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CONTROL OF ITAL
OCT. 1944 - NOV. 1944

10000/136/244

CONTROL OF ITALIAN ARMY MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION
OCT. 1944 - NOV. 1946

901/CC

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 29, 1918LIST OF PAPERSOffice of the
Chief CommissionerFile under No. 901 CONTROL OF ITALIAN ARMY
MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION

ALLIED COMMISSION

Vol 1 Page 3

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
21	Ltr 8251/253/2.22	1 Nov 46	Cappa	No objection by Allied Auth to demot 1924-25 classes during Nov.
22	Ltr G-5 960.32	1 Nov 46	CC	Italian Army - Call Up

This fil downgraded to. Confidential

3003

Confidential

901/CC

Q. M. C. Form 363 (Old No. 480)
Revised July 26, 1946Office of the
Chief Commissioner**LIST OF PAPERS**File under No. 901 CONTROL OF ITALIAN ARMY
MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION

ALLIED COMMISSION

From: 30 Oct. 45

SECRET

Vol. I Page 2

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
14	Ltr G/7	26 Mar 46	CC	Handover of It Army to It Govt
15	Ltr 8251/512/EC	29 Mar 46	De Gasperi	Handover of It Army to It Govt
16	Ltr 8251/535/EC CC	6 May 46	De Gasperi	Strength of Italian interim Army to be Maintained
17	Ltr 600/EC Lush	17 Jun 46	CC	SACMED right to command It Army & to delegate Allied Commanders
17a	Ltr 8270/146/EC	24 Aug 46	AFHQ	It Army Call Up (Pending revision in AFHQ Memo 10 of 20 Feb 45)
18	Ltr 7166/65213/122	29 Aug 46	CC	Reduction of personnel of It Army
19	Ltr 8270/148/EC	24 Sep 46	AFHQ	Italian Army Call Up 3002
+ 20	Ltr 2621/214/EC	26 Sep 46	De Gasperi	Revision in draft Peace Treaty (It) re admittance of Former Fascists to It Armed Forces & Carabinieri
20a	Memo Col Fiske	30 Oct 46	CC	Re strength of It army

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

SECRET

901/CC

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief CommissionerFile under No. 901 CONTROL OF ITALIAN ARMY
MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION

ALLIED COMMISSION

From: 30 Oct. 44

SECRET

Vol. I Page I

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
I	AFHQ, AG 091.7II/I69 GCT-O	30 Oct. 45	All Conce.	Transfer to AFHQ of Control of Italian Army Manpower & Organization
1a	AFHQ AG 091.711 G(SD)-O	2 Nov 45	CC AC	Handover of Italian Army to Italian Gov
2	Cbl GHQ CMF FX 5I827	4 Nov. 45	AC MMIA	Italians inducted into three Armed Forces
3	Ltr Stone 825I/356/EC	6 Nov. 45	AFHQ	Return of Italian Army to Italian Gov.
3a	Cbl F 52277 AFHQ	7 Nov 45	ALCOM	Rate of call up Italians to three forces
4	Ltr CC 901 Stone	9 Nov 45	Parri	Return of Italian Army to Italian Gov. Enclo: Directive I
5	Memo TS/INT/122 Browning	19 Nov 45	AC CC	Press release, return Italian army to G
6	Ltr G/7 Browning	27 Nov 45	AFHQ CC	Handover It army to the It Govt
7	Ltr 825I/EC Browning	28 Nov 45	AFHQ	Distribution of Italian Armed Forces
8	Ltr G/7 Browning	11 Dec 45	All Conce.	Handover of the Italian Army to It Gov
9	Ltr 925I/418/BC Stone	21 Dec 45	De Gasperi	Handover Army to Italian Government
10	Ltr Stone	4 Feb 46	AFHQ G-5	Call Up 300,000 Army
10a	Ltr 825I/502/EC	15 Feb 46	AFHQ	Strength of Italian Army
11	Ltr Pidsly	5 Mar 46	Min of war	Demobilization
12	Cbl 1788 ALCOM	12 Mar 46	AFHQ	Mobilization of Slovenes
13	Cbl 1552 13 Corps	12 Mar 46	ALCOM	Mobilization of Slovenes

SECRET

3812

Healy CC

Ref: 653/22/20

15 February 1946

SUBJECT: Strength of Italian Army.

FEB 18 REC'D

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Paragraph 7 and 8 of your Directive AS 653/211 C(2)46 dated 2 Nov 45 ("Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government") specifies the strength of the Interim Italian Army by categories.
2. When the strength figures of the Italian Army (excl. RMTIB and 65-7TIB) as at 1 Jan 46 became known, the question of the demobilization of further classes was again considered and Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (MLA) letter A.017 dated 30 Jan 46 was sent to the Minister of War - see Appendix "A".
3. His reply is attached at Appendix "B" and from it can be seen that he:
- (a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but
 - (b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilizing the 1921 Class prior to the call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Interim Army drop temporarily to about 125,000, which, with the 15,000 RMTIB and 65-7TIB troops, makes a total of about 140,000.
4. Taking everything into account I recommend that:
- (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000, until we know the terms of the Peace Treaty;
 - (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength of the Interim Army to about 125,000 as stated by the minister - the 1921 Class being released as in B(b);
 - (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the actual and required strengths of the Army and the decision (to be made later) regarding the July and November intakes.
5. I should be glad of your early approval in order that the necessary instructions may be issued by the War Ministry for the demobilization of the 1921 Class in ample time to ensure smooth action.

M. S. LUSH

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Land Forces (MLA).Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.S/16
901/a

APPENDIX "A" to letter 8251/502/EC of Feb 1946.C O P Y .Subject: Strength of Italian Army.Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)A.017
30 January 1946.To : Minister of War.

1. In connection with the question of demobilization of further classes of the Italian Army, I am directed to refer you to Section III, 7 and 8 of the Allied Commission, Land Forces Sub-Commission (M.M.I.A) Directive No.1 issued under my C/7 of 8 Nov 45.

2. (319) That section shows that it is the Allied intention that the Italian Army as an interim measure shall be maintained at a figure not exceeding 140,000. That figure, as you know, was based on what Count CASATTI, when Minister of War, considered necessary to enable the Italian ~~army~~ Army to fulfil its functions. All planning and calculations not only as regards fighting equipment, supplies, etc., but also with respect to redeployment of Allied Forces in ITALY have been and are being made on the basis of that figure.

3. For various reasons, of which you are well aware, it is obviously not possible to keep the strength of the Army at exactly 140,000. Further demobilization of classes however must seriously affect the lay-out and effective strength authorised in para 7 of the Directive referred to above and I must therefore point out that no further classes should be demobilized until it is quite clear that by now intake the interim Italian Army can be maintained at a figure of approximately (but not exceeding) 140,000.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION.

(Sgd) L. BROWNING,
Major-General,
C.O.C. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

LB/ejo

Copy to: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
File G/6.

2999

0009

COPY TRANSLATION.APPENDIX "B" to letter 1291/I DD of Feb 1946.FROM : Ministry of War.
TO : M.M.I.A.REF : 202790/14
DATE : 3.2.46.

SUBJECT: Strength of the Italian Army.

Reference A.047 of 30 Jan 46.

1. I agree that, in view of the state of the country, it is necessary to maintain the strength of the Army as near as possible to the maximum figure permitted of 150,000 men. But consideration must be given to unavoidable financial exigencies which, in all probability (the examination of the budget with the Ministry for the Treasury will commence shortly), will render it impossible to maintain this level for the time being.

2. I consider it advisable to arrange, during March next, and at the same time as the call up of the 1921 Class, for the discharge of 1921 Class which has a long period of service (5 years). Due to their state of mind the troops of the 1921 Class are elements of little use and are a bad example to the others (see the enclosed extract of the report of the Milan Military Govt. Commdr.). It is therefore advisable to return them to civilian life as soon as possible.

With the discharge of those men, the total strength of the Army will be slightly reduced as compared with the maximum permitted, but the Army, however, will certainly gain in efficiency.

3. With the discharge of the 1921 Class and the call up of the 1922 Class recruits it can be estimated that, by the end of March, the strength of the Army will be about 125,000 men (AS-PPM and TR-TRU units excluded); this strength is considered sufficient for the needs of the country and it is hoped that we shall be able to get from the Treasury, if the financial situation does not worsen, the necessary funds for it.

4. The discharge of the 1922 and 1923 Classes will follow at such times as it is possible to carry out new call ups in relation to the availability of the Regional Training Centres.

(Signed) PROFIO,
War Minister.

2998

COPY TRANSLATION (Extr. ct).

FROM : Milan Military Territorial Command.
TO : Ministry of War.
SUBJECT: Morale of the troops.

REF: 03/230

DATE: 18.1.46.

Another category of discontented men is that of the 1921 Class, to whom premature information, divulged by a misinformed press, has given hope, since October last, of discharge in the near future.

Actually, no measure of this kind has been adopted. This, however, has not prevented the 1921 Class feeling spiritually, already demobilised and forming part, according to the best hypotheses, of that category of disinterested personnel which I have already commented upon.

I have recently had notified to me some cases in disciplinary infraction which are directly derived from the state of mind of these men. I have had carried out, and have carried out personally, rigorous enquiries. Also here I have not uncovered anything exceptionally serious, but a widespread bad-feeling which could assume a more concrete or deplorable form if fostered, as is already being commenced, by parties or tendencies contrary to the military organisations.

Apropos of this I would quote a recent movement tending to bring amongst us the not uninterested scruples of the "conscientious objectors" which exist in the Anglo-Saxon nations.

Some unit commanders, questioned by me, declared themselves in favour of putting a stop to this state of affairs by discharging the 1921 Class which is of little use and sets a bad example to the others.

I do not agree with this opinion. The 1921 Class troops represent in the units under my command, a proportion which varies from 15 to 27%. In view of the fact that the units are at present somewhat over strength on war establishment, their discharge would not greatly lessen the efficiency of the units. I calculate, in fact, that on the completion of the operation the units would be left with about 85% of their war establishment; not a serious inconvenience and certainly preferable to that stated above".

(signed) MARAS,
G.O.C.

2997

S. S. C. - T.

17 June 1946.

Ref: 600/20.

Chief Commissioner.

Control of Italian Army (operational and administrative) within Italian administered territory (i.e., excluding UGRIA and VENETO GIULIA) was handed over to the Italian Government on 14 November 1945. SACMED reserves right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre and to delegate to his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

(Directive of Nov 2 1945 AFHQ).

2996

S E C R E T.

Ref: 600/30.

17 June 1946.

Chief Commissioner.

Control of Italian Army (operational and administrative) within Italian administered territory (i.e., excluding ~~YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE~~) was handed over to the Italian Government on 12 November 1945. SACATO reserves right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

(Directive of Nov 2 1945 AFHQ).

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VOLUME TIGHTLY BOUND -
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MAR 6 REC'D

SEGRETO
SECRET

QUADRO DI BATTAGLIA E DISLOCAZIONE PARTICOLAREGGIATA
DELL'ESERCITO ITALIANO

N° 4/1

(*Varianti al 1° Febbraio 1946*)

ORDER OF BATTLE AND LOCATION STATEMENT
ITALIAN ARMY

(*Variations as at 1 February 1946*)

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LANDFORCES SUBCOMMISSION
ALLIED COMMISSION
M. M. I. A.

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO E MOBILITÀ

PARTE I US-ITI — PART I US-ITI

Variazioni	Variations	<i>Notes</i>
<u>PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZA</u>	<u>BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION</u>	
Depennare reparticontraddistinti dai numeri di Serie 2, 6, 9, 20, 28	Delete serials 2, 6, 9, 20, 28 and all detail	
Serie 3 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Napoli e sostituire: Aversa	Serial 3 — (Location) Delete «Napoli» and substitute: Aversa	
Serie 4 — (Dislocazione) Scrivere: Napoli	Serial 4 — (Location) Insert «Napoli»	
Serie 8 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Napoli e sostituire: Barra	Serial 8 — (Location) Delete «Napoli» and substitute: Barra	
Serie 13 — Aggiungere «C.do» a «28º btz. Servizi Q. M.»; correggere forza organica in 8 - 29 - 37	Serial 13 — Add «HQ» (28 QM Service Bn); Amend W. E. Strengths: 8 - 29 - 37	
Serie 14 — Depennare: 2º btz. Polizia Militare e forza organica, 23 - 482 - 505; sostituire: 5º, 7º, 8º Cp. P. M., 15 - 454 - 409	Serial 14 — Delete: 2 M. P. Bn, and W. E. Strengths: 23 - 482 - 505; substitute: 5, 7, 8 P. M. Cos, 15 - 454 - 409	
Serie 24 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Paniglia e sostituire: Livorno	Serial 24 — (Location) Delete «Paniglia» and substitute: Livorno	
Serie 30 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Pomigliano e sostituire: Capodichino	Serial 30 — (Location) Delete «Pomigliano» and substitute: Capodichino	
Serie 32 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Capodichino e sostituire: Poggio-reale	Serial 32 — (Location) Delete «Capodichino» and substitute: Poggio-reale	
Serie 33 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Sterparone e sostituire: Vigliasiti	Serial 33 — (Location) Delete «Sterparone» and substitute: Vigliasiti	
Serie 38 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Spinazzola e sostituire: Torretta	Serial 38 — (Location) Delete «Spinazzola» and substitute: Torretta	
Serie 40 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Cereola e sostituire: Capodichino	Serial 40 — (Location) Delete «Cereola» and substitute: Capodichino	

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PARTE II BR-ITI — PART II BR-ITI

Variazioni	Variations	Notes
(A) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZA	(A) BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION	
Depennare i reparti contraddistinti dai numeri di Serie 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, 44, 45, 51, 52, 68, 71	Delete Serials 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, 44, 45, 51, 52, 68, 71, and all detail	
Serie 57 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare «Tortorella» e sostituire: Pomigliano d'Arco	Serial 57 — (Location) Delete «Tortorella» and substitute: Pomigliano d'Arco	
Serie 63 — (Dipendenza) Cancellare 716 ^a Rgpt. e sostituire: 712 ^a Rgpt.	Serial 63 — (Under Command) Delete 716 Rgpt and substitute: 712 Rgpt	
(B) PER ARMA E SERVIZIO	(B) BY ARMS AND SERVICES	
Depennare i reparti contraddistinti dai numeri di serie 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111, 117, 118, 119, 141, 143, 116, 148, 152, 153, 154	Delete Serials 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111, 117, 118, 141, 143, 146, 148, 152, 153, 154, and all detail	
Serie 110 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare «Fagagna» e sostituire: Udine	Serial 110 — (Location) Delete «Fagagna» and substitute: Udine	
Serie 127 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare «Tortorella» e sostituire: Pomigliano d'Arco	Serial 127 — (Location) Delete «Tortorella» and substitute: Pomigliano d'Arco	

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PARTE III ITL-ITI — PART III ITI-ITI

Variazioni	Variations	Notes
(A) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZA	(A) BY TERRYTorial DISTRIBUTION	
Annullare i numeri di Serie da 6 a 32 e sostituirli con quelli di cui all' allegato 1.	Delete Serials 6 To 32 incl. and substitutes with those of Appx 1 (Attached)	(a) To be implemented to February 1946. (b) In vigore dal 1° Febbraio 1946.
Serie 53 — Correggere l'organico e forza organica in: UR/I/I 12 - 490 502 (a)	Serial 53 — Amend W. E. and W. E. Strengths to read UR/I/I 12 - 490 502 (a)	
Serie 91 — Correggere Pareo Auto- vie, Effe, « A » in 1° Pareo Auto- vie, Effe.	Serial 91 — Amend « A » Efficient Veh Park to read: 1 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 112 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Fossano e sostituire: Torino	Serial 112 — (Location) Delete « Fos- sano » and substitute: Torino	
Serie 114 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Torino e sostituire: Novi Ligure	Serial 114 — (Location) Delete « To- rino » and substitute: Novi Li- gure	
Serie 126 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Novi Ligure e sostituire: Aequi	Serial 126 — (Location) Delete « Novi Ligure » and substitute: Aequi	
Serie 134 - 135 - 137 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Casale Monferrato e so- stituire: Vercelli	Serial 134 - 135 - 137 — (Location) Delete « Casale Monferrato » and substitute: Vercelli	
Serie 191 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Ormea e sostituire: Ceva	Serial 191 — (Location) Delete « Or- mea » and substitute: Ceva	
Serie 214 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Imperia e sostituire: Albenga	Serial 214 —(Location) Delete « Im- peria » and substitute: Albenga	
Serie 227 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Albissola e sostituire: Arenzano	Serial 227 — (Location) Delete « Al- bissola » and substitute: Arenzano	

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PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Variazioni	Variations	Notes
(1) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZA (Segue)	(1) BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION (Contd)	
Depennare il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 271	Delete Serial 271 and all detail	(a) To be implemented in February 1946
Serie 278 — Correggere 7° Parco Autoveic. Effic. in 3° Parco Autoveic. Effic.	Serial 278 — Amend 7 Efficient Veh Park to read: 3 Efficient Veh Park	(a) In vigore da 10 Febbraio 1946
Depennare il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 295	Delete Serial 295 and all detail	
Serie 307 — Correggere 68° Rgt. Ptr. «Legnano» C.do in: 67° Rgt. Ptr. «Legnano» C.do	Serial 307 — Amend 68 Inf Regt HQ «Legnano» to read: 67 Inf Regt HQ «Legnano»	
Serie 311 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Morbegno e sostituire: Torino	Serial 311 — (Location) Delete «Morbegno» and substitute: Torino	
Serie 327 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Tavernola e sostituire: Cerobbio	Serial 327 — (Location) Delete «Tavernola» and substitute: Cerobbio	
Serie 349 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Bressanone e sostituire: Merano	Serial 349 — (Location) Delete «Bressanone» and substitute: Merano	
Aggiungere il nuovo numero di Serie 349-1 come segue: (Reparto) 4° Rep. Salmerie per Rgt. Alpini (Dislocazione) Vipiteno — (Dipendenza) Cdo Mil. Terr. Bolzano — (N° Organico) UR/1/1 (Forza Organica) 12 — 490 — 502 (a)	Add new Serial 349-1 as under: (Unit) 4 Pack Tpt. Coy for Regt Alpini — (Location) Vipiteno — (Under Command) Cdo Mil. Terr. Bolzano — (W. E.) UR/1/1 W. E. Strengths) 12 — 490 — 502 (a)	2989
Serie 365 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Pescantina e sostituire: S. Pietro Incarjano	Serial 365 — (Location) Delete «Pescantina» and substitute: S. Pietro Incarjano	
Serie 366—367 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Trento e sostituire: Bolzano	Serial 365—367 — (Location) Delete «Trento» and substitute: Bolzano	

PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Variazioni	Variations	Note
(1) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZE (Segue)	(1) BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION (Contd)	
Depennare il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 368	Delete Serial 368 and all detail	
Serie 370 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Trento e sostituire: Bolzano	Serial 370 — (Location) Delete: Trento and substitute: Bolzano	
Serie 385 — Correggere 6° (Parco Autovie, Effie, in 4° Parco Autovie, Effie); cancellare Verona e sostituirla: Trento	Serial 385 — Amend 6° Efficient Veh Park to read: 4 Efficient Veh Park; Delete «Verona» and substitute: Trento	
Serie 390 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Pescoceta	Serial 390 — (Location) Delete: Verona and substitute: Pescoceta	
Serie 397 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Bolzano e sostituire: Merano	Serial 397 — (Location) Delete: Bolzano and substitute: Merano	
Serie 409 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare S. Bonifacio e sostituire: Riva di Trento	Serial 409 — (Location) Delete: S. Bonifacio and substitute: Riva di Trento	
Serie 414 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Riva di Trento	Serial 414 — (Location) Delete: Verona and substitute: Riva di Trento	
Serie 439 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Trento	Serial 439 — (Location) Delete: Verona and substitute: Trento	
Depennare il repartocontraddistinto dal numero di Serie 478	Delete Serial 478 and all detail	
Serie 483 — Correggere Parco Autovie, Effie, «B» in 5° Parco Autov. Effie.	Serial 483 — Amend «B» Efficient Veh Park to read: 5 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 503 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare: Fidenza e sostituire: Modena	Serial 503 — (Location) Delete: Fidenza and substitute: Modena	

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PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Variazioni	Variations	Notes
(1) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZE (Segue)	(1) BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION (Contd)	
Serie 504 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Pesaro e sostituire: Ferrara	Serial 504 — (Location) Delete «Pesaro» and substitute: Ferrara	(a) To be implemented in February 1946.
Dipendente il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di serie 506	Delete Serial 506 and all detail	(b) In vigore dal 10 Febbraio 1946.
Serie 507 — Aggiungere N° organico UR/II e correggere forza organica in: 12 - 490 - 502 (n)	Serial 507 — Insert W. E. UR/II and Amend W. E. Strengths: 12 - 490 - 502 (n)	
Serie 552 — Correggere 5 ^a Parco Autov. Ellie. in 6 ^a Parco Autov. Ellie.	Serial 552 — Amend 5 Efficient Veh Park to read: 6 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 553 — Correggere 6 ^a sez. Autambulanze in 6 ^a sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 553 — Amend 6 ^a Amb. Car Section to read: 6 Amb. Car Section	
Dipendente i reparti contraddistinti dai numeri di Serie 561 - 565 - 573 - 574 - 576	Delete Serial 561 - 565 - 573 - 574 - 576 and all detail	
Serie 583 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Firenze e sostituire: Laterina	Serial 583 — (Location) Delete «Firenze» and substitute: Laterina	
Dipendente il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 598	Delete Serial 598 and all detail	
Serie 617 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Coloniae e sostituire: Livorno	Serial 617 — (Location) Delete «Coloniae» and substitute: Livorno	
Serie 625 — Correggere 4 ^a Parco Autovie. Ellie. in 7 ^a Parco Autovie. Ellie.	Serial 625 — Amend 4 Efficient Veh Park to read: 7 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 626 — Correggere 1182 ^a sez. Autoambulanze in 7 ^a sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 626 — Amend 1182 Amb. Car Section to read: 7 Amb. Car Section	

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PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Variazioni	Variation	Note
(1) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZA (Segue)	(1) BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION (Contd)	
Serie 645 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Città di Castello e sostituire: Palermo	Serial 645 — (Location) Delete City di Castello and substitute: Palermo	
Serie 647 - 648 - 649 - 650 — Sostituire Dislocazioni con: zona Palermo	Serial 647 - 648 - 649 - 650 — Substitute Locations with: zone Palermo	
Serie 656 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Montecatini e sostituire: Massa	Serial 656 — (Location) Delete Montecatini and substitute: Massa	
Serie 670 - 671 - 672 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Torre degli Agli e sostituire: Firenze	Serial 670 - 671 - 672 — (Location) Delete e Torre degli Agli and substitute: Firenze	
Serie 674 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Castello e sostituire: Tuoro	Serial 674 — (Location) Delete Castello and substitute: Tuoro	
Aggiungere il nuovo numero di Serie 770-1 come segue: (Reparto) 1003* Sez. staccata Art. — (Dislocazione) Gaeta — (Dipendenza) C.d.o. Mil. Terr. Roma — (N° Organico) 154/SMRE/1 (Forza Organica) 2 — 7 — 9	Add new serial 770-1 as at under: (Unit) 1003 Detached Army Sec. (Location) Gaeta — (Under Command) Cdo Mil. Terr. Roma (W.E.) 154/SMRE/1 (W.E. Strengths) 2 — 7 — 9	
Serie 778 — Correggere 1° Parco Autovie, Effie, in 8° Parco Autovie, Effie.	Serial 778 — Amend 1 Efficient Veh Park to read: 8 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 779 — Correggere 33° Sez. Ambulanza in 14° Sez. Ambulanza	Serial 779 — Amend 33 Amb Car Section to read: 14 Amb Car Section	
Serie 780 — Correggere 61° Sez. Ambulanza in 8° Sez. Ambulanza	Serial 780 — Amend 61 Amb Car Section to read: 8 Amb Car Section	
Dipenmare il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 840	Delete Serial 840 and all detail	
Serie 863 — Correggere 3° Parco Autovie, Effie, in 9° Parco Autovie, Effie.	Serial 863 — Amend 3 Efficient Veh Park to read: 9 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 866 — Correggere 84° Sez. Ambulanza in 9° Sez. Ambulanza	Serial 866 — Amend 84 Amb Car Section to read: 9 Amb Car Section	

PARTE III ITI-ITI (*Segue*) — PART III ITI-ITI (*Contd*)

Variazioni	Variations	Note
(A) PER DISLOCAZIONE E DIPENDENZA (<i>Segue</i>)	(A) BY TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION (Contd)	
Depennare il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 876	Delete serial 876 and all detail	
Serie 886 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare «Napoli» e sostituire: «Cosenza»	Serial 886 — (Location) Delete «Napoli» and substitute: «Cosenza»	
Serie 887 — (Dislocazione) Inserire: «Napoli»	Serial 887 — (Location) Insert: «Napoli»	
Depennare il reparto contraddistinto dal numero di Serie 943	Delete serial 943 and all detail	
Serie 948 — Correggere 2° Parco Autoveic. Effie, in 10° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 948 — Amend 2/Effient Veh Park to read: 10/Effient Veh Park	
Serie 949 — Correggere 85° Sez. Automobilienze in 10° sez. Automobilienze	Serial 949 — Amend 85/Amb Car Section to read: 10/Amb Car Section	
Serie 1097 — Correggere 37° Sez. Automobilienze in 11° Sez. Autoambulenze	Serial 1097 — Amend 37/Amb Car Section to read: 11/Amb Car Section	
B) PER ARMA E SERVIZIO		
Annullare i numeri di serie da 1281 a 1304 e sostituirli con quelli di cui all' allegato 2.	Delete serials 1281 to 1304 Incl and substitutes with those of «Appx 2» (Attached)	
Depennare gli enti contraddistinti dai numeri di serie: 1566, 1567, 1622, 1631, 1697, 1843, 1853, 1854, 2017, 2062, 2063, 2068, 2072	Delete serials 1566, 1567, 1622, 1631, 1697, 1843, 1853, 1854, 2017, 2062, 2063, 2068, 2072 and all detail	2985
Serie 1338 — Correggere 69° Rgt. Ftr. «Legnano» Cdo in 67° Rgt. Ftr. «Legnano» Cdo	Serial 1338 — Amend 69 Inf Regt HQ «Legnano» to read: 67 Inf Regt HQ «Legnano»	
Serie 1341 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare «S. Bonifacio» e sostituire: Riva del Garda	Serial 1341 — (Location) Delete «S. Bonifacio» and substitute: Riva del Garda	

PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Variazioni	Variations	Note
(B) PER ARMA E SERVIZIO (Segue)	(B) BY ARMS AND SERVICES (Contd)	
Serie 1347 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Città di Castello e sostituire: Palermo	Serial 1347 — (Location) Delete «Città di Castello» and substitute: Palermo	
Serie 1353 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Faenza e sostituire: Modena	Serial 1353 — (Location) Delete «Faenza» and substitute: Modena	
Serie 1357 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Napoli e sostituire: Cosenza	Serial 1357 — (Location) Delete «Napoli» and substitute: Cosenza	
Serie 1358 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Fossano e sostituire: Torino	Serial 1358 — (Location) Delete «Fossano» and substitute: Torino	
Serie 1361 — Correggere I Itg. Bersaglieri - Gotti, del 69° Rgt. Inf. Legnano in I Btg. Bersaglieri - Gotti, del 67° Rgt. Inf. Legnano.	Serial 1361 — Amend Bersaglieri - Gotti, Bn of 69 Inf Regt - Legnano - to read: Bersaglieri - Gotti, Bn of 67 Inf Regt - Legnano.	
Serie 1367 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Città di Castello e sostituire: zona Palermo	Serial 1367 — (Location) Delete «Città di Castello» and substitute: zone Palermo	
Serie 1373 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Pesaro e sostituire: Ferrara	Serial 1373 — (Location) Delete «Pesaro» and substitute: Ferrara	
Serie 1374 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Firenze e sostituire: L'atetina	Serial 1374 — (Location) Delete «Firenze» and substitute: L'atetina	
Serie 1398 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Torino e sostituire: Novi Ligure	Serial 1398 — (Location) Delete «Torino» and substitute: Novi Ligure	
Serie 1381 — Correggere II 39° Rgt. Inf. - Legnano in II 67° Rgt. Inf. Legnano; (Dislocazione) Cancellare Morbegno e sostituire: Torino	Serial 1381 — Amend 2 Inf Bn of 69 Inf Regt - Legnano - to read: 2 Inf Bn of 67 Inf Regt - Legnano; (Location) Delete «Morbegno» and substitute: Torino	
Serie 1387 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Perugia e sostituire: zona Palermo	Serial 1387 — (Location) Delete «Perugia» and substitute: zone Palermo	
Serie 1391 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Bressana Monte e sostituire: Merano	Serial 1391 — (Location) Delete Bressana Monte - and substitute: Merano	

PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Variazioni	Variations	Notes
(E) PER ARMA E SERVIZI (Segue)	(E) BY ARMS AND SERVICES (Contd)	
Serie 1401 — Correggere Btg. Alpini «L'Aquila» del 69° Rgt. Ftr. «Legnano» in Btg. Alpini «L'Aquila» del 67° Rgt. Ftr. «Legnano»	Serial 1401 — Amend Alpini «L'Aquila» Bn of 69 Inf Regt «Legnano» to read: Alpini «L'Aquila» Bn of 67 Inf Regt «Legnano».	(a) To be implemented in February 1946
Serie 1404 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Riva di Trento	Serial 1404 — (Location) Delete «Verona» and substitute: Riva di Trento	(a) In vigore dal 10 Febbraio 1946
Serie 1407 — 1417 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Città di Castello e sostituire: zona Palermo	Serial 1407—1417 — (Location) Delete «Città di Castello» and substitute: zone Palermo	
Serie 1425 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Perugia e sostituire: zona Palermo	Serial 1425 — (Location) Delete «Perugia» and substitute: zone Palermo	
Serie 1457 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Novi Ligure e sostituire: Acqui	Serial 1457 — (Location) Delete «Novi Ligure» and substitute: Acqui	
Serie 1461 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Montecatini e sostituire: Massa	Serial 1461 — (Location) Delete «Montecatini» and substitute: Massa	
Serie 1528 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Imperia e sostituire: Albenga	Serial 1528 — (Location) Delete «Imperia» and substitute: Albenga	
Serie 1643 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Casale Monferrato e sostituire: Vercelli	Serial 1643 — (Location) Delete «Casale Monferrato» and substitute: Vercelli	
Serie 1644 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Tavernola e sostituire: Cernobbio	Serial 1644 — (Location) Delete «Tavernola» and substitute: Cernobbio	
Serie 1654 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Pescantina e sostituire: S. Pietro Incarino	Serial 1654 — (Location) Delete «Pescantina» and substitute: S. Pietro Incarino	
Serie 1665 — 1671 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Casale Monferrato e sostituire: Vercelli	Serial 1665 — 1671 — (Location) Delete «Casale Monferrato» and substitute: Vercelli	
Serie 1677 — 1688 — 1723 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Trento e sostituire: Bolzano	Serial 1677 — 1688 — 1723 — (Location) Delete «Trento» and substitute: Bolzano	
Serie 1785 — Inserire N° Organico U.R./I correggere forza organica att: 12 - 490 - 502 (a)	Serial 1785 — Insert W. E. U.R/I/I; Amend W. E. Strength: 12 - 490 - 502 (a)	

2983

PARTE III ITI-ITI (Segue) — PART III ITI-ITI (Contd)

Varizioni	Variations	Notes
(B) PER ARMA E SERVIZIO (Segue) (B) BY ARMS AND SERVICES (Contd)		
Serie 1786 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare San Lazzaro di Savignano e sostituire Vipiteno; correggere dipendenza in Cdo Mil. Terr. Bolzano; inserire N° Organico UR/1/1; correggere forza organica in: 12 - 190 - 502 (n)	Serial 1786 — (Location) Delete San Lazzaro di Savignano and substitute: Vipiteno; Amend under command: Cdo Mil. Terr. Bolzano; Insert N. Organico UR/1/1; Amend W. E. Strengths: 12 - 190 - 502 (n)	(n) To be implemented in P.M. January 1947. (n) In vigore dal 1° Febbraio 1947.
Serie 1787 — (Dipendenza) Inserire Cdo Mil. Terr. Bologna e N° Organico UR/1/1; correggere forza organica in 12 - 190 - 502 (n)	Serial 1787 — (Under Command) Insert: Cdo Mil. Terr. Bologna; insert W. E.: UR/1/1; Amend W. E. Strengths: 12 - 190 - 502 (n)	
Serie 1808 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Castello e sostituire: Tuoro	Serial 1808 — (Location) Delete: Castello and substitute: Tuoro	
Serie 1809 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Trento	Serial 1809 — (Location) Delete: Verona and substitute: Trento	
Serie 1811 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Albisola e sostituire: Arenzano	Serial 1811 — (Location) Delete: Albisola and substitute: Arenzano	
Serie 1842 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Coltano e sostituire: Livorno	Serial 1842 — (Location) Delete: Coltano and substitute: Livorno	
Serie 1916 — Correggere 1° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 8° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1916 — Amend 1 Efficient Veh Park to read: 8 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1917 — Correggere 2° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 10° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1917 — Amend 1 Efficient Veh Park to read: 10 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1918 — Correggere 3° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 9° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1918 — Amend 3 Efficient Veh Park to read: 9 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1919 — Correggere 4° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 6° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1919 — Amend 4 Efficient Veh Park to read: 6 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1920 — Correggere 5° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 6° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1920 — Amend 5 Efficient Veh Park to read: 6 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1921 — Correggere 6° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 4° Parco Autoveic. Effie.; (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Trento	Serial 1921 — Amend 6 Efficient Veh Park to read: 4 Efficient Veh Park; (Location) Delete: Verona and substitute: Trento	

2982

PARTE III ITI-ITI (*Segue*) — PART III ITI-ITI (*Contd*)

Variazioni	Variations	Note
(B) PER ARMA E SERVIZIO (Segue) (B) BY ARMS AND SERVICES (Contd)		
Serie 1922 — Correggere 7° Parco Autoveic. Effie. in: 3° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1922 — Amend 7 Efficient Veh Park to read: 3 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1923 — Correggere Parco Autoveic. Effie. «A» in: 1° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1923 — Amend «A» Efficient Veh Park to read: 1 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1924 — Correggere Parco Autoveic. Effie. «B» in: 5° Parco Autoveic. Effie.	Serial 1924 — Amend «B» Efficient Veh Park to read: 5 Efficient Veh Park	
Serie 1929 — Correggere 36° Sez. Autoambulanze in: 14° Sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1929 — Amend 36 Amb Car Section to read: 14 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1930 — Correggere 37° Sez. Autoambulanze in: 11° sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1930 — Amend 37 Amb Car Section to read: 11 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1931 — Correggere 61° Sez. Autoambulanze in: 8° Sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1931 — Amend 61 Amb Car Section to read: 8 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1932 — Correggere 62° Sez. Autoambulanze in: 6° Sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1932 — Amend 62 Amb Car Section to read: 6 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1933 — Correggere 34° sez. Autoambulanze in: 9° Sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1933 — Amend 34 Amb Car Section to read: 9 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1934 — Correggere 85° Sez. Autoambulanze in: 10° Sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1934 — Amend 85 Amb Car Section to read: 10 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1935 — Correggere 1182° Sez. Autoambulanze in: 7° Sez. Autoambulanze	Serial 1935 — Amend 1182 Amb Car Section to read: 7 Amb Car Section	
Serie 1971 - 1990 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Torre degli Azzii e sostituire: Firenze	Serial 1971 - 1990 — (Location) Delete «Torre degli Azzii» and substitute: Firenze	
Serie 1987 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Verona e sostituire: Peschiera	Serial 1987 — (Location) Delete «Verona» and substitute: Peschiera	
Serie 2021 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Bolzano e sostituire: Merano	Serial 2021 — (Location) Delete «Bolzano» and substitute: Merano	2981
Serie 2037 — (Dislocazione) Cancellare Ormea e sostituire: Ceva	Serial 2037 — (Location) Delete «Ormea» and substitute: Ceva	

ALLEGATO

Serial Serie	UNIT (b)	REPARTO (c)	LOCATION Dislocazione (d)	UNDER COMMAND Dipendenza (e)	W. E. Organico N° (f)	W. E. STRENGTHS Forza organica		
						OFFERS Uff. (g)	ORs S o T (h)	TOTAL Totale (i)
6	HQ Central Military Schools	Scuole Centrali Mil. C.do	Cesano	Scuole Centrali Mil.	—	33	271	304
7	Incr. to 42 BLU for the Central Military Schools	Nucleo It. cpl. 12° BLU per Scuole Centrali Militari	—	—	CM/880/1	2	46	48
8	Infantry School	Scuola di Fanteria	—	—	—	119	858	977
9	Arty School	— Artiglieria	Bracciano	—	—	115	639	754
10	Art School	— Artieri	—	—	—	51	275	326
11	Signals School	— Collegamenti	—	—	—	90	535	625
12	Instructors School (all Arms)	Scuole Istruttori Varie Armi	Manziana	—	—	63	460	523
13	Physical Training School	Scuola di Educaz. Fisica	Cesano	—	—	12	41	53
14	Service & Welfare School	Scuola Serv. ed Assistenza	Rieti	—	—	16	41	57
15	HQ 2 Inf. Trg. Regt.	2° Rgt. Add. Fir.	Cesano	—	—	50	472	528
16	Motorization Schools	Scuole della Motorizzazione	Cecchignola	—	—	96	771	867
17	152 Field Hygiene Sect	152° Sez. Disinfezione	Cesano	—	CM/736/1	1	27	28
18	1500 Independent Tpt. Pl.	1500° Plot. Trasporti	—	—	CM/533/1	1	49	50
19	455 Veh. Rep. Wksps For C. M. S.	455° Off. Rip. autov. per Scuole Centr. Mil.	Cecchignola	—	CM/891/1	3	96	99
20	319 Fd Bakery	319° Squadra Panettieri	—	—	CM/507/1	1	32	33
dat(from) 21 at (to) 32	Serials not used	Serie non impiegata	—	—	—	—	—	—

ALLEGATO 1 — APPX 1

UNIT (a)	REPARTO (c)	LOCATION Dislocazione (d)	UNDER COMMAND Dipendenza (e)	W. E. Organico N° (f)	W. E. STRENGTHS Forza organica			NOTES (g)
					OFFERS Uff. (g)	ORs S. o. T. (h)	TOTAL Totale (i)	
Q Central Military Schools	Scuole Centrali Mil.: C.do	Cesano	Scuole Centrali Mil.	—	33	271	304	
to 12 BLU for the Central Military Schools	Nucleo it. cpl. 12° BLU per Scuole Centrali Militari	*	*	CM/880/1	2	46	48	
Infantry School	Scuola di Fanteria	*	*	—	119	858	977	
Artillery School	* * Artiglieria	Bracciano	*	—	115	639	754	
Art School	* Artieri	*	*	—	51	275	326	
Signal School	* Collegamenti	*	*	—	90	535	625	
Instructor's School (all Arms)	Scuole Istruttori Varie Armi	Manziana	*	—	63	460	523	
Physical Training School	Scuola di Educaz. Fisica	Cesano	*	—	12	41	53	
Services & Welfare School	Scuola Serv. ed Assistenza	Rieti	*	—	16	41	57	
Q/2 Inf. Trg. Regt.	2° Rgt. Add. Ftr.	Cesano	*	—	50	472	528	
Motorization Schools	Scuole della Motorizzazione	Cecchignola	*	—	96	771	867	
Field Hygiene Sect	152° Sez. Disinfezione	Cesano	*	CM/736/1	1	27	28	
Independent Tpt. Pl.	1500° Plot. Trasporti	*	*	CM/533/1	1	49	50	
Veh. Rep. Wksp For C. M. S.	155° Off. Rip. autov. per Scuole Centr. Mil.	Cecchignola	*	CM/891/1	3	96	99	
Fd Bakery	319° Squadra Panettieri	*	*	CM/507/1	1	32	33	
trials not used	Serie non impiegate	—	—	—	—	—	—	

ALLE

Serial Serie	U N I T (a)	R E P A R T O (c)	L O C A T I O N Dislocazione (d)	U N D E R C O M M A N D Dipendenza (e)	W. E. Organico N° (f)	W. E. STRENGTHS Forza organica		
						O F F R S Uff. (g)	O R S S e T (h)	T O T A L Totale (i)
1281	HQ Central Military Schools	Scuole Centrali Militari C.do	Cesano	Ministero Guerra	—	36	271	304
1282	Incr. to 12 BLU for the Central Military Schools	Nucleo II. cpl. t2° BLU per Scuole Centrali Militari	—	Scuole Centrali Militari	CM/SSO/I	2	46	48
1283	Infantry School	Scuola di Fanteria	—	—	—	119	858	977
1284	Arty School	* * Artiglieria	Bracciano	—	—	115	639	754
1285	Fd Engineering School	* Artieri	—	—	—	51	275	326
1286	Signal Training School	* Collegamenti	—	—	—	90	535	625
1287	Instructors School (all Arms)	* Istruttori varie Armi	Manziana	—	—	63	400	523
1288	Physical Training School	* DI Educazione Fisica	Cesano	—	—	12	41	53
1289	Services & Welfare School	* Servizi ed Assistenza	Rieti	—	—	16	41	57
1290	HQ 2 Infr. Rgt. Rgt.	2° Rgt. add. Infr.	Cesano	—	—	56	472	528
1291	Motorization Schools	Scuole della Motorizzazione	Cocchignola	—	—	96	771	867
1292	152 Field Hygiene Sect	152° Sezione Disinfezione	Cesano	—	CM/736/I	1	27	28
1293	1500 Independent Tpt Pl.	1500 PI. Trasporti	—	—	CM/533/I	1	49	50
dat from 1294 at (a) 1304	Serials not used	Serie non impiegate	—	—	—	—	—	—

ALLEGATO 2 — APPIX 2

UNIT (a)	REPARTO (b)	LOCATION Dislocazione (c)	UNDER COMMAND Dipendenza (d)	W. E. Organico N° (e)	W. E. STRENGTHS Forza organica			NOTES (f)
					OFFICERS Uff. (g)	ORs S e T (h)	TOTAL Totale (i)	
Central Military Schools	Scuole Centrali Militari C.do	Cesano	Ministero Guerra	—	33	271	304	
to 12 BLU for the Central Military Schools	Nucleo it. cpl. 12° BLU per Scuole Centrali Militari	*	Scuole Centrali Militari	CM/SS0/1	2	46	48	
Army School	Scuola di Fanteria	*	*	—	119	858	977	
Artillery School	* Artiglieria	Bracciano	*	—	115	639	754	
Engineering School	Artieri	*	*	—	51	275	326	
Signal Training School	Collegamenti	*	*	—	90	535	625	
Motorized School (all Arms)	Istruttori varie Armi	Manziana	*	—	63	460	523	
Medical Training School	di Educazione Fisica	Cosimo	*	—	12	41	53	
Services & Welfare School	Servizi ed Assistenza	Ricci	*	—	16	41	57	
2 Inf. Rgt. Rgt.	2° Rgt. add. tr.	Cesano	*	—	56	472	528	
Motorization Schools	Scuole della Motorizzazione	Cecchignola	*	—	96	771	867	
Field Hygiene Sect	152° Sezione Disinfezione	Cesano	*	CM/736/1	1	27	28	
Independent Trpt Pl.	1500 PI. Trasporti	*	*	CM/533/1	1	49	50	
Is not used	Serie non impiegata	—	—	—	—	—	—	

CHIEF COMMISDRE AC

SECRET

SUBJECT: Strength State and Order of
Battle of the ITALIAN Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COMM, AC. (MMIA)

SD/92/1

4 Mar 46

Ref MMIA letter SD/92/1 dated 20 Feb 46.

1. Inc1 herewith is amendment showing variations as
at 1 Feb 46.
2. Please tick on form of receipt below.

Major General,
M. M. I. A.

Distribution:

As strength State
Plus 1 copy to M14/4 War Office London

PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN QUICKLY

TO: G (SD), LAND FORCES SUB-COMM, AC. (MMIA)

Receipt is acknowledged of copies of enclosure
to Land Forces Sub Forces Sub Comm. AC. (MMIA) letter SD/92/1

4 Mar 46

Ref MMIA letter SD/92/1 dated 20 Feb 46.

1. Incld herewith is amendment showing variations as at 1 Feb 46.
2. Please tick on form of receipt below.

Major General,
W. M. T. A.

Distribution:

As strength State
Plus 1 copy to M14/4 War Office London

PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN QUICKLY

TO: G (SD), LAND FORCES SUB-COMM, AC. (MMIA)

Receipt is acknowledged of copies of enclosure
to Land Forces Sub Comm, AC. (MMIA) letter SD/92/1
dated 4 Mar 46.

Signature

Date.....46

Unit or Branch

NOV 6 1946

COPY

72/46

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5 960.32

1 November 1946

SUBJECT: Italian Army - Call Up.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

[17a]

Reference our G-5: 960.32 of 31 October, your 8270/150/EC
dated 24 October further to your 8270/148/EC of 24 September and
8270/146/EC of 24 August.1. AFHQ Administrative Memorandum Number 10 dated 20 February
1945, subject: Conditions Under which Italians will be Exempted From
the Military Service, was rescinded 31 October 1946.

2. ALCOM is on the distribution list for the above revision.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

/S/ Illegible for

A.L. HAMBLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

2977

✓m

ACTION - CC

INFO - CC
Land Forces of
Air Force of
Navy S/P

(7)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

NOV 4 1946

AC

Ref. 8251/601/33

/ November 1946

Dear Dr. Cappa,

In acknowledging your letter no. 8251/25572a22, dated 25 October 1946 to Admiral Sims, I am happy to inform you that the Allied authorities have no objection to the proposal to demobilise the 1924-25 classes during November instead of during December.

The Ministry of War has already approached the Land Forces sub-Commission on this matter and he has already been informed of their agreement.

Yours very truly,

ME
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

27/10/46

Doctor Paolo Cappa
Undersecretary of State,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C

Received
November 2976
RECORDED
V/W

(20)

cc /

Col Fisher

Strength of Station Army
(less Comatmen and US and Br ITIs
but including 2800 permanent
cadre) is estimated as follows

1 November 46 137000

1 December 46 107000

15 January 47 147000

Cumulative increase in strength
is 14000 which average
will about be maintained

30 Oct 46

42975

M

(10A)

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

See 22 in 207/CC

90/22

2974

Ref. : 8270/148/EO

24 September 1946.

SUBJECT: Italian Army-Call-up.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Your views on this Commission's letter No. 8270/146/EO [17] a
dated 24 Aug on this Subject would be appreciated, please.

For the Chief Commissioner:

P. V. Knisely

Brigadier,
Acting Executive Commissioner.

+ 8253/c
23/10/46

Copy to: C. C. _____
Land Forces S/C
Navy S/C
Air Force S/C

2973

19

0.0 3 8

J.P. 4 1946 CC

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 29 August 1946.

71766/65215/1.3.2.

Dear Admiral,

The considerations made by you in your letter Nr 8251/835/39 of 6 May 1946 with regard to the reduction of personnel of the Italian Army have induced me to re-examine with the utmost attention, together with the War Minister, this delicate problem. In fact, studies have been predisposed aiming to ascertain what economy in the expenses could be realized in the case of reduction of the army forces to 120,000, 100,000 and 80,000 men respectively. It resulted however that carrying out any of the aforesaid reductions we would sacrifice the defensive efficiency of the armed land forces, without obtaining a proportional advantage for the Budget. It has therefore been decided to maintain the structure of the army on the base of 140,000 men, considering the studies which have been made as a simple possibility to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for a useful clarification in occasion of general discussion of the budgets.

Sharing then the opinion expressed by you in the abovementioned letter, the Ministry of War has also agreed that, instead of weakening any further the contingent of troops, an adequate economy could be more opportunely obtained by a reduction, at the right time, of civilian personnel by at least 75%.

With best regards, believe me

For the President

The Undersecretary to the Presidency

/s/ avv. Paolo Cappa

Admiral Harry W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

EC Dist. 310
2972
ACTION: EC
INFO: L.F.S.
cc

18

OK

Ref: 8270/146/MC

24 August 1946

SUBJECT: Italian Army-Call-up.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 10 dated 20 February 45 entitled "Conditions under which Italians will be exempted from Military Service" was written at a time when Italy, as far as liberated, was under control of the Allied Authorities and when the Italian Army, for which recruits were being called up, was largely operating under control of AFHQ. Since then practically the whole of Italy has been handed back to the Italian Government and the interim Italian Army has been returned to the control of the Italian Ministry of War/AFHQ AGC91.711 GSD/0 of 2 December 1945.

2. The Italian War Ministry is now calling up new age groups for limited service in the Italian Army in order to maintain it at the strength authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as laid down in the above-quoted letter. Now that active operations have ceased and in view of the fact that the labour market is far more open to the Allied authorities due to unemployment and also that few men liable to military call-up can be regarded as key men, the retention by Allied military authorities of these young men would not appear to be advisable.

3. In these circumstances it is recommended that exemption from Military Service should now be left entirely in the hands of the Italian Government and that the above quoted Administrative Memorandum either be cancelled or suitably amended.

For the Chief Commissioner:

H.S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: G.C.
Land Forces S/C
Air Force D/C
Navy S/C

2971

17A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

S E C R E T.

A P O 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 600/EC.

17 June 1946.

Chief Commissioner.

Control of Italian Army (operational and administrative) within Italian administered territory (i.e., excluding UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA) was handed over to the Italian Government on 14 November 1945. SACMED reserves right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre and to delegate to his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

(Directive of Nov 2 1945 AFHQ).

MSL

✓

2970

Ref.: 8351/935/10.

6 May 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, the strength of the Italian Army was fixed by the Allies at 140,000, exclusive of 75,000 Carabinieri.

This figure of 140,000 was determined after discussion with the War Minister DALIOTTI as representing the minimum Italian needs, both for internal security and defence of the frontiers under existing circumstances.

I need hardly say that it is as much to the interest of Italy as for the Allies that the Italian Army should be maintained at approximately that figure. Allowing for the inevitable overhead non-combatant troops (such as Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administrative troops, etc) required to direct the Army and the large number of recruits under training at any moment, the potential fighting troops are the minimum necessary to achieve the object in view. Any reduction in the total strength must fall on these potential fighting troops.

It is therefore with some disquiet that I am informed by my Land Forces Sub-Commission that the War Ministry have been asked by the Cabinet to consider a possible reduction of the strength of the Army from 140,000 to 100,000, or even 60,000.

The reason for this, I understand, is financial. I fully appreciate the necessity of exercising economy. Yet I must point out that there are some 55,000 civilians in the Ministry of War of which the great majority is completely redundant to the Army needs but who are costing against the Army budget.

I must therefore take issue to you that while appreciating your financial difficulties, the Allies cannot consider a reduction of the Army strength below approximately 140,000 while there is this large number of redundant civilians carried on the Army budget.

I shall be glad to have your remarks on the above at an early date on this important matter.

Very truly yours,

781 Ellery V. Stone 2969

Copy to: Land Forces
Sub-Com (Ref your
G/6/1 dated 2 May)

ELLERY V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROMA.

see 18

16

*CC*HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 8251/52/BG

29 March 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Enclosed you will find copy of amendment to Directive No. 1 regarding the hand-over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Subcommission (MILIA) of the Allied Commission.

The contents of this Directive have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Subcommission (MILIA) to the Minister of War.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

COPY TO: LAND FORCES S/C (MILIA).

2968

(15)

CHIEF COMM. A.C.

SUBJECT: Handover of the ITALIAN Army to the ITALIAN Government

MAR 27 REC'D

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/7

26 Mar 46

To : See Dist. below

Ref MMIA Directive No 1 (G/7 dated 8 Nov 45) subject: Handover of the
ITALIAN Army to the ITALIAN Government, and MMIA letter G/7 of 8 Mar 46.

Para III 7(c) will be amended as follows:

Delete : Administration Total 31,000

and

Insert : Administration Total 28,000

A. G. M. I. A. X
G/7

Major General G/7
MMIA

ABC/aa

INTERNAL

Ministry of War	Dep Comd
Chief Commissioner A.C.	DGS
Executive Commissioner A.C. (2) one for Prime Minister	Col A/Q
Navy Sub Commission	G (five)
Air Forces Sub Commission	A (four)
HQ 2 District (5)	Q (five)
List 'B'	RE
	SIGS
	ST (three)
	MED
	RMIC
	War Diary (two)
	File: G/3/1
	Spare (twenty)

[Signature]

(14)

MAR 13 REC'D

10:30

CIPHER

W/541

I 552
121025A

SECRET

MAR 13 0900

IMPORTANT

MAIN 13 CORPS

CIPHER TELEGRAM

ACTION FREEDOM

This message may not be distributed outside
 French or American Government Departments or
 Headquarters. It must not be transmitted even in Cipher
 without prior permission of the C.I.A. (Messages marked
 O.T.P. are to be handled by the C.I.A. (referred).

INFO: AICOM

SECRET

YOUR FA 2416 OF 10 MAR CH.

1. THIS HQ HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED MOBILISATION FOR ITALIAN ARMY BY
 ITALIAN AUTHORITIES OF SLOVENES IN ZONE A VENEZIA GIULIA
2. PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK A LOCAL SLOVENE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED IN TRIESTE CARRIED AN ARTICLE
 ON 27 FEBRUARY ALLEGING THAT AMG HAD RECENTLY BEEN ASSISTING "SEVERAL CASES OF ENFORCED
 ENLISTMENT IN THE ITALIAN ARMY" AND NAMING 3 ALLEGED REGIMENTS OF VENEZIA GIULIA
 INVOLVED. AN INVESTIGATION OF THIS ALLEGATION WAS IMMEDIATELY CARRIED OUT BY THIS HQ.
 WITH RESULTS AS FOLLOWS. 1 INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION WAS SERVING IN THE ITALIAN
 ARMY IN SARDINIA SINCE 8 SEPTEMBER 43. ON 28 JUNE 45 HE LEFT HIS UNIT FOR TRIESTE
 CIVIL
 WITHOUT PERMISSION. THE ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES RECENTLY REQUESTED HIS RETURN.
 ON BEING CONTACTED BY THE CIVIL POLICE IN TRIESTE HE REMOVED HIMSELF TO ZONE B. IT
 THEREFORE APPEARS THAT HE IS TECHNICALLY A DESERTER FROM THE ITALIAN ARMY AND THE CHARGE
 OF "ENFORCED ENLISTMENT" IS INACCURATE. THE SECOND INDIVIDUAL NAMED WAS FORMERLY AN
 OFFICER IN THE ITALIAN ARMY BUT HAS CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT ANY ATTEMPT HAS BEEN
 MADE TO PERSUADE HIM TO REPORT TO ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE THIRD INDIVIDUAL
 NAMED HAS NOT BEEN TRACED. THE CHARGE OF ENFORCED ENLISTMENT THUS APPEARS WHOLLY
 INACCURATE AND SIMILAR TO MANY OTHER DISTORTIONS OF THE TRUTH EMANATING FROM LOCAL
 EXTREMISTS AND SOURCES HOSTILE TO AMG

2966

INFO/ACTION: ED. COMMISSIONER 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER CIVIL AFFAIRS FILE
SKELETON

AC DIST

(13)

SECRET

ALCOM

12 MAR 46

ADM

IN 43 CORPS

1758

INSTRUCTED

DO YOU KNOW THAT THE FOUR OR FIVE OF THEM DIED IN NO KNOWLEDGE OF ITALIAN ARMY HAVING FORCED SLOVENES FROM THE ITALIAN ARMY TO ALCOM HAS GIVEN NO SUPPORT TO AID IN THIS PROJECT OR IN CERTAIN SITUATION FORTY FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ITALIAN ARMY WOUNDED OR YUGOSLAV CIVILIANS WERE REPORTEDLY MOVED FOR IMMEDIATELY TO THESE DISCHARGED SAMP ON HOSPITAL LINE TRAINS HANDED OVER BY ABANDONMENT WITH YUGOSLAV MISSION TO THESE DISCHARGED WEST OF MORGAN LINE REG TROOPS HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED TO A TYPE OF LATTER MAY HAVE VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED IN ITALIAN ARMY BUT ALL THESE PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED IN FUTURE CALL UP PLANS OF ITALIAN WAR MINISTRY INCLUDES YUGOSLAV PROVINCE IN WHICH SOME ITALIAN SUBJECTS OF SLAV ORIGIN MAY RESIDE TO THESE WILL BE TREATED ON THEIR MERITS ACCORDING TO ITALIAN LAW

22 Feb

Copy to: LAND FORCES S/C.



PRIORITY

Office of the Executive Comdr

2965

W.M. 6

SUBJECT : Demobilisation

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.G.C.
(M.M.I.L.) R.O.M.E.

A 017 5 Mar. 1946.

TO : Ministry of War

1. Reference this R.O.M.E. of 30 Jan 1946 and your 202790/11 of 3 Feb 46.
2. It is now confirmed that the 1921 class may be discharged "pari passu" with the call up of the 40,000 recruits of the 1924 class.

2/106

W. P. Dally, M.A.C.
Major General
M.M.I.L.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

2964

A.H.G./as

⑪

Bogus -
Sphets CC
Would you
like me to ^{Table}
see the PM ^(B)
on para. 4(b)
a. Will you
straighten it out
I am personally
opposed to let -

Ting The R.
down to 12.5 M
unless De G
accepts full
responsibility.

SP
EWS
cc

British can get a
bad U.S. press from
this, otherwise

O O 4 9

FEB 18 RECD

3819.

Ref: 8251/502/PC.

15 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Strength of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Paragraph 7 and 8 of your Directive AG 091.711 G(2D)-0 dated 2 Nov 45 ("Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government") specifies the ceiling of the Interim Italian Army by categories.
2. When the strength figures of the Italian Army (excl. BR-ITIS and GS-ITIS) as at 1 Jan 46 became known, the question of the demobilisation of further classes was again considered and Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (MIA) Letter 4.017 dated 30 Jan 46 was sent to the Minister of War - See Appendix "A".
3. His reply is attached at Appendix "B" and from it can be seen that he:
- (a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but
 - (b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilising the 1921 Class pari passu with the Call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Interim Army drop temporarily to about 125,000, which, with the 15,000 BR and GS-ITI troops, makes a total of about 140,000.
4. Taking everything into account I recommend that:
- (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000, until we know the terms of the Peace Treaty;
 - (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength of the Interim Army to about 125,000 as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 3(b);
 - (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the actual and required strengths of the Army and the decision (to be made later) regarding the July and November intakes.
5. I should be glad of your early approval in order that the necessary instructions may be issued by the War Ministry for the demobilization of the 1921 Class in ample time to ensure smooth action.

M S LUSH

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Land Forces (MIA).Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

10a

CH

4 February 1946.

Ref: 0270/129/EC.

SUBJECT: Call Up - Italian Army.

TO : G-5, A.F.H.Q.

1. The next "call up" for the Italian Army is due to take place during March. The Italian Ministry of War are anxious to make this call up as universal over ITALY as is possible and in this they are supported by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
2. There arises the question of the Province of UDINE which, as you know, is still nominally under AMG control though in many respects control has been handed back to the Italian Government.
3. From every point of view I consider that UDINE should be included in the call up regions; the province is without dispute an integral part of ITALY, any failure to include UDINE Province might perhaps be taken by YUGOSLAVIA as being a sign of weakness or a surrendering of rights on the part of ITALY in regard to the province.
4. I therefore propose to inform the Italian Government that UDINE Province may be included in the call up.

*J.S./Clerk, W. Stone**ELLIERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner**2/1/46*Copy to: AMG XIII Corps
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA), AC.

2962

(10)

ref: 3201418/c

21 November 1945

My dear Mr. Vice Minister,

I believe you will find one of my previous des.^ss regarding the handing over of the Italian Navy to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Anti-Comintern (LFLA) of the Italian Comintern.

The contents of this despatch have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Anti-Comintern (LFLA) to the War Office of us.

Yours very truly,

Adm. G. S.
Mr. Alfredo, R.M.
Chief Comintern

Dr. Alfonso Di Giacomo
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Comintern
Rome

Copy to: L.F. S.C.

2961

(9)

DEC 12 1943

SUBJECT : Handover of the Italian Army to the Italian Government

LAND FORCES SUB COM, I.C. (M.I.L.)

G / 7

U. Deo 45

TO : See Distn below

Ref M.I.L Directive No. 1 (G/7 of 8 Nov 45) subject: Handover of the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

Para III 7. will be amended as follows:

Under (a) stand:

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland

to read:

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,250 men for ten territorial regions on mainland

Amend: Total 40,000 to read:

Under (e) stand:

Training and Reinforcements Total

to read:

Training and Reinforcements Total

12,500

*Franklin K.
Mr General Sec
A.M.I.L.*

DISTRIBUTION:

Ministry of War
Colonel Commissioner I.C.
and Sub Commissions I.C.
Army Sub Commission I.C.
Land Forces Sub Commission I.C.

2960

D/P Comd
Col. A. J.
G. (2nd)
A. (1st)
G. (2nd)

Ref. M.I.U. Directive No. 1 (G/7 of 8 Nov 45) subject: Invasion of
the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

Para III.7. will be amended as follows:

Under (a) amend:

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for
ten territorial regions on mainland

25,000

to read:

Ten Independent regiments each of 2,250 men for
ten territorial regions on mainland

22,500

Amend: Total 40,000 to read:

37,500

Under (e) amend:

Training and Reinforcements Total

10,000

to read:

Training and Reinforcements Total

12,500

Amend X
or General War
Bill I A

-20/500

DESTINATION:

Ministry of War

1st Commissioner A.C.

1st Vice Commission A.C.

1st Forces Sub Commission A.C.

Comd 1 BDU (with copy of Directive No. 1)

Dsp Comd

Col A/C

C (Dive)

C (Dive)

C (Dive)

SAC (Three)

Head

NAME

File: G/J/1

Spire: (Twenty)

1 " "

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12 BL & TU

S.E.R.E.T.
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Ref/ 8251/EC.

28 November 1945

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces

TO AFHQ (for Chief of Staff)

1. HISTORY

(a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition "of the" Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces, and therefore must consider now the ultimate disposition of the various formations and units.

(b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brigadier YATES and Major General BROWNING/Brigadier LUSH recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signals FX 54297 dated 24 November and FX 54298 dated 25 November.

(c) As a result of this, Colonel PIDSLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission, AC) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 November with Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and discussed the whole matter with GOC 2 District, returning to ROME on Sunday, 25 November.

(d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a conference with Signor JACINI, still functioning as Minister of War, on 26 November, by Brigadier LUSH and General BROWNING.

(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS

(a) The Eastern frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 corps.

(b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to return troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult security situation are involved.

(c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also

901/c

(a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces, and therefore must consider now the ultimate disposition of the various formations and units.

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(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

POLITICAL FACTORS

(a) The Eastern frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 Corps.

(b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to re^{occupy} troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult security situation are involved.

(c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also be an Italian responsibility. The withdrawal of British troops from the French frontier introduces a delicate situation. To avoid incidents, it is advisable that no major move of Italian troops to that frontier should be made, though limited patrol movement is necessary to avoid French infiltration.

(a) The internal security question will be dealt with by Italian troops in the following order of employment:

- (i) CC.RR
- (ii) CC.RR mobile columns
- (iii) Independent Regiments (see also para 3(a) below)
- (iv) Combat Divisions.

The main function of Combat Divisions therefore is frontier defence and only in cases of extreme urgency should they be used for internal security.

(e) The resignation of the present Italian Government on 24 November, complicates the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

(f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal law and order will rest with the Italian Government, subject to SAC's overriding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to bind themselves in advance to a fixed distribution of their available Forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Infantry Divisions for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

3. MILITARY FACTORS

(a) Excluding services and headquarters and training installations, the following FIGHTING TROOPS are available:-

(1) Five Infantry Divisions (TRIULI, CREMONA, LEGNANO, ECIGORE, MANTOVA). These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are up to WF as follows:-

Total Division.....	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment.....	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion.....	770
Artillery Regiment.....	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

(ii) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WP:-

Total Regiment.....	2,500
Each Battalion.....	800

One Regiment per Territorial Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B").
but Battalions are up to WE.

(iii) Three IS Divisions of two Brigades each of two

(e) The resignation of the present Italian Government on 24 November, complicates the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal law and order will rest with the Italian Government, subject to SACT's over-riding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to bind themselves in advance to a fixed distribution of their available Forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Infantry Divisions for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

3. MILITARY FACTORS

(a) Excluding services and headquarters and training installations, the following FIGHTING TROOPS are available:-

(1) Five Infantry Divisions (FRIULI, CREMONA, LEGNANO, FOGLIORE, MANTOVA). These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are up to WE as follows:-

Total Division.....	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment.....	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion.....	770
Artillery Regiment.....	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

(II) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WE:-

Total Regiment.....	2,500
Each Battalion.....	800

One Regiment per Territorial Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B") but Battalions are up to WE.

(III) Three IS Divisions of two Brigades each of two Regiments of two Battalions. Vide Appendix "B", SABAUDA and ASTA IS Divisions in SICILY are at 90% of WE, while CALABRIA IS Division in SARDINIA is approximately at 60% of WE viz:-

Total IS Division.....	5,000
Each Brigade.....	2,250
Each Regiment.....	1,000
Each Battalion.....	500

They are equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

(b) A large part of the Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments are employed on guarding dams and installations, and are widely dispersed. Supervision and training to any major extent is thus not possible at present. The present state of training is low in consequence, and further because there has been a heavy change-over of personnel due to:-

(1) Reduction in strength compared with that at the time of the German surrender.

(ii) Demobilisation of older classes - which is continuing.

(iii) Reduction of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units and transfer of soldiers of military age to formations as above.

The greater part of the older and better trained men and of tradesmen and specialists have been or are about to be released from the Army. Replacements are being trained at the maximum speed. To restore the efficiency of the Army, it is advisable that formations be relieved of their extensive guard duties and concentrated as far as possible in order to undertake controlled and extensive training.

Should, as is desirable for standardisation and other reasons, Independent Regiments and IS Divisions be equipped with British equipment, the necessity for intensive training will be further increased.

(c) AFHQ view is that apart from possible frontier trouble, the probable areas for employment of the strategic reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the HEEL of ITALY. They consider that this points to a distribution of three Infantry Divisions NORTH of the APPENNINES and two SOUTH.

(d) Morale, particularly in the Infantry and IS Divisions, is reasonably good at present. Italian officers and men regard service near the frontier as an honour, and would view a move from the frontier southwards as a withdrawal, especially if without Allied or Italian replacement. The War Ministry has similar views from a political and prestige angle.

Each Infantry Division has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move southwards. Much would depend on the published reason for the move.

(e) Any move southwards would ease the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical

(111) Reduction of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units and transfer of soldiers of military age to formations as above.

The greater part of the older and better trained men and of tradesmen and specialists have been or are about to be released from the Army. Replacements are being trained at the maximum speed. To restore the efficiency of the Army, it is advisable that formations be relieved of their extensive guard duties and concentrated as far as possible in order to undertake controlled and extensive training.

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Each Infantry Division has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move southwards. Much would depend on the published reason for the move.

(e) Any move southwards would ease the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical locations of Independent Regiments and other permanent Italian military installations. Climate in the South favours a move in this direction during the winter.

GOC, 2 District from the accommodation point of view would like one Infantry Division at any rate moved south of the APPENNINES. He can let FRIULI stay, with an

adjustment of its area locally. LEGNANO and CREMONA do not interfere - nor does MANTOVA. From 2 District point of view, therefore, a move of FOLGORE SOUTH of the APPENINES would be adequate as regards the accommodation angle.

On the other hand, 2 District stated that there were large areas which they were not using or from which they were withdrawing Allied troops, and that adequate accommodation for one Italian Division (thus accommodating all five such North of the APPENINES) might well be found after reccce., particularly in the area MANTOVA - MODENA - PINELLA. The Italians also consider that this should be possible.

It is understood that AFHQ have ordered FOLGORE to move to the BRESCIA area, the move to be completed by 10 December.

(f) Provided bids for rail transportation of POL were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.

(g) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or POL.

4. At the discussion with Signor JACINI on 26 November he stated the Italian Government's views as follows:-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Infantry Divisions of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the question:

- (a) Military
- (b) Internal political
- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being sea. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely populated agricultural areas of the South. "To hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY". ROME is well centered for and in any case "the key of ROME is MILAN". Southern areas, such as BARI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem. In any event, Independent Regiments are there as a reserve.

As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN area concentrated to have an Infantry Division

be possible.

It is understood that AFHQ have ordered FOLGORE to move to the BRESCIA area, the move to be completed by 10 December.

(f) Provided bids for rail transportation or POL were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.

(g) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or POL.

4. At the discussion with Signor MACINI on 26 November he stated the Italian Government's views as follows:-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Infantry Divisions of guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the question:

- (a) Military
- (b) Internal political
- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being seen. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated agricultural areas of the South. "To hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY". ROME is well centered for and in any case "the key of ROME is MILAN". Southern areas, such as BARI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem. In any event, Independent Regiments are there as a reserve.

As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Infantry Division in the GENOA Area, but as MANTOVA Division are esconced there and their accommodation is not wanted by the Allies, they would like to leave MANTOVA in situ to avoid a move.

The fifth Infantry Division (FOLGORE) should be somewhere in the PO Valley if accommodation can be found, which the Italians think is possible (see third Sub-para of 3(e) above). FOLGORE should be as close to BOLOGNA as possible.

To sum up, the Italian Government, who will shortly be in operational control of these Divisions would prefer to locate all

five Infantry Divisions North of the APPENNINES. But, if pressed, they would agree to moving one SOUTH of the APPENNINES as near BOLOGNA as possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) 1S Divisions to remain in situ.
- (b) Independent Regiments to remain in projected locations and be constituted up to full WE as soon as possible.
- (c) LEGNANO, CREMONA and MANTOVA to remain in situ.
- (d) Locations of PRATILO to be readjusted locally with 2 District to enable this Division to guard the ALTO ADIGE.
- (e) A recce. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District to discover whether FOLGORE can be accommodated in the PO Valley.
- (f) A simultaneous recce. to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of FOLGORE South of the APPENNINES in case the recce. as in (e) does not succeed.
- (g) No administrative difficulty over FOLGORE move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.
- (h) It is advisable to relieve Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments of guard duties, to enable them to train.
- (1) It is strongly recommended, with full concurrence of GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission, JC (ITA) that proposals (J) - (f) above be accepted, that the FOLGORE Division be located as near to the PO Valley as possible and that AFHQ:
 - (1) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY;
 - (II) Give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence:
 - (a) On ITALO-AUSTRIAN frontier;
 - (b) on ITALO-FRENCH frontier.

(e) A move, to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District to discover whether FOLGORE can be accommodated in the PO Valley.

(f) A simultaneous recce, to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of FOLGORE South of the APPENNINES in case the recce, as in (e) does not succeed.

(g) No administrative difficulty over FOLGORE move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.

(h) It is advisable to relieve Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments of guard duties, to enable them to train.

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(1) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY;

(ii) Give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence:

- (a) On ITALO-AUSTRIA frontier;
- (b) on ITALO-FRENCH frontier.

2957

Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

COPY TO:
Land Forces S/C (MTA)

Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Venezia Region

LO NO. 2 District
Executive Commissioner

HQ, N^o2 DISTRICT
HQ, N^o3 DISTRICT - 5 -

APPENDIX "A"

Phone conversation Brig. YATES/Gen BROWNING at 1000 hrs - 23 Nov 4

1. C.G.S., A.F.H.Q. wishes me to see the Italian Government and persuade them to:-

(a) Move FRIULI and FOLGORE out of BOLZANO Area.

(b) Move two Combat Divs South of the APPENNINES.

2. A.F.H.Q.'s view is as follows:-

(a) The Italians need an efficient Army and we are prepared to give it to them.

(b) The Combat Divisions cannot train and remain efficient if they're doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

(d) In any event, FRIULI and FOLGORE must move out of BOLZANO Area because:-

(1) The area is not suitable for training;

(II) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES and two South.

(f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration over-ride necessary military ones.

(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

3. Brig. YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered

(b) The Combat Divisions cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 Districts, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

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(II) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

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(f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political considerations over-ride necessary military ones.

(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

3. Brig. YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an order from A.F.H.Q. and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-arrange their administrative plan.

4. Gen. BROWNING stated that this was all a matter for "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C." and that therefore it would have to be tackled in full conjunction with Chief Commissioner, A.C. Brig. YATES agreed.

23 Nov. 45

Signed: L. Browning,
Maj. Gen.

LOCATIONSUNITFRIULI DIV.

- HQ
- 87 Inf. Regt.
- 88 Inf. Regt.
- 35 Arty. Regt.
- 120 Eng. Bn.
- Services

PUGLIORE DIV.

- HQ
- Nembro Regt.
- Garibaldi Regt.
- 184 Arty. Regt.
- 184 Eng. Bn.
- Services

CREMONA DIV.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGNANO DIV.

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA DIV.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 166 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

I.S. Regts.

- | | |
|----------------|---------|
| No 1 I.S. Regt | (2 Bns) |
| No 2 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 3 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 4 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 5 I.S. Regt | (2 Bns) |
| No 6 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 7 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 8 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |

LEVICO
BASSANO DEL GRAPPA
S. BONIFACIO
TRENTO
LEVICO
various

BRESSANONE
DOBBIACO
BOLZANO
COLLE ISARCO
ORTISEI
VARIOUS

TURIN
ASTI
VERCELLI
CHIANTI
CASAL MONFERATO
VARIOUS

BORGAMO
BERGAMO
SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

- CARIGNAN Regt.
- 184 Arty. Regt.
- 184 Eng. Bn.
- Services

BELZANO
COLLE ISARCO
OTTISEI
VARIOUS

CREMONA Div.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGNANO Div.

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA Div.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 166 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

T.I.S. Regts.

- | | |
|-----------------|---------|
| No 1 I.S. Regt | (2 Bns) |
| No 2 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 3 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 4 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 5 I.S. Regt | (2 Bns) |
| No 6 I.S. Regt | (3 ns) |
| No 7 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 8 I.S. Regt | (1 Bn) |
| No 9 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 10 I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |

- VARAZZE
- SAVONA
- COMO
- PIACENZA
- CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
- VARIOUS

2956

- TURIN
- GENOA
- BRESCIA
- VERONA
- PADUA
- MODENA
- LUCCA
- VITERBO
- BARI
- NAPOLI

LOCATIONS

UNIT

Miscellaneous Guard Bns.

- 513 Guard Bn
- 528 Guard Bn
- 529 Guard Bn
- 515 Guard Bn
- Grenadier Bn

I.S. Divs

- SABAUDA DIV
- AOSTA DIV
- CALABRIA DIV

LATERINA
VITERBO
AREZZO
ROME

MESSINA
PALERMO
CAGLIARI

SUBJECT: Handing over of the Italian Army
to the Italian Government.

Gov 27 Nov

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (IMIA)

G/7

27 Nov 45

TO : APHC
Chief Commissioner A.C.

I forward herewith, for your information a copy of a letter on
the above subject that I have just received from the Minister of War.

A.P.C. (cont'd)
for *Major General, G.S.*
Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C. (IMIA).

LB/jw

26 Nov 45.

QD/106
23/106

✓ 2955

(6)

COPY TRANSLATION

FROM : Ministry of War

REF : 225256/II

TO : General BROWNING., M.M.I.A.

DATE : 16/11/45

SUBJECT: Handing over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government
(Directive No.1)

I acknowledge receipt of letter G/7 of the 3th November containing the directives of the Allied Supreme Command relating to the passing to the Italian Government of the control of the Italian Army.

I would like to express to you my appreciation of the instructions contained in said letter and beg of you to tender this appreciation to the Allied Supreme Command on my behalf.

I assure you of my full collaboration in the complete application of the clauses in the above letter.

Signed: JACINTI

War Minister

Translated by: O. DANIS Cpl

Typew copy by: J. WARD Cpl

26 Nov 45.

2954

(6)

FILE NOTE.

C P S E C R E T

TS/IMI/122
(Copy to File A/610/3)

1. A.P.H.Q. Directive AG 691.711 G(SD)-O dated 2 Nov 45 ("Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government") was marked SECRET.
2. we got Chief Commissioner's approval to our G/7 of 8 Nov (Directive No. 1) which informed the War Ministry re the A.P.H.Q. directive. That was also marked SECRET.
3. C.C. saw and approved JACINTI'S and my speeches at the dinner on 16 Nov. These were quoted in the Press and obviously this matter can no longer be kept SECRET.
4. (a) I asked C.C. for guidance as to what we were to say to the Press of the French or Russians, if asked.
(b) C.C. directed that we could admit that, in accordance with the instructions of C.C.S., w.e.f. 2400 hours 14 Nov:-
 - (i) Administrative control of the Italian Army had been handed back to the Italian Government.
 - (ii) Operational control also - within the territory handed over.
 - (iii) this was of course still subject to the rights and powers of the Allied Commission (through "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.") which is still the authoritative body set up under the Armistice terms.
 - (iv) "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C." will continue to advise the War Ministry on matters relating to the Italian Army.
 - (v) In general the whole business should not be minimized or emphasized, but be considered as merely a normal evolution of the well known Allied policy to hand over more and more to the Italians.

19 November 1945.

✓ Major General,
M.M.I.A.

(Copy to Chief Commissioner, ALLIED COMMISSION.)

2953

CC 901

9 November 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Enclosed you will find copy of Directive No. 1 regarding the hand-over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Sub-commission (EMIA) of the Allied Commission.

The contents of this Directive have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Subcommission (EMIA) to the Minister of War.

Yours very truly,

To Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

c c E f e e C o m m u n .

2952

~~SECRET~~ and ~~IMMEDIATE~~

NOV 9 RED
CC 0930

ALLIED COMMISSION

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (LFLA)

C / 7

6 Nov 45

DIRECTIVE No. 1

TRANSFER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

I.

GENERAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement to peace terms. The Supreme Allied Commander therefore directs that the following arrangements be made for the handing over of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government and for its future organisation, training and administration.

II. TRANSFER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the five BR-ITL combat groups are their support units and 10,000 Guardsmen now held in BR-ITL category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of control over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

III. FUTURE OF US-ITL and BR-ITL Units.

- (a) Seven US-ITL units less one BR-ITL combat group designated as long as necessary to be disbanded in Italy and elsewhere. Such units will be used by the Italian Government to assist in the control of the Italian Army. The number of US-ITL personnel will be reduced in proportionately following the end of US-ITL command in US-ITL units, which no longer control the Italian Army or US-ITL command in US-ITL units, until such time as the Italian Army is fully reorganized.
- (b) Remaining US-ITL and BR-ITL units will be offered to the Italian Government.

Units, etc., the Italian Army, US-ITL and BR-ITL Service 10, Nov.

2961

4. Transfer of the Commando. Control of the Commando will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and oversight of the Italian Government. There will be a maximum of 5,000 which will be controlled by the Italian Army. The Commando will be used on civilian occasions only and will not be used for military purposes.

For history see GURKHA.

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander therefore directs to the following arrangements be made for the handing over of the Italian Army training and administration.

II. HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the BR-ITI combat groups mentioned as long as they are held in accordance with existing circumstances will remain under the command of US-ITI authorities. Such units will be used in the national columns of Allied Forces. On arrival at their destination, all personnel will be held. It is recommended that US-ITI personnel, who are not to be retained, be repatriated to Italy as soon as possible. US-ITI personnel in service as of 14 November 1945, shall be held as part of the United Nations army until such time as they are released to the Italian Government.

(b) After the end of the transition of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units, the US-ITI and BR-ITI Forces will be in contact with the US-ITI IC, Low.

4. Influence of the Government. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government. The other 12,000 members of the Italian Army located in the Italian Army will be placed under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. The Italian Army will be responsible for military security.

5. Provisions.

(a) The Supreme Italian Commander, Italian Army, Theatro di Sogno, the right to exercise command of the 12,000 men of the Italian Army located in the Italian Army, and to collect his authority to command direct.

(b) The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organisation, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

(c) Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational control of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

(a) An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Army and Orabimici and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be put forward by Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

(b) The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMC).

III. FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines:

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINA.....	15,000
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland.....	25,000
Total.....	<u>40,000</u>

(b) Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.
Total.....

2950

(c) Command.

Total.....

50,000

6. Military Mission.

(c) An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. This Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

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Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland.....	25,000
Total.....	<u>40,000</u>

(b) Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.	2950
Total.....	50,000

(c) Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters	Total.....	9,000
Total.....	Total.....	21,000

(d) Administration.

(e) <u>Training and Reinforcements.</u>	Total.....	10,000
	Total.....	<u>140,000</u>

...../3

8. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MLIA).

10. Administration.

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

(1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.

(2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

(d) US-ITI Service units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and provisioning.

(e) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, official stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri.

(1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material.

(2) From local supplies.

10. Administration.

(a) With effect from 2100 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) Italian Army and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in United British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision of some of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.
- (d) US-ITI Service units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

(e) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri.

- 2949
- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local materials as may be authorised by Allied Forces Headquarters.
 - (2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY or stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.
 - (3) Through the Italian Government import programme.
- (c) As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11(b) above will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import programme, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11(b) above:

.....
/4

(1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13(c) below.

(2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

(c) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and food requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one year's maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of summation of disposal of to the Italian Government and authorised expenditure republished various natures will also be transferred and warlike equipment available from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7, above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed \$1,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus disposals agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITT-ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, the Italian Army through M.A.C.

2948

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the F.O.I. and coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Stores. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 124,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one year's maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposal organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested from its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7, above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed \$1,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITU ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through ITI, are rescinded.

(b) Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorised in paragraph 11(b)(2) above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of ITI and origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

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...../5

16. Accounting.

- 5 -

(a) Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in subparagraphs (b) and (c) below will apply.

(b) Accounting for Allied Military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carrabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITALIAN contingent.

(c) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to US-ITU units will follow established procedures of the British and US Forces. Issues from US military stocks other than disposals through WMC, will be through WMC (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

A. Brownning

fd

Major-General,
Director,
Land Forces and Commissars (LFC)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

785015

MINISTRY OF WAR
Chief Commissioner A.C.
Exec Commissioner A.C.
New Sub Commissioner ...
Air Forces Sub Commissioner A.C.
Senior MATA LO c/o MATA LO NEW ITALY MILAN
MILS. LO NEW ITALY MILAN
" " c/o 2C1 Sub Area
" " c/o 66 Area
" " c/o Signal Office GETOL
" " TURIN c/o 7 AREA
" " NEW ITALY MILAN (attention Capt FOX)
" " BOLZANO 60 Sub Area c/o 68 Area Rest
" " SICILY
" " 4th Floor Provincia Buildings NAPLES
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above, and for the Garibaldi, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow
and US depots direct to BRITI and US ITALI units will follow established
procedures of the British and US Forces. Issues from US military stocks
other than disposals through ANC, will be through MITA (US Contingent)
who will maintain adequate records.

(c) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British
and US depots direct to BRITI and US ITALI units will follow established
procedures of the British and US Forces. Issues from US military stocks
other than disposals through ANC, will be through MITA (US Contingent)
who will maintain adequate records.

L. Brown

rd

Major-General,
Director,
Land Forces Sub Commission (MITA)

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Res Commissioner A.C.

New Sub Commission A.C.

Air Forces Sub Commissioner A.C.

Senior MITA LO c/o MITA LO NW TAIL MILAN

" " c/o 2nd Sub Area

" " c/o 3rd Area

" " c/o Signal Office GENOA

" " TURIN c/o 7 ARMI

" " MITALI MILAN (attention Capt FOX)

" " BOLOGNA 60 Sub Area c/o 68 Arty Regt

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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IMPORTANT

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AFHQ

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(2)

From C(2) CMF.

Reference our FA 51827 of 4 November. Present rate of call up Italians in Italy to the three armed forces. Please expedite reply for 9 November. Information required urgently by troopers.

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ACTION L FORCES S/C (2)
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref: 8251/356/SD,
6 November 1945.

SUBJECT: Handover of Italian Army to the
Italian Government.
TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. I have read the minutes of a meeting held to discuss
the turnover of the Italian Army and CJ.MR to the Italian Govern-
ment, sent to me by CHQ, GME.

2. I refer to para 6. I note therein the formation of
an Allied Military Mission and the statement that the Italian
Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. I
presume that no such statement will be included in any directive
sent to me for neither is it in my power to give effect to the
directive nor is it in consonance with FM 437.
3. I would suggest that for the sake of consistency the
directive prepared by AFHQ, discussed at SACMED's Conference, and
thereafter issued to the Air Forces Sub-Commission, should be
followed in any directive prepared for the Land Forces Sub-Commission.
The Air Forces Sub-Commission meets the service and political aspects
of its functions admirably and could, and I submit should be, equally
applied to the Land Forces Sub-Commission in the new conditions.
Paras 2 and 3(a) are especially applicable.

701/c
13/ Every V. Stone
ELIJAH V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

2945

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FX51827

G/2869

NOV 04 1838

NOV 05 1150

G (SD) GHQ CME

PRIORITY

ALLIED COMMISSION MMIA

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Following information urgently required. Present rate
of call up of Italians in ITALY to the three armed forces.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711 G(SD)-0

MFA/wp

.....
 : S E C R E T :
 :Auth: SAC, MP :
 :Initials: *MFC* :
 :Date: 2 Nov 1945 :

 2 November 1945

SUBJECT: Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government.

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)

I. GENERAL.

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organization, training and administration.

II. HANOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

a. US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

b. Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10 *2943* below.

*See Sup.*SECRET*On***SECRET**

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and overriding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

a. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theater, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

b. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

c. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

a. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

b. The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) will shortly be issued.

III. FUTURE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organization. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

a. Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA	15,000.
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland	<u>25,000.</u>
Total	40,000.

b. Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

Total	50,000.
-----------------	---------

c. Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters	Total	9,000.
--------------	-----------------	--------

d. Administration.

Total	31,000.
-----------------	---------

e. Training and Reinforcements.

Total	<u>10,000.</u>
	140,000.

8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MIA).

10. Administration.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units. **2942**

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

b. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

c. BRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

d. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

b. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardization of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri:

- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorized by Allied Force Headquarters.
- (2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.
- (3) Through the Italian Government import program.

c. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 b above, will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import program, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11 b, above:

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

- (1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 c, below.
- (2) Thereafter, those items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures.

d. With effect from 0400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import program.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organizations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

a. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

b. Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

c. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-O,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

a. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MMIA are rescinded.

b. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 b (2), above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting.

a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in sub-paragraphs b and c below, will apply.

b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

c. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BRI-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through ANLC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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(See Next Page)

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dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

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AP893

SO TO A/C
A/CC 792
RHF/wp 1/11/44
S E C R E T
Auth: SAC, MT
Initials: *as/k*
Date: 30 October 44

AG 091.711/169 GCT-O

30 October 1944

SUBJECT: Transfer From AAI to AFHQ of Responsibility for Control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

TO : All Concerned.

1. OBJECT:

The object of this letter is to define the changes in the responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI as the result of the handing over to AFHQ by AAI of the control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

2. DATE OF HANDOVER:

AFHQ will assume the responsibilities set out in the following paragraphs with effect from 1 NOVEMBER 1944.

3. CEILING OF THE ITALIAN ARMY:

AFHQ will decide the distribution of personnel to categories within the ceiling laid down from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. PROVISION OF PERSONNEL:

a. Through the agency of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMA), The Allied Commission, AFHQ will undertake the provision of personnel to meet the Allied requirements within the categories of the ceiling.

b. The present proportionate distribution, i.e.:

	<u>Specialist Personnel</u>	<u>Non-Specialist Personnel</u>
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3)	
Combat Groups	1/3)	2/3

will continue in force until amended by AFHQ, and the personnel made available will be allotted between US and British in those proportions.

c. AFHQ will take over control of Priority List 8 - British Requirements of Italian Army personnel for Service Units, and Priority List 7 - Priority of shipment of personnel and units from SARDINIA to ITALY.

5. FORMATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will undertake the formation of all units in the case of the relevant Formation Orders, for all units to be formed from Italian Army personnel to operate under Allied Command. - 1 -

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SECRET19 OCT-0,
dtd 30 October 1944 (Cont'd)6. WAR ESTABLISHMENTS:

AFHQ will publish War Establishments for British controlled units where necessary, but AAI is authorized to publish or amend and implement War Establishments for British controlled units peculiar to the Operational Zone.

7. ALLOCATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will allot units as between the Operational Zone and L of C Area.

8. TRAINING OF ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS:

AFHQ, being responsible for training facilities and equipment of Combat Groups, will supervise the training of these formations.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. Roberts
H. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

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Revised July 26, 1918

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				2938

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

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