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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
JAN. 1945; JULY 1945 - JULY 1946

0912

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Office of the
Chief Commissioner

LIST OF PAPERS

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1002-1 SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES & AGENDA

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Vol. III

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30	SAC (46) 2nd Meeting	15 Feb 46		
30a	Agenda 3rd Meeting	10 Mar 46		5290
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33	SAC (46) 4th Meeting Agenda	26 Jun 46		
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Chief Commissioner

=ALLIED COMMISSION=

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 1002-1 SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

TOP SECRET

Vol. ~~II~~ III

MINUTES & AGENDA

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM--	DATE	TO--	SYNOPSIS
1	Agenda 1st Meeting	26 Jul 45		
2	Minutes 1st Meeting	26 Jul 45		
3	Agenda 2nd Meeting	2 Aug 45		
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5	Agenda 3rd Meeting	9 Aug 45		
6	Minutes 3rd Meeting	9 Aug 45		
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9	Agenda 5th Meeting	4 Sep 45		
10	Minutes 5th Meeting	6 Sep 45		
11	Agenda 6th Meeting	25 Sep 45		
12	Minutes 6th Meeting	27 Sep 45		
13	Agenda 7th Meeting	2 Oct 45		
14	Minutes 7th Meeting	4 Oct 45		
15	Agenda 8th Meeting	21 Oct 45		
16	Minutes 8th Meeting	26 Oct.45		
17	Agenda 9 th Meeting	20 Nov 45		
18	Minutes 9th Meeting	22 Nov 45		
19	Agenda 10th Meeting	10 Dec 45		
20	Minutes 10th Meeting	10 Dec 45		
20a	Min. AGENDA Armistice Pap.	11 Dec 45		
21	Agenda 11th Meeting	17t Dec 45		
22	Special Meeting Agenda	17 Dec 45		
23	Special Meeting Minutes	17 Dec 45		

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TOP SECRET

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DRAFT

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TOP SECRET

13 May 46

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Top Secret Documents

TO : Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

1. Reference your letter SACS/1, subject as above, dated 2 May 46, directing that subject documents be returned by 10 May 46 or an explanation given as to reasons for non-return thereof.

2. This Headquarters was in receipt of three copies of Revised Appendix 'C' to G-3 AFHQ L40/3 of 14 March 46, one copy each (of which) was loaned to our American ~~and British Political~~ **TOP SECRET** Advisors.

3. It has been found upon inquiry of our British Political Advisor that the Appendix 'C' which was loaned to him was unfortunately enclosed in a British Embassy file which was temporarily sent to London. Immediate steps are being taken to have this paper returned as soon as possible to Rome.

4. Enclosed herewith will be found our two other copies of ⁵²⁸⁸ Appendix 'C'. *Acknowledgment of receipt of this letter and enclosure is requested*

for the Chief Commissioner
J. C. Church

ELIERY B. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

W. H. ...
Staff Officer ...

Encl:

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Sup files
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COPY NO

103

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 4th Meeting
8th July 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
FRIDAY, 5TH JULY, 1946

PRESENT :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Admiral Sir. Algernon E. Willis,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral E.H. Hill,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal L. DANVALE,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- His Excellency Sir Noel CHALLES, Bart.,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.
- Major General M.M.A. MACLEOD,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Rear Admiral Ellery L. STONE,
Chief of Communications, Allied Command

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- Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Admiral Sir, Alvernnon U. WILLIS,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral E.M. LILLI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal L. DARVALIN,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- His Excellency Sir Noel CHARLES, Bart.,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.
- Major General M.W.M. MACLEOD,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Rear Admiral Ellery V. SPONE,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Major General W.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Mr. D. WICK, KEY,
U.S. Charge D'Affaires.
- Mr. Philip BROAD,
British Political Adviser.
- Mr. Homer L. EYINGTON, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser.
- Colonel C.G. BLAKELY,
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ.

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Colonel G.S. SMITH,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.
Brigadier D.P. YATES,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.
Colonel L.L. HAMBLEN,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :

Rear Admiral G.L. WARREN,
Flag Officer Liaison, ITALY.
Captain R.M.G. GAMBER,
Naval Liaison Officer to Supreme Allied Commander.
Captain W.F. FITZGERALD, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
Brigadier J.L.C. MAPLER,
Acting Major General Administration, GHQ, CTF.
Brigadier F.G. DREW,
DD Civil Affairs, The War Office.
Colonel A.R. HARTMAN,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 HTOUSA.
Colonel F.G.J. PARSONS,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.
Lieutenant Colonel H. HEWITT,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.
Wing Commander R.A. FIELD,
Air Plans, Air HQ, RAF, ITALY.
SECRETARIES :
Major V.G. CONLEY
Major B.L. TINSLEY.

2986

Brigadier J.L.C. MAPLER,
Acting Major General Administration, GHC, CMTF.

Brigadier F.G. DREW,
DD Civil Affairs, The War Office.

Colonel A.R. HARTMAN,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 MTOUSA.

Colonel F.G.A. PARSONS,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

Lieutenant Colonel H. HEMITT,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.

Wing Commander R.A. FIELD,
Air Plans, Air HQ, RAF, ITALY.

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SECRETARIES :

Major V.G. CONLEY
Major B.L. TINSLEY.

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1. REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY.

(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5).

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the food situation had improved within the last two or three weeks due to the beginning of the harvest. The ration, which had been reduced to 150 grams, is expected to be increased to 300 grams. There need be no concern about the food situation if there are no transport or URRSA failures.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked if the present cuts were likely to cause disturbances.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that he did not consider this likely. At the same time, as prices in the "open" market were generally too high for the average person, political demonstrations might possibly be engineered by Communists with the object of obtaining increases in wages.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER took note of the above.

2. RETURN OF NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS.

(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5).

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that at the present time 13 Corps were holding a total of sixty-four deserters. Combined Chiefs of Staff had made no comment on MAF 1124 dated 22nd March 1946 in which THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER had defined his policy on this matter.

MR. BYINGTON said he understood it had been agreed that no individual would be handed back to JUGOSLAVIA until his case had been referred to AFHC for examination and asked that before any action was taken to hand these men over he should have the opportunity of consulting the Foreign Office. He suggested, however, that consideration should also be given to the fact that a long time had elapsed since this question of the JUGOSLAV deserters had caused trouble for us with the JUGOSLAV authorities. The latter did not seem, so far as he was aware, to be pressing for the deserters to be handed back, and as such a long time had elapsed he suggested that this was an additional reason for our not taking the initiative now ourselves.

MR. BYINGTON agreed with MR. BROAD's comments.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that the men would not be handed over without reference to this HC, and ruled that his existing policy would stand unless contrary instructions were received from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

(SAC (46) on 10/10/77, 10/10/77)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that at the present time 13 Corps were holding a total of sixty-four deserters. Combined Chiefs of Staff had made no comment on M.F. 1124 dated 22nd March 1946 in which THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER had defined his policy on this matter.

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MR. BRINGTON agreed with MR. BRIGGS's comments.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that the men would not be handed over without reference to this HQ, and ruled that his existing policy would stand unless contrary instructions were received from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 6).

(a) The Chief of Staff referred to a draft which had been prepared in PARIS for instructions to be sent to SACMED on the question of the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER summarised the statement as a feeling of optimism that armed intervention by the JUGOSLAVS in VENEZIA GIULIA was unlikely and that, as regards POLA, we had at least been given the option to evacuate should the necessity arise.

In reply to a question by THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ADMIRAL WILLIS stated that he would have three LSTs available to evacuate forces from POLA for the ensuing two to three weeks, after which time the situation should be reviewed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that, should serious trouble arise, there were two Polish divisions which would be available until August or September and that the ITALIANS had five Combat Groups.

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ADMIRAL WILLIS said that his present policy was to retain in the Northern ATLANTIC two cruisers, four, five or six escorts and three LSTs in addition to the minesweeper force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed his satisfaction at this display of naval force which he considered had caused some concern to the JUGOSLAVS.

(b) SIR NOEL CHARLES asked if AFHQ were giving facilities for civilians in POLA to emigrate to ITALY if they so desired, or if the matter was being left to the ITALIAN Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that an ITALIAN ship called at POLA three days a week and that the ITALIANS were free to leave if they so wished.

MR. BRAD asked whether some warning could not be given to the ITALIANS as he considered that when we did actually move out disturbances would occur.

SIR NOEL CHARLES added he would like to be able to tell the ITALIAN Government to take such steps as they could to enable those who wished to leave POLA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that this was a matter for the ITALIAN Government and requested the political representatives to refer the question to the State Department and Foreign Office.

(c) LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE then raised the question as to whether those inhabitants desirous of leaving would be allowed to take with them their possessions including such items as plant and machinery.

COLONEL HAMBLEN stated that this question had already been put forward to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (NAF 1159 dated 20th June 1946).

REAR ADMIRAL STONE added that the IIF referred only to applications by owners to move plant and that it was despatched prior to the recent development regarding the probability of POLA going to JUGOSLAVIA. He considered that this development had created a different situation, and that the point should be included in any document of transference prepared at the Peace Conference.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed and directed COLONEL

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed and directed COLONEL HAMBLEN to prepare the necessary recommendation for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and requested that similar recommendation should be made through political channels.

(d)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had this morning been informed by GENERAL HARDING that broadly the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA had changed from an operational risk to an internal security risk as a result of the ITALIAN spirit of defiance. THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it might be advisable to hint to the ITALIAN Government that this matter was causing embarrassment.

SIR NOEL CHARLES said he would speak to Sir. DE GASPERI.

COLONEL HAMBLEN stated that this problem was at present under consideration by G-3 AFHQ who considered it unwise to take the matter up with Sir. DE GASPERI.

BRIGADIER WATTS added that after consulting those concerned, it was generally felt that we should not ask for ITALIAN assistance in keeping law and order in VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE since we had always taken the line that this was entirely the concern of AFHQ.

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MR. BYRINGTON considered that the UNITED STATES and BRITISH Governments should discuss the matter before taking any action, as it was against the State Department's existing policy to approach the ITALIAN Government on this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that, pending receipt of the recommendations of S-3 AFHQ, no further action should be taken.

4. FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE THREE ITALIAN SERVICES INDUSTRIES.

ADMIRAL WILLIS stated that he was very concerned that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN should be kept as head of ITALIAN Naval affairs. In view of the foregoing partition of the ITALIAN Fleet he considered it essential that a strong and popular war should be at the head of the ITALIAN Navy, as the possibility of the ITALIANS scuttling their ships had to be taken into account. Although he considered ADMIRAL DE COURTEN pre-eminently suitable to control the Navy during this difficult period, his position as head of a Ministry would be made most difficult, if not untenable, by his known strong Monarchist views. The problem was complicated by the fact that it was still not known whether the new ITALIAN Government would contain a single Minister of Defence with Under Secretaries for Navy, Army and Air, or whether there would be a separate Ministry for the Navy as heretofore. If ADMIRAL DE COURTEN could not continue as Minister or Under Secretary, ADMIRAL WILLIS considered it of first importance that he should be retained as Chief of Naval Staff.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE agreed with the views of ADMIRAL WILLIS and pointed out that THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER only had the right to approve or disapprove of the appointments of any officer or service minister and that he could not insist on the appointment of any particular officer. REAR ADMIRAL STONE added that it was probable that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN did not wish to retain his appointment now that a Republic had been formed.

REAR ADMIRAL WARREN stated that an alternative man as Minister or Under Secretary would be S.R. CORSI who was a moderate Socialist. He considered, however, that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN would feel that he had lost prestige if he were pressed to serve under S.R. CORSI, and would not be able to command the same respect from the Navy as he has done in the past. He did not know whether ADMIRAL DE COURTEN would be prepared to serve under S.R. CORSI.

In reply to a question by ADMIRAL WILLIS, REAR ADMIRAL STONE considered it possible that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN might accept the post of Minister or Under Secretary. 233

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then summed up and directed REAR ADMIRAL STONE to continue efforts on the agreed line that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN should be 233

Under Secretaries for Navy, Army and Air, or whether there would be a separate Ministry for the Navy as heretofore. If ADMIRAL DE COURTEN could not continue as Minister or Under Secretary, ADMIRAL WILLIS considered it of first importance that he should be retained as Chief of Naval Staff.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then summed up and directed REAR ADMIRAL STONE to continue efforts on the agreed line that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN should be retained in one of the capacities mentioned.

5. PROPOSED REPLACEMENT FOR ALLIED COMMISSION.

BRIGADIER YATES gave a summary of M/PS P/326 which recommended the establishment of an "Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ", the Chief of which would also act as Chief Civil Affairs Officer, AFHQ and Chief Liaison Officer (IT. LV), AFHQ.

MR. KEY stated that he had received instructions from the State Department approving the views previously expressed by the BRITISH and UNITED STATES Embassies in Rome that there should be only one agency in Rome representing THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER. He accordingly supported the M/PS recommendation.

SIR NOEL CHARLES said he had received no instructions from the Foreign Office but agreed with the substance of MR. KEY's statement.

COLONEL HABLELL made a counter proposal that the provisions of Para III(a) of the Agreement should be implemented by the establishment of an ITALIAN Military Affairs Section, whose functions would be limited to those provided for in Para III(a) of the Agreement only. All other residual functions of the Allied Commission would be handled by a Sub-Section of G-5 to be established in Rome.

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BLAKENEY agreed with the views expressed by COLONEL HAMBLEN.

After further discussion, THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that COLONEL HAMBLEN's counter proposal would be adopted and the Combined Chiefs of Staff immediately advised accordingly. * He added that there would probably be time to alter this proposal before the actual signing of the new agreement in case Combined Chiefs of Staff did not approve.

6. MOVE OF AFHQ TO NORTH OF ITALY.

BRIANDIER YATES gave a summary of MJPS P/331. BLEGNI, FLORENCE and PADUA had been examined as directed. The first two were unsuitable for either operational or accommodation reasons. PADUA was considered the only place offering any reasonable possibilities although accommodation was also difficult there. As an alternative recommendation, it was suggested that AFHQ should remain in its present location.

After general discussion, THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed COLONEL BLAKENEY to prepare a study based on the existing reconnaissance reports on PADUA in order to determine whether further reconnaissance was required to expedite any possible move of AFHQ to that area.

7. ITALIAN INTERNEES.

COLONEL SMITH stated that 378 ITALIAN internees were still held by the ALLIED Military Authorities. He recommended that these cases should again be reviewed with the object of reducing the numbers to a minimum which he anticipated would be 250 - 300.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that there appeared to be no proof as to their guilt and they could not therefore be brought to trial. There might possibly be a case against the saboteurs, but in the case of those accused of espionage, there was no direct evidence that today they would be detrimental to the ALLIED forces if released. The retention of these internees without trial was considered to be unjust. He recommended that the espionage cases, which are the bulk, should certainly be released and the saboteur cases be reviewed. The ITALIAN amnesty gave added weight to his recommendation.

SIR NCEL CHARLES and MR. EYINGTON agreed with the views expressed by REAR ADMIRAL STONE. 282

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER summed up by saying that, in so far as the espionage agents were concerned,

- (a) if they could have been sentenced they would have been, and they were in fact held without trial;
- (b) there is an amnesty of ITALIANS who were both tried and convicted;
- (c) ITALIAN Government appeared to want to set them free;
- (d) they could do no harm if released.

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SIR NOEL CHARLES and MR. BYINGTON agreed with the views expressed by
REAR ADMIRAL STONE. **5982**

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- (b) there is an amnesty of ITALIANS who were both tried and convicted;
- (c) ITALIAN Government appeared to want to set them free;
- (d) they could do no harm if released.

There was, however, a case for holding the saboteurs until they could do no damage to our communications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER therefore directed that all espionage agents should be freed over a period and the ITALIAN Government informed accordingly; and that all saboteurs' cases should be reviewed with a view to reducing the number held.

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Normal.

* (Despatched as M.F. 1173 dated 5th July 1946).

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JUL 6 1946

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 4th Meeting
4th July, 1946.

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27

COPY NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference Agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held on Friday 5th July 1946, as amended by AFHQ letter dated 29 Jun 46.

1. The following further item is added :-

"1(A). FUTURE ORGANISATION OF THE U.S. ITALIAN SERVICES INDUSTRIES

(This item will be discussed immediately after Item No.1 on the Agenda)"

2. The conference will now commence at 1030 hrs, not 1100 hrs as previously detailed.

1002-1/11

B.K. Tinsley
M.V.G. CCKLEY,
MAJOR,
DEPUTY SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Normal

"1(A). FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE [unclear] Agents)"

2. The conference will now commence at 1030 hrs, not 1100 hrs as previously detailed.

1002-1/10

Bill Tindley
Major 5081
M.V.G. COMLEY,
MAJOR,
DEPUTY SECRETARY.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
SECURITY CONTROL DOCUMENT SUBJECT

JUL 6 1946

DATE JUNE 4 1946

AS NO. B-102

COPI NO. 27-29

AG, M & D, Sec. AFHQ
APO 512 c/o PM.

FROM: NEW YORK, N. Y.

TO: Chief Comm. Allied Comm.

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ORGANIZATION & TARA _____

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 4th Meeting
4th July, 1946.

TOP SECRET 41
COPY NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

33

Reference Agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held on Friday 5th July 1946, as amended by AFHQ letter dated 29 Jun 46.

- The following further item is added :-
 W1(A). FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED ITALIAN SERVICES INDUSTRIES
 (This item will be discussed immediately after Item No.1 on the Agenda)"
- The conference will now commence at 1030 hrs, not 1100 hrs as previously detailed.

1007-1/cc

Bill Tinsley
M.V.G. COLLEY, MAJOR,
DEPUTY SECRETARY.

WJ

1. The following further item is added :-

"1(A). FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN SERVICES UNITIES

(This item will be discussed immediately after Item 10.1 on the Agenda)"

2. The conference will now commence at 1030 hrs, not 1100 hrs as previously detailed,

1007-1/cc

Bk. Tindley
M.V.G. CONLEY, MAJOR,
DEPUTY SECRETARY.



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C. Brown

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 4th Meeting
20th June, 1946

TOP SECRET 27
COPY NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

33

Reference Agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference
to be held on 5th July 1946.

The following item is added :-

"4. ITALIAN INTERESTS

(R-2 AFHQ will raise orally the question as to whether the Italian Interests held by the Allied Authorities can now be released.)"

*added to SAC's copy
1 July
JHR*

1002-1/10

V.G. CONLEY,
MAJOR,
DEPUTY SECRETARY.

5978

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The following item is cited :-

"4. ITALIAN INTERNEES

(3-2 AM) will raise orally the question as to whether the Italian Internees held by the Allied Authorities can now be released)"

*added to CC's copy
1 July
JHE*

V.S. COLEBY,
LIAISON,
DEPUTY SECRETARY.

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JUN 28 1946

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 4th Meeting
20th June, 1946

TOP SECRET
COPY NO 21

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE 3-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON FRIDAY 5TH JULY, 1946

A F I M D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting - already circulated)

The following items from the minutes of SAC (46) 3rd Meeting of 25 Mar 46 will be reviewed at this meeting:-

(a) REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY
(Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission)
(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3)

(b) RETURN OF THE NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA TO THE JUGOSLAVS
(Statement on present situation by CAO and US & Erit Polais)
(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5)

(c) POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 6)

2. PROPOSED REPLACEMENT FOR ALLIED COMMISSION

(AFPS 326 (final) and PAR 670 - already circulated)

3. MOVE OF AFHQ TO THE NORTH OF ITALY

(AFPS paper - to be circulated)

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(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting - already circulated)
The following items from the minutes of SAC (46) 3rd Meeting of 25 Mar 46 will be reviewed at this meeting:-

- (a) REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY
(Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission)
(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3)
- (b) RETURN OF THE NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA TO THE JUGOSLAVS
(Statement on present situation by CAO and US & Brit Zolads)
(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5)
- (c) POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 6)

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2. PROPOSED APPROPRIATE FOR ALLIED COMMISSION
(IJPS 326 (final) and PAN 670 - already circulated)

3. MOVIE OF AFHQ TO THE MARCH OF ITALY
(IJPC paper - to be circulated)

4. ITALIAN INTERNEES
(G-2 AFHQ will raise orally the question as to whether the Italian Internees held by the Allied authorities can now be released.)
J. C. O'Neil, Lieutenant Colonel, SECURITY.

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5. FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE 3 ITALIAN SERVICE MINISTRIES

* PAN 670 attached. *1a* ^{11/6/cc sub.}

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(Item 4 added per addendum #B-100) ITEM 5 ADDED PER COL PARSONS PHONE MSG 4 JULY

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**ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat**

20th May, 1946

Subject : Withdrawal of TOP SECRET documents.

*25 May
Post B*

Memorandum to : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Reference our letter SACG/1 dated 2nd May, 1946.

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated 13th May, 1946 together with two (2) copies of revised Appendix 'C' to G-3 paper G-3 AFHQ 140/3 of 14th March, 1946.

It is noted that three (3) copies of the G-3 paper under reference, indicated as being in your possession on our above quoted letter, were not returned. Will you please hasten despatch of these documents to this Secretariat.

See (30) b

1002-1/c

J.C. Curme
J.C. CURME,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander **5275**

*cc Dist.
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Lfor cc*

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Suprema Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 3rd Meeting
25th March, 1946

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COPY NC 27

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference minutes of Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, held on 16th March, 1946 and amendments thereto issued on 21st March, 1946.

Will all copy holders please destroy both these documents and substitute the reprinted minutes attached, in which the amendments have been incorporated.

1002-1/CC

J. Currie
D.E. CURRIE,
Lt. Colonel,
Secretary.

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Commander in Chief, BTA
Commander, 13 Corps.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference minutes of Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, held on 16th March, 1946 and amendments thereto issued on 21st March, 1946.

Will all copy holders please destroy both these documents and substitute the reprinted minutes attached, in which the amendments have been incorporated.

1002-1/CC

D. S. Jurne
D. S. JURNÉ,
Lt. Colonel,
Secretary.

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" 28 - EC
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JOHN W.

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SAC's 1st Meeting
16 March 1946

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1106 HOURS ON
SATURDAY, 16 MARCH 1946

PRESENT :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Rear Admiral Jules James,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Vice Marshal J.F. Fogarty,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- His Excellency Sir Noel Charles, Bart.,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.
- Lieutenant General Sir John Hurdin,
Commander 13 Corps.
- Major General M.W.M. MacLeod,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.

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PAGONE :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Rear Admiral Jules James,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Vice Marshal J.F. Fogarty,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- His Excellency Sir Noel Charles, Bart.,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.
- Lieutenant General Sir John Harries,
Commander 13 Corps.
- Major General A.W.H. MacLeod,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General A.S. Luff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ.
- Rear Admiral Ellery V. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
- Major General L.J. Jaynes,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Mr. Philip Broad,
British Political Adviser.
- Mr. Homer M. Brington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser.
- Colonel G.R. Tuff, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.

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Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General S.L. Hambien,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

Colonel C.G. Blakeray,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :

Captain R.M. Jambier,
Naval Liaison Officer to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier M.S. Lush,
Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Brigadier F.G.A. Parsons,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

Brigadier J.L.C. Napier,
Deputy Adjutant General, GHQ, CMF.

Brigadier J.D. A. Anderson,
RGS (SD), GHQ, CMF.

Group Captain R.B. Parkerham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy.

Colonel C.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

Colonel Perry McJ. Smith,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Wing Commander R.A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy.

SECRETARIES :

Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Curme,
Major R.A. Paget-Booke,

2072

- Brigadier F.G.A. Parsons,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.
- Brigadier J.L.G. Masier,
Deputy Assistant General, HQ, CMF.
- Brigadier J.D. Anderson,
RGS (SD), GHQ, CMF.
- Group Captain R.B. Pakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy.
- Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.
- Colonel Perry McJ. Smith,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
- Wing Commander R.A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy.
- Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Curme,
Major R.A. Paget-Jooke,

5272

SECRETARIES :

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 2nd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 14th February, 1946.

NOTE BY SECRETARY

(Correction to Minute 2 SAC (46) 2nd Meeting)

(a) AFHQ has been informed that the Parachute Infantry Regiment will now be moved by rail and not by air transport.

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Correction to Minute 2 of SAC (46) 2nd Meeting (continued)

(b) It is now estimated that under favourable conditions and with all other traffic halted to afford maximum priority, the reinforcements of one Regimental Combat Team and one Parachute Infantry Regiment would be on the ground and effective within six days of the receipt of the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the move.

2. FEEDING OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

(Previous reference SAC (46) 3rd Meeting, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF, Chief Administrative Officer, raised the question of the date by which the Italian Government were to assume responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force. At the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, held on the 14th February, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that 31st March be fixed as the latest date by which the Italian Government should assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had written to AFHQ in regard to this decision; in view of the very serious Italian food situation he hoped that some less drastic action might be adopted.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF went on to say that he had put forward a suggestion that two months supply in bulk should immediately be transferred from British Depots to Italian Depots. This would provide for subsistence of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force, except for a very small U.S. commitment which he understood Headquarters AFMUSA would have no difficulty in meeting, until 31st May 46. This proposal was, he understood, acceptable to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and would enable the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force to be fed until 31st May 46 without increasing the strain on the resources of food of the Italian Government.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE confirmed that this suggestion was acceptable.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF went on to say that he considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be informed that after 31st May 46, the C-47 would be unable any longer to meet the commitment of feeding the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force and asked for their approval to the transfer of responsibility for this commitment to the Italian Government with effect from the 1st June 46.

The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had written to AFHQ in regard to this decision; in view of the very serious Italian food situation he hoped that some less drastic action might be adopted.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF went on to say that he had put forward a suggestion that two months supply in bulk should immediately be transferred from British Depots to Italian Depots. This would provide for subsistence of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force, except for a very small U.S. commitment which he understood Headquarters AFUSA would have no difficulty in meeting, until 31st May 46. This proposal was, he understood, acceptable to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and would enable the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force to be fed until 31st May 46 without increasing the strain on the resources of food of the Italian Government.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE confirmed that this suggestion was acceptable.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF went on to say that he considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be informed that after 31st May 46, the COT would be unable any longer to meet the commitment of feeding the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force and asked for their approval to the transfer of responsibility for this commitment to the Italian Government with effect from the 1st June 46.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the telegram at Appendix 'B' to the number CAO/228/1 of the 14th March 46,

and

* (b) Directed that this telegram be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, Minute 6)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that a ration of bread in ITALY of 225 grams per day could be maintained until the 23rd March out of stocks on hand. On the 20th March, USNA expect to receive the latest information on arrivals

* Resubmitted as NAF 1123.

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scheduled for April, and on this information they intend to decide whether or not the ration should be reduced. A month ago serious consideration was given to lowering the ration from 225 grams per day to 150 or 170 grams per day.

He went on to say that the basic ration in ITALY amounted to only 600 calories per day. This was supplemented by purchases in the open market which increased its value to some 1500 calories per day. Comparing this ration with other countries, ADAM ADRIAL STONE stated that in the British Zone in GERMANY they were receiving about 1000 calories a day, in the American Zone in GERMANY they received 1500 calories a day. in the UNITED KINGDOM the value of the ration amounted to 2600 calories a day and in AMERICA to 3000 calories a day. This gave the conference some idea of the desperate food situation in ITALY.

ADAM ADRIAL STONE pointed out that the bulk of the 1500 calories a day in ITALY was purchased in the open market, and this of course considerably increased the activities of the black market. He also said that it was hoped that certain ships would be diverted to ITALY which would enable UNRRA to continue the present ration for civilians. No definite information as to the future ration would be available until the 20th or 21st March.

THE SWISS ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. RASSOWITZ, PIP - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS

(Previous reference SAC (46) 1st Meeting, Minute 3)

THE SWISS ALLIED COMMANDER is MR. BRINGTON, US Political adviser, to open this discussion.

MR. BRINGTON stated that when the question of this investigation was first under consideration the British and American authorities were in agreement that a full investigation should be made. It was felt, at that time, that unless a full investigation were carried out, both the British and U.S. Governments would later be accused by the Italians of suppressing information regarding JUCOSAVY terrorist activities. Now that work on this investigation had temporarily ceased he felt that a public statement should be made giving the reason for the cessation of this investigation, which was that adequate machinery was not available to carry on the work. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorized the cessation of the investigation and had authorized that a public statement might be made. The reasons given for authorising this

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the future nation would be available until the 20th of 1950

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. BASLOVITZKA PIT - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS

(Previous reference SAC (US) 1st Meeting, Minute 3)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER AS MR. SWINSON, US Political Adviser, to cover this discussion.

MR. SWINSON stated that when the question of this investigation was first under consideration the British and American authorities were in agreement that a full investigation should be made. It was felt, at that time, that unless a full investigation was carried out, both the British and U.S. Governments would later be accused by the Italians of suppressing information regarding JUSCOLOV terrorist activities. Now that work on this investigation had temporarily ceased he felt that a public statement should be made adequate the reason for the cessation of this investigation, which was that adequate machinery was not available to carry on the work. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorized the cessation of the investigation and had authorized that a public statement might be made. The reasons given for authorising this public statement were in order to minimize any effect on Italian public opinion, and the possibility that the JUSCOLOV would interpret the cessation of the investigation as an admission that the accusations against them were unfounded. He went on to stress very strongly the views of the Department of State, which were, that the Italian Government should be consulted before any decision was taken in regard to the issuance of the statement authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING in a reply to a question from the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that it should be made clear in any public statement that the cessation of investigations did not necessarily mean the original allegations were untrue. He did not think a statement would create any undue excitement but that as the matter had not been raised in the Press lately it might be better not to raise it at this particular time.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE suggested that he might approach the Italian Government, inform them of the reasons for the cessation of the investigation and ask them whether they wished a public statement to be made on the lines authorized.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he felt some statement should be made to the Italian Government as to why the investigations had ceased. He also considered that the Italian Government should be told that it was not considered advisable to make a public statement due to the present state of tension in VENEZIA GIULIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission inform the Italian Government :

*Confused with my
23/11/46, file
1200/100. See also sub
23/11/46 from CC
to C/S. AFHQ.*

- (a) that the cessation of the investigations at BASSOVIZZA Pst was due to lack of adequate machinery and the physical difficulties involved. This cessation did not imply that the allegations made by CIAI had been proved to be without foundation.
- (b) that the results to date were inconclusive.
- (c) that it was considered inadvisable to make a public statement to this effect at this time owing to the present state of tension in VENEZIA GIULIA.

5. THE RETURN OF THE NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA TO THE JUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that in actual fact, there were in all thirty-three JUGOSLAV deserters. He said that of these thirty-three, seven had arrived in plain clothes. He considered there was no such thing as a military refugee. Either the man was a soldier or he was not. A man in uniform could not be termed 'a military refugee.' If people crossed over in plain clothes they might then be termed 'political refugees.'

MR. WYNTON said that at the moment relations with the JUGOSLAVS were very indefinite. When this matter was first considered it was decided by the Foreign Office, and a statement had been made, that political refugees would not be handed back to the JUGOSLAV authorities. When he submitted a request to the State Department for instructions as to treatment of JUGOSLAV Army deserters, he was advised that the same ruling, as for political refugees, held good.

MR. BROAD stated that the British and US policies were not quite the same because the British Government had agreed to recognise the TITO regime. He said that he had had no reply from the Foreign Office on this matter but that he understood their view was the same, i.e. that we should not return deserters, if after interrogation they were found to have deserted for political reasons.

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MR. SACAD stated that the British and US policies were not quite the same because the British Government had agreed to recognise the TITO regime. He said that he had had no reply from the Foreign Office on this matter but that he understood their view was the same, i.e. that we should not return deserters, if after interrogation they were found to have deserted for political reasons.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that the number of civilian refugees was not very large at the moment but that if so called 'political refugees' were accepted a very large number might well come over. He pointed out that the present policy being pursued was that they were not accepted in Displaced Persons Camps.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked what was done with these civilians.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN stated that 13 Corps treated them as any other civilians in their area, but that some were at large in ITALY. Even now the number, although not large, ought to be controlled as they were bad characters to have in ITALY, who would inevitably cause trouble.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADING said that the disposal of those in uniform was a problem which would have to be settled at an early date.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGHAM said that he considered that deserters coming over in uniform should be sent back.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING pointed out that it was very inadvisable to allow these refugees to remain at large in VENEZIA GIULIA. He felt this would inevitably lead to a great deal of trouble. He said that normally those soldiers who accidentally crossed the MORGAN Line were returned. This was a mutual agreement with the JUGOSLAVS.

MR. BRCAD and MR. BYINGTON both expressed the opinion that the question of returning deserters in uniform should be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that a decision was essential. He held the opinion that there was no such thing as a 'military political refugee.' He pointed out that in the case of deserters coming over in uniform it had to be proved, before their return to the JUGOSLAVS, first that the deserters were soldiers of the JUGOSLAV Armed Forces, and secondly that they had not been recruited in VENEZIA GIULIA since the cessation of the War in Europe. This would afford time for diplomatic action to be taken to obtain a decision on these matters.

MR. BYINGTON said that both the British and US Governments were in agreement that political refugees should not be returned.

This was agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that the deserters in uniform from the JUGOSLAV Armed Forces would be returned as soon as it had been proved that the deserter concerned :
 - (i) was a member of the JUGOSLAV Armed Forces, and
 - (ii) had not been recruited from VENEZIA GIULIA since the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE.
- (b) Requested the British Political Adviser to consult the Foreign Office and the Deputy US Political Adviser to consult the State Department with a view to clarifying the status and the treatment to be accorded to refugees crossing the MORGAN Line in civilian clothes.

6. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, Minute 2)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that the conference should consider the revised draft telegram, Appendix 'C' to the paper by G-3 AFHQ, in the light of the nature of the whole problem.

R2K8

AN EXHIBITION SAID THAT SOME OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

agreement that political refugees should not be returned.

This was agreed.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that the deserters in uniform from the JUGOSLAV Armed Forces would be returned as soon as it had been proved that the deserter concerned :

(i) was a member of the JUGOSLAV Armed Forces, and

(ii) had not been recruited from VENEZIA GIULIA since the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE.

(b) Requested the British Political Adviser to consult the Foreign Office and the Deputy US Political Adviser to consult the State Department with a view to clarifying the status and the treatment to be accorded to refugees crossing the MORGAN Line in civilian clothes.

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6. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, Minute 2)

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that the conference should consider the revised draft telegram, Appendix 'C' to the paper by G-3 AFHQ, which gave a complete picture of the whole problem.

COLONEL TUFF suggested that in paragraph 1 of the draft telegram the figure of eighty-three tanks be amended to read eighty. This was agreed, as was the amendment to line eight, the word 'explanation' to be in the plural.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANDING said, in regard to paragraph 2(a), that he had received a telegram in morning to the effect that about 1925 hrs on the 15th March a JUGOSLAV Officer had been shot in TRIESTE. This Officer was walking in the streets of TRIESTE with his wife and received three bullet wounds. The witnesses were his wife, and two British soldiers. The Officer was now in hospital and was expected to live. LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANDING said that he had no further information.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING in answer to a question by the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER in paragraph 3 of the draft telegram, stated that it was true that 13 Corsos was not tactically disposed but was deployed for the purpose of implementing the MORGAN-JOVANOVICH agreement, virtually as a police force.

ALL VICE MARSHAL FORTY stated that the Air Ministry intended to reduce the Desert Air Force by 3 Squadrons by 1 June 40, which would bring the squadrons available for operations down to seven. This was due mainly to the manpower shortage. He suggested this information be added at the end of paragraph 5.

This was agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, referring to paragraph 7 of this signal, stated that he hoped the US and British Governments would issue a formal statement as a result of this telegram, which he considered would lessen the tension in VENETIA, TRIESTE, and GORIZIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING agreed and suggested that some addition be made to this paragraph, stressing that it was intended to maintain allied Military Government and the civil police force in VENETIA, TRIESTE, and GORIZIA.

This was agreed.

MR. BRADY stated that the British Government, in conjunction with the US Government intended to carry out their obligations, including the maintenance of the police force until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

MR. BRISTON concurred.

This suggestion was agreed.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that he was very interested in the Naval aspect. He said that two destroyers were normally at TRIESTE and that one Cruiser and two destroyers were available at about five days notice. He also had a commitment for a list of one brigade from POLA.

MR. ADRIAN JAMES confirmed that US Naval forces would also be available.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then stated that as he actually knew the extent of the Naval resources it remained to ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff what land and air resources would be made available in the event of JUGOSLAV

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADDON agreed and suggested that some addition be made to this paragraph, stressing that it was intended to maintain Allied Military Government and the civil police force in VENEZIA, GIULIA.

This was agreed.

MR. BACAD stated that the British Government, in conjunction with the US Government intended to carry out their obligations, including the maintenance of the police force until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

MR. BRINGTON concurred.

This suggestion was agreed.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS stated that he was very interested in the Naval aspect. He said that two destroyers were normally at TRIESTE and that one Cruiser and two destroyers were available at about five days notice. He also had a commitment for a lift of one brigade from POLA.

MR. ADMIRAL JAMES confirmed that US Naval forces would also be available.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then stated that as he actually knew the extent of the Naval resources it remained to ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff what land and air resources would be made available in the event of JUGOSLAV aggression in VENEZIA, GIULIA.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS agreed and suggested therefore that the word 'sea' in paragraph 6 line eleven of the draft be omitted.

This was agreed.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HADDON raised the question of the evacuation of the Civil Police and civilians who have been employed by AIG in the event of the withdrawal of the garrison from POLA.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS pointed out that the evacuation might have to be done from beaches South of POLA due to the six inch gun batteries on BALONI ISLAND. He suggested the AIG might be able to deal with these batteries. In the meantime these beaches were being inspected as to their suitability for use by L.S.T's.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he understood that the number of civilians including police was expected to be about 400. This was confirmed by LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said that he had two more points to raise, the first was that in paragraph 3 of the paper G-3 AFHQ/14J/3 it was stated that he had the equivalent of one armoured brigade. He considered that this gave a wrong impression as in fact he had only two armoured regiments.

BRIGADIER VATES said that in making this statement account had been taken of one US Tank Battalion in addition to the two armoured regiments. He said he would have the paper amended to state this more exactly.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING went on to say his second point was that he had to Tac A Squadron at UDINE.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY stated that there were actually two Tac A Squadrons, one at KLAGENFURT and the Polish Tac A Squadron now at TREVISO.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stated that he would prefer to have the Tac A Squadron down in ITALY and not in AUSTRIA.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY said that this Squadron was moving to ITALY now.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Approved the telegram, as amended in discussion.
- ** (b) Directed that it be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF GHQ GAF AND AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

(reference paper SACS (46) 1 dated 10th March 46)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that the conference consider the paragraphs of the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Annexure IV to the paper, which was attached to the Revised Agenda.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that before this was done he would like to give an outline as to how these recommendations came about. He said that these proposals originated just over a month ago when the War Office ordered that GHQ GAF be disbanded by 1 June 46. As a result of this, much discussion and planning for reorganisation had taken place at various conferences. He said that he now had a theatre HQ, and an operational HQ in 13 Corps, and were these combined into one HQ it would at all times be heavily loaded, and no doubt

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AIR VICE MARSHAL ECCLARTY said that this Squadron was moving to ITALY

now.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the telegram, as amended in discussion.

** (b) Directed that it be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF GHQ SAE AND AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

(reference paper SACS (46) 1 dated 10th March 46)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that the conference consider the paragraphs of the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Annexure IV to the paper, which was attached to the Revised Agenda.

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MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that before this was done he would like to give an outline as to how these recommendations came about. He said that these proposals originated just over a month ago when the War Office ordered that GHQ CMAF be disbanded by 1 June 46. As a result of this, much discussion and planning for reorganisation had taken place at various conferences. He said that he now had a theatre HQ, and an operational HQ in 13 Corps, and were these combined into one HQ it would at all times be heavily loaded, and no doubt in operations overloaded. It was proposed to form a new Allied HQ based on HQ 13 Corps and HQ WTCUSA, and apparently the War Office hoped in this way to make a considerable saving in manpower. In actual fact the saving of manpower was very small, being only about 500. If GHQ CMAF were disbanded, the question of disposals in ITALY would have to be handled after 1 June 46 by BTA who were a long way away and had very little background as to the methods of handling these surpluses.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that as an alternative the War Office might be strongly recommended to change these orders so that the present AFHQ, reduced in size, could continue and move up to the North. Having moved to the North it would later be decided how and when to amalgamate it with 13 Corps.

** Despatched as HAF 1122 8.

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ADMIRAL CUMMINGS stated that there was a strong feeling in LONDON that it was desirable at this stage to do away with the present AFHQ, mainly to save manpower. He said that it was not understood in LONDON why it should be necessary to have a Corps HQ and also an AFHQ, thus apparently implicating 13 Corps administration.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that in the event of operations developing we might be covering three or four corps, as well as the civilian police, and Italian Divisions.

MAJOR GENERAL MACLEOD said that he agreed with MAJOR GENERAL DUFF and that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER's suggestion appeared to be the best solution.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he considered that AFHQ should remain in its present form and be moved up to the North of ITALY where it would also be able to carry out the residual functions of the 13th Army Group. Certain parts of GHQ might be left behind to finish their tasks and then dissolve.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pointed out that if GHQ GAF were disbanded it would slow down the progress of disposals, which after 1 June 46 would have to be carried out by BTA who had no knowledge of how this work was being done and were geographically a very long way away.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said he understood that the policy was to continue the administration of ITALY and in particular VENEZIA, GIULIA until the Peace Treaty was ratified. Thereafter it was intended to be rid of our commitments as quickly as possible.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS said that he considered that the reasons given for this alternative proposal in the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be strengthened and amplified.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said that he considered if this new alternative were accepted that AFHQ should take over the responsibilities of 13 Corps gradually.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that it was intended to be a gradual merger. He said that whoever this 13th commander might be, he would have to exercise operational command over at least three Divisions.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said that he was convinced that this would not be done from anywhere West of PARIS.

This was agreed.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANDING said he understood that the policy was to have to be carried out by BTI who had no knowledge of how this work was being done and were geographically a very long way away. continue the administration of ITALY and in particular VINEZI, GIULLI, until the Peace Treaty was ratified. Thereafter it was intended to be rid of our commitments as quickly as possible.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that he considered that the reasons given for this alternative proposal in the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be strengthened and amplified.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANDING said that he considered if this new alternative were accepted that AFHQ should take over the responsibilities of 13 Corps gradually.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that it was intended to be a gradual merger. He said that whoever this 1st commander might be, he would have to exercise operational command over at least three Divisions.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANDING said that he was convinced that this would not be done from anywhere West of RADUS.

This was agreed.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY stated that his HQ and IAF would be combined by GWH.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that a stronger recommendation for the adoption of this new proposal be embodied in the draft telegram.

(b) Directed that the telegram then be despatched.

Despatched after redrafting as GHQ signal TX 62994 dated 18 Mar 46 to War Office, and for information to Combined Chiefs of Staff and to British Chiefs of Staff and G in C Med, after a conference held by the Chief of Staff, the recommendations of which were approved by the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER.

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DECISIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AFTER THE DISBANDMENT
OF AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked if it was felt that this matter should be left until the future of AFHQ had been decided. He considered that it might be desirable to send some cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get a new directive for the Allied Commission. He asked BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN if this paper would apply equally in the event of the alternative to closing AFHQ on 1 June 46 was adopted.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that there would be no changes in the present set up. He pointed out that there was no urgency about the matter now and suggested it could be discussed at the next meeting.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE disagreed with this statement. He suggested that the draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff could be re-worded so that it was not so dependent on the present situation.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN agreed with this and said that it was not advisable to send this telegram as it stood in view of the proposed move of AFHQ to the North.

SIR NOEL CHARLES said that he understood there was a directive coming from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject. He considered that the telegram as drafted was admirable and suggested that it be sent after slight modification. It would undoubtedly assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE considered that the telegram should be sent within the next few days.

SIR NOEL CHARLES said that the present policy was to allow the Italian Government as much liberty as possible.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADDING stated that if AFHQ did move, it should be situated not further West than Padua. He considered any move must be to the final place which would be the major HQ remaining in ITALY.

This was agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that a telegram on the lines of the draft telegram be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at an early date.

2. IDENTITY CARDS - WHEN CROSSING THE MORGAN LINE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADDING raised the question of bringing into force

RDR

SIR NOEL CHARLES said that he understood there was a misunderstanding from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject. He considered that the telegram as drafted was admirable and suggested that it be sent after slight modification. It would undoubtedly assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE considered that the telegram should be sent within the next few days.

SIR NOEL CHARLES said that the present policy was to allow the Italian Government as much liberty as possible.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADDING stated that if AFHQ did move, it should be situated not further west than Foggia. He considered any move must be to the final place which would be the major HQ remaining in ITALY.

This was agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that a telegram on the lines of the draft telegram be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at an early date.

9. IDENTITY GAMES - WHEN CROSSING THE MORGAN LINE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADDING raised the question of bringing into force the regulation that people should carry identity cards when crossing the MORGAN Line. The effective date for this was 7 April 46, and he considered that a public announcement should be made before that date.

COLONEL TUFF said that a signal had been sent to BELGRADE to inform the JUGOSLAV authorities of the date, and a similar signal was being despatched to Allied Commission for the information of the Italian Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

(Handwritten signature)
D.O. JAMES,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Commander in Chief, EAC
Commander, 13 Corps.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 3rd Meeting
15th March, 1946

TOP SECRET
CONF. No. 19

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

REVISED AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HRS ON SATURDAY, 16TH MARCH, 1946

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)
2. LEVEL OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY
(Oral report by Allied Commission)
3. BASSOVIZZA PIT - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS
(US POLAD will raise orally the question as to whether a public statement on the lines authorised in FAM 634 should be made at this time)
4. THE RETURN OF THE NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN VENEZIA GIULLA TO THE JUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES
5. * POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULLA
(Paper by G-3, AFHQ - G-3 AFHQ/140/3 dated 14 Mar 46 - already circulated)
6. ** RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF GHQ CAF AND AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM
(Paper No. SAC (46) 1 - already circulated)

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(SAC (46) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)

REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Oral report by Allied Commission)

BARSOVITZA PIT - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS

(US POLID will raise orally the question as to whether a public statement on the lines authorized in F.A.N 634 should be made at this time)

THE RETURN OF THE NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN VENEZIA GIULLA TO THE JUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES

5. * POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULLA
(Paper by G-3, AFHQ - G-3 AFHQ/140/3 dsted 14 Mar 46 - already circulated)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF 5HQ GAF AND AFHQ IN ITS FALSEST FORM

(Paper No. S40 (46) 1 - already circulated)

RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF AFHQ IN ITS FALSEST FORM.

(Paper on Allied Commission and draft telegram for approval and despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff - already circulated)

- * Revised Appendix 'C' attached.
- ** Revised Annexure IV attached.

DISTRIBUTION :

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Commander-in-Chief, BIA.
Commander, 13 Corps.

D.C. CURME,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Author's Sign
2 May 1946

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attached to SACMED

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ANNEXURE IV~~

DRAFT SIGNAL

TOP SECRET

TO : AFHQ WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CABINET OFFICES WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is WAF

Ref FAN 631.

1. In accordance with a War Office proposal to disband GHQ CEF by 1 Jun I have re-examined the allied command arrangements which would be required in ITALY after that date.
2. Until such time as the Peace Treaty with ITALY is ratified by the four major powers JUGOSLAVIA and ITALY I am convinced that an Allied C in C in ITALY and an AFHQ will be required. It now appears likely that ratification may not take place before the autumn of 1946 and possibly not until Spring 1947.
3. Experience in the past has shown the value both from an operational and political point of view of a Supreme Allied Commander. In view of the possibility of operations in VENETIA, TRIESTE, until the Peace Treaty is ratified and the delicate political situation affecting ITALY and her neighbours I consider that a Supreme Allied Commander in ITALY should be retained but in view of his increased area of responsibility his title might appropriately be modified accordingly to Supreme Allied Commander ITALY.
4. The War Office has proposed that with the dissolution of GHQ CEF all British troops in ITALY should come under command of HQ 13 Corps.
5. Any assumption of responsibility by USARP for US forces in ITALY would unduly complicate administrative and supply arrangements which function

in ITALY and an AFHQ will be required. It now appears likely that ratification may not take place before the autumn of 1946 and possibly not until Spring 1947.

3. Experience in the past has shown the value both from an operational and political point of view of a Supreme Allied Commander. In view of the possibility of operations in VENEZIA, GIULI, until the Peace Treaty is ratified and the delicate political situation affecting ITALY and her neighbours I consider that a Supreme Allied Commander in ITALY should be retained but in view of his decreased area of responsibility his title might appropriately be modified accordingly to Supreme Allied Commander ITALY.

4. The War Office has proposed that with the dissolution of GHQ CEF all British troops in ITALY should come under command of HQ 13 Corps.

5. Any assumption of responsibility by USFEET for US forces in ITALY would unduly complicate administrative and supply arrangements which function most effectively at present. HQ AFHQUSA reduced in size should therefore continue as the major US HQ in ITALY.

6. In the event of the dissolution of GHQ CEF it would be practicable to set up a new Allied HQ in N. ITALY by integrating as necessary the appropriate staff sections of HQ AFHQUSA and HQ 13 Corps. In the interests of prestige and continuity the new Allied HQ should retain the title of AFHQ. Political representation will be required.

7. The matters for which the new Allied HQ will be responsible are broadly :
Operations
Intelligence

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2.

Internal Security

Civil Affairs

Coordination of matters of an Allied or Political nature.

In these matters the actions of the new Allied HQ must be governed by Allied policy. It is therefore considered that in all the above matters the new AFHQ should answer direct to Combined Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with existing procedure.

8. In my study I have taken into account the comparatively short time during which an Allied Commitment in ITALY was continue and have endeavoured to iron up my proposals so as to accomplish the disbandment of GHQ C.F. in such a way as to entail a minimum of changes in the present system, which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

- (a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.
- (b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HQ AFHQUSA and HQ 13 Corps, interpreted where necessary.
- (c) There should be located with this Headquarters a Naval Liaison Detachment, a HQ RAF ITALY and a British and an American Political Adviser.
- (d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to

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which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

- (a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.
- (b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HQ ETOUSA and HQ 13 Corps, integrated where necessary.
- (c) There should be located with this Headquarters a Naval Liaison Detachment, a HQ RAF ITALY and a British and an American Political Adviser.
- (d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to Combined Chiefs of Staff for all matters affecting operations, Intelligence, Internal Security, Civil Affairs and matters of Allied or Political nature.

10. FAN gives my views on the situation in this theatre. On the evidence at my disposal, to carry out by 1 Jun the plan outlined above, would entail running serious risks. I recommend that the change over be effected gradually, by moving elements of AFHQ progressively to N. ITALY and carrying out the final fusion with 13 Corps at a later date.

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13 May 1946

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Top Secret Documents

TO : Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

1. Reference your letter SACS/1, subject as above, dated 2 May 46, directing that subject documents be returned by 10 May 46 or an explanation given as to reasons for non-return thereof.

2. This Headquarters was in receipt of three copies of Revised Appendix 'C' to G-3 AFHQ 140/3 of 14 March 46, of which one copy each was loaned to our American and British Political Advisors.

3. It has been found upon inquiry of our British Political Advisor that the Appendix 'C' which was loaned to him was unfortunately enclosed in a British Embassy file which was temporarily sent to London. Immediate steps are being taken to have this paper returned as soon as possible to Rome.

4. Enclosed herewith will be found our two other copies of said Appendix 'C'. Acknowledgment of receipt of this letter and enclosures is requested.

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. C. Rively
J. C. RIVELY
Major, Inf.
Staff Officer to CC

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2 Incls:
2 copies of Revised Appx
'C' to G-3 AFHQ 140/3 of
14 Mar 46.

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ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Minutes of SAC's political meetings.

FILE NO.

TO : Office of the Chief Commissioner.

1015 May 1946.

You asked the other day for the return to you of the Political Adviser's copy of the revised appendix 'C' to the agenda of the SAC's political meeting (SAC (46) 3rd meeting - 16th March).

I find that this paper is unfortunately at present available, as it was enclosed on a British Embassy file which has temporarily been sent to London. The paper will be returned to you so soon as the file in question comes back to Rome.

A. S. Halford

A. S. HALFORD
Political Adviser

TOP SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

MAY 8 RECD

COPY NO 14

Subject : Withdrawal of TOP SECRET documents

SACS/1

6731

2nd May, 1946

C. Comm.

To : Distribution below

1. Reference item 5 of the Revised Agenda for the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference held on 16th March, 1946, issued on 15th March, 1946. Will all addressees please return the copies held by them of the revised Appendix 'C' to the paper G-3 AFHQ/140/3 of 14th March, 1946. The number of copies issued will be found below against list of addressees.

2. In accordance with G-3 AFHQ letter 140/3 of 28th April, 1946 (Appendix 'A') will those addressees against whose names is shown the number of copies of this paper issued to them by this Secretariat, please return them to this Secretariat for onward transmission to G-3, AFHQ.

3. The papers referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above should be returned by 10th May, 1946 or an explanation as to reasons for non return forwarded.

4. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter.

D.S. CURRIE

Lt. Colonel, G.S.,

Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

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D/Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ	1	-
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G-3, AFHQ	1	-
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G-5, AFHQ	2	-
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Brit POLAD	4	2
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	3	3
Liaison Section, AFHQ	1	1
Secretary C-in-Cs Committee, GHQ AFHQ	1	-
G-in-C, B.T....	2	2
Comd, 13 Corps	2	2

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Appx 'A'

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

File: G-3 AFHQ/140/3

28 April 1946

SUBJECT: Possible Operations in VENEZIA GIULIA

TO : See Distribution

Reference G-3 AFHQ/140/3 of 14 March.

1. Changes in the situation since publication of the reference paper have made it inaccurate and misleading in a number of respects.

2. It is therefore requested that all holders of this document return their copies to ~~G-3 AFHQ~~ as soon as possible.

SAC Secretariat

[Signature]
for D. PAUL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
AC of S, G-3

HH/as

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (46) 3rd Meeting
10th March 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100
HOURS ON SATURDAY, 16TH MARCH 1946

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING (1)
- (SAC (46) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)
2. REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY (2)
- (Oral report by Allied Commission)
3. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COLLAPSE IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF
GHQ CUF AND IF HQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM (2)
- (Paper No. SAC (46) 1 - already circulated)
4. RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF
AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM (3)
- (Paper on Allied Commission and draft telegram for approval and
despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff - to be circulated) 5256
5. ELSSOVIZZA PIT - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS

(US POLD will raise orally the question as to whether a public
statement on the lines authorised in FAN 643 should be made at
this time)

AGENDA

1

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (46) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)

46

2. REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Oral report by Allied Commission)

2

3. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMING IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF GHQ C.I.F. AND VI HQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

(Paper No. SAC (46) 1 - already circulated)

3

4. RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

(Paper on Allied Commission and draft telegram for approval and despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff - to be circulated) 5256

5. RISSOVIZZA PIT - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS

(US POLD will raise orally the question as to whether a public statement on the lines authorized in F.H. 643 should be made at this time)

D. G. Currie
D. G. CURRIE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

ECDIST-12 Nov

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Commander, 15 Corps

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*Chief Com
Allied Com*

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 2nd Meeting
15th February 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 14TH FEBRUARY
1946

PRESENT :-

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Murray,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Captain R.M.G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Rear Admiral Jules James,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal J.F. Fogarty,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy
- Major General A.D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General A.C. Puff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Brigadier W.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Major General I.C. Jaynes,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

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Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Captain R.M.G. Gambior, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral Jules Janes,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean

Air Vice Marshal J.F. Fogarty,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy

Major General A.D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier W.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General L.C. Jaynes,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
British Political Advisor

Mr. Honor M. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

Brigadier General G.S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier F.C.A. Parsons,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Colonel Lester H. Barnhill,
Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

- Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander
- Colonel Perry McC. Smith,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
- Wing Commander R.A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy

SECRETARIES :-

- Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Currie
- Captain W.N. Esbeck, Jr.

1. MINUTE OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SIC (46) 1st Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 3rd January 1946.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV ALLOCATION IN WITZEL GULLIA
(Previous reference SIC (46) 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that arrangements had been completed for the Regimental Combat Team and the Parachute Infantry Regiment to come as reinforcements. The Combat Team would come by rail, the Parachute Infantry Regiment would arrive by air transport and their vehicles would follow by rail.

COLONEL SMITH, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that in an emergency the whole force could be fully effective within 72 hours.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FORBES said that with regard to the air reinforcements, the Tactical Air Force would operate with RAF but USPT would retain command of the Strategic Air Force. He stated that the only tactical reconnaissance squadron in WITZEL GULLIA was a Polish squadron belonging to the RAF. In view of the War Office instruction that 2 Polish Corps were not to be used he had requested directions from the Air Ministry as to whether the use of this Polish Tactical Air Force squadron could

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in an emergency this squadron could

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2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV COMMISSION IN WARSAW (Previous reference S.O. (46) 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that arrangements had been completed for the Regimental Combat Team and the Parachute Infantry Regiment to come as reinforcements. The Combat Team would come by rail, the Parachute Infantry Regiment would arrive by air transport and their vehicles would follow by rail.

COLONEL SMITH, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that in an emergency the whole force could be fully effective within 72 hours.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FORBES said that with regard to the air reinforcements, the Tactical Air Force would work with RAF but USAF would retain command of the Strategic Air Force. He stated that the only tactical reconnaissance squadron in WARSAW was a Polish squadron belonging to the RAF. In view of the War Office instruction that 2 Polish Corps were not to be used had requested directions from the Air Ministry as to whether the ban extended to this Polish Tactical Air Force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in an emergency this squadron could probably be used and directed:

That whatever decision was given by the Air Ministry it should be accepted and the information should not be communicated to the squadron concerned.

3. HEADTRACK OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO THE IT IIA GOVERNMENT (Previous reference S.O. (46) 1st Meeting, Minute 4)

SERGEANT LUSH said that the headtrack was continuing smoothly. THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked where Allied Commission were now represented by their liaison officers.

SERGEANT LUSH replied that the Allied Commission were now represented by liaison officers at GAO, VILNA, TORON, POLZANO, VENTOL, LESPOLA, WPLIS, BARI and R.L.M.C.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said he did not think the local representative of Allied Combaseair had been very active over the handling of the question of electricity supplies at TURIN.

BRIGADIER LUSH said the trouble there had been that the Project had not pressed the matter very strongly on the administrative side and that the Allied Commission's local representative had little power to apply pressure.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that if this representative had kept the Allied Commission more fully informed more vigorous action could have been taken.

BRIGADIER LUSH said that the matter of electricity had been taken up in MILAN a month previously and some difficulty was being experienced in towns in the PIEDMONT region due to the slowing of administrative processes during the handback of the territory.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed his disapproval of the lack of action on the part of the liaison officer at TURIN, who he allowed the French flag to continue to fly when the British and American flags had been lowered.

BRIGADIER LUSH said that he thought the liaison officer did not take action as he felt to do so would cause an undesirable international incident. This matter had now been settled and the French liaison officer was being away for a short time, and he hoped he would be replaced by another officer.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

(Previous reference S.C. (46) 1st Meeting, Minute 6)

BRIGADIER LUSH said that a letter had been sent to AFHQ stating that the Allied Commission did not consider that the Italian government could undertake the feeding of the Italian Navy and Air Force before 31st March. In view of the present food situation he thought there might be great difficulty in doing

Took note of the above.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed his disapproval of the lack of action on the part of the liaison officer at T.M.D. when he allowed the French flag to continue to fly when the British and American flags had been lowered.

CAPTAIN LUSH said that he thought the liaison officer did not take action as he felt to do so would cause an undesirable international incident. This matter had now been settled and the French Liaison officer was going away for a short time, and he hoped he would be replaced by another officer.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. FOOD OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

(Previous reference S.A.C (46) 1st Edition, Minute 6)

ADMIRAL LUSH said that a letter had been sent to AFHQ stating that the Allied Commission did not consider that the Italian Government could undertake the feeding of the Italian Navy and Air Force before 31st March. In view of the present food situation he thought there might be great difficulty in doing so even after 31st March. The Chief Commissioner had requested the Prime Minister to form a committee of the Service Ministries to see into the whole question of feeding the Navy and the Air Force in order to be able to take over this responsibility by 31st March.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pressed for the date to be fixed not later than 31st March. He said we were feeding something over 60,000 Italian mouths and that the proportion in relation to British troops was getting steadily larger. The whole burden of doing this was falling on the U.S.C which was the arm of the service most understaffed and least able to meet it. Already 300 officers had been transferred from other arms of the service to the U.S.C and at the end of March it would become necessary to offer officers' release in order to feed the Italian Navy and Air Force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that in the case of rations each individual had to be certified as operationally vital. He could not describe either the Italian Navy or the Italian Air Force as operationally vital.

CAPTAIN GAMBIR agreed.

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BRIGADIER LUSH said that the difficulty was that food for the Italian services had to be procured by the Italian economic representative in bidding against UNRRA and Allied military procurement, both of which had higher priorities. At the present moment there was just sufficient to tide over the Italian Army for six months.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that 31st March be fixed as the latest date by which the Italian Government should assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

5. AUDITOR OF AMERICAN BELIEVED FOR U. VENTURA GULL:

(Previous reference S.O. (46) 1st Section, Minute 9)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the situation as he understood it was that we had asked the State Department and Foreign Office to make representations to BELGIUM to find the culprits.

MR. BROOKS and MR. BYINGTON agreed that this was so and they had had no further information on the subject.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in the meanwhile, 13 Corps were continuing to press the Yugoslav Military Mission for an answer to their letter of 16th January, which requested information as to the results of the search for the two wanted men.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said he would like to do something more to follow the matter up.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that any further action must now be left to the Political Advisers and if they could bring further pressure to bear on their departments so much the better.

MR. BROOKS and MR. BYINGTON agreed to do what they could in this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

6. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Previous reference S.O. (46) 1st Section, Minute 10)

MR. ETCARD and MR. WASHINGTON agree that this was so and they request further information on the subject.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER said that in the meanwhile, 13 Corps were continuing to press the Juresew Military Mission for an answer to their letter of 10th January, which requested information as to the results of the search for the two wanted men.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said he would like to do something more to follow the matter up.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER said that any further action must now be left to the Political Advisers and if they could bring further pressure to bear on their departments so much the better.

MR. BROAD and MR. PYNCHON agreed to do what they could in this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER :

Took note of the above.

6. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (46) 1st Action, Minute 10)

ROJALIER LUSH said that the situation was extremely grave. The monthly consumption amounted to some 250,000 tons. At the beginning of February there was less than that amount in stock and they were living from hand to mouth as new stocks arrived. UNWA expected the March arrivals to amount to just under this figure as they had been warned by UNWA WASHINGTON that the March arrivals might have to be scaled down. UNWA had no accurate whatsoever as to anything arriving for April. UNWA are now considering how to meet their commitment for the five months before the harvest is due. It may mean the disappearance of the pasta ration of 500 grammes a month. It may also mean cutting the bread ration to 150 grammes, which is half the FA estimate of the minimum subsistence ration in this country. This would give them just sufficient to tide through July when the harvest comes in.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER asked whether there was any other way to help out with food supplies.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL LUSH said that at the present moment there were the hidden reserves, which were the food supplies which had not been harvested in from the farmers, and he thought that this would be sufficient to live on for a month if the ration had to go down to 150 grams of bread, but that the situation by the end of March might be very serious. Continued drought in southern and central Italy was causing considerable anxiety for the crops. In the north the crops were better, but throughout the country there was a shortage of rain and only heavy rain in April and May would avert an extremely poor harvest.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that from the air, flying above ITALY, there appeared to be more land under cultivation than before.

LIEUTENANT LUSH agreed that more land had been put under cultivation but it was equally affected by the continued drought.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE asked if the hidden reserves was an individual holding.

LIEUTENANT LUSH said that it was held by farmers.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that in that case it would be the city people who would suffer and that presumably any unrest would take place in the cities.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in view of the gravity of the situation, directed:

That this matter should be reviewed at each future meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference.

7. MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN ITALY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE CEASE FIRE

(JFS Study No. P/ 324 (Final))

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he entirely agreed with the conclusions of the JFS paper and that it was no use doing anything at the moment as the situation was too undeveloped.

MR. BROOKS asked, BIRMINGHAM.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander, but suggested that it might be possible to prepare for two extreme cases - one that all troops would have to be ordered to and the other that the troops would remain for some considerable time. The chief concern of the Commanding 13 Corps, General Merwin, was the question of accumulation if troops were to remain in VITIZIA GULL for any considerable time. If the Joint Planning Staff could give General Merwin some indication of his commitments in these

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that in that case it would be the city people who would suffer and that presumably any unrest would take place in the cities.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in view of the gravity of the situation, directed:

That this matter should be reviewed at each future meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference.

7. MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN ITALY SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE PACE TREATY

(JPS Study No. P/ 324 (Final))

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he entirely agreed with the conclusions of the JPS paper and that it was no use doing anything at the moment as the situation was too undeveloped.

MR. PROUDMAN, BRITISH, agreed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander, but suggested that it might be possible to prepare for two extreme cases - one that all troops would move out by an early date and the other that the troops would remain for some considerable time. The chief concern of the Command 13 Corps, General Harling, was the question of accommodation if troops were to remain in VENEZIA GIULIA for any considerable time. If the Joint Planning Staff could give General Harling some indication of his commitments in these two extreme cases it would be very helpful.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that the reason for this study was a letter from General Harling in which he asked for planning information. The Joint Planning Staff had come to the conclusion that it was very difficult to give this to him because there was no information on which to base it at the moment. If troops were in VENEZIA GIULIA next winter there came the question of preparing alternative accommodation in order to allow large numbers of industrial buildings, schools and so forth to be handed back to the Italians. Any large building programme to enable this to be done was started by the administrative staffs of both AFHQ and CIP to be impossible. Therefore, in reply to General Harling it was stated that in view of the difficulties of being unable to forecast the terms of the Peace Treaty, he must continue to plan on his present scale of accommodation, even if 13 Corps remains there next winter.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE asked whether General Harling had made any estimate of how long it would take to withdraw troops and in what sequence they would withdraw.

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MAJOR GENERAL WARD said he did not think that would not then very much further as he withdrew it was unlikely troops would withdraw from VENEZIA GIULIA back to another place in ITALY.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE asked if there was any likelihood of British troops moving northward by rail.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that a move out of VENEZIA GIULIA to the north by rail would probably be impossible for the next three, and probably six, months.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE suggested that General Mordant might put forward an estimate of how much shipping he required.

MAJOR GENERAL LEE said it would probably be a case of how much shipping there was available when it came to the time.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF asked whether it would be possible to use the ports at the head of the ADRIATIC on account of mines, as at present only freight ships were allowed to use them.

CAPTAIN GAMER said it would be possible to use TRIESTE and that VENICE in any case was very shallow and would limit tonnage size of ship used.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked what was the earliest possible date on which a move would be likely to take place.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD said there was a possibility that a move could begin by July or August and that the War Office were hoping to have troops out before the winter.

MAJOR GENERAL LEE asked whether the Italians were in a position to prevent the return of buildings occupied by troops.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, if it was agreed that we should keep our forces there, the Italian government had no power to demand certain buildings.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the recommendations of JPS Study No. P/324. (Final).

(b) Directed that the Chief of Staff investigate the possibility of providing General Mordant with any further information which might assist his plan.

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CAPTAIN GARDNER said it would be possible to use THIRSTE and that VEDICE in any case was very shallow and would limit the size of ship used.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked what was the earliest possible date on which a move would be likely to take place.

MAJOR GENERAL BIRD said there was a possibility that a move could begin by July or August and that the War Office were hoping to have troops out before the winter.

REAR ADMIRAL JAMES asked whether the Italians were in a position to deny the return of buildings occupied by troops.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, if it was agreed that we should keep our forces there, the Italian government had no power to demand certain buildings.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Approved the recommendations of JPS Study No. P/324 (Final).

(b) Directed that the Chief of Staff investigate the possibility of providing General Verrier with any further information which might assist his planning.

6. TRANSFER OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FROM THIRSTE TO VEDICE

(JPS Study No. P/325 (Final))

REAR ADMIRAL JAMES said that this question had been examined three months previously and although at that time there were strong administrative and operational reasons in favour of the transfer it was felt necessary to re-examine the political considerations, which influenced the question of the transfer, were then predominant. Now the situation had considerably changed, in that very considerable political factors were being shored into northern POLITICAL parts, in particular by WPA. Manpower commitments were getting more stringent every day, as a result of which it became more undesirable to have duplicate administrative both in THIRSTE and VEDICE. There were still the considerable political objections. However, the Joint Planning Staff had come to the conclusion that this transference should take place and that the risks involved were not very great. As far as THIRSTE was concerned our forces there had been steadily reduced and by 1st April it would only entail withdrawing a very small tonnage from THIRSTE. This would benefit considerably as it would enable them to make use of practically

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couple were allowed to use them.

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the entire capacity of the port. The actual manpower saving, although not very great at first, would be an increasing one, and one of specialist personnel. TRIESTE would continue to be used for certain stores such as petrol and coal, which although used by the military are not actually handled in the port by the military.

MR. BROOK asked what would be the effect on the Italians and whether they would mind VEICOM being used to a greater extent.

CAPTAIN LASK said he did not think they would raise any serious objection and it would in any case utilize more Italian labour, which would be an advantage to them.

MR. TROTT said that his instructions were still the same and he thought that the political case was fairly set out in the paper.

THE SURVIVOR ALLIED COMMANDER did not raise in regard to paragraph 3(a) of the paper. He said that this was true when the NOVAH line was negotiated and that these reasons were put up for clearing the line, it was an argument difficult to refuse, but the situation had changed considerably since then.

MR. TROTT agreed.

MR. MITCHELL JAMES thought that paragraph 12(c) of the paper would alone be adequate reason for moving to VEICOM.

THE SURVIVOR ALLIED COMMANDER said that there was a very strong operational reason which not stronger every day, because if there was trouble in TRIESTE it was very much to our advantage not to be dependent on it.

CAPTAIN GALLER said that surely in the event of trouble in TRIESTE, the Army would have to be reinforced through TRIESTE and therefore thought that they should keep the Army facilities in the port in their hands.

THE SURVIVOR ALLIED COMMANDER said this was not so. They would be reinforced from GORIZIA by air and by rail.

CAPTAIN GALLER said that any reductions in the Naval Port Party which could be made would be welcome.

MAJOR GENERAL NEFF pointed out that at the time of the KORAN-JOVANOVIC agreement VEICOM was still mined and ships would be unable to use it for six months, and it was therefore not available as a port. In addition railway facilities had been destroyed and TRIESTE was the only port. Now the back-
had completely changed.

THE SURVIVOR ALLIED COMMANDER said that from the operational military point of view he was in favour of not using TRIESTE, and asked for the roll-

the adequate reason for moving to VIESTE.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDANT said that there was a very strong operational reason which was stronger every day, because if there was trouble in VIESTE it was very much to our advantage not to be dependent on it.

CAPTAIN GILBERT said that surely in the event of trouble in VIESTE, the Army would have to be reinforced through TRIESTE and therefore thought that they should keep the heavy facilities in the port in their hands. They would be re-

inforced from GORIZIA by air and by rail.

CAPTAIN GILBERT said that any objections in the Naval Port Party which could be made would be welcome.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pointed out that at the time of the MORGAN-JOVANOVIC agreement VIESTE was still alive and ships would be unable to use it for six months, and it was therefore not available as a port. In addition railway facilities had been destroyed and TRIESTE was the only port. Now the **book 7/9** had completely changed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDANT said that from the operational military point of view he was in favour of not using TRIESTE, and asked for the political views.

MR. WINGTON said that when this was considered at the meeting of November 22nd (SAC (45) 9th Meeting, Minute 7) he thought the decision taken was a very wise one. At that time the Supreme Allied Commander stated that we had so far been remarkably successful. He said that nothing should be done to disturb that balance as the result of which the occupation of any excuse to embarrass us, the cessation of military maintenance through TRIESTE would have that effect. Moreover, it would cause unemployment in the area. The matter of unemployment is thought to have been raised by UNRA. The principle reason set forth by the Supreme Allied Commander's commitments, but the principle reason set forth by the Supreme Allied Commander is that this move is even more true today than it was last November. The very delicate situation in VIESTE. GILBERT will be reaching its most critical stage during the next few months. It should not be disturbed by any withdrawal from TRIESTE. The State Department has instructed him to urge that military maintenance should not be transferred from VIESTE to TRIESTE and he hopes that the wise decision taken by the Supreme Allied Commander last November would not be reversed as this critical moment.

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MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY said it would not be possible to keep some kind of military control in TRIESTE while at the same time gradually removing our personnel back to VIENNA from TRIESTE.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said he understood it was intended to keep TRIESTE under military control. The number of personnel who would come away in the first party would be about 100. He did not think the Juroslavs would ever find out that a change was taking place. It would be noticeable only in that one Headquarters had replaced another.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that he thought that if we wanted to strengthen our military position by moving to VIENNA it would have a better effect on Tito than the agreement which we would offer him by staying in TRIESTE, and he believed the State Department might realize this and agree.

MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY said that the State Department might be concerned as to the eventual status of TRIESTE and desire to keep it as an international port.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that in that case this point should be brought up, but that he did not think agreement would assist that.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that the State Department felt there should be no disturbance of the military situation in the area at this critical time, and if military maintenance was withdrawn it would be a factor that might be very serious. If the maintenance is withdrawn it will inevitably be noticed by the Juroslavs as they have a very good intelligence service. He said that he still felt that General Khablenko's statement of 22 November that the Juroslavs would undoubtedly try to use our abandonment of TRIESTE as a means of stirring up trouble, still held good today.

MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY said that he did not see how it could affect the Force Treaty whether we were withdrawing our troops through TRIESTE or not and that as far as the port being an international one was concerned it would be virtually under military control and he did not believe people would know the difference.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that at a recent meeting it did not seem at all certain that UNTRA would make full use of the port of TRIESTE.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said according to their opinion TRIESTE would have to be enlarged in order to take the tonnage they require.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY COMMANDER said there appeared no doubt that UNTRA would make full use of the port.

MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY said that it was not a question of tonnage but a question of principle. He realized the move would involve an extremely small number of men and might, though he doubted it, pass unnoticed. He agreed with the argument put

but that he did not think arrangements would assist that.

MR. DUNSTON said that the State Department felt there should be no disturbance of the military situation in the area at this critical time, and if military maintenance was interrupted it would be a factor that might be very serious. If the maintenance is interrupted it will inevitably be noticed by the Yugoslavs as they have a very good intelligence service. He said that he still felt that General Khabalenko's statement of 22nd November that the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly try to use any abandonment of TRIESTE as a means of stirring up trouble, still held good today.

MR. GARDNER said that he did not see how it could affect the Force Treaty whether we were maintaining our troops through TRIESTE or not and that as far as the port being an international one was concerned it would be virtually under military control and he did not believe people would know the difference.

MR. WOOD said that at a recent meeting it did not seem at all certain that UNRRA would make full use of the port of TRIESTE.

MR. GENERAL DUFF said according to their bidding TRIESTE would have to be enlarged in order to take the tonnage as they required.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSION said there appeared no doubt that UNRRA would make full use of the port.

MR. FROST said that it was not a question of tonnage but a question of man and cycle. He realised the move would involve an extremely small number of men and might, though he doubted it, pass unnoticed. He agreed with the argument put forward by Mr. Dunston that anything which disturbed the status quo at this time might be used by Tito as propaganda against us.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSION said the only proposals he could make use of was that as we were not using TRIESTE we had no right to be so far into YUGOSLAVIA. He agreed with Admiral James that a strong line was essential.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FORBURY asked if the withdrawal would have any effect on the later use of TRIESTE.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSION said we would not ship out troops from TRIESTE.

MR. GENERAL DUFF added that we would use TRIESTE to get equipment out.

CAPTAIN SERRIER stated that if TRIESTE was not being fully used it was very likely that the Naval Party would be withdrawn.

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THE SUMMIT ALLIED CONFERENCE said there were several factors which had not been brought up.

The first point was that the Charter was not proposed until 1st April by which time the Foreign Ministers' Deputies Commission would have been there and gone away. Also the interest of that by this date the main outlines of the Peace Treaty should have been worked out between the Allies and presumably the Jews-slaves would have lost interest in putting up flows as a result. As the main details of the Peace Treaty would have been decided, the use which was made of the port would carry little or no weight. No

The second point was that the time he expected political trouble was when the terms of the Peace Treaty were disclosed. He expected the Jews-slaves to make all sorts of complaints but did not think the question of whether we might incur our forces through TRISTE or TRIESTE would interest them, but rather the injuries that were being done them by the terms of the Peace Treaty.

There was another side to it which affected the British in particular, and that was that the military men ever involved were specialists, of whom we are very short in this theatre. A great many men were due for release in the next two or three months, a proportion of whom would naturally be from these specialist services. The only means of preventing the release of any officer or man is if he could be certified as operationally vital. He considered that if he did not release these commitments it would be necessary to certify a number of men as operationally vital and keep them there. It was not within his power to certify under the conditions he had heard to-day that TRISTE was operationally vital. It might be politically desirable, but not operationally vital, and in addition, it was operationally desirable to get out of TRISTE. He therefore considered there was no option but to transfer this military maintenance to VENICE.

MR. WINSTON asked whether this matter would go to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

THE SUMMIT ALLIED CONFERENCE said that they would be informed of it and given full reasons but that he would make the decision here. If the Foreign Office and the State Department wished to reverse the decision they would have to ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to provide more men for this theatre.

MR. WINSTON then asked whether it was proposed to consult the Italian Government in advance of the above being done.

MR. WINSTON then asked if it to be desirable to obtain the Italian Government's point of view.

THE SUMMIT ALLIED CONFERENCE said that as a matter of normal courtesy we should inform the Italian Government.

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could be certified as operationally vital. He considered that if he had not done so since these commitments it would be necessary to certify a number of men as operationally vital and keep them there. It was not within his power to certify under the conditions he had heard to-day that THURTELL was operationally vital. It might be politically desirable, but not operationally vital, and in addition, it was operationally desirable to get out of THURTELL. He therefore considered there was no action but to transfer this military maintenance to VENICE.

MR. PLYINGTON asked whether this matter would go to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that they would be informed of it and given full reasons but that he would make the decision here. If the Foreign Office and the State Department wished to reverse the decision they would have to ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to provide a memo for this matter.

MR. SWINCHON then asked whether it was proposed to consult the Italian Government in advance of the memo being sent.

BRIGADIER IUSH considered it to be desirable to obtain the Italian Government's point of view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that as a matter of normal courtesy we should inform the Italian Government.

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MR. SWINCHON said it was unfortunate that this was the most critical period in VENEZIA GIULIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said he saw no reason why it should make any difference unless it was badly handled.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE asked whether paragraph 13 of the conclusions of the JPS report held good.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that this conclusion did hold good.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that he wanted to make sure that we did not require THURTELL before we gave it up.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that was a separate decision.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that with this in view, provided that we make the whole matter as inconspicuous as possible, he saw no reason for any difficulty to arise.

MR. HENRY suggested that the Italian government should not be told about the increased use of VENICE just yet. He suggested telling them about the middle of March, as he wanted to give the Foreign Office and State Department time to consult the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT LUSH thought that the Italian government should be given a reasonable time to make any alterations in their own arrangements.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that as we were closing TORONTO and that it would seem a natural result that the VENICE tonnage should increase.

MAJOR GENERAL WARR felt that nothing need be disclosed by informing the Italian government as so many reasons appeared to exist for increasing the VENICE tonnage.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER wished that it should be made quite clear to the Foreign Office and the State Department that the considered view on the military side was that there would not be any serious repercussions.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the recommendations of JPS Study No. F/325 (Final) and directed :

- (a) That the import of all tonnage which must be handled by military personnel should be transferred from TORONTO to VENICE with effect from 1st April 1946.
- (b) That the Chief of Staff advise the Italian government, through the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on a suitable date, as to the additional military tonnages which would be imported through VENICE after 31st March 1946. ✓
- (c) That a telegram* be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he proposed to take and the reasons for his decision.

10. DEFLECTION EXPLOSION AT TORONTO

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military side was that there would be no any serious repercussions

THE SHUTTLEWORTH CONTINUED :

Approved the recommendations of JFS Study No. P/325 (Final) and directed :

(a) That the inventory of all tonnage which must be handled by military personnel should be transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE with effect from 1st April 1946.

(b) That the Chief of Staff advise the Italian Government, through the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on a suitable date, as to the additional military tonnage which would be handled through VENICE after 31st March 1946. ✓

(c) That a telegram* be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he proposed to take on the reasons for his decision.

10. AMMUNITION EXPLOSION AT TORRE ANUNZIATA

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CAPTAIN QUINN said that the recent explosion at TORRE ANUNZIATA was of considerable concern to property and loss of life. While it was clear that the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accepted no responsibility for any such ammunition, there was a certain possibility of damage to ships and part installations from any explosion which might occur while this ammunition was being shipped for duty. This was the safe handling of these explosives a matter of crucial interest. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, desired very great precautions to be taken in the handling of this material. There had been a case some time ago which resulted in the loss of a ship at SIDA due to an explosion of ammunition being unloaded by German prisoners of war. He understood that the question of handling this ammunition for dumping had been reviewed as a result of this explosion and the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would be interested to know the result of this.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that as a result of this explosion the Italian Government were greatly concerned; the methods of handling this ammunition were now under discussion between the Italian Government and Headquarters, Peninsular Base Section.

* Despatched as MF 1115

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THE SUBJECT ALIID CONSIDERED whether the results of this review would apply everywhere or whether they concerned W.P.I.S. areas only.

LIAISON OFFICER W.P.I.S. said that on the British side we had our own separate negotiations and that our handling programme was taken place on the other side of ITALY.

LIAISON OFFICER W.P.I.S. said that it was essential to risk ITALY of this disastrous result in which there were still men to do it and that he might not be able to conform in advance detail with all the negotiations and at the same time reconcile the situation with the Italian Government.

LIAISON OFFICER W.P.I.S. said that his information was that the arrangements made in the W.P.I.S. areas were satisfactory to the Italian Government.

THE SUBJECT ALIID CONSIDERED :

Task force of the above.

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat (3) (27-29)

9th January 1946

AP 4

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

It is notified that there will be no meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on Thursday, 10th January 1946. Date of the next meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference has not yet been set. This will be advised in due course.

RALPH COOKE
R. A. PREE-COKE,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

1002-1/CC

5244

It is notified that there will be no meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on Thursday, 10th January 1946. Date of the next meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference has not yet been set. This will be advised in due course.

RALPH COOKE Majd.
R. A. FACKET-COOPER,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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SAC (46) 1st Meeting (Addendum)
5th January 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference minutes of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference held on Thursday 3rd January. Copy holders are requested to make the following amendments to this document :-

Page 2, under heading "The following were also present":

- Delete: "Group Captain R.B. Pakenham,
 Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY"
- Insert: "Wing Commander R.A. Field,
 Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY".

Page 2, Item 6, para 3: (ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered)"

Delete and substitute :

"ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the sense of the directive meant that the Allied Naval Area Commander could not divest himself of administrative interests".

Page 5, Item 9, para 10, line 1 :

- Delete: "regulations".
- Insert: "principles".

Page 5, footnote:

- Delete: "NAF 1106".
- Insert: "NAF 1105".

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Delete: "Group Captain R.B. Pakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY"
Insert: "Wing Commander R.A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY".

Page 3, Item 6, para 3: (ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered)"

Delete and substitute :

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the sense of the
directive meant that the Allied Naval Area Commander
could not divest himself of administrative interests".

Page 5, Item 9, para 10, line 1 :

Delete: "regulations".

Insert: "principles".

Page 5, footnote:

Delete: "N.F 1106".

Insert: "N.F 1105".

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RAFyef-Cooke
W.A. FLETCHER-COOPER,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

S.C (46) 1st Meeting (Addendum)
4th January 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference minutes of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference held on Thursday 3rd January. Copy holders are requested to make the following amendments to this document :-

Page 2, under heading "The following were also present":

Delete: "Group Captain E.B. Pakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY

Insert: "Wing Commander T.A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY".

Page 5, footnote:

Delete: "RAF 1106"

Insert: "RAF 1105".

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RAF Capt. Cooke,
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Delete: Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, and
Insert: "Wing Commander R.A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, R.F, II.IV".

Page 5, footnote:
Delete: "W.F. 1106"
Insert: "W.F. 1105".

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 1st Meeting
3rd January 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 3RD JANUARY 1946

PRESENT:-

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General John C. E. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal J. F. Fogarty,
Air Commander-in-Chief, RAF, ITALY
- Rear Admiral Jules James,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Rear Admiral Ellery V. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Brigadier General A. L. Karlsen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Brigadier J. L. C. Napier, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ (British)
- Colonel Lester H. Barnhill, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ (U. S.)

1002-1/01

PRESENT:-

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General John C. E. Lee,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal J. P. Fogarty,
Air Commander-in-Chief, RAE, ITALY
- Rear Admiral Jules James,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Brigadier J. L. C. Napier, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ (British)
- Colonel Lester H. Barnhill, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ (U. S.)
- Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister
- Mr. Homer H. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser
- Brigadier D. P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
- Colonel E. B. Nichols, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

- Brigadier T. G. A. Parsons,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

see enclosure
- 1 -

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel J. E. Bastien, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel Perry McC. Smith,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

~~Colonel G. G. G. G. G.~~
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy

Wing Commander R. A. Field,
Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY

AUTH-
SAC (46) 1ST MEETING
(ADDENDUM)
4TH JAN 1945

SECRETARIES:

Major R. A. Paget-Cooke
Major William M. Haas

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 11th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 20th December 1945.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 2)

BRIGADIER YATES stated that representatives were going to USFTI on 10th January to make arrangements for possible reinforcements to come from USFTI if required. These reinforcements would be both infantry and a certain amount of air support.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HARRIS stated that a cable had been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in which they said that they could not set aside any reserves specifically for ITALY but that they might be able to make available from United States resources in western EUROPE reinforcements not exceeding two reinforced infantry regiments.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. INVESTIGATION INTO JUGOSLAV ATROCITIES AT BASSOVIZZA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 3)

December 1945.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 2)

BRIGADIER YATES stated that representatives were going to USFMT on 10th January to make arrangements for possible reinforcements to come from USFMT if required. These reinforcements would be both infantry and a certain amount of air support.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN stated that a cable had been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in which they said that they could not set aside any reserves specifically for ITALY but that they might be able to make available from United States resources in western EUROPE reinforcements not exceeding two reinforced infantry regiments.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Tock note of the above.

3. INVESTIGATION INTO JUGOSLAV ATROCITIES AT BASSOVIETZA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 3)

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN reported that nothing further had been received on this subject from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. R2/40

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Tock note of the above.

4. UNDECK OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 4)

MR. AIRMAIL STONE confirmed that all formalities had now been completed in regard to the handback. He had received a letter from the Italian Prime Minister reiterating the Government's pledge not to station any troops in the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier zone other than Carabinieri. He was informing the Italian Government that the numbers of Carabinieri were not to be raised excessively without reference to ANHQ. In reply to a question by the Supreme

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Allied Commander, he said that he thought the beneficial effect of news of the handcheck on Italian morale had been rather overshadowed by the recent news from MOSCOW.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked if there was any news of the start of negotiations direct between the French and Italian governments.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that as soon as the agreement concerning the stationing of Carabinieri in the frontier zone had been made the French had made a claim through the Italian Ambassador in PARIS for the BRIG. and TEND. areas. The Italian Ambassador had been summoned to Rome by the Government for a full report.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

5. FUTURE FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 5)

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAZELTON stated that no reply had yet been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and he did not think that the time had yet come to raise the question with them again. He considered significant the recent statement in the press by Mr. Byrnes that there would be no question of revising the Armistice Terms.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

6. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 7)

REAR ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM confirmed that he had consulted with the Naval Sub Commission of the Allied Commission and that they had agreed on the following addition to paragraph 5 of JFS Study No. F/320 (Final) (Revised), which he thought would be agreeable to Rear Admiral Stone. He suggested that the addition should read :-

"In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander, the Naval Sub Commission of the Allied Commission is responsible for supervising the administration of the Italian Navy".

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that if this paragraph was put in he felt that the "administration" in the first sentence of paragraph 5 of the JFS

BRIGADIER GENERAL HARRIS stated that he had not yet seen the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and he did not think that the time had yet come to raise the question with them again. He considered significant the recent statement in the press by Mr. Dymnes that there would be no question of revising the Armistice Terms.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

6. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

(Previous reference S.C. (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 7)

AIR VICE MARSHAL CUMBERBELL confirmed that he had consulted with the Naval Sub Commission of the Allied Commission and that they had agreed on the following addition to paragraph 5 of JCS Study No. P/320 (Final) (Revised), which he thought would be agreeable to Rear Admiral Stone. He suggested that the addition should read :-

"In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander, the Naval Sub Commission of the Allied Commission is responsible for supervising the administration of the Italian Navy".

AIR VICE MARSHAL STONE stated that if this paragraph was put in he felt that the words "and administrative" in the first sentence of paragraph 5 of the JCS paper should be deleted as he did not think the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive laid down anything in respect of the administration of the Navy itself.

AIR VICE MARSHAL CUMBERBELL considered that the sense of the directive meant that the ~~Naval Sub Commission~~ could not divest itself of administrative interests.

the ~~Naval Sub Commission~~ ^{5th January 1946} ~~Commander~~ ^{Auth - SAC (46) / 1st Meeting (Addendum)}

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that addition as above should be made to paragraph 5 of JCS Study No. P/320 (Final) (Revised).

AIR VICE MARSHAL STONE said that he could not yet even begin to give a date by which the Italian Government could assume the responsibility for financing the Italian Navy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stressed that the problem was largely one of manpower and our ability to supply it; and further he pointed out that we might be losing the services of a certain number of the Poles in the near future.

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It was agreed that Rear Admiral Stone should let AFHQ know as soon as possible the soonest date by which the Italian Government could undertake the feeding of the Italian Navy.

7. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

(Previous reference SiC (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 3)

AIR VICE MARSHAL FORBURY stated that the necessary signal had been despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

BRIG. AIR GENERAL LINDEN informed the meeting that the Air Commander-in-Chief, RAF, ITALY had received a directive from the Air Commander-in-Chief, RAF, AFHQ, authorising him to have full responsibility for advising the Supreme Allied Commander with reference to the Italian Air Force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER :

Took note of the above.

8. BOUNDARIES OF AFHQ

(JCS Study No. F/333 (Final))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining the implications of FM 631, with particular reference to Command and Staff arrangements in those areas previously included within the boundaries of AFHQ, but now excluded, and attaching two draft signals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff respectively.

BRIG. AIR LIEUT. stated that the Joint Planning Staff had examined FM 631 in detail. He pointed out that the main effect of FM 631 was of course to remove AFHQ and the British forces in AFHQ from the Supreme Allied Commander's authority. As far as the AFHQ area was concerned the Joint Planning Staff felt that it was highly desirable to include the whole of JUGOSLAVIA, which at the moment was excluded, since we obviously had direct operational and intelligence interests in JUGOSLAVIA. Any threat to the AFHQ area in ITALY could only come from JUGOSLAVIA and further we had our forces already deployed in VENEZIA GIULIA. In addition, the wording of FM 631 was ambiguous as regards the actual eastern boundary of the AFHQ area, which referred to "all of ITALY including the occupied parts of VENEZIA GIULIA.....". The whole of VENEZIA GIULIA was occupied but only the west of the MORGAN line was occupied by the Allies. It was not clear whether they meant the eastern boundary to be the eastern boundary of VENEZIA GIULIA or the boundary of the MORGAN line itself. In the proposed cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff we had always asked for the whole of JUGOSLAVIA to be included in the area of the Supreme Allied Commander's responsibility.

(AES Study No. P/323 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining the implications of FIM 631, with particular reference to Command and Staff arrangements in those areas previously included within the boundaries of AFIC but now excluded, and attaching two draft signals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff respectively.

BRIG. IAN YATES stated that the Joint Planning Staff had examined FAN 631 in detail. He pointed out that the main effect of FIM 631 was of course to remove AFIC and the British forces in GREECE from the Supreme Allied Commander's authority. As far as the AFIC area was concerned the Joint Planning Staff felt that it was highly desirable to include the whole of JUCOCLVL, which at the moment was excluded, since we obviously had direct operational and intelligence interests in JUCOCLVL. Any threat to the AFIC area in ITALY could only come from JUCOCLVL and further we had our forces already deployed in VAEZL GIULI. In addition, the wording of FIM 631 was ambiguous as regards the actual eastern boundary of the AFIC area, which referred to "all of ITALY including the occupied parts of VAEZL GIULI.....". The whole of VAEZL GIULI was occupied but only the west of the MORAN Line was occupied by the Allies. It was not clear whether they meant the eastern boundary to be the eastern boundary of VAEZL GIULI or the boundary of the MORAN Line itself. In the proposed cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff we had anyway asked for the whole of JUCOCLVL to be included in the area of the Supreme Allied Commander's responsibility.

On the American side he stated that there were practically no interests outside ITALY which would require any special Command arrangements. On the British side however interservice interests in GREECE and such interests as remained in NORTH AFRICA could be appropriately dealt with by an interservice committee, the machinery for which existed in AFIC.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM remarked that this would correspond roughly to the system in force in the MIDDLE EAST.

AIR VICE-MARSHAL POLKETT said that he felt that any changes should involve as little as possible from the present organization. He suggested a supreme interservice Commander. He assumed that this would in fact mean a British supreme interservice Commander.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with this point of view, but as he had understood from the CIGS on his recent visit that GREEK would undoubtedly be transferred to NORTH EAST before long the subject could be allowed to rest, particularly in view of the forthcoming Greek elections.

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BY ILL. CUNNINGHAM pointed out that GRUCE would come under the Inter-service Committee in MI FILE EAST, of which he was a member.

BRIGADIER WATTS added that he understood there were strong administrative objections to transferring GRUCE to MI FILE EAST.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

- (a) That the existing arrangements should stand.
- (b) That the proposed cables to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff respectively should be despatched at once.*

9. MURDER OF AMERICAN MILITARY MEN IN WITZLI GULL.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked for information on this subject and said that he understood the murderers had been identified and were being searched for in the Yugoslav zone.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that they had been identified by name, that it had been proved they were wearing Yugoslav uniform but that they had not been of the command immediately opposite the American zone.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER assumed that we would demand their surrender for interrogation by 36th Division.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE thought that it would be better and would certainly look better if the interrogation was carried out by 13 Corps.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with this view.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMILTON said that Commander, 13 Corps was agreeable to this.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said further that after being handled over and interrogated by 13 Corps he presumed they would be tried by military court.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMILTON said that we were not permitted to try a soldier belonging to another of the United Nations. Such a trial could only be arranged through diplomatic channels, if then. In answer to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he stated that we were forbidden by international law to hold such a trial.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMILTON quoted the case of an American sergeant in the British port of CR. V. who was arrested for murder by the British police. The United States authorities had sent a United States cruiser to that port and had tried the prisoner on board by court martial.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER assured that we would demand their surrender for interrogation by 88th Division.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE thought that it would be better and would certainly look better if the interrogation was carried out by 13 Corps.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with this view.

BRIEFING GENERAL HANLON said that Commander, 13 Corps was agreeable to this.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said further that after being handled over and interrogated by 13 Corps he presumed they would be tried by Military court.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANLON said that we were not permitted to try a soldier belonging to another of the United Nations. Such a trial could only be arranged through diplomatic channels, if then. In answer to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he stated that we were forbidden by international law to hold such a trial.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CURRIN said that the case of an American seaman in the British port of CRUVEN who was arrested for murder by the British police. The United States authorities had sent a United States cruiser to that port and tried the American on board by court martial.
 AUTH - SAC(46) 1ST MEETING (ADDENDUM) 5TH JANUARY 1945

principles **2327**

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE said that case under the regulations governing jurisdiction over American forces personnel in HOLLAND. In this case we should ask the Jugoslavs to try the two men for this murder and let us know the results of the trial.

MR. EVINGTON said at this point that he would find out what the State Department's view on this case was. He was not prepared at this stage to answer for them and he was sure that they would want to consider the case fully before expressing their views.

BRIEFING GENERAL HANLON pointed out that regardless of the law on this matter there would be considerable chances of repercussions and retaliation if we were to try two Jugoslavs for murder. He felt that the matter would have to be considered on a diplomatic level.

- 5 -
* Despatched as M.F. 1105 and 11000S 287.
AUTH - SAC(46) 1ST MEETING (ADDENDUM) 4TH JANUARY 1945

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUMMINGS reminded the meeting that if we created such a precedent we would have to consider what our position would be if the Yugoslavs had cause for complaint against a British or American soldier and asked for him to be handed over to them for trial.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY quoted the case of a British officer who had been involved in an accident in BELGRADE recently. The Yugoslavs had asked in this instance that the British should deal with the case.

BRIG. IER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that we had always insisted that any miscreants of ours be handed back to us to deal with.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE stated his views as follows :-

- (a) We should ask for the hand over of the two men for the purpose of enquiry at the scene of the crime.
- (b) When the enquiry was completed we should hand the men over to the Yugoslavs for them to take action.
- (c) We should ask the Yugoslavs to inform us of the result.

Answering a question by the Supreme Allied Commander he said that we should also ask to have observers at the trial, and his authority for this was that in similar cases in FRANCE officials of the community where the offence had taken place were always invited to attend the trial.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed his agreement with Lieutenant General Lee.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE asked whether we had the right to demand the hand over of the two men and their custody for the purpose of an enquiry.

BRIG. IER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that we had done this in the case of other members of the United Nations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER queried whether we would be prepared to hand over one of our people for interrogation by the Yugoslavs.

BRIG. IER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that if we were asked to we would have to do so.

BRIG. IER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that so far the local authorities seemed to be helping.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES advanced the view that we had the right to try the two men ourselves. His opinion was committed on our own terms.

answering a question by the Supreme Allied Commander he said that we should also ask to have observers at the trial, and his authority for this was that in similar cases in EUROPE officials of the community where the offence had taken place were always invited to attend the trial.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed his agreement with Lieutenant General Leo.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE asked whether we had the right to demand the hand over of the two men and their custody for the purpose of an enquiry.

BRIGadier GENERAL HANBLEN said that we had done this in the case of other members of the United Nations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER queried whether we would be prepared to hand over one of our people for interrogation by the Jugoslavs.

BRIGadier GENERAL HANBLEN said that if we were asked to we would have to do so.

BRIGadier GENERAL HANBLEN said that so far the local authorities seemed to be helping.

REAR ADMIRAL JAMES advanced the view that we had the right to try the two men provided the crime was committed on our own territory.

MR. BYINGTON reiterated his desire to find out exactly what the State Department's view was.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that action should continue along the lines as at present.

10. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

REAR ADMIRAL STONE advised the meeting that he felt he must send a signal to AFHQ to express his concern over the present food shortage. The latest check showed a shortage of 339,000 tons of food as at 31st December 1945. This had occurred during the period of FAI responsibility but would carry over into the UMRU period. He understood that UMRU's procurements were also short, therefore he proposed to despatch this signal to AFHQ to sound a note of warning. He reminded the meeting that this question did of course touch also on the question of the feeding of the Italian armed forces.

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BRIG. GEN. CAROL HUNTER stated that we had sent two messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject. To the first they had replied that feeding of the Italians was no longer a military responsibility but that they would use their good offices to advise those whose responsibility it now is of the gravity of the situation. No reply, he said, had been received to the second message.

THE SUPPLY ALIEN COMMITTEE agreed that it was no longer a military matter but reminded the meeting that if trouble arose as a result of food shortage it would become a military matter.

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S. J. C. O. U. S. A.
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AP 827

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 1st Meeting
29th December 1945

*Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 3RD JANUARY 1946

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 11th Meeting - already circulated) — (1)

2. ALMA MATER

(JRS Study No. P/323 (Final) - already circulated) — (2)

100-1/00
John W. Williams, Jr.
D.O. CUFFE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISSEMINATION

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 11th Meeting - already circulated) —

①

2. AFHQ BOUNDARIES

(JFS Study No. P/323 (Final) - already circulated) —

②

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John Wilson
D.C. CURT,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECURITY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 11th Meeting
21st December 1945

SECRET ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTE OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE HELD IN THE 3-2 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 20TH DECEMBER 1945

PRESENT :-

- Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal J.F. Fawcett, representing
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF MEWE
- Commander S.M. January, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Major General A.V. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General A.C. Puff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Rear Admiral Hilary W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Brigadier General A.L. Harblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Liaison

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LIST :

Lieutenant General Matthew B. Midgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John W.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Vice Marshal J.F. Forzy, representing
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, AFHQ

Commander S.L. Jannery, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Major General L.V. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General L.C. Puff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General A.L. Harbler,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. Homer H. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

Brigadier General G.S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier T.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Brigadier General William L. Lee,
Asst. Director Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

Colonel C.G. Plakeney,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel J. L. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel P. McC. Smith
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Group Captain R. B. Pakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy.

SECRETARIES :-

Lt. Colonel D.C. Currie
Major William J. Haas

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 10th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 11th December 1945.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENETIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that replies had now been received from USPEST with regard to air assistance against possible Yugoslav aggression in VENETIA GIULIA and that a signal had been despatched requesting permission to send an RAF planning staff to arrange details of the air assistance.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. INVESTIGATION INTO JUGOSLAV ATROCITIES AT BASSOVIZZA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that no further instructions had been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

F 1162

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 11th December 1945.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that replies had now been received from USFLT with regard to air assistance against possible Yugoslav aggression in VENEZIA GIULIA and that a signal had been despatched requesting permission to send an RAF planning staff to arrange details of the air assistance.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. INVESTIGATION INTO JUGOSLAV ATROCITIES AT BASSOVIZZA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that no further instructions had been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. HANDBACK OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD said that in this connection MAP 1102 had been despatched, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the action taken by the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the Supreme Allied Commander would sign the actual proclamations with regard to the handback to-day and that the Italian Prime Minister would later sign on behalf of the Italian Government.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

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5. FUTURE FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that MAT 965 had been despatched on 12th December in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander, and that as yet no reply had been received.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

6. BRITISH INTERSERVICE COMBAND ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD stated that this matter was being studied by the Joint Planning Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

7. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

(JES Study No. P/320 (Final) (Revised))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and the desirability of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control, and recommending that no change be made in the present system of control, but that the Italian Government should assume responsibility for the supply of rations for the Italian Navy on certain conditions.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD said there were two papers for consideration at the meeting - No. P/320 (Final) (Revised) on the subject of the Italian Navy and No. P/319 (Final) (Revised) on the subject of the Italian Air Force, which the Joint Planning Staff had prepared in accordance with the directions received at Minute 9 of SAC (45) 9th Meeting. In the case of both these services the circumstances were different from that of handing back control of the Italian Army, which was required as an instrument of the Italian Government for maintaining law and order in the country.

Tack note of the above.

7. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY
(JPS Study No. P/320 (Final) (Revised))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and the desirability of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control, and recommending that no change be made in the present system of control, but that the Italian Government should assume responsibility for the supply of rations for the Italian Navy on certain conditions.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD said there were two papers for consideration at the meeting - No. P/320 (Final) (Revised) on the subject of the Italian Navy and No. P/319 (Final) (Revised) on the subject of the Italian Air Force, which the Joint Planning Staff had prepared in accordance with the directions received at Minute 9 of S/C (45) 9th Meeting. In the case of both these services the circumstances were different from that of handing back control of the Italian Army, which was required as an instrument of the Italian Government for maintaining law and order in the country.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS agreed with the recommendations of JPS Paper No. P/320 (Final) (Revised). He stated that it should be noted that the operational control of the Italian Navy derives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that it did not operate only within the sphere of influence of SACMED area of authority. In fact, ships were operating in PERUVAL, and it was proposed to send a unit of the Italian Navy even as far as SHANGHAI. The Italian Navy was fulfilling a very important function and was very useful to the Allied cause, an instance of which was that four cruisers were being employed entirely in moving Allied Naval personnel. He further stated that he considered it essential that the standard of rations should be maintained and that whilst fully agreeing with the second recommendation he considered that before the Italian government was made responsible for the feeding of the Italian Navy it should be ensured that they were in a position so to do.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE was in full agreement that it was necessary that the standard of feeding should be maintained. He pointed out that whilst UNTRAM was bringing in food it could not bring in food purely to maintain a scale of rations for armed forces, and that he foresaw some difficulty in the Italian Government undertaking this commitment at an early date. It would involve the Italian Mission in WASHINGTON in perhaps arranging UNTRAM for food supplies and the necessary shipping space.

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that if the Army could be fed surely it would be possible to feed the Navy as well.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the situation with regard to maintaining the standard of rations for the Italian Army was at the moment in some doubt. This was due to the fact that Allied Commission was handing over responsibility for civil food supplies to UNRRA.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pointed out that an economy in the food provided for the Armed Forces was desirable quite apart from which the main bottleneck was not ultimately one of lack of food but a manpower question, in that in the near future insufficient manpower would remain available to handle the quantities involved. He pressed that the date on which the Italian government should assume responsibility for feeding the Navy should be fixed at not later than 31st March 1946.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that before fixing a date it was essential to ensure that the Italian government was in a position to do this. He pointed out further that the Italian Navy was one of the most stable forces in ITALY at the moment.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE commented that a date of March 31st entailed procuring food in January and that availability of shipping must be assured for February loadings.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pointed out that the Italian government had a commitment to feed 50 million civilians and that the extra rations for the Army, Navy and Air Force would be a small commitment in proportion to this.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the ration supplied by the Italian government to civilians was less in some cases than that provided to German prisoners of war. He could give no guarantees that the Italian government would be capable of undertaking this commitment.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF requested that the commitment of providing these rations by the British Army should be terminated by 31st March unless the Italian government stated they were unable to assume this responsibility by that date.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that every endeavour should be made to ensure that the Italian government should be able to assume the responsibility of feeding the Italian Navy as soon as possible, a target date to be fixed as 31st March 1946.

BRIEFIER GENERAL HAELEN concurred in the recommendation but considered that the JFS paper should be redrafted so as to incorporate the views of the Naval Sub Commission.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that it was impossible to relate the direction

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MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pointed out that the Italian government had a commitment to feed 50 million civilians and that the extra rations for the Army, Navy and Air Force would be a small commitment in proportion to this.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the ration supplied by the Italian government to civilians was less in some cases than that provided to German prisoners of war. He could give no guarantees that the Italian government would be capable of undertaking this commitment.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF requested that the commitment of providing these rations by the British Army should be terminated by 31st March unless the Italian government stated they were unable to assume this responsibility by that date.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that every endeavour should be made to ensure that the Italian government should be able to assume the responsibility of feeding the Italian Navy as soon as possible, a target date to be fixed as 31st March 1946.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN concurred in the recommendation but considered that the JPS paper should be redrafted so as to incorporate the views of the Naval Sub Commission.

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that it was impossible to relate the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with that of the Supreme Allied Commander to the Naval Sub Commission which was mainly concerned with maintenance, whereas the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive related to the world-wide operation of the Italian Navy.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE agreed with regard to operations but pointed out that the Naval Sub Commission was responsible not only for maintenance but also for administration.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD pointed out that the recommendations in any case would not be affected.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF commented that the resultative sentence of paragraph 14 of the paper was not a correct statement of fact.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Approved the recommendations of the JPS paper No. P/320 (Final) (Revised), subject to consultations with the Naval Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

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- (b) Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the earliest date at which the Italian government could assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy before the target date of 31st March 1946.

8. FUTURE OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE

(JCS Study No. P/319 (Final) (Revised))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force and the desirability of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian government control, and attaching a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

AIR VICE MARSHAL POLLEY was in agreement with the paper and the proposed draft signal, with certain amendments. After discussion the following amendments to the draft signal were agreed :-

Para 4, line 2 to read: "...should be organised on a defensive basis".

Para 5, line 5, to read: "2 Air Sea Rescue and General Reconnaissance Squadrons".

Para 5, line 7, to read: "1 Training School (Flying and Technical)".

Para 6, lines 2 and 3, to read: "the Italian Air Force should be operated by the Air Ministry under any direction through functional sub-commands".

MR. PYMINGTON said he would like to suggest the wording in the second sentence in paragraph 8 of the draft signal be changed by deleting the phrase "to the extent necessary to relieve the Italian Air Force of air line commitments" and the substitution instead of the following phrase: "...both to relieve the Italian Air Force of internal air line commitments and to serve as an aid to internal transport in the economic rehabilitation of ITALY". He stated that the policy of the United States government according to his instructions from the State Department was in favour of the resumption of internal air transport in ITALY. The present restrictive clause in the signal was inconsistent with the United States position and also he considered seemed somewhat inconsistent with paragraph 11 of the JCS paper which advocated restarting Italian civil aviation and did not mention the limitation contained here.

After discussion the wording of the second sentence was approved to read: 5220

Para 4, line 2 to read: "...should be organized on a defensive basis".

Para 5, line 5, to read: "2 Air Sea Rescue and General Reconnaissance Squadrons".

Para 5, line 7, to read: "1 Training School (Flying and Technical)".

Para 6, lines 2 and 3, to read: "the Italian Air Force should be operated by the Air Ministry under my direction through functional sub commands".

MR. EVINGTON said he would like to suggest the wording in the second sentence in paragraph 2 of the draft signal be changed by deleting the phrase "to the extent necessary to relieve the Italian Air Force of air line commitments" and the substitution instead of the following phrase: "...both to relieve the Italian Air Force of internal air line commitments and to serve as an aid to internal transport in the economic rehabilitation of ITALY". He stated that the policy of the United States Government according to his instructions from the State Department was in favour of the resumption of internal air transport in ITALY. The present restrictive clause in the signal was inconsistent with the United States position and also he considered seemed somewhat inconsistent with paragraph 11 of the JCS paper which advocated restarting Italian civil aviation and did not mention the limitation contained here.

After discussion the wording of the second sentence was approved to read: 5228

"I therefore recommend that internal Italian civil aviation should be permitted both to relieve the Italian Air Force of internal air line commitments and to serve as an aid to internal transport in the economic rehabilitation of ITALY and that it should be regulated by the Italian government under the supervision of the Air Forces Sub Commission".

MR. WILSON, referring to paragraph 11 of the paper dealing with the control of civil aviation in ITALY, said he would have preferred the same wording as the amended wording of paragraph 8 of the signal and also he considered that civil aviation should be permitted by the authority of the Air Forces Sub Commission rather than AFHQ. He went on to say that the Air Forces Sub Commission would like to have added one light bomber squadron to the force set out in paragraph 8 of Appendix III to the paper.

MR. AIR GENERAL said that this would be of assistance in the event of aggression by land but agreed that similar aid could be given by fighter bombers.

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AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY disagreed with the proposed addition of a light bomber squadron and said he thought the force proposed was a well balanced one and it was better to keep to the lines laid down without adding at this stage another squadron, which would inevitably detract from getting this force well trained and organised.

After discussion it was agreed not to add a light bomber squadron.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the retention of four territorial Headquarters considered that they might for a time be required.

BIG AIR GENERAL LEE said he could really see no object in retaining these four Headquarters in so small a force. Their continuance would inevitably mean the retention of many unnecessary high ranking Air Force officers and staffs.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY agreed with Brigadier General Lee that there was no justification for these four Headquarters and they represented a considerable waste of manpower.

BIG AIR GENERAL LEE stated that the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.F., agreed with the paper and he thought that after two or three months there would be no need for these Headquarters.


THE DEPUTY SURFACE ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the deletion of these Headquarters in due course would undoubtedly improve the morale of the younger officers

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring once more to the draft telegram, wished to add to the end of the last paragraph the words "and limited private flying and gliding" MAJOR GENERAL MAPD asked Admiral Stone what type of private flying he envisaged taking place.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied the use of small light aircraft mainly for business men to make such journeys as from ITALY to SICILY. He considered that gliding would provide occupation purely as a sport and would be good for the youth of ITALY

"ADMIRAL CUMMINGHAM considered that it would produce a means of building up a shadow air force in the same way as the Germans had done after the last war.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE agreed that this was a possibility, but pointed out that the Allied forces would be in the country and that the Air Forces Sub Commission could control the extent to which it was developed.

THE DEPUTY SURFACE ALLIED COMMANDER ruled that gliding should not be private flying. 

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THE DEPUTY SURVEYOR GENERAL considered that the deletion of these Headquarters in due course would undoubtedly improve the morale of the younger officers

MAJOR GENERAL STONE, referring once more to the draft telegram, wished to add to the end of the last paragraph the words "and limited private flying and gliding"

MAJOR GENERAL STONE asked Admiral Stone what type of private flying he envisaged taking place.

ADMIRAL STONE replied the use of small light aircraft mainly for business men to make such journeys as from ITALY to SICILY. He considered that gliding would provide occupation purely as a sport and would be good for the youth of ITALY

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that it would produce a means of building up a shadow air force in the same way as the Germans had done after the last war.

ADMIRAL STONE agreed that this was a possibility, but pointed out that the Allied forces would be in the country and that the Air Forces Sub Commission could control the extent to which it was developed.

THE DEPUTY SURVEYOR GENERAL ruled that gliding should not be allowed but agreed that the signal should be suitably amended to allow limited private flying.

BRIEFING GENERAL HURPIN raised the point of whether the purchase of aircraft should be limited to the purchase from the United States and Great Britain only.

It was agreed after discussion that this limitation should stand.

THE DEPUTY SURVEYOR GENERAL :

- (a) Approved the recommendations of JIS paper No. P/319 (Final) (Revised).
- (b) Directed that the signal as amended in discussion should be despatched*.

P. C. CURRIE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

*Despatched as MF 1103 of 21 December 1945

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*Chief Commission
Allied Commission*

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING CALLED BY THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
TO DISCUSS FAN 635
HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1200 HOURS
ON MONDAY 17 DECEMBER 1945

PRESENT :-

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General H.B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Major General A.D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister
- Mr. Homer F. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser
- Brigadier D.F. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

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- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General E.B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Major General A.R. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Rear Admiral Elery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister
- Mr. Homer K. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser
- Brigadier D.F. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES :-

Lt. Colonel D.C. Curme
Major William M. Haas

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The Conference had before them a telegram* from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, directing him as to the formal public announcement of the handover to the Italian Government Administration of the remaining Italian territory now under Allied Military Government, including the islands of LIPIDUSI, LINGOSA, and PANTELLERIA, but excluding VENEZIA, GUILIA and the Province of UDINE.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER wished to decide whether any immediate action was required. He considered that to defer action would inevitably lead to complications; false rumours, which were inevitable, and articles in the Press would do further harm. He referred in particular to the United Press release made in PARIS on the 12th. The Chief of Staff read out this release.

Mr. Philip BROAD stated that a further Press release had been made, the text of which he handed to the Supreme Allied Commander. The Supreme Allied Commander read this to the meeting.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER recommended that, in view of what they had already heard, an immediate announcement would be in every way desirable. He stated that there was, in addition, another reason why he would like to make an announcement within the next few days. As this reason was a purely British one, he did not wish to press it unduly. A question had been asked in the House of Commons on 17th, and H.M.G. would like to be able to give a comprehensive answer to this question before the House of Commons rose on the 20th. This would only be possible if a formal public announcement was made and released to the Press in time for publication on the 19 December.

Rear Admiral STONE, Chief Commissioner Allied Commission, said that in view of his instructions of the 11 December, that he was to ensure that the agencies under his control would at present give no publicity to the exclusion of Italian troops from the FRANCO-ITALIAN Frontier zone or to the possible rectification to the ITALIAN Frontier, he would prefer to postpone the announcement, possibly until the time of actual handover. He had assured the Italian Prime Minister that the Allies had not been responsible for the United Press release from PARIS with regard to this. To make this further announcement now would be considered create a bad impression on the Italian Government.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the opinion that it might give the impression that we were not keeping good faith with the Italian Government, and he agreed with Admiral STONE that it would be better to postpone the announcement for this reason.

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desirable. He stated that there was, in addition, another reason why he would like to make an announcement within the next few days. As this reason was a purely British one, he did not wish to press it unduly. A question had been asked in the House of Commons on IT'LY, and H.M.G. would like to be able to give a comprehensive answer to this question before the House of Commons rose on the 20th. This would only be possible if a formal public announcement was made and released to the Press in time for publication on the 19 December.

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The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the opinion that it might give the impression that we were not keeping good faith with the Italian Government, and he agreed with Admiral STONE that it would be better to postpone the announcement for this reason.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER tabled a proposed draft of the wording of the announcement for discussion at the meeting, whether to be made public now or at a later date.

Mr. Philip HO. D suggested that this announcement might be more acceptable if the wording was slightly changed so as to give the impression that it was being made after the matter had been discussed with the Italian Government. Also that this night, at the same time, overcome the objection to making an immediate announcement rather than waiting until the date of handover.

Rear Admiral STONE said he would like to discuss this matter with the Italian Prime Minister, and if possible, get his agreement to making this public announcement. He also wished to keep to the wording of paragraph 4 of F.M. 635, thereby leaving out any reference to agreements other than to the Peace Treaty.

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Mr. Philip BROLD stated that it was in the interests of the Italian Government to make this statement early, in order to stop further undesirable rumours circulating as to future frontier rectifications and withdrawal of troops.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed and directed that the wording should be changed to that suggested by Mr. Philip BROLD, which would make this announcement more palatable to the Italian Government, make possible an immediate public announcement which would appear as confirmation of Admiral STONE's previous announcement of 13 December, and at the same time should emphasise our confidence in the Italian Government.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and Admiral STONE concurred.

The agreed wording of the public announcement was read to the meeting and follows:-

"Since his announcement of 13 December 1945, Rear Admiral Ellery W. STONE, USNR, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, has been in consultation with the Italian Government with regard to the detailed arrangements for the handing back to Italian Administration of the territories therein mentioned.

It is confirmed that the remaining Italian Territory now under Allied Military Government, including the islands of L. IMPUSI, LIUGI, and F. TELLERIA, but excluding VENEZIA, GUILIA, and the Province of UDINE will be transferred to Italian Administration on 31 December 1945.

The transfer of these territories and any withdrawal of Allied troops which the Supreme Allied Commander may determine is without prejudice to any frontier rectification which may be decided in the Peace Treaty."

Rear Admiral STONE stated that he would call on the Italian Prime Minister this evening or tomorrow morning, and would endeavour to get his agreement to the release of this statement in time for publication in world Press on the morning of Wednesday 19 December.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, if necessary, he was prepared to bring pressure to bear on the Italian Prime Minister to agree to the publication of this announcement.

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It is confirmed that the remaining Italian Territory now under Allied Military Government, including the islands of LAMPUS, LIOSI, and I. ANTILIEU, but excluding VIMIZI, GUILI, and the Province of UDINE will be transferred to Italian Administration on 31 December 1945.

The transfer of these territories and any withdrawal of Allied troops which the Supreme Allied Commander may determine is without prejudice to any frontier rectification which may be decided in the Peace Treaty."

Rear Admiral STONE stated that he would call on the Italian Prime Minister this evening or tomorrow morning, and would endeavour to get his agreement to the release of this statement in time for publication in world Press on the morning of Wednesday 19 December.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, if necessary, he was prepared to bring pressure to bear on the Italian Prime Minister to agree to the publication of this announcement.

Mr. BYBICTON expressed the opinion that the announcement should not be made without the agreement of the Italian Prime Minister.

Rear Admiral STONE expressed the opinion that the Italian Prime Minister would agree to the publication, and did not wish to use pressure unless it was essential. The announcement would be released in time for publication by world Press on Wednesday 19 December, subject to agreement by the Italian Prime Minister.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved as amended in discussion the wording of the public announcement to be made as directed by P.M. 635.

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(b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to communicate to the Italian Prime Minister the text of the announcement referred to at (a) above, and obtain his agreement to its release for publication in the Press on Wednesday 19 December 1945.

[Handwritten signature]
P. G. CURRY,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

17th December 1945

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

will hold a Conference
in
the G-3 War Room

on
Monday 17 December 1945
at 1200 hours

AGENDA:

To discuss FAN 635 and decide on the timing of the action ordered.

DISTRIBUTION:

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General Hatcher B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- His Excellency Sir Noel Charles, Bart,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome
- The Honourable A.C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser
- Major General A.D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

[Signature]
D.C. QUAIL,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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✓ Rear Admiral Ellery T. Stone,

1002-1/cc

AGENDA:

To discuss FAX 635 and decide on the timing of the action ordered.

Handwritten initials
D.S. CUMME,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

His Excellency Sir Noel Charles, Bart,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome

The Honorable A.C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Major General A.D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

✓ Rear Admiral Ellery T. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broud,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. Horer M. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 11th Meeting
17th December 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 20TH DECEMBER 1945

A G E N D A

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 10th Meeting - already circulated) ———— (1)
- 2. FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY
(JFS Study No. P/ 320 (Final) (Revised) - already circulated) — (2)
- 3. FUTURE OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE
(JFS Study No. P/319 (Final) (Revised) - already circulated) — (3)

D.C. CURIE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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SACMED'S POLITICAL CONFERENCE
11 December 1945

ARMISTICE PAPERS

1. Minutes of SAC's Conference 27 Sept. 1945 - discussion re civil and military affairs agreements with Italy.
2. JPS P/313 (Revised) "Military and Civil Affairs Agreement with Italy (US Comment)" - dated 2 Oct. 1945.
3. Minutes of SAC's Conference 4 Oct. 1945:
 - Para 8 - Discussion re military and civil affairs agreements with Italy.
 - Para 9 - Discussion re "Interim Document to Replace Armistice"
4. AFHQ F-55392 5 Dec. 1945 - AC views requested re revision Italian Armistice terms.
5. AC's "Interim Document to Replace Existing Armistice Terms".
6. AC covering letter in reply to F-55392, forwarding draft agreement.

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SACMED'S POLITICAL CONFERENCE
11 December 1945

ARMISTICE PAPERS

1. Minutes of SAC's Conference 27 Sept. 1945 - discussion re civil and military affairs agreements with Italy.
2. JPS P/313 (Revised) "Military and Civil Affairs Agreement with Italy (US Comment)" - dated 2 Oct. 1945.
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6. AC covering letter in reply to F-55392, forwarding draft agreement.

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Chief Clerk
Attended

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAS (AS) 10th Meeting
11th December 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE 9-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
TUESDAY 11TH DECEMBER 1945

PRESENT:

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General Mather B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Admiral Sir J. H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal J. F. Roberts, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDLANT
- Commodore Benjamin V. McClanish, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- His Excellency Sir Noel Charles, Bart,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome
- Mr. Homer M. Eyrington, Jr., representing,
U. S. Political Adviser

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PRESENT:

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Admiral Sir J. I. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Vice Marshal G. F. Fogarty, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MED.
- Commodore Benjamin V. McClellandish, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- His Excellency Sir Noel Charles, Barb,
His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome
- Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., representing,
U. S. Political Adviser
- Major General G. D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General G. C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Brigadier General G. J. Harnden,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Colonel G. J. Blakeney,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister
- Mr. J. Terley Jones,
United States Embassy, Rome
- Brigadier General G. S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

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Brigadier D. P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Colonel L. J. Glenn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel A. R. Hartman,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.

Colonel R. McC. Smith,
Liaison Officer Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Weston, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Group Captain A. B. Pakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy

SECR 7.1.115:

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major William M. Reas

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 9th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd November 1945, as amended by the addendum issued on 26th November.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV APPESSION IN VENIZIA, GIBLIA
(Previous reference SAC (45) 9th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD reported that a signal had been sent to USFA 249
requesting assistance to that assistance the United States Air Forces in Europe
with the Jugoslavs.

Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Group Captain A. B. Fakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy

SIC. T. 112:

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major William M. Haas

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 9th Meeting)

THE COMMANDER approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd November 1945, as amended by the addendum issued on 26th November.

2. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENETIA, GUILIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 9th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD reported that a signal had been sent to USRA **5919** for information as to what assistance the United States Air Forces in Europe could make available in the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

3. DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 9th Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL WARD reported that the directive to Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army, had been revised in agreement with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on the lines suggested at the last meeting and had subsequently been issued.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

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4. INVESTIGATION INTO JUGOSLAV ATROCITIES AT PASSOVIZZA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 9th Meeting, Minute 10)

Each GENERAL WARD said that in accordance with the directions at the last meeting, work had now been suspended and the Combined Chiefs of Staff informed. No further instructions from them had been received. Meanwhile the equipment remained on the site.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Teck note of the above.

5. REBELLION OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(JIS Study No. P/321 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining, in the light of the current restrictions on employment of Italian troops in the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier zone, the situation produced by the desert of the Combined Chiefs of Staff signal FAX 634 directing the Supreme Allied Commander to hand back the northern Italian provinces and other Italian territories to Italian Government control, and attaching a draft signal on the subject to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that three possible courses were open:-

- (i) To carry out literally the instructions in FAX 634.
- (ii) To hold up action and refer the whole matter back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (iii) To take cognizance of the fact that, if the instructions of FAX 634 were carried out as they stood, the Italians would probably move troops into the frontier zone thereby provoking a violent French reaction, and therefore to attach to the handback of territories some condition designed to prevent such a state of affairs arising.

He recommended course (iii). He also thought it would be necessary to inform the French in regard to what was being done.

troops in the FRANCO-ITALIAN Frontier zone, the Supreme
Chief of the Combined Chiefs of Staff signal FAW 634 directing the Supreme
Allied Commander to hand back the northern Italian provinces and other
Italian territories to Italian government control, and attaching a draft
signal on the subject to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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- (iii) To take cognizance of the fact that, if the instructions of
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probably move troops into the frontier zone thereby pro-
voking a violent French reaction, and therefore to attach
to the handback of territories some condition designed to
prevent such a state of affairs arising.

He recommended course (iii). He also thought it would be necessary to in-
form the French in regard to what was being done.

MR. SPENCER STONE considered it most important that he be authorized
to notify the Italian Government immediately that the handback of territories
had been approved. He understood the reasons which made some reservation in
regard to the Franco-Italian frontier zone necessary and he suggested that
this could be dealt with if he told the Italian Prime Minister that, when the
transfer documents came to be signed, it might be necessary to raise the ques-
tion of whether Italian troops could be allowed in the frontier zone. If
handled in this way the matter would not be likely to cause the Italian Prime
Minister any alarm.

MR. WILKINSON said that the United States Ambassador regretted that he
was unable to attend the meeting. The Ambassador was of the opinion that
the contents of FAW 634 should be notified to the Italian Government im-
mediately.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then tabled a revised draft signal to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. WILKINSON said that he would have to ask for instructions, with re-
gard to an order which did not contemplate the handback without restriction
of all northeastern Italian territory, up to the 1959 Franco-Italian Fron-
tier, on the same basis as other northern provinces. So ever, if it were

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decided that some condition must be attached to the handback, the method of approaching the matter suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, was in his view more satisfactory than any other.

SIR ROSE GRANDES agreed that this method of approach was the most satisfactory. He further agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander that steps should be taken to prevent the Italian Government moving troops into the frontier zone.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGHAM considered that restrictions should definitely be imposed on the employment of Italian troops in the frontier zone.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the suggestion in the draft cable that a public announcement should be made that the hand over of northern provinces would be without prejudice to any rectification of the Italian frontier which might subsequently be decided on, pointed out that a direction as to the public announcement required was included in paragraph 3 of F.A.N. 637. These instructions had presumably been carefully considered by the State Department and Foreign Office and agreed by them.

MR. BROWD read a signal from the British Ambassador in WASHINGTON to the Foreign Office which stated that the State Department agreed that the Supreme Allied Commander should be instructed:-

- (a) that on the withdrawal of allied troops no Italian troops other than Carabinieri should enter a fifteen mile belt along the frontier;
- (b) that in handing over territory to Italian Government administration a communication to the Italian Government and a public announcement should be made stating that this is without prejudice to any frontier rectifications which may subsequently be decided.

MR. BYINGTON said that he could not accept this signal as expressing the State Department view, which, according to his present directive, was that Italian northwest border territory should be returned to Italian administration at the same time and on the same terms as the rest of northeast ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, in view of this political signal and in the light of information he had obtained when visiting the War Office, it was most probable that he would receive further directions in regard to an announcement concerning the Franco-Italian border zone.

MR. PROUD read a signal from the British Ambassador in which he stated that the Supreme Allied Commander should be instructed:-

- (a) that on the withdrawal of allied troops no Italian troops other than Carabinieri should enter a fifteen mile belt along the frontier;
- (b) that in handing over territory to Italian Government administration a communication to the Italian Government and a public announcement should be made stating that this is without prejudice to any frontier rectifications which may subsequently be decided.

MR. BYINGTON said that he could not accept this signal as expressing the State Department view, which, according to his present directive, was that Italian northwest border territory should be returned to Italian administration at the same time and on the same terms as the rest of northwest ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, in view of this political signal and in the light of information he had obtained when visiting the War Office, it was most probable that he would receive further instructions in regard to an announcement concerning the Franco-Italian border zone.

MR. ADRIAN STONE thought it would be unwise to commit ourselves at this time to making a public statement in regard to the northwest frontier. However, he pointed out that the terms of ZAN 634 included a specific reservation in regard to FOLZANO. If no similar warning were given to the Italian Government in regard to the Franco-Italian border zone, they would inevitably conclude that a definite decision had been taken to hand back the northwestern border territories without any conditions.

MEETINGS GENERAL HIDEWAY agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved, as amended in discussion, the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which he had tabled and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it*.

* Despatched as N.F. 1096 of 11 December.

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- (b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to inform the Italian Government that the territories mentioned in PAN 632 would be handed back to Italian government control about 31st December.
- (c) Further instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, when communicating the above information to the Italian Prime Minister, to notify him informally that:
- (i) when the transfer documents came to be signed, a condition, that Italian troops other than Carabinieri should not be stationed within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border, might be imposed;
 - (ii) it would probably be necessary to make a public announcement that the handover would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon.
- (d) Directed that the aforesaid under his control should at present give no publicity to the exclusion of Italian troops from the Franco-Italian frontier zone or the possible rectification of the Italian frontiers.
- (e) Instructed the Chief of Staff to inform the Chief of the French Liaison Mission to AFHQ, on the same day as the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would approach the Italian Government in accordance with (b) and (c) above:
- (i) that pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the U.S., U.K. and French Governments, the handback of territory could not affect the existing restrictions on the employment of Italian troops other than Carabinieri in the frontier zone;
 - (ii) that the handover would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon.
 - (iii) that, in order to avoid embarrassing the Italian Government, the Supreme Allied Commander wished that no publicity should at present be given to the conditions of the handover stated at (i) and (ii) above.

(e) Instructed the Chief of Staff to inform the Chief of the French Liaison Mission to AFHQ, on the same day as the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would approach the Italian Government in accordance with (b) and (c) above:

(i) that pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the U.S., U.K. and French Governments, the handback of territory could not affect the existing restrictions on the employment of Italian troops other than Carabinieri in the Frontier zone;

(ii) that the handover could be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian Frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon.

(iii) that, in order to avoid embarrassing the Italian Government, the Supreme Allied Commander wished that no publicity should at present be given to the conditions of the handover stated at (i) and (ii) above.

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6. STAFF FUNCTIONS OF AMI 9 COM IAFHQ

AMIA 9 COM IAFHQ referred to the statement in paragraph 2 of PAFHQ 634 that all command functions of AMI 9 COM IAFHQ were to be performed by 13 Corps. The matter did not concern the Italian Government and therefore would be kept separate from the questions which had just been discussed. However, the point was not clear and he felt that any action on it should be suspended until clarification had been obtained.

AMIA 9 COM IAFHQ said that in order to operate AMI 9 COM IAFHQ in contact with the Italian Government, he read to the conference a draft of AMI 9 COM IAFHQ Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject. This draft had not been coordinated with staff sections concerned. The matter was also connected with the general reorganization of the Allied Commission in regard to which the views of the Supreme Allied Commander had been requested. He would submit a draft on the latter matter for approval in the near future.

AMIA 9 COM IAFHQ was in general agreement with Brigadier General ... He felt that the functions, which he at present performed as Chief Civil Affairs Officer, would in any event continue.

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THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to continue the staff coordination of draft signals on the lines which he had suggested and to submit them for approval in due course.

7. COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

(JCS Study No. P/318 (Final))

MR. CO. FLEMING had before them a study by the Joint Planning Staff examining the desirability of moving ANHQ to any location other than one in the vicinity of Rome, and concluding that ANHQ should remain at CASALIA.

BRIGADIER WATTS explained that the only reason for moving to any location other than Rome would be on grounds of accommodation and general welfare.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Approved the recommendation of JCS Study No. P/318 (Final).

8. BRITISH INTERSERVICE COMAND BRANCHMENTS OUTSIDE ITALY

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS raised the question of British interservice command arrangements outside ITALY, in view of the fact that P.M. 631 restricted the area of supreme Allied interservice command to Italian territory.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD said that this matter was under study and that it might be necessary to seek clarification from the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to have this matter examined and to make appropriate recommendations in due course.

W. J. Whittman

Approved the recommendation of JTS Study No. F/313 (Final).

3. BRITISH INTERSERVICES COMMAND STRATEGIC OUTSIDE ITALY

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM raised the question of British interservice command arrangements outside ITALY, in view of the fact that F.M. 631 restricted the area of command allied interservice command to Italian territory.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD said that this matter was under study and that it might be necessary to seek clarification from the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY COMMAND:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to have this matter examined and to make appropriate recommendations in due course.

J. G. S. Latham
J. G. S. LATHAM,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY. 5215

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*copy from memo to SACs
(27-29)*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 10th Meeting
10th December 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS
TOMORROW TUESDAY 11th DECEMBER 1945

AGENDA:

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
SAC (45) 9th Meeting - already circulated
2. HANDBACK OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
 - (a) JPS Study No. P/321 (Final) - to be circulated
 - (b) Combined Chiefs of Staff signal FAN 634 - MC IN 1765 of 9 December 1945
 - (c) AFHQ signals NAF 1010 - MC OUT 4110 of 13 June 1945
NAF 1090 - MC OUT 1071 of 14 November 1945
NAF 1096 - MC OUT 2312 of 30 November 1945
3. LOCATION OF AFHQ
JPS Study No. P/318 (Final) - already circulated

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AGENDA:

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
SAC (45) 9th Meeting - already circulated
- 2. HANDBACK OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
 - (a) JPS Study No. P/321 (Final) - to be circulated
 - (b) Combined Chiefs of Staff signal FAN 634 - MC IN 1765 of 9 December 1945
 - (c) AFHQ signals NAF 1010 - MC OUT 4110 of 13 June 1945
NAF 1090 - MC OUT 1071 of 14 November 1945
NAF 1096 - MC OUT 2312 of 30 November 1945
- 3. LOCATION OF AFHQ
JPS Study No. P/218 (Final) - already circulated

J.G. Sweetman
 J.G. SWEETMAN,
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
 SECRETARY.

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Chief Commissioner, Alcom

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 9th Meeting
22nd November 1945

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COPY NO 27

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 22nd NOVEMBER 1945

PRESENT:

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Captain R.M.G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral M. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Air Vice Marshal J. F. Tooty, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDWT
- Major General A.D. Ward
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Brigadier General G.L. Eberle
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Colonel C.G. Blakney,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., representing

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Captain R.W.G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral M. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal J. F. Forry, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAF

Major General A.D. Ward
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Colonel C.G. Blakeney,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Major I.G. McPherson, representing
Deputy British Resident Minister

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Brigadier F.G.A. Parsons,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Colonel A.R. Hartman,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, MTOUSA

Colonel Mills S. Savage, representing
Chief, Air Advisory Section, MTOUSA

Colonel P. McC. Smith,
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J.E. Dastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Group Captain R.E. Pakenham,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy

SECRETARIES:

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman

Major William M. Hays

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 8th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 24th
October 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 8th Meeting, Minute 2)

BRIGADIER YATES reported that the San Marco Regiment and 25 out of the
27 Italian Guard Battalions had now been handed over to Italian control.
One of the remaining Guard Battalions was in the NAPLES area and would be
relieved shortly. The other battalion was employed in 13 Corps area, under
Allied control and would continue to be so required for some time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 8th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 24th October 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

3. REPORT ON THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV PROBLEM IN NORTHEAST ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 8th Meeting, Minute 5)

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN reported that additional information had now been forwarded by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, broadening his ethnological survey so as to cover the areas of northeast ITALY west of VENEZIA GIULIA. A copy of the complete report was now on file at AFHQ and the original was held at the Allied Commission for inspection if desired.

*

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

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4. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN ITALIAN PROVINCES TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SIC (45) 8th Meeting - Minute 4)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WARD said that he understood that the State Department had now reversed their position and were prepared to agree to the return of BOZIZINO province to Italian government administration. Before he had received this information he had intended to propose that a further signal on the subject should be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he did not now think this would be desirable, as it looked as though instructions on the subject might be received very shortly.

BRIGADIER LUSH, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that although the machinery for effecting the handover was fully prepared, a delay of ten days, from the receipt of the decision, would be required before it could be implemented.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MURPHY, in reply to a question by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had already agreed to the return to Italian control of the communes of M. P. S., LIVORNO and P. S. at the same time as the northern provinces. In addition a recommendation had also been made to them that the islands of LIPARI, if the Supreme Commander's recommendations were agreed, therefore, only UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA would remain under Allied Military Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that no further signal should for the present be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the handover of the northern provinces.

5. FOSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference S.C. (45) 8th Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF, referring to remarks made at the last meeting by General Leunitzer in regard to later offensive action by 13 Corps, said that the administrative resources on which the reinforced corps would depend were decreasing daily. The matter was under detailed examination but it appeared that a delay of about 30 days would be necessary to achieve a sufficient administrative build up in order to pass to the offensive. As redeployment proceeded it would become increasingly difficult to maintain such an offensive should it become required.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, as the Jugoslavs were really little better than partisans, it would be an error to base administration requirements for hard fighting, in the

to the return to Italian control of the combined chiefs of staff had already agreed
FISL at the same time as the exarces of N. FIPS, LIVORNO and
tion had also been made to them that the islands of LAMPEDUSO,
PANTHERIA and LINOS should also be handed back. If the Supreme
Commander's recommendations were agreed, therefore, only UDINE and VENEZIA
GIULIA would remain under Allied Military Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that no further signal should for the present be
despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the
handover of the northern provinces.

5. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference S.C. (45) 8th Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF, referring to remarks made at the last meeting by
General Leunitzer in regard to later offensive action by 13 Corps, said
that the administrative resources on which the reinforced corps would depend
were decreasing daily. The matter was under detailed examination but it
appeared that a delay of about 30 days would be necessary to achieve a
sufficient administrative build up in order to pass to the offensive. As
redployment proceeded it would become increasingly difficult to maintain
such an offensive should it become required. **211**

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, as the Jugoslavs were
really little better than partisans, it would be an error to base adminis-
trative calculations on maintenance requirements for hard fighting, in the
sense that the Allies had known it in ITALY.

VICE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF said that he had now been advised by the US
Navy Department that the US Naval Forces in the Mediterranean would be
available to the Supreme Allied Commander for use in the event of Jugoslav
aggression.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

6. RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN MISSION IN ITALY

(Previous reference S.C. (45) 8th Meeting, Minute 7)

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported as follows:-

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- (i) Instructions had been received that, as the British and United States Governments had claimed the rights to decide for themselves the size of their missions in ROUMANIA, BULGARIA and HUNGARY, steps to limit the size of the Russian mission in ITALY could not be taken.
- (ii) AFHQ had refused the Russian request for unofficial collecting centres in various places in ITALY. A subsequent Russian request that one or two Russian officers should be attached to the staffs of certain static Allied Headquarters was under consideration.
- (iii) Russian officers now had the same freedom to move in ITALY as other Allied officers and were subjected to the same restrictions.

Weekly meetings were being held by the AFHQ staff with the Head of the Russian mission and these were proving satisfactory.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

7. TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE
(JPS Study No. P/517 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper concluding that the transfer of military maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE, though both desirable and practicable from a military point of view, raised strong political objections, and recommending that no change in the existing arrangements should therefore be made.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that, while appreciating political factors, the conclusions of the JPS paper were not welcome from the administrative point of view. British forces in AUSTRIA had now been entrained through TRIESTE for six months but it was probable that their maintenance would eventually be transferred to western EUROPE. The immediate cessation of maintenance through TRIESTE would not involve the port being entirely idle, as over half the tonnage now handled there consisted of U.S.A. supplies which would continue.

MR. BRINGTON said that he had definite instructions from the State Department to oppose both any reduction in the Allied use of TRIESTE and also any re- imposition of Allied control in VENICE, which maintenance through that port would involve.

MAJOR MCPHERSON indicated that the Foreign Office held a similar view.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that...

Took note of the above.

7. TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE

(JPS Study No. P/317 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper concluding that the transfer of military maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE, though both desirable and practicable from a military point of view, raised strong political objections, and recommending that no change in the existing arrangements should therefore be made.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that, while appreciating political factors, the conclusions of the JPS paper were not welcome from the administrative point of view. British forces in AUSTRIA had now been maintained through TRIESTE for six months but it was probable that their maintenance would eventually be transferred to western EUROPE. The immediate cessation of maintenance through TRIESTE would not involve the port being entirely idle, as over half the tonnage now handled there consisted of USSR supplies which would continue.

MR. BRINGTON said that he had definite instructions from the State Department to oppose both any reduction in the Allied use of TRIESTE and also any re-imposition of Allied control in VENICE, which maintenance through that port would involve. **2910**

MAJOR MCPHERSON indicated that the Foreign Office held a similar view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it was in any event militarily essential to restrain footings in VENICE, so as to switch to this port if necessary. He did not think the objections to re-establishment of control there were serious.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY, agreeing with the Supreme Allied Commander, considered that the latter was one for military decision by AFHQ and that the political views which had been represented were not to be interpreted as instructions.

MAJOR GENERAL HAMILTON said that a change was not desirable for military reasons. In concluding the MOSCOW-JOVANOVIC Agreement great stress had been placed on the line of communication through TRIESTE, and the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly contrive to use our abandonment of it as a means of stirring up trouble. This would cause military embarrassment.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that we held VENEZIA GIULIA in a nice balance, as a result of which the occupation had so far been remarkably successful. Nothing should be done to disturb that balance and, as the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly take advantage of any excuse to embarrass us, the cessation of maintenance through TRI-SFA would have that effect. Moreover, it would cause unemployment in the area.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Approved the recommendation of JFS Study No. P/317 (Final).

8. DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY

(Paper No. SAC (45) 24)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, dealing with his functions in his capacity as Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD asked the representative of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to state what functions the Land Forces Sub-Commission now retained, apart from its role as a military mission, and whether it could soon become a normal military mission directly under AFHQ.

BRIGADIER LUCH said that it was the duty of the Commander of the Land Forces Sub-Commission to advise the Chief Commissioner on military matters. Moreover, in view of the precise terms the legality of MIAA was dependent on its status as a Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. A military mission, independent of the Allied Commission, was not, therefore, at present practicable. The Chief Commissioner would prefer the directive to be re-drafted so as to make clear the full role of the Commander, MIAA, and to cover his functions as Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission. The directive to the Air Forces Sub-Commission had been prepared in this manner.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN agreed that the legality of the military mission was dependent on its status as the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

THE CONFERENCE then discussed detailed amendments of the directive.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 24 in accordance with the request of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and in the light of the above discussion.

BRIGADIER LUCH said that it was the duty of the Commander of the Land Forces Sub-Commission to advise the Chief Commissioner on military matters. Moreover, in view of the armistice terms the legality of MIA was dependent on its status as a Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. A military mission, independent of the Allied Commission, was not, therefore, at present practicable. The Chief Commissioner would prefer the directive to be re-drafted so as to make clear the dual role of the Commander, MIA, and to cover his functions as Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission. The directive to the Air Forces Sub-Commission had been prepared in this manner.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMILTON agreed that the legality of the military mission was dependent on its status as the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

THE CONFERENCE then discussed detailed amendments of the directive.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 24 in accordance with the request of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and in the light of the above discussion.

9. POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND ITALIAN NAVY

AIR VICE MARSHAL TOSARTY raised the question of the policy for the Italian Air Force which was now mainly grounded. He felt that a review was required with a view to seeing whether a policy, parallel to that agreed for the Italian Army, could be adopted.

CAPTAIN GAMBER, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that he did not think there was any need for a change of policy regarding the Italian Navy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the Joint Planning Staff.

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R-1146

1c. INVESTIGATION OF ALICE JUGOSLAV SOCIETIES - I RASOVICZ

MAJOR GENERAL LUSH said that the operations at the RASOVICZ Pit were not yielding any useful results. A recommendation had been made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that either the work should stop, or alternatively that proper machinery should be procured and the task handed over to a civilian agency. No reply had been received. He understood that the Foreign Office were amenable to a cessation of the work but the State Department desired it to continue. He recommended that arrears operations be suspended until a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was received.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFLY said that he was entirely in agreement with the Chief of Staff's suggestion.

MAJOR GENERAL LUSH said that he had been to look at the pit personally. The material being obtained by the present ad hoc military machinery was quite useless as evidence, and the engineering troops involved were simply wasting their time.

LIEUTENANT LUSH asked whether a public statement could be made on the subject to placate Italian public opinion.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFLY did not consider that such a statement would serve any useful purpose.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS:

- (a) Instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange to suspend arrears operations at the RASOVICZ Pit, pending a decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to the provision of proper mining equipment.
- (b) Directed that, for the present, no public announcement or press release should be made on this subject.

J.G. Sherman
J.G. SHERMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY: R208

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LEUTENANT GENERAL MCGUIRE did not consider that such a statement would serve any useful purpose.

THE SUPPORT ALLEY CONTINUED:

- (a) Instructed the Chief of Staff to errance to suspend grabbing operations at the BISOVIZZ Pit, pending a decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to the provision of proper mining equipment.
- (b) Directed that, for the present, no public announcement or press release should be made on this subject.

J.G. Sheehan
 J.G. SHEEHAN,
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL
 SECRETARY 5208

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Normal plus
 Commander, 13 Corps..... 1 CW.

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Chief Comm
Sup Allied Com
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 9th Meeting
20th November 1945

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COPY NO 27

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 22nd NOVEMBER 1945

AGENDA:

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
SAC (45) 8th Meeting - already circulated
 2. TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE
JIS Study No. P/317 (Final) - already circulated
 3. DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY
Paper No. SAC (45) 24 - already circulated
- TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:-
4. FILM DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY
Paper SAC (45) 23 - already circulated

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FILE 9257

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William M. MacArthur
J.G. STEPHAN

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
SAC (45) 8th Meeting - already circulated

2. TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE *no previous assignments*
JHS Study No. P/217 (Final) - already circulated

3. DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY
Paper No. SAC (45) 24 - already circulated
Done for you etc (file inserted)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:-

4. FILM DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY
Paper SAC (45) 23 - already circulated
FILE 9257

*William McManis
5207
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.*

DISTRIBUTION

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Ex Comm 15/10/10

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

F-1120
OCT 27 1945

SAC (45) 5th Meeting
26th October 1945

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COPY NO. 28

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1000 HOURS ON
TUESDAY 24th OCTOBER 1945

PRESENT:-

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Captain R.M.C. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Air Vice Marshal J. Whitford, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAE
- Major General L.L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Major General A.D. Ward,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General C.B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

5206

Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Captain R.M.G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal J. Whitford, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAE

Major General L.L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General L.D. Ward,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General C.E. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. A.C. Russell, representing
Deputy British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Allery V. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier D.F. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, MTOUSA

Colonel Mills S. Savage, representing
Chief, Air Advisory Section, MTOUSA

Colonel P. McC. Smith,
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J.I. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Wing Commander R.A. Field,
Chief of Air Plans, Air Headquarters, R&F, Italy

SECRETARIES:

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman

Major William M. Haas

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 7th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 4th October 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 7th Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER reported that 22 Guard battalions had now been handed over to Italian control leaving only five remaining under Allied command. The turnover of the San Marco Regiment had, however, been held up by difficulty in accommodating the troops destined to relieve it.

BRIGADIER YATES estimated that all 27 Italian Guard battalions and San Marco Regiment should be released to Italian control by early November.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 7th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 4th October 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 7th Meeting, Minute 2)

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BRIGADIER YATES estimated that all 27 Italian Guard battalions and ⁵²⁰⁵ San Marco Regiment should be released to Italian control by early November.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. REPORT ON ITALO-JUGOSLAV PROBLEM IN NORTHEAST ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 7th Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL LITWITZER said that the report submitted by the Allied Commission was incomplete in regard to two matters which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed should be covered. The first of these concerned the state of the ARSA coal mines, a survey of which could not be completed because the Yugoslavs refused to allow access to them. The second matter concerned the extension of the ethnological survey westward into ITALY outside VEREZIA GIULIA so as to cover the limits of possible Yugoslav claims. Allied Commission would be instructed to complete their report in this regard.

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MAJOR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the A.S. coal mines, pointed out that it was precisely for dealing with matters of this sort that the Joint Economic Committee had been set up under the FORGAN-JOVINOVIC Agreement. However, the Yugoslavs had consistently refused to allow movement of supplies from east of the MORGAN Line into the TRIESTE area. He felt that the elimination of this committee should be proposed as the Yugoslavs had prevented it from functioning as intended.

GENERAL HUBBEN considered that the Anglo-American representatives on the committee had done all they could. The Yugoslavs were undoubtedly being obstructive and Commander, 13 Corps, considered that the committee could not make further progress in regard to major matters such as movement of supplies from the Yugoslav zone. This question had therefore been taken up through diplomatic channels at EIGHT DE. He considered, however, it would be unwise to propose the abolition of the committee as it was useful to 13 Corps over minor matters.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to broaden his ethnological survey so as to cover those areas in Northeast ITALY, outside VENTZLI GULLI., which might be the subject of Yugoslav claims.
- (b) Directed that the abolition of the Joint Economic Committee should not be proposed.
- (c) Invited the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser, in consultation with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to continue to raise through diplomatic channels such major matters concerning the economy of VENTZLI GULLI. as the Joint Economic Committee were unable to handle.

4. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN ITALIAN PROVINCES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (45) 7th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEHITZER said that G-5 had proposed a further signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting that authorisation to hand back at least those territories not under dispute be expedited. He understood that the United States State Department was strongly opposed to the hand back of BOLZANO and that, in view of this attitude, the British Foreign Office had agreed to the retention of ANG therein for the present.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

the subject of Jugoslav claims.

- (b) Directed that the abolition of the Joint Economic Committee should not be proposed.
- (c) Invited the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser, in consultation with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to continue to raise through diplomatic channels such major matters concerning the economy of VENETIA, GULLIA as the Joint Economic Committee were unable to handle.

4. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN ITALIAN PROVINCES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (45) 7th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMMINGER said that G-5 had proposed a further signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting that authorization to hand back at least those territories not under dispute be expedited. He understood that the United States State Department was strongly opposed to the hand back of BOLZANO and that, in view of this attitude, the British Foreign Office had agreed to the retention of AIG therein for the present.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to submit, for the approval of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, the proposed signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and subsequently to despatch it*.

5. FUTURE COMMAND IN ITALY

(JIS Study No. F/315 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE has before them a study attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, recommending that the supreme allied interservice command and AFHQ should be retained for the present and that, on dissolution of AFHQ, a small US Headquarters should be set up in ITALY as a sub-command of USFET, to exercise command of all US land forces in ITALY and to provide the US component of AFHQ.

*Despatched as NAF 1080 of 24 October 1945.

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWISER said that General McVerney before departing from the theatre had expressed general agreement with the paper. However, it was desired to make a drafting amendment in regard to the recommendations of the signal. He also felt that, as it dealt mainly with the reorganization of the US command, it should include a statement that General Ridgway agreed the proposals.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the recommendation of the signal should state that the United States Commanding General of the sub-command of USPTF in ITALY should be the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. He pointed out that the redraft of the recommendation tabled by the Chief of Staff omitted the statement that supreme allied interservice command should be retained for the present. He considered that this statement should be included.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUGBY affirmed his general agreement with the proposals of the paper. After discussion he agreed the retention of the recommendation regarding supreme allied interservice command.

CAPTAIN CAMBER pointed out that, as drafted, the naval paragraph of the signal argued that as allied naval command was desirable, the appointment of supreme commander from within this allied naval command was derived should be retained. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, did not consider this argument sound. The latter felt strongly, however, that if the appointment of a supreme commander were discontinued there would have to be set up in ITALY a Commanders-in-Chief Committee, on which the British and United States Army, Air and Naval Commanders-in-Chief would be represented. Such a committee would be unwieldy and it was more than doubtful whether any useful decisions would emerge from it. Moreover, if it were set up it would be possible for a contention to be made that French, Greek and even possibly Italian Commanders should sit on the committee. The naval point of view was, therefore, that it was most desirable to retain the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander.

VICE ADMIRAL GLEESFORD agreed.

AIR VICE MARSHAL WHITFORD supported the arguments put forward on behalf of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for the retention of a supreme interservice commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the abolition of a supreme allied commander would require that the justice terms be modified, if the powers given by this instrument to the allied command in ITALY were to be retained. He suggested that this was an additional reason for the retention of a supreme allied commander and should be mentioned in the signal.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

ained. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, did not consider this argument sound. The letter felt strongly, however, that if the appointment of a supreme commander were discontinued there would have to be set up in ITALY a Commanders-in-Chief Committee, on which the British and United States Army, Air and Naval Commanders-in-Chief would be represented. Such a committee would be unwieldy and it was more than doubtful whether any useful decisions would emerge from it. Moreover, if it were set up it would be possible for a contention to be made that French, Greek and even possibly Italian Commanders should sit on the committee. The naval point of view was, therefore, that it was most desirable to retain the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander.

VICAR ADMIRAL GLEESFORD agreed.

VICAR VICE MARSHAL WHITFORD supported the arguments put forward on behalf of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for the retention of a supreme inter-service commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the abolition of a supreme allied commander would require that the justice terms be modified, if the powers given by this instrument to the allied command in ITALY were to be retained. He suggested that this was an additional reason for the retention of a supreme allied commander and should be mentioned in the signal.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to redraft, in the light of the above discussion, the signal attached to JPS Study No. P/315 (Final) and to despatch the revised draft** after submitting it to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for his approval.

6. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA, GIULIA.
(JPS Study No. P/314 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the situation which would arise in the event of an attack on the Allied forces in VENEZIA, GIULIA by Yugoslav armed forces or in the event of a state of disorder developing in that area as a result of Yugoslav inspiration, and attaching a draft directive on the subject to Commander, 13 Corps.

**Subsequently despatched as M.F. 1081 of 25 October 1945

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MAJOR GENERAL WARD pointed out that it could not be assumed that in the event of trouble the whole of the 2nd Polish Corps would be available. This would depend on the situation elsewhere in ITALY. He also thought the signal should state more clearly that an attack in strength by the Yugoslavs without previous warning, though possible, was not probable. He also suggested that the final paragraph of the draft directive, referring to the Yugoslav detachment west of the MORGAN Line, should be deleted.

BRIGADIER YATES, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that the purpose of the final paragraph had been to convey to 13 Corps the idea that they were not committed to retaining the Yugoslav detachment in its present area should they wish to move it.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER, referring to the offensive which, in the event of Yugoslav attack, would be launched after the Allied forces had been reinforced considered that the object of this offensive should be to destroy the Yugoslav forces and not merely to re-establish control of any particular area.

CAPTAIN GAMBIR said that the naval paragraph of the signal should be amended to give Commander, 13 Corps, specific details as to the naval force which was likely to be available to support him. A force of two destroyers or frigates was normally maintained in the Northern ADRIATIC and reinforcement by one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement would be dependent on the situation. He also pointed out that the amphibious lift for the Brigade Group/RCT would not be trained in assault landings or in evacuation over beaches.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD said that he had sought information from his superiors as to what United States naval forces would be available in the event of Yugoslav hostilities. The estimate of naval forces given by Captain Gambier referred to British forces only. There were at present one United States cruiser and two destroyers on the station. He (Vice Admiral Glassford) did not consider, however, that any mention of United States naval forces should be made in the directive until he had received further information on this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal to 13 Corps in the light of the above discussion and subsequently to despatch it***.

7. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN MISSION 202
(Paper No. S/C (45) 22)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal to 13 Corps in the light of the above discussion and subsequently to despatch it***.

7. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN MISSION **2202**

(Paper No. S/C (45) 22)

THE CONFERENCE had before them the record of the meeting which the Chief of Staff had held with Major General Basilov on 11th October to discuss repatriation of Russian citizens and connected matters.

MAJOR GENERAL LEVINITZ outlined the points which had been discussed at this meeting, during the course of which it had become clear that the Russians had considered that the YALTA Agreement permitted them to travel freely throughout ITALY without any further authorisation. In his opinion the recent increase in the freedom of movement allowed to Allied representatives in Balkan countries was the result of the enforcement, on the Russian officers in ITALY, of compliance with the standard Allied procedure for obtaining travel orders. It had also transpired at his meeting with Major General Basilov that the latter wished to set up a series of so-called collecting centres for Russian citizens in ITALY. This request had since been submitted in writing but no reply had yet been made.

***Despatched as F-50372 of 25 October 1945

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P-1120

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN observed that it was his information that in ROMANIA, BULGARIA and HUNGARY the members of the British and American delegations to the Allied Commissions in those countries were allowed complete freedom of movement.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that a signal had been despatched to MOSCOW for Generals Gammell and Deane, requesting them to approach the Russian General Staff in order to obtain a reduction in the number of Russian officers in ITALY to reasonable proportions. The advice of Generals Gammell and Deane on the whole question of freedom of movement for Russian officers and arrangements for Russian repatriation had also been requested. The Chief Administrative Officer felt that, pending a reply, no decision should be made to alter the regulations for movement of Russian officers in ITALY or in regard to their proposal for collecting centres. Meanwhile, the present Head of the Russian Mission for Repatriation was coming down to AFHQ once a week to discuss matters with the appropriate sub-section of "A" Branch, GHQ CTF, and other staff sections if required.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

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LEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

By J. G. Sweetman

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
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- 6 -

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(16)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S SECRETARIAT

Date 22 October 1945

TO: MAJOR STEARNS:

Confirming telephone conversation
this afternoon. SAC Conference will be
held Wednesday morning at 1000 hours
in the G-3 War Room, AFHQ. Agenda
remains the same as the attached.

RSTH.



1082

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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COPY NO 38

SAC (45) 8th Meeting
21st October 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1100 HOURS

ON
TUESDAY 23RD OCTOBER 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
SAC (45) 7th Meeting - already circulated ①
2. COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF HQ HQUSA
JPS Study No. P/315 (Final) - already circulated ②
3. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION AGAINST VENEZIA GIULIA
(a) 13 Corps signal 0320 of 24 September - MC II 1115
(b) JPS Study No. P/314 (Final) - already circulated
No record of receipt by AC ③
4. REPERCUSSION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
Paper No. SAC (45) 22 - already circulated ④

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

- 2. COLELAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF HQ MTOUSA
JFS Study No. P/315 (Final) - already circulated
- 3. POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION AGAINST VENETIA GIULIA
(a) 13 Corps signal 0320 of 24 September - MC II: 1115
(b) JFS Study No. P/314 (Final) - already circulated

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

- 4. REPUTATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
Paper No. SAC (45) 22 - already circulated

Jy Vaid nan.
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 7th meeting
4th October 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 4th OCTOBER 1945

PRESENT

- General Joseph T. McNarney,
Acting Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General W.D. Morgan,
Acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Captain R.L.G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commodore B.V. McCandlish, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Air Vice Marshal J. Whitford, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAE
- Major General L.L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Major General A.D. Ward,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
- Major General C.B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie.

Captain R.A.G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commodore B.V. McCandlish, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal J. Whitford, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAE

Major General L.L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General A.D. Ward,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Major General C.B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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EC List - 6 Oct 45
28 Chief Comm
29 Exec Comm
30 PARAS.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Brigadier P.G.A. Parsons,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Air Commodore J.H. Edwards -Jones,
Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF, MEDME

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J.B. Burwell,
Chief, Air Advisory Section, MTOUSA

Group Captain R.B. Pakenham,
Chief, Air Plans, RAF, MEDME

Colonel P.McC. Smith,
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr.,
Office of the U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:

Lt. Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 6th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 27th September 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that arrangements were proceeding for the relief of the remaining seven Italian Guard Battalions and their subsequent handover to Italian government control. It was anticipated that most of these units would be handed over by mid-October. Italian ~~4409~~

Colonel J.E. Bestion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:

Lt. Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 6th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 27th September 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

X-4253/CL (Previous reference SAC (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that arrangements were proceeding for the relief of the remaining seven Italian Guard Battalions and their subsequent handover to Italian government control. It was anticipated that most of these units would be handed over by mid-October. Italian ~~units~~ to relieve the San Marco Regiment were being prepared and in about two weeks time it should be possible to release this Regiment to the control of the Italian Naval authorities.

THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

3. ETHNOLOGICAL SURVEY OF NORTHWEST ITALY

X-1204/CL (Previous reference SAC (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER said that the report by the Allied Commission had been received at AFHQ and was under examination by the staff.

THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

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4. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL AND CHEESE

(Previous reference SAC (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that UNRU had accepted the loan of cheese. This commodity was now being loaded in ITALY and would shortly reach GREECE. The financial arrangements connected with the loan were under further study.

BRIEFER GENERAL HAMBLEN reported there was no change in the situation in regard to olive oil.

THE ACTING SUPRTE ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

5. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN ITALIAN PROVINCTS TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference S.C (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had stated that the recommended handovers were under urgent consideration on governmental level. No decision had yet been taken.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE said that he had mentioned to Signor Ferri that certain technicalities were holding up a final decision on the question. Although the latter had expressed some concern at the delay, the Italian government were not as yet seriously alarmed.

THE ACTING SUPRTE ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above reports.

6. ITALIAN MARCHING AGAINST POLISH TROOPS

(Previous reference S.C (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL STONE said that in accordance with directions given to him at the last meeting he had sent a further letter to the Italian Prime Minister protesting against an anti-Polish article in a Socialist newspaper and pointing out that his original communication should be interpreted as applying to deliberate attempts by any organization to undermine the discipline of 2 Polish Corps.

THE ACTING SUPRTE ALLIED COMMANDER :

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not at all*

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accorded to
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was [unclear]

MR. AMBROSI STONE said that he had mentioned to Signor Parri that certain technicalities were holding up a final decision on the question. Although the latter had expressed some concern at the delay, the Italian government were not as yet seriously alarmed.

THE CHING SUPPLEMENT ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above reports.

6. ITALIAN PROBABILITIES AGAINST POLISH TROOPS

X-2603/ [unclear] (Previous reference S.C (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 8)

MR. AMBROSI STONE said that in accordance with directions given to him at the last meeting he had sent a further letter to the Italian Prime Minister protesting against an anti-Polish article in a Socialist newspaper and pointing out that his original communication should be interpreted as applying to deliberate attempts by any organization to undermine the discipline of 2 Polish Corps.

THE ACTING SUPPLEMENT ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

7. MOVIE OF AFHC TO ROME

(Previous reference SAC (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 9)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that the cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was discussed at the last meeting, had been despatched. A detailed reconnaissance of the accommodation in Rome was at present being made.

MR. AMBROSI STONE said that, as instructed at the last meeting, he had sounded the Italian government on this subject. The Prime Minister hoped to give him a definite answer during the coming week. His initial reaction, however, had not been one of enthusiasm and he had appeared somewhat worried about the amount of accommodation in Rome remaining requisitioned.

NOTE 1075 despatched as MC CUT 5465 of 30 September 1945

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MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that for some time it had been the policy that requisitioned accommodation in ROE should not be returned to Italian ownership as it became vacant, in case it should be required for this Headquarters. It was intended that the main offices should be in the Air Ministry building which had previously been occupied by the British Element of the Allied Commission for JUSTICE. Detailed reconnaissance might show that it would be possible to surrender certain of the accommodation at present requisitioned and still retain sufficient to accommodate the Headquarters in ROE if required.

THE ACTING SUPPLY ALIEN COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

8. MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY

14-102-2/c (JCS Studies Nos. 7/312 (Revise.) and 7/313 (Revised))

THE COMPETENCE had before them drafts received from LONDON and WASHINGTON of proposed agreements between the UNITED KINGDOM and IT IV and between the UNITED STATES and IT.IV, together with revised draft comments on these agreements for despatch by Commander-in-Chief, Central Mediterranean Force, and Commanding General, MTOUS.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that the British draft agreement proposed that supplies and services required for the British forces in IT IV should be provided by the Italian government free of charge. Field Marshal Alexander had, at the last meeting, expressed the view that this provision was unduly harsh. Subsequent to that meeting, however, it had been represented to him that the effect of making sterling payments for such purposes would be disastrous to the interests of British troops in IT.IV, for great pressure would inevitably be exerted to have such sterling payments reduced and as a result the welfare amenities at present available in IT IV would probably be cut by some 75 per cent. Furthermore, the position in regard to the employment of Italian labour would be greatly affected. Field Marshal Alexander after considering the matter further had felt there could be no question of incurring difficulties, in regard to sterling funds, in order to maintain, in IT.IV, troops who were largely there for the purpose of rehabilitating the country and maintaining order in it. He had suggested a compromise solution whereby the cost of the services required by British troops might be offset by the British services rendered to IT.IV. The planners had examined the matter in this light but had come to the conclusion that any such arrangement would not be practicable.

The Chief Administrative Officer thought, however, that it might be possible to give the assistance desired to the Italian government, if the British

MAJOR GENERAL WUFF said that the British draft agreement proposed that supplies and services required for the British forces in IT IV should be provided by the Italian government free of charge. Field Marshal Alexander had, at the last meeting, expressed the view that this provision was unduly harsh. Subsequent to that meeting, however, it had been represented to him that the effect of making sterling payments for such purposes would be disastrous to the interests of British troops in IT IV, for great pressure would inevitably be exerted to have such sterling payments reduced and as a result the welfare amenities at present available in IT IV would probably be cut by some 75 per cent. Furthermore, the position in regard to the employment of Italian labour would be greatly affected. Field Marshal Alexander after considering the matter further had felt there could be no question of incurring difficulties, in regard to sterling funds, in order to maintain, in IT IV, troops who were largely there for the purpose of rehabilitating the country and maintaining order in it. He had suggested a compromise solution whereby the cost of the services required by British troops might be offset by the British services rendered to IT IV. The planners had examined the matter in this light but had come to the conclusion that any such arrangement would not be practicable.

The Chief Administrative Officer thought, however, that it might be possible to give the assistance desired to the Italian government, if the British government should wish to make such a gesture, by giving them a sterling credit for the funds spent by British troops in IT IV. This would bring the practice into line with that of the UNITED STATES, as dollar credits were at present given for similar expenditure by United States troops. Moreover, as the amounts involved were already recorded by the Allied Commission, such a course would not involve accounting difficulties. He wished, however, to have an opportunity to examine the matter further.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGKIN considered that the Chief Administrative Officer's last suggestion should be examined in greater detail and if found practical should be recommended to the British Chiefs of Staff. This would involve a slight delay in the despatch of the British comments and he asked if the Acting Supreme Allied Commander would agree to a postponement in the despatch of the United States comments, so that the two could leave the Headquarters at the same time.

THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreeing with the above proposal by the Acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, reiterated his view that the closer the two national agreements and procedures could be made to approach each other, the better it would be.

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MAJOR GENERAL STONE, agreeing in principle to the proposal of the Chief Administrative Officer, observed that he would like an opportunity to have his Financial Adviser confirm that the arrangement was workable.

THE VISITING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to examine further the proposal he had made at 'X' above, and in the light of this study to redraft the British comments circulated under JFS Study No. F/312 (Revised), & to submit a revised draft for approval.
- (b) Approved the United States draft comments circulated under JFS Study No. F/313 (Revised) but directed that they should not be despatched pending the redrafting of the British comments in accordance with (a) above.
- (c) Instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the despatch of both comments in due course.

9. INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACEMENT EXISTING ITALIAN JUSTICE TERMS

X - 20/24 (JFS Study No. F/310 (Final)) *RECALLED - No copy retained this office*

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian government, designed as an interim measure to replace the existing armistice terms until the signature of a definite peace treaty.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMMIZER said that this paper had been prepared as it was thought possible that the Supreme Allied Commander might be directed to produce such a document. No such direction had, however, yet been received. The paper represented the best the planners could do without detailed direction as to political background, which could only be received from the two governments.

MR. OFFICE said that the policy of the two governments was not yet decided. There had been a proposal to have the Supreme Allied Commander address to the Italian government a communication in regard to the revision of the armistice terms. It was unlikely, however, that the governmental position would be clarified for some little time.

MR. BROWN considered that little more could be done on this subject until further direction was received from the two governments.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE believed that if the Italian government were to be asked to sign a new document to replace the armistice terms, the new agreement should be drafted on the basis of the same political background as that on which the military and civil affairs agreements had been prepared. While the

092

Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian government, designed as an interim measure to replace the existing armistice terms until the signature of a definite peace treaty.

MAJOR GENERAL LUNNIN said that this paper had been prepared as it was thought possible that the Supreme Allied Commander might be directed to produce such a document. No such direction had, however, yet been received. The paper represented the most the planners could do without detailed direction as to political background, which could only be received from the two governments.

MR. GIFFIN said that the policy of the two governments was not yet decided. There had been a proposal to have the Supreme Allied Commander address to the Italian government a communication in regard to the revision of the armistice terms. It was unlikely, however, that the governmental position would be clarified for some little time.

MR. BROWN considered that little more could be done on this subject until further direction was received from the two governments.

MR. WILL STONE believed that if the Italian government were to be asked to sign a new document to replace the armistice terms, the new agreement should be drafted on the basis of the same political background as that on which ⁵¹⁹⁵ ~~the~~ on the military and civil affairs agreements had been prepared. While the present paper was adequate on the basis of the terms of reference given to the Joint Planning Staff, it did not really represent any revision of the existing arrangements and was in fact harsher to Italy than the "Macmillan Memorandum". He did not think that Signor Parri could sign such a document.

THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL agreed that if he were called upon to forward such a document he would probably be directed to prepare it on a similar political basis as that on which comments on the military and civil affairs agreement had been made. However, he did not think that further study of the subject would be justified until definite instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been received. He considered that the Joint Planning Staff had, on their given terms of reference, produced an able paper which would be useful in such an event. However, he wished that the distribution of this paper should be restricted as it might be considered to represent an accepted policy, and its contents should not at present be made known outside Allied Force Headquarters.

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THE ACTING SUTHERLAND ALLIED COMMANDER :

Withheld approval of the provisions of JIS Study No. T/310 (Final) and directed that copies circulated should be withdrawn and filed for use in the event that definite instructions on this subject were received.

J. G. Sweeney
J. G. SWEENEY,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
STAFF AV.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 7th Meeting
2nd October 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 17 OCTOBER 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

SAC (45) 6th Meeting - already circulated

2. MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY

(a) British Agreement and British comments

(i) PROOPERS signal 74076 CA2 (B) - MC IN 8882 of 17 Sep 45

(ii) JFS Study No. P/312 (Revised) - to be circulated

(b) United States Agreement and United States comments

(i) Draft Agreement already circulated under JFS Study No. P/313 (Final).

(ii) JFS Study No. P/313 (Revised) - to be circulated.

3. INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACE EXISTING ITALIAN ARMISTICE TERMS

JFS Study No. P/310 (Final) - to be circulated

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

SAC (45) 6th Meeting - already circulated

2. MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY

(a) British Agreement and British comments

- (i) TROOPERS signal 74076 CA2 (B) - MC IV 8882 of 17 Sep 45
- (ii) JFS Study No. P/312 (Revised) - to be circulated

(b) United States Agreement and United States comments

- (i) Draft Agreement already circulated under JFS Study No. P/313 (Final).
- (ii) JFS Study No. P/313 (Revised) - to be circulated.

3. INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACE EXISTING ITALIAN ARTISTICE TERMS

JFS Study No. P/310 (Final) - to be circulated

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J.G. STEPHAN
J.G. STEPHAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
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Sup (45) 6th Meeting
4th September 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 27th SEPTEMBER 1945

PRESENT:

- Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- General Joseph A. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- Captain R. K. G. Gambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander S. ... Janney, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Field Marshal Sir ... Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, R.F., MIDE
- Brigadier General G. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
- Lieutenant General ... D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
- Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFM

- Mr. G. Goffie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser
- Mr. Philip Brown,
Deputy British Resident Minister

CC Inst - 29 SEP 45

J1 CHIEF COMMO

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Captain R. M. C. Cambier, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Commander G. W. Tunney, representing
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir G. G. C. Carré,
Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F. AFHQ

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General J. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General C. E. Snyder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. G. Coffie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Brown,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellevy N. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General M. G. White,
Acting Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Lt. Col. M. C. Hoffman, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Luerle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General L. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

3 1102

Brigadier F. G. A. Parsons,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier H. C. L. Sharp,
Q (Maint) Section, AFHQ

Colonel P. McC. Smith, representing
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel G. Wickerley,
G-4 (M & TW) Section, AFHQ

Mr. Homer E. Byington, Jr.
Office of the United States Political Adviser

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lt. Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 5th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 6th September 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

X-8253/a (Previous reference SAC (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 3)

BRIGADIER GENERAL BRADLE reported that 20 Italian Guard Battalions had now been turned over to the Italian government control. The remaining seven were employed on Guard duties and would require relief. It was anticipated, however, that these reliefs would be effected in the near future by troops of 10th Indian Division (which had now moved from VENEZIA GIULIA to Northwest ITALY) and of 2nd Air Bde, which was being withdrawn from BTA.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said the Italian Naval Authorities were anxious to get the San Marco Marine Regiment back under their control. He had already urged in signals to AFHQ that this step should be taken and wished to press the matter again.

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 5th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 6th September 1945.

2. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

X-82-53/2 (Previous reference SAC (45) 5th Meeting - minute 3)

BRIGADIER GENERAL DEBIE reported that 20 Italian Guard Battalions had now been turned over to the Italian government control. The remaining seven were employed on guard duties and would require relief. It was anticipated, however, that these reliefs would be effected in the near future by troops of 10th Italian Division (which had now moved from VENEZIA GIULIA to Northwest ITALY) and of 2nd Arm. Bri. etc, which was being withdrawn from BLK.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said the Italian Naval Authorities were anxious to get the San Marco Marine Regiment back under their control. He had already urged in signals to AFM that this step should be taken and wished to press the matter again.

BRIGADIER GENERAL DEBIE said that the regiment was in the B.KI 5191 area where they had recently been used for internal security duties in connection with the recent disturbances. The turnover of the regiment to the Italian Naval Authorities was awaiting the organisation of a proper force of Guard battalions to assume the internal security duties which it was at present carrying out.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Took note with approval of the progress in turning over Guard battalions to Italian government control.

(b) Directed that the San Marco Regiment should be released to the control of the Italian naval authorities as soon as adequate arrangements for its relief from its present task could be made.

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3. ETHNOLOGICAL SURVEY OF NORTHEAST ITALY

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X-1000/a (Previous reference S.C. (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 5)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, said that the Ethnological survey, which the Allied Commission were holding in regard to Northeast ITALY, was almost completed and would be forwarded in the next day or so. He doubted if the report would be able to add much to existing knowledge on the subject. It represented an estimate of the present position in the opinion of AG officers. To make a full survey would require that a commission should visit the area for a lengthy period and take account of such matters as how the present distribution of population had been brought about, whether persons had been moved by force, etc. The report which he had prepared consisted of data only and did not contain recommendations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to forward his report as soon as possible.

4. USE OF NORTHEAST ITALIAN PORTS FOR TRAFFIC TO SWITZERLAND

X-4004/a (Previous reference S.C. (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 6.)

MAJOR GENERAL MACRUDER reported that this matter was now satisfactorily settled. The first ship transporting goods to SWITZERLAND had commenced to discharge and arrangements had been made to give the Swiss facilities for handling a tonnage which was adequate for their needs and would not prejudice Italian or Allied requirements.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note with approval of the above.

5. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL AND CHEESE

(Previous reference S.C. (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 7)

MAJOR GENERAL MACRUDER reported that UNRRA had been informed that 500 tons of cheese would be made available as a loan. UNRRA had not however as yet accepted this or allocated the food to GREECE, but were seeking advice from their own Headquarters. He considered that as the question was one of relief for GREECE, UNRRA were the proper agency to handle the matter, as it was desirable that all relief matters should be dealt with through the same channel.

MR. G. DIETZ CHELSEA H. BLISS said that no olive oil could be made available for GREECE from Italy before December and it was doubtful if there

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L. JOE CHIRAL GRUDER reported that this matter was now satisfactorily settled. The first ship transporting goods to SWITZERLAND had commenced to discharge and arrangements had been made to give the Swiss facilities for handling a tonnage which was adequate for their needs and would not prejudice Italian or Allied requirements.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note with approval of the above.

5. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL AND CHEESE

(Previous reference S.C. (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 7)

L. JOE CHIRAL GRUDER reported that UNRRA had been informed that 500 tons of cheese would be made available as a loan. UNRRA had not however as yet accepted this or allocated the food to GREECE, but were seeking advice from their own Headquarters. He considered that as the question was one of relief for GREECE, UNRRA were the proper agency to handle the matter, as it was desirable that all relief matters should be dealt with through the same channel.

BR. G. DIEM GENERAL H. BLENK said that no olive oil could be made available for GREECE from Italy before December and it was doubtful if there would then be any surplus over Italian needs. Supplies from NORTH AFRICA and MIDDLE EAST were allocated by the Combined Food Committee and could only be purchased with their approval. UNRRA had been informed of the Greek request and invited to place a bid for such supplies. However, it was felt that there were in fact adequate quantities of olive oil in GREECE if only the Greeks could be induced to take vigorous steps to assess it.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer to press UNRRA to take effective action in regard to the provision of cheese for GREECE.
- (b) Took note of the report by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, with regard to the availability of olive oil.

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6. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN ITALIAN PROVINCES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 8)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that, as some three weeks had elapsed since this matter had been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a follow-up signal had been despatched requesting an early reply. He understood that, when approval had been obtained, it would not be necessary to wait, as had originally been suggested, for as long as three weeks before effecting the handover.

GENERAL MORGAN reported that, as the Allied Commission now had time to prepare for the handover, it could be effected within approximately ten days of the approval being received.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF THE BALKANS

(Previous reference SAC (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 9)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he had ascertained that the report made at the last conference, that the survey photography of GREECE was practically complete, was not correct. In point of fact little more than the southern half of the country had been covered. The remaining area was too big to be completed by ground survey and even if photography was completed up to the frontier, there were not sufficient survey troops in CEF at the moment to undertake ground survey. However, the RAF aircraft engaged on photo reconnaissance flights had now been diverted to tasks in the MIDDLE EAST and the whole matter was therefore moribund.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Reiterated his policy that, should RAF aircraft for the purpose become available, the survey should be completed by air photography methods up to the Bulgarian frontier but that violation of that frontier should be avoided without further instructions.

8. ALLEGED INFILTRATION CONDUCT OF POLISH TROOPS

(Previous reference SAC (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 11)

GENERAL MORGAN said that he had been instructed by signal* to protest to General Perri regarding deliberate attempts to undermine the morale and discipline of 2 Polish Corps and to request that immediate steps be taken to stop this organised Communist campaign. He had conveyed this protest by letter. There were now, however, indications that, while the

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL O'NEILL said that he had ascertained that the report made at the last conference, that the survey photography of GELICE was practically complete, was not correct. In point of fact little more than the southern half of the country had been covered. The remaining area was too big to be completed by ground survey and even if photography was completed up to the frontier, there were not sufficient survey troops in CF at the moment to undertake ground survey. However, the R.F. aircraft engaged on photo reconnaissance flights had now been diverted to tasks in the MIDDLE EAST and the whole matter was therefore moribund.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Reiterated his policy that, should R.F. aircraft for the purpose become available, the survey should be completed by air photography methods up to the Bulgarian frontier but that violation of that frontier should be avoided without further instructions.

B. ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT OF POLISH TROOPS

X-751/CC (Previous reference S.G. (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 11)

GENERAL VITAL STONE said that he had been instructed by signal* to protest to Signor Farri regarding deliberate attempts to undermine the morale and discipline of 2 Polish Corps and to request that immediate steps be taken to stop this organised Communist campaign. He had conveyed this protest by letter. There were now, however, indications that, while the Communist activities had diminished, the campaign was being taken up by the Socialists. His instructions and the letter which he had sent were capable of interpretation as applying to Communists only. He would despatch a further letter of protest making it clear that his original communication should be given a wider interpretation, if so instructed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to make it clear to the Italian government that deliberate attempts by any organization to undermine the morale and discipline of troops under his command could not be tolerated.

*AF-44035. HQ OUT ALSZ of 17 Sep 45

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9. MOVE OF AFHQ TO ROME

(JPS Study No. P/311 (Final);
Paper No. SAC (5) 21)

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THE CONFERENCE had before them a study by the Joint Planning Staff setting out the advantages and disadvantages of a move to ROME after 1 December, together with a note by the Chief of Staff recommending that the proposal to move be agreed and attaching a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other Headquarters concerned, informing them accordingly.

MR. BROUD said that the proposed move might be misinterpreted by the Italians as a tightening of Allied control and a means of bringing pressure against the Italian government, at a time when the general policy was to relax such control. Personally, however, he considered that the move was desirable and the British Ambassador in Rome was of the same opinion.

MR. OFFICER said that the United States Ambassador was opposed to the move and hoped that it would not be undertaken without full consideration of the political factors involved. He therefore thought that the proposed signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should request that due consideration be given to these factors.

MR. MIRIAM STONE observed that he would like to be authorized to ascertain the reactions of the Italian government on the matter before a final decision was taken. He believed that they would be sensitive of the fact that the move would involve continued requisitioning of considerable accommodation in ROME, as the general policy was to hand back such accommodation to their control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that after December 1st, when it was proposed the move should take place, the Headquarters would be much smaller and would alter its complexion. The Joint Planning Staff had estimated that the move would involve some 6000 personnel. However, he believed that this estimate was based on the war establishment of GHC DMF as at 1 October. This would be reduced by 1 December. He believed, therefore, that the additional personnel to move to Rome would be smaller than had been suggested, and he felt that the question of accommodation would not be an overriding factor. If tactfully handled, therefore, the Italian government might be induced to invite the Headquarters to move to Rome. From the military point of view there was no doubt that a move to Rome was in every way desirable. As staffs were cut down it would become more than ever necessary to be centrally located in Italy and the bulk of the military problems remaining at that time would be of an administrative and political nature requiring contact with the Embassies and the Allied Commission. Moreover, the fact that the United States authorities required to remove the FORWARD switchboard and certain other United States equipment from CASERTA as soon as possible after 1 December meant that

be given to these factors.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE observed that he would like to be authorized to ascertain the reactions of the Italian government on the matter before a final decision was taken. He believed that they would be sensitive of the fact that the move would involve continued requisitioning of considerable accommodation in ROME, as the general policy was to hand back such accommodation to their control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that after December 1st, when it was proposed the move should take place, the Headquarters would be much smaller and would alter its complexion. The Joint Planning Staff had estimated that the move would involve some 6000 personnel. However, he believed that this estimate was based on the war establishment of GHC COMF as at 1 October. This would be reduced by 1 December. He believed, therefore, that the additional personnel to move to COMF would be smaller than had been suggested, and he felt that the question of accommodation would not be an overriding factor. If tactfully handled, therefore, the Italian government might be induced to invite the Headquarters to move to COMF. From the military point of view there was no doubt that a move to COMF was in every way desirable. As staffs were cut down it would become more than ever necessary to be centrally located in ITALY and the bulk of the military problems remaining at that time would be of an administrative and political nature requiring contact with the Embassies and the Allied Commission. Moreover, the fact that the United States authorities required to remove the FREDDO switchboard and certain other United States equipment from CASERTA as soon as possible after 1 December meant that considerable signals and similar work would be required even if the Headquarters remained at COMF.

GENERAL MCNEILY said that from a military point of view he had no objection whatever to the proposed move. He considered, however, that certain amendments should be made to the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He did not consider that it had always been true that the location of the Headquarters in COMF would have considerable advantages but agreed that this would be so after 1 December. He thought it desirable to include in the signal an estimate of the size of the Headquarters which would move.

AIR VIKSVAL GATROD pointed out that the trunk air services to destinations outside ITALY were based on the NALES complex of airfields. It would not be possible to move these terminals for some time. This would lead to some inconvenience to officers travelling by air from the Headquarters in COMF to destinations outside the theatre.

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CAPTAIN GUBBIER said that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, wished to point out that naval representation at the Headquarters in Rome would necessarily be sparse. It might be therefore that, if the Headquarters moved to Rome, operational decisions involving naval factors would have to be delayed until a naval assessment could be obtained. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was also in some doubt as to whether the expense of moving was justified in view of the short life which AFM was likely to have after the move.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed that operational decisions on matters having naval implications would be delayed by the move. However, he considered that such operational decisions were now secondary and the main problems were non-operational in nature. In regard to the expense of moving he pointed out it was probable that some form of Headquarters, responsible for ITALY, would be required for a considerable time.

BRIGADIER GENERAL NEWMIE said that the signals work in preparing the Rome Headquarters would take some two months from the decision to move being taken. It was therefore necessary that this decision should be made as soon as possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff,

(i) to revise the signal circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 21 in the light of the above discussion and with particular reference to the views of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander at 'X' above, and subsequently to despatch it.

(ii) To put in hand all preparations for the move of the Headquarters to Rome, including the preparation of accommodation and the installation of signals facilities, so that the new Headquarters would be ready for occupation on 1 December 1945.

(b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to state informally to the Italian Prime Minister that the Supreme Allied Commander would like to move a reduced Headquarters to Rome during December. The Chief Commissioner should point out that not only would efficiency and economy thereby be increased but that, by being in closer touch with the Italian government, speedier and greater help could be rendered to that government as required. An invitation to move to Rome would be very welcome.

- (a) Instructed the Chief of Staff,
- (i) to revise the signal circulated under paper No. S.C. (45) 21 in the light of the above discussion and with particular reference to the views of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander at XV above, and subsequently to despatch it.
- (ii) To put in hand all preparations for the move of the Headquarters to ROME, including the preparation of accommodation and the installation of signals facilities, so that the new Headquarters would be ready for occupation on 1 December 1945.

- (b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to state informally to the Italian Prime Minister that the Supreme Allied Commander would like to move a reduced Headquarters to ROME during December. The Chief Commissioner should point out that not only would efficiency and economy thereby be increased but that, by being in closer touch with the Italian Government, speedier and greater help could be rendered to that government as required. An invitation to move to ROME would be very welcome.

10. MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY

(JCS Studies Nos. P/312 (Final) and P/313 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them drafts of Military and Civil Affairs agreements between BRITAIN and ITALY and between the UNITED STATES and ITALY, together with papers by the Joint Planning Staff commenting on these drafts from the point of view of the British Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General, ITCUSA, respectively.

GENERAL L. MCKEN PHELY said that he had not yet had an opportunity to examine the United States draft agreement or the proposed comments on it in detail. He considered that the Joint Planning Staff should draw up for him a signal for despatch to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the same way as a draft signal had been prepared for despatch to the British Chiefs of Staff by Field Marshal Alexander in his capacity as British Commander-in-Chief. Such a signal might include the gist of the cover note by the Joint Planning Staff to their paper on the United States draft agreement. In order to obviate the difficulties which might occur

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if two agreements were signed and a demand were made for the same Italian facilities by both the British and United States authorities, he felt that an additional clause should be inserted in both agreements. This clause might state that in such an event the Italians would make these facilities available in accordance with the agreed decision of the Anglo-American Command.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER questioned the advisability of the statement in the memorandum attached to the British draft that the agreement should remain in force for five years. For the reasons of which he had notified the British Chiefs of Staff in his comments on the British draft of the Peace Treaty with ITALY, he considered it unwise to mention a definite period.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HUBBEN suggested, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commissioner, agreed, that the reason why this time limit was mentioned might be the fact that it was the British proposal to make the Italians pay wholly for the cost of occupation, whereas the financial arrangements in the United States draft were more lenient.

BRIGADIER SHARP said that from the administrative point of view it was considered desirable to retain the present arrangements whereby the Italian provided supplies and services free of charge.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that, while this might be a sound departmental view, the object was to rehabilitate ITALY as quickly as possible and this proposal would militate against that object.

BRIGADIER WILSONS said that the United States paper contained certain clauses on matters which had not been thought of when examining the British draft. Several of these proposals were quite agreeable from the British point of view. He suggested, therefore, that the paper on the British draft agreement should be referred back to the Joint Planning Staff for further examination in this light.

GENERAL HONAREY, agreeing with this suggestion, felt that the closer the two draft agreements approached to each other and the greater degree of agreement in commenting on them by the national staffs of the Headquarters, the better. He suggested, therefore, that a copy of the United States draft agreement should be forwarded to LONDON and similarly he wished to forward copies of the British draft to WASHINGTON.

MR. OFFIE mentioned that in addition to these military and civil affairs agreements, there was under consideration in the Headquarters a draft for a revision of the Italian Armistice terms. He had been informed

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that, while this might be a sound departmental view, the object was to rehabilitate ITALY as quickly as possible and this proposal would militate against that object.

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GENERAL MONAGHEY, agreeing with this suggestion, felt that the closer the two draft agreements approached to each other and the greater degree of agreement in commenting on them by the national staffs of the Headquarters, the better. He suggested, therefore, that a copy of the United States draft agreement should be forwarded to LONDON and similarly he wished to forward copies of the British draft to WASHINGTON.

MR. OFFIE mentioned that in addition to these military and civil affairs agreements, there was under consideration in the Headquarters a draft for a revision of the Italian armistice terms. He had been informed that the State Department had requested the Combined Chiefs of Staff to instruct the Supreme Allied Commander to submit such a proposed revision of the armistice terms. This document might be needed as an interim arrangement until a final Peace Treaty was signed, as the London negotiations towards the conclusion of such a treaty were making only slow progress.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to revise their papers I/312 (Final) and I/313 (Final) as might be necessary in the light of the above discussion, and as a result to prepare:

(a) For despatch by him as British Commander-in-Chief to the British Chiefs of Staff,

(i) a policy signal on the lines of that annexed to JFS Study No. I/312 (Final);

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(iii) A letter forwarding detailed comments on the British draft agreement, a copy of the United States draft agreement together with the comments of Commanding General, MTOUSA, thereon, and a statement as to which clauses of the United States draft agreement (which were not incorporated in the British draft) were considered to be acceptable by the British staff at AFHQ.

(b) For despatch by the Commanding General, MTOUSA, to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,

(i) a policy signal as suggested by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander at AFHQ above;

(ii) A letter forwarding detailed comments on the United States draft agreement, a copy of the British draft agreement together with the British comments thereon, and a statement as to whether any matters raised in the British draft agreement (and not in the United States draft agreement) were considered acceptable by Headquarters, MTOUSA.

11. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

(AFHQ Directive JG 091.711/291 SACS-O of 23 September 1945)

THE CONFERENCE took note of a directive which had been despatched to the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, in regard to the interim policy to be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force, pending the conclusion of a final Peace Treaty.

12. DIRECTIVE TO AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, RAF, ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (45) 20)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a directive which had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDIAN, to the Air Officer Commanding, RAF, ITALY, setting out his responsibilities to the Supreme Allied Commander and other Commanders.

AIR VADMAL GARRON said that this directive had been issued as part of the process of transferring Headquarters, RAF, MEDIAN, to C.I.T.O. The directive became effective on 1 October, but there would be an overlap of 15 days until mid-October during which he himself would remain at AFHQ.

draft agreement (annex to the United States draft agreement) were considered acceptable by Headquarters, AFMUS.

11. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

(AFHQ Directive AG 091.711/231 SACS-O of 23 September 1945)

THE CONFERENCE took note of a directive which had been despatched to the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, in regard to the interim policy to be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force, pending the conclusion of a final Peace Treaty.

12. DIRECTIVE TO AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, RAF, ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (45) 20)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a directive which had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDW, to the Air Officer Commanding, RAF, ITALY, setting out his responsibilities to the Supreme Allied Commander and other Commanders.

AIR VISCOUNT G. PROD said that this directive had been issued as part of the process of transferring Headquarters, RAF, MEDW, to CILIO. The directive became effective on 1 October, but there would be an overlap of 15 days until mid-October during which he himself would remain at CASERTA.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

J.G. Sweetman
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 755

SAC (45) 6th Meeting
25th September 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 27TH SEPTEMBER 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
SAC (45) 5th Meeting - already circulated.
2. MOVE OF AFHQ TO ROME
(a) JPS Study No. P/311 (Final) - already circulated. c c
(b) Paper No. SAC (45) 21 - already circulated.
3. MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY
(a) Agreement between Britain and Italy
(1) TROOPERS signal No. 74075 CA (B) - MC IN 8469 of 16 Sept 45.
(2) TROOPERS signal No. 74076 CA 2 (B) - MC IN 8882 of 15 Sept 45.
(3) JPS Study No. P/312 (Final) - already circulated.
(b) Agreement between United States and Italy
JPS Study No. P/313 (Final) - to be circulated.

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:

4. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

SAC (45) 5th Meeting - already circulated.

2. MOVE OF AFHQ TO ROME

- (a) JPS Study No. P/311 (Final) - already circulated.
- (b) Paper No. SAC (45) 21 - already circulated.

3. MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY

- (a) Agreement between Britain and Italy
 - (1) TROOPERS signal No. 74075 CA (B) - MC IN 8469 of 16 Sept 45.
 - (2) TROOPERS signal No. 74076 CA 2 (B) - MC IN 8882 of 15 Sept 45.
 - (3) JPS Study No. P/312 (Final) - already circulated.
- (b) Agreement between United States and Italy
JPS Study No. P/313 (Final) - to be circulated.

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:

4. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

AFHQ Directive AG 091.711/231 SACS-O of 23 Sept 45 addressed to Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. **5184**

5. DIRECTIVE TO AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, R.F. ITALY

Paper No. SAC (45) 20 - already circulated.

J.G. Sweetman
 J.G. SWEETMAN,
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
 SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

S4C (45) 5th Meeting
6th September 1945

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COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 6TH SEPTEMBER 1945

PRESENT:

Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Rear Admiral E. W. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, R.F., MEDAE

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral E. M. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, R.F., MEDAE

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General L. C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G. S. Smith,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General A. D. Ward,
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Major General H. G. White,
Acting Chief of Staff, MTOUSA

Colonel P. McC. Smith, representing
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES :-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 4th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held
on 23 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY
(Previous reference SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that he had been informed
by the Chief Signal Officer that a reply had been sent to the
Communications Sub Commission of the Allied Commission, stating
that their request for the release of certain circuits for
civilian use throughout ITALY could be met, with the exception
of a line between ROME and NAPLES. It had been suggested to
the Communications Sub Commission that the Italian Government
might be asked to obtain the release from the PTT of one of
their seven circuits between those cities so that, by employing
improved equipment, additional circuits could thus be made
available for civilian traffic.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

Major Robert T. Hanley

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 3)

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reported that 11 Italian guard battalions had been turned over to Italian Government control; five of these had formerly been under U.S. command, the other six under British command. There were now no Italian guard battalions remaining under United States control. Of those under British control it was expected that, by the 15th of September, five additional battalions would be released to Italian Government control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

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4. JUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENEZIA GIULLIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 4)

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN reported that a supplementary directive, pertaining to naval and commercial shipping claimed as items of war booty by the Yugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULLIA, had recently been issued to XIII Corps.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 8)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Chief of Staff, reported that the Vice President of the Civil Affairs Commission was at the present time in VENEZIA GIULLIA supervising the collection of information for the survey, covering ethnological and similar matters, which Allied Commission had been directed to undertake in regard to the ITALO-JUGOSLAV problem in Northeast ITALY. Progress up to the present time had been satisfactory and he hoped to forward a report shortly. It was his understanding that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was in possession of certain material which would be valuable for the final report. He asked whether a parallel report was still to be prepared by XIII Corps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that the original terms of reference to Allied Commission had recently been broadened. As Commander XIII Corps, had represented that his headquarters was too close to the problem to be able to view it in proper perspective, it had been decided to leave the survey wholly to the Allied Commission.

MR. OFFICE observed that, in view of the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in LONDON, it might be advisable for the Supreme Allied Commander to direct the preparation of a summary of day-to-day events in regard to Allied Military Government in the VENEZIA GIULLIA area since the occupation of that territory. Such a summary would undoubtedly be of use in the near future.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN considered that such a summary would be of value, but that the survey now being prepared by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should have priority over any other reports of this nature.

X

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X

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER:

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Confirmed the remarks of the Chief of Staff at 'X' above, and directed that the survey now being made by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be completed as soon as possible.

6. USE OF NORTHWEST ITALIAN PORTS FOR TRAFFIC TO SWITZERLAND
(Previous reference SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 10)

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported that the Allied Commission had been directed to discuss with the Italian Government the feasibility of opening the ports of GENOVA and SAVONA for use by Spanish

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ships engaged in the transportation of goods to SWITZERLAND.
No reply had as yet been forthcoming.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

7. GREEK REQUISITIONS FOR OLIVE OIL AND OTHER ITEMS
(Previous reference SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 11)

BRIGADIER GENERAL HILLEN reported that it had not been found possible to make a loan to GREECE of 2,000 tons of olive oil from ITALY.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF stated that urgent representations had just been received requesting the loan of 2,000 tons of cheese to GREECE for vital political reasons. He believed that some 500 tons could be made available from British sources after obtaining War Office approval.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

8. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN PROVINCES IN NORTHERN ITALY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. SAC (45) 18)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending that the Province of BOLZANO should be returned to the Italian Government at the same time as other territories in Northern ITALY, but that Allied Military Government should be retained in UDINE Province indefinitely.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that a signal had already been dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending that all the Northern Provinces, other than BOLZANO, UDINE and VERONA, should be returned to the Italian Government on 30 September 1945, or twenty one days after receipt of order for this handover, whichever date was the later. The signal now before the conference made recommendations in regard to BOLZANO and UDINE.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said he was anxious that the handover of the Northern territories should not be postponed into the month of October, as this would have an unfortunate political effect. He suggested, therefore, that the Combined

took note of the above reports.

8. HANDOVER OF NORTHERN PROVINCES IN NORTHERN ITALY TO
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REAR ADMIRAL STONE said he was anxious that the handover of the Northern territories should not be postponed into the month of October, as this would have an unfortunate political effect in ITALY. He suggested, therefore, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve of the handover back becoming effective on 30 September 1945, or twenty one days after receipt of orders, or whichever was the sooner.

BRIGADIER GENERAL BURNHAM, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that, while it was not technically essential to have Combined Chiefs of Staff approval before turning over the undisputed territories, it was necessary to have such approval in regard to BOLZANO and UDINE, as the present proposals were contrary to the existing directive to the Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MCNALLY said that having referred the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander to effect the handover without receiving their approval. However, if that approval was given, there was not likely to be any objection to the date of the

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handover being put forward. He considered, therefore, that no further recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in regard to the date at which the handover should take place, were required. He objected, however, to the statement in the draft signal that it was not administratively advisable to separate the MARVIS area from the rest of the Province of UDINE. Such a step would give rise to difficulties, but it could be done.

MR. OFFICE said that the State Department had informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that it favored the return to Italian control of UDINE Province at the same time as the other areas of Northern ITALY. Personally, he realized, however, that there might be military factors which would prevent that. He did not think that the political effect of the retention of UDINE to Allied Military Government would be serious, provided it was made clear that the reasons were military. He thought, however, that a date at which it would probably be possible to return the Province to Italian control should be mentioned and he suggested that, as it was hoped to have the Peace Treaty signed by the end of the year, a date of 1 December 1945 might be feasible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER saw no military objection to the return of BOLZANO to the Italian Government and was in favor of this handover being effected as soon as possible. However, he could not possibly agree to the handover of UDINE Province at present. This province controlled the communications into TRIESTE. A situation in which there was danger of ITALO-JUGOSLAV clashes across these lines of communication would be intolerable. It would, moreover, place him in an impossible position vis-a-vis Marshal TITO, as the one thing on which he had insisted in dealing with the Yugoslavs was that he must have the area of his lines of communication under his own control and his own military government. He did not think it wise to tie himself to any particular date for the return of UDINE to the Italian Government. This handover must be dependent on two conditions, firstly, the settlement of the ITALO-JUGOSLAV frontier problem and, secondly, the feasibility of maintaining the British Zone of TRIESTE through Northwest EUROPE. He was most anxious that the province should be handed back as soon as possible, but the turnover must await fulfillment of these conditions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SAITE emphasized that the security situation in BOLZANO was not satisfactory. There were in the area a number of Germans of arrestable categories still to be rounded up and the completion of these security measures would be difficult if the province was not under Allied Military Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a question by the Allied Commission, agreed that the latter

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tion in BOLZANO was not satisfactory. There were in the area a
number of Germans of arrestable categories still to be rounded
up and the completion of these security measures would be diffi-
cult if the province was not under Allied Military Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a question by the
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed that the latter
could inform the Italian Prime Minister that UDLI would be re-
turned to Italian control as soon as military conditions per-^{mitted}
mitted. The Italian Prime Minister should also be reminded of
the extent to which he (Field Marshal ALLIED) had always
insisted on having his lines of communication under his own con-
trol. The Supreme Allied Commander would, however, give every
assistance to the Italian authorities in regard to the comple-
tion of their electoral rolls and similar matters in the terri-
tories remaining under Allied Military Government. He did not
consider that the security aspect, mentioned by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, was sufficiently important to prevent the
handback of BOLZANO.

MR. BROLD said he had just received a signal from E. P.
Ambassador, who was visiting Northeast ITALY, to the effect
that Commander, III Corps, now considered that some formula
could be found which would allow him to have the necessary con-
trol in UDLI Province, while permitting this territory to be

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handed back to the Italian Government. He (Mr. BROAD) was in favour of an arrangement on these lines if at all possible. In regard to the return of BOLZANO he pointed out that the Foreign Office had anticipated that the French and the Russians might propose that this territory should be included in SYRIA. However, as H.M. Ambassador in Rome had subsequently sent a strong signal recommending the return of this Province to Italian Government control, it was probable that the Foreign Office had now come round to this point of view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said he was not at present willing, even if Commander, XIII Corps, now recommended otherwise, to accept any arrangement other than the continuation of Allied Military Government in the Province of UDINE.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER instructed:

- (a) the Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal circulated under paper SAC (45) 18 in the light of the above discussion, and subsequently to dispatch it *.
- (b) the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to inform the Italian Prime Minister that the Province of UDINE would, for military reasons, be retained under Allied Military Government but would be returned to ITALY when these reasons ceased to exist.

9. PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF THE BALKANS

(Paper No. SAC (45) 19)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that the survey of GREECE, which was being undertaken as a British commitment, would involve flights across the boundaries of adjacent states, and recommending that the Supreme Allied Commander should authorize such flights across the ALBANIAN, JUGOSLAV and TURKISH frontiers without seeking clearance from those Governments, but should seek guidance on the problem of flights across the GREEKO-BULGARIAN frontier. A draft cable to the British Chiefs of Staff in this sense was attached.

AIR MARSHALL GARROD said that since the paper had been written, the Air Ministry had directed that photo reconnaissance flights to complete the cover of PERSIA and SYRIA should be given a higher priority than similar flights in the Balkans. IX U.S. Air Force had also been directed by the United States authorities to photograph the Balkans, and it was hoped that, as

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* - Dispatched as N.F 1071 of 6 September 1945.

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inform the Italian Prime Minister that the Province of UDINE would, for military reasons, be retained under Allied Military Government but would be returned to ITALY when these reasons ceased to exist.

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MR. BROAD thought it was most undesirable to ask Russian permission for flights over BULGARIA as such permission would undoubtedly be refused.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN pointed out that, if permission for flights over the Bulgarian frontier were requested from the Russians, the implication would be that similar flights over the Yugoslav and other frontiers had already been made without permission.

GENERAL MCILRNEY mentioned that the U.S. position, in regard to the photographing of all Balkan territories by U.S. Air Forces, was that such flights would not be undertaken without permission from the states concerned.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER felt that the survey of the Yugoslav, Albanian and Turkish frontiers of GREECE should be completed as soon as possible without permission from those states being requested. He pointed out that the absence of photographic cover of the area of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier would only leave a small portion of the survey of GREECE not so covered. He felt that this might well be completed by ground survey methods.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Authorised Commander-in-Chief, R/AF MEDME, to make photographic reconnaissance flights in the area of the Yugoslav, Albanian and Turkish frontiers of GREECE, without requesting permission from those states.
- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to take up with the Director of Survey the feasibility of completing, by ground survey methods, the maps of the Bulgarian frontier region.

10. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS

3-1050/4 (Paper No. SAC (45) 17)

THE CONFERENCE had before them the record of a meeting held between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Soviet plenipotentiary delegate for repatriation on 29 August 1945.

MR. OFFIE, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's refusal to allow the Russian officers to screen Polos, recommended that a similar screening of the Greek soldiers to

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

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MR. OFFIE, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's refusal to allow the Russian officers to screen Poles, recommended that a similar request of the Czech Mission, to screen alleged Czech citizens among the members of 2 Polish Corps who had elected to return to RUSSIA, should similarly be refused. Liaison Section had recommended that this Czech request should be acceded to.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that he had addressed a note to the Chief of Staff on this matter, recommending that Czech Mission should not be allowed to screen Polish forces.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reiterated his policy that officers of Allied nations should not be allowed to screen personnel of nationalities other than their own. Allied officers should, however, be allowed access to concentrations of their own nationals and where any individuals of their own nationality were held in Camps containing other nationalities, such individuals should be brought outside the Camp for interview by their own officers.

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11. ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT OF POLISH TROOPS

MR. OFFIE, referred to a signal* which indicated that General Anders had information that a distributor of propaganda leaflets written in bad Polish had been caught in the ROLL area, and had admitted receiving instructions from the Italian Communist party. General Anders had further stated that another distributor had been found in the area of 2 Polish Corps who admitted to the same source of instructions. In view of the Russian allegations of improper conduct by Polish forces, Mr. Offie thought it might be advisable to release General Anders' story to the Press.

GENERAL MCNARNEY considered that the story should be released to the Press provided it was first fully investigated and found to be true.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to have the report from 2 Polish Corps thoroughly investigated and if confirmed to arrange for it to be given appropriate publicity.

12. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLIED TROOPS IN ITALY

(Signal MEDCOS 272 - MC OUT 831 of 4 September 45)

THE CONFERENCE took note of a signal which had been dispatched to the British and United States Chiefs of Staff estimating future requirements for Allied Forces in ITALY.

J. G. Sweetman

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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publicity.

12. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLIED TROOPS IN ITALY

(Signal MEDCOS 272 - MC OUT 851 of 4 September 45)

THE CONFERENCE took note of a signal which had been dispatched to the British and United States Chiefs of Staff estimating future requirements for Allied Forces in ITALY.

J. G. Sweetman

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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* - MISSPOL's signal G-33 of 5 September - MC IN 2528.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 5th Meeting
4th September 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 6th SEPTEMBER 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 4th Meeting - already circulated) ✓ ①
2. HANDOVER OF PROVINCES OF BOLZANO AND UDINE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(Signal No NAF 1069 to Combined Chiefs of Staff - MC OUT 37 ②
of 1 September 1945
Paper No SAC (45) 18 - already circulated) ✓ ⑤
3. PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY IN THE BALKANS
(Paper No SAC (45) 19 - to be circulated) - N/R
- TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-
4. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
(Paper No SAC (45) 17 - already circulated) ⑥
5. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLIED TROOPS IN ITALY
(Signal No MEDCOS 272 to British Chiefs of Staff - MC OUT 83 ⑦
of 4 September 1945)

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AC 1045
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HANDOVER OF PROVINCES OF BOLZANO AND UDINE TO ITALIAN

GOVERNMENT
(Signal No MAF 1069 to Combined Chiefs of Staff - LC OUT 37) (2)
of 1 September 1945 (3)
Paper No SAC (45) 18 - already circulated) ✓

PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY IN THE BALKANS - N/R
(Paper No SAC (45) 19 - to be circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE (6)
(Paper No SAC (45) 17 - already circulated) ✓

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLIED TROOPS IN ITALY (7)
(Signal No MEDCOS 272 to British Chiefs of Staff - MC OUT 83 of 4 September 1945)

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J.G. Sweetman
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY 175

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 4th Meeting
24 August 1945

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COPY NUMBER

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 23RD AUGUST 1945

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PRESENT:

- General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME
- Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
- Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
- Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
- Colonel C. G. Blakeney, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister
- Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

cc Dist - 27 August

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

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Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Rear Admiral Flery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel C. R. Tuff, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General A. D. Ward,
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Major General M. G. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MTOUSA

Major General M.W.M. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br)

Colonel P. McC. Smith, representing
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY :-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 9 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY
(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that the Chief Signal Officer was pursuing this matter with the Allied Commission. It appeared that it might be possible to use certain land lines jointly for both civilian and military traffic. A measure of approval for such a procedure had been received from the United States War Department and similar approval was being sought from the British War Office. It had not yet been possible, however, to settle details of the financial arrangements which joint use would involve. Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorized a relaxation of the previous security regulations, so as to allow ship owners in ITALY and GREECE to forward messages regarding shipping movements through normal commercial channels.

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 9 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

x - 6754/4 (Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 2)

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

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3. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

x - 125/4 (Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that in order to provide the basis for the ten internal security brigades, the formation of which was to be the first step in the reorganization of the Italian Army, six Italian Guard Battalions would be turned over to Italian government control by 25 August. By 20 September this number would be increased to eleven battalions. It was considered that no further releases of Guard battalions would then be possible unless they were replaced by Allied troops or unless guard commitments were reduced. This aspect was under further examination.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

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4. JUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENEZIA GIULIA

X-9014 (Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that as a result of the discussion at the previous meeting the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, had held at AFHQ a conference attended by representatives of the Allied Commission. In consequence, it had been decided to amend the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 8 in two respects. The first was to lay down as an AFHQ directive that salt and tobacco were to be considered disease and unrest items and so were not to be released to the Jugoslavs. It had previously been intended to leave the decision on this matter to 13 Corps. In the second place the directive now stipulated specifically that items of Italian government ownership might only be released to the Jugoslavs if there was evidence that effective control of such items had been assumed by the Germans or by the Fascist Republican authorities. As so amended the directive had now been despatched* to 13 Corps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMLEN said that on a recent visit to VENEZIA GIULIA he had discovered that the war booty, claimed by the Jugoslavs, had in fact been in the possession of their civilian agents throughout the negotiations. Now that it had been decided that certain of these items could not be released to JUGOSLAVIA, 13 Corps might require some further direction as to the use of force in order to seize these items.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in noting the above reports, directed:

that the measures necessary to appropriate to Allied Military Government uses items such as salt and tobacco, which were held within the Allied occupied area and were not now to be released to JUGOSLAVIA, could properly be left to Commander, 13 Corps.

5. FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

(Paper No. SAC (45) 13)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that since Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, had been dissolved, it was necessary to have an arrangement whereby Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEIME, and the Commanding General, AAF/MTO, should act together, in committee, on air matters of common Allied interest, and attaching a draft charter for such a committee.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the object of the proposed committee was to bind the Commanding General, AAF/MTO and himself together so that they could offer joint advice to the Supreme Allied Commander on Allied air matters and also to provide one authority with which the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, could deal. In reply to a query by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, he said that the Allied Liaison Section, which the paper proposed should act as Secretariat to the Committee, was an RAF staff section under his

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE, with the agreement of the Deputy U.S. Political Adviser, suggested that it would be advisable for the Committee to have an Allied Secretariat and asked whether the secretarial facilities could not be provided by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

COLONEL BASTION said that the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat could assume certain duties for routing papers to and from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee but could not provide complete secretarial facilities for that Committee, as these would be of a somewhat technical nature and would, therefore, require the attention of Air Force officers.

*AG 386.3/223 GEG-0 dated 19 August 1945

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the draft charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 13, subject to its amendment in order to :-

- (a) provide that Committee with an Allied Secretariat;
- (b) set out the relationship between that Secretariat and the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

6. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION

X-5503/c (Paper No. SAC (45) 14)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a revised draft directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission had previously been responsible in certain respects to the Mediterranean Allied Air Commander-in-Chief and now that this appointment was terminated it was proposed that the Sub-Commission should be responsible to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZJR disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three service sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analogous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General

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AIR MARSHAL GARROD, referring to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander's last remark, said the difficulty was that nobody knew what size or type of air force would be permitted to Italy by the Peace Treaty. There were indications that the present Italian Air Force was larger than the limit which was likely to be finally imposed. Consequently, the handover of the Italian Air Force to the Italian government might give rise to difficulties at a later stage. However, the Italian Air Ministry was assuming increasing administrative control. Referring to the portions of the draft directive dealing with

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the channels of responsibility of the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, he said it ought to be made clearer that, while on service matters the sub-commission would deal with Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, on other broader matters it was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to redraft, in the light of the above discussion, the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 14 and, after obtaining the necessary Air Force concurrences, to submit the revised draft to him for his approval.

7. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION

X-58057 (Paper No. SAC(45) 15)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper concluding that a policy for Italian civil aviation could not be laid down until further guidance was received, and attaching a draft signal designed to obtain such guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. MARSHAL GARROD said that, as the matter was so tied up with the terms of the prospective Italian Peace Treaty, it was not possible to go further without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He agreed with the questions proposed by the draft signal but thought it desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should make recommendations in regard to them. He considered these recommendations should be, firstly, that Italian civil aviation should be permitted but should not be allowed to operate in VENEZIA GIULIA or other disputed territories, secondly, that the Italian government should be allowed to own and control the Italian civil air lines, and thirdly, that the Italian aviation industry should not be revived. He explained that the small Italian Air Force, which the Peace Treaty was likely to permit, and the requirements of Italian civil aviation were most unlikely to be large enough to give a sufficient market for an Italian aircraft industry to be an economic proposition. Consequently, if such an industry were revived, there would always be a danger of the Italians in order to gain further markets, seeking either to obviate the military terms of the Peace Treaty or to spread their civil aviation further afield. However, he agreed that for economic reasons the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, on anything other than a very small scale, was not a practical proposition for some years.

MR. OFFIE considered, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed, that it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander at the present stage to make a definite recommendation that an Italian aviation industry should not be allowed. He thought, however, that the general subject

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MR. OFFICE considered, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed, that it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander at the present stage to make a definite recommendation that an Italian aviation industry should not be allowed. He thought, however, that the general subject of civil aviation should be raised as it was possible that the British and United States governments would shortly wish to discuss with the Italian government problems affecting British and United States civil aviation.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that if development of civil aviation was allowed it did provide a nucleus for war expansion. GERMANY had already taught us that lesson once. He therefore considered that it should be stipulated that no Italian aircraft industry would be permitted for the present. This provision could, if necessary, be relaxed later. However, if the stipulation were not made now, it would be difficult to impose it later.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER considered that the statement that the present directive to the Allied Commission prohibited discussion of civil aviation with the Italians should be deleted from the draft signal. He had been unable to trace any such direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he believed that this decision was taken by the Supreme Allied Commander and could be reversed by him if he so wished.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with Air Marshal Garrod that it was desirable to comment, in so far as military implications were concerned, on the questions being put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From the military point of view, he considered that State ownership of Italian civil aviation would simplify Allied control. He also thought that, in regard to the possibility of permitting the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, the question should be posed as to whether that industry should be State owned and controlled, or privately owned as at present.

REAR ADMIRAL L. STONE, referring to the statement in the draft signal that if an Italian civil aviation industry were permitted it would be difficult to exercise technical control of design, observed that this appeared contradictory to the recommendation that no attempt should be made to impose an Allied control on Italian research. This recommendation had been agreed at a previous meeting and the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the British draft of the Italian Peace Treaty had been forwarded on that basis.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F. MEDWAY, and the Commanding General, A.F./MTO, to redraft in the light of the above discussion, the signal circulated under paper No. S.A.C (45) 15, and subsequently to despatch it.

8. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

X-201/c (Paper No. S.A.C (45) 11)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper, circulating the comments which the Supreme Allied Commander had made on the draft Peace Treaty with ITALY, as prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reported that when in LONDON he had obtained some information from the Foreign Office with regard to the status of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been set up by the POSTSDAM Conference, had placed the question of the Italian Peace Treaty at the top of its agenda. The Foreign Office understood that the Treaty would include a settlement of both the Northeast and Northwest Italian frontier questions, would cover the future of the former Italian colonies and would impose appropriate limitations on the Italian armed forces. The Foreign Office were anxious to have the Supreme Allied Commander's views, especially with regard to a permanent settlement in the Northeast, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was already examining this matter. It was hoped that the Council

RAF/MCO, to redraft in the light of the above discussion, the signal circulated under paper No. SiC (45) 15, and subsequently to despatch it.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMLEN reported that he had received a personal signal from Brigadier General Spofford asking for certain information about Italian industry and indicating that the United States War Department were now actively interested in the question of the Peace Treaty.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

9. REPRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

(Paper No. SiC (45) 12)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a record of a meeting held between the

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Supreme Allied Commander and Major General Basilov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate in regard to repatriation.

REAR ADMIRAL L. STONE said that certain persons, whom the Russians claimed to be Soviet citizens, were accommodated in displaced persons camps under Allied Commission control and also in camps operated by UNRRA. He had received directions in regard to the disposal of some of these persons to British prisoner of war camps. His AC was an integrated Anglo-American undertaking, his problem was an Allied one and these persons must be considered under Allied rather than British or American control. The divergence between the British and United States positions was therefore giving him some embarrassment. Further, in view of the Y.L.T.A. Agreement, he questioned the desirability of sending displaced persons to prisoner of war camps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN explained that the prisoner of war camps to which these displaced persons had been sent, were camps for liberated Allied prisoners of war and not camps for captured enemy prisoners of war. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, need not therefore be disturbed by the thought that these Soviet citizens were being treated as enemy prisoners of war.

BRIGADIER GENERAL TIERIE said that the terms of the agreements signed at Y.L.T.A. stipulated that civilian Soviet citizens would be treated in precisely the same way as Soviet military personnel, who had been made prisoners by the enemy and liberated by the United States or British forces.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that there was now no divergence of opinion between the British and United States governments in regard to the interpretation of the Y.L.T.A. Agreements except in so far as the use of force, to effect the repatriation of unwilling persons, was concerned. In this respect, Field Marshal Alexander's position was that he would not forcibly return to RUSSIA or elsewhere people who did not wish to go.

THE DEPUTY SUPRIME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that the major difficulty in regard to the Y.L.T.A. Agreement was the determination of what constituted a Soviet citizen. In regard to the use of force to effect repatriation, while he personally had a directive from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to personnel in purely United States custody (and which directive differed from that issued to Field Marshal Alexander in his British capacity), he considered it most desirable that, as certain persons were held as an Allied responsibility the question should be posed on an Allied basis to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPRIME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (AFOUS.), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to examine

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (AFUSA), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to examine the Allied commitments in the Theatre for prisoners of war and displaced persons, with particular regard to the desirability of the use of force to effect repatriation, and as a result of this examination to draft for his approval:

- (a) A signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting that an Allied policy directive be given to the Supreme Allied Commander on this matter.
- (b) Instructions to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and any other agencies concerned, as to how persons considered to be an Allied commitment should be handled pending receipt of the instructions to be requested from the Combined Chiefs of Staff under (a) above.

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10. USE OF NORTHWEST ITALIAN PORTS FOR TRAFFIC TO SWITZERLAND

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the Admiralty had requested his views in regard to the use of the ports of GENOA and SAVONA by Spanish ships engaged in the transportation of goods to SWITZERLAND. SAVONA was already under Italian control and GENOA would be on 1 September. While the capacity of those ports was considerable the ability of the inland communications (especially the railways) to clear them was limited. In consequence, the situation might arise later in which the Italians would complain that supplies for Northwestern ITALY were being interfered with by the transit of this traffic to SWITZERLAND. He had replied to the Admiralty that from a naval point of view he had no objection provided Spanish ships concerned would accept his routing instructions.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to investigate this matter further.

11. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL

MR. BROAD said he was informed that the Greek Government, considering that they were about to have serious economic difficulties in regard to the supply of oils and fats, had requested assistance from the British and United States Ambassadors, who in turn had referred this request to their governments. The Deputy Resident Minister had further had a signal from the British Ambassador to GREECE enquiring whether, pending such assistance on governmental level, AFHQ could make a loan to GREECE of 2,000 tons of olive oil from ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN said that he had received a copy of some of the signals to which the Deputy Resident Minister had referred and a preliminary examination had been made. This indicated that any major assistance from ITALY was out of the question. It was believed that this year only some 52,000 tons of olive oil had been amassed in the whole of ITALY as against 45,000 tons last year in that part of the country which was then under Allied control. Furthermore, he had information which indicated that the Greeks had not amassed some of last year's crop of olive oil in the AEGEAN Islands and that vigorous measures in these areas would produce results. A similar request for loans had been received in respect of both the US and British zones in AUSTRIA. He felt that the Greek government had not realized that there was a world-wide shortage of oils and fats. He had also noted the Supreme Allied Commander's signal sent from GREECE indicating that failing ITALY an attempt should be made to get supplies from NORTH AFRICA or MIDDLE EAST. He was not hopeful of this but he wished to explore certain aspects of the matter further.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

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Instructed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to investigate the matter further and, in due course, to submit appropriate recommendations in regard to the Greek government's request.

J.G. Sweetman

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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SAC (45) 4th Meeting
21st August 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 23RD AUGUST 1945

A G E N D A

FLAG No

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting - already circulated) - ①
- 2. FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 13 - to be circulated) - ②
- 3. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 14 - to be circulated) - ③
- 4. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 15 - to be circulated) - ④

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

- 5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 11 - already circulated) - ⑤
- 6. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 12 - already circulated) - N/R

J.G. Sweetman

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY

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(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting - already circulated) -
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(Paper No. SAC (45) 13 - to be circulated) -
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- ④ 4. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 15 - to be circulated) -
- ⑤ 5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 11 - already circulated) -
- 6. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 12 - already circulated) - N/R

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

J.G. Sweetman
 J.G. SWEETMAN,
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
 SECRETARY.

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SAC (45) 3rd Meeting
9th August 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 9TH AUGUST 1945

PRESENT :-

- Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- Rear Admiral H. A. Facker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
- Air Vice Marshal G. B. ... Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, R.F. MedMe
- Brigadier General J. ... Mollison,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater
- Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
- Major General ... C. Duff
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Mr. C. Coffie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Rear Admiral H. A. Facker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, North West African Waters

Air Vice Marshal G. B. ... Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F. Middle

Brigadier General J. ... Mollison,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. C. Duff
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Coffie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery A. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that as a result of termination of hostilities, military traffic was almost completely administrative and not operational. He therefore felt that the military services no longer require all of the exclusive, direct circuits assigned to them and that if military traffic loads were combined, many additional circuits could be returned to the Italian Government for civilian use.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES :-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 2nd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 4 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER FACILITIES TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that, in accordance with the direction given him at SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 3, enquiries had been made into the possibility of reducing or removing present censorship restrictions on civil communications. However, as these restrictions had been prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was necessary to obtain their approval to any alterations. A signal had therefore been despatched* to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting authority for ship-owners and agents in ITALY and GREECE to forward messages through normal commercial telegraphic channels. With regard to the release for civilian use of certain communication lines now reserved for military traffic, he stated that this question was most complex but that investigations were progressing. Only 65 per cent of the pre-war communications facilities of ITALY were now in operating condition and only 15 per cent of these were available for civilian use. Military requirements had not decreased since the cessation of hostilities, due to the widespread deployment of our forces throughout the country. The release of further circuits could therefore only be effected if poorer facilities for military communications were accepted. He considered that the Italian Government after examining the matter should put in a demand for the additional circuits required for the shipping commitment. The Chief Signal

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 2nd Meeting)

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that as a result of the termination of hostilities the secrecy of the military traffic was not as important as previously. It might therefore be possible for the military to share certain circuits with civilian users.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMITZER added that the Commanding General, MTOUSA, had directed all United States units to examine urgently the feasibility of releasing to the Italians accommodation and material now requisitioned for military use.

MAJOR GENERAL UPF reported that a similar directive to British forces had been drafted and would be issued in the near future.

* MAT 671 (HC OUT 2010) dated 7 August 1945.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Reiterated his policy that accommodation, land lines and similar facilities in ITALY should be released to civil purposes as soon as military requirements permitted.

3. MALGAMATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 6)

REAR ADMIRAL PACKER reported that further examination had shown that 60 per cent of the officers and 50 per cent of the ratings of the Royal Yugoslav Navy complement at TRAPUNTO had now elected not to return to JUGOSLAVIA. Similarly, 70 per cent of the officers and 60 per cent of the ratings at MILTA had likewise declined to return; no figures were available for the personnel stationed at ALEXANDRIA. All members of the Royal Yugoslav Navy who elected not to return to JUGOSLAVIA would eventually become displaced persons under Allied control. However it had been agreed that at the end of a few weeks these persons would again be given an opportunity to elect to return to their country.

Mr. OFFIE reported that a communication had been received through French diplomatic channels enquiring as to how many Yugoslav displaced persons now in ITALY might be available for employment in agricultural and other work in FRANCE.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD reported that arrangements had progressed favourably for turning over to the Yugoslav Navy the eight American-built boats supplied on Lend-Lease arrangements. These craft would remain under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

4. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

x - 8253/6 (Previous reference SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LEUNITZER reported that instructions had been sent to MILA directing them to proceed with the reorganisation of the Italian Armed Forces within the present ceilings, pending final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of the policy recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander.

French diplomatic channels enquiring as to how many Yugoslav displaced persons now in ITALY might be available for employment in agricultural and other work in FRANCE.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

4. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (45) 9)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a revised draft letter to the British Chiefs of Staff setting forth the comments of Field Marshal Alexander in regard to the paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which attached draft Naval, Military and Air clauses of the Peace Treaty with ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had examined the draft letter in detail, and he was in general agreement with it. Some minor revisions would be necessitated by the recent Russian declaration of war on J.P.N. In reply to a remark by the Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, concerning the necessity of increasing the Italian Armed Forces should ITALY be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, he observed that his

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comments were based on the assumption that all overseas possessions would be taken from ITALY as indicated in the paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. He did not feel called upon to express any opinion as to whether these overseas territories should be removed or not.

MR. BROAD and MR. OFFICE expressed agreement with the draft reply.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that he was generally in agreement with the draft letter, but suggested certain minor amendments.

GENERAL MCWARTNEY considered that the paragraph in the draft Treaty prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, which referred to Italian provision of supplies for Allied Armies in AUSTRIA and GERMANY should be deleted. In its present form, this paragraph would permit the Russians to requisition quantities of supplies from ITALY for the provision of their forces in AUSTRIA and GERMANY. Since ITALY was not self sufficient for supplies and a large part of her needs were being supplied in American imports, he could not agree to any clause which would cause the misuse of these materials of American origin.

REAR ADMIRAL PICKER after making a number of minor comments stated that his Commander-in-Chief could not agree with the Naval clauses of the Treaty as drafted by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. It was stated that the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Navy would remain until 1950 or for a lesser period. In the view of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, this period was too short.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER repeated his opinion, as stated at the previous conference, that no specific time limit should be stated. He considered the lifting of these restrictions should be dependent on a change of circumstances rather than mere passage of time.

GENERAL MCWARTNEY believed that the inclusion of a stated time-limit would make the Peace Treaty more acceptable to the Italian government. He considered, moreover, that it would prevent continuous overtures in an endeavour to bring about cancellation or reduction of the severity of the clauses from time to time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff:

To revise, in the light of the above discussion, the draft letter and attached appendix circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 9, and to submit the amended draft for his approval.

6. JUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(Paper No. SAC (45) 8)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the despatch of an attached draft directive to Headquarters, XIII Corps authorising the release to the Jugoslavs, under the terms of the MORGAN-JOVANOVIC agreement, of certain items of war booty which were captured by their forces and which were **2161**

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff:

To revise, in the light of the above discussion, the draft letter and attached appendix circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 9, and to submit the amended draft for his approval.

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MAJOR GENERAL LEHITZER stated that, in accordance with the terms of the MORGAN-JOVANOVIC Agreement, the Jugoslavs were entitled to remove certain items of war booty from the Anglo-American occupied area of VENEZIA GIULLA, subject to the provisions of International Law. Accordingly, recommendations as to what items should be released had been made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The latter had approved the majority of the proposals, but had queried whether we were entitled to forbid the release of items essential to the maintenance of law and order, items which would necessitate replacement in kind by the allies, and enemy-owned lire accounts. A decision on these items was awaited.

MAJOR GENERAL P.CKER considered that the reference to commercial ships in the draft directive to XIII Corps should be deleted. The Jugoslavs had not as yet demanded the return of any commercial shipping, and it was undesirable to make any reference which might suggest that they had a right to do so. In reply to a remark by Brigadier General Hamblen, he stated that various harbour and small craft were being released to them, but no large sized ships had so far been claimed.

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE agreed that the proposed directive was sound on the basis of the instructions received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he expressed the view that various items which it was proposed to release to the Yugoslavs, such as salt and tobacco, should be considered as items essential to the prevention of disease and unrest. In addition, he stated that until recently he had not been informed of the text of the recommendations made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Neither he, nor his political advisers, were in agreement with its proposals. It was his contention, in which he was supported by his legal advisor, that property of the Italian Government could not be properly considered as Yugoslav War Booty, as since the Armistice of 1943, JUGOSL.VI. had not been at war with ITALY. Accordingly, he had written a letter to the Chief of Staff, setting out the reasons for his disagreement, and he was of the opinion that in the light of that letter, the Supreme Allied Commander might consider the alteration of certain of his recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. OFFICE stated that he had previously expressed his non-concurrence to the AFHQ proposals for the disposition of War Booty. It was his opinion that a more complete statement should be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whom he did not believe had been fully aware of the political implications of their decision. He considered that, in the meanwhile, the release of items to the Yugoslavs should not proceed.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HANBLIN, referring to the disagreement expressed by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the United States Army Political Advisor, stated that those views had been fully expressed at AFHQ before recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been despatched. These views, and the reasons for which they had been over-ruled, were summarised in the paper by the Secretary which was before the Conference. In the absence of the Supreme Allied Commander the subject had been discussed at great length between the Chief of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer. He (Brigadier General Hanblin) was of the opinion, that even though the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission had not been present for those discussions, the view held by him had been put forward fully before the decision was taken. In fact the advice of the legal advisers at AFHQ was contrary to that of the legal advisor to the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

That action in regard to the release of War Booty to the Yugoslavs be suspended until he had given the matter further consideration.

7. PROCESSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
(Paper No. S.C (45) 10)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the dispatch of an attached draft signal to British and United States Forces.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMBLEN, referring to the disagreement expressed by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the United States Deputy Political Adviser, stated that these views had been fully expressed at AFHQ before recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been despatched. These views, and the reasons for which they had been over-ruled, were summarised in the paper by the Secretary which was before the Conference. In the absence of the Supreme Allied Commander the subject had been discussed at great length between the Chief of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer. He (Brigadier General Hamblen) was of the opinion, that even though the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission had not been present for those discussions, the view held by him had been put forward fully before the decision was taken. In fact the advice of the legal advisers at AFHQ was contrary to that of the legal advisor to the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

That action in regard to the release of War booty to the Yugoslavs be suspended until he had given the matter further consideration.

7. PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 10)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the dispatch of an attached draft signal to British and United States Headquarters in GERMANY setting forth the views of this Headquarters and its subordinate commands in regard to the establishment of an Anglo-American Association which had been proposed by SHLEF. 5180

MAJOR GENERAL L. LEWITZER stated that a conference had recently been held at Headquarters, Fifth Army, at which representatives of all three services and the principal subordinate commands of the Theatre had been invited to express their views in regard to the organization of the proposed Association. He was in general agreement with the proposals, although he considered that the Association should provide for an exchange of scholarships between the United States and Great Britain similar to the Rhodes Scholarships. At the present stage however, the number of scholarships could not be determined, since this would depend largely on the funds available in future. Referring to paragraph 3b of the draft signal, he stated that if such an Association were to confine its future membership to the personnel of the Armed Forces, it might be accused of having political intentions.

GENERAL MCMAHONEY agreed with the Deputy Chief of Staff.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, noting the general approval of the meeting in regard to scholarships, expressed the view that the necessary money might be obtained from wealthy philanthropists of Great Britain and the United States.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF stated that, although he had not been present at the conference at Headquarters, Fifth Army, he had been informed that the provision of exchange of scholarships between the two countries had been suggested at that meeting. He therefore requested an opportunity to investigate the reasons for failing to include the suggestion in the draft signal.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer:

- (a) to investigate the reasons for omitting from the draft signal, the suggestion made by the Deputy Chief of Staff at (X) above, and
- (b) to revise the draft signal in the light of the above discussion and of his findings at (a) above, and submit the revised draft to him for approval.

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A. G. Stevenson

J. G. STEVENSON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

(b) to revise the draft signal in the light of the above discussion and of his findings at (a) above, and submit the revised draft to him for approval.

A. G. Johnston
J. G. STEPHEN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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SAC (45) 3rd Meeting
7th August 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE THIRD MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 9TH AUGUST
1945

Page no

A G E N D A

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 2nd Meeting - already circulated) ①
- 2. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
((a) British Chiefs of Staff Paper No. PHP (45) 2 (Final) - already
circulated on limited distribution as Appendix B to JFS Study
No. P/309 (Final); ②
- (b) Paper No. S.C (45) 9 - already circulated) ③
- 3. JUGOSLAV W.R BOCTY IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(Paper No. SAC (45) 8 - already circulated) ④
- 4. PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
((a) USFET Signal S-97287 (MC IN 8628 of 13 July 1945); N/R
- (b) Paper No. S.C (45) 10 - to be circulated)

J.G. Sweetman
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

- 2. (a) British Chiefs of Staff Paper No. PHP (45) 2 (Final) - already circulated on limited distribution as Appendix B to JPS Study No. P/309 (Final);
- (b) Paper No. S.C (45) 9 - already circulated)
- 3. JUGOSLAV W.R BOOBY IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(Paper No. S.C (45) 8 - already circulated)
- 4. PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
(a) USFET Signal S-97287 (MC IN 8628 of 13 July 1945);
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N/R

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SAC (45) 2nd Meeting
4th August 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 2ND AUGUST 1945

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral V. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAE

Major General J.M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lyman L. Lennitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

The Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral V. Glasford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Carrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDIE

Major General J.M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

The Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General L. Browning,
Director, Military Mission Italian Army

Brigadier General J.A. Mollison,
Commanding General Designate, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theatre

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

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Brigadier M.S. Lush,
Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(S.C 45 1st Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 26th July 1945.

2. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURE OF AFHQ

(Previous reference S.C 45 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEHNITZER reported that the Chief of Staff had taken with him to ENGLAND, for the consideration of the War Office, a proposal for the War Establishment of a British Headquarters parallel to MTOUSA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

(Previous reference S.C 45 1st Meeting, Minute 5)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that a second meeting had been held between representatives of the Naval and Army Staffs and the Merchant Shipping authorities for the purpose of further examining the provision of civil signal facilities after the withdrawal of the Naval Port Parties. There were two

(SAC 45 1st Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 26th July 1945.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to examine:

- (a) the possibility of reducing or removing present censorship restrictions on the use of civil land lines.
- (b) the feasibility of releasing for civilian use, certain lines now reserved for military traffic and to report accordingly.

4. AMALGAMATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 6)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that slightly more than 50% of the

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at TARANTO
non-commissioned personnel of the Royal Yugoslav Navy/had elected to return to JUGOSLAVIA and to become members of the amalgamated Yugoslav Navy. He had no report of the number of officers who had so elected. Generally speaking, the arrangements for the amalgamation were proceeding satisfactorily.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGNOR NENNI

(Previous reference S.A.C. 45 1st Meeting, Minute 8)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that, in accordance with the directions given at the last conference, he had called on the Italian Prime Minister, and informed him that Signor Nenni's recent speech in MILAN was a violation of his oath as an Italian Minister, and such conduct was not likely to induce confidence in the Italian Government on the part of the United States and British Governments. The Prime Minister had readily agreed and had undertaken to express this view to Signor Nenni. The Chief Commissioner added that he had taken the opportunity at the same time of expressing similar concern regarding an unconfirmed report of a speech along the same lines made by Signor Togliatti, the Minister of Justice.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

6. ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference S.A.C. 45 1st Meeting, Minute 9)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMBITZER reported that the approved reply to the letter from the Italian Foreign Minister, in which the latter had made certain claims regarding the Italian population of coastal areas of ISTRIA, had recently been despatched by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander stated that the welfare of the Italian population of the Yugoslav occupied area of VENEZIA GIULIA was causing anxiety to the Italian Government. Signor Parri had informed him that it was the Italian intention to request that the International Red Cross be allowed to investigate reports of atrocities committed in the area. It was Admiral Stone's view that the Allied military authorities should endorse such a request if it were formally made.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) stated that it was his policy that military negotiations with the Yugoslavs in regard to VENEZIA GIULIA should not be reopened and that any queries in regard to the situation in the Yugoslav occupied area should be raised through diplomatic channels.

(b) directed that the Italian request for facilities to be allowed to the International Red Cross should, if forwarded formally, be endorsed on his behalf.

7. REORGANISATION OF RAF COMMAND IN ITALY

(Previous reference S.C 45 1st Meeting, Minute 11)

AIR MARSHAL GARROD reported that he had agreed with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, that the headquarters formerly known as the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force should be called Mediterranean Coastal Air Force for the present. The name of the Air Headquarters remaining in ITALY would be

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reexamined when the time came for Headquarters R.A.F. MEDAE to move to CAIRO.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the above arrangements.

8. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
(J/S Study No. P/306 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the requirements for Italian armed forces in the interim period until the peace conference, and recommending that the Italian army should be organized as a force of 140,000 men plus 65,000 Carabinieri, that the present arrangements in respect of the Italian Navy should not be changed and that a separate investigation should be carried out in regard to the Italian Air Force. The paper further attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting approval of this policy.

MR. KIRK expressed the view that everything possible should be done to develop the Italian Army, as the future preservation of law and order would depend largely on the development of that force. In relation to this, the development of the Carabinieri was less important, as the Italian people had greater respect for the Army than the Carabinieri.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the current policy that the province of Bolzano should remain under Allied Military Government indefinitely, stated that after careful consideration, he had now recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the return of this province to the Italian Government on September 30th. He requested therefore that the draft signal now under discussion should be worded so as to avoid prejudicing this decision. He also thought that the statement in the draft signal, to the effect that the Carabinieri were corrupt and inefficient, was too strong. With regard to the size of the interim Italian Army, Signor PARRI had informed him that it was the intention of the Italian Government to request an increase of 20,000, making a total of 160,000. He had suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that he discuss this matter with the Ministry of War, after which, if it were still believed desirable the Government could make a definite recommendation to the Allied authorities.

GENERAL McMERNEY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should include a

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GENERAL McNEVEY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should include a recommendation regarding the need for a strong Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army. **2154**

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed concern regarding the maintenance of supply for the civil population of ITALY. The future arrangements for the provision of such supplies had not yet been agreed and any cessation would add most gravely to the difficulty of maintaining law and order. He agreed with Admiral STONE's remark concerning the Carabinieri. He also agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in regard to the importance of the task of MIA. The main difficulty with the Italian Army was not its rank and file, but the quality of its officers. This could only be improved by the organization of good officer schools, efficient training, and the elimination of unsatisfactory officers. He considered that the JPS proposals for the size and organization of the Italian Army were sound. It was important to restrict the force to a size which could be made efficient. Any suggestion by the Italian Government for an increase in the size of the Army was therefore unlikely to meet with his approval.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD considered that the paragraphs of the signal pertaining to the size and composition of the Italian Air Force should be revised to state that the existing ceiling of 34,000 should be maintained.

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In reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander he stated that the Italian Air Force was at present providing useful internal air communications and also providing manpower for service duties.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported that a separate meeting was being held that afternoon to determine administrative responsibilities in regard to the Italian Army and that separate recommendations would be submitted on this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated under JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) in accordance with the above discussion, and to submit the revised draft to him for his approval*.

(b) Directed that Commanding General, AAF/LTO and AOC-in-C RAF Middle should :

- (1) Cause a further investigation to be made regarding the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to retain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty
- (2) in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, examine what responsibilities in regard to the administration of the Italian Air Force can legitimately be transferred to the Italian Government

and report accordingly.

9. ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

X-1207/1 (JPS Study P/309 (Final)) 3/14

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which attached draft Naval, Military and Air clauses of the Peace Treaty with ITALY (on which Field Marshal Alexander had been requested to comment in his capacity as British Commander-in-Chief) together with a study by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff putting forward recommendations in regard to these comments.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER pointed out that while the Supreme Allied Commander had been asked to comment on the whole report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, only the draft clauses of the actual Peace Treaty which had been forwarded for detailed comment were the Naval,

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the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to retain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty

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MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER pointed out that while the Supreme Allied Commander had been asked to comment on the whole report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, only the draft clauses of the actual Peace Treaty which had been forwarded for detailed comment were the Naval, Military and Air clauses. These could only be read in the light of the political background set out in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, but the draft political clauses of the Peace Treaty had not been forwarded for comment.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the political and military clauses were inter-linked. Comment on the latter could only be made on the assumption that the political clauses would include the removal of all Italian overseas possessions as indicated in the political background given in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. Any retention of such overseas territories would have a major effect on the Italian requirements for Naval, Military and Air Forces. He did not agree with the contention of the Joint Planning Staff that there was difficulty in reconciling the objective of establishing ITALY as a useful and prosperous European state not under Soviet influence with the objective of compelling ITALY to give up all pretence to be a great power and proving to her that aggression did not pay.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD suggested that the Supreme Allied Commander's

* - Dispatched as N.F. 1051 (MC OUT 604) of 3 August 1946

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reply should make it clear that his detailed comments were entirely based on the assumption at para 4 of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff paper.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, while agreeing that detailed comments must be based on this political background, said that he would like to make certain political comments in general terms. He considered that the size of the Italian armed Forces should be governed by three major considerations. The first was that, for ITALY's own sake, they must be limited to a size which the country could maintain in an efficient state. They must, therefore, in any event, be small. Secondly, they must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend the country against her neighbours, particularly JUGOSLAVIA. Thirdly, they must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking those neighbors or threatening the interests of the principal allied powers.

GENERAL MCMAURNEY considered that the wording of the clauses which gave rights equal to the principal allied powers (U. K., US., U.S.S.R., FRANCE) was most unfortunate as at present drafted. The Russians had already showed a habit of interpreting treaties to suit their own ends, and the present draft could be read to allow them to station troops in ITALY and to demand all types of military facilities there, subject in certain respects to a nominal declaration of war against J.P.M. This was a most dangerous situation wholly at variance with the political object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that he completely disagreed with the recommendation of the Joint Planning Staff that the limitations of military installations in SARDINIA and SICILY should be reviewed in 1950. The implication of such a clause would be that they would be removed after that date. Installations in these islands would always threaten British imperial communications at a vital point, and he felt strongly that the LONDON draft, whereby these limitations would be permanent, should not be altered. In regard to the Italian Navy, he pointed out that it was the only one of the three Italian armed services which had maintained a good esprit-de-corps. It was therefore important that, while the Navy must be reduced, this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian prestige unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships to RUSSIA would, for example, have a most unfortunate effect. He believed, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed that thinking people in ITALY realised that the financial strain involved would in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. Finally, he thought that the timing of the signature of the proposed treaty required careful consideration. It would appear much less harsh to the Italians if the terms became known after the considerably more severe terms, which were expected to be imposed on GERMANY, had been published.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that if it was necessary to have places such as SICILY and SARDINIA demilitarised, then permanent demilitarisation must be effected. However, he agreed with the Joint Planning Staff that there was a danger that if the terms imposed were too harsh, ITALY would become a Balkanist

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that if it was necessary to have places such as SICILY and SARDINIA demilitarised, then permanent demilitarisation must be effected. However, he agreed with the Joint Planning Staff that there was a danger that if the terms imposed were too harsh, ITALY would become a "Balkanist" rather than a Western European country. He considered that in the long run this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the danger of ITALY being slightly too strong and be able to threaten communications through the Mediterranean.

MR. KIRK thought that the draft clauses were unfortunate in that they tended to put into a permanent Peace Treaty with ITALY, arrangements which were only required for the interim period while Allied forces were stationed in the country and up to the conclusion of the Japanese war. He doubted whether any final Peace Treaty with ITALY was in fact, urgently required. What was necessary was a gradual relaxation of Allied control and for that purpose an interim "modus vivendi" was urgently needed.

MR. BROAD, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander as to from what source was pressure being applied to conclude a Peace Treaty with ITALY in the near future, said that he understood that it was the desire of the UNITED STATES State Department that such a treaty should be concluded at an early date. He believed the British Foreign Office

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were also coming round to this view. He remarked however, that decisions taken at POTSDAM would probably affect the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Deferred action in regard to commenting on the British Chiefs of Staff's proposal for the Peace Treaty with ITALY until he had considered the matter further.

FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Previous reference Paper No. S.C (45) 7)

10.
X-1001/cc

THE CONFERENCE took note of a letter, which had been dispatched over the signature of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff, forwarding to them copies of a memorandum by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission in regard to future policy towards ITALY.

J.G. Sweetman
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, G.S.
SECRETARY.

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Ch. Commissioner, Allied Commission
(31(31-33))

AP 575

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Chief Clerk

S.C (45) 2nd Meeting
31 July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE SECOND MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 2 AUGUST 1945

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(S.C (45) 1st Meeting - already circulated)
- 2. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
(JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) - to be circulated)
- 3. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/309 (Final) - to be circulated)
- TO TAKE NOTE ONLY: *Not with EC.*
- 4. FUTURE POLICY FORMED ITALY
(Paper No. S.C (45) 7 - already circulated)

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J. G. Sturgeson
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

1002

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(S.C. (45) 1st Meeting - already circulated)
- 2. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ILLINOIS ARMED FORCES
(JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) - to be circulated)
- 3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY WITH ILLINOIS
(JPS Study No. P/309 (Final) - to be circulated)

TO P. 2. NOTE ONLY: NOT WITH EC.

- 4. FUTURE POLICY FOR ILLINOIS
(Paper No. S.C. (45) 7 - already circulated)

J. G. STEWART,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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- 33. POLITICAL ADVISERS

(3)

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (45) 1st Meeting
26th July 1945

Copy No. 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE, HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 26TH JULY 1945

PRESENT:-

- General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Captain A.V.S. Pickhardt, representing
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
- Air Vice Marshal G.B.A. Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME
- Major General J. M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
- Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
- Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
- Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
- The Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Brund, representing

1002-1/0
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Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Captain A.V.S. Pickhardt, representing
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal G.B.A. Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

Major General J. M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General Lyman L. Lennitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

The Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G. S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier T. R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General A. C. Duff,
TCG, AFHQ.

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EC List - 28 July 45

31 CHIEF COMMISSIONERS

32 EXEC COMMISSIONERS

33 POLITICAL ADVISERS

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28 JUL 1945

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Brigadier D. P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lt. Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS

(SAC (O) (45) 14th Meeting
SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the Minutes of their meetings held on 12 July, 1945, and 20 July, 1945.

2. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURE OF AFHQ

(Previous reference SAC (O) (45) 14th Meeting - Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that planning was continuing in regard to the reorganisation of Allied Force Headquarters and that a proposal for the establishment of a British Headquarters similar to MTOUSA was under examination.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ZADAR AND VIS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 4)

BRIGADIER GENERAL EBERLE reported that the withdrawal of stores and personnel from ZADAR had been completed and that a total of 548 tons of stores had been loaded at VIS. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, had arranged for five LCTs to arrive at VIS on 24th July to withdraw personnel and vehicles and this would conclude the operation.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

4. TRANSFER OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS FROM PWB IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that the withdrawal of PWB from the distribution from press and radio news throughout ITALY except in the VENEZIA GIULIA area, had been virtually completed. It had been decided, however, to leave one press control officer on the staff of each Regional Commissioner until such time as the Region had been turned back to the control of the Italian Government.

*Estimated
2/22/46*

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 12)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that, in accordance with the directions given at the last conference, a meeting had been attended by representatives of the Naval and Army Staffs and the Merchant Shipping Authorities. Full agreement had been reached on all major problems in regard to the operation of the ports and the provision of signals facilities after the withdrawal of the naval port parties. Referring to his statement at the previous conference, he reported that he had received a communication from the local representative of the Ministry of War Transport stating that in this Theatre the War Shipping Administration and the Ministry of War Transport operated as an integrated agency and in complete cooperation.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

6. AMALGAMATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that final arrangements for the amalgamation of the Royal Yugoslav Navy with the Partisan Navy had been agreed in discussions between his representatives and those of the Yugoslav Naval Staff and Royal Yugoslav Navy at Allied Force Headquarters on 20 and 21 July. It had been agreed that vessels of the Royal Yugoslav Navy would proceed to SIBENIK and on arrival would become part of the amalgamated Yugoslav Navy, remaining, however, under the general operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The amalgamated Navy would fly the Yugoslav Navy flag with the red star. Royal Yugoslav Naval officers and men would have the free choice of returning to Yugoslavia or remaining outside. Unfortunately those who took the latter course would eventually become stateless refugees. Those personnel joining the amalgamated Navy would wear their present uniforms until replacements become available, and would retain their ranks, but their titles would change to conform to Yugoslav custom. They would have the same rights, pay, and duties as Yugoslav personnel. Arrangements were also made in regard to minesweeping and supplies.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

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Took note, with approval, of the above report.

7. FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 3
JPS Study No. P/308 (Final))

Extract in 1001

THE CONFERENCE had before them a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, advocating the adoption by the Allies of a policy of active interest in regard to the future of ITALY, together with a draft letter for signature by the Supreme Allied Commander, forwarding the Chief Commissioner's letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and making certain comments.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER said that the Chief Commissioner's letter had already been given a wide distribution both in LONDON and in WASHINGTON. It was, therefore, extremely desirable that copies should be forwarded officially to the Chiefs of Staff. However, referring to paragraph 4 of the JPS Study, he questioned whether it was desirable to raise the issue of the ability of UNRRA to assume responsibility for civil supplies in ITALY.

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MAJOR GENERAL MAGRUDER, referring to the Deputy Chief of Staff's last point, said that an enquiry, in regard to the arrangements required on the termination of military responsibility for civil supplies, had been received from the Supreme Allied Commander in BERLIN. The question arose because, on the U.S. side, the decision had been taken to terminate the military responsibility for civil supplies in ITALY at an early date. At that time the Foreign Economics Administration would take over the United States financial responsibilities which were involved. No parallel decision had been taken on the British side to cover the interim period until UNRRA would assume responsibility in October. It had been suggested that during this interim period UNRRA should take over financial responsibility, while the physical handling of the supplies should continue to be a matter for the military authorities in conjunction with the Allied Commission. This proposal that UNRRA should assume financial responsibility had been agreed by AFHQ. There remained, however, the greatest objection to UNRRA assuming physical responsibility for handling the supplies as it was not considered that this organization was yet capable of doing so. There was, therefore, no conflict between the signal which had been sent to the Supreme Allied Commander and the view put forward in the JPS paper, that the physical responsibility should not be handed over to UNRRA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that as the Chief Commissioner's letter had already been circulated both in LONDON and in WASHINGTON, the purpose of the Supreme Allied Commander's letter was merely to forward copies so as to regularize the existing position. It was not, therefore, desirable to use that forwarding letter to raise this separate and complicated question.

MR. KIRK suggested that the Chief Commissioner's letter might be forwarded without comment.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM, disagreeing with the United States Political Adviser, thought that the Supreme Allied Commander must comment on the military matters raised in the basic letter. He thought, therefore, that it should be made clear that the Supreme Allied Commander did not necessarily support these views. This was particularly applicable to the naval recommendations with certain of which he (Admiral Cunningham) was in complete disagreement. He wished, therefore, to see the final paragraph of the Supreme Allied Commander's draft letter strengthened so as to state this disagreement.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it would be wise in forwarding the paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to notify them that the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the military aspects of the paper would follow.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it would be wise in forwarding the paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to notify them that the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the military aspects of the paper would follow.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN thought that it would be unwise to express any strong views in the present letter. The time for doing this would be when the Supreme Allied Commander forwarded his detailed military comments.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to prepare for his signature the letter circulated under JPS Paper No. P/308 (Final), deleting the paragraph referring to UNRRA responsibilities, and subsequently to despatch it to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff, together with copies of the letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

8. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGNOR NENNI
(Paper No. SAC (45) 6)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper, recommending that the Chief

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Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be instructed to protest strongly to the Italian Prime Minister in regard to a speech by Signor Nenni in which he campaigned for a republic, and attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the incident and the action taken.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that it appeared from the press reports of Signor Nenni's speech that the undertaking not to raise the institutional question had been violated. It seemed desirable, therefore, that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should approach the Italian Prime Minister and register a strong protest, especially as Signor Nenni was the Italian Minister charged with the responsibility for preparing impartially the Constituent Assembly which was to decide between a republic and a monarchy.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that he had now been able to obtain confirmation of the exact words used by Signor Nenni, which he read to the Conference. While these words were undoubtedly most improper the associated Press report had clearly exaggerated his actual statement. It was incorrect to state that Signor Nenni had campaigned vigorously for a Republic, and he (Rear Admiral Stone) did not consider this statement could be construed as a violation of the undertaking of the Italian Government. It was, however, a violation of his oath by an individual minister. He doubted whether, under the current directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied Commission had a right to caution the government in the manner indicated in the paper. Moreover, the legal situation was complicated by the fact that the speech had taken place in AMG territory. He suggested, therefore, that his representations to the Italian Prime Minister should take the line of suggesting that such violations of his oath by an Italian minister were not likely to induce confidence in the Italian Government on the part of the United States and British Governments.

X.

MR. KIRK agreed that this speech by one minister did not constitute a violation of its undertaking by the entire Italian Government. He did not consider it advisable to stress the fact that the speech took place in AMG territory, as this would only invite the making of similar speeches in territory which had been handed back to the Italian Government.

MR. BROD, agreeing with the remarks of the United States Political Adviser, considered that the form of protest suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would be preferable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Directed that a protest should be made to the Italian Prime Minister by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, ~~at the~~ ^{at the} lines of his remarks at 'X' above.

- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram

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MR. BROAD, agreeing with the remarks of the United States Political Adviser, considered that the form of protest suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would be preferable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Directed that a protest should be made to the Italian Prime Minister by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, ~~or~~ ^{by} lines of his remarks at 'X' above.
- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram circulated under Paper No. SAC (45) 6 to conform with his direction at (a) above and subsequently to despatch it*.

9. ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA.

(Paper No. SAC (45) 4)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a letter from the Italian Foreign Minister in which certain claims were made regarding the Italian population of coastal areas of ISTRIA and a draft reply for despatch by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER said that only a formal acknowledgement had so far been sent to the Italian Foreign Minister. It was desirable that a fuller

* - Despatched as M.F 1048 of 26 July 1945.

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reply should be furnished him. The suggested letter pointed out that the areas in question were not under Allied administration.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE suggested that in the reply it would be unwise to refer to the military agreement signed in VENEZIA GIULIA as it had been considered undesirable to furnish a copy of this document to the Italian Government.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that the reference to the anchorages off the west coast of ISTRIA required redrafting. Although the BELGRADE agreement gave the Supreme Allied Commander certain rights in regard to these anchorages, in point of fact, in accordance with the terms of the subsequent military agreement, no control was being exercised over them.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to redraft in the light of the above discussion the proposed reply to the Italian Minister circulated under Paper No. SAC (45) 4 and to forward it in its revised form to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, for despatch. #

10. RETENTION OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT IN THE THEATRE

(JPS Study No. P/307 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the anticipated future requirements for amphibious lift in the Mediterranean Theatre and attaching a draft signal in the MEDCOS series recommending the retention of certain British landing craft and the release of others.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that the basic recommendation was to retain amphibious lift for about a brigade in the theatre. The absence of such lift might lead to dangerous lack of flexibility in the movement of Army reserves.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, while he had no objection to the despatch of this signal, he thought the United States naval department would not react favourably to the immobilization of craft in this theatre while the shortage of such craft in the Pacific continued.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Approved the draft signal circulated as Appendix 'B' of JPS Study No. P/307 (Final) and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it*.

11. REORGANIZATION OF R.F. COMMAND IN ITALY

51/4

(JPS Study No. P/307 (Final))

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

approved the draft signal circulated as Appendix 'B' of JPS Study No. P/307 (Final) and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it*.

51/4

11. REORGANIZATION OF RAF COMMAND IN ITALY

(Paper No. S.C (45) 5)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that, as there was no longer any U.S. component in Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force, that Headquarters should lose its Allied title, and be renamed "Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY". It was intended that the new Headquarters should command all Italy-based RAF aircraft. It would also arrange to provide such coastal sorties as the naval authorities in ITALY might require.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that while he had no objection to the proposed title, he thought that a Mediterranean Coastal Air Force Headquarters should

* - Despatched as MEDCOS 263 of 26 July 1945.
- Forwarded to Allied Commission by memorandum dated 26 July 1945.

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remain and work in close touch with the Headquarters of the naval Commander-in-Chief. After all the experience which had been laboriously acquired during the war it would be a pity to drop the title of a coastal air force completely.

AIR VICE MARSHAL BAKER said that the present Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force controlled only one coastal squadron and that this would in due course be withdrawn to M.I.T.A. The title of a coastal air force was, therefore, inappropriate for that Headquarters. He believed that retention of the title of a coastal air force in the theatre was a separate problem and that in any case it would probably be desirable for such a headquarters to be based on M.I.T.A.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

- (a) That the Allied title of Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force should be dissolved.
- (b) That Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F. MEDAE, should endeavour to reach agreement both as to the future title of the R.A.F. Headquarters in ITALY and as to the retention of a coastal air force headquarters.
- (c) That, in the event of failure to reach agreement in accordance with (b) above, a decision on this matter should await the return of the Supreme Allied Commander.

12. COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Paper No. S.A.C (45) 2)

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of a letter which had been despatched to the British Chiefs of Staff, commenting, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, on the note by Commanders-in-Chief, MIDDLE E.A.S.T, regarding future command arrangements in the Mediterranean Theatre.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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retention of a coastal air force headquarters.

- (c) That, in the event of failure to reach agreement in accordance with (b) above, a decision on this matter should await the return of the Supreme Allied Commander.

12. COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Paper No. S:IC (45) 2)

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J. G. Sweetman
 J. G. SWEETMAN,
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
 SECRETARY. R143

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S.C. (45) 1st Meeting
24th July 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 26th JULY 1945

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS
(S.C. (45) 14th Meeting - already circulated)
S.C. (45) 16th Meeting - already circulated
- 2. FUTURE POLICY TECHNIQUES ITALY
(Paper No. S.C. (45) 13 - already circulated)
JFS Study No. F/308 (Final) - already circulated
- 3. THE ILLUM INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGMOR MENDEL
(Paper No. S.C. (45) 16 - to be circulated)
- 4. THE ILLUM CLAIMS REGARDING DR. THEO. CHULL
(Paper No. S.C. (45) 14 - to be circulated)
- 5. RETENTION OF AMBIBIOUS LEFT IN THE THEATRE
(JFS Study No. F/307 (Final) - already circulated)
- 6. PROPOSAL FOR THE COORDINATION IN ITALY
(Paper No. S.C. (45) 15 - to be circulated)
- 7. CONFERENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(Paper No. S.C. (45) 12 - already circulated)

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T.G. SWEETMAN

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W. S. Smith
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W. S. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
REGIMENTAL QUARTERS

- 2. FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Paper No. S.C (45) v3 - already circulated)
(JFS Study No. P/308 (Final) - already circulated)
- 3. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGNOR NEMMI
(Paper No. S.C (45) v5 - to be circulated)
- 4. ITALIAN CLIPS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA
(Paper No. S.C (45) v4 - to be circulated)
- 5. RETENTION OF AIRFIELDS LEFT IN THE THEATRE
(JFS Study No. P/307 (Final) - already circulated)
- 6. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMAND IN ITALY
(Paper No. S.C (45) v5 - to be circulated)
- 7. COMAND IN THE PENTAGON
(Paper No. S.C (45) v2 - already circulated)

TO ITALY ONLY :-

DISTRIBUTION:

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