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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
JULY - NOV. 1946

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G. P. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

Allied Commission

File under No. 1002-1/CC SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Vol. IV 8-4733

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37a	Ltr G-3 AFHQ/187	5 Aug 46	CC	Organization & Location of AFHQ
38	SAC (46) 5th Meet	7 Aug 46		Summary of SACMED's Pol Conf 6 Aug
39	Ltr Lush	7 Aug 46	CC	
40	Ltr 217/460/EC	22 Aug 46	AFHQ G-5	Frwdng of Mins of SACMED's Confer
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41	Agenda 6th Meeting	10 Oct 46		
42	Ltr Tinsley	16 Oct 46	CC	Frwd of draft NAF 5234
43	SAC 46 6th Meet	21 Oct 46	CC	Change in agenda
43a	SAC 46 6th meet	23 Oct 46	CC	Minutes of 6th meeting
44	Ltr Stone	24 Oct 46	Gen Morgan & Lee	Regret being unable to attend conf
45	Ltr B177	5 Nov 46	CC	Change in minutes of 6th meeting Supreme Allied Commander Conf.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC(46) 6th Meeting
5th November, 1946.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

AMENDMENT

Recipients of the Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference held on 23rd October, 1946, are requested to amend their copies as follows :-

Item 2. Delete third sub-paragraph and substitute :-

"The view of Captain GAMBIER was supported by Vice Admiral BIERI, who added, in reply to the question of whether the detail of Italian Captains of known loyalty would not prevent sabotage, that if members of its crew had the intention to sabotage a ship, even a loyal Captain would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent it."

B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC(46) 6th Meeting
5th November, 1946.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

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B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

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PERSONAL

24 October 1946.

I am sorry that I was not able to attend your conference yesterday due to being unable to take off from Ciampino. I had planned to take off at 9:30 but when I got to the field at 9:15 the weather was very threatening and Operations would not let us take off. Actually, the field was closed for takeoffs until 11:30.

When it was evident that I would not be able to get to the meeting on time, I returned to my office and telephoned to Colonel Hamblen for presentation at the meeting my comments on Item 2 of the agenda and the current estimate of the Italian food situation.

With all good wishes,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

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100-2-1/uc

Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan, KCB, DSO, MC,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,
Allied Force Headquarters,
C.M.F.

Copy to: Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, U.S. Army,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,
AFHQ - APO 512.

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (46) 6th Meeting
10th October, 1946

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100
HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 23RD OCTOBER 1946

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
2. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(WPS 334 (Final) - already circulated)

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B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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AGENDA

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
- 2. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(MPS 334 (Final) - already circulated)

B.L. Tinsley
 B.L. TINSLEY,
 MAJOR,
 SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 6th Meeting
21st October, 1946.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held on Wednesday, 23rd October, 1946.

1. The following item is added:-
 - "2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET.
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting, Minute 2, refers)."
2. Existing Item 2 will be renumbered as Item 3.

P.L. Tinsley

P.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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- 1. The following item is added:-
 "2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET.
 (SAC (46) 5th Meeting, Minute 2, refers)."
- 2. Existing item 2 will be renumbered as item 3.

B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC(46) 6th Meeting
23rd October, 1946.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
WEDNESDAY, 23RD OCTOBER, 1946.

PRESENT :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. MORGAN,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General Sir John HARDING,
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Central Mediterranean Forces.
- Captain R.H.G. GARDNER,
Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Vice Admiral B.H. BIERI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Vice Marshall L. DIRVALL,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- Major General T.S. AIREY,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General L.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.

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PRESENT :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. MORGAN,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General Sir John HARDING,
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Central Mediterranean Forces.
- Captain R.H.G. GAIBER,
Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Vice Admiral B.H. BIERI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Vice Marshall L. DARWALL,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- Major General T.S. AIREY,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General L.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Mr. Homer H. BYINGTON, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser.
- Mr. D.V. BENDALL,
Representing British Political Adviser.
- Brigadier C.E.R. BUSTIN,
Brigadier i/c Administration, GHQ CEF.
- Colonel H.H. SMITH,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.
- Colonel P. McC. SMITH,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.
- Colonel A.L. HABLEN,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.
- Colonel H.E. KELLY,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, ATOUSA.
- Colonel C.G. BLAKENEY,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, ATOUSA.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Captain T.B. CLARK,
Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,
Mediterranean.

Colonel P.J.C. MURPHY,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HTOUSA.

Colonel E.G.A. PARSONS,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

Lieutenant Colonel N.L. FOSTER,
G-3, AFHQ.

Wing Commander R.A. FIELD,
Rear Air HQ, Italy.

SECRETARIES :

Major B.L. TINSLEY.
Major V.G. CONLEY.

5297

SECRETARIES :

Major B.L. TINSLEY,
Major V.G. CONLEY.

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1. PROPOSED MOVE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

(SAC(46) 5th Meeting, Minute 5 refers).

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER referred to the minutes of the last SACMED conference at which the proposed move of AFHQ had been fully discussed and stated that this question had not been settled between General EISENHOWER and Field Marshal MONTGOMERY. He reminded the conference, however, that we are a very long way from the centre of our interests and activities in ITALY and that it is supremely important that AFHQ should not become divorced from the formations in North East ITALY who are closely engaged in these activities. History had repeatedly shown that difficulties and misunderstandings were apt to arise where a headquarters was located a considerable distance from its operational formations.

In conclusion, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that heads of sections and officers of their staffs should visit operational formations as often as possible in order to ensure close liaison and co-operation.

2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET

(SAC(46) 5th Meeting, Minute 2 refers).

Major General AILEY referred to a report from French sources to the representative of US State Department in PARIS that the sabotage of Italian warships by interested Italian naval officers was possible.

Captain GAMBIR stated that as the Allies did not have physical possession of the Italian ships we could not prevent sabotage. It was believed that senior Italian officers appreciated that sabotage of these ships would be against the best interests of ITALY. Under the treaty, the arrangements for the hand-over of ships to be surrendered to the governments of USA, UK, USSR and FRANCE would be made by a Four-Power commission. It was C-in-C MED's view that the report did not call for further action since the Allied Governments have left the Italian Government in no doubt of the consequences of sabotage.

Vice Admiral BIERI supported the view of Captain GAMBIR, adding that nothing could be done to prevent sabotage of a ship if members of its crew had that intention.

Colonel HAMBLEN stated that information had been received through the Sub-Commission of Allied Commission that no high-level plan

order of

2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET
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Major General ALLEY referred to a report from French sources to the representative of US State Department in PARIS that the sabotage of Italian warships by interested Italian naval officers was possible.

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Vice Admiral BILDI supported the view of Captain GAMBIR, adding that nothing could be done to prevent sabotage of a ship if members of its crew had that intention.

Colonel HAMBLEN stated that information had been received through the Naval Sub-Commission of Allied Commission that no high-level plan to sabotage vessels existed but that certain Italian officers had remarked that they would not hand over their ships. **2226**

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER concluded by stating that the real weakness of the position was that any member of a crew could sabotage a ship but that, since we could not take physical possession of the ships and the Italian Government had been warned many times of the possibility of sabotage, we could take no action to prevent it.

3. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER referred to MPS 334 (Final), already circulated. He stated that he had already discussed the paper with the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and Lieutenant General HARDING and they had agreed, after taking everything into consideration, that the best course to follow was that outlined in para 11(c) of the paper. As a result, a second NAF, which was that now before the meeting, had been drafted.* He proposed that the meeting should now consider this NAF in order that any amendments considered desirable could be made.

* - Issued under SACED Conference paper dated 16 October, 1946.

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(a) Para 1.**

Colonel P. McC. SMITH considered that the "directive" should be referred to as the "theatre directive".

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated the directive was issued by the Theatre to the local commander. He made the alternative suggestion that "Allied tasks in the VENEZIA GIULLIA Area" should be substituted for "directive to General HARDING as to his tasks in VENEZIA GIULLIA".

The latter amendment was agreed.

(b) Para 2(a).

(i) Air Vice Marshall DAVALL suggested that "operational forces" should read "operational land forces".

After discussion, it was agreed that the phrase should be amended to read "operational ground forces in the VENEZIA GIULLIA Area", and that "under General HARDING" should be deleted.

(ii) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that a statement should be added to the effect that, of the formations remaining in VENEZIA GIULLIA, 2 AA Brigade, 1 AGR and the Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division were considerably under strength.

Lieutenant General HARDING suggested that it would be preferable, in the case of 1 AGR, to state that it consisted of only two medium regiments and that the added sentence should therefore read "Of these, 2 AA Brigade and the Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division are considerably under strength and 1 AGR consists of only two medium regiments."

This was agreed.

(c) Para 2(b).

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that no ground reinforcements were available from USFET and this sub-para was therefore agreed as drafted.

(d) Para 2(c).

There were no comments and this sub-para was agreed as drafted.

(e) Para 2(d).

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked for confirmation that the Allied administrative machinery was not adequate to sustain major operations in the Venezia Giulia area. General BLKENNY and Brigadier

225

(11) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the formations remaining in should be added to the effect that, of the formations remaining in VENEZUELA GIULLI, 2 Arm. Brigade, 1 AGR and the Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division were considerably under strength.

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This was agreed.

(c) Para 2(b).

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that no ground reinforcements were available from USFET and this sub-para was therefore agreed as drafted.

(d) Para 2(c).

There were no comments and this sub-para was agreed as drafted.

(e) Para 2(d).

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked for confirmation that the Allied administrative machinery was not adequate to sustain major operations. This was confirmed by Colonel BLANEY and Brigadier BASTIN.

Colonel P. McC. SMITH suggested that "the proposed reduction" and "is approved" should be amended to read "a proposed reduction" and "is put into effect" respectively.

This was agreed.

(f) Para 2.

(i) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he wished to make clear the point that we are no longer capable of withstanding a major attack and proposed that the paragraph should be rewritten as:

"In view of the above factors I consider that the resources at my disposal are no longer capable of meeting an attack on the scale which the JUGOSLAVS could mount, and that to attempt to do so would incur the

** - References are to paragraphs of the draft M.F.

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risk of involving my troops in operations too far forward with consequent grave risk of embarrassment to the UNITED STATES and UNITED KINGDOM Governments. In fact I consider that my forces are now only just adequate for an internal security role."

Lieutenant General HARDING suggested that the last sentence, as proposed, would be more specific if amended to read:-

"In fact, I consider that the capabilities of my forces have now been reduced to the maintenance of law and order in the case of serious internal disorder, or delaying action/in the case of major attack."

Mr BYINGTON pointed out that para 11(b) and not para 11(c) of the LIPS paper more accurately represented Allied political objectives.

The proposal, as amended by Lieutenant General HARDING, was agreed.

(ii) Air Vice Marshall DAWALL stressed the importance of maintaining the Air Force at its present strength and wished to add the sentence "It is particularly important that the air forces, including planned reinforcements, should not be reduced".

This proposal was strongly supported by Lieutenant General HARDING, Vice Admiral BLEBI and Captain GAMBIRA, and its inclusion was agreed.

(g) Para 4.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that reference to the progress of the Italian Peace Treaty should be omitted.

Mr BYINGTON concurred.

The remainder of this paragraph was deleted as its substance is considered in sub-para (j) below.

(h) Para 5.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER proposed that this paragraph be revised as follows:-

"I recommend, therefore, that the Allied tasks in VENEZIA GIULIA should be:-

a. The maintenance of law and order up to the MORGAN Line.

b. In the event of serious attack to inflict maximum damage and delay consistent with maintaining the security of my forces. This would, of course, entail the disposition of my troops in such a manner

5224

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This proposal was strongly supported by Lieutenant General HARDING, Vice Admiral BIZZI and Captain GAMBIR, and its inclusion was agreed.

(g) Para 4.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that reference to the progress of the Italian Peace Treaty should be omitted.

Mr BYINGTON concurred.

The remainder of this paragraph was deleted as its substance is considered in sub-para (j) below.

(h) Para 5.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER proposed that this paragraph be revised as follows:-

"I recommend, therefore, that the Allied tasks in VENEZIA GIULIA should be:-

- a. The maintenance of law and order up to the MORGAN Line.
- b. In the event of serious attack to inflict maximum damage ⁵²⁹⁴ and delay consistent with maintaining the security of my forces. This would, of course, entail the disposition of my troops in such a manner as to enable me to carry out the above tasks, if such an attack appeared imminent."

Sub-para 2 was agreed without comment.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then asked Lieutenant General HARDING to give his interpretation of sub-para b.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that, if the JUGOSLAVS launched a full-scale attack in VENEZIA GIULIA, his primary consideration would be the security of his forces and that concentration would be necessary to keep them intact. He would not withdraw automatically and would only do so when in danger of being in an insecure position, at the same time allowing the JUGOSLAVS to gain as little as possible.

Air Vice Marshall DARVELL considered that the task under consideration was not sufficiently specific and that positive instructions should be given for delaying the enemy and covering VENICE.

Lieutenant General HARDING did not agree that the proposed task was inappropriate for ground forces but admitted that the air forces could not operate in the same way.

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The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that the air forces should pursue a policy of harassing and blaying the enemy with such forces as were available to them, moving back their base in conformity with the withdrawal of the ground forces who must be the controlling factor.

After further discussion, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER summed up by saying that it was clear that the commanders of both air and ground forces visualised the battle being fought in the same way but that it would be necessary to issue a separate directive to the air forces. There was no necessity to refer this question to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The inclusion of the paragraph, as proposed, was agreed.

(j) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER proposed that the following should be included as para 5 of the N.F.:-

"The ~~adoption~~ of such a policy would also enable me to begin the reduction of certain stores held in the Theatre against the possibility of major operations and thus ensure that Allied troops are in a position to leave ITALY within 90 days of the ratification of the peace treaty."

In reply to a question by the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER regarding the political implications if ITALY were not evacuated within the 90-day period, Mr BYINGTON stated that the most important consideration was maintenance of adequate military strength to carry out present policy. As he saw it, the whole tenor of the proposed N.F. was that of a declaration of military bankruptcy in terms of political policy. The question of the 90-day period was a very secondary one. He stressed that any move to reduce military forces in VENIZI: GIULIA was against political policy and that naturally any preliminary reduction of stores needed by those military forces would likewise be contrary to political policy. He asked if it was definitely established that the Allied forces could not evacuate in the 90-day period.

Colonel BLKENNEY said that it was estimated that the American forces could just complete evacuation in that time.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that the British would have a considerable quantity of heavy equipment to be moved to the Middle East and questioned whether sufficient shipping would be available.

Air Vice Marshall DARWALL considered that the Air Force could evacuate within the required period.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that it might become necessary to abandon stores if measures were not taken to expedite the withdrawal when the time came.

to leave ITALY within 90 days of the ratification of the peace treaty.

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Colonel BLKENEY said that it was estimated that the American forces could just complete evacuation in that time.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that the British would have a considerable quantity of heavy equipment to be moved to the Middle East and questioned whether sufficient shipping would be available.

Air Vice Marshall DARWALL considered that the Air Force could evacuate within the required period.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that it might become necessary to abandon stores if measures were not taken to expedite the withdrawal when the time came.

The inclusion of the paragraph, as proposed, was then agreed.

(k) Para 6.

After general discussion regarding the possibility of a complete withdrawal from ITALY as the result of a major attack, it was agreed that the following should be added to the final paragraph:-

"Should a complete withdrawal from ITALY become necessary it is my view, and that of General LEE, that all Allied forces should be evacuated through West Italian ports as all Adriatic ports would present dangerous hazards. Top level study on this subject is now being made."

In conclusion, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (i) Directed that the draft MAF, as now amended, should be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.*

* - Despatched as MAF 1224 dated 23 October 1946.

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(ii) Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the heads of the MJPS, in the light of paragraph 6 of the M.F.

4. POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED CIVIL DISORDERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that, in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations for the establishment of the TRIESTE Free State, there was a possibility that local SLAV Communists might take the law into their own hands and create disorders. They had very considerable potentialities e.g. public utility services, sabotage and sniping, and would produce a difficult situation. He considered that, if this possibility were agreed, the problem should now be examined with a view to producing a plan to meet any situation that might develop.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER supported Lieutenant General HARDING's proposal.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the MJPS.

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B.L. Tinsley.

B.L. TINSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

B.L. Timsley.

B.L. TIMSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 6th Meeting
21st October, 1946.

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COPY NO 29

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference Agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held on Wednesday, 23rd October, 1946.

1. The following Item is added:-
- "2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET.
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting, Minute 2, refers)."
2. Existing Item 2 will be renumbered as Item 3.

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B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MJOR,
SECRETARY.

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B.L. Tinsley.

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (46) 6th Meeting
16th October, 1946

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference Item 2 of the agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held at 1100 hours on 23 October 1946.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander in conjunction with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander has examined WPS P/334 (final).
2. Although he considers that the operational policy as set out in para 11 (b) of the main paper may be practicable now, he is of the opinion that our future policy should be as set out in para 11 (c) and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be requested to limit our role to this.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander has therefore directed that a draft NAF be prepared on these lines for consideration at the meeting on 23 October 1946. The draft NAF is attached at Appendix 'A'.

B.L. Tinsley

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B.L. TINSLEY

1 2 3 |

Reference Item 2 of the agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held at 1100 hours on 23 October 1946.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander in conjunction with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander has examined MJPS P/334 (final).

2. Although he considers that the operational policy as set out in para 11 (b) of the main paper may be practicable now, he is of the opinion that our future policy should be as set out in para 11 (c) and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be requested to limit our role to this.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander has therefore directed that a draft NAF be prepared on these lines for consideration at the meeting on 23 October 1946. The draft NAF is attached at Appendix 'A'.

B. L. Tinsley

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B. L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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GHQ C&F (for Brig i/c Adm)
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G-4 (ATO)

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Appendix 1A

D R A F T

TO: CCS

This is NAF _____.

Subject is policy in the event of operations in Venezia Giulia.

1. Recent reductions in Allied manpower in Italy have necessitated a review being made of the directive to General HARDING as to his tasks in Venezia Giulia and of the action it would be possible to take to counter possible aggression by Jugoslavs.
2. This review has brought out the following main factors:-
 - a. The operational forces under General HARDING have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm'd Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Gp, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 AGRA.
 - b. No ground reinforcements are now available from USFET.
 - c. 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.
 - d. Owing to the general contraction of Allied administrative resources and manpower, the Allied administrative machinery, especially UNITED STATES, is not adequate to sustain major operations. This will be further aggravated if the proposed reduction of 5,000 in UNITED STATES Theatre strength is approved. 219
3. I consider that the above factors have so weakened the capabilities

that not only would I be unable to withstand direct attack

1 2 3 3

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b. No ground reinforcements are now available from USFET.

c. 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.

d. Owing to the general contraction of Allied administrative resources and manpower, the Allied administrative machinery, especially UNITED STATES, is not adequate to sustain major operations. This will be further aggravated if the proposed

reduction of 5,000 in UNITED STATES Theatre strength is approved. 219

3. I consider that the above factors have so weakened the capabilities of my forces that not only would I be unable to withstand direct attack by the Yugoslavs, but I would also run the risk of my forces becoming a serious embarrassment to the UNITED STATES and the UNITED KINGDOM governments by getting involved in major operations too far forward. In particular, owing to ground and communications, Allied troops in Trieste would be in the gravest danger.

4. Good progress has been made with the Italian Peace Treaty and I consider that the residual Allied tasks will be the maintenance of law and order in Venezia Giulia. Furthermore, certain stores are still held in the theatre against the possibility of major operations. If we are to be out of Italy within 90 days of Peace Treaty ratification, I consider that we must start reducing these stores now.

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5. I recommend, therefore, that General HARDING's task should be:
 - a. The maintenance of law and order in Venezia Giulia.
 - b. To maintain the security of the Morgan Line unless directly attacked.
 - c. In the event that an attack becomes imminent to dispose his forces, so that without risking them, he can impose the maximum delay and damage on the enemy.
6. If the above tasks are accepted and a major attack is pressed towards the PC Valley, I request guidance as to the policy to be followed if I am forced to abandon the PIAVE Line, bearing in mind the fact that the British are based on Venice and the UNITED STATES forces on Leghorn.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

the British are based on Venice and the UNITED STATES forces on Leghorn.

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SAC(46) 6th Meeting
23rd Oct ber, 1946.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

27-28-79

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BY AUTHORITY OF S.A.C.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
WEDNESDAY, 23RD OCTOBER, 1946.

PRESENT :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. MORGAN,
Supremo Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supremo Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General Sir John HARDING,
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Central Mediterranean Forces.
- Captain R.H.G. GAMBIER,
Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Vice Admiral B.H. BIERI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Vice Marshall L. DREWALL,
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- Major General T.S. AIRLY,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General L.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.

5317

Mr. Homer M. BYINGTON, Jr.

5317

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

Lieutenant General Sir John HARDING,
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Central Mediterranean Forces.

Captain R.H.G. GAMBIER,
Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Vice Admiral B.H. BIERI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.

Air Vice Marshall L. DUNWALL,
Air Officer Commanding, R.A.F, Italy.

Major General T.S. AIREY,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.

Major General L.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.

Mr. Homer H. BYINGTON, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser.

Mr. D.V. BENDALL,
Representing British Political Adviser.

Brigadier C.E.R. BASTIN,
Brigadier i/c Administration, GHQ C.M.F.

Colonel H.H. SMITH,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.

Colonel P. McC. SMITH,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.

Colonel A.L. HABLEN,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

Colonel H.E. KELLY,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, ATOUSA.

Colonel C.G. BLAKENEY,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, ATOUSA.

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Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'y' or '7'.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Captain T.B. CLARK,
Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,
Mediterranean.

Colonel P.J.C. MURPHY,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, MTOUSA.

Colonel E.G.A. PARSONS,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

Lieutenant Colonel M.L. FOSTER,
G-3, AFHQ.

Wing Commander R.A. FIELD,
Rear Air HQ, Italy.

SECRETARIES :

Major B.L. TINSLEY.
Major V.G. CONNELLY.

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1. PROPOSED MOVE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

(SAC(46) 5th Meeting, Minute 5 refers).

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER referred to the minutes of the last SACMED conference at which the proposed move of AFHQ had been fully discussed and stated that this question had now been settled between General EISENHOWER and Field Marshal MONTGOMERY. He reminded the conference, however, that we are a very long way from the centre of our interests and activities in ITALY and that it is supremely important that AFHQ should not become divorced from the formations in North East ITALY who are closely engaged in these activities. History had repeatedly shown that difficulties and misunderstandings were apt to arise where a headquarters was located a considerable distance from its operational formations.

In conclusion, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that heads of sections and officers of their staffs should visit operational formations as often as possible in order to ensure close liaison and co-operation.

2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET

(SAC(46) 5th Meeting, Minute 2 refers).

Major General AILEY referred to a report from French sources to the representative of US State Department in PARIS that the sabotage of Italian warships by interested Italian naval officers was possible.

Captain GABLER stated that as the Allies did not have physical possession of the Italian ships we could not prevent sabotage. It was believed that senior Italian officers appreciated that sabotage of these ships would be against the best interests of ITALY. Under the treaty, the arrangements for the hand-over of ships to be surrendered to the governments of USA, UK, USSR and FRANCE would be made by a Four-Power commission. It was C-in-C MED's view that the report did not call for further action since the Allied Governments have left the Italian Government in no doubt of the consequences of sabotage.

Vice Admiral BIERI supported the view of Captain GABLER, adding that nothing could be done to prevent sabotage of a ship if members of its crew had that intention. Amended (see 8177) at

Colonel HAMBLEN stated that information had been received through the Naval Sub-Commission of Allied Commission that no high-level plan to sabotage vessels existed but that certain Italian officers had remarked that they would not hand over their ships.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER concluded by stating that the real

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Vice Admiral BIERI supported the view of Captain GABLER, adding that nothing could be done to prevent sabotage of a ship if members of its crew had that intention. Amended (see B177) at 221545

Colonel HAMBLEN stated that information had been received through the Naval Sub-Commission of Allied Commission that no high-level plan to sabotage vessels existed but that certain Italian officers had remarked that they would not hand over their ships.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER concluded by stating that the real weakness of the position was that any member of a crew could sabotage a ship but that, since we could not take physical possession of the ships and the Italian Government had been warned many times of the possibility of sabotage, we could take no action to prevent it.

3. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER referred to MPS 334 (Final), already circulated. He stated that he had already discussed the paper with the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and Lieutenant General HARDING and they had agreed, after taking everything into consideration, that the best course to follow was that outlined in para 11(c) of the paper. As a result, a second NAF, which was that now before the meeting, had been drafted.* He proposed that the meeting should now consider this NAF in order that any amendments considered desirable could be made.

* - Issued under SACMED Conference paper dated 16 October, 1946.

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(a) Para. 2.**

Colonel P. McC. SMITH considered that the "directive" should be referred to as the "theatre directive".

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated the directive was issued by the Theatre to the local commander. He made the alternative suggestion that "Allied tasks in the VENEZIA GIULIA area" should be substituted for "directive to General HARDING as to his tasks in VENEZIA GIULIA".

The latter amendment was agreed.

(b) Para 2(a).

(i) Air Vice Marshall DARVILL suggested that "operational forces" should read "operational land forces".

After discussion, it was agreed that the phrase should be amended to read "operational ground forces in the VENEZIA GIULIA area", and that "under General HARDING" should be deleted.

(ii) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that a statement should be added to the effect that, of the formations remaining in VENEZIA GIULIA, 2 AA Brigade, 1 AGR and the Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division were considerably under strength.

Lieutenant General HARDING suggested that it would be preferable, in the case of 1 AGR, to state that it consisted of only two medium regiments and that the added sentence should therefore read "Of these, 2 AA Brigade and the Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division are considerably under strength and 1 AGR consists of only two medium regiments."

This was agreed.

(c) Para 2(b).

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that no ground reinforcements were available from USEET and this sub-para was therefore agreed as drafted.

(d) Para 2(c).

There were no comments and this sub-para was agreed as drafted.

(e) Para 2(d).

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked for confirmation that the Allied administrative machinery was not adequate to sustain major

"Under General HARDING" should be deleted.

(ii) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that a statement should be added to the effect that, of the formations remaining in VENEZIA GIULLA, 2 AA Brigade, 1 AGR and the Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division were considerably under strength.

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This was agreed.

(c) Para 2(b).

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER confirmed that no ground reinforcements were available from USEET and this sub-para was therefore agreed as drafted.

(d) Para 2(c).

There were no comments and this sub-para was agreed as drafted.

(e) Para 2(d).

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked for confirmation that the Allied administrative machinery was not adequate to sustain major operations. This was confirmed by Colonel BLANEY and Brigadier BASTIN. **314**

Colonel P. McC. SMITH suggested that "the proposed reduction" and "is approved" should be amended to read "a proposed reduction" and "is put into effect" respectively.

This was agreed.

(f) Para 3.

(i) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he wished to make clear the point that we are no longer capable of withstanding a major attack and proposed that the paragraph should be rewritten as:

"In view of the above factors I consider that the resources at my disposal are no longer capable of meeting an attack on the scale which the JUGOSLAVS could mount, and that to attempt to do so would incur the

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** - References are to paragraphs of the draft N.F.

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risk of involving my troops in operations too far forward with consequent grave risk of embarrassment to the UNITED STATES and UNITED KINGDOM Governments. In fact I consider that my forces are now only just adequate for an internal security role."

Lieutenant General HARDING suggested that the last sentence, as proposed, would be more specific if amended to read:-

"In fact, I consider that the capabilities of my forces have now been reduced to the maintenance of law and order in the case of serious internal disorder, or delaying action/in the case of major attack."

Mr BYINGTON pointed out that para 11(b) and not para 11(c) of the WPS paper more accurately represented Allied political objectives.

The proposal, as amended by Lieutenant General HARDING, was agreed.

(ii) Air Vice Marshall DAWALL stressed the importance of maintaining the Air Force at its present strength and wished to add the sentence "It is particularly important that the Air forces, including planned reinforcements, should not be reduced".

This proposal was strongly supported by Lieutenant General HARDING, Vice Admiral BELL and Captain GABLER, and its inclusion was agreed.

(g) Para 4.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that reference to the progress of the Italian Peace Treaty should be omitted.

Mr BYINGTON concurred.

The remainder of this paragraph was deleted as its substance is considered in sub-para (j) below.

(h) Para 5.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER proposed that this paragraph be revised as follows:-

"I recommend, therefore, that the Allied tasks in VENEZIA GIULIA should be:-

a. The maintenance of law and order up to the MORGAN Line.

b. In the event of serious attack to inflict maximum damage and delay consistent with maintaining the security of my forces. This would, of course, entail the disposition of my troops in such a manner as to enable me to carry out the above tasks, if such an attack appeared

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This proposal was strongly supported by Lieutenant General HARDING, Vice Admiral BIZZI and Captain GABRIEL, and its inclusion was agreed.

(g) Para 4.

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Mr BYINGTON concurred.

The remainder of this paragraph was deleted as its substance is considered in sub-para (j) below.

(h) Para 5.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER proposed that this paragraph be revised as follows:-

"I recommend, therefore, that the Allied tasks in VENEZIA GIULIA should be:-

- a. The maintenance of law and order up to the MORGAN Line.
- b. In the event of serious attack to inflict maximum damage ⁵²¹³ and delay consistent with maintaining the security of my forces. This would, of course, entail the disposition of my troops in such a manner as to enable me to carry out the above tasks, if such an attack appeared imminent."

Sub-para a was agreed without comment.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then asked Lieutenant General HARDING to give his interpretation of sub-para b.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that, if the JUGOSLAVS launched a full-scale attack in VENEZIA GIULIA, his primary consideration would be the security of his forces and that concentration would be necessary to keep them intact. He would not withdraw automatically and would only do so when in danger of being in an insecure position, at the same time allowing the JUGOSLAVS to gain as little as possible.

Air Vice Marshal DARVILL considered that the task under consideration was not sufficiently specific and that positive instructions should be given for delaying the enemy and covering VENICE.

Lieutenant General HARDING did not agree that the proposed task was inappropriate for ground forces but admitted that the air forces could not operate in the same way.

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The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that the air forces should pursue a policy of harassing and flying the enemy with such forces as were available to them, moving back their base in conformity with the withdrawal of the ground forces who must be the controlling factor.

After further discussion, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER summed up by saying that it was clear that the commanders of both air and ground forces visualised the battle being fought in the same way but that it would be necessary to issue a separate directive to the air forces. There was no necessity to refer this question to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The inclusion of the paragraph, as proposed, was agreed.

(j) The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER proposed that the following should be included as para 5 of the M.F.:-

"The ~~adoption~~ of such a policy would also enable me to begin the reduction of certain stores held in the Theatre against the possibility of major operations and thus ensure that Allied troops are in a position to leave ITALY within 90 days of the ratification of the peace treaty."

In reply to a question by the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER regarding the political implications if ITALY were not evacuated within the 90-day period, Mr BYINGTON stated that the most important consideration was maintenance of adequate military strength to carry out present policy. As he saw it, the whole tenor of the proposed M.F. was that of a declaration of military bankruptcy in terms of political policy. The question of the 90-day period was a very secondary one. He stressed that any move to reduce military forces in VENIZIA GIULIA was against political policy and that naturally any preliminary reduction of stores needed by those military forces would likewise be contrary to political policy. He asked if it was definitely established that the Allied forces could not evacuate in the 90-day period.

Colonel BLAKENEY said that it was estimated that the American forces could just complete evacuation in that time.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that the British would have a considerable quantity of heavy equipment to be moved to the Middle East and questioned whether sufficient shipping would be available.

Air Vice Marshall DARWALL considered that the Air Force could evacuate within the required period.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that it might become necessary to abandon stores if measures were not taken to expedite the withdrawal

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Air Vice Marshall DARWALL considered that the Air Force could evacuate within the required period.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that it might become necessary to abandon stores if measures were not taken to expedite the withdrawal when the time came.

The inclusion of the paragraph, as proposed, was then agreed.

(k) Para 6.

After general discussion regarding the possibility of a complete withdrawal from ITALY as the result of a major attack, it was agreed that the following should be added to the final paragraph:-

"Should a complete withdrawal from ITALY become necessary it is my view, and that of General LEE, that all Allied forces should be evacuated through West Italian ports as all Adriatic ports would present dangerous hazards. Top level study on this subject is now being made."

In conclusion, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (1) Directed that the draft MAF, as now amended, should be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.*

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* - Despatched as MAF 1224 dated 23 October 1946.

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(11) Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the heads of the MJPS, in the light of paragraph 6 of the N.F.

4. POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED CIVIL DISORDERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

Lieutenant General HARDING stated that, in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations for the establishment of the TRIESTE Free State, there was a possibility that local SLAV Communists might take the law into their own hands and create disorders. They had very considerable potentialities e.g. public utility services, sabotage and sniping, and would produce a difficult situation. He considered that, if this possibility were agreed, the problem should now be examined with a view to producing a plan to meet any situation that might develop.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER supported Lieutenant General HARDING's proposal.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the MJPS.

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Bk. Tinsley.
B.L. TINSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the JPS.

B.L. Tinsley
B.L. TINSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

OCT 24 1946

SAC (46) 6th Meeting
21st October, 1946.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Reference agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held on Wednesday, 23rd October, 1946.

1. The following item is added:-
- "2. POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE OF ITALIAN FLEET.
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting, Minute 2, refers)."
2. Existing Item 2 will be renumbered as Item 3.

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B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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Reference agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held on Wednesday, 23rd October, 1946.

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B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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*Chief Commissioner 27-2829
Allied Commission 2675*

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (46) 6th Meeting
16th October, 1946

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE



Reference Item 2 of the agenda for the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference to be held at 1100 hours on 23 October 1946.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander in conjunction with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander has examined MJPS P/334 (final).
2. Although he considers that the operational policy as set out in para 11 (b) of the main paper may be practicable now, he is of the opinion that our future policy should be as set out in para 11 (c) and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be requested to limit our role to this.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander has therefore directed that a draft NAF be prepared on these lines for consideration at the meeting on 23 October 1946. The draft NAF is attached at Appendix 'A'.

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B. L. Timbery

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B. L. Tinsley

B. L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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- GHQ CME (for Brig i/c Adm)
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Appendix 1A

D R A F T

to: CCS

This is NAF _____.

Subject is policy in the event of operations in Venezia Giulia.

1. Recent reductions in Allied manpower in Italy have necessitated a review being made of the directive to General HARDING as to his tasks in Venezia Giulia and of the action it would be possible to take to counter possible aggression by Yugoslavs.

2. This review has brought out the following main factors:-

a. The operational forces under General HARDING have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm'd Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Co, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 AGRA.

b. No ground reinforcements are now available from USFET.

c. 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding I of C and installations in Italy.

d. Owing to the general contraction of Allied administrative resources and manpower, the Allied administrative machinery, especially UNITED STATES, is not adequate to sustain major operations. This will be further aggravated if the proposed **5208** reduction of 5,000 in UNITED STATES Theatre strength is approved.

3. I consider that the above factors have so weakened the capabilities

a. The operational forces under General HARDING have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm'd Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Gp, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 AGR4.

b. No ground reinforcements are now available from USFET.
c. 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.

d. Owing to the general contraction of Allied administrative resources and manpower, the Allied administrative machinery, especially UNITED STATES, is not adequate to sustain major operations. This will be further aggravated if the proposed **5208** reduction of 5,000 in UNITED STATES Theatre strength is approved.

3. I consider that the above factors have so weakened the capabilities of my forces that not only would I be unable to withstand direct attack by the Yugoslavs, but I would also run the risk of my forces becoming a serious embarrassment to the UNITED STATES and the UNITED KINGDOM governments by getting involved in major operations too far forward. In particular, owing to ground and communications, Allied troops in Trieste would be in the gravest danger.

4. Good progress has been made with the Italian Peace Treaty and I consider that the residual Allied tasks will be the maintenance of law and order in Venezia Giulia. Furthermore, certain stores are still held in the theatre against the possibility of major operations. If we are to be out of Italy within 90 days of Peace Treaty ratification, I consider that we must start reducing these stores now.

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5. I recommend, therefore, that General HARDING's task should be:
 - a. The maintenance of law and order in Venezia Giulia.
 - b. To maintain the security of the Morgan Line unless directly attacked.
 - c. In the event that an attack becomes imminent to dispose his forces, so that without risking them, he can impose the maximum delay and damage on the enemy.
6. If the above tasks are accepted and a major attack is pressed towards the PO Valley, I request guidance as to the policy to be followed if I am forced to abandon the PLAVE Line, bearing in mind the fact that the British are based on Venice and the UNITED STATES forces on Leghorn.

If I am forced to abandon the K-LIVE line, bearing in mind the fact that
the British are based on Venice and the UNITED STATES forces on Leghorn.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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COPY NO 27

SAC (46) 6th Meeting
10th October, 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100
HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 23RD OCTOBER 1946

A G E N D A

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
- 2. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(MPS 334 (Final) - already circulated)

(See [])

B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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1002-1/4

AGENDA

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
- 2. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(MPS 334 (Final) - already circulated)
(See)

B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

5306

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MEMORANDUM:

TO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

VICE ADMIRAL ENRICO ACCORETTI is acting
for Admiral De Courten during the latter's
illness.

EdSS

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1002-1/4

AGENDA

- 1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
- 2. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(MPS 334 (Final) - already circulated)

Tinsley

TINSLEY,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

5306

*Joe Ben
SAC
conference*

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22 August 1946

Ref: 217/460/23

SUBJECT: Minutes of SACMED's Conference.

TO : G-5 Section,
AFHQ.

1. I enclose herewith copy No. 29 of the minutes of SACMED's No. (46) 4th meeting and copy No. 26 of No. (46) 5th meeting as these are no longer required.

2. As the British and United States political advisers here now receive their copies direct from Caserta only two copies of the minutes of SACMED's Conferences will be required by this commission.

For the Chief Commissioner:

A. W. Kinsely.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

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AUG 8 1946

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A P O 794
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Secret

7th August 1946.

Chief Commissioner.

Following is summary of SACMED's Political Conference yesterday:

1. Italian Navy. General LEE asked whether the US Navy shared any responsibility for the safeguarding of the Italian Fleet from scuttling. I replied that insofar as any responsibility lay it was an Allied responsibility and therefore would presumably be shared by US. Captain GAMBIER, however, stated categorically that as C-in-c MED was not in physical control of the Italian Navy he had no responsibility and therefore the US Navy had no responsibility with regard to the possible scuttling of ships, which was the responsibility of the Italian Government.
2. Move of AMHQ. Polads and self stressed the importance of notifying the Italian Government with regard to any move and if possible consulting them with regard to the location. SACMED agreed but added that he did not have much sympathy with the Italian Government as Allied troops were here to protect their interests and not for their own pleasure.

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General HARDING suggested UDINE instead of PADUA and found general agreement. This will be explored. General LEE, however, opposed the whole scheme on the basis of expense. It was decided to put the pros and cons to the CIGS, War Office, LONDON, and ask him to discuss with General EISENHOWER on his forthcoming visit to the States.

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M. S. L.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

BSL/JG.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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SAC (46) 5th Meeting
7th August 1946

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE 3-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
TUESDAY, 6TH AUGUST, 1946.

PRESENT :

- Lieutenant General Sir William D. MORGAN,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General Sir John HARDING,
Commander, 13 Corps.
- Captain R.L.G. GAMBER,
Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Vice Admiral B.H. BIZZI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Commodore J.G. ELTON,
Representing Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- Major General T.S. AIREY,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General L.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General A.C. DUFF,
Representing Brigadier i/c Administration, CHQ GHQ.

1002-1/66

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Mr. P.T. SCARLETT,

1002-1/00

- Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
- Lieutenant General John C.H. LEE,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
- Lieutenant General Sir John HARDING,
Commander, 13 Corps.
- Captain R.M.G. GAMBIER,
Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- Vice Admiral B.H. BIZZI,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
- Air Commodore J.G. ELTON,
Representing Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.
- Major General T.S. AIREY,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General L.C. JAYNES,
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- Major General A.C. DUFF,
Representing Brigadier i/e Administration, SHQ CMF.
- Mr. P.W. SCARLETT,
British Political Adviser.
- Mr. Homer M. BYINGTON, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser.
- Brigadier J. D'A. ANDERSON,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ.
- Colonel G.S. SILTH,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.
- Colonel A.L. HARBLEN,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

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E.C. (2)

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :

Brigadier A.E. MORRISON,
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ.

Colonel K. BUCHAK,
Deputy Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ.

Colonel J.E. WOOD,
Deputy Chief Engineer, AFHQ.

Colonel H.L. MILLER,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 MTOUSA.

Colonel P. McC. SMITH,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 MTOUSA.

Colonel D.N. LAVLEY,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 MTOUSA.

Captain T.B. CLARK,
Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,
Mediterranean.

SECRETARIES :

Major V.G. COMLEY.
Major B.L. TINSLEY.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 MPO SA.

Captain T.B. CLARK,
Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,
Mediterranean.

SECRETARIES :

Major V.G. COMLEY.
Major B.L. TINSLEY.

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1. REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 1)

BRIGADIER LUSH stated that on 1st August 1946 the Italian Government had a million and a half tons of wheat in stock which, on the present ration, should last for four months. In addition, the UNKRA programme of 5000 tons of wheat, together with the amasse now held, should carry the country through until 1st April 1947. He considered the general food situation was now better than at any time since the liberation of the country.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

2. FUTURE ORGANISATION OF THREE ITALIAN SERVICES MINISTRIES

(Previous reference SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 4)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER asked what the present position was with regard to ADMIRAL DE COURTEN.

CAPTAIN GAMBIER stated that ADMIRAL DE COURTEN had wished to resign as Chief of Naval Staff but had re-considered his decision and was now continuing in that capacity for the present.

BRIGADIER LUSH understood that he would continue as Chief of Naval Staff until the Peace Treaty was signed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE asked if there was any American responsibility for the safeguarding of Italian Naval equipment.

COLONEL HARBLEN said the present Directive stated that COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MEDITERRANEAN was responsible for the operation of the Italian Navy.

CAPTAIN GAMBIER replied that as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MEDITERRANEAN was not in physical control of the individual ships he was not responsible for their safeguarding from sabotage.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Concluded by stating that he felt the safety of the Italian ships depended largely on the good offices of ADMIRAL DE COURTEN.

5301

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CAPTAIN GAMBIER replied that as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MEDITERRANEAN was not in physical control of the individual ships he was not responsible for their safeguarding from sabotage.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Concluded by stating that he felt the safety of the Italian ships depended largely on the good offices of ADMIRAL DE COURTEN.

5301

3. PROPOSED REPLACEMENT FOR ALLIED COMMISSION

(Previous reference SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 5)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that no reply had been received to the signal despatched to Combined Chiefs of Staff and there was no change in the present position. He then asked BRIGADIER LUSH what the situation was regarding the Agreement.

BRIGADIER LUSH replied that the Italian Prime Minister had said he would prefer not to give the Italian counter proposals or comments until the Peace Treaty was under preparation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

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4. ITALIAN INTERNEES

(Previous reference SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 7)

COLONEL SMITH stated that out of 309 cases which had been reviewed, the release of 170 internees had been authorized. There was, however, a certain delay in effecting the releases as the Italian Government was given a period of time in which to agree to the release of internees concerned so that they might detain them again if they so wished.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that urgent action should be taken to expedite disposal of these internees and that, if delay were caused by the Italian Government, they should simply be notified of impending release which should then be put into effect.

5. POSSIBLE FUTURE ORGANISATION AND LOCATION OF AN ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS TO REPLACE THE PRESENT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

(Previous reference SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 6)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that, in view of the direct conflict of interests as brought out by the G-3 AFHQ paper, he wished to obtain widest opinions on this matter.

MR. SCARLETT said that the only important political point was that the necessity for the move should be fully explained at the right time to the Italian Government. The establishment of AFHQ would not be popular at its new destination and an advance explanation would enable the Italian authorities to squash any rumours which might arise. He did not anticipate that the Italian Government would raise any objection to the move.

MR. BYINGTON stated that, as far as the State Department was concerned, it was considered most advisable politically that the views of the Italian Government regarding the move should first be ascertained and given full consideration. He suggested that this be done prior to any signal being sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He also stated that any reduction in military strength in VENEZIA GIULIA involved as a result of the move would be of political interest.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stated that the actual reorganization of 1 Armoured Division and 56 Division into one division would cause a reduction in the number of units. It would not cause any appreciable reduction in the number of personnel, because both formations were under strength at the present time and, combined together, they would make no more than one full division of three Infantry Brigades and one Armoured Brigade. It was necessary to merge two divisions to make one effective

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE asked about reduced gun strength when the 1st Armoured and 56th Divisions are consolidated.

5300

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING replied that it would mean fewer Artillery units, but a small reduction in guns since personnel (gunners) to man the guns of the two divisions are not available.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER added that the British Government had already agreed the reduction of units which would result from the merger and that the matter was now being discussed in WASHINGTON by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CAPTAIN GAMBIER stated that the move would not in any way alter the commitments of COM ANDER-IN-CHIEF MEDITERRANEAN and that it was the intention to retain a Naval Liaison Staff with AFHQ.

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VICE ADMIRAL BIERI stated that, if HQ MTOUSA moved to the North, the American Naval HQ at NAPLES would become isolated and its maintenance problem thereby made very difficult.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING suggested that UDINE would be a better location for AFHQ than PADUA, and recommended that, before a final decision was reached, a detailed reconnaissance of UDINE should be made. He considered that UDINE was the more advantageous location, principally in view of its proximity to the Headquarters of Divisions and AMB, and, in addition, because it had a good airfield and it was in general a healthier and more suitable town to live in than PADUA.

BRIGADIER LUSH added that he was of the opinion the Italian Government would prefer an AFHQ at UDINE rather than at PADUA.

AIR COMMODORE ELTON stated that, from the point of view of Air HQ ITALY, it would be preferable for AFHQ to be at UDINE as Air HQ was already located there and also because of its excellent airfield.

In reply to a question by LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING, AIR COMMODORE ELTON stated that it was expected that the present strength of three Wings would be retained until the end of the year and was doubtful whether any accommodation now occupied by the RAF could be given up.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER requested AIR COMMODORE ELTON to approach the AIR OFFICER COMMANDING with a view to ascertaining whether any help could be given in this matter.

COLONEL WOOD stated that it was not possible to give any definite estimates for costs of Engineer work at either UDINE or PADUA, as detailed examinations had not as yet been made. He estimated that it would take in all twelve weeks to complete preparation of accommodation at the new location, after orders were issued and money allocated.

BRIGADIER MORRISON stated that as far as Signals were concerned, either PADUA or UDINE would be equally good, both being on the main cable route. In reply to a question by THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, he agreed that it would be practicable to provide the necessary signals communication if AFHQ moved to North East ITALY and HQ MTOUSA remained at CASERTA.

COLONEL BUCHAK added that if HQ MTOUSA remained alone at CASERTA or moved to LECHORN an approximate 30% increase in American Signals personnel would be required to serve properly the Headquarters. All heavy construction work necessary to provide signal facilities would have to be on a contract basis, and would be very expensive. Certain types of highly skilled communication specialists, both civilian and military, such as cable splicers and carrier-repeater men are critically short. Necessary

accommodation now occupied by the Air could be given up.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER requested AIR COMMODORE ELTON to approach the AIR OFFICER COMMANDING with a view to ascertaining whether any help could be given in this matter.

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COLONEL BUCHAK added that if HQ MTOUSA remained alone at CASERTA or moved to LECHORN an approximate 30% increase in American Signals personnel would be required to serve properly the Headquarters. All heavy construction work necessary to provide signal facilities would have to be on a contract basis, and would be very expensive. Certain types of highly skilled communication specialists, both civilian and military, such as cable splicers and carrier-repeater men are critically short. Necessary additional military circuits in North ITALY would have to be requisitioned from the Italian Government. Wire facilities across ITALY from LECHORN to UDINE or PADUA are extremely limited. The requisitioning of these facilities will, no doubt, be opposed by the Italian Ministry of Telecommunications.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF considered that the estimated saving of British manpower was excessive as, by the time the proposed change-over comes into effect, the figure would be reduced. As regards the future of HQ 3 District he considered that it could be disbanded at the end of September provided AFHQ did not move at the same time, but that AFHQ could move after completion of disbandment.

Further discussion followed on the manpower question, after which THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER summed up on this point and stated that, from a purely British point of view, an amalgamation of AFHQ and 13 Corps in the North would result in a great saving in manpower.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE then gave the American point of view. He stressed that they were at present under considerable pressure regarding restriction of expenditure. Any move involving considerable financial expense would necessitate his approaching the War Department for additional funds. Extra personnel would also probably be required. In addition, he considered it inadvisable to place administrative responsibility on a Tactical commander at the front. From his point of view the present position was quite satisfactory, and he did not consider the advantages of a move counterbalanced the cost involved. He hoped to be able to remain at CASERTA and redeploy from there within his allotted income.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that this was the whole problem as, from the British side, we could not continue to keep a complete British Corps HQ in the North and the present staff at CASERTA. Already a large number of British appointments were being duplicated unnecessarily.

COLONEL HAMLEN pointed out the difficulties which would arise in administering civil affairs matters if an organisation were arrived at which separated THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER from the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER or moved AFHQ further from ROME.

COLONEL SMITH (G-3 AFHQ) added that the amalgamation of two British HQs would result in the Americans having split into two HQs.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that it meant transferring part of the burden from the British to the Americans but that, from the overall manpower point of view, a saving would be effected.

After further general discussion THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER summed up. As it was impossible to arrive at an agreed solution, he considered that the problem should be presented to the respective Chiefs of Staff for decision. He therefore suggested that, rather than send a non-concurred cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, advantage should be taken of the fact that FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY was going to WASHINGTON this month, and that he should be asked to take the matter up with GENERAL EISENHOWER for their joint consideration. With their wider knowledge of world commitments and the information which we could put at their disposal regarding the situation here, they would be able to give a decision. Meanwhile, both UDINE and PADUA should be investigated further so that, if the decision was given to move AFHQ to North East ITALY, we should be ready to take advantage of the first opportunity to move.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE agreed to this course and added that, pending a decision, the Americans would investigate the possibility of moving HQ PTOUSA to LEGHORN.

In conclusion, THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that :-

1 2 7 4

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that it meant transferring part of the burden from the British to the Americans but that, from the overall manpower point of view, a saving would be effected.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE agreed to this course and added that, pending a decision, the Americans would investigate the possibility of moving HQ MTCUSA to LEGHORN.

In conclusion, THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that :-

- (a) G-3 AFHQ should arrange forthwith, in conjunction with HQ 13 Corps and Air HQ where necessary, for detailed reconnaissances to be made of UDINE and PADUA in case a decision is given that AFHQ should move to North East ITALY. UDINE would be given first priority for reconnaissance.
- (b) G-5 should draft a letter to Allied Commission instructing Chief Commissioner to inform the Italian Government of the possible move of AFHQ to the North of ITALY and HQ MTCUSA to LEGHORN, and that, if AFHQ moved to UDINE, accommodation at PADUA would be freed. The letter should request the views of the Italian Government on this matter. The Italian Government should not be informed about the merger of the two British divisions.

DISTRIBUTION:

Normal.

B.L. Tinsley

B.L. TINSLEY,
Major,
Secretary.

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CC
AUG 14 1946
1230

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

FILE : G-3 AFHC/187

SUBJECT: Organization and Location of #Fw4

5 August 1946

Copy No. 11

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff the attached draft NAF has been prepared.
2. Those recipients who are attending the SACMED Conference tomorrow, 5 Aug 46, are requested to be in possession of a copy of the draft NAF.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN.

T. S. AIREY,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J.A. Anderson
J.D'A ANDERSON,
Brigadier, G.S.
i/c of S, G-3.

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- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, thru NLO
- Commander, United States Naval Forces, Mediterranean (thru SACS)
- Air Commander-in-Chief, RAF ITALY
- GOC, XIII Corps (thru SACS)
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Command

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T. S. AIREY,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

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OFFICIAL:

J.A. Anderson
J.D'A ANDERSON,
Brigadier, G.S.
AC of S, G-3.

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- Commander, United States Naval Forces,
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- Air Commander-in-Chief, RAF ITALY
- GOC, XIII Corps (thru SACS)
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/c SACS)
- Chief of Staff
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- G-1
- Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2
- G-3 AFHQ
- Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3 MTOUSA
- G-4 Plans
- G-5
- Brigadier i/c Administration
- Chief Engineer
- Chief Signals Officer
- CC POLAD
- EC POLAD
- SACS
- Woy & Tn
- WBE Plans
- Quision Section, AFHQ
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TO: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR CCS
CABINET OFFICES WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

This is NAF ____.

1. In accordance with F/N 671, I have been examining the possibility of a move of AFHQ to NE ITALY and the organisation of an appropriate Allied HQ. in the new location.
2. In view of the many political factors inherent in the final discharge of Allied commitments in ITALY, I consider that it is of the utmost importance to retain an Allied HQ and the appointment of SACMED so long as these Allied commitments remain.
3. With the announcement of a proposed settlement in VENEZIA GIULLA and of the establishment of a Free Territory of TRIESTE, there is now a reduced risk of invasion of Zone 'A' by the JUGOSLAVS. The focus of Allied commitments in ITALY lies increasingly in VENEZIA GIULLA. The bulk of Allied Forces is now located in NE ITALY. Certain residual commitments mainly concerned with the disposal of depot stocks, PW and SEP remain in Southern and Central ITALY. It is estimated that (excluding IEGHORN area) these commitments will in the main be disposed of

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2. In view of the many political factors inherent in the final discharge of Allied commitments in ITALY, I consider that it is of the utmost importance to retain an Allied HQ and the appointment of SACMED so long as these Allied commitments remain.
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4. For these reasons it now seems appropriate to me to move AFHQ to NE ITALY so that it can control more effectively the Allied troops under command and supervise more closely the many problems which will arise out of the final settlement in VENEZIA GIULIA and the establishment of the Free Territory of TRIESTE, if required to do so.

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5. AFHQ has been the product of integrating, where necessary, HQ MTOUSA and GHQ CMAF located together. However, after careful investigation, certain conflicting considerations now arise:-

(a) British -

With the paramount necessity for economy in British manpower, it is no longer possible to maintain both GHQ and Hq. XIII Corps in being. As Hq XIII Corps is already located in the area where the ultimate Allied commitments are bound to lie, has knowledge of local conditions and can provide the necessary tactical staff for the direct control of troops, I consider that Hq XIII Corps, provided with the necessary increments, should be retained as the British element of AFHQ and that GHQ CMAF should be disbanded. In addition, such an arrangement would produce the greatest overall saving of British manpower.

(b) United States -

United States ceiling has been drastically cut and is now the minimum acceptable for its tasks. Any

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and HQ XIII Corps in being. As HQ XIII Corps is already located in the area where the ultimate Allied commitments are bound to lie, has knowledge of local conditions and can provide the necessary tactical staff for the direct control of troops, I consider that HQ XIII Corps, provided with the necessary increments, should be retained as the British element of AFHQ and that GHQ C&F should be disbanded. In addition, such an arrangement would produce the greatest overall saving of British manpower.

(b) United States -

United States ceiling has been drastically cut and is now the minimum acceptable for its tasks. Any move of HQ LTOUSA to NE ITALY to form Allied HQ with HQ XIII Corps, will require an increase in personnel. Moreover, it will involve considerable expenditure of funds to move personnel and equipment as well as to prepare suitable accommodation. Neither of these disadvantages has any compensating advantage to LTOUSA.

6. After careful discussion with General LEE, I have come to the conclusion that, if Allied Headquarters is to be moved to NE ITALY, the only solution lies in compromise and the following plan should be adopted:-

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- (a) That Allied HQ should be established at PADUA.
- (b) That AFHQ should thereafter be composed of HQ, XIII Corps and such elements of HQ MTOUSA as are necessary to achieve essential integration. There should continue to be naval, air and political representation.
- (c) That HQ MTOUSA should move to LEGHORN simultaneously with the move of AFHQ to PADUA.
- (d) That CHQ CMF, less those elements required as increments to XIII Corps, should be disbanded.
- (e) That the target date for the opening of AFHQ at PADUA would be about 8 weeks after approval of the plan and provision of funds.

7. The effect of this plan will be:-

(a) Manpower -

- | | | | |
|------|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| (i) | Estimated British saving | - | 180 Officers
1000 O.Rs. |
| (ii) | Estimated United States increase | - | ' |

(b) Cost:-

- (i) Forecasted British cash expenditure to cover works services necessary to prepare accommodation in PADUA is not

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increments to VIII Corps, should be installed.
(e) That the target date for the opening of AFHQ at PADUA would be about 8 weeks after approval of the plan and provision of funds.

7. The effect of this plan will be:-

(a) Manpower -

(i) Estimated British saving - 180 Officers
1000 O.Rs.

(ii) Estimated United States
increase

(b) Cost:-

(i) Forecasted British cash expenditure to cover works services necessary to prepare accommodation in PADUA is not expected to exceed Twenty thousand Pounds.

(ii) Forecasted United States immediate expenditure to cover move to PADUA and LECHORN and preparation of accommodation is not expected to exceed dollars, and the forecasted cost of monthly maintenance at PADUA and LECHORN is not expected to exceed dollars.

(c) Estimated size of total HQs at PADUA:-

(i) British
(incl AFHQ element)

230 Officers
1500 ORs.

(ii) United States
(AFHQ element only)

118 Officers
674 EM
13 CIVILIAN

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8. I request, therefore, that you approve the plan outlined in para. 6 above and that the War Office and War Department be asked to authorize the necessary expenditure, details of which will be submitted as soon as possible.

9. General LEE is unable to concur in this plan and is sending a separate Signal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in WASHINGTON.

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AUG 2 1946

C. Gamm (3)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 5th Meeting
30th July, 1946

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100
HOURS ON TUESDAY 6TH AUGUST 1946

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (46) 4th Meeting - already circulated)
2. STATUS OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY
(SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 1)
3. TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF
AN ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS TO REPLACE THE PRESENT ALLIED
FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
(SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 6)

1002/100

A. Gamm
A.C. CURRY,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY. 5992

1002-1/00

(SAC (46) 4th Meeting - already circulated)

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(SAC (46) 4th Meeting, Minute 5)

L. G. Curie
L. G. CURIE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY. R-92

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Revised July 26, 1918

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