

ACC

10000/135/730

135/730

SECURITY, POLICY
FEB. 1946 - JAN. 1947

TO : Director.

M.3.

Ref Min 2. The subject has been discussed by the S.S.O., D.D. and myself and the following conclusions were reached:

- (a) The fact that the Italian authorities now control the movement and clearance of Foreign Aircraft Flights in no way solves the problem.
- (b) It should be the responsibility of the Italian Authorities to organise a proper security control on all airfields.
- (c) The Italian Authorities should be notified of the above view, and that we point out the fact that we have put in quite a lot of spadework for them in checking and producing a classified list of airfields, and that they could use this as a basis on which to organise a proper security control.

9th January 1947.

Boyle
E. BOULT F/O
Air III (A.S.O.)

4.

Air 3.

Ref Min 3.

OK., go ahead with 1. A 17. & base in 19 A

2 16 A.

1947.

(4)

2841

2. Our reply to 6A should I think be on the lines of para 4 of End. 5A.

10.9.46.

Ref end 5c
S.O.

2.

2840

A.S.O.

Ref 15A para 3. ^(12A) Do your classification scheme now necessary - I don't know how to new clearance regulations make the scheme less necessary! 2. And secondly must we really go to 17AHC again - I don't see why, unless it is to ask them to verify allied authorities (if that be necessary). 3. Please discuss with SSO & DSD it then let me know your combined recommendation.

ASO
for info
10/12

D.P.

W. 11/11
Dir.

R.

T-1508

191

From: Air Headquarters,
R.A.F., Italy.

To: All Sections,
all Units under Command of A.H.Q., Italy.

Date: 30th December, 1946.

Ref: AHQ/L/S.2113/INT(S3C).

MOVEMENT CONTROL - ITALY AND AUSTRIA.

British civilian personnel (British Officers' wives etc.) proceeding to Italy from Austria, will be required to pay a charge of 50 Austrian Schillings (25/-) for the issue of a Visa to enter Italy, if they are proceeding for purely private reasons.

In the same way, British civilians who wish to proceed from Italy to Austria for purely private reasons will not normally be granted an Allied Force permit to enter Austria.

Wives accompanying their husbands on Posting will have no difficulty in obtaining an A.F.P., and will be issued with an Italian Visa free of charge. Wives accompanying their husbands on temporary duty will be considered as proceeding for purely private reasons, and will not normally be issued with an A.F.P., they will also have to pay for any Italian Visa issued.

2839

MOVEMENT CONTROL - ITALY AND AUSTRIA.

British civilian personnel (British Officers' wives etc.) proceeding to Italy from Austria, will be required to pay a charge of 50 Austrian Schillings (25/-) for the issue of a Visa to enter Italy, if they are proceeding for purely private reasons.

In the same way, British civilians who wish to proceed from Italy to Austria for purely private reasons will not normally be granted an Allied Force permit to enter Austria.

Wives accompanying their husbands on Posting will have no difficulty in obtaining an A.F.P., and will be issued with an Italian Visa free of charge. Wives accompanying their husbands on temporary duty will be considered as proceeding for purely private reasons, and will not normally be issued with an A.F.P., they will also have to pay for any Italian Visa issued.

2839

Handwritten signature

M.M. HILSON,
Squadron Leader, for,
Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
AIR HEADQUARTERS, E.A.A.F., ITALY.

1106/101

SECRET.

From: Intelligence (Security) Officer,
Air Headquarters, R.A.F., Italy.
To: All Units under control of Air Headquarters Italy.
Date: 7th January, 1947.
Ref: AFQI/S.2107/INT(SEC).

DISCLOSURE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION -
NEED FOR CONTINUED SECURITY IN PEACE-TIME.

Reference is made to M.O. A.954 which is reproduced below and which is circulated to all Units for information.

2. Attention is drawn to paragraph 7 and all Units should see that this is carried out.

D. S. Lenny
Flight Lieutenant,
Intelligence (Security) Officer,
AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F., ITALY.

(C.10728/41/M.I.S.I. - 14. 11. 46).

(This Order affects paras. 258, sub-para.(i)(c) and (ii), and 278 of M.P. 657).

1. It is evident that R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel are unaware of the continued need for security in regard to service information, there apparently being an impression that with the cessation of hostilities the necessity for such security no longer exists. The purpose of this order is to correct that impression and to remind all ranks that even in peace time, certain information, equipment, etc., must necessarily be safeguarded, according to its security classification.

2838

35/Jan 22

U. S. Embassy
 D. S. LAMBERT, Esq.
 Flight Lieutenant,
 Intelligence (Security) Officer,
 AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F., ITALY.

(C.10728/41/A.I.S.I. - 14. 11. 46).

(This Order affects paras. 253, sub-para-(i)(c) and (ii), and 276 of A.P. 837).

1. It is evident that R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel are unaware of the continued need for security in regard to service information, there apparently being an impression that with the cessation of hostilities the necessity for such security no longer exists. The purpose of this order is to correct that impression and to remind all ranks that even in peace time, certain information, equipment, etc., must necessarily be safeguarded, according to its security classification.
2. The majority of the security restrictions and precautions essential in wartime under Defence Regulations have been relaxed or revoked with the advent of peacetime conditions. In peace time, the demands of security must be weighed against the needs of normal every day life, intensive security measures being only justifiable in a state of national emergency.
3. Nevertheless, it is essential to maintain the secrecy of certain information and equipment and the utmost discretion must, therefore, always be used when discussing service matters, particularly with members of the public. The disclosure of items of information on such subjects as are listed below, however unimportant or trivial they may seem individually, may be of great assistance to a potential enemy, and care must be taken not to mention, either orally or in correspondence, any facts about the fighting services.
4. The most important subjects on which the unauthorised disclosure of information is forbidden are as follows:

(a) /

SECRET.

- (a) Strength, including numbers of aircraft, personnel, guns, ships, tanks, etc.
- (b) Organisation, including the composition and operational functions of units, stations and headquarters staffs, and the duties and responsibilities of specific branches of the Services.
- (c) Plans of any description, operational or otherwise, including strategy, tactics, and re-organisations.
- (d) Equipment, including aircraft, armament, rocket projectiles, radar and particularly, trends of development and new devices.
- (e) Disposition, i.e., numbers, titles and operational functions of units or formations coupled with their precise locations.

5. No reference to this order or any subsequent order or instruction concerning the safeguarding of security in the Services is to be made to any person not holding an official position in one of the Services.

6. C.O.s are to bring the contents of this order to the attention of all ranks forthwith and are to emphasise the necessity for discretion at all times. A serious view will be taken of any contravention of this order and disciplinary action will be taken against offenders.

7. The contents of this order are to be reproduced quarterly in station or unit routine orders.

(A.M.O. A.1284/43 cancelled).

- - - - -

7. The contents of this order are to be reproduced quarterly in station or unit routine orders.



101

2837

From: Air Headquarters, F.A.P., Italy.

To: As below.

Date: 20th September, 1946.

Ref: FRY/C.2107/PA(SPO).

TOP SECRET

From a perusal of correspondence between this Headquarters and other formations, and vice versa, it is evident that a certain amount of routine material is being over-classified.

2. It is appreciated that the first consideration of the individual is to be "on the safe side", but a certain amount of thought will often reveal that a letter may be downgraded by one or more degrees of secrecy.
3. It should be particularly noted that, because a letter is included in a Secret or Top Secret file, this does not necessarily mean that the letter itself must be of that category. Such files are trouble can be saved by careful wording of the letter, and particularly the subject heading, so as to exclude all mention of Secret, or Top Secret matters. For example, the objective, date, and scope of an operation may be Top Secret; but documents dealing with consequential matters, such as movement of personnel and forces, may be placed in a lower category, always providing they do not convey any details of the operation, which must be regarded as Top Secret.
4. Details of security categories are set out in an Appendix to this letter, together with examples of matter which would normally be graded in the respective categories. These examples are intended only as a guide, and where it is clearly desirable, Officers may grade particular subjects in a higher or lower category than that indicated by the examples.
5. Security categories have been so designed and drawn that so far as possible, the security precautions that must be taken correspond to the importance of the matter to be so guarded. It follows therefore, that misuse of these categories, particularly "Secret" and "Top Secret", must be avoided, since it will detract from the value of the safeguard employed.
6. The question of security classification is to be used in signals display slightly from the above, in that consideration of emphasis may be involved. This question was dealt with fully under this Headquarters letter, FRY/412/3, dated 20th September, 1946.
7. In any case where doubt exists, on the question of the correct category to be used, reference should be made to the Intelligence (Security) Officer of the formation concerned.

2836

2239

17A

Flt Off Legat

RECEIVED

to exclude all mention of Secret, or Top Secret matters. For example, the objective, date, and scope of an operation may be Top Secret; but documents dealing with consequential matters, such as movement of personnel and stores, may be placed in a lower category, always providing they do not convey any details of the operation, which must be regarded as Top Secret.

4. Details of Security categories are set out as an Appendix to this letter, together with examples of matter which would normally be graded in the respective categories. These examples are intended only as a guide, and where it is clearly desirable, Officers may grade particular subjects in a higher or lower category than that indicated by the examples.

5. Security categories have been so designed and framed that so far as possible, the security precautions that must be taken correspond to the importance of the matter to be safeguarded. It follows therefore, that misuse of these categories, particularly "Secret" and "Top Secret", must be avoided, since it will detract from the value of the safeguards employed.

6. The question of security classification to be used in signals differs slightly from the above, in that compromise of cyphers may be involved. This question was dealt with fully under this Headquarters letter, AI/4512/3, dated 2nd September, 1946. 2836

7. In any case where doubt exists, on the question of the correct category to be used, reference should be made to the Intelligence (Security) Officer of the formation, who should be in a position to give advice.

8. Such guidance can be obtained, on the correct classification of documents, by a careful study of Air Publication 3085 - "Security of Official Documents, Information and Material".

Group Sept 16,
Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
RAF Waddington, Lincs.

RESTRICTED.TOP SECRET.

(i) Certain secret documents, information, and material, the security aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the British Commonwealth of Nations, shall be graded Top Secret.

(ii) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Top Secret:-

- (a) Plans or particulars of future effort or special operations.
- (b) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with (a) above.
- (c) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (d) Information of the methods used or success obtained by our intelligence services and Counter-Intelligence Services, or which would imperil secret agents.
- (e) Critical information of new and important inventions of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (f) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

SECRET.

(iii) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause a fatal security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the Nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or could be of great advantage to a foreign nation, shall be graded Secret.

(iv) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Secret:-

- (a) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (b) Plans or particulars of operations not included under Top Secret.
- (c) Instructions regarding the employment of important new inventions of war.

2835

which would imperil secret war.

- (c) Critical information of new and important functions of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (f) Particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

SECRET.

(iii) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which would imperil national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or could be of great advantage to a foreign nation, shall be classified secret.

(iv) The following are examples of matter which normally will be classified secret:

- (a) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (b) Plans or particulars of operations not included under Top Secret.
- (c) Instructions regarding the employment of important new positions of war.
- (d) Order of Battle information and locations and moves affecting the Order of Battle.
- (e) Knowledge of enemy material and procedure, the value of which depends upon the enemy not knowing that we possess it.
- (f) Vital military information on internal defense.
- (g) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (h) Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- (i) Important improvements to existing functions of war until accepted for service use.
- (j) Photographs of valuable plants or vital installations under our control.
- (k) Certain development projects.
- (l) Important cryptographic devices unless assigned to a lower category.

2835

APPENDIX (CONTINUED)

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

(v) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the national security, could be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, or of any governmental activity, or of an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of advantage to a foreign nation, shall be graded Confidential.

(vi) The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded Confidential:-

- (1) Matters, transactions, arrangements of personnel and administrative nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (2) Routine official correspondence which is not a source of information of vital interest to the body.
- (3) Routine Intelligence reports.
- (a) General Military and Air Force frequency allocations.
- (c) Military and Air Force, unless so collected together that they reveal the Order of Battle.
- (r) Technological information of Confidential grade.
- (2) Unit movements of personnel and significant in their activities or subject to operational threat.
- (h) Certain technical documents and manuals for training, the disclosure of which would be of interest to the enemy.
- (i) General technical documents and manuals of operations.
- (j) Air photographs of territories on an operational or subject to operational threat.

RESTRICTED

(vii) Documents, information or material (other than Secret, Secret or Confidential) which should be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes, shall be graded Restricted.

(viii) The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded Restricted:-

- (1) Information of Secret or Confidential grade in excess of the Secret or Confidential grade.
- (b) Information of Confidential grade for official use only.
- (c) Information of Confidential grade for official use only.

2834

(vii) Documents, information or material (other than Top Secret, Secret or Confidential) which shall be published or communicated in any form except for official purpose, shall be given Debarment.

(viii) The following provisions shall be given which shall be given to be restricted:-

- (a) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (b) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (c) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (d) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (e) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (f) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (g) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (h) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (i) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (j) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (k) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (l) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (m) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (n) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (o) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (p) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (q) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (r) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (s) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (t) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (u) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (v) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (w) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (x) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (y) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.
- (z) Information of a secret or confidential nature shall be given to be restricted.

NOTES.

1. Cryptographic System: Any Code or cipher (whether by hand, mechanical or electrical) and instructions therefor.
2. Cryptanalysis: Code and cipher breaking.
3. Order of Battle: Report of the positions of forces, and the identification of units in formation containing those forces in or adjacent to operational theatres.
4. Positions of war: Any data used for war.

REF. RICHED.

From :- Air Headquarters, F.A.A., Italy.

To :- As below.

Date :- 20th September, 1946.

Ref. :- AT I/3.2107/IN (SAC).

SECURITY CATEGORIES.

From a perusal of correspondence passing between this Headquarters and other formations, and vice versa, it is evident that a certain amount of routine material is being over-classified.

2. It is appreciated that the "first consideration of the individual is to be "on the safe side", but a certain amount of thought will often reveal that a letter may be downgraded by one or more degrees of security.
3. It should be particularly noted that, because a letter is included in a Secret or Top Secret file, this does not necessarily mean that the letter itself must be of that category. Such time and trouble can be saved by careful wording of the letter, and particularly the subject heading, so as to exclude all mention of Secret, or Top Secret matters. For example, the objective, date, and title of an operation may be Top Secret; but documents dealing with consequential matters, such as movement of personnel and stores, may be placed in a lower category, always provided they do not convey any details of the operation, which must be regarded as Top Secret.
4. Details of security categories are set out as an Appendix to this letter, together with examples of matter which would normally be graded in the respective categories. These examples are intended only as a guide, and where it is clearly desirable, Officers may grade particular subjects in a higher or lower category than that indicated by the examples.
5. Security categories have been so designed and framed that so far as possible, the security precautions that must be taken corresponding to the importance of the matter to be safeguarded. It follows therefore, that misuse of these categories, particularly "Secret" and "Top Secret", must be avoided, since it will detract from the value of the safeguards employed.
6. The question of security classification to be used in signals differs slightly from the above, in that compromise of cyphers may be involved. This question was dealt with fully under this Headquarters letter, AT I/4312/sigs., dated 2nd September, 1946.
7. In any case where doubt exists, on the question of the correct category to be used, reference should be made to the instructions (SAC) No.

2833

objective, date, and scope of an operation may be Top Secret; but documents dealing with consequential matters, such as movement of personnel and stores, may be placed in a lower category, always realizing they do not convey any details of the operation, which must be regarded as Top Secret.

4. Details of Security categories are set out as an Appendix to this letter, together with examples of matter which would normally be placed in the respective categories. These examples are intended only as a guide, and where it is clearly desirable, Officers may treat particular subjects in a higher or lower category than that indicated by the examples.

5. Security categories have been so designed and framed that so far as possible, the security precautions that must be taken correspond to the importance of the matter to be safeguarded. It follows therefore, that misuse of these categories, particularly "Secret" and "Top Secret", must be avoided, since it will detract from the value of the safeguards employed.

6. The question of security classification is to be used in single different slightly from the above, in that compromise of cyphers may be involved. This question was dealt with fully under this Headquarters letter, AIR/4512/3150, dated 2nd September, 1946. 2833

7. In any case where doubt exists, on the question of the correct category to be used, reference should be made to the Intelligence (Security) Officer at the formation, who should be in a position to give advice.

8. Much guidance can be obtained, on the correct classification of documents, by a careful study of AIR Publication 3086 - "Security of Official Documents, Information and Material".

Group Captain,
Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
AIR STATION, HARTLEY, S. 10.11.47.

RESTRICTED.

TOP SECRET.

(i) Certain secret documents, information, and material, the security aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the British Commonwealth of Nations, shall be graded Top Secret.

(ii) The following are some examples of material which normally will be graded Top Secret:-

- (a) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (b) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with (a) above.
- (c) Very important political considerations dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (d) Information of the methods used or success obtained by our Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services, or which could impair secret agents.
- (e) Critical information of use but likely to injure us if disclosed, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (f) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

SECRET.

(iii) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which could, or is likely to, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or could be of great detriment to the foreign nation, shall be graded Secret.

(iv) The following are some examples of material which normally will be graded Secret:-

- (a) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (b) Plans or particulars of operations not included under Top Secret.
- (c) Information regarding the employment or import of new machines or war.

(d) Order of battle information and locations and moves affecting the

2832

- (c) Critical information of new and important units of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (d) Important particulars of cryptanalytic and cryptanalytic.

SECRET.

(iii) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which would be a serious security, or a serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or could be of great value to a foreign nation, shall be marked Secret.

(iv) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be marked Secret:-

- (a) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (b) Plans or particulars of operations not included in a Top Secret.
- (c) Instructions regarding the employment of important new weapons of war.
- (d) Order of Battle information and locations and movements affecting the Order of Battle.
- (e) Knowledge of cryptographic and procedure, the value of which depends upon the enemy not knowing that we possess it.
- (f) Vital military information on important defenses.
- (g) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (h) General reports on general military operations.
- (i) Important improvements to existing units of war until accepted for service use.
- (j) Photographs of vulnerable points or vital installations under our control.
- (k) Certain development projects.
- (l) Important cryptographic devices unless assigned to a lower category.

2832

APPENDIX (CONTINUED)

RESTRICTED.CONFIDENTIAL.

(v) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, or of any governmental activity, or of an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of detriment to a foreign nation, shall be graded Confidential.

(vi) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Confidential:-

- (a) matters, laws, regulations, and documents of a personal and confidential nature, the knowledge of which is desirable to safeguard the administrative process.
- (b) routine operational and budgetary reports which do not contain information of vital interest to the Army.
- (c) routine intelligence reports.
- (d) General Administrative Information of the Army.
- (e) military and naval matters, and in general, together with any other matter, the disclosure of which would be injurious to the Army.
- (f) technological information of distinctive value.
- (g) United States Government property and information in the possession or control of the Army.
- (h) Certain technical documents and manuals for training, instruction and inspection of personnel.
- (i) General Information of the Army, the disclosure of which would be injurious to the Army.
- (j) Air photographs of territories under our control in or adjacent to operational theaters.

RESTRICTED.

(vii) Documents, information, or material (other than Top Secret, Secret or Confidential) which should be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes, shall be graded Restricted.

(viii) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Restricted:-

- (a) Information of a confidential nature in the possession of the Army.
- (b) Training and technical documents for official use only.
- (c) Certain routine documents relating to supply and

2831

- (c) Unit movements of major units and divisions in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.
- (d) Certain technical data in manuals for training, maintenance and operation of the most modern units of war.
- (e) General tactical and doctrinal results of operations.
- (f) Air photographs of territories in or over which or adjacent to operational theaters.

EXCLUDED

(vii) Documents, information or material (other than Top Secret, Secret or Confidential) which shall be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes, shall be graded Restricted.

(viii) The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded restricted:-

- (a) Information of areas of non-operational air bases or areas remote from theaters of war.
- (b) Training or technical manuals for special and only not intended for release to the public.
- (c) Certain routine documents relating to supply or procurement.
- (d) Air photographs of territories and areas remote from operational theaters.
- (e) Photographs of aircraft, enemy supplies or damaged areas, except those which reveal Secret sources.
- (f) Strength returns of units remote from operational theaters.

2831

NOTES.

1. Cryptographic System: Any Code or cypher (whether by mechanical or electrical or instructions therefor).
2. Cryptanalytic: Code and cypher breaking.
3. Order of Battle: Inventory of positions of forces, with the identification of units or formations comprising those forces in or adjacent to operational theaters.
4. Manpower: Any data which is used for war.

S/O Lywell

UNCLASSIFIED

From :- Air Headquarters, T.A.D., Italy.

To :- As Below.

Date :- 20th September, 1946.

Ref. :- AIRI/S.2107/ITA(SEC).

SECURITY CATEGORIES.

From a perusal of correspondence as sent between this Headquarters and other formations, and vice versa, it is evident that a certain amount of routine material is being over-classified.

2. It is appreciated that the first consideration of the individual is to be "on the safe side", but a certain amount of thought will often reveal that a letter may be downgraded by one or more degrees of security.
3. It should be particularly noted that, because a letter is included in a Secret or Top Secret file, it is does not necessarily mean that the letter itself must be of that category. Such time and trouble can be saved by careful wording of the letter, and particularly the subject heading, so as to exclude all mention of Secret, or Top Secret matters. For example, the objective, date, and scope of an operation may be Top Secret; but documents dealing with consequential matters, such as movement of personnel and stores, may be placed in a lower category, always providing they do not convey any details of the operation, which must be regarded as Top Secret.

4. Details of Security categories are set out as an Appendix to this letter, together with examples of matter which would normally be graded in the respective categories. These examples are intended only as a guide, and where it is clearly desirable, Officers may treat particularly subjects in a higher or lower category than that indicated by the examples.

5. Security categories have been so designed and framed that so far as possible, the security precautions that must be taken consequent to the importance of the matter to be safeguarded. It follows therefore, that misuse of these categories, particularly "Secret" and "Top Secret", must be avoided, since it will detract from the value of the safeguards employed.

6. The question of security classification to be used in signals differs slightly from the above, in that compromise of cyphers may be involved. This question was dealt with fully under this Headquarters letter, AIRI/4512/51, dated 2nd September, 1946.

7. In any case where doubt exists, on the question of the correct category to be used, reference should be made to the correct category.

dealing with conventional matters, unless involved or presumed to be involved, may be placed in a lower category, always providing they do not convey any details of the operation, which must be regarded as Top Secret.

4. Details of Security categories are set out as an Appendix to this letter, together with examples of matter which would normally be graded in the respective categories. These examples are intended only as a guide, and where it is clearly desirable, Officers may give particular subjects in a higher or lower category than that indicated by the examples.

5. Security categories have been so designed and framed that so far as possible, the security precautions that must be taken correspond to the importance of the matter to be so guarded. It follows therefore, that issues of these categories, particularly "Secret" and "Top Secret", must be avoided, since it will detract from the value of the safeguard employed.

6. The question of security classification to be used in signals differs slightly from the above, in that compromise of cyphers may be involved. This question was dealt with fully under this headquarters letter, 2830 dated 2nd September, 1946.

7. In any case where doubt exists, on the question of the correct category to be used, reference should be made to the Intelligence (Security) Officer of the formation, who should be in a position to give advice.

8. Such guidance can be obtained, on the correct classification of documents, by a careful study of the publication 3085 - "Security of Official Documents, Information and Material".

Group Captain,
Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
RAF Staff College, Farnham.

APPENDIX.

RESTRICTED.

TOP SECRET.

(i) Certain secret documents, information, and material, the security aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the British Commonwealth of Nations, shall be graded Top Secret.

(ii) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Top Secret:-

- (a) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (b) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with (a) above.
- (c) Very important political comments dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (d) Information of the methods used or success obtained by our intelligence services and Counter-Intelligence Services, or which could imperil secret agents.
- (e) Critical information of men and important units of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (f) Particulars of cryptology and cryptanalysis.

SECRET.

(iii) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which could even to a small degree, cause serious injury to the interests of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or could be of great advantage to a foreign nation, shall be graded Secret.

(iv) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Secret:-

- (a) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (b) Plans or particulars of operations not included under No. 2829.
- (c) Instructions regarding the employment of important new additions of war.
- (d) Orders of battle in progress.

Intelligence services and Counter-Intelligence services, or which would imperil secret matter.

- (c) Critical information of war and important missions of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (d) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

SECRET.

(iii) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to an interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or could be of great advantage to a foreign nation, shall be SECRET.

(iv) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded Secret:-

- (a) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (b) Plans or proposals of operations not included under **2829**.
- (c) Instructions regarding the employment of important new weapons of war.
- (d) Order of battle information and locations and moves affecting the order of battle.
- (e) Knowledge of enemy material and procedure, the value of which depends upon the enemy not knowing that we possess it.
- (f) Vital military information on important defenses.
- (g) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (h) Advance reports on general war or operations.
- (i) Important improvements to existing missions of war until accepted for service use.
- (j) Photographs of vulnerable points or vital installations under our control.
- (k) Certain cryptologic projects.
- (l) Important cryptographic devices unless assigned to a lower category.

APPENDIX (CONTINUED)

RESTRICTED.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(v) Documents, information, or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, or of any governmental activity, or of an individual, or would cause comparative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of detriment to a foreign nation, shall be rated Confidential.

(vi) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be rated Confidential:-

- (a) Letters, telegrams, and documents of a personal and confidential nature, the knowledge of which is attributable to negligence for administrative reasons.
- (b) Routine operations and battle reports which do not contain information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (c) Routine Intelligence Reports.
- (d) General Military Plans in Frequency Allocations.
- (e) Military and Signals, including collection together that they reveal the Order of Battle.
- (f) Completely lost information of administrative nature.
- (g) Unit movements of non-combat and administrative in areas within or adjacent to operational theatres.
- (h) Certain technical documents and manuals used for training, maintenance and inspection of equipment and personnel of AF.
- (i) General technical lessons learned as a result of operations.
- (j) Air photographs of territories in or over control in or adjacent to operational theatres.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(vii) Documents, information or material (other than Top Secret, Secret or Confidential) which shall be published or otherwise become known except for official purposes, shall be rated Restricted.

(viii) The following are some examples of matter which normally will be rated Restricted:-

- (a) Information of value of a non-operational significance in areas remote from the theatres of war.
- (b) Training or technical documents or manuals are only of interest to the public.
- (c) Certain routine documents relating to supply and

2256

- (3) Unit documents which could be used to identify the threat.
- (4) Certain technical documents and manuals used for training, maintenance and instruction of the threat.
- (5) General technical documents and manuals used for operations.
- (6) Air photographs of territories under our control in or adjacent to operational areas.

NOTES:

(vii) Documents, information or material (other than the Secret, Secret or Confidential) which should be published or disseminated to the public except for official purposes, shall be marked "Secret".

(viii) The following are examples of material which normally will be marked "Secret":-

- (a) Information of value of non-pertinent significance in connection with the threat.
- (b) Training and technical documents and manuals used for training the threat.
- (c) General technical documents and manuals used for operations.
- (d) Air photographs of territories under our control in or adjacent to operational areas.
- (e) Photographs of the threat, except those which reveal Secret sources.
- (f) Strength returns of units relevant to operational areas.

2828

NOTES:

1. Cryptographic System: Any Code or cypher (whether by hand, mechanical or electrical) and instructions therefor.
2. Cryptanalysis: Code and other breaking.
3. Order of Battle: Information in positions of forces, with the identification of units in positions and the threat.
4. Positions: Any information used for war.

16A

I-145-2

SECRET

From : Air Headquarters, R.A.F. Italy.
To: Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.
Copy to: MAC SEC. , Air Headquarters Italy (REAR)
Date: 6th December, 1946
Ref: AME/S.2112/Int(Sec).

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS ON AIRFIELDS IN ITALY

Further to conversation Reid-Denby recently at this Hq's, a list of various airfields, landing grounds, etc. has now been obtained and is set out below. These are supplementary to your list attached to AFSC/1106/Int. of 18th Oct. 1946.

2. It is pointed out, however, that it is not suggested that these lists are complete by any means but are based on available information at this Hq's. and should be used as a guide in compiling a final list.

ALLIED AIRFIELDS.

- | | |
|------------|-----------|
| Foggia | Emergency |
| Marcianese | Br. |
| Pisa | Am. |
| Lavariano | Br. |
| Ponchi | " |
| Padua | ? Br? |
| Pola | Br. |

AIRFIELDS

Rivolto/Villaoria (Dispersal area used by RAF MU.
Aviano
Osoppo (Disp. area occupied by a Tank Regt.)

LANDING GROUNDS

- Povoletta
Savile
Mandago
Belluno
Casarsa
Matta di Livenza
Aillo (in use as a racecourse)
Plezzo
Rivis

ITALIAN AIRFIELDS IMPORTING SERVICEABILITY AND MOVEMENTS NO THE C.A.V.S.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Milano Linate | Brte (rome) |
| Sa Spezia Cadimare (Sea PLANE Base) | Brindisi (seaplane base) |
| Orical Serio | Crotone |
| Venegono | Lecco |
| Venezia Liao | Sanvito di Taranto |
| | Alghero |

Aviano
Pisa
Am.
Lavarano
Br.
Ronchi
Padua
? Br?
Br.
Pola

AIRFIELDS

Rivolto/Villaorba (Dispersal area used by RAF MU.

Aviano
Ossopo (Disp. area occupied by a Tank Regt.)

LANDING GROUNDS

Povoletta
Socile
Maniago
Delluno
Casarsa
Matta di Livensa
Aillo (in use as a racecourse)
Plezzo
Rivis

ITALIAN AIRFIELDS REPORTING SERVICEABILITY AND MOVEMENTS TO THE C.A.V.S.

Milano Linate
Sa Spezia Cadimare (Sea PLANE Base)
Orical Serio
Venegono
Venezia Lido
Trento
Villafranca
Pologna
Polzano
Centocelli
Trosimone
Perugia
Paiova
Belluno
Guidonia
Siena Ampugnano
San Nicolo Varano (seaplane base)
Cagliari (Seaplane base)
Olbia
Bari

urbe (roma)
Brindisi (seaplane base)
Crotone
Lecce
Savvito di Taranto
Alghero
Olbia (seaplane base)
Palermo
Novi Ligure
Torino
Vergiate
Venezia Tre Porte (seaplane base)
Genfardine
Bracciano (seaplane base)
Pomigliano D'Arco
Brindisi
Taranto (seaplane base)
Monseurato
Chinisia
Pomigliano

Other 'aeromes listed
))))-----))))

Gnodi
Tortorella
Sterparone
Siena (Malignano)
Amendola
Cellone
Forli
Giulia
Littoria (Roma)
San Severo
Stornara
Triolo
Vincenzo

2827

Denby
E/Lt. D.S. Denby
I.(S).O.
ANQ ITALY. RAF CIP.

1106/1N

I. 1435
15A

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.
Copy to : Air Headquarters Italy.

Date:- 14th November, 1946.

Ref :- MAAC/4085/AFALS.

13A

12A

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS ON AIRFIELDS IN ITALY

Further to this Secretariat's letter of even reference dated 1st November, 1946.

2. It is considered that the points raised in your letter AFSC/1106/Int dated 18th October, 1946 regarding the security of aircraft movements to Airfields in Italy are fully covered now that control of foreign aircraft flights to Italy has been handed back to the Italian Government. (This Secretariat's letter of even reference of to-days date refers). It is therefore proposed to take no further action on your letter.

3. If, however, you consider that loopholes in airfield security still exist despite the new clearance regulations, it is requested that you raise the matter further with this Secretariat.

B. E. de Lough f/kr.

for

S. J. B. HAMILTON
Wing Commander
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

See Para 2.



I-1431

14A

From: Air Headquarters, R.A.F., Italy.
 To: Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome. ✓
 Date: 8th November, 1946.
 Ref: AMCL/S. 2105/INT(SEC).

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS ON AIRFIELDS IN ITALY.

Reference is made to your AFSC/1106/INT., dated 18th October, 1946.

2. The control of movements on airfields in Italy as outlined in this letter is agreed to with the following provisos:

3. From a study of "List of Airfields and Landing Grounds - Italy", issued by Air Ministry, Dept. A.I.2(b), it appears that there are many more landing grounds available for illegal entry than are noted in the Appendix to your letter.

4. There are several landing grounds which although occupied by R.A.F. Units, have no flying control facilities, e.g. RIVOLTO. X

5. If these points could be tied up, there seems to be no objection to the proposed scheme being adopted.

W. M. Wilson

W. M. WILSON,
 Squadron Leader,
 for Air Vice Marshal,
 Air Officer Commanding,
AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F., ITALY.

2825

Copy to: M.A.A.C. Secretariat, Air Headquarters Italy (Rear), C.M.F..

AIR II

Letter to AMCL dated 12.11.46. to I.A.M. and to M.T.O.U.S.A. (APO 512)
 are indicated to bring our list of airfields up to date.
 S.S.D. Ref. AMCL/S. 2105/INT(SEC) 14/11/46. R. Keyman 14/11/46.

I - 1429

13A

From:- Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

To :- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome,

Date:- 1st November, 1946.

Ref :- ~~AFSC~~ ^{HARC} 4203/1/AFALS.

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS ON AIRFIELDS IN ITALY

Reference is made to your letter AFSC/1106/INT dated 18th October, 1946:

2. The whole question of control of foreign aircraft flying to or over Italy is at present under review by Allied Force Headquarters, in connection with the proposed hand-over of such control to the Italian Government, and the proposals made in your letter are being considered in conjunction with the over-all picture

3. An early decision is anticipated, and will be passed to you as soon as possible.

*gk^m
15/11*

(*Hamilton*)
S.J.B. HAMILTON
Wing Commander
Secretary to The
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

13/11

12/11

14/11

Q328
u/a. L. J. J.
187

2824

Secret. S-10

D. D. - JRM 25/10

S. S. O. - 25/10

Ain 2 25/10,
AIR 1. 26/10.

A. S. O. 25/10.

ORBI.

then S. I. O. ✓ 25/10

ORBI 2 26/10

FROM : A.F.S. 1. Rome.

To : B.A.A.S. Secretariat C/o A.H.U., Italy Rear Command.
A.H.U. Italy Office

Ref. : AFSC/116/Int.

Date : 19th October 1946.

SECRET

AIRPORT MOVEMENTS IN ITALY

1. It has been noted by this Sub Commission that there exist in Italy many servicable airfields in remote districts where illegal entry into the country and other activities prejudicial to security could occur, especially if any such flight was undertaken by aircraft with false American or British markings.
2. To obviate this loophole, this Sub Commission urges that airfields in Italy be split into the following four categories and that the aforementioned regulations should be applied to each.
 - A. Airfields under Allied Control with Full Flying Control Facilities.
 - B. Airfields with full Italian Flying Control Facilities.
 - C. Airfields manned by small Italian holding parties.
 - D. Abandoned airfields.
3. Movements to airfields in Category A to be controlled by normal Allied Movement signals as at present.
4. Movements to airfields in Category B to be controlled by normal Italian Movement signals as at present.

2823

many accessible airfields in remote districts where illegal entry into the country and other activities prejudicial to security could occur, especially if any such flight was undertaken by aircraft with false American or British markings.

2. To abridge this preamble, this sub Commission urges that airfields in Italy be split into the following four categories and that the unembargoed regulations should be applied to each.

A. Airfields under Allied Control with Full Flying Control facilities.

B. Airfields with full Italian Flying Control Facilities.

C. Airfields manned by small Italian holding parties.

D. Abandoned Airfields.

3. Movements to airfields in Category A to be controlled by normal Allied Movement Signals as at present.

4. Movements to Airfields in Category B to be controlled by 2823 Italian Movement signals as at present.

5. Movements to Airfields in Category C, except in cases of emergency, to be given at least six hours prior warning to the nearest Italian Aircraft Safety Centre (C.C.A.S.) so that due warning may be passed by telephone or telegram to the authorities concerned.

6. Movements to Airfields in Category D to be prohibited except in emergency or on special authority from Air Forces Air Commission and forty-eight hours notice to the Italian Air Ministry or Central Aircraft Safety Centre (C.C.A.S.).

7. It is proposed that local authorities (Carabinieri, Gendarmes and I.A.F. holding parties) on airfields in categories C and D shall be instructed to impose all aircraft contravening these instructions and report action to Air Forces Air Commission. Cases of aircraft landing on Airfields under Italian jurisdiction to be dealt with in accordance with AHC/3.2105/Int/Sec dated 21st March 1946 (copy attached) unless they hold a clearance certificate from an Allied Flying Control (apart from as in Appendix A).

DD - Fk M 25/10

S.S.O.

S.I.O.

Air 2

A.S.O.

2822

SECRET

From : Intelligence (Security) Officer,
Air Headquarters, R.A.F., ITALY, C.M.F.

To : Distribution as below.

Date : 21st March, 1946.

Ref. : AHQI/S.2105/Int(Sec)

CLEARANCE OF AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN
BRITISH OR AMERICAN.

1. Reference our AHQI/S.2105/Int(Sec) dated 7th March 1946, on above subject.
2. After 25th March 1946, the Allied Force permit system for control of entry into ITALY from all countries, except Germany and Austria, will cease and responsibility for exercising this control will return to the Italian Government, who will operate the normal visa and passport peacetime requirements.
3. British and American service personnel may enter ITALY on production of valid travel orders.
4. It should therefore be noted that passengers and crews of aircraft landing in ITALY, which have not received prior clearance, are not to be detained providing that such persons are in possession of the required valid entry documents.
5. Passengers and crews, other than British or American service personnel, not in possession of such valid entry documents, are to be handed over to either

(a)	Italian public safety airfields control,
(b)	Italian public safety port control,
(c)	the local Questura
(d)	the local Carabinieri,

 who are responsible for disposal.

6. The aircraft is to be held in accordance with the instruction referred to in para. 1 of this letter.

2821

into ITALY from all countries, except Germany and Austria, will cease and responsibility for exercising this control will return to the Italian Government, who will operate the normal visa and passport passport requirements.

3. British and American service personnel may enter ITALY on production of valid travel orders.

4. It should therefore be noted that passengers and crews of aircraft landing in ITALY, which have not received prior clearance, are not to be detained providing that such persons are in possession of the required valid entry documents.

5. Passengers and crews, other than British or American service personnel, not in possession of such valid entry documents, are to be handed over to either

- (a) Italian public safety airfields control,
 - (b) Italian public safety port control,
 - (c) the local Questura
 - (d) the local Carabinieri,
- who are responsible for disposal.

6. The aircraft is to be held in accordance with the instruction referred to in para. 1 of this letter.

2821

Distribution:

R.A.F. Station, Bari
 " " Prindisi
 " " Penigione
 H.Q. D.A.F.
 149 Staging Post
 357 H.U. (Isol)
 A.H.Q. Italy Comms. Sqdn.
 293 Sqdn 'C' Det.
 D.P.W., R.A.F.
 249 Wing.
 A.F.S.C.
 G-2, AFHQ
 G-3, AFHQ
 G-4, AFHQ

British Polled
 10/10/50

C. S. BURGESS,
 Squadron Leader,
 Intelligence (Security) Officer,
 AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F. ITALY.

Internal: A.O.C.
 A.O.A.
 G/C Ops
 A.F.A.L.S.
 S. I.O.
 S. Rev.O.

APPENDIX 'A'

AIRCRAFT LOG

Airfield CL 10 10 10

R.T. Callsign TO 10

Frequency 116.1-117.9-6440

Height A.S.I. 305 YL 10

CREW

PILOT

2nd PILOT

NAV.

W/OP

Cleared to

First stop.

Fuel state

W/T Callsign

W/T Callsign

A/C Keeping watch on.

E.T.D.

E.T.D.

Date

A/C Type

No.

Unit.

Flt.

Strengths (if not in contact)

Height

Altitude

Cruising speed

Endurance

Nav. Briefing

S.S. Briefing

Met. Briefing

Ops. Officer

E.T.D.

PILOT'S SIGNATURE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

W/OP

Cleared to

First stop.

Fuel safe

W/T Call sign

W/T Call sign

A/C Keeping watch on.

E.T.D.

E.T.A.

Height

Altitude

Cruising speed

Endurance

Nav. Briefing

S.S. Briefing

Met. Briefing

Ops. Officer

A.D.

CAPT'S SIGNATURE

FOR COMMANDER'S OFFICE

CAPT. and NAV. to report to Station Operations at :-

S.P.

Ops. OFF

S.P.

Ops. OFF

S.P.

Ops. OFF

For information No. R.A.A. Unit Ciampino (S.P.)
(To be included in departure signal)

ROUTE

TIMES

TRUE

TRACK

Total Times :

APPENDIX 'B'

CATEGORY A

Bari.
Capedichino
Ciampino
Treviso
Udine
Gorizia
Tisone

Pisa

CATEGORY B

Centocelle
Fresinone
Urbe
Guidonia
Lecce
Brindisi
Gieia del Colle
Milan Linato
Balzano
Ralegra
Venice San Nicolo'
Trapani
Alghero

Bergamo
Orto
Padova

CATEGORY C

Canari
Venegona
Lenate
Valpurga
Sesto Calende
Nevi Ligure
Asritella
Villarova d'Albenga

Desenzano
Aviano
Jesi
Falconara
Reggio Emilia
Vicenza

Lido di Roma
Latina
Cepua
Pentecagnano
Lago Patria
Siena Ampugnano
Firenze
Pentefera

Viterbo
Gressete
Perugia
Castiglione
Teligue

CATEGORY C

Rimini
 Citta del Colle
 Milano Linate
 Bologna
 Bologna
 Venice San Nicolo'
 Trapani
 Alghero

Genoa
 Venegono
 Linate
 Valpurga
 Sesto Calende
 Novi Ligure
 Aerialia
 Villanova d'Albana

Desenzano
 Aviano
 Jesi
 Falconara
 Reggio Emilia
 Vicenza

Lido di Roma
 Latina
 Capua
 Pontecagnano
 Lago Patria
 Siena Aspuano
 Firenze
 Pontedera

Viterbo
 Gresseto
 Perugia
 Castiglione
 Foligno

2820

Pescara
 S. Pancrazio
 Crotteglia
 Crotteglia
 Vibo Valentia

Chinitia
 Castelvetrano
 Stagnano
 Comiso
 Reggio Calabria
 Siracusa

Olbia
 Monserrate

CATEGORY A

Savigny

Pampas

S. Vito dei Normanni

Pantelleria

S. Ginstad

Pratica di Mare

P. la Litteria
 Mendevii
 Savigliano

Vevalano
 Brunica
 Luge
 Mantova
 Metta di Licenza
 Poggio Renatico
 Pempesa

Tortoreta Celammella
 Ariane
 Scalea
 Benevento
 Bovino
 Campobasso
 Ferme
 Gioia del Colle Vecchio
 Porto Cesareo
 S. Vito dei Normanni

Gerbini
 Gela
 Pantelleria

Venafiorita
 Chilibani
 Decinmannu
 Borere
 Porto Canto
 S. Giusta

2819

Sezze Litteria
 Siena Pian del Lago
 Spoleto
 Terracina
 Pratica di Mare

Confidential

19a

From: Air Forces Sub Commission, H.Q. Allied Commission; ROME.

To: Field Security Section, TRIESTE.

Date: 30th September, 1946.

Ref: AFSC/1106/INT

Assistance Centre for Personnel of the I.A.F.- Trieste.

With reference to the above Centre, it is understood that it is possible that action may be taken to close this Centre, as Italian military units in Trieste might be considered contrary to agreements made previously with the Yugoslav Government.

2. This Centre has in the past furnished much material and moral assistance to I.A.F. personnel who reside or pass through Trieste, and has no other military significance.

3. It would, therefore, be much appreciated if you could use your good offices in assisting to keep this Centre open.



2818

M.E. REID W.CDR
FOR AIR VICE MARSHAL
DIRECTOR
AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION.

S.I.O.

Col. Santini states that similar action was taken with the Italian Naval Office in Trieste who informed the authorities that they were subordinate to the Naval Sub Commission. Nothing further was done to remove them.

huk

27/9/46.

2817

104

104 (T)
PRO-MEMORIA FOR THE AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION

Subject: Assistance Centre in Trieste for Personnel of the I.A.F.

Some time ago the F.S.S. at Trieste, through Col. ORLANDI (Italian Army), Head of the local Military District H.Q., asked for a list of military and civilian personnel employed by the Assistance Centre for I.A.F. Personnel.

On 12th September an English Major, on a visit to the H.Q. of the above military office, asked Col. Orlandi among other things for details of the administrative and disciplinary subordination of the Centre. The English Major privately let it be understood that the presence of Italian military units in Trieste might be considered contrary to the agreements made previously with the Yugoslav government.

Your Sub Commission is informed of the above in order that it may put in a good word in order to avoid a wrong interpretation of the duties of the Trieste centre which would lead to an order for its transfer or abolition.

For this reason it is confirmed that the Centre in question is exclusively concerned with material and moral assistance of Air Force personnel which resides in or passes through Trieste.

(F. SANTINI).

2816

PRO-MEMORIA FOR THE AIR FORCE'S SUB COMMISSION

Subject: Assistance Centre in Trieste for Personnel of the I.A.F.

Some time ago the F.S.S. at Trieste, through Col. ORLANDI (Italian Army), Head of the local Military District H.Q., asked for a list of military and civilian personnel employed by the Assistance Centre for I.A.F. Personnel.

On 12th September an English Major, on a visit to the H.Q. of the above military office, asked Col. Orlandi among other things for details of the administrative and disciplinary subordination of the Centre. The English Major privately let it be understood that the presence of Italian military units in Trieste might be considered contrary to the agreements made previously with the Yugoslav government.

Your Sub Commission is informed of the above in order that it may put in a good word in order to avoid a wrong interpretation of the duties of the Trieste centre which would lead to an order for its transfer or abolition.

For this reason it is confirmed that the Centre in question is exclusively concerned with material and moral assistance of Air Force personnel which resides in or passes through Trieste.

(F. SANTINI).

2815

PRO-MEMORIA PER L'AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION

OGGETTO: Centro di assistenza di Trieste per il personale dell'
l'Aeronautica. -

Qualche tempo fa la F.S.S. di Trieste chiedeva tramite il Colonnello dell'Esercito ORLANDI, capo del locale Ufficio Stralcio del Distretto Militare un elenco degli elementi militari e civili in servizio presso quel Centro di Assistenza per il personale dell'Aeronautica. -

Il 12 c.m. un maggiore inglese, recatosi in visita presso la sede di detto Ufficio Stralcio, chiedeva fra l'altro al Colonnello ORLANDI particolari circa la dipendenza amministrativa e disciplinare del Centro stesso. In via riservata il maggiore inglese lasciava intendere che la presenza di Enti Militari Italiani in Trieste poteva essere ritenuta in contrasto con gli accordi stipulati a suo tempo con il governo jugoslavo. -

In considerazione di quanto precede si interessa codesta Sottocommissione perchè voglia interporre i suoi buoni uffici al fine di evitare che una mal intesa interpretazione dei compiti attribuiti al Centro di Trieste possa provocare un ordine per il suo trasferimento o per la sua abolizione. 2814

Si conferma, allo scopo, che il Centro in parola svolge esclusivamente compiti di assistenza materiale e morale nei

cio Stralcio del Distretto Militare un elenco degli elementi militari e civili in servizio presso quel Centro di Assistenza per il personale dell'Aeronautica. -

Il 12 c.m. un maggiore inglese, recatosi in visita presso la sede di detto Ufficio Stralcio, chiedeva fra l'altro al Colonnello ORLANDI particolari circa la dipendenza amministrativa e disciplinare del Centro stesso. In via riservata il maggiore inglese lasciava intendere che la presenza di Enti Militari Italiani in Trieste poteva essere ritenuta in contrasto con gli accordi stipulati a suo tempo con il governo jugoslavo. -

In considerazione di quanto precede si interessa codesta Sottocommissione perchè voglia interporre i suoi buoni uffici al fine di evitare che una mal intesa interpretazione dei compiti attribuiti al Centro di Trieste possa provocare un ordine per il suo trasferimento o per le sua abolizione. 2814

Si conferma, allo scopo, che il Centro in parola svolge esclusivamente compiti di assistenza materiale e morale nei riguardi del personale dell'Aeronautica che risiede o che affluisce a Trieste. -

Parla

From : Air Forces Sub Commission. Allied Commission. Rome.
 To : Italian Air Ministry, Ufficio 'I'.
 Date : 16th September, 1946.
 Ref : AFSC/1106/INT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

VISITS TO ITALIAN AIR FORCE UNITS AND ESTABLISHMENTS BY ALLIED
 SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES AND AIR ATTACHES.

Reference your UI/753749/C. dated 6th September, 1946,
 concerning visits by all Allied Service Representatives and Air Attaches
 to Italian Air Force Units and Establishments may only be made when
 authorised by the Air Forces Sub Commission.

2. If you are approached by those officials you should tell
 them that they should in the first place notify the A.F.S.C. because the
 A.F.S.C. is the correct channel of communication between the Allies and
 the Italian Air Ministry.

3. Normally these visits will only be made by arrangement
 with the Italian Air Ministry (which is, indeed, now the custom with the
 Staff Officers of the A.F.S.C.) and the Allied Representatives will
 normally be accompanied by an Officer of the A.F.S.C.

4. In the case of Foreign Attaches (other than those of the
 Allies), they should comply with normal diplomatic custom and directly
 arrange visits by agreement of Italian Air Ministry, but it would be
 appreciated if the Air Ministry would inform the A.F.S.C. of any intended
 visits before those visits are made.

Ian P. Brodie.

I.E. BRODIE,
 AIR VICE MARSHAL.
 DIRECTOR,
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

*5th is relevant, but not the authentic
 (which is in an EnCom file)*

Copy to :
 Chief Commissioner through Executive Commissioner.

S.I.O.
 D.D. 18/9
 S.S.O. 17/9
 Air 1 17/9.

2013

5 4A

Reference encl. 144 Col. Santini states that this request is put forward to ascertain the position with regard to Russian representatives who have expressed a desire to visit I.A.F. departments. The Russians state that they have the same rights as A.F.S.C. in visiting the I.A.F. unannounced.

Subj. 49.

2812

From: Stato Maggiore dell'Aeronautica
Ufficio "I"

To: Air Forces Sub Commission, Intelligence Section.

Date: 6th September, 1946.

Ref: UI/753749/C

Subject: Visits to Italian Air Force Units by Foreign Air Attaches.

The regulations of the Italian Air Force concerning visits to Air Force Units by Foreign Attaches provide that prior request should be made by the Attache to the Gabinetto del Ministro.

In order to avoid any unpleasant misunderstanding, this Office would be grateful if the A.F.S.C. would state whether it considers that this regulation can be kept in force or whether it should be modified in regard to some, or all of the Allied military attaches.

Head of Ufficio "I"
(Lt. Col. Pilota F. SANTINI)

Primo,

May I have your decision on this matter?

1-1-46

[Signature]

2811

STATO MAGGIORE DELL'AERONAUTICA

UFFICIO "I."

Protocollo

41/753769/c

I - 1383

-6 SET 1946

194

AL AIR FORCE SUP COMMISSION
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Risposta al Foglio del

Div.

Sez.

N.

OGGETTO: Visite ad Enti Aeronautici Italiani di Addetti Aeronautici
Stranieri.

Le disposizioni dell'Aeronautica Italiana, in materia di visite ad Enti Aeronautici da parte di Addetti Stranieri, prevedono una preventiva richiesta degli Addetti stessi al Gabinetto del Ministro.

Allo scopo di evitare ogni spiacevole equivoco, questo Ufficio gradirebbe conoscere se codesta A.F. S.C. ritiene possa essere mantenuto in vigore tale disposizione o debba essere modificata nei riguardi di parte o di tutti gli Addetti Aeronautici Alleati.

IL CAPO UFFICIO "I"
(Ten. Colonn. Pilot. F. SANTINI)

2810

Russians say they are members of A.C.

7A

From: Air Forces Sub Commission, H.Q. Allied Commission, ROME.

To: Italian Air Ministry, Ufficio "I".

Date: 1st June, 1946.

Ref: AFSC/1106/INT

6A

Reference your UI/752450/C dated 31/5/46, this office informs you that visits by Allied Service representatives to Italian Air Force Units or establishments may only be made when authorised by this Sub Commission.



M.E. REID W/CDR
for AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION.

2809

CONFIDENTIAL

Rome, 31.5.46

60(1)

Stato Maggiore Regia Aeronautica
Ufficio "I"

To: Air Forces Sub Commission
Intelligence Section
R O M E .

Ref: UI/752450/C

Subject: Visit of French Officers to 114 I.A.F. Depot.

This office learns that on 30th April 1946, two French Officers, who had arrived a few days before at Elmas airport in a seaplane of the French Navy and who belonged to an Armistice Commission, asked if they might visit the airfields in Sardinia.

The Sardinian Air Force Commander, having learned through official channels that these Officers had visited Italian Army and Navy Units, had the two guests accompanied on a visit of Elmas airport.

When, due to an accident with the car near Serrenti where No. 114 I.A.F. Depot is (arms and munitions) the committee had to stop, the French Officer expressed a desire to visit the Depot; this was done.

This is passed to the A.F.S.C. Intelligence Section for information with the suggestion that prior warning should be given of visits of this kind with the object of avoiding incidents which might prove to be unpleasant.

It would also be appreciated if we might be informed whether there was any authority for the visit in question.

2808

Head of Ufficio "I"
(Ten. Col. Pilota Felice Santini)

CONFIDENTIAL

Rome, 31.5.46

6A(1)

Stato Maggiore Regia Aeronautica
Ufficio "I"

To: Air Forces Sub Commission
Intelligence Section
R O M E .

Ref: UI/752450/C

Subject: Visit of French Officers to 114 I.A.F. Depot.

This office learns that on 30th April 1946, two French Officers, who had arrived a few days before at Elmas airport in a seaplane of the French Navy and who belonged to an Armistice Commission, asked if they might visit the airfields in Sardinia.

The Sardinian Air Force Commander, having learned through official channels that these Officers had visited Italian Army and Navy Units, had the two guests accompanied on a visit of Elmas airport.

When, due to an accident with the car near Serrenti where No. 114 I.A.F. Depot is (arms and munitions) the committee had to stop, the French Officer expressed a desire to visit the Depot, this was done.

This is passed to the A.F.S.C. Intelligence Section for information with the suggestion that prior warning should be given of visits of this kind with the object of avoiding incidents which might prove to be unpleasant.

It would also be appreciated if we might be informed whether there was any authority for the visit in question.

Head of Ufficio "I"
(Ten. Col. Pilota Felice Santini)

2807



CONFIDENZIALE

Stato Maggiore Regia Aeronautica

UFFICIO "I"

UI/ 752450 /c

Prot. N°

Allegati

I 1244 6A
No. 31.5 196AL AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION
Intelligence Section
R O M ARisposta al Teleg. del
Dir. Leg. N°

OGGETTO : Visita di Ufficiali francesi al 114° Deposito R.A.-

Risulta a questo Ufficio che il giorno 30 Aprile u.s., due Ufficiali francesi, giunti qualche giorno prima all'Aeroporto di Elmas con un idrovolante della Marina francese e facenti parte di una Commissione di Armistizio, chiesero di poter effettuare una visita ai campi di aviazione della Sardegna.-

Il Comandante dell'Aeronautica della Sardegna avendo saputo, in via ufficiosa, che i predetti Ufficiali avevano visitato Enti del R° Esercito e della R° Marina, fece accompagnare i due ospiti nella visita all'Aeroporto di Elmas.-

Poichè per un incidente di macchina nei pressi dell'abitato di Serrenti, ove ha sede il 114° Deposito R.A. (materiale di armamento e munizionamento) la comitiva si dovette fermare, l'Ufficiale francese manifestò il desiderio di visitare il Deposito stesso: cosa che fu fatta.-

Tanto si comunica a codesta A.F.S.C., Intelligence Section, per opportuna conoscenza, suggerendo questo Ufficio l'opportunità che visite del genere siano preventivamente annunciate allo scopo di evitare incidenti che potrebbero essere spiacevoli.-

Si gradirà conoscere quanto effettivamente risulta circa l'autorizzazione ad effettuare la visita stessa.-

IL CAPO UFFICIO "I"
(Ten. Col. Pilota - F. Santini)

Franklin

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Requests for Information from Allied Nations

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MILIA)

INT/222/1

18 Feb 46

TO : Executive Commissioner,
H.Q. Allied Commission.

1. In view of requests that are received from time to time from Allied nations for information about the Italian Armed Forces, or for permission to visit their units or establishments, it is felt that a common policy is required for the guidance of the three Service Sub-Commissions.

2. I attach to this letter a draft that has been produced by a committee at which Naval, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub-Commissions were represented and which has been agreed to by the Chiefs of each Sub-Commission.

3. If you agree with the provisions of this draft I would be glad if you would issue it as a Directive.

4. The policy outlined in this directive would not of course apply to U.S.A. or U.K. and it cannot apply to non-Allied nations who maintain the normal channels of information direct with the Italian Ministries through their attaches.

J. Brown 2805

Major-General,

2. I attach to this letter a draft that has been produced by a committee at which Naval, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub-Commissions were represented and which has been agreed to by the Chiefs of each Sub-Commission.

3. If you agree with the provisions of this draft I would be glad if you would issue it as a directive.

4. The policy outlined in this directive would not of course apply to U.S.A. or U.K. and it cannot apply to non-Allied nations who maintain the normal channels of information direct with the Italian Ministeries through their attaches.

2. Reviewing 2805

Major-General,
M.I.A.

MEM/24

COPY to: Chief, Naval Sub-Commission, A.C.
Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.

DD 19/2
SS 19/2
SS 19/2 (to file)
Org 19/2
S.E.O. 19/2
for compliance with spirit of L draft plan
Write in this Report. to cover of
do not refer to Director or in his absence
W.D.D.
19/2

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

5 B

INFORMATION ON THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES FOR ALLIED POWERS (OTHER THAN U.S.A. AND U.K.)

1. In view of the importance of adopting a common policy in regard to the treatment of requests from ALLIED service representatives for information about the ITALIAN Armed Forces or requests for visits to them, the following notes are issued for the guidance of Navy, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub-Commissions.
2. CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIED OFFICERS AND ITALIAN SERVICE MINISTRIES.
Direct contact between ALLIED officers and ITALIAN service ministries will not be permitted. ALLIED officers wishing to correspond or to have interviews with members of the ministries will do so through the sub-commissions.
Where, however, an ALLIED officer may have to deal continually with a branch of a ministry on account of some special task that he has to undertake under the terms of the armistice the above rule may be waived by the chief of the sub-commission concerned.
3. INFORMATION.
 - (a) Information may be given to properly accredited ALLIED service representatives on matters of strength, composition, establishments and armament of ITALIAN armed forces, except on matters of a top secret nature.
 - (b) Information will not be given on future plans and policies of a secret nature while those are still under discussion.
 - (c) Information will not be given on questions of morale, fighting value, personalities of ITALIAN officers, or on the relationships between services or between services and civilian sides of ministries.
 - (d) In general, the criterion should be that information will only be given to ALLIED officers of a nature that could normally have been acquired through attaché channels, and which has already been furnished S.A.C.

04

usually with a branch of a ministry on account of some special task that he has to undertake under the terms of the armistice the above rule may be waived by the chief of the sub-commission concerned.

3. INFORMATION.

(a) Information may be given to properly accredited ALLIED service representatives on matters of strength, composition, establishments and armament of ITALIAN armed forces, except on matters of a top secret nature.

(b) Information will not be given on future plans and policies of a secret nature while these are still under discussion.

(c) Information will not be given on questions of morale, fighting value, personalities of ITALIAN officers, or on the relationships between services or between services and civilian sides of ministries.

(d) In general, the criterion should be that information will only be given to ALLIED officers of a nature that could normally have been acquired through attache channels, and which has already been furnished S.A.C.

Information which has only come into the possession of the sub-commissions through their very close and intimate contacts with the ITALIAN armed forces in carrying out their supervisory and advisory roles will not be disclosed.

4. VISITS OF ALLIED OFFICERS TO UNITS OR ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

Visits by Allied service representatives to Italian service units or establishments may only be made when authorized by the appropriate service sub-commission. Such authorization will normally only be given in order to allow of the accomplishment of a specific task under the terms of the armistice. If the necessity arises of authorizing visits not within the terms of the last sentence, authorization should only be made in agreement with the appropriate ITALIAN ministry, and the visiting officer should be accompanied by a BRITISH or AMERICAN representative of the sub-commission concerned.

2804

From : AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, AC, Rome
To : AFSC, AC, LEGGE ; AFSC/AC Bari ; AFSC/AC Milan
Date : 25th March 1946
Ref. : AFSC/1106/TNT.

CLEARANCE OF AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN
BRITISH OR AMERICAN

2A
Further to letter AFSC/1106/TNT dated 12th March 1946
herewith further instructions on the above subject.

M. J. J.
for M. J. J. O/Cdr.
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

2803

Copy

From : Intelligence (Security) Officer, AEO, R.A.F. Italy. CWP
 To : Distribution as below
 Date : 21st March 1946
 Ref. : AHQI/S.2105/INT.(Sec)

DEPARTURES ON AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN BRITISH OR AMERICAN

1. Reference our AHQI/S.2105/Int(Sec) dated 7th March 1946; on above subject.
2. After 25th March 1946, the Allied Force permit system for control of entry into ITALY from all countries, except Germany and Austria will cease and responsibility for exercising this control will remain to the Italian Government, who will operate the normal visa and passport peace-time requirements.
3. British and American service personnel may enter ITALY on production of valid travel orders.
4. It should therefore be noted that passengers and crews of aircraft landing in Italy, which have not received prior clearance, are not to be detained providing that such persons are in possession of the required valid entry documents.
5. Passengers and crews, other than British or American service personnel, not in possession of such valid entry documents, are to be handed over to either
 - (a) Italian public safety airfield control
 - (b) Italian public safety port control
 - (c) The local Questura
 - (d) The local Carabinieri
 who are responsible for disposal.
6. The aircraft is to be held in accordance with the instructions referred to in para.1 of this letter.

G.S. BRIGGS, S/Ldr
 Intelligence (Security) Officer,
 AEO, R.A.F. Italy
 Internal: A.O.C.
 A.O.A.
 G/C Ops. 2802
 A.P.A.B.S.
 S.I.O.
 S.Nov.O.

Distribution:

R.A.F. Station; Bari
 " " Brindisi
 " " Pomigliano

H.Q., D.A.F.
 149 Staging Post
 357 H.U. (Is1)
 A.H.Q. Italy Comm. Sqdn.
 293 Sqdn. I.C. Det.
 D.F.M., R.A.F.
 249 Wing
 A.F.S.C.
 G-2, AFHQ
 G-3, AFHQ ; G-4, AFHQ ; British Poled.

SECRET

8 Copies.

From: Intelligence (Security) Officer,
Air Headquarters, R.A.F., ITALY, G.M.F.

To: Distribution as below.

Date: 21st March, 1946.

Ref: AB-I/3.2105/Int(300)

CLEARANCE OF AIRCRAFT, OTHER FILM
PERSONNEL ON AIRCRAFT

1. Reference our AB-I/3.2105/Int(300) dated 7th March 1946, on above subject.
2. After 25th March 1946, the Allied Force permit system for control of entry into ITALY from all countries, except Germany and Austria, will cease and responsibility for exercising this control will return to the Italian Government, who will operate the normal visa and passport police requirements.
3. British and American service personnel may enter ITALY on production of valid travel orders.
4. It should therefore be noted that passengers and crews of aircraft landing in ITALY, which have not received prior clearance, are not to be detained providing that such persons are in possession of the required valid entry documents.
5. Passengers and crews, other than British or American service personnel, not in possession of such valid entry documents, are to be handed over to either
 - (a) Italian public safety airfield control,
 - (b) Italian public safety port control
 - (c) the local ~~post~~ ^{post}
 - (d) the local Carabinieri,
 who are responsible for disposal.
6. The aircraft is to be held in accordance with the instruction referred to in para. 1 of this letter.

time requirements.

3. British and American service personnel may enter ITALY on production of valid travel orders.

4. It should therefore be noted that passengers and crews of aircraft landing in ITALY, which have not received prior clearance, are not to be detained providing that such persons are in possession of the required valid entry documents.

5. Passengers and crews, other than British or American service personnel, not in possession of such valid entry documents, are to be handed over to either

- (a) Italian public safety airfield control,
 - (b) Italian public safety port control
 - (c) the local *questura*,
 - (d) the local Carabinieri,
- who are responsible for disposal.

6. The aircraft is to be held in accordance with the instruction referred to in para. 1 of this letter.

2801

Ed. Bayan

C. A. BAKER,
Squadron Leader,
Intelligence (Security) Officer,
AIR HEADQUARTERS, E.A.F., ITALY.

Distribution:

R.A.F. Station, Bari
" " Brindisi
" " Foggia
H.Q. D.A.F.
249 Staging Post
357 H.U. (local)
A.M.C. Italy Com. Sqdn.
293 Sqn 'C' Det.
D.F.M., E.A.F.
249 Wing
A.F.S.G.
C-2, AFHQ
C-3, AFHQ
C-4, AFHQ
British Police.

Internal: A.C.C.
A.C.A.
G/U Ops
A.F.S.G.
S. I.G.
S.Mov.O.

Secret.

From: Air Forces Sub Commission, H.Q. Allied Commission, ROME.
To: Air Forces Sub Commission, LECCE.
Air Forces Sub Commission, BARI.
Air Forces Sub Commission, MILAN.
Date: 12th March, 1946.
Ref: AFSC/1106/INT.

CLEARANCE OF AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN
BRITISH OR AMERICAN.

Copy of a letter from AHQ, ITALY on the above subject
is passed to you for information and necessary action.

M.E. REID W/CDR
AIR VICE MARSHAL
DIRECTOR
AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION.

2800

SECRET

From: Air Headquarters, R.A.F., ITALY.

To: Distribution as below.

Date: 7th March, 1946.

Ref: AHQI/S.2105/Int(Sec)

CLEARANCE OF AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN
BRITISH OR AMERICAN.

Several instances have come to notice recently of aircraft, other than British or American, arriving in Italy without prior clearance having been obtained from this Headquarters.

2. In future, all such aircraft landing in Italy about which you have not been given such prior notice of clearance are to be held, and the crew and all passengers to be kept under observation until such time as notification of clearance is received by you either from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat, or Air Headquarters, R.A.F. Italy.

C.S. BURGESS
Squadron Leader
Intelligence (Security) Officer
AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F., ITALY.

DISTRIBUTION.

External.

R.A.F. Station, Bari.
RAF Station, Brindisi.
HQ, DAF
No. 149 Staging Post
No. 357 Maintenance Unit (IESI)
AHQ Italy Com. Squadron
No. 293 Squadron "C" Detach.
RAF Station POMIGLIANO
Air Forces Sub Commission
Deputy Provost Marshal, RAF.
NO 249 Wing

G-2, AFHQ
G-3, AFHQ
G-4, AFHQ
British Polad.

Internal.

A.O.C., A.O.A.
S.A.E.O.
Group Captain, Ops.
A.F.A.I.
S.I.O. 2799
S.Mov.O.

I 1092

SECRET.

From : Air Headquarters, R.A.F., ITALY.
 To : Distribution as below.
 Date : 7th March, 1946.
 Ref. : AMI/5.2105/Int(see)

CLEARANCE OF AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN
 BRITISH OR AMERICAN.

Several instances have come to notice recently of aircraft, other than British or American, arriving in Italy without prior clearance having been obtained from this Headquarters.

2. In future, all such aircraft landing in Italy about which you have not been given such prior notice of clearance are to be held, and the crew and all passengers to be kept under observation until such time as notification of clearance is received by you, either from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat, or Air Headquarters, R.A.F., Italy.

G. H. BURGESS
 G. H. BURGESS
 Squadron Leader
 Intelligence (Security) Officer
 AIR HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F., ITALY.

DISTRIBUTION.

External.

RAF Station, Bari.
 RAF Station, Brindisi.
 HQ, DAF
 No. 149 Staging Post.
 No. 357 Maintenance Unit (Test)
 AMI Italy Com. Squadron.
 No. 293 Squadron "C" Detach.
 RAF Station Poulis.
 Air Force Sub Commission
 Deputy Provost Marshal, RAF.
 No. 249 Wing.
 G-2, AMI.
 G-3, AMI.
 G-4, AMI.
 British Polad.

Internal.

A.C.C., A.O.A.
 S.A.S.O.
 Group Captain, Ops.
 A.F.A.L.S.
 S.I.O.
 S. Mov. C

2798

*Loose
 Burr
 Millan*

2300