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POLITICAL
MINUTES
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/136/257 POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ (MINUTES OF MEETINGS, MINUTES & AGENDA)
SEPT. - DEC. 1945

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1002-1/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 1002-1 POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ
(MINUTES OF MEETINGS: MINUTES & AGENDA)

Part I

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MINUTES & AGENDA

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25	Minutes, 35th Meeting	9 Dec 44		(Corrigendum)
26	Agenda, 36thMeeting	19 Dec 44		
27	Minutes 36th Meeting	19 Dec 44		
28	Agenda 37th Meeting	29 Dec 44		
29	Minutes 37th Meeting	30 Dec 44		
	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ + +

Confidential

File destroyed as authorized by Lt. Col. Gilbert

Confidential

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Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

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MINUTES & AGENDA

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4	Agenda 27th Mtg	3 Oct 44		
5	Minutes 27th Mtg	4 Oct 44		
6 -	Minutes 28th Mtg	12 Oct 44		
7	Errata 28th Mtg	13 Oct 44		
8	Agneda 29th Mtg	16 Oct 44		
9	Minutes 29th Mtg	17 Oct 44		
10	Agenda 30th Mtg	23 Oct 44		
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20	Agenda 34th Mtg	30 Nov 44		
21	Minutes 34th Mtg	30 Nov 44		
22	Agenda 35th Mtg	5 Dec 44		(Cancelled)
23	Agenda 35th Mtg	9 Dec 44		

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting
30th December 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON SATURDAY 30 DECEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

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Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

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37th Mtg
Minutes

C on S Dist

Chief Comm (31)
C on S (32)
Pol. Sec (33)

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :- K 584

Brigadier General C.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad,
Office of British Resident Minister

Colonel A.C.W. Hobson, representing (For Items 4 and 5)
Chief, INC

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.A. Bannister

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 19th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GRADISCA"

(Previous reference SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - Conclusions 2(a) and 2(b))

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the GRADISCA would be brought in the first instance to ALEXANDRIA after interception, where 400 beds were available. The numbers of wounded on board would probably exceed 400, however, and it depended on instructions sought from the War Office as to the classes of patients to be disembarked whether it would be necessary to bring the vessel into the Neel ports or ALGIERS. He hoped to avoid this if possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

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Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.A. Bannister

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

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3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

X-3201/CC

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 and Annexure)

THE CONFERENCE had before them the text of an agreement signed between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) defining their mutual relations, which had received the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the Italian Government would shortly announce the fact of the agreement and at the same time issue a retraction of the statement formerly made concerning the recognition of the CLNAI by the Allied Military Command.

THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of the terms of the agreement between the Italian Government and the CLNAI, as set forth in Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

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4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY. K 584

X-92553/cc (Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 157)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Chief of Staff reporting the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on News Agencies appointed under conclusion 5 of SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting and recommending that private news agencies be permitted to operate in ROME and that a technical sub-committee be appointed to study the further extension of their operation in liberated ITALY.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stated that at the meeting of the Sub-Committee there had been some disagreement between the viewpoints of the Allied Commission and the Psychological Warfare Branch and the admission of private news agencies to ROME had been agreed as a compromise. He felt that, although this might involve some security risk, it should be accepted. Further extension of the activities of the news agencies would be studied by the technical sub-committee, which he recommended should be under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who should report its recommendations, with his views, to AFHQ.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of ROME on and after 15 January 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, so inform the private news agencies.

(b) Appointed a technical sub-committee consisting of,

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Chairman
Director, PWB
Chief, INC
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ

or their representatives, to investigate at what juncture and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

(c) Directed that the technical sub-committee appointed under (b) above, in carrying out their investigation, have particular regard to the safeguards required to prevent the establishment of a monopolistic indigenous news agency in ITALY.

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Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ

or their representatives, to investigate at what juncture and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

(c) Directed that the technical sub-committee appointed under (b) above, in carrying out their investigation, have particular regard to the safeguards required to prevent the establishment of a monopolistic indigenous news agency in ITALY.

(d) Directed that no measures other than normal censorship be adopted to prevent the publication of material liable to cause disorder or unrest, unless in the opinion of the competent military authorities the precipitation of a situation prejudicial to military security should be imminent.

5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Chief, INC, recommending that the Italian Government be invited to create a Board of Governors to act as advisers to the management of EIAR, as a first step in freeing the Italian radio from Allied control.

/MR. BARNES

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MR. BARNES said that he would prefer to see more competition in the radio field. He felt also that the Italian radio should buy its news from the private news agencies, as had been approved in principle in the case of the Italian press. He advocated the earliest possible removal of all control over news issuing both through the press and through the radio, since it would be impracticable to maintain for long the distinction between news published in ROME and news published elsewhere in ITALY. It must be understood, however, that the removal of control would mean that PWB would no longer be able to carry out its directives received from LONDON and WASHINGTON PWB's function would then pass into the purely informational stage, and could more appropriately be undertaken by the Office of War Information (USA) and the Ministry of Information (UK) on behalf of the respective governments. He suggested that he submit a paper setting forth these considerations.

MR. MACMILLAN agreed that some adjustment of the functions of PWB would certainly follow from the freeing of the Italian press and radio and added that he believed this to be in accordance with the wishes of LONDON and WASHINGTON . He felt that the maximum liberty consistent with military security should now be accorded to the Italian press and radio, and drew a parallel between the organisation proposed for ELAR and the BBC. Proposals for relaxing existing controls were already under discussion in WASHINGTON.

MR. KIRK, approving in general the proposals under discussion, added that the PWB organisation would continue to have a valuable advisory function and expressed the hope that it would be retained in this capacity.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reaffirmed that his policy was to create a free Italian press and radio as early as feasible and to allow news to be published without restraint where this was possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the recommendations of Chief, ENC, embodied in Part III, paragraph 1, of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158 and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, take suitable action to implement them.

(b) Directed that Director, PWB, submit through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee his recommendations regarding the organisation and functions of PWB when the Italian press and radio had been freed and what transitional measures he advised.

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS

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6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 159)

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THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper requesting that the Supreme Allied Commander approve participation by representatives of the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its dependend committees.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON regarded it as unwise to appoint representatives of the Italian Government on Allied standing boards and committees, since points would inevitably arise the discussion of which in the presence of Italian representatives would be undesireble and embarrassment would therefore result. He thought it preferable to coopt Italian representatives for those meetings and subjects where their presence would be helpful.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM strongly supported the viewpoint of the Chief Administrative Officer. While recognising that there would be frequent occasions on which the presence of Italian representatives would be advantageous, particularly in the case of the Industrial Coordination Committee, he considered

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that they should be invited to attend on those specific occasions only.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY agreed with Admiral Cunningham and pointed out that the right of access to files, which would accompany permanent Italian membership of the board or standing committeess, would be undesirable.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE asserted that the proposal before the Conference was in line with what he understood to be the intention of the President and Prime Minister and that only regular membership was consistent with the position of the Italians as cobelligerents. He felt that regular membership of the board and committees was the best means of creating in the Italian Government a better understanding of the economic problems which the Allies were facing in ITALY, and that it would dispel much of the feeling on the part of the Italians that the Allies were deliberately impeding the economic rehabilitation of ITALY. Security requirements would be met by the screening of the individuals who were to become members of the committees and of the board.

MR. MACMILLAN said that since the board made the policy decisions, leaving detail to the committees, it would be wiser not to have Italian representatives on the board. He advocated that authority be given to the chairman of each committee to invite Italian representatives to be present at appropriate committee meetings, and recommended that discussion of subjects should be so arranged that when an Italian representative was invited to attend a meeting his presence throughout that particular meeting, for all items, would be appropriate Items unsuitable for discussion in the presence of the Italian representative could be discussed at a separate meeting which he would not be invited to attend.

MR. KIRK queried whether security considerations applied in respect of all committees and suggested that Italian representatives might be appointed permanently to committees in respect of which no security factors arose.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, jointly authorise the Allied Local Resources (Italian) Board to invite suitable representatives of the Italian Government to attend meetings of the Board, or of its dependent committees, upon occasions when their presence would be advantageous and would not be prejudicial to military security.

7. RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ISLANDS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 160)

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7. RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ISLANDS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 160)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper requesting a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy as to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian populations of enemy-occupied islands in the AEGEAN, and as to whether mass evacuation of civilians from those islands should be permitted.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM explained that in his view a stage had now been reached at which clarification of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy in this matter was needed. Swedish and International Red Cross relief supplies had already been authorised for admission into enemy-occupied CRETE, and relief was being sent under Allied arrangements to the neighbouring part of CRETE not occupied by the enemy. A delegation had come out of RHODES asking for relief supplies and for the mass evacuation of the civilian population of that island. He pointed out that the relief or evacuation of civilians in the German-occupied AEGEAN islands would alleviate the position of the enemy garrisons and would immeasurably increase Allied difficulties in the eastern Mediterranean.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had already requested from the staff a paper embodying details of the location and strength of German garrisons,

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the numbers and nationality of the civilian populations of the islands, and other pertinent facts. He pointed out that there were the following alternatives : to mop up the German garrisons on the islands, for which sufficient resources could not be made available; evacuation of civilians, which also was not feasible; allowing the civilian populations to starve, which was undesirable; and making it possible for shipments of food to reach them, which probably would be the desirable alternative, and which, if done, should probably be under Swedish and International Red Cross auspices.

MAJOR GENERAL AIREY said that the object of the enemy in leaving garrisons on some of the AEGEAN Islands was to cause as much embarrassment to the Allies as possible. The admission of relief to the islands would further this object. The enemy were responsible under International law for the civil populations of the islands which they held.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that if the relief came from Red Cross scurces it would be carried in ships not in the Allied shipping pool.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that indirectly Allied shipping would be affected by such shipments, since the ships used were vessels which the Allies coul have seized, but did not seize, under their right of angary.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said that it would be desirable to have a statement from the Navy as to the extent to which International Red Cross relief shipments to the AEGEAN Islands would affect Allied shipping.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and G-2, review the situation in respect of civilian populations in the enemy-occupied area of CRETE and in enemy-occupied DODECANESE and AEGEAN Islands and recommend what policy should be adopted in each case in regard to their relief and/or evacuation, taking into account particularly the following factors :-

(a) the location, strength and supply position of the enemy garrisons;

(b) the numbers and nationalities of the civilian populations and their capacity to support themselves;

(c) the effect of admitting relief supplies under Swedish or International Red Cross auspices on -

(i) the capacity of the enemy garrisons to hold out,

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(a) the location, strength and supply position of the enemy garrisons;

(b) the numbers and nationalities of the civilian populations and their capacity to support themselves;

(c) the effect of admitting relief supplies under Swedish or International Red Cross auspices on -

(i) the capacity of the enemy garrisons to hold out,

(ii) the Allied shipping position in the Eastern Mediterranean;

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(d) the availability of Swedish or International Red Cross relief supplies in the Eastern Mediterranean;

(e) the administrative implications of the evacuation of the civilian populations, in whole or in part, from enemy-held areas;

(f) the naval implications of the relief and/or evacuation of these civilian populations.

8. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

X-4010/cc THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of telegram No. NAF 830 of 21 December 1944 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting a statement of policy on the provision of bread for the populations of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA, and the

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allocation of shipping to implement that policy; and of telegram No. LAC 911 of 22 December 1944, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, furnishing an estimate of the stocks and monthly sailings necessary to provide a 300 gramme basic bread ration for ITALY and SICILY and SARDINIA.

9. RELIEF TO ALBANIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 156)

THE CONFERENCE had before them, for information, a paper by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, describing the status of Albanian relief arrangements, and stating in particular that the ship to carry engineer stores for repair of the port of DURAZZO was not being called forward pending the outcome of negotiations with Colonel-General Hoxha.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stressed the need for a careful survey of the requirements necessary for opening up the port of DURAZZO, including the minesweeping commitment involved, since these requirements could only be met at the expense of other commitments. He understood that ML ALBANIA were revising their requirements, particularly in respect of landing craft.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON remarked that no actual relief could proceed to ALBANIA before February 1945.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 156 and of the above discussion.

10. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALBANIA

THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of telegram No. W-79253 of 19 December 1944, and telegram No. W-80599 of 29 December 1944, from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US War Department respectively, stating that the United States did not contemplate sending a military mission to ALBANIA, but that it contemplated sending a State Department political representative and, possibly, military observers.

11. SPANISH AIR LINE TO THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR reported that advice had been received through the United States Political Adviser that the Spanish Government wished to operate

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11. SPANISH AIR LINE TO THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR reported that advice had been received through the United States Political Adviser that the Spanish Government wished to operate a civil air line from the Spanish mainland to the BALEARIC Islands. The State Department were under the impression that M.A.F had previously agreed to the operation of this line. While this was not the case, and some confusion with the projected line to the Canaries had arisen, M.A.F in fact had no objection, and he understood that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement. It was merely a question of issuing the necessary warnings. The Spanish Government should be advised that the air line should comply with the existing Allied instructions regarding aircraft flying in the vicinity of Allied shipping, and should be warned that the use of JU52s would increase the risk of incidents. X

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that no complications vis-à-vis Allied shipping were likely to arise at present, but they might arise in the future if the GIBRALTAR-MARSEILLES route were shortened.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser to inform the U.S. State Department that he had no objection to the inauguration by the Spanish Government of the proposed airline from BARCELONA to PALMA, subject to the considerations raised by the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean at 'X' above.

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(b) Directed the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, convey to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, for communication through the State Department to the Spanish Government, the details of the procedures and instructions which the proposed airline should observe to avoid incidents with Allied shipping.

12. EVACUATION OF EPIRUS AND IONIAN ISLANDS

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM referred to the evacuation of PREVEZA now proceeding and pointed out that Zervas was asking for the evacuation of 500 of his troops and of approximately 5,500 civilians from the island of LEVKAS. There appeared to be a possibility that a request would also be made for the evacuation of civilians from ZANTE and KEFHALLONIA. He observed that the evacuation of Greek civilians from these localities was not a commitment which he could accept. He added that he had understood the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to be to give no support either to EDES or to ELAS in this area except by way of evacuating EDES forces, but a telegram had now been received from 3 Corps indicating that a Naval patrol of the straits inside CORFU would be arranged in order to prevent landings on CORFU by ELAS or the Albanians before the island was in a position to defend itself.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the view that the 500 EDES troops should be evacuated from LEVKAS but not the 5,500 civilians. His intention was to reduce the military commitment in GREECE to the minimum as soon as possible. Evacuation of Allied troops from SALONIKA and PATRAS would be effected in accordance with this policy when conditions permitted. While the evacuation of EDES forces was desirable for humanitarian reasons actual support of Zervas would have increased the military commitment in GREECE and could not therefore be entertained.

MR. MACMILLAN added that the principle followed was not to support or to make use of Greek partisan forces but only of such Greek forces as were called up legally under the auspices of the Greek Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, discuss with him further the question of evacuation of Greeks from the IONIAN Islands.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that his intention should be evacuated from LEVKAS but not the 5,500 civilians. His intention was to reduce the military commitment in GREECE to the minimum as soon as possible. Evacuation of Allied troops from SALONIKA and PATRAS would be effected in accordance with this policy when conditions permitted. While the evacuation of EDES forces was desirable for humanitarian reasons actual support of Zervas would have increased the military commitment in GREECE and could not therefore be entertained.

MR. MACMILLAN added that the principle followed was not to support or to make use of Greek partisan forces but only of such Greek forces as were called up legally under the auspices of the Greek Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, discuss with him further the question of evacuation of Greeks from the IONIAN Islands.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting
26th December, 1944.

K-565

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON FRIDAY 29TH DECEMBER, 1944
SATURDAY

AGENDA

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G-3 and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - already circulated)

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 - to be circulated)

4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 157 - to be circulated)

5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158 - to be circulated)

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 159 - to be circulated)

7. RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY OCCUPIED ISLANDS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 160 - to be circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE:-

8. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
(Telegrams No. MAF 830 and LAC 911 of 21 and 22 December to Combined Chiefs of Staff - MC OUT 7699 and 7832)

28 DEC 1944

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03922

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - already circulated)

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 - to be circulated) ✓

4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 157 - to be circulated) ✓

5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158 - to be circulated)

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS ✓
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(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 160 - to be circulated)

. TO TAKE NOTE:-

8. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
(Telegrams No. NAF 830 and LAC 911 of 21 and 22 December to Combined Chiefs of Staff - MC OUT 7699 and 7832) ✓

9. RELIEF TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 156 - to be circulated)

10. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALBANIA
(Telegram No. W-79253 of 19 December from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff - MC IN 15364)
(Telegram No. W-80599 of 21 December from U.S. War Department - MC IN 17285)

NOTE:- Chief, INC is invited to attend or be represented for Items 4 and 5.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting
19th December 1944

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 19TH DECEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Commodore H.A. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Hon. Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell M. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

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0396

Commodore H.A. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Hon. Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell ?. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel H.B. Hitchens, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General I.L. Foster, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Major General W.A.M. Stawell,
Commander, SOM

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36th Mtg
Minutes

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section , AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 35th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee held on 9th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GRADISCA"

COMMODORE PACKER said that it was reported that the German hospital ship GRADISCA would sail shortly from TRIESTE in order to take off hospital cases from their garrison in CRETE. He drew attention to the instructions as a result of which this vessel had been intercepted in the course of her previous sailing from the AEGEAN and enquired whether a similar procedure was to be adopted on this occasion. He did not consider there would be any advantage in intercepting the vessel during her outward sailing from TRIESTE to CRETE.

MR. KIRK said that the Department of State still maintained the view, which they had expressed on the previous occasion, that interception of the German hospital ship was not advisable. However, he fully realised that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had endorsed the action which the British Admiralty had on that occasion ordered.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :

(a) Arrange for the interception of the GRADISCA on her return journey from CRETE and for the bringing of this vessel into a suitable Allied port so that German wounded, other than serious cases, could be disembarked and taken into custody.

(b) [illegible] with the Chief Administrative Officer to

0368

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COMMODORE PACKER said that it was reported that the German hospital ship GRADISCA would sail shortly from TRIESTE in order to take off hospital cases from their garrison in CRETE. He drew attention to the instructions as a result of which this vessel had been intercepted in the course of her previous sailing from the AEGEAN and enquired whether a similar procedure was to be adopted on this occasion. He did not consider there would be any advantage in intercepting the vessel during her outward sailing from TRIESTE to CRETE.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :

(a) Arrange for the interception of the GRADISCA on her return journey from CRETE and for the bringing of this vessel into a suitable Allied port so that German wounded, other than serious cases, could be disembarked and taken into custody.

(b) Determine, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to what port it would be most suitable to bring this ship in the light of availability of hospital accommodation.

3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

4930

Extracted: 4010/CC

(Papers Nos. FC (44) 152 and SAC (F) (44) 155)

THE CONFERENCE had before them two papers, the first being a record of a meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on the subject of food rationing in ITALY at which it had been decided to prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting the establishment of a 300 gramme ration throughout the liberated area of ITALY; and the second attaching a draft of such a telegram and recommending that in the event of an unfavourable reply, a further telegram proposing a reduced uniform ration should be despatched.

/LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERTSON

(21)

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that previous discussions at the Political Committee in regard to food rationing had been confined to the situation in SICILY, which was somewhat different from the rest of the country in that there was at least a strong suspicion that a considerable quantity of local wheat existed in the island, though it could not be brought forward for amassment. The preparation of a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as directed at Conclusion 3(c) of FC (44) 35th Meeting had commenced but before agreement could be reached two occurrences caused the whole situation to be reviewed. The first event was the receipt of a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, urging the establishment, by importation of the necessary wheat of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY, or, alternatively, if that could not be done, the establishment of a parity ration throughout the area on a reduced scale. The second factor was a telegram from Commanding General, Fifth Army, expressing the view that, unless further supplies were made available in forward areas, militarily serious unrest was likely to result. The former Chief Administrative Officer had, therefore, held a meeting and as a result had directed that a telegram should be drawn up, putting a strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision. A draft of this telegram was now before the meeting. Meanwhile, the Allied Commission had that morning reported (cable No. S 395 - MC IN 14636 of 18 December) that notices and posters demanding more food had appeared in FLORENCE. This was a further indication of the seriousness of the situation.

MR. KIRK thought it very necessary to lay a final statement before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and especially before the Prime Minister and the President, so that they could realise the consequences of a failure to provide this food. He considered that the phraseology of the draft telegram was impressive.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, confirmed that the necessary food to implement the ration did not exist in the country, except possibly in SICILY. There the amassment had reached 66 per cent and it was his opinion and that of his advisers that the present government would not be any more successful than its predecessor in obtaining any appreciable increase.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McNARNEY considered that portions of the telegram as at present drafted were most ill advised. Paragraph 1 in effect asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a blank cheque against future operations. The Chiefs of Staff would require an estimate of the impact on future operations of shipping the tonnage of wheat required. He was doubtful of the truth of the statement at paragraph 6

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available in forward areas, [illegible]
result. The former Chief Administrative Officer had, therefore, held a meeting and as a result had directed that a telegram should be drawn up, putting a strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision. A draft of this telegram was now before the meeting. Meanwhile, the Allied Commission had that morning reported (cable No. S 395 - MC IN 14636 of 18 December) that notices and posters demanding more food had appeared in FLORENCE. This was a further indication of the seriousness of the situation.

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, confirmed that the necessary food to implement the ration did not exist in the country, except possibly in SICILY. There the assessment had reached 66 per cent and it was his opinion and that of his advisers that the present government would not be any more successful than its predecessor in obtaining any appreciable increase.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McNARNEY considered that portions of the telegram as at present drafted were most ill advised. Paragraph 1 in effect asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a blank cheque against future operations. The Chiefs of Staff would require an estimate of the impact on future operations of shipping the tonnage of wheat required. He was doubtful of the truth of the statement at paragraph 6 of the draft that the shipping allotted to the theatre for operational maintenance would not permit any further reduction and urged that an immediate examination should be made to determine what additional shipments were required to meet the 300 gramme ration and what proportion of these could be met from allocations already made to the theatre. The telegram should be redrafted to include this information and the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be asked to provide the balance of the shipping necessary. A contribution by the Theatre from normal sailings would assist in securing a favourable reply.

4989

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER accepted General McNarney's views as to how the case should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was disturbed by the lack of food which he considered would sooner or later lead to unrest and disorders to the detriment of operations. He considered that definite promises to the Italians had been made and felt that action must be taken to implement them.

/LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERTSON

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that owing to the machinery by which previous cuts in the theatre allocation of shipping had been effected these reductions had been made mainly at the expense of US military maintenance.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer establish :-

(i) What monthly sailings of wheat, additional to those at present programmed, would be required to ensure the maintenance of a 300 gramme ration throughout ITALY during the period until the next harvest became available for consumption.

(ii) What contribution, if any, in terms of sailings per month, could be made by the Mediterranean Theatre from the existing operational shipping programme without serious prejudice to military operations in the theatre.

(b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in consultation with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, redraft those portions of the draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.C (P) (44) 155 to which the latter had taken exception, in such a way as to put the matter in the best possible light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, adding a statement of the results of the examination carried out under (a) above.

(c) Directed that for the present no action be taken on recommendation 3(b) of paper No. S.C (P) (44) 155 pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.

(d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for the drawing up of plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10 January 1945 but that action to implement such plans be deferred pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.

(e) Directed that Conclusion 3(b) of PC (44) 35th Meeting be regarded as cancelled.

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure
Paper No. S.C (P) (44) 154)

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portions of the draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.C (P) (44) 155 to which the latter had taken exception, in such a way as to put the matter in the best possible light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, adding a statement of the results of the examination carried out under (a) above.

(c) Directed that for the present no action be taken on recommendation 3(b) of paper No. S.C (P) (44) 155 pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 gramme ration.

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(e) Directed that Conclusion 3(b) of PC (44) 35th Meeting be regarded as cancelled.

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Extract 1 320/kc

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure
Paper No. S.C (P) (44) 154)

In addition to papers which had been considered at their previous meeting, the CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that the delegates of the CLN.I had certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy. 4988

MR. KIRK said he was in favour of any agreement which the Italian Government were prepared, of their own volition, to enter into with the CLN.I. On the other hand, there should not be any Allied attempt to dictate to, or to exert pressure on, either party since such action, apart from being an undesirable intervention in Italian internal affairs, might result in the establishment in Northern ITALY of an authority which might later oppose the ROME Government.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the first paragraph of the draft Agreement circulated with PC (44) 144 had been drawn so as to provide for the participation of the Italian Government in the military agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLN.I, which had already been signed. The Italian Prime Minister had stated to him that he was prepared to recognise the CLN.I in these terms, or

/alternatively

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alternatively in the terms which had been suggested in August, but he was not willing to designate them as the agents of his Government in Northern ITALY. On the other hand, he understood that the CLN.I were not willing to recognise the Italian Government in the terms proposed.

MAJOR GENERAL STAVELL said that, according to the views which the delegates had expressed to him, the CLN.I were now prepared to recognise the Italian Government. He was of opinion that their recognition by the Italian Government as the latter's agents would produce much improved resistance activities in northern ITALY and would also decrease the problems to be met when that area was occupied. He explained that the Allied authorities had up till now been acting as intermediaries in regard to discussions between the Italian government and the CLN.I and he urged that the time had now come for the remaining CLN.I delegate, who possessed plenary powers, to negotiate directly with the Italian government a form of agreement for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Committee would not sign the agreement in the form proposed at present.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that an agreement between the Italian Government and the CLN.I would be advantageous. He would not, however, consider any modification of his existing agreement with the CLN.I; nor was he willing to enter into a tripartite agreement with that body and the Italian Government, since this would embroil him in any future differences between the CLN.I and the ROME Government. He agreed that representatives of the CLN.I and the Italian Government should be brought together and allowed to work out an agreement between themselves but as military considerations were involved such an agreement must be subject to his approval.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS considered that such an agreement would have two advantages. It would strengthen the hand of the Italian Government after the occupation of northern ITALY and meanwhile it would strengthen the partisans and enable them to carry out increased activities. He observed that payments were at present being provided from British sources to the CLN.I and reported that it had been suggested that if the Italian Government did not agree to take over responsibility for these payments they should become a joint British and US account. Whatever the financial procedure adopted, however, the commitment would eventually be shouldered by the Italian Government under the existing general financial arrangement.

MR. BROAD said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

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MR. BROAD said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR and REAR ADMIRAL STONE supported the Supreme Allied Commander's view that a bilateral agreement, subject to his approval, should be concluded between the Italian Government and the CLN.I, if this could be done without Allied pressure.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that no further action be taken towards concluding a tripartite agreement between himself, the Italian Government and the CLNAI.

(b) Directed that the Allied Commission arrange to put the remaining delegate of the CLN.I in touch with the Italian Government with a view to the conclusion between these two authorities, subject to his approval, of a voluntary bilateral agreement to govern their mutual relations.

/(c) Directed

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(c) Directed that his existing military agreement with the CLNAI remain unchanged.

5. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Extracted file 9253.cc

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 153)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that it was desirable, in order to give the Italians greater liberty, that private press agencies should soon be permitted to operate in ITALY, but arguing that such action would give rise to certain difficulties if the change were made at the present time.

MR. KIRK said that the aim should be that when the Allies left ITALY they should leave behind them a healthy, free press. However, unless the Italians were given a measure of freedom now, they would not develop the ability to manage their own affairs. He fully realised that there were certain complications in practice in connection with the proposed changes but he thought that the principle was sufficiently important for these difficulties to be accepted. The position of the military in this matter was, he felt, adequately covered by the requirements of military censorship.

MR. BARNES said that PWB was perfectly willing to hand over to the Italians the press facilities which they at present controlled in ITALY. However, he pointed out that this might give rise to three difficulties. In the first place, as all incoming news was now screened by PWB, it might be necessary for military reasons to impose a political censorship by AFHQ, the repercussions of which might on occasion be severe. In the second place it was difficult to see how private agencies could be provided with the means of communication necessary to distribute their news throughout the country unless some assistance could be provided by army signals. In this connection, he pointed out, in reply to a remark by Rear Admiral Stone, that it would not meet the case if the existing PWB communications were handed over to an Italian agency, as such action would automatically place that agency in a position of monopoly. The third difficulty which he foresaw was that the opening up of ITALY to foreign news agencies would lead to a demand by other private business organisations to commence working in the country. He thought it likely that the Motion Picture companies in particular would make such an application.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE did not consider that incoming news handled by private agencies would need to be subject to political censorship. He thought that the Italian people should now be permitted to read

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE did not consider that incoming news handled by private agencies would need to be subject to political censorship. He thought that the Italian people should now be permitted to read accounts of current affairs as published in other countries. He pointed out that a procedure had already been set up to deal with the demands of the motion picture companies and he did not foresee any complications in this respect. He remarked that, even after the proposed admission of private agencies, there would remain a need for PWB activities in AMG territory. He agreed with Mr. Barnes that it was most undesirable for the handover to be effected in any way which would tend to produce a monopoly of news in the country.

4986

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, as the Allies had now been in ITALY for more than a year, we should be prepared to sacrifice certain advantages in order to give the Italians greater liberty in the management of their internal affairs, provided always that no serious interference with military operations resulted.

MR. BARNES confirmed that this was the aim towards which PWB had been working. The only question for decision was in regard to the timing of the proposed transfer of responsibility. PWB had been endeavouring

/to build

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to build up an Italian non-monopolistic private news agency. However, he did not yet consider that this agency was sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, disagreeing with Mr. Barnes, observed that the Italians themselves thought they were ready to stand on their own feet and applications from external private news agencies indicated that they were of this opinion also.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McNARNEY observed that, if the proposed Italian agency were weak, the external private agencies would break it. He considered that the purpose for which these agencies were now trying to secure entry into the country, was to establish their post-war position.

COLONEL HITCHENS said that on grounds of military security a change would not be propitious at the present moment.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in ITALY at the earliest moment consistent with the military security.

(b) Appointed the following sub-committee :-

Chairman - Chief of Staff

Representatives of - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Chief Signals Officer
Director, PWB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, INC.

Secretary - Major W. A. Bannister

to examine and report to him :-

(i) At what juncture the removal of the PWB screen on news issued to the Italian press should be effected, and the operation of private news agencies in ITALY permitted.

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0402

(a) Agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in ITALY at the earliest moment consistent with the military security.

(b) Appointed the following sub-committee :-

Chairman - Chief of Staff

Representatives of - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Chief Signals Officer
Director, PWB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, PNC.

Secretary - Major W. A. Bannister

to examine and report to him :-

(i) At what juncture the removal of the PWB screen on news issued to the Italian press should be effected, and the operation of private news agencies in ITALY permitted.

(ii) What safeguards should be established to ensure that there should be no development in ITALY of a monopolistic indigenous news agency. 4985

(iii) What measures should be taken in regard to the dissemination of news in ITALY to avoid the publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest to the prejudice of military operations,

and that the Sub-Committee confine their recommendations to that part of ITALY, responsibility for the administration of which had been returned to the Italian Government.

/6. RELIEF

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6. RELIEF IN YUGOSL.VI.A K 552

(Previous reference PC (44) 35th Meeting - Minute 9)

THE CONFERENCE had before them telegram No. FX 69206 to Brigadier Maclean, directing him to endeavour to reach agreement with Marshal Tito on the subject of relief, and telegram No. N.F 829 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the contents of a telegram received from Brigadier Maclean showing the urgent need of relief in D.LM.TI. and of the contents of the Supreme Allied Commander's reply.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS pointed out that the reason for the breakdown of negotiations with Tito had been his failure to allow adequate supervision of relief distribution in accordance with the requirements of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McNARNEY observed that there would be little prospect of obtaining any relaxation of these requirements from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. OFFIE stated that an unconfirmed report had that morning reached him that Marshal Tito had agreed to the principle of unrestricted observation and to the entry initially of 100 observers.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above discussion.

7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GREECE

THE CONFERENCE :-

Took note of telegram No. LI 189 from III Corps, reporting that UNRRA was withdrawing its personnel from integration with ML GREECE in the ATHENS-PIRAEUS area, and of telegrams Nos. FH 69914 and M.T 462 to UNRRA LONDON and CCAC respectively requesting them to instruct Chief, UNRRA, GREECE Commission, that in any area of withdrawal due to hostilities re-integration should be effected immediately upon cessation of such hostilities.

J. H. L.SCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Chiefs of Staff.

MR. OTTIE stated that an unconfirmed report had that morning reached him that Marshal Tito had agreed to the principle of unrestricted observation and to the entry initially of 100 observers.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above discussion.

7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GREECE

THE CONFERENCE :-

Took note of telegram No. LI 189 from III Corps, reporting that UNRRA was withdrawing its personnel from integration with ML GREECE in the ATHENS-PIRAEUS area, and of telegrams Nos. FH 69914 and M.T 462 to UNRRA LONDON and CCAC respectively requesting them to instruct Chief, UNRRA, GREECE Commission, that in any area of withdrawal due to hostilities re-integration should be effected immediately upon cessation of such hostilities.

J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
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K 552

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Secretary General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander, Balkan Air Force	46-50
Spares	51-55

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Chief Signals Officer	Item 5	1 copy
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G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
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Spares	51-55

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K-541

SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting
17th December, 1944

COPY NO. 28

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM ON TUESDAY 19TH DECEMBER, 1944

A G E N D A

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, C-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 35th Meeting - already circulated)

3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
((a) Paper No. PC (44) 152 - already circulated)
((b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 155 - to be circulated)

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
((a) Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure - already circulated)
((b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 154 - already circulated)

5. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 153 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

6. RELIEF IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Telegrams No. FX 69206 - MC OUT 5583 and No. NAF 829 - MC OUT 5584 to Brigadier Maclean and Combined Chiefs of Staff respectively, dated 15th December, 1944)

7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GREECE

((a) Telegram No.LI 189 - MC IN 11433 of 12 December from III Corps.)
((b) Telegrams No. FX 69914 - MC OUT 6036 and No.

0414
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015
100 2-1

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS
(PC (44) 35th Meeting - already circulated)

3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
((a) Paper No. PC (44) 152 - already circulated)
((b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 155 - to be circulated)

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
((a) Paper No. PC (44) -144 and Annexure - already circulated)
((b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 154 - already circulated)

5. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 153 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

6. RELIEF IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Telegrams No. FX 69206 - MC OUT 5583 and No. NAF 829 - MC OUT 5584 to Brigadier Maclean and Combined Chiefs of Staff respectively, dated 15th December, 1944)

7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GREECE

((a) Telegram No.LI 189 - MC IN 11433 of 12 December from III Corps.)
((b) Telegrams No. FX 69914 - MC OUT 6036 and No. MAT 462 - MC OUT 6034 to UNRRA LONDON and CCAC respectively, dated 16th December, 1944)

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NOTE:-

Commander, SOMTO is invited to attend for Item 4
Chief, INC is invited to attend or be represented for Item 5.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander, SOMTO, c/o SOMLO	46-47
Chief, INC	48
Spares	49-53

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G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4 (A)	42
G-4 (B)	43-45
G-5	46-47
Commander, SOMTO, c/o SOMLO	48
Chief, INC	49-53
Spares	

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 525
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PC (44) 35th Meeting (Corrigendum)
13th December 1944

(24)

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. At the request of Mr. Broad the following amendment is issued to the Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the Political Committee :-

Item 11. Add after Brigadier Lush's statement the following :-

"MR. BROAD said that H.M Government considered that it was necessary to adhere to the existing agreement under which proposed appointments must all be submitted to the Allied Commission for approval".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Director, PWB	25
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Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30

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British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PB	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33 — {cc. CJS Polsec "A" Files — 4980
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 (Special Operations)	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander, Balkan Air Force	46-51
Spares	52-56

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P.C.(44) 35th. Meeting
10th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS 6521 SECRET

So to Chief Commissioner

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

DEC 12 RECD
CC. 1129

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1130 HOURS ON SATURDAY 9 DECEMBER, 1944.

PRESENT:-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister.

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.C.H. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister.

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES:

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major J.C. Sweetman

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K 521

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING.

(PC (44) 34th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their Meeting held on 30th November, 1944.

2. RELIEF FOR ALBANIA.

(Previous reference PC (44) 34th Meeting - Minute 5.)

COLONEL MENN reported that arrangements were in hand to commence distribution of relief in ALBANIA on 1 January 1945. A mission was being dispatched to the country in the near future to make the necessary contacts.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER took note with approval of the above.

3. WHEAT FOR SICILY.

Extracted X-4021/cc

(Previous reference - PC (44) 34th Meeting - Minute 7.)

BRIGADIER LUSH stated that the position regarding the amassment of Sicilian grain had further deteriorated and present supplies would run out in the major towns on 15 December. A shipment of 9,000 tons was due to arrive on 20 December and it was proposed to cover the intervening period by moving 5,000 tons of grain to SICILY by rail. The shipment of 9,000 tons would then suffice until 10 January. Thereafter imports would be required until the next harvest in July. The present shortage was due to the failure of the Italian Administration to secure delivery from the local farmers of an adequate supply of grain, amassment of which had failed by some 70,000 tons to meet even the reduced estimate. However, it had always been realized that local supplies would not suffice for the needs of the Island until the next harvest and the import of some 121,000 tons, in March and subsequent months, had been envisaged in order to support the 300 gramme ration. He suggested that these shipments might now be spread over the months January - June, either the amount of the ration or the number of ration holders being proportionately reduced. The reduction of the ration to 200 grammes would allow a reduction to some 70/80,000 tons in imports. In reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that the Italian Administration had, in certain cases, used both troops and carabinieri to seize hoarded grain from the farmers, but this action had not in the main been directed against the larger land-owners, who were considered to be the principal offenders. The High Commissioner in SICILY had now ordered farmers to produce 25 kg. each of wheat immediately. The local administration were taking steps to enforce the collection of this amount.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY believed that there were considerable supplies [illegible] SICILY. The Allies should not employ operational

0422

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Sicilian grain had further deteriorated and present supplies would run out in the major towns on 15 December. A shipment of 9,000 tons was due to arrive on 20 December and it was proposed to cover the intervening period by moving 5,000 tons of grain to SICILY by rail. The shipment of 9,000 tons would then suffice until 10 January. Thereafter imports would be required until the next harvest in July. The present shortage was due to the failure of the Italian Administration to secure delivery from the local farmers of an adequate supply of grain, amassment of which had failed by some 70,000 tons to meet even the reduced estimate. However, it had always been realized that local supplies would not suffice for the needs of the Island until the next harvest and the import of some 121,000 tons, in March and subsequent months, had been envisaged in order to support the 300 gramme ration. He suggested that these shipments might now be spread over the months January - June, either the amount of the ration or the number of ration holders being proportionately reduced. The reduction of the ration to 200 grammes would allow a reduction to some 70/80,000 tons in imports. In reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that the Italian Administration had, in certain cases, used both troops and carabinieri to seize hoarded grain from the farmers, but this action had not in the main been directed against the larger land-owners, who were considered to be the principal offenders. The High Commissioner in SICILY had now ordered farmers to produce 25 kg. each of wheat immediately. The local administration were taking steps to enforce the collection of this amount.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY believed that there were considerable supplies of local wheat hoarded in SICILY. The Allies should not employ operational shipping to import grain into areas in which local supplies existed. It should be made plain to the Italian Government that by 10 January 1945 they must have made adequate arrangements to provide grain for the Sicilian towns from local resources, if necessary by forceful requisition. In his opinion, the only way to force the Administration to requisition local wheat was to suspend shipments, as in present circumstances these only served to feed the black-market. Suspension of shipments might be coupled with Government-controlled relief.

BRIGADIER LUSH in reply pointed out that, as the shortage was confined to the towns, withholding of shipments might cause riots in PALERMO and CATANIA. He did not consider that the provision of relief, by means of emergency soup kitchens or such like arrangements, under Italian Government control was practicable in view of the weakness of the Administration.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM observed that the Sicilian ports were of considerable Naval importance and riots in these towns would have an adverse effect on Naval operations in the Theater.

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SECRET

K 521

MR. BARNES agreed with Lieutenant General McNarney that the farmers were withholding their wheat in the hope of obtaining higher prices on the black-market. He considered, however, that no manipulation of prices paid by the Government would induce the farmers to bring forward more grain. If riots occured, he thought that they would be directed against the larger land-owners and would not initially be anti-Allied in nature.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that the maintenance of the 300 gramme ration in SICILY would involve a commitment for 4½ Liberty ships per month, which could only be met at the expense of operational requirements. He thought, and Lieutenant General Gammell agreed, that the two Italian Divisions in SICILY should be used to extract the hoarded grain by force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER was not prepared to accept the diversion of shipping from operational requirements. He considered that the Sicilian ration should be reduced to 200 grammes at once.

MR. KIRK felt that it was necessary to galvanize the Italian Government into action to force the local farmers to hand over their wheat. He thought that the best means of doing this was to withhold further shipments and enforce the immediate reduction of the ration.

MR. BROAD, while agreeing with Mr. Kirk, commented that this action would need to be taken in conjunction with a carefully planned propoganda campaign.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

(a) That the Allied Commission take action to move 5,000 tons of wheat to SICILY by rail, in order, in conjunction with the shipment of 9,000 tons due on 20 December, to provide adequate grain for the Sicilian towns until 10 January.

(b) That the Allied Commission instruct the Italian Government:

(i) That in view of the failure to secure adequate amassment of local wheat in SICILY, the ration in that Island should be cut to 200 grammes per head per day forthwith.

(ii) That forcible measures to requisition adequate local supplies to meet the requirements of the Sicilian towns from 10 January 1945 until the next harvest must be taken at once.

(iii) That further shipments would not be forthcoming..

(c) That G-5 prepare for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken, and requesting guidance as to

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MR. BROAD, while agreeing with Mr. Kirk, commented that this action would need to be taken in conjunction with a carefully planned propoganda campaign.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

(a) That the Allied Commission take action to move 5,000 tons of wheat to SICILY by rail, in order, in conjunction with the shipment of 9,000 tons due on 20 December, to provide adequate grain for the Sicilian towns until 10 January.

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(ii) That forcible measures to requisition adequate local supplies to meet the requirements of the Sicilian towns from 10 January 1945 until the next harvest must be taken at once.

(iii) That further shipments would not be forthcoming..

(c) That G-5 prepare for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken, and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local amassment.

4. ALLEGED YUGOSLAV DESERTERS.

Extracted: 091

(Paper No. FC (44) 148)

SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS INTO YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION.

(Paper No. FC (44) 150)

THE COMMITTEE had before them two papers, the first recommending a procedure for screening Yugoslav requests to have deserters from the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation apprehended and returned to Yugoslav jurisdiction and the second dealing with the subject of subversion of Italian troops of Yugoslav origin and their illegal recruitment into the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, recommending an interim reply to the Italian Minister of War on the subject pending a full investigation of Yugoslav activities in ITALY.

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that it should be made clear that only deserters from the Partisan Land Forces would be returned to their jurisdiction. The position had become obscure owing to Niksic's broadcast from LONDON directing all Yugoslavs to declare for Marshal Tito's forces, but he understood that this did not apply to the Royal Yugoslav Navy and Air Force for which separate arrangements were in force. Deserters from the Royal Yugoslav Navy or Air Force should be handed back to these organizations.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EAKER wished it to be made clear that some 18 men of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force, now serving with USAAF, should not be forced, against their will, to return to Yugoslavia, where they felt reprisals would be taken against them.

MR. BROAD considered that final action on these matters should not be taken until the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations in LONDON, regarding the formation of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government, were known.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Deferred action on Paper No. PC (44) 148 and instructed the Secretary to bring this paper forward for further consideration by the Political Committee when the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations in LONDON were known.

(b) Directed that G-5 address an interim reply to the Allied Commission in accordance with Conclusion 5 a of Paper No. PC (44) 150.

(c) Directed that G-2 (in conjunction with G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission) prepare for the Political Committee a report as to the numbers, location and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison Officers and Missions in ITALY, and as a result of their investigation:

(i) Draft for his approval a further communication to be made to the Allied Commission for transmission to the Italian Minister of War.

(ii) Recommend, as soon as the United Provisional Yugoslav Government was established, what action should be taken to induce this Government to eliminate its superfluous Liaison Officers and Missions, reducing its Military Representatives to conform with its proper needs in ITALY.

5. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL.

Extracts
D41

(Paper No. PC (44) 147)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper describing how certain anti-Tito [illegible] had requested the Allied Commission to allow them to re- [illegible] that

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

Committee when the results of Dr. [illegible]

(b) Directed that G-5 address an interim reply to the Allied Commission in accordance with Conclusion 5 a of Paper No. PC (44) 150.

(c) Directed that G-2 (in conjunction with G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission) prepare for the Political Committee a report as to the numbers, location and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison Officers and Missions in ITALY, and as a result of their investigation:

(i) Draft for his approval a further communication to be made to the Allied Commission for transmission to the Italian Minister of War.

(ii) Recommend, as soon as the United Provisional Yugoslav Government was established, what action should be taken to induce this Government to eliminate its superfluous Liaison Officers and Missions, reducing its Military Representatives to conform with its proper needs in ITALY.

5. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL.

Estimated 291

(Paper No. PC (44) 147)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper describing how certain anti-Tito Yugoslav Officers had requested the Allied Commission to allow them to recruit anti-Tito Yugoslav personnel into combatant units, and recommending that no action should be taken by the Allies with a view to such a development. 4.76

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Approved the conclusion set forth at Paragraph 4 of Paper No. PC (44) 147 and directed that the Allied Commission take action accordingly.

6. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTEINGS.

(Paper No. PC (44) 145)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper stating that it was desirable, for Naval reasons, for Italian schooners proceeding to the Northern Adriatic to use routes through Yugoslav territorial waters, but pointing out the political difficulties which such a course involved.

(4) THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER: directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean:

(a) Request Marshal Tito through Brigadier Maclean to authorize the passage through Yugoslav territorial waters of schooners proceeding under the Italian flag on missions in direct support of Allied Military operations, and to issue the necessary instructions to local Yugoslav Commanders.

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(b) Consider whether any distinguishing marks, additional to those already carried by such vessels, should be adopted to facilitate their identification by the Yugoslavs as employed in Allied service.

7. EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE ON COMBINED RELIEF OPERATIONS.

(Paper No. PC (44) 151)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper, showing that present conditions in GREECE rendered the equitable distribution of relief extremely difficult and recommending that a draft cable be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the position and requesting guidance.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS stated that recent developments in GREECE raised two points in regard to relief supplies. In the first place, it was for consideration whether a further directive should be issued to Lieutenant General Scobie. Secondly he thought it would be appropriate to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the action being taken in respect of ML GREECE.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Directed that no further instructions be sent to Lieutenant General Scobie in respect of relief matters at present.

(b) Approved the draft telegram annexed to Paper No. PC (44) 151 and directed that G-5 despatch it.*

8. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

Extracted: 3201/cc

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff at which there had been drawn up a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY (CLNAI). The agreement had been so drafted that, by the omission of certain passages, it could be converted into a bilateral agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI. The annexure to this paper described how, in view of the delay that would be necessary before the new Italian Government could sign the agreement and the urgent need of the CLNAI delegates to return to Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander had decided to proceed immediately with the bilateral agreement and to return the delegation. It was reported to the Committee that this agreement had subsequently been signed and that it was hoped that the agreement of the Italian Government to convert it into a tripartite agreement would be secured at a later date.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

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(a) Directed that no further instructions be sent to [redacted] General Scobie in respect of relief matters at present.

(b) Approved the draft telegram annexed to Paper No. PC (44) 151 and directed that G-5 despatch it.*

8. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

Extracted: 3201/cc

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff at which there had been drawn up a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY (CLNAI). The agreement had been so drafted that, by the omission of certain passages, it could be converted into a bilateral agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI. The annexure to this paper described how, in view of the delay that would be necessary before the new Italian Government could sign the agreement and the urgent need of the CLNAI delegates to return to Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander had decided to proceed immediately with the bilateral agreement and to return the delegation. It was reported to the Committee that this agreement had subsequently been signed and that it was hoped that the agreement of the Italian Government to convert it into a tripartite agreement would be secured at a later date.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

9. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA.

475

(Paper No. PC (44) 146)

THE COMMITTE had before them a paper pointing out that it had been intended to send two relief ships to SPLIT and DUBROVNIK under certain conditions, less restrictive than those necessary for the implementation of the full ML plan, but that Marshal Tito had been unwilling to accept even these reduced conditions. In consequence these ships had not been sent, but on humanitarian grounds a consignment of supplies had been sent by schooners to SPLIT. Marshal Tito had been informed of this in telegram No. FX 62867 dated 4 December 1944.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

10. RELATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS.

(24)

(Paper No. PC (44) 149)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper appending copies of draft agreements between the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito, in regard to the introduction of forces into the ZARA area and the use of Yugoslav ports

* Subsequently dispatched as MAT 442 of 9 December.

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by Allied Naval Forces. These draft agreements had been taken into Yugoslavia by Brigadier Maclean for negotiation with Marshal Tito.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

11. FORMATION OF NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

Extract 225-5/cc

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER inquired what was the position regarding the submission of the names of the New Italian Government for approval by the Allied authorities, with particular reference to the precedent set at the time of the last change of government.

MR. KIRK replied that the situation at the last change of government was a special one in that the British Government, on being informed of the composition of the new government, asked that an extraordinary meeting of the advisory council should be held to express its opinion on Signor BONOMI and his government which had not taken office until that opinion had been expressed. Mr. Kirk observed that the United States Government now took the position that the composition of the Italian Government was entirely a matter for the Italians themselves, although any new government must subscribe to the same commitments towards the Allies as had been undertaken by the previous government, and the Supreme Allied Commander might, if necessary for military reasons, veto the appointment of the heads of service ministries.

BRIGADIER LUSH said that the composition of the new government would be notified to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in the course of the day and that the Chief Commissioner would inform the United States and British representatives in Rome and would report the names to AFHQ. It had not been

MR. BROAD said that H.M. Government considered that it was necessary to adhere to the existing agreement under which proposed appointments must all be submitted to the Allied Commission for approval.

J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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Supreme Allied Commander	1
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Chief of Staff	15
[illegible] Administrative Officer	16
	17

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by Allied Naval Forces. These draft agreements had been taken into Yugoslavia by Brigadier Maclean for negotiation with Marshal Tito.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

11. FORMATION OF NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

Extracted 225-S/c

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BRIGADIER LUSH said that the composition of the new government would be notified to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in the course of the day and that the Chief Commissioner would inform the United States and British representatives in Rome and would report the names to AFHQ. It had not been stipulated that the composition of the government required approval by AFHQ.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

J. H. L. SCHLLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25

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military reasons, veto the appointment of the heads of service ministries.

BRIGADIER LUSH said that the composition of the new government would be notified to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in the course of the day and that the Chief Commissioner would inform the United States and British representatives in Rome and would report the names to AFHQ. It had not been stipulated that the composition of the government required approval by AFHQ.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

J. H. L. SCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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U.S. Political Adviser		18-20
British Resident Minister		21-24
Director, PWB		25
Secretary General Staff		26
Secretary, IS & PS		27-29
Chief, Liaison Section		30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission		31-33
G-1 (A)		34
G-1 (B)		35
G-2		36-37
G-3		38-39
G-3 Special Operations		40
G-4 (A)		41
G-4 (B)		42
G-5		43-45
Spares		46-50
Commander, Balkan Air Force		51-56
	EXTRACTS	
Lt. Col. J. W. Evans, HQ III Corps	Minute 7	4 Copies
A. HQ (Balkans) c/o G-5	Minutes 2,7 and 9	2 "
Commander SOMTO c/o SOLO	Minute 8	2 "

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-5

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PC (44) 35th Meeting
8th December, 1944

COPY NO. 31

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1130 HOURS ON SATURDAY 9TH DECEMBER, 1944

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 34th Meeting - already circulated)

2. ALLEGED YUGOSLAV DESERTERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 148 - already circulated)

3. SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN TO YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
(Paper No. PC (44) 150 - already circulated)

4. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)

5. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTEINGS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE:-

6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure - already circulated)

7. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - already circulated)
(Telegram No. FX 62867 to Maclean Mission - MC OUT 1313 - 4 Dec)

8. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. PC (44) 149 - already circulated)

Note:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is requested to attend for Items 2 and 3.

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3. SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN TO YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
(Paper No. PC (44) 150 - already circulated)

4. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)

5. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTEINGS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE:-

6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
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(Paper No. PC (44) 149 - already circulated)

Note:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is requested to attend for Items 2 and 3.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
Secretary.

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Chief Administrative Officer	16	G-4 (B)	42
Deputy Chief of Staff	17	G-5	43-45
U.S.Political Adviser	18-20	Commander,SOM	46
British Resident Minister	21-24	Spares	47-51
Director, PWB	25		
Secretary, General Staff	26		
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29		
Chief, Liaison Section	30		
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission c/o IS & PS	31-33		

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PC (44) 35th Meeting
5th December, 1944

COPY NO. 31

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD AT 1100 HOURS IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM ON WEDNESDAY 6TH DECEMBER, 1944

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 34th Meeting - already circulated)

2. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 - already circulated)
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 Annexure - to be circulated)

3. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTEINGS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)

4. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - to be circulated)

5. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)

Note: This was cancelled and meeting held on 9th with new agenda — See folio (2 3).

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS 6 DEC 1944

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	13-14

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(Paper No. PC (44) 144 Annexure - to be circulated)

3. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTEINGS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)

4. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - to be circulated)

5. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)

Note: This was cancelled and meeting held on 9th with new agenda — see folio (23).

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS 6 DEC 1944

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Chief Administrative Officer	16
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Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50
SOM LO	51-52

NOTE:- Commander, SO (M) Is invited to attend for Item 2.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 34th Meeting
1st December, 1944.

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1500 HOURS ON THURSDAY 30TH NOVEMBER, 1944

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. F.G. Reinhardt, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Noce,

34th Mtg
Minutes

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. F.G. Reinhardt, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

4271

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier C.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 Plans, AFHQ

Colonel T.R. Henn,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

(21)

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/Secretaries....

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 33rd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd November, as subsequently amended.

2. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN BARI
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 3)

X - 291

MAJOR GENERAL NOCE reported that the Partisan Commander in BARI had now received instructions from Marshal Tito that JANL personnel in ITALY were to conform with the orders in force for all Allied troops. While he had undertaken, therefore, that arms would not be carried off duty, personnel on guards or picquets would be armed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that officers commanding hospitals had complained that Partisan Commisars were discharging JANL patients without reference to the RAMC staff. He had accordingly requested Brigadier Maclean to ask Marshal Tito to issue orders designed to discontinue this practice.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference P C (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

X-3201/c

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ridden by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy would be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander,

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SECRET

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 33rd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd November, as subsequently amended.

2. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN BARI
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 3)

X-291

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that officers commanding hospitals had complained that Partisan Commisars were discharging JANL patients without reference to the RAMC staff. He had accordingly requested Brigadier Maclean to ask Marshal Tito to issue orders designed to discontinue this practice.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference P C (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

X-5201/cc

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ridden by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy would be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander,

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without reference to the RAMC staff. He had accordingly requested Brigadier Maclean to ask Marshal Tito to issue orders designed to discontinue this practice.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference P C (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

X-3201/cc

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note with approval of the above

4. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that the Officer Commanding DELHI had reported from SPLIT that food was so scarce that he had supplied a certain quantity including flour to the local population. In exchange for it he had been receiving vegetables. Admiral Cunningham felt that it was improper for H.M. ships to engage in barter, but had queried whether it would not be possible to allow naval craft proceeding to YUGOSLAVIA to carry up to 10 tons of supplies drawn from military stocks, as had been done at the time of the German withdrawal from GREECE.

/Lieutenant General Clark

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that the two ships, previously loaded for YUGOSLAVIA had now been waiting at TARANTO for some 10 days as it was felt that if they had proceeded immediately to YUGOSLAVIA in accordance with Conclusion 8(a) of PC(44) 33rd Meeting, Partisan local commanders might have refused to allow them to unload, pending receipt of TITO's orders. Brigadier Maclean was now on his way to BELGRADE with instructions to obtain TITO's agreement to the unloading of these ships and other emergency measures of relief without prejudice to the BARI discussions. He appreciated, however, that it might be some time before TITO's instructions were received at the ports.

MR. BROAD pointed out that a telegram had already been despatched to BELGRADE embodying the instructions given to Brigadier Maclean.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR thought that ad hoc relief should be introduced forthwith on the lines suggested by Admiral Cunningham.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for the immediate sailing for destinations previously planned of the two relief ships now held at TARANTO, and for their retention offshore from their destinations if Marshal Tito's agreement to their discharge had not been received by the time they arrived.

(b) Authorised the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to arrange further that vessels proceeding to Yugoslav ports should each carry up to 10 tons of relief supplies drawn from military stocks if, in the opinion of those two officers, the supplies provided under (a) above proved insufficient to relieve destitution in the vicinity of the ports.

5. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 10)

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD reported that contrary to Conclusion 10(a) of PC (44) 33rd Meeting, G-5 with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff, the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister had deemed it advisable to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that steps were being taken to initiate relief operations in ALBANIA. Before this decision could be implemented, it would [illegible] by ML (ALBANIA)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(a) [illegible] conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for the immediate sailing for destinations previously planned of the two relief ships now held at TARANTO, and for their retention offshore from their destinations if Marshal Tito's agreement to their discharge had not been received by the time they arrived.

(b) Authorised the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to arrange further that vessels proceeding to Yugoslav ports should each carry up to 10 tons of relief supplies drawn from military stocks if, in the opinion of these two officers, the supplies provided under (a) above proved insufficient to relieve destitution in the vicinity of the ports.

5. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA
(Previous reference FC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 10)

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD reported that contrary to Conclusion 10(a) of FC (44) 33rd Meeting, G-5 with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff, the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister had deemed it advisable to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that steps were being taken to initiate relief operations in ALBANIA. Before this decision could be implemented, it would be necessary to allot the service units required by ML (ALBANIA) This question was now under review but it would probably be some weeks before relief supplies began to reach ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

4969

6. ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY
(Previous reference FC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 12)

X-225-5-Fc

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL observed that, in advancing the Allied Governments' desiderata in connection with the new Italian Cabinet, the Allied Commission had asked that General Piancentino, the Italian Chief of Air Staff, be relieved of the additional role of Secretary of State for Air and that a non-service Secretary of State be appointed.

State

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the Allied Commission had at his request also asked for the retention of Admiral de Courten as Minister of Marine.

(21)

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above statement.

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7, WHEAT FOR SICILY
(Previous reference PC (44) 142)

X-4021/CC

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper:-

(a) Revealing that the amassment of Sicilian grain had fallen short of previous estimates, and that it would be necessary to import 160,000 tons of wheat between January and June 1945 if the bread ration of 300 grammes were to be maintained.

(b) Outlining five courses open to the Supreme Allied Commander, and requesting direction as to which of them should be adopted.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that, in addition to the five courses suggested, it might be possible to institute emergency soup kitchens or such-like arrangements.

BRIGADIER LUSH stated that:-

(i) Even if amassment had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grammes.

(ii) The local administration though it had improved on last years record had clearly failed to organise effective amassment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.

(iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grammes per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.

(iv) Signor BONOMI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if **a**passing measures were tightened up. He pressed most strongly for imports in order to permit the maintenance of the 300 gramme ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to send a shipload of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January, 1945.

(v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 gramme ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political

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(i) Even if assessment had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grammes.

(ii) The local administration though it had improved on last year's record had clearly failed to organise effective assessment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.

(iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grammes per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.

(iv) Signor BONOMI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if rationing measures were tightened up. He pressed most strongly for imports in order to permit the maintenance of the 300 gramme ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to send a shipload of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January, 1945.

(v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 gramme ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political repercussions.

MR. BARNES thought that this problem, if not resolved, would give the Sicilians a stick with which to beat the ROME government. He also reported that small farmers were unwilling to surrender their grain, arguing that the large holders were retaining theirs for sale on the black market. 4968

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK agreed that much grain was being held by the farmers. He felt that the Sicilians would always ask for more, and he urged that the Italian Government be told that they must find a solution for this problem themselves.

(21)

/MR. BROAD

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MR. BROAD observed that the situation of any new Italian Government which might be formed was likely to be difficult for some time. He felt that if nothing were done to help it over this problem its instability would be increased. He suggested that a compromise should be adopted. Imported supplies should continue to be provided, but on an "ad hoc" basis, depending on the situation from month to month. At the same time the Italian Government should not be informed of this policy, but pressure on them to extract further grain in SICILY should be increased.

MR. REINHARDT doubted whether indirect pressure on the Italian Government was likely to produce the desired results.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD AND BRIGADIER LUSH, replying to a question by the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreed that raising the price paid to farmers would not bring about an improvement in the situation. Contrary to the allegations of certain farmers, it was considered that the price of 1,000 lire per quintal was a fair one and covered costs of production.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR pointed out that the Sicilian separatist movement was strong, and that it was believed in certain quarters to have the support of the Allied Governments. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER did not believe that this was a suitable case for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would accept neither the diversion of shipping from operational commitments in order to bring in imports, nor the use of force to increase amassment. He felt, therefore, that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S ruling of 24 September should be maintained, namely "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the X local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available" He was of the opinion that no indication should be given to the Italians that they might receive supplies after the December ship-load. He agreed that the Sicilian population should not be allowed to die of starvation, but felt that if the Italian administration were incapable of feeding it adequately, soup kitchens or similar measures under Allied control should be instituted.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944 (see X above) be maintained without modification.

(b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian

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have the support of the Allied Governments. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

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X

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944 (see X above) be maintained without modification.

(b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to Sicily could be expected by them after the December ship-load already promised.

(c) Directed that G-5 study and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of organising emergency distribution of food in SICILY under Allied control.

4967

(d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer examine and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee as to the repercussions on operational shipping commitments if the imports required to maintain the bread ration in SICILY at 300 grammes were sanctioned.

8. BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 143)

(21)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper and draft telegram to the War Office recommending the formation of a British Military Mission to be despatched to ALBANIA at an early date and outlining its main functions.

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/MR. BROAD...

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MR. BROAD explained that neither the British nor the U.S. Governments were at present willing to recognise the F.N.C. who were virtually the "de facto" overnment in ALBANIA. Consequently it was not proposed to send diplomatic representatives to that country. It was necessary to maintain contact but it was thought to be undesirable to keep the existing SOE missions in the country in view of the nature of their past activity. It was therefore suggested that the most practical "stop-gap" would be a military mission.

MR. REINHARDT reported that an OSS party was in ITALY in readiness to go into ALBANIA. The State Department had been informed of the British intentions outlined in the paper under discussion.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM thought it was illogical to withdraw the SOE missions and introduce an OSS party simultaneously.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS replied that the OSS party in question was only a small one headed by an Army Captain. He also pointed out that, unlike SOE, OSS did not engage in covert activity only. He was of the opinion nevertheless that a U.S. Military Mission, similar in character and composition to the British Mission suggested should also be sent into ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Secretary to despatch to the War Office the draft telegram as amended in discussion.*

(b) Directed that G-5 seek authority from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a U.S. Military Mission to ALBANIA, similar in character and composition to the British Mission under discussion.

9. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT BARI

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR understood that the U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister were contemplating closing their offices in BARI. Both these offices had been of great assistance to Commanders Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic, and he thought it highly desirable to maintain US and British political advisers in BARI, even after representation had been set up in BELGRADE and TIRANA.

MR. BROAD explained that the office of the British Resident Minister in BARI, of which he was himself normally in charge, covered YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and HUNGARY, the first two countries named being

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0448

He was of the opinion nevertheless that a U.S. [illegible] similar in character and composition to the British Mission suggested should also be sent into ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Secretary to despatch to the War Office the draft telegram as amended in discussion.*

(b) Directed that G-5 seek authority from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a U.S. Military Mission to ALBANIA, similar in character and composition to the British Mission under discussion.

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MR. BROAD explained that the office of the British Resident Minister in BARI, of which he was himself normally in charge, covered YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and HUNGARY, the first two countries named being their principal interest. When missions were properly established in YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA there would no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the British Resident Minister's office at BARI. Nevertheless, he proposed to suggest to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser that they should attach representatives to the ACC Balkan Air Force when they closed their offices in BARI.

4966

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Endorsed MR. BROAD's suggestion recorded above and invited him to take action accordingly.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

(21)

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* Despatched as FX 61059 dated 1st December, 1944

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Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	42-44
Spares	45-50

EXTRACTS

Commander, Balkan Air Force	Minutes 2,4,5,6,8 and 9	4 copies
M HQ (BALKANS) c/o G-5	Minutes 4,5,8, and 9	2 copies
Commander SOMTO c/o SOMLO	Minutes 3,8 and 9	2 copies

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G-3 Special Op[illegible]	37
G-4 (A)	38
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G-5	41
Chief, Liaison Section	42-44
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	45-50
Spares	

EXTRACTS

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M HQ (BALKANS) c/o G-5	Minutes 4,5,6, and 9	2 copies
Commander SOMTC c/o LOMLO	Minutes 3,8 and 9	2 copies

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(21)

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SECRET 49 ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS SECRET

K-477

PC (44) 34th Meeting
SAC (44) 117th Meeting
29th November, 1944.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE
AND
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

A COMBINED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1500 HOURS ON THURSDAY 30TH NOVEMBER, 1944

A G E N D A

A. POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 33rd Meeting - already circulated)

2. WHEAT FOR SICILY
(Paper No. PC (44) 142 - to be circulated)

3. MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 143 - to be circulated)
(Telegram No. BAF 473 from Balkan Air Force dated 23rd November, 1944)

B. SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, C-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (44) 116th Meeting - already circulated)

3. EMERGENCY RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

1002-1/C

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. WHEAT FOR SICILY
(Paper No. PC (44) 142 - to be circulated)

3. MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 143 - to be circulated)
(Telegram No. BAF 473 from Balkan Air Force
dated 23rd November, 1944)

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1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, C-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (44) 116th Meeting - already circulated)

3. EMERGENCY RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

4. OPERATIONAL POLICY IN RESPECT OF CRETE
(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

4964

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

/ Distribution

(20)

NOTE:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is invited to attend for item A 3
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 is invited to attend for Items B 3 and 4.

File

FILES A

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Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
Secretary, IS & PS	25-27
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	28
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	29-36
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G-4 (Log Plans)	43
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G-1 (B)	45
G-3 Special Operations	46
Chief, Liaison Section	47
Chief Signals Officer	48
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	49-51
Spares	52-56

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G-4 (B)	42
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G-4 (Log Plans)	44
G-1 (A)	45
G-1 (B)	46
G-3 Special Operations	47
Chief, Liaison Section	48
Chief Signals Officer	49-51
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	52-56
Spares	

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 471 COPY NO. 42

PC (44) 33rd Meeting (Corrigendum)
27th November, 1944

SECRET

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

(17)

At the request of the U.S. Political Adviser the following amendment to the minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the Political Committee is notified.

MINUTE 2: after Brigadier Hodgson's statement insert the following:-

" MR. KIRK stated that since G-3's recommendation had been made without consultation with his office, and since he understood that Colonel McDowell had appreciated that the situation as set forth in Mihajlovic's message under reference was a fairly accurate presentation of the facts, he felt that further consideration should be given to this matter. He observed that in America there was considerable feeling with regard to Mihajlovic's position and there was in the United States a large Yugoslav colony which was deeply interested in the matter."

Amend the opening sentence of Colonel Sloane's statement to read :-

" COLONEL SLOANE replied that "

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2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies in accordance with the above.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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CC 2

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J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
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G-1 (B)	28
G-2	29-30
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G-3 Special Operations	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35
G-5	36-37
Secretary, IS & PS	38-40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	42-44
Spares	45-49

(19)

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FILES

42 - A' file
43 - COS
44 - Mr. Macmillan

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K 460

ALLIED FORCE HEAD UARTERS

SECRET

4575

A

Q

PC (44) 33rd Meeting (Corrigendum)
24th November 1944

COPY NO 42

17

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. The following amendment is issued to the Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the Political Committee :-

OK
LS

Minute 8. Delete conclusion and last sentence of Mr. Macmillan's statement and substitute the following :-

"The report should also state that, in view of the urgent need, limited relief supplies (i.e. those at present loaded and awaiting despatch at BARI) were being despatched to YUGOSLAVIA under the best arrangements possible for observation in the circumstances and regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the immediate despatch of limited tonnages of relief supplies to YUGOSLAVIA, on the understanding that the best arrangements possible in the circumstances were made for observation of distribution by ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer take action accordingly.

(b) Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, draft for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the present status of negotiations regarding relief for YUGOSLAVIA and the action being taken under (a) above, and requesting guidance as to the line to be taken if the Yugoslavs maintained their refusal to accept travelling observers".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS
2 GROUP
A

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COPY NO

Supreme Allied Commander 1
2

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0458

(a) Approved the [illegible] supplies to YUGOSLAVIA, on the understanding that the best arrangements possible in the circumstances were made for observation of distribution by ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer take action accordingly.

(b) Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, draft for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the present status of negotiations regarding relief for YUGOSLAVIA and the action being taken under (a) above, and requesting guidance as to the line to be taken if the Yugoslavs maintained their refusal to accept travelling observers".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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G-3 Special Operations	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35
G-5	36-37
Secretary, IS & PS	38-40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	42-44
Commander, Balkan Air Force	45-49
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(18)

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FILES A

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A/a

S.O.T.C. Commissions

983
24 RECD

3904

ALLIED FORCE HEAD UARTERS

K 452

SECRET

COPY NO 42

FC (44) 33rd Meeting
22nd November 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1530 HOURS ON TUESDAY 21ST NOVEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterrancan Theatre

Captain M.B. Laing, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, AFHQ

33rd Mtg
Minutes

2001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

04601

Minutes

Captain M.B. Laing, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slesser, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, AFHQ

Commodore Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel C.C. Sloane, Jnr, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major General M.W.M. Macleod,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B) (for Item 5)

Lieutenant Colonel [illegible].R. Davis, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) (for Item 5)

(1)

1227

4960

SECRET

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0462

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MR. KIRK stated that since G-2's recommendation had been made without consultation with his office, and since he understood that Colonel McDowell had appreciated that the situation as set forth in Mihajlovic's message under reference was a fairly accurate presentation of the facts, he felt that further consideration should be given to this matter. He observed that in America there was considerable feeling with regard to Mihajlovic's position and there was in the United States a large Yugoslav colony which was deeply interested in the matter.

4959

COLONEL SLOANE replied that Lieutenant Colonel Mcdowell had undoubtedly been restricted in his conversations with Mihajlovic and information had certainly been "planted" on him. Intelligence from independent and reliable sources left no doubts as to Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy.

SECRET

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :- K 452

Major General W.A.M. Stawell,
Commander, Special Operations, Mediterranean

Mr. P. Broad,
Office of the British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of the U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES :-

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 32nd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15th November 1944.

2. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC

(Previous reference PC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 2)

BRIGADIER HODGSON reported that Colonel Macdowell's comments on General Mihajlovic's last message had now been received and that G-3 recommended that no further action be taken.

COLONEL SLOANE, replying to a question by Mr. Kirk, stated that Lieutenant Colonel Macdowell had undoubtedly been restricted in his movements while with Mihajlovic and information had certainly been "planted" on him. Intelligence from independent and reliable sources left no doubts as to Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above and directed that in view of the evidence of Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy available to G-2 no reply be sent to his last message or any further action taken in the matter.

0463

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(PC (44) 32nd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15th November 1944.

2. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC

(Previous reference PC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 2)

BRIGADIER HODGSON reported that Colonel Macdowell's comments on General Mihajlovic's last message had now been received and that G-3 recommended that no further action be taken.

COLONEL SLOANE, replying to a question by Mr. Kirk, stated that Lieutenant Colonel Macdowell had undoubtedly been restricted in his movements while with Mihajlovic and information had certainly been "planted" on him. Intelligence from independent and reliable sources left no doubts as to Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above and directed that in view of the evidence of Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy available to G-2 no reply be sent to his last message or any further action taken in the matter.

3. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN BARI

(Previous reference PC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 3)

X-09-

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that he had now received a report from Commander, 3 District, stating that while Partisan behaviour had improved slightly no concrete results were likely until orders had been received from Marshal Tito. 2,000 Partisans were now being evacuated weekly and it might be possible to increase this figure to 2,500. On the basis of a weekly evacuation of 2,000 it was estimated that there would remain in ITALY on 1 January 1945 4,000 JANL personnel, 3,600 hospital patients and 500 displaced persons.

4938

MR. BROAD reported that Russian personnel in the BARI area were also carrying arms and agreed that there had been a slight improvement in Partisan behaviour.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that it was unsatisfactory that the Russians and the Partisans should not conform to the orders in force for other Allied personnel and should continue to carry arms.

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/THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMAN

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K 452

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer prepare a brief on this matter for discussion with Brigadier Maclean during his forthcoming visit to AFH., with a view to representing strongly to Tito the need for him to issue specific orders designed to improve this situation.

4. SECURITY SITUATION IN ROME

(Paper No. PC (44) 136)

attached for CCRR 365/sec

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the security situation in ROME was serious enough to warrant consideration of precautionary measures and recommending :

(a) That the Chief Administrative Officer investigate the underlying causes for this situation.

(b) That G-3 examine the present internal security scheme for the area and recommend any additional measures necessary.

COLONEL SLOANE explained that the paper had been compiled on information received from Commander, RAAC.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that in the absence of the Commander, RAAC, he had discussed the situation with his deputy during his recent visit to ROME and he believed that the main cause of unrest was the food shortage and the consequent constant rise in prices. He himself had come to the conclusion that this situation was to some extent due to the presence in ROME of large numbers of Allied personnel and he felt that certain sections were there because of the amenities offered by the city, whereas they could equally well be accommodated and carry out their duties in other parts of ITALY. Thus he was somewhat concerned at the proposal to start a U.S replacement camp in the area for some 5,000 to 7,000. While it was desirable to restrict the numbers of Allied personnel in the ROME area, he particularly wished not to cut down the numbers on leave in view of the educational benefits derived from such visits.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS pointed out that no suitable alternative accommodation for a replacement camp of the size required could be found in ITALY and, in view of the serious replacement situation in Fifth Army, it seemed necessary to proceed with the scheme.

MR. KIRK observed that if the U.S replacements could be used if necessary to assist in the maintenance of internal security their presence would be beneficial and to some extent offset the Supreme Allied [illegible] troops were not

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and recommend any [illegible]

COLONEL SLOANE explained that the paper had been compiled on information received from Commander, RMAC.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that in the absence of the Commander, RMAC, he had discussed the situation with his deputy during his recent visit to ROME and he believed that the main cause of unrest was the food shortage and the consequent constant rise in prices. He himself had come to the conclusion that this situation was to some extent due to the presence in ROME of large numbers of Allied personnel and he felt that certain sections were there because of the amenities offered by the city, whereas they could equally well be accommodated and carry out their duties in other parts of ITALY. Thus he was somewhat concerned at the proposal to start a U.S replacement camp in the area for some 5,000 to 7,000. While it was desirable to restrict the numbers of Allied personnel in the ROME area, he particularly wished not to cut down the numbers on leave in view of the educational benefits derived from such visits.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS pointed out that no suitable alternative accommodation for a replacement camp of the size required could be found in ITALY and, in view of the serious replacement situation in Fifth Army, it seemed necessary to proceed with the scheme.

MR. KIRK observed that if the U.S replacements could be used if necessary to assist in the maintenance of internal security their presence would be beneficial. This consideration would to some extent offset the Supreme Allied Commander's objections. He wondered, however, whether Italian troops were not better suited for such use.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL enquired whether more use could not be made of the Carabinieri. Sir Noel Charles felt that their lot was not a happy one and had suggested that something might be done to improve it.

COMMODORE STONE, replying to a question by Mr. Kirk, stated that the Italian Government had not asked for an increase in the number of Italian troops in the ROME area or anywhere else on the mainland. While he believed that increased numbers of Carabinieri could most usefully be employed and he agreed with Lieutenant General Gammell's suggestion that it might therefore be desirable to increase their pay and rations, this would give them better treatment than the Italian Army, including those units fighting with AAI. This policy was therefore questionable. He considered that press attacks on the Italian forces, which were increasing, could be dealt with by censorship since it could be argued that they were military rather than political in character.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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(a) Directed that G-3 instruct Commander, Rome Area Allied Command, to report on the internal security situation in the ROME area and to recommend any additional precautionary measures considered necessary.

(b) Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, examine and report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Carabinieri.

(c) Directed that G-2 report to him periodically on the internal security situation in the ROME area.

5. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AND OF ITALIAN CO-OPERATORS IN BRITISH CUSTODY SERVING IN ITALY

(Paper No. PC (44) 136)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper arising out of PC (44) 31st Meeting, Conclusion 8 :

(a) Recommending that the stigma of prisoner-of-war status be removed provided present conditions of service remained unchanged.

(b) Submitting a draft letter directing the Allied Commission to invite the Italian Government to make proposals as to the manner in which prisoner-of-war status could be removed.

(c) Submitting a draft telegram for despatch to the Chiefs of Staff outlining the above recommendation and action.

MAJOR GENERAL MACLEOD reported that he had discussed this question during his recent visit to LONDON. The War Office were opposed to any change which might dislocate the present administrative arrangements which were working well He felt, however, that if a change of name only were contemplated, such as the substitution of "Employment" for "Prisoner of War Units" there could be no objection.

MR. KIRK thought it was unnecessary to inform the Italian Government that this question was under discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the draft letter to the Allied Commission be amended accordingly.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS suggested that a sentence might be added to paragraph 2 of the draft telegram intimating that Italian prisoners of war in British custody had also been moved to ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SHOFFORD observed that Major General Macleod's suggest-

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provided present conditions of service remained unchanged.

(b) Submitting a draft letter directing the Allied Commission to invite the Italian Government to make proposals as to the manner in which prisoner-of-war status could be removed.

(c) Submitting a draft telegram for despatch to the Chiefs of Staff outlining the above recommendation and action.

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MR. KIRK thought it was unnecessary to inform the Italian Government that this question was under discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the draft letter to the Allied Commission be amended accordingly.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS suggested that a sentence might be added to paragraph 2 of the draft telegram intimating that Italian prisoners of war in British custody had also been moved to ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD observed that Major General Macleod's suggestion was within the terms of the Directive regarding Italian prisoners of war received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that G-5 despatch the telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the letter to the Allied Commission, amended in accordance with the above discussion.

(b) Invited the United States Political Adviser to inform the State Department of the action being taken.

6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. FC (44) 137)

X-320/cc THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :-

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K 452

(a) Recommending the terms of a draft memorandum of agreement which it was proposed to encourage the Italian Government to enter into with the Committee of National Liberation in Northern ITALY.

(b) Suggesting a procedure for the disposal of Italian patriots liberated by the Allied armies.

MAJOR GENERAL STANNELL, amplifying the paper, stated that representatives of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY were at present in ROME and had had preliminary discussions with the Italian Government and himself. They felt that recognition would give them a greater measure of control over the various sub-committees in the North and would increase their influence with industrialists which they deemed to be particularly desirable in view of the anti-scorch policy now being pursued. They also believed that recognition would give them greater protection from reprisals from the Fascists, whom they feared more than the Germans.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that, although past experience in other countries had shown that the recognition of liberation movements entailed dangerous political consequences, the military advantage in this instance appeared to dictate it. It might be more logical for the proposed agreement to be entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern ITALY but such a procedure would involve the practical difficulty of supplying 100 million metropolitan lire monthly, since the currency in use in liberated ITALY was valueless on the enemy side of the line.

X-3201/c

COMMODORE STONE reported that he had had a preliminary discussion with the Italian Prime Minister, who was opposed to the Committee's proposal that it should exercise control in liberated areas until the Italian Government was established. He added that the Committee's representatives had indicated to the Italian Government that their proposals carried the agreement of Mr. Macmillan and himself which in fact was untrue. He had not yet discussed the question of funds with the Italian Government but he believed that ~~they might find it~~ it would be possible to furnish the 100 million metropolitan lire monthly ~~provided the equivalent were made available to them in liberated ITALY in Allied military currency.~~ without This would remove the practical objection to the conclusion of an agreement between the Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL observed that it might be more desirable to enter into a tri-partite agreement.

MR. KIRK concurred in Lieutenant General Gammell's suggestion but suggested that no compulsion be used and that the Italian Government merely be invited to be a party to the agreement.

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A-3201/5 COMMODORE STONE reported that he had had a preliminary discussion with the Italian Prime Minister, who was opposed to the Committee's proposal that it should exercise control in liberated areas until the Italian Government was established. He added that the Committee's representatives had indicated to the Italian Government that their proposals carried the agreement of Mr. Macmillan and himself which in fact was untrue. He had not yet discussed the question of funds with the Italian Government but he believed that ~~they~~ it might ~~find it~~ be possible to furnish the 100 million metropolitan lire monthly ~~provided the equivalent were made available to them in liberated ITALY in Allied military currency~~. This would remove the practical objection to the conclusion of an agreement between the Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL observed that it might be more desirable to enter into a tri-partite agreement.

MR. KIRK concurred in Lieutenant General Gammell's suggestion but suggested that no compulsion be used and that the Italian Government merely be invited to be a party to the agreement.

MR. MACMILLAN thought that some limit should be set to the monetary assistance given to the Committee. He suggested that this should be framed on the basis of a given sum per month per head, the total sum not to exceed a fixed amount. Subject to the addition of such a clause and to rewording of paragraphs 5 and 8 designed to secure a greater measure of Allied control he thought that the Agreement as submitted could serve as a basis for further discussions between representatives of AFHQ, AAI and the Allied Commission.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that the Allied Commission invite the Italian Government to furnish to the Allied Military authorities for payment of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern ITALY some 100 million metropolitan lire a month in exchange for the equivalent in Allied military currency and to join in a tri-partite agreement, reporting to the next meeting of the Political Committee as to the Italian Government's reactions.

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(b) Directed that G-3, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, MAAF, AAI, SOM and the Allied Commission,

(i) draw up a revised draft memorandum of agreement in the light of the above discussion,

(ii) examine the proposed procedure for the disposal of liberated patriots, and recommend what action should be taken in this matter and by whom.

7. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

(Paper No. PC (44) 132 (Annex))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper covering a draft telegram for despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff incorporating the modifications recommended atPC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 10.

X-1014/cc THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 despatch the telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the NAF series as amended further in discussion.

8. CONVERSATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATES

(Paper No. PC (44) 140)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Indicating that the BARI conversations on relief and rehabilitation had been suspended owing to the Yugoslav delegates' insistence on restricting Allied rights of and facilities for observation.

(b) Recommending that no compromise be agreed to in this matter and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be advised accordingly.

MR. BROAD explained that agreement had been reached on all aspects except the observers. The Yugoslav delegates had agreed to the presence [redacted] but not to travelling

(18)

In place of conclusion and last sentence of Mr. Macmillan's statement substitute the following:

"The report should also state that, in view of the urgent need, limited relief supplies (i.e. those at present loaded and awaiting despatch at BARI)

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Directed that G-5 despatch the telegram to the [illegible]
Staff in the NAF series as amended further in discussion.

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATES

(Paper No. PC (44) 140)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Indicating that the BARI conversations on relief and rehabilitation had been suspended owing to the Yugoslav delegates' insistence on restricting Allied rights of and facilities for observation.

(b) Recommending that no compromise be agreed to in this matter and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be advised accordingly.

MR. BROAD explained that agreement had been reached on all aspects except the observers. The Yugoslav delegates had agreed to the presence [illegible] distribution but not to travelling

(18)

In place of conclusion and last sentence of Mr. Macmillan's statement substitute the following:

"The report should also state that, in view of the urgent need, limited relief supplies (i.e. those at present loaded and awaiting despatch at BARI) were being despatched to YUGOSLAVIA under the best arrangements possible for observation in the circumstances and regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

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(a) Approved the immediate despatch of limited tonnages of relief supplies to YUGOSLAVIA, on the understanding that the best arrangements possible in the circumstances were made for observation of distribution by ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer take action accordingly.

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(b) Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, draft for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the present status of negotiations regarding relief for YUGOSLAVAIA and the action being taken under (a) above, and requesting guidance as to the line to be taken if the Yugoslavs maintained their refusal to accept travelling observers."

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Staff in the NAF series as amended further in discussion.

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATES

(Paper No. FC (44) 140)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Indicating that the BARI conversations on relief and rehabilitation had been suspended owing to the Yugoslav delegates' insistence on restricting Allied rights of and facilities for observation.

(b) Recommending that no compromise be agreed to in this matter and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be advised accordingly.

MR. BROAD explained that agreement had been reached on all aspects except the observers. The Yugoslav delegates had agreed to the presence of observers in ports and centres of distribution but not to travelling observers. The principal Yugoslav delegate had departed for BELGRADE to seek further instructions on this point. He added that there was an urgent need on the Dalmatian coast for the contents of two relief vessels which were at present loaded and awaiting despatch in BARI. In reply to an observation by Air Marshal Slessor that the Russians were sending in large tonnages of grain to YUGOSLAVIA he observed that these supplies could not reach those parts of the country which stood most in need of them. He agreed, however, that it was urgently necessary for the Allies to counterbalance Russian aid to YUGOSLAVIA.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should merely be informed of the present status of the negotiations and should be asked for guidance as to the line to be adopted in the event of a final refusal on the part of the Yugoslavs to accept travelling observers. ~~The report should also state that we were anxious to despatch the two vessels waiting at BARI, with appropriate observers, and should ask for approval of their despatch, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.~~ DELETED K 460 Amendt Corr SEE ATCHD DELETED

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, draft for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the lines suggested by Mr. Macmillan in his statement recorded above.

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9. TREATMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS

(Telegram No. BAF 461 dated 13 November 1944 from H.Q. Balkan Air Force)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a telegram from the Balkan Air Force reporting the shooting in DUBROVNIK of German prisoners of war and alleged Yugoslav collaborators.

MR. BROAD felt that strong representations should be made to Marshal Tito on this matter, particularly as British forces were now fighting alongside the JANL in YUGOSLAVIA. He added that he was expecting an independent report on the subject and undertook to forward this to AFH. when received.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER remarked that the Russians and Partisans were reported to be shooting some of their German prisoners of war in the BELGRADE area. It would be difficult therefore to induce Partisans elsewhere to do otherwise. Moreover the shooting of alleged Yugoslav collaborators was entirely the domestic concern of the Yugoslavs themselves.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3 prepare a brief on this matter for discussion with Brigadier Maclean during his forthcoming visit to AFH. and that the brief contain a draft statement for presentation to Marshal Tito reminding him of the undertaking given on his behalf by General Velebit regarding the treatment of German prisoners of war at the meeting held at AFH. on 20th April 1944 (SAC (44)(Special) 1).

10. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 139)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper recommending :-

(a) That ML (ALBANIA) be directed to initiate relief operations forthwith without prior negotiations with any Albanian authorities but subject to notification to them of intended entry.

(b) That a revised Memorandum of Agreement for use between ML (ALBANIA) representatives and local Albanians, as nowsubmitted, be approved.

MR. BROAD reported that AOC, Balkan Air Force, was informally discussing proposals similar to those embodied in the paper with the Albanian Committee in BARI. He asked, therefore, that a decision in this matter might be deferred until the outcome of these discussions was known.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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Directed that G-3 prepare a brief on this matter for Brigadier Maclean during his forthcoming visit to AFHQ and that the brief contain a draft statement for presentation to Marshal Tito reminding him of the undertaking given on his behalf by General Velebit regarding the treatment of German prisoners of war at the meeting held at AFHQ on 20th April 1944 (SAC (44)(Special) 1).

10. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA

(Paper No. FC (44) 139)

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MR. BROAD reported that AOC, Balkan Air Force, was informally discussing proposals similar to those embodied in the paper with the Albanian Committee in BARI. He asked, therefore, that a decision in this matter might be deferred until the outcome of these discussions was known.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER : 4953

(a) Endorsed Mr. Broad's suggestion recorded above and invited him to inform G-5 of the outcome of these discussions in due course.

(b) Directed that G-5 refer this matter again to the Political Committee when they had examined Mr. Broad's report on the BARI discussions.

11. LEAFLETS TO GERMAN TROOPS IN CRETE

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR drew attention to telegram No. GN /35 dated 19 November from HQ 3 Corps, suggesting that leaflets stating inter alia that British forces could round up the German garrison of CRETE when they thought fit should be dropped on the Germans in the island. He was of opinion that this threat should be omitted from the proposed leaflet as it could not be implemented at present.

/MR. BARNES.....

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MR. BARNES undertook to clear the leaflet which was now in course of preparation with HQ MAAF.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the view of Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, recorded above and took note with approval of the undertaking by Director, PWB.

12. ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY

X-225-4 AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR stated that General Piancentini, the Italian Chief of Air Staff, had for some months been fulfilling the additional role of Secretary of State for Air. Piancentini was a satisfactory Chief of Staff but he was inclined to dabble in politics as Secretary of State for Air and the efficiency of the Italian Air Force was being adversely affected in consequence. He thought that the appointment of a non-service Secretary of State was therefore desirable.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that the Communist Party was at present claiming all the service portfolios. If this issue were forced on the Italian Prime Minister the new Secretary of State might be found to be obstructive both to MAAF and to the Italian Prime Minister. He thought, therefore, that Commodore Stone might merely suggest to Signor Bonomi that, if any changes in his Government were contemplated, the relief of Piancentini at the Air Ministry by a civilian would be desirable.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the British Resident Minister's suggestion recorded above and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, take action accordingly.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16

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his Government were contemplated, the relief of [illegible] by a civilian would be desirable.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the British Resident Minister's suggestion recorded above and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, take action accordingly.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
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Chief Administrative Officer	16
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4952

EXTRACTS

Commander, Balkan Air Force	Items 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 (5 copies)
Commander, SOM	Item 6 (1 copy)
M.M. (Balkans)	Items 8 and 10 (3 copies)

(11)

SECRET

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SECRET

Chief Commissioner AC

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K442

PC (44) 33rd Meeting
20th November 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 42

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1530 HOURS ON TUESDAY 21ST NOVEMBER 1944

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 32nd Meeting - already circulated)

2. SECURITY SITUATION IN ROME
(Paper No. PC (44) 136 - already circulated)

3. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AND OF ITALIAN COOPERATORS IN BRITISH CUSTODY SERVING IN ITALY
(Paper No. PC (44) 138 - already circulated)

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 137 - already circulated)

5. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 132 (Annexe) - already circulated)

6. CONVERSATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATES
(Paper No. PC (44) 140 - already circulated)

7. TREATMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS
(Telegram from H. Balkan Air Force dated 18 November No. BAF/461)

8. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 139 - already circulated)

9. RELIEF INTO GREECE
(Telegrams from HQ 3 Corps Nos. GO/ 10 of 12 November and GO/632 of 16 November. Telegram from SACMED to Commander, 3 Corps, dated ROME 18

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(PC (44) 32nd Meeting - already circulated)

2. SECURITY SITUATION IN ROME
(Paper No. PC (44) 136 - already circulated)

3. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AND OF ITALIAN COOPERATORS IN BRITISH CUSTODY SERVING IN ITALY
(Paper No. PC (44) 138 - already circulated)

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 137 - already circulated)

5. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 132 (Annexe) - already circulated)

6. CONVERSATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATES
(Paper No. PC (44) 140 - already circulated)

7. TREATMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS
(Telegram from H. Balkan Air Force dated 13 November No. BAF/461)

8. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 139 - already circulated)

9. RELIEF INTO GREECE
(Telegrams from HQ 3 Corps Nos. GO/ 10 of 12 November and GO/632 of 16 November. Telegram from SACMED to Commander, 3 Corps, dated ROME 13 November).

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NOTE: The following are invited to attend or be represented :-

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 for Item 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A)) for Item 3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B))
Commander, H. SCM for Item 4.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 421
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A

PC (44) 32nd Meeting
15th November 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1000 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 15TH NOVEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General R.G. Lewis, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant Colonel G. Eyres Monsell, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G -2, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,

32nd Mtg
Minutes

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Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General R.G. Lewis, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant Colonel G. Eyres Monsell, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G -2, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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Commodore Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Brigadier General A.J. McChrystal, (for Items 5 and 6)
Chief, INC

SECRETARIES

(15)

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 31st Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 7th November 1944, subject to the following amendment :-

Minute 4. Amend the first sentence of Commodore Stone's statement to read as follows :-

(1)

Amended as

"..... reported that he had already informed the Italian Prime Minister verbally that the 15,000 Italians under discussion were being brought over to ITALY and that, as in the case of the recent move to FRANCE of Italians under United States control, he had not objected".

2. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC

(Previous reference PC (44) 31st Meeting - minute 2)

MR. KIRK reported that Topalovic claimed to have received a further message from Mihajlovic. He understood that Sir Noel Charles had sent a copy of it to the British Resident Minister.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Invited the British Resident Minister to arrange for G-3 to have a copy of this message on its arrival and directed that they obtain Lieutenant Colonel Macdowell's comments on it and recommend what action (if any) should be taken.

3. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN BARI

(Previous reference PC (44) 31st Meeting - minute 7)

COMMODORE STONE reported that there had been partisan misdemeanors in other parts of ITALY, including ROME, on which he had sent a full report to AFHQ.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

X-091

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer :

(a) Examine the feasibility of accelerating the rate of evacuation of Yugoslav Partisans from ITALY.

(b) Expedite the report by Commander, 3 District, on Partisan behaviour in his area.

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MR. KIRK reported that Topalovic claimed to have received a [illegible] message from Mihajlovic. He understood that Sir Noel Charles had sent a copy of it to the British Resident Minister.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Invited the British Resident Minister to arrange for G-3 to have a copy of this message on its arrival and directed that they obtain Lieutenant Colonel Macdowell's comments on it and recommend what action (if any) should be taken.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

X-591 Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer :

(a) Examine the feasibility of accelerating the rate of evacuation of Yugoslav Partisans from ITALY.

(b) Expedite the report by Commander, 3 District, on Partisan behaviour in his area.

4. NAVAL OPERATIONS BASED ON YUGOSLAV PORTS 4648

(Previous reference PC (44) 31st Meeting - minute 9)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the situation at SPLIT, ZARA and SIBENIK was still unsatisfactory and it was clear that the local Partisan Commanders had not received the instructions which had been requested of Marshal Tito in the telegram sent to the Maclean Mission on 7 November. In the matter of the Yugoslav Navy also no progress had been made and its ships were still lying at MALTA as he feared that their arrival in the ADRIATIC without prior agreement from Tito would lead to incidents. He suggested that a further telegram might be sent to the Maclean Mission requesting that the despatch of instructions in these two matters by Marshal Tito be expedited.

/MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS

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X | MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS said that it might be well to indicate in the telegram to the Maclean Mission that the amount of artillery and other support which could be given to the Partisans was dependent on the opening up of SPLIT, ZARA SIBENIK and possibly other ports.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD reported that two ships loaded with relief supplies for YUGOSLAVIA were awaiting the outcome of the BARI conversations before sailing.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above discussion and directed that G-3, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, send a further telegram to the Maclean Mission designed to hasten the issue of the desired instructions by Marshal Tito and embodying the Deputy Chief of Staff's suggestion at 'X' above.

5. POLICY REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN ITALY

(Paper No. PC (44) 127)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Setting out PWB's present policy and seeking its endorsement.

(b) Recommending that private news agencies should not be allowed to set up in ITALY so long as ITALY remained a theatre of operations, and that PWB should prepare the ground for the establishment of an Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function when private news agencies began to operate.

MR. BARNES, amplifying the paper, stressed that PWB wished to avoid the eventual establishment of a government controlled agency such as Stefani had been. He believed that if private agencies were allowed to start up while ITALY still remained a theatre of operations they might bring in news injurious to military operations or to Allied policy. Thus, for example, there would be no machinery to stop agencies reporting criticism of ITALY in Congress. He added that the problems regarding Italian broadcasting were very similar.

COMMODORE STONE felt that the time had now come to give the Italians greater liberty by allowing private agencies to start up. He observed that no part of the armistice terms empowered the Allies to force a news agency of the kind suggested by PWB on to the Italian Government. Replying to

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5. POLICY REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN [illegible]

(Paper No. PC (44) 127)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Setting out PWB's present policy and seeking its endorsement.

(b) Recommending that private news agencies should not be allowed to set up in ITALY so long as ITALY remained a theatre of operations, and that PWB should prepare the ground for the establishment of an Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function when private news agencies began to operate.

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COMMODORE STONE felt that the time had now come to give the Italians greater liberty by allowing private agencies to start up. He observed that no part of the armistice terms empowered the Allies to force a news agency of the kind suggested by PWB on to the Italian Government. Replying to a question by Mr. Macmillan, he stated that, despite the fact that private agencies could at present secure payment only in blocked lire, he understood that Reuters, Associated Press and others were anxious to start up immediately in ITALY with an eye to the futur He added that news from the Tass Agency was being flown into ITALY by Russian aircraft for use by the communist press.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL EYRES MONSELL supported the proposal that private news agencies should not be allowed to start up so long as ITALY remained a theatre of operations on grounds of military security.

MR. MACMILLAN queried whether G-2 could not reconsider the security aspect. There seemed little reason for restricting incoming political news. He also pointed out that the U.S. and British taxpayers were at present paying for all Italian news services and that the early introduction of private agencies was therefore desirable on these grounds also.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that PWB, in conjunction with G-2, G-5 and the Allied Commission, endeavour to agree on the action to be taken on the matters raised in Paper No. PC (44) 127 and report to the next meeting of the Committee.

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6. MOTION PICTURE POLICY FOR ITALY K 421

(Paper No. PC (44) 123)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper stating that PWB had been directed by the Psychological Warfare Sub Committee to invite the Allied Commission to start a temporary film board, whose main function would be to set up and control an epurated Italian film producing industry, and inviting the Committee's endorsement of this action.

MR. BARNES explained that at the present time it would be impossible for private companies to function in ITALY as they lacked both the means of importing films and transport facilities for them in ITALY. He also pointed out that PWB control was necessary in order to ensure that news reels and other films of propaganda value were shown.

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COMMODORE STONE believed that as in the case of news agencies it was now time the Italians were given some measure of control. In particular, he considered that it was improper that PWB, a propaganda agency, should control picture houses and the film producing industry which were commercial enterprises.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that the problem under discussion differed from that of the press and news agencies. It was only possible for the Italian people to have films because the British and U.S. Governments made these and transport for them available through the medium of PWB. He felt, therefore, that the Allied Governments were entitled to some control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the policy agreed by the Psychological Warfare Sub Committee and directed that PWB and the Allied Commission take action in accordance with Paper No. PC (44) 123 of 2nd November 1944.

7. REVIVAL OF THE ITALIAN BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 125)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the British Resident Minister, suggesting that much good might be done by reviving the Italian Boy Scout movement and requesting authority for the despatch of a delegation to help and advise on its reorganisation.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD reported that a representative of the Boy Scouts International Bureau had already been in ITALY for some months, studying the reorganisation of the Italian movement.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the policy agreed by the Psychological Warfare Sub Committee and directed that PWB and the Allied Commission take action in accordance with Paper No. PC (44) 120 of 2nd November 1944.

7. REVIVAL OF THE ITALIAN BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 125)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the British Resident Minister, suggesting that much good might be done by reviving the Italian Boy Scout movement and requesting authority for the despatch of a delegation to help and advise on its reorganisation.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD reported that a representative of the Boy Scouts International Bureau had already been in ITALY for some months, studying the reorganisation of the Italian movement.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER : 4946

Invited the British Resident Minister, in conjunction with G-5, to report to the Foreign Office on the measures which were already in hand for the revival of the Italian Boy Scouts Movement suggesting that the despatch of a delegation to ITALY at this stage was not desirable, but that a present of a small number of uniforms and scouting material would be useful.

8. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Extracted from 383.6-1

(Paper No. PC (44) 134)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by G-5 arising out of Conclusion 4(b) of PC (44) 31st Meeting, recommending that the Italian Prime Minister be advised, in reply to his letter of 8 October 1944, that the Supreme Allied Commander would be glad to receive any suggestions which the Italian Government would care to make towards a solution of this problem and that he be further advised that the matter was being referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, together with a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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/BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD

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BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD suggested that consideration of this matter be deferred until the views of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B), who had recently discussed this matter in LONDON and had only just returned, had been ascertained.

MR. MACMILLAN thought it would be desirable to arrive at some formula whereby the stigma of prisoner-of-war status was removed for Italian personnel serving in ITALY. He appreciated, however, that this might raise the numbers in the Italian forces above the "ceiling" prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out, however, that this was a technical difficulty only since all types of Italian personnel, both those in the Italian forces and all types of prisoners of war, were being maintained by the Allies.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS pointed out that the Italian Government's wish to remove all personnel from diluted units into the Italian forces would be unacceptable since this could not be done without considerable prejudice to military operations.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS remarked that personnel in diluted units were better paid and fed than those in the Italian forces.

COMMODORE STONE reported that he had now received a letter from the Italian Prime Minister protesting against the move of U.S controlled Italian prisoners of war to FRANCE. It would be remembered that Signor BONOMI had agreed to this orally and his letter was doubtless written in order to protect himself. A similar letter could also be expected regarding the U.S controlled Italians now being transferred to ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Prisoners of War Sub Committee set up under Conclusion 8(a) of PC (44) 9th Meeting take Paper No. PC (44) 134 under review in the light of Major General McLeod's discussions in LONDON and that they report further to him on the matter, including in their report proposals for releasing from prisoner-of-war status Italian personnel serving in ITALY.

9. STATUS OF ITALIAN PARTISANS

Extracted from (Paper No. PC (44) 135)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by G-5 incorporating the views of AMI and the Allied Commission and recommending that :-

(a) The Allied Commission be directed to take up with the Italian Government the preparation of an appropriate statement so as to ensure treatment as prisoners of war for captured Italian partisans.

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Italian Prime Minister protesting against the move of U.S controlled Italian prisoners of war to FRANCE. It would be remembered that Signor BONOMI had agreed to this orally and his letter was doubtless written in order to protect himself. A similar letter could also be expected regarding the U.S controlled Italians now being transferred to ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Prisoners of War Sub Committee set up under Conclusion 3(a) of PC (44) 9th Meeting take Paper No. PC (44) 134 under review in the light of Major General McLeod's discussions in LONDON and that they report further to him on the matter, including in their report proposals for releasing from prisoner-of-war status Italian personnel serving in ITALY.

9. STATUS OF ITALIAN PARTISANS

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1112/cc THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by G-5 incorporating the views of AMI and the Allied Commission and recommending that :-

(a) The Allied Commission be directed to take up with the Italian Government the preparation of an appropriate statement so as to ensure treatment as prisoners of war for captured Italian partisans.

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(b) Distinctive insignia be worn by Italian Partisan Bands in all cases where such procedure was possible.

BRIGADIER GENERAL STOFFORD emphasised the difficulty in differentiating between regular bands, for whom prisoner-of-war status could logically be claimed, and irregular ones. He thought, as suggested in the paper, that the Committee should be largely guided by the Allied attitude regarding the Volksturm in GERMANY.

X LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMBELL suggested that, as a first move, the Liberation Committee in MILAN should be declared to be part of the Italian Government and General Cadorna, who was now with the Committee, to be the military head of the Partisans and General Alexander's representative with them. The advantages to be gained from this close contact between the Italian Government and the Milan Committee would be easier government of newly-liberated territory and closer execution of Allied orders regarding anti-scorch and other operations. It was estimated that one hundred million lire a month would be required to keep the Italian resistance movement going during the coming winter. This sum was beyond the capacity of SCE and he suggested that the

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X | Italian Government might be asked to supply these funds, as part of their policy of recognition of the Partisan Movement."

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM felt that it would be difficult to disarm Partisan bands in liberated areas and that it would be necessary to incorporate them into the regular forces, as had been done in FRANCE. The "ceiling" laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff would therefore probably be exceeded.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS observed that the "ceiling" for the Italian forces was calculated on ration strengths. In view of the world shortage which had developed in certain foodstuffs, it was improbable that any suggestion for the raising of the "ceiling" above its present figure would be well received in WASHINGTON. There was no theoretical limit, however, to the forces which the Italian Government might raise and maintain from their own resources. It would in any case be necessary to import supplies to feed them as civilians.

MR. BARNES said that whereas the Partisans received considerable publicity while they were fighting, they seemed to receive little attention or recognition once they were on the Allied side of the line and that this was causing considerable discontent among them. He also reported that the certificates which AMI were delivering to certain Partisans were traded in the black-market and had reached a high price.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Endorsed the recommendation that distinctive insignia be worn by Partisan bands wherever possible and directed that G-3 take action accordingly.

(b) Directed that G-3 ascertain and report to him the numbers of Partisans now operating in regular and irregular bands respectively.

(c) Directed that the Allied Commission ascertain whether the Italian Government would be willing to carry out the Chief of Staff's suggestion at 'X' above.

(d) Undertook to discuss this subject during his forthcoming visit to ROME.

10. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

X-1014/cc (Paper No. PC (44) 132)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper embodying a plan for the Allied military government of VENEZIA GIULIA and recommending that a telegram explaining the main features in the plan be despatched to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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market and had reached a high price.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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(c) Directed that the Allied Commission ascertain whether the Italian Government would be willing to carry out the Chief of Staff's suggestion at 'X' above.

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X-1014/cc (Paper No. PC (44) 132)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper embodying a plan for the Allied military government of VENEZIA GIULIA and recommending that a telegram explaining the main features in the plan be despatched to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER remarked that the government of VENEZIA GIULIA would raise considerable political complexities and queried whether it would not be preferable to await developments in BELGRADE before making any firm decisions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that it was desirable to obtain an interim policy in order that planning should proceed. It was for this purpose that it was proposed to seek the views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. KIRK objected to the statement in paragraph 3 of the draft telegram, proposing that the Supreme Allied Commander should undertake negotiations with Tito and representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government. He submitted that this matter should more properly be dealt with on a governmental level and suggested that the draft telegram be amended accordingly.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EYRES MONSELL pointed out that the Carabinieri had done much useful work as security police in ITALY. He appreciated the objections to their use in VENEZIA GIULIA, but it might be found necessary to station small numbers there owing to the lack of any suitable substitutes. He suggested, therefore, that the first sentence of paragraph 2(b) in the

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/draft telegram

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draft telegram under discussion be amended to read "Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian Carabinieri or troops".

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 re-draft the telegram circulated under Paper No. FC (44) 132 in the light of the comments made during discussion and submit it at the next meeting of the Committee.

11. IMPORTS INTO ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that a telegram was being sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicating that the introduction of relief into ITALY was limited not only by the supplies and shipping available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff but also by considerations of shipping acceptance and internal movement. There appeared to be a misapprehension in WASHINGTON in this respect. in ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

12. PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH OCCUPATIONAL AND POST HOSTILITIES PROBLEMS (JPS Study No. P/239 (Final))
PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OFFICERS' COMMITTEE (JPS Study No. P/242 (Final))

THE COMMITTEE had referred to them from the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference two studies by the Joint Planning Staff recommending respectively :

(a) That a Post Hostilities Inter-Service Planning Staff or Committee be formed to deal with all occupational and post hostilities matters other than those which were primarily operational in character.

(b) That a Principal Administrative Staff Officers' Committee be set up to which purely administrative and politico-military matters might be referred for decision.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS stated that the Chief Administrative Officer intended to discuss these two papers with the Senior British and United States Naval and Air Administrative Officers in the near future and suggested that a decision in this matter should be deferred until these discussions had taken place. It might be found that a permanent high level committee of the kind suggested was not necessary. As regards the formation of a Joint Administrative Planning Staff, he felt that such questions as could not appropriately be referred to the Joint Planning Staff could be dealt with by Log Plans, AFHQ, in conjunction as necessary with the other two services.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR strongly supported the proposal to form a Principal

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12. PROGRESS REPORT ON SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(JPS Study No. P/239 (Final))
PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OFFICERS' COMMITTEE
(JPS Study No. P/242 (Final))

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(b) That a Principal Administrative Staff Officers' Committee be set up to which purely administrative and politico-military matters might be referred for decision.

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AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR strongly supported the proposal to form a Principal Administrative Staff Officers' Committee and a Joint Administrative Planning Staff. He considered that there was a marked need, at both the higher and the lower levels, for some inter-service machinery to deal specifically with administrative and politico-military problems. At present there was no machinery other than the Joint Planning Staff at the lower level and the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference or the Political Committee at the higher level.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM felt that a Principal Administrative Staff Officers' Committee, such as it had been found necessary to form in LONDON, would be of considerable value in the Mediterranean Theatre.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL suggested that, if a Principal Administrative Staff Officers' Committee were formed, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, should be a member and through him contact should be maintained with the political advisers on matters with which they were concerned

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER : K 421

(a) Approved in principle the establishment of a Principal Administrative Staff Officers' Committee as suggested in JPS Study No. P/242 (Final)

(b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with the Administrative Staffs of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :-

(i) Recommend what should be the precise composition and terms of reference of such a Committee, having regard to paragraphs 2 and 3 of JPS Study No. P/242 (Final).

(ii) Recommend, having regard to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of JPS Study No. P/239 (Final), what steps were necessary, if any, to ensure that purely administrative and politico-military problems were dealt with at the lower level by some inter-service organisation other than one whose orientation was basically operational.

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COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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EXTRACTS

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Chief, INC	Items 5 and 6 (1 copy)
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ALLIED FORCE HEAD UARTERS K-417

PC (44) 32nd Meeting
14th November 1944

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COPY NO. 39

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1000 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 15TH NOVEMBER 1944

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 31st Meeting - already circulated)

2. POLICY REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. PC (44) 127 - already circulated)

3. MOTION PICTURE POLICY FOR ITALY
(Paper No. PC (44) 128 - already circulated)

6.K. 4. REVIVAL OF THE ITALIAN BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT
(Paper No. PC (44) 125 - already circulated)

5. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR
(Paper No. PC (44) 134 - already circulated)

6. STATUS OF ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 135 - already circulated)

7. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 132 - already circulated)

8. PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH OCCUPATIONAL AND POST HOSTILITIES PROBLEMS
(JPS Study No. P.239 (Final) - already circulated)
PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OFFICERS' COMMITTEE
(JPS Study No. P/242 (Final) - already circulated)

NOTE: Chief, INC, is invited to attend or be represented for Items 2 and 3.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K-417

PC (44) 32nd Meeting
14th November 1944

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(Paper No. PC (44) 125 - already circulated)

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(Paper No. PC (44) 128 - already circulated)

4. REVIVAL OF THE ITALIAN BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT
(Paper No. PC (44) 125 - already circulated)

5. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR
(Paper No. PC (44) 124 - already circulated)

6. STATUS OF ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 135 - already circulated)

7. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS
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for J.H. LASCELLES,
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-399

PC (44) 31st Meeting
7th November 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
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A. C.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 7TH NOVEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. C.E. Steel, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

31st Mtg
Minutes

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31st Mtg
Minutes

Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
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Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Stofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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Commodore Ellery W. Stone,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russel Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major General M.G. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) (for Item 4)

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :- K-399

Brigadier General C.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

Brigadier General A.J. McChrystal,
Chief, INC (for Item 5)

Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson,
G-3 (Operations), AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jnr,
Secretary, General Staff, AFHQ

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 30th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 24 October 1944.

2. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC

(Previous reference PC (44) 30th Meeting - Minute 6)

MR. KIRK said that he understood Mihajlovic's attitude to be that his supporters were now in a position to assist in the destruction of the German forces in YUGOSLAVIA but that they were themselves in danger from the Partisans. He queried whether steps could not be taken to assure the safety of Mihajlovic and some of his closer followers.

MR. STEEL queried the desirability of initiating any arrangements for the evacuation of Mihajlovic or his followers. He pointed out that the case of Abas Kupi was not a parallel since there was no evidence of collaboration between him and the enemy.

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Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

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MR. STEEL queried the desirability of initiating any arrangements for the evacuation of Mihajlovic or his followers. He pointed out that the case of Abas Kupi was not a parallel since there was no evidence of collaboration between him and the enemy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. GREEK AIR MINISTRY

(Previous reference PC (44) 30th Meeting - Minute 6)

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR reported that an advance party of the Greek Air Staff was shortly moving to ATHENS with the Greek War Ministry and General Staff. He understood that a portion of the Greek admiralty would move to ATHENS at the same time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

/4.....

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K-399

4. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN U.S. CUSTODY AS SERVICE UNITS IN ITALY

EXTRACTED SEE 9200/CC

(Paper No. PC (44) 131)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that upwards of 15,000 Italian prisoners of war in service units, controlled by the U.S. Forces, would shortly be brought to ITALY, and seeking guidance as to :-

(a) the form which notification of this to the Italian Government should take;

(b) the formulation of an appropriate reply to a letter received from the Italian Prime Minister again raising the question of release from prisoner of war status of Italian personnel serving with the Allied forces.

MAJOR GENERAL WHITE explained that the 15,000 Italians concerned were volunteers, that the units consisted of Italians with U.S. personnel only in a supervisory capacity and that their position was similar to that of British-controlled "Co-operators". Their move to ITALY involved a departure from previous policy, insofar as American-controlled Italians were concerned but the recent move of British-controlled Italians to ITALY had led to no difficulty apart from formal representations from the Italian Government

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that Italian personnel were working with the British forces under two sets of conditions. There were "co-operator" units consisting of volunteers, who enjoyed most of the privileges of Allied personnel, as well as prisoners integrated into certain British ancillary units. The present procedure was working satisfactorily and the "Co-operators", in particular, had proved themselves very useful. He advocated extreme caution, therefore, if any discussions were entered into with the Italian Government as he felt that any decision regarding American-controlled personnel would have its repercussions on the status of British-controlled personnel, not only in ITALY but in other theatres such as INDIA.

MR. KIRK pointed out that ITALY had now been granted certain privileges including diplomatic representation in LONDON and WASHINGTON, and in the eyes of the Italians it was anomalous that their personnel, including voluntary "Co-operators", should still have prisoner of war status

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only in a supervisory capacity and that their position was similar to that of British-controlled "Co-operators". Their move to ITALY involved a departure from previous policy, insofar as American-controlled Italians were concerned but the recent move of British-controlled Italians to ITALY had led to no difficulty apart from formal representations from the Italian Government

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MR. KIRK pointed out that ITALY had now been granted certain privileges including diplomatic representation in LONDON and WASHINGTON, and in the eyes of the Italians it was anomalous that their personnel, including voluntary "Co-operators", should still have prisoner of war status only. He wondered whether, in replying to the Italian Prime Minister's letter, it would not be possible to suggest that arrangements were being studied for the removal of this stigma. No undertaking need be conveyed, however, to do this at an early date.

1958

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY thought that the two subjects under discussion should be considered separately. First, it had been decided to bring these Italian service units into ITALY and he felt that all that need be done was to inform the Italian Government verbally of this decision. Secondly, it was necessary to reply to the Italian Prime Minister's letter raising the general issue. He felt that this reply might take the form of, or include, a request for concrete proposals from the Italian Government.

COMMODORE STONE reported that he had already informed the Italian Prime Minister verbally that the 15,000 Italians under discussion were being brought over to ITALY and that, as in the case of the recent move to ITALY of ~~British-controlled~~ under U.S. control Italians, he had not objected. He therefore considered that there was no reason for reopening this question with the Italian Government

POWs

Transferred from France

Transferred on

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

13

(a) Took note that the impending move to ITALY of upwards of 15,000 Italian prisoners of war in U.S. custody had been notified verbally to the Italian Government and directed that no further notification be made.

SECRET

/(b).....

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(b) Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, submit a draft reply to the Italian Prime Minister's letter for consideration at the next meeting of the Committee.

5. TRANSFER OF SHIP-BORNE RADIO STATION 'PHOENIX' TO THE PACIFIC

(Paper No. PC (44) 126)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper recommending :

(a) The transfer of the 'PHOENIX' to the Pacific, subject to her being considered seaworthy by the Ministry of War Transport.

(b) That Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, advise on the difficulties arising from the fact that her owners, captain and crew were Italians, and that he be instructed to undertake the necessary naval details in the event of her proceeding to the Pacific.

BRIGADIER GENERAL McCHRYSTAL supported a remark by Mr. Barnes that the 'PHOENIX' was of no great psychological warfare value to the Mediterranean Theatre and urged that her transfer to the Pacific, where she was required, be sanctioned forthwith. She had now been surveyed by the Ministry of War Transport and, subject to certain minor repairs, she was deemed sufficiently seaworthy to proceed.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the 'PHOENIX' was now at Castellamare where he believed the repairs in question could be executed. He pointed out, however, that there were heavy conflicting repair commitments and that she might be delayed on that account. He could not advise her going to the Pacific with an Italian captain and crew, but considered that this was more properly a question for decision by the Ministry of War Transport.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that the 'PHOENIX' be released for use in the Pacific.

(b) Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in conjunction with the Ministry of War Transport and PMB, arrange for the necessary repairs and other details connected with the ship's move to the Pacific.

6. POSITION IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND ISTRIA FOLLOWING GERMAN WITHDRAWAL

(Paper No. JC (44) 130)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(b) Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in conjunction with the Ministry of War Transport and PMB, arrange for the necessary repairs and other details connected with the ship's move to the Pacific.

6. POSITION IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND ISTRIA FOLLOWING GERMAN WITHDRAWAL

EXTRACT MADE
SEE 104/44

(Paper No. PC (44) 130)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the U.S. Political Adviser indicating that the Liberation Committee for Northern ITALY was apprehensive of the situation which might arise in the provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA and ISTRIA after the German withdrawal and that they recommended as a possible remedy the strengthening and publicising of the direct agreements between the Italian Government and Marshal Tito.

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MR. KIRK stated that since submitting the paper he had received new information on the subject. He would therefore prefer this subject discussed at a forthcoming meeting in the light of this new information.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that a decision regarding the action desired would have to be made in agreement with Marshal Tito and that this along with other subjects pending would probably have to await recognition of his government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :-

13

/(a).....

SECRET

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(a) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser to bring this subject forward for consideration at a forthcoming meeting of the Committee in the light of his new information.

(b) Directed that G-2, in conjunction with G-3, take steps to ascertain and report to him on the extent of the relations obtaining between the Italian National Liberation Committee and Marshal Tito.

7. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN BARI

MR. KIRK stated that he had received an enquiry from the U.S. Government regarding Partisan misdemeanors in BARI.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that Partisan personnel were being evacuated back to Yugoslav territory at the rate of 600 a week.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR said that he had not heard of any major incidents recently even though the Yugoslav Minister of War in LONDON had, apparently, without reference to anyone in authority, ordered all personnel back to YUGOSLAVIA. Steps were being taken to rectify this order.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS observed that one of the complaints levelled against the Partisans was that their personnel in the BARI area were still carrying arms, but that the local Partisan Commander had stated that he was not in a position to issue an order to stop this practice. He felt that this was intolerable.

MR. STEEL supported Major General Rooks' statement and suggested that this matter be put to Tito strongly without delay.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL suggested that the request to Tito might take the line that it was desired that Partisan forces in ITALY should conform with the orders in force for British and U.S. personnel and therefore that they should be ordered not to carry arms. X

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that :

(a) G-3, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, instruct the Maclean Mission to request Marshal Tito to order Partisan forces in the BARI area to cease carrying arms forthwith and that they embody in their telegram to the Maclean Mission :-

(i) the Chief of Staff's suggestion at X above.

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MR. STEEL supported Major General Rooks' statement and suggested that this matter be put to Tito strongly without delay.

X LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAIRDNER suggested that the request to Tito might take the line that it was desired that Partisan forces in ITALY should conform with the orders in force for British and U.S. personnel and therefore that they should be ordered not to carry arms.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that :

(a) G-3, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, instruct the Maclean Mission to request Marshal Tito to order Partisan forces in the BARI area to cease carrying arms forthwith and that they embody in their telegram to the Maclean Mission :-

(i) the Chief of Staff's suggestion at X above,

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(ii) a statement to the effect that the Supreme Allied Commander was dissatisfied with the attitude of the Partisan Commander in BARI in this matter.

(b) The Chief Administrative Officer have Commander, 3 District, report on Partisan behaviour in his area.

8. RELAXATION IN RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

(Paper No. PC (44) 129)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that responsibility for the procurement of civilian supplies, other than petroleum products, in French North AFRICA would be the responsibility of the French authorities with effect from 1 January 1945, and recommending that the existing ban on the entry of business men into French North AFRICA and restrictions on commercial communications be relaxed to the extent allowed by security considerations.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CAMPBELL reported that an order had already gone out lifting the ban on civilian entry into French North AFRICA with effect from 10 November.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Took note with approval of the Chief of Staff's statement at 'X' above.

(b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with G-2 and the Chief Signals Officer, arrange for such relaxation on commercial communications as was compatible with military security.

9. NAVAL OPERATIONS BASED ON YUGOSLAV PORTS

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that he wished to open up SPLIT, ZARA and SIBENIK as a matter of urgency and that for this purpose he was planning to sail a cruiser and a small naval party into each of these ports. Owing to the unsatisfactory reception which naval forces had encountered in Partisan territory, however, he desired direction in the matter.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CAMPBELL suggested that a telegram should be despatched forthwith to the Maclean Mission informing them of the desirability of opening up these ports, and instructing them to arrange for Tito to send the necessary orders to his local Commanders.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, send a telegram to the Maclean Mission instructing them to inform Tito that Allied naval forces were being despatched to SPLIT, ZARA and SIBENIK and possibly other Yugoslav ports, and asking him to order his local commanders to extend assistance to these forces.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CANNELL suggested that a telegram should be despatched forthwith to the Maclean Mission informing them of the desirability of opening up these ports, and instructing them to arrange for Tito to send the necessary orders to his local Commanders.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, send a telegram to the Maclean Mission instructing them to inform Tito that Allied naval forces were being despatched to SPLIT, ZARA and SIBENIK and possibly other Yugoslav ports, and asking him to order his local commanders to extend assistance to these forces.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
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EXTRACTS K-399

Commander, Balkan Air Force — Minutes 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 (5 copies)
Chief, INC — Minute 5 (1 copy)
MAT Representative, AFHQ — Minute 5 (1 copy)
Chief Signals Officer — Minute 8 (1 copy)

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0516

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-396

PC (44) 31st Meeting
SAC (44) 107th Meeting
6th November 1944

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A

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 7TH NOVEMBER 1944

AGENDA FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, C-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 30th Meeting - already circulated)

3. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AS SERVICE UNITS IN ITALY
(Paper No. PC (44) 131 - to be circulated)

4. TRANSFER OF SHIP-BORNE RADIO STATION 'PHOENIX' TO THE PACIFIC
(Paper No. PC (44) 126 - already circulated)

5. POSITION IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND ISTRIA FOLLOWING GERMAN WITHDRAWAL
(Paper No. PC (44) 130 - already circulated)

6. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN BARI
(Oral statement by US Political Adviser)

7. RELAXATION IN RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
(Paper No. PC (44) 129 - already circulated)

NOTES: (a) Papers Nos. PC (44) 125, 127 and 128 will be considered at the next meeting of the Political Committee.

(b) A.C of S, G-1(A), is invited to attend or be represented for Item 3.

(c) Chief, INC, is invited to attend or be represented for Item 4.

AGENDA FOR SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1002-2/cc

(Paper No. PC (44) 131 - to be circulated)

4. TRANSFER OF SHIP-BORNE RADIO STATION 'PHOENIX' TO THE PACIFIC
(Paper No. PC (44) 126 - already circulated)

5. POSITION IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND ISTRIA FOLLOWING GERMAN WITHDRAWAL
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(Oral statement by US Political Adviser)

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(Paper No. PC (44) 129 - already circulated)

NOTES: (a) Papers Nos. PC (44) 125, 127 and 128 will be considered at the next meeting of the Political Committee.

(1) 1002-2/cc

(b) A.C of S, G-1(A), is invited to attend or be represented for Item 3.

(c) Chief, INC, is invited to attend or be represented for Item 4.

1002-2/cc

AGENDA FOR SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

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HEADQUARTERS 7 NOV 44 A. C. C.

8. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (44) 106th Meeting - already circulated)

9. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FOR SUPPLY TO NORTH ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (44) 118 - already circulated)

10. ACCOMMODATION IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (44) 114 - already circulated)

11. PROVISION OF A LAUNCH AND SEAPLANE FOR COMMANDER, 3 CORPS
(Oral statement by the Chief Administrative Officer)

TO TAKE NOTE:

12. RELATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (44) 117 - already circulated)

- 1 -

(12)

for B.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY

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Chief Administrative Officer	15
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 30th Meeting
24th October 1944

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COPY NO 40

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
ROOM AT 1600 HOURS ON TUESDAY 24TH OCTOBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, MediterraneanTheatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-3, AFHQ

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Colonel C.E. Lewin-Harris, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Mr. Russell Barnes,

30th Mtg
Minutes
1

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Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-3, AFHQ

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Colonel C.E. Lewin-Harris, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, PWB

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Major General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section

Brigadier General C.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

Brigadier J.G. Nicholson,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

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30th Mtg
Minutes
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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Mr. C. Offic,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jnr,
Secretary, General Staff, AFHQ

SECRETARIES :-

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 29th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 17th October, subject to the following amendment :-

Minute 3, line 3. For "a directive" substitute "guidance".

2. CONTROL OF UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA IN ROME

(Previous reference PC (44) 29th Meeting - Minute 2)

COMMODORE STONE reported that the Russians wished to suppress the publication in ITALY of works by Trotsky on the grounds that Trotsky was a fascist. The Allied Control Commission had taken the view that to accede to the Russian request would involve a breach of the freedom of speech.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note with approval of the action of the Allied Control Commission in this matter.

3. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROUMANIA

(Previous reference PC (44) 29th Meeting, Minute 3)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that it was hoped to issue guidance to ACC, ROUMANIA, on this matter within the next few days.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

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(Previous reference PC (44) 29th Meeting - Minute 2)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. SUPPLY SITUATION IN ITALY

4930

MR. MACMILLAN reported that there were a number of problems which he and Mr. Kirk had been discussing with Mr. Harris and Mr. Mitchell of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. These questions had arisen largely out of recent statements made by the Prime Minister and the President. He pointed out that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, would be returning to AFHQ on 25 October and suggested that, if it was possible to agree a programme of action with him and with the Chief Administrative Officer, the X Supreme Allied Commander should authorise the sending of the necessary telegrams to WASHINGTON in his name and the giving of the necessary local instructions. This procedure was suggested in view of the urgency of the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved Mr. Macmillan's suggestion at 'X' above and directed that the officers concerned proceed accordingly.

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K 367

5. SUPPLY SITUATION IN GREECE

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reported that he had received a letter from Commander, 3 Corps, indicating that a serious situation had arisen in GREECE. The Greek Government had some 160,000 men in public utility companies and municipal employment whose wages they were bound to finance. As prices rose due to the galloping state of inflation the payment of these individuals had automatically to increase or they would starve. The Government had no revenue and it was not possible at present to raise taxes. Nor was it possible to buy such things as olive oil, which were cheaper in the provinces, and import them to ATTICA because communications were so poor and transport was lacking and because merchants would not take a fixed price with the drachma in constant depreciation. The only immediate solution appeared to be to issue rations to utility company workers, municipal employees, etc, as a temporary expedient in lieu of wages until the currency had been stabilised. AML were not in a position to do this because sufficient supplies were not yet ashore or available and because it was contrary to their directive, which provided that supplies must be issued on sale - the revenue going to the Greek Government. The only possible method appeared to be for the International Red Cross to depart from their general principle and to undertake the feeding of these employees whilst continuing to feed the destitute poor. The latter were estimated at 200,000 to 300,000. The president of the International Red Cross had undertaken to do this but had emphasised that Red Cross resources would only enable him to do it for a fortnight. Brigadier General Saddler was in accord with the point of view expressed by Lieutenant General Scobie and had said that he had made appropria representations to WASHINGTON

The Supreme Allied Commander added that Lieutenant General Scobie was asking on behalf of the Greek Government for the provision of additional MT to enable the Government to draw cheaper supplies from the provinces and for the provision of sea transport for the same purpose, mainly to bring in supplies of olive oil and bread.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK observed that ML HQ (GREECE) had submitted an original transport requirement of 17 GT companies, very few of which it had been possible to make available for operational reasons. The supply of MT to the Greek Government would prove most difficult. He suggested that caiques proceeding with supplies to outlying ports should backload with olive oil and any other essentials obtainable. He added that conditions were undoubtedly most desparate in the big towns and that Lieutenant General Scobie's view was possibly coloured by the fact that he was stationed in ATHENS. As regards the currency problem he reported that Lieutenant Commander Southard had already left for LONDON where he would interview Sir Eric Speed at the War Office on the basis of agreed instructions which had been given him.

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM supported Lieutenant General Clark's remarks regarding the backloading of food supplies. He expressed his opposition to the shipment of MT to GREECE and pointed out that much could be done in the way of distribution by the use of caiques to smaller ports and onward carriage by pack transport.

MR. MACMILLAN said that he had understood the original plan of ML HQ (GREECE) to be to barter relief supplies in outlying districts for olive oil and other local commodities and suggested that attention should be drawn to the soundness of this arrangement. He was in favour of the temporary solution proposed by Lieutenant General Scobie but added that, if within the fortnight sufficient currency were not printed and available and confidence in it had not been established, it would be necessary to instruct ML HQ (GREECE) to distribute supplies to the destitute without immediate payment. The problem was not one of shortage of supplies but of difficulty of exchange.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the proposal to supply essential workers from International Red Cross stocks during the next fortnight and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer inform Commander, 3 Corps, accordingly.

/(b)

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(b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer examine and report what, if any, additional MT could be made available for the distribution of supplies within GREECE.

(c) Directed that the principle of issuing relief supplies without immediate payment, in contravention of the existing ML HQ (GREECE) directive, be reconsidered at the next meeting of the Committee.

6. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC

(Paper No. PC (44) 124)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a message alleged to have emanated from General Mihajlovic stating that he had a force of 50,000 men at his orders in BOSNIA and was willing to place himself under the command of General Wilson .

MAJOR GENERAL AIREY said that there was no confirmation that General Mihajlovic had this number of troops in this locality.

MAJOR GENERAL NOCE said that General Mihajlovic was reported to have taken to the mountains with a handful of officers.

MR. KIRK enquired whether any intelligence had been received from Lieutenant Colonel McDowell and suggested that if not he should be asked to state his views on this message. M. Topalovic might also be asked the source of his information.

MR. BARNES remarked that a representative of PWB had recently returned from Lieutenant Colonel McDowell and might be able to throw some light on the matter.

MR. MACMILLAN emphasised the danger of any reply being made by the Supreme Allied Commander since it would jeopardise the agreement recently reached in MOSCOW and the forthcoming discussions between Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that no reply be made to the message purporting to have emanated from General Mihajlovic.

(b) Invited Mr. Kirk, in conjunction with PWB, to ascertain the nature of the communications existing between M. Topalovic and General Mihajlovic, to establish as far as possible the facts regarding the message under discussion and to report their findings to a

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7. USE OF CAMERAS IN COURT IN ITALY

MR. MACMILLAN drew attention to a PWB summary in which it was stated that the Supreme Judge had protested strongly against the filming of the Azzaloni trial by PWB and had referred to a similar incident at the Caruso trial. He considered himself that it was regrettable that any films should be made of proceedings of this nature.

COMMODORE STONE observed that Count Sforza had himself requested the filming of the Caruso trial but agreed that from the point of view of civil government it was undesirable that cameras should be allowed in court.

MR. BARNES said that the films had been taken as documentary records of what occured but that there was no intention of releasing them to the public. Until recently censorship in matters of this kind had been undertaken by INC but even under the new procedure no releases were made by PWB except in close consultation with the competent sections of AFHQ.

See 9256/cc EXTRACTED

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER : K 367

Ruled that the filming of trials was derogatory to the dignity of the Italian courts and directed that ACC, in conjunction with PWB, arrange that in future no cameras were allowed in Italian courts.

8. GREEK AIR MINISTRY

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR reported that M. Papandreou had instructed a senior Greek Air Force officer to collect suitable personnel to form a Greek Air Ministry in ATHENS. He considered that there was no real need for a Greek Air Ministry but admitted that it might be desirable from the Greek point of view that one be formed. It must be clear, however, that the Greek Air Ministry would exercise no control over the operations of Greek squadrons when they moved to GREECE. He suggested that Mr. Leeper be invited to ask the Greek Government whether they wished to establish an Air Ministry and that, if they did so wish, no objections should be raised.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the formation of a Greek Air Ministry might have undesirable repercussions on the administration of the Greek Navy and that he did not particularly favour the early resuscitation of the Greek Admiralty.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Undertook to raise this matter with HM Ambassador to GREECE during his forthcoming visit to ATHENS.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22

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for J.H. LASCELLES,
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Spares	41-45

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EXTRACTS

Commander, M HQ (Balkans)	Item 5 (3 copies)
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	Items 5, 6 and 8 (4 copies)
Commander, Balkan Air Force	Item 8 (4 copies)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

PC (44) 30th Meeting
23rd October 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1600 HOURS ON TUESDAY 24TH OCTOBER 1944 AND NOT AT 1100 HOURS AS PREVIOUSLY ADVISED

REVISED AGENDA

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, C-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 29th Meeting - already circulated)

3. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC
(Paper No. PC (44) 124 - to be circulated)

The following operational items will be taken at the end of the Political Committee's meeting :-

4. MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF
(Paper No. SAC (44) 112 - already circulated)

5. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(Paper No. SAC (44) 113 - already circulated)

6. SECURING OF BASE ON THE DALMATIAN COAST
(JPS Study No. P/241 (Final) - already circulated)

7. ACTION AGAINST ENEMY FORCES WITHDRAWING THROUGH NORTHERN ALBANIA
(JPS Study P/243 (Final) - to be circulated)

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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3. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC
(Paper No. PC (44) 124 - to be circulated)

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J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 344

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COPY NO 41

PC (44) 29th Meeting
17th October 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

20 OCT Recd

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON TUESDAY 17TH OCTOBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Brigadier General C.P. Cabell, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. C.E. Steel, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

29th Mtg Minutes

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. C.E. Steel, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

4925

Major General F.C. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, MMHQ (Balkans)

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson,
G-3 (Operations), AFHQ

Air Commodore L.T. Pankhurst,
Director of Plans, HQ MAAF

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Govenor R. Cochran,
UNRRA Representative to Supreme Allied Comm

Note
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29th Mtg
Minutes

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

SECRETARIES K344

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 28th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 11th October 1944.

2. CONTROL OF UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA IN ~~EW~~ Sic

(Previous reference PC (44) 28th Meeting - Conclusion 6(a))

MR STEEL pointed out that the instruction which had been sent to the Commanding General, Rome Allied Area Command, appeared to be directed against the Poles, whereas apparently no direction was given regarding anti-Polish propaganda.

COMMODORE STONE replied that it had been agreed to deal with instances of anti-Polish propaganda in the Italian Communist press as they arose. Replying to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he expressed the view that, while it would be possible to indict editors, guilty of such incidents, before military courts, it would be better to handle them through the Italian Government as agreed at the last meeting of the Committee.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Cm 9255/44 EXTRACTED

Took note of Commodore Stone's suggestion and directed that no action be taken to indict before military courts editors of Italian newspapers, guilty of the dissemination of matter liable to embarrass the Allied authorities, unless previous attempts through the Italian Government to restrain such activities had failed.

3. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROUMANIA

(Previous reference PC (44) 28th Meeting - Conclusion 10)

MAJOR GENERAL AREY explained that the arrangement proposed in Paper No. PC (44) 119 cut across the existing policy for control of travel. He felt that AFHQ should issue a directive to the Missions in the countries in question specifying the classes of individual whose evacuation might be permitted, and that the Missions should be required to refer all other cases to G-2, AFHQ , for clearance before evacuation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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Replying to a question by the [illegible], that, while it would be possible to indict editors, guilty of such [illegible], before military courts, it would be better to handle them through the Italian Government as agreed at the last meeting of the Committee.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of Commodore Stone's suggestion and directed that no action be taken to indict before military courts editors of Italian newspapers, guilty of the dissemination of matter liable to embarrass the Allied authorities, unless previous attempts through the Italian Government to restrain such activities had failed.

3. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROUMANIA

(Previous reference PC (44) 28th Meeting - Conclusion 10)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the views expressed by Major General Airey, as recorded above, and directed that the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Chief Administrative Officer implement Conclusion 10 of PC (44) 28th Meeting on this basis.

4. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Previous reference PC (44) 28th Meeting - Conclusion 13)

MR. KIRK suggested that the telegram in the NAT series which was under preparation by G-5 should include a statement to the effect that from a military standpoint the tranquillity of the Mediterranean Theatre might be jeopardised if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

/THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER : K344

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for the inclusion of Mr. Kirk's suggestion in the telegram under reference.

5. RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE BALKANS

(Paper No. PC (44) 123)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a note by Commander, M HQ (Balkans) explaining the present situation regarding relief supplies to the Balkans and emphasising the difficulties arising out of -

(a) the shortage of clothing,

(b) the cancellation of food deliveries scheduled for November, and

(c) recent public statements which may have given the impression that adequate resources for relief were available.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES, amplifying the paper, made the following points.:-

(1) There was no guarantee that Food deliveries scheduled for arrival in December 1944 and subsequent months would in fact be shipped.

(2) Up to January 1945 Clothing (including blankets) would be available only to the extent of less than ten per cent of minimum estimated requirements.

(3) It was planned to put GREECE on to a bread ration of 350 grams, which would, however, start at 250 grams only.

(4) Sizeable quantities of concentrated foods were available in Middle East for Balkan relief, and arrangements were in hand to make use of these.

(5) Introduction of relief to the IONIAN Islands was proceeding satisfactorily. It was being effected by caiques from the Italian mainland at present but it was intended eventually to supply these islandsthrough PATRAS.

(6) A general statement was being issued informing the public that, owing to world shortage, relief supplies would fall far short of what the United Nations would wish to send to liberated countries.

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(1) There was no guarantee that Food deliveries scheduled for arrival in December 1944 and subsequent months would in fact be shipped.

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(6) A general statement was being issued informing the public that, owing to world shortage, relief supplies would fall far short of what the United Nations would wish to send to liberated countries.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK observed that, due to congestion at MARSEILLES and other considerations there would be a shortage of merchant tonnage in the Mediterranean during November and December. He added that there was a world shortage of clothing and that even Allied troops in the Mediterranean were short of the requisite number of blankets on that account. He therefore emphasised the need for restraint in press and other statements regarding the volume of relief supplies available for the BALKANS.

MR. STEEL pointed out that the 250 gram bread ration suggested by Major General Hughes was lower than the scale in force in ITALY and that this might have adverse political consequences.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the difficulties of transportation and distribution, which should be emphasised to the Greeks and would probably be appreciated by them. The increase in the ration in ITALY had been made possible largely by improved transport facilities, which were known to be poor in GREECE. He felt that it would be unwise to start the ration in GREECE on too high a figure but agreed that 250 grams was suitable. Replying to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that there was no clothing earmarked for YUGOSLAVIA which could be diverted to GREECE. The only stocks held for YUGOSLAVIA were battle dress and boots which were intended for the Partisan forces and could not therefore be released.

/ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM

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4923

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that minesweeping and other naval factors would limit the speed with which relief could be introduced to some of the islands and lesser ports on the Greek mainland. It would however be possible in the first instance to supply these places by caique from PIRAEUS, PATRAS, KALAMAKI, PREVEZA and other ports opened up. He added that he had ordered his ships to avoid sinking caiques in the Eastern Mediterranean whenever possible.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of Paper No. PC (44) 123 and of the above discussion.

6. NEW ZEALAND GIFT FOR GREEK RELIEF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that it had been decided to accep a free gift from the New Zealand Government to the people of GREECE, con sisting of some 800 tons of foodstuffs for the shipment of which instruc tions had been given. It had now been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the gift should not be set against the programme of relief supplies being provided to GREECE under official auspices.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

7. AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR ACC PERSONNEL

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reported that Commodore Stone had enquired whether a transport aircraft could be made available by MAAF for the exclusive use of ACC personnel.

COMMODORE STONE pointed out that while the regular air transport services were utilised by his staff as far as possible, they could not always carry his personnel to the remote places they frequently had to move to and at the times required.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL remarked that owing to the higher priority work on which the limited number of transport aircraft in the theatre were engaged he had recently been unable to obtain one for Commander, 3 District, who also covered an extensive area.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CABELL stated that it would only be possible to provide an aircraft for the ACC at the expense of supply dropping operations in the Balkans or elsewhere.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

0539

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

7. AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR ACC PERSONNEL

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COMMODORE STONE pointed out that while the regular air transport services were utilised by his staff as far as possible, they could not always carry his personnel to the remote places they frequently had to move to and at the times required.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL CABELL stated that it would only be possible to provide an aircraft for the ACC at the expense of supply dropping operations in the Balkans or elsewhere.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that aircraft should not be diverted for the purpose under discussion from supply dropping to the Balkans or elsewhere but that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, consider sympathetically the request of the Allied Control Commission for a Dakota for their exclusive use, and that he make one available to them as soon as circumstances permitted. 4922

8. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

The record of the discussion which took place on this item has been circulated as an Annexe to these minutes in the form of Paper No. SAC (44) 107 and has been given an appropriate distribution accordingly.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

(7)

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EXTRACTS

Commander, M HQ (Balkans)	Items 5, 6 & 8 (4 copies)
Chief, IN C	Item 2 (2 copies)
Governor Cochran, UNRRA	Items 5 & 6 (1 copy)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 29th Meeting
16th October 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON TUESDAY 17TH OCTOBER 1944

(6)

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 28th Meeting - already circulated)

2. RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE BALKANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 123 - already circulated)

(6) 10 Oct/cc

3. NEW ZEALAND GIFT FOR GREEK RELIEF
(Oral statement by Chief Administrative Officer)

TO TAKE NOTE :-

4. TRANSFER OF PROVINCES OF TERAMO, AQUILA, PESCARA, CHIETI, VITERBO AND RIETI TO ITALIAN ADMINISTRATION
(Telegram No. MAT 354 of 14 October 1944 to Combined Civil Affairs Committee)

The following operational item will be taken at the end of the Political Committee's meeting :-

5. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN GREECE

((a) Paper No. SAC (44) 106 - to be circulated
(b) JPS Study No. P/240 (Final) - to be circulated

NOTE : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is invited to attend for Item 5
Commander, M HQ (Balkans) is invited to attend for Items 2 3 & 5.

Dec. 1

William VI 4920

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2. RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE BALKANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 123 - already circulated)

3. NEW ZEALAND GIFT FOR GREEK RELIEF
(Oral statement by Chief Administrative Officer)

TO TAKE NOTE :-

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Commander, M HQ (Balkans) is invited to attend for Items 2 3 & 5.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS
17 OCT 1944
A. C. C.

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PC (44) 28th Meeting

13th October 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

(6)

CORRIGENDUM

Please amend the Minutes of PC (44) 28th Meeting of 11th October as follows:-

On page 7	PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE RELIEF IN ALBANIA	to be numbered 6
" " 7	REQUEST FROM ALLIED (SOVIET) HIGH COMMAND, ROUMANIA, FOR BRITISH FILMS	" " 7
" " 8	FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY	" " 8

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	44-46
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HEAD Q.
14 OCT 1944
A. C. C.

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PC (44) 28th Meeting
12th October 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 11TH OCTOBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Commodore L.T. Pankhurst, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General R.G. Lewis, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ.

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, M HQ (Balkans)

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0548

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General R.G. Lewis, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

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Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, MMLO (Balkans)

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section , AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Brigadier General A.J. McChrystal,
Chief, PWB (for Item 6)

Mr. C.E. Steel,
Office of British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel E.E. Hyde,
G-1 (A) Section, AFHQ (for Item 5)

(6)

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Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

K 327

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 27th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 4th October 1944.

2. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

(5)

(Previous reference PC (44) 27th Meeting - Conclusion 4(a))

COMMODORE STONE reported that the Italian Prime Minister had agreed verbally to the proposed employment of 28,000 Italian prisoners of war in FRANCE.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

See 3005/4 Took note of the above.

3. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GERMAN ARMISTICE

(Previous reference PC (44) 27th Meeting - Conclusion 4(b))

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the Foreign Office were of the opinion that ITALY should neither be represented at the armistice discussions with GERMANY nor participate in its enforcement. If some in strument were required to close the state of war existing between GERMANY and ITALY it could be negotiated by the Control Commission which would be set up in GERMANY and the Allied Control Commission in ITALY. He added that these comments had been transmitted to the U.S. State Department whose views on the subject were awaited.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

(Previous reference PC (44) 27th Meeting - Minute 8)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that Flag Officer, TARANTO, had reported that there was a pitiable shortage of food and clothing in the IONIAN Islands. It was now intended to ship up to ten tons of 'ad hoc' relief supplies drawn from military stocks in each operational vessel proceeding to the [illegible] the IONIAN Islands and the West coast of GREECE until such time

0550

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4916

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that a relief ship was due to arrive at KALAMATA shortly and that it was hoped that PREVEZA could accept a small relief ship by 21 October.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES observed that the situation in the liberated AEGEAN Islands was better than in the IONIAN Islands as relief supplies were being sent from stocks in TURKEY . On the assumption that large scale relief to YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA would not begin in the immediate future, it was estimated that existing stocks of food supplies in the Middle East would cover essential Greek requirements for 30 days. Should full scale relief for all these countries be required at an early date, however, there would be deficiencies in some items.

(b)

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MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that Air Vice Marshal Elliot was seeking authority to compromise on certain points in respect of the relief negotiations with the Yugoslav delegates at BARI. He felt that the conclusion of an agreement should not be pressed to the point of compromise. The resulting delay would make it possible to use temporarily for GREECE, against subsequent replacement, supplies earmarked for YUGOSLAVIA. He added that relief supplies due to arrive in the theatre in November had not sailed, and that non-availability of supplies had been given as the reason. A serious situation would develop if arrivals scheduled for subsequent months also failed to sail. He had accordingly reported the matter to Mr. Eden personally, urging that appropriate action be taken to forestall the development of critical conditions.

X

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Endorsed Mr. Macmillan's views recorded at 'X' above and directed that G-5 convey them as his policy to Commander, Balkan Air Force.

(b) Took note with approval of the action taken by Mr. Macmillan in connection with the cancellation of the sailings of November relief arrivals.

5. VISITS OF VATICAN AUTHORITIES TO PRISONER OF WAR AND INTERNEE CAMPS

(Paper No. PC (44) 117)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Indicating that the Pope had enquired of the Supreme Allied Commander during his audience on 24 August whether the Vatican authorities could be given facilities to visit German and other prisoners of war and civilian internees in Allied custody in ITALY.

(b) Suggesting that visits to prisoner of war camps be permitted but that visits to civilian internee camps be either refused or be limited in frequency and subject to certain security measures.

MR. KIRK said that he understood that the Vatican desired these facilities for the purpose of giving "normal religous assistance" to Roman Catholic prisoners of war and internees.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out the need to make it clear that these facilities were granted not to the Vatican State as such, but to the Church. If the visitors were held to represent the Vatican State, other neutral

0552
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

5. VISITS OF VATICAN AUTHORITIES TO PRISONER OF WAR AND INTERNEE CAMPS

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(b) Suggesting that visits to prisoner of war camps be permitted but that visits to civilian internee camps be either refused or be limited in frequency and subject to certain security measures.

MR. KIRK said that he understood that the Vatican desired these facilities for the purpose of giving "normal religous assistance" to Roman Catholic prisoners of war and internees.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out the need to make it clear that these facilities were granted not to the Vatican State as such, but to the Church. If the visitors were held to represent the Vatican State, other neutral States might demand similar facilities. It should also be made clear to the Vatican that no discussions on grounds for internment and suchlike subjects would be entertained. If these visits were agreed to, he suggested that it should be brought home to the Vatican that they had not been permitted by the Germans. 4915

COLONEL HYDE reported that the U.S. War Department had objected to such visits about a year ago. The matter had been put to them again and, subject to their approval, G-1(A) was agreeable to the proposed visits.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Invited the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, in conjunction with G-1(A), G-1(B) and G-2, to despatch letters to the U.S. and British representatives at the Holy See informing them that visits both to prisoner of war and internee camps would be permitted subject to restrictions to be specified in these letters on the basis of Paper No. PC (44) 117 and the above discussion.

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6. CONTROL OF UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA IN ROME

K 327

(Paper No. PC (44) 116)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a note by Chief, Liaison Section, drawing attention to recent cases where propaganda disseminated by one nation had included material liable to discredit the good name of another nation and suggesting that representatives of the various United Nations on the Allied Advisory Council and of the Italian Government be requested to adhere to an undertaking to restrain such activities by their nationals.

MAJOR GENERAL BEAUMONT NESBITT, amplifying the paper, stated that the proposal was designed to assist the Poles. Their Public Relations Branch, being a military organisation, was subject to a censorship which could stop publication of any material liable to embarrass the Allied authorities, whereas the Russians were free to do as they pleased and were apparently using certain sections of the Italian Press and other organisations to reproduce Russian material, including anti-Polish propaganda. Replying to a question by Mr. Macmillan, he added that the Poles, if given a free hand, would almost certainly produce material which would provoke protests from the Russians.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that the various representatives of the Allied Advisory Council would probably be unwilling to sign the proposed self-denying ordinance without consulting their respective governments and that this would open up wider issues. He suggested therefore that the general procedure proposed was impractical and that incidents should be dealt with individually as they arose through the Allied Control Commission.

MR. KIRK supported this view, adding that the general procedure proposed by Chief, Liaison Section, amounted in effect to political censorship, and that in any case reference to the Advisory Council would probably reveal unwelcome differences of view between its members.

MR. BARNES pointed out that PWB ran exhibitions depicting the war effort of the principal United Nations. He suggested that the Poles be told that PWB could undertake any further exhibitions desired by them. It would also be possible to penalise offending newspapers by arranging for APB to cease supplies of newsprint.

COMMODORE STONE observed that there were limits to the extent to which certain papers could be penalised. Thus it would doubtless be undesirable to compel the leading Communist papers to cease publication by withholding supplies of newsprint. He felt that Signor Bonomi might well be required to instruct Signor Togliatti to dispose of editors who consistently ignored his orders in matters of this kind.

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MR. KIRK supported this view, adding that the general procedure proposed by Chief, Liaison Section, amounted in effect to political censorship, and that in any case reference to the Advisory Council would probably reveal unwelcome differences of view between its members.

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4914

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that no further action be taken regarding the self-denying ordinance proposed in Paper No. PC (44) 116, but that G-5 instruct Allied Control Commission to be prepared to take action to ensure any individuals responsible for instances of the kind indicated in the paper.

(b) Directed that Director, PWB, inform the Polish Public Relations Branch in ROME that PWB would be willing to undertake any other exhibitions of Polish art and culture to be held in the theatre, but that no compulsion be exercised in the matter.

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7. PAYMENT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALY TERRITORY K 327

(S)

1002-2/cc

(Paper No. PC (44) 120)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by G-4 :

(a) Indicating that the Italian Prime Minister had informed the Acting Chief Commissioner of the ACC that the political effect of the proposed lira account would be "disastrous".

See: x-4605-/c for complete story

(b) Suggesting that a draft telegram, as submitted, be despatched to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee after insertion of a statement on the Italian Prime Minister's reaction as recorded at (a) above.

COMMODORE STONE, amplifying the paper, stated that it was now estimated that the drawings against the proposed lira account would amount to not less than one billion lire monthly. In the opinion of the Italian Prime Minister the proposed measure would seriously affect the stability of the Italian stock market and of the lira. He added that Italian financial circles had been led to understand by an article alleged to have originated in Wall Street that some remission of Italian obligations could be expected.

exchange

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD observed that events might well prove Italian expectations to be pessimistic and pointed out that the German indemnity had been fixed at ten billion lire monthly of which some seven billion monthly had been paid. This was in excess of probable Italian indebtedness to the Allies.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 insert in the draft telegram circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 120 a statement (to be agreed with the U.S. Political Adviser, the British Resident Minister and the Allied Control Commission) embodying the reactions of the Italian Prime Minister, and that they then despatch the telegram in the MAT series.

8. PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FORCES

(Paper No. PC (44) 122)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the New York office of OWI had requested Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through PWB, to make an appreciative statement on the Italian forces serving under him. Similar requests were also being made of the Supreme Allied Com-

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ster the proposed measure would seriously affect the stability of the Italian stock market and of the lira. He added that Italian financial circles had been led to understand by an article alleged to have originated in Wall Street that some remission of Italian obligations could be expected.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD observed that events might well prove Italian expectations to be pessimistic and pointed out that the German indemnity had been fixed at ten billion lire monthly of which some seven billion monthly had been paid. This was in excess of probable Italian indebtedness to the Allies.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 insert in the draft telegram circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 120 a statement (to be agreed with the U.S. Political Adviser, the British Resident Minister and the Allied Control Commission) embodying the reactions of the Italian Prime Minister, and that they then despatch the telegram in the MAT series.

8. PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FORCES

(Paper No. PC (44) 122)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the New York office of OWI had requested Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through PWB, to make an appreciative statement on the Italian forces serving under him. Similar requests were also being made of the Supreme Allied Commander, Air C-in-C, C-in-C AAI and Commanding General, Fifth Army.

4913

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM queried the desirability of making any appreciative statement on the Italian forces remarking that it would be unfavourably received in MALTA, FRANCE and elsewhere.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that Director PWB, inform OWI that publication of any appreciative statements on the Italian forces was considered undesirable so long as fighting continued on Italian soil.

(b) Directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, AAI, and Commanding General, Fifth Army, act accordingly if approached and that G-3 telegraph Commander-in-Chief, AAI, and Commanding General, Fifth Army, in this sense.

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9. ESTABLISHMENTS IN ITALY FOR DISPLACED YUGOSLAVS K 327

(Paper No. PC (44) 118)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

(a) Indicating that Marshal Tito had requested that no more Yugoslavs be sent to EGYPT or NORTH AFRICA and that he would undertake that as few as possible would in future be evacuated from YUGOSLAVIA to ITALY.

(b) Recommending that five camps and centres, which had hitherto been in use for Yugoslavs in transit to EGYPT and NORTH AFRICA, be renamed "Accommodation Centres for Displaced Yugoslavs" and that they be taken over by UNRRA.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that under the proposed scheme the number of Yugoslavs in ITALY would not be increased and that their retention here would permit some economy in the use of shipping. The effect would be to render the existing transit camps permanent in character.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GALE ELL suggested that Marshal Tito should be told that if he was prepared to stop evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA, AFHQ would endeavour to conform with his wishes, but that in any case, and particularly if evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA continued, AFHQ must retain complete freedom of administrative action.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed, and added that it was desirable to avoid setting aside specific accommodation for specific nationalities. It should be pooled and regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that G-5 take action in accordance with the recommendations in Paper No. PC (44) 118 as modified by the suggestion at 'X' above, and that no firm undertaking be given to Marshal Tito in the matter.

(b) Directed that accommodation in the theatre for refugees be regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

10. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROUMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 119)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the U.S. Political adviser recommending a procedure for the

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMBELL suggested that Marshal Tito should be told that if he was prepared to stop evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA, AFHQ would endeavour to conform with his wishes, but that in any case, and particularly if evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA continued, AFHQ must retain complete freedom of administrative action.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed, and added that it was desirable to avoid setting aside specific accommodation for specific nationalities. It should be pooled and regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that G-5 take action in accordance with the recommendations in Paper No. PC (44) 118 as modified by the suggestion at 'X' above, and that no firm undertaking be given to Marshal Tito in the matter.

(b) Directed that accommodation in the theatre for refugees be regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

10. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM RUMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 119)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the U.S. Political Adviser recommending a procedure for the evacuation of various categories of personnel from ROUMANIA with the co-operation and consent of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

MAJOR GENERAL BEAUMONT NESBITT, referring to PC (44) 26th Meeting, Conclusion 3(b), stated that General Anders had now asked the Polish Government to approach the British and US Governments regarding the evacuation of certain Poles from ROUMANIA.

MR. MACMILLAN, replying to a question from the Supreme Allied Commander, remarked that a similar procedure could be applied for evacuations from BULGARIA and other liberated areas. In cases where there was no Allied Control Commission, the nearest Allied Mission or authorities could clear the request for entry, if the necessary information was available to them.

AIR COMMODORE PANKHURST pointed out that para 4(ii) in the paper under discussion charged MAAF with the entire responsibility for moving personnel including their eventual disposal from airfields in ITALY. He suggested that 15th Air Force liaison officers in BUCHAREST or elsewhere should not arrange transport until applications had been considered, approved and classified as to priority by AFHQ. MAAF's responsibilities must be restricted to the pro-

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vision of air transport only. They could not undertake any administrative arrangements at either end in respect of these evacuees.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the proposal submitted by the U.S. Political Adviser in Paper No. PC (44) 119, and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, take action accordingly and in the light of the above discussion.

10. PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE RELIEF IN ALBANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 121)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper covering a proposed 'pro forma' Memorandum of Agreement for use by Allied Commanders with local leaders in ALBANIA if the opportunity arose.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES explained that, as there was no party of any pre-eminence in ALBANIA, it was not proposed at present to draw up an agreement on the lines of that now under discussion with the Yugoslav delegates in BARI. In the memorandum under discussion M HQ (Balkans) had aimed at simplicity and brevity and they had avoided any reference to financial obligation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that RANKIN B conditions might soon obtain in ALBANIA. He had been directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to send any forces of occupation to ALBANIA but he felt that it might be necessary to consider the despatch of elements of the Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic in order to ensure equitable distribution of any relief supplies sent in. He enquired what the political implications of such a move might be.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that ALBANIA was not an ally and that the United Nations were under no obligation to assist in her relief and rehabilitation.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that it was unlikely that any Albanian ports would have to be opened up for naval purposes. Any naval vessels that did put in to Albanian ports would, however, be carrying small quantities of relief supplies and in this connection the proposed memorandum of Agreement would be of use to captains of these ships.

MR. KIRK observed that the draft contained no mention of relief agencies and no indication as to the source from which relief would be derived or as to how it would be administered. Moreover, paragraphs 3(b) and (c) might be held to imply that any likely Albanian leader was entitled to impose taxes and generally take the law into his hands.

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MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES replied that the proposed Memorandum was only intended for use in connection with 'ad hoc' relief. A proper agreement could be negotiated if at a later date some suitable party emerged.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the Memorandum of Agreement as submitted and directed that M HQ (Balkans), in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and Commander, Balkan Air Force, arrange for its issue to all forces proceeding to ALBANIA.

11. REQUEST FROM ALLIED (SOVIET) HIGH COMMAND, ROUMANIA, FOR BRITISH FILMS

MR. BARNES reported that the Russian High Command had requested the British Mission in BUCHAREST to arrange for the despatch of British films to ROUMANIA. Subject to the Supreme Allied Commander's approval, he was proposing to despatch films depicting the British war effort, such as "Desert Victory" and enquired whether American films should also be sent.

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MR. OFFIE remarked that there was some restriction on the despatch of American films to certain foreign countries and suggested that the State Department be consulted.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that Chief, P/B, despatch suitable British films to Allied Control Commission, ROUMANIA.

(b) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser to obtain the U.S. State Department's approval to the despatch of American films by P/B to ROUMANIA

11. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

COMMODORE STONE drew attention to President Roosevelt's recent statement claiming that food and other relief supplies were being sent to ITALY on a sufficient scale to "maintain full health and efficiency". The increased bread ration south of the GARIGLIANO of 300 grams daily , to which the Supreme Allied Commander had agreed without the previous consent of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee with effect from 1 July, was in fact only a minimum subsistence ration. Indeed, unless the Combined Civil Affairs Committee could undertake that monthly shipments to ITALY from 1st November onwards would be at the rate of 165,000 tons (instead of 100,000 tons monthly as at present) it would be necessary to reduce the ration to 230 grams. This estimate presupposed the early occupation of Northern ITALY. He suggested that a telegram be sent to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee asking for a reply to a letter sent them on 24 September requesting their agreement to the 300 gram bread ration, and for a statement as to whether or not the additional wheat shipments which this would entail would be forthcoming.

X-400-2 MR. MACMILLAN observed that it would be possible to consume the present harvest at a higher rate in the coming months, if it were definitely known that adequate shipments would be arriving in subsequent months to make up the resulting deficiency.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD added that an important variable affecting the rate of consumption was the length of time that might elapse before it became necessary to feed the PO Valley.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 send a telegram to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in the MAT series based on the above discussion and requesting an answer to the points raised by the Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

J.H. LASCELLES Lt Col

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J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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PC (44) 27th Meeting
4th October 1944

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COPY NO 47

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 4TH OCTOBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Commodore L.T. Pankhurst, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, M HQ (Balkans)

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,

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Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, MAAF HQ (Balkans)

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Govenor R. Cochran,
UNRRA Representative to Supreme Allied Commander

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel E.E. Hyde, (For Item 4)
G-1 (A)

Lieutenant Colonel G.R. Davis, (For Item 4)
G-1 (A)

Wing Commander N.H. Sharpe, (For Item 6)
G-3 (Special Ops)

Major H.J. Feldman, (For Item 4)
G-1 (A)

27th Mtg
Minutes

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/Secretariat.

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SECRETARIES:- 302

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(P.C. (44) 26th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 27th September 1944, subject to the following amendment:-*

Page 3 - last sentence on the page - delete from "be induced" to end of sentence and substitute - "be approached in the first instance"

2. DISPOSAL OF YUGOSLAV EX PRISONERS OF WAR
(Previous reference - PC (44) 26th Meeting, Conclusion 5)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK, replying to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that the move of these 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex prisoners of war would be delayed as they were low on the priority list. It was intended that the move should eventually take place by sea direct from MARSEILLES to MIDEAST.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above.

3. VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY
(Previous reference- P.C. (44) 26th Meeting - Conclusion 10)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Directed that G-5 circulate as a Political Committee Paper the minutes of his meeting with Mr. Myron Taylor and others in Rome on 29th September, 1944.

4. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
(Paper No. PC (44) 113)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the Italian Government had learned of the decision to employ 28,000 Italian prisoners of war in FRANCE as service troops, and raising the question of what communication, if any, should be made to the Italian Government on this matter.

MAJOR GENERAL NOCE pointed out that it was intended to

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THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above.

3. VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY
(Previous reference- P.C. (44) 26th Meeting - Conclusion 10)

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MAJOR GENERAL WOOD pointed out that it was intended to use these Italians in rear of all allied units had not merely in rear of French units, as stated in the paper.

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CAPTAIN STONE explained that to the Italian Government's enquiry on this subject he had replied that he was seeking information. When they were in possession of the facts it was possible that a protest would follow.

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* NOTE:- MR. KIRK desires it to be recorded that he notified his wish that this amendment should be made in a note to the Secretary dated 1 October 1944. Since the amendment did not effect the action to be taken on the minute in question, no amendment was issued at that time and the normal procedure was adopted whereby amendments to the Minutes of a Committee meeting are proposed at the next meeting of the Committee

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MR. MACMILLAN observed that in view of Italian co-belligerency this was a matter for discussion with the Italian Government and not with the protecting power (Switzerland) as had been suggested. He pointed out that this question had its roots in the fruitless negotiations with the Italian Government which had taken place earlier in the year regarding the status of Italian prisoners of war, and which had broken down mainly through the reluctance of the United States and British Governments to introduce the necessary legislation to effect a change in status. The use to which these prisoners of war would be put involved a breach of the letter of the Geneva Convention, but was consistent with the understanding agreed with Marshal Badoglio regarding the employment of prisoners of war. If the Italian Government pressed the matter, he felt that they should be told that the Allies were ready to re-open negotiations if they so wished, but that it should be pointed out that the Italian Government had previously passed over in silence more than one opportunity of doing so. He suggested that Captain Stone should advise the Italian Government verbally of the use to which the prisoners of war in question were being put, and should seek the Italian Government's informal acceptance of the position, in confirmation of the assurance previously given by Marshal Badoglio.

X

CAPTAIN STONE agreed that the approach suggested by Mr. Macmillan held a fair prospect of success. Reported

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reported that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission had received a letter from the Italian Prime Minister requesting that ITALY be allowed to participate actively in the armistice to be imposed on GERMANY in the name of the United Nations. This question was akin to that under discussion, as being further evidence that the Italian Government were feeling their way towards the status of an Ally.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that there might well not be a formal armistice with GERMANY. If there were, a clause would be required providing for the association with the United Nations of the cobelligerent nations, as such.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Approved the British Resident Minister's suggestion at "X" above and directed that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission take action on this basis.

(b) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, in conjunction with G-5, to submit at the next meeting recommendations as to the answer to be sent to the Italian Prime Minister's letter regarding Italian participation in the German armistice.

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0570

Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission requesting that ITALY be allowed from the Italian Prime Minister requesting that ITALY be allowed to participate actively in the armistice to be imposed on GERMANY in the name of the United Nations. This question was akin to that under discussion, as being further evidence that the Italian Government were feeling their way towards the status of an Ally.

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5. PAYMENT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 112)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper outlining the Allied Control Commission's objections to Administrative Memorandum No. 31 which required the Italian Government to set up:-

(a) A procurement agency, to which the Allied forces would normally resort for goods, services and facilities, and which would pay for such procurements.

(b) A lira account which the Allied forces would use to pay for all goods, services and facilities which the Italian procurement agency did not or could not produce.

CAPTAIN STONE, said that he had discussed the proposed procurement agency with the Italian Government. He saw no great obstacle to its establishment but pointed out that it would be unlikely to meet more than 10% of Allied demands. He had not yet discussed the Lira Account, which was a more complicated subject, and it was estimated that its enforcement would require the Italian Government to pay out some three to five hundred million lire monthly. Replying to a question by the

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Supreme Allied Commander, he stated that the measures demanded of the Italians were in accordance with the terms of the armistice. The Italians would interpret their enforcement, however, as an indication that, despite Italian co-belligerency, the Allies were contemplating no remission of the Armistice terms. The Allied Control Commission were strongly of the opinion that their enforcement at this juncture was inopportune and might lead to political repercussions, including press attacks. He suggested that he be allowed to sound the Italian Prime Minister and Finance Minister informally on the whole subject, emphasising to them that this was part of the assistance expected of ITALY as a co-belligerent.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that under the existing arrangements currency was provided by the Allies, flown into ITALY, expended, and the sum charged to the Italian State suspense account, for ultimate reimbursement in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. While not suggesting that the proposed lira account should operate retroactively, he queried whether it was not time to put the procedure on the proper basis by obliging the Italian Government to pay currently for all goods, services and facilities required by the Allies in ITALY. The largest item would probably be labour. He added that US War and Navy Department regulations required all American expenditures in ITALY to pass through the US Army and Navy appropriations, where dollars were held against them. He agreed that this was an internal matter, but observed that the War Department were already questioning the propriety of spending dollars on goods and services in respect of which they did not consider themselves obligated. The proposed scheme would remove this problem.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM emphasised the need to ensure that the effectiveness of work was not impaired as a result of dilatory settlement of bills. The present situation required clarification since the Admiralty had advised him that there was no need to pay for floating docks, now under construction, or for other services. He explained that the British Army Pay Services acted as agents for the Royal Navy for such items as were paid for in ITALY, charging the Admiralty in LONDON at the rate of 400 lire to the pound.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the rapidly mounting overdraft resulting from Allied expenditure in ITALY was not shewn in the Italian budget, and the future presentation of the final bill in a single statement to the Italian Government would cause a considerable shock. He agreed with the proposed scheme in principle, but nevertheless queried whether the time was psychologically opportune for enforcing it on the Italian Government and he favoured Captain

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK, replying to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, remarked that, apart from the US War Department's difficulties referred to by Brigadier General Spofford, the present procedure was working satisfactorily If the proposed scheme were enforced in its entirety, there would ensue not only political troubles, but very probably a drying up of supplies and labour.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission approach the Italian Government with a view to:-

/(i)

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(i) Obtaining their views on the proposed lira account

(ii) their setting up a procuring agency to meet a portion of the requirements of the Allied Forces

(b) Directed that G-5 in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister ascertain and report to him the views of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on the proposed lira account.

6. WITHDRAWAL OF BULGARIAN FORCES FROM GREECE
(Paper No. P.C. (44) 115)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper embodying a report from Force 133 Mission in THRACE to the effect that ELAS, in conjunction with Bulgarian forces were attacking the Capetanos, who were also threatened by Bulgarian Partisans, and suggesting alternative courses of action for dealing with the situation.

WING COMMANDER SHARPE, amplifying the paper, said that the local Bulgarian partisan leader had denied the right of BLOs to intervene. It was not known what backing he or ELAS had from the Bulgarian or Russian authorities.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the British and U.S. Governments, at the request of the Soviet Government, had now agreed to waive their original prerequisite that Bulgarian forces be removed from GREECE before armistice negotiations began. He had also just heard from ANKARA that the Bulgarian Government's representative there had explained that the Bulgarian forces in THRACE were under the command of Marshal Tobulkhin, who had doubtless ordered them to remain there in order to cover his left flank. It appeared :-

X

(1) that armistice negotiations with BULGARIA were unlikely until the country was under complete Russian domination

(2) that the removal of Bulgarian forces from THRACE was unlikely except in furtherance of Russian operations against the Germans.

(3) that if Bulgarian forces in THRACE were withdrawn the operation would be so carried out as to enable EAM/ELAS most easily to take over the territory at present under Bulgarian occupation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that from reports which had reached him it appeared that all the Russian field forces in BULGARIA were in the Northwest part of the country and that the attitude of the [illegible] to the Bulgarians was cold. He believed the [illegible] SALONIKA railway

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(3) that if Bulgarian forces in THRACE were withdrawn the operation would be so carried out as to enable EAM/ELAS most easily to take over the territory at present under Bulgarian occupation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that from reports which had reached him it appeared that all the Russian field forces in BULGARIA were in the Northwest part of the country and that the attitude of the Russians in SOFIA to the Bulgarians was cold. He believed the Russians' present intention was to reach the BELGRADE-SALONICA railway at an early date and he did not consider it illogical that they should require the Bulgarians to remain in THRACE and thus protect their left flank. He felt that Russian ignorance of Bulgarian activities in THRACE was not impossible.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that G-3:-

(i) arrange that Force 140 order General Sarafis, on the basis of the recent agreement, to restrain ELAS forces in THRACE from any action against the Capetanos or collaboration with the Bulgarians.

(ii) Arrange that ACC (Bulgaria) report on the situation in BULGARIA and THRACE, immediately after entry into BULGARIA, with particular reference to the military validity of the Bulgarian explanation recorded at "X" above.

(5)

(b) Agreed that no action in this matter could appropriately be taken at this stage with the Soviet or Bulgarian Governments.

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PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON RELIEF FOR YUGOSLAVIA K-302
(Telegrams No. NAF 792 and 794 to Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Nos. F 33146, F 33698 and F 33789 to Balkan Air Force)

THE COMMITTEE had before them five telegrams arising out of Conclusion 4(b) of PC (44) 26th Meeting of 27th September 1944, and embodying:-

(a) Instructions to Commander, Balkan Air Force, to negotiate with the representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government and of the Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation, in lieu of the agreement proposed in Paper No. PC(44) 109, an informal memorandum of agreement on the basic principles of relief, namely:-

(i) Equitable distribution without distinction of race, creed or political affiliations.

(ii) Allied Forces and/or agencies to observe and check on the distribution of supplies and to receive consequential facilities for thier officers concerned

(b) Instructions to Commander, Balkan Air Force, not to start these negotiations on a firm basis before 5th October lest the Combined Chiefs of Staff should want any alterations made to the instructions at (a) above.

(c) Notification of (a) and (B) above to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES explained that the decision to start the negotiations on 5th October had been taken after consultations with the U.S. Political Adviser, British Resident Minister and other parties interested as reports from BARI indicated that both sets of Yugoslav delegates were proving restless.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the representative of the Royal Yugoslav Government was in fact one of Tito's nominees in the Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

8. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that:-

(a) The implementation of the authorised relief plan for GREECE

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the Combined Chiefs of Staff should want any alteration to the instructions at (a) above.

(c) Notification of (a) and (B) above to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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MR. MACMILLAN reported that the representative of the Royal Yugoslav Government was in fact one of Tito's nominees in the Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

8. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that:-

(a) The implementation of the authorised relief plan for GREECE was not feasible as long as operations were proceeding in ITALY and the ADRIATIC which rendered the provision of units required for the ML Force order of battle, and the provision of landing craft and mine-sweeping vessels, impracticable. 4903

(b) The original calculations had been upset by the need to introduce relief supplies to certain parts of Greece before the Piraeus and the other ports envisaged by the authorised plan could be put to use. An 'ad hoc' plan was now under examination and if necessary a telegram would be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting authority to implement it on the understanding that it would be carried out without prejudice to the relief plan already authorised, which would supersede it as and when conditions permitted.

(c) It now seemed likely that the Russians would reach the BELGRADE-SALONIKA railway at an early date. With their main line of withdrawal cut the Germans might decide not to attempt to extricate their static forces but to leave them behind to hold key distribution points as fortresses. Such a course might well delay relief operations in GREECE further.

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MR. MACMILLAN stated that he was alarmed by the magnitude of the task confronting the Supreme Allied Commander in GREECE particularly in view of the complications outlined by him at (b) above. He queried whether stocks and the tonnage to lift them were sufficient and whether the regulations governing the distribution of these supplies were not too rigid. Thus he understood that there was difficulty over the despatch of 600,000 Red Cross garments from EGYPT to GREECE, as UNRRA had ruled that all clothing must be sold. GREECE was the only Balkan state where there remained some hope of establishing a non-communist government and it was therefore essential in his opinion to organise early and effective relief.

MR. KIRK supported Mr. Macmillan and stressed the humanitarian aspect. He reported that the Swedish and Swiss Commissions in GREECE were concerned for the safety of their supplies if Allied troops did not follow in hard on the heels of the Germans.

GOVERNOR COCHRAN said that at present and for some time to come UNRRA would carry out the directives of the military to the maximum extent possible with their resources in personnel.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES remarked that the principal difficulty confronting M EQ (Balkans) was the lack of suitable tonnage; there were not sufficient caiques, and the use of merchant ships to such ports as PATRAS would involve minesweeping, which Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, could not undertake in view of his commitments in the Western Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Aegean. If RANKIN B conditions were to persist indefinitely the existing plan could be adjusted to meet the new circumstances.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that it would probably be possible to send supplies in merchant ships to POROS and KYTHERA for transipment in caiques to the mainland, and that was under examination.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD remarked that the quantities of food earmarked for GREECE were relatively greater than those sent to ITALY and Southern FRANCE in the early days of Allied occupation. Shipment of items for rehabilitation, however, were likely to be deferred.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above discussion.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

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J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution
Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air C-in-C, Mediterranean
COMNAVNAW
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief, PWB
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
[illegible] Ambassador to Greece
Commander, ML HQ (Greece)

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2	G-3
3-4	G-3 Special Operations
5-11	G-4 (A)
12-13	G-4 (B)
14	G-5
15	Secretary, IS & PS
16	Secretary, M.E.D.C. GHQ MEF
17-19	Liaison Section
20-22	Acting Chief Commissioner, ACC
23	Commander, Balkan Air Force
24	Commander, Force 140
25	Commander M HQ (Balkans)
26	Spares
27-28	
29-30	
31	
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34-35	
36-38	
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 296

PC (44) 27th Meeting
3rd October, 1944

COPY NO.44

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 4TH OCTOBER, 1944

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 26th Meeting - already circulated)

2. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
(Paper No. PC (44) 113 - already circulated)

3. PAYMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 112 - already circulated)

4. WITHDRAWAL OF BULGARIAN FORCES FROM GREECE
(Paper No. PC (44) 115 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE :-

5. PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON RELIEF FOR YUGOSLAVIA
((a) Telegram No. NAF 792 of 30th September, 1944 to CCS)
((b) Telegram No. 33146 of 2nd October 1944 to Balkan Air Force)

6. BULGARIAN ARMISTICE TERMS
(Paper No. PC (44) 114 - already circulated)

NOTE :- The following are invited to attend or be represented
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 113 - already circulated)

3. PAYMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 112 - already circulated)

4. WITHDRAWAL OF BULGARIAN FORCES FROM GREECE
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TO TAKE NOTE :-

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((b) Telegram No. 33146 of 2nd October 1944 to Balkan Air Force.

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(Paper No. PC (44) 114 - already circulated)

NOTE :- The following are invited to attend or be represented
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 for Items 3 and 5
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for Item 4
Brigadier Nicholson for Item 6.

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/s/ ?
/t/ J/H/ LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19

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British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ, MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	44
Spares	45-49

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Sec'y Gen
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By DFE

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29th September 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

Please note that MR. MACMILLAN wishes the following amendment made to his statement in the last sentence of Minute 3 of PC (44) 25th Meeting.

Delete MR. MACMILLAN's statement and substitute the following :-

"It might be possible to discuss the draft after approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with representatives of Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito who are expected at BARI".

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26

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"It might be possible to discuss the draft after approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with representatives of Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito who are expected at BARI".

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
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G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
Commander, Balkan Air Force	44-47
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	48-
Commander, M HQ (Balkans)	49-50
Commander, ML HQ (Yugoslavia)	51-52
Spares	53-57

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 26th Meeting
27th September 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Sir James H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant-General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major-General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff toSupreme Allied Commander

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major-General I.T.P. Hughes, representing
Commander, Force 140

Major-General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Lieutenant-General Sir James H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant-General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major-General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff toSupreme Allied Commander

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

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Commander, Force 140

Major-General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major-General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Colonel C.E. Lewin Harris,
G-5 Section, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose
Major C.N.F. Odgers

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K-276

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 25th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 20th September 1944.

2. CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN ROUMANIA AND BULGARIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 5)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMMELL reported that subsequent to the last meeting of the Political Committee, the Supreme Allied Commander had agreed, after further consideration, that in spite of the conclusion then reached it would be preferable for control of Force 133 elements in ROUMANIA and BULGARIA to be vested in AFHQ and action had been taken accordingly.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of the above.

3. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROUMANIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 6)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EAKER and MAJOR-GENERAL AIREY reported that arrangements for the evacuation of the Poles in question by air were possible, but pointed out that this involved a risk of difficulties with the Russians which might prejudice future Allied activities in ROUMANIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that Article 5 of the Armistice with ROUMANIA provided for the handing over to the Soviet High Command by ROUMANIA of all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war in their hands and that the action proposed in respect of Poles in ROUMANIA was inconsistent with this article. He understood that no firm undertaking had been given to General Anders regarding their evacuation.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEAUMONT-NESBITT observed that General Anders would certainly wish the Allies to do their best for Poles in ROUMANIA and also for those in YUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. He suggested that Poles in ROUMANIA might be advised to report to the British Mission there and that authority should be sought for that mission to act on behalf of the Polish Government.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMMELL considered that General Anders should be informed that the risk of evacuation in a clandestine manner was not acceptable but that the possibility of evacuating Poles in ROUMANIA under the auspices

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3. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROUMANIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 6)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EAKER and MAJOR-GENERAL AIREY reported that arrangements for the evacuation of the Poles in question by air were possible, but pointed out that this involved a risk of difficulties with the Russians which might prejudice future Allied activities in ROUMANIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that Article 5 of the Armistice with ROUMANIA provided for the handing over to the Soviet High Command by ROUMANIA of all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war in their hands and that the action proposed in respect of Poles in ROUMANIA was inconsistent with this article. He understood that no firm undertaking had been given to General Anders regarding their evacuation.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEAUMONT-NESBITT observed that General Anders would certainly wish the Allies to do their best for Poles in ROUMANIA and also for those in YUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. He suggested that Poles in ROUMANIA might be advised to report to the British Mission there and that authority should be sought for that mission to act on behalf of the Polish Government.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMBELL considered that General Anders should be informed that the risk of evacuation in a clandestine manner was not acceptable but that the possibility of evacuating Poles in ROUMANIA under the auspices of the British Mission was under examination.

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MR. MACMILLAN considered that the problem should be put before the State Department and the Foreign Office for guidance.

MR. KIRK suggested that General Anders might also be advised to have the matter taken up by the Polish Government in LONDON and WASHINGTON.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister to inform the State Department and the Foreign Office respectively of the situation regarding Poles in ROUMANIA and other Balkan countries, in the light of the above discussion, and to request their guidance as to the policy to be adopted.

/(b).....

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(b) Direct that the Chief, Liaison Section, inform General Anders that the risk attached to evacuation of Poles from ROUMANIA in a clandestine manner was unacceptable but that instructions were being sought from LONDON and WASHINGTON in the matter; and advise him to request the Polish Government to take the matter up also with WASHINGTON and LONDON.

4. PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE ROYAL YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 109)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft agreement for negotiation with the Royal Yugoslav Government to cover the activities in YUGOSLAVIA of ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) and the forces under its command.

MR. MACMILLAN said that at present certain delegates from Marshal Tito were about to arrive at BARI to discuss matters connected with relief supplies for YUGOSLAVIA and that Commander, Balkan Air Force, had urged that Dr. Subasic should send out to BARI representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to join in these discussions. He understood that Dr. Subasic had ordered his representative in CAIRO to attend. If representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government did arrive, he considered that they and Marshal Tito's delegates should be invited to agree on certain general principles on the basis of which relief in YUGOSLAVIA would be operated. The two basic principles were equitable distribution and the granting of facilities for inspection by the Allies, who were providing the relief supplies. If Marshal Tito declined to grant inspection facilities it might be necessary to refuse to supply relief. If, on the other hand, the basic principles were agreed then it would be possible to introduce clauses dealing with the status of Allied personnel working in YUGOSLAVIA in connection with relief, thus eventually building up to something like the agreement under discussion. It was clear that the Royal Yugoslav Government had in practice no power to carry out the agreement as at present drawn. Their representatives must first be asked to accept the principle of joint negotiation with Marshal Tito's delegates, and at the end of these negotiations it must be decided whether a formal agreement was required.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUGHES observed that the two basic principles referred to by Mr. Macmillan were the two main points for discussion in the forthcoming talks between Marshal Tito's delegates and Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA). In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he said that relief matters had only been discussed in broad outline with Marshal Tito by Brigadier Maclean. He emphasised that Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), had no intention of referring in his discussions with Marshal Tito's delegates to the draft agreement at present under discussion.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER emphasised the necessity for insisting that Marshal Tito did not remove the Allied relief representatives once they were installed in YUGOSLAVIA. He added that, if the arrival of the delegates of the Royal Yugoslav Government were delayed, it would be possible to mark time with Marshal Tito's delegates by requesting them to produce details of their various relief requirements.

MR. KIRK pointed out that the normal technical procedure would be the negotiation of an agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government as originally suggested. He agreed, however, that Marshal Tito had de facto power in YUGOSLAVIA and pointed out the difficulty of combining the two elements. He added that embarrassment would result if Marshal Tito were consulted first in this matter, or if negotiations were conducted with anyone other than the Royal Yugoslav Government. He felt that the Royal Yugoslav Government should be induced themselves to invite discussion with Marshal Tito's delegates.

consulted in the first instance

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/LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMMELL

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL considered that discussions at BARI should be left in the hands of the representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department with Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) acting as a technical adviser.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that further consideration of the draft agreement be postponed.

(b) Endorsed the views of the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister recorded above and invited them, in conjunction with G-5 and Commander, M HQ (BALKANS), to work out a plan of action based on the above discussion.

5. DISPOSAL OF YUGOSLAV EX-PRISONERS OF WAR

(Paper No. PC (44) 110)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a letter from the AlliedPW Repatriation Unit, CMF, requesting instructions for the disposal of 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war detained in SWITZERLAND, together with recommendations on this subject by the Chief, Liaison Section.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEAUMONT-NESBITT emphasised the importance of not moving these Yugoslavs until the conditions of service in the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation had been made known to them.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the importance of concentrating Royalist and Partisan Yugoslavs in separate camps and suggested that the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslavs in question should be held at MARSEILLES until suitable arrangements for their accommodation had been made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that G-4 (Mov & Tn) examine the possibility of moving the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war direct from MARSEILLES to the MIDDLE EAST.

(b) Endorsed the recommendations of the Chief, Liaison Section, set forth in paragraph 3 of paper No. PC (44) 110 and directed that he inform HQ Allied PW Repatriation Unit accordingly.

6. AGREEMENT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 101 (Revised))

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with recommendations on this subject by the Chief, Liaison Section.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEAUMONT-NESBITT emphasised the importance of not moving these Yugoslavs until the conditions of service in the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation had been made known to them.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the importance of concentrating Royalist and Partisan Yugoslavs in separate camps and suggested that the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslavs in question should be held at MARSEILLES until suitable arrangements for their accommodation had been made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that G-4 (Mov & Tn) examine the possibility of moving the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war direct from MARSEILLES to the MIDDLE EAST.

(b) Endorsed the recommendations of the Chief, Liaison Section, set forth in paragraph 3 of paper No. PC (44) 110 and directed that he inform HQ Allied PW Repatriation Unit accordingly.

6. AGREEMENT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 101 (Revised))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a revised draft agreement with the Greek Government covering operation of a British force supported by an Allied Relief organisation in GREECE, as amended by the Foreign Office. 4895

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the State Department had agreed to the text of the Foreign Office draft subject to certain minor amendments* and had expressed their willingness that the agreement should now be negotiated with the Greek Government.

* These amendments are as follows :-

(a) In line 2 of the preamble substitute "Greek units" for "other allied units". If units of other nationalities in addition to British and Greek are in fact to be employed the United States Government suggest "Greek units and other units".

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(b) Line 5 of the preamble should be amended to read "restoring stable conditions under which relief may be provided".

/ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that paragraph 10 of the agreement as at present drafted left the position regarding Merchant Seamen open. He agreed, however, that this was properly a matter for the Ministry of War Transport.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of the above.

7. TEXT OF ARMISTICE WITH ROUMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 111)

THE COMMITTEE took note of the terms of the Armistice imposed on ROUMANIA.

8. ARMISTICE WITH BULGARIA

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that the negotiation of the armistice with BULGARIA would now probably take place in MOSCOW and that there might be points arising in the course of the negotiations on which the views of the Mediterrancan Theatre should be expressed.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROOKS said that the terms of the armistice were under preparation by the European Advisory Council in LONDON. He suggested that consideration should be given to points which it was desired to include from the point of view of the MediterraneanTheatre, and that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to put these before the European Advisory Council. He suggested that an inter-service committee should be established to investigate the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Instructed the Secretary to draft for his approval a telegram* to the British Chiefs of Staff asking whether his views on points of particular concern to the Mediterrancan Theatre which might arise in connection with the Bulgarian Armistice negotiations were required.

(b) Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the establishment of a Committee, representative of the appropriate service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre, to study the material available in AFHQ indicating the probable content of the Armistice terms to be imposed on BULGARIA and to report to him what, if any, recommendations should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Council to cover points of interest to the Allied service and political

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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(b) Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the establishment of a Committee, representative of the appropriate service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre, to study the material available in AFHQ indicating the probable content of the Armistice terms to be imposed on BULGARIA and to report to him what, if any, recommendations should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Council to cover points of interest to the Allied service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre .

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9. OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN

(Telegram No. G075 of 26th September from Force 140 to BAF)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM drew attention to a telegram in which Commander, Force 140, requested Commander, BalkanAir Force, to hold 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment in KYTHERA. He pointed out that the retention of this squadron at KYTHERA would be valueless, since the advanced base for light naval craft was being moved to POROS with 9 Commando. He considered that the Greek Sacred Squadron should also be moved to POROS.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the views of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, recorded above and instructed the Secretary to arrange that Commander, Force 140, issue instructions for the earliest possible movement of 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment to POROS.

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*Dispatched as MEDCOS 196 of 27 September 1944.

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VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY

K-276

Y-42038

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he would be discussing voluntary relief with Mr. Myron Taylor in ROME on 29th September and enquired what steps had been taken for its organisation.

CAPTAIN STONE replied that a Committee consisting of representatives of the Italian Government, Italian Red Cross and the Vatican had been set up to handle and distribute voluntary relief when supplies arrived. An Allied Control Commission Liaison Officer with the Committee had been appointed and co-ordination with UNRRA effected.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL Clark said that he envisaged difficulty in providing transport for voluntary relief. Moreover, it seemed uncertain whether or not voluntary relief supplies of the suggested categories would be additional to the minimum tonnages of each category supplied under the normal civil supply arrangements for Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that all voluntary relief must be co-ordinated under a single control. Additional relief organisations would undoubtedly wish to participate in voluntary relief in ITALY and the position in respect of GREECE had also to be considered. He referred to the offer by the New Zealand Government of approximately 700 tons of foodstuffs to the people of GREECE (TROOPERS telegram GEM 270 dated 25th September 1944).

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the supplementing of relief tonnages authorised by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee with additional voluntary relief supplies in one country would lead to difficulties in other countries less favourably treated.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that three factors conditioned the restriction of relief supplies provided under the authority of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee:-

(a) Certain relief items might be in world short supply.

(b) Insufficient shipping tonnage might be available to transport the full tonnage required even though the supplies might be available.

(c) Expenditure might not be authorised in respect of certain commodities which were considered to be outside basic relief needs.

In his opinion it would be inappropriate that voluntary relief should be used to supplement tonnages officially restricted for the reasons in (a) or (b) but there would be no objection to supply by voluntary relief of commodities for which expenditure by the Allied Governments was not authorised.

CAPTAIN STONE said that in the case of ITALY there were certain items of

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In his opinion it would be inappropriate that voluntary relief should be used to supplement tonnages officially restricted for the reasons in (a) or (b) but there would be no objection to supply by voluntary relief of commodities for which expenditure by the Allied Governments was not authorised.

CAPTAIN STONE said that in the case of ITALY there were certain items of relief supplies, notably milk, in respect of which the official allowance was clearly inadequate and which could be readily supplemented by voluntary relief. He could see no objection to voluntary relief in such circumstances. 4893

Minute of Mtg

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above discussion.

J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

/DISTRIBUTION

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K-276

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Chief, PWB	23
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EXTRACTS

H.M. Ambassador to Greece	Item 6 (1 copy)
Commander, ML HQ (Greece)	Item 6 (1 copy)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 250

PC (44) 25th Meeting
20th September 1944

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COPY NO 43 9065

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 20TH SEPTEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air-Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major-General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major-General I.T.P. Hughes, representing
Commander, Force 140

Major-General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Captain Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

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Lieutenant-General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major-General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

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Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Captain Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Colonel C.E. Lewin Harris,
G-5 Section, AFHQ

4891

Mr. C. Offie,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles,
Major W.E. Rose
Major C.N.F. Odgers

25th Mtg
Minutes

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 24th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on Wednesday, 13th September 1944.

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DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, FORCE 140 TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

(Paper No. PC (44) 107)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft directive to Commander, Force 140, designed to ensure that in discussions with the Greek Government concerning relief and rehabilitation, there should be no departure from the ruling by Combined Chiefs of Staff that no agreement as to basic policies or principles be concluded without their prior approval.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUGHES said that discussions had already been opened with the Greek Government on the lines suggested.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the draft Directive, as amended in discussion, and directed that G-5 issue it to Commander, Force 140, who should bear in mind the importance of taking all possible steps to safeguard the security of such discussions.

3. PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE ROYAL YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 109)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft agreement for negotiation with the Royal Yugoslav Government to cover the activities in YUGOSLAVIA of ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) and the forces under its command.

Delete per K-287 of 29 Sept & substitute: "It might be possible to discuss the draft after approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with representatives of Dr. SUBASIC and Marshal TITO who are expected at BARI."

MR. MACMILLAN said that the draft agreement was similar to that prepared for negotiation with the Greek Government, but pointed out that the practical status of the two governments was dissimilar owing to the pre-eminence of Marshal Tito in YUGOSLAVIA. It was uncertain how much reality there would be in discussing the agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government. He therefore suggested that despatch of the agreement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be delayed until the method of submission had been further studied. He added, in reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, that the proposed agreement represented more than a statement of the Allied standpoint, since Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) was in need of guidance. It might be possible to discuss the draft, after approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito jointly at BARI. DELETE

AIR-MARSHAL SIESSOR drew attention to paragraph 4(b) of the proposed agreement and suggested that exception might be taken by Marshal Tito to an Allied demand for the maintenance of law and order by the Royal Yugoslav Government on the ground that this was strictly his concern. He added that Marshal Tito was reported to have departed recently without prior notice, ostensibly to SERBIA, in a Russian aircraft.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER queried whether in the event that Marshal Tito carried out his declared intention to employ surrendered German forces on public works, the Allies would be expected to provide food for them and whether this would not have an adverse effect on the relief of civilians.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that further consideration of the draft agreement for negotiation with the Royal Yugoslav Government be deferred until the next meeting of the Committee.

(b) Instructed the Secretary to forward copies of Paper No. PC (44) 109 to Commander, ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) and to Mr. Broad.

/(c).....

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(c) Directed that G-5 redraft paragraph 4 of the draft agreement to conform with the following opening sentence :-

"In aid of the task of the Commander, the Yugoslav Government will be called on to ensure the prevalence of the following conditions, in order that relief may be efficiently distributed - "

and taking into account the considerations brought out in the above discussion.

4. PROTEST FROM MARSHAL TITO REGARDING ALLIED CONTACTS WITH GENERAL MIHAJLOVIC

(Paper No. PC (44) 103)

THE COMMITTEE :-

Took note of the reply sent by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tito's protest reported in Paper No. PC (44) 104 and discussed at PC (44) 24th Meeting (Minute 9).

5. CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN ROUMANIA AND BULGARIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 106)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper recommending the transfer of the command of Force 133, in so far as operations in BULGARIA and ROUMANIA were concerned, from GHQ, MEF, to AFHQ.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMMELL suggested that, as Force 133 elements in these countries would shortly be coming under the direct control of the British Missions being sent in, little advantage would be gained at the present time by making the proposed change of control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that control of Force 133 elements in ROUMANIA and BULGARIA remain under GHQ, MEF, until such time as it could be assumed by the British Missions being despatched to those countries, and that G-3 so inform Middle East.

6. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROUMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 105)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper requesting consideration

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Paper No. PC (44) 106)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper recommending the transfer of the command of Force 133, in so far as operations in BULGARIA and ROUMANIA were concerned, from GHQ, MEF, to AFHQ.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMMELL suggested that, as Force 133 elements in these countries would shortly be coming under the direct control of the British Missions being sent in, little advantage would be gained at the present time by making the proposed change of control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that control of Force 133 elements in ROUMANIA and BULGARIA remain under GHQ, MEF, until such time as it could be assumed by the British Missions being despatched to those countries, and that G-3 so inform Middle East.

6. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROUMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 105)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper requesting consideration of what steps could be taken to evacuate certain Poles from ROUMANIA to ITALY by air.

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AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR observed that, unless carefully arranged, the extraction of these men without the knowledge of the Russians would prove difficult, and that discovery by the Russians might prejudice the position of the Allied missions in ROUMANIA.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that at least the five Poles nominated in Colonel Schaetzel's letter might be evacuated with the 100 remaining Allied aircrews whom he understood it was proposed to evacuate.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that MAAF, in conjunction with G-2, arrange if possible for the evacuation by air of the five Poles listed in paper No. PC (44) 105, and report on the practicability of evacuating any further Poles nominated by General Anders, up to a total of approximately 100.

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RECRUITING OF MEMBERS OF ITALIAN FORCES FOR YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

(Previous reference - SAC (44) (Special) 4th Meeting, Conclusion 7(b))

X CAPTAIN STONE referred to instructions received from the Supreme Allied Commander to request guidance from the Advisory Council for ITALY as to whether, in principle, Italian nationals of Croat or Slovene origin serving with the Italian armed forces might be permitted to volunteer for service with the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation. He observed that reference to the Advisory Council at this time would result in a difference of views on the Council itself. It would also involve reference to the Italian Government, who were sensitive regarding relations with YUGOSLAVIA, more especially since the possible return to YUGOSLAVIA of the north-eastern Italian provinces had been mentioned in a BBC broadcast in Spanish which had been picked up in ITALY. He added that the heads of the ACC service departments were strongly opposed to the reference of this matter to the Advisory Council.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that to permit Italians of Croat or Slovene origin to volunteer for service with Marshal Tito was equivalent to allowing them to change their nationality and amounted to prejudging the peace settlement. On the other hand, since Italian prisoners of war of Croat or Slovene origin had been allowed to volunteer, it was logical that those serving in the Italian forces should also be allowed, but this raised certain difficulties, for example, in the case of Italian naval personnel born in the Dalmatian Islands. He agreed with Captain Stone that the matter should not be raised at this juncture with the Advisory Council.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that reference to the Advisory Council for ITALY of the principle set forth at 'X' above be postponed indefinitely but that the matter be recalled to his notice should this postponement have unfavourable repercussions.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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