. The articles signed by a "nom de plume" FLIT have definitely been brought home to Colonel Spartaco BACCARI, a regular officer who was on the reserve at the time. (See appendix D).

Colonel François.

7688 -

4. The officers slandered in the articles awaited in vain for some official action to be taken by the Air Minister. Finally Col. François visited Col. Baccari and gave him the option of a duel or a denial of the allegations. (This involved Baccari's face being slapped). The denial was printed in L'Intransigente dated 22nd November (Appendix E).

5. No positive official action has yet been taken by the Air Ministry against Col. Baccari.

Colonel Remondino.

6. On 10th December Col. Remondino accompanied Air Vice Marshal Brodie to Lecce on a tour of official inspections.

7. On 14th December, during his absence from Rome, a letter purporting to be written by Col. Remondino was published in the newspaper La Voce Repubblicana. Another copy was sent to the Air Minister (See Appendix F.).

8. Neither of the letters were signed and Col. Remondino denies all knowledge of their source. It is my belief that this is an attempt to force Col. Remondino's actual resignation which

Top Secret

(124)

would be unavoidable if the Air Minister did not issue a refutation to be published officially by the I.A.M.

Chief of Staff - General Aimone Cat.

9. In the past we have had previous attempts to substitute Gen. Aimone Cat, an efficient, suitable and straightforward C.A.S. From another intelligence source it is now reported that the Air Minister has asked H.R.H. Prince Umberto for authority to replace Gen. Aimone Cat by Gen. Mattei. This is reported by Gen. Scagliotti (deputed ex-Republican Air Force), who is reported to have learnt this from Generals Aimone Cat and Mattei and in conversation with General Cassiani (A.D.C. to H.R.H.).

10. The next step will presumably be for Dr. Cevolotto to propose the change to De Gasperi (President of the Council) who should consult the Chief of the General Staff (Gen. Trezzani). If the C.G.S. is agreeable he may approach the Chief Commissioner who will give his ruling.

Ufficio 'I' - Lt. Col/ Santini (Italian Air Force Intelligence).

11. This department is understandably feared and disliked by the associates of the movement against the Staff Officers. In the articles referred to in this report they have been accused of various misdeeds, totalitarian methods etc. etc., all of which accusations have never been substantiated.

12. In all their actions from the time of the Armistice Lt. Col/ Santini and his officers have been exemplary in their collaboration with the Allied Authorities and any Allied Intelligence Agency will corroborate this statement.

13. A few days ago Col. Santini reported to me the case of one of his Lieutenants forging the signature of an A.F.S. Officer and he is being most severely dealt with, but it is feared that this case may be used to re-open the offensive against this department and its Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Santini.

14. If this offensive is opened after the C.A.S. and his deputy

2185

propose the change to De Gasperi (President of the Council) who should consult the Chief of the General Staff (Gen. Trezzani). If the C.G.S. is agreeable he may approach the Chief Commissioner who will give his ruling.

Ufficio 'I' Lt. Col. Santini (Italian Air Force Intelligence).

11. This department is understandably feared and disliked by the associates of the movement against the Staff Officers. In the articles referred to in this report they have been accused of various misdeeds, totalitarian methods etc. etc., all of which accusations have never been substantiated.
  12. In all their actions from the time of the Armistice Lt. Col. Santini and his officers have been exemplary in their collaboration with the Allied Authorities and any Allied Intelligence Agency will corroborate this statement.
  13. A few days ago Col. Santini reported to me the case of one of his Lieutenants forging the signature of an A.F.S. Officer and he is being most severely dealt with, but it is feared that this case may be used to re-open the offensive against this department and its Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Santini.
  14. If this offensive is opened after the C.A.S. and his deputy are replaced by officers perhaps more in agreement with the present Air Minister, it is highly probably that the Allies would lose their most useful contacts in Ufficio 'I' as well as the two good officers mentioned.
- The Allied Courier Service and Italian Civil Aviation.
15. There are undoubtedly powerful Italian Civil Aviation interests which would be satisfied if the officers mentioned above in this report were replaced by individuals who might prove more cooperative to them.
  16. The direction in which the present situation is proceeding leads one to believe that the movement against the Air Ministry Staff Officers is willing to use the Civil Aviation Interests to its own ends.

- 3 -

Top Secret.

(123)

17. The I.A.F. Courier Service, run under the auspices of the A.F.S.C. with the excellent cooperation of the Italian Air Staff is undoubtedly most distasteful to the leaders of Civil Aviation interests as it is creating a precedent for the future close supervision of civil aviation by the Italian Air Ministry as well as removing the urgency for the rehabilitation of civilian services.

#### Conclusions.

18. There is an immediate possibility of our having to endeavour again to maintain General Aimone Cat and Colonel Remondino in their posts as Chief of Air Staff and A.C.A.B. and possibly Col. Santini, even to the extent of losing the Air Minister.

19. There is the urgent need of maintaining them in their posts in order to keep an efficient control over the Italian Air Ministry policy and the Italian Air Force.

20. Instructions must be issued to the Air Minister and Air Staff for stern measures to be taken against any persons proved to have been involved in a subversive plot against the supporters of Allied authority and planning. This will have a most salutary effect on the morale of those officers who really are doing their best to do their job under most difficult conditions.

21. If Dr. Cevolotto, in his position as Air Minister, were to spend more of his time working in the interests of the Italian Air Force and were to take less interest in party politics, the present situation with its damaging effect upon the efficiency of I.A.M. officers would not have arisen.

19th December 1945.

*D. J. Smith*  
Senior Intelligence Officer.

FROM: AIR FORCE COMMISSION,  
ALLIED COMMISSION, ECNE.

TO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, THROUGH EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ECNE.

DATE: 18TH DECEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/567/2/CEG.

TOP SECRET.

FUTURE OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

118

With reference to A.F.H.Q. Joint Planning Staff Paper P.319 (Final) of December, 1945, I agree in general but make the following comments:-

(i) Paragraph 11. In the last two sentences it is stated that ".... the creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of A.F.H.Q." General Lee and I both feel that a limited amount of gliding and of private flying could well be permitted under the general authority of A.F.H.Q. and under the detailed supervision of A.F.S.C. Therefore, it is suggested that the draft cable attached to P.319, paragraph 10 should have added at the end of the last sentence "and limited private flying and gliding".

(ii) Appendix "A" to P.319 does not include Light Bomber Squadrons (of which the Italians now have two), because the M.J.P.S. think that with one such squadron the Italian Air Force would not be a purely defensive force. It is, however, strongly recommended that the Italian Air Force be allowed one Light Bomber Squadron (of the Baltimore/Mosquito type) in order to make the Italian Air Force more balanced in support of its Army, and to allow of a nucleus on which to build should the Peace Treaty allow light bombers. Therefore, in the draft cable to C.C.S. paragraph 5, it is recommended that one Light Bomber Squadron be added to the list of flying units.

(iii) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 2, I am still of the opinion that Bomber/ Fighter Squadrons should be permitted training in the use of aircraft rockets as they are the best air weapon in the case of a civil disturbance and also useful in support of the Italian Army and Navy. Civil disturbance or trouble on a certain frontier seem to us to be far more likely events than the Italians attacking Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. On the other hand if the Italians are allowed to undertake aircraft rocket training in the near future, Italy's neighbours may be encouraged to do the same. However, this matter could be settled on air level at a later date because rocket training is not mentioned in

*80/dec/18/12/45*  
*120*

(i) Paragraph 11. In the last two sentences it is stated that "... the creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of A.P.H.Q." General Lee and I both feel that a limited amount of gliding and of private flying could well be permitted under the general authority of A.P.H.Q. and under the detailed supervision of A.F.S.C. Therefore, it is suggested that the draft cable attached to P.319, paragraph 10 should have added at the end of the last sentence "and limited private flying and gliding".

(ii) Appendix "A" to P.319 does not include Light Bomber Squadrons (of which the Italians now have two), because the M.J.P.S. think that with one such squadron the Italian Air Force would not be a purely defensive force. It is, however, strongly recommended that the Italian Air Force be allowed one Light Bomber Squadron (of the Baltimore/Mosquito type) in order to make the Italian Air Force more balanced in support of its Army, and to allow of a nucleus on which to build should the Peace Treaty allow Light Bombers. Therefore, in the draft cable to C.C.S. paragraph 2, it is recommended that one Light Bomber Squadron be added to the list of flying units.

(iii) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 2, I am still of the opinion that Fighter Squadrons should be permitted training in the use of aircraft rockets as they are the best air weapon in the case of a civil disturbance and also useful in support of the Italian Army and Navy. Civil disturbance or trouble on a certain frontier seem to us to be far more likely events than the Italians attacking Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. On the other hand if the Italians are allowed to undertake aircraft rocket training in the near future, Italy's neighbours may be encouraged to do the same. However, this matter could be settled on an A.P.H.Q. level at a later date because rocket training is not mentioned in the draft cable to C.C.S.

(iv) Appendix "A" to P.319 para 6 second sentence - this states that "It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify four Territorial Headquarters, but until matters left over from the late war are liquidated, these Headquarters will have to remain". I wish to record at this stage, that without consulting the Italian Air Ministry we are not justified in corroborating the statement that four Territorial Headquarters will not be required in the future; the Italian Air Force always has had Territorial Headquarters, and if they are dispensed with, severe complications in their organisation and administration are possible. Therefore instead of "will justify four Territorial Headquarters", I recommend that the wording be changed to "may not justify four Territorial Headquarters".

P

*See to 121 122*  
*San I. P. Rodi*  
*RA 1/2*

I.E. BROOK,  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
 AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Copy:  
 A.V.M. P.J. FUGATEY, AIR, ITALY.  
 GENERAL W.L. ILES, A.P.S.C. HOME.  
 H.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT (1 copy).

8501

1365

Chief Commissioner

Allied Commission

TOP SECRET

1/319 (Final)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 31

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

118

13 December 1945

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

DEC 14 1945

117

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, subject: "Italian Navy and Air Force", the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff has prepared the attached final paper on the Italian Air Force. The Italian Navy is the subject of F/320 (Final) distributed at the same time as this paper.

file 8001

2. A draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached to the paper for approval.

112

Philip ...  
Brigadier, GS.,  
Chairman

DISTRIBUTION

See M.119

F. 120

TOP SECRET

7680 -

478093.

426.

(CSO)



TOP SECRET

11/219 (Final)

TOP SECRET

(117)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

13 December 1945

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

GRAND

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AG 091.711/231 S.08-0 of 23 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to regard the whole of the Italian Air Force; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present armistice period, S.08-0 in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

- a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity her armed forces will therefore be small.
- b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with JUGOSLAVIA...
- c. They must NOT be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interest of the principal Allied powers.

3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, POLAND, HOLLAND and NORWAY. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in A.G. 091, File 231 S. 05-0 of 23 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (distributed to all interested sections). It has been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In view of the Italian Government's needs after the present armistice period, S. 05-0 in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

- a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity her armed forces will therefore be small.
- b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with GUGUSLAVIA...
- c. They must NOT be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interest of the principal Allied powers.

3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, HUNGARY, POLAND and N.A.A.U. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers. The successful equipping and training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organization of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be allowed at the Peace Treaty, in order to make it capable of carrying out its functions as a part of the Italian Armed Forces with effect from the date of withdrawal of Allied forces from ITALY.

*per 7 120*

CURRENT DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force as an operational force ceased to exist. On the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, certain units were, however, kept in employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment. The employment of these units is at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has been the intention that the Italian Air Force (within the authorized ceiling, as it may from time to time be determined), shall be self-supporting in all respects with the following exceptions - tyres, rations and such technical equipment as is necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft in their possession. It is

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET  
1/519 (Final)

TOP SECRET

and an interim policy directive referred to in paragraph 2 was given to the U.O.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission. All Allied aircraft handed over to the Italians, either to assist their participation in the war against GERMANY, or to help them carry out various post-hostility functions for the Allies, are to be considered as a loan.

PRESENT CEILING OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian Air Force as authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under:-

Operational Air Force	22,000
Employed by the R.A.F.	2,500
Employed by the U.S.A.F.	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would otherwise have been carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative service, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, W/T school and several English speaking establishments in the LACOs area. Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons assist the Italian courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of R.A.F. manpower as follows:-

- a. To fill existing R.A.F. establishment vacancies where practicable.
- b. To give further assistance to R.A.F. Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian

2 1-9 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS OF THE I.I.I.N. AIR FORCE

6. Operational Air Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would otherwise have been carried out by the Allied Air Forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the Allied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian Air Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative services, maintenance backing and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, W/T school and several Engineering establishments in the Lucca area. Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons assist the Italian courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for Air Sea rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorized to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution of R.F. manpower as follows:-

- a. To fill existing R.F. establishment vacancies where practicable.
  - b. To give further assistance to R.F. Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.
8. Personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the U.S.A.F. are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the R.F.

ENTER, MAINTENANCE AND I.I.I.N. REQUIREMENTS FOR I.I.I.N. AIR FORCE

9. Short-term policy

- a. So long as the Allies remain in I.I.I.N. the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and air support for the Army in the guarding of such frontiers as are not already guaranteed by the Allies. Since the only frontiers not so guarded are with SWITZERLAND and FRANCE it is not considered that this latter requirement is a very formidable one. However, to permit of these requirements being properly satisfied, it will be necessary to modify in favour of the Italian Air Force certain of the regulations regarding its organization and training.

- b. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary

116

TOP SECRET (TOP SECRET)

F/319 (Final)

that the re-organisation of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

2. It is envisaged that we shall continue to make use of the Air Courier Service and that we shall possibly extend it to take over some of the internal Allied Air Transport Services in Italy. Such Italian courier services would not be allowed to operate in the vicinity of the disputed territories, nor to demilitarised zones except with the authority of AFHQ. The Italian Air Force will continue to take over responsibility for Air Sea Rescue operations around the shores of ITALY (SARDINIA and SICILY) with the intention that it will ultimately be the sole organisation undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for RAF and USAAF personnel in all possible trades. This would assist us to fill larger gaps created in our own organisation occasioned by accelerated release. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained may be used by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack emanating from areas outside her frontiers.

10. Long-term policy

1. The strength of the Italian Air Force must depend on a compromise between two opposing factors :
  - (i) ITALY must not be in a position to threaten sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.
  - (ii) ITALY should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.

2. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the immediate post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Buying the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the

76

accelerated release. Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained may be used by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of Italy against air attack emanating from areas outside her frontiers.

#### 10. Long-term policy

- a. The strength of the Italian Air Force must depend on a compromise between two opposing factors :
- (i) Italy must not be in a position to threaten sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.
  - (ii) Italy should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.
- b. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force. This should serve as a deterrent to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the immediate post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allies Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. S. O. C. in his comments on the Draft Peace Treaty prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the Italian Air Force should be a maximum of 12,000, but this was an arbitrary figure as no examination had been made of the establishments necessary to support the first line squadrons to be permitted. However, since Italy is to be allowed a post-war Army it is clear that she must be allowed an Air Force commensurate with the former. The size of the post-war Italian Air Force must depend partially on the economic ability of Italy to maintain fighting forces. There will also be a requirement for Air Sea Rescue and Coastal reconnaissance aircraft in view of Italy's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be combined in General Reconnaissance Squadrons. Assuming that Italian civil aviation is permitted there will also be a requirement for Air Force Transport Squadrons to enable Air Forces and Italian Army Forces

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

P/319 (Final)

to be moved rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that are a serious menace to the sea lanes through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "L".

11. Air Transport.

In order to assist in the rehabilitation of Italy all forms of internal transport are needed and at the present time the Italian Air Force is running a courier service with its bomber transport and sea plane squadrons. These squadrons are in effect fulfilling tasks that would normally be done by civil aviation. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganised into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of this duty and the transport squadrons should be trained and used in their proper Air Force role which would be transportation of troops, stores and equipment. In order to relieve the Italian Air Force of its current air transport commitments it would be necessary to restart Italian Civil Aviation. This could be done by transferring transport aircraft and aircrews to civil aviation. In the present state of Italy civil aviation should be government controlled so that the Air Force Sub-Commission may keep it under observation and see that it is not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which it is desired to operate. This organisation of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of AFK.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

12. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

1. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retain complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by regulating the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force envisaged is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a

commitments it would be necessary to restart Italian Civil Aviation. This could be done by transferring transport aircraft and aircrews to civil aviation. In the present state of Italy civil aviation should be government controlled so that the Air Force Sub-Commission may keep it under observation and see that it is not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which it is desired to operate. This organization of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation organization will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of AFM.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

12. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

- a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retain complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by regulating the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force envisaged is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, signals and radar equipment, etc..
- b. It is considered that immediate reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced immediate reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.
- c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the necessary signals and certain radar organization are provided. It is unlikely that Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain. There will be a need for the Air Sea Rescue squadrons to be provided with certain modern Anglo-American wireless equipment if they are to perform their Air Sea Rescue duties efficiently in combination with other Nations operating Air Sea Rescue in the Mediterranean.

TOP SECRET



13. Clothing and other requirements.

Provision of clothing, kit bags and other day to day requirements should be the responsibility of the Italian Government.

14. Intions.

1. The provision of the military element of the rations for the Italian Air Force is at present a CEF and MIOUS. responsibility. The present strength of the Italian Air Force is approximately as follows :-

Type of Personnel	Strength	Nation responsible for military element of ration.
Iti/Iti	25,300	British
Br/Iti	4,000	British
US/Iti	2,800	US

The increase of numbers above the authorised ceiling of 31,000 is caused by the Italian Air Force cooperator - companies being added to the strength of the Italian Air Force during the period of their disbandment which is currently taking place (H.K 621 refers).

2. It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Air Force. The Italian Government will shortly assume responsibility for the provision of the whole ration for Iti/Iti Army personnel. The handling and accounting for supplies for Italian Air Force personnel involves a manpower commitment for the British and US armies which it will become increasingly more difficult to meet, particularly in respect of the larger British commitment, owing to diminishing manpower ceilings. From an Army point of view, it is therefore essential that they are relieved of this commitment at the earliest possible date.

3. Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working with RAF and USAAF units scattered throughout Italy. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not considered possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations. The practicability of substituting Italian civilians or possibly German PW should be considered.

4. The ability of the Italian Government to assume responsibility for the provision of rations for Iti/Iti Air Force personnel will to a large extent depend upon their ability to finance the additional

to the strength of the Italian Air Force during the period of their disbandment which is currently taking place (F.A.N 621 refers).

1. It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of an Italian Air Force. The Italian Government will shortly assume responsibility for the provision of the whole ration for Itri/Iti Army personnel. The handling and accounting for supplies for Italian Air Force personnel involves a manpower commitment for the British and US armies which it will become increasingly more difficult to meet, particularly in respect of the larger British commitment, owing to diminishing manpower callings. From an Army point of view, it is therefore essential that they are relieved of this commitment at the earliest possible date.

2. Ex/Iti and US/Iti personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working with A.F. and USAAF units scattered throughout Italy. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not considered possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations. The practicability of substituting Italian civilians or possibly German P.O.s should be considered.

3. The ability of the Italian Government to assume responsibility for the provision of rations for Itri/Iti Air Force personnel will to a large extent depend upon their ability to finance the additional imports necessary. If the Italian Air Force is to be organised into an efficient force, it is important that a satisfactory scale of rations should be maintained. It should be noted that on assuming Italian responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration.

15. Capability of Italian Economy.

For some time to come, in order to maintain the Italian Air Force in equipment, it would be necessary, as in the case of the Italian Army, to augment, from limited stocks, the material and supplies which could be provided from indigenous sources. The Italian civil aircraft industry, subject to receiving raw material, should be fully capable of maintaining any civil aviation organisation permitted, provided that the Italian Government considered it economical to do so.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

E/S19 (Final)

FUTURE OF AIR FORCE'S SUB-COMMISSION

16. The Air Forces Sub-Commission is the vehicle set up under article 57 of the Armistice Terms with Italy as the Allied Organisation to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that it should remain in its present form until a Peace Treaty is concluded, as the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian Air matters, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being. In the event of the Italian Air Force being reorganised and eventually handed over to the Military Italian Government it should undertake parallel duties to the Italian Mission of the Italian Army and that part of it which performs mission duties should be known as the Air Mission to the Italian Air Force (AMIAF).

CONCLUSIONS

- 17. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganised to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces inflicting any attacks upon across her borders.
- b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.
- c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and AUSTRIA.
- d. That until such time as the command, organisation and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control.
- e. Italian Civil Aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.
- f. That it is essential for C4F to be relieved of its responsibility for the provision of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except BR/Iti and US/Iti personnel as soon as possible, and it is desirable that this responsibility should be assumed by the Italian Government.

to be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces in frustrating any attacks from across her borders.

- D. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.
- E. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, ENGLAND, HOLLAND and NORWAY.
- F. That until such time as the command, organization and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control.
- G. Italian Civil Aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.
- H. That it is essential for CAF to be relieved of its responsibility for the provision of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel as soon as possible, and it is desirable that this responsibility should be assumed by the Italian Government.
- I. That solely from the aspect of rations, RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should release Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel and they should be replaced by Italian civilians or possibly by German POWs so that CAF and AIOUSA can be relieved of their responsibility for the supply of rations to Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 18. a. That the Italian Air Force should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time, but that the reorganization and training of the Italian Air Force should begin forthwith to the Order of Battle and organization outlined at Appendix "A" in order to form a basis for a well organized and efficient Air Force that can be used for defence in cooperation with the other services; that, when a sufficiently high standard of organization and training has been reached the Italian Air Force should be handed back to Italian Government control.

2201

785017

- b. That the Italian Government be permitted to start internal civil aviation and that the necessary aircraft, aircrews and maintenance personnel should be discharged from the Italian Air Force to form the civil aviation organization.
- c. That CAF be relieved of its present responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Er/Iti and US/Iti personnel. Only those Italian Air Force personnel who are serving as an integral part of RAF and USAF units should be regarded as Er/Iti and US/Iti personnel.
- d. That the Allied Commission be instructed to examine the practicability of the Italian Government assuming responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Er/Iti and US/Iti personnel at as early a date as possible on a scale equivalent to that provided for the other Italian Armed Forces.
- e. That RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should examine the feasibility of replacing Er/Iti and US/Iti Air Force personnel by Italian civilians or possibly German PW at the earliest possible date in order that CAF and MTOUSA can be relieved of their responsibility for providing rations for Er/Iti and US/Iti personnel.
- f. That the Air Forces Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the Peace Treaty and assume corresponding responsibilities to those of MIA.

113

TOP SECRET

ASSEMBLY '44  
TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

10 December 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE - ORGANIZATION AND COMING

<u>Type of Sqn</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>No. of Sqdns.</u>	<u>1.s. per Sqn.</u>
Fighter/Bomber	P-38	5	16
Tac/n.	Spitfire	1	16
ASB & CR.	Flying Boat	2	20
Transport Sqdns	Civil Type	2	16
Training School	Elementary & Service Types	1	20
Communication	Obsolete/Service & Civil Types	1	16

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organized into an interceptor fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in tactical support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the USAF should sell a number of P-38 and P-5 aircraft to the Italian Government. The P-5 is a photographic version of the P-38 and by changing the nose can be converted to P-38 which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons likewise will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a sever menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/B. The Tac/B squadron for administrative purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever Air Headquarters would work in parallel with the Italian army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the Italian Air Force is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be able. It will need photographic and adequate R/I equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

4. Air Sea Rescue and C.S. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats or seaplanes so that in performance of their air sea rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors.

208

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organized into an Interceptor Fighter sector of 2 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in tactical support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the USAF should sell a number of P-58 and F-5 aircraft to the Italian Government. The F-5 is a photographe which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The Interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons likewise will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a sever menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R squadron for administrative purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever Air Headquarters would work in parallel with the Italian Army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the Italian Air Force is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be mobile. It will need photographic and adequate R/T equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

4. Air Sea Rescue and G.I. Squadrons. should be equipped with flying boats or seaplanes so that in performance of their Air Sea Rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One Squadron should be based to cover the West Coast of Italy and one the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and capable of working in conjunction with the RAF operating from Malta and the French Air Force from the South Coast of France.

2081

5. Transport Squadrons. These should be equipped with a normal civil type of aircraft and their normal use should be to provide mobility for the Italian Air Force and to lift Italian Army Forces where necessary. Until such time as civil aviation is working in Italy they should have an establishment of 30 aircraft per squadron. When, however, Italian civil aviation begins they should be reduced to an initial equipment of 16 aircraft per squadron and the balance of aircraft could be transferred to Italian civil aviation and completely discharged, without any reserve obligation, to civil life.

6. Flying Training. There will be a need for a flying training school for the Italian Air Force as there must be a continuous small new intake. This training school should consist of 2 branches, elementary and service training

TOP SECRET

E/319 (Final) APPENDIX "A"

TOP SECRET FOR SECRET

and it will require approximately 15 elementary training aircraft and 15 service type aircraft. Operational training should take place in the squadrons.

7. Italian Air Ministry. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and employs relatively large number of Italian Air Force personnel, a rather higher proportion than is normal in British Service Ministries, in view of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry use officers in many cases where British Service Ministri would use civil servants.

8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are organized on a territorial basis. It is not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify 4 Territorial Headquarters, but until matters left over from the late war are liquidated these Headquarters will have to remain. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct through:

- (a) An interceptor fighter sector with 3 squadrons.
- (b) A Fighter/Bomber wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R Squadron.
- (c) A Transport wing of 2 squadrons.
- (d) A C.R./A.S.A. wing of 2 squadrons.
- (e) A Training wing responsible for flying and technical training.
- (f) A Maintenance wing.

The above wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

9. Ceilings. The current ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 31,000 which is approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when ITALY surrendered. Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishment required to operate an Air Force of such nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any expansion permitted by the Peace Treaty must lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing certain functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the U.S.A.F and RAF and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by Allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave ITALY this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling pending the Peace Treaty must depend on these require-



- (a) An interceptor fighter sector with 2 squadrons
- (b) A Fighter/Bomber wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R Squadron.
- (c) A Transport wing of 2 squadrons.
- (d) A G.A./A.S.A. wing of 2 squadrons.
- (e) A Training wing responsible for flying and technical training.
- (f) A Maintenance wing.

The above wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

9. Ceiling. The current ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 31,000 which is approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when ITALY surrendered. Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishment required to operate an Air Force of such nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any expansion permitted by the Peace Treaty must lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing certain functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the USAF and RAF and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by Allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave Italy this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling pending the Peace Treaty must depend on these requirements and the establishment for any Italian Air Force permitted and until these establishments are worked out it is impossible to make an arbitrary ceiling of 12,000.

TOP SECRET

2207

785017

112

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ACTION: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is NAF

1. I have been examining whether it is desirable or feasible to return the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, as has been done in the case of the Italian Army.

2. The Armistice Terms grounded the Italian Air Force, but this policy has been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force, which is now employed in the working of courier services and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Certain personnel are employed within RAF and USAF units and on guard duties on Allied air fields and installations.

3. Immediate Operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are not under Allied control. Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of Italy against air attack.

4. as a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force, and that it should be large enough to provide air defense to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

5. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized

7669

duties. Certain personnel are employed within RAF and USAF units and on guard duties on Allied air fields and installations.

3. Immediate Operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are not under Allied control. Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of Italy against air attack.

4. As a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be a purely defensive force, and that it should be large enough to provide air defense to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

5. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized forthwith into the following flying units:

700y

- 5 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons
- 1 Tac/R Squadron
- 2 Air Sea Rescue & Ground Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 2 Transport Squadrons
- 1 Training School
- 1 Communication Squadron

This will form a basis on which the expansion of the Italian Air Force to meet the commitments described in paragraph 4 above can take place if permitted by the Peace Treaty.

6. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and it is proposed that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct, through functional sub-commands, under my overall direction.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(11)

The ceiling of the Italian Air Force must depend on the requirements for and strength of units necessary to command, administer and maintain the flying units described above, and Anglo - U.S. Air Force requirements.

8. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganized into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of its present commitment in running courier services to meet largely civil government commitments. I therefore recommend that Italian civil aviation should be permitted to the extent necessary to relieve the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and that it should be controlled by the Italian Government so that the Air Forces Sub Commission may keep it under observation. External air-lines will not be permitted until Italian civil aircraft safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

9. With regard to the supply of aircraft, spare parts and equipment, I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be procured from either the United States or Great Britain so that the Allies retain full control over the first line strength of the Italian Air Force. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that the Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and signal equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain.

Sub Commission may keep it under observation. External air-lines will not be permitted until Italian civil aircraft safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

9. With regard to the supply of aircraft, spare parts and equipment, I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be procured from either the United States or Great Britain so that the Allies retain full control over the first line strength of the Italian Air Force. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that the Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and signal equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain.

10. I do not consider that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control until a sufficiently high standard of organization and training has been reached in the use of certain modern equipment, radar, etc. I therefore request your authority to proceed with the reorganization of the Italian Air Force as described above, and to permit the Italian Government to start internal civil air lines.

TAP SECRET

2211

181

AFHQ for G-5.

8825

28 Nov

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

1.04

REFERENCE YOUR FOX FIVE FOUR THREE SIX SIX OF TWO FOUR NOVEMBER PD  
PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DAHS FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALCOM CITE AOEKO PAREN  
THIS MATTER WAS FULLY DISCUSSED ON TWO <sup>SEVEN</sup> ~~SIX~~ NOVEMBER WITH BRIGADIER PARSONS  
WHO HAS FULL INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT

Copy to: Navy S/O  
Air Forces S/O

*File*  
*30/11*

0000

Ex. Commissiener

3434  
M B. LUSH

Brigadier  
Executive Commissiener

*Copy for file 8001/2c*

*PA*  
*2/12*

(105)

Note for File:

1. I discussed the telegram at Page 1 with Brigadier PARSONS, (G-5 AFHQ), Air Vice Marshal BRODIE and Brigadier General LEE (Air Forces Sub-Com), and Captain BUTLER (Navy Sub-Com).
2. Air Vice Marshal BRODIE put in pages 2 and 3 as draft replies. Captain BUTLER put in page 4 of which we amended the last paragraph.
3. G-5 stated that there was no necessity to answer the telegram at length and I therefore propose to telegraph to the effect that this has been discussed with Brigadier PARSONS who has full information.
4. Brigadier PARSONS produced a staff study on several points of the MJPS plan and has promised that before the plan reaches the final stages the Navy and Air Force Sub-Commissions will be asked to comment and attend the final meeting.

See (105)

MSL

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

27 Nov 1945.

7067

TOP SECRET

109

Following comments questions paragraph 3 your P 54366 cite FHGGG refer Italian Navy:

(a) Simultaneous interim reduction Italian Navy to proposed Peace Treaty strength paragraph 2 and transfer control to Italian Government is not considered feasible or desirable from political or operational and administrative point of view. Navy is being operated in Allied and Italian interests for transport mine-sweeping and related duties with minimum Allied supervision and control over internal organization except for ship movements which cannot be relaxed. Vessels not required have been and can be readily reduced to care and maintenance status under CCS 515/1. Control over internal affairs Italian Ministry of Marine has never been exercised to same extent as in case of Italian Army and is now primarily a liaison function with a reservation of power. Recommend that no arbitrary changes in strength of Italian Navy be made commensurate that present control and administration continue and that strength be gradually reduced as directed by Cinc Med and Navy Sub Commission A.C.

(b) It is considered that Italian economy can support the ships and personnel recommended in paragraph 2 of your P 54366 provided the Italian Government can in the future actually import a reasonable amount of food clothing fuel and materials commencing early 1946.

(c) No comments - see (b) above.

(d) The Navy Sub-Commission A.C. is the vehicle set up under Article 37 of Armistice Terms with Italy as the Allied Organization to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Navy. Irrespective of any changes which are made in the strength and degree of control over the Italian Navy pending the Peace Treaty it is strongly recommended that the Navy Sub Commission A.C. continue to function.

finance the cost of and

106

as part of AC

*the use must continue to function as the  
 Dept without to support the government  
 should be by law the  
 should be effort*

TOP SECRET



106

Draft Refs  
~~A-F~~ by Air Force Sub Com.

a Yes but not in strength under para 26 above  
 proposed draft order of battle handed to  
 Bin Pearson ..

b. Not Probable get up to present with only 31,000.

c Not applicable.

d as at present

In view of Allied Commitments & the assistance  
 which IAF is giving to UK in Air Transport  
 it would not be possible <sup>now finite</sup> arbitrarily to reduce  
 personnel ceiling from 31,000 to figure laid down

in No 2.

7661

SECRET  
105

QUEST OF HATTIS

For

POST WAR I.A.F. - LONG TERM ALLIED REQUIREMENTS.

(as foundation for I.A.C. allowed by Rescue Terms).

Serial Nos.		No. of Squads.	Establishment A/C. Crews.
1	<u>Fighters - Guns/Bombs/rockets - (Lightnings etc).</u>	4	16
2	<u>Trainer - Fighter type a/c - Army Coop, Flares and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).</u>	2	16
3	<u>Transport - Civil type a/c (or civil a/c): Current types of B/T a/c will continue to be used until worn out.</u>	2	16 (approx)
4	<u>AM/GR - Bombers (until re-equipped with Flying boats or landplanes).</u>	2	16
5	<u>Communication - Obsolescent type <del>thru-out</del> Military &amp; civil landplanes.</u>	1	15 (approx)
6	<u>Flying Training School - Including O.T.U.</u>	1	30 (approx)

CONDITIONS:

- (a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Esc/role.
- (b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Squads until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Squads will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Squad as required by A.C. (partly for Allies) and as available.
- (c) Reserve to be approximately 50, at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Rescue Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

6060

and Survey. (Mustang or Spitfire).

2

16

Transport - Civil type A/c (or civil a/c):  
Current types of B-1 a/c will continue to be  
used until worn out.

2

15 (approx)

ASL/OL - Seaplanes (until re-equipped with  
flying boats or landplanes).

2

16

Communication - Obsolete type ~~planes~~ Mil-  
itary & civil landplanes.

1

15 (approx)

Flying Training School - Including C.F.T.

1

30 (approx)

CONDITIONS:

(a) On Serial 2 - I.A.F. will require ab initio training in the Tac/ Role.

(b) On Serial 3 - Allow 4 Sqn until Civil Aviation is allowed, when 2 Sqn will be disbanded to civil aviation; until then, permit of more than 16 a/c per Sqn as required by A.C. (partly for allies) and as available.

7660

(c) Reserve to be approximately 50%, at least until modern aircraft are supplied together with spare parts. Surplus aircraft above this reserve to be stored until the Peace Treaty, some to be broken down for spare parts as required.

(d) Supply to be as follows and to include Technical Equipment & Spares.

- (i) Combat aircraft - from British or American sources.
- (ii) Civil and Transport a/c - from Italian sources with option to Italian Government to obtain them from U.S. or British sources.
- (iii) P.C.L. To be provided (on payment by the Italian Government) in such quantities as to maintain and train an efficient I.A.F. International A.S.F. Service and a courier service until civil aviation is permitted.

(e) The Order of Battle shows the maximum to be permitted for training and Allied supply purposes, but may be reduced to a limited extent (after consultation with the allies), if the Italian economy cannot support such a force. Flying units and aircraft retained by the I.A.F. in excess of this Order of Battle will not be given authority for training except pure flying to a limited extent.

*3001 or 3001/RC*  
**TOP SECRET**  
*Ex Com*

104

P 54366 cite FHGEG  
241719A

G/4258

250930

FREEDOM signed SACHMED

Top Secret

ALCOM Rome

NOV 26 1945

Future of Italian Navy and Italian Air Forces.

1. Under examination are the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Forces with a view to determining future policy to be adopted in respect of these services pending Peace Treaty. In particular, desirability or otherwise of restoring these services to Italian Government control and administrative responsibility is being examined. Comments contained in your 8593 regarding feeding these services are noted.

2. SACHMED recommendations in connection with draft Peace Treaty considered here in August are summarised as follows.

a. Navy.

- 1. Personnel ceiling approximately 18,000.
- 2. Fleet to be limited to 2 old Battleships, 5 6in cruisers, 2 Fleet destroyers, 20 torpedo boats, 20 corvettes.
- 3. Such number of small surface craft as can be manned and maintained within a ceiling allocation of 3,000.

b. Air Forces.

- 1. Personnel ceiling approximately 12,000.
- 2. Air Forces to be limited to 6 squadrons of S/E fighter aircraft and 2 squadrons of transport aircraft.
- 3. Each squadron to consist of 16 aircraft with overall reserve of 20% of the types in the squadrons.
- 4. One Air-Sea Rescue Squadron.
- 5. Training School with sufficient training aircraft.

7559

3. To assist in preparation of MJPS paper your views required by 0900 hours November 28th on following points.

- a. Desirability of handing over to Italian control and administration forces as in paragraph 2.
- b. Capability of Italian economy to support those forces.
- c. If you consider Italian economy not yet capable of this your views as to a phased programme of handover are requested.
- d. Your recommendations as to future of naval air forces Sub-Commissions in event of handover being approved.

*See 110*

*Copy to - 8001/RC*

**TOP SECRET**

OVER

NOV 20 1945

A.C. Distribution

- Act : Navy Sub-Commission
- Air Force Sub-Commission
- Inf : C. Comm.
- Ex. Comm.
- File (xx)

(The following text is extremely faint and mostly illegible. It appears to be a memorandum or report detailing the distribution of information to various committees and commissions.)

1945

2219

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017



N. 17615-1965

# MINISTERO DELLE CORPORAZIONI <sup>32441</sup>

Segreteria Particolare dell'Ecc. il Sottosegretario di Stato



INTERESSATO

*Corso Italia - Roma - Via Cavour  
Cappella - Roma - Via Cavour  
Cappella - Roma - Via Cavour*

2 2 2 0

Declassified E.O. 12350 Section 1.3/NND No.

785017

7659-1000

10000 / 135 / 680

THIS FOLDER  
CONTAINS PAPERS  
FROM NOV. 45  
TO FEB. 47  
CATALOGUE-