

ACC

10000/135/696

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ALA LITTORIA
SEPT. 1943 - SEPT. 1945

17A

From: Air Forces Sub Commission, H.Q. Allied Commission.
To: Finance Sub Commission, Attention Lt. Col. E.F. Waters.
Date: 25th September 1945.
Ref: AFSC/INT/24

ALA ITALIANA.

1. This Sub Commission is very anxious to settle the outstanding matter of the above-named firm.
2. The position is that Ala Italiana was formed under the Fascist regime from these nuclei of the two Italian Civil Aviation concerns Ala Littoria and LAI which went north subsequent to the Armistice on 8th September 1943. Both these concerns, although limited liability companies, were in fact largely owned by the Government, who held the majority of the shares. Ala Italiana is therefore a para statal organisation, and all its available funds (80 million odd) are held in various banks in northern Italy. (See Ministero dell'Aeronautica letter 22077/AG/4136 Coll. dated 24th July 1945, a translated copy of which is attached).
3. In so far as Civil Aviation in Italy is not permitted by the Allies, this firm finds itself in the position of having employees still on its books, whom it has to pay, but to whom it is impossible to give useful work. As its funds were blocked by the Allies on the liberation of the north, the employees of this still legally constituted firm are in a state of semi-starvation. It is for this reason that two extraordinary credits were paid to this firm in June and July, on the latter occasion in order to stop an incipient riot which was brewing up in Venice.

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4. After the passing of this second credit, this Sub Commission, after consultation with yourselves, ordered the liquidation of the Company. We now desire to inform you that a liquidator has been appointed who is satisfactory to all parties, namely Dottore TOLOMEI. We are now being approached from all sides to have the liquidation hastened, and it is for this reason that we request you to signal Colonel Howell, the R.F.C. of XII Region, informing him officially of the name of the liquidator, and authorising him to unlock the funds of Ala Italiana as and when requested by the liquidator.

5. We are aware that the funds of this concern should properly be turned over to the Italian Treasury, but in view of the Ministry of Finances letter attached requesting that the firm should have control of its own funds, provided your Sub Commission has no objection, it is suggested that the action requested in para 4 above should take place without delay.

T.G.M. PEARCE W/ODR
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

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MINUTE to Air Vice Marshal I.E. BRODIE.

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1. Reference enclosure. The matter was taken up with the Finance Sub Commission who pointed out that the funds in question, having belonged to a company associated with the Fascist Government, had all been confiscated and handed over to the Italian Treasury to go into the national exchequer. In the circumstances, Ala Italiana had no further claim on these monies and was, in fact, insolvent. In view of the disturbances which the firm's employees were making in Venice however, the Finance Sub Commission, acting on behalf of the Italian Treasury, signalled their R.F.O. in Padua, authorising him to issue an extraordinary credit of 4 million lire through their paying agents in Venice. This money was to be debited against the national exchequer.
2. The Finance Sub Commission point out further that this procedure cannot be repeated. There are only two things that can be done in future:-
 - (a) Wind up Ala Italiana altogether OR
 - (b) Budget for the wages of the employees in the normal manner, so that they become Government employees. In these circumstances, the cost could almost certainly be debited against the Regia Aeronautica vote - which I understand is already ludicrously small.
3. I explained the above situation to Col. PORRU, and in view of the social and political problems involved, as well as the whole vexed question of civil aviation policy, he has decided to take the matter up with the Minister, who will doubtless communicate with us in due course.

B.

T.G.N. PEARCE, W/CDR.

Senior Intelligence Officer. 1531

July 27th, 1945

STATEMENT BY GUIDO TRACCOLI.

On 1st January 1939, I was Commanding the old Ala Littoria at the Venezia Lido Airport with a view to operating the Civil Air Line - VENICE - BERLIN -

On the 8th of June 1940 I was recalled to the Regia Aeronautica of which service I am a regular officer, and posted to a bomber transport squadron operating between Italy and Eritrea. During the month of September 1940 I was again attached to the Ala Littoria.

In 1941 I was employed at the Ala Littorio Workshops in Venice as a test pilot, and in 1942 promoted to Captain whilst in the same occupation.

On the 25th September 1943 I was released by the Commander of the Nucleo Comunicazioni Ala Italiana of the S.A.S. on the strength of Regia Aeronautica discharge papers dated 12th September 1943.

In October 1943 the engineer SOLESIN, Director of the Ala Italiana di Venezia sent a list of personnel on his strength to the Republican Military Authorities.

I evaded another calling up and refused to continue serving in the forces, (i) indefinite leave whilst awaiting discharge (27th October 1943,) (ii) indefinite discharge (29th February 1944) and discharge in October 1944.

Because of the serious measure of reprisals towards my family living at the Lido in Venice, it was impossible for me to follow my impulse and join the Partisans. Instead I had to rely on what little sabotage I could carry out on my own as a civilian.

I carried this out faithfully and consistently as can be ascertained by the result of my work. As soon as I noticed that it was no longer possible for me to stay with the Societa Ala Italiana, I left and renounced my rank of 1st Commander.

EVENTS AFTER 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1943.

On the 8th September 1943 I am called to Berlin in aircraft I-Bios from Venice where I repulse all attempts by the neo-fascist Government dispersed in Germany, to get me to join them and rejoin to Italy by road with the whole crew on the 16th of September. I have hardly set foot at my official and private

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VENICE AFTER 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1943.

On the 8th September 1943 I am called to Berlin in aircraft I-110s from Venice where I refused all attempts by the neo-fascist Government dispersed in Germany, to get me to join them and return to Italy by road with the whole crew on the 16th of September. I have hardly set foot at my official and private residence at Lido di Venezia on the 16th of September, when SIGMUND NOAK, representative of the D.L.K. lets

I learn that the new director of the airfield FISANI and CACCIANO the Commandant of the airfield, sides with the new Government. FISANI advised me to do the same. SOLESIN informed CACCIANO and me of NOAK's order to decently leave the aircraft in Germany. Having heard of my reluctance NOAK calls me and says clearly that any hostile act against the Germans will be met with reprisals against my family.

The "Ala" slowly disintegrated. The engineer VELANI, Director General of the Society, in the course of a visit to Germany declares to me that the "Ala" is impotent. On the 21st of September I try to reach ROME by train but without success. On November 1st I leave Venice as an employee of the Società CLOZA is leaving for ROME by car and I am able to take a lift. In ROME I ask VEALANI, CERONI and ARCIDIACONO for information as to the situation that they will do their best to safeguard us.

I ask if I should stay in ROME, but am advised to stay where I am so I return to Venice.

In the meantime, in spite of the work done by VELANI, the Rome Office is unable to prevent the Germans from taking the material from the Ostia workshops.

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I avoid as much as possible giving any help to the Germans, but the position is grave the German Command has strengthened itself in the North of Italy. The neo-fascists have found a footing and the Government once more show signs of predomination ~~more~~. SOLESIN communicates our names to the Republican Air Force, and these are brought to the notice of a German Major acting as Liaison Officer.

In spite of the delicate position I call at the Italian and German H.Q. at PADOVA and obtain permission for the personnel to remain in VENICE, which enables us to remain with the D.L.H. and have no direct contact with the Germans.

Major FELLIZZARI, under orders from the Under Secretary for Air, forms a transport nucleus of the "Ala Italiana" which goes to Germany.

The D.L.H. makes every effort to send our personnel to Germany as testers. Our Company finds it impossible to be of any help and the Republican Air Force insists that we shall become part of it.

PEROLI has already initiated arrangements to constitute a military group with elements from the "Ala", which will precipitate the breaking up of the company. Our position is grave, as to leave the Society means coming under either the D.L.H. or the Aeronautica or the Obligatory Workers Service. To go over to the partisans means for most, as for me, danger to our families. It is necessary to find a solution.

The rumours of liquidation in Rome were distorted and exaggerated in Venice.

The new president, COL. SERRA is a military man and the Society is evidently destined to become a republican military organ. I think it time to react. It has come to my knowledge that CLOZA is maneuvering to take over the reins. I try to win over PEROLI and CLOZA. DAZNINO is my associate. I ~~try~~ go to the Air Ministry at Bellagio but they do not trust me as we had not volunteered. They start protesting because nothing had been transferred North. Lt. Colonel BAYLON declares openly that as the Company is backed by the Government, he intends to liquidate it and absorb the precious aircrew personnel. PEROLI accepts the position of head of the transport Group. Once more I find myself in the predicament of trying to save the Company. It is clear to me that I must overcome the obstacles presented by my firm convictions hostile towards the Government and the necessity of obtaining the confidence of collaborators favourable to the Government. I try to persuade PEROLI, but COCEBIO and SALOMINI advise me not to associate with PEROLI. I, however, am convinced of the necessity for a moderator amongst our ranks.

I try my utmost to convince Lt/Col. BAYLON and therefore the Under Secretary BOTTO that we should be definitely disassociated from the German Command and from the D.L.H., and allow us to remain a Civil Airways Company without likeli-

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I try my utmost to convince Lt/Col. BAYLON and therefore the Under Secretary BOTTO that we should be definitely disassociated from the German Command and from the D.L.M., and allow us to remain a Civil Airways Company without likelihood of being dissolved. The Under Secretary does not trust those who, like myself, have not volunteered to serve in the transport group. FEROLI confirms his ¹⁵²³ willingness to comply. Although I am still frowned upon for not having become a member of the fascist party, I feel that I have succeeded in paving the way.

At this point circumstantial proof indicates that CLOZA with PAVOLINI's help is about to take control of the company, thus endangering once more its status. I am worried and try to persuade CLOZA not to do it, but he distrusts me.

The new president SERRA appears to be losing interest in the Company in the North. I am under the impression that the Ministry at BELLAZIO are aware of this and are thinking of abandoning the ROME CO. and absorbing what is left of the company in the North. SOLESIN cannot give us a direct answer regarding the financial situation of the Northern network. At TRIESTE the engineer FIACCARINI, manager of the local "AIA" is arrested. We all feel that the end of the war or the liberation of VENICE is a long way off, and we are preoccupied from the economic point of view. The cost of living is increasing and we realise that if the company is liquidated, we shall be left in the hands of the Germans. We think, on the other hand, that if the Company can still remain on its feet, we should not be giving any effective help to the Republic or to the Germans, but could, instead, effect a passive resistance of some importance.

8/11 February 1944. In this frame of mind I accompanied FEROLI to ROME for the transport already arranged by PRESIDENT SERRA of 20 million in securities from ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ROME to the North. In order to obtain a reliable safe conduct, and owing to the importance of the cargo, we go to ROME armed and in uniform, although none of us form part of the active Italian Air Force. I am not certain of the reaction to this by our ROMAN colleagues, but it appears that they are not aware of the position of the personnel in VENICE in comparison to that in ROME, In any case I am sure that if at the time they had understood ~~the~~ our true intentions (that is not to deprive the necessary subsistances of about ten families from one moment to another,) they would have given, without any doubt, their approval. I am certain they would give it to us now.

At this moment, however, our gesture has only succeeded in making a false impression, and in fact the Republican Government restored its faith in us and demonstrated it in no uncertain fashion.

The Air Force nominates FEROLI as executor of the "ALA" Italiana and CLOZA as his right hand man, both party members, and as representatives of the Society two consultants FRARACCI and DAZIMMO, both non party members. We are once more asked to become members, but again we succeed in evading this request by making full use of our value as technicians. In order to safeguard ourselves we are forced to countersign documents written by FEROLI and CLOZA, but we know well - and facts will confirm our judgement - that these documents are of no real value.

At this stage I think it opportune to take over the administrative direction and place DAZIMMO in charge of the personnel, and to begin with everything seems to go according to plan, but later we are handicapped by new arrivals from the ROME Office, the larger number of whom are incompetent and strong fascists. They immediately take sides against us on the strength that we are not members of the fascist party, and protest that we were responsible for the discharge of two fascists the driver CASTAGNA and an employee EZIDI from our offices at MAROCCO VENETO, and for stopping the promotion of a fascist employee by the name of ROVERATI. They succeed in winning over FEROLI and CLOZA.

I ask to go to ROME with FEROLI in order to clarify the question of the alienation between ROME and MAROCCO, then I ask to go to SPAIN. Both these requests are turned down. FEROLI and CLOZA don't trust me, they have evidently discovered my little game - I have not given up hope.

FEROLI and CLOZA insist that I should join the fascist party. In vain I endeavour to make them change their ideas and partly succeed.

They place a fascist by name of CAVALLOTTI in charge of the personnel, who though under DAZIMMO is there to keep an eye on me. It is quite clear that they have given up hope of co-operation from me, and they deal directly with H.Q. without keeping me informed.

At the same time the Chief of Civil Aviation, the fascist

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FEROLI is firmly backed by the new Chief of Civil Aviation, the fascist DR. PORRU. They both fear being kicked out of office by LT/COL. CASTELLANI. The Germans wish to deport to Germany labourers from the VENICE workshops and also to absorb the Trieste workshops. FIACCARINI is in a delicate position. With difficulty I manage to transfer him and avoid him the serious consequences. FEDER, MICHELI and CALVOSA all TRIESTE personnel are accused of sabotage, and anti-fascism. I help them too by having them transferred. BLASICH would pass "Trieste" over to the Germans. SOLESIN favours the Germans. CAZZIANO is watched as he had not become a member of the party. RIMER, the engineer, in charge of the Venice Workshops can only show weak resistance, assisted by the engineer FONTANOLFI. RIMER and CAZZIANO are imprisoned for approximately two months for having obviously apposed the exportation of material from the workshops. For the aircrew things are worse still. The D.L.H. wishes to engage pilots immediately as testers. I try to handicap the success of these intentions. I oppose passive resistance. I succeed in sending SOLESIN away in spite of GERMAN opposition. I try to get FEROLI against the Germans so that they do not deport personnel from the workshops. We send a strong written protest to the German Command which obtain partly the required result. As for the test pilots, they succeed with proposals and counter proposals in prolonging the matter to such an extent that it is completely forgotten. I disapprove in no uncertain manner the D.L.H. who oblige the 2nd pilots to fly between MILAN and BERLIN. At personal risk I advise these pilots to discreetly evade this service, giving as a motive the fact that our company had found no basis of accord with the D.L.H.

I must point out that this action, which was purely personal, is in con-

Continued/4.....

trast to that undertaken by PEROLI. I try to play up to PEROLI and the authorities, and I do this in order not to hamper my real intentions, one of which, for instance, was the transference of the seat of the Co. from Marocco Veneto to VENICE.

Having received orders from the Germans to vacate the villa at MAROCCO, PEROLI and CLOZA, with the approval of the Government, look for premises in the Alps or near the Government. I appose this strongly and in the absence of PEROLI and CLOZA, transfer the company to VENICE under the pretext of GERMAN pressure. I realise the responsibility attached to this move, but I am convinced that VENICE is the only place where the company could be transferred in order to preserve what little is left of it. In Venice, also, we could be in direct contact with the workers and await calmly for the liberation.

Some credit was recuperated from the Government and from the German Command. Unfortunately this transfer leaves no doubt as to my intentions. PEROLI and CLOZA incited by the fascists on the managements state that they will make another change of address. I continue to act on my own. I succeed in effecting the discharge of the pilots, obtaining a compromise in the farce of taking an oath in that personnel abstain from military obligations.

The accusations against me become more insistent. I am reported to the fascist authorities as being anti-fascist and a go-slow type. PEROLI and CLOZA keep me in the dark as to what is going on with H.Q. partly because they are manœuvring for positions at the head of the organisation.

July 1944. I can consider myself an outcast from the organisation.

The Germans demolish the workshops at the Lido Venice but we can do nothing about it. TRIESTE is also being taken possession of by the Germans.

My only responsibility is to administer the workmen whom I have been able to keep at TRIESTE. PEROLI is trying to transfer the company to ASIAGO.

I leave the company with a free conscience, the personnel have a fixed salary, a reserve balance is in VENICE, and as the company is now merged into the I.A.T.I. the personnel are safe-guarded.

I consider that what I have done will bear fruit.

24th August 1944. PEROLI is happy to accept my resignation.

I leave the company about the middle of September and am completely discharged on the 15th October.

In order to avoid any sort of forced labour I feign employment at the docks but I do no work and receive no remuneration.

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24th August 1944. PEROLI is happy to accept my resignation.

I leave the company about the middle of September and am completely discharged on the 15th October.

In order to avoid any sort of forced labour I feign employment at the docks but I do no work and receive no remuneration.

After leaving the Co. I get the impression of being followed, and am threatened with arrest. In order not to compromise others or myself, I abstain from any activity.

I am willing to vouch for the aforementioned at any time.

(GUIDO FRAPACCI.)

Cw. / C.

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AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION
ALLIED COMMISSION
R O M E

17 novembre 1944

Vs. rif. 12973/AG/918
Ns. rif. AFSC/INT/17/I 295

MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA
GABINETTO DEL MINISTRO
Ufficio Affari Generali
R O M A

Oggetto - Epurazione - Enti sottoposti alla vigilanza
del Ministero dell'Aeronautica.--

In evasione al foglio di cui sopra in data
15 corrente, si dà il benestare alla nomina del per
sonale elencato e destinato ad integrare la Commis
sione di I Grado per l'Epurazione del Personale Ci
vile degli Enti suddetti.

Si fa però eccezione per il Signor Polidoro
Cosimo, che viene proposto quale eventuale sostituto
del Rag. Mascolo Giuseppe, non essendo la nomina
del Detto Signor Polidoro Cosimo ben accetta.

P. DE HAAN S/LDR INT
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

1526

RISERVATA
PERSONALE



SEGRETO

Roma 11 15 Novembre 1944 XA

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

UFFICIO AEROSILURANTX "I"

13A
AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
(Maggiore De Haan)
- ROMA -

I 302

Prot. N. 5/5448 Allegati uno

Risposta al foglio del

Div.

Sez.

N.

OGGETTO: POLIDORO Cosimo.

Ref. I 295 - Spinazzano

Le trasmetto in allegato informazioni confidenziali relative al nominativo in oggetto.

IL CAPOUFFICIO "I"
(Ten.Col.Pilota - F. SANTINI)

[Handwritten signature]

Si prega: trattare per ogni lettera un solo argomento e indicare nella risposta il n. di Protocollo e la Divisione a cui si risponde.

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POLIDORO Cosimo - L. A. T. I.

POLIDORO Cosimo di Salvatore e di Urmi Angela, nato a R. Calabria l'11 febbraio 1898, qui abitante - Via Baccina n.81, figura nell'elenco delle persone sovversive della R. Questura di Roma.

- Iscritto al P.N.F. dal Settembre 1922 ne venne radiato in data non potuto accertare.-
- In data 27 Giugno 1935, ottenuta la riammissione, chiese successivamente la retrodatazione.-
- Il 16 Giugno 1936 assunto dalla S.A. "ALA LITTORIA" ad Asmara, quale spedizioniere di dogana, categoria C., venne trasferito alla Direzione Generale di Roma il 16 Marzo 1938 ed il 1° Settembre 1939 alla Direzione Generale delle linee atlantiche.-
- L'11 Settembre 1939, trasferito alla Direzione Centrale della L.A.T.I., fu assegnato alla categoria concetto e successivamente il 1° Febbraio 1940 a quella di concetto di 1^ classe.-
- E' ammogliato con Turriziani Emilia, donna di casa ed ha i seguenti figli: Mario di anni 22, celibe, disoccupato; Giovanni, di anni 19, celibe; Angelina, di anni 17, nubile, casalinga, Salvatore, di anni 14, studente; Carlo, di anni 11, studente e Luca, di anni 9, alunno.-
- A Roma non ha beni di fortuna.-
- Il POLIDORO durante il servizio prestato alla L.A.T.I., pur ottenendo dalla Direzione anticipi sulle sue competenze, ha condotto vita di una certa agiatezza, non rispondente alle sue reali possibilità. Infatti negli anni 1941 - 42 - 43, sebbene padre di sei figli, era uso consumare i pasti in lussuose trattorie della capitale quali "S. Carlo" e "Canepa".-
- Fino a qualche tempo prima dei noti eventi del Settembre 1943, il POLIDORO, di tanto in tanto, si faceva raggiungere a Roma da una sua amante, residente a Treviso con la quale trascorreva parte del giorno.-

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- Tra il personale della Direzione della L.A.T.I. si dice che il POLIDORO, valendosi della sua qualità di spedizioniere, non si sia fatta sfuggire alcuna occasione utile per realizzare non indifferenti guadagni, esercitando il controllo, affiancandosi a subalterni di volo.-
- Presso il Comando dei CC.RR. del Ministero dell'Aeronautica non risultano specifici precedenti sul conto del POLIDORO.-

Contro il personale della L.A.T.I. vennero fatte accuse vaghe per contrabbando.-

- La famiglia POLIDORO è tenuta in buona considerazione nel vicinato e conduce vita di una certa agiatezza.-
- Il POLIDORO dal 15 Aprile 1944, data del suo licenziamento dalla L.A.T.I., al 31 Agosto detto anno, ha percepito per assegni vari e liquidazione la somma di lire 84.177,85.-

Dopo quest'ultima data però ha continuato a percepire stipendio, indennità di presenza e caro vita quale membro di una Commissione interna, pur non avendo alcun specifico incarico dalla Società.-

Roma, 11 Novembre 1944

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Roma, 11 Novembre 1944

1523

REPORT ON A MEETING WITH ING. SATI,
VICE COMMISSIONER OF THE ALA
ITALIANA

In the year 1929 the Italian Air lines consisted of the S.A.M. (Societa Anonima Mediterranea) covering the services to Sardinia and later on to Tunis. Subsequently the S.A.N.A. Aero-Expresso and the Transadriatica came into existence.

In 1933 all these air lines were united under the name of "Ala Littoria".

The "Ala Littoria" flew services to Barcellona, Tripoli, Vienna, Berlin, and in the early days also a transatlantic service to South America. The latter was worked by a separate branch of the "Ala Littoria" which eventually became independent and was known as the L.A.T.I. Such people as Bruno Mussolini and Biseo were interested in L.A.T.I.

Shortly after the armistice the personnel of the Ala Littoria and of the L.A.T.I. formed a corporative society mainly to safeguard their interests. At the present moment the personnel of the Ala Littoria now "Ala d'Italia" comprises some three crews (not complete) and some fifteen first pilots. It is said to dispose of about eight crews. This personnel receiving no pay is impatient to be re-employed.

Ing. Sati states that approaches were made by Americans with a view to a future operation of Italian Air Lines, but nothing has resulted so far. A so called Sindicato Finanziario per la Gestione Linee Aeree has been formed. Sir John Serrao, late legal adviser to the Embassy is the promoter, others interested are Ing. Sati, Dr. Crippa, Comm. Visigato. The latter a financier. Col. Pezzani (see F.S.S. report on his gun) is also interested and appears to have been in touch with Col. Poletti and with the American Express line.

It is stated that according to Dr. Crippa, who was 1522
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eight or nine to be re-employed.

and appears to have been in the American Express line.

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Ing. Sathi is most anxious to see the Ala Italiana and has had a talk with

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Sept. 14th 1944

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STATO MAGGIORE R^AERONAUTICA
Ufficio "I."

Roma, 8 Agosto 1944

Prot.n.431

Allegati n° _____

Al Maggiore DE HAAN

::: R O M A :::

OGGETTO: Conclusioni sull'attività del personale dell'ALA ITALIANA
nel periodo 8 Settembre 1943 - 4 Giugno 1944.-

Si trasmettono le conclusioni, risultanti a questo Ufficio, relative al sottotato personale dell'ALA ITALIANA, per attività svolta nel periodo di occupazione nazifascista:

- Generale S.A.	TEDESCHINI-LALLI +	Gennaro
- Colonnello A.A.	SERRA +	Antonino
- Colonnello	PARVOPASSU +	
- Ten.Colonnello	KLINGER ✓	Umberto
- Ten.Colonnello	PATERNITI +	
- Maggiore	COCCHIA +	Enzo
- Maggiore	PASQUALI ✓	Riccardo
- Ten.di Vasc.	GERRONI +	
- Capitano G.A.	VELANI +	Bruno
- Capitano	ULIVI ✓	Armando
- Capitano	DAZZO &	Giuseppe
- Capitano	SALMINCI +	Rigoberto
- Tenente	MAESTRI ✓	Filiberto
- Maresciallo	GALLIANI ✓	Mario
- Maresciallo	BASSO ✓	Ernesto
- Maresciallo	BELLINELLO ✓	Mario
- Maresciallo	TEOBALDI &	Andrea
- Maresciallo	GRANCINI ✓	Ovidio
- Ingegnere	VIANELLO ✓	Alberto
- Ingegnere	MAGATTI ✓	Guglielmo
- Regioniere	CAPPELLETTI ✓?	Renato

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In pari data copia delle conclusioni è stata inviata alle rispettive Commissioni di Discriminazione per il Personale.

Si allega inoltre un breve cenno sulla situazione militare dell' "ALA ITALIANA".



IL CAPO UFFICIO " I "
(Maggiore A.A.r.n. - F. Santini)

F. Santini

STATO MAGGIORE DELLA REGIA AERONAUTICA
- Ufficio "I." -

SITUAZIONE MILITARE DELLA SOCIETA' "AIA ITALIANA".

Al fine di poter serenamente giudicare l'operato dei dirigenti dell'AIA ITALIANA, è necessario premettere alcune precisazioni di carattere prettamente militare:

- 1) - la convenienza o meno dell'accettazione degli incarichi in seno alla Società alla data del 16 Settembre, ossia 8 giorni dopo i noti avvenimenti;
- 2) - il consiglio dato dall'allora commissario generale URBINI al generale TEDESCHINI di occupare la carica di presidente dell'AIA ITALIANA nonostante gli avvenimenti susseguistisi;
- 3) - ripercussioni sugli altri dirigenti di tale consiglio.

L'onore militare non ammette una collaborazione con il nemico e quindi in base a tale principio i dirigenti dell'AIA ITALIANA avendo accettato un incarico che inevitabilmente li avrebbe portati ad una collaborazione effettiva con il governo che si stava stabilendo nella città di Roma, e necessariamente con il nemico tedesco che già l'aveva occupata, hanno tradito leggi dell'onore militare che non ammettono tergiversazioni rispetto alle convenienze ed ai doveri umanitari.

Astraendo da quanto sopra e considerando le condizioni ultradifficili nelle quali essi si sono veduti a trovare, si deve riconoscere che la loro opera è valsa a tenere il personale e la consistenza patrimoniale finanziaria della Società in maniera tale da poter recare un utile quando gli alleati hanno liberata la città di Roma.

Mentre in un primo momento era mira dei dirigenti di salvare anche il materiale, successivamente questo disegno venne abbandonato e lo sforzo intenso venne rivolto al beneficio esclusivo del personale, in particolare quello di volo, che, dati i bandi promulgati dalla repubblica sociale italiana era sempre perseguibile e deportabile qualora non fosse stato cautelato da una organizzazione ausiliaria militare quale era la società AIA ITALIANA.

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3) - ripercussioni sugli altri dirigenti di tale consiglio.-

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Se a questo si aggiunge l'opera del Colonnello REMONDINO, commissario dell'Aeronautica a Roma, messi alle dipendenze del governo, al quale bastavano solo delle scuse per poter fattivamente aiutare il personale della Regia Aeronautica, si comprende come questo disegno sia stato effettivamente portato bene a termine.-

Queste premesse sono necessarie per poter giudicare serenamente l'operato dei dirigenti dell'ALA ITALIANA e del personale che necessariamente è stato coinvolto in alcune responsabilità di carattere prettamente militare, quelli possono essere il trasporto degli apparecchi a Nord Italia. Alcuni di questi apparecchi avevano già i colori tedeschi, fatto che non lasciava dubbi sulla loro ulteriore destinazione.-

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I dirigenti dell'ALA ITALIANA coinvolti negli avvenimenti dell'8 settembre sono i seguenti:

- Generale di S.A. TODESCHINI - LAZZI Cennaro, nominato presidente della società dal 16.9.1943 al 19.12.1943. Ad esso necessariamente debbono affiancarsi il consiglio di amministrazione, il collegio sindacale e tutti i dirigenti in carica.
 - In particolare il Capitano Bruno VELANI nella sua qualità di direttore generale ed il Tenente di Vascello CERRONI nella sua qualità di segretario generale;
 - Colonnello Dott. SERA Antonino, presidente ed amministratore delegato della società dal 19.12.1943 al 10.3.1944, con i relativi consigli di amministrazione e colleghi sindacali nonché dei dirigenti rimasti in carica;
 - Capitano PEROTTI Max, commissario dell'ALA ITALIANA dal 10.3.1944 ad ora e che attualmente risiede nel Nord Italia affiancato dai tre consiglieri, Capitano DAGNINO, Capitano FRARACCI, e comandante dei moschettieri de Juze CIOZA.-
- Alla presente si allegano le risultanze emerse per ognuna delle persone sopracitate.-

IL CAPO UFFICIO "I."
(Maggiore A.A.R. in F. SANTINI)



ad ora e uno...
 tre consiglieri, Capitano DACHINO, Cap...
 dei moschettieri de duce CLOZZA.-

Alla presente si allegano le risultanze emerse per ognuna delle
 persone sopracitate.-

IL CAPO UFFICIO "I."
 (Maggiore A.A.R.N. F. SANTINI)



1518

8A

Ala Littoria Civil Air Line.

1. The screening section of the Italian Air Ministry (known as "Stato Maggiore della R. Aeronautica - Ufficio I") under its chief, Major Santini, has completed its interrogations and investigations in connection with the ALA Italiana, its directors and other personnel, and has submitted a voluminous report dealing with each individual case and giving its findings. It would seem that Major Santini and Lt. Venturini have done their work very thoroughly. The report is very objective and well reasoned, but as it is too lengthy for translation in its entirety I attach a translation of the foreword dealing with the actual company and a summarised form of the conclusions reached in the case of the more important individuals.
2. It would be seen that the majority of the individuals implicated are Air Force Officers. On the other hand they were employed by a civil air line. Major Santini would be glad to know whether you consider they should be dealt with as I.A.F. Officers or as civilians. If as Air Force Officers they would come under military law.
3. In my opinion their appointment to the board of directors or to the management of ALA Italiana was mainly due to the fact that they held commissions in the I.A.F. from Generals downwards. On dates subsequent to the 3th September they secured advantageous appointments thanks to their I.A.F. rank. Consequently they should be dealt with as Officers who did or did not collaborate with the enemy.

4. Major Santini would also be glad to have your

with the actual company and a summarized form of the conclusions reached in the case of the more important individuals.

2. It would be seen that the majority of the individuals implicated are Air Force Officers. On the other hand they were employed by a civil air line. Major Santini would be glad to know whether you consider they should be dealt with as I.A.F. Officers or as civilians. If as Air Force Officers they would come under military law.

3. In my opinion their appointment to the board of directors or to the management of Ala. Italiana was mainly due to the fact that they held commissions in the I.A.F. from Generals downwards. On dates subsequent to the 8th September they secured advantageous appointments thanks to their I.A.F. rank. Consequently they should be dealt with as Officers who did or did not collaborate with the enemy.

4. Major Santini would also be glad to have your opinion on the degree of punishment to meet each case. I am inclined to think this ought to be left to the I.A.F., though we might hold an watching brief.

August 15th 1944

P. de Haan S.Ldr

1517

7A

Draft of letter to Major SANTINISCREENING OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

Ref. your no. 553 of the 10th August and subsequent memorandum dealing with the above matter, and following our meeting of yesterday :

1.) PERSONNEL OF THE ALA ITALIANA

It is my view that I.A.F. personnel employed by Ala Italiana subsequently to the 8th September 1943 and covered by your individual reports of the 8th August 1944 be dealt with as Italian Air Force Officers and not as civilians.

It is for the Tribunal of the Regia Aeronautica to decide on the degree of punishment to be awarded in each individual case, but the A.F.S.C. is to be informed of the findings of the Court and the sentences awarded.

2.) PERSONNEL OF THE REGIA AERONAUTICADegrees of Guilt :

In your minute of the 8th September and subsequent memorandum you have drawn attention to certain problems which have arisen in the course of discrimination of Italian Air Force Personnel. From a perusal of these it would appear that on the basis of your findings such personnel are to be divided into three distinct categories :

- a) Those to whom no punishment is to be awarded, the individuals being free from all guilt.-
- b) Those to be placed under open arrest and referred to the Military Tribunal.
- c) Those to be placed under close arrest and referred to the Military Tribunal.

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Broadly speaking the cases which you have listed could be allocated under the above headings as shown on the attached. It must however be borne in mind that there may be extenuating circumstances, especially in the case of officers below air rank and N.C.O.s who; to a large extent, may have been influenced by the attitude of their Commanding Officers. Moreover family considerations and lack of means may also explain the attitude taken up by individuals who come under the heading b), as for instance those who accepted payments from Fascists or Germans, but did not actually collaborate with them.

3.)

I agree that in the case of Officers of Colonel and General's rank the order for arrest be passed to Major Battersby of the Public Safety Division through the A.F.S.C.

1515

6A

SUB-DIVISION OF DEGREES OF GUILT.--1.- a) No Punishment Awarded.

This would apply in cases of persons who did not swear allegiance to the Fascist Republic or collaborate in any way with the Nazis or the Republicans.

Personnel of the Rome Nucleus who were authorised to take the oath of allegiance to the Republican Air Force in order to sabotage and who did actually sabotage the Nazi Fascist war effort.

b) To be Placed under Open Arrest and Referred to Military Tribunal.

This would apply to :

Personnel who though not collaborating with Republicans and Nazis in order to safeguard their persons resorted to subterfuges so as to avoid suspicion and possible arrest.

Personnel who having opted for the Republic whilst in concentration camp in Poland, were repatriated, but did not actually collaborate with the Nazi-Fascists on their return to Italy.

Personnel of the Rome Nucleus who took oath for the Republic in order not to incur risks, falsified their signatures, but did not actually collaborate with the Nazi-Fascists.

Personnel who went North in compliance with the orders of the Republican Air Force, handed over to their Republican counterpart in the North, and then left the service of the Republican Air Force and subsequently did not in any way collaborate with the Republic or the Nazis.

Personnel who pro-forma signed an application to join the Republican Air Force in order to safeguard their persons, but did not actually serve with the Republican Air Force or collaborate in any other way with the Republic or the Nazis.

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c) To be Placed under Close Arrest and Referred to Military Tribunal.

This would apply in the case of :

Personnel of the Republican Air Force found in liberated territory.

Personnel who having enrolled in the Republican Air Force whilst in concentration camp in Poland, were repatriated and subsequently did collaborate with the Nazi-Fascists.

Personnel of the Rome Nucleus who of their own free will took the oath of allegiance to the Republic and collaborated with the Nazi-Fascists.

Personnel who went North in compliance with the orders of the Republican Air Force, who remained North and actually collaborated with the Nazi-Fascists.

Personnel who went North in compliance with the orders of the Republican Air Force and collaborated with the Nazi-Fascists until they succeeded in obtaining their discharge.

- 2.- It should be borne well in mind that even in these three sub-divisions there are various degrees of guilt and each case must be considered on its merits. For instance personnel who left Rome for Florence in obedience with the orders of the Republicans, pocketed Republican pay without signing any oath of allegiance, and returned to Rome where they went into hiding, did actually in fact sabotage the German war effort, and at most a summary punishment would suffice in their case.

18th August 1944

1513

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION
A.C.C.

5A
Rome, August 18th 1944

To : STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA
Ufficio "I" - Via Piemonte, 51

R O M A

SCREENING OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.-

Ref. your no. 553 of the 10th August and subsequent memorandum dealing with the above matter, and following our recent meeting :-

1.- Personnel of the Ala Italiana.-

It is my view that I.A.F. personnel employed by Ala Italiana subsequently to the 8th September 1943 and covered by your individual reports of the 8th August 1944 be dealt with as I.A.F. Officers and not as civilians.

It is for the Tribunal of the R.Aeronautica to decide on the degree of punishment to be awarded in each individual case, but the Air Forces Sub Commission is to be informed of the findings of the Court and of the sentences awarded.

2.- Personnel of the R. Aeronautica.-

Degrees of guilt :-

In your minute of the 8th August and subsequent memorandum you have drawn attention to certain problems which have arisen in the course of discrimination of I.A.F. personnel. From a perusal of these it would appear that on the basis of your findings such personnel are to be divided into three distinct categories :

- a) Those to whom no punishment is to be awarded, the individuals being free from all guilt. 1512

- b) Those to be placed under open arrest and referred to the Military Tribunal.
- c) Those to be placed under close arrest and referred to the Military Tribunal.

Broadly speaking the cases which you have listed would come under the above headings as shown on the attached. It must however be borne in mind that there may be extenuating circumstances, especially in the case of officers below air rank and M.C.O.s who, to a large extent, may have been influenced by the attitude of their Commanding Officers. Moreover family considerations and lack of means may partly explain the attitude taken by individuals who come under the heading b), as for instance those who accepted payments from Fascists or Germans, but did not actually collaborate with them.

- 3.- I agree that in the case of Officers of Colonel and General's rank the order for arrest be passed to Major Battersby of the Public Safety Division through the Air Forces Sub Commission.

W.A.B. BOWEN BUSCARLET
AIR VICE-MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

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4A

Ala Littoria Civil Air Line.-

1. The screening section of the Italian Air Ministry (known as "Stato Maggiore della R. Aeronautica - Ufficio I") under its chief, Major Santini, has completed its interrogations and investigations in connection with the ALA Italiana, its directors and other personnel, and has submitted a voluminous report dealing with each individual case and giving its findings. It would seem that Major Santini and Lt. Venturini have done their work very thoroughly. The report is very objective and well reasoned, but as it is too lengthy for translation in its entirety I attach a translation of the foreword dealing with the actual company and a summarised form of the conclusions reached in the case of the more important individuals.

2. It would be seen that the majority of the individuals implicated are Air Force Officers. On the other hand they were employed by a civil air line. Major Santini would be glad to know whether you consider they should be dealt with as I.A.F. Officers or as civilians. If as Air Force Officers they would come under military law.

3. In my opinion their appointment to the board of directors or to the management of Ala Italiana was mainly due to the fact that they held commissions in the I.A.F. from General downwards. On dates subsequent to the 8th September they secured advantageous appointments thanks to their I.A.F. rank. Consequently they should be dealt with as Officers who did or did not collaborate with the enemy.

4. Major Santini would also be glad to have your opinion on the degree of punishment to meet each case. I am inclined to think this ought to be left to the I.A.F., though we might hold a watching brief.

R. de Haan S.Ldr
P. de Haan S.Ldr

August 15th 1944

In my view they should be dealt with as I.A.F. Officers.

The punishment should be left to the I.A.F. but we must watch the case & see that there is no whitewashing.

15/8. W.B. Acc.

I.A.F. H.Q.

Office "I"

MILITARY SITUATION OF THE "ALA ITALIANA" SOCIETY.-

In order to be able to give an unprejudiced judgement regarding the behaviour of the directors of ALA ITALIANA, it is necessary to consider some matters of a strictly military nature :

- 1) Whether or not it was convenient to accept posts in the Society on Sept. 16th, eight days after the German occupation;
- 2) the advice given by Gen. URBANI then "Commissario Generale" to Gen. TEDESCHINI to take the position of President of ALA ITALIANA in spite of the above events;
- 3) the effect of this advice on the other directors.

Military honour does not allow collaboration with the enemy, and therefore, the directors of ALA ITALIANA have betrayed the principles of military honour, which allow no compromise with regard to convenience and humanitarian duties, by accepting duties that were bound to bring them to an active collaboration with the Fascists who were already taking over Rome, and consequently with the Germans who had already occupied the town.

Apart from the above, and considering the very difficult conditions they were in, it should be acknowledged that their work did actually serve to keep the personnel and the finances of the Society together, with the result that they were in condition to be useful to the Allies after the liberation of Rome.

At the start the directors had hoped to be able to save the material too, but later this object was given up and all their efforts were directed towards helping personnel, particularly the flight personnel which, following the proclamations issued by the Italian Social Republic, were always in danger of persecution and deportation if they had not been protected by an auxiliary military organisation like ALA ITALIANA.

If we add to this the work of Col. REMONDINO "commissario" of the air force at Rome, who took orders from the Royal Government and always found excuses to actively assist I.A.F. personnel, it will be clear that this object was achieved.

How much, in actual fact, have Ala done to help the Allies?

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The above considerations are necessary to judge without any prejudice the acts of the directors of ALA ITALIANA and its personnel who have necessarily been involved in some responsibilities of a strictly military nature, as for instance the transferring of a/c to Northern Italy. Some of these a/c already carried German colours, thus leaving no doubt as to their ultimate destination.

The directors of ALA ITALIANA involved in the events of Sept. 8th are the following :

GEN. S.A. TEDESCHINI-LABELLI Gennaro, appointed President of the Society on Sept. 16th 1943 up to Dec. 19th 1943. Notably he was assisted by the administrative council and all the acting directors. Particularly Capt. BRUNO VELANI, general director and Navy Lt. CERRONI secretary general.

COL. DR. SERRA Antonino, President and head of the administrative part of the society from Dec. 19th 1943 to March 1st 1944 together with the council of administration and the advisory board, and also the directors still remaining.

CAPT. PEROLI Max "commissario" of ALA ITALIANA from March 1st 1944 up to now, actually residing in the North, assisted by three councilors Capt. DAGNINO, Capt. FRARACCI and GLOZA, commander of the "moschettieri del duce".

The results of the enquiries made on each of the above are enclosed.

A L A I T A L I A N A

Outline of evidence in the cases of certain I.A.F. personnel screened by S.I.A. and sent to A.F.S.C. for opinion.

LALLI

General TEDESCHINI was ^{asked} ~~sent~~ to assume Presidency in place of Col. KLINGER. Took over on 15th Sept. and had BRUNO VELANI appointed Director General.

He was responsible for

- a) concession of fuel and reserve stores to the Germans
- b) concession of eleven a/c to the Republicans
- c) Sending of nine million lire to the Republican Office at Venice
- d) sending of a telegram to Col. PARVOPASSI, Ala Italiana representative at Madrid containing phrases offensive to the Badoglio government and ordering the representative to remain under the orders of the Republican government.

LALLI did not resign the presidency of Ala Italiana in December, but was dismissed by the Republican Ministry for national defence.

Comment LALLI did not safeguard the interests of the Nation. By accepting the presidency he must have known it would mean collaboration with the Germans and Republicans which, in fact, is what he did. Regarding the concession of material to Germany and the Republicans his excuses to the effect that he followed the wishes of the D.L.H. (whose job it was to safeguard a/c and material) are not valid. None of the pilots questioned ever received orders or advice about sabotage or "go slow" policy. LALLI's actions were influenced by VELANI (see note on VELANI) whose authority was complete.

The only thing in LALLI's favour was an increase in pay of personnel to meet rising cost of living. But if he had wished he need not have done so, in order to force the personnel to desert the organisation and therefore render the organisation powerless.

Of the liquid assets there was a sum of 120,000,000 lire whereas the sums distributed in pay did not exceed 5,000,000 lire.

LALLI denied having sent the telegram to PARVOPASSI, maintaining that he resigned on 19.12.43, whereas the telegram was not consigned until Feb. 1st.

After careful enquiry it is fairly certain that the telegram was originated by the Undersecretary of the Republican Air Force, T.COL. DE FEO, who is now in the North.

COL. SERRA Followed LALLI as President on Dec. 19th persuaded, he states, by personnel of Ala Italiana. He found the society without material (which had already been sent North) and he concerned himself with the transfer North of ~~money~~ assets and attempted to coerce personnel in favour of Republicans. He also tried to involve military personnel in transfer to Republicans, and when reproved for so doing, attempted to destroy incriminating papers. He did not succeed and these are now evidence against him.

SERRA transferred 65 million lire to the Republicans. Terminated his Presidency he attempted to get 50,000,000 lire from the Society for his service, unsuccessfully.

Comment Demonstrated to be collaborationist by carrying on under the Republicans, accepting Presidency of Ala Italiana, travelling to the North for the purpose of receiving orders, receiving pay from Ala Italiana as well as claiming further remuneration, attempting to persuade officers to join Republicans. Positively collaborationist by transferring 65 million lire to Republicans and helping to set up Ala Italiana at Venice.

COL. PARVOPASSU. As Ala Italiana representative he professed to serve the Badoglio government, but at the same time received monies for months of September, October and November and rendered accounts up to January in respect of Barcellona land and sea plane stations, Pollenza and Madrid.

Comment It is curious that he should have sworn adhesion to Badoglio government while at the same time knowingly

1506

maintaining contact with the Republicans.

TEN/COL. KLINGER On September 8th KLINGER was performing duty with Ala Italiana as Delegate Counsel, as SANDALLI had already decided to replace him by LALLI, who was supposed to take over on the 14th. However, KLINGER received orders to remain where he was. He refused, for personal reasons. KLINGER was invited to go North. He did not do so, but disappeared from view, and in spite of repeated searching remained hidden. He declared he did not go North because it would have placed him in an unfavourable light. He affirms that he had no contact with Fascist elements during the eight months, but that his services were sought by LUFTHANSA in connection with the transfer of materiel North which he also refused. He gave General CAPPA assurance of his loyalty to the Liberation Front.

TEN/COL. PATERNITI This man assumed command of Lido di Roma personnel. In that capacity he passed orders to three sea-plane crews to take their a/c North. He merely carried out orders from VELANI.

MAJOR COCCHIA C.O. of "Nucleo Ala Italiana". Affirmed that he did not give orders to leave to a/c in his charge because telephone service was interrupted. Such was not the case. On Sept. 12th he allowed his personnel to go.

In middle of September he was put on leave by S.A.S. Command. He put himself at disposition of Ala Italiana HQ. He was in close relation with VELANI, but his collaboration was not direct. He was put in charge of navigating personnel.

On Oct. 18th VELANI gave him certain orders originating from German HQ. On this occasion he said the a/c engines were not in proper state to go. He took part, as aircrew, in flights to Venice - three in all. On January 1st he joined the Clandestine movement (BANDA NERI della BRIGATA MAMELI) but took no active part. Later he joined the GENTE DELL'ARIA and towards end of May had charge of Air Force personnel. This was confirmed.

Comment. This man failed as C.O. of the NUCLEO in that he gave no orders to his personnel. Later, when on leave, 1505 flew three a/c to the North and did not attempt to fly South, nor did he attempt to organise sabotage. He also took

orders from Capt. VELANI, a junior rank, and otherwise showed a lack of dignity. His defense that he was a civilian pilot flying civilian a/c is not valid in that the markings on one a/c were the Nazi cross.

MAJOR PASQUALI C.O. of SEZIONE TRASPORTI del LITTORIO, Rome
On Sept. 9th he interested himself in the 44th Stormo T. in order that they should fly South, or to Sardinia. He was later asked by VELANI to go back as O.C. navigational personnel and to transfer German Pilots on S. 82 a/c. He went to Centocelle to act as interpreter. While explaining the controls to German pilots he made intentional errors, as a result of which the a/c crashed and burned out. After that he decided not to collaborate.

Comment. Behaviour was praiseworthy.

NAVY IT. CERRONI Between 16th September and 19th December acted as Secretary General of Ala Italiana and advisor to VELANI. He stated that the work of the Society tended to save the personnel, but that collaboration was forced by circumstances. He also confirms what VELANI says about the telegram to PARVOPASSU being sent by DE FEO, without authority from LALLI or Ala Italiana.

Comment. Not so culpable for having accepted post as Secretary General as for knowing that stores were being sent to the Germans, which, as an officer, he should not have subscribed to. There is no evidence to show that he made any attempt to divert either material or a/c.

CAPT. BRUNO VELANI His acceptance of post as Director General on September 16th and his prompt offer of collaboration to the Germans were clearly against National interests and lacked entirely the dignity of an officer. He made it clear to Ala personnel that activity was to continue in collaboration. He stated that he undertook to work as a civilian and only in the interests of the Society and its personnel, since the Allies would soon take over. (The Allies at that time showed no signs of being in a position to take over for at least two months). When asked why he did not attempt to send a/c and material South he said that had he done so it would have compromised his effort to save the major part by subtle methods. Interrogation provides evidence that VELANI was approached by one VIANELLO - in charge of stores etc - with a view to sabotage. VELANI does not recall being approached.

Acts of sabotage were carried out by VIANELLO and MAGATTI, without help from and in spite of VELANI's orders. Velani's explanations of his intention to create a block of personnel for self protection is weak, in that it served only to provide the Germans with operative personnel.

VELANI's conduct and relations with LUFTHANSA can be judged by a letter of thanks from its director Dr. LUTZ.

All the orders to aircrews to fly a/c North must have come from VELANI, since he states his appointment was advised by Gen. URBANI, who gave a directive to IALLI.

CAPT. ULIVI Twice attempted to fly South, but lacked sufficient fuel. Came to Rome against orders and informed VELANI he would not co-operate with Germans.

CAPT. DAZZO Poor character. Made a few flights on orders of VELANI, as a civilian, but made excuses not to fly and also made excuses when his flight engineer suggested making South.

CAPT. SALMINCI Flew two a/c North, but refused to fly a/c to Germany. He pranged one a/c purposely at Venice.

LT. MAESTRI Was asked by VELANI to fly a/c as second pilot. Refused to co-operate with Germans and eventually obtained a Vatican pass which left him undisturbed.

ING. VIANELLO Civil occupations; carried out extensive sabotage.

ING. MAGATTI Civil occupation. Carried out sabotage.

RAC. CAPPELLETTI Civil occupation. Administrative Section. Said to have milked the Ala Italiana for many years. However this man was partially responsible for withholding Society funds from being transferred North, and has also handed over 65 million lire to the I.A.F. in Rome. Case requires a careful administrative enquiry by very capable people. Much depends on whether such cases are to come under civil or military law.

1503

DRAFT OF LETTER TO MAJOR SANTINI

Ref. your no. 553 of the 10th August and subsequent memorandum dealing with the above matter, and following our meeting of yesterday :

1.) PERSONNEL OF THE ALA ITALIANA

It is my view that I.A.F. personnel employed by Ala Italiana subsequently to the 8th September 1943 and covered by your individual reports of the 8th August 1944 be dealt with as Italian Air Force Officers and not as civilians, and if as the result of your screening, found guilty of collaborating with the Republic or the Nazis, that they be referred to the Military Tribunal.

It is for the Tribunal of the Regia Aeronautica to decide on the degree of punishment to apply in each individual case, but the A.F.S.C. is to be supplied with complete information regarding the proceedings in court, the findings and the sentences awarded.

2.) PERSONNEL OF THE REGIA AERONAUTICA

1562

In your minute of the 8th September and subsequent memorandum you have drawn attention to certain problems which have arisen in the course

of discrimination of Italian Air Force Personnel, from a perusal of these it would appear that they fall into three distinct categories.

a) Where no punishment is to be awarded, the individuals being free from all guilt.-

b) Where the individual is to be placed under open arrest and referred to the Military Tribunal.

c) Where the individual is to be placed under close arrest and referred to the Military Tribunal.

Broadly speaking the cases which you have listed could be allocated under the above headings as shown on the attached, but it must be borne in mind that they may be extenuating circumstances, especially in the case of Officers below field rank and N.C.O.s who, to a large extent, may have been influenced by the attitude of their Commanding Officers. Moreover family considerations and lack of means may also explain the attitude taken up by individuals who come under the heading b), as for instance those who accepted from Fascists or Germans payments, but actually did not collaborate with them.

0361