Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/136/115

ITALIAN GOV'T, POLITICS
JAN. - APR. 1944

1039

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

FATIMA 1168

Capt. Stone

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE) C-(39)

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FREEDOM RELEASE HEADQUARTERS A.A.I.

22nd. April. 1944.

V16

GEN MACFARLANE

DA'OGLIO CALLED AT MY OFFICE THIS MORNING PD FATA TO AFE) FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FREEDOM HEADQUARTERS AAI FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FAREN HE DISCUSSED WITH ME THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT PT FATA TWO IT HE STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF TOGLIATTI HE COULD NEVER HAVE FORMED A NEW GOVERNMENT PT TOGLIATTI HAD REMINDED HIM GREAT ASSISTANCE THROUGHOUT AND HE HAD A VERY HIGH OPINION OF HIS INTELLIGENCE PT TOGLIATTI HAD ASSURED HIM THAT HE WOULD WILLINGLY SERVE UNDER HIM UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR PT HE HAD FURTHER ASSURED THE MARSHAL THAT UNTIL THE END OF THE WAR HE WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION OF THE MONARCHY PT FATA THREE PT BADOGLIO IS SUMMONING ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ASSEMBLE AT SALERNO ON MONDAY TWENTY FOUR PT HE WAS THEN TO PRESENT THEM TO THE KING AND HE INTENDS TO HOLD HIS FIRST PLENIPOTENTIARY CABINET MEETING ON TUESDAY TWENTY SEVENTH PT FATA FOUR PT AFTER THIS MEETING HE PROPOSES TO PUBLISH A STATEMENT OF THE POLICY OF HIS GOVERNMENT PT FATA FIVE PT THE MARSHAL ASSURED ME THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DISLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION OR DELAY IN DEALING WITH CURRENT PRO LEMS AND THAT THE RETIRING MINISTERS HAD BEEN ORDERED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEIR SUCCESSORS UNTIL THE LATTER

(55-)

M/L &
2-2 slips.

1040

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HAD SETTLED IN TO THEIR NEW TASKS PD BADOGLIO PROMISED THAT IN HIS STATEMENT OF POLICY HE WOULD ESPECIALLY STRESS THE NECESSITY FOR GETTING MAXIMUM VALUE OUT OF THE COMING HARVEST AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION PD PARA SIX PD BADOGLIO PROMISED TO SEND ME AT ONCE A FORMAL UNDERTAKING ON BEHALF OF HIS NEW GOVERNMENT TO ASSUME ALL THE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE ALLIES ENTERED INTO BY HIS LATE GOVERNMENT PD HE IS ALSO GOING TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS AS REGARDS THE KING MUST BE REGARDED AS BINDING UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE ITALIAN PEOPLE CAN FREELY EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS PD PARA GENERAL PD BADOGLIO WAS IN VERY GOOD SPIRITS AND EVIDENTLY REGARDED HIMSELF AS DELIGHTED WITH THE SUCCESSFUL RESULT OF THREE DAYS OF CONTINUOUS AND VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS PD HE WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED AT THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES WHICH HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE IN HIS NEW CABINET PD HE WAS ALSO RATHER PROUD OF HIS ACHIEVEMENT IN MANOEUVRING PARTY OF ACTION INTO JOINING HIS GOVERNMENT BY OFFERING POSTS TO THE RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT LIBERAL DEMOCRAT AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES AND USING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THIS OFFER AS A BARGAINING FACTOR WITH THE PARTY OF ACTION PD HE HAD THEREBY SUCCEEDED AT THE LAST MOMENT IN SECURING THE COLLABORATION OF ALL SIX OF THE BARI PARTIES PD BADOGLIO RETURNS TO SALERNO TODAY

Content and Classification
authenticated by

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

1041

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FATIMA M 167

5F

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C CORO) APRIL 21 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM

PEURR

FINAL COMPOSITION OF TWO CABINET REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE REACHED AFTER TWO DAYS OF INTENSE DISCUSSION BETWEEN BADOGLIO AND ALL OPPOSITION LEADERS PD WHEN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FAT A MIKE ONE SIX SIX APRIL TWO ONE PARTM CROCE AND TOGLIATTI ARE GIVEN MUCH CREDIT FOR THE SOLUTION PD THE PRICE PAID FOR THE ACTION PARTYS DECISION WAS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO AND THE LIMITATION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP TO THE PARTIES REPRESENTED AT THE BARI CONGRESS PD SFORZA ALSO USED HIS INFLUENCE TO INDUCE THE PARTY OF ACTION TO COME INTO LINE PARA BADOGLIO HOPES THAT THE DEMOCRATIC COMPOSITION OF HIS NEW CABINET WILL BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PARA ALL SERVICE MINISTERS REMAIN UNCHANGED PERIOD BANDELLI HOWEVER MAY BE REPLACED SHORTLY PARA AMONG THE NEW DEMOCRATICS WHOSE NAMES APPEAR IN THE GOVERNMENT ARE ALDISIO THE LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARTY IN SICILY COMMA APPOINTED PREFECT OF CALTANISETTA BY AMG DEMICLN TARCHIANI PRE DASH FASCIST EDITOR OF THE CORRIERE DELLA SERA

(53)

(57)

M 167

21 Apr.

1042

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CAA WHOSE PRESENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD STRENGTHEN ITS POSITION AMONG THE ANTI DASH FASCIST RESISTANCE GROUPS IN THE NORTH PD DI NAPOLI AND CULLO ARE XXXXXXX LESSER LIGHTS IN THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES PD QUINTIERI IS A LOCAL BANKER OF STANDING WHO WAS APPOINTED TO THE FINANCE MINISTRY FOR HIS TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS PD

3-1

Contents and Classification authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

1043

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FATIMA 166

SF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE G CODE)

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FLIMSY

21st. April, 1944.

W6

GEN MACFARLANE

REFERENCE MY TELEGRAM NUMBER FATIMA NINE ONE SIX FIVE PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL ELLIOTT CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARIN BADOGLIO HAS TODAY SUCCEEDED IN FORMING A GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE ALL SIX PARTIES PT FOLLOWING IS LIST WHICH WILL BE ANNOUNCED THIS EVENING PT PRIME MINISTER CMA MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMA BADOGLIO PT MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO CMA CROCE CMA STORZA CMA NOVINO CMA CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT CMA MARCINI CMA SOCIALIST CMA TOGLIATTI CMA COMMUNIST PT MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR CMA ALDISIO CMA CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA SALERNO CMA SOCIALIST AND PARRICCIOLA CMA PARTY OF ACTION PT MINISTRY OF JUSTICE CMA ARANGIO RUIZ CMA LIBERAL CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA LOMBARDO CMA LABOUR DEMOCRAT PT PUBLIC WORKS CMA TARCHIANI CMA PARTY OF ACTION CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA CILENTO CMA LABOUR DEMOCRAT PT AGRICULTURE CMA GULLO CMA COMMUNIST CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA DEGASPERI CMA LIBERAL PT INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE CMA DI NAPOLI CMA SOCIALIST CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA SANSONETTI CMA CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PT FINANCE CMA RUINIERI CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA PESENTI CMA COMMUNIST PT COMMUNICATIONS CMA ? CEVALONA CMA LABOUR DEMOCRAT CMA UNDERSECRETARIES DI RAIMONDO AND FANO PT EDUCATION CMA OMODEO CMA PARTY OF ACTION CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA JERVOLINO CMA CHRISTIAN

1044

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M166 - 2

DEMOCRAT PD WAR CMA ORLANDO CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA PALERMO CMA COMMUNIST PD NAVY CMA DE COURTEN CMA UNDERSECRETARY CMA ALBERGO CMA SOCIALIST PD AIR CMA SANDALLI PD UNDERSECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL CMA MORELLI CMA ~~LABOR~~ LIBERAL PD THOSE WITHOUT DESIGNATION ARE NONPARTY MEN

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner

(53)

TOP SECRET

1043

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET FATIMA M165

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 21st. April. 1944.

TOP SECRET

AMONITY V16

GEN MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

BADOGLIO SENT ME SITUATION REPORT LATE LAST NIGHT PT FARIN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL ELSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FARIN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PARTY OF ACTION ALL THE SIX PANI PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO ENTER HIS GOVERNMENT PT IN ADDITION CMA ONE POSP IN THE CABINET WILL BE GIVEN TO THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS AND ONE UNDERSECRETARYSHIP TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PT THE FORMER WILL BE A NOMINEE OF DE NICOLA'S PT PARA END PT BADOGLIO IS MAKING A LAST ATTEMPT THIS MORNING TO INDUCE THE PARTY OF ACTION TO CHANGE ITS MIND PT IF HE FAILS HE INTENDS TO CARRY ON AND FORM HIS CABINET WITHOUT IT PT PARA THREE PT BADOGLIO HAS PROMISED TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF PROGRESS TODAY AND TELLS ME THAT SO FAR HE HAS MADE NO COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESS

3

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner

S2
M165
21 Apr.

TOP SECRET

1046

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

FATIMA 1164

Capt. Stone

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

20th. April, 1944.

VIA

GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

TOGLIATTI ALIAS ERCOLI CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON AT MARSHAL'S REQUEST FOR GENERAL WILSON DIA DIRECTIVE PRESIDENT, MINISTERS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA TO MACFARLANES PERSONAL PARTY. HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES WAS A MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS TTY PT PARA TWO TOGLIATTI STATED DEFINITELY THAT HIS PARTY WERE VERY READY TO SERVE UNDER BADOGLIO AS PRIME MINISTER PT IN HIS OPINION BADOGLIO HAD A PERFECTLY CLEAN RECORD PT PARA THREE TOGLIATTI SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PARTY OF ACTION WOULD DEFINITELY NOT REFUSE FOR ALWAYS TO JOIN THE NEW GOVERNMENT PT HE ASKED ME HOW I WOULD VIEW UNDER DICTATION PT I SAID THAT PROVIDED THE OTHER FIVE OPPOSITION PARTIES AGREED TO COLLABORATE WITH BADOGLIO THE DEFECTION OF ONE RELATIVELY SMALL PARTY COULD BE REGARDED WITH EQUANIMITY PT PARA FOUR TOGLIATTI SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN BADOGLIO THIS MORNING AND WAS SEEING HIM AGAIN LATER TODAY PT HE CONSIDERED THAT FAVOURABLE PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE WITH THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT PT PARA FIVE TOGLIATTI CLAIMED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS BY FAR THE BEST ORGANISED IN ITALY BUT REPEATED HIS RECENT THESIS THAT ALL EFFORTS MUST IN THE MEANTIME BE DEVOTED TO ENSURING MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HELP THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST GERMANY AND THAT POLITICAL DISPUTES MUST BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE WAR HAS BEEN WON

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General
Chief Commissioner

(51)

TOP SECRET

M1164
20 Apr.

1047

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

FATIMA 0163

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE COMM) 19th. April. 1974.

TOP SECRET V16

PRIORITY GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

(44)

4 1 6 2

REFERENCE MY FATIMA MIKE ONE SIX TWO TO FAREM TO ATHS FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA

BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FOUR

THE JUNTA MET AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON AND FAILED TO REACH ANY FINAL DECISIONS ABOUT THE

FORM OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT BY THE ACTION PARTY CMA WITH SOME

SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST SUPPORT CMA I AM CONCERNED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PROVIDE

SUFFICIENT REPRESENTATION FOR THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT

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✓5 Filed 50

(50)

4163

15 Apr.

TOP SECRET

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General
Chief Commissioner

1048

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

19th. April. 1944.

V16

GEN MACFARLANE

I SAW BADOGLIO AT SALERNO THIS AFTERNOON PD PARA TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL I TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE CARRYING ON WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT FOR MORE THAN A VERY SHORT TIME PD I MOVED THAT HE ANTICIPATE COMPLETING HIS NEW GOVERNMENT SPEEDILY AND ASKED HIM TO LET ME KNOW THAT PROGRESS HE HAD MADE PD PARA TWO PT BADOGLIO ASSURED ME THAT ALL THE MINISTERS OF HIS LAST GOVERNMENT WERE SPOILT AT THEIR POSTS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION UNTIL THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK OFFICE PD HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO NAPLES TOMORROW AND INTENDED TO SPEND WEDNESDAY AND FRIDAY CONFERRING WITH THE POLITICIANS WHO WERE PRACTICALLY ALL IN NAPLES PD HE WAS DOUBTFUL OF REACHING FINALITY TOMORROW BUT HOPED TO HAVE HIS NEW GOVERNMENT COMPLETE BY FRIDAY EVENING PD HE PROMISED TO SEND ME A WRITTEN PROGRESS REPORT EACH EVENING PD PARA THREE PD BADOGLIO STATED THAT IT WAS PROVING DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS AS THE PARTIES WERE QUARRELLING AMONG THEMSELVES AND ALSO WITHIN THEMSELVES OVER MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS PD ALL PARTIES WANTED FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR INTERIOR PD HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT HE INTENDED TO RETAIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS HIMSELF PD BOTH HE AND CROCE HAD TRIED HARD TO GET DE NICOLA TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT BUT THEY HAD FAILED PD DE NICOLA HAS PROMISED THE MARSHAL HELP

(49)

M162

19 Apr

TOP SECRET

file/2006

1049

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

AND AFFICE WHENEVER DESIRED BUT REFUSES TO TAKE OFFICE IF PARA FOUR PP THE MARSHAL
EX RESSES HIMSELF AS STILL PERFECTLY CONFIDENT THAT ALL THE PARTIES CNL WITH THE
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE ACTION PARTY CMA SHOULD COLLABORATE IN THE FORMATION OF THE
NEW GOVERNMENT PP THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO PUT FORWARD THE NAMES OF ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY
NEAR-EASTERN CANDIDATES FOR CABINET APPOINTMENTS PP THE MARSHAL WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF THIS
AND INTENDED TO INCLUDE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER PROVINCES INCLUDING
SICILY PP PARA FIVE PP THE MARSHAL HAS IT MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT HE WAS AS
ANXIOUS AS HE WERE TO SEE THE NEW GOVERNMENT SATISFACTORILY FORMED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE
IT HE ASSURED ME THAT IF NECESSARY HE INTENDED TO BE TOUGH WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES THAT
FAILED TO CARRY OUT IN A COOPERATIVE SPIRIT THEIR PROMISES TO COLLABORATE WITH HIM

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

1050

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET FATIMA M160

TOP SECRET

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 18th. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET V16

PRIORITY GEN MACFARLANE

FRENCH

(41)

4 / 5 6 17

REFERENCE FATIMA NINE ONE FIVE EIGHT OF SEVENTEENTH APRIL I PASSED TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CNA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PASSED FURTHER CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN BADOGLIO AND THE OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE CONTINUED TODAY PD I HAVE NO DEFINITE NEWS YET OF RESULTS OF BADOGLIO'S MEETING WITH KINGS THIS MORNING OR OF MEETING OF JUNTA THIS AFTERNOON PD OMOVEO STATES THAT THE ACTION PARTY IS RELUCTANT TO GIVE ITS FULL COOPERATION UNLESS EITHER BADOGLIO IS REPLACED AS PRIME MINISTER OR IT RECEIVES SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES THAT A PROGRAMME OF "PURGATION" TO INCLUDE HIGH RANKING OFFICERS IS PUT INTO EXECUTION PD THE PARTY IS HOWEVER DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE PD PARA PD I SHALL REPORT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR AND HAVE ARRANGED TO SEE THE MARSHAL TOMORROW AFTERNOON PD

CCC

Copy to DCC - 1914-1400.

(48)

A160

18 Apr.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

1051

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FM M 158

DSH 576
19 APR 1944

SF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) April 17, 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY ROUTINE

FREEDOM

IT IS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT HAS SUBMITTED ITS RESIGNATION TO THE KING AND THAT THE KING HAS ASKED THE MARSHAL TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT ON A FOAM BASE TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIX PARTIES PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE FIVE ZERO APRIL ONE FIVE PAREN (47) DURING THE COURSE OF TODAY AND TOMORROW BADOGLIO IS CONFERRING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND CROCE PD HE HOPES TO HAVE COMPLETED HIS GOVERNMENT BY APRIL ONE NINE PD THE JUNTA IS MEETING AGAIN TOMORROW FOR FINAL DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

S fide/200

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

(47)

41/58
17 apr

1052

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SF (1)

DSJ 564
18 APR 1944
Fatima M152

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 16 APRIL 1944

25

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

AFTER YESTERDAY'S MEETING JUNTA ISSUED COMMUNIQUE SHOWING UNANIMOUS DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO ACCEPT KING'S PLAN AND TO ENTER A NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE COMPOSED MAINLY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIX PARTIES PROVIDED THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT REITERATES ITS PLEDGE THAT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE SHALL DETERMINE THE FUTURE FORM OF THE STATE BY MEANS OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES PARA CABIN TO FRG FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MTKS ONE FOUR SEVEN APRIL ONE THREE PARA WE LEARN THAT THE SIX PARTIES ARE ALL READY TO SERVE UNDER BADOGLIO ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE FORMS A NEW GOVERNMENT PARA NO FORMAL DECISION HAS TAKEN WHETHER THE PARTIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE MARSHAL INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY BUT IT APPEARS THAT CROCE IS ACTING AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE MAJORITY AND WILL MEET WITH BADOGLIO ON APRIL ONE SEVEN OR ONE EIGHT IF ONLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS LIKELY TO INSIST ON DEALING DIRECT PARA NO DETAILED PROGRAM FOR A

(42)

(43)

M152
16 Apr

file/4236

1053

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

NEW GOVERNMENT RESULTED BUT ALL STRESS THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY BETTER QUALIFIED TO CARRY ON THE WAR AND ELIMINATE ALL TRACES OF THE FASCIST REGIME PD PARA IT IS OBVIOUS THAT DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS THERE WILL BE MUCH HARD BARGAINING PD AT PRESENT IT IS LIKELY THAT CROCE AND SFORZA AND SOLERINO DE NICOLA WILL BE MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO

Content & Classification authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lt. General,
Chief Commissioner.

(K)

1054

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

INCOMING

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29/16

F32994

SECRET

16 Apr. 1525 DFE

URGENT

Apr 161302

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE EMMOS

Apr 161505B

PATTEN FOR MACFARLANE REPEATED HQ MAAF

(49)

Following is response to your M150.

We fully appreciate your concern regarding the continuity of the Italian Government as it might affect the fulfillment of the obligations incurred under the Armistice, but we do not consider it necessary that you inform Badoglio that we cannot allow him to resign and that he must continue in office. Should a technical resignation be considered necessary under Italian practice, such action could be covered by a prior agreement between the King and Badoglio under which the former would promise to immediately call upon Badoglio to form the new government.

2. If Italian practice permits, and we understand it does, Badoglio should inform the King of his intention to reconstruct the Cabinet and obtain the King's approval. He should thereafter summon his present cabinet colleagues and ask them to "place themselves in his hands." Following this procedure neither the Marshal nor his present cabinet ministers should resign a priori. Upon the conclusion of the current soundings and discussions the Marshal should present to the King a list of his new appointments. Thereafter, undoubtedly, some of his present colleagues will remain where they are, some will be appointed to other posts, and some may resign. By this procedure there will not be a lacuna and there will be no moment when there are not a prime minister and other minister in power to act.

ACC DISTRIBUTION:
Gen. MacFarlane

(15)

Capt. Stone
Sir Noel Charles
Political Section
F 32994
16 Apr

Note by C.C. to Printer:
Please to take
on actual

SECRET

File/CCS

1055

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C CCBM)

TOP SECRET

URGENT

FREEDOM

15th. April. 1944.

V16

GEN MACFARLANE

45

I SAW BADOGLIO THIS MORNING PD EARLY TO FREEDOM FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND MURPHY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FATIMA I GAVE HIM THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR FOX EACH THREE ONE SEVEN TWO ONE FHCIC PD HE GAVE ME AN UNQUALIFIED UNDERTAKING AS REGARDS THE FIRST POINT PD HE AGREED ALSO UNRESERVEDLY ON THE SECOND POINT BUT ASKED ME TO LET HIM HAVE OUR INSTRUCTION IN WRITING PD I AM DOING THIS PD PARA PD THE MARSHAL TOLD ME THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS CMA LABOUR DEMOCRATS AND LIBERALS WERE IN HIS OPINION CERTAIN TO COLLABORATE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT CROCE AND BODINO WOULD ACCEPT OFFICE PD THE MARSHAL IS NOW AWAITING THE RESULT OF THE MEETING OF THE SIX PARTY JUNTA THIS AFTERNOON PD HE EXPECTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE PARTY OF ACTION WILL DECIDE TO COLLABORATE WITH HIM PD IF AT LEAST FIVE OF THE PARTIES SO DECIDE CMA THE MARSHAL WILL TENDER HIS RESIGNATION AND THAT OF HIS CABINET TO THE KING PD THE KING WILL THEN INVITE THE MARSHAL TO FORM A NEW CABINET PD PARA PD WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED THAT THE MARSHAL WAS GOING TO REMAIN IN OFFICE AND MERELY ENLARGE OR ALTER THE COMPOSITION OF HIS CABINET PD THE COURSE OF ACTION NOW PROPOSED BY THE MARSHAL ALTHOUGH PURELY CONSTITUTIONAL SEEMS TO INVOLVE THE RISK THAT AS SOON AS THE MARSHAL RESIGNS THE PARTIES MIGHT CHANGE THEIR TACTICS AND MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT

44

1056

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO FORM A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT PD PARA PD I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHETHER YOU APPROVE OF THE MARSHAL CARRYING OUT HIS PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION OR WHETHER YOU WOULD WISH ME TO INFORM HIM THAT HE CAN NOT ALLOW HIM TO RESIGN AND THAT HE MUST CONTINUE IN OFFICE AND CONFINE HIMSELF TO INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JUNTA PARTIES IN HIS GOVERNMENT PD PARA PD IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE MARSHAL WOULD APPROACH THE KING BEFORE MONDAY AT EARLIEST BUT I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR VERY URGENT REPLY

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41

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

1057

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

36/13
SECRET

APR131958B
" 131725B
F31721
FHMG3
THG16

PRIORITY
FREEDOM SGD CINC PERSONAL FROM WILSON
FATIMA FOR MACFARLANE REPEATED HQ MAAF

I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE MANNER IN WHICH ALLIED INTERESTS SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED IN THE EVENT OF THE FORMATION OF A NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER ITS COMPOSITION, SHOULD ACCEPT ALL THE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE ALLIES ENTERED INTO BY THE OLD "TOP SECRET" GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING BOTH SETS OF ARMISTICE TERMS AND ALL THE SUBSEQUENT UNDERTAKINGS. PLEASE THEREFORE MAKE IT CLEAR TO MARSHAL BADOGLIO AT ONCE THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO DEAL WITH ANY NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH DOES NOT FORMALLY DECLARE ITSELF WILLING TO ASSUME ALL THE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE ALLIES ENTERED INTO BY ITS PREDECESSOR.

YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM MARSHAL BADOGLIO THAT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT MAY BE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE KING MUST BE REGARDED AS BINDING UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE ITALIAN PEOPLE CAN FREELY EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. IT WILL NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WAR EFFORT THAT THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION SHOULD BE RAISED AGAIN UNTIL THAT TIME AND YOU SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR TO THE MARSHAL.

ACC DISP

WF C

(Z) Political Sec.

F31721
13 9m

SECRET

1058

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FATIMA M 147

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 13 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

AFTER KINGS ANNOUNCEMENT GIUNTA HELD MEETING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED TO HOLD A FURTHER MEETING AT THREE PETER MIKE ON APRIL ONE FIVE TO CONSIDER FOLLOWING FOUR MAIN QUESTIONS PARA PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE FOUR FIVE APRIL ONE TWO PAREN FIRST WHETHER THE GIUNTA SHOULD ACCEPT THE KINGS PROPOSAL AS A SOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM SEMICLN SECOND WHETHER THEY SHOULD ENTER A REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO SEMICLN THIRD WHETHER THE PARTIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY THROUGH THE GIUNTA CONCERNING PARTICIPATION IN A REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT SEMICLN FOURTH ANY SUGGESTIONS BY THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES FOR THE POLITICAL PROGRAM FOR ANY REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT PARA CROCE AND SFORZA AS WELL AS ERCOLI AND RODINO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT LEADER ARE TO BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE MEETING ON APRIL ONE FIVE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

11059

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Redacted

ALLIED TROOPS ENTER ROME PT PARA PT THIS DECISION CMA WHICH I FIRMLY BELIEVE CMA FURTHERS NATIONAL UNITY CMA IS FINAL AND IRREVOCABLE PT ENDS

(47)

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner

ENCLAIR

1060

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

~~SECRET~~ Restricted

FATIMA 2046

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

~~SECRET~~ Restricted

~~SECRET~~ Routine

13th. April, 1944.

VIG

GEN MACFARLANE

~~SECRET~~ REPEATED HEADQUARTERS AAI

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMOUNCEMENT REFERRED TO IN MY FATIMA MIKE ONE FOUR FIVE FF PARA

TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER'S OFFICE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

REPEATED HEADQUARTERS AAI FOR GOC IN C FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARA

BEGINS FF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE KNOW THAT I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WITH THEM AT THEIR SIDE IN

DIFFICULT TIMES AND IN HAPPY ONES FF THEY KNOW THAT EIGHT MONTHS AGO I PUT AN END TO

THE FASCIST REGIME AND BROUGHT ITALY CMA NOTWITHSTANDING MANY DANGER AND RISK CMA TO

THE SIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CMA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION AGAINST NAZISM FF

PARA FF THE ITALIAN NAVY CMA THE AIR FORCE CMA AND THE ARMY CMA OBEDIENT TO MY CALL

DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS CMA HAVE BEEN FIGHTING UNDAUNTEDLY AGAINST THE ENEMY CMA

SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE ALLIED FORCES FF ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY CMA IS

CMA AND SHALL BE EVER MORE GREAT FF THE DAY SHALL COME WHEN CMA OUR DEEP WOUNDS HEALED

CMA WE SHALL TAKE ONCE MORE OUR PLACE AS A FREE PEOPLE AMONG FREE NATIONS FF PARA FF

PUTTING INTO EFFECT WHAT I HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES AND TO MY

GOVERNMENT CMA I HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW FROM PUBLIC AFFAIRS BY APPOINTING MY SON

CMA THE PRINCE OF PIEDMONT CMA LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF THE REALM FF PARA FF THE

APPOINTMENT WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE BY THE FORMAL TRANSFER OF POWER ON THE DAY ON WHICH

(41)

M 1446
13 Apr

1061

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMA)

12th. April. 1944.

TOP SECRET

V16

URGENT

GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.A.I.

ON TENTH INST I WAS PRESENT AT INTERVIEW WITH KING OF ITALY WITH MACMILLAN CMA MURPHY AND CHARLES PD PARIS TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER'S OFFICE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED HEADQUARTERS AAI FOR GOC IN C FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARIS AFTER DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH AQUARONE CMA PRIMAS AND FINALLY BADOGLIO TOOK PART CMA THE KING ISSUED TODAY A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF WHICH TEXT IS GIVEN IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM PD THIS STATEMENT IS IN EFFECT A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE KING OF THE PLAN WHICH HE COMMUNICATED TO ME ON TWENTYFIRST FEBRUARY AND WHICH I COMMUNICATED TO YOU IN MY FATIMA TWO THREE FIVE EIGHT OF THAT DATE

(40)

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

1062

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Secret

ATIMA M142

DSJ 563
10 APR 1944

PAPAL (GOC PACE-ROME C 208) 7 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

(38) [redacted]

(39)

OCT - DECLASSIFIED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1063

Secret

FATIMA M142

DSM 503
10 APR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COM) 7 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

RESULTING FROM THE SORRENTO MEETING YESTERDAY THE GIUNTA PUBLISHED A RESOLUTION RECORDING THE URGENT NECESSITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE LIBERATION OF ROME PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE FIVE APRIL FOUR PAREN IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MEANS THAT THE GIUNTA ACCEPTED THE DE NICOLA PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO A SINGLE MODIFICATION PD THEY DESIRE THAT THE KING SHOULD NOT ONLY ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING AND CREATING A LIEUTENANCY IN FAVOR OF THE CROWN PRINCE BUT SHOULD PUT THIS INTO EFFECT FORTHWITH WITHOUT WAITING ARRIVAL IN ROME PD DE NICOLA IS TO BE ASKED TO COMMUNICATE THIS DECISION TO THE KING PARA PENDING THE RESULTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WILL BE ANY CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT PARA THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNIST DECISION TO ENTER

38

M 1 3 5

000.1 Politics Italian

A RESOLUTION RECORDING THE URGENT NECESSITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE LIBERATION OF ROME PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE FIVE APRIL FOUR PAREN IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MEANS THAT THE GIUNTA ACCEPTED THE DE NICOLA PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO A SINGLE MODIFICATION PD THEY DESIRE THAT THE KING SHOULD NOT ONLY ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING AND CREATING A LIEUTENANCY IN FAVOR OF THE CROWN PRINCE BUT SHOULD PUT THIS INTO EFFECT FORTHWITH WITHOUT WAITING ARRIVAL IN ROME PD DE NICOLA IS TO BE ASKED TO COMMUNICATE THIS DECISION TO THE KING PARA PENDING THE RESULTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WILL BE ANY CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT PARA THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNIST DECISION TO ENTER

38

39

7 apr

000.1 Politics Italian

file/FDO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1064

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE IRISH FREE STATE WAS NOT ACCEPTED WITH THE RESERVE AS A SOURCE OF SATISFACTION TO THE OTHER PARTIES TO IT IF DOUBTFUL IF NEVER THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE U.K. OF WHICH HOME IS KING

Content & Classification
Authenticated by:

NEIL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

(39)

THE GOVERNMENT REGARDLESS OF THE KINGS POSITION WAS NOT ACCEPTED WITHOUT RESERVE IS A SOURCE OF SATISFACTION TO THE OTHER PARTIES PD IT IS DOUBTFUL HOWEVER THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT IF VICTOR EMMANUEL PERSISTS IN HIS WISH TO ENTER ROME AS KING

Content & Classification
authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

1066

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authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

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SECRET

FATIMA 2135

5 APR 1944

04030B

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

4th. April. 1944.

SECRET

VAPOUR 16

PRIORITY

MAJOR DOE

FREEDOM

M 1 3 0 2

REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE ZERO OF SECOND APRIL PD FARIN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FARIN THE JUNTA MET YESTERDAY FOR TWO HOURS AND AFTER AN INTERVAL WERE JOINED BY THE LOCAL NAPLES COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR A FURTHER SESSION OF THREE HOURS TO DISCUSS THE COMMUNIST PROPOSALS WHICH WERE EXPOUNDED BY SCOLI PD NO DECISION WAS REACHED AND DISCUSSION WAS ADJOURNED UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL SIXTH CMA WHEN A FURTHER MEETING WILL BE HELD AT SORRENTO IN CROCE'S PRESENCE PD SFORZA WILL ALSO ATTEND PD THE PI MAIN OPPOSITION TO COMMUNIST LINE HAS SO FAR COME FROM THE LIBERALS AND THE PARTY OF ACTION

38

Capt. Stone

file/P-A

SECRET

ROBERT E. DOE.
Major. AGD.
Secretary General

1069

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET PATTA 34

DS 15 481
5 APR 1944

PATTA (GEN MACFARLANE) C COPY 3 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

PATTA FOR

NEVER HAS STORM THIS WORLD BEEN FOUND SUCH VERY DISTURBED OVER THE EXPLOITATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY DICTION PD PARIS AND LONDON EDITIONS OF AMERICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH INFORMATION LETTER FROM PATTA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE PATTA MYR ONE THREE ZERO APRIL TWO PLEIN HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PARTY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN UNDER ORDERS FROM MOSCOW AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT WOULD DESTROY THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ITALY BY PROLONGING THE NEO FASCIST RULE OF THE KING AND HELP IT WOULD MERELY SERVE TO INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET RUSSIA NOT ONLY AS REGARDS ITALY BUT IN OTHER LIBERATED AREAS OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL PD HE DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD LOST THE OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING ABOUT A MORE DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE LOCAL ITALIAN QUESTION PARA SFORZA CONFIRMED THAT THE GIUNTA WAS TO MEET TODAY TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM PUT BY THE COMMUNIST COUNCIL TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT PD HE SAID HE HIMSELF HAD

31 Cy

3 Cys

SECRET

FATIMA M 134

D3B 481
15 APR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 3 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

REBER SAW SFORZA THIS MORNING AND FOUND HIM VERY DISTURBED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY DECISION PD PAREN AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE ZERO APRIL TWO PAREN HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PARTY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN UNDER ORDERS FROM MOSCOW AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT WOULD DESTROY THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ITALY BY PROLONGING THE NEO FASCIST RULE OF THE KING AND THAT IT WOULD MERELY SERVE TO INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET RUSSIA NOT ONLY AS REGARDS ITALY BUT IN OTHER LIBERATED AREAS OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL PD HE DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD LOST THE OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING ABOUT A MORE DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE LOCAL ITALIAN QUESTION PARA SFORZA CONFIRMED THAT THE GIUNTA WAS TO MEET TODAY TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM PUT BY THE COMMUNIST PROPOSAL TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT PD HE SAID HE

HIMSELF HAD

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ROBERTSON SFORZA THIS MORNING AND FOUND HIM VERY DISTURBED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY DECISION PD PAREN AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE ZERO APRIL TWO PAREN HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PARTY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN UNDER ORDERS FROM MOSCOW AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT WOULD DESTROY THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ITALY BY PROLONGING THE NEO FASCIST RULE OF THE KING AND THAT IT WOULD MERELY SERVE TO INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET RUSSIA NOT ONLY AS REGARDS ITALY BUT IN OTHER LIBERATED AREAS OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL PD HE DEEPLY REGRETTED THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD LOST THE OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING ABOUT A MORE DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE LOCAL ITALIAN QUESTION PARA SFORZA CONFIRMED THAT THE GIUNTA WAS TO MEET TODAY TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM PUT BY THE COMMUNIST PROPOSAL TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT PD HE SAID HE HIMSELF HAD

(37) a
3 apr.

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1072

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

REFUSED TO ATTEND SINCE HE CONSIDERED THAT THE GIUNTA HAD ONLY THE AUTHORITY CONFERRED UPON IT BY THE BADI RESOLUTI WHICH REQUIRED THE KINGS ABDICATION AS THE CONDITION FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH THE WEAK SOCIALIST PARTY OF THE SOUTH WAS COMMITTED TO FOLLOW THE COMMUNIST LEAD AND ALTHOUGH THE CHRISTIAN AND LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PARTIES WOULD JOIN THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER BISTEARN THEY UNJUSTLY OF FORTIFYING THE MONARCHY SFORZA INSISTED THAT THE ACTI N AND LIBERAL PARTIES WOULD HOLD OUT FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE BARI COMMITMENT PARA HE THEN SAID THAT HE CHOSE AND DE NICOLA WHO WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE KING WERE TO MEET AGAIN SOON TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SALVAGE SOMETHING IF THIS DE NICOLA PROPOSAL BE STORZA IMPLIED THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER TO SERVE IN A CABINET UNDER THE LIEUTENANCY OF HUMBERT PARA THROUGH OF THE CONVERSATION IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WHEREAS SFORZA WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SAVE WHAT HE CAN OF HIS POSITION HE IS NOT PREPARED TO STAND ALONE IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO PD HIS ATTITUDE WAS PROBABLY REFLECTING THAT OF THE ACTI N AND LIBERAL PARTIES

3 pp.

Content and classification
authenticated by:

(37)

NOEL M.E.N MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief
Allied Commissioner

REFUSED TO ATTEND SINCE HE CONSIDERED THAT THE GIUNTA HAD ONLY THE AUTHORITY CONFERRED UPON IT BY THE BARI RESOLUTION WHICH REQUIRED THE KINGS ABDICATION AS THE CONDITION FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT PD ALTHOUGH THE WEAK SOCIALIST PARTY OF THE SOUTH WAS COMMITTED TO FOLLOW THE COMMUNIST LEAD AND ALTHOUGH THE CHRISTIAN AND LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PARTIES WOULD JOIN THE GOVERNMENT IN THE QUOTES MISTAKEN IDEA UNQUOTES OF FORTIFYING THE MONARCHY SFORZA INSISTED THAT THE ACTION AND LIBERAL PARTIES WOULD HOLD OUT FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE BARI COMMITMENT PARA HE THEN SAID THAT HE CROCE AND DE NICOLA WHO WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE KING WERE TO MEET APRIL FOUR TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SALVAGE SOMETHING OF THE DE NICOLA PROPOSAL PD SFORZA IMPLIED THAT ALL THREE WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER TO SERVE IN A CABINET UNDER THE LIEUTENANCY OF HUMBERT PARA THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WHEREAS SFORZA WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SAVE WHAT HE CAN OF HIS POSITION HE IS NOT PREPARED TO STAND ALONE IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO PD HIS ATTITUDE WAS PROBABLY REFLECTING THAT OF THE ACTION AND LIBERAL PARTIES

Content and classification
authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE

1073

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THAT HE CROCE AND DE NICOLA WHO WAS IN TOUCH WITH THE KING WERE TO MEET APRIL FOUR TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SALVAGE SOMETHING OF THE DE NICOLA PROPOSAL PD SFORZA IMPLIED THAT ALL THREE WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER TO SERVE IN A CABINET UNDER THE LIEUTENANCY OF HUMBERT PARA THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WHEREAS SFORZA WAS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SAVE WHAT HE CAN OF HIS POSITION HE IS NOT PREPARED TO STAND ALONE IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO PD HIS ATTITUDE WAS PROBABLY REFLECTING THAT OF THE ACTION AND LIBERAL PARTIES

Content and classification
authenticated by:

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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SECRET PARIS M 130

PSB 476
5 APR 1944

PARIS (GEN MACFARLANE C COM)

5 APRIL 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF CHOU EN LAI IN MARCH TWO EX [illegible] OF THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN OCCUPIED ITALY WAS APPOINTED AND GIVEN PRIOR USE OF MILITARY LINE OF COMMUNICATION TO ARRIVE FOR GENERAL CONSULTATION WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND CHIEF ALLIED PROCONSULAR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES AT THAT TIME. THE TWO ARRIVED IN ROME YESTERDAY AND AFTER A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS DURING WHICH THEY MADE KNOWN THEIR DESIRE TO CONFER WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ON THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY AND ON THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY THEY WERE GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT FOR TODAY AT WHICH THEY PRESENTED A DOCUMENT CALLING FOR A RAPID SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL IMPASSE IN THE FOLLOWING FOUR BASIC POINTS.

PARA ONE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNITED FRONT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND ANTIFASCIST FORCES PD PARA TWO ASSURANCE THAT THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM WOULD BE FREELY DECIDED BY THE WHOLE COUNTRY THROUGH THE MEANS OF A NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AFTER THE WAR PARA THREE THE CREATION OF A NEW STRONG GOVERNMENT OF TEMPORARY CHARACTER SUPPORTED BY THE POPULAR PARTIES AND CAPABLE OF ORGANIZING A PROMPT RESISTANCE IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY

CCC

(37)

2 Sept

file/200

1976

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AND OF CREATING A STRONG ITALIAN ARMY TO FIGHT AGAINST THE GERMANS PARA FOUR ASSURANCE TO ALL ITALIANS WHATEVER THEIR CONVICTIONS THAT THE STRUGGLE THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS ENGAGED UPON IS DIRECTED TOWARDS FREEING THE COUNTRY FROM THE INVADER AND FROM THE TRAITORS WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL CATASTROPHE SEMICOLON AL THAT IN THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT THERE IS ROOM FOR ALL PARA THIS RESOLUTION WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE PRESS IN THE AFTERNOON WHEN NENNI MADE A STATEMENT ALONG THE SAME LINES CMA EMPHASIZING THROUGHOUT THE NEED OF INTENSIFYING ITALYS WAR EFFORT PD FROM IT AND SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS TWO MAIN POINTS EMERGED PARA FIRST THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST PARTY THOUGHT THAT THE FORMATION OF A BROADBASED GOVERNMENT COULD BE FACILITATED BY THE ABDICATION OR REMOVAL OF THE KING CMA THEY DID NOT INSIST UPON THIS AS A CONDITION PD SECONDLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD NO OBJECTION TO SERVING IN A GOVERNMENT UNDER BADOGLIO PD THEY INTENDED TO MAKE THEIR POINT OF VIEW CLEAR TO THE CIURTA PD FROM

1077

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

OTHER SOURCES IT APPEARS THAT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE GIUNTA HAS BEEN CALLED FOR APRIL THREE PARA IT IS STATED IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES THAT BADOGLIO WOULD BE PREPARED AT LEAST TO OFFER THE PORTFOLIO OF LABOR TO THE COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

1078

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/G/149

DCC

DSB 413
25 MAR 1944

FMM/rj

54

23rd. March, 1944.

Secretary,
The Executive Junta of Liberated Italy,
Via Paolo Emiliani, 53.
NAPLES.

Dear Sir,

In reply to your letter of March 22nd. I wish to inform you that I have not yet received from the Allied Governments any remarks on the memorandum to which you refer.

2. As you know, I forwarded copies of the memorandum to the Allied Governments concerned as soon as I received it. I have since then asked the Allied Governments to expedite any reply they wish to make and have now asked them again to let me know their reactions without delay.

3. With the expression of my high consideration.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

50 b

f. 20/400

1079

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FATIMA 1120

DSIJ 412
25 MAR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 23rd. March, 1944.

SECRET 16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

PART ONE PD I HAVE RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE JUNTA POINTING OUT THAT MORE THAN A MONTH HAS NOW ELAPSED SINCE THEY SUBMITTED THE MEMORANDUM WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I HAVE REPLIED THAT I AM ASKING THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO EXPEDITE AN EXPRESSION OF OPINION PD

PART TWO PD IT WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO BE HERE IF I COULD BE GIVEN EVEN SOME INTERIM REPLY AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

1080

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION

DS/J 4/12
25 MAR [illegible]

EXECUTIVE GIUNTA OF LIBERATED ITALY

Via Paolo Imbriani 53

Naples

Naples, March 22, 1944

to GENERAL MACFARLANE

CHIEF OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

NAPLES

My dear General,

The Executive Giunta of Liberated Italy, has submitted to you last February 18th, a memorandum in which according to the order received from the Bari Congress, proposals were outlined for the solution of the present Italian crisis.

As it has been more than one month since the above document was submitted, the Executive Giunta solicits a reply in the matter.

Please accept, dear General, the expression of our highest consideration.

for the Executive Giunta

the Secretary

/s/ Filippo Caracciolo

(36)

[illegible]

[illegible]

DAO PCC
SCANNED
[illegible]

1081

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FATIMA M111

OSS 303
15 MAR 1944

FATIMA 12th. March. 1944 .

SECRET 10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ITALIAN EMBASSY AT MADRID FD PAREN TO AFHQ FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN QUOTE FD NUMBER FIVE NINE DATED MARCH ELEVENTH FD THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN FLEET HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED WITHOUT DISTINCTION OF MEN AND IDEAS AND WITH GREATEST PATRIOTISM BY ALL THE ITALIAN PEOPLE FD THE ASSURANCES RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL ARE UNDOUBTEDLY OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE FD I WISH HOWEVER TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT FACT NAMELY THE SPIRITUAL UNANIMITY WITH WHICH THE COUNTRY CMA FROM THE ALPS TO SICILY CMA FOLLOWED THE CONTROVERSY FD THIS GIVES US ALL MORE REASON FOR HOPE AND FAITH AND CONFIRMS US IN OUR DETERMINED WILL TO FIGHT THE COMMON FOE WITH ALL OUR MEANS FD ABOVE TO BE CABLED TO TANGIERS CMA STOCKHOLM CMA LISBON CMA DUBLIN CMA BUENOS AIRES CMA BERNE AND ANKARA FD SIGNED BADOGLIO UNQUOTE

ROBERT E. DOE,
Major AGD,
Secretary-General

SECRET 14 MAR 1944

1082

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

DCC

FATIMA M110

DSJ
15 MAR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

12th. March. 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF RESOLUTION READ AND ADOPTED AT NAPLES MEETING TODAY FULL PARIS
TO AFHQ FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED
HEADQUARTERS ACMF FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARIS
BEGINS FULL STOP THE PEOPLE OF NAPLES CMA IN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE ANTI-FASCIST PARTIES CMA
IE CMA THE PARTY OF ACTION CMA THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY CMA AND WITH
THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR IN THE MASS MEETING OF TWELFTH MARCH CMA ONE NINE
FOUR FOUR CMA PROCLAIM THE WILL OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE TO INTENSIFY THEIR WAR EFFORT
THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY BY THE SIDE OF THE ALLIED FORCES AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY
CMA NAZI-FASCISM FULL STOP

IT IS FURTHER DECLARED THAT THE CREATION OF A TRULY ITALIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IS LINKED WITH
THE SOLUTION OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL LIFE CMA FOOD CMA TRANSPORT CMA
INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION CMA AGRICULTURAL REORGANISATION AND CMA AS AN ESSENTIAL
PRELIMINARY TO THESE CMA THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION MUST BE PURGED CMA BEGINNING WITH
THE SUPPORTERS OF THE MONARCHY AND THEIR COLLABORATORS CMA THE ACCOMPLICES OF FASCISM CMA
AND A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT COMPOSED OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES MUST BE FORMED FULL STOP SIGNED

(34) C

file 700

14 MAR 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

1083

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

THE PARTY OF ACTION CMA THE SOCIALIST CMA COMMUNIST AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES PD ENIS

3-

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

(34) C

14 MAR 1944

1084

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL FATIMA M109

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

12TH. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

PUBLIC MEETING TOOK PLACE BETWEEN TEN AND TWELVE THIRTY TODAY AND WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT OR ANY DISTURBANCE TO PUBLIC ORDER FD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACMF FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN ATTENDANCE IS ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN SIX AND TEN THOUSAND CMA OF WHICH COMMUNISTS WERE MOSTPROMINENT AND BEST ORGANISED FD HEAVY RAIN BEGAN HALF WAY THROUGH THE MEETING BUT EVEN BEFORE THIS THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ROWDYISM CMA THOUGH ANY MENTION OF THE KING OR BADOGLIO WAS GREETED WITH PROLONGED CATCALLS FD THE CROWD DISPERSED FOR LUNCH QUICKLY AND QUIETLY AND MADE NO ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE IN THE STREETS FD

PART TWO FD TRANSLATION OF RESOLUTION PASSED BY ACCLAMATION IS CONTAINED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FD IT IS SIGNED BY THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AS WELL AS THE PARTY OF ACTION CMA THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES FD THE REPUBLICAN PARTY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN JOINED TO ACTION PARTY BUT APPARENTLY WISHED FOR SEPARATE REPRESENTATION AT LEAST AT THIS MEETING

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

CONFIDENTIAL

1085

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FATIMA M107

13 MAR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

SECRET

PRIORITY.

11th. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACMF

PART ONE PD I SAW BADOGLIO LAST NIGHT PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACMF FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN HE HAD BEEN GREATLY RELIEVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE REGARDING THE ITALIAN FLEET AND BY THE COMMUNICATION MADE BY REBER TO PRUNAS PD HE SEEMED PERFECTLY SATISFIED AND MADE NO COMMENT OTHER THAN EXPRESSING GRATITUDE THAT THE SITUATION HAD TURNED OUT SO SATISFACTORILY PD

PART TWO PD HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD YET PRODUCED ANY ANSWER TO THE KING'S PROPOSALS FORWARDED TO YOU IN FATIMA NUMBER 2358 PD — No copy —

PART THREE PD BADOGLIO SENT ME YESTERDAY A LONG PRIVATE LETTER SETTING FORTH HIS REASONS FOR HOPING THAT ITALY MIGHT BE ACCORDED ALLIED STATUS PD IN IT HE SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH HMG IF I WERE GOING TO VISIT ENGLAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE PD I TOLD HIM THAT MY MOVEMENTS WERE UNCERTAIN AND THAT SO IMPORTANT A QUESTION WAS ONE WHICH COULD BE DEALT WITH ONLY BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN CONCERT PD I GAVE HIM NO ENCOURAGEMENT BUT SUGGESTED THAT IF HE SO WISHED HE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO SET FORTH HIS PROPOSALS IN A MEMORANDUM TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WHICH I WOULD FORWARD FOR HIM PD

SECRET

1086

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

I THINK IT LIKELY THAT YOU WILL BE RECEIVING A MEMORANDUM ON THESE LINES IN THE NEAR FUTURE

3-

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

(35) 4

1087

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FATIMA M106

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

SECRET

URGENT

10th. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

6241452

YOUR NUMBER SIX TWO FOUR FIVE TWO PD PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL WILSON REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACMF PERSONAL EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I HAVE NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING AN INSECURE MEETING WHICH MIGHT INTERFERE WITH WAR EFFORT PD

PART TWO PD ONE MEETING ONLY IS TAKING PLACE IN AN ENCLOSED SPACE PD THE ROOF HAS BEEN DESTROYED PD IT CANNOT THEREFORE BE BLOWN OFF FROM WITHIN AND IF IT RAINS ITS ABSENCE WILL HELP TO MAINTAIN TRANQUILLITY PD

PART THREE PD POLETTI HAS THE SITUATION AND THE POLITICAL AND LABOUR LEADERS WELL IN HAND PD I AM SATISFIED THAT THE LATTER ARE GENUINE IN THEIR DESIRE THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE ORDERLY PD I AM ALLOWING NO QUOTE LIVE UNQUOTE BROADCAST BUT THERE WILL BE A BROADCAST RESUME AFTER THE MEETING AS WAS DONE IN THE CASE OF THE BARI CONFERENCE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

SECRET

10 MAR 1944

1088

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy

10 March 1944

I have received your letter of March 8 with its enclosure relating to your conversation with Ambassador Bogomolov. In compliance with your request, I have been glad to transmit the Memorandum and the substance of your letter to Allied Force Headquarters for communication to the British and American Governments.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner.

Court Carlo Sforza
6 Via Carducci
Naples.

1089

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

copy

Naples, March 8th, 1944.

Dear General MacFarlane,

Ambassador Bogomolov having paid me a visit on his arrival to Naples we spoke, among other things, of the Italo-Jugoslav relations. A few hours before, I had received, concerning them, a message from Italian patriots in the North, which I showed to Mr. Bogomolov. The Soviet agent told me he would gladly transmit our views to Moscow and to Marshal Tito. That is why, when today I returned him his visit, I left with him, for transmission to his government, the enclosed memo.

I would appreciate very much that the same text be submitted to Mr. Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull. May I ask you to be so good as to do so.

Since the British have a mission with Tito may I venture to suggest to Mr. Eden that a direct British communication of the memo to the Jugoslav leader would be appreciated by us. It might be misleading for Tito to receive our memo only from one source.

Gratefully and sincerely yours,

/s/ SFORZA

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Pencilled notes:

To Political Section; !!
FNMM, 8/3

(337)

1090

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy

MEMORANDUM.

Leaders of Italian patriots in Northern Italy have written Sforza informing him that they have made contact with Jugoslav partisans in order to ensure friendly future relations. They inform Sforza that following solution might be reached :

a) In accordance with rifht of self-determination Trieste remains to Italians,

b) but port becomes international corpus separatum with free customs administered by a committee composed mainly of Italians and Jugoslavs, but also of Czecks, Austrians, etc.

Sforza assured full agreement to solution and added that an even greater contribution to international cooperation might be to offer Fiume and adjoining area to future League of Nations.

Such plan while giving L.N. a perfectly equipped port, would suit Switzerland which dislikes ulterior enlargements of L.N. on Swiss territory and would suit Russia and all Oriental European nations. Moreover it would bring peace and prosperity in a zone otherwise bound to see eternal quarrels because of intermingling of two nationalities.

Naples, March 8th, 1944.

copy

(55)

1091

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Secretary General

Following is extract from Winston Churchill's speech to the House of Commons today, Thursday, March 9th:

"....As President Roosevelt has said, the question of future employment and disposal of the Italian Fleet has been subjected to some discussion, and in particular, consideration has been given to the immediate reinforcement of the Soviet Navy, either from Anglo-American or Italian resources. I have no statement to make on those discussions other than to say that at present no change is contemplated in the arrangements with the Italian Naval authorities under which Italian ships and crews take part in the common struggle against the enemy in theatres where they now operate. It may well be found that consideration of the Italian Fleet would best be left over until the end of the war against both Germany and Japan...."

//

5

3.15.

1092

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET TATSUA 1005 Dec

H

DS-U 3-4f
13 MAR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE'S CODE) 9th. March, 1944.

SECRET 10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

V Delivered by Gen Macfarlane.

PRESTON

REFERENCE SPECIAL SIGNAL OF YESTERDAY IT HARDLY TO ARE NOT ONLY MY PERSONAL SAFETY FROM FATIMA BUT MACFARLANE'S PERSONAL SAFETY I HAVE DEFINITELY TAKEN USE OF GOOD QUITE PROTECT OBJECTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MEETING IF THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO HOLD THEIR MEETING I TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY POSSESS POPULAR SUPPORT IF MEETING IS BEING HELD IN ENCLOSED SPACE IF SUITABLE CAPACITY OF I CANNOT CONTROL WHAT WILL BE SAID AT THE MEETING BY BUT I CAN CONTROL PUBLICITY BY

MUST END IF WITHOUT THE SAFETY VALVE OF A MEETING THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE BY THEY WOULD HAVE INEVITABLY TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE THREE PARTIES AND ALMOST CERTAINLY DISTURBANCES WITH SO SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE INEVITABLY AFFECTED MOST ADVERSELY OUR ONLY HOPE OF GETTING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OR REACHING SOME BY I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS STILL THE AIM OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS BY MY RUSSIAN COLLEAGUE HAS CONSIDERABLE CONTACTS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY HERE AND THE COMMUNIST LEADER TECHNICHI KUBEL WITH MOSCOW AND SOLICITOR TO MEET EUROPE LAST IF

LAST TIME TO I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I REFUSE YET THE MEETING TO AVOID A CERTAIN SITUATION WHICH COULD HAVE DISASTROUS INTO OPEN CONFLICT WITH THE WORLD OF THE PARTIES OF THE

Fifteen Thousand

SECRET

10 MAR 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1093

SECRET FATIMA M105 DCC

(H) DS-8 321 SF
13 MAR 1944

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 9th. March, 1944.

SECRET 10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

Retained by Gen Macfarlane

REFERENCE SPECIAL SIGNAL OF YESTERDAY PD PAREN TO AFHQ EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL WILSON FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I HAVE SPECIFICALLY BARRED USE OF WORD QUOTE PROTEST UNQUOTE IN CONNECTION WITH THE MEETING PD THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO HOLD THIS MEETING T TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY POSSESS POPULAR SUPPORT PD MEETING IS BEING HELD IN ENCLOSED SPACE PD ESTIMATED CAPACITY ~~ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO~~ FIFTEEN THOUSAND PD I CANNOT CONTROL WHAT WILL BE SAID AT THE MEETING PD BUT I CAN CONTROL SUBSEQUENT PUBLICITY PD

PART TWO PD WITHOUT THE SAFETY VALVE OF A MEETING THE STRIKE WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE PD THIS WOULD HAVE ENTAILED TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE THREE PARTIES AND ALMOST CERTAINLY IMPRISONING THEM PD SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE INEVITABLY AFFECTED MOST ADVERSELY OUR ONLY HOPE OF GETTING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ON REACHING ROME PD I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS STILL THE DESIRE OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD MY RUSSIAN COLLEAGUE HAS CONSIDERABLE CONTACTS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY HERE AND THE COMMUNIST LEADER TEDESCHI DINED WITH BOGOMOLOV AND SOLODOVNIK THE NIGHT BEFORE LAST PD

PART THREE PD I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I PERMITTED THE MEETING TO AVOID A CERTAIN STRIKE WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT US INTO OPEN CONFLICT WITH THE WHOLE OF THE PARTIES OF THE

FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARIN I HAVE SPECIFICALLY BARRED USE OF WORD QUOTE PROTEST UNQUOTE IN CONNECTION WITH THE MEETING PD THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO HOLD THIS MEETING T TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY POSSESS POPULAR SUPPORT PD MEETING IS BEING HELD IN ENCLOSED SPACE PD ESTIMATED CAPACITY ~~ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO~~ FIFTEEN THOUSAND PD I CANNOT CONTROL WHAT WILL BE SAID AT THE MEETING PD BUT I CAN CONTROL SUBSEQUENT PUBLICITY PD

PART TWO PD WITHOUT THE SAFETY VALVE OF A MEETING THE STRIKE WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE PD THIS WOULD HAVE ENTAILED TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE THREE PARTIES AND ALMOST CERTAINLY IMPRISONING THEM PD SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE INEVITABLY AFFECTED MOST ADVERSELY OUR ONLY HOPE OF GETTING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ON REACHING ROME PD I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS STILL THE DESIRE OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD MY RUSSIAN COLLEAGUE HAS CONSIDERABLE CONTACTS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY HERE AND THE COMMUNIST LEADER TEDESCHI DINED WITH BOGOMOLOV AND SOLODOVNIK THE NIGHT BEFORE LAST PD

PART THREE PD I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I PERMITTED THE MEETING TO AVOID A CERTAIN STRIKE WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT US INTO OPEN CONFLICT WITH THE WHOLE OF THE PARTIES OF THE

34

9 Mar

SECRET

10 MAR 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1095

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LEST HE IT I NOW WITHDRAW PERMISSION FOR THE MEETING HE WILL DO SO AGAINST A SIMILAR CRISIS IN MY OBJECT IS TO ENSURE TRANQUILLITY IN THE MEANTIME AND A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH HY REASON WHEN AMG BAYCOLLO'N ADMINISTRATION COMES TO AN END.

LAST ITEM BY THERE IS NO MENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S NAME IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PARTIES OF THE COMING MEETING IF YOU WILL RECOLLECT THAT A DIRECTIVE FROM THE COMBINED UNITS OF STAFF SPECIFICALLY FORBADE THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND GRANTED QUOTE THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY UNQUOTE

(341) A

SECRET

L.T. MURTAGH
2 I/C AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

10 MAR 1944

LEFT PD IF I NOW WITHDRAW PERMISSION FOR THE MEETING WE WILL BE UP AGAINST A SIMILAR CRISIS PD MY OBJECT IS TO ENSURE TRANQUILLITY IN THE MEANTIME AND A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL SOLUTION WHEN WE REACH ROME AND BADOGLIO'S ARBITRATION COMES TO AN END PD

PART FOUR PD THERE IS NO MENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S NAME IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PARTIES OF THE COMING MEETING PD YOU WILL RECOLLECT THAT A DIRECTIVE FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF SPECIFICALLY REMOVED THE PREVIOUS BAN ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND GRANTED QUOTE THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY UNQUOTE

L.T. MONTANT
2 Lt AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TO ENSURE TRANQUILLITY IN THE MEANTIME AND A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL SOLUTION WHEN WE REACH ROME AND BADOGLIO'S ADMINISTRATION COMES TO AN END PD PART FOUR PD THERE IS NO MENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S NAME IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PARTIES OF THE COMING MEETING PD YOU WILL RECOLLECT THAT A DIRECTIVE FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF SPECIFICALLY REMOVED THE PREVIOUS BAN ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND GRANTED QUOTE THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY UNQUOTE

Lt. MONTANT
2 Lt AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

(34) A

SECRET

10 MAR 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1098

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

PATINA #103 DCC

10 MAR 1944

SF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C CORR)

SECRET

URGENT

9th. March. 1944.

1005S MACFARLANE

(H)

PERSONAL

6148 ?

YOUR NUMBER SIX ONE FOUR EIGHT MINE FI MARSHAL TO APMC FOR GENERAL WILSON FOR HIS EYES ONLY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAPER

PART ONE FI I HAVE DEFINITE ALLEGATIONS AND CORROBORATION TO HAND IN INFORMING PROMPT THAT REPORTS OF PRESIDENT'S ILLNESS ARE INACCURATE FI THIS WILL HELP TO BREAK THE PATCOLIO FI THEY WANT PATCOLIO RESIGNED IN CIRCUMSTANCES CONSISTENT TO WHICH WE CAN GIVE PUBLICITY FI UNLESS THIS SITUATION ENSUES I DO NOT SEE HOW TO SAVE PATCOLIO MYSELF UNTIL I HAVE CONSENTED OFFICIAL AND CONSENT TO TELL HIM FI

PART TWO FI IT IS NOW FOUR DAYS SINCE THE ARMISTICE WAS ANNOUNCED AND ITALIAN ANXIETY AND APPREHENSION REMAIN GREAT BUT I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DISTURBANCES PENDING RECEIPT OF OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FI I SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL ARRIVE SOONEST POSSIBLE

L.T. MONTAGUE JR
A Lt. ADC
ACTG. AD Jr Exec

(33)L

SECRET

9 MAR 1944

SECRET

FATIMA M103 DCC

10 MAR 1944

SF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

SECRET

URGENT

8th. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

(H)

FREEDOM

61489 ?

YOUR NUMBER SIX ONE FOUR EIGHT NINE PD PASSED TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON FOR HIS EYES ONLY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PASSED

PART ONE PD I HAVE INFORMED ALEXANDER AND CUNNINGHAM PD REBER IS INFORMING PRUNAS THAT REPORTS OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ARE INACCURATE PD THIS WILL HELP TO REASSURE BADOGLIO PD BUT WHAT BADOGLIO REQUIRES IS SOMETHING CONCRETE TO WHICH HE CAN GIVE PUBLICITY PD UNLESS THE SITUATION DEMANDS I DO NOT PROPOSE TO SEE BADOGLIO MYSELF UNTIL I HAVE SOMETHING OFFICIAL AND CONCRETE TO TELL HIM PD

PART TWO PD IT IS NOW FOUR DAYS SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT PD ITALIAN ANXIETY AND APPREHENSION REMAIN GREAT BUT I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DEVELOPMENTS PENDING RECEIPT OF OFFICIAL EXPLANATION PD I SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL ARRIVE SOONEST POSSIBLE

L.T. MONTANT JR
2 Lt. AGD
Actg. Adjutant

file/1000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1099

YOUR NUMBER SIX ONE FOUR EIGHT NINE PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON FOR [illegible]

ONLY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN

PART ONE PD I HAVE INFORMED ALEXANDER AND CUNNINGHAM PD REBER IS INFORMING PRUNAS THAT REPORTS OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ARE INACCURATE PD THIS WILL HELP TO REASSURE BADOGLIO PD BUT WHAT BADOGLIO REQUIRES IS SOMETHING CONCRETE TO WHICH HE CAN GIVE PUBLICITY PD UNLESS THE SITUATION DEMANDS I DO NOT PROPOSE TO SEE BADOGLIO MYSELF UNTIL I HAVE SOMETHING OFFICIAL AND CONCRETE TO TELL HIM PD

PART TWO PD IT IS NOW FOUR DAYS SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT PD ITALIAN ANXIETY AND APPREHENSION REMAIN GREAT BUT I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DEVELOPMENTS PENDING RECEIPT OF OFFICIAL EXPLANATION PD I SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL ARRIVE SOONEST POSSIBLE

L.T. MONTANT JR
2 Lt. AGD
Actg. Adjutant

file/[illegible]

33

8 Mar

SECRET

9 MAR 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1107

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

S!

DS-8 287
9 MAR 944

HQ ACC, APO 394
Sec'y, G-2
Rec'd
By

COPY/ Mar 8/44.

Telephoned by Montanari

(Italian monitored from USA Radio (as from Tass Agency, Moscow))

Badoglio and his Government intend to resign if they do not receive satisfaction concerning Roosevelt's announcement that a third of the Italian fleet will be transferred to the Soviet Union because no responsible government could continue to exercise its functions in the present situation. The Government circles communicate that Badoglio has decidedto resign Monday if he does not receive further details.

Circles of the Badoglio Government state that the Head of the Allied Control Commission, General MacFarlane, was called by Badoglio Saturday on Badoglio's own request and communicate that MacFarlane himself had expressed surprise at Roosevelt's announcement. The Badoglio government and its Cabinet assert that the division of the Italian fleet would obviously be a special slight for King Victor Emmanuel who is entirely responsible for the surrender of the fleet to the Allies. Badoglio said that only a small part of the fleet actually is at present free in Italian harbours principelly in Taranto.

- - - - - - - - - - -

No action. PWB put a "stop" on this. FNMM, 8/3

33a ✓ 5

I telephoned to Naples by Montanari

Was sent to us from Naples

8 Mar

300.1

1102

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FATIMA 1610

Dept C. C.

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

SECRET

URGENT

4th. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE
/s/ S/L Perry

FREEDOM RPTD HQ A.C.M.F.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT REFERRED TO IN PART THREE OF IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM PD PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MAKINS AND REINHARDT RPTD HEADQUARTERS ACMF PERSONAL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN BEGINS ON THE PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ALLIED SUPREME COMMAND CMA AND PROMPTED BY THE DESIRE OF UPHOLDING THE WAR EFFORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CMA THE ACTION CMA SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES CMA DESPITE THEIR ABSOLUTE DISAPPROVAL OF THE POLICY BEING PURSUED IN ITALY CMA HAVE DECIDED WHILE AWAITING THE ANSWER OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE EXECUTIVE GIUNTA FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN CRISIS CMA TO SUSPEND THE DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANIZED FOR SATURDAY CMA MARCH FOUR FOR A TEN MINUTE SUSPENSION OF WORK PD THE THREE PARTIES DESIRE IN THIS WAY TO PROVIDE YET ANOTHER PROOF OF THEIR COMPLETE SUPPORT OF THE MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE WAR CMA WHICH IS BEING FOUGHT AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY PD IN PLACE OF THE SUSPENSION OF WORK CMA THE THREE PARTIES ARE ORGANISING A MASS MEETING WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN A LARGE CITY SQUARE ON SUNDAY CMA MARCH TWELFTH PD AT THE SAME TIME ALL NECESSARY MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN FROM MARCH THIRTEENTH TO INITIATE A POPULAR PETITION TAKEN BY SIGNATURE PD THIS DECISION HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORKERS' TRADE UNIONS BELONGING TO THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR PD ENDS

L.T. MONTANT Jr
2nd Lt, AGD
Adjutent

SECRET

6 MAR 1944

1103

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FATIMA 1609

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM.)

SECRET

URGENT

4th. March, 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM RPTD HQ A.C.M.F.

PART ONE PD YESTERDAY MORNING THE THREE PARTIES PUBLISHED A CIRCULAR STATING THAT WORK IN THE DOCKYARD AND ON ESSENTIAL SERVICES WAS NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED STRIKE PD PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MAKINS AND REINHARDT RPTD HQ ACMF PERSONAL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF REGION THREE INTERVIEWED LABOUR LEADERS AND WITH EXCEPTION OF THE NAPLES CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR UNION LEADERS AGREED NOT TO TAKE PART IN THE STRIKE PD LEADERS OF CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR AGREED THAT STRIKE ACTION WAS UNDESIRABLE BUT DID NOT WISH TO LET THE PARTY LEADERS DOWN PD THEY ASKED IF I WOULD RECEIVE THEM AND THE PARTY LEADERS PD PART TWO PD I SAW THEM YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND REPLATED MY INSTRUCTION THAT STRIKE ACTION WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED PD PART THREE PD LATER IN THE EVENING THE SAME DEPUTATION CAME TO SEE ME WITH A DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT FOR PRESS AND RADIO CALLING OFF THE STRIKE PD WITH CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS I APPROVED ITS ISSUE AND FINAL TEXT FOLLOWS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM PD PART FOUR PD YOU WILL NOTE THAT I HAVE RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THE PARTIES HOLDING A PUBLIC MEETING ON SUNDAY MARCH TWELFTH NOR TO THEIR PREPARING A PETITION PD IT WAS NATURALLY MADE VERY CLEAR THAT THE MEETING COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGEMENTS APPROVED BY REGIONAL COMMISSIONER THIRD REGION PD IN MY OPINION AND THAT OF MY ADVISERS INCLUDING REBER AND SOLODOVNIK IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ALLOW THE PARTIES SOME LAWFUL AND ORDERLY METHOD OF DEMONSTRATING THE WEIGHT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT WHICH THEY CLAIM AND WHICH THEY CONSIDER HAS BEEN CALLED IN QUESTION PD FAILURE TO DO THIS WILL INEVITABLY BRING MATTERS TO A HEAD PD WE WOULD THEN BE FORCED TO APPREHEND PARTY LEADERS AND THE PROSPECTS OF A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE UNAVOIDABLE POLITICAL REORGANISATION WHEN WE REACH ROME WOULD BE GRAVELY PREJUDICED AS WOULD THE CONTINUANCE OF ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION IN THE COUNTRY.

NOT Float file

6 MAR 1944 XXII

1104

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4887

NAVAL MESSAGE

CLNC MED (ALGIERS AND NAPLES)
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

FROM: FOTALI

MOST SECRET

A JET BOMB STRUCK FOR 15 MINUTES IN TARANTO DOCKYARD AND FOUR YARD CRAFT DAMAGED FOR LOSS TO-DAY SATURDAY IN A PROTEST AGAINST PRIME MINISTER'S ALLEGED RECENT STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT HE CONSIDERED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BELOW PAR HAD ARRANGED ARMISTICE AND NOT KEPT UP FACTS AND AS THE ONLY WORKABLE GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT. IT WAS CLEARLY AT THIS IS NOT TRUE. THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO WHETHER STRIKE TOOK PLACE FOR WORK WAS PROCEEDING NORMALLY. IF IT DID, IT WILL RAISE HEARTED AND WITHOUT INCIDENTS

T.O.O.O; 1637 DAK

DISP: LOG A SHC SO ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION VIA FLAMPO

ACTION
INFO

ACTION O.A. DK
INFO SECRETARY GENERAL
DEP CC
POLAD
FILE
FLOAT

MOST SECRET

COPY

(27) d

4 Docs.

1105

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy Capt Stone

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION OUTGOING MESSAGE FM/hjp

SVC/RELAY NO. M/C NO :

CLASS: MOST SECRET REF NO: 2430

PREC : URGENT FILED : 4 MAR

FROM : FATIMA REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM, UPTD HQ ACMF

MARSHAL BADOGLIO ASK ME TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING PD PART TO FREEDOM FOR EYES ONLY OF GENERAL WILSON GMA REINHARDT AND MAKING REPEATED TO HQ ACMF FOR EYES ONLY OF GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FROM FATIMA PART 1 PART ONE PD HE WAS MOST UPSET AT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT APOSTROPHE S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ITALIAN FLEET PD HE STATED THAT THIS STATEMENT MADE HIS POSITION QUITE IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT HE WOULD LOSE ENTIRELY THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT NOT ONLY OF THE ITALIAN NAVY BUT OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY PD HE WAS VERY HURT AT THE FACT THAT THE FIRST INTIMATION OF THE PRESIDENT APOSTROPHE S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE REACHED HIM THROUGH REUTERS PD HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION TO THE KING AT ONCE PD HE HAD NO DESIRE TO MAKE A DIFFICULT SITUATION EVEN MORE DIFFICULT BY TAKING THIS ACTION AND CONSIDERED THAT IT MIGHT VERY WELL LEAD TO THE KING APOSTROPHE S ABDICATION BUT THE MARSHAL CONSIDERED THAT HIS PERSONAL AUTHORITY HAD BEEN UNDERMINED AND HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE PD PART TWO PD I INFORMED THE MARSHAL THAT NEITHER I NOR THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE ACC HAD HAD PREVIOUS NOTICE OF THE PRESIDENT APOSTROPHE S STATEMENT AND THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF IT CONSISTED ONLY OF RADIO AND PRESS REPORTS PD I TOLD THE MARSHAL THAT I WOULD TELEGRAPH 3 AC AT ONCE ASKING FOR OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT AND EARNESTLY REQUEST THE MARSHAL NOT TO TAKE HIS PROPOSED ACTION UNTIL I RECEIVED A REPLY PD PART THREE PD THE MARSHAL PROMISED TO HOLD HIS HAND PENDING MY RECEIPT OF A REPLY BUT EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR GREAT URGENCY AS HIS POSITION HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE

(33)

2430
4 Mar 44

Oct 1 1000 Pittsburgh

Fill 1700

1106

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE NO. _____ TP FREEDOM RPTD HQ ACMF (CONT'D)

AUTHENTICATED:

HENRY W. STONE,
Captain, USNR,
Deputy Chief Commissioner

This message
cleared freedom — 1616
HCMF — 1645

Teletype

1107

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U.S. SECRET Equals Brit. MOST SECRET

6 MAR 1944 2175

FN34/hjp

1/04

MOST SECRET

URGENT

FATIMA

FREEDOM RITD HQ ACMF

2130

MAF 041423/
041510/

SECRET CIPHER

TO FREEDOM FOR EYES OF GENERAL WILSON ONLY REINHART AND MACINES RPTD HQ ACMF FOR EYES ONLY GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FROM FATIMA

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY W. STONE
Capt. USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AC
1 - DSC
1 - DCC
1 - Telecommunications

U.S. SECRET Equals Brit. MOST SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

4745

DSM 281

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION...INCOMING MESSAGE...3 MAR 44

CLASS.....S
PREC......"C"
FROM.....FREEDOM
TO.....FATIMA

HEADQUARTERS
3 MAR 1944
A. C. C.

M/C NO.....21/03
REF NO.....59358
FILED.....031320
RECD.....031435
J LEE

FHCIC. PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE FROM GENERAL WILSON (PAREN TO FATIMA REPEATED FIFTH ARMY REAR). REFERENCE YOUR 1150 OF 2ND MARCH. I APPROVE YOUR PROPOSAL THAT IN THE EVENT OF STRIKE NOT BEING CALLED OFF, THE LEADERS OF THE 3 PARTIES SHOULD BE GIVEN 24 HOURS TO LEAVE AMG TERRITORY AND STRONG WARNING FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD BE ISSUED AT THE SAME TIME.

ACC DISTRIBUTION:

Action.....Secretary General
Info.....Dep C C
C A Br
File

SECRET

4 MAR 1944

1109

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref. 122(000.1)

CONFIDENTIAL

DS J 241
F 5 MED 1944

FNEM:/rj

2nd. March, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Brigadier General A.W. Pence, USA.
Commending, Peninsular Base Section.

SUBJECT: Strikes and Demonstrations by Civilian Employees of U.S. Army.

1. I have received your note of 1st. March, 1944. relative to the proposed ten minute strike on 4th. March.

2. I am aware of the proposed strike and recognise that it is the responsibility of the Allied Control Commission to take all steps necessary to prevent any interference with the normal functioning of Army operations.

3. I have personally been in contact with leaders of the various political parties and through Allied Military Government Officers with the heads of the various labour unions and I am hopeful that the proposed strike will be called off.

for NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

4 MAR 1944
XXII

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(32)

1150

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MOST SECRET

OUTGOING

FROM/dfe

DTG 081240Z MAR 44

file/400 Fatima 1523

MAR 07

(H)

MOST SECRET

URGENT

FATIMA

FRSEIGN PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON, NAPLES.
AMB MURPHY

O/L

> 1 4 2 3

REFERENCE MY FATIMA ONE FOUR SEVEN FIVE PD TO FRSEIGN PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA NAPLES AND MURPHY FROM FATIMA SIGNET MACFARLANE PD AFTER MY MEETING YESTERDAY WITH THE JUNTA WE OBTAINED COPIES OF A MANIFESTO ISSUED AS A PAMPHLET IN THE NAPLES AREA BY THE COMMUNIST CMA SOCIALIST AND ACTION PARTIES PT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PAMPHLET HAS PRODUCED AND BANNED BEFORE MY MEETING WITH THE JUNTA PD PART TWO PD AFTER STATING THAT CHURCHILL'S POSTPONE S RECENT REMARKS SHOWED A FALSE APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION THE PAMPHLET CALLS ON ALL WORKERS CMA EMPLOYEES CMA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN TO SUSPEND WORK FOR TEN MINUTES FROM ELEVEN TO ELEVEN TEN ABLE NINE ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH PD TO SHOW THAT SUCH ACTION IS NOT A STRIKE BUT ONLY A POLITICAL ANTIFASCIST MANIFESTATION THOSE PARTICIPATING ARE CALLED ON TO WORK AN EXTRA QUARTER OF AN HOUR FROM TWELVE TO TWELVE FIFTEEN ON THE SAME DAY PD THE PAMPHLET CONCLUDES WITH FOLLOWING SENTENCE PD QUOTE BY PARALYZING FOR TEN MINUTES THE ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE OF THE CITY THE NEOPOLITANS WILL TELL CHURCHILL 3rd OUR COUNTRY WANTS PD FULL TEXT OF PAMPHLET FOLLOWS SEPARATELY PD PART THREE PD I AM TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTION PD ONE PD COLONEL POLETTI CMA CHIEF OF REGION THREE CMA IS SUMMONING ALL THE LABOR LEADERS IN NAPLES TO INFORM THEM THAT THE PROPOSED STOPPAGE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THEY WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF HIS ORDERS ARE NOT OBEYED PD TWO PD I AM ORDERING THE JUNTA REPRESENTATIVES

3 - MAR 1944

MOST SECRET

OUTGOING FM3M/dfe

DTG 3:0
8 MAR 1944

file/100 Fatima 1523

MAR 07

(H)

MOST SECRET

URGENT

FATIMA

FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON, HAKINS, AND REINHARDT

OK

→1473

REFERENCE MY FATIMA ONE FOUR SEVEN FIVE PD TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA HAKINS AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD AFTER MY MEETING YESTERDAY WITH THE JUNTA WE OBTAINED COPIES OF A MANIFESTO ISSUED AS A PAMPHLET IN THE NAPLES AREA BY THE COMMUNIST CMA SOCIALIST AND ACTION PARTIES PD IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PAMPHLET WAS PRODUCED AND ISSUED BEFORE MY MEETING WITH THE JUNTA PD PART TWO PD AFTER STATING THAT CHURCHILL APOSTROPHE S RECENT REMARKS SHOWED A FALSE APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION THE PAMPHLET CALLS ON ALL WORKMEN CMA EMPLOYEES CMA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN TO SUSPEND WORK FOR TEN MINUTES FROM ELEVEN TO ELEVEN TEN ABLE MIKE ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH PD TO SHOW THAT SUCH ACTION IS NOT A STRIKE BUT ONLY A POLITICAL ANTIFASCIST MANIFESTATION THOSE PARTICIPATING ARE CALLED ON TO WORK AN EXTRA QUARTER OF AN HOUR FROM TWELVE TO TWELVE FIFTEEN ON THE SAME DAY PD THE PAMPHLET CONCLUDES WITH FOLLOWING SENTENCE PD QUOTE BY PARALYZING FOR TEN MINUTES THE ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE OF THE CITY THE NEOPOLITANS WILL TELL CHURCHILL WHAT OUR COUNTRY WANTS PD FULL TEXT OF PAMPHLET FOLLOWS SEPARATELY PD PART THREE PD I AM TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTION PD ONE PD COLONEL POLETTI CMA CHIEF OF REGION THERE CMA IS SUMMONING ALL THE LABOR LEADERS IN NAPLES TO INFORM THEM THAT THE PROPOSED STOPPAGE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THEY WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE

COPY

3750

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MEETING YESTERDAY WITH THE JUNTA WE OBTAINED COPIES OF A MANIFESTO ISSUED AS A PAMPHLET IN THE NAPLES AREA BY THE COMMUNIST CMA SOCIALIST AND ACTION PARTIES PD IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PAMPHLET WAS PRODUCED AND ISSUED BEFORE MY MEETING WITH THE JUNTA PD PART TWO PD AFTER STATING THAT CHURCHILL APOSTROPHE S RECENT REMARKS SHOWED A FALSE APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION THE PAMPHLET CALLS ON ALL WORKMEN CMA EMPLOYEES CMA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN TO SUSPEND WORK FOR TEN MINUTES FROM ELEVEN TO ELEVEN TEN ABLE MIKE ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH PD TO SHOW THAT SUCH ACTION IS NOT A STRIKE BUT ONLY A POLITICAL ANTIFASCIST MANIFESTATION THOSE PARTICIPATING ARE CALLED ON TO WORK AN EXTRA QUARTER OF AN HOUR FROM TWELVE TO TWELVE FIFTEEN ON THE SAME DAY PD THE PAMPHLET CONCLUDES WITH FOLLOWING SENTENCE PD QUOTE BY PARALYZING FOR TEN MINUTES THE ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE OF THE CITY THE NEOPOLITANS WILL TELL CHURCHILL WHAT OUR COUNTRY WANTS PD FULL TEXT OF PAMPHLET FOLLOWS SEPARATELY PD PART THREE PD I AM TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTION PD ONE PD COLONEL POLETTI CMA CHIEF OF REGION THREE CMA IS SUMMONING ALL THE LABOR LEADERS IN NAPLES TO INFORM THEM THAT THE PROPOSED STOPPAGE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THEY WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF HIS ORDERS ARE NOT OBEYED PD TWO PD I AM ORDERING THE JUNTA REPRESENTATIVES

MOST SECRET

3 - MAR 1944

2 Mar

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FARGO 1176
FATIMA

8 MAR 1944

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMD)

SECRET

URGENT

1st. March. 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

OK
(1475) FATIMA

FIFTH REFERENCE TO MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM FD FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON, MAYNE AND EVERSH FD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR SEVEN FIVE FD FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE FROM EXECUTIVE JUNTA TO PRIME MINISTER FF BEGINS FD THE PERMANENT EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF LIBERATED ITALY, BEING CONVINCED THAT THE WAR EFFORT IS THE SUPREME OBJECTIVE, ASSURES YOU - CONTRARY TO OTHER INFORMATION THAT HAS REACHED YOU - THAT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND ARMY WILL MAKE A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THAN AT PRESENT AS SOON AS ITALIANS TOO ARE ALLOWED THAT LIBERTY WHICH IT IS THE AIM OF THE WAR TO BRING ABOUT TO ENDS

1 add

file 478

Lt. MCKEANT JR 2105
Actg. Adjutant.

(32) 1 Annex

2

SECRET

~~FARGO~~ 1476
FATIMA

(H)

PSY 255
8 MAR 1944

SF

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

1st. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

OK
(1475) FATIMA

WITH REFERENCE TO MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM PD ~~FARGO~~ FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON, MAKINS AND REHER PD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR SEVEN SIX PD FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE FROM EXECUTIVE JUNTA TO PRIME MINISTER PD BEGINS PD THE PERMANENT EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF LIBERATED ITALY, BEING CONVINCED THAT THE WAR EFFORT IS THE SUPREME OBJECTIVE, ASSURES YOU - CONTRARY TO OTHER INFORMATION THAT HAS REACHED YOU - THAT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND ARMY WILL MAKE A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THAN AT PRESENT AS SOON AS ITALIANS TOO ARE ALLOWED THAT LIBERTY WHICH IT IS THE AIM OF THE WAR TO BRING ABOUT PD ENDS

FDO 1

file/FDR

L.T. MONTANT JR
2 Lt. AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON, MAXINS AND REBER PD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR SEVEN SIX PD FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE FROM EXECUTIVE JUNTA TO PRIME MINISTER PD BEGINS PD THE PERMANENT EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF LIBERATED ITALY, BEING CONVINCED THAT THE WAR EFFORT IS THE SUPREME OBJECTIVE, ASSURES YOU - CONTRARY TO OTHER INFORMATION THAT HAS REACHED YOU - THAT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND ARMY WILL MAKE A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THAN AT PRESENT AS SOON AS ITALIANS TOO ARE ALLOWED THAT LIBERTY WHICH IT IS THE AIM OF THE WAR TO BRING ABOUT PD ENDS

File/708

L.T. MONTANT JR
2 Lt. AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

32 b

1 Mar

2 - MAR 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Outgoing cable, Reference No. 1523, continued:

DSJ 250
8 MAR 1944

OF THE THREE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ISSUE IN THE PRESS TOMORROW MORNING AND ON THE RADIO COMMENCING TONIGHT AN ANNOUNCEMENT INFORMING EVERYONE THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE PAMPHLET ARE NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE FOLLOWED FD I AM INFORMING THESE THREE MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA THAT IF MY INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT SATISFACTORILY BY NOON TOMORROW I WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM FD PART FOUR FD IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION AND THAT OF MY ADVISERS THAT WE CAN ONLY DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BY BEING TOUGH FD THE LEADERS OF THE THREE PARTIES OF THE LEFT CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO FLOUT OUR AUTHORITY IN THIS WAY AND ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY AS MARTYRS WELCOME OUR TAKING ACTION AGAINST THEM THERE IS IN MY OPINION NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE OPEN TO US UNLESS THEY COMPLY WITH MY ORDERS

AUTHENTICATED:

L. T. MONTANT, Jr
2nd Lt, AGD
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Gen. Alexander

(32) d

1118

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIA

DRL 241 (ATIS)
5 MAR 1944

HEADQUARTERS
PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
Office of the Commanding General
APO 782

1 March 1944

AG 004.07
BPFCO 1 MAR '44

S-199

Subject: Strikes and Demonstrations by Civilian Employees of U. S. Army.

To : Chief Commissioner, Headquarters Allied Control Commission, Office of the Deputy President, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to reports that Italian workers are to stage a 10 minute strike on 4 March 1944.

2. It is believed that all contact with the officials of the various unions or with the leaders of the political parties sponsoring them should be made by Allied Military Government officials.

3. This Headquarters is concerned with strikes and demonstrations only from the point of view of preventing any interference with the normal functioning of Army installations. Such action on the part of Allied Military Government authorities as will insure this objective is requested.

000.1

NO ACC APO 394
Records Center
By NARS 215354
NB

A. W. PENCE
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

HQ PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
2 MAR 1944
A. C. Co.

ANF/js

3450

17

(32)

CONFIDENTIAL

1119

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy

SECRET

DS/AI 2
8 MAR 1944
SECRET

FATIMA 1475 - NAPLES

SF

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

1 March 1944

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

HQ ACC APO 512
Secy Gen
Rec'd
(#32)
By

FREEDOM

REFERENCE MY FARGO ONE FOUR FOUR TWO PD PART ONE PD I HAVE JUST SEEN THE JUNTA PD FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MAKING AND REBER PD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR SEVEN FIVE PD I TOLD THEM MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT NO ACTION SUCH AS THE PROPOSED STRIKE FOR NEXT SATURDAY WOULD BE PERMITTED PD THE CENTRE PARTIES POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT STATED THAT THEY WOULD INFORM THEIR PARTIES IMMEDIATELY OF MY INSTRUCTIONS PD PART TWO PD SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA AFFIRMED THAT THEY REPRESENTED A FAR LARGER PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAN DID THE GOVERNMENT OF BADOGLIO AND THAT THEY FOUND THEMSELVES IN A MOST DIFFICULT POSITION AS THEY WERE DEPRIVED OF ANY METHOD BY WHICH THEY COULD ATTAIN THEIR ENDS PD THEY HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT AND THEIR NUMEROUS FOLLOWERS WERE BECOMING VERY RESTIVE AT THEIR FAILURE TO PRODUCE RESULTS PD PART THREE PD I REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A POLITICAL DISCUSSION PD I INFORMED THEM THAT IT WAS MY DESIRE TO KEEP THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS FULLY INFORMED OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN OCCUPIED ITALY PD THAT I WAS ALWAYS PREPARED TO FORWARD ANY COMMUNICATIONS THAT THE JUNTA MIGHT WISH TO MAKE TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PF BUT THAT THIS WAS CONDITIONAL UPON THE JUNTA DOING NOTHING WHICH MIGHT DISLOCATE THE EXISTING AIMINIS* TRATION OR IMPEDE THE WAR EFFORT PD PART FOUR PD THE JUNTA TOOK NOTE OF THIS AND I HAVE NOW AGREED TO FORWARD A SHORT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH THE JUNTA HANDED IN YESTERDAY PD SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM PD PART FIVE PD BEFORE MEETING THE JUNTA I INFORMED GENERAL SOLODOVNIK OF MY PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION PD HE AGREED ENTIRELY AND WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE MEETING PD LT COL MONFORT USA AND MR CACCIA WERE ALSO PRESENT

(32)

1120

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/F/120(600.1)

FEMS/rj

1st. March, 1944.

For 1270

As you asked, I telegraphed to the Prime Minister the message which you gave to me on the 29rd. February.

Mr. Winston Churchill has now replied requesting me to transmit to Y.E. his personal thanks for your message.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

H.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
Capo del Governo.

4 MAR Rec'd

(27) to 2
1 Mar

1121

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/F/118

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

DS/ 231
2 MAR 1944

FNMM/rj

29th. February, 1944.

I enclose herewith copy of a telegram which I sent to Freedom this morning. It explains itself.

2. As there was sufficient time to get an answer from Algiers I thought it sound to get General Wilson's agreement to my proposed action with the Junta tomorrow.

3. I propose to have my Russian General present at my meeting with the Junta. He is already pretty thick with the leaders of the three parties of the Left but he is very sound on the question of stopping anything that might tend to dislocate war effort.

4. Incidentally, I have just heard that Pogulomov, the head of the Russian Section of the Advisory Council, is arriving in Naples tomorrow with a party of eleven to take up his permanent residence here. He and his party will doubtless find lots to occupy them in the political field but they can hardly come into our complicated picture here until the rest of the Advisory Council arrive. The Council can only give the agreed advice of all its members.

5. I hear that Harold MacMillan is due back in Algiers about March 8th. and that Bob Murphy should arrive from America shortly after that date.

6. I hope very much you will be able to come to my monthly meeting which I told you about on Friday, the 3rd. at 1100 a.m.. I think you might find it quite interesting. We meet in my Headquarters (Headquarters, A.C.;C) in the Provincia Building in Naples.

file/100

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Gen Alexander

1 - MAR 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

SECRET

FARGO 1442

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 29th. February, 1944.

SECRET 10050 - MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

PART ONE. POLITICAL SECTION HAVE INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY OF JUNTA THAT LEADERS OF SOCIALIST, COMMUNIST AND ACTION PARTIES PROPOSE TO CALL TEN MINUTES STRIKE IN NAPLES AREA ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH AS PROTEST AGAINST PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT PD FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON, MAKINS AND REBER PD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR FOUR TWO PD APPARENTLY THEY INTEND TO INSTRUCT WORKERS TO WORK FIFTEEN MINUTES OVERTIME DURING LUNCH INTERVAL TO COMPENSATE PD

PART TWO PD I HAVE ARRANGED TO RECEIVE THE LEADERS OF THE JUNTA AT AT ONE ONE ZERO ZERO HOURS TOMORROW FIRST MARCH AND PROPOSE TO INFORM THEM THAT NO SUCH ACTION CAN BE PERMITTED PD I HAVE ALSO PUT COMPLETE STOP ON PUBLICITY IN ITALY AS REGARDS INTENTION OF THE THREE PARTIES BUT PRESS MESSAGES ON THE SUBJECT HAVE BY NOW ALMOST CERTAINLY REACHED UK AND USA.

PART THREE PD JUNTA HAVE SUBMITTED A SHORT COMMENT ON PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT WHICH I HAVE REFUSED TO FORWARD UNLESS THEY GIVE DEFINITE UNDERTAKING TO CEASE ALL ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH WAR EFFORT PD

PART FOUR PD PLEASE REPLY URGENT WHETHER YOU APPROVE ACTION I PROPOSE TO TAKE TOMORROW PD

PART FIVE PD WE ARE BEING ASKED CONTINUALLY WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE OFFICIAL ANSWER TO THE MEMORANDUM OF THE JUNTA TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD IT WILL HELP ME VERY GREATLY IF I COULD BE INFORMED BEFORE TOMORROW'S MEETING WHETHER THIS IS THE CASE OR WHETHER THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS INTEND TO PRODUCE A SPECIFIC AGREED REPLY

L.T. MONTANT, JR.
2d Lt AGD
Actg Adjutant

SECRET

1123

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

1944 FEB 1944

FMMM/hjp

2/27

2403

FEB

27/2 3:P

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

IMMEDIATE

27 FEB. 1944

SYDNEY ZANTMAN CALLED ON ME TODAY TO BE SURE THAT HE WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO COLLABORATE WITH ME AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE IN HIS TASK OF FREEING THE COUNTRY OF TRAITORS TO PAGES TO PREPARE FOR COLLAPSE IN CHIEF CHA MAKING CHA REINHARDT CHA AND MIS FRAU MACFARLANE PERSONAL FROM FATIMA MADRID HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE CAN NOT TOUCH ANY OFFICIALS APPOINTED BY US WITHOUT OUR CONSENT TO ME TOLD ME THAT HE HAD INVITED THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION TO COLLABORATE WITH HIM IN HIS TASK TO WHICH HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED THE COMMITTEE'S REPLY BUT HAS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO HIS EXPLAINED THAT IN DEALING WITH TRAITORS THERE WOULD BE FOUR DEGREES OF SEVERITY OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THOSE CHA WHO TO RESIGN CHIEF THEIR OFFICES TO TAKE NO CONFINEMENT IN CONCENTRATION CAMP TO THOSE TO ORDINARY PROCEDURE BY ORDINARY COURTS FOR ORDINARY CRIME AL OFFENCES TO RUN TO TRIAL BY SPECIAL TRIBUNAL UNDER MILITARY LAW IN CASES OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE TO I HAD FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ZANTMAN WHO HAS STRAIGHT AND ALMOST GENTLE MANNERS FOR ONE WHO HAD ADMITTED TO BE AN ASSASSIN TO HE HAD ACCOMPANIED BY STAFF CHIEF FROM GENOA WHO IS COLLABORATING WITH HIM TO I HAVE HEARD QUASIF AND GIVE IT FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH THAT ZANTMAN WHO IS A SOCIALIST INTENDS TO RETAIN SOME PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICES AND THEREBY GET THE MACHINE RUNNING ON THE SPOT TO HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF THIS DURING OUR INTERVIEW

1-00000

AUTHENTICATED:

Jake Lyon

M.R.A. MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - AG Files
2 - Dep Sec Gen
1 - Chief Commissioner
1 - Deputy Chief Comm.

SECRET

SECRET

1778 24 FEB 1944

OUTGOING

FRMM/hjp

2/27

2403

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

FREEDOM

27 FEB 1944

FEB

271230A

SIGNOR ZANIBONI CALLED ON ME TODAY PD HE STATED THAT HE WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO COLLABORATE WITH ME AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE IN HIS TASK OF PURGING THE COUNTRY OF FASCISTS PD PAREN TO FREEDOM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF CMA MAKINS CMA REINHARDT CMA AND MGS FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FROM FATIMA PAREN HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE CAN NOT TOUCH ANY OFFICIALS APPOINTED BY US WITHOUT OUR CONSENT PD HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS INVITING THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION TO COLLABORATE WITH HIM IN HIS TASK PD HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED THE COMMITTEE APOSTROPHE S REPLY BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD AGREE PD HE EXPLAINED THAT IN DEALING WITH FASCISTS THERE WOULD BE FOUR DEGREES OF SEVERITY OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THEM CLN ONE PD REMOVAL ONLY FROM OFFICE PD TWO PD CONFINEMENT IN CONCENTRATION CAMP PD THREE PD CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY ORDINARY COURTS FOR ORDINARY CRIMINAL OFFENSES PD FOUR PD TRIAL BY SPECIAL TRIBUNAL UNDER MILITARY LAW IN CASES OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE STATE PD I WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ZANIBONI WHO HAS CHARMING AND ALMOST GENTLE MANNERS FOR ONE WHO HAS ASPIRED TO BE AN ASSASSIN PD HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SIGNOR ONETTO FROM GENOA WHO IS COLLABORATING WITH HIM PD I HAVE HEARD GOSSIP AND GIVE IT FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH THAT ZANIBONI WHO IS A SOCIALIST INTENDS TO ARRAIGN SOME PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SERVICES AND THEREBY PUT THE BADOGLIO REGIME ON THE SPOT PD HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF THIS DURING OUR INTERVIEW

AUTHENTICATED:

File/[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PARKS TO FREEDOM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF CMA MAKING CMA REINHARDT CMA AND LTRS FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FROM FATIMA PARKS HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE CAN NOT TOUCH ANY OFFICIALS APPOINTED BY US WITHOUT OUR CONSENT PD HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS INVITING THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION TO COLLABORATE WITH HIM IN HIS TASK PD HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED THE COMMITTEE APOSTROPHE S REPLY BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD AGREE PD HE EXPLAINED THAT IN DEALING WITH FASCISTS THERE WOULD BE FOUR DEGREES OF SEVERITY OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THEM CLN ONE PD REMOVAL ONLY FROM OFFICE PD TWO PD CONFINEMENT IN CONCENTRATION CAMP PD THREE PD CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY ORDINARY COURTS FOR ORDINARY CRIMINAL OFFENSES PD FOUR PD TRIAL BY SPECIAL TRIBUNAL UNDER MILITARY LAW IN CASES OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE STATE PD I WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ZANIBONI WHO HAS CHARMING AND ALMOST GENTLE MANNERS FOR ONE WHO HAS ASPIRED TO BE AN ASSASSIN PD HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SIGNOR ORETTO FROM GENOA WHO IS COLLABORATING WITH HIM PD I HAVE HEARD GOSSIP AND GIVE IT FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH THAT ZANIBONI WHO IS A SOCIALIST INTENDS TO ARRAIGN SOME PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SERVICES AND THEREBY PUT THE BADOGLIO REGIME ON THE SPOT PD HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF THIS DURING OUR INTERVIEW

AUTHENTICATED: Feb 1945

Distribution:
2 - AG Files
2 - Dep Sec Gen
1 - Chief Commissioner
1 - Deputy Chief Comm.

SECRET

NEIL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/P/110.

29 FEB 1944

FNM/rj

27th. February, 1944.

I have received a letter from Signor Alberto Tarchiani and wrote to him to thank him for it but my letter was returned with the remark on the envelope that Signor Tarchiani was not at the given address. You will doubtless be seeing him and I would be very grateful if you would thank him on my behalf for his letter which I read with interest.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

COUNT CARLO SFORZA.

28 FEB 1944

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

PAGE 1340

FAIRBANKS (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

26th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

EGENT

FREEDOM EYES ONLY GENERAL WILSON FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

_____ The King's offer which I communicated to you in my Fatima 2358 is naturally secret. I have not informed General Golodovnik. I am, however, anxious lest he might receive information on the subject from Russian member of the Advisory Council. or from Local Leakage HQ I feel, therefore, that I ought to let him know the King's offer for his own information and for transmission if he wishes only to Russian member of Advisory Council or Moscow

1128

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/F/106

PERSONAL

SF

FMM:rj

26th. February, 1944.

Your letter of 17th. February No. 2022/6G has only just reached me. I am sorry for the delay but it appears to have been held up here.

2. I think that probably most of your troubles have been in Apulia which, as you know, has never been under A.M.G. control. Now that Apulia is under McCaffery and included in my Region II, A.C.C., I hope that there will be an improvement.

3. The question of getting rid of officials, etc., who were either willy-nilly Fascist members or collaborated with the Fascist administration is one of the greatest difficulty. If we got rid of everyone who collaborated in the Fascist administration we are left with practically no one of any use for carrying on. That there are still undesirables in office is, I am afraid, almost inevitable but I am continually urging all concerned to get rid of all those, at any rate, who were pronouncedly Fascist. It is a most difficult job for my fellows in the provinces and communes where most of the population turn informer against each other, and sifting truth from false accusation is sometimes almost impossible. I am doing my best and hope that the situation will improve.

4. You will doubtless refer any specific cases which come to your notice to McCaffery and if he is unable to produce results he will let me know and I will bring pressure to bear through the Italian Government.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Major-General E.P. Nares, C.B.E., M.C.,
G. O. C.,
No.2. District,
B A R I.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/P/102.

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

FMM/rj

26th. February. 1944.

I have read all the enclosed papers.

2. I have thought over the question very hard and have come to the very definite conclusion that any inquiry regarding Von Rahden or any efforts made on his behalf from any possible source would almost inevitably prove disastrous to Von Rahden.

3. I know my Russians fairly well and had experience of somewhat similar cases during my year in the country. Without exception intervention of this sort failed, generally with the unhappiest results for the individuals concerned.

4. As regards the suggestion put forward by Airey I can confidently say that the Russians would never dream of giving him up on such grounds. I hardly suppose it is possible to get instructions through to Von Rahden but I think his only hope would be to pretend to be an ardent anti-Nazi and champion of Communism and to volunteer for employment as an agent. In this case the Russians might well be prepared to infiltrate him or drop him by parachute into Germany or some German occupied country if not even to some neutral country.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC.
Commander-in-Chief.
A. C. M. F..

Note by Gen. Mason Macfarlane: "I have retained original and am sending this by hand."

1130

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/P/103

CONFIDENTIAL

PWB

FREM/rj

26th. February, 1944.

I have only just received your memorandum on Psychological Warfare policy and control.

2. I had a long talk with General Alexander last night on the subject of P.W.B. and had just written you a letter on the subject. I am, however, not sending it to you and hope that with this new directive and control organisation things will be more satisfactory in the future.

3. During the last couple of days I have been having talks with some of the new senior P.W.B. officials in this country and we have already come to various arrangements to ensure better liaison and collaboration. As you know, one of my principal headaches in the past has been the political activity and partiality which P.W.B. has so frequently displayed. I hope that that era is now a thing of the past.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GBE, KCB, DSO, MC,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

(21)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/F/100

DF

S.Y. 214
27 FEB. 1944

FNMM/rj

26th. February. 1944.

Thank you for your letter of 23rd. February in which you enclosed a telegram from Senator Croce and yourself to Mr. Churchill.

You asked me to use my discretion in the matter of forwarding this telegram and I did so to the extent of telegraphing at once a brief resumé of your telegram in which I made all the points you wished to stress.

I was very interested in your letter.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

COUNT CARLO SFORZA.

100 3173

(27) c. 2

27 FEB

1132

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/P/97

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

27 FEB 1944 FNLM/rj

25th. February, 1944.

I enclose herewith copies of a letter I received yesterday from Sforza.

2. I have just sent you a brief telegram on the subject but I thought you might like to see the letter and its enclosure in original.

3. I telegraphed you yesterday regarding my talk with de Nicola. He made a very much better impression on me than any other Italian politician I have seen up to date. Reber will be telling you about him.

(4. I think we ought to take very careful thought before accepting the de
(Nicola- Victor Emmanual proposal as a solution to the political situation. It
* (is almost certain to prove extremely distasteful to a considerable opposition
(who may place us in the position of still being the supporters of the unpopular
(King and opponents of the will of the people. I still think that this may lead
(to many kinds of difficult repercussions.

5. It is all too evident that the whole of this political business here is in a tangle. Very little of it makes sense and I am sure that only a drastic solution will do much good. Even de Nicola seems illogical. For instance, after describing to me his success as intermediary between the King and Sforza as representing the opposition, he told me that although Sforza clearly wished to be Prime Minister he had absolutely no following anywhere in Italy.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
GBE, KCB, DSO, MC,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

Pencilled note:
* - This is confirmed by de Nicola.

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

27 FEB 1944

1133

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

Naples, February 23d, 1944.

PERSONAL

DS/J 194
27 FEB 1944

Dear General MacFarlane,

Senator Croce to whom I told this morning your best wishes asked me to thank you most cordially. He is much better and will leave after tomorrow for Sorrento.

I found him sorry, almost in despair, for the dangerous phrases of Mr. Churchill's speech. Like me, he was more sorry for England's moral frame than for us.

I cannot hide from you that when I read it this morning in a text more complete than the one given by the Bisorgimento I was most shocked, all the more so that I was afraid it might alter the chances of the happy solution of which I told you yesterday.

It is true that I have also seen, this morning, former speaker de Nicola who tells me that he is sure that the man in question will keep his word. But you see how dangerous and risky all that is. How difficult it is to judge political problems from some distant Head Quarters...

De Nicola relieved me of any secret about nomes - you have already felt it - and told me that he is going to see you. I am glad, he is a very honest man.

Croce and I feel that our duty - being above the parties - was to state to Mr. Churchill a few facts. Here is our telegram for him. But Croce agrees with me that since the most important fact is the reclimation of the decisions taken at Bavello, and since we have full confidence in your vision, we must leave it to you to decide whether to cable immediately our message to Mr. Churchill or to use it in the way you think best.

But I cannot hide from you that if you can succeed in eliminating the bad impression created by the speech you'll render a service even more to England's fame than to Italy. It should be avoided that some day historians will have some reason to say that Great Britain relied gladly in Italy on fascists and pro-nazis to carry on a war from freedom.

Believe me.

Sincerely yours.

/s/ SFORZA

COPY

27 FEB 1944
XXII

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COPY

27 FEB 1944

PRIME MINISTER - LONDON

Naples, Febr. 23 1944

Being of those who, after a painful internal struggle felt and worked as allies and friends of Great Britain in spite of fascist Italy fighting against you, we consider it our duty to inform you that your speech has caused deepest dismay among the millions of Italians who feel like us.

Sure that you realize the sincerity of our feelings not only for Great Britain but also for you to whom European freedom owes so much, we would not be loyal devoted friends of your country if hesitating to submit you three points showing where we deeply disagree from sources of your information.

1. The alleged fear that a democratic government might "oppose requests from Allied armies" seems an unjustified attack on our loyalty to allied cause, all the more so that our main opposition against present government is its inability to help you and validly cooperate with you.

2. Equally incomprehensible is statement about "representatives of parties anxious to get the power" since the second signer of this telegram was offered by king on November 5 to become Prime Minister and refused only because king's presence was obstacle to serious war effort - not to speak of the many offers of Badoglio to the parties to join at once the government.

3. To say that/democratic government could have "no valid authority on the armed forces" may only have been suggested to you by people who, being only in touch with the Badoglio government, ignore that we have great confidence in some Italian generals who have been always anti-nazi and who have no responsibility in the shameful disintegration of September last. Moreover we are decided to advise our friends when in Government to decide about choice of military leaders in full previous agreement with the Allied authorities. We conceive a future government with much more sincere collaboration with them - contrary to what is now.

B. CROCE

SFORZA

COPY

27 FEB 1944

1135

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FARGO 1292

SECRET

DATE 28 FEB 1944

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 25th February. 1944.

10050 MACFARLANE

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND MAKINS FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Part One. I have received letter from Sforza in which he says that Prime Minister's statement has come as a great shock to Croce and himself. He enclosed a typical long telegram from Croce and himself to the Prime Minister but left it to me whether to send it or not.

Part two. I suggest that Makins should telegraph MacMillan telling him that I have considered it unnecessary to send the complete telegram but that the principal points are as follows. One. Subject has caused deepest dismay among millions Italians. Two. The fear that a democratic government might oppose requests from Allied Armies seem an unjustified attack. Three. Statement regarding representatives of parties anxious to get the power if incomprehensible. Four. The statement that a democratic government could have no valid authority on the Armed Forces can only have been suggested by people in touch only with the Badoglio Government.

Part three. I leave it to MacMillan to pass this to the Prime Minister if he sees fit.

3807

1136

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FANOC 1291

FANOC (GEN MACFARLANE C CODE) 24th. February. 1944.

SECRET 10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND REMBASSY FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

part one. Signor de Nicola came to see me today. He said that the proposal made to me by the King and reported to you in my Fatima 2558 had been the result of endeavours made by himself to arrive at a solution to the existing political impasse. He had first obtained the approval of Croce and Sforza to his proposals. He had then spent four hours inducing the King to come to a decision. And he had finally informed Croce and Sforza of exactly how far the King was prepared to go. He said that Croce and Sforza were definitely prepared to accept the King's proposal although they would much prefer that action should be taken at once instead of being postponed until Rome.

part two. De Nicola assures me that he is quite certain that the King's proposals will prove acceptable to the three parties of the Centre. He is, however, very doubtful if they will be acceptable to the three parties of the Left. He stressed the fact that a large proportion of the population are supporters of the Christian Democrat Party.

Part Three. In his opinion the King's proposal if adopted would ensure the loyalty of the Armed Forces as the King himself would remain as titular King while Rumbert acted

(22)

25 FEB 1944 XXII

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as Lieutenant of the Realm with full Royal powers.

Part Four. Should the Allied Governments permit the King to carry out his proposed course of action the sequence of events would be as follows. One. An immediate announcement by the King that on arrival in Rome he would create Humbert Lieutenant of the Realm with full powers while he himself retired from public life remaining only the title of King. Two. Having entered Rome the King would not even go to the Quirinal but would proceed to his ville. Three. On the same day the Badoglio Government would resign. Immediately after this Humbert would call upon the choice of the Centre Parties for Prime Minister to form a government. This government would have been agreed before arrival in Rome and would take office immediately.

PART Five. De Nicola was most insistent that the formation of the new government must repeat must precede our arrival in Rome and that certain vacancies in the Cabinet must be reserved for leading politicians now in Rome

Part Six. De Nicola considers that it should not be difficult to induce the Centre Parties to accept postponement of action until Rome. If this is so and if de Nicola's information is correct (and it is confirmed by a conversation today between Reber and

3820

25 FEB 1944

1138

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Sforza) we would appear to have an agreed solution between the King and the Centre Parties which would be in accord with the policy outlined in Mr. Churchill's statement in the House. We might, however, find ourselves after arrival in Rome with a government of the Centre alone and possibly a strong opposition of the Left with no more possibility of making themselves felt politically than they have at the moment. It is clear that they might easily become a very disturbing factor in the new administration

25 FEB 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/F/94

OUT 210
27 FEB 1944

FINMS/rj

24th. February. 1944.

Thank you for your letter No. 526.DF of 23rd. February.

I have transmitted your telegram to my Prime Minister and he should receive it today. I am sure he will be very glad to receive it.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

H.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
Capo del Governo.

25 FEB XXII

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

FARGO 1270

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

24th. February. 1944.

1005O MACFARLANE

FREEDOM FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Kindly transmit following telegram from Marshal Badoglio to the Prime Minister. Quote. I have heard the radio broadcast of your inspiring speech in the House of Commons. I thank you on behalf of the Italian Armed Forces for the flattering judgement you have expressed on their performance. Much more indeed could be done and considerable contingents of Italian troops especially suited for mountain warfare could effectively cooperate in Allied actions if only arms and equipment we have long been asking for could be sent to us. Two. As for the Government I have the honour of presiding you have clearly realised that it is guided and inspired by a single and clearcut purpose: help the allies in every possible way to win the war. Three. It is the Government's opinion that internal questions should be dealt with when the entire Italian people will be able to express freely their own will. For the time being a single purpose must over-rule all other considerations; beat the Germans. Signed Badoglio.

3072

L.F.NICKEL,
Lt.Col.AGD
Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

25 FEB 1944

1141

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RESTRICTED

222113A

N 3788

25 FEB NNA

4344

RESTRICTED TELEGRAM

RECEIVED AT

PBS SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER 23 FEB 44

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

CG PBS FOR FARGO FOR MACFARLANE(PERSONAL)

NONE

HQ ACMF

201950A

222113A

C-2103

NONE

REF YOUR 1038 OF 17 FEB PARA 2. I AGREE WITH APPOINTMENT OF A CORPS COMMANDER FOR SICILY

PBS DISTR:

Action.....Hq ACC
Info.....Secy
C-2
CG

ACC DISTR:

Action....Sec. General (2)
Info.....Dep C G
File
Float

RESTRICTED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

1143

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

N-3821

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED AT PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

23 FEBRUARY 1944

. SECRET

. PRIORITY

TO (ACTION) : CG PBS FOR FAMGO

(INFORMATION) : NONE

FROM : SIGNED CINC

DATE TIME SIGNED : 221825A

DATE TIME REC'D : 230218A

REFERENCE NR. : 55155

CITE : FHMGB

Replying to para 2 of FARGO 1038 (REF PBS 8602 of 17 February cite FARGO 1038) It is felt that the decision in this matter should be taken by HQ ACMF after assuming responsibility for Sicily.

PBS DISTR:

Action - HQ ACC
Info - Secy
" - CG

ACC DISTR:

Action - Secretary General
Info - Dep CC
" - File
" - Float

25 FEB 1944

1144

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FANGO 1262

FANGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

SECRET

PRIORITY

21th. February. 1944.

10950 MACFARLANE

FROM FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

In view of Prime Minister's statement I recommend strongly that you should issue the following directive to P.W.B. . Quote. In view of Prime Minister's statement in House of Commons no publicity will be given or permitted until Rome in reached to the following. Personal attacks on the King or Crown Prince, demands for abdication or criticism of a kind to bring them into disrepute. Personal attacks on members of the Government or criticism likely to bring the Government into disrepute or statements likely to provoke disorder and dislocate administration. With the exception of the above there will be no political censorship of any kind so long as political comment and criticism does not transgress the laws of the country. Unquote. If we are to continue to support the King's Government until we reach Rome we must ensure that its authority and power to administer the country is not undermined. The opposition have been told quite clearly that they will get their chance when we reach Rome. I send you the above as although I have myself given a general directive to P.W.B. to avoid giving publicity to matter likely to increase political tension I have as yet no authority over them

L.F.NICKEL?
Lt.Col.AGD
Adjutant General

(27)

SECRET

25 FEB 1944
XXII

1145

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FARO 1250

FARO

SECRET

PRIORITY

13 FEB 48

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS CHARACTERIZED THE SECRETARY OF EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF GOVERNMENT FOR THEY TO PERSUADE PARTY LEADS FOR MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAPER TO APPEAR ONLY ORIGINAL WILSON HAS MEETING RESIDENT MINISTER AND PLANNING TO GET FARO ONE AND ONLY HERO TO BE SAID CHARACTER HAS DISAPPOINTED AND SADDENED RATHER DEPRESSED BY THESE REACTIONS. STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF TEAM OF TESTIMONY TO BE SAID THAT FAILURE IN THE COUNTRY AGAINST KING AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS GROWING STRONGER AND THE JUNTA ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THEIR LOSS RESPONSIBLE SUPPORTERS IN CHECK TO THE JUNTA HAD PRACTICALLY DECIDED THAT IT ALLOWED TO PUT THEIR PROGRAMME INTO EFFECT THAT TO INVITE GRACE TO BE THE LIEUTENANT OF THE REALM AND TO MAKE HIM THE SOLE LIEUTENANT TO UP TO DATE THE JUNTA HAD REACHED NO DECISION REGARDING THEIR CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY

copy to:
Gen Macfarlane

(27)

L. J. NICOL
Lt. Col., AGD
Adjutant General

25 FEB 19 XXII

SECRET

SECRET

SF

FARGO 1250

FARGO

SECRET

PRIORITY

23 FEB 44

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM

GENERAL SOLODOVNIK SAW CARACCIOLA CMA SECRETARY OF EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF OPPOSITION CMA TODAY PD PENBASE PAREN FARGO FOR MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ EYES ONLY GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND REINHARDT PD CITE FARGO ONE TWO FIVE ZERO PD HE SAID CARACCIOLA WAS DISAPPOINTED AND SEEMED RATHER DEPRESSED BY PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT ON ITALY OF YESTERDAY PD HE SAID THAT FEELING IN THE COUNTRY AGAINST KING AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS GROWING STRONGER AND THE JUNTA ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THEIR LESS RESPONSIBLE SUPPORTERS IN CHECK PD THE JUNTA HAD PRACTICALLY DECIDED CMA IF ALLOWED TO PUT THEIR PROGRAMME INTO EFFECT CMA TO INVITE CROCE TO BE THE LIEUTENANT OF THE REALM AND TO MAKE HIM THE SOLE LIEUTENANT PD UP TO DATE THE JUNTA HAD REACHED NO DECISION REGARDING THEIR CANDIDATE FOR THE PREMIERSHIP

000.1 Political, Ital Govt

copy to:
Gen Macfarlane

File Pds.

3006

L. F. NICKEL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1146

[illegible] CARACCIOLA CMA SECRETARY OF EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF OPPOSITION CMA TODAY PD PENBASE PAREN FARGO FOR MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ EYES ONLY GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND REINHARDT PD CITE FARGO ONE TWO FIVE ZERO PD HE SAID CARACCIOLA WAS DISAPPOINTED AND SEEMED RATHER DEPRESSED BY PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT ON ITALY OF YESTERDAY PD HE SAID THAT FEELING IN THE COUNTRY AGAINST KING AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS GROWING STRONGER AND THE JUNTA ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THEIR LESS RESPONSIBLE SUPPORTERS IN CHECK PD THE JUNTA HAD PRACTICALLY DECIDED CMA IF ALLOWED TO PUT THEIR PROGRAMME INTO EFFECT CMA TO INVITE CROCE TO BE THE LIEUTENANT OF THE REALM AND TO MAKE HIM THE SOLE LIEUTENANT PD UP TO DATE THE JUNTA HAD REACHED NO DECISION REGARDING THEIR CANDIDATE FOR THE PREMIERSHIP

0001 Political, Stal Gift

copy to:
Gen Macfarlane

File Ads.

3056

L. F. NICKEL
Lt. Col., AGD
Adjutant Genera 1

25 FEB 1944

27

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/P/81

22 FEB 1944

FNM/rj

20th. February. 1944.

Thank you for your No. 496/EOT of 19th. February.

I will be very glad indeed to receive a memorandum as suggested by you, and to forward it immediately to the Allied Governments.

You need have no fear that the Allied Governments are only hearing one side of the case. They have been kept informed of the political picture in this country from both sides to the best of our ability throughout.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EXTRACT FROM PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN T. HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FEBRUARY 22nd, 1944.

PS/PL 232
2 MAR 1944

ITALY.

It is hard enough to understend the politics of one's own country. It is almost impossible to understend those of foreign countries. The senest and sefest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness and ability to fight the Germans, and thus lighten the burden of the Allied troops. This is no time for ideological preference for one side or the other and certainly we, His Majesty's Government; have not indulged ourselves in this way at all. Thus in Italy we are working for the present through the Government of the King and Bedoglio. In Yugoslevia we give our aid to Marshal Tito. In Greece in spite of the fact that a British officer was murdered by the guerrilla organisation called Elas, we are doing our best to bring about a reconciliation or at least a working agreement between the opposing forces.

I will say a word if the House will permit me about each of these unhappy countries and the principle which should govern us and which we are certainly following. We signed the Italian armistice on the basis of unconditional surrender with King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Bedoglio who were, and up to the present are, the legitimate government of Italy. On their authority the Italian Navy, not without some risk and loss, surrendered to us and practically all Italian troops and airmen who were not dominated by the Germans also obeyed the orders they received from the Crown. Since then these Italian Forces have cooperated with us to the best of their ability and nearly 100 Italian ships of war are discharging valuable services in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Italian troops have entered the front line in Italy. Although on one occasion they suffered severe casualties, they continue to fight alongside our men and very much larger numbers are engaged in indispensable services to the Allied Armies behind the front. Italian airmen are also fighting on our side. The battle in Italy for reasons which I have already explained will be hard and long. I am not yet convinced that any other government can be formed at the present time in Italy which would command the same obedience from the Italian armed forces. Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome, as I trust and believe we shall, we shall be free to discussthe whole Italian political situation and we shall do so with many advantages that we do not possess at the present time. It is from Rome that a more broadly based Italian Government can best be formed. Whether a Government thus formed will be so helpful to the Allies as the present dispensation I cannot tell, it might of course be a Government which would try to make its position good with the Italian people by resisting as much as it dared the demands made on them in the interests of the Allied armies. I should be sorry, however, to see an unsettling change made at a time when the battle is at its climax swaying to and fro. When you have to hold a hot coffeepot it is better not to break the handle off until you are sure that you will get another equally convenient and serviceable, or at any rate until there is a dishcloth handy. The representatives of the various Italian parties, who assembled a fortnight ago at Bari, are of course eager to become the Government of Italy. They will certainly have no elective authority and certainly no constitutional authority either until the present

(20)

/King

1150

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King abdicates or until he or his successor invites them to take office. It is by no means certain that they would have any effective authority over the Italian armed forces now fighting with us. Italy lies prostrate under his miseries and disasters, food is scarce, shipping to bring it is voraciously absorbed by our ever expanding military operations. I think we have gained 12,000,000 tons this year increase to the allies yet the shortage continues because our great operations absorb every ship as it comes and the movement of food is difficult. It would be a misteke to suppose that the kind of political conditions or forces exist in Italy such as work so healthily in unbeaten lands or countries which have not been shattered by war or stifled by a long period of Fascist rule. We shall see much more clearly how to proceed and have much more varied resources at our disposal if and when we are in possession of the capital city. The policy therefore which His Majesty's Government have agreed provisionally with the Government of the United States is to win the battle for Rome and take a new view when we are there.

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Capt. Stone.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
APO 394

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's Speech

2164/INFO
1 Mar 1944

TO : Regional Commissioners
Heads of Sub Commissions
" " Branches

Herewith the correct text of that portion of the Prime Minister's speech which deals with Italy.

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel, Cavalry
Deputy Executive Commissioner

EXTRACT FROM PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE HOUSE ON FEB 22nd 1944

ITALY.

305

It is hard enough to understand the politics of one's own country. It is almost impossible to understand those of foreign countries. The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness and ability to fight the Germans, and thus lighten the burden of the Allied troops. This is no time for ideological preference for one side or the other and certainly we, His Majesty's Government, have not indulged ourselves in this way at all. Thus in Italy we are working for the present through the Government of the King and Badoglio. In Yugoslavia we give our aid to Marshal Tito. In Greece in spite of the fact that a British officer was murdered by the guerrilla organization called Elas, we are doing our best to bring about a reconciliation or at least a working agreement between the opposing forces.

I will say a word if the House will permit me about each of these unhappy countries and the principle which should govern us and which we are certainly following. We signed the Italian armistice on the basis of unconditional surrender with King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio who were, and up to the present are, the legitimate government of Italy. On their authority the Italian Navy, not without some risk and loss, surrendered to us and practically all Italian troops and airmen who were not dominated by the Germans also obeyed the orders they received from the Crown. Since then these Italian Forces have cooperated with us to the best of

which deals with Italy.

NORMAN B. FISER
Colonel, Cavalry
Deputy Executive Commissioner

[illegible] SPEECH IN THE HOUSE ON [illegible] 22nd 1944.

Main.

It is hard enough to understand the politics of one's own country. It is almost impossible to understand those of foreign countries. The wisest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness and ability to fight the Germans, and thus hasten the burden of the Allied troops. This is no time for ideological preference for one side or the other and certainly not, His Majesty's Government, have not indulged ourselves in this way at all. Thus in Italy we are working for the present through the Government of the King and Badoglio. In Yugoslavia we give our aid to Marshal Tito. In Greece in spite of the fact that a British officer was murdered by the guerilla organisation called ELAS, we are doing our best to bring about a reconciliation or at least a working agreement between the opposing forces.

I will say a word if the House will permit me about each of these unhappy countries and the principle which should govern us and which we are certainly following. We signed the Italian armistice on the basis of unconditional surrender with King Victor Emanuel and Marshal Badoglio who were, and up to the present are, the legal Government of Italy. On their authority the Italian Navy, not without some risk and loss, surrendered to us and practically all Italian troops and airmen who were not dominated by the Germans also obeyed the orders they received from the Crown. Since then those Italian Forces have cooperated with us to the best of their ability and nearly 100 Italian ships of war are discharging valuable services in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Italian troops have entered the front line in Italy. Although on one occasion they suffered severe casualties, they continue to fight alongside our men and very much larger numbers are engaged in indispensable services to the Allied armies behind the front. Italian airmen are also fighting on our side. The battle in Italy for reasons which I have already explained will be hard and long, I am not yet convinced that any other government can be formed at the present time in Italy which would command the same obedience from the Italian armed forces. Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome, as I trust and believe we shall, we shall be free to discuss the whole Italian political situation and we shall do so with many advantages that we do not possess at the present time. It is for this [illegible] that a more broadly based Italian Government can best be formed.

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4 MAR 1944 XXII

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DSM 141

23 FEB 1946

CONTROL COMMISSION
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/h.jp

26/

SECRET

861

URGENT

1823 51A

PRIORITY (WAR. DEPT.)

222136 (by cable)

REPEAR FOR ADDRESS OFFICE OF STAFF
[illegible] TO UNITED STATES AND
MILITARY OFFICE [illegible] PARIS
AND ADVISE FLASH [illegible]
FOR 2ND. CORPS TO FLORENCE

Political situation is developing faster than had been foreseen and has outrun previous telegrams from Algiers. This is WAR 622 there are already indications that opposition parties are planning to dislocate administration. I have discussed the situation with Sforza, Alexander, Macfarlane, Lacaita and Kirby and am in the following:

1. I am convinced that a Fascist coalition cannot be delayed and cannot be held dependent on the progress of the battle for Rome.

2. The opposition have agreed a policy and have submitted for consideration to the Allied Governments their suggested program of action. (In accepting this for onward transmission I am holding them that it is being forwarded only on condition that they indulge in no activity against the Badoglio Government while under consideration.) Briefly put, the six opposition parties have agreed upon a program to permit the cessation of the Crown Prince provided the latter would delegate his powers to [illegible] a single individual or of a group until constitutional assembly can decide the constitutional question at the end of this war. They have requested Allied assistance in putting this program into effect, pointing out that if no action is taken they cannot continue to guarantee the actions of less responsible elements. At the same time their executive committee have issued

(2)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DSM 141
23 FEB 1944

CONTROL COMMISSION
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SECRET 861

URGENT 182351A

FREEDOM (GEN. WILSON) 222130 (by cable)

AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
PLEASE PASS TO PRIME MINISTER AND
FOREIGN OFFICE REPEATED FREEDOM
AND STAFF FROM GENERAL WILSON
FOR INFO ONLY TO FATIMA

Political situation is developing faster than had been foreseen and has outrun previous telegrams from Algiers. This is NAF 622 there are already indications that opposition tactics may threaten to dislocate administration. I have discussed the situation with Devers, Alexander, MacFarlane, Caccia and Reber and submit the following:

1. I am convinced that a clear decision cannot be delayed and cannot be made dependent on the progress of the battle for Rome.

2. The opposition have agreed a policy and have submitted for communication to the Allied Governments their suggested program of action. (In accepting this for onward transmission I am telling them that it is being forwarded only on condition that they indulge in no activity against the Badoglio Government while under consideration.) Briefly put, the six opposition parties have agreed upon a program to permit the accession of the Crown Prince provided the latter would agree to delegate his powers to a lieutenancy or a single individual or of a group until constituent assembly can decide the constitutional question at the end of this war. They have requested Allied assistance in putting this program into effect, pointing

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23 FEB 1944

Incoming No. 861 from Freedom (cont'd)

an appeal to all those in the service of the State to regard the King and Government as rebels and not to take part in their rebellion against the Italian people. Circulation of and publicity for this appeal have been stopped as far as possible. The Committee have been informed such action cannot be tolerated and they have been very severely warned. They have been operating from Area I Italy and any action against them for subversive activity against the Badoglio Government can only be taken by us. We cannot possibly allow this sort of thing to go on. The present attitude of the opposition threatens to interfere with our military operations more seriously than by likely repercussions to an abdication and a change in the Government. If we take the obvious course in support of Badoglio's administration or allow Badoglio to do so in King's Italy and arrest and take proceedings against the members of the opposition Executive Committee we lay ourselves open to a storm of protest from almost every direction. But if we continue to support Badoglio we can hardly adopt any other course.

3. There are two main alternative courses: 1, to bring pressure on the King to abdicate in favor of Humbert whose succession in accordance with the constitution should in our opinion insure the loyalty of the Italian Armed Forces. And, 2, to inform the opposition that the Allied Governments will not tolerate any change in the political situation until Rome is reached and that any attempt to interfere with the Badoglio Government will be instantly repressed. In either case intervention on our part is now required.

4. In view of situation described in para 2, we are inevitably faced with having to decide between these two courses at a very early date and we are in a better position to control the consequences now than we shall be immediately before or after capture of Rome.

5. From local angle, I recommend therefore that the Allied Governments should agree at the earliest possible moment to inform the King that they

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23 FFR 1944

insist upon his bowing to the will of his people and abdicating immediately in favor of the Crown Prince and that the Crown Prince should then be informed that he should summon the chosen representative of the opposition to form immediately a fresh Government. It of course goes without saying that before any steps are initiated we would obtain and undertaking from the opposition, severally and collectively, to subscribe to all the engagements entered into with the Allies by Badoglio.

6. Full details of opposition program and our comments follow earliest possible.

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ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NO.

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM (Gen Wilson)

TO : FOR INFO TO PATIMA

23 FEB 1944

M/C NO : 261

REF NO: 861

Why so delay { FILED : 182351A
REC'D : 222130(by cable)

(Cover Stone)

For [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

OUTGOING FTHM/lws

CLASS: MOST SECRET

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR CINC

M/C No: 7/21

Ref No: 2358

Filed: Tel

Rec'd: 2/2225Z

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AG
2 - DSG

(24)

3470

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TRANSLATION

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

To General Mason MacFarlane
Chief of the Allied Control Commission

Dear General MacFarlane,

In my letter of last December 17th, I informed your predecessor General Joyce that the Council of Ministers, on my proposal, had unanimously pronounced itself in favor of Italian adherence to the Atlantic Charter.

At the same time I begged General Joyce to have the courtesy to let the Allied governments know of this Italian initiative and to inform me at the fitting moment as to what procedure should be followed by us to bring it to a concrete conclusion.

Not having yet received from the Allied Control Commission any statement, I presume that there are no obstacles, that our unilateral declaration is sufficient and that special executive procedures are not required.

Before bringing it to the attention of Italian public opinion, I would however, like to find out, since, as you know, I lack any other means of ascertainment, if the matter belongs precisely within the bounds of good taste, as I presume it does.

It is superfluous to assure you that the question has for us evident importance.

Believe me, with cordial friendship

/s/ Badoglio

Pfc H. F. Jaeckel - Transl.
/hjp

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CC/P/80.

SECRET

DSH 1'21
2-2-44

FNMM/rj

20th. February, 1944.

1. I enclose herewith a memorandum which I have just received from Badoglio which may provide you with a little more ammunition and assistance in dealing with this P.W.B. business.

2. As regards M.G.S..

You probably know that there is pretty strong feeling over here as regards the way in which M.G.S. has endeavoured to run things over here by remote control rather than by leaving things to the people on the spot to do. Futhermore, there is evidence that questions occasionally get blocked and held up in M.G.S..

With A.C.C. and A.M.G. now running as one show under one Headquarters things are very different to what they were and it may be that M.G.S. has not yet accustomed itself to the new set-up.

I understand that Julius Holmes is unlikely to return to M.G.S. and you may be looking for a successor to him. In this event, and at any rate for the next month or two, I would very strongly recommend to you Colonel Spofford who has returned to Algiers as I have no sufficiently important job vacant to which I could post him here. He is quite first class and has an intimate knowledge of the work put here as well as having been with me through the reorganisation period. I feel that it might be useful to you as well as to me to have him, at any rate temporarily, as head of M.G.S..

I feel equally that it would be an admirable thing if Terence Maxwell were given an opportunity of seeing something of the practical side of the work over here. If you were agreeable I would put him in command of a Region with a really good Number Two, or I could attach him to a Region Headquarters to see something of the work over here. He could spend a week or so at Headquarters here at the beginning of his tour.

3. I spoke for a moment today to Devers on the subject of the promotion of Captain Stone, U.S.N.R., my deputy and one of the Commissions Vice-Presidents, to Flag rank. This seems to be hanging fire rather, owing to the attitude of the U.S. Naval authorities. I think that if you as President of the A.C.C. could make it clear that the promotion is quite unconnected with Naval requirements but is extremely desirable from the point of view of giving my deputy adequate status, it should be possible to put it through.

Forgive me if, as is quite possible, you have already dealt with this question.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., D.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters.

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22 FEB 1944

MEMORANDUM

It is easy to see that for some time now the P.W.B. of Bari is clearly leaning toward the Left, favouring enterprises and unrestraint of the so-called Anti-Fascist Parties, and on the other hand obviously hindering actions of the Government, its organs of propaganda, and of the Parties which support the Government.

The Opposition Parties, feeling themselves supported by the Allies, or at least by some of them, who without regard to the orders which they received, take advantage of their position to let their own ideologies prevail, have intensified their interfering actions. Characteristic is the evolution of the "Gazetta del Mezzogiorno", which has come under th e Action Party with its wretched Director, fanatic follower of the "High Priest" of Naples.

This state of affairs is in large part due to the changes which took place among the directing heads of the P.W.B. of Bari. Lieutenant Colonel Munrow, author of the magnificent circular on the "Dignity of the Press", cultured gentleman, expert on the life and history of our Country, conscious above all of the necessity to safeguard the <u>liberty of all</u> and not only of a scant part, has been succeeded by Colonel (or Lieutenant Colonel) Picard, who surely follows a vastly different road from that taken by his predecessor. Enough to consider the suspension order for one month of the newspaper "L'Unione" (it's Director Merini has been arrested), a measure never taken against other Papers, which nevertheless vituperate daily not only the Person of His Majesty the King, but the same monarchical institution, the Army and its leaders, insulting the feelings of the majority of Italians.

The same for Major Greenless, man of the Left, but who at the time of Munrow kept his conduct within impartial channels, has suddenly given signs of wanting to follow in the footsteps of Picard.

It is urgent;

A) To obtain directives which will tend to assure <u>Liberty for All</u>, and not only for some, who by old methods wish to impose their will upon the majority,

B) Obtain Munrow's return to Bari.

C) To define the absurd position of the "Gazetta del Mezzogiorno", semi-official Government organ, which plays up conspicuously only what will enhance the actions of the Opponents.

D) Bring about a cessation of the Radio Broadcasts against the Ministry and against the vital interests of the Nation by Radio Bari, which pro- claims itself "The Free Voice of the Italian Government."

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Translation please

PROMEMORIA

DS 9 121

22 FEB 1944

E' FACILE RILEVARE CHE, DA QUALCHE TEMPO, IL P.W.B. DI BARI HA NETTAMENTE PIEGATO VERSO SINISTRA, FAVORENDO INIZIATIVE ED INTEMPERANZE DEI COSIDETTI PARTITI ANTI-FASCISTI E OSTACOLANDO, PER CONTRO, IN MODO EVIDENTE, L'AZIONE DEL GOVERNO, DEI SUOI ORGANI DI PROPAGANDA E DEI PARTITI CHE IL GOVERNO APPOGGIANO.

I PARTITI DI OPPOSIZIONE SENTENDOSI SORRETTI DAGLI ALLEATI O, QUANTO MENO, DA QUALCUNO DI ESSI, CHE, INDIPENDENTEMENTE DAGLI ORDINI RICEVUTI, SI VALE DELL'INCARICO PER FAR PREVALERE LE PROPRIE IDEOLOGIE, HANNO INTENSIFICATO LA LORO AZIONE DISGREGATRICE. CARATTERISTICA E L'EVOLUZIONE DELLA "GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO", PASSATA AL PARTITO D'AZIONE COL SUO INFELICE DIRETTORE, FANATICO DEL GEROFANTE DI NAPOLI.

TALE STATO DI COSE È IN GRAN PARTE CONSEGUENZA DEL MUTAMENTO AVVENUTO NEI DIRIGENTI DEL P.W.B. DI BARI. AL TENENTE COLONNELLO MUNROW – AUTORE DELLA BELLISSIMA CIRCOLARE SULLA "DIGNITÀ DELLA STAMPA", COLTO GENTILUOMO, ESPERTO DELLA VITA DEL NOSTRO PAESE E DELLA SUA STORIA, CONSCIO, SOPRATUTTO, DELLA NECESSITÀ DI TUTELARE LA LIBERTÀ DI TUTTI E NON SOLTANTO DI UNA ESIGUA PARTE – È SUCCEDUTO IL COLONNELLO (O TENENTE COLONNELLO) PICARD, CHE SEGUE SICURAMENTE UNA VIA BEN DIVERSA DA QUELLA BATTUTA DAL PREDECESSORE. BASTI CONSIDERARE LA DECRETATA SOSPENSIONE PER UN MESE DEL GIORNALE " L'UNIONE" (IL DIRETTORE MARINI È STATO ARRESTATO), PROVVEDIMENTO MAI APPLICATO AD ALTRI FOGLI, CHE PURE QUOTIDIANAMENTE VILIPENDONO, NON SOLO LA PERSONA DI S.M. IL RE MA LO STESSO ISTITUTO MONARCHICO, L'ESERCITO ED I SUOI CAPI, OLTRAGGIANDO I SENTIMENTI PIÙ PURI DELLA MAGGIORANZA DEGLI ITALIANI.

COSÌ IL MAGG. GREENLEES, UOMO DI SINISTRA, MA CHE AL TEMPO DEL MUNROW IMPRONTAVA LA SUA CONDOTTA A CRITERI DI IMPARZIALITA, HA DATO SUBITO SEGNO DI VOLER MARCIARE SULLE ORME DEL PICARD.

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E' URGENTE:

A)- OTTENERE DIRETTIVE CHE TENDANO AD ASSICURARE LA LIBERTÀ PER TUTTI, NON SOLTANTO PER UNA PARTE CHE, CON VECCHI METODI, VUOLE IMPORSI ALLA MAGGIORANZA.

B)- OTTENERE IL RITORNO A BARI DEL MUNROW.

C)- DEFINIRE L'ASSURDA SITUAZIONE DELLA "GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO" UFFICIOSO DEL GOVERNO, CHE DÀ RISALTO SOLAMENTE A CIÒ CHE PUÒ VALORIZZARE L'AZIONE DEGLI AVVERSARI.

D)- FAR CESSARE LE RADIO-TRASMISSIONI CONTRO IL MINISTERO E CONTRO I VITALI INTERESSI DELLA NAZIONE DA RADIO BARI, CHE SI PROCLAMA "LIBERA VOCE DEL GOVERNO D'ITALIA".

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C)- DEFINIRE L'ASSURDA SITUAZIONE DELLA "GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO" UFFICIOSO DEL GOVERNO, CHE DÀ RISALTO SOLAMENTE A CIÒ CHE PUÒ VALORIZZARE L'AZIONE DEGLI AVVERSARI.

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CC/P/78

Capo [illegible]

22 FEB 1944

FMEM/rj

20th. February, 1944.

I regret that I have just heard from General Alexander that operational responsibilities make it impossible for him or General Clark to accept the Crown Prince at either General Alexander's Headquarters or at the Headquarters of the Fifth Army.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
Capo del Governo.

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No. 496/Prot.

THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

PS 3 117
22 Feb 1944

19 February 1944

Dear General MacFarlane:

You have notified me this morning that you have transmitted to the Allied Governments a report of the members of the Congress in Bari.

As I told you briefly over the telephone, it might be opportune that the arguments of the present government be made known to the Allied Governments, in order that these might be able to form an exact picture of the situation, or that the Allied Governments decide to send a commission here which might ascertain for itself the morale and viewpoints of the population.

One cannot form a precise idea of happenings by listening to one side only; no judge could pass judgment under those circumstances.

If you think it opportune, I will have a memorandum prepared which will express the reasons which this Government thinks are necessary to be made known to the Allied Governments, and will send it to you.

Heartiest Greetings,

Badoglio.

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FARGO 1112

SECRET

FARGO (Mr. Reber, Dir. Pol. Sect.) 19 FEB 44

SECRET 10050 Mr. Reber

ROUTINE

AFHQ FOR EGS

Pass following to CCS for President and State Department and to London for Prime Minister and Foreign Office Information Civil Affairs and British Resident Minister.

Opposition's program of action is contained in a Memorandum addressed to me for submission to the Allied Governments. Copies in translation are being forwarded by air to ALGIERS to be communicated to the members of the Advisory Council.

In submitting its proposals the Executive Giunta states that its object is to permit within the framework of the constitution a postponement of the institutional problem until the end of hostilities, and the creation of an anti-Fascist Government representative of the Italian nation.

The six Parties agree that the present King should abdicate forthwith to be succeeded by the Prince of Piedmont who, however, must agree to delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers to a single or collective Lieutenancy which would not include either a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier but would have powers enabling it to proceed at once to the immediate constitution of an anti-Fascist representative Government. This delegation of powers would remain in effect until war conditions

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would permit the convocation of an assembly regularly elected by the Italian people. In agreeing to the accession of Humbert, the Giunta nevertheless points out that his adherence to Fascism and his responsibility for the attack on France can not be forgotten.

Inasmuch as not only had royal powers been previously delegated under the constitution to a Lieutenant, but the present King had also ceded certain of his royal prerogatives in permitting the establishment of the Fascist Grand Council and granting to Mussolini the supreme command of the armed forces, there is no juridical reason why in the opinion of the Giunta the Crown should not at present accept for a limited period the foregoing procedure the object of which is clearly defined.

The expressed policy of the Allies is to guarantee to the Italian people the free choice of their own Government and institutions and to maintain strict neutrality in all internal Italian political matters. But since this neutrality does in fact constitute support for the King who has stubbornly refused to give way the Giunta considers that it becomes necessary if the Allies approve the Giunta's program for the Allies themselves to make it clear to the King and Humbert that they must follow the proposed course of action. Only by taking such action can the Allies avoid blocking the will of the Italian people and maintain their expressed principles.

According to the Giunta, action is required immediately for two reasons, first, because the situation is steadily worsening and themoderate solution now advanced might not later prove possible either because of the state of public opinion or because of more serious events; and second, the Parties and patriots of Northern Italy, faced by the prolongation of this unsatisfactory situation, might decide to have recourse to more radical solutions of their own. Such action might in turn force the Giunta to review its present attitude. In submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments the Giunta further states that it would not be fulfilling its duty if it did not

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point out the gravity of the Italian situation and cites several examples of alleged reactionary tactics of the King of causes of friction.

I have informed the Giunta that in agreeing to forward the above program to the Allied Governments I must insist that pending a reply, no action be taken to interfere with the Badoglio Government or to aggravate the present situation and likewise that the program should be considered confidential and should not be communicated to the press. To forestall possible indiscreet announcements on the part of the Giunta or any of its members I am, however, informing the press that I have received a program and am forwarding it to the said Governments for their consideration.

Our comments follow.

311.5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

SECRET

COPY

18 February 1944

PSH 22 FEB 1944

REC'D AT PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

. SECRET

. PRIORITY

TO (ACTION) : CG PBS FOR FARGO AND (R) AFHQ

(INFO) : NONE

FROM : ACMF

DATE SIGNED : 181825A

DATE REC'D : 182220A

REF NR. : 171

CITE : MA 1106

Personal for General Mason MacFarlane, from General Alexander.

Reference paragraph 1 of FARGO 1038 of 17 Feb regret that operational responsibilitiesmake it impossible to accept the Crown Prince either at HQ ACMF or at Fifth Army.

ACC DISTR:

(Action) Secretary General
(Info) Dep. C.C.
" File
" Fleet

000.1

3823

(18) a2

SECRET

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DSU 99
21 FEB 1944

PAOC 1070

PAOC (ARIC.LIAISON EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER) 18 FEBRUARY 1944

SECRET

10050

URGENT

IBC FOR AGC REGION I, TU SIMILAR FOR AGC REGIONS II AND V, TO CABLE

There are signs that opposition parties intend sabotage Italian Governments efforts possibly by direct action and that irresponsible elements are getting out of control. It is most important that you should watch situation and report urgently any indications of action which may jeopardise Allied military interests such as strikes, sabotage, etcetera or which may effectively obstruct proper functions of Italian Government machine. Provincial Commissioners should telegraph to this headquarters direct

BY HAND TO:

Region III

L. F. NICKEL
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General

111737

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FARGO 1074

FARGO

SECRET

ROUTINE

18 February 1944

10050-Collins

AFHQ FOR INC FOR PHILLIPS FOR HAYDEN

Edited Literal

Signal PBS 8613 of 17 February requesting stop on Executive Junta Manifesto is ref. Please transmit to Troopers and AGWAR. This now releasable provided all portions deleted which interpretable as incitement to rebellion or disaffection.

PRO, ACC

(18) a 1

SECRET

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FARCO 1039

DSM 137
22 FEB. 1944

FARCO (GEN MACFARLANE CHIEF COMMISSIONER) 17 FEBRUARY 1944

SECRET

10050-MACFARLANE

ROUTINE

RHQ AGMT (~~ACMIL~~). AFHQ (~~MIDD~~) from Macfarlane personal RJ

I spoke to Badoglio last night on the subject of the Comando Supremo. In practice the Comando Supremo has not come into the picture at all as regards the Italian Navy and Air Force. It has become an additional and in my opinion unnecessary link in our dealings with the Italian Army. I told Badoglio that the Army Sub-Commission under Duchesne would in future work direct with the Italian War Office and General Staff at Lecce. That after Marshal Messe and the Comando Supremo had moved to Salerno I would deal with Messe only personally and only on questions of high policy. Badoglio was in complete agreement. Messe and the Comando Supremo are moving ~~to the Salerno area~~ RJ about 21 February. to the Salerno area RJ.

file 2110

(18) t

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET FARGO 1038

FARGO

SECRET

PRIORITY

17 FEBRUARY 44

10050 MACFARLANE

HQ ACMF FREEDOM (ACTION)

I saw Badoglio last night and he made the following requests. PEMBASE (FARGO FROM MACFALANE PERSONAL) To Hq ACMF FOR GEN ALEXANDER RPTD AFHQ FOR MGS FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, MACMILLAN, CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR ACTION. CITE FARGO One Zero Three Eight. One. That the Crown Prince might be allowed to be attached to the Staff of either General Alexander or General Clark to "follow the present operations". I gave this request little encouragement but agreed to forward it. Two. He requested permission to appoint a Corps Commander for Sicily. The Italian troops in Sicily are being increased and I recommend strongly that this request be agreed. Three. After making yet another rather bitter complaint regarding the extent to which we were allowing the opposition to indulge in criticism of the King, his government and the Armed Forces, he asked whether he might be allowed to take action under the laws of Italy against individuals or newspapers making statements which were in violation of the law of the land.

L. F. NICKEL,
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General

SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DSG 167

FARGO

SECRET

PRIORITY

17 FEBRUARY 44

10050 MACFARLANE

HQ ACMF FREEDOM (ACTION)

He stated that he had no desire whatever to interfere with the right of freedom of speech but that when this freedom of speech was calculated to bring disrepute upon the King, the government and the Armed Forces and was also clearly sponsored by us, it made his position extremely difficult. I told the Marshal that I had already presented his views in this matter and that I would again bring to the notice of my Commander-in-Chief. Comment. The present situation from the point of view of Badoglios Government with which we have to collaborate is very difficult. It would clearly be disastrous to permit his government to take legal action against prominent members of the opposition. On the other hand we are at the moment through PWB giving them encouragement and facilities for what amount to breaking the law of the land. I have already spoken to PWB both in Naples and in Bari on this question and I am convinced that in the meantime everything possible should be done to keep published comment by the opposition within, if possible, legal limits.

L.F.NICKEL
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

D50/136

FAIRGO 1037

FAIRGO (GEN MACFARLANE G CORS)

SECRET

URGENT

17th February 1944

19050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM FOR C-IN-C, MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Para One. King and Queen are living in Villa at Revello. King asked me to see him yesterday. Para Two. Count Aquarone and members King's personal staff told my personal assistant during my interview with the King that the King was going to talk to me on the following lines. Italy is rapidly splitting up into two camps. This is a dangerous development and the worst possible for the country. Should the King abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince did I think it would be possible to obtain guarantee that the Crown Prince would not be subjected to the same attacks as the King had experienced. Could there be any objection to the King moving to Naples. Para three. In fact the King spoke to me on quite different lines. After inquiring regarding the progress of the fighting he stressed and continued to stress throughout the interview the urgency of his getting to Rome at the earliest possible moment. He claimed that he would have no difficulty in Rome in getting either Orlando or Bonomi or some other responsible politician to form a government. He claimed that abdication even in favour of the Crown Prince would have a very bad effect in the country. He complained that our censorship and publicity in Bari were most unfair and displayed marked partiality in favour of his opponents. He thought that Badoglio was getting very tired and that he was making a great mistake in filling all the ministerial posts in his cabinet with comparatively unknown men. He attributed most of his present difficulties to Count Sforza. He had heard stories that the Allies wished him to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince and

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DSG/36
RDO 1037

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COM)

SECRET

URGENT

17th February 1944

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM FOR C-IN-C, ALGIERS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Para One. King and Queen are living in Villa at Ravello. King asked me to see him yesterday. Para Two. Count Zoppi and members King's personal staff told my personal assistant during my interview with the King that the King was going to talk to me on the following lines. Italy is rapidly splitting up into two camps. This is a dangerous development and the worst possible for the country. Should the King abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince did I think it would be possible to obtain guarantee that the Crown Prince would not be subjected to the same attacks as the King had experienced. Would there be any objection to the King moving to Naples. Para three. In fact the King spoke to me on quite different lines. After inquiring regarding the progress of the fighting he stressed and continued to stress throughout the interview the urgency of his getting to Rome at the earliest possible moment. He claimed that he would have no difficulty in Rome in getting either Orlando or Bonomi or some other responsible politician to form a government. He claimed that abdication even in favour of the Crown Prince would have a very bad effect in the country. He complained that our censorship and publicity in Bari were most unfair and displayed marked partiality in favour of his opponents. He thought that Badoglio was getting very tired and that he was making a great mistake in filling all the ministerial posts in his cabinet with comparatively unknown men. He attributed most of his present difficulties to Count Sforza. He had heard stories that the Allies wished him to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince and

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to install a government representing the Bari Congress Parties. He hoped there was no truth in these rumours. He inquired whether I thought he should make some personal reply to the pronouncements of the Bari Congress. In reply to his last two remarks I stated firstly that the country was full of irresponsible rumours and secondly that he must decide for himself on the question of issuing any personal reply to the Bari pronouncements. Para Four. Comments. I gained the following definite impressions One. The King is apparently either misinformed or not fully informed of the present political situation. I very much doubt if the message to him from the Executive Junta of the Committees of Liberation has been allowed to reach him. Two. The King failed to speak to me on the lines anticipated by his immediate advisers and it seems clear that there is little possibility of his considering the question of abdication before reaching Rome except under very strong outside pressure

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Ref. CC/G/65.

DSL 169
25 FEB 1944

FNMM/rj

17th. February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Major Fielden,
Public Relations Officer,
Headquarters, Allied Control Commission.

Reference your memorandum of 9th. February regarding attempt by Executive Council of the Bari Congress to publicise their meeting with me. Please ensure that there is a censorship stop on any mention of myself in connection with Italian political activities or politicians.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

fdd/480

(13)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

17 FEB 1944
CONFIDENTIAL
INCOMING

/SK

10/16

52343

161526A FEB

162035A FEB

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHMGS

EATIMA FOR GRADY

AFTER COORDINATION THIS HEADQUARTERS, REFERENCE YOUR 2318 OF 15 FEBRUARY, YOUR MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT WAS FORWARDED 7 FEBRUARY. PARAPHRASE FOLLOWS BY COURIER.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AG FILE
1 - B.S.G.
1 - DEP CHIEF COMM. - INFO
1 - MR. GRADY - INFO

Telegram to Naples
1000 17/2/44

Sent for code 1030 17/2/44
Read

"UK" Equals British

1182

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U.S. CONFIDENTIAL equals British CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING EWS/hjp

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

PARIS

FREEDOM FOR MG3

PLEASE TELEGRAPH ME THE DATE ON WHICH MY MESSAGE PARGO FIVE FOUR TWO JANUARY TWO GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT WAS FORWARDED BY FREEDOM TO PARIS TO FREEDOM FOR MG3 FROM PARIS FROM GRADY SIGNED MA FARLANE PAREN PLEASE SEND ME BY COURIER COPY OF MESSAGE AS FORWARDED T AGWAR

AUTHENTICATED:

EMERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - AG Files
1 - Capt Stone
1 - Mr. Grady

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL equals British CONFIDENTIAL.

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~~Telegram~~

SF

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMD)

15th. February. 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

A.C.M.F. PERSONAL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

With reference Freedom No. 50145 FREOS. I have discussed question personally with McGregor, Duchesne and Foster. We are all agreed that provided abdication took place in favour of Crown Prince and that Crown Prince was acceptable to the opposition the likelihood of reactions in any of the three Services would be remote. The main factor would appear to be the question of the Crown Prince succeeding to the Throne. So long as this is assured the probability of any trouble with the Services is very small. Naturally this probability would be very much reduced by a voluntary or apperently voluntary abdication. It would be equally naturally increased according to the degree and form in which pressure were applied. Should it be necessary to apply pressure it is obvious that every endeavour should be made to prevent publicity. In the unlikely event of any reactions manifesting themselves they are least likely to occur in the Army and probably most likely in the Navy

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Ref. CC/C/51

SECRET

DSM 131
22 FEB 1944

SF

FNM/r:j

19th. February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
(ATTENTION M.G.S.)

Your telegram No. 50027.

1. I communicated your remarks to Badoglio.

2. Badoglio asked me to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief that as regards the first point he wished to point out that he was obviously placed in a very difficult position when expression of opinion took the form of remarks about the King and the Armed Forces which contravened the laws of the country.

3. The Marshal makes the very understandable point that it is very difficult for him to carry on if we permit and broadcast expressions of opinion which are definitely illegal under the laws of the country which he is governing.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

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(11) 64

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DSG 122

CC/P/48

SECRET AND PERSONAL

12 Feb 44

I have just received my very delayed copy of Freedom telegram 50145. Do you wish me to ask Lucheasne, MacGregor and Foster urgently for their respective opinions?

As you will see from the political memorandum which I am also sending you, an abdication by the King would apparently now be followed by the succession of the Crown Prince. All my information goes to show that the opposition parties have agreed on this.

Clearly, therefore, an abdication under these conditions would cause much less repercussion in monarchist circles than an abdication including the elimination of the Crown Prince and the establishment of a Regency.

Voluntary abdication by the King would obviously cause less comment than an abdication under Allied pressure unless such pressure were very discreetly and secretly applied.

My personal view for what it is worth is that an abdication by the present King in favour of the Crown Prince would be unlikely to cause serious re-ercussions in the armed forces.

Would you please let me know by my returning messenger what action, if any, you would like me to take on the telegram under reference.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander
G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C.,
C-in-C

copy

(15) CL

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY N

Ref. CC/C/14

MOST SECRET

SF

Mac/rj

11th. February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters

1. I enclose herewith three documents -

"A" - draft telegram from Count Sforza and Signor Croce to Messrs Eden, Hull and Molotov.

"B" - a document on the constitutional complications of the existing political situation in Italy handed to me by Count Sforza and written by Italian legal experts in Bari.

"C" - a redraft of the message referred to in "A", above, produced by Count Sforza and Signor Croce after I had discussed documents "A" and "B" with Sforza.

2. Before you forward the telegram at "C" to London, Washington and Moscow you may like to have my latest views on the problem presented by the existing political situation in Italy, and I attach a memorandum on the subject which I have endeavoured to keep as short as possible.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

(B) 1(4)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

MOST SECRET

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY 11TH FEBRUARY, 1944.

1. We have in Italy a constitutional government under the King. It was with Badoglio, its Prime Minister, that we concluded the Armistice.

2 This Government has been unable to enlist the support of any of the leaders of the existing political parties in Italy. It functions as an administration of Under-Secretaries and available technicians. Up to date, with the bulk of liberated Italy under A.M.G. it has succeeded in keeping the machine running and has apparently cooperated with the Allied authorities to the best of its ability.

3. From the earliest days after the Armistice it has been clear that there was very considerable opposition to this Government and that this opposition included the leaders of all political parties represented in liberated Italy.

4. This opposition has latterly become much more vocal and claims to speak for the majority of the population of Italy. This may be open to doubt but that it claims a large measure of support among the population is obvious.

5. The degree of unanimity existing between the parties forming the opposition is in some respects uncertain but they are united in two respects. Firstly, that the King should abdicate and, secondly, that a government representing the opposition parties should replace that of Badoglio.

6. We are up against the following difficulty. -

7. We are collaborating with a government which is unpopular with a large section of the community. It is accused of being unrepresentative and weak, and of employing many individuals who are regarded as being badly compromised with Fascism. The King with his record of collaboration with Mussolini and at least partial responsibility for Italy's entry into the war is anathema to the opposition. On the other hand, we have a strong and apparently growing opposition to which we have given the opportunity of voicing its ideas and aims to an extent which is proving most embarrassing to the Government which we are supporting.

8. But although this opposition is reasonably well organised and claims, probably with right, to represent a very considerable following, it has no constitutional possibility of implementing its programme and of superseding in office a government which it regards, possibly also rightly, as unrepresentative, reactionary and weak.

9. As the opposition have no constitutional possibility of attaining their object they may well be tempted to resort to direct action. This might initially take the form of sabotaging Badoglio's administration in the considerable territory which has now been handed over to him and might eventually lead to something in the nature of a putsch and the formation of an opposition government. P.T.O.

(8140)

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10. It used to appear that the opposition would be content to await our arrival in Rome before bringing matters to a head. But with the delay in the advance on Rome there are many indications which are confirmed by the expressed opinions of opposition leaders that the opposition wish to take action at the earliest possible moment. One cogent reason which they advance is that the extremer elements in Rome will be tempted to establish a government in Rome as soon as the Germans evacuate and that the Allies entering Rome in collaboration with Badoglio's Government may find an opposition government already installed.

11. The Executive Junta of the opposition parties represented at the Bari Congress have already despatched a communication to the King calling upon him to abdicate. This may or may not produce immediate repercussions but the fact remains that events may start moving rapidly and it is essential that we should have a clear policy as to the line we should adopt.

12. It is idealogically sound to say that the Italian people should work out their political salvation for themselves. But in the existing set-up the only way in which a formidable opposition can achieve its aims is by direct action which may well cause considerable dislocation of our war effort.

13. As I see it, we can no longer safely sit by and do nothing. There are two alternative courses of action open to us. -
(a) To warn the opposition, including their leaders in Rome, that we will not tolerate any interference with Badoglio's administration until we get to Rome. We might get the available leaders to agree to this but they have already told me that they can not guarantee the action of less responsible elements.
(b) To bring pressure on the King to abdicate if, as seems likely, he refuses of his own volition to do so. This would leave the way clear to the succession of the Crown Prince and the formation of a representative Government which might include Badoglio.

14. I will briefly summarise the arguments for and against either course. The arguments for the first course and against the second are as follows:
(a) Leave well alone. Badoglio's Government has delivered the goods reasonably well up to date.
(b) There is a possibility that bringing pressure to bear on the King might have serious repercussions in the Italian armed forces, especially in the officer class and also in Italian diplomatic missions abroad.
(c) The opposition can hardly pretend to speak for all Italy and it is difficult to determine the exact measure of support which it enjoys even in a liberated Italy although it is clear that it considerable.
(d) An opposition might well regard themselves much more as liberated friends than as defeated enemies. They would naturally have to subscribe to all the Armistice and other conditions subscribed to by Badoglio, but subsequent dealings with them might be more difficult.
The arguments in favour of the second course and against the first are as follows:

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(a) We will be dealing with a government of known political leaders who will have more authority over, and influence on, the Italian people than the existing Government.
(b) The whole of the Centre and Left parties are now in opposition. Without intervention there will be a constant threat of trouble. If the Badoglio Government has to resort to force against the Centre and the Left a very bad impression will be made throughout the world. There are already indications that any any rate in America and Russia the Badoglio Government is looked upon as a weak, reactionary and almost neo-Fascist organisation.
(c) All recent evidence from Rome shows that the Rome leaders are already tending towards more extreme courses. The best way of keeping them quiet is by having a government of their friends already in office by the time that Rome is taken.
(d) The longer we postpone a solution the more difficult is it likely to be to achieve one tranquilly and the more radical is it likely to have to be.

15. I would emphasise that in my opinion which is shared by all my responsible advisors here, it is necessary for us to take one course or the other. From the local point of view we are all agreed that the second presents greater advantages and less dangers to the Allied cause. What is still more important is that one course or the other should be approved by the Allied Governments without delay.

16. Only if the King should decide to abdicate voluntarily in response to the invitation of the Six Party Junta, will intervention be unnecessary. Should he refuse and should we decide to bring pressure to bear upon him the sequence of events is likely to be as follows. -
(a) The King abdicates in favour of the Crown Prince.
(b) The Six Parties have at last agreed that in order to secure the abdication of the King they are prepared to accept the Crown Prince as his successor.
(c) The Crown Prince would invite a suitable representative of the Six Parties to form a government. We might have to bring pressure to bear upon him to do so but I consider this very unlikely.
(d) A government representing the opposition would be formed. It is likely that such a government might call upon the new King to delegate to it certain of his powers but agreement on this point has not yet been reached by the Six Parties. That the new King would fail to accede to any request in this connection is most unlikely.

17. According to statements by leading members of the Six Parties such a government would be unwilling to dislocate administration by a ruthless and widespread purge but would confine itself to dealing severely with a few hundred only of the principal Fascists still at large. These leaders have also pledged themselves to produce much more vigorous assistance in the prosecution of the war against Germany than the present Government has been able to ensure.

18. The opposition leaders have also agreed categorically to leave the question of the ultimate government of Italy for decision by the Italian electorate after the whole of Italy has been freed.

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19. The comparatively recent decision by the Six Parties to accept the Crown Prince as successor to the King may well facilitate the question of the King's abdication and reduce the possibility of repercussions.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

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"A"

SECRET. CONFIDENTIAL

Naples, February 10 1944

TELEGRAM to the Honorable Cordell Hull, Washington
Right Honorable Anthony Eden, London
Mr. Molotoff, Moscow.

The following statements and considerations are the result of careful consultations with some of the most distinguished elements in liberated Italy, including high legal authorities and the Executive Junta. All join in our description of imminent danger and necessity of urgent decisions.

1 - The Bari Congress and the deep echo it has provoked throughout Italy have proved the will of the nation.

2 - The indignity of the King is acknowledged by all the Italians; and the so-called "monarchist" group staged at present are promoted by the pro-German and pro-fascist elements which are afraid that they will be held accountable for their political corruption and military crimes.

3.- The growing congenital weakness of the Badoglio government and its incapacity to solve any problem are equally proved.

4 - It is vain to hope that Italy finds again the moral forces needed to join the war against Germany which is our first duty - a war which a government issued of our free political parties might rapidly and successfully organize - if the Allies continue to admit a king and a government supported only by the elements which look to the king or his son as the alibis of their own pro-German and pro-fascist activities.

5 - We showed in Bari our moderation and our desire of political continuity by offering a compromise on the basis of the conservation of the monarchy until a final decision of the whole nation is legally reached, but on condition that the monarch and the gang around him are placed in the impossibility to go on plotting against the Italian freedom and - in spite of empty words - against the war effort which we want to put on the top of all our duties.

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6 - A juridical consultation which we have submitted to General Macfarlane proves that a delegation from the future king of all his powers to an extraordinary government or - we add as our personal opinion - to a Lieutenant general of the Realm or to a Regent (the appointment going to some highly respected private citizen) are consistent with our political traditions. It is true that if our past kings have often delegated all civil powers they never delegated their military powers as this time it is essential that it is done for the safety of our freedoms and for a true war effort; but the present king did delegate all his supreme military powers to a criminal adventurer who used them for the most anti-national of wars in 1940.

7 - By submitting a moderate solution based on our historical and even monarchical traditions we have done our duty. Now the duty of the Allies begins. Until now only a theoretical freedom of the Italians to decide has been admitted. But the Italians have no such freedom unless they resort to a revolution, which we want to avoid even for the sake of the war effort; the armed forces are only in the hand of the king and of the generals who betrayed the Allied cause last September.

8 - By delaying the solution of the Italian problem the Allies harm their own positions because - by collaborating in Italy with dubious elements (and all are dubious since all served the Germans) they make deeper and deeper a confusion which amounts to a sabotage of the war.

9 - From their constant loyalty to the cause of the Allies - even when all present official Italy was branding them and their friends as "anti-Italian" - the two undersigned draw the certainty that their sincerity is not doubted. They have no personal ambitions, they think only of the honor of Italy and of an orderly democratic Europe. Ready to do anything for the victory of the

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democracies, they know that they may leave to General Macfarlane , who has a solid grasp of the situation, to inform the Allies of the shameful revealing incidents which show how urgent is a complete radical transformation; enough to remind the recent appointment as secret political adviser of the Badoglio government of a man (Maldi) who helped Mussolini to disrupt and cheat France in 1939 - 40; and the arrival in Naples and his reception by the highest authorities of a disreputable fascist military adventurer (Ricciotti Garibaldi) with the aim of confusing any action for war effort. Of such incidents General Macfarlane is fully informed and we confide that he is informed of something worse; the growing suspicion of the nation for the new governmental army which puts in key places some of the most insolent fascist officers of the past; nothing could be more harmful to the war effort; the Italians being afraid that a defeated gang of pro-German generals wanting to escape punishment and the reduction of our standing army(which will be the first decision of a free cabinet) uses the king as an alibi hoping to reduce Italy to the condition of defeated Spain after Cuba, a Spain with thousands of generals but with seeds of future revolutions.

10 - Once the king (present or future) and the defeated gang around him enter the road of plots and intrigues there will be no limit to degradation and dangers. What happened with Badoglio who certainly meant well at the beginning is a proof. With the present leaders Italy goes to a neo-fascism more dangerous than the old one because more hypocritical; the disintegration increases; the sense of the state is disappearing; nobody obeys; nobody believes. We rely on the Allies to make it possible for us to help their cause which is our cause. Only the Allies have the force - but force means responsibility and action.

(Benedetto Croce)

(Sforza)

"B"

PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN CRISIS

The Congress of Bari has given proof to the world of the full political maturity of the Italian people, who are ready to discard temporarily every ideologic fight in order to unite toward the common aim: make war. After that event, the Italian crisis could reach a solution, at one condition: that on both sides further sacrifices be made in order to attain a supreme harmony. Otherwise, all sides concerned will use their strength in a political conflict, and the war effort, which should be paramount, will suffer most from this state of affairs.

There is a possibility, we believe, of eliminating the present discord.

The points on which an agreement has already been reached are the following:

1) Necessity of an efficient Italian participation to the war. Such a necessity is proclaimed by both the "monarchists" and the people, and is exemplified by the daring fight put up by the patriots in the regions still occupied.

2) Advisability of postponing until the end of the war the solution of the institutional problem and the judgment on the responsibilities of the dynasty. Such a postponement - always claimed on the monarchist side - is accepted by the Committees of Liberation, because of the present impossibility of deciding the issue in a legitimate way.

3) Necessity of forming a serious government, which would unite all forces, regardless of the monarchical or anti-monarchical creed of the individuals concerned, for the war of liberation. Such a government should also provide for the most pressing needs of the populations, assuring them a minimum standard of life and restoring mainly through moral prestige - the meaning of authority, now completely lost.

The points on which an agreement has not yet been reached are the following:

1) On the "monarchical" side it is commonly assumed that the king has no co-responsibility in the past Mussolini government; and that anyway only the whole of the Italian people, legally assembled after Italy's liberation, will have the right

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The points on which an agreement has not yet been reached are the following:

1) On the "monarchical" side it is commonly assumed that the king has no co-responsibility in the past Mussolini government; and that anyway only the whole of the Italian people, legally assembled after Italy's liberation, will have the right to decide on such matters. The parties, on the contrary, affirm that the sovereign is fully co-involved in the responsibilities of the past regime, that the crown prince is heavily compromised too, having been among those generals more guilty of delivering the army to the Germans. Therefore the parties are asking the abdication

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of the king and the formation of an extraordinary government with full powers.

2) The "monarchists" want the king to constitute the new government with a representation of all parties. The parties, on the contrary, refuse any sort of collaboration with the king, and believe that the right to form the government rests only with the people, who can exercise it through representatives of all the anti-fascist parties, which interpret the general opinion of the country, or at least of a very great majority.

These being the only remaining grounds for disunity among the Italians, one must find a way to reconcile the opposed tendencies, by putting - for the time being - the king and his dynasty in a condition not to carry on personally and directly the regal powers, and by giving at the same time to the Italian people the kind of government they need and deserve.

The problem examined in constitutional terms.

A solution cannot be found in the letter of the Constitution. It is well known that the "Statuto" was a royal act by which a king, who considered himself of divine right, granted his subjects the basic liberties required by their civic consciousness. It is only too natural that, due to this originary character of the Constitution, no rule was foreseen, regarding the responsibility of the king as head of the state, nor regarding the way to ensure the loyal execution of the Constitution itself, with the one exception of art. 22, which imposes an oath on the king. And logically there are no provisions enabling the people to compel the king to observe the Constitution. Lacking written rules, we must make use of the spirit of the Statute, especially the one it has acquired following the free plebiscites by which the other peoples of Italy have declared their will to unite with the kingdom of Sardinia. On the strength of these plebiscites, by which it has been solemnly affirmed that the king of Sardinia was accepted as king of Italy in so far as he was a constitutional king (we recall for instance the formula used in the plebiscites of the neapolitan provinces: "The people want Italy to be one and indivisible,

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the ways to achieve them, and sufficient guarantees of liberty and legitimacy. But such a gap, explainable by the historical origin of the albertine and Italian constitution, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the 1848 constitution is intangible and that the people have no right to declare the decadence of the king, if guilty of attempting at their liberties.

To establish a legitimate procedure it is necessary to look into the spirit of the Constitution as well as in the customary precedents.

The spirit of the Constitution, so far as Italian unity is concerned, is that of a reciprocal entente. This entente cannot be broken arbitrarily by one of the two parties. It can be broken either by mutual consent, or by violation of the obligations thereof. Our Constitution does not provide for a body empowered to establish the existence of such a violation and to impose the respect of the statuatory rules. All that is left then, as in all cases in which the law does not ensure the means of its own actuation is self-protection, a primitive weapon, but an effective one, used in a fully legitimate way throughout the whole history of civilization. Nevertheless the Italian people, conscious of the seriousness of the hour and of their duties toward the Allies, do not intend to have recourse to self-protection. One last possibility is left: that the king himself - who cannot deny the part played by him in the present ruin of Italy and of its traditional ideals of liberty and civilization - transfer to the people by a regal and spontaneous gesture the exercise of those powers the people had intrusted him with. The king should do this as any gentleman who, having received a mandate and a doubt having arisen as to his good use of it, submits to the mandatory party his acts for judgment, and suspends the exercise of his powers. Should we do the Savojas the wrong of believing them less worthy than any gentleman?

By doing so, the king would suspend all discussions around the monarchy until a constitutent assembly in which monarchist members, if elected, would sit; he would also free the minds of the people, appeasing their fears of a political reaction and enable them to devote all their energies to the war.

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Solution of the problem according to Law.

To reach this end the parties must stop all anti-monarchical, anti-king, or anti-prince activities; while the king and his successors must intrust temporarily the actual exercise of their powers to a body presenting full guarantees of impartiality and freedom. This temporary surrender of powers may take place by a sovereign act of delegation or by an intrustment - not forseen by the Constitution but far from alien to its spirit

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and to the precedents of our public law. Indeeed the Constitution does not forbid the king to delegate his powers in case of pressing necessity, and the possibility of such a delegation has always been recognized by our law: as far back as the Risorgimento and at the time of our wars of independence the king used to appoint a lieutenancy in exceptional cases; this was being done for the exigencies of war or for purposes of personal representation in newly annexed territories (1). <u>These precedents are not mentioned here because of a desire to have a lieutenancy created today, but to show that the kings of Italy always used liberally their delegatory power, even though it is not mentioned in the Statute</u> (2).

It being proved that the king can delegate all or part of his powers, we must find a procedure for a similar delegation, enabling <u>morally</u> the government to act with assured firmness - and enabling the king and his house to assume a nobler and more dignified attitude than that presently chosen, while waiting for the free manifestation of the popular will.

<u>Delegation of powers and the king's position.</u>

The king should intrust his powers to an extraordinary body - with the express reserve that such a delegation does not impair his rights or those of his family to the throne of Italy, but is simply meant to enable the formation of a government with full powers. In granting such a delegation the king shall renounce the right of revoking said delegation for the duration of the war and of the works of the Constituent Assembly.

The delegation of powers will not modify the constitutional position of the king. <u>Nominally</u> he will continue to be the head of the State, laws and decrees will continue to be promulgated in his name; the same for judicial sentences and the naming of offficials. National insignia will remain what they are. The inviolability of the king (art. 4 Stat.) will be maintained, same as the use of the royal palaces and of all liquid assets of the Crown, not to speak of all private property.

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In short the delegation of powers will simply enable a temporary government to re-

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(1) In 1848 Carlo Alberto delegated all civil powers to Eugenio Carignano. In 1859 and 1866 Victor Emmanuel II did the same. In 1915 Victor Emmanuel III named Tomaso di Savoja his Lieutenant General for ordinary affairs and urgent matters (royal decree 25/5/1915 n.699).
In 1849 V.E. II delegated the royal signature to the duke of Genoa (see for all this Marchi: "General Lieutenancies in Italian constitutional Law").

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organize Italy and its war effort, and to prepare with complete impartiality and freedom the Constituent Assembly for the day circumstances and the Allied authorities will render it possible. The king would remain nominally and formally head of the State. But, urged by a high and disinterested feeling, with a sovereign act inspired by the best traditions of his predecessors, he would relinquish temporarily the powers he derives from a popular election, as a true gentleman whose reputation has been tarnished by a suspicion, and who wants to await the judgement of public opinion expressed in all impartiality and objectivity.

In reality the temporary delegation of powers will not seem so exceptional if one recalls the way the constitutional regime degenerated in the past twenty fascist years. The Italian government, in October 1922, stopped being a <u>parliamentary</u> one, first de facto, then de jure, and became responsible only to the king (L.24/1/1925, n.2263). This new type of government was held by some to be analogous to the monarchies of old or to the German empire. But there the head of the State was also the head of the government, or he had a chancellor - while here the head of the government, though theoretically responsible to the king alone, in reality carried out for twenty years the policies he chose, so much so that his powers could have come from a formal, total delegation by the king.

Still more: the highest of all regal powers, that of <u>commander in chief</u> of all armed forces (art. 5, Statute) was conferred by the king to the fascist duce. This was the supreme step on a long road of abdications of the constitutional rights and powers of the king.

<u>The delegated body.</u>

Our public law records only the formula of the lieutenancy, general or regional, for a set group of affairs. What is required now is the delegation of all civil and military powers. This step, seemingly very important, is in reality of lesser

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The delegated body.

Our public law records only the formula of the lieutenancy, general or regional, for a set group of affairs. What is required now is the delegation of all civil and military powers. This step, seemingly very important, is in reality of lesser consequence and especially less dangerous than that taken under fascism. The king should realise that the people are not asking him too much when they request him to delegate temporarily his powers, that under fascism he had permanently transferred to the duce. This sovereign who for twenty years sanctioned all the violations of the Constitution and of all the Italian liberties, who accepted to submit the legal succession to the throne to a vote of the fascist Grand Council, this man, in a word, who had fully agreed to the absolutistic dictatorship of Mussolini, should not refuse today to the Italian people, anxious to attain complete unity in this tragic hour, what he did not deny to a man who was promising the Italians only slavery and wars. The

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democratic forces of Italy believe to have more of a right than Fascism to ask for a time today what was so lightly given away permanently yesterday.

Consequently nothing - constitutionally or juridically speaking - stands in the way of a delegation, by the king to an extraordinary government, of all powers including that of calling a Constituent Assembly at the end of the war. Politically and morally speaking this temporary delegation is a duty for the King, a fundamental contribution to unity for the common goal of waging war. The king has asserted that he wants to be the first to serve the fatherland: the political parties are pointing him a way to do so.

Constitutional consequences of the delegation.

The distinction, fundamental in all constitutional governments, between head of the State and head of the government, was almost entirely suppressed in fascist Italy. Must it reappear today? Most certainly yes; but in the only political climate in which it is possible, namely a parliamentary regime which would enable the free interplay of the parties and the normal succession of governments, and therefore legitimate the existence of a head of the State superior to all parties.

Today there is no Parliament, the Senate harbours the worst elements of fascism, the people are in the material impossibility of electing their representatives. At the present juncture the distinction between head of the State and head of the government is ephemereal, for the government being responsible only to the king, the fundamental rule of our public law - "the king reigns and does not govern" - becomes devoid of any practical significance. A government responsible to the king only, and not concurrently to a parliament, would indeed be nothing but "the king's government". As soon as such a government would depart from a line willed by the king, the latter would have no difficulty in dismissing it. In Italy, in the present situation, the interplay of free and representative institutions is no longer possible.

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In short the temporary delegation of the regal powers not only would not really destroy the above distinction, but it would give the government that necessary independence towards the king, which would normally be assured by a freely working parliament, and which can only be assured, now, by the unanimous consent of the parties, interpreters of the will of the nation. The government being responsible not to the king, but to public opinion, such a responsibility might take the form of a responsibility to an assembly constituted along the lines of the Algiers national

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consultive assembly. Such a body would answer for the acts of the government.

The other formula: the Lieutenancy (or Regency).

A similar solution might be the creation of a general Lieutenancy (or Regency). It would have the advantage of being closer to Italian constitutional precedents, but it would be less welcomed by the parties which would see in it a proof of the king's obstinate determination to interfere in the actual government of the State. Should this be the solution adopted, the lieutenant or regent would have to be a person of the highest moral prestige, of great personal authority - chosen outside the reigning dynasty - who would exercise the powers of the king in his name and in completely autonomous manner. The lieutenant or regent would appoint the government, to which full powers, necessary for the reconstruction of Italy, would be granted.

Outline of a law of delegation.

Here is, concretely formulated, a project of law which would bring about the much desired harmony of the nation, and would insure for the morrow a free reasset of the country:

We, Victor Emmanuel III, by the grace of God and the will of the nation king of Italy, in all loyalty as king, in all affection as Italian, having pondered upon the grievous conditions in which our country has fallen, and the tragedies which have befallen our beloved Italy, moved by a fatherly feeling, anxious to see our unfortunate people reflourish under free civic institutions, conscious of the necessity for all the energies of the country to unite in the common task of liberating the sacred soil of the fatherland from the hated invader, having heard the cries that mount to our heart from all the hearts of

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have sovereignly decided to transfer temporarily our regal powers to a provisional government until the cessation of hostilities; this government will exercise them in our name and with our full preventive consent. Said government will promulgate the laws necessary for the people to freely express their will, and for the constitutional, economic and social asset of Italy. With the same spirit of complete devotion to the fatherland as our great ancestors, we shall partake with joyfull and fatherly feelings to the rebirth of Italy, inviting all citizens to unite around us and around the government delegated by us for this common sacred task.

With reference to the decrees of 1848; 1859; 1860; 6 of Nov. 1860: 1860; 9 Oct. 1870 n.5908; 2 of May 1915 n. 699;

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With certain science, regal authority and having heard the advice of our Crown Council, we have decreed and we decree:

Art. 1 Our regal powers are temporarily delegated to an extraordinary government (or to a "luogotenente generale straordinario", or to a Regent), which will exercise them in our name for the whole duration of the war (1).

Art. 2 At the end of the state of war and as soon as the clauses of the armistice (or of the peace?) will allow, the government will summon a constituent assembly freely elected by the people.

Art. 3 The assembly will be elected in the way prescribed by the laws which the extraordinary government can and will emanate in summoning the people.

Art. 4 The assembly will establish the Statute of the Italian State and the economic and social directives to be followed by it.

Art. 5 The assembly once summoned, the extraordinary government will delegate its powers to it, and will retain only the administration of ordinary affairs.

Art. 6 The delegation we have conferred to the government is, for the period of time established, irrevocable.

Art. 7 Nothing is changed in regards to the legal succession to the throne, to the guarantees of inviolability of the king, to the rights upon the properties of the Crown and of the private patrimony, to the titles of nobility, etc. The provisions concerning the oath of allegiance of the ministers, of the officials and of all the members of the armed forces, the national insignias and seals, the use of the national flag et similia, will continue to be in full force.

Art. 8 Until the dispositions of the new Constitution will be promulgated, the dispositions of the Statute of the 4th of March 1848 will continue to apply, insofar as they are compatible with the present provisions.

All other dispositions in contrast with the above ones are abrogated.

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(1) If the solution of the Lieutenancy or of the Regency prevails, one should add to art. 1: "The lieutenant (or regent) will form a provisional government, in which all parties be represented; said government will be responsible to the lieutenant (or regent).

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"C"

From Sforza and Croce to the three Allied Foreign Ministers.

Naples, February 10, 1944.

Being in constant intimate touch with the six parties but being personally independent our appraisement of the situation might perhaps be useful.

Junta sent letter to King urging him abdicate immediately for nation's and war effort's sake.

Most probably King will not, unless he receives secret hint from Allies who alone have the force.

If abdicating in favor of his son, present Cabinet is obliged by our laws to resign at once into hands new king.

But no responsible statesman will accept form new Cabinet unless new king signs decree yielding all military civil powers to an extraordinary government or to a Lieutenant General of Realm chose among some most respected private citizens. A scheme communicated to General MacFarlane shows all this is consistent with precedents.

New king will accept at once this condition if same secret hint takes place being it understood that new rulers assure respect of national consultation of whole liberated nation. All this should seem imperative to Allies as to us because a second cabinet of Generals and officials would mean complete lack of popular support and because only a Cabinet including six parties may save Italy from growing disintegration and may start war effort. We two, for example, are decided not to join Cabinet on different conditions since silent acceptance of this compromise has been maximum reached from Leftist parties and since a minor formule would not be accepted North.

Necessary to form new Cabinet at once in order to avoid possible serious danger of two governments one in Salerno and one in Rome dreamed of by daring elements there.

First duties of new Cabinet:

1) To include only four or five Ministers each keeping various interims in order to make it easy and immediate a reshaping of Cabinet when in Rome.

2) To reaffirm not only most complete loyalty to armistice rules but add that supreme duty is to organize much more intimate collaboration than at present with Allies for war effort and future general policy.

3) In order to avoid depressing influence of defeated pro-Nazi generals, to create only one civilian Minister for National Defence with three military Under-Secretaries, the names of which are ready.

4) In order to create new war atmosphere to try and eliminate a

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big military and civil Fascists who betrayed last September but for give to all minor Fascists urging them to rehabilitate in war.

5) Knowing that present big army is definitely rotten, to create only a small decent standing army South, and organize volunteers North which has never been done in a national form.

6) New Government is sure of its will because it knows it has no other means to assert itself and save Italy.

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U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET 11 FEB 1944

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE /sk

SVC/RELAY NO. M/C NO :10/14 14 FEB 1944

CLASS: MOST SECRET REF NO:5014S

PREC : PRIORITY FILED :111201A FEB

FROM : FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE THREE REC'D :11164.A FEB

TO : ACMF FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER RPTD FATIMA FOR MACFARLANE

Allied CINC desires considered report on probable effect conferred on personnel of various levels within Italian army, navy and airforce of abdication of King Victor Emmanuel. Bearing in mind the difficulty of securing objective data as to exposing attitudes of officers and men, will you cause a report to be made on the situation. You will no doubt draw upon sources of information in ACC and elsewhere and take account of circumstances in which abdication might be brought about for example voluntarily, under pressure from his own people or through active intervention of Allies.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG files
1 - Dep Chief Commissioner- Info
1 - V.P. Admin. Sec. - Info
1 - Main HQ ACC (DRL)
1 - Political Section - Info

File "Political"

[illegible] Signal Corps.

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U.S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

11 FEB 1944

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE /sk

SVC/RELAY NO.

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : ROUTINE

FROM : FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHMCS

TO : FATIMAFOR MACFARLANE RPTD FARGO FOR MACFARLANE

M/C NO : 3/11

REF NO: 50027

FILED : 102015A Feb

REC'D : 110312A Feb

Herewith reply to your Memorandum of the 5th February Reference CG/G/33 covering a written communication from the Italian Government putting forward 3 requests concerning the control of criticism of the government and the activities of officials of the psychological warfare branch in Italy. On the 1st point you may say that it is the Allied policy that there be free expression of opinion in liberated Italy, subject to the requirements of security and public order. On the second point you may say that such facilities as may be available for the publication of newspapers will be distributed impartially among all sections of opinion. To the 3rd request you may reply that the policy is that Allied Officers in Italy concerned with matters of censorship, information or propaganda will act on basis of strict impartiality and without bias towards any section of Italian public opinion. At its next meeting the Advisory Council for Italy will be informed on my behalf of the Italian representations and of my reply.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG Files
1 - Rep. Chief Commissioner

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1715 hrs. 11 Feb

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COPY

M-1260

Received at Peninsular Base Section Signal Message Center 9 FEBRUARY 1944

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO (ACTION) : HQ ACLT FOR ALEXANDER)EYES ONLY (WARGO PERSONAL FOR MACFARLANE)EYES ONLY

(INFORMATION) : NONE

FROM : CINCMED CTHO

DATE TIME SIGNED : 081900A

DATE TIME REC'D : 090430A

REFERENCE NR. : A3167

CITE : 81265

For your information the British and American Governments have not yet reached full agreement upon Italian policy either for the immediate period or the period after the capture of Rome. It has not been thought wise to submit these questions to the Advisory Council until the two Governments have agreed on a policy. For the same reason I should be glad if discussion could be avoided as far as possible for the present with the various Italian groups. The British resident minister and the American representative have agreed this course.

Info AFHQ Eq Sec O.K.

/s/ MACF

ACC Dist.
Pa to CO only

Crypto /s/ K. Deutsch

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C O P Y

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

C O P Y

February 9th 1946

To: Lieut. General Sir N. Mason MacFarlane
From: P.R. O., A.C.C.

It may interest you to see the attached document which the Executive Council of the Peri Congress attempted to issue after their meeting with you. Their tactics were not very admirable as they did their best to induce both the radio and the Press to issue it as an "official communique" which had your blessing; you may perhaps like to warn them against such procedure.

If you could let me know, perhaps through your Secretary General, when you hold such meetings and what action you went as regards publicity, I should be very greteful, as I should then be more prepared than I was in this case to deal with any leakages or rumours.

The same is true of proclamations. General order No. 18 regarding racial toleration, was issued without my being informed at all: the result is that correspondents, including Sprigge of Reuters, have protested to me that they knew nothing of it until it was published in the local press: and they naturally regard this as unfair treatment, which encourages them to spy and scoop if they can! Perhaps you could issue orders through Major Doe that all releases should be made through, or at least with the knowledge of, this office?

/s/ Lionel Fielden

Major
Public Relations Officer.

In ink: Several correspondents have this morning filed stories steting that, as the Proclamation is the first to be issued from Peri but to apply to A.M.G. territory, it implies "the immediate transfer of territory." I have put a censor stop on these "implications" but it shows the danger of making releases other than through this office.

C O P Y

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TRANSLATION

Work of the Antifascist Executive Council.
Abdication of the King
Demand made to the Allied Cotrol Commission

Following up its study of the measures to be adopted immediately in carrying out the resolutions of the Bari Congress, the Executive Council of Liberated Italy met General MacFarlane, Head of the Allied Control Commission, on the morning of Saturday February 5th.

The Executive Council informed General MacFarlane of its task which essentially consists of taking all measures to procure the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and to bring about conditions in which a real national and democratic government can be set up to prosecute the war with vigour and to initiate the reconstruction of the country's life.

The Executive Council urged on General MacFarlane the necessity of hastening the steps to clarify and regularise the national life.

At the end of the meeting, which was marked by the greatest cordiality, General MacFarlane assured the Council that he would instantly transmit the Council's views to the Allied Governments and would emphasise their extreme urgency.

C O P Y

21 FEB 1944 /603 1047

SUBJECT:- PROTEST BRINDISI CITIZENS.

Allied Control Commission.

Headquarters
71 Sub Area
19/A
7th Feb '44

1. With reference to your 091.1 of 30 January forwarding a communication from the Under Secretary of State (Italy) to which was attached an unsigned and undated "Synopsis of protest to the Italian Government by numerous intellectuals of Brindisi".

2. The very vagueness of the insinuations leads one to suppose that this synopsis was only compiled as covering up some individual or individuals from any responsibility in the present emergency.

3. The Under Secretary is in a position to verify that all requisitions are carried out with the full authority of the Italian Government, but the British first satisfy themselves that alternative accommodation is available when this is necessary.

4. Local authorities are most helpful and considerate and often appeal to British Authority offering alternative and acceptable accommodation. There is never any question of the furniture "lying in the street" and British lorries are often provided when long journeys make it a hardship for a family to use horse transport.

5. The majority of civil business is naturally at a complete standstill and an inspection of the town shows at once that even those shops that are open, can only carry on a paltry trade for a few hours a day often only relying on the Allies for any custom. Many premises are closed and yet unrequisitioned.

6. I personally know many Italian Officials and I am always available, as they well know, should an appeal be necessary. The good relations between my Staff and these Officials is on the highest level.

7. I am not in a position to supervise civilian food distribution and I know the A.C.C. are always in touch with that problem. At the same time I would point out that the British Army in this Sub Area has been severely restricted from buying local produce as will be seen from Sub Area Orders No.42 of 12 Oct '43 and 103 of 27 Oct'43. These Orders were enforced long before the remainder of Italy for which Orders were issued by 2 District on 1 Jan '44, Reference 1517 Q. Lt.Col.MONTFORD and Lt.Col. MAYNE of the Allied Control Commission are personally well aware of the co-operation I have most willingly given in this respect.

8. Incidentally the British never have any " freshly killed meat " and the ration of bread is 12 ozs a day and this is most strictly enforced.

9. Far too many Italians including both Civilians and the Services are more concerned with internal politics to the detriment of our War effort.

10. The British in the vast majority of cases are showing real tact and often great friendliness to the Italians, and in fact the relations between the Italians and British are on a very good footing in spite of the concentration of troops and Depots in this operationally important Area. This is all the more remarkable when it is realised I am employing 11,000 Italians daily of which 6,500 are civilians.

11. I respectfully protest that such vague letters and unfounded insinuations cannot help in the difficult problem of the prosecution of the campaign in ITALY.

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L. J. Wood Rance

Colonel.,
Commanding 71 Sub Area.

file
FDD
23 Feb
Received Salerno 21/2/44

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Urgent and Most Secret

Ref. CC/G/38.

FNMM/rj

5 Feb 44

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Allied Force Headquarters
(For the Attention of Commander-in-Chief,
Mr MacMillan (for Advisory Council) and MGS)

1. Admiral De Courten and Signori Reale and Philipson arrived last night from Brindisi as a deputation from Marshal Badoglio bringing with them a written communication from the Italian Government of which I enclose a translation.

2. You will note that the communication is neither dated nor signed.

3. The document raises the question of whether it should be permitted in Italy so long as there is a Constitutional Monarchy to give publicity to statements bringing the King and the armed forces into disrepute and undermine their prestige in the country.

4. The Italian Government make three requests.

5. As regards their second and third requests, instructions have already been in force for some time on both questions and if they are properly carried out by all concerned the Italian Government should have no cause for complaint. There have been cases in which it would appear that P.W.B. have displayed partiality in favour of the opposition parties, but only recently categorical instructions regarding strict impartiality have again been communicated to this organisation.

6. As regards the first Italian request, I would be grateful for an early ruling on this subject. It is clear that much that was said at the recent Bari conference amounted to lese majestee in the eyes of the existing Italian Government, and as far as the prestige of the King and the armed forces are concerned many of the published remarks must have obviously contributed to bring them into disrepute.

7. That clearly was the object of the conference.

8. On the one hand, we are encouraging free speech and assisting materially in giving publicity to what occurred at the conference. On the other hand, we are collaborating as far as possible with the King's Govt.

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9. The point of view of the existing Italian Government is clear. They find it difficult to understand how we can expect close collaboration between the Allies and the King's Govt. if the Allies continue to encourage and assist the publication of scurrilous remarks about the King and his armed forces.

10. The Deputation stressed the unfortunate effect which the Bari conference and the publicity given to it had had on, in particular, the officers of the Italian Navy, and stressed equally the fact that a very large proportion of the soberer elements of the Italian population were entirely unrepresented at Bari.

11. I would be glad if you would indicate the lines on which I should speak to Badoglio in connection with the first request made by the Italian Govt. in the document under reference.

12. When next I see Badoglio, I will confirm the fact that this unsigned documents represents the views of his Government. In point of fact I have no reason to doubt this.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lt General
Chief Commissioner

cc Hq ACMF (for CINC)

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The Government which has the honor of ruling the country is fully conscious of its grave tasks : to prepare and wage the war with all its strength and lead Italy back into the society of free nations.

To carry out this program an essential condition is required : the moral and material reconstruction of the country, which is already in full process of development, and with results that were hardly hoped for.

It is sufficient to recall the work already carried out or being carried out in eliminating all remnants of Fascism, the fine cooperation given in all lines of work by the population in the rear areas, the tireless activity of the Navy and of the Merchant Marine, the active participation of the Air Force and that of the Army, which if properly armed, could furnish a greater contribution to the war effort on the Italian as well as other fronts.

This firm and determined effort often finds unexpected obstacles.

A movement of opposition which represents only a part, and the least numerous part, of the liberated population is attempting to divide and to stir Italian public opinion, which, though in full agreement as to the essential tasks, remains divided on a conditional question, which does not even concern a principle but a person : the pretended incompatibility of governing with King Victor Emanuel III.

It is not necessary to discuss at present this attitude, but the Government can guarantee as to the absolute loyalty of the King in the relations with the Allies, in matters of internal policy, and in the assurance of the exercise of liberty in all its forms to all Italians.

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But the exercise of liberty should not obstruct or seriously disturb the action of the Government, which is based above all on the prestige, authority and respect of the laws of the State.

The Government sees no difficulty in modifying existing laws, and all Fascist laws limiting liberty have been abolished, but it must ensure scrupulous observance of fundamental laws.

The opposition has full right of freedom of speech, but it cannot insult the head of the State and the armed forces, without disturbing the country, halting its progress and violating the law that safeguards these institutions.

These excesses are often due to the intention of rising above the law, of spreading the conviction that violation of the law is carried out in the shadow of the protection of Allied authorities.

This of course is not true, but in politics appearance often takes the place of reality.

The Italian government, conscious of the political forces that uphold it, has nothing to ask from the Governments of the United Nations except the assurance that their impartiality is directed towards safeguarding the rights of the Government and of the opposition and it formulates the following requests, which are the condition sine qua non for an efficient government activity:

I.- The censorship which is exeercised jointly by the Government and by the Allies must ensure that the head of the State and of the armed forces should not be continously and basely insulted, and that the Armed forces should not be constantly criticized and diminished in the eyes of the public opinion.

The exercise of criticism, which any free goverment cannot

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but desire, must be kept within legal forms, and must represent a useful collaboration.

2. Government supporters and the opposition should be freely allowed to publish newspapers both partizan and non partizan.

3. The intervention of the P.W.B. should be avoided in matters that concern policy, publications, choice of radio or newspaper collaborators, among both government and opposition supporters; it should be limited to the strict control of all publications and expressions of public opinion, so as to keep them in harmony with the political and military conduct of the war.

The government has no intention of maintaining a monopoly of its rule and confirms the assurance already given that, as soon as Rome is reached, the Head of the State will carry out, with all respect of constitutional forms, the consultation of legitimate representatives of all parties and all currents of opinion, for the purpose of setting up a Government that is to be the expression of the unanimous will of the Italian people to carry on the national and democratic war, until the attainment of the aims that are to be fulfilled according to the public declarations of the Allies.

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FREEDOM HQ ACMF (INFO)

PARA ONE PD PURCHASE PARTN FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARTN TO AFHQ FOR MSS FOR CINC SAR MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS RPTD HQ ACMF FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER PD CITE FARGO SEVEN FOUR SIX PD THE EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF THE SIX PARTIES REPRESENTED AT THE RECENT BARI CONGRESS CAME TO SEE ME THIS MORNING PD THEY CONFINED THEMSELVES TO COMMUNICATING TO ME THE IMMEDIATE TASKS WHICH HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED TO THEM BY THE PARTIES WHICH THEY REPRESENTED PD THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS PD ONE PD TO SECURE THE ABDICATION OF THE KING PD TWO PD TO PREPARE THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT WITH FULL POWERS INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE EXERCISED BY THE HEAD OF THE STATE PD SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE IN OFFICE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS PROPER ELECTIONS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE LIBERATION OF ALL ITALY PD PARA TWO PD SEVERAL SPEAKERS STRESSED THE FACT THAT THEY REPRESENTED A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION OF LIBERATED ITALY PD THAT THEY REPRESENTED THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WHO HAD ALWAYS BEEN ANTI DASH FASCIST PD THAT IT WAS SELF DASH EVIDENT THAT THE KING WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO FORM A BROAD DASH BASED GOVERNMENT AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS AND INEVITABLY MUST REMAIN WEAK AND WITHOUT INFLUENCE PD THAT AN UNFORTUNATE SITUATION WAS NOW BEING CREATED IN ITALY BY WHAT

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SECRET PRIORITY PARIS 6 FEB 44

TO ADMIRALTY (NAVAL ATTACHE)

REPEATED TO WASHINGTON FOR NAVAL ATTACHE

FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ARMISTICE THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO MAKE A DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR LOYALTY TO THE ALLIED CAUSE. ON FEB 4 THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF GENERAL FOCH WAS OBSERVED AS A NATIONAL HOLIDAY. THE GERMANS HAD FORBIDDEN ANY DEMONSTRATIONS IN HIS HONOUR BUT THE PEOPLE OF PARIS DEFIED THE GERMANS AND THE VICHY GOVERNMENT AND MADE THE DAY A GREAT SUCCESS.

THE CEREMONY AT THE STATUE OF FOCH ON THE AVENUE DE LA GRANDE ARMEE WAS ATTENDED BY A VAST CROWD WHICH COVERED THE WHOLE AVENUE FROM THE ARC DE TRIOMPHE TO THE PORTE MAILLOT. THE GERMANS HAD FORBIDDEN THE PLACING OF WREATHS AT THE STATUE BUT THE CROWD DISREGARDED THIS ORDER AND THE STATUE WAS COVERED WITH FLOWERS AND WREATHS. THE GERMANS HAD ALSO FORBIDDEN THE PRESENCE OF ANY FRENCH TROOPS BUT A DETACHMENT OF THE GARDE REPUBLICAINE WAS PRESENT AND THE CROWD CHEERED THEM AS THEY MARCHED PAST.

THE CROWD WAS ESTIMATED AT 100,000 PERSONS AND THE DEMONSTRATION WAS ENTIRELY SPONTANEOUS AND WITHOUT ANY PREVIOUS ORGANISATION. THE GERMANS HAD ALSO FORBIDDEN THE WEARING OF THE LIBERATION BADGE BUT THIS WAS WORN BY ALMOST EVERYONE IN THE CROWD AND THE GERMANS DARE NOT TAKE ACTION AGAINST SO LARGE A CROWD.

THE DEMONSTRATION WAS ENTIRELY FRENCH AND THERE WERE NO ALLIED FLAGS OR EMBLEMS. THE CROWD SANG THE MARSEILLAISE AFTER THE LIBERATION AND THE CHANT "VIVE DE GAULLE" WAS HEARD FREQUENTLY.

THE DEMONSTRATION WAS A COMPLETE REPUDIATION OF VICHY AND A DEFIANCE OF THE GERMANS AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST OCCASION ON WHICH THE PEOPLE OF PARIS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPRESS THEIR FEELINGS FREELY SINCE THE ARMISTICE.

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PARIS 6 FEB 44

5 FEB 44

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PARIS 796

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L.F. HICKEL,
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
Pol. Section
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L.F. MICHEL,
Lt. Col., AGD.
Adjutant General.

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OSS 4/9
17 FEB 1944

3 February 1944

To: Mr. Caccia

Montanari is concerned about the passages which I have marked in pencil, saying that extremists are quoting it as showing that the Allies favor revolutionary methods to force the abdication of the King. Moreover, he states that persons who actually heard the BBC broadcast contend that passages were omitted which, if they had been included, would have given a different impression.

You may want to secure the actual text of the broadcast to see if there has been any distortion as reproduced in the Gazzetta.

E.W.S.

1 Incl:
Excerpts fr "Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno"
2 February 1944

1231

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

DP/G/34

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

1 February 1944.

Harold MacMillan, Esq.,
British Resident Minister,
Algiers, Algeria.

I enclose herewith telegrams for Congress, to House of Commons, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which Sforza gave me last night and would like forwarded as soon as possible.

I also enclose two telegrams from Sforza and Croce to Cordell Hull, Eden and Molotov which he has also asked me to forward.

You will remember me mentioning these to you, and I think it wise that you should see them before dispatch.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General,
Chief Commissioner

000.1

29[illegible].

(3) 1 (Love)

1232

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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PRIORITY

1 FEBRUARY 1944

100SO MACFARLANE

AFHQ FOR MGS FOR MACMILLAN AND FOR MURPHY

Sforza asked to see me last night. He was very full of the moderation and orderly conduct of the Bari conference. He took most of the credit for this himself. He stated that it was his influence which had prevented a resolution calling for a republic in place of the monarchy. He himself had wished to pass a resolution declaring the Crown Prince unfit to succeed the King and he stressed that he personally was still in favor of a regency. He had however withdrawn his motion at the request of Rodino and the Catholics. Croce and he had been urged to take office in the Executive Junta. They had refused as they thought that their steadying influence would be greater as elder statesmen outside the Junta. The only reasonably well known member of the Junta is Tedeschi of the Communist Party. Sforza told me that the Executive Junta did not intend to take any action to precipitate matters as a result of the Congress resolutions. As you will see from Sforza's telegrams which I am sending you separately by air, the Executives of the Congress are making great play of the fact that only limited radio facilities were permitted to them

SECRET

(3) K

1233

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

DS-8 2 copy
6 MAR 1944

HAC/dmd

Ref. No. 650.1

1 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Captain Stone

Many thanks for your memorandum of 28 January about telegram No. 25700 of 8 January giving a new political directive from the combined chiefs of staff. So far as we know, no action has been taken to communicate the substance of the directive to the Italian Government. The reason was that we did not take it as something to be passed on to the Italian Government as a formal communication. We took it to be a guidance to ACC-AMG in judging what to encourage or discourage in their day to day dealings with the Italian Government.

Unless you have strong reasons for thinking otherwise, we should be inclined therefore to continue to treat this directive as for internal consumption.

Political Section

2955

(3) a 3

2 - MAR 1944

1234

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 014.33

(014.33)
REPATRIATION

3—0788

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1)	Capt Stone	26 Jan	Gen MacF	a) Repatriation PW Officers b) Italian Navy c) Vatican Property d) King's Political Intentions e) PW Agreement
2)	Col Quinsmith		Chief of Staff	Fwds list of It PW Officers submitted by Com.Sup. for repat.
3) FARGO 581	Gen MacF	28 Jan	FREEDOM	Messe requires return of PW Officers for efficient functioning of It. Army
4) DP/G/32	Gen MacF	31 Jan	Capt Stone	List of PW too long. Have Messe submit officer lists of 25 men for urgent repatriation.
5) 10942/OP Com. Sup.	Marshal Messe	4 Feb	A.C.C.	Bari better suited than Taranto for landing wounded PWs from hospital ships
6) 383.6	Capt Stone	6 Feb	FOTALI, Taranto	Fwds (5) & asks for comments
7) CC/P/70	Gen MacF	18 Feb	Badoglio	Pl give urgent reasons for repat. of Lt. Eman. Di Sergio
8) 383.6	Capt. Stone	6 Feb.	Messe	Asks. (5) & latter has been referred to higher authorities.
9) MIN INTERIOR #338	U'Sec. of State	1 Feb	A.C.C.	Repat. of Dr. Falcone et al from Kenya to Somalia
10) DCC 014.33	Capt. Stone	19 Feb	Min. of Interior	Asks. (9) & latter has been fwdd to higher authorities.
11) DCC 014.33	Capt. Stone	19 Feb.	AFHQ	Fwds. (9) for action

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

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