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135/740

OPERATIONS ALLADIN & HEARTBREAK  
MAY, JUNE 1946



Top Secret 9AS.I.O.

I have given instructions that Operation  
 Alladin & Heartbreak are now terminated -  
 because the King of Portugal left for Lisbon  
 via Madrid on 13 June at 1620.

Duty Officer AFSC organisation now  
 reverts to normal half day & holiday routine -  
 I have told Mr Hosier.

Please file this gen.

3207

14/6.

PAH  
 Des.

- 7A
1. Operation <sup>now</sup> known as Heartbreak.
  2. A.H.Q. is totally responsible for whole of air transport.
  3. Request that a responsible officer of D.F.S.C. or O.C.M. be made available to obtain clearance of aircraft, crew & passengers to land at Lisbon. Aircraft, crew & escort to return (presumably through Portuguese Embassy).
  4. Nothing to be done until W/C Storm gives the word to go.
  5. Someone to be available day & night - please inform telephone no. or com W/C Storm are that party Aladdin.

3206.

from W/Cdr Field A.H.Q. - 5/6 1800 hrs. Shown to A.H.Q. by Lt. Luch  
 Rather out of date. W/S 5/6



S.S.O.

T.S.

In

It has been decided that the Italian Govt will be responsible for the release of the more of the Italian Govt - though in the most unlikely event of circumstances AFHQ will initiate action by the allies to assist with allied aircraft. The code word used may be 'Heartbreak'.

2. Duty on borders of AFHQ (probably Gen. Foster, 53, 1st Freedom 164) will also take part.
3. Special Orders for duty officers and Prisoners of War are therefore held in abeyance - at 24 hrs notice.
4. One AFSC American pilot and <sup>seriously</sup> must however always be available in the Rome area until 17<sup>th</sup> June unless special permission is obtained from AFHQ. Boudin Over holidays or half days 3265
5. The 'duty' American pilot is to notify the AFSC duty officer of his whereabouts & telephone numbers.
5. The AFSC duty officer is the possessor of the special orders mentioned above.

TOP SECRETTo : A.O.C.

'Heartbreak'

169.

OPERATION ALADDIN

I saw the Executive Commissioner at 15,30 hours 31st May, who stated that the Supreme Allied Commander did not wish the Allies to be involved in Aladdin.

He asked if two Italian aircraft could stand by if called for by the Prime Minister or the Air Minister. *Do they know?*

They should be ready to fly either to Naples or to Portugal. *Where to?*

For security I suggested using Ciampino instead of Centocelle and have arranged with Col. Marek to speak to the American C.O. for permission to land there.

I was not at this stage to take any action regarding permits to fly or to land in foreign countries.

*L. E. Jarian*  
L.E. JARIAN, G/C,  
S.S.O.

31st May, 1946.

3204

*L. E. Jarian to be in departure*  
*AFSC Duty Officer - correct? Suspend!*



TO: GROUP CAPTAIN I.E. JARMAN. ✓

TOP SECRET. 48

OPERATION ALADDIN.

Reference attached papers, please inform Major Sass and Major Nixon concerning the possible move of the King and Queen (Aladdin) from Ciampino to Marchionese and thence to some place outside Italy.

2. Major Sass will be entirely responsible at short notice for the move from Ciampino to Marchionese where a link-up is to be effected with A.H.Q. Communication Squadron. The Duty Officer at A.H.Q. Communication Squadron is immediately to be informed of E.T.D. (initiative by Major Sass or Major Nixon) with a request for the information to be passed to A.H.Q. Italy.

3. Major Sass is to inform the U.S. Officer Commanding Ciampino about operation Aladdin - by personal contact (not telephone, nor letter) - in order that there will be no security or other hitch at Ciampino should the operation be ordered.

4. Brigadier Lush and I (if in Rome) will go to Ciampino if Aladdin is ordered. In my absence Group Captain Jarmam will go.

5. Should the A.F.S.C. aircraft become unserviceable, A.H.Q. Italy is immediately to be asked to send an aircraft to Ciampino in substitution.

*I. E. Dromie*

I.E. DROMIE,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL. 3263  
DIRECTOR,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

30th June, 1946.

COPY: BRIGADIER M. LUSH. For information.  
AVL. F.J. EOGARTY. For information.

OUTGOING MESSAGE.

TO : AFHQ

5th June 1946.

FROM : ALCON CITE STONE

Unnumbered

SECRET.

Subject moves of Italian Royal Family.

Chief of Italian Air Staff has informed Director Air Forces Subcommission that following plans have been made for tomorrow June 6 by Italian Aircraft.

- (1) One G42 leaves ROME for POMIGLIANO where it picks up Princess VIOLETTA and family and continues direct to ALMAZA EGYPT refuelling EL ATRAH if necessary.
- (2) One 875 from ROME picks up 14 persons POMIGLIANO returns ROME and picks up COME DE TORINO and DUC D'ACOSTA and continues direct to BRUSSELS.

In addition to above one 395 will stand by as from tomorrow to take King to LUXEM when required (presumably June 8).

Above notified to Air Vice Marshal FOGARTY in ROME.

OF PRIORITY.

Ex. Commissioner.

(Sgd) M.S. LUSH, Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

Ex. Com's Distribution.  
 Chief Commissioner  
 US Embassy  
 UK Embassy  
 CA Section  
 Air Forces S/C

3262

S/O. *[Signature]*  
 for info.

*[Signature]* 7/6



## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

TOP SECRET.

Ref: 364/EC.

29 May 1946.

SUBJECT: Interview with Prime Minister.

TO : C-5 Section,  
Allied Force Headquarters.  
(PERSONAL for Brig. Gen. HANSEN).

1. I forward record of interview with the Prime Minister which is self-explanatory. The various points were discussed to-day with the Supreme Allied Commander, Sir Noel Charles, Mr. Wesley Jones (United States Embassy) and Brigadier Low, R.A.A.C.
2. SACRED took note of paras 1 and 2. At his direction I will concert with R.A.A.C. over para 2.
3. As a result of para 3 it was agreed that an Allied Aircraft should stand by on CLAPHAM Aerodrome, ROSE, to convey the King and Queen and possibly the children by air to MARCHIONNE CASERTA where they would proceed by another Allied Aircraft to their destination, probably PORTUGAL, via GIBRALTAR. SACRED instructed me to arrange with Navy Sub-Commission *Alladin* for an Italian cruiser to stand by in NAPLES Harbour to take the rest of the family, numbering about twenty, to GIBRALTAR for dispersal thence. SACRED gave directions for the necessary action to be taken by AFHQ for arranging the flight from MARCHIONNE to PORTUGAL and the journey of the cruiser from NAPLES to GIBRALTAR (the latter after discussion with C. in C. Med.). *SINBAD*
4. I explained that the date of the move might be at any time after the elections but most probably between 7 and 17 June, during which period the official results of the referendum would be made known.
5. It was agreed that action on paragraph 5 now lay with the Italian Government and the King. 3201
6. With regard to paragraph 6, SACRED directed C. in C. R.A.A.C. to arrange for the British Armoured Car Squadron now in ROSE to pass through the city en route for some exercise outside during Friday, 31 May. I am asking the Prime Minister whether he has any objection to this and Brigadier Low will arrange locally.

/cont.

## ADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

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7. BRUMBY explained that there was a British Battalion in MILAN who had orders to make themselves known: the armored division at PAVIA could only be used in that area.

8. I will keep you informed of developments and I suggest that for purposes of secrecy and brevity the hypothetical move of the King and Queen by air, and of the remainder of the Royal Family by sea, should be known as Operation ALANBY and ALANBY respectively.

For the Chief Commissioner:

B/M. S. CUSH

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.Yrdl.

Copy to: U.S. Embassy.  
British Embassy.  
Brigadier IOW, A.A.A.O.  
Navy Sub-Commission, A.O.  
Land Force Sub-Commission, A.O. (MIA)  
Air Force Sub-Commission, A.O.

3200

Personal for AJM Bowdie. ✓



H QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
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Office of the Executive Commissioner

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

I saw the Prime Minister this evening.

1. I handed him a letter conveying the Allied Governments decision to terminate the Institutional Truce. The Prime Minister was gratified and remarked that the decision was timely. He asked about publication. I said that this matter was in his hands: he said he thought he would omit the actual date of the letter and say that the Government had "recently" received the decision. He will submit draft communique tomorrow.
2. I asked him to give to me for transmission the Sacred assurance that in the plans for securing Public order during and after the elections the safety of the Royal Family has been included. He said that he could give me such an assurance and would send me the detailed plans tomorrow. He said that he had the impression that there would be no attempts of aggression - at any rate he hoped not.
3. I asked him whether in the event of the referendum resulting in a republic and in the event of request being made to the Allied Authorities, the Italian Government would have any objection to the Allied Authorities providing facilities in the form of transport for the move of the Royal Family from Italy. He said that there would certainly be no objection; on the contrary the Italian Government would prefer that such facilities be provided. We agreed that it would probably be best for the Italian Government to move the members of the Royal Family to, say, the airfield when the Allied Authorities would take them over. De Gasperi said he did not know where the King wanted to go: we agreed that it might be in his best interest to go

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## F. QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

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to Portugal.

4. We then discussed the probable date of departure in the event of the voting falling for a republic. The Prime Minister said that the official results could not be announced until 9 days after the voting i.e. June 12 (this should be checked). The King could stay until then although it might be difficult for him and then the Prime Minister, would advise him to go before, if he felt that there would be disorder. On the departure of the King, the existing Prime Minister (i.e. de Gasperi) automatically becomes Chief of State. He said that he would discuss the matter with the King who, he was certain, would do whatever was considered best for the State. He did not think it would be necessary for the King to sign an instrument of abdication though he would probably write a letter to the Prime Minister and Nation before he went. We agreed that it would be better for the women and children to go before June 12 if the results looked as if the vote would be for a republic.

5. I discussed with the Prime Minister the desirability of the King making a declaration to the Italian Armed Forces adjuring them to remain loyal to the State and abide by the results of the Referendum. I suggested that if such a declaration were made it should be made immediately after the voting had ceased (12 noon June 3) and before the results were known. The Prime Minister was sceptical at first of the necessity, but afterwards tended to favour the suggestion, but remarked that if the King made such a declaration the republicans must do so also. He will discuss with the King and inform us.

6. The Prime Minister said he was fairly satisfied with state of Public order. He foresaw sporadic outbursts of disorder and made it clear that the Government had



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no means to deal with anything more serious. He asked whether it would be possible for the Allies "to move a few troops about the country e.g. stage a route march in Milan area" and so help to ensure tranquillity. I told the Prime Minister that I would mention this to Saczed, but the suggestion came a little too late and there were very few Allied troops available for such purposes.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

28 May 1946.

3197

1A  
TOP SECRET.

TO: A.F.S.C. DUTY OFFICER.  
 GROUP CAPTAIN I.E. JARMAN. ✓  
 MAJOR E.J. SASS.  
 MAJOR M. NIXON.  
 BRIGADIER M. LUSH (FOR INFORMATION 2 COMES ONE FOR ALLIED COMMISSION DUTY OFFICER IF REQUIRED).  
 WING COMMANDER REID.  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL F.J. FOGARTY - (FOR INFORMATION).  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL I.E. BRODIE.

#### OPERATIONS ALADDIN AND SINBAD.

Operations Aladdin and Sinbad may possibly be brought into action between the 3rd and 17th June inclusive. These operations are planned in connection with the Elections.

2. Major Sass is making arrangements for one of the A.F.S.C. (American) aircraft to be immediately available at Ciampino at any time between the above dates. Separate instructions are being issued to Major Sass.
3. Air Vice-Marshal Brodie and/or Group Captain Jarman will be available in Rome throughout this period by telephone. They will notify their movements to each other and to the Duty Officer at 1700 hours daily. The Duty Officer is to ask for any special instructions before cease-work on any one day.
4. The Duty Officer is shown in Appendix "A" and is to contact the Allied Commission Duty Officer at cease-work each day and to inform him of his whereabouts and telephone number (for the rest of the day).
5. Any messages, in which the code words 'Aladdin' or 'Sinbad' are used, are immediately to be passed to Air Vice-Marshal Brodie, or in his absence Group Captain Jarman, and also to Major Sass and Major Nixon, whose movements and telephone numbers must also be made known to the A.F.S.C. Duty Officer each day.
6. The normal office and residence telephone numbers of the addressees shown above are shown in Appendix "B".
7. The outgoing A.F.S.C. Duty Officer is to hand these instructions to his relief on being relieved at 0845 hours daily.
8. No executive action on Aladdin or Sinbad is to be taken without confirmation that the message originates from Brigadier Lush or his Deputy.

*I. E. Brodie*  
 I.E. BRODIE,  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
 DIRECTOR,  
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.

30th May, 1946.



APPENDIX "A".  
-----DUTY OFFICER A.F.S.C - JUNE 3RD - 17TH INCLUSIVE.

MONDAY	JUNE 3RD	FLIGHT LIEUTENANT CARTER.
TUESDAY	JUNE 4TH	FLYING OFFICER de BENEDUCCI.
WEDNESDAY	JUNE 5TH	FLIGHT LIEUTENANT TURNER.
THURSDAY	JUNE 6TH	PILOT OFFICER SMITH.
FRIDAY	JUNE 7TH	WING COMMANDER THOMPSON.
SATURDAY	JUNE 8TH	FLIGHT LIEUTENANT REID.
SUNDAY	JUNE 9TH	FLIGHT LIEUTENANT REID.
MONDAY	JUNE 10TH	WING COMMANDER WALKER.
TUESDAY	JUNE 11TH	SQUADRON LEADER SALTER.
WEDNESDAY	JUNE 12TH	WING COMMANDER WALKER.
THURSDAY	JUNE 13TH	SQUADRON LEADER RAY.
FRIDAY	JUNE 14TH	FLIGHT LIEUTENANT HOSIER.
SATURDAY	JUNE 15TH	WING COMMANDER REID.
SUNDAY	JUNE 16TH	WING COMMANDER REID.
MONDAY	JUNE 17TH	FLIGHT OFFICER LEECH.

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## APPENDIX "B".

## TELEPHONE NUMBERS.

NAME:OFFICE:RESIDENCE:

AIR VICE-MARSHAL T.E. BRODIE.

478093

NO. 9 CUISSEPI MANGILI,  
TELE NO: 843243.

GROUP CAPTAIN I.E. JARMAN.

478126

FLORA HOTEL:  
TELE NO: 478241.

BRIGADIER M. LUSH.

489081  
EXT: 343VILLA ROSSO,  
VIA SAMASAPATO, 11,  
MONTE PATICLI:  
TELE NO: 843370.

MAJOR E.J. SASS.

489081  
EXT: 449GRAND HOTEL ROSE.  
TELE NO: 478831.

MAJOR M. NIXON.

VIA ELEONORA DI SE NO. 4.  
878300.

3134



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