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GENERAL ADOLFO INFANTE
NOV. 1944 - FEB. 1945; FEB. 1946

580/cc

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 580 GENERAL ADOLFO INFANTE

~~Confidential~~

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Memo Quayle	30 Nov 44	Stone	Encl attack on Infante in <u>Domenica</u> Facts sound, but says Inf coward
2	Ltr Casati #15	2 Jan 45	Stone	Pls tell me what you know about Infante's repatriation from Greece
3	Ltr Quayle	10 Jan 45	Infante	You correct in taking orders & leaving Greece as you did.
4	Ltr Quayle	13 Jan 45	Watrous	Please forward any evidence on In- fante's escape from Greece.
5	Ltr, Infante	13 Jan 45	Quayle	On Infante's escape from Greece and ltrs written him by subordinates.
6	Memo Quayle	15 Jan 45	Land Forces S/C	On Infante's escape from Greece and letters written him by subordinates.
7	Draft ltr Alexander		Bonomi	Warning on Ital press campaign vs. Greeks; clarification of Gen INFANTE's position on leaving Greece
8	Ltr Stone	18 Jan 45	Casati	Evidence on Infante's repatriation being secured from Cairo.
9	SE/135/G14/P8, Watrous	4 Feb 45	Quayle	Evidence on Infante's repatriation.
10	Ltr, Stone	10 Feb 45	Casati	Evidence on Infante's repatriation.

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~~Confidential~~

SECRET

10 February 1945.

Dear Count Casati:

Further to my letter of January 18th I am now writing to give you the information I have obtained from Allied military authorities on the repatriation from Greece of General Adolfo Infante.

1. Major General Infante, commanding the PINDARO Division in Greece, signed an armistice with Colonel WOODHOUSE (the head of the Allied Military Mission) and the Guerilla Joint HQ's within two days of the termination of hostilities with Italy; i.e., 9 September 1943. By the terms of the armistice his division became "co-belligerent" troops and retained their arms.

2. In October 1943 the civil war in Greece broke out and was immediately followed by the total disarming of the Italians.

3. By this time the departure of General Infante was desirable to Colonel Woodhouse as his presence was a grave embarrassment to the Allied Headquarters, living as they then were continually on the run from the Germans and on bad terms with ELAS HQ. Colonel Woodhouse therefore pressed for General Infante's evacuation.

Eventually the General was informed by signal, following direction received by G.H.Q. MIDEAST that the Italian High Command wanted General Infante sent out and that he should proceed accordingly to the Albanian coast.

After prolonged argument ELAS HQ allowed General Infante to go and he finally left the Allied Military Mission's HQ at the end of November 1943.

4. From the above it is quite clear that Major General Infante did not desert his troops but only followed the instructions given to him. During the period of nearly three months which he spent at the Allied Military Mission HQ, he continually expressed great concern as to the fate of his division and always insisted

.....that

H.E. Count Alessandro Casati,
Minister for War,
Italian Government,
Rome.

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that the best service he could render them was to be allowed to go to Italy to plead their cause.

British officers then in Greece attest that soon after the civil war started Italian troops of the PINEROLO Division were perforce scattered all over Greece and that even if General Infante had remained he could have had no effective contact with them.

I must request Your Excellency, on the grounds of military security, to treat the information given above as secret.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

*Delivered to A's Liaison
office 10 Feb 1925 hours
for delivery by hand*

4602

No distribution

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SECRET

AMERICAN RELIEF FOR ITALY, INC.

Transportation Report Month of February 1946.

The following is the statement of the use of the 74 American Relief for Italy trucks in the service of the National Committee.

This report covers the period from February 1 to February 28 and the figures herein submitted have been calculated on the business basis adopted by the National Committee for the Distribution of Relief in Italy (ENRSI), Transportation Section, and already submitted in the previous reports.

The use of the vehicles is in three categories:

1. Use for the distribution of relief supplies furnished to ENRSI by American Relief for Italy and other contributing agencies;
2. Gratuitous transport of critical supplies of other agencies including Italian Red Cross, hospitals, orphanages, Department of Public Welfare, Protestant Welfare Association, Catholic Charities and Association of Jewish Welfare Groups;
3. The full use of back loading (return trips from hauls of the first two categories) to augment the food supply under the Ministry of Food and other public utilities. This includes the bringing of grain, potatoes, rice, eggs and other foods into the metropolitan area from the rural districts and the hauling of electric transformers, cement, wiring, water mains and other critically needed industrial supplies on transport space which would otherwise be wasted on return trips. At the request of the Ministries of Food and Industry repayment for this service was accepted by ENRSI by Government transfer of funds for this service. This income is then converted into maintenance service and labor cost of the National Committee, Transportation Section.

The following is an account of the three categories of service in quintal kilometer converted into lira value:

First Category: Distribution of relief supplies:

quintal kilometers 2,559,746 - lire value 4,218,064

Second Category: gratuitous service to indigenous agencies:

Agency	Quintal Kilometer	Lira Value
1) American Relief for Italy	30,319	70,098
2) U.N.R.R.A. (Food Distribution)	717,255	947,494
3) Winter Assistance Committee	55,712	64,682
4) Institution "Maria Immacolata"	4,896	7,561
5) Seminario Arcivescovile	4,896	7,561
6) Salesian Institution	4,896	7,561
7) Institution "S. Annunziata"	4,896	7,561
8) Municipio of Cassino	5,153	7,917
9) Swiss Relief (Dono Svizzera)	331,276	525,396
10) International Red Cross	90,722	97,365
11) Pontifical Relief Commission	25,934	36,372
12) Ministry of Post-Office Assistance	84,864	110,739
13) Public Health Department		
Ministry of the Interior		
14) Orphanage "S. Giuseppe"	36,992	51,823
15) Committee for Aid to Torre Annunziata	5,920	9,844
16) Italian Red Cross	88,020	86,319
17) Protestant Group	33,728	48,900
18) Institution "Figlie di S. Paolo"	1,408	3,839
19) Institution "Figlie Missionarie di	7,552	11,126

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The following is an account of the three categories of service in quintal kilometer converted into lire value:

First Category: distribution of relief supplies:

quintal kilometers 2,559,746 - lire value 4,218,084

Second Category: gratuitous service to indigenous agencies:

Agency	Quintal Kilometer	Lire Value
1) American Relief for Italy	50,319	70,098
2) U.M.R.A. (Food Distribution)	717,255	947,494
3) Winter Assistance Committee	55,712	64,682
4) Institution "Maria Immacolata"	4,896	7,561
5) Seminario Arcivescovile	4,896	7,561
6) Salesian Institution	4,896	7,561
7) Institution "SS. Annunziata"	4,896	7,561
8) Municipio of Cassino	5,152	7,917
9) Swiss Relief (Dono Svizzera)	331,276	525,596
10) International Red Cross	90,722	97,365
11) Pontifical Relief Commission	25,984	36,372
12) Ministry of Post-war Assistance	84,864	110,739
13) Public Health Department		
(Ministry of the Interior)	36,992	51,823
14) Orphanage "S. Giuseppe"	5,920	9,844
15) Committee for Aid to Torre Annunziata	88,020	86,319
16) Italian Red Cross	33,728	48,900
17) Protestant Group	1,408	3,838
18) Institution "Figlie di S. Paolo"	7,552	11,196
19) Institution "Figlie Missionarie di Maria"	7,808	11,546

(continued)

- 2 -

	Quintal Kilometer	Lire Value
1) Churches of the Holy See	5,984	9,054
2) Institution "Angeli Custodi"		
(Beltonie Marins e Montane)		
3) 7 Days Adventists	1,920	3,501
4) Infants' Institution of Arce	6,075	10,117
5) Republic of St. Marino	3,616	5,818
6) Institution "Di Donato"	34,173	49,326
7) Unione Donne Italiane (U.D.I.)	4,160	6,502
	3,008	10,167

Totals 1,621,235 2,208,508

Third Category: Transport on back haul for general public service under the Ministry of Food and Industry, quintal kilometer 528,176 - lire value 736,292.20.

A total operation for a period 1 to 29 February of quintal kilometer 5,109,157 - lire value 7,162,884.20.

A similar report will be submitted monthly.

4080

SECRETHQ FORCE 399
CAF

Ref: SE/135/314/B8

4 February 1945

Dear

The following are the facts concerning Major General INFANTE's evacuation to ITALY confirmed by ELOs at present in CAIRO and in particular by Col WOODHOUSE:-

1. Maj Gen INFANTE, commanding the PIEROLO Division in GREECE, signed an armistice with Col WOODHOUSE and the Guerilla Joint HQs within two days of the termination of hostilities with ITALY, i.e. 9 Sept '43. By the terms of the armistice his division became 'co-belligerent' troops and retained their arms.
2. Shortly after the signature of this armistice it became clear that ELAS GHQ, though signatory to the armistice, were evading its provisions and intended eventually to disarm the whole of the ITALIAN force. Maj Gen INFANTE therefore suggested that he should pay a brief visit to GHQ WLF, to report to Gen. WILSON. Communications were difficult but as a plane was expected early in October Col WOODHOUSE asked permission to send him out on it. Permission was given by GHQ, MIDEAST, through us at "Col WOODHOUSE's discretion".

3. But in fact it was not this reply which caused the decision to send him out in the end. In Oct '43 the civil war broke out before the plane expected in October had arrived and was immediately followed by the total disarming of the ITALIANS. Furthermore, ELAS GHQ stated that they were not prepared at that time to allow Maj Gen INFANTE to leave GREECE. Consequently the plane which arrived towards the end of October '43 left without him. This was the last plane of the year and left no alternative but evacuation by sea if orders came to that effect.

4. By this time there was no operational reason for Maj Gen INFANTE to be evacuated, although his departure was now desirable as his presence was a grave embarrassment to ALNIFIS' HQ, living as they then were continuously on the run from the GERMANS and on bad terms with ELAS GHQ. Col WOODHOUSE therefore continued to press for his evacuation. Eventually he was informed by signal, following direction received by MIDEAST, that the ITALIAN High Command wanted Maj Gen INFANTE sent out and that he should proceed accordingly to the ALBANIAN coast.

After much further procrastination, ELAS GHQ allowed Maj Gen INFANTE to go and finally he left ALNIFIS' HQ at the end of

580/cc

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After much further procrastination, ELAS GHQ allowed Maj Gen INFANTE to go and finally he left ALHIMIS' HQ at the end of November '43 and arrived safely in ITALY.

5. From the above it is quite clear that Maj Gen INFANTE did not desert his troops but only followed the instructions given to him. During the period of nearly three months he spent at our HQ he continually expressed great concern as to the fate of his division and always insisted that he should be allowed to go to ITALY to plead their cause.

It should be/

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See 10

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It should be noted that soon after the civil war started ITALIAN troops of the PINEROLO Div were 'per force' scattered all over GREECE and that even if Maj Gen IMMANUEL had remained he could have had no effective contact with them.

I trust this is what you want.

Yours

W

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To: Major J.A. QUAYLE, R.A.,
Headquarters Allied Commission,
APO 394.

The contents above come from File 133 Cairo (COT 25/6/47)

EWS/hjp

18 January 1945

Dear Count Casati:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of January 2nd and to tell you that I have taken steps to secure evidence on the repatriation from Greece of General Infante. As this has to be obtained from Cairo it may take some time but I will write you again more fully as soon as I am able to do so.

Sincerely,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

H.E. Count Alessandro Casati
Minister for War
Italian Government
Rome

4687 - FILES A only

See (9)

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(9)

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

1. The recent return of Italian soldiers from Greece has given rise to a press campaign which dwells on atrocities on the part of the Greek population against Italian soldiers. This campaign is much to be deplored in that it serves not only to lower the morale of Greek soldiers who are now fighting in Italy but is likely to militate against and seriously endanger the lives of Italian soldiers who are now held as prisoners of war in Greece, when the question of their culpability for war crimes comes to be investigated by the Greeks who hold them prisoners.

2. Correlated to the above, the Italian press has also carried several violent attacks on General Adolfo Infante reflecting discredit on his departure from Greece twelve months ago. In connection with these attacks I feel that you should be informed of the following facts:-

a. General Infante's return took place in February 1944 by an explicit and special order of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, at that time Commander in Chief of the Middle East, which included the Balkan Theatre of Operations. His return took place after a 1,000 mile trip on foot over enemy territory, and in perilous circumstances, being made possible only by orders issued by the Command of the Middle East during the entire journey.

b. The return from overseas of some Italian Generals was approved by Allied Authorities for the purpose of increasing the Italian War Effort. The officers were selected with special consideration for

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b. The return from overseas of some Italian Generals was approved by Allied Authorities for the purpose of increasing the Italian War Effort. The officers were selected with special consideration for their record in the Italian Army and according to their comportment on September 8th, 1943.

cc: Minister of War

H. R. ALEXANDER,
Field Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

JAQ/hjp

15 January 1945

TO: Land Forces Sub-Commission, Hq A.C. (5)

The attached letter, a copy of one written to General Infante by officers, NCOs and privates of Italian units once in Greece, is forwarded to you for record purposes at the General's request.

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

5-80/CC

4685

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Transl. on

Rome, 13 January 1945

Dear Major Quayle,

I received your letter of January 10th, and I am most grateful to you for what you so kindly wrote to me.

In this sad moment, it has been a great comfort to me to receive such tokens from people who could see and follow me during my hard work.

I am therefore certain that you will be glad to hear that many officers and soldiers who were in Greece have written to me to express their devotion and manifest their gratitude for my modest work.

I enclose a copy of one of the many letters which I have received; it bears the signature of many officers and is particularly significative.

In the tragical hours that my Country went through, I feel I have fulfilled my duty, and with the 'cooperation agreement', signed on September 11th with Col. G. Montagna-Woodhouse, Chief of the British Mission in Greece, I had the good fortune of being a precursor in the relations of co-belligerency which exist today between our countries.

My long and hard journey through Greece and Albania was constantly comforted by the assistance I received from the various British posts, which, in accordance with the orders they received from Cairo, received and directed me for the whole duration of my journey,

Better than anything else, I remember your welcome in Sea-view cave, and all you did to help and understand the situation of the Italians: for this I shall for ever be grateful to you.

Yours truly,

s. A. Infante

4684

Major J.A. QUAYLE
Staff Officer to A.C.
R o m e

e.c.

FILE INFANTE

No circulation or
distribution
See (6)

15-1-45-10

Sir:

The undersigned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates of the "Pinerolo" Division and of other units in Greece, now back in Italy, feel it their duty to set forth the following:

1. - The general attitude of the Greek population towards the Italian soldiers, after the Armistice, has been human and generous, (even during Italian occupation there had never been toward the Italians the hostility felt for the Germans).

The Andartes and Greek civilians did their best to help and guide the many thousands of Italians, who were trying to join you in the mountains. This they did to the risk of their lives, in order to save us from the constant German menace.

Later, in those areas where resentment for our military operations was still very much alive, a number of brutal episodes of which the Italian soldiers were victims took place. On the other hand, especially in the large and small towns, Greek families hid us, lodged us and for long months shared with us their food and anxieties.

It is duly right, to remember that we found greater help in the area dominated by EDES Nationalist Units, than in the areas dominated by the ELAS.

2. - Luckily for us, following the Armistice you immediately understood what it was right for us to do. Thanks to the "Pact of Cooperation" you negotiated and signed on September 11th, 1943, (three days after the Armistice), together with the British Military Mission in Greece and the Chiefs of the various Partisan Organizations, the following goals were achieved:

To General Adolfo Infante.

- 2 -

- Military honor was saved, because our arms had not been given up either to the Germans or to the Andartes;
- The Italian Units were immediately considered cobelligerents by the Allies (long before this happened in Italy);
- The Allied Command in the Middle-East was pledged to supply and later repatriate the Italians in Greece.

For more than one month we were isolated from Italy in tragic material conditions. You, were firm, active and tactful, and this held us together. You had been faithful to an oath, you were confident in the future of our Country, your leadership made us carry out difficult acts of sabotage against the Germans. We received the praise of the Officers of the Allied Mission and of the Andartes.

3. - When the Greek Civil War broke out, our units were disbanded through the treason of the ELAS's Andartes, and you, together with the Officers of A.H.Q., were arrested and after closely guarded by Red soldiers. Only your energy and ability avoided the massacre of all the officers and the discontinuance of food supplies. And this while the situation was rendered more serious by ferocious German raids and the strained relations between the British Mission and the Chiefs of the ELAS.

- 4682 4. - We all know that you refused several times to leave us to go to Cairo to confer with General Wilson, while trying in vain to send an officer to the Middle-East Command in order to inform on the situation.

When you received, at the end of November, the order to repatriate, following a request of the British High Command (which we had knowledge of), and you decided to try to attempt the trip, we all hoped you would eventually get back. We felt

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- 3 -

sure that you would have done the utmost in view of helping us.

5. - For some time we did not know anything about you, and we believed the rumors, according to which you had been either killed or taken by the Germans. When finally news came that in February you had safely landed in Italy, we hoped for an early repatriation.

Many of us, in the meantime, beaten by incessant German raids and winter, gave up to the Germans. On the other hand a very active Communist propaganda tried to work up our soldiers against their officers and yourself, Sir, accusing you of having abandoned us to our fate.

6. - Now we are back in Italy and we see what our Country is going through. We fully realize what you have done for us.

Our Military honor was saved, we were able to fight the Germans as far back as September 8th, we were accepted as co-belligerents by both the Allies and the Greeks, we have saved our lives and 20,000 of us are back in our Country, (150,000 more are in concentration camps in Germany). All this is due to your faithfulness, to your courage and to your tact.

We wish to give you formal recognition for all this.

(Signed by 27 Officers and Soldiers).

4681 December 28th, 1944.



p. e. e.
Al. Margaritis



IL PRIMO AIUTANTE DI CAMPO GENERALE
DI S.A.R. IL LUOGOTENENTE GENERALE DEL REGNO

Roma - 1945, gennaio 13.

Mi caro Major Quayle,

ho ricevuto la Sua lettera del 10 gennaio e Le sono veramente grato per quanto Ella gentilmente ha voluto scrivermi.

In questo periodo di amarezze, mi è stato di grande conforto ricevere testimonianze oneste di persone che hanno potuto vedermi e seguirmi nel mio duro lavoro.

Sono certo, perciò, che Le farà piacere sapere che numerosi ufficiali e militari di truppa, che erano in Grecia con me, hanno voluto scrivermi per confermarmi la loro devozione e manifestarmi la loro gratitudine per la mia modesta opera.

Tra le tante lettere ricevute Le unisco in copia una firmata da molti ufficiali, particolarmente significativa.

Pur nelle tragiche circostanze attraversate dal mio Paese, ho la sicura coscienza di aver adempiuto il mio dovere e di aver avuto la fortuna, con il "Patto di cooperazione" firmato l'11 settembre 1943 con il Col. C. Montague - Woodhouse, Capo della Missione inglese in Grecia, di essere stato un precursore dei rapporti di collaborazione oggi esistenti fra i nostri due Paesi.

Nel mio lungo e duro viaggio attraverso la Grecia e l'Albania, mi è stata di costante conforto l'assistenza ricevuta dai successivi posti britannici, che, in adesione agli ordini ricevuti dal Cairo, mi hanno accolto e diretto durante tutta la mia traversata.

Fra tutti, particolarmente presente al mio animo è rimasto il ricordo delle accoglienze da Lei avute nella caverna di Sea-wiew e di tutto quanto Ella ha fatto per aiutare e comprendere la situazione degli italiani: di ciò Le sarò eternamente grato.

In aff. A. Infante

(gen. Adolfo INFANTE)

Major J.A. QUAYLE
Staff Officer to A.C.

R O M A

28 dicembre 1944

COPIA

Signor Generale,

Noi sottoscritti - ufficiali, sottufficiali e militari di truppa, già della Divisione "Pinerolo" e di altri reparti dislocati in Grecia ed ora rimpatriati - sentiamo il dovere di affermare quanto segue:

- 1) - Il contegno della popolazione greca nei riguardi dei militari italiani (che anche durante la nostra occupazione non era mai stata decisamente ostile, differenziandoci profondamente dai tedeschi) dopo l'armistizio è stato umano e spesso generoso nei nostri riguardi.

Quando, rispondendo al Suo appello, migliaia di italiani cercarono di raggiungere le zone montane dove Ella ci chiamava, Andartes e civili greci fecero a gara per assisterci, guidarci e soccorrerci, spesso a rischio della loro vita, e per sottrarci alla implacabile caccia dei reparti germanici.

Se, in seguito, non mancarono episodi brutali di spoliazione e di sfruttamento di militari italiani, specie nelle zone montane ed in quei villaggi dove più vivi erano i risentimenti per le operazioni belliche da noi compiute, innumeri furono anche prove di generosità, specie nei maggiori centri abitati, dove famiglie greche, con loro grave pericolo, ci nascosero, ci ospitarono e per lunghi mesi divisero con noi sia le ansie che il loro scarso cibo.

Ed onestamente dobbiamo riconoscere che tale assistenza si è verificata in maggior misura per quelli di noi che si sono trovati nella zona dominata dai reparti Nazionalisti dell'E-des, in minor misura in quelli che sono dovuti rimanere nella zona dei reparti comunisti dell'Elas.

- 2) - All'atto dell'armistizio Ella ha, per nostra fortuna, subito intuito la linea di condotta da seguire. Con il "Patto di cooperazione" da Lei trattato e firmato l'11 settembre 1943, cioè appena tre giorni dopo l'armistizio, con la Missione Militare inglese in Grecia e con i capi delle varie organizzazioni ribelli, è riuscito:

4679 - a salvare l'onore militare, evitando la consegna delle armi sia ai tedeschi che agli Andartes;
- a far subito considerare i reparti italiani (molto prima che ciò avvenisse in Italia) cobelligeranti con gli Alleati;
- ad impegnare il Comando Interalleato del Vicino Oriente, e lo stesso Governo inglese, al mantenimento degli italiani in Grecia ed al loro trasporto in Patria, non appena possibile.
Per oltre un mese, completamente isolati dalla Madre Patria, in tragiche condizioni materiali ed in penose condizioni spirituali, solo l'attività, la fermezza ed il tatto da Lei dimostrati

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- 2 -

hanno impedito pericolosi sbandamenti. La Sua parola calda, paterna ed efficace, la Sua cristallina fedeltà al giuramento prestato, la Sua fiducia nei destini della Patria, ci hanno animati e spinti a svolgere brillanti azioni di sabotaggio contro i tedeschi, azioni che hanno destato l'ammirazione di tutti gli ufficiali della Missione Alleata e degli stessi Andartes.

- 3) - Scoppiata la guerra civile greca, travolti i nostri reparti dal tradimento degli Andartes dell'Elas, malgrado che Ella stesso, con i pochi ufficiali del Comando, fosse stato arrestato e poi guardato a vista dalle guardie rosse, con la Sua energia e con la Sua abilità è riuscito ad evitare il massacro di tutti gli ufficiali (dipinti dalla propaganda comunista quali ancora fascisti) ed a far continuare i rifornimenti di viveri nonostante le intensificate distruzioni provocate dai feroci rastrellamenti tedeschi e la difficile situazione nella quale la stessa Missione inglese venne a trovarsi verso i capi dell'Elas (chiaro preludio degli odierni avvenimenti).
- 4) - Noi tutti sappiamo come Ella abbia più volte declinato l'invito a recarsi al Cairo per conferire col generale Wilson, e come abbia invano cercato di inviare un nostro ufficiale al Comando Interalleato del Vicino Oriente per far presente la nostra difficile situazione.

Quando alla fine di novembre Ella ricevette l'ordine di rimpatriare in seguito a richiesta del Comando Supremo Italiano (a noi tutti noto) e decise di tentare la traversata, sperammo vivamente che Ella potesse giungere in Patria, sicuri che avrebbe fatto l'impossibile per aiutarci.

- 5) - Col passare del tempo, nulla vedendo giungere, in un primo tempo dubitammo che Ella fosse caduto nel tentativo (come voci incontrollate fecero credere); in seguito, avuti i primi sentori del Suo arrivo in Italia nel mese di febbraio, sperammo in un pronto rimpatrio.

Nel frattempo i rastrellamenti tedeschi ed i rigori dell'inverno avevano fatto cadere l'animo a molti dei nostri compagni, che finirono con l'aderire alle lusinghe tedesche, passando a collaborare con essi. Mentre una attivissima propaganda comunista verso i nostri soldati (esplicita soprattutto da disertori italiani passati con gli Andartes prima dell'armistizio) cercava di minare il nostro morale con una violenta campagna di denigrazione contro tutti gli ufficia-

./.

4678

- 3 -

li, ed in particolare contro di Lei, accusato di averci abbandonati al nostro destino.

- 6) - Rientrati ora in Patria e resici conto delle tragiche difficoltà nelle quali si dibatte il nostro Paese, abbiamo potuto constatare tutto quanto Ella ha fatto a nostro favore.

Se all'armistizio abbiamo salvato l'onore delle armi, ed abbiamo, primi fra tutti, iniziato la sera stessa dell'8 settembre le ostilità contro i tedeschi; se siamo stati subito accettati come cobelligeranti dagli Alleati e dagli stessi Greci; se abbiamo potuto, sia pure in condizioni talvolta tragiche, sopravvivere durante questo lungo anno; se oggi come noi, quasi 20.000 italiani sono rimpatriati, mentre altri 50.000 nostri compagni dalla Grecia sono stati deportati in Germania; lo dobbiamo soprattutto al Generale Infante, al suo felice intuito, alla sua fermezza, al suo tatto, alla sua fedeltà al giuramento prestato, e di ciò desideriamo qui dargliene atto formale.

(seguono 27 firme)



p. e. c.

al. Margherita

4677

1405

CONFIDENTIAL

JAQ/hjp

13 January 1945

In confirmation of our telephone conversation the other day I would be grateful if you could send to me copies of any signals you may have concerning the repatriation of General Infante, and also obtain from Cairo any evidence which would show how the matter originated. The point of this is that Infante is being violently criticized and attacked in the press for having deserted his Division and run away to the comfort and security of Italy, and the Minister for War has asked us confidentially for evidence which might support Infante's statement that he was in point of fact evacuated by order of SACMED. The matter is fairly urgent.

You told me on the phone that a letter was on the way about Cela. It has not yet turned up and he is exulting to come over and see you in Bari. Of course if he can go back to Albania that would be much the best thing for him as in this life he is a complete misfit, but you will find, if you see him, that he is very afraid that he will not be safe.

I am going to try and get across to see you in Bari as soon as I can but it is not easy. All best wishes for the new year.

4676

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CG

Major Elliot Watrous
Section B-8, Force 399
C.M.F.

4

CONFIDENTIAL

580/cc

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

JAG/d36

10 January 1945

During the past few weeks I have read in the Italian press several vicious attacks upon you, chiefly with respect to the manner in which you left your division, the Pinerolo, in Greece.

In that I was in Albania at that time, and since you passed your last three weeks in the Balkans at my Headquarters I feel bound to write and tell you as a personal friend how much these attacks--emanating either from ignorance or misunderstanding or both--have distressed me.

I was not present with you when you received orders to leave Greece, but I do know that throughout your hard journey through country in which civil war was rife, and in which as an Italian General you were continually in danger of betrayal to the Germans--if not of direct capture by them, you were passed from hand to hand by a chain of British officers living in the mountains of Greece and Albania, of whom I was the last in the chain. Without their assistance you would, I know, be the first to say that you could not have escaped, and--this is the point--without orders from our own Allied Headquarters you may be sure that we would not have rendered this assistance.

It is perhaps stupid to repeat what you already know perfectly well, but in view of the obvious ignorance of some of your attackers, and since I know from first hand the situation as it then was, I send you the following comments as a record of my own strong opinions.

Had you not complied with orders to leave but stayed with your Division in the mountains you would have been able to do absolutely nothing to assist your troops. Your only hope of bringing them any relief was to leave Greece and go to Italy. The instances where leaders of troops, or of expeditions, have, under orders, left their men in an endeavor to obtain help for them are too numerous to mention, but probably the most notable is General MacArthur. On your return to Italy I also know what great endeavors you made to relieve and repatriate the troops who were under your command. Some success in this was achieved. The fact that it was not possible to do more was due in no way to lack of effort on your part, but rather to the tragic and inevitable position which the Italian troops in Greece and Albania were placed.

Yours sincerely,

See (5)

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.

General Adolfo Infante
First Aide de Camp General to
H.R.H. the Lieutenant General of the Realm
Rome
FILES A

580/cc

675

Translation

Department of War
n. 15

Rome, 2 January 1945

Dear Admiral,

I will be most grateful if you can
communicate to me what you know about the repatriation
from Greece of Generale di divisione INFANTE Adolfo.

Truly yours,

/s/ Alessandro Casati

Admiral Ellery Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

Spoken to Watson on
phone, who will send his
own signals & also try to
procure those of Cairo.

4674

V.A.Q.
8-1-45

See (8)

(2)

B/U 13-i



IL MINISTRO DELLA GUERRA

Roma, 2 GEN 1945

JAN 3 - RECD

11-15

Caro Ammiraglio,

Le sarò molto grato se vorrà comunicarmi quanto a Lei
risulta in merito al rimpatrio del generale di divisione
INFANTE Adolfo dalla Grecia.

Cordiali saluti

dal suo devot.

Alessandro (altri)

See

Signor
Ammiraglio Ellery Stone
Capo della Commissione Alleata

4673

ROMA

(2)

30 November 1944

Chief Commissioner:

Reference attached translation of an article from "DOMINICA" of 26 November.

This article is a very accurate account of what actually happened, and as far as I know every one of the facts recorded are absolutely correct. Unfortunately (in the middle of page 2) there is a very defamatory remark made about General Infante. I have heard many other remarks of similar nature made by Italians who do not know the facts of the case. For the Prince to have attached to him a man who is branded as a coward, (for this is what it amounts to) is not very helpful at present, and I wonder if through the press the real story of Infante's escape from Greece, and the reasons therefor, could not be given some publicity.

J.A.Q.

J. A. Q.

Pls discuss with Infante to get his reaction - also some ideas of what the answer should be

my

NO ACTION

580/c

4672

Please start a file for me on INFANTE.

FILES A

(1)

FROM "DOLOMENICA" OF 26 NOVEMBER 1944

ITALIAN SLAVES IN GREECE

In the West side of Thessaly the Pinerolo Division, composed with the 13, 14 and 31st Infantry Brigades and the 6th Asata Cavalleria, fought until the 8th September 1943 and the Command of Generals Infante and Del'Geludice.

The country was very difficult to move a big mass of men and materials, but was very favorable for the passage of the Division to decide of Greek resistance, after the Italian Armistice.

The Pinerolo Division went to the 6th Division (Andartes) and, a treatise according to a treatise signed by Greek Generals Veliciotis and Samariniotis, Commanders of the E.L.A.S., by General Papathanasion, Commander of the E.K.K.A., by Colonel Raptoulas of E.D.E.S., all forces of the Greek resistance, could keep its own equipment complete and had guarantee its organization.

In the night between the 10th and the 11th September I joined the Andartes forces, and on the 12th, in a small place in the Parnaso Mountains, a part of the 7th and 8th company of 44 Infantry, led by 2nd Lt. D'Ambr, Trotto, De Vico joins us.

We were 170 men with equipment but without arms, having been disarmed by the Andartes contrary to what they signed.

We arrived at Sperchiada, where we met other men with Lt. Foganti. At last on the 15th September we arrived at Karpenisicion, where there was a new Italian concentration camp.

Karpenisicion, in next few days is the tragic meeting of thousand and thousand Italians. They arrived from all parts of Greece: from Peloponnesus, Piraeus, Euboea, Cefalonia and Corfu. They all are ill, miserable and defeated men. And the odyssey of the camp of hunger" begins.

In the meantime the news arrives that an Italian Division, led by a General is still in the mountains, at four days march away. By the British Mission I get the permit to go and meet Gen. Infante, who was the Divisional Commander, on the 27th September.

So I come in contact with Colonel Chrise of the British Mission, and he promised me formally to take care of the Karpenisicion camp. On the 3 October I make my way back, and after 4 days I'm once more in the "camp of hunger".

More men had arrived meanwhile: a group coming from Eubea was led by Lt. Col. Novelli, another one by Major Araneo, a third one (all 462) joined with men of the 2nd Bersaglieri) by Captain De Santis, a fourth by Major Valbonesi.

Every day it was harder: cold humidity, hunger were killing more and more men day by day. Our jailors Andartes weren't looking after us at all, they hated us.

It was already October when I received the order to take the Command of that detachment "waiting to be armed and equipped" for next military operation by the British Military Mission. The men I was to command were about 6000 strong and they arrived in Karpenisicion, seat of the Andartes command (as I said before) from all parts of Greece.

With the order of undertaking the command was presented to me translated between the

a treaty according to a treaty signed by Greek General Veliciotis and Samariniotis, Commanders of the E.L.A.S., by General Papathanasios, Commander of the E.K.K.A., by Colonel Haptopoulos of E.D.E.S., all forces of the Greek resistance, could keep its own equipment complete and had guarantee its organization,

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With the order of undertaking the command was presented to me the copy of the agreement that had been before stipulated between the Allied Mission, the Greek Command and the Italian Armed Forces, I act then in accordance with these orders.

Here is the text:

Agreement for the cooperation of Italian Military forces.
Today, September 11th, 1943, after having been signed the Armistice between United Nations and the Italian Government and following the orders published by Chief Commander of Middle East General Wilson, about their Italian cooperation of Armed force wanting to fight with the Allies against Germany, the interested Command of Greek Forces and the General Commander of Pinerolo Division decide the following points:

(1) INCL

1. All Armed Forces of the above mentioned Division will collect and concentrate in localities indicated by the Command of Greek Forces in Thessaly.
2. All Italians under the orders of these commanders will undertake with Greek formations, a public safety service in their zone - all officers and soldiers wanting to fight against Germany will keep their arms etc.
3. The Allied Mission promises to assure the maintaining of the Italian forces on the same financial basis as the Greek Forces (one gold pound sterling a month).
4. The interallied Command promises, when the military situation will allow it, to send back all officers and soldiers desiring to go back to Italy.
5. When the Italians will be accustomed to that special type of guerilla warfare that is used in Greece and when the military situation will allow it, one separate sector will be set in action by the Italian units in Greece.

Signed Col. Raptopoulos (HDES)
Col. Christos (British Mission)
Gen. Sorogian (FIAS)
Gen. Infante

Naturally I waited in vain the rearming of my soldiers and their employment. On the contrary on the 3th October in a meeting between the leaders Andartes the Commander of the British Mission and myself, the Greeks announced that they decided for the future not to supply, in any way, the interned Italians. Lt. Col. Arthur, of the British Mission, tried to modify that decision with no result. From that day we were supplied, very meagerly directly by the Allies, but it was enough to be kept alive.

In the meantime, the Andartes were getting more and more hostile and, against the agreement that they had signed, the ELAS forces disarmed the Pinerolo Division, and they sent the men to concentration camps, especially to Vicoori and Veraiide.

After the breaking of this agreement the troops of Pinerolo Division were deprived of their officers, who were taken to a monastery and ill treated.

General Infante only, Divisional Commander could escape/imprisonment and in December with the help of the Allied Mission he reached Italy. This man, who actually lives comfortably in a Royal Palace completely forgotten his men, and ignores their tragical fate.

We lived this terrible life until last November when the news of Germans arriving in Karpenisicion suddenly came. With the help of Col. Arthur we could reach the wood in time not to fall in other enemy hands. Our soldiers were divested, beaten, insulted by the Greek population and by the Andartes Forces.

However, little by little dying with hunger, they began to toll at very humble work in some farms. The Allied Command gives to Greek families half a pound sterling /6/ a month for each Italian soldier living in their home, and a pound sterling for each officer.

But the Italian soldiers pays his master with his work.

They are 6,000 men unshod, naked, ill who receive the following: bread, boiled nettles, bread made with maize, and water. They

will allow it, to send back all officers and soldiers desiring to go back to Italy.

2. When the Italians will be accustomed to that special type of guerrilla warfare that is used in Greece and when the military situation will allow it, one separate sector will be set in action by the Italian units in Greece.

Signed Col. Raptapulos (EDIS)
Col. Charles (British Mission)
Gen. Scroggie (ELAS)
Gen. Infante

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But the Italian soldiers pay his master with his work.

They are 6,000 men unshod, naked, ill who receive the following food: boiled nettle, bread made with maize, and water. They can be beaten and insulted by their masters, without any defence.

Meanwhile all the Greek population of the Thessaly region requires the Italian slaves for the monthly gold pound they can get.

Niokori, the biggest Italian concentration camp, is to-day a veritable market of slaves. The proprietors of the Thessaly country go to this market to choose the men they want, as they could choose animals.

In the winter of 1943-44 more than 1,000 Italians of the Pinerolo Division died with hunger and misery in Neriade; and only in the Spring the British Command forced the Greek population to give better food to their slaves.

We know that the Greek Government declared ~~these~~ recently that they will treat Italians better, following the rules of liberty and humanity of all civilised people; but will the authority of the legal Greek Government reach these?

Antares, EDES, EAM, EKKA, ELAS all these formations that did not yet declare their position, are ruling in this country.

Major Well, an Allied Officer, was taken as a prisoner and beaten, having befriended and helped some Italians.

Will those Italians survive for another winter in that infernal condition?

But, above all, does the Italian Government know what is happening in Thessaly?

I came specially to Italy, sent by those Italian soldiers, treated as slaves in Greece, to explain their situation and to bring them, in any way, some help. They have marked on their cap an "S", initial of a horrible word in Greek, that they don't know; but, they know the Italian word: SLAVES!

Let us verify the responsibilities of the traitors and the cowards, but specially let us give some hope to those who are suffering unjustly for others fault.

(signed) Major Giuseppe Lagos.

4659

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