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IAF, FUTURE POLICY
APR., MAY 1945

FUTURE POLICY AND STATUS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

HQ., M.A.A.F., CMF : 24.5.45.

Present: Chief of Staff, RAF.
 A.V.M. Brodie, AFSC, Rome.
 A.O.A., MAAF.
 Air Cdre. Wincer, C.A.
 Air Cdre. Woolley, C.I.O.
 Air Cdre. Edwards-Jones, D/D Ops.
 G/Capt. McLaren Reid, A.I.S.
 G/Capt. Sherman, Training.
 G/Capt. French, Rep. C.M.S.O.
 Wing Cr. Grant, Air Training.
 Wing Cr. Fisher, A.I.S.
 Wing Cr. Knowles, A.F.S.C.
 Squadron Ldr. Conroy, A.I.S.

1 The Chief of Staff opened the meeting by stating that with the ending of the war in Europe, our relations with the Italian Air Force had changed, and called for review.

He reminded the meeting that the Italians were an ex-enemy people, but that after their defeat they had shown a certain willingness to collaborate with the Allies. This had been accepted without any promise that it would give them any better standing at the Peace Conference, or entitle them per se to any measure of re-employment after the war. The Italian Air Force depended for its existence after defeat of Italy upon the contribution which it had made to the war effort against Germany, and the onus was placed upon the Italians to put forward the maximum effort, advised, aided, and where necessary supplied so far as the Allies thought fit to make resources available. The function of A.F.S.C. during the war was to ensure that the greatest use was made by the Italians of their expressed willingness to co-operate.

2 Now that the war in Europe had ended, it seemed clear that the I.A.F. no longer has a right to remain in being. It was predicated upon a contribution to the war effort which no longer could be made. On the other hand, it was clear that, from a political point of view, and from a common-sense one, if indeed the Peace Treaty granted the Italians any measure of air forces, the present organization should not be allowed to go to pieces. Consequently, an interim policy was submitted to the Air Ministry for the I.A.F., and this has now been broadly approved. Signals GB.56 May 5 and MSW.657 May 20 refer.

These signals confer on M.A.A.F. the broad right to employ certain material in certain ways in respect of the I.A.F. It remains to interpret in terms of British support and help and manpower how much and in what

collaborate with the Allies. This had been accepted without any promise that it would give them any better standing at the Peace Conference, or entitle them per se to any measure of re-armament after the war. The Italian Air Force depended for its existence after defeat of Italy upon the contribution which it had made to the war effort against Germany, and the onus was placed upon the Italians to put forward the maximum effort, advised, aided, and where necessary supplied so far as the Allies thought fit to make resources available. The function of A.F.S.C. during the war was to ensure that the greatest use was made by the Italians of their expressed willingness to co-operate.

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3 Arising out of the former statement, A.V.M. Brodie asked whether the policy of the A.F.S.C. should be to let things drift, or to build up the I.A.F. to as efficient a force as possible.

C.O.S. stated that our policy, viewed from a negative angle would be not to allow the I.A.F. to collapse. From a positive point of view, we were under no obligation, and we were in no position where manpower was concerned to do more than keep it together in a moderate state of efficiency. It had been stated that the Royal Navy was adopting much the same policy.

A.O.A. considered that the I.A.F. should be left to carry on as best it could without Allied assistance, in view of our own acute manpower shortages. A.V.M. Brodie felt that at least some supervision should be exerted in our own interests. He stressed that the I.A.F. needed careful watching to ensure that they did not misuse material at their disposal, quite apart from any question of their using it to the best advantage of the Allies. It was stated that the present establishment of the A.F.S.C. was 44 officers and 107 other ranks.

/ conclusions . . .

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Decision :

- (a) Our policy should be to keep the I.I.F. in being above the level of collapse, but not necessarily at a high level of fighting efficiency.
- (b) No increases in establishment are to be made without very careful consideration, and only in the direst cases, which must be referred to the C.O.S.
- (c) The work and establishment of the A.F.S.C. vis-à-vis the I.I.F. in the present circumstances are to be scrutinized with a view to reduction.

Interim Policy

C.O.S. stressed that the assistance set out in GB.56 May 5 and approved by the Air Ministry in no way condoned the existence of the I.I.F. or promised anything to the prejudice of the terms of the Peace Treaty. This must always be kept in mind. The provisions of this signal do not confer on the Italians any rights, nor do they imply the necessity to sign the I.I.F. the whole of the facilities set out in it.

This signal made provision for :

- (a) the establishment of a courier service " of a size sufficient to meet the reasonable needs of the Allied Commission and the requirements to rehabilitate Italian administration as soon as possible. "
- (b) for the handing over on loan of up to 40 Baltimore aircraft for conversion to passenger transport under Italian arrangements.
- (c) for permission to be given to the I.I.F. to retain the use of their present fighter aircraft, including P.39's. *on loan*

Courier Service.

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5 Courier Service.

A.V.M. Brodie stated that the courier service was intended to operate between ROME, MILAN, TRIESTE, and BOLOGNA, and later TUNES, and possibly other centres. C.O.S. emphasised the need for this service to be organized, rigidly controlled, and kept under close scrutiny to avoid undue expansion and misuse. A.O.A. suggested controlling supplies of aviation fuel as the best means of doing this. Arising out of this point, it was apparent that the British would in fact have to supply fuel for all I.A.F. activities, and that the question of the overall allotment of fuel for flying, transportation, as well as other supplies, would have to be carefully investigated.

6 It was stated that approximately 50 SM 79 and 82, and 50 Cant seaplanes were available for the service, together with an unknown number completed or in production in Northern Italy.

The question of how far the Italian aircraft industry should be permitted to work now that the European war had ended was discussed. It was clear that this was a matter of major principle, and the responsibility of A.F.S.C. to represent the situation as known to HQ M.A.F. for consideration of the Air Commander-in-Chief.

7 It was clear that the question of safety precautions, flying control, pilots' and crews' qualifications, and the general operation of the courier service carrying British officials must receive very close

/ consideration . .

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consideration, and that it should not be launched on anything approaching even a moderate scale without this being done.

Conclusions.

- (a) D/D Ops. to consider every aspect of the establishment of this service, and to report as soon as possible on the lines which it should follow, and the necessary limitations on its functions.
- (b) A.F.S.C. to submit a statement, with recommendations, on the position regarding Italian industry for high level representation.
- (c) D/D Ops. is to co-operate with C.I.O. and C.M.S.O. wherever necessary in producing the above report. The security aspect of the travel of Italians is one calling for particular consideration.

8 Baltimore.

C.O.S. pointed out that the fact that the Air Ministry were prepared to loan up to 40 Baltimores did not necessarily mean that we should loan this number to them. A.V.M. Brodie was of the opinion that they would be necessary, but this obviously required checking with the reasonable requirements for passenger carrying.

The situation regarding backing was discussed. C.O.S. recommended that since they were on loan, we should keep the aircraft serviceable, i.e. supply backing or not as we considered desirable; but that we should hand over no spares in bulk which would enable the Italians to keep more aircraft in being than we deemed advisable. A.V.M. Brodie asked if the aircraft factories owned by Italians could be used to maintain those aircraft in spares, the cost of production being borne by the Italians. C.O.S. ruled that if ultimately the Italian aircraft factories were allowed to turn out aircraft spares, and if on investigation C.M.S.O. considered that this was a necessary source of supply, it was possible that these factories would be used.

9 The question of the conversion of the Baltimores and their inspection after conversion was discussed. A.V.M. Brodie said that the A.F.S.C. could supervise the conversion of the prototype, but that owing to shortage of staff, the remainder would be similarly converted by the Italians. He stated that this would be satisfactory.

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Conclusions :

(a) D/D Ops. to consider and recommend upon the number of Baltimores to be loaned to meet the overall transport requirements and the courier service.

(b) C.M.S.O. to investigate and approve, if he could do so, proposals for conversion.

10

Fighters.

It was clear that the fighters were not necessarily required in their operational capacity, and should be redistributed or used during the interim period primarily to enable pilots to keep up their flying skill. Flying obviously must be controlled in relation to maintaining this at a certain level, and to the expenditure of fuel.

In this connection, C.O.S. enquired as to the previous experience of these pilots as bomber-transport pilots. A.V.M. Brodie stated that the Italian C.A.S. had stated that a number had bomber experience, but there seemed to be some doubt. The question of conversion was one which needed looking into, and it was stressed that there must be no question of inexperienced pilots finding a way into transport employment to the detriment of safety.

/ It was agreed . . .

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It was agreed that, so long as any need existed, conversion could continue at FROSINONE, subject to review.

Conclusions :

- (a) D/D Ops., with A.F.S.C., to investigate and report upon the best distribution and employment of fighters with the principles in view.
- (b) A.F.S.C. to report on the training of fighter pilots in bomber-transport work.

11

Training.

- (a) Ab initio. C.O.S. pointed out that no ab initio training was authorized. A.V.M. Brodie said that this was understood, but that he was not satisfied that a certain amount might not be going on. He agreed to check and confirm.
- (b) Conversion training, FROSINONE. This would be justified only in so far as the need for pilots to be converted existed. D/D Ops. should investigate this question as a part of the whole problem.
- (c) Training staff. A.V.M. Brodie agreed that no additional training staff would be required for the above commitments. It was stressed that the resources of the training staff, as of any other Branch of this Headquarters, would be at his disposal *pari passu* with other Commands.

12

Air/Sea/Rescue.

D/D Ops. agreed to investigate in consultation with M.A.C.A.F. the Allied requirements for Italian assistance in this work.

13

Supply.

It has been stated above that fuel, spares, equipment, and other materials will have to be supplied perhaps to a considerable extent at the expense of the British. It will therefore be necessary to assess what the cost in terms of this to the I.A.F. will be to us, and to submit a definite proposal for the reconstitution of the I.A.F. within the terms above to the Air Ministry for approval. This would be a natural outcome of D/D Ops' overall investigation made in consultation with A.F.S.C., A.O.A., A.S.O.-in-C and C.K.S.G. and will come a head of any other work.

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14 Bases and airfields.

- (a) BRACCIANO. A.V.M. Brodie asked for the use of Bracciano as a seaplane base between Rome and Genoa, owing to the fact that no usable strip exists at the latter place. C.O.S. directed that D/D Ops. and A.F.S.C. should clear the question of the restriction on the use of this base from a security point of view with A.F.H.Q., and to ask authority now in occupation, and report the result if unsatisfactory to A.F.S.C. IECCE.

- (b) A.L.S. stated that it was intended to do- requisition the airfield and hand it over to the Italians. Meanwhile it had been assigned to M.T.A.A.F.S.C. for clearing up purposes. C.O.S. instructed A.L.S. to obtain a definition of the position from the executive American authorities, and to represent to them the Italian requirement.

/ to use the airfield . .

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to use the airfield, not only to store obsolescent aircraft, but for the operation of fighter aircraft during the interim period.

- (c) FROSINONE. It was agreed that the Italians could still continue to use this, so long as the need for a Baltimore conversion school existed.
- (d) NISID. A.V.M. Bradie reported that the I.A.F. is operating from NISID to SICILY. D/D Ops. asked if M.I.I.F. had given permission for the use of NISID, and it was confirmed that no such permission had been given. The question of Navy consent being necessary was discussed, and it was agreed that A.P.S.C. should take the matter up with the Navy side of the Commission, and if necessary, A.L.S. with the Naval authorities.

15 Ground training.

C.O.S. said that the Italians might think well of instituting a certain amount of ground training. He felt, however, that it was for them to do this, and while we would advise, we were not in a position to provide instructors or other material resources. He felt that an administration school was a larger step than the Italians were capable of taking, since their own administration seemed to be in a state of chaos, but that possibly something on the lines of the NCO's school or the Aircrew Officers' school might be organized by them themselves.

In general, he felt that R.A.F. syllabuses, as such, would be of very little practical value to the Italians, who individually had not much idea of what was involved. He recommended that Wing Cdr. Biscoe, who is responsible for this, should consult with G/Capt. Training at this Headquarters, and he would have no objection to selected Italian officers visiting the school at SULMONA. He was not prepared to accept Italian personnel as members of British courses.

16 C.O.S. was emphatic that Moral Leadership Courses, as understood by the R.A.F., were not appropriate to foreign air forces. There were a number of reasons for this, and in any case the introduction of such courses under British auspices must be referred to and carefully considered by the Air Ministry. It was understood that some information had been supplied. This should not be followed up, and no attempt should be made to stimulate interest in these courses without prior reference to the Chief of Staff personally.

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17

War Savings Certificates.

C.O.S. outlined the circumstances in which these were made available to the Italians, and pointed out that all except some 3900 had been returned. A.F.S.C. had been somewhat difficult on this subject over a long period, and the matter was not made easier by wholly irregular individuals of political importance. He pointed out that the Italians had invested relatively large sums individually at the expense of the British Treasury by purchasing certificates in lira redeemable in sterling. He could in no circumstances agree with the representations of the Italian authorities that re-purchase should be allowed, & since by far the greater majority had refunded, he saw no reason why the remainder should not do so also. A matter of considerable principle was involved, and he proposed to take action in conformity with the reported instructions of the Air Ministry to obtain a complete refund.

If there were still recalcitrants, action would be taken to cancel the numbers of the certificates in Italian hands. Owners would then have to claim their right to payment and would be repaid in the currency in which the purchases were made.

The question of correspondence through irregular channels was also taken up.

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18 Relations of A.F.S.C. with H.Q., M.I.A.F.

C.O.S. stated that the directive issued to the A.F.S.C. (IG. 334/144 IS&PS-0 dated 6th March 1945), might require revision in the light of present circumstances, but that its principles still remained effective as a guidance to the attitude to be adopted towards the I.A.F.

Emphasis was laid on the necessity for A.O.C., AFSC. to keep in very close touch with this Headquarters, especially during the interim period. Relatively small matters might involve large questions of policy, and it was particularly important that nothing should be done to compromise the later situation. Such touch should be maintained both by reporting as necessary, and by personal contacts, and C.O.S. reiterated once more his instructions that A.L.S. and A.F.S.C. should meet every 7 to 10 days during this period, either in this Headquarters or in ROHE, so as to keep fully informed.

C.O.S. particularly stressed once more that the resources of this H.Q. were available to the A.F.S.C., and that they should not hesitate to visit or consult branches, who could probably give them considerable help, and, if necessary, direction.

19 Communications.

All Intelligence matters should be normally forwarded direct to the C.I.O., with copies to A.L.S. where this was considered necessary.

C.O.S. stated that Intelligence reports would not necessarily be followed by executive action, and where this was necessary, it would form the subject of a special communication to the executive side.

All executive matters are to be addressed to A.L.S. for action either by them or the appropriate branch, or for the information of the C-in-C or C.O.S. if appropriate.

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26th May 1945

CB.16

Distribution :

C-in-C, Med.ME
C of S, Med.ME
A.O.A.
Air Cdre. Wincer, C.A.
Air Cdre. Woolley, C.I.O.
G/Capt. McLaren Reid, A.L.S.
G/Capt. Shorman, Training.
A/Cdre. Edwards-Jones, D/D Ops.
G/Capt. French, D/C.M.S.O.
Wing Cdr. Grant, Air Training.

A.S.O.-in-C.

External :

A.V.M. Brodie, A.F.S.C. (3).

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Vico-Morabal,
Chief of Staff,
R.A.F., MED. BR.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF
 15 JULY 1945 AT 10.30 AM

SECRET

Paragraphing as per agenda.

Present:

AIR VICE-ADMIRAL I.E. BRODIE.
 GROUP CAPTAIN L.E. JARVIS.
 COLONEL M.M. ALLEN.
 WING COMMANDER V.B. ROYCE.
 WING COMMANDER L.L. HINCHER.
 GROUP CAPTAIN M.C. OLLASON.
 WING COMMANDER A.H. KNOWLES.
 MAJOR E.F. SLISS.
 WING COMMANDER M.E. BOGGS.
 WING COMMANDER R.H.M. PRITCHARD.
 SQ ADJUTANT LIEUTENANT P.L. HARRISON.

*Breakdown
 of assembly*

The J.O.C. stated that this conference had arisen out of a meeting held
 at CASERNA last week which he had attended with A.V. BOWEN-MCGOWAN and COL.

HARRISON.

1. FUTURE POLICY.

(1) After cessation of fighting.

- (a) The Air Corps will be withdrawn on the cessation of hostilities. This was explained at the J.O.C. last week. A.C.C. and D.M. both consider that some of the Air Corps at least should be retained, and this will be taken up again when appropriate.
- (b) Although the Air Corps stated that all I.I.F. fighters would be grounded, it was agreed that the other fighters should not be grounded on the cessation of hostilities. Some of them, at any rate, should be used so that the Italians can be given some flying practice.
- (c) There is no ruling yet about the Baltimore. C/O JARVIS stated that the Baltimore could be made into a 7 seater carrier w/c it was decided that G/C JARVIS should arrange for one of these a/c to be made available for our inspection either at P.M. or P.O.M. He would get W/O JARVIS to call in at 205 Group to see a preserver Baltimore and to report on its suitability for air transport in Italy - an approximate of the potential freight carrying capacity of a Baltimore is also required.

The A.O.C. stated that this conference had arisen out of a meeting held at CASERTA last week which he had attended with A.V. POWEN-INSOLIT and COL. BAUDRICE.

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- (a) The Aircodores will be withdrawn on the cessation of hostilities. This was emphatically confirmed at A.A.B. last week. A.O.C. and D.D. both consider that some of the Aircodores at least should be retained, and this will be taken up again when appropriate.
- (b) Although the Air O-in-C stated that all I.A.F. fighters would be grounded, it was agreed that the other fighters should not be grounded on the cessation of hostilities. Some of them, at any rate, should be used so that the Italians can be given some flying practice.
- (c) There is no ruling yet about the Baltimore. C/O BAKER stated that the Baltimore could be made into a 7 seater carrier a/c; it was decided that C/O JAMES should arrange for one of these a/c to be made available for our inspection either at FOB B or FOGLIA. Cdr BAKER stated that he would get W/O R CLINTON to call in at 205 Group to see a passenger Baltimore and to report on its suitability for air transport in Italy - an approximate of the potential freight carrying capacity of a Baltimore is also required.
- (d) C/O OLIVIERO confirmed that the state of SM.32 a/c is better now than they were six months ago; they have recently been overhauled, and previous engine trouble had been completely cured. 16 + 4 SM.32's can be maintained indefinitely. It was agreed that the Cante are a waste of time and if possible should be replaced.

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- (e) LECCE seems to stand out as a decision in the South of Italy for the concentration of a large part of the I.A.F. C/O JAMES said that the Americans were extending the runway at FOGLIA, so it didn't look as if we should be given this airfield. In article in the HILLMAN was suggested when the North falls, and particulars are awaited at A.A.B.C. regarding three airfields in this vicinity. It was thought that MILAN would be very popular from the Italian point of view as so many of the personnel came from the North.
- (f) The A.O.C. made a statement on Civil Aviation confirming that we are not allowed to discuss this subject with the Italians during the war. Discussion will, however, take place at the Vice-President's Conference A.O. on 25th April 1945. The Italian Air Ministry appears to be adhering to the stipulated policy.

Pravda re Bologna

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(ii) RAIL activity is over.

(c) The A.C.C. remarked that he was favourably impressed by the hard work put in by the I.A.B. units and workshops, whereas he thought the administrative formations are too heavy, and therefore less efficient. At the moment, I.A.B. (V/GER MILS) is sorting out I.A.B. establishments and it is likely that more bodies will be available in the near future to work in BAM and P.A.B. units.

(d) In answer to "How should we use the I.A.B.?" the D.D. gave certain facts and figures concerning the amount of supplies and bombs dropped over Yugoslavia in recent months. These figures compared unfavourably with what would be expected from the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. The D.D. said he thought the I.A.B. should be taken out of the Yugoslav job, and should be used up and down Italy transporting supplies and personnel. The A.C.C. asked if the transport aircraft were being used to great extent, and G/C MILLER stated that there was always a waiting list for passengers, but he was not sure about freight. It was thought that some Allied officers objected to travelling on what they termed "steamed out Italian s/c". W/GER. ROGER confirmed that the courier service organization was being used to capacity. This service will probably be extended by some means.

G/C MILLER thought that the S.A.2 seemed unusually in supply dropping with Allied s/c and he confirmed that the effort of the Certe was poor. He stated that 334 s/c are now being re-used and perhaps some of their supply s/c could be turned over to the I.A.B.

The supply of DOJ's and Wellingtons to the I.A.B. was discussed; it appears that in the Mediterranean there are about 200 of these s/c were not being used. G/C MILLER said that the Wellington is a poor war emergency training s/c. It was agreed that the supply of Wellingtons to the I.A.B. should be discussed with A/Cdr. TUNIS on his visit to I.A.B.C.

The D.D. said that he thought further "steamed out" s/c would be handed over to the I.A.B. if we could confirm that there were plenty of trained crews available who could handle them. A/Cdr. ROGER said that although the Italian pilots were good, the "steamed out" were poor. It was generally agreed that the Italians have experienced air and ground personnel available, but not the s/c

great extent, and C/O O'HANLON stated that there was always a waiting list for passengers, but he was not sure about freight. It was thought that some Allied officers objected to traveling on what they termed "clumpy" out Italian a/c's. W/Cdr. MCNEIL confirmed that the courier service organization was being used to capacity. This service will probably be extended by some plans.

C/O O'HANLON thought that the D.D. 12 compared favorably in supply dropping with Allied a/c and he confirmed that the report of the Centre was poor. He stated that 234 lbs are now being received and perhaps some of their supply a/c could be turned over to the I.A.F.

The a/c's of MCJ's and Wellingtons to the I.A.F. was discussed. It appears that in the Mediterranean there are about 200 of these a/c's were not being used. C/O O'HANLON said that the Wellington is a post war operational training a/c. It was agreed that the supply of Wellingtons to the I.A.F. should be discussed with A/Cdr. MCNEIL on his visit to I.A.F.C.

The D.D. said that he thought further S.A. a/c's would be handed over to the I.A.F. If we could confirm that there were plenty of trained crews available this could handle them. W/Cdr. MCNEIL said that although the Italian pilots were good, the transporters were poor. It was generally agreed that the Italians have experienced air and ground personnel available, but not the a/c in which to employ them.

The D.D. stated that anything we can show the Air Transport Command which will relieve USAF effort would be appreciated. If suitable aircraft types were given to the I.A.F. such as the transport work in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and even North Africa could be taken over from the Allies.

W/Cdr. MCNEIL asked that if any more Allied a/c types were given to the Italians, we should put a firm promise from the Allies to supply spares and equipment. This had unfortunately not been done previously with the Allied a/c's present in use in the I.A.F.

It was suggested that the Italians are being more for the war effort on the "air" side than other small countries.

It was agreed that C/O O'HANLON with the assistance of the D.D. should draft a memo on this subject (for submission to I.A.F.C.).

Continued /5.....

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2. TRAINING IN I.A.F.

(1) W/Cdr ROYCE and W/Cdr BOCK were handed a copy of G/C OLLISON'S letter on training in the I.A.F. Wing at LECCE and were asked to submit a similar one in respect of CANE, BIERNO and FROSINONE. G/C OLLISON was asked to submit a report on the MIOCHI Squadrons at LECCE.

(ii) G/C OLLISON said that a Navigation Officer be brought in. The I.O.C. said he thought that there was every chance of our getting an Air Observer. It was thought that a Gunner Leader would not be necessary at this stage of the war. It was thought that a Flight Engineer on the maintenance side would be useful; it was decided to discuss this with C.I.S.O. when he visits Rome in the near future, in fact the whole question of Engineer, Signals and R/T technical staff would then be brought up. There should be an I.F.S.C. Officer at LECCE, BIERNO and FROSINONE to look after maintenance, from 700 etc. G/C OLLISON said that an Intelligence Officer (W/O MONTICASTRE) at present attached to him from 334 Wing had been very useful indeed, and if possible he should be transferred to I.F.S.C. G/C JARMAN agreed to see this Officer when at LECCE, and meantime W/Cdr FARMER verbally to arrange that he is not withdrawn from LECCE.

(iii) It was agreed that S/Ldr. GRADSHAW would signal N.A.A.F. (W/Cdr GRANT) to see if they could obtain for us an I.A.F. Transport Squad syllabus. (Action has already been taken to obtain Fighter and Bomber C.T.U. syllabuses.)

(iv) Flying Control in the I.A.F. is practically non-existent at the moment. The first thing seems to be to get the I.F. personnel. There are many I.A.F. Officers available; G/C OLLISON said he would submit the names of about 4 he had in mind. W/O MONTICASTRE would be able to get flying control going at LECCE. N.A.A.F. to be asked to lend us an Officer for a week or so to make a general survey. It might be a good thing to form a small Flying Control School at LECCE. The I.O.C. will take this up with the Italian A.A.

W/Cdr KROMBES was asked to make enquiries as to what equipment was available for Flying Control; S/Ldr OLLIVAN to be contacted by W/Cdr KROMBES.

3. ENGINEERING POLICY.

C.I.S.O. is going to take action similar to that taken in the case of the Equipment Branch in order better to assist the Engineering Branch of the I.A.F. It was decided that W/Cdr OLLIVAN, W/Cdr ROYCE, S/Ldr OLLIVAN and W/Lt. MITCHELL should be here during C.I.S.O.'s visit. W/Cdr. KROMBES to contact C.I.S.O.'s Office to obtain the date of W/Cdr. THOMAS'S visit to I.F.S.C. W/Lt. then the Italians will be told by I.O.C. that such a meeting is to take place and have the Italians consulted on.

REFERENCE verbally to arrange that he is now in the U.S. (W/Cdr GRANT) to see if they could obtain for us an R.L.F. Transport Squad syllabus. (Action has already been taken to obtain Fighter and Bomber O.R.U. syllabuses.)

(iv) Flying Control in the I.L.F. is practically non-existent at the moment. The first thing seems to be to get the I.L.F. personnel. There are now I.L.F. Officers available; G/C OLLISON said he would submit the names of about 4 he had in mind. P/O MONTGOMERY would be able to get flying control going at once. I.L.F. to be asked to lend us an Officer for a week or so to make a general survey. It might be a good thing to form a small Flying Control School at once. The A.O.C. will take this up with the Italian A.C.

W/Cdr KNOWLES was asked to make enquiries as to what equipment was available for Flying Control; S/Ldr CHAFFIN to be contacted by W/Cdr KNOWLES.

3. ENGINEERING POLICY.

C.I.E.O. is going to take action similar to that taken in the case of the Equipment Branch in order better to assist the Engineering Branch of the I.L.F. It was decided that W/Cdr CHAFFIN, W/Cdr ROYCE, S/Ldr CHAFFIN and P/Lt. MITCHELL should be here during C.I.E.O.'s visit. W/Cdr KNOWLES to contact C.I.E.O.'s Office to obtain the date of W/Cdr CHAFFIN'S visit to I.L.F. S.C. 2017, then the Italians will be told by A.O.C. that such a meeting is to take place and have certain Technical Officer standing by in case they are required for consultation.

4. OBSOLETE ITALIAN L/C.

A decision has been made at I.L.F. whereby I.L.F. will be 1659 allowed to retain some 150 obsolete L/C. A letter on this subject is at present awaited from I.L.F. C. Meanwhile the Italian Air Minister and Prime Minister have been informed verbally. Some of the 150 L/C are at present being used on the courier service; W/Cdr ROYCE was asked to notify ROYCE which L/C are being used for this purpose. P/Lt. ROYCE, being an airfield remote from repair facilities, has been suggested as a good storage place. W/OSHOME and SP. VITO DI TIRANTO are possible alternatives. If the airworthy and other L/C are taken to PALLINO, they will be guarded. (The R.L.F. Maintenance Unit nearby has been moved.)

5. ORGANISATION.

(i) There was a discussion on the possibility of combining Units. Area with 4th Z.I.T. W/Cdr ROYCE stated that these two H.Q.'s each had different

Continued /4...

-4-

functions. It would be a good thing if the United States combined with the Air Ministry. United States appears to be a stop gap, and interferes with 4th Z.I.T. Alternatively United States and 4th Z.I.T. might well be combined.

(ii) (iii) It was proposed, and generally agreed, that the following Staff Officers, and the Main Equipment Section, would be moved to ROME from BARI as soon as arrangements can be made for their reception this end. W/Cdr GLADSTONE, S/Ldr CHARTER, F/Lt MITCHELL and one Equipment Officer, together with O.P.'s as required. It was the considered view that ROME is the place where major policy is dealt with, and the Staff Officers should be here for that purpose and for educating the Italian A.I. W/Cdr ROYCE said that it would be necessary to have substitutes, possibly of a lower rank, at BARI. However, moves will not take place until after the visit of G.H.S.O. except of FLIGHT LIEUTENANT MITCHELL, whose N.C.O. could carry on at BARI for the time being.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between M.A.A.F. and this H.Q. will take place; W/Cdr FISHER (A.L.S.) to visit ROME once a fortnight, and the A.O.C. to visit M.A.A.F. once a fortnight. It was agreed that there would be a conference at A.F.S.C. ROME each Wednesday afternoon of ROME OFFICE DEPARTMENTAL HEADS. It was agreed that a Conference, similar to the one held on the 22nd April, should be held about once a month - the middle of the month being preferable. R.A.F.

(v) It was agreed that F/Lt WHITE should deal with all established questions as Camp Commandant.

C/C OHLSON said that he could do with a Clerk at LECCE. In view of the shortage of Clerks in this Command, it was suggested that he might employ a civilian for the work - there being the necessary vacancy on the establishment to cover this.

C/C JARMAN made a statement on the situation as regards communication a/c, to the effect that there is to be a drastic reduction in the Command. The Italian A.I. should be approached on the subject with a view to securing perhaps a SAULIN, and J.F.S.C. ROME should contact H.Q. M.A.A.F. about the possibility of getting an OHLSON a/c for LECCE on receipt of "a case" from LECCE.

W/Cdr ROYCE referred to the job which T/O DE BENEDEUCCI was at present doing at BIVIGNO, and it was agreed that this Officer should be promoted to the rank of FLIGHT LIEUTENANT as there is a Squadron Leader Cr. post at BIVIGNO not filled - W/Cdr FRAPPE for action.

(vi) In view of certain Officers from BARI being shifted to LECCE, the vacancy position should sort itself out. (there W/Cdr FISHER) rather than redistribution, rather

A.O.C. to visit L.A.S.C. and a conference at L.A.S.C. ROE each Wednesday afternoon of ROE OFFICE DEPARTMENTAL. It was agreed that a Conference, similar to the one held on the 22nd April, should be held about once a month - the middle of the month being preferable.

(v) It was agreed that F/IT WHITE should deal with all/establishment questions as Camp Commandant.

G/C OLLISON said that he could do with a Clerk at LECCE. In view of the shortage of Clerks in this Command, it was suggested that he might employ a civilian for the work - there being the necessary vacancy on the establishment to cover this.

G/C JARVIN made a statement on the situation as regards communication a/c, to the effect that there is to be a drastic reduction in the Command. The Italian A.I. should be approached on the subject with a view to securing perhaps a SALVIN, and A.F.S.C. ROE should contact H.Q. I.A.A.F. about the possibility of getting an AISON c/o for LECCE on receipt of "a case" from LECCE.

W/Cdr ROYCE referred to the job which F/O DE BENEDECCI was at present doing at BIRMO, and it was agreed that this Officer should be promoted to the rank of FLIGHT LIEUTENANT as there is a Squadron Leader Org. post at BIRMO not filled - W/Cdr REARCE for action.

(vi) In view of certain Officers from BAPI being shifted to ROE, the correspondence position should sort itself out. H.A.A.F. (thru W/Cdr FISHER) again to be asked to address everything to A.F.S.C. ROE for distribution, rather than that correspondence should go direct to BAPI, or even to BAPI via B.A.F.

6. FUTURE OF LECCE AND PROSINONE.

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It was decided that the C.F.U. should be left at PROSINONE. G/C OLLISON in consultation with W/Cdr CLINSTON to inform A.O.C. whether the refresher unit at LEVERNO can be accommodated at LECCE, on receipt of which, H.A.A.F. to be asked for approval of Air Forces Sub-Commission's proposals in the event of LECCE being de-requisitioned.

G/C OLLISON as O.C. A.F.S.C. Detachment, LECCE, to take over control of the MACCHI squadrons. (A.O.C. has asked C.A.S. I.A.F. not to move MACCHI Sqdns from LECCE to PROSINONE pending a decision.

7. MOVE NORTHWARDS.

A comprehensive plan is not as yet possible. On the Intelligence side, Wing Commander Pearce said that he had one Officer (F/O REID) ready to move into MILAN as soon as the North falls; W/Cdr REARCE to discuss with A/Cdr WOOLLEY in view of the shortage of Intelligence Officers at A.F.S.C. On

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the Equipment site, nothing can be settled until we actually know what is left in the North; W/Cdr KNOWLES has the matter under constant review. The move Northwards to be discussed with C.O.S.C. when he visits A.F.S.C.

The A.O.C. said he thought it would be a good thing if a copy of M.A.A.T.'s plan on future planning could be obtained, or even perused by an A.F.S.C. Officer. W/Cdr FINCHER will be approached on this; C/C FLEXMAN (PLANS) M.A.A.T. is directly concerned.

3. INFORMATION.

A.O.C. asked all Officers present to circulate too much rather than too little information.

C/O GILLISON spoke about obtaining machines etc. for the News Room at LECCOE which was most popular. His machine known as 'Victory' was very popular. W/Cdr FINCHER said that M.A.A.T. were very tight on this type of thing, but that he would do his best to see what could be obtained.

9. GENERAL.

W/Cdr FINCHER asked whether there was any likelihood of the I.A.T. being used in the Pacific. The A.O.C. said he didn't think there was any likelihood whatever.

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I.A. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OUTRIGGER COMMANDING.

I. E. being used in the Pacific. The I.O.C. said he didn't think there was any likelihood of that.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 24th April, 1945.
Ref: 1250/25/AF.

I. B. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

1657

SECRET.

AGENDA.

CONFERENCE TO BE HELD ON SUNDAY 22ND APRIL AT 10.30 HOURS
IN ALLIED COMMISSION BUILDING, ROE, IN ROOM NC.47 OF THE
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (OFFICE OF W/CDR. A.H. KNOWLES.)

The following will be required to attend:

Heads of Sections in A.F.S.C. Rome.
Wing Commander W.L. Winter.
Wing Commander W.E. Royce.
Group Captain W.C. Ollason.
Wing Commander W.E. Pocock.

1. FUTURE POLICY.

(i) After cessation of fighting.

probably

- (a) Airacobras to be withdrawn.
(b) Fighters will be grounded.
(c) Balloon may be grounded.
(d) Transport aircraft will probably be required for internal transportation of Italian Government Officials, Air Force Officers and freight.

Not to be imparted to any Italian or outside of the Officers shown on Page 3.
Transport aircraft will probably be required for internal transportation of Italian Government Officials, Air Force Officers and freight.
Concentration of I.A.F. aircraft at one or two airfields, e.g. LEGGE, TOGGIA, MILAN, ETC.

(ii) Until fighting is over.

Policy is to make the I.A.F. as efficient as possible, assuming that the war will go on indefinitely.

(iii) Best use of I.A.F.

How can the I.A.F. be most effectively used to help the Allied war effort before, and after, cessation of fighting.

Have we any hope of obtaining Wellingtons, Dakotas or Stinsons for transport work (the I.A.F. aircrafts are much experienced, and with further aids should be highly efficient.)

2. TRAINING IN I.A.F.

(i) After cessation of fighting.

probably

- (a) Airacobras to be ~~withdrawn~~.
- (b) Fighters will be grounded. } Not to be imparted to any Italian or
- (c) Baltimore may be grounded. } outside of the Officers shown on Page 3.
- (d) Transport aircraft will probably be required for internal transportation of Italian Government Officials, Air Force Officers and freight.
- (e) Concentration of I.A.F. aircraft at one or two airfields, e.g. LEGGE, FOGGIA, MILAN, ETC.

(ii) Until fighting is over.

Policy is to make the I.A.F. as efficient as possible, assuming that the war will go on indefinitely.

(iii) Best use of I.A.F.

How can the I.A.F. be most effectively used to help the Allied war effort before, and after, cessation of fighting.

Have we any hope of obtaining Wellingtons, Dakotas or Signmasters for transport work (the I.A.F. aircrafts are much experienced, and with further aids should be highly efficient.)

2. TRAINING IN I.A.F.

Based on Group Captain Ollason's letter: (i) What improvements can be effected, and (ii) what extra specialist Officers required, e.g. Air Observer (combining Navigational and bombing instruction), Summary leader, flight engineer. Should these Officers be centred on ROE, or based on PROSINONE or LEGGE.

- (iii) Air and Ground syllabuses.
Flying control.

- (iv) What extra equipment is required, both in aircraft and for training purposes.

3. ENGINEERING POLICY.

C.I.S.O. stated (on 18th April) that he proposes to take action similar to that taken in the case of the Equipment Branch, in order better to assist the Engineering Branch of the I.A.F. (C.I.S.O. will be in ROE about the 30th April and will discuss this.)

Continued /2.....

-2-

4. OBSCLETE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT.

Decision made at M.A.A.T. (on 18th April) whereby I.A.F. will be allowed to retain some 150 obsolete aircraft. Therefore those which are airworthy to be flown to our airfield remote from repair facilities, e.g. Palato. Aircraft which cannot be flown without considerable repair to be left where they are, provided the Italians do not work on them? No raw material or spares will be provided for maintenance or repair of these aircraft.

About 25 of these aircraft are now being used to boost up the transport squadrons, but when they become past praying for they should be flown to a remote airfield.

5. ORGANISATION.

(i) Units here and 4th Z.A.F.

Can we force the Italians to combine these two Headquarters?

(ii) A.F.S.C.

Movement of certain Officers from BARI to ROME.

(iii) Equipment.

Proposed move of Main Equipment Section from BARI to ROME, and future demand channels for Italian Air Force.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between M.A.A.T. and this H.Q. is required by Chief of Staff M.A.A.T. Wing Commander Fisher, (A.L.S.) is being given the sole job of looking after this Sub-Commission's interests, and will make a fortnightly visit to this H.Q. A.O.C. will make a fortnightly visit to M.A.A.T. Suggest Staff Conference at A.F.S.C. ROME on Wednesday afternoon, i.e. after Vice President's Conference, and before exchange of weekly information with M.A.A.T. which would then be made every other Wednesday and Thursday respectively.

(v) A.F.S.C. Establishments.

(a) Any additions required.

(b) Any deletions required.

e.g. Instead of P/O Armament Officer, add Squadron Leader or Flight Lieutenant Air Bomber.

(iii) Equipment.

Proposed move of main Equipment Section from BARI to ROME, and future demand channels for Italian Air Force.

(iv) A weekly exchange of information between M.A.A.F. and this H.Q. is required by Chief of Staff I.A.A.F. Wing Commander Fisher, (A.L.S.) is being given the sole job of looking after this Sub-Commission's interests, and will make a fortnightly visit to this H.Q. A.O.C. will make a fortnightly visit to M.A.A.F. Suggest Staff Conference at A.F.S.C. ROME on Wednesday afternoons, i.e. after Vice President's Conference, and before exchange of weekly information with M.A.A.F. which would then be made every other Wednesday and Thursday respectively.

(v) A.F.S.C. Establishments.

(a) Any additions required.

(b) Any deletions required.

c.g. Instead of P/O Armament Officer, add Squadron Leader or Flight Lieutenant Air Reserver.

(vi) Distribution of correspondence.

(a) To and from M.A.A.F. and formations higher than A.F.S.C. through A.F.S.C. ROME.

(b) Letters from A.F.S.C. detachments direct to ROME, copy to BARI when required for information vis-a-vis UNITA AREA, ZAT 4 and B.A.F.

6. FUTURE OF LECCE AND FROSINONE.

Lecce is being returned to the Italians in toto. Should the whole of the O.T.U. including Refresher Training etc. be removed from FROSINONE to LECCE? It may be profitable to leave Baltimore training at FROSINONE and have all other training at LECCE, c.g. Macchis at LECCE.

Continued /3.....

-3-

7. MOVE NORTHWARDS.

is the Italian battle progresses, what plan should be adopted, and what resources have we?

8. DEFENSION -- too much rather than too little.

9. GENERAL -- any other business.

I.E. Brodie

I.E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Ref: AFSC/25/AIR.
Date: 21st April, 1945.

DISTRIBUTION:

AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE.
GROUP CAPTAIN E.E. JAFFE.
COLONEL M.H. BALDWIN.
~~MAJOR E.J. SASS.~~
MAJOR COMMANDER W.E. ROYCE.
MAJOR COMMANDER T.L. HIGHER.
GROUP CAPTAIN W.C. OLIVASON.
MAJOR COMMANDER A.H. KNOWLES.
MAJOR E.J. SASS.
MAJOR COMMANDER H.E. POOCK.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Ref: AFSC/27/AIR.
Date: 21st April, 1945.

DISTRIBUTION:

AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE.
GROUP CAPTAIN L.E. JEFFIN.
COLONEL M.A. BALDWIN.
~~WING COMMANDER~~
WING COMMANDER W.E. ROYCE.
WING COMMANDER T.J. LINGER.
GROUP CAPTAIN W.C. OLIVASON.
WING COMMANDER A.V. KNOTEC.
MAJOR E.J. SASS.
WING COMMANDER W.E. POCOCK.
WING COMMANDER T.G.M. MARCE.
SQUADRON LEADER F.L. BRADSHAW.
File.

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