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HOLD FILE
NOV. 1945 - MAR. 1946

SECRET

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.L.I.A.)

CC. 2E/v/12
March 1946

Chief Commissioner, A.C. (2)

Subject: Reorganization of CC. 2E

1. In October 1945 the responsibility for reorganization of the CC. 2E was transferred to my Sub-Commission, but no extra staff was provided till January 1946.

2. I decided to tackle the problem as follows:-

(a) Organization and initiation of a special staff.

10 experienced British Police Officers were transferred to me from Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the field in 1943. A two-day "course" was held by H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.L.I.A.) to explain to these officers the general M.L.I.A. set-up and procedure and the task before us. An H.Q. Section in R.I. under Lt. Col. HILL was organized as a "Carabinieri Section" of H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.L.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as L.C.'s to the CC. 2E Divisional and Brigade H.Q.'s.

(b) Collection of information.

The H.Q. Section applied itself to gaining information on all CC. 2E matters from G.H.Q., CC. 2E, while the L.C.'s did the same in outstations all over Italy. Simultaneously the H.Q. Section and the L.C.'s assisted the CC. 2E in day-to-day procedure and applied ginger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the CC. 2E.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.L.I.A.) on 13 and 14 March 1946, at which all L.C.'s attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "tidying-up" which has been done since Jan 1946, it is now possible to plan more accurately for the future. I directed that this planning should take two forms:-

- (i) the immediate objective - I have laid down that our immediate object is to transform the CC. 2E into a properly armed and equipped force capable of doing its job, before the elections take place next June. Such limited reorganization as is possible will also take place, without any major change which might upset the equilibrium and functioning of the CC. 2E. With proper arms and

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I decided to tackle the problem as follows:-

(a) Reorganization and invigoration of a special staff.

10 experienced British Police Officers were transferred to me from Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the field in ITALY. A two-day "recourse" was held by H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.A.I.A.) to explain to those officers the general A.C.I.A. set-up and procedure and the task before us. An H.Q. Section in Rome under Lt. Col. MALL was organized as a "Carabinieri Section" of H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.A.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as I.O.'s to the CC.RR. Divisional and Brigade H.Q.'s.

(b) Collection of information.

The H.Q. Section applied itself to gaining information on all CC.RR. matters from G.H.Q., CC.RR., while the I.O.'s did the same in outstations all over ITALY. Simultaneously the H.Q. Section and the I.O.'s assisted the CC.RR. in day-to-day procedure and applied finger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the CC.RR.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

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Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.A.I.A.) SS/5 on 13 and 14 March 1946, at which all I.O.'s attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "tidying-up" which has been done since Jan 1946, it is now possible to plan more accurately for the future. I directed that this planning should take two forms:-

- (i) the immediate objective - I have laid down that our immediate object is to transform the CC.RR. into a properly armed and equipped force capable of doing its job, before the elections take place next June. Such limited reorganization as is possible will also take place, without any major change which might upset the equilibrium and functioning of the CC.RR. With proper arms and equipment, however, the morale and prestige of the CC.RR. should be considerably enhanced. In fact, from all reports this enhancement is already considerable.
- (ii) the ultimate objective - to put the CC.RR. completely on modern feet. This will be a development out of 2(d)(i). It will involve many major matters as longer term policy, such as:- reorganization and change of staffs and superior personnel; standardization of organization; review of terms and condition of service; accommodation generally; reorganization of the complete training scheme; organization as initial of criminal records and scientific aids to crime detection on modern lines; etc.- this inevitably will take time.

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3. (a) The stage we have reached now is set out in the attached interim report to me by Lt Col. HIGGINS.

(b) The report shows:-

(1) that we have made considerable progress towards our immediate objective, despite the chaos and inertia that existed in the CC.RR hitherto.

(2) the task before us in achieving our ultimate objective and the lines on which we are thinking and acting.

4. The advantage of CONTINUITY as regards retention of personnel connected with the CC.RR business are obvious. I would urge that at this critical stage no major removals of officers should take place. The value of the work done by these few officers is out of all proportion to their numbers. Moreover, their ability, enthusiasm and energy has been beyond praise. I think that we can achieve success if, and only if, continuity is maintained.

5. Finally, I would mention that I have placed the CC.RR as "first priority", regarding what I know is your view in the matter viz. that the first line of defence for law and order is the CC.RR, the Army proper being merely secondary and in reserve for this purpose.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and the interim report to the British and American Ambassadors, as they have taken and are taking a considerable interest in this vital matter.

HR/c

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Major General,
M.I.A.

Copy to:- British Embassy.
American Embassy.

SECRET

SUBJECT : Reorganization of CORR - Interim Report

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, AG,
(N. Y. I. A.)
ROME

CORR/C/12

17 March 1946

1. POLICE OFFICER STAFF OF CORR SECTION

CSO I	Lt Col H. HIGGINS	B
CSO II (Admin)	Major J. POWELL	B
CSO II (Ops)	" R. F. WILSON	B
Schools and Trg	Capt T. MARCH	B
Liaison Officers		
TURIN	Major A. G. RHODES	
MILAN	" P. COLEMAN	
FLORENCE	" W. GREENHURST	
ROME	" W. BLOW	
NAPLES	" G. HAYES	
PALERMO	" T. SODANO	

Commenced duty on 14 Jan 1946.

2. POLICY

- (a) (i) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the CORR may be rapidly improved having regard to the responsibilities they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious on-line wave.
- (ii) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and
- (iii) To submit recommendations regarding organization, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a longer term policy.
- (b) To deal with 2(a) CORR ICA were required to make a comprehensive preliminary survey of existing conditions in Division, Brigade and lower formations. This HQ Section simultaneously commenced a survey at CORR, GIV, ROME. This preliminary survey has been made and it is now possible to assess the information obtained in a condensed form, state what has been done already, and what will be done in the immediate future to complete 2(a) (ii) above.
- (c) A conference of CORR Officers was held at these HQs on 15th and

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1. FOUR OFFICER STAFF OF CRR SECTION

CSC I	LT Col H. HUGHES	R
CSC II (AD'IN)	Major B. FOWLER	B
CSC III (Ops)	" B. F. FOWLER	B
Deputy and Tech	Capt I. WALKER	B
Division Officers		
MURPHY	Major A. C. HILLS	
MILAN	" P. COXHEAD	
FLORIN E	" W. C. CROUCHMAN	
ROSE	" W. LAGRE	
BAILEY	" C. BATES	
BARROW	" T. G. GALLAGHER	

Commenced duty on 14 Jan 1946.

A. POLICY

(a) (i) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the CRR may be rapidly improved having regard to the responsibilities they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious crisis.

(ii) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and

(iii) To submit recommendations regarding organization, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a long term policy.

(b) To deal with 2(a) CRR 103 were required to make a comprehensive preliminary survey of existing conditions in Division, District and lower formations. This HQ Section simultaneously commenced a survey at CRR, GPO, ROME. This preliminary survey has been made and it is now possible to assess the information obtained in a condensed form, state what has been done already, and what will be done in the immediate future to complete 2(a) (ii) above.

(c) A conference of CRR Officers was held at these HQs on 13th and 14th March 46 to discuss fully and amplify the facts now known, to ensure that the programme under 2(a) (i) and (ii) above is carried out to the best advantage and to gain further information upon which to base final recommendations for permanent improvement in CRR organization as in 2 (a) (iii) above.

.....2/

- 2 -

(a) The immediate objective at this stage is to provide the OORR with the necessary facilities to perform efficiently the duties required of them. Convenience and personnel comfort through restrooms and improvement for keeping up morale, are secondary considerations.

(c) Drastic changes in the nature of the OORR as a police agency are not envisaged, as it is unlikely they would be acceptable to the WILLIAMS. The peculiar position occupied by the OORR in relation to other Police Agencies, chiefly the Quetta, also prevents any possible though desirable changes.

(d) As this Section is limited in its activities to the OORR, it is intended without major alteration in the character of the OORR to make that force more efficient in itself. Nevertheless, the closest touch is being kept with Public Safety Sub-commission AC in respect of the Police angle.

3. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The OORR is organized into:

(a) Commando Generale - the CGC in name. (See Appx 'A')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and efficient, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally, the 13 "officers" being too top-heavy to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inadvisable to alter this understated organization and procedure. That can come later when the formations and units are more on their feet.

(b) Divisions and Brigades (See Appx 'B')

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These commanders pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staffs concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have decentralized to them a much greater responsibility and power of supervision and control. The most that can be said of them is that they do very little harm. Under existing regulations, for instance, Divisional Commanders are expressly forbidden from visiting OORR Stations of their lower formations!

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities will be made.

(c) Legions (See Appx 'C')

Reports from LCC show that more energy and determination is shown by Legion Commanders.

Apart from NARIES Regim, which has been the subject of separate reports, no immediate changes are necessary.

(c) As this Section is limited in its activities to the GARR, it is intended without major alteration in the character of the GARR to take that force more of interest in itself. Inversely, the closest touch is being kept with Public Safety Sub-Commission AS in respect of the police angle.

3. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The GARR is organized into:

(a) Domestic Service - the GMR in RMS (see Appx '2')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and efficient, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally, the 13 "staffs" being too top-heavy to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inadvisable to alter this undivided organization and procedure. That can come later when the formations and units are more on their feet

(b) Frontiers and Brigades (See Appx '3')

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These commanders pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staffs concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have decentralized to them a much greater responsibility and power of supervision and control. The most that can be said of them is that they do very little harm. Under existing regulations, for instance, Divisional Commanders are expressly forbidden from visiting GMR Stations of their lower formations.

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities will be made.

(c) Legions (See Appx '3')

Reports from LCs show that more energy and determination is shown by Legion Commanders.

Apert from HARRIS Legion, which has been the subject of separate reports, no immediate changes are necessary.

(d) Groups and Companies (See Appx '4')

On the whole, as satisfactory as can be expected under the circumstances. The personnel are good but require equipment and leadership.

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(a) Mobile Battalions (See Annex 'B')

1. comparatively recent innovation. This powerful, hard hitting mobile reserve should help both directly and indirectly in the maintenance of law and order. See also page 12.

4. COMMODITIES

Confidential reports will be submitted on the important commodities and staff officers. In general, while many of these are gone (and would be better, given proper powers and support), there are some whose capabilities and energy leave much to be desired. The matter of changes will have to be approached delicately in view of the political implications involved, particularly at this time. This however will have to be faced sooner or later, nonetheless. Without proper direction, no force can become efficient.

5. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES

(a) There is no doubt that lack of clothing and boots for the GCR has largely been due to faulty distribution procedure within the GCR; the present system is for Legion Commanders to report direct to GCR GCR which is done by way of a monthly report showing requirements and stocks held. There is no method at GCR for checking these returns and Legions are permitted to leave them at their own discretion.

(b) Each Legion has a store of clothing, equipment, arms and ammunition which is supervised by a subaltern with 300s and men under his command. To maintain reserve stocks, and in an effort to ensure easy distribution (which has not been accomplished), certain supplies are held in main depots, e.g. MILLS, LONS, EAT, HARRIS, entirely under GCR control. Legion Station maintain these main depots but releases therefrom are authorised by GCR only. GCR either supply from existing stocks or send consolidated Legion demands to the War Ministry, who release available supplies to GCR. The latter allots the supplies to Legions in need and notifies the Legion concerned.

Up to that point the supplies still lie in Army or GCR main depots, however they may be and the Legions have to collect them from the depot.

(c) Little, if anything, is ever done by the War Ministry or GCR to ensure the physical delivery of the supplies to the Legions who are often not in a position to collect, having insufficient or unreliable transport at their disposal. Thus the Legions are left to their own devices and the complaining shown by the War Ministry and GCR regarding this is largely responsible for the frequent delays in getting supplies out to men in the ground. One LG reported his opinion that it was "a matter of luck how much equipment Commanders had and when he got it". This he concurs.

(d) The complaining referred to above is largely due to the curbing and control of the GCR which is reflected in the mentality of LGs, and Minister and GCR. The GCR down to Legion level is the child of

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Call 800-854-2222

(*) Each Region has a store of clothing, equipment, tents and ammunition in which is supervised by a Subsector with MOOs and men under his command. To maintain reserve stocks, and in an effort to ensure equal distribution (which has not been accomplished), certain supplies are held in main depots, e.g., Hanoi, Hout, TAIL, NALPS, entirely under the control of the Region's military division there with depots but released thereafter on second requisitioning by 60% or less. The latter supply from existing stocks or second requisitioning being subject to the War Minister, who makes available information to the latter about the supplies to regions in need and facilitates the action concerned.

[illegible]

(d) The complement of referred to above is largely due to the curbing of control of the GORR which is reflected in the mentality of HQ's, War Ministry and GORR. The GORR down to region level is the child of the War Ministry. Then it is adopted by the Ministry of Interior, who is by no means a satisfactory foster parent. Thus at War Ministry and GORR there exists a lack of drive to see that the GORR are equipped in a fit condition to carry out their duties.

Age Group	Percentage of Respondents
18-29	65
30-39	70
40-49	75
50-59	80
60-69	82
70+	85

(c) In an effort to effect an immediate remedy, a recommendation has been made by this Station (and concurred with by GHO, CCRB) for Army channels of supply to be used at once for all CCRB supplies (excepting accommodation stores). This would ensure the physical delivery of supplies to all Legions through the Army Territorial Commands, and would fix the responsibility of maintaining the CCRB upon the War Ministry. It would also ensure simplification of procedure and economy and prevent serious delay in distribution.

A scheme has been drawn up, which, it is confidently anticipated, will have the desired effect. For details see Appendix 'D'.

Released for the period October 1945 to 25 February 1946 as Appendix 'D'.

6. SUPPLEMENT

(a) Extraneous duties performed by the CCRB have, according to GHO, become necessary owing to the chaotic and unreliability of other police agencies.

Expenditures have been effected and more than 500 personnel have been returned to normal duties. Allied Military demands for the Services of CCRB have been exacting and this in being dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission, AC.

(b) Dissipation of strengths are being closely observed by IGA and representations made to Brigade Commanders, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available.

Establishment Authorized	Present with units
65,000	58,322

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The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick, men on leave, etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, CCRB being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve as special Companies for eventual guard duties. Steps have been taken to remedy this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representations have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) GHQ CCRB, IGA and Public Safety Sub-Commission AC are strongly opposed to the closing of any permanently manned CCRB Station. We enclose there are 4106 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or under. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying between 3 and 21) of companies throughout ITALY. The withdrawal of the CCRB from any of these stations would deprive the population of any police protection whatever and if any visible sign of the power of the law. Therefore the closing of such stations will not be recommended, but an improved standard of efficiency demanded.

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Reinforce for the period October 1945 to 25 February 1946 as
Appendix IV.

6. CONCLUSIONS

(a) Extraneous duties performed by the CORR have, according to HQ,
become necessary owing to the absence and unreliability of other
military agencies.

Expenditures have been effected on more than 500 personnel have
been returned to normal duties. Military demands for the Service
of CORR have been exacting and this in being dealt with by Public Safety
Sub-Commission, HQ.

(b) Dissipation of strength are being closely observed by HQ and
representations made to Brigade Commanders, in order to obtain
maximum value from the forces available.

Establishment Authorized	Present with HQ
65,000	58,522

964

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick,
on leave etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed,
CORR being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve as special
Companies for eventual guard duties. HQs have been taken to run
this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representa-
tions have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) HQ CORR, HQs and Public Safety Sub-Commission HQ are strongly
opposed to the closing of any permanently manned CORR Station. No
concur. There are 400 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or
under. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing
the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying
between 3 and 24) of companies throughout H.M. The withdrawal of
the CORR from any of these stations would deprive the population of
any police protection whatever and if any visible sign of the power
of the law. Therefore the closing of such stations will not be
recommended, but an improved standard of efficiency demanded.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) The unsatisfactory "Government" system, whereby CORR barracks
stores are provided by civilian contractors, has completely broken down
and the condition of most of the 5,000 CORR's concerned is bad.
The contractors are obliged to maintain the buildings, provide three
times and bedding and kitchen equipment. They are at present quite
unable to do this.

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(b) It would be difficult to overcome the many legal and other difficulties in order to change the present accommodation situation, and, short of compulsory acquisition of all houses, as suggested by OCHQ which would mean lengthy legislation, no immediate remedy can be suggested. OCHQ can not favour state ownership of the buildings concerned, as local interest (which OCHQ values) in the housing of the OCHQ would no longer be taken.

(c) The provision of accommodation stores is another matter. Here again the War Ministry should step into the breach. OCHQ GHO have applied to War Ministry, on our recommendation, for the loan of accommodation stores to improve existing conditions. The question of accounting is one for the Ministries and contractors concerned.

(d) Similarly regarding remains to be buried, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War should co-operate in this vital matter. Genio Civile and Genio Militare must provide the necessary material, and there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labour.

(e) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for OCHQ will be submitted.

2. UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT

(a) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions very greatly in different regions. Since October 1945 the War Ministry have reduced to OCHQ among other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 72,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 pullovers, 70,000 blankets, 71,000 shirts, etc.

(b) The normal scale of clothing for OCHQ is generous (too generous for immediate fulfilment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now allotting more to OCHQ and the general situation is improving. 963

(c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated list made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if the supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered at once.

(d) OCHQ uniforms etc requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1946 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

3. ARMED AND EQUIPMENT

(a) GHO suggested a scale for arming OCHQ (less Mobile Battalions). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate adoption of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.

(b) 16,110 Beretta automatic rifles with abundant supply of ammunition, are already on their way to Legions.

...to the Ministry, for our recommendation, for the loan of ... to improve existing conditions. The question of ... for the Ministries and contractors concerned.

(d) Similarly regarding renting to escurants, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War should co-operate in this vital matter. Civilian and Military must provide the necessary material, and there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labor.

(e) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for CORP will be submitted.

8. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT

(a) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions vary greatly in different Legions. Since October 1946 the War Ministry have released to CORP among other items 72,000 jackets, 7,000 pairs of trousers, 20,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of shoes, 40,000 pull-overs, 70,000 blouses, 71,000 skirts, etc.

(b) The normal scale of clothing for CORP is generous (too generous for immediate fulfillment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now allotting more to CORP and the general situation is improving. 363

(c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated indent sent to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if the supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered as soon as possible.

(d) CORP uniforms etc requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1946 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

9. ARMS AND AMMUNITION

(a) GMR suggested a scale for arming CORP (less Mobile Battalions). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate adoption of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.

(b) 16,110 Beretta automatic rifles with abundant supply of ammunition, are already on their way to Legions.

A further 34,000 Beretta automatic rifles are being assembled, 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition is available, and will be supplied to the CORP exclusively.

In addition, each CORP Station is now receiving a Braco machine-gun and a minimum of 20 handgrenades for station defence. Many have already been delivered.

(c) The carrying of automatic rifles by GCRH on normal day-patrols in cities should be discouraged for obvious reasons. However, the GCRH must have available at all times weapons equal to those in possession of the "enemy", who have acquired considerable numbers of powerful weapons illegally as a result of the war. Therefore, present and future distribution will ensure 50,000 automatic rifles for GCRH use on dangerous duties, or when strong opposition may be met.

(d) Authority has been given for the manufacture of sufficient 9 mm pistols (mod 34) to arm the GCRH on the scale of 4 per unit.

(e) On provision of the above GCRH armament will be standardized, sufficient, and no further recommendations regarding arms will be necessary.

(f) GCRH have expressed great satisfaction and morale and prestige has been raised as a result.

(g) For scale of arms: see appendix 'F'.

10. TRANSPORT

(a) An establishment for GCRH transport (class Mob Bna) has been agreed and it is attached hereto as appendix 'F'.

(b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each GCRH Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - one vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. This all supplies will be distributed by GCRH themselves from Legions to the smallest unit, and present method of distribution by locally-hired transport (in many cases by bullock cart) will be abolished.

(c) The provision of any required transport in an efficient state is the most vital need of the GCRH. The general situation regarding lack of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.

(d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by

- (i) Re-allocation of Army transport,
- (ii) Release to GCRH of the next 500 vehicles from ITALIAN ARMY workshops.
- (iii) Release to GCRH of new vehicles by War Ministry, out of those becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with ARMP and the Treasury.

(e) As it is inadvisable to deplete Army transport which is still very short, the solution (d) (iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which confirmation is waiting is being requested) to provide GCRH with:

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sufficient, and no further recommendations regarding arms will be necessary.

(1) CDR have expressed great satisfaction and morale and prestige has been raised as a result.

(2) For supply of arms: see appendix '1'.

10. TRANSPORT

(a) An establishment for CDR Transport (less Mob Bus) has been agreed and is attached hereto as appendix '2'.

(b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each CDR Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - no vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. Thus all supplies will be distributed by CDR themselves from Legation to the smallest unit, and present method of distribution by locally hired transport (in many cases by bullock cart) will be abolished.

(c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient state is the most vital need of the CDR. The general situation regarding lack of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.

(d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by

(i) Re-allocation of Army transport,
(ii) Release to CDR of the new 500 vehicles from Indian Army workshops.

(iii) Release to CDR of new vehicles by War Ministry, one of these becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with IROR and the Treasury.

(e) As it is inadvisable to deplete Army transport which is still very short, the solution (d) (iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which confirmation in writing is being requested) to provide CDR with:

- (i) 250 Jeeps - "delivery to commence in about 3 weeks".
- (ii) 910 heavy and medium lorries - new, from Indian motor industry - 500 to be delivered by the end of June 45.
- (iii) 24 light lorries - new, from Indian factories - delivery soon.
- (iv) 500 motor cycles - new, from CUMI factory - delivery soon.
- (v) 2000 bicycles - new, from BILCHET factory - delivery soon.

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Recent census shows over 50% of holdings are inefficient. Most passenger vehicles are requisitioned and no facilities exist for their repair, it being the intention of GORR to de-requisition as a matter of policy.

(g) The establishment is thus extremely modest and possible quickly to implement, but it will provide all immediate GORR transport requirements for maintenance and high operational efficiency.

14. POL

(a) POL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a provincial basis through Prefects. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the same time in some cases of a biased political content.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through Army channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by UPRRA as part of its needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the Army POL is supplied to Legions with the Army having to increase its purchase or reduce consumption in units to use POL. Therefore it is recommended that the petrol now supplied through UPRRA should be allotted by Ministry of Industry and Commerce to the GORR who would then allot to Legions, the channels of supply being through Army Territorial Commands.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by GORR at "Comitato Italiane Petroli" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.P. points may not function, but this could be overcome by reserves in sufficient quantity to be available at Army Territorial Commands for use in emergencies.

(d) Full recommendations will be made regarding POL supplies and distributions.

15. "IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS."

(a) More than 2,000 stations are without telephones. It is not yet known how many of these stations formerly had telephone communications. Where telephones are installed, the majority are available for post time service only. (Civilian exchange system).

(b) It is recommended that private lines be installed throughout. Much detailed information is being collected, but it is apparent that no appreciable improvement can be expected in telephone communications in the immediate future.

13. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

(a) A scheme for wireless communications down to group level has been recommended and the sets will, it is hoped, be provided immediately by AMHQ. Spare sets (3) will be kept at Legion HQ, available for temporary use at any station - in below Group level - in emergency.

Copy of wireless scheme recommended is attached as Appendix '12'. This is essential in view of the lack of telephone communications.

(b) The provision of motor-cycles according to scale is the best practical remedy for the poor state of CCRB communications.

14. MOBILE BATTALIONS

(a) Agreement on minor points has not yet been reached between CCRB and War Ministry as to the establishment of these Battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the Battalions will be up to establishment by the end of May 1946.

(b) We have obtained from AFHQ the release of 125 "Staghounds" captured over and their issue is expected in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, CESANO. A further 45 "Staghounds" will later be provided to replace the 45 numbers at present held in the North of ITALY, i.e. 2400A, MILAN, TURIN and GENOA. Efforts are being made to obtain spares for both numbers and "Staghounds" and request has been made to AFHQ for supplies of ammunition for cannon.

(c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at CESANO. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the order in the Battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.

(d) It is considered that the Battalions should be formed of 3 companies, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by AMHQ CCRB accordingly, and isolated detachments will be recalled to BA HQs.

LOCs have been asked to see that the instruction of AMHQ is fully complied with and report.

(e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, defect the players for which the Mobile Battalions were formed and the above is being pressed. So that the Battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming elections. See also para 3 (e).

15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

(a) Apart from specialist training at Army Schools at CESANO, important training is being given as in (b).

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14. MOBILE BATTALIONS

- (a) Agreement on minor points has not yet been reached between GMR and my Ministry as to the establishment of these Battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the Battalions will go up to establishment by the end of May 1946.
- (b) We have obtained from AMHQ the release of 125 "Steghanda" Armoured Cars and their issue is expected in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, CASANO. A further 15 "Steghanda" will later be provided to replace the 45 Hummers in process held in the North of ITALY, i.e. FENIA, ARIZ, FUMI and GEMO. Efforts are being made to obtain spares for both Hummers and "Steghanda" and request has been made to AMHQ for supplies of ammunition for cannon.
- (c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at FENIA. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crews in the Battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delays in training.
- (d) It is considered that the Battalions should be formed of 360th component, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by GMR JCSH accordingly, and isolated detachments will be recalled to HQ.

LOS have been asked to see that the instruction of GMR is fully complied with and report.

(e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, defect the purposes for which the Mobile Battalions were formed and the above is being remedied, so that the Battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming election. See also para 3 (e).

15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

(a) Apart from specialist training at Army Schools at CASANO, elementary training is being given as in (b).

Pre-war, all elementary training was given at ROME and TURIN. Owing to the lack of equipment and accommodation, schools are not working to the maximum capacity.

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(B)	Location	Actually Under training	Max Capacity per annum
(i) Sezione Allievi CORR Caserma Vittorio Emanuele, Via Legnano 3, <u>ROME</u>		1250	3000
(ii) Battaglione Allievi CORR <u>Torino</u> , Castello Reale, <u>TORINO</u>		300	800
(iii) Battaglione Allievi CORR di Bari, Caserma Arce- metico, <u>BARI</u>		300	500
(iv) Battaglione Allievi CORR di Cagliari, <u>CAGLIARI</u> (Sardinia)		400	500
(v) Scuola Centrale CORR di Firenze, Via della Scala 20, <u>FLORENCE</u> (MOON)		700	700

One CORR occupies 1/3rd of accommodation at the Central School in ROMA for its officers.

(c) The present method of instruction in foreign and accommodation and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of selection for MOON courses leaves much to be desired, and no officers' training course is taking place at the moment. The matters of recruiting, training, terms and conditions of service are all under review. A final report will be made shortly.

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16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF CORR

(a) Any success achieved by the CORR in maintaining law and order in existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of affairs in CORR.

CORR have no system of criminal records, or the recording of crime.

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them.

This important section of police work has always been regarded as the responsibility of the Questura.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these defects and full recommendations will later be made.

(b) With the immediate implication of the remedies suggested regarding transport, arms and ammunition, Mobile Battalions, accommodation stores, and, in particular, channels of supply through frontier rail stations, the situation of the CORR for detailed improvement through-

Torino, Castello Reale,
TORINO

800

300

(iii) Contrattazione Alloggiamenti (CORA)
di Enrico, Disertore Area
Enrico, Enrico

500

300

(iv) Contrattazione Alloggiamenti (CORA)
di Enrico, Disertore Area
Enrico, Enrico (Sardinia)

500

100

(v) Scuola Centrale CORA
di Enrico, Disertore Area
Enrico (4000)

700

700

CORA CORA occupies 1/3rd of accommodation at the Central School
in ROMA for its office.

(a) The present method of instruction is forced and accommodation
and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of allocation for
NCOs courses leaves much to be desired, and no Officers' training
course is taking place at the moment. The matters of recruitment,
training, terms and conditions of service are all under review.
A final report will be made shortly.

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15. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF CORA

(a) Any success achieved by the CORA in maintaining law and order in
existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of
affairs in CORA.

CORA have no system of original records, or the recording of orders.

Scientific side in detection of crime are almost unknown to them.
This important section of police work has always been regarded as the
responsibility of the Gendarmerie.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these
defects and full recommendations will later be made.

(b) With the immediate application of the remedial suggested regarding
the transport, arms and ammunition, Mobile Battalions, accommodation
at times, and, in particular, channels of supply through territorial
Command and the adoption of the system for deterring improvement through-
out the CORA organization, this HQ is satisfied that the following
results will be achieved:-

- (i) The CORA will progressively become more and more successful in
maintaining law and order in the immediate future, and
- (ii) CORA will improve in its functioning as an efficient,
independent Police Force, without altering the special
character and tradition of this Branch of the Italian Army,
particularly as and when the reorganization gets into force.

W. J. J. J.

W. J. J. J., Lt Col 480
CORA Section, M.M.I.A.

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Appendix 'A' to CORR/G/12
dated 19 March 1945

COMPLEX CENTRALE

The CMC CORR comprises the undermentioned staff:

PRINCIPAL Brunetto, Generale, Comandante.

Chief of Staff : Col GIACCO MARIO;

Vice-Chief of Staff : Lt Col RAIMO MARCO.

Ufficio Segreteria e Riservato (Secretary's Office - Confidential Notary)

CC : Lt Col RAIMO MARCO - matters regarding personnel (Officers; recruiting of Officers), and revenue to Officers and WOCs.

Ufficio Situazione ("Situation" Office)

CC : Major RUGGERO RUGGERO - Reports on orders, arrests, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major PIERRE GILDO - Duty matters, records for ordinary work, reinforcement.

Ufficio Ordinamento (Organisation office)

CC : Major CACCIO CESARE - Division into smaller commands, strength, limits of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the structure of the regulations of CORR. 958

Ufficio Personale Sottufficiali e Truppe (Personnel Office - ORS)

CC : Major SIMONE EMILIO - Movement, marriage, discipline, instruction and training of WOCs and soldiers of CORR.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilisation Office)

CC : Capt RAIMO MARIO - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, rehabilitation of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC : Major MILLO DOMENICO - Publication of the "Profilo d'Ordine", of the official bulletin of CORR, and the paper "CIRCOLARE DELLA RUOTA ITALICA" - printing of CORR regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione del Carabiniere in Congedo" (Organisation for ex-Carabinieri).

Ufficio Assistenza (Welfare)

CC : Major MILLO DOMENICO - Welfare of personnel.

Vice-Chief of Staff : Lt Col EMANUELE MARCO.

Ufficio Segreteria e Ricerche e (Secretary's Office - Confidential Veterans)

CC : Lt Col EMANUELE MARCO - matters regarding personnel (Officers); recruiting of Officers, and reviews to Officers and NCOs.

Ufficio Situazione (Situation Office)

CC : Major RUGERO DI RUSSIERO - Reports on crimes, crimes, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major PIERONI CARLO - Duty matters, reviews for ordinary work, re-intervention.

Ufficio Organamento (Organization Office)

CC : Major GAGGIO CESARE - Division into smaller Commands, strength, issue of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the 36th Army, the Regulations of ODRU. 958

Ufficio Personale Sovversivi e Gruppo (Personnel Office - ODRU)

CC : Major SPINELLI EMILIO - Movement, marriage, discipline, instruction and training of NCOs and soldiers of ODRU.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilization Office)

CC : Capt GAGGIO MARIO - Arrangements of the personnel returning from imprisonment or intervention, confidential correspondence, demobilization of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC : Major MILITIC DOMENICO - Publication of the "Foglio di Ordine", of the official bulletin of ODRU, and the paper "CARATTERI DELLA RUSSIA ITALICA" - printing of ODRU regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione dei Carabinieri in Congedo" (Organization for ex-Carabinieri).

Ufficio Assistenza (Welfare)

CC : Major MILITIC DOMENICO - Welfare of personnel.

Ufficio Amministrazione (Administrative Office)

CC : Col. MORICOLA GIOVANNI - Administration.

Ufficio di Commissariato (Supplies)

CC : Col LA ZARA ANGELO - Rationing and equipment of the ODRU personnel.

Appendix II to CORR/G/12
dated 19 March 1946

Ufficio Collegamento e Motorizzazioni (Communications and Motorization)

CC : Col CARL RIGOLFO - Arms, motorization and communications of CORP.

Direzione Ispice e Motoriaria (Hiding Establishment and Mounted Section)

CC : Col MARMONTI TRANSCANTONIO - Harves, mules, etc, of CORP.

Ufficio Inchieste (Inquiries and Screening)

CC : General FURRIERI ALFREDO (General of Divisions) - Screening of Officers and WCCs, in connection with their political background, and with what they did after the armistice.


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
GENERAL LAYOUT - CARABINIERI

NOTE: In addition, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to certain legions.

1426

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
- 4 -

Appendix 'B' to OCHP/C/12
dated 12 March 1946GENERAL LAYOUT - CARABINIERI


NOTE: In addition, there are 12 Mobile Units which are attached to certain Legions.

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Appendix
DateDETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

- 2 -

Appendix 'B' to CERE/C/12
dated 19 March 1946DETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

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Appendix "C" to ASIA Letter
CC. 92/5/12 dated 12 March 1946

1. Attached is a diagrammatic key to proposed channel of supply to CC. AS Legions.
2. The system intended to be implemented, is briefly as follows:-
 - (a) Legions submit demands to Army Territorial Command.
 - (b) War Ministry release items available and notify the appropriate Territorial Commander, who is responsible for collection from Army Depots unless delivery to Territorial Command has been arranged by Ministry of War.
 - (c) Legions will collect from Territorial Command and be responsible for "break-down" and delivery to sub-units.
3. The following supplies and equipment are involved:-

Clothing and Equipment
Arms and Ammunition
Rations
Petrol
Vehicles

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
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PROPOSED CHARTER OF SERVICE TO DIVISIONS OF CERR

Appendix
of 1

MINISTRY OF WAR

ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS



Note 1: GHQ, Div and Bde HQs are to be maintained by the nearest Legion.

Note 2: Legions will be responsible for collecting from Army Territorial Commands, and distribution to own Sub-units.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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PROPOSED CHANGES CONCERNING DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS

Approved by CCRB/3/12
of 1 March 1946

MINISTRY OF WAR
ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

LAN	SOLEZANO	UDINE	BOLOGNA	FLORENCE	ROME	BARI	NAPLES	PALERMO
				DISTRICT				
LAN	SOLEZANO	FADUL	BOLOGNA	CENTRAL SCHOOL	ROME	BARI	NAPLES	PALERMO
	VERONA	FRIESTE	ANCONA	FLORENCE	ROME		CATANZARO	MESSINA
				DISTRICT	ROME			
					LAZIO			
					ABRUZZI			
					CASERTA			

Div and Bde HQs are to be maintained by the nearest legation
and will be responsible for collecting from Army Territorial Commands,
and distributing to own Sub-Units.

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Appendix "D" to NMIA letter
CC, RR/C/12 dated 7 March 1946.

RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE CC, RR

From October 1945 to 25 February 1946.

ITEMS	Released by W. M.	Received by CC, RR	RECEIVED Process Short (a)	
Caps	50,000	24,650	-	2,350
Jackets	28,057	38,127	10,150	-
Cloth for jackets	34,050	-	-	34,050 in course of manufacture
Flouses	10,000	-	-	10,000 - do -
Trousers	32,401	39,450	7,049	-
Cloth for Trousers	37,600	-	-	37,600 - do -
Greatestcoats	29,600	30,950	1,350	-
Cloth for Greatestcoats	3,000	-	-	3,000 - do -
Hackinaws	2,116	1,716	-	400
Putties	25,300	45,780	20,480	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443
Boots	66,600	90,500	23,900	-
Shirts	90,252	71,200	-	28,052 - do -
Dresses	52,000	71,310	-	10,600
Socks	64,632	75,843	9,211	-
Under-shirts	1,674	1,674	-	-
Pallovers	40,000	40,000	-	-
Towels	21,200	20,000	-	1,200
Blankets Comforters	66,000) 22,000)	70,800	-	17,200

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Jackets	29,057	38,127	10,150	-
Cloth for Jackets	34,050	-	-	34,050 in course of manufacture
Shouses	10,000	-	-	10,000 - do -
Trousers	32,401	38,450	7,049	-
Cloth for Trousers	37,600	-	-	37,600 - do -
Overcoats	24,800	30,980	1,350	-
Cloth for Overcoats	3,000	-	-	3,000 - do -
Undershirts	2,116	1,716	-	400
Undies	25,300	45,790	20,490	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443
Shoes	66,600	90,500	23,900	-
Shirts	99,252	71,200	-	28,052 - do -
Drawers	32,000	71,310	-	10,600
Socks	64,632	73,843	9,211	-
Undershirts	1,674	1,674	-	-
Pullovers	40,000	40,000	-	-
Towels	21,200	20,000	-	1,200
Blankets	66,000 }	70,800	-	17,200
Comforters	22,000 }			
Overalls	3,212	2,192	-	1,020
Gloves	3,064	1,354	-	1,710
Shoes	2,554	1,354	-	600
Overcoats with fur	600	-	-	600
Crash Helicopters	896	258	-	660

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Appendix "D" to JIA letter
CC, BR/5/12 dated 14 March 1946.

1. 2. 3. 4.

Short No. 2.

ITEM 9 Released by W. B. Received by CC, BR Excess Short

Capos Waterproof 510 - - 510

Jackets (Flasks) 10,000 10,000 - -

and Short Trousers 1,674 1,674 - -

Uniforms 130,000 130,000 - -

Shirts 15,300 15,300 - -

Shirts for drivers 1,254 1,254 - -

Complete Allied Uniforms with Shirts (Grey-green) 10,000 10,000 - -

Complete (Grey-green) Uniforms (Jackets and Trousers) 10,650 10,650 - -

The following materials released to CC, BR on 20 February 1946 are still to be withdrawn by them:-

951

Wool 6,000 - -

Shirts 12,486 - -

Wool (woollen) 3,000 - -

Wool 6,200 - -

Shirts (Cotton) 24,372)

The following materials will be released shortly:-

Wool 10,000

Uniforms 10,000

Boots 10,000

Quincy Waterway	540	-	-	510
Blankets(Blankets)	10,000	10,000	-	-
Long Short Trousers	1,674	1,674	-	-
Hooded Blankets	130,000	130,000	-	-
Shirts	-	15,300	15,300	-
Quartals for drivers	-	1,954	1,954	-
Complete Allied Uniforms with Shirts dyed green	-	10,000	10,000	-
Complete Gray-Green Uniforms(Jackets and Trousers)	-	10,050	10,050	-

The following materials referred to CC-32 on 20 February 1946 are still to be withdrawn by them: 951

Yards	6,000	-
Blankets for drivers	12,186	-
Hooded Blankets	3,000	-
Shirts	6,290	-
Jackets(Jackets)	24,972	)

The following materials will be released shortly:-

Yards	10,000
Uniforms	10,000
Boots	10,000

(4) Excess is due to special releases from other sources such as HQ 2 District direct.

SECRETSECRETApproved
of 187TABLE OF EQUIPMENT - ARMS AND AMMUNITIONA. AUTOMATIC PISTOLS BERETTA MOD. 34

One for each man (officers excluded, as they provide their own). The revolvers mod. 89 which are now held will be substituted by automatic pistols mod. 34.

B. RIFLES MOD 91.

One for each man who is not in possession of a Beretta automatic rifle.

C. AUTOMATIC RIFLES BERETTA MOD. 38 Cal. 9

One for each man in Mobile Battalions (12 Battalions);
4 for each 5 men of the total strength of 1000
and men excluded men of Mobile Battalions (56,929 men)
Four for the 4 Commando Raggruppamento Mobile Bns -
Total 16.

D. LIGHT MACHINE GUNS BREDA MOD. 30 Cal. 6.5.

- 5 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 2 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 2 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 4 for each "Comando Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili" (4 for four Raggruppamenti)
- 21 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 72 for COHQ School "Legione Allievi"
- 16 for the Central School
- 5 for the Squadron Group, Legion of Rome
- One for stations with less than 10 men; total 4,106
- 2 for stations with not more than 25 men
- 3 for stations with not more than 50 men
- 4 for stations with more than 50 men

E. HAND GRENADES

- 50 for each Comando Generale (General)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglioni (4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Legion (Legione Allievi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (21)
- 20 for each station with less than 10
- 20 for each station with not more than
- 30 for each station with not more than
- 50 for each station with more than 50

F. AMMUNITION

As follows for each weapon:

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal. 9	21
	7
Total	28
- Rifle mod. 1891	72
	28
Total	100
- Automatic rifle Beretta	80
	170
Total	250
- Light Machine guns Breda	500
	422
Total	922

Appendix 'E' to CCIA/G/12
of 14 March 1946.

C.G.E.R.

TABLE OF WEAPONS - ARMS AND AMMUNITION

B. HAND GRENADES

- 50 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili (4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Region (Regione Allievi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (21)
- 20 for each station with less than 10 men
- 20 for each station with not more than 25 men
- 30 for each station with not more than 50 men
- 50 for each station with more than 50 men

C. AMMUNITION

As follows for each weapon:

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal.9	24 rds handed to each man
	7 " reserve
Total	28
- Rifle mod. 1891	72 rds handed to each man
	28 " reserve
Total	100
- Automatic Rifle Beretta	80 rds handed to each man
	170 " reserve
Total	250
- Light Machine gun Breda	500 rds handed to men
	422 " reserve
Total	922

B. WEAPONS MOD. 34

(officers excluded, as they provide
revolvers mod. 89 which are now held
by automatic pistols mod. 34.

who is not in possession of a
rifle.

BERETTA MOD. 38 Cal. 9

In Mobile Battalions (12 battalions):
1/3 of the total strength of HQs
men of Mobile Battalions (56,929 men)
Comando Raggruppamento Mobile Bn -

B. WEAPONS MOD. 38 Cal. 9

Comando Generale (General HQ)
Division HQ (3 Divisions)
Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
Comando Raggruppamento Battaglioni
for four Raggruppamenti)
Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
Model "Legione Allievi"
Central School
Squadron Group, Legion of Rome
stations with less than 10 men; total 4,106
stations with not more than 25 men
stations with not more than 50 men
stations with more than 50 men

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ESTABLISHMENT FOR CARBINIARI TRANSPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, REGIONS AND BATTALIONS

ORGANIS	Motor Cars	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	ATVs	Motorbikes	
		30 cwt 5 ton	Over 5 ton					
General Command	12	1	1	2	8	1	1	
Division Command	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	
Brigade Command	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	
Region Command	3	2	3	1	6	-	1	
Group Command	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	
Company Command	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	
Sec Command and stations Commanded by IIs	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	
Stations with personnel up to 10 men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
" " " " " 25 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
" " " " " 50 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
" " " " over 50 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Squadron Group	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Royal Guard - XXII Squadron	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Carabinieri Legion	2	2	2	2	60	6	1	
General School	2	1	1	1	20	2	-	
"Reggimento" Command (each "Reggimento" includes 4 sub Bns)	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	
Total vehicles required for all Carabinieri units, except the 12 Mobile Battalions	962	915	67	697	1951	8	23	124

Appendix 'F' to CRR/G/12
14 March 1946

ESTABLISHMENT FOR CARBONITE CONCENTRATION - DIVISIONS, BUILDINGS, MACHINES AND LESSEER UNITS

	Motor Cars	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	Armored Cars	Warehouses	Bicycles	Patrol Carriers
		30 cwt - 5 ton	Over 5 ton						
1/4	1	1	1	2	8	1	1	6	1
1/2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
3/4	1	2	1	1	6	1	1	6	1
1	1	1	1	1	10	1	1	2	1
1 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
2 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
3	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
3 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
4	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
4 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
5	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
5 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
6	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
6 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
7	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
7 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
8	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
8 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
9	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
9 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
10	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
10 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
11	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
11 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
12	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
12 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
13	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
13 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
14	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
14 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
15	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
15 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
16	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
16 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
17	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
17 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
18	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
18 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
19	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
19 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
20	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
20 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
21	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
21 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
22	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
22 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
23	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
23 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
24	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
24 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
25	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
25 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
26	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
26 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
27	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
27 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
28	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
28 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
29	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
29 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
30	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
30 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
31	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
31 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
32	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
32 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
33	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
33 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
34	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
34 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
35	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
35 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
36	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
36 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
37	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
37 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
38	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
38 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
39	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
39 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
40	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
40 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
41	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
41 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
42	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
42 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
43	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
43 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
44	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
44 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
45	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
45 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
46	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
46 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
47	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
47 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
48	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
48 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
49	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
49 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
50	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
50 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
51	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
51 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
52	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
52 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
53	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
53 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
54	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
54 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
55	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
55 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
56	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
56 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
57	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
57 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
58	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
58 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
59	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
59 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
60	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
60 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
61	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
61 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
62	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
62 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
63	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
63 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
64	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
64 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
65	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
65 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
66	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
66 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
67	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
67 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
68	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
68 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
69	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
69 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
70	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
70 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
71	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
71 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
72	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
72 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
73	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
73 1/2	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
74	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1
74 1/2	1	1							

A. M. D. N. E. V.

Appendix "C" to JMWTA Letter
SC.25/5/42 dated 17 March 1946.

Carabinieri Wireless Communications.

The following are the proposed Carabinieri requirements for wireless communications:-

1. MOBILE BATTALIONS

	For each Battalion	Total for 12 Bns.
No. 17 Sets	3	102
No. 9 Sets	2	24
No. 58 Sets	12	144

2. Carabinieri HQ's in Rome and 18 Legions outside Rome.

Eleven powerful sets are required to enable communication to be set up between Rome and Legions in the following cities:-

TURIN, ALESSANDRIA, CANSA, MILAN, PADOVA, BOLZANO, VERONA, BERGAMO, FLORENCE, ANCONA, LECORNO, GENOVA, NAPLES, BARI, CATANZARO, MESSINA, PALERMO, CAGLIARI.

3. Two Legion HQ's in Rome.

Three No 9 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri HQ's in Rome and the two Legions in Rome. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri HQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 14 Groups. 131 No 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Groups.

5. Station HQ's.

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble, it is proposed that three No 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required sixty No 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No 9 Set could be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there whilst trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set would return to Legion HQ when the situation became normal.

7. Mobile Battalions

No. 9.	No. 19.	No. 53.
1	1	1
1	1	1

Legion HQ's
Mobile Battalion HQ's in field
Mobile Battalion HQ's to 3 Div HQ's

948

2. Carabinieri HQ's in Rome and 16 battalions outside Rome.

Nineteen powerful sets are required to enable communication to be set up between Rome and Legions in the following cities:-

TORIN, ALESSANDRIA, GENOVA, ALBA, FOGGIA, VERONA, BOLOGNA, PAVIA, ANCONA, FERRARA, CREMA, NAPLES, MILAN, CATANZARO, NOSTRA, PATERNO, CANTIERI.

3. The Legion HQ's in Rome.

Three No 9 Sets are required for communication between Carabinieri HQ in Rome and the 12 Legions in Rome. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two legions to communicate with Carabinieri HQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 144 Groups. 134 No 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Groups.

5. Station HQ's.

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wire less sets but that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble. It is proposed that three No 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with ground operators. Total required sixty No 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No 9 Set should be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there whilst the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set would return to Legion HQ when the situation becomes normal.

7. Mobile Battalions.

Radio Sets		No. 9.	Hq. 19.	No. 58.
Legion HQ's				
1	1			-
1	1			-
-	4			-
-	3			-
-	-			12
2	3			12
24	108			144
Total for 12 Mobile Battalions				

8. SUMMARY OF SETS REQUIRED.POWERFUL SETS.

Carabinieri HQ, ROME	1
12 Legions Outside ROME	18
	19

SECRET.

Sheet No. 2.

Appendix "G" to MIA Letter
CG. 52/5/12 dated 17 March 1946

3. SUMMARY OF SETS REQUIRED. (Cont'd)

<u>No. 2 SETS.</u>	
CHQ. ROOM	4
2 Regt Legions	2
Legions	20
Group	111
Specd Sets at Legions	60
Mobile Battalions	24
	<u>216</u>

<u>No 12 SETS.</u>	
Mobile Battalions	108

<u>No 36 SETS.</u>	
Mobile Battalions	144

947

Subject:-- Reorganization of CC.RR

SECRET

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.H.I.A.)

CC.RR/3/12
13 March 1946

Chief Commissioner, A.C. (2)

1. In October 1945 the responsibility for reorganization of the CC.RR was transferred to my Sub-Commission, but no extra staff was provided till 14 Jan 1946.

2. I decided to tackle the problem as follows:--

(a) Organization and initiation of a special study.

10 experienced British Police Officers were transferred to me from Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the field in Italy. A two-day "course" was held by H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.H.I.A.) to explain to these officers the general M.H.I.A. set-up and procedure and the task before us. As H.Q. Section in R.A. under Lt. Col. Mitchell was organized as a "Carabinieri Section" of H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.H.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as L.O.'s to the CC.RR Divisional and Brigade H.Q.'s.

(b) Collection of information.

The H.Q. Section applied itself to gaining information on all CC.RR matters from M.H.Q., CC.RR, while the L.O.'s did the same in outstations all over Italy. Simultaneously the H.Q. Section and the L.O.'s assisted the CC.RR in day-to-day procedure and applied ginger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the CC.RR.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.H.I.A.) RCSE on 13 and 14 March 1946, at which L.O.'s attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C. **946**

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "tidying-up" which has been done since Jan 1946, it is now possible to plan more accurately for the future. I directed that this planning should take two forms:--

(i) the immediate objective - I have laid down that our immediate object is to transform the CC.RR into a properly armed and equipped force capable of doing its job, before the elections take place next June. Such limited reorganization, as is possible will then take place, without any major change which might upset the equilibrium and functioning of the CC.RR. With proper arms and equipment, however, the morale and prestige of the CC.RR should be considerably enhanced. In fact, present reports indicate this enhancement

2. I decided to tackle the problem as follows:-

(a) Organization and initiation of a special staff.

10 experienced British Police Officers were transferred to me from Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the field in ITALY. A two-day "seminar" was held by H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.H.I.A.) to explain to these officers the general M.H.I.A. set-up and procedure and the task before us. An H.Q. Section in RMH under Lt. Col. Mithell was organized as a "Garabandieri Section" of H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.H.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as L.O's to the CC.RR Divisional and Brigade H.Q.'s.

(b) Collection of information.

The H.Q. Section applied itself to gaining information on all CC.RR matters from A.H.Q., CC.RR, while the L.O's did the same in outstations all over ITALY. Simultaneously the H.Q. Section and the L.O's assisted the CC.RR in day-to-day procedure and applied ginger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the CC.RR.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.H.I.A.) RMH on 15 and 16 March 1946. At this L.O's attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "tidying-up" which has been done since Jan 1946, it is now possible to plan more accurately for the future. I directed that this planning should take two forms:-

- (i) the immediate objective - I have laid down that our immediate object is to transform the CC.RR into a properly armed and equipped force capable of doing its job, before the elections take place next June. Such limited reorganization as is possible will take place, without any major change which might upset the equilibrium and functioning of the CC.RR. With proper arms and equipment, however, the morale and prestige of the CC.RR should be considerably enhanced. In fact, from all reports this enhancement is already considerable.
- (ii) the ultimate objective - to put the CC.RR completely on modern feet. This will be a development out of 2(d)(i). It will involve many major matters as longer term policy, such as:- reorganization and change of staffs and superior personnel; standardization of organization; review of terms and conditions of service; accommodation generally; reorganization of the complete training scheme; organization at initial of criminal records and scientific aids to crime detection on modern lines; etc. This inevitably will take time.

- 2 -

3. (a) the stage we have reached now is set out in the attached interim report to me by Lt Col. .
- (b) The report shows:-
- (i) that we have made considerable progress towards our immediate objective, despite the delays and inertia that existed in the CC,RR hierarchy.
- (ii) the task before us in achieving our ultimate objective and the lines on which we are thinking and acting.
4. The advantages of CONTINUITY as regards retention of personnel connected with the CC,RR business are obvious. I would urge that at this critical stage no major re-arrangements of officers should take place. The value of the work done by these few officers is out of all proportion to their numbers. Moreover, their ability, enthusiasm and energy has been beyond praise. I think that we can achieve success if, and only if, continuity is maintained.
5. Finally, I would mention that I have placed the CC,RR as "first priority" alongside with what I know is your view in the matter viz. that the first line of defence for law and order in the CC,RR, the Army proper being merely secondary and in reserve for this purpose.
6. I am sending a copy of this letter and the interim report to the British and American Embassies, as they have taken and are taking a considerable interest in this vital matter.

M/c

L B Major General,
M.M. 944Copy to:- British Embassy,
American Embassy.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Reorganization of CCRB - Interim Report

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, AG,
(M.F.F.A.)

CCRB/8/12

1st March 1945

1. POLICE OFFICER STAFF OF CCRB SECTION

CSO I	Lt Col R. HICKMAN	1
CSO II (ADMN)	Major E. POWELL	1
CSO III (Ops)	" R. P. BRIDGEMAN	1
Schools and Trg	Capt T. HAZEN	1
Liaison Officers		
TURIN	Major A. C. HILLIS	
MILAN	" E. COXHEAD	
FLORENCE	" W. GREENWICH	
ROME	" T. LLOYD	
NAPLES	" G. HAYES	
PALERMO	" T. COOMBE	

Commenced duty on 14 Jan 1945.

2. POLICY

(a) (i) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the CCRB may be rapidly improved having regard to the responsibilities they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious crime wave.

(ii) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and

(iii) To submit recommendations regarding organization, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a longer term policy.

(b) To deal with 2(a) CCRB LAs were required to make a comprehensive preliminary survey of existing conditions in Division, Brigade and lower formations. This HQ Section simultaneously commenced a survey at CCRB, CCRB, Rome. This preliminary survey has been made and it is now possible to assess the information obtained in a condensed form, state what has been done already, and what will be done in the immediate future to complete 2(a) (ii) (b) (c).

(c) A conference of CCRB officers was held at these HQs on 15th and 16th March 1945 to discuss fully and amplify the facts now known, to

14 March 1946

1. POLICE OFFICER STAFF OF THE SECTION

130 T
621 T (ADM)
131 T (Ops)
Schnitz and Ing
Lindson Officers
RUBIN
MILAN
FLORENCE
KANE
NAPLES
BARKER

130 T
621 T (ADM)
131 T (Ops)
Schnitz and Ing
Lindson Officers
RUBIN
MILAN
FLORENCE
KANE
NAPLES
BARKER

Continued until 14 Jan 1946.

2. POLICE

(a) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the GPR may be rapidly improved having regard to the responsibilities they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious crisis.

(1) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and

(11) To submit recommendations regarding organization, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a long term policy.

(b) To deal with 2(a) GPRs were required to make a comprehensive preliminary survey of existing conditions in Division, Brigade and lower formations. This HQ Section simultaneously commenced a survey at GPR, GPR, GPR. This preliminary survey has been made and it is now possible to assess the information obtained in a condensed form, state what has been done already, and what will be done in the immediate future to complete 2(a) (ii) above.

(c) A conference of GPR officers was held at these HQs on 13th and 14th March 46 to discuss fully and amplify the facts now known, to ensure that the programme under 2(a) (i) and (ii) above is carried out to the best advantage and to gain further information upon which to base final recommendations for permanent improvement in GPR organization as in 2 (a) (iii) above.

.....2/

(d) The immediate objective at this stage is to provide the OORR with the necessary facilities to perform efficiently the duties required of them. Convenience and personal comfort through necessity and impartant for keeping up morale, are secondary considerations.

(e) Practical changes in the nature of the OORR as a police agency are not envisaged, as it is unlikely they would be acceptable to the public. The peculiar position occupied by the OORR in relation to other Police Agencies, chiefly the Question, also prevents any possible though desirable change.

(f) As this Section is limited in its activities to the OORR, it is intended without major alteration in the character of the OORR to make the forces more of a police in itself. Nevertheless, the closest touch is being kept with Public Safety Sub-committee AG in respect of the police angle.

8. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The OORR is organized into:

(a) Command Structure - the HQ in OORR (see Annex 'A')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and efficient, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally, the 13 "officers" being too heavy to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inadvisable to alter this understood organization and procedure. That can come later when the formations and units are more on their feet.

(b) Divisions and Brigades (See Annex 'B')

These commanders pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staffs concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They would accept and have decentralized with a much greater responsibility and power of supervision and coordination that can be said of them is that they do very little harm. Under existing regulations, for instance, Divisional Commanders are expressly forbidden from visiting OORR Stations of their lower formations.

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities will be made.

(c) Legions (See Annex 'C')

Reports from Legions show that more energy and determination is shown by Legion Commanders.

Apart from NARIS Region, which has been the subject of separate reports, no immediate changes are necessary.

to other police agencies, possible through desirable changes.

(1) As this Section is limited in its activities to the CRR, it is intended without major alteration in the character of the CRR to make that force more of a unit in itself. Nevertheless, the closest tie is being kept with Public Safety Sub-Commission AG in respect of the police angle.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The CRR is organized into:

(a) Commando Component - the CRR in RRR (see Appx 'A')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and criticism, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally; the 13 "officers" being so top-heavy to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inadvisable to alter this undivided organization and procedure. That can come later when the formations and units are more on their feet

(b) Divisions and Brigades (See Appx 'B')

These commanders pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staffs concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have decentralized the much greater responsibility and power of supervision and control must that can be said of them is that they do very little work. Under existing regulations, for instance, Divisional Commanders are expected to follow from visiting CRR stations if their lower formations

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities will be made.

(c) Legions (See Appx 'B')

Reports from DCs show that more energy and determination is shown by Legion Commanders.

Report from KUBINS Region, which has been the subject of separate reports, no immediate changes are necessary.

(d) Groups and Companies (See Appx 'B')

On the whole, as satisfactory as can be expected under the circumstances. The personnel are good but require equipment and leadership.

.....3/

(c) Mobile Battalions (See Annex D)

A comparatively recent innovation. This powerful, hard hitting, mobile reserve should help both directly and indirectly in the maintenance of law and order. See also page 12.

ARMY SUPPLIES

Confidential reports will be submitted on the important components and staff officers. In general, while many of these are good (and would be better, given proper pay and support), there are some whose capabilities and courage leave much to be desired. The matter of changes will have to be approached delicately in view of the political implications involved, particularly at this time. This however will have to be faced sooner or later, anyhow. Without proper direction, no force can become efficient.

COMMANDS OF SUPPLY

(a) There is no doubt that lack of clothing and boots for the CORR has largely been due to faulty distribution procedure within the CORR; the present system is for Legion Commanders to indent direct to GHQ CORR which in due time will report shortages and requirements and stocks held. There is no method at GHQ for checking these returns and Legions are permitted to issue items at their own discretion.

(b) Each Legion has a store of clothing, equipment, arms and ammunition which is supervised by a subaltern with WO2s and men under his command. He maintains reserve stocks, and in an effort to ensure easy distribution (which has not been accomplished), certain supplies are held in main depots, e.g. MILAN, ROSE, BARR, NETHER, entirely under the control of GHQ. Legion Staffs maintain these main depots but releases therefrom are authorized by GHQ only. GHQ either supply from existing stocks or send consolidated Legion demands to the War Ministry, who release available items to GHQ. The latter allots the supplies to Legions in need and notifies the Legion concerned.

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Up to that point the supplies still lie in Army or CORR main depots wherever they may be and the Legions have to collect them from the depot.

(c) Little, if anything, is ever done by the War Ministry or CORR GHQ to ensure the physical delivery of the supplies to the Legions who are often not in a position to collect, having insufficient or unreliable transport at their disposal. Thus the Legions are left to their own devices and the responsibility shown by the War Ministry and GHQ regarding this is largely responsible for the frequent delays in getting supplies out to men in the ground. One LO reported his opinion that it was "a matter of luck how much equipment Carabiniere had and when he got it". This is no excuse.

(d) The competence referred to above is largely due to the curial dual control of the CORR which is reflected in the mentality of the War Ministry and CORR. The CORR does to Legion level is the child of

5. MATTERS OF SUPPLY

(a) There is no doubt that lack of clothing and boots for the OCHS has largely been due to failure of distribution procedure within the OCHS; the present system is for Legion Commanders to submit direct to HQ OCHS which is done by way of a monthly report showing requirements and stocks held. There is no method at HQ for checking these returns and Legions are permitted to issue items at their own discretion.

(b) Each Legion has a store of clothing, equipment, arms and ammunition which is supervised by a subaltern with HQS and not under his command. In addition there are stocks, and in an effort to ensure easy distribution (which has not been accomplished), certain supplies are held in main stores, C.E. MILAN, KONG, B.M.T. MATHS, entirely under the control of HQS. Legion stocks maintain these main depots but releases therefrom are authorized by HQ only. HQ either supply from existing stocks or send consolidated Legion demands to the War Ministry, who release available stock to HQ. The latter allows the supplies to Legions in need and notifies the Legion concerned.

Up to that point the supplies will lie in Army or OCHS main depots wherever they may be and the Legions have to collect them from the depots.

(c) Little, if anything, is even done by the War Ministry or OCHS HQ to ensure the physical delivery of the supplies to the Legions who are often not in a position to collect, having insufficient or unreliable transport at their disposal. Thus the Legions are left to their own devices and the consequences shown by the War Ministry and OCHS regarding this is largely responsible for the frequent delays in getting supplies out to men on the ground. One LG reported his opinion that it was "a matter of luck how much equipment Garibini had and when he got it". This HQ concurs.

(d) The complacency referred to above is largely due to the curbing of control of the OCHS which is reflected in the mentality of HQ's War Ministry and OCHS. The OCHS down to Legion level is the child of the War Ministry. Then it is adopted by the Ministry of Interior, who is by no means a satisfactory master parent. Thus at War Ministry and OCHS there exists a lack of drive to see that the OCHS are equipped in a fit condition to carry out their duties.

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- 4 -

(e) In an effort to effect an immediate remedy a recommendation has been made by this Station (and concurred with by CDR, OCMR) for Army supplies to be used at once for all OCMR supplies (excepting accommodation stores). This would ensure the signal delivery of supplies to all regions through the Army Territorial Commands, and would fix the responsibility of maintaining the OCMR upon the War Ministry. It would also ensure simplification of procedure and economy and prevent serious delay in distribution.

A scheme has been drawn up, which, it is confidently anticipated, will have the desired effect. For details see Appendix 'C'.

Released for the period October 1945 to 25 February 1946 as Appendix 'D'.

6. SUMMARY

(a) Extensive duties performed by the OCMR have, according to HQ, become necessary owing to the absence and unreliability of other police agencies.

Economies have been effected and more than 500 personnel have been returned to normal duties. Allied Military demands for the Services of OCMR have been exacting and this is being dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission, AC.

(r) Disposition of strengths are being closely observed by ICS and representations made to Brigade Commanders, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available.

Establishment authorised	Present with units
65,000	56,322

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick, men on leave etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, OCMR being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve as special Companies for eventual guard duties. It has been taken to the War Ministry. The use of these Companies is under review and representatives have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) CDR OCMR, ICS and Public Safety Sub-Commission AC are strongly opposed to the closing of any permanently manned OCMR Station. We incur. There are 4406 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or under. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying between 5 and 21) of companies the whole of I/LX. The withdrawal of the OCMR from any of these stations would deprive the population of any police protection whatever and of any visible sign of the power of the law. Therefore the closing of such stations will not be recommended, but an improved standard of efficiency demanded.

7. RECOMMENDATION

6. SAFETY

(a) Extraneous notice performed by the COM have, according to CHQ, become necessary owing to the blackout and moral lability of other police agencies.

Expenditures have been effected and more than 500 personnel have been returned to normal duties. Allied Military demands for the Service of COM have been reacting not only to being dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission, etc.

(b) Disruption of strength is being directly observed by COM and representatives made to High Commanders, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available.

Establishment Authorized	Present with units
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65,000	56,322
--------	--------

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick, men on leave, etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, COM being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve. **940** Companies for eventual guard duties. Steps have been taken to ensure this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representations have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) The COM, COM and Public Safety Sub-Commission are strongly opposed to the closing of any governmentally owned COM Station. We cannot. There are 1406 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or under. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying between 5 and 21) of companies throughout H.M.I. The withdrawal of the COM from any of these stations would deprive the population of any police protection whatever and of any visible sign of the power of the law. Therefore the closing of such stations will not be recommended, but an improved standard of efficiency demanded.

7. ACCOMMODATION

(a) The unsatisfactory "Gerentecis" system, whereby COM barracks stores are provided by civilian contractors, has completely broken down and the condition of most of the 5,000 COM barracks is bad. The contractors are obliged to maintain the buildings, roads, furniture and bedding and kitchen equipment. They are at present quite unable to do this.

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- (b) It would be difficult to overcome the many legal and other difficulties in order to change the present accommodation situation, and, apart from compulsory acquisition of all barracks occupied by GCRB which would mean lengthy legislation, no immediate remedy can be suggested. GCRB HQ do not favour state ownership of the buildings concerned, as local interest (which GCRB value) in the housing of the GCRB would no longer be taken.
- (c) The provision of accommodation stores is another matter. Here again the War Ministry should step into the breach. GCRB HQ have applied to War Ministry, on our recommendation, for the loan of accommodation stores to improve existing conditions. The question of accounting is one for the Ministries and contractors concerned.
- (d) Similarly regarding messing to barracks, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War should co-operate in this vital matter. GCRB HQ and GCRB HQ are providing the necessary material, and there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labour.
- (e) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for GCRB will be submitted.

UNIFORMS AND CLOTHING

- (a) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions very unsatisfactory in different legions. Since October 1945 the War Ministry have released to GCRB among other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 32,000 sweaters, 90,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 pull-overs, 70,000 blankets, 71,000 shirts, etc.
- (b) The normal scale of clothing for GCRB is generous (ten generous for immediate fulfilment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now allotting more to GCRB and the general situation is improving.
- (c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been secured and a consolidated indent made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered as soon as possible.
- (d) GCRB uniforms are requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1946 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION

- (a) GCRB suggested a scale for arming GCRB (less Mobile Battalions). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate completion of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.
- (b) 16,110 Barrett automatic rifles with abundant supply of ammunition, are already on their way to Legions.

again the War Ministry should step into the breach. OGRH GSG have applied to War Ministry, on our recommendation, for the loan of accommodation stores to improve existing conditions. The question of accounting is one for the Ministries and contractors concerned.

(d) Similarly regarding repairs to houses, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War should co-operate in this vital matter. Civic and Civilis Military must provide the necessary material, and there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labour.

(e) Mrs. detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for OGRH will be submitted.

UNIFORM AND CLOTHING

(a) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions very greatly in different regions. Since October 1945 the War Ministry have released to OGRH among other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 32,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of boots, 45,000 pull-overs, 70,000 blankets, 74,000 shirts, etc.

(b) The normal scale of clothing for OGRH is generous (too generous for immediate fulfillment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now eliminating more to OGRH and the general situation is improving.

(c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated indent made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered **939** promptly.

(d) OGRH uniform etc requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1946 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION

(e) GSG suggested a scale for arming OGRH (less Mobile Battalion). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate adoption of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.

(f) 16,110 Beretta automatic rifles with abundant supply of ammunition, are already on their way to Leghorn.

(g) Further 34,000 Beretta automatic rifles are being assembled, 8,000,000 rounds of ammunition is available, and will be supplied to the OGRH exclusively.

In addition, each OGRH Station is now receiving a Broda machine-gun and a minimum of 20 handgrenades for station defence. Many have already been delivered.

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(c) The carrying of automatic rifles by OORH on normal day-patrols in cities should be discouraged for obvious reasons. However, the OORH must have available at all times weapons equal to those in possession of the "enemy", who have acquired considerable numbers of powerful weapons illegally as a result of the war. Therefore, present and future distribution will ensure 50,000 automatic rifles for OORH use on dangerous duties, or when strong opposition may be met.

(d) Authority has been given for the manufacture of sufficient 9 mm pistols (mod 34) to arm the OORH on the scale of 1 per man.

(e) On provision of the above OORH armament will be standardised, sufficient, and no further recommendations regarding arms will be necessary.

(f) OORH have expressed great satisfaction and morale and prestige has been raised as a result.

(g) For scale of arms: see appendix 'A'.

10. TRANSPORT

(a) An establishment for OORH Transport (less Mob Bus) has been agreed and it is attached hereto as appendix 'B'.

(b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each OORH Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - one vehicle serviced a varying number of stations. Thus all supplies will be distributed by OORH themselves from legions to the smallest unit, and present method of distribution by locally hired transport (in many cases by bullock cart) will be abolished.

(c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient state is the most vital need of the OORH. The general situation regarding 938 of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.

(d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by

- (i) Re-allocation of Army transport,
- (ii) Release to OORH of the next 500 vehicles from ITALIAN Army workshops.
- (iii) Release to OORH of new vehicles by War Ministry, out of those becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with ARAR and the Treasury.

(e) As it is inadvisable to deplete Army transport which is still very short, the solution (d) (iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which confirmation in writing is being requested) to provide OORH with:

- (1) Authority has been given for the manufacture of sufficient 9 mm pistols (mod 34) to arm the COBR on the scale of 1 per man.
- (2) On provision of the above COBR armament will be standardized, sufficient, and no further recommendations regarding arms will be necessary.
- (3) COBR have expressed great satisfaction and morale and prestige has been raised as a result.
- (4) For scale of arms: see appendix 'A'.

10. TRANSPORT

- (a) An establishment for COBR transport (less Mob Bus) has been agreed and it is attached hereto as appendix 'B'.
- (b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each COBR station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - the vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. When all supplies will be distributed by COBR themselves from Legions to the smallest unit, and present method of distribution by locally hired transport (in many cases by bullock cart) will be abolished.
- (c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient state is the most vital need of the COBR. The general situation regarding 938 of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings under our supervision, taking place.

- (d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by

- (i) Re-allocation of Army transport.
- (ii) Release to COBR of the next 500 vehicles from ITALIAN Army workshops.
- (iii) Release to COBR of new vehicles by War Ministry, out of those becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with ARAB and the Treasury.

- (e) As it is inadvisable to deplete Army transport which is still very short, the solution (d)-(iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which cooperation in writing is being requested) to provide COBR with:

- (i) 250 Jeeps - delivery to commence in about 3 weeks.
- (ii) 940 heavy and medium lorries - new, from ITALIAN motor industry - 500 to be delivered by the end of June 45.
- (iii) 24 light lorries - new, from ITALIAN factories - delivery soon.
- (iv) 500 motor cycles - new, from CUSCINI factory - delivery soon.
- (v) 2000 bicycles - new, from BLANCHI factory - delivery soon.

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CCRR have made arrangements for collection of the above, as they become available.

(2) The establishment of CCRR transport (less Mobile Battalions) compared with present holdings is

	Passenger vehicles	Medium Load Carriers	Heavy Load Carriers	Light Lorries and Jeeps	Motor Cycles	Total
Establishment:	982	915	67	897	1951	5712
Actual:	714				1234	2489

Recent census shows over 50% of holdings are inefficient. Most passenger vehicles are requisitioned and no facilities exist for their repair, it being the intention of CCRR to re-requisition as a matter of policy.

(5) The establishment is thus extremely modest and possibly quickly to be implemented, but it will provide all immediate CCRR transport requirements for maintenance and high operational efficiency.

11. POL

(a) POL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a provincial basis through Prefecture. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the same time are of a biased political person.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through new channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by UNRRA as part of civilian needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the Army to supply POL to Legions will mean the Army having to increase its purchase or reduce consumption in units to supply UNRRA. Therefore it is 987 ended that the petrol now supplied through UNRRA should be allotted by Ministry of Industry and Commerce to CCRR who would then allow to Legions, the channels of supply being through Army Territorial Command.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by CCRR or "Comitato Italiano Petroli" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.P. points may not function, but this could be overcome by reserves in sufficient quantities to be available at Army Territorial Command for use in emergency.

(d) Full recommendations will be made regarding POL supplies and distributions.

12. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) More than 2,000 stations are without telephones. It is not yet

2489

10/31

741

Report census shows over 50% of buildings are inefficient. Most passenger vehicles are requisitioned and no facilities exist for their repair, it being the intention of CORR to de-acquisition as a matter of policy.

(g) The establishment is thus extremely modest and possible quickly to implement, but it will provide all immediate CORR transport require-ments for maintenance and high operational efficiency.

11. POL

(a) POL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a provincial basis through freights. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the moment in a poor state of a blessed political period.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through any channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by UNRRA as part of civilian needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the army to supply POL to Legions will mean the army having to increase its purchases or reduce consumption in units to supply CORR. Therefore it is ⁹³⁷ended that the petrol now supplied through UNRRA should be allotted to industry, if Industry and Commerce to UNRRA who would then allow to Legions, the channels of supply being through army Territorial Commands.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by CORR at "Comitato Italiano Petroli" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.P. points may not function, but this could be overcome by reserves in sufficient quantities to be available at any Territorial Command for use in emergency.

(d) Full recommendations will be made regarding POL supplies and distributions.

12. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) More than 2,000 stations are without telephones. It is not yet known how many of these stations formerly had telephone communications. Where telephones are installed, the majority are available for post time service only. (Civilian exchange system).

(b) It is recommended that private lines be installed throughout. Much detailed information is being collected, but it is apparent that no appreciable improvement can be expected in telephone communications in the immediate future.

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13. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

- 8 -

(a) A scheme for wireless communications down to group level has been recommended and the sets will, it is hoped, be provided immediately by GMRG. Spare sets (3) will be kept at Legion HQ, available for temporary use at any station - ie below Group level - in emergency.

Copy of wireless scheme recommended is attached as Appendix 'a'. This is essential in view of the lack of telephone communications.

(b) The provision of motor-cycles according to scale is the best protection remedy for the poor state of GMRG communications.

14. MOBILE BATTALIONS

(a) Agreement on minor points has not yet been reached between GMRG and the Ministry as to the establishment of these Battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the Battalions will be up to establishment by the end of May 1946.

(b) We have obtained from GHQ the release of 123 "Staghounds" armoured cars and their issue is expected in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, GMSMO. A further 45 "Staghounds" will later be provided to replace the 45 Humbers at present held in the North of IRELAND, i.e. RIDGE, MILK, TYPIN and GMRG. Efforts are being made to obtain spaces for both Humbers and "Staghounds" and request has been made to GHQ for supplies of ammunition for cannon.

(c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at GMSMO. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crews in the Battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.

(d) It is considered that the Battalions should be formed of 938 companies, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by GHQ GMRG accordingly, and isolated detachments will be recalled to Bn HQs.

LGs have been asked to see that the instruction of GHQ is fully complied with and report.

(e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, defect the purposes for which the Mobile Battalions were formed and the above is being pressed, so that the Battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming elections. See also para 5 (e).

15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

(a) Agent from specialist training at Army Schools at GMSMO

14. MOBILE BATTALIONS

- (a) Agreement on minor points has not yet been reached between GMR and War Ministry as to the establishment of these Battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the Battalions will be up to establishment by the end of May 1946.
- (b) We have obtained from GHQ the release of 125 "Staghounds" assigned Corps and they are in receipt in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, CASANO. A further 15 "Staghounds" will later be provided to replace the 15 numbers at present held in the North of Italy, i.e. 15th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th. Efforts are being made to obtain spares for both numbers and "Staghounds" and request has been made to Army for supplies of ammunition for combat.
- (c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at CASANO. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crews in the Battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.
- (d) It is considered that the Battalions should be formed if 938 is completed, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructors have been given by GHQ CORP accordingly, and isolated detachments will be recalled to HQ.

IGs have been asked to see that the inauguration of GHQ is fully completed with and report.

- (e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, and the purpose of which the Mobile Battalions were formed, and the above is being pressed, so that the Battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming elections. See also page 3 (e).

15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

- (a) Apart from specialist training at Army Schools at CASANO, elementary training is being given as in (b).

Pre-war, all elementary training was given at ROSE and THERM.

Owing to the lack of equipment and accommodation, schools are not working to the maximum capacity.

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(b)	<u>Location</u>	<u>Actually Under training</u>	<u>Max Capacity per annum</u>
(i) Sezione Allievi CORR Caserma Vittorio Emanuele, Via Legnano 3, <u>ROME</u>		1250	3000
(ii) Battaglione Allievi CORR Torino, Castello Reale, <u>TORINO</u>		500	800
(iii) Battaglione Allievi CORR di <u>TRIESTE</u> , Caserma dei Maurizi, <u>TRIESTE</u>		500	500
(iv) Battaglione Allievi CORR di Cagliari, <u>CAGLIARI</u> (Sardinia)		100	500
(v) Scuola Centrale CORR di Firenze, Via della Scala 23, <u>FIRENZE</u> (1000)		700	700

OHQ CORR occupies 1/3rd of accommodation at the Central School in Rome for its officers.

(c) The present method of instruction is farcical and accommodation and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of selection for NCOs courses leaves much to be desired, and no Officers' training course is taking place at the moment. The matters of recruiting, training, terms and conditions of service are all under review and a final report will be made shortly.

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16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF CORR

(a) Any success achieved by the CORR in maintaining law and order in existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of affairs in CORR.

CORR have no system of criminal records, or the recording of crime.

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them. This important section of police work has always been regarded as the responsibility of the Gendarmerie.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these defects and full recommendations will later be made.

(b) With the immediate application of the remedial suggested regarding transport, arms and ammunition, public relations, accommodation stores, and, in particular, channels of supply through frontier-guard compounds and the adoption of the plan for det. filed improvement through it-
it is estimated that the following

TORINO, CASVELLO NEAR, 300 TORINO 300

(144) Partigiani killed CORR 500
at Bari, Carabinieri arrested 300
nautes, BAR 500

(145) Partigiani killed CORR 500
at Cagliari, Cagliari 400
(Sardinia) 500

(146) Partigiani killed CORR 700
at Firenze, Via della Scala 2, 700
Florence (TCC) 700

also CORR occupied 1/3rd of accommodation at the Central School
in Rome for its offices.

(c) The present method of instruction is farcical and accommodation
and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of solicitation for
MOOs courses leaves much to be desired, and no officers' training
course is taking place at the moment. The matters of recruiting,
training, terms and conditions of service are all under review and
a final report will be made shortly.

16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF CORR 933

(4) Any success achieved by the CORR in maintaining law and order in
existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of
affairs in CORR.

CORR have no system of criminal records, or the recording of crime.

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them.
This important section of police work has always been regarded as the
responsibility of the Questura.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these
defects and full recommendations will later be made.

(6) With the immediate application of the remedies suggested regard-
ing transport, arms and ammunition, Mobile Battalions, accommodation
stores, etc., in particular, channels of supply through furnished
Commandos and the adoption of the plan for detailed improvement through-
out the CORR organization, this HQ is satisfied that the following
results will be achieved:-

- (1) The CORR will progressively become more and more successful in
maintaining law and order in the immediate future, and
- (14) CORR will improve in its functioning as an efficient,
independent Police force, without altering the social
character and tradition of this Branch of the Italian Army,
particularly so and when the reorganization gathers force.

ffm/01/001

H. HIGGINS, Lt Col C30 I
CCRR Section, M.M.I.C.

SECRET

COMANDO CORRA

As amended 141 to CORRA/C/12
dated 19 March 1946

The CMO CORRA comprises the undermentioned staff:

BRUNETTI Brunetto, Generale, Comandante.

Chief of Staff: Col SACCHI Mario;

Vice-Chief of Staff: Lt Col MILANO Marco.

Ufficio Segreteria e Riservato (Secretary's Office - Confidential Section)

CC: Lt Col BINCO Marco - matters regarding personnel (Officers); recruiting of Officers, and rewards to Officers and NCOs.

Ufficio Situazione ("Situation" Office)

CC: Major RUGGERI Ruggiero - Reports on crimes, arrests, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC: Major PINONI Guido - Duty matters, requests for ordinary work, reinforcement.

Ufficio Ordine ("Order" Office)

CC: Major CACCIO Cesare - Division into smaller Commands, strength, lists of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the strength and the regulations of CORRA.

Ufficio Personale (Personnel Office) (One)

CC: Major GEMELLI Emilio - Movement, marriage, discipline, instruction and training of NCOs and soldiers of CORRA.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilization Office)

CC: Capt CALIANO Mario - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, demobilization of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC: Major MILANO Domenico - Publication of the "Foglio d'Ordine", or the official bulletin of CORRA, and the paper "CORRA PER LA NUOVA ITALIA" - printing of CORRA regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione del Carabinieri in Congedo" (Organization for ex-Carabinieri).

Ufficio Assistenza (Welfare)

CC: Major MILANO Domenico - Welfare of personnel.

Ufficio Amministrazione (Administration)

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Ufficio Segreteria e Riservato (Secretary's Office - Confidential Not com)

CC : Lt. Col. BINCO Jacus - matters regarding personnel (Officers); recruiting of Officers, and rewards to Officers and NCOs.

Ufficio Situazione (Intelligence Office)

CC : Major RUMORI Rugiero - Incidents on crimes, arrests, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major FUMORINI Guido - Duty rosters, rewards for ordinary work, reinforcement.

Ufficio Ordine (Organization Office)

CC : Major CACCIO Cesare - Division into smaller commands, strength, lists of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the strength and the requisitions of CORR.

Ufficio Personale Subufficiali e Truppe (Personnel Office & Oks)

CC : Major SIMONINI Emilio - Movement, rewards, discipline, instructions and training of NCOs and soldiers of CORR.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilization Office)

CC : Capt. CARLINO Mario - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, mobilization of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC : Major WILMO Domenico - Publication of the "Foglio d'Ordine", of the official bulletin of CORR, and the paper "Gazzettino della Nuova Italia" - printing of CORR regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione del Carabinieri in Croce" (Organization for ex-Carabinieri).

Ufficio Assistenza (Welfare)

CC : Major WILMO Domenico - Welfare of personnel.

Ufficio Amministrazione (Administrative Office)

CC : Col. MONTELA Giovanni - Administration.

Ufficio di Commissariato (Supplies)

CC : Col. LA ZARA Angelo - Rationing and eqpt of the CORR personnel.

Appendix A' to CORR/C/12
dated 19 March 1946

Ufficio Collegamenti e Motorizzazioni (Communications and Motorization)

CC : Col CENNI Rosolfe - Arm, motorization and communications of CORR.

Direzione Iralca e Veterinaria (Rifing Establishment and Mounted Section)

CC : Col MARCONI Francoscantonio - Horse, mules, etc, of CORR.

Ufficio Inchieste (Inquiries and Screening)


CC : General FERRARI Alvaro (Generale di Divisione) - Screening of Officers and WCOs, in connection with their political background, and with what they did after the armistice.

1467

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
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- 1 -

GENERAL LAYOUT - CARABINIERI

NOTE: In addition, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to certain Legions.

- 1 -

Appendix 'B' to CORV/C/12
19 March 1946GENERAL LAYOUT - CAHABINTERI


NOTE: In addition, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to certain legions.

- 2 -

SECRET

DETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

CHQ




SUMMARY:-

3 Divs
6 Bdes
4 HQ Mob Bns Gps

24 Legions
111 Groups
12 Mob Bns

- 2 -

Appendix 'B' to OCRM/G/12
dated 19 March 1946DETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

SECRET.

Appendix "C" to MEIA Letter
OC. PR/G/12 dated 7 March 1964

1. Attached is a diagrammatic key to proposed channel of supply to CC. MR Regions.
2. The system intended to be implemented, is briefly as follows:-
 - (a) Regions submit demands to Army Territorial Command.
 - (b) War Ministry release items available and notify the appropriate Territorial Commander, who is responsible for collection from Army Depots unless delivery to Territorial Command has been arranged by Ministry of War.
 - (c) Regions will collect from Territorial Command and be responsible for "break-down" and delivery to sub-units.
3. The following supplies and equipment are involved:-

Clothing and Equipment
Arms and Ammunition
Rations
Petrol
Vehicles

of

930

14721


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- 2 -

SECRET

PROCEDURE CONTROL OF SUPPLY OF MEDICINE AND DRESS

MINISTRY OF WAR
ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS



Note 1: Hqs, Div and Bde Hqs are to be maintained by the nearest Legion

Note 2: Legions will be responsible for collecting from Army Territorial Commands, and distribute to own Sub-Units.

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- 2 -

PROCESSED CONTROL OF SUPPLY TO UNITS - SEE

Approved by CG to CGR/2/12
of March 1946

MINISTRY OF WAR
ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

BOLZANO	UDINE	BOLONGNA	FLORENCE	ROME	BARI	NAPLES	PALERMO
UNITS							
BOLZANO VERONA	TRIESTE FRIULI	BOLONGNA ANCONA	GENERAL SCHOOL FLORENCE LEGHORN	ROME TUSCANY LIVORNO LIVORNO ARREZZO CARRARE	BARI	NAPLES CATANZARO	PALERMO MESSINA

and the HQs are to be maintained by the nearest Legion.

will be responsible for collecting from Army Territorial Commands,
distribution to own Sub-Units.

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SECRET

Appendix "D" to ISIA letter
CC. 33/5/12 dated 11 March 1946.

RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE CC. RE

From October 1945 to 25 February 1946.

ITEM	Released by W. M.	Received by CC. RE	RECEIVED Expense Sheet (B)	
Caps	50,000	24,650	-	5,350
Jackets	28,057	38,187	10,150	-
Cloth for Jackets	34,050	-	-	34,050 In course of manufacture
Houses	10,000	-	-	10,000 - do -
Trousers	32,401	35,450	7,049	-
Cloth for Trousers	37,600	-	-	37,600 - do -
Granteopats	20,600	30,950	1,350	-
Cloth for Granteopats	3,000	-	-	3,000 - do -
Backinaws	2,116	1,716	-	400
Patties	25,300	45,780	20,480	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443
Boots	66,600	90,500	25,000	-
Shirts	99,252	71,200	-	28,052 - do -
Blankets	82,000	71,340	-	10,660
Socks	64,632	73,843	3,211	-
Unwearshirts	1,674	1,674	-	-
Pullovers	40,000	40,000	-	-
Towels	21,200	20,000	-	1,200
Blankets Comforters	66,000 22,800	70,800	-	17,200
Overalls	3,212	2,132	-	-

928

Caps	30,000	24,650	-	5,350
Shirts	28,037	38,187	10,150	-
Cloth for jackets	34,050	-	-	34,050 In course of manufacture
Blouses	10,000	-	-	10,000 - do -
Trousers	52,401	39,450	7,049	-
Cloth for trousers	37,500	-	-	37,500 - do -
Overcoats	28,600	30,250	1,650	-
Cloth for overcoats	3,000	-	-	3,000 - do -
Knickerboys	2,116	1,716	-	400
Pettico	23,300	45,750	20,450	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443
Socks	66,600	30,500	23,900	-
Shirts	95,252	71,200	-	26,052 - do -
Overalls	82,000	71,310	-	10,690
Socks	64,632	73,843	7,211	-
Undershirts	1,674	1,674	-	-
Pullovers	40,000	40,000	-	-
Boys	21,200	20,000	-	1,200
Blankets	66,000 }	70,300	-	17,200
Comforters	22,000 }			
Overalls	3,212	2,192	-	1,020
Gloves	3,064	1,554	-	1,110
Heads	2,554	1,954	-	600
Overcoats with fur	600	-	-	600
Crash Helmets	898	258	-	640

SECRET

Sheet No. 2.

Appendix "III" to HIA letter
CC, RR/5/12 dated 17 March 1946.

ITEMS	Released by W. H.	Received by CC, RR	RECEIVED Excess Short
Caps Waterproof	510	-	510
Uniforms (Flasks)	10,000	10,000	-
1st Short Trousers	1,674	1,674	-
Hoodkerchiefs	130,000	130,000	-
Shirts	-	15,300	15,300
Spectacles for drivers	-	1,254	1,254
Complete Allied Uniforms with Shirts and green	-	10,000	10,000
Complete Grey-Green Uniforms (Jackets and trousers)	-	10,650	10,650

The following materials released to CC, RR on 20 February 1946
are still to be withdrawn by them:-

Overalls	6,000	-
8 bottles for drivers	12,486	-
Hoodie (woollen)	5,000	-
Gloves	5,200	-
Shoes (Gordon)	24,972	)

927

The following materials will be released shortly:-

Caps	10,000
Uniforms	10,000
Shoes	10,000

(a) Excess is due to special releases from
other sources such as HQ 2 District direct.

1477

Wanteens (Flasks)	10,000	-	10,000
Cam Short Trowsers	1,574	-	1,574
Flarechiefs	130,000	-	130,000
Shirts	-	15,500	15,500
Spectacles for drivers	-	1,554	1,554
Complete Allied Uniforms with shirts and green	-	10,000	10,000
Complete Gray-Green Uniforms (Jackets and trousers)	-	10,650	10,650

The following materials released to CG, BR on 20 February 1946 are still to be withdrawn by them:-

Variables	6,000	-	-
8 shoes for drivers	12,186	-	-
Boots (leather)	3,000	-	-
Gloves	5,200	-	-
Boots (Cotton)	24,972	-	-

922

The following materials will be released shortly:-

Caps	10,000	-	-
Uniforms	10,000	-	-
Boots	10,000	-	-

(a) Excess is due to special releases from other sources such as Hq 2 District direct.

SECRETSECRETPage
of 1TABLE OF EQUIPMENT - ARMS AND AMMUNITIONA. AUTOMATIC PISTOLS BERETTA MOD. 34

One for each man (officers included, as they provide their own). The revolvers mod. 89 which are now held will be substituted by automatic pistols mod. 34.

B. RIFLES MOD 91.

One for each man who is not in possession of a Beretta automatic rifle.

C. AUTOMATIC RIFLES BERETTA MOD. 38 Cal. 9

One for each man in Mobile Battalions (12 Battalions);
4 for each 5 men of the total strength of HQs
and men included men of Mobile battalions (36,929 men)
Four for the 4 Comando Raggruppamento Mobile Ans -
Total 46.

D. LIGHT MACHINE GUNS BREDA MOD. 50 Cal 6.5.

- 5 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 2 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 2 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 4 for each "Comando Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili" (4 for four Raggruppamenti)
- 21 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 72 for "CNR School "Legione Allievi"
- 16 for the Central School
- 5 for the Squadron Group, Legion of Rome
- One for stations with less than 10 men; total 4,106
- 2 for stations with not more than 25 men
- 3 for stations with not more than 50 men
- 4 for stations with more than 100 men

E. RAPID GRENADES

- 50 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglioni (4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Region (Regione Allievi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (24)
- 20 for each station with less than 10 men
- 20 for each station with not more than 25 men
- 30 for each station with not more than 50 men
- 50 for each station with more than 100 men

F. AMMUNITION

As follows for each weapon:

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal. 9

Total

- Rifle mod. 1891

Total

- Automatic rifle Beretta

Total

- Light machine guns Breda

Total

T O R R

Approved by CORE/C/12
of 17 March 1946.

TABLE OF EQUIPMENT - WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

WEAPONS MOD. 34

Officers excluded, as they provide
valves mod. 39 which are now held
by automatic pistols mod. 34.

is not in possession of a
rifle.

WEAPONS MOD. 38 Cal. 2

Mobile battalions (12 Battalions);
of the total strength of 1009
of Mobile battalions (56,929 men)
and Raggruppamenti Mobili -

WEAPONS MOD. 30 Cal. 6.5.

Generale (General HQ)
HQ (3 Divisions)
HQ (6 Brigades)
Raggruppamenti Battaglioni
four Raggruppamenti
HQ (12 Bns)
"Legione Alievi"
School
Group, Legion of Rome
with less than 10 men; total 1,106
with not more than 25 men
with not more than 50 men
with more than 50 men

E. WEAPONS

- 50 for each Command Generale (General HQ)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili
(4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Region (Regione Alievi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (21)
- 20 for each station with less than 10 men
- 20 for each station with not more than 25 men
- 30 for each station with not more than 50 men
- 50 for each station with more than 50 men

F. AMMUNITION

As follows for each weapon:

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal. 9	21 rds handed to each man
	7 " reserve
Total	28
- Rifle mod. 1891	72 rds handed to each man
	28 " reserve
Total	100
- Automatic rifle Beretta	80 rds handed to each man
	170 " reserve
Total	250
- Light machine gun Broda	500 rds handed to man
	42 " reserve
Total	542

1480

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ESTABLISHMENT FOR CARAVANIERI TRANSPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, REGIONS AND REGIMENTAL

COMMENTS	Motor Cars	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	Auto Rickshaws	Workshops	
		Up to 5 tons	Over 5 tons					
General Command	10	1	1	1	3	-	1	
Division Command	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	
Brigade Command	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	
Regimental Command	3	2	3	2	6	-	1	
Company Command	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	
Company Command	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	
See Command and stations Commanded by HQs	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	
Stations with personnel up to 10 men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
" " " " 25 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
" " " " 50 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
" " " " over 50 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Squadrons' Group	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Royal Guards - GCRH Squadron	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Officers' Legion	2	2	2	2	60	6	1	
General School	2	1	1	1	20	2	-	
"Baggruppamento" Command (each "Baggruppamento" includes 4 Mob Hqs)	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	
Total vehicles required for all Caravanier units, except the 12 Mobile Battalions	982	915	67	397	1951	8	23	1

Appendix 'F' to GMR/G/12
of 1 March 1946

ESTABLISHMENT FOR CIRCUMSTANCES TO REPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS

	Motor Cars	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	Armored Cars	Motorcycles	Bicycles	Petrol Carriers
		10 ton	Over 10 ton						
1st	14	1	1	1	3	1	1	6	1
2nd	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
3rd	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
4th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
5th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
6th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
7th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
8th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
9th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
10th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
11th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
12th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
13th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
14th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
15th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
16th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
17th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
18th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
19th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
20th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
21st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
22nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
23rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
24th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
25th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
26th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
27th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
28th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
29th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
30th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
31st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
32nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
33rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
34th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
35th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
36th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
37th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
38th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
39th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
40th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
41st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
42nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
43rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
44th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
45th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
46th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
47th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
48th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
49th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
50th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
51st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
52nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
53rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
54th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
55th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
56th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
57th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
58th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
59th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
60th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
61st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
62nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
63rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
64th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
65th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
66th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
67th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
68th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
69th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
70th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
71st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
72nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
73rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
74th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
75th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
76th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
77th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
78th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
79th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
80th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
81st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
82nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
83rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
84th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
85th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
86th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
87th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
88th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
89th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
90th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
91st	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
92nd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
93rd	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
94th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
95th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
96th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
97th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
98th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
99th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
100th	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Total	982	915	67	897	1951	8	23	12474	22

Appendix "C" to JCSA Letter
CG-PP-112 dated 11 March 1945.

Carabinieri Wireless Communications.

The following are the proposed Carabinieri requirements for wireless communications:-

1. MOBILE BATTALIONS	For each Battalion	Total for 12 Bns.	
		No.	105
No. 12 Sets	2	24	
No. 9 Sets	12	144	
No. 38 Sets			

2. Carabinieri HQ's in Rome and 13 Legions outside Rome.

Nineteen powerful sets are required to enable communication to be set up between Rome and Legions in the following cities:-

MILAN, ALESSANDRIA, GENOVA, TRIESTE, PADOVA, BOLZANO, VERONA, BRESCIA, FLORENCE, ANCONA, IMPERIA, GENOVA, NAPLES, BARI, CATANZARO, MESSINA, PALERMO, CAGLIARI.

3. Two Legion HQ's in Rome.

Three No 2 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri HQ in Rome and the two Legions in Rome. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri HQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in Italy, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 141 Groups. 131 No 5 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Groups.

5. Station HQ's.

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless, but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble and disorder, it is proposed that three No 2 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required sixty No 2 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No 2 Set could be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there whilst trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set would return to Legion HQ when the situation became normal.

7. Mobile Battalions.

Radio Sets		
No. 1.	No. 12.	No. 38.

Legion HQ's	1	1	-
Mobile Battalion HQ's in Field	1	1	-
Mobile Battalion HQ's to 3 Coy HQ's	-	4	-
3 Coy HQ's to Armoured Cars	-	3	-

2. Carabinieri HQ's in Rome and 12 Legions outside Rome.

Minimum powerful sets are required to enable communication to be set up between Rome and Legions in the following cities:-

TURIN, ALESSANDRIA, GENOA, MILAN, PADOVA, BOLZANO, VERONA, BOLOGNA, FLORENCE, AREZZO, MANTOVA, ORISTANO, NAPLES, BARI, CATANIA, MESSINA, PALERMO, CAGLIARI.

3. Two Legion HQ's in Rome.

Three No 9 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri HQ in Rome and the two Legions in Rome. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri HQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY. SICILY and SARDEGNA and they are divided into 141 Groups. 134 No 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Groups.

5. Station HQ's.

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless, but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble and disaster, it is proposed that three No 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required sixty No 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No 9 Set could be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there whilst trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set would return to Legion HQ when the situation became normal.

7. Mobile Battalions.

Radio Sets		
No. 9.	No. 15.	No. 30.
1	1	-
1	1	-
-	4	-
-	3	-
-	-	12
2	3	12
24	108	144

Legion HQ's
Mobile Battalion HQ's in Field
Mobile Battalion HQ's to 3 Coy HQ's
3 Coy HQ's to Armoured Cars
3 Coy HQ's to 3 Platoons

Total for 12 Mobile Battalions

8. SUMMARY OF SETS REQUIRED.

POWERFUL SETS.	
Carabinieri HQ, Rome	4
18 Legions Outside Rome	18
	<u>19</u>

SECRET.

Sheet No. 2.

Appendix "G" to JAILA Letter
CG, RV/G/12 dated 11 March 1946

8. SUMMARY OF SETS REQUIRED. (Cont'd)

No. 7 SETS.

CHIEF, HQM	1
1 RCAF Legation	2
Legation	20
Quarters	111
Secret Sets of Legations	60
Mobile Battalions	24
	<u>218</u>

No. 19 SETS.

Mobile Battalions	<u>109</u>
-------------------	------------

No. 36 SETS.

Mobile Battalions	<u>144</u>
-------------------	------------

E.C. *Personal*

MAR 2 RECD

*Pls coordinate with reports of Navy AF
S/Cs To make complete report for AFHQ 18*SUBJECT:- Report of Inspection of Islands of PANTELLARIA
and LAMPEDUSA.*So to cc.**This is in hand by
EC's office.*Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
G/8/1

25 February 1946

TO : Chief Commissioner, A.C.
(6 Copies of Report)

1. Reference is made to AFHQ signal F 59503 of 26 January 1946.
2. Report of Inspection of islands of PANTELLARIA and LAMPEDUSA conducted by representative of this Sub-Commission is attached herewith.


JOHN J. WARD, Capt.
For Major General,
M.M.I.A.
Copy to:- Navy Sub-Commission A.C.,
Air Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,Internal: "C"
"A"
CC.HR Section

FEB 2 1946

REPORT OF INSPECTIONS MADE BY ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES OF LAND FORCES,
NAVY AND AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION.
6-16 FEBRUARY 1946.

PANTELLARIA - Allied Liaison Officer left Pantellaria 15 Jan 46. No military personnel other than 15 CC.RR, commanded by a lieutenant and 7 Finances Guards. CC.RR are armed with carbines cal. 6.5, and pistols cal 9. The detachment has 2 light machine guns cal. 6.5 and a quantity of Italian hand grenades. No other serviceable weapons were seen on Pantellaria. No ammunition of any type was in battery positions.

The defenses of Pantellaria consisted of 22 mixed A.A. and C.D. batteries plus groups of concrete blockhouses scattered over the island, particularly at port entrances and inlets. In general the batteries of 90 mm and below were dual purpose A.A. and C.D. Larger calibres were C.D. only. All batteries were designed to be six gun batteries, though in some batteries some gun positions had not been installed before the island's surrender. All battery positions have suffered from the original bombings, from exposure to weather and looting of component parts (gun dials, prisms, etc.) by local inhabitants. Lieutenant Hall, Navy Sub-Commission is forwarding with his report a map giving the location and strength of the batteries. The majority of concrete blockhouses seem to be intact. Prior to the surrender, there had been one battalion of Army troops on the island whose principal duty was the manning of light automatic arms of the island's blockhouses. All batteries were manned by Italian Navy personnel or by the M. I. M. A. R. J. Local inhabitants preferred to join the MILITARY and serve at home rather than accept Army service. The possible recovery of battery property or installations would be a concern of the Italian Navy. Army property on the island was limited to one barracks for accommodating the blockhouse battalion. I saw several vehicles of Army type without targa of any sort but was informed they were Navy property.

At one ammunition dump, all of which are concealed in caves, I found some boxes of rifles and German 20 mm A.A. guns. These had deteriorated much less than the batteries which had been exposed to weather but were still rusty. There is a large airport on the island and though not in use, is in excellent condition.

CONCLUSION: None of the batteries on the island are at present operational and could not be rendered operational without thorough overhaul at an Arsenal. My personal estimate is that 60% of the guns could be rendered serviceable by Arsenal overhaul. Many of the guns are of the 1914-1918 vintage but two 90 mm batteries were manufactured in 1942. Of the remaining blockhouses, 70% are undamaged and as serviceable as they ever were. The ammunition dumps contain all classes of ammunition but due to deterioration should all be classed as dangerous. I saw some bags of cordite beginning to "sweat".

RECOMMENDATION: That the guns be evacuated to the mainland and scrapped as salvage. That the blockhouses be destroyed by explosive. That all ammunition be dumped in the required fathoms at sea.

LAMPEDUSA - Allied officer left approx. 25 Jan 46. No military personnel other than 9 CC.RR and 5 Finance Guards armed with carbines and pistols. Island defenses consisted of 6 mixed A.A. and C.D. batteries, blockhouses at

Guards. CC.RR are armed with carbines. Detachment has 2 light machine guns cal. 6.5 and a quantity of Italian hand grenades. No other serviceable weapons were seen on Pantellaria. No ammunition of any type was in battery positions.

The defenses of Pantellaria consisted of 22 mixed A.A. and C.D. batteries plus groups of concrete blockhouses scattered over the island, particularly at port entrances and inlets. In general the batteries of 90 mm and below were dual purpose A.A. and C.D. Larger calibres were C.D. only. All batteries were designed to be six gun batteries, though in some batteries some gun positions have not been installed before the island's surrender. All battery positions have suffered from the original bombings, from exposure to weather and looting of component parts (gun dials, fuses, etc.) by local inhabitants. Lieutenant Kahl, Navy Sub-Commission is forwarding with his report a map giving the location and strength of the batteries. The majority of concrete blockhouses seem to be intact. Prior to the surrender, there had been one battalion of Army troops on the island whose principal duty was the manning of light automatic arms of the islands blockhouses. All batteries were manned by Italian Navy personnel or by the M.I.E.M.A.T. Local inhabitants preferred to join the MILITARE and serve at home rather than accept Army service. The possible recovery of battery property or installations would be a concern of the Italian Navy. Army property on the island was limited to one barracks for accommodating the blockhouse battalion. I saw several vehicles of Army type without target of any sort but was informed they were Navy property.

At one ammunition dump, all of which are concealed in caves, I found some boxes of rifles and German 20 mm A.A. guns. These had deteriorated much less than the batteries which had been exposed to weather but were still rusty. There is a large airport on the island and though not in use, is in excellent condition.

CONCLUSION: None of the batteries on the island are at present operational and could not be rendered operational without thorough overhaul at an Arsenal. My personal estimate is that 60% of the guns could be rendered serviceable by Arsenal overhaul. Many of the guns are of the 1914-1918 vintage but two 90 mm batteries were manufactured in 1942. Of the remaining blockhouses, 70% are undamaged and as serviceable as they ever were. The ammunition dumps contain all classes of ammunition but due to deterioration should all be classed as dangerous. I saw some bags of cordite beginning to "sweat".

RECOMMENDATION: That the guns be evacuated to the mainland and scrapped as salvage. That the blockhouses be destroyed by explosive. That all ammunition be dumped in the required fathoms at sea.

LANDFORDUS - Allied officer left approx. 23 Jan 46. No military personnel other than 9 CC.RR and 5 Finance Guards armed with carbines and pistols. Island defenses consisted of 8 mixed A.A. and C.D. batteries, blockhouses at landing areas and one field artillery battery 75 mm.


Army personnel were restricted to manning of blockhouses and the field artillery battery, which consists of four pieces, two dated 1907 and two 1911. There were also six armoured reconnaissance cars, of which only the frames remain.

-2-

The batteries of Lampedusa have suffered from weather and theft, but show no signs of bomb damage. Ammunition for the most parts fused but lacking propelling charges, is scattered around the gun pits. There is one main ammunition depot situated in a cave and badly scattered. Ammunition appeared in most instances serviceable. Blockhouses are in the main undamaged. Batteries were manned by Navy and MILMART personnel. Navy Sub-Commission representative will forward map of gun positions with his report. There is a medium sized airport on the island and though not in use is in fair condition.

CONCLUSION: Same as for Pantellaria, though I would estimate 90% of the battery guns could be made serviceable by Arsenal rehaul.

RECOMMENDATION: Same as for Pantellaria.


JOHN J. WARD,
Captain EAC,
Asst. G-4, M.M.I.A.

920

AIR FORCE SUPPLY DIVISION

AIR COMMISSION

JPO 504

SECRET

REF: AFSC/553/078
DOWNSIDE, 1948REPORT ON THE AIR FORCE SUPPLY DIVISION
AND COMMISSION

Appendix "A": Map showing location of Airfields and Fuel Storage.

Appendix "B": Inventory of Fuel on Installation.

1. The purpose of this inspection was to determine the condition of the Italian Air Force installations, including on the island and the large air and fuel storage facilities, for work necessary to facilitate these islands.





DESCRIPTION

2. Allied and Italian Government Personnel. The Allied Commission Liaison Officer left this island on January 10th. Before leaving, he asked the Italian Governor, Mr. Sicolo Almona (a former Major in the Army) responsible for the island and its air facilities left on the island. There are no air personnel in the island.
3. Airfield - The location of the airfield is shown in Appendix A. The airfield has a sod surface with five volcanic rock sub-surfaces. It is well drained and is all weather. The landing is 300 feet by 2000 ft. and is covered with white concrete strips embedded in the ground. Landing direction is 15 - 10. Planes that are off to the air have no obstructions and would set off with a relatively heavy load for a short runway. The ground from the end of the runway drops about 500 ft. to the sea. There is adequate room for parking up to 5 or 6 thousands of planes on the field.
4. The location of the base is shown in Appendix A. The base is a large structure built under a small hill, making it very difficult to bomb damage. A bomb hit over one of the entrances

6. Supply Barracks. - The area for two fields were kept in a large system of cover, with seven structures, located near the hangar under another hill. The caves now contain approximately 500 cases of Allied 40 mm shells, 50 barrels of machine, and approximately 500 rounds of 75 mm Allied ammunition.
7. Water Pond. - The water pond is located behind the hangar. There are 11 trenches in the soil. Most of these have been completely filled with rubble. Three of four trenches are of concrete and a tank truck used to haul water for the local population, are serviceable. The repair work, the building with 11 trenches for dealing in vehicles, is only slightly damaged.
8. Photo Laboratory. - There is a photo lab located in the hangar. The building has not been damaged. The equipment is missing.
9. Electric Power Building. - It is a small building with the water pool. It is several 30 V and several 25 V generators that were used as auxiliary power units for the field. The field was supplied from the main power plants on the island. These plants have been damaged, probably beyond repair.
10. Barracks. - The barracks is located behind the hangar and has received direct bomb hit removing most of the building structure. One hangar, however, can easily be repaired.
11. Infantry Co. and the Hangar. - The island of soldiers have not been completely destroyed.
12. Radio Station. - Three sets to the radio station are located approximately 100 m south of the airfield. All the installations have been wrecked or removed, and the radio is damaged.
13. Underground Fuel Storage. - The location of the underground fuel storage tanks are shown in Appendix III. There are 5 underground tanks, but it is not confirmed. Most of the tanks outside is missing, but it could be easily repaired. Capacity of each tank is estimated at 50 to 75 tons.
14. Underground Fuel Storage. - The location of the underground fuel storage is located at the airfield. The location of this is shown in Appendix III. This is relatively undamaged, except for the buildings, which are slightly damaged. The location is built in caves into the side of a hill, with 6 entrances. Capacity is unknown, but seems to be quite large.
15. Underground Fuel Storage. - There is a large ammunition dump near the center of the island. Approximately 20 cases of 20 mm ammunition is stored there. No other air force ammunition was observed. Inventory and recommendations on this dump will be found in the report by the 1st Air Force.
16. Underground Fuel Storage. - To completely destroy the fuel storage installation on the island, it is recommended that the underground storage be destroyed and the large underground fuel storage at the airfield destroyed and removed. The 1st Air Force has 4 1/2 100 mm mortar units which could be destroyed, but it is not necessary to destroy the mortars as it is not an important military installation.

1493

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015





- 3 -

APPENDIX #22ALLIED POL STORED IN HANGER

80 oct. gasoline	45	lbs
100 "	458	"
lub. oil, 5 cft. (square 5 gal. cans)	1039	cans
" " (round 5 gal. cans)	445	"
Black cup grease	100	"
Yellow "	20	"

145 POL STORED IN HANGER

lub. oil, 5 cft.	274	cans
gear oil	25	"
" " (oil minerals inconceivable)	3	"
600 grease 2	150	"

ALLIED POL STORED IN HOBBS TAY (BLACK CANNIES)

lub oil, 5 cft. (5 gal. cans)	19	cans
Yellow cup grease	2	"
Grease (M.B. 3-25)	100	"

915

1496

Ref: 632/EG

28 February 1946

SUBJECT: Report of the Islands of
PANTELIERIA and LAMPEDUSA

TO : GOC, Land Forces S/C, (MMIA)

I should be grateful if you would coordinate with the Navy and Air Forces Sub-Commissions and prepare a combined report on the inspection of the Islands of PANTELIERIA and LAMPEDUSA by the representatives of the three Service Sub-Commissions in accordance with AFHQ signal. I have received reports from your Sub-Commission and Air Forces Sub Commission but wish to present the report as a whole to AFHQ.

M. S. L.
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

ML/JG

914

1497

THE MAYOR OF MILAN.

Milan, 26 February, 1946.

To:- Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
E. O. R. H.

The Mayor of Trento, Dott. Gino BATTISTA, has already written you, asking you to accept the honorary Presidency of the Protecting Consortium Committee, which is being constituted between the Councils of Milan and Trento, and whose main aim is to build, provide for, and manage a great Alpine Colony, near Trento.

This Colony will be for about 200 boy refugees of Cassino, who will be enabled to recuperate both morally and physically, from the tragic events of war.

I know how much you take to heart the conditions of our poorest children, and hope you will accept the honorary Presidency of the Protecting Consortium Committee.

The citizens of Milan will be especially grateful to you, and, through the Committee, they will come to the aid of the children of Cassino.


With best regards,

The Mayor
(s) E. Creppi

913

(43)

cc
Dawson



IL SINDACO DI MILANO

Milano, li 26 Febbraio 1946

Il Sindaco di Trento, dott. GIGINO BATTISTI, già Le ha indirizzato una lettera, Ammiraglio, per pregarla di assumere la Presidenza onoraria del Comitato promotore di un Consorzio che è in corso di costituzione tra i Comuni di Milano e di Trento e che ha lo scopo di provvedere alla istituzione ed alla gestione di una grande colonia alpina che dovrà sorgere nei pressi di Trento.

In questa colonia dovrebbero trovare ospitalità circa 800 dei ragazzi profughi di Cassino, i quali, attraverso l'assistenza morale e materiale che loro verrebbe praticata in una saluberrima località alpina potrebbero presto recuperare la loro salute fisica e spirituale, così duramente provata dalle vicende tragiche della guerra e profittare di una profonda opera di educazione di cui hanno necessità assoluta.

So quanto a Lei, Ammiraglio, stia a cuore la sorte della nostra infanzia più povera e che ha maggiormente sofferto della guerra e confido che Ella vorrà accettare la Presidenza onoraria del Comitato promotore del Consorzio.

Di ciò Le saranno vivamente grati i cittadini di Milano, che troveranno nel Comitato promotore del Consorzio un prezioso organo che li aiuterà a tradurre rapidamente in realtà il loro desiderio di venire in aiuto nel modo più efficace ai bimbi di Cassino.

Voglia gradire, Ammiraglio, il mio saluto più devoto.

IL SINDACO

912

All' Ammiraglio
Ellery STONE
Commissario Capo della
Commissione Alleata

R O M A

THE MAYOR OF MILAN.

Milan, 26 February, 1946.

To: - Admiral Elmer N. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
E. O. N. E.

The Mayor of Trento, Dott. Giulio PAVETTA, has already written you, asking you to accept the honorary Presidency of the Promoting Conscription Committee, which is being constituted between the Municipalities of Milan and Trento, and whose main object is to build, provide for, and manage a great Alpine Valley, near Trento.

This Colony will be for about 800 boy refugees of Cassino, who will be enabled to recuperate both morally and physically, from the tragic events of war.

I am very much you take to heart the conditions of our poorest children, and hope you will accept the honorary Presidency of the Promoting Conscription Committee.

The citizens of Milan will be especially grateful to you, and, through the Committee, they will come to the aid of the children of Cassino.

With best regards,

The Mayor
(S) P. Gregori

12 December 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I thank you for your letter of 8 December enclosing copies of letters bearing on the case of the Italian company "Rimione Adriatica di Sicurtà" of Trieste and "Internationale Unfall & Schadensversicherungs Ges., A.G." of Belgrade.

Sincerely yours,

EILEEN W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

The Hon. Alexander Kirk
American Ambassador
Via Vittorio Veneto 119
Rome

*Original letter of
Ambassador of 5 Dec
to E.C. for action
C.A. Mason
Chief Clerk*

1501

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

12 December 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I thank you for your letter of 8 December enclosing copies of letters bearing on the case of the Italian company "Rimione Adriatica di Sicurtà" of Trieste and "Internationale Unfall & Schadensversicherungsges., A.G." of Belgrade.

Sincerely yours,

HILARY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

The Hon. Alexander Kirk
American Ambassador
Via Vittorio Veneto 119
Rome

910.

*See file
603/10*

1502

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AMT LINDSEY WORTH

9115

7 DECEMBER 45

ROUTING

UNCLASSIFIED FC

PARA ONE PD REQUESTING YOUR OFF FOUR FOUR ZERO ONE ZERO
FIVE (REMARKS)

PAPER TO LA AMT LINDSEY WORTH FROM HQ WILSON CITY ASSET PAPER

PARA TWO PD NEVER BEFORE HAS A CHRISTMAS BONUS BEEN GIVEN
TO AN EMPLOYEE PD AMHQ HAS SOME AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH
HOURS AND IF THEY SPARE ONE THIS YEAR PD WILL ADVISE YOU PD

603/10

909

ESTABLISHMENT SECTION

301

G. M. PARKIN,
Colonel.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

15191/7

1 November 1945

TO: Rear Admiral Killery W. Stone,
Chief Commission.

1. This refers to Professor Parri's attached inquiry regarding the two insurance companies in Trieste.

2. As you know, under the State Department's Safeguard project, we were charged with the obligation of carefully investigating all insurance companies with a view to obtaining all information bearing on their Axis connections, transfer and encashment of funds forced, and their possible use as economic espionage agencies. The responsibility for handling this has now been transferred to the American Embassy, the British Embassy working in close conjunction with it.

3. You will recall also that we are still required by the GDS to control the foreign financial transactions of Italian insurance companies.

4. In connection with the foregoing, when our insurance officers were handling the Safeguard project, we called on all insurance companies to furnish complete lists of their stock holders and required them to answer a long list of questions concerning their past foreign operations. The two big companies in Trieste, Assicurazioni Generali and Rinascente Adriatica di Sicurtà, supplied us with the required information and our insurance officers (none of whom are now here) may have requested the minutes of their Boards of Managers for scrutiny, but we doubt that these books have been permanently sequestered. We are checking this with the only insurance officer left, who is now stationed in Trieste with AG Venezia Giulia.

(Signed) *[Signature]* 908

R.S. BISHOP,
Colonel,
Director,
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

cc: CPO, Venezia Giulia AND

(with copy of note from Parri)

(Please report the present disposition of the various records referred to by Prime Minister as soon as possible).

1504

NOV 21 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB COMMISSION

20 November 1945

13191/F

SUBJECT : Files of "Assicurazioni Generali"
and "Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà".

TO : Chief Commissioner. ✓

1. Reference is made to our memorandum 13191/F of
11 November to you.

2. We are now able to advise you further in the
matter of Professor Parri's inquiry relating to the
alleged sequestration of the books and restricted corre-
spondence of the Trieste insurance companies "Assicura-
zioni Generali" and "Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà".

3. The investigation of these two insurance companies
was carried out not by AMG Venezia Giulia, but by two of-
ficers of O.S.S., Rome. The only part taken by AMG was to
furnish these two officers with a letter of introduction.

4. The Chief Finance Officer of AMG Venezia Giulia
has seen the officials of both companies and it would
appear that there is a misunderstanding about the whole
matter and Professor Parri has been misinformed.

5. The officials of both companies confirm that no
books or records were sequestered.

907

BET J. J. J. J. J.
Acting Director F.F.C.
Finance Sub Commission

Hold for letter
to follow up my
letter to them
WMS, c

