Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/136/261

POLITICA
PAPERS
SEPT. 194

1290

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/136/261

POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ, MINUTES OF MEETINGS, PAPERS & NOTES
SEPT. 1944 – JAN. 1945

1291

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LIST OF PAPERS

1002-2/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1002-2/CC POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ, MINUTES OF MEETINGS: PAPERS & NOTES

PART I

PAPERS & NOTES

~~Official~~ Confidential

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
34	SAC (P) (44) 156	26 Dec 44		Relief to Albania
34a	SAC (P) (44) 157	27 Dec 44		Private Press Agnecies in Italy
35	SAC (P) (44) 158	27 Dec 44		Radio Plan for Liberated Italy
36	SAC (P) (44) 159	26 Dec 44		Participation by Italian Government in Allied Local Resources Board
37	SAC (P) (44) 160	27 Dec 44		Relief & Mass Evacuation of Civilien Population from Enemy Occupied Islends
38	SAC (P) (44) 161	27 Dec 44		Relations with Italian Partisans
39	SAC(P)(44)161 Annex	29 Dec 44		Relations with Italian Partisans
40	SAC(P)(44) 162 +	7 Jan 45		Relations with Ital Partisans.

+ (See folio 1, Volume III, File 1002-2/CC)

File Arrangements —

5451

Confidential

Confidential

1292

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1002-2 POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ. MINUTES OF MEETINGS: PAPERS & NOTES

PAPERS & NOTES

PART I.

TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
18	PC(44) 139	20 Nov 44		Relief into Albania
19	PC(44) 140	20 Nov 44		Converestions with Yugoslav D-le-gates - observation of distribution
20	PC(44) 141	23 Nov 44		Relations with Italian Partisans-Mtg, SAC, SOMTO, CLNAI.
21	PsWSC(44) 18	23 Nov 44		Possible Italian participationin war against Japan - news policy.
21a	PC (44) 142	29 Nov 44		Wheat for Sicily.
22	PC(44) 143	29 Nov 44		Military Mission to Albania.
23	PC (44) 144	30 Nov 44		Relations with Ital Partisans.
24	PC (44) 145	4 Dec 44		Italian Schooner Reuteings.
25	PC (44) 146	5 Dec 44		Relief Measures in Yugoslavia
25a	PC (44) 144 Annex	5 Dec 44		Relations with Yugoslav Partisans
26	PC (44) 147	5 Dec 44		Anti-Tito Yugoslav Military Personnel
27	PC (44) 148	6 Dec 44		Alleged Yugoslav Deserters
28	PC (44) 149	6 Dec 44		Relations with the Yugoslavs
29	PC (44) 150	7 Dec 44		Subversion of Ital tps by JNAL.
30	PC (44) 151	8 Dec 44		Effect of developments in Greece on combined relief operations.
30a	PC (44) 152	13 Dec 44		Food rationing in Italy
31	Memo COS AFHQ	15 Dec 44		Political Committee ceases to exist; SAC conference on Tuesdays will dis cuss political matters.
31a	SAC(P) 153	16 Dec 44		Pvt News Agencies in Italy.
31b	SAC(P) 154	16 Dec 44		Relations with Ital Partisans.
32	PC(44) 155	17 Dec 44		Food rationing in Italy
33	Memo IS & PS	17 Dec 44		SAC (O&P)conferences in G-3 W.R.

1293

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LIST OF PAPERS

1002-2/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1002-2 POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ, MINUTES OF MEETINGS: PAPERS & NOTES

PART I

Page 1

PAPERS AND NOTES

TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	PC(44) 112	28 Sep 44		Payment of Goods & Services in Italian Territory
2	PC(44) 113	2 Oct 44		Use of Ital POW in Southern France
3	PC(44) 116	6 Oct 44		Control of United Nations propaganda in Rome
4	PC(44) 122	10 Oct 44		Proposed Appreciative Statement on the Ital Armed Forces
5	PC(44) 120	10 Oct 44		Payment of Goods & Services in Ital Territory
6	PC(44) 123	14 Oct 44		Relief Supplies to the Balkans
7	PC(44) 125	25 Oct 44		Boy Scout Movement in Italy
7a	PC(44) 127	27 Oct 44		Press and pvt news agencies-Italy
8	PC(44) 131	6 Nov 44		Use of Ital POW in US custody as service units in Italy
8a	PC(44) 126	2 Nov 44	—	Motion picture policy for Italy.
9	PC(44) 132	11 Nov 44		AMG for Venezia Giulia & related matters
10	PC(44) 133	12 Nov 44	(Recalled by AFHQ)	Allied POW in Hungery
11	PC(44) 134	13 Nov 44		Status of Italian POWs
12	PC(44) 135	13 Nov 44		Status of Italian Partisans
13	Ltr Quayle 1002-2	18 Nov 44	IS & PS AFHQ	Add to distribution Actg Pres., COS, AC.
14	PC(44) 132 Annex	20 Nov 44		AMG for Venzia Giulia &tc
15	PC(44) 136	20 Nov 44		Security Situation in Rome
16	PC(44) 137	20 Nov 44		Relations with Italian Partisans
17	PC(44) 138	20 Nov 44		Status of Ital POW in US Custody & of Ital Coop'ers in Brit Custody serving in Itely

5449

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

CC 1475
DECLASSIFIED
So to a c

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 581

SAC (P) (44) 161 Annexure
29th December 1944

TOP SECRET
COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

(38)

1. It is notified for information that the Supreme Allied Commander has already approved paragraphs (1) and (2) of the agreement set out in para 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 (see telegram F74148 of 25 December from FREEDOM to Allied Commission). By implication he has also approved para (3) of the agreement in question (see telegram quoted above and telegram No. S-403 of 27 December to FREEDOM from the Allied Commission).

2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 is therefore cancelled. Instead the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the CLNAI as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26

(12 2-2 (initials) 5 1 8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 202 the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the CLNAI as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Advisor	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, AC & CS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commissioner	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

: : : : : : : : : : : : :
:CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
: BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
: : : : : : : : : : : : :

(31)

1002-2/c (Sicily 3201/c)

List

Copy 31 — SOTOCC
" 32 — C of S
" 33 — Pol Sec.

"A"

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1298

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Clauses (1) and (2) were approved in SACMED's message F-74148 of 25 December to the Chief Commissioner, A.C., and clause (3) is in accordance with instructions given in the same message.

cc. 1271
28/12/44.

TOP SECRET

K 57

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (44) 161
27th December 1944

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. On the basis of an exchange of telegrams with HQ Allied Commission, this HQ has been informed that the following agreement was signed on 26th December by the Italian Government, represented by BONOMI, and the CLNAI, represented by MARE :-

"(1) The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ of the Anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of ITALY NOT yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this end as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of ITALY as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government".

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 4).

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement quoted in paragraph 1 above and to direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLNAI of ~~such~~ his approval.

agreement quoted in para 1 above.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2

C of S distribute

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

territory occupied by the enemy.

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of ITALY NOT yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this end as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of ITALY as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government".

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 4).

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement quoted in paragraph 1 above and to direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLNAI of ~~his~~ approval of the agreement quoted in para 1 above.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

c/s distribute
1 — Chief Comm to 32nd
1 — Political Section 33

: : : : : : : : : : : : :
:CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
: BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
: : : : : : : : : : : : :

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Copy 1 NO RECEIPT

CC 1280
DEC 29 REC'D

6615

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 568

SAC (P) (44) 160
27th December 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM ENEMY OCCUPIED ISLANDS

Note by Secretary

1. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, wishes to raise the question of the despatch of relief to enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN and the mass evacuation of civilian population from those islands.

2. He has recently been informed by FOLEM that a delegation left RHODES on 5th December charged by the German administration and the Greek community with organising civilian relief supplies for RHODES. The delegation had been told by the German commander in RHODES that he was concerned over the shortage of food for the civilian population and that even British relief ships would be allowed. The delegation reported that the Germans were proposing to evacuate 10,000 civilians from RHODES and that the population of the island were seeking opportunities to leave. FOLEM pointed out that, unless the Turks could be persuaded to accept the responsibility for refugees from RHODES, they would become an unwelcome British commitment. He suggested that it would be more economical to introduce relief through the medium of the International Red Cross and that, if the International Red Cross were unwilling to participate, the despatch of a British ship should be considered, subject to satisfactory safeguards. He drew a parallel between the case of RHODES and the case of the CHANNEL ISLANDS.

3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accordingly requests a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy :-

5446

(a) As to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian population of enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN.

(b) As to whether mass evacuation of civilians from enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN should be permitted.

He points out that it would clearly assist the enemy war effort to allow either (a) or (b).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. He has recently been informed by FOLEM that a delegation left RHODES on 5th December charged by the German administration and the Greek community with organising civilian relief supplies for RHODES. The delegation had been told by the German commander in RHODES that he was concerned over the shortage of food for the civilian population and that even British relief ships would be allowed. The delegation reported that the Germans were proposing to evacuate 10,000 civilians from RHODES and that the population of the island were seeking opportunities to leave. FOLEM pointed out that, unless the Turks could be persuaded to accept the responsibility for refugees from RHODES, they would become an unwelcome British commitment. He suggested that it would be more economical to introduce relief through the medium of the International Red Cross and that, if the International Red Cross were unwilling to participate, the despatch of a British ship should be considered, subject to satisfactory safeguards. He drew a parallel between the case of RHODES and the case of the CHANNEL ISLANDS.

3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accordingly requests a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy :-

5446

(a) As to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian population of enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN.

(b) As to whether mass evacuation of civilians from enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN should be permitted.

He points out that it would clearly assist the enemy war effort to allow either (a) or (b).

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Copies Distributed
Chief Commissioner No 71.
Political Section 73.

HEADQUARTERS
28 DEC 1944

/DISTRIBUTION

37

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 568

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, P&B	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (H)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

5445

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, P/B	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (H)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

5445

(37)

SECRET

1302

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy

ec 1279
DEC 29 RECD
no receipt
6673

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-566

SAC (P) (44) 159
26th December 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS.

Note by the Secretary

1. On 2 December 1944 the Allied Commission submitted to the first meeting of the Industrial Coordination Committee, Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board, a proposal that a representative of the Italian Government (Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labour) be admitted to membership of the Industrial Coordination Committee.

2. The Allied Commission offered the following grounds for this proposal:

"The Allied Commission believes that participation by the Ministry in the work of the Committee would be helpful to all parties concerned. AC is now attempting insofar as possible to have all operational functions in the field of industrial production performed by the Italians themselves. If the Italian Government is to assume an increasing measure of responsibility for the Italian economy, it is essential for its representatives to begin to participate in the discussions as to the use of that economy in furthering the war effort and in decreasing the extent to which Italy needs to call on the United Nations for essential civilian supplies. Moreover, it would help the Italian Government and people to understand the necessary limitations of supply and transport, and spur them to put forth their best efforts in the development of local resources, if they participated in the determinations on the allocation of the relatively meagre sources that are available."

3. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who presided at the meeting mentioned, has requested that the proposal be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, and has suggested that there be considered also the question of membership of representatives of the Italian Government on the Board itself.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve in principle participation by the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. The Allied Commission offered the following grounds for this proposal:

> "The Allied Commission believes that participation by the Ministry in the work of the Committee would be helpful to all parties concerned. AC is now attempting insofar as possible to have all operational functions in the field of industrial production performed by the Italians themselves. If the Italian Government is to assume an increasing measure of responsibility for the Italian economy, it is essential for its representatives to begin to participate in the discussions as to the use of that economy in furthering the war effort and in decreasing the extent to which Italy needs to call on the United Nations for essential civilian supplies. Moreover, it would help the Italian Government and people to understand the necessary limitations of supply and transport, and spur them to put forth their best efforts in the development of local resources, if they participated in the determinations on the allocation of the relatively [illegible] resources that are available."

3. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who presided at the meeting mentioned, has requested that the proposal be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, and has suggested that there be considered also the question of membership of representatives of the Italian Government on the Board itself.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve in principle participation by the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its dependent Committees and to authorise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to proceed accordingly.

C & S Distribute

Chief Commissioner No. 38.
Political Sect No. 33.

(36)

J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS
28 DEC 1944
A.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1190 - 250.000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

K-566

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Advisor	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, US & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

5443

- - - - -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chief, [illegible]	[illegible]
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	34
G-1 (A)	35
G-1 (B)	36-37
G-2	38-39
G-3	40
G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4 (A)	42
G-4 (B)	43-45
G-5	46-50
Spares	

5443

- - - - -

(36)

CONFIDENTIAL

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1490 - 350,000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL K-570 CC 1272 DEC 29 RECD

Copy A NI RECEIPT 1627

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (44) 158
27th December, 1944.

COPY NO. 21

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

Note by Chief, INC

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS 28 DEC 1944 A. C.

I. Objectives with reference to radio in ITALY

1. The ultimate objective of Allied effort in the field of radio is to promote a free radio which will not be the instrument for any government, political party or group of private interests.

2. To this end Italian radio should be adjusted to the conditions of the free ITALY of tomorrow. This does not mean that Italian radio should necessarily be re-modelled along British or American lines. Rather it must be based upon Italian character, temperament, traditions and economic possibilities. It must be politically free but not beyond the reach of criticism.

II. Present PWB Policy

1. Conforming to overall directives, which call for the swiftest possible transfer to Italian hands of all domestic services, PWB transferred as of October 1, 1944, to EIAR, the existing Italian radio organisation, the responsibility for, and the actual organisation and production of, all musical programmes in AC territory, both "live" and recorded, representing approximately 50 per cent of the total radio output. PWB continues to assist EIAR in the production of musical programmes especially as regards supply of recorded programmes.

2. PWB retains the right to intervene and to request modifications in EIAR's musical programmes:- 542

(a) If it becomes apparent that these programmes pursue political aims at variance with those of the United Nations.

(b) If the quality, artistically or technically, of the programmes as broadcast is not of sufficiently high standard.

3. PWB retains the responsibility for and the actual organisation and production of the "spoken" programmes, e.g. news and political

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

should necessarily be re-modelled along British or American lines. Rather it must be based upon Italian character, temperament, traditions and economic possibilities. It must be politically free but not beyond the reach of criticism.

II. Present PWB Policy

1. Conforming to overall directives, which call for the swiftest possible transfer to Italian hands of all domestic services, PWB transferred as of October 1, 1944, to EIAR, the existing Italian radio organisation, the responsibility for, and the actual organisation and production of, all musical programmes in AC territory, both "live" and recorded, representing approximately 50 per cent of the total radio output. PWB continues to assist EIAR in the production of musical programmes especially as regards supply of recorded programmes.

2. PWB retains the right to intervene and to request modifications in EIAR's musical programmes;-

5442

(a) If it becomes apparent that these programmes pursue political aims at variance with those of the United Nations.

(b) If the quality, artistically or technically, of the programmes as broadcast is not of sufficiently high standard.

3. PWB retains the responsibility for and the actual organisation and production of the "spoken" programmes, e.g. news and political commentary, and other spoken features, dramatisations and prose readings.

III. Recommendations

1. Upon the basis of proposals made to it by PWB the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee (PsWSC (44) 8th Meeting) recommends that the Italian Government be invited:-

(a) To create a Board of Governors to act as advisers to the management of EIAR with a term of two years composed of the following:

A nominee of the Minister of Education
A University Professor
An Industrialist
A member of EIAR Employees' Association
A Musician
An Author
A journalist

(35)

/CONFIDENTIAL

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1190 - 250.000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Each, with the exception of the first, to be nominated by the appropriate body, e.g. the Association of University Professors, the Chamber of Commerce, the Federazione Stampa, etc; the terms to be staggered in order to preserve continuity of experience.

(b) To call upon this Board of Governors to make recommendations concerning the future organisation and operation of EIAR consistent with the maintenance of a free radio in ITALY after the time of withdrawal of PWB from the Italian radio field.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, to take action accordingly.

(Intd) A.C.M.H.
for A.J. Mc C.

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
	40

K441

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Intd) A.C.W.H.
for A.J. Mc C.

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Chief, INC	46
Spares	47-51

5441

Cof S Distribution
Air Commun. No. 31
Political Sect No. 33

(35)

CONFIDENTIAL

S.G.M.A. - 544 - 1400 - 250 000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Cafs. K-569

CC 1271 DEC 29 REC'D NO RECEIPT

SAC (P) (44) 157
27th December 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 31 66 Y Y

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Note by the Chief of Staff

1. The Sub-Committee on News Agencies appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, Minute 5) met on 26th December 1944 to consider the questions referred to it by the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Sub-Committee also had before it a proposal by the Chief, Commissioner, Allied Commission, to permit private news agencies to sell news to newspapers of the city of ROME, only.

3. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Supreme Allied Commander as follows:-

(a) Reference question (i), as to the juncture at which the PWB screen on news should be removed and the operation of private news agencies permitted:-

(1) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of ROME on and after 15 January 1944.

(2) That a technical sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Allied Commission, PWB, INC, and the Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ, be appointed to investigate the time and the methods by which the distribution of news to newspapers throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY by private news agencies will be feasible.

(b) Reference question (ii), as to the safeguards which should be established to ensure against the development in ITALY of a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

That for the time being no Italian news agency be permitted to distribute news in ITALY outside ROME. That the time when ARTI, or any other Italian news agency, is to be permitted to enter the field of news distribution be investigated by the technical sub-committee.

5440

(c) Reference question (iii), as to what measures should be taken to avoid publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest:

That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(1) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of ROME on and after 15 January 1944.

(2) That a technical sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Allied Commission, PWB, INC, and the Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ, be appointed to investigate the time and the methods by which the distribution of news to newspapers throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY by private news agencies will be feasible.

(b) Reference question (ii), as to the safeguards which should be established to ensure against the development in ITALY of a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

That for the time being no Italian news agency be permitted to distribute news in ITALY outside ROME. That the time when ARTI, or any other Italian news agency, is to be permitted to enter the field of news distribution be investigated by the technical sub-committee.

5440

(c) Reference question (iii), as to what measures should be taken to avoid publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest:

That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken, unless a serious situation from the military point of view seems likely to arise. The security risk admittedly existing as a result of the admission of private news agencies to ROME is outweighed by the advantage in respect of freedom of the press, particularly in view of the power of the Supreme Allied Commander under the Armistice terms to impose necessary measures of censorship to meet particular situations which may arise.

(Initd) J.H.

copies distributed
Allied Commission No. 21
Political Sect No. 22.

(34) a

HEADQUARTERS
28 DEC 1944
A. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION — COPY NO — K-569

Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Chief, INC	46
Spares	47-51

5439

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Chief, INC	46
Spares	47-51

5439

(34) a

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Cf'd NO RECEIPTS

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS CC 1276 DEC 29 RECD SECRET

K-567

COPY NO 31

SAC (P) (44) 156
28th December 1944

6678

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELIEF TO ALBANIA

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

1. On 23 December G-5 submitted a staff study directing attention to the following:-

a. Military Liaison Hq (Albania) had been directed to introduce relief supplies into Albania, and the troop concentration date set at 3 January 1945.

b. It is planned that the Durazzo Harbor will be swept on approximately 27 December 1944 and ML (A) recce will follow immediately.

c. Neither the U.S. nor U.K. Governments have recognized an Albanian Government, and are desirous that no action on the part of ML (A) should commit them to recognition of any particular group.

d. This Headquarters has decided that no negotiations should be carried out with Col. Gen. HOXHA (NKL), except that Lt. Col. Palmer was despatched to advise him of the nature and scope of ML (A) organisation, the fact that ML (A) charter was in no way subject to alteration, and to request him to instruct his Durazzo representatives to enter into the necessary local agreements with ML (A).

e. At this time it had been decided that one U.S. and one U.K. ML (A) representative should be made available to clarify any technical points that might arise.

f. Lt. Col. Palmer on his return has reported that on 20 December 1944 he outlined the ML (A) plan, and HOXHA reserved consideration on the acceptance of the requested instructions, because of the following factors:

5498

(1) Number of personnel involved.
(2) Observers.

Col. Gen. HOXHA indicated that the attachment of "a few" officers at his Headquarters would meet requirements, and that his organization was competent to determine relief needs and to administer supply distribution.

HEADQUARTERS 28 DEC 44

g. In order to make a January 15/25 delivery of engineer stores to repair

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

c. Neither the U.S. nor U.K. Governments have recognized an Albanian Government, and are desirous that no action on the part of ML (A) should commit them to recognition of any particular group.

d. This Headquarters has decided that no negotiations should be carried out with Col. Gen. HOXHA (PNLA), except that Lt. Col. Palmer was despatched to advise him of the nature and scope of ML (A) organisation, the fact that ML (A) charter was in no way subject to alteration, and to request him to instruct his Durazzo representatives to enter into the necessary local agreements with ML (A).

e. At this time it had been decided that one U.S. and one U.K. ML (A) representative should be made available to clarify any technical points that might arise.

f. Lt. Col. Palmer on his return has reported that on 20 December 1944 he outlined the ML (A) plan, and HOXHA reserved consideration on assistance of the requested instructions, because of the following factors:

(1) Number of personnel involved.
(2) Observers.

Col. Gen. HOXHA indicated that the attachment of "a few" officers at his Headquarters would meet requirements, and that his organization was competent to determine relief needs and to administer supply distribution.

HEADQUARTERS
28 DEC 1944
A. G.

g. In order to make a January 15/25 delivery of engineer stores to repair the port of Durazzo to receive relief supplies, it would be necessary to call forward approximately 1600 tons ex Mideast immediately.

h. It was arguable that these stores should not be called forward because

(1) It was desirable to avoid a situation similar to that of ML (Y), where 2 ships stood by and were eventually unloaded during negotiations.

(2) It was not desirable to load, and call forward a ship, until its need was specifically determined.

i. It was also arguable that these stores should be called forward:

(1) The time lag from calling forward to sailing, approximately ten days, would permit cancellation of loading or sailing up to 2 January.

(2) Any delay in calling forward would so seriously postpone arrival that, were agreement reached in December 1944, Engineer Stores would not follow until February 1945.

(34)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(3) Following arrival of Engineer stores further time would be required to put the port in order to receive relief supplies.

(4) Any unnecessary delay should be avoided as tending to increase Albanian suspicion.

2. Under these circumstances, G-5 recommended that:

a. The necessary stores be called forward ex Mideast immediately.

b. Lt. Col. Palmer be instructed to return to MOXHA's Hq on 27 December 1944.

(1) to obtain his reply to the request that he instruct his representatives at Durazzo to enter into the necessary local agreements and,

(2) to advise this Hq and ML (A) not later than 29 December 1944 of any further points requiring detailed clarification.

c. Should such clarification be necessary the Commander and Deputy Commander ML (A) should proceed to MOXHA, after briefing, to advise final terms.

d. If these terms were not accepted

(1) ML (A) officers should return,

(2) announcements should be made immediately over PWB in Albanian and in English, of the terms of the offer and of MOXHA's refusal,

(3) the ship should be held or diverted and concentration of troops cancelled.

3. The British Resident Minister, U.S. Political Adviser, CAO and the Deputy SAC concurred in the recommendations of G-5 as set forth above except that the Deputy SAC expressed the view that past experience gives little hope of any useful action prior to reaching agreements. To call the ship forward now would only result in lost shipping time. The Deputy SAC therefore recommended that an agreement be reached prior to calling forward. Accordingly the ship has not been called forward, but Lt. Col. Palmer has been instructed to proceed as in para 2b. 5/37

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to take note of the above developments.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Commander ML (A) should proceed to HOXHA, after briefing, to discuss final terms.

d. If these terms were not accepted

(1) ML (A) officers should return,

(2) announcements should be made immediately over PWB in Albanian and in English, of the terms of the offer and of HOXHA's refusal,

(3) the ship should be held or diverted and concentration of troops cancelled.

3. The British Resident Minister, U.S. Political Adviser, CAO and the Deputy SAC concurred in the recommendations of G-3 as set forth above except that the Deputy SAC expressed the view that past experience gives little hope of any useful action prior to reaching agreements. To call the ship forward now would only result in lost shipping time. The Deputy SAC therefore recommended that an agreement be reached prior to calling forward. Accordingly the ship has not been called forward, but Lt. Col. Palmer has been instructed to proceed as in para 2b.

5737

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to take note of the above developments.

(Intd) T.R.H.
for C.M.S.

(34)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

Cof 5 Distributed
Chief Commissioner No. 37
Political Section 33.

5436

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

Cy's Distribute

Chief Commissioner No. 37

Political Section 33.

5426

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

cc 120 / DEC 20 REC'D 6000

Chief Comm.

RESTRICTED K 546
COPY NO. 39

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

1. The Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room is being converted to a G-2 War Room and its use for Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences and other meetings, except those called by G-2, will be discontinued forthwith.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences, both Operational and Political, will be held in future in the G-3 War Room (entrance through room No. 2016)

3. The Supreme Allied Commander's 9 o'clock meetings will continue to be held in the G-3 War Room.

4. The 36th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference, scheduled for Tuesday 19th December at 1030 hours, will be held in the G-3 War Room and NOT in the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room as previously notified.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution

	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
G-1 (A)	18
G-1 (B)	19
G-2	20

5425

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Political) Conference, scheduled for Tuesday 19th December at 1030 hours, will be held in the G-3 War Room and NOT in the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room as previously notified.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
G-1 (A)	18
G-1 (B)	19
G-2	20
G-3	21-22
G-4 (A)	23
G-4 (B)	24
G-4 (Mov & Tn)	25
G-4 (Log Plans)	26
Chief, Liaison Section	27
Chief Signals Officer	28
U.S. Political Adviser	29-31
British Resident Minister	32-35
Director, PWB	36
Secretary, General Staff	37
Secretary, IS & PS	38
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	39-40
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	41
Commander, SOMTO, c/o SOMLO	42
Chief, INC	43
Spares	44-48

5425

HEADQUARTERS 19 DEC 1944 A

FILES A

33

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 542

SAC (P) (44) 155
17th December 1944

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The Supreme Allied Commander has directed (Conclusion 3(c) of PC (44) 35th Meeting) that G-5 prepare for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local ammassment.

2. On 13th December the Chief Administrative Officer held a meeting, a record of which is contained in paper No. PC (44) 152. It will be observed that at Conclusion (a) of the record of this meeting G-5 were directed to prepare a telegram to the Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY. A draft telegram has been prepared and coordinated with the appropriate authorities. A copy of this draft telegram is attached.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested :

(a) To authorise the despatch of the attached draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) To direct that in the event of an unfavourable reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff G-5, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, prepare for his approval a further telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending,

(i) the introduction of a reduced uniform bread ration throughout ITALY,

(ii) the terms of a statement for issue jointly by the United States and British Governments explaining the reasons which necessitated the introduction of the reduced uniform scale.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. On 13th December [illegible] record of which is contained in paper No. FC (44) 152. [illegible] that at Conclusion (a) of the record of this meeting G-5 were directed to prepare a telegram to the Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY. A draft telegram has been prepared and coordinated with the appropriate authorities. A copy of this draft telegram is attached.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested :

(a) To authorise the despatch of the attached draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) To direct that in the event of an unfavourable reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff G-5, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, prepare for his approval a further telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending,

(i) the introduction of a reduced uniform bread ration throughout ITALY,

(ii) the terms of a statement for issue jointly by the United States and British Governments explaining the reasons which necessitated the introduction of the reduced uniform scale.

(c) To endorse Conclusion (b) of the meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on 13th December to the effect that the Allied Commission be directed to draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945, but to defer any action to implement such plans for the present.

5434 Luncz 1 1002-4/CCS 452/10/(CC)

to Gen Cabs

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

: : : : : : : : : : : : :
:CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
: BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
: : : : : : : : : : : : :

(32)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

K 512

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

5433

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chief Commissioner, [illegible]	34
G-1 (A)	35
G-1 (B)	36-37
G-2	38-39
G-3	40
G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4 (A)	42
G-4 (B)	43-45
G-5	46-50
Speres	

5433

(32)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

DRAFT CABLE K 542

TO: CCS personal from Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander (repeated to the President and the Prime Minister respectively through State Department and Foreign Office channels).

1. This is a personal and urgent request to you for a firm and final statemen of the policy of our two Governments on the provision of bread for the population of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA, supported by a firm and final guarantee of the means to implement that policy month by month over minimum periods of not less than six months. This request has the complete support of my political and economic advisers.

2. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has always been to allot sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in ITALY a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognised as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in FRANCE and GREECE; it is lower than that in N.W. Europe as a whole. The matter is, therefore, not one of preferential treatment for ITALY; it is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in ITALY necessary for the continuance of military operations.

5432

3. As you have been advised, it has been our constant endeavour to raise the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of ITALY. We have proved that there is always a discrepency between what it is theoretically possible to amass for controlled distribution, and what is in fact, amassed and available for this purpose. This is no new problem and is always

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in ITALY a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognised as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in FRANCE and GREECE; it is lower than that in N.W. Europe as a whole. The matter is, therefore, not one of preferential treatment for ITALY; it is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in ITALY necessary for the continuance of military operations.

5432

3. As you have been advised, it has been our constant endeavour to raise the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of ITALY. We have proved that there is always a discrepancy between what it is theoretically possible to amass for controlled distribution, and what is in fact, amassed and available for this purpose. This is no new problem and is always most acute in peasant-populated countries with weak local administration. We cannot hope within measurable time to correct it. It is therefore idle to discuss further the use of grain which for controlled distribution in support of a ration scale is non-existent. Nor is it more useful to pass the responsibility to the Italian Government for a problem which they cannot solve.

4. Hitherto we have been able to establish a ration of 300 grams south of the Garigliano. It has not been possible to do so north of this line, where a 200 gram bread ration obtains. The disparity between the two zones is causing resentment and distress which have already led to disorders and this fact has again been brought to my notice by my Army Commanders. In the combat zone and in

32

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

K 542

newly liberated areas the combination of undernourishment and the winter operational conditions is causing the greatest hardship; and the necessity for preventing militarily serious disorders in and near the combat zone is as imperative as the politicel and military necessity for preventing them in the south.

5. There is no doubt that the Italian people regard the statement made by the President and the Prime Minister as constituting a pledge which will not be broken; and in this connection I wish to quote thefollowing statements on which they base their hopes.

a. "The first objective in improving the lot of the Italian people is to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and famine". (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26 September 1944).

b. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in ITALY where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency". (The President on 29 October 1944).

c. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of ITALY that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required, to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people". (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31 October 1944). 5431

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and famine". (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26 September 1944).

b. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in ITALY where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency". (The President on 29 October 1944).

c. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of ITALY that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required, to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people". (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31 October 1944). 5431

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to implement these promises. Of late weeks the cuts which have been imposed make it impossible for me to plan consistently for any uniform ration. It will be superfluous for me to emphasise the administrative and political objections to an unstable ration scale for such a basic foodstuff as bread. It has, for example, been brought to my notice that some fifty to sixty thousand tons only are expected to arrive in this country in January, as against previously planned and advised shipments of ninety thousand tons of wheat equivalent. It is impossible to plan the feeding of a population of 25 million people (and later 45 million) with a plan which, as past experience has shown, may be upset from week to week. Further, the shipping allotted to me for operational maintenance has already been so cut that it will not permit of any further reduction if

(32)

TOP SECRET

1330

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

K 542

operations are to continue as planned. I would also drew your attention to the fact that whatever difficulties confront us now they may be counted as small compared with those which we march to meet in the densely populated areas of Northern ITALY.

7. In order to provide for a uniform 300 gram bread ration throughout ITALY SICILY and SARDINIA (including the provision for future commitments in North ITALY), I estimate that I shall require an average import of 185,000 tons monthly for the 5 months February to June. For each month during which that portion of ITALY north of our present line does NOT become a commitment, an average of 91,000 tons can be deducted, provided forward stockpiling is eliminated.

8. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation, and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theatres of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot continue to administer those parts of ITALY under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians, unless I am regularly and continuously provided with the means to do so. I believe that, both for our immediate war effort and for the final achievement of peace, an ITALY which does not nurse the perpetual grievances of broken promises, hunger and apathy and a growing physical weakness of her people, will be the best testimony to the justice of Allied dealing. I do not think that firm and generous treatment will be without its effect as an example to other countries.

5230

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation, and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theatres of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot continue to administer those parts of ITALY under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians, unless I am regularly and continuously provided with the means to do so. I believe that, both for our immediate war effort and for the final achievement of peace, an ITALY which does not nurse the perpetual grievances of broken promises, hunger and apathy and a growing physical weakness of her people, will be the best testimony to the justice of Allied dealing. I do not think that firm and generous treatment will be without its effect as an example to other countries.

(32)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Cbf Comm. 5858

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K-539

SECRET

19 Dec 1944

SAC(P)(44)154
16 December 1944

COPY NO. 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. A draft for a tripartite agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CNLIA), was circulated with paper No. PC(44)144. Owing to the delay in the formation of the new Italian Government, it later became necessary, as explained in paper No. PC(44)144 Annexure, to return the CNLIA delegation without this agreement having been signed. Instead, the signatures of the delegation were obtained to a bipartite agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CNLIA.

2. However, in accordance with the sense of the discussions at PC(44)34th Meeting Minute 3 and PC(44)35th Meeting Minute 8, Commander SOMTO discussed the draft tripartite agreement with the CNLIA delegates before their return to Northern Italy. It appeared that the delegation had certain objections to this draft, of which the more important were:-

(a) In regard to Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement, the delegates considered it essential that the CNLIA should be recognized as the agents of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it; and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

(b) The delegates objected to the inclusion of the words "including such orders to disband and surrender their arms when required to do so" at the end of Paragraph 5 of the draft agreement. They consider that such wording:-

(i) Implies distrust on the part of the other signatories.

(ii) Is unnecessary because it is implicit in the preceding words "and will obey orders issued by him or by the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

came necessary, as explained in paper No. PC(44)144 Annexure, [illegible] CNLLA delegation without this agreement having been signed. Instead, the signatures of the delegation were obtained to a bipartite agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CNLIA.

2. However, in accordance with the sense of the discussions at PC(44)34th Meeting Minute 3 and PC(44)35th Meeting Minute 8, Commander SOMTO discussed the draft tripartite agreement with the CNLIA delegates before their return to Northern Italy. It appeared that the delegation had certain objections to this draft, of which the more important were:-

(a) In regard to Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement, the delegates considered it essential that the CNLLA should be recognized as the agents of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it; and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

(b) The delegates objected to the inclusion of the words "including such orders to disband and surrender their arms when required to do so" at the end of Paragraph 5 of the draft agreement. They consider that such wording:-

(i) Implies distrust on the part of the other signatories.

(ii) Is unnecessary because it is implicit in the preceding words "and will obey orders issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf."

(iii) Is unwise in that it unnecessarily draws attention at this stage to a situation which, because it has given rise to such problems in other liberated territories, is delicate in the extreme.

3. On the other hand, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, has expressed the view that the Italian Government should not be requested to confer on the CNLLA any more definite recognition than is contained in Paragraph 1 of the existing draft.

C.O.S. Distribution.

Chief Com. 31
Political 33
C.O.S. 32

-1-

316

SECRET

FILE A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

4. A further meeting is therefore being held in Rome on Sunday, 17th December, between the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and representatives of Commander SOMTO and G-5. As a result of this meeting, it is hoped to lay before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference a revised draft memorandum of agreement, which the Supreme Allied Commander will be invited to approve for transmission to the Italian Government.

for J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-32
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	33
G-1(A)	34
G-1(B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4(A)	41
G-4(B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander SOMTO c/o SOMLO	46-47
Deputy Paymaster in Chief	48
Colonel Riepe, AAI	49-51
Spares	52-60

5498

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	3-4
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	13-14
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	15
Chief of Staff	16
Chief Administrative Officer	17
Deputy Chief of Staff	18-20
U.S. Political Advisor	21-24
British Resident Minister	25
Director, PWB	26
Secretary, General Staff	27-29
Secretary, IS & PS	30
Chief, Liaison Section	31-32
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	33
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	34
G-1(..)	35
G-1(B)	36-37
G-2	38-39
G-3	40
G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4(..)	42
G-4(B)	43-45
G-5	46-47
Commander SOMTO c/o SOMLO	48
Deputy Paymaster in Chief	49-51
Colonel Riepe, AMI	52-60
Spares	

5498

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

31h

SECRET

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

5882

Brit Comm

SECRET K-540
COPY NO 31

19 Dec
1185

SAC(P)(44)153
16 December 1944

RECEIVED
17 DEC 1944
G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

POLICY REGARDING PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. In a previous paper (number PC(44)127) the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee recommended:

a. That private news agencies should not be allowed to start up in ITALY as long as that country remained a theatre of operations.

b. That PWB should endeavor to prepare the ground for the establishment of Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function when privately owned agencies begin to operate. This co-operative agency would be owned and operated by member newspapers and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

2. This paper was discussed at PC(44)32nd Meeting when the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the British Resident Minister both requested that the foregoing policy should be revised and that in order to give the Italians greater liberty, private agencies should now be permitted. In consequence, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that PWB, G-2, G-5 and the Allied Commission, should endeavor to agree on the action to be taken and report accordingly.

3. The Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee therefore held a meeting in ROME with the Allied Commission and G-5, at which it was agreed that PWB would not interpose any objection to the entrance of private news agencies. It was, however, pointed that their entrance might:

5427

a. Retard the progress of a non-monopolistic private Italian agency.

b. Possibly impair the political situation through the admission of the news from outside sources which are, at the present time, screened by PWB.

4. It has been determined from consultations with the private news agencies that they will be willing and able to take over as from 15 January.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

This co-operative agency would be owned and operated by member newspapers and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

2. This paper was discussed at PC(44)32nd Meeting when the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the British Resident Minister both requested that the foregoing policy should be revised and that in order to give the Italians greater liberty, private agencies should now be permitted. In consequence, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that PWB, G-2, G-5 and the Allied Commission, should endeavor to agree on the action to be taken and report accordingly.

3. The Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee therefore held a meeting in ROME with the Allied Commission and G-5, at which it was agreed that PWB would not interpose any objection to the entrance of private news agencies. It was, however, pointed that their entrance might:

5427

a. Retard the progress of a non-monopolistic private Italian agency.

b. Possibly impair the political situation through the admission of the news from outside sources which are, at the present time, screened by PWB.

4. It has been determined from consultations with the private news agencies that they will be willing and able to take over as from 15 January.

5. G-2 point out that, although there does not appear to be any direct security risk from the entrance of these private agencies, there is, in view of the disturbed political situation in liberated territory, an indirect risk that unfiltered news might further impair the political situation to such an extent that it might become necessary to withdraw Allied troops from the front for internal security measures.

-1-

C.O.S. Distribution

Chief Com. 31
C.O.S 32
Political 33.

(31a)

SECRET

FILE "A"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

SECRET

6. The ruling of the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested as to whether the political advantage to be obtained by allowing the entrance of private agencies into ITALY justifies the increased military risk involved.

for J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Advisor	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, CCS & POS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1(A)	34
G-1(B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4(A)	41
G-4(B)	42
G-5	43-44
Spares	45-50

5496

1336

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, JS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1(A)	34
G-1(B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4(A)	41
G-4(B)	42
G-5	43-44
Spares	45-50

5426

(31a)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

K 537

cc. 1176
DEC 18 RECD

CONFIDENTIAL

5781

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

50

AND

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

At the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the following arrangements will come into effect as from Sunday 17th December, 1944:-

1. The Political Committee will cease to exist.

2. A Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held at 1030 hours on TUESDAYS to discuss political matters. Normal attendance at these meetings will be as at List "A" attached.

3. A Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held at 1030 hours on FRIDAYS to discuss operational matters Normal attendance at these meetings will be as at List "B" attached.

4. Items and papers for the Agendas will NOT be accepted unless they reach the Inter Service and Political Secretariat before the following times:-

Political matters	1800 hours on Saturdays
Operational matters	1800 hours on Tuesdays

Matters which are of urgent operational importance may, however, be accepted for inclusion in the Agendas later than these times. Such matters should be notified as early as possible to the Inter Service and Political Secretariat.

5. Items put forward for the Agendas will be confined to matters involving important policy decisions. 5495

6. If important matters involving inter-service or political considerations and requiring urgent decisions arise between meetings, the Inter Service and Political Secretariat should be informed of them at once.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander will hold an

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

held at 1030 hours on FRIDAYS to discuss Operational [illegible]. Normal attendance at these meetings will be as at List "B" attached.

4. Items and papers for the Agendas will NOT be accepted unless they reach the Inter Service and Political Secretariat before the following times:-

Political matters	1800 hours on Saturdays
Operational matters	1800 hours on Tuesdays

Matters which are of urgent operational importance may, however, be accepted for inclusion in the Agendas later than these times. Such matters should be notified as early as possible to the Inter Service and Political Secretariat.

5. Items put forward for the Agendas will be confined to matters involving important policy decisions. 5495

6. If important matters involving inter-service or political considerations and requiring urgent decisions arise between meetings, the Inter Service and Political Secretariat should be informed of them at once.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander will hold an Operations and Intelligence Conference daily (including SUNDAYS) at 0900 hours in the G-3 War Room. Attendance at this Conference (which supersedes the Chief of Staff's Morning Meeting) will be as at List "C" attached. Those on both Lists "B" and "C" (other than speakers at the 9 o'clock meeting) will NOT be expected to attend the 9 o'clock meeting on Fridays.

John Harding

JOHN HARDING
Lieutenant General.
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS
17 DEC 1944

Attached.

(31)

15th December, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST "A"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
4. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
5. Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
6. Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
8. Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
9. United States Political Adviser
10. British Resident Minister
11. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
12. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ
13. Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission for Italy.
14. Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ

with, in attendance

15. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
16. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
17. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
18. Deputy United States Political Adviser

LIST "B"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
4. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
5. Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
6. Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
8. Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
9. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
10. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
11. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

with, in attendance

5424

12. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
13. Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
14. Chief, G-3 Operations Section, AFHQ
15. Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

LIST "C"

1. Supreme Allied Commander

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LIST "B"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
4. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
5. Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
6. Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
8. Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
9. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
10. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
11. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

5494

with, in attendance

12. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
13. Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
14. Chief, G-3 Operations Section, AFHQ
15. Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

LIST "C"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
3. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
4. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
5. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
6. Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
8. Chief Intelligence Officer, HQ MAAF
9. Deputy Director of Operations, HQ MAAF
10. Chief, G-3 Operations Section, AFHQ
11. Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
12. Deputy Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
13. Commander "A" Force

---

(31)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
G-1 (A)	18
G-1 (B)	19
G-2	20
G-3	21-28
G-4 (A)	29
G-4 (B)	30
G-4 (Mov & Tn)	31
G-4 (Log Plans)	32
Chief, Liaison Section	33
Chief Signals Officer	34
U.S. Political Adviser	35-37
British Resident Minister	38-41
Secretary, General Staff	42
Secretary, IS & PS	43-45
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	46-48
Director, PWB	49
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	50-52
SOM LO	53-54
Lt.Col.Crichton, c/o IS & PS	55
Chief, INC	56
Spares	57-61

5423

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chief, Liaison Section	33
Chief Signals Officer	34
U.S. Political Adviser	35-37
British Resident Minister	38-41
Secretary, General Staff	42
Secretary, IS & PS	43-45
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	46-48
Director, PWB	49
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	50-52
SOM LO	53-54
Lt.Col.Crichton, c/o IS & PS	55
Chief, INC	56
Spares	57-61

5423

(31)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 152
13th December 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 43

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

Record of a meeting held in the Chief Administrative Officer's Office at 1100 hours on Wednesday 13th December 1944.

PRESENT :-

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel D.M. Libby, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (A)

Major General R.G. Lewis,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (B)

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel J.E. Butterworth,
G-5 Section

Colonel J. Legg,
Allied Commission

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARY :-

Major J.G. Sweetman

THE MEETING had before them the following documents from the Allied Commission :-

(a) A letter from the Chief Commissioner stating strongly the case for implementing a 300 gramme bread ration in ITALY, but recommending that, in the event of shipping being inadequate to support such a scale, ration parity should nevertheless be established throughout the liberated area (including SICILY and SARDINIA).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel J.E. Butterworth,
G-5 Section

Colonel D.M. Libby, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (A)

Colonel J. Legg,
Allied Commission

Major General R.G. Lewis,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (B)

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

SECRETARY :-

Major J.G. Sweetman

5422

THE MEETING had before them the following documents from the Allied Commission :-

(a) A letter from the Chief Commissioner stating strongly the case for implementing a 300 gramme bread ration in ITALY, but recommending that, in the event of shipping being inadequate to support such a scale, ration parity should nevertheless be established throughout the liberated area (including SICILY and SARDINIA).

(b) A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, explaining the position in regard to food supplies in ITALY and recommending that, if shipping to make a 300 gramme ration possible cannot be guaranteed, the decision to reduce the ration in the southern area and at the same time equalise it throughout the country should be communicated to the Italian Government in a joint statement to be made by the Allied Governments.

(c) A draft joint statement by the Allied Governments in accordance with (b) above.

COLONEL HENN stated that there were three problems which the meeting should consider. The first was that of wheat supplies for SICILY. The Supreme Allied Commander had reported on 24th September to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he did not propose to import wheat into that island as sufficient local grain was available. Later, in view of the failure of the

/amassment of

30a

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

amassment of Sicilian wheat to reach early estimates, the Allied Commission had been directed to investigate the possibilities of emergency feeding in SICILY, but examination had shewn that little could be expected in this respect. At PC (44) 35th Meeting, Minute 3(c), G-5 had been directed to prepare a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the position and the immediate action which had been directed, and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continual Italian failure to secure adequate local amassment. G-5's draft cable on this subject had not been concurred by G-4 (A), who maintained that any further diversion of shipping from operational requirements was not acceptable and consequently a ration, which could not be covered by existing allocations, could not be recommended. The second problem before the meeting was the consideration of the Allied Commission's recommendation that it was necessary to establish parity in rationing, so as to provide to the best of our ability an equitable standard throughout the country. The Allies had a clear responsibility in this respect. Thirdly, the meeting should produce a draft statement for publication in the event of the equalisation of the ration, at a level below 300 grammes, being necessary.

BRIGADIER LUSH said the Chief Commissioner was strongly of opinion that equalisation of the ration was essential. The decision as to the scale at which parity should be effected must be made on the basis of a firm allocation of shipping for the importation of supplies. It was important that no promise should be made to maintain the ration on a level above what the shipping allocation would permit. The Chief Commissioner further felt that any disparity in SICILY would create a most serious situation in that island. Brigadier Lush added that the fact must be faced that in SICILY further local supplies would not be produced for amassment on any appreciable scale no matter what action was taken. He further pointed out that the 300 gramme ration could not be implemented on the present shipping allocation without prejudicing the stock-pile which was earmarked to provide the minimum impact ration in northern ITALY.

MR. KIRK considered that the Chief Commissioner's letter made a very strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration. In view of the present situation in ITALY and the statements which had been made by both the President and the Prime Minister (which had been interpreted in ITALY as a promise of a 300 gramme ration) he considered that SACMED ought to make the final request for an increased shipping allocation to allow of the establishment of a ration on this scale. The telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should therefore state fully the case for such a ration and point out the serious consequences to be expected from any reduction so that the President and the Prime Minister could assess the responsibility involved in a decision to withhold further shipping. He did not consider that the telegram should include any reference to the establishment of the ration on the scale of 250 grammes, nor was it

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

which parity should be effected must be made on the basis of a firm allocation of shipping for the importation of supplies. It was important that no promise should be made to maintain the ration on a level above what the shipping allocation would permit. The Chief Commissioner further felt that any disparity in SICILY would create a most serious situation in that island. Brigadier Lush added that the fact must be faced that in SICILY further local supplies would not be produced for amassment on any appreciable scale no matter what action was taken. He further pointed out that the 300 gramme ration could not be implemented on the present shipping allocation without prejudicing the stock-pile which was earmarked to provide the minimum impact ration in northern ITALY.

MR. KIRK considered that the Chief Commissioner's letter made a very strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration. In view of the present situation in ITALY and the statements which had been made by both the President and the Prime Minister (which had been interpreted in ITALY as a promise of a 300 gramme ration) he considered that SACMED ought to make the final request for an increased shipping allocation to allow of the establishment of a ration of this scale. The telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should therefore state fully the case for such a ration and point out the serious consequences to be expected from any reduction so that the President and the Prime Minister could assess the responsibility involved in a decision to withhold further shipping. He did not consider that the telegram should include any reference to the establishment of the ration on the scale of 250 grammes, nor was it necessary to raise the question of a joint statement at this stage. It should be emphasised that the establishment of a 300 gramme ration would not represent an especial favour to ITALY at the expense of other countries but was merely the minimum essential to prevent disease and unrest and provide conditions in ITALY suitable for the continuance of our military operations.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed with Mr. Kirk that the telegram should be confined to presenting the case for a 300 gramme ration. He felt that experience in SYRIA had shown that there was no sovereign remedy for producing hoarded grain quickly. Several measures were necessary and these took a considerable time. On current decisions, supplies for SICILY were ensured until 10th January only, consequently sufficient time for effective action to bring out hoarded supplies was not available. Representations had been made in LONDON that the procedure for making the recent cuts in shipping had discriminated unfairly against this theatre and some additional allocation might be made available. He questioned whether it was right to divert in the next month some 14,000 tons of wheat to SICILY in view of Lieutenant General Clark's opinion (expressed in AAI message CAO 346 of 12 December) that further supplies were urgently required in forward areas if militarily serious unrest was to be avoided.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

COLONEL LIBBY said that discussions now proceeding would not produce an increase in the theatre shipping allocation greater than three to four ships per month. He stressed that military maintenance could not be subject to any further cuts if operations were to continue. There could be no question of providing increased civilian shipments within the existing allocation. It was for that reason that while this allocation stood he could not agree to any policy involving an increase on the ration (of 200 grammes flour equivalent to 250 grammes bread) which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed in their reply to LAC 71 of 28 December 1943.

COLONEL LEGG pointed out that the purpose of diverting 14,000 tons to SICILY was to avoid a reduction of the ration as the consequencesof such a step were likely to be more serious than failure to raise the ration in the north. The Allied Commission desired to raise the ration in the forward area but did not consider that this should be done until a firm shipping allocation had been received and consequently a firm assessment had been made of the scale of ration which could be maintained.

COLONEL BUTTERWORTH, in reply to Major General Lewis, stated that the shipping required to implement a 300 gramme ration would be of the order of eight ships per month. He confirmed that the wheat was available and that shipping was the limiting factor. The advance of the armies had led to an increased civil commitment which it was not possible to meet within a static shipping allocation.

MR. BROAD agreed with Mr. Kirk that SACMED should recommend a 300 gramme ration in the strongest possible terms.

BRIGADIER LUSH enquired whether planning for the import of further wheat into SICILY after 10th January should proceed. In his view such shipments would be necessary, though the Italian Government should not be soinformed at this stage.

THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER :

(a) Directed that G-5 (in conjunction with G-4 (A), G-4 (B), British Resident Minister and U.S Political Adviser) prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY in accordance with Mr. Kirk's remarks at 'X' above. R/20

(b) Directed that the Allied Commission draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945 but defer any action to implement such plans for the present.

(c) Approved in principle the proposal to establish parity in ration

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

increased civil commitment which it was not possible to meet within a static shipping allocation.

MR. BROAD agreed with Mr. Kirk that SACMED should recommend a 300 gramme ration in the strongest possible terms.

BRIGADIER LUSH enquired whether planning for the import of further wheat into SICILY after 10th January should proceed. In his view such shipments would be necessary, though the Italian Government should not be soinformed at this stage.

THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER :

(a) Directed that G-5 (in conjunction with G-4 (A), G-4 (B), British Resident Minister and U.S Political Adviser) prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY in accordance with Mr. Kirk's remarks at 'X' above. 20

(b) Directed that the Allied Commission draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945 but defer any action to implement such plans for the present.

(c) Approved in principle the proposal to establish parity in ration scales throughout liberated ITALY but ruled that no further action towards such parity, or in regard to the proposed joint statement by the Allied Governments, be taken until a reply had been obtained to the telegram to be despatched under (a) above.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

/DISTRIBUTION

B0a

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterraneanr	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-44
Spares	45-50

5419

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-3	[illegible]
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-44
Spares	45-50

5419

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

1354

300

SECRET

SO To CHIEF COMMISSIONER
1107 RECD 3 COPIES, 10

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-514

PC(44)151
8 December 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 31

RECEIVED
9 DEC 1944
G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE ON COMBINED RELIEF OPERATIONS

Note by Actg. Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

1. Existing directives of the CCS for combined relief and rehabilitation operations in GREECE appear to contemplate the introduction of relief only into liberated areas in which reasonably settled conditions exist. A basic requirement is that distribution should be equitable without distinction of race, creed or politics. The Combined Chiefs have taken the position that where chaos and anarchy exist relief may be abrogated.

2. Recent developments in ATHENS include fighting between British forces and those of the Greek Government on the one side and EAM-ELAS forces on the other; declaration of military areas under full control of the British military; and domination of other areas by EAM-ELAS forces.

3. Under these circumstances ML GREECE is proceeding with combined relief operations pursuant to existing directives, insofar as conditions permit the import and distribution of supplies.

4. These conditions in GREECE however are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions (as distinguished from chaos and anarchy) on which combined relief operations are assumed to have been predicated do not and for some time may not exist. Relief operations if continued may well be discriminatory in effect if not by intention, according to the element in control of each area.

5. It is believed that continuance of combined relief operations in GREECE under existing conditions should be brought to the attention of the CCS for any comment which they may wish to make. Attached is a draft telegram designed to accomplish this purpose.

6. The Political Committee are invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorise the dispatch of this telegram.

HEADQUARTERS

8

1022

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. Recent developments in Athens [illegible] and those of the Greek Government on the one side and EAM-ELAS forces on the other; declaration of military areas under full control of the British military; and domination of other areas by EAM-ELAS forces.

3. Under these circumstances ML GREECE is proceeding with combined relief operations pursuant to existing directives, insofar as conditions permit the import and distribution of supplies.

4. These conditions in GREECE however are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions (as distinguished from chaos and anarchy) on which combined relief operations are assumed to have been predicated do not and for some time may not exist. Relief operations if continued may well be discriminatory in effect if not by intention, according to the element in control of each area.

5. It is believed that continuance of combined relief operations in GREECE under existing conditions should be brought to the attention of the CCS for any comment which they may wish to make. Attached is a draft telegram designed to accomplish this purpose.

6. The Political Committee are invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorise the dispatch of this telegram.

(init) T. R. H.

for C. M. S.

HEADQUARTERS 9DEC1944 G-5

NOTE: This paper will be taken as Item 5a. at the 35th Meeting of the Political Committee to be held at 1130 hours, Saturday, 19 December 1944.

(30)

FILES A

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

K-514

Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eight Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4 (A)	42
G-4 (B)	43-45
G-5	46-50
Spares	

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DRAFT CABLE

K-514

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO : AGWAR FOR CCS

INFO: Central District UK Base Section (London) for British Chiefs of Staff, HQ ComZone Main (ETOUSA)

signed Wilson cite FHGEG. This is MAT _____

Effect of political and military developments on combined relief operations in GREECE is subject.

1. You are undoubtedly fully informed on subject of current political and military developments in GREECE. These include (a) fighting in ATHENS between forces of British and Greek Governments on the one side and EAM and ELAS on the other, (b) fighting between ELAS and other Greek elements in a few localities, and (c) co-operation for the introduction of relief between British and ELAS forces in still other localities dominated by EAM.

2. Under these circumstances ML GREECE is proceeding with combined relief operations insofar as circumstances permit and insofar as the import and distribution of supplies is possible, but there may well be some discrimination according to the elements in control at the different ports of entry.

3. In short present conditions in GREECE are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions mentioned in TAM 250 upon which combined relief [illegible] predicated do not and for some time may not exist.

5417

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ELAS on the other, (b) fighting between ELAS and other Greek elements in a few localities, and (c) co-operation for the introduction of relief between British and ELAS forces in still other localities dominated by EAM.

2. Under these circumstances ML GREECE is proceeding with combined relief operations insofar as circumstances permit and insofar as the import and distribution of supplies is possible, but there may well be some discrimination according to the elements in control at the different ports of entry.

3. In short present conditions in GREECE are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions mentioned in TAM 250 upon which combined relief operations were predicated do not and for some time may not exist.

4. The foregoing is reported for your information and any comment which you may wish to make for the guidance of this Headquarters. Meanwhile we propose to continue the import and distribution of relief supplies to the extent permitted by prevailing conditions.

Distribution:

G-5	SGS
CAO	AG Records
G-3	C/S MTO
G-4 (B)	US POLAD
IS&PS	Brit. Res. Min.
G-4	

(30)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

S.O.W. Chief (Commissioner) 5447 (3)

CC 1112
DEC 11 RECD

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 150
7th December, 1944

K 510

SECRET
COPY NO. 31

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RESTRICTED
10 DEC 1944

SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS INTO THE YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Note by Secretary

1. A letter has been received by MMIA from the Italian Minister of War, charging that representatives of the Yugoslav Partisans are inviting desertion of Italian soldiers. It is alleged that trucks were sent from the headquarters of the Partisan Committee in ROME to SIENA to collect Italian soldiers who were to desert from Army units in order to enlist in Yugoslav formations. It is stated that the trucks actually returned with some seven Italian soldiers.

2. Liaison Section states that a report by the intelligence officer of the United States Army Air Force Support Command, MTO, shows the following facts:-

(a) There have recently been 462 desertions of men of Yugoslav origin, out of a total of 1600 such troops in the Italian division in the Command. There is no direct evidence that these desertions were provoked by Yugoslavs but the Commanding General of the division, his Chief of Staff, and several subordinate commanders were found to be of that opinion.

(b) The Italian officers suspect the Yugoslav Headquarters in NAPLES to be the source of this proselytising. All the desertions of soldiers of Yugoslav origin have so far been from those units of the division which are located in the close neighbourhood of NAPLES. The units further away have not so far suffered from desertion.

K 416

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

of War, charging that representatives of the Yugoslav Partisans are inviting desertion of Italian soldiers. It is alleged that trucks were sent from the headquarters of the Partisan Committee in ROME to SIENA to collect Italian soldiers who were to desert from Army units in order to enlist in Yugoslav formations. It is stated that the trucks actually returned with some seven Italian soldiers.

2. Liaison Section states that a report by the intelligence officer of the United States Army Air Force Support Command, MTO, shows the following facts:-

(a) There have recently been 462 desertions of men of Yugoslav origin, out of a total of 1600 such troops in the Italian division in the Command. There is no direct evidence that these desertions were provoked by Yugoslavs but the Commanding General of the division, his Chief of Staff, and several subordinate commanders were found to be of that opinion.

(b) The Italian officers suspect the Yugoslav Headquarters in NAPLES to be the source of this proselytising. All the desertions of soldiers of Yugoslav origin have so far been from those units of the division which are located in the close neighbourhood of NAPLES. The units further away have not so far suffered from desertion.

(c) These Italian officers state that the propaganda carried out by the Yugoslavs stresses the point that, unless Yugoslavs now join with Tito, it will be another five years or more before they see their families across the Adriatic, during the imminent Third War, which it is implied is sure to come between Russia and the remainder of the present Allies and co-belligerents.

(d) These desertions are markedly impairing the morale of native Italian troops.

3. There are known to be a minimum of 18 Yugoslav Partisan officers in ROME, 3 in NAPLES and 3 in TARANTO, apart from the NLA authorities in the BARI area. It is believed that a close investigation would reveal the existence of many more and their location in areas of ITALY in which the Yugoslavs can have no legitimate interest. There are, in addition, the Royal Yugoslav Delegates in ROME and ALGIERS.

(29)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

4. It is expected that a united provisional Yugoslav Government founded on the Subasic-Tito agreement will soon be established. When this takes place, it will be possible to call upon this government to reduce its military representation in ITALY to conform with its legitimate needs, which, apart from NLA Headquarters in BARI, would appear to be best related to a military component for any diplomatic mission it may wish to maintain in ROME.

5. In the interim, Liaison Section (with the concurrence of G-2, G-3, the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser) recommend:-

(a) That G-5 be directed to request the Allied Commission to address an interim reply to the Italian Minister of War stating that the Supreme Allied Commander shares the Minister's apprehension as to the effect of acts of this kind and has ordered a complete investigation into the activities of Yugoslav Partisan officers in ITALY.

(b) That G-2, G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission be instructed to collect all information available as to the numbers, locations and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison officers and missions in ITALY, and to render a report to the Political Committee in due course.

(c) That a further communication be made to the Italian Minister of War as soon as this report has been considered.

(d) That, as soon as it is established, the united provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to eliminate superfluous liaison officers and missions, reducing its military representation to conform to its proper needs in ITALY.

6. G-5 have pointed out that representations to the Yugoslavs to require the return of the alleged deserters to Italian military jurisdiction cannot at present be made, as the communication from the Italian Minister of War fails to identify the persons who are stated to have deserted. 5415

7. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize action in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

1363

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) That G-2, G-3, G-5, Liaison Section [illegible] Mission be instructed to collect all information available as to the numbers, locations and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison officers and missions in ITALY, and to render a report to the Political Committee in due course.

(c) That a further communication be made to the Italian Minister of War as soon as this report has been considered.

(d) That, as soon as it is established, the united provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to eliminate superfluous liaison officers and missions, reducing its military representation to conform to its proper needs in ITALY.

5415

6. G-5 have pointed out that representations to the Yugoslavs to require the return of the alleged deserters to Italian military jurisdiction cannot at present be made, as the communication from the Italian Minister of War fails to identify the persons who are stated to have deserted.

7. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize action in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

for [illegible]
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

/Distribution....

(29)

SECRET

1364

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander, Balkan Air Force	46-51
Spares	52-56

5414

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander, Balkan Air Force	46-51
Spares	52-56

2414

29

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 1096
DEC 8 - RECD

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 505

TOPSECRET

PC (44) 149
6th December. 1944

COPY NO. 31

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS

Note by Secretary

Attached for information at Appendix "A" is a copy of the draft agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito which Brigadier Maclean has taken into Yugoslavia with him.

At Appendix "B" is a further draft agreement taken into Yugoslavia by Brigadier Maclean concerning purely naval matters.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30

5413

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander-in-Chief, AAI	46-48
Chief, INC	49
Commander, ML HQ YUGOSLAVIA	50
Spares	51-55

5413

:CLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET :
:BY AUTHORITY OF THE SAC :

/Appendix "A"

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

TOP SECRET

K 505

DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE AND MARSHAL TITO.

---

1. It is agreed that for the purpose of supporting the J.N.L in their fight against the Germans in northern JUGOSLAVIA, British forces should now be introduced into the Z.D.R area. It is further agreed that these forces are being introduced into JUGOSLAVIA for the sole purpose of destroying the German armies and that they will be withdrawn when their presence is no longer required for this purpose.

2. The primary object of these forces will be to establish and maintain a base from which to extend and intensify air action against the enemy. To this end it is further agreed that the air forces in the Z.D.R area shall be:-

6 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons (including the two J.N.L Squadrons) with the possible addition at a later date of another Fighter/Bomber Squadron and one Night Fighter Squadron.

A Balkan Air Force Command Post

Ancillary Units including R.D.F Units

The total air forces will be approximately 4,000 officers and men.

K 112

This force will be under the operational command of a Royal Air Force Officer, who in turn will be under the general direction of MARSHAL TITO for operations in JUGOSLAVIA.

3. It is also agreed that British Land Forces should be sent to the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

13966

the enemy. To this end it is further agreed that the air forces in the ZADAR area shall be:-

6 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons (including the two J.NL Squadrons) with the possible addition at a later date of another Fighter/Bomber Squadron and one Night Fighter Squadron.

1 Balkan Air Force Command Post

Ancillary Units including RADAR Units

The total air forces will be approximately 4,000 officers and men.

412

This force will be under the operational command of a Royal Air Force Officer, who in turn will be under the general direction of MARSHAL TITO for operations in JUGOSLAVIA.

3. It is also agreed that British Land Forces should be sent to the ZADAR area. The role of these forces will be to carry out the extensive technical work required to establish and maintain the port and base and in conjunction with the J.NL to carry out the defence of the base as far forward as possible. They will also be available to carry out offensive operations in conjunction with the J.NL forces if required. These forces shall not without the conclusion of a further agreement, exceed 20,000, of which not more than 50% will be fighting troops. They will include infantry, artillery, engineers, a small amount of light armour and the necessary technical signal and administrative units for the maintenance of the forces.

(28)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

It is agreed that the operation of these forces will be carried out in consultation with and in support of the appropriate J.N.L Commanders.

4. In order to facilitate naval operations further north in the ADRIATIC it is agreed that operations may be carried out against these islands by those forces based on ZADAR or from advanced bases occupied by the Navy.

5. It is agreed that in order to prepare the way for the early arrival of these forces British reconnaissance parties shall be allowed to proceed forthwith and that full facilities and liberty of movement shall be granted by the J.N.L Commanders and authorities to these parties.

6. It is understood that the British Authorities will be entirely responsible for the supply of the British forces introduced by them. The J.N.L Authorities will, however, afford all reasonable help to the British forces in respect of local facilities in the area of operations.

It is further understood that while entirely responsible for their own administration the British forces will in no way interfere with the local civil administration.

5411

7. It is agreed that the implementation of this agreement shall be entrusted to the British Air and Land Force Commanders in close collaboration with the appropriate J.N.L Commanders and that the latter will be nominated and given in writing full authority to treat with them.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. It is understood that the British Authorities will be entirely responsible for the supply of the British forces introduced by them. The J.N.L Authorities will, however, afford all reasonable help to the British forces in respect of local facilities in the area of operations.

It is further understood that while entirely responsible for their own administration the British forces will in no way interfere with the local civil administration.

5411

7. It is agreed that the implementation of this agreement shall be entrusted to the British Air and Land Force Commanders in close collaboration with the appropriate J.N.L Commanders and that the latter will be nominated and given in writing full authority to treat with them.

8. Arrangements for naval co-operation will be the subject of a separate agreement.

---

(28)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

TOP SECRET

K 505

DRAFT NAVAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE AND MARSHAL TITO

1. The Allied Navies in furtherance of their operations in the ADRIATIC against the common enemy will require the temporary use of any ADRIATIC ports and anchorages which the operational situation may demand.

2. It will be necessary to install a British Naval Officer and Staff together with the necessary Naval personnel and equipment afloat or ashore at these ports in order to co-ordinate and organise the operational and administrative matters of the Allied Naval Forces and shipping.

3. The command of the ports will remain in JUGOSLAV hands, but it is agreed that:-

(a) The Allied Navies may conduct operations from and in the ports as they require.

(b) The Allied Navies may take their own Naval and anti-air defence measures.

(c) The JUGOSLAV Authorities will give every assistance to the British senior Naval officer and keep him informed of all matters which may affect Allied naval operations.

(d) The Allied Naval forces concerned will be withdrawn as

5410

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

or ashore at these ports in order to co-ordinate and organise the operational and administrative matters of the Allied Naval Forces and shipping.

3. The command of the ports will remain in JUGOSLAV hands, but it is agreed that:-

(a) The Allied Navies may conduct operations from and in the ports as they require.

(b) The Allied Navies may take their own Naval and anti-air defence measures.

(c) The JUGOSLAV Authorities will give every assistance to the British senior Naval officer and keep him informed of all matters which may affect Allied naval operations.

(d) The Allied Naval forces concerned will be withdrawn as soon as their presence is no longer required.

5410

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(28)

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 506
SECRET
COPY NO. 31

PC (44) 148
6 December 1944

RECEIVED
7 DEC 1944
G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.
13-6-12

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ALLEGED YUGOSLAV DESERTERS

Note by Secretary

1. The Yugoslav Delegation in ROME has expressed to the Allied Commission their desire to obtain custody of certain Yugoslav Nationals residing in ROME, on the grounds that they are deserters from the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation. Some of the persons sought are believed to be in Allied custody in a refugee camp.

2. G-5, with the concurrence of the British Resident Minister, the United States Political Adviser, and G-1 (B), have suggested that the Allied Commission's policy should be:

a. That proven deserters from the Yugoslav Armed Forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslavian military jurisdiction.

b. That the liberty of other persons, whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons, should be protected.

3. It is considered, therefore, that a procedure should be set up whereby the Yugoslav authorities would be required to set forth certain particulars in regard to each person. This will permit the Allied Authorities to screen requests without entering into political issues. It is also thought that the Allied Commission should require notification of a desertion within 60 days of its occurrence.

4. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to endorse the above proposals and to authorise the dispatch of the attached draft letter to the Allied Commission.

J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

be apprehended and returned to [illegible] jurisdiction.

b. That the liberty of other persons, whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons, should be protected.

3. It is considered, therefore, that a procedure should be set up whereby the Yugoslav authorities would be required to set forth certain particulars in regard to each person. This will permit the Allied Authorities to screen requests without entering into political issues. It is also thought that the Allied Commission should require notification of a desertion within 60 days of its occurrence.

4. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to endorse the above proposals and to authorise the dispatch of the attached draft letter to the Allied Commission.

J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

1002-7/cc (Comint-091)

A

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U. S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

(27)

HEADQUARTERS 7 DIC

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DRAFT

K 506 SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394.

Subject: Alleged Yugoslav Deserters.

1. Under date of 30 November 44 (reference Dpr/2/G2/DP) a letter from Major KOLJENSIC of the Yugoslav Delegation in ROME, on the subject of Yugoslav deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.

2. You should advise Major KOLJENSIC that it will be your policy to assist him in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation, but that it will be necessary for him to conform with a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied Armies. Each individual case will require to be considered separately, with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is sought.

3. It will therefore be necessary for the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and, prior to taking any action towards apprehension, you should require that particulars be furnished. This might be set forth in affidavit form as follows:

(1) Name of deserter.
(2) Rank.
(3) Military Unit.
(4) Date of enlistment or induction.
(5) Date and circumstances of desertion.
(6) Probable whereabouts.

5408

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Armies. Each individual case will require to be considered separately, with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is sought.

3. It will therefore be necessary for the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and, prior to taking any action towards apprehension, you should require that particulars be furnished. This might be set forth in affidavit form as follows:

5408

(1) Name of deserter.
(2) Rank.
(3) Military Unit.
(4) Date of enlistment or induction.
(5) Date and circumstances of desertion.
(6) Probable whereabouts.

You should also require notification of any desertion within 60 days thereof.

By Command of General WILSON:

J. A. H. GAMMELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

(27)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-499

CONFIDENTIAL

PG (44) 147
5th December 1944

COPY NO. 31

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL

Note by Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. Four YUGOSLAV officers, General ZIVOLJIN PAVLOVITCH, General MARKO MIHAJLOVITCH, General GEORGES GLICHITCH and General ALEKSANDER MARKOVITCH, called at the Allied Commission with a view to seeking a channel to the appropriate authorities at this Headquarters in order to discuss their future plans.

2. These officers desire permission to form YUGOSLAVS who are not followers of TITO into combatant units to fight on any Allied front except against YUGOSLAVS. It is said that there are 250 officers and 1780 NCOs and ORs in SWITZERLAND who have signed a declaration indicating their willingness to fight on any Allied front but not under TITO. There are said to be 60 or 70 officers and 150 NCOs and ORs in ITALY, and a greater number in EGYPT and FRANCE who could be recruited for this purpose. The Generals also have information regarding anti-TITO factions in YUGOSLAVIA.

3. The position of anti-TITO personnel at this time is anomalous. These persons, if they do not enter the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation, may be treated as deserters if they should return to Yugoslav jurisdiction. It is their claim that there is a state of civil war in YUGOSLAVIA.

4. Entirely apart from technical legal considerations, it appears that to permit the recruitment of Yugoslavs hostile to TITO, outside of YUGOSLAVIA into combatant units would be inconsistent with our friendly relations with Marshal TITO. It is recommended that no action be taken with a view to any such development. It is believed in this case that no useful purpose can be served by an interview between the Yugoslav officers and officers of this Headquarters, and that such action would create a most dangerous precedent. It is recommended that the Allied Commission be instructed to advise the Yugoslav officers to this effect.

(intd) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

are said to be 60 or 70 officers and 150 NCOs and ORs in ITALY, and a greater number in EGYPT and FRANCE who could be recruited for this purpose. The Generals also have information regarding anti-TITO factions in YUGOSLAVIA.

3. The position of anti-TITO personnel at this time is anomalous. These persons, if they do not enter the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation, may be treated as deserters if they should return to Yugoslav jurisdiction. It is their claim that there is a state of civil war in YUGOSLAVIA.

4. Entirely apart from technical legal considerations, it appears that to permit the recruitment of Yugoslavs hostile to TITO, outside of YUGOSLAVIA into combatant units would be inconsistent with our friendly relations with Marshal TITO. It is recommended that no action be taken with a view to any such development. It is believed in this case that no useful purpose can be served by an interview between the Yugoslav officers and officers of this Headquarters, and that such action would create a most dangerous precedent. It is recommended that the Allied Commission be instructed to advise the Yugoslav officers to this effect.

(intd) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

1002-2/cc (Sept 12 '91)

FILES A

(20)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

A

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U. S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
M HQ (BALKANS) c/o G-5	46-47
Spares	48-52

K-499

5406

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-3	40
G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4 (A)	42
G-4 (B)	43-45
G-5	46-47
M HQ (BLKANS) c/o G-5	48-52
Spares	

5406

(26)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

5380

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 501

PC(44)144 - Annexure.
5 December 1944.

SECRET

COPY-NO. 31

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary.

1. In accordance with Conclusion (b) of Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30th November, the delegation from the Committee of National Liberation for NORTHERN ITALY (CLNAI) have been detained in ROME. It would now appear however, that there is likely to be some delay before a new Italian Government is formed, and further delay before the proposal for the recognition of the CLNAI can be submitted to the new government when formed.

2. G-2 in a recent appreciation gave the opinion that the enemy may evacuate Northwest ITALY this month. It is apparent, therefore, that no time should be lost if plans for anti-scorch and other measures of resistance in North West ITALY are to be effective.

3. The delegation feel that they should return, if not to ITALY, at any rate to SWITZERLAND. They feel that their prolonged absence at this critical juncture may be misconstrued by their adherents in Northern ITALY. Time is needed to distribute the funds authorized by the Supreme Allied Commander, and generally to make the money work. Also plans for anti-scorch are held up pending the return of Signor PARRI, the military member of the delegation.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander has accordingly directed that Commander, SOM: -

(a) Bring the delegation to AFHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bi-lateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944.

(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern ITALY at times and by means dictated by security. (The Chairman of the Committee is likely to have to remain in SWITZERLAND on his way to Northern ITALY for some time, to complete financial arrangements.)

5405

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

may evacuate Northwest ITALY this month. It is apparent, therefore, that no time should be lost if plans for anti-scorch and other measures of resistance in North West ITALY are to be effective.

3. The delegation feel that they should return, if not to ITALY, at any rate to SWITZERLAND. They feel that their prolonged absence at this critical juncture may be misconstrued by their adherents in Northern ITALY. Time is needed to distribute the funds authorized by the Supreme Allied Commander, and generally to make the money work. Also plans for anti-scorch are held up pending the return of Signor PARRI, the military member of the delegation.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander has accordingly directed that Commander, SOM: -

(a) Bring the delegation to AFHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bi-lateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. FC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944.

(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern ITALY at times and by means dictated by security. (The Chairman of the Committee is likely to have to remain in SWITZERLAND on his way to Northern ITALY for some time, to complete financial arrangements.)

5. The delegation are very disappointed that the primary object of their visit, namely, recognition by the Italian Government, has not so far been achieved, but they hope that this may materialise in the near future. In any case, no announcement of such recognition could be made until they are safely back in North West ITALY and under cover. All that would then be required would be a radio announcement by the Italian Government.

6. It is therefore recommended that: -

(a) Conclusion (a) of Paper No. FC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944 should stand.

REDUCED COPY
12 DEC 1944
A. C.

SECRET

5405
(25a)
1384
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 501

(b) Commander, SOM, should secure the signature of the delegation to a document undertaking to accept the Italian Government's participation in a tripartite agreement if this can be secured on the terms set out in the draft attached to Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944.

J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-32
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	33
	34
G-1(A)	35
G-1(B)	36-37
G-2	38-39
G-3	40
G-3 Special Operations	41
G-4(A)	42
G-4(B)	43-45
G-5	46-47
Commander SOM c/o SOMLO	48
Deputy Paymaster in Chief	49-51
Colonel Riepe, AAI	52-60
Spares	

5404

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-32
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	33
G-1(A)	34
G-1(B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4(A)	41
G-4(B)	42
G-5	43-45
Commander SOM c/o SOMLO	46-47
Deputy Paymaster in Chief	48
Colonel Riepe, AAI	49-51
Spares	52-60

5404

25a

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K498

TOP SECRET

PC(44)146
5 December 1944.

COPY NO. 31

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

Note by Act'g. Ass't. Chief of Staff, G-5

1. At the time of the last Political Committee meeting the intention was to send the two ships, previously held loaded in the HEEL, one each to the ports of SPLIT and DUBROVNIK. These ships were being sent in under certain conditions, less than those necessary for the implementation of the full ML Plan, but such as had already been agreed durin, the discussions at BARI.

2. Subsequent to that meeting, and on the evenin, of the same day, a signal was received saying that TITO was unwilling to accept even these reduced conditions. He wished to have nothing to do with ML or UNRRA, and to sign for the supplies with an AFHQ nominee in BARI or BELGRADE; but he professed to accept the strict basic principles already laid down. He requested that all the supplies should be sent to SPLIT, and not part to SPLIT and part to DUBROVNIK as had been intended.

3. Telegram No FX-62867 was dispatched to the Maclean Mission on 4 December 1944 and should be read in conjunction with this paper.

(init) T. R. H.

for C. M. S.

DISTRIBUTION:	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24

5403

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

BELGRADE; but he professed to accept the strict basic principles already laid down. He requested that all the supplies should be sent to SPLIT, and not part to SPLIT and part to DUBROVNIK as had been intended.

3. Telegram No FX-62867 was dispatched to the Maclean Mission on 4 December 1944 and should be read in conjunction with this paper.

(init) T. R. H.

for C. M. S.

DISTRIBUTION:	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1(A)	34
G-1(B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4(A)	41
G-4(B)	42
G-5	43-45
MHQ BALKANS, c/o G-5	46-47
Spares	48-55

5403

1002-2/CC

(25)

TOP SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

FILES

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

S.O. to Chief Commission

K 491

CONFIDENTIAL

CC. 1063
5/12/43.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 145
4th December, 1944

COPY NO. 31

RECEIVED
4 DEC 1944
G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTEINGS

Note by Secretary

1. With the coming of winter months, and the consequent bad weather, the operation of schooners off the Adriatic Coast northwards from BRINDISI will present considerable difficulties.

2. It is considered essential that all schooners take shelter when the "Bora" blows (mid-November to end of February)

3. It is understood that some schooners are now being routed via the TREMITI Islands, and between these islands and ANCONA (3 days sailing), there is no shelter available for vessels drawing more than 7-8 feet of water.

4. Before the war, it is understood that all but the smallest schooners proceeding to the Northern ports during the winter months, crossed over to either VIS or LAGOSTA, and then proceeded up the Yugoslav coast, using shelter as necessary amongst the islands there, and returning to the mainland of ITALY on reaching DUGI Island.

5. From the navigational and sea-mining aspects it is desirable to use this route again. Moreover, if it is impossible to do so, schooner traffic carrying essential supplies to forward areas will be almost brought to a standstill during the winter months. It is thought, however, that there may be considerable political objection to the routeing of vessels flying the Italian ensign through Yugoslav territorial waters.

6. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander whether the political objection must override the naval advantages.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

5402

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

via the TREMITI Islands, and between these islands and ANCONA (3 days sailing), there is no shelter available for vessels drawing more than 7-8 feet of water.

4. Before the war, it is understood that all but the smallest schooners proceeding to the Northern ports during the winter months, crossed over to either VIS or LAGOSTA, and then proceeded up the Yugoslav coast, using shelter as necessary amongst the islands there, and returning to the mainland of ITALY on reaching DUGI Island.

5. From the navigational and sea-mining aspects it is desirable to use this route again. Moreover, if it is impossible to do so, schooner traffic carrying essential supplies to forward areas will be almost brought to a standstill during the winter months. It is thought, however, that there may be considerable political objection to the routeing of vessels flying the Italian ensign through Yugoslav territorial waters.

6. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander whether the political objection must override the naval advantages.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

5402

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1 (A)	34
G-1 (B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4 (A)	41
G-4 (B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

HEADQUARTERS 5 DEC 1944 C.

CONFIDENTIAL

24

File Pol Papers

1002-2/CC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

4538

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

DEC 2 - RECD

K 480

PC (44) 144
30th November, 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 44

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1530 HOURS ON MONDAY 29TH NOVEMBER, 1944

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General W.A.M. Stawell,
Commander, SOM TO

Brigadier General C. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations.

Colonel T.R. Henn,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel F.T. Hammond,
G-5.

Colonel J.R. Riepe,
AAI

Colonel Joseph Rodrigo,
OSS

Major W.H. Suhling,
AAI

Lieutenant A.M. Bullowa,
G-5.

SECRETARY:-

Major W.E. Rose.

HEADQUARTERS
20 DIC 1944
5.901

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General W.A.M. Stawell,
Commander, SOM TO

Brigadier General C. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations.

Colonel T.R. Henn,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel F.T. Hammond,
G-5.

Colonel J.R. Riepe,
AAI

Colonel Joseph Rodrigo,
OSS

Major W.H. Suhling,
AAI

Lieutenant A.M. Bullowa,
G-5.

SECRETARY:-

Major W.E. Rose.

HEADQUARTERS
20 DEC 1944
A. C.

Sum #-3201/1
(2/10/44)

THE MEETING had before them:-

(a) A third draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) - not fully concurred in by the U.S. Political Adviser, G-5 and the Allied Commission - arising out of PC (44) 33rd Meeting, conclusion 6.

(b) A note by G-5 raising certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement at (a) above.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD stated that Mr. Kirk and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who both had strong views on the proposed agreement, had been unable to come down from Rome for the meeting owing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. They had both pointed out however that a definite agreement could not be reached until there was a new Italian Government with which to discuss it and had also reported that recognition of the Patriot movement had been one of the factors contributing to the cabinet crisis. He understood that the Allied Commission was of the opinion that the Italian Government should not be a party to this agreement but that it should be a military instrument between the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the CLNAI.

(23)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 480

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL proposed that the meeting should agree on two alternative memoranda, covering tripartite and bilateral agreementsrespectively. He pointed out in this connection that no part of the armistice terms empowered the Allied Governments to demand either the Italian Government's adherence to such an agreement or their recognition of the Partisan movement.

MAJOR GENERAL STAWELL observed that recognition of the movement by the Italian Government was most desirable since it was in a much stronger position than the Supreme Allied Commander to order industrialists and other waverers to cooperate. He estimated that the value of the agreement would be halved if the Italian Government were not a party to it. He urged that the monthly contributions be raised to a maximum of 160 million lire instead of the 100 million lire previously suggested, pointing out that even at the higher figure the cost of resistance would be cheaper than in other countries.

Replying to a question by Lieutenant General Gammell, he stated that the funds would be supplied in Allied Military lire by the Deputy Paymaster in Chief, AFHQ to the Allied Commission who would in turn pass them over to the Italian Government for transfer in metropolitan lire to Northern Italy through banks and other agencies. Any sums which might be sent direct to the field by SOE/OSS would be part of the maximum monthly figure of 160 million lire. He agreed therefore, with Lieutenant General Gammell that it should be stated in the proposed agreement that the funds were being made available "on the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER"

COLONEL RIEPE queried whether there might not be some difficulty over the proposed method of payment with the American Fiscal authorities.

MR. BROAD stated that the Foreign Office were in favour of the proposed agreement but wished a clause inserted so as to safeguard any risk of the CLNAI coming under the control of a particular political party. He suggested therefore, that a paragraph 4, reading as follows, be inserted in the draft agreement:-

"The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER. The Political Head of the CLNAI must be a person acceptable to the Italian Government"

K 400

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

Commission who would in turn pass them over to the Italian Government for transfer in metropolitan lire to Northern Italy through banks and other agencies. Any sums which might be sent direct to the field by SOE/OSS would be part of the maximum monthly figure of 160 million lire. He agreed therefore, with Lieutenant General Gammell that it should be stated in the proposed agreement that the funds were being made available "on the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER"

COLONEL RIEPE queried whether there might not be some difficulty over the proposed method of payment with the American Fiscal authorities.

MR. BROAD stated that the Foreign Office were in favour of the proposed agreement but wished a clause inserted so as to safeguard any risk of the CLNAI coming under the control of a particular political party. He suggested therefore, that a paragraph 4, reading as follows, be inserted in the draft agreement:-

"The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER. The Political Head of the CLNAI must be a person acceptable to the Italian Government"

MAJOR GENERAL STAWELL reported that the CLNAI delegates were anxious to return to occupied Italy as early as possible. If it was now proposed to await the formation of a new Italian Government it would be necessary either to hold Signor Longhi, much against his will, or to let him go , in which case his signature to the agreement, which was most desirable, would not be obtained.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:-

(a) Instructed the Secretary:-

(i) To bring the draft memoranda of agreement as amended in discussion (attached) before the first meeting of the Political Committee following the formation of a new Italian Government.

/(ii)

(23)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 480

(ii) To send the amended draft agreements to the U.S. Political Adviser and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission enquiring of them whether they wished to suggest any major modifications prior to their submission to the Political Committee.

(iii) To invite the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to report to the Political Committee at its first meeting following the formation of a new Italian Government, as to the feasibility of obtaining the latter's adherence to the form of tripartite agreement proposed bearing in mind Major General Stawell's statement at "X" above.

(b) Directed that Commander, SOM ensure that Signor Longhi and other delegates of the CLNAI remain in liberated Italy until the signature of the proposed agreement and that he take all other steps to ensure that secrecy were observed regarding these negotiations.

W.E. ROSE
MAJOR

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director PWB	25
Secretary, IS & PS	26-28
Secretary, General Staff	29
G-1 (A)	30
G-1 (B)	31
G-2	32-33
G-3	34-35

5399

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

and that he take all other steps to ensure that
secrecy were observed regarding these negotiations.

W.E. ROSE
MAJOR

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director PWB	25
Secretary, IS & PS	26-28
Secretary, General Staff	29
G-1 (A)	30
G-1 (B)	31
G-2	32-33
G-3	34-35
G-3 Special Operations	36
G-4 (A)	37
G-4 (B)	38
G-5	39-42
Chief, Liaison Section	43
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	44-46
Commander SOM ITO, c/o SOMLO	47
Deputy Paymaster in Chief	48
Colonel Riepe, AAI	49-51
Spares	52-56

5209

(23)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 480

DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) is recognised by the Italian Government as the established body representing the anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The CLNAI for its part accepts the Italian Government recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Italian Government, which signed the armistice terms and as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government wish the utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CLNAI will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLNAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CLNAI) will, on behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which 5398 will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CLNAI will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLNAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military commend of the CLNAI) will, on behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.

5398

4. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Political Head of the CLNAI will be a person acceptable to the Italian Government.

5. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CLNAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately

(23)

/upon....

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 480

upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CLNAI will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disband and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the CLNAI in common with all other anti-fascist organisations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CLNAI and all other anti-fascist organisations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

LIGURIA	20
PIEDMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

5297

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory, [illegible]

not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CLNAI and all other anti-fascist organisations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

LIGURIA	20
PIEDMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

5297

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

7. Allied Missions attached to the CLNAI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by CLNAI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

(23)

SECRET

1400

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 480

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS..... .....

FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.....

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL

LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.....

NOTE PASSAGES UNDERLINED WOULD BE OMITTED IF THE AGREEMENT WERE MADE ONLY BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER AND THE CLNAI.

5396

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

1402

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5296

SECRET

3

SECRET K 479

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

PC (44) 143
29th November, 1944.

COPY NO. 41

RECEIVED
30 NOV 1944
G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.
29

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA

Note by Secretary

1. As a result of the report and proposals set forth in telegram No BAF 473 dated 23rd November 1944 from Balkan Air Force, G-5 propose, with the concurrence of the United States Political Adviser, the British Resident Minister, G-3 and M HQ Balkans that the attached draft telegram should be sent to the War Office.

2. Attention is drawn :-

(a) to the slight variation in the functions of the proposed Mission as set out in para 3 of the attached draft, compared with those suggested in BAF 473.

(b) to the rank proposed in para 4 of the attached draft for the head of the Mission.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to endorse the proposals set forth in the attached draft telegram and to authorise its despatch.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
	20-28

5295

1403
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3. The Political Committee [illegible] Commander to endorse the proposals set forth in the attached [illegible] and to authorise its despatch.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 (Special Operations)	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-36
Secretary, IS & PS	37-39
Chief, Liaison Section	40
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	41-43
Commander, M HQ Balkans, (c/o G-5)	44-45
Commander, Balkan Air Force	46-50
Commander, SOM LO	51-52
Spares	53-57

5295

1202-21/CC

(22) File

-1-

FILES A

SECRET

/Draft Cable....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

SECRET

DRAFT CABLE

TO:- TROOPERS

INFO:- III CORPS

1. The question of the future British representation in Albania has been under consideration. While it seems clear that some representative mission must remain in the country we are strongly of the opinion that the SOE Missions should be withdrawn as soon as possible. The personnel who compose them were trained as Liaison Officers for guerrilla operations and the situation is altered by the virtual withdrawal of the Germans from the country.

2. It is proposed, therefore, subject to your approval, to evacuate the majority of these missions forthwith, and to concentrate the remainder under Lt. Col. Alan Palmer at ANLA GHQ for the time being. We recommend, however, that as soon as possible, in any case not later than 31 December 1944, Lt. Col. Palmer's present SOE Mission at FNC HQ should be replaced by an orthodox Military Mission. This would maintain relations with FNC pending decision as to recognition of any future government in Albania and report to SACMED and not direct to authorities in UK.

3. The functions of this mission would include:

A. The providing of up to date information on political tendencies in Albania.

B. Advising on probable Albanian reaction to any particular policy contemplated by HMG.

C. Giving expert advice to AFHQ on the financial and economic situation including possibilities of trade.

2294

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

however, that as soon as possible, in any case not later than 31 December 1944, Lt. Col. Palmer's present SOE Mission at FNC HQ should be replaced by an orthodox Military Mission. This would maintain relations with FNC pending decision as to recognition of any future government in Albania and report to SACMED and not direct to authorities in UK.

3. The functions of this mission would include:

A. The providing of up to date information on political tendencies in Albania.

B. Advising on probable Albanian reaction to any particular policy contemplated by HMG.

C. Giving expert advice to AFHQ on the financial and economic situation including possibilities of trade.

D. Advising interested parties concerning the use of Albanian air fields or ports for civil or military purposes.

E. Advising or assisting interested parties with the distribution of suitable propaganda.

F. Providing such information as requested by ML Albania in the event of an ML organisation being set up in the country.

4. It is recommended that in order to give Mission sufficient status effectively to carry out above functions, it should have at its head an officer of the rank at least of Brigadier. His advisers might usefully be chosen from suitable officers now serving in, or with experience of Albania. In particular, we suggest that functions of political adviser might be fulfilled by Lt.Col. Palmer.

(22)

/5...

SECRET

5294

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

5. ML Albania, when established, will, of course, be distinct from the proposed British Military Mission, which should be instructed to co-operate with it.

6. It is understood that independent American representation is to be temporarily provided by a Military Mission under OSS auspices.

7. Further recommendations regarding personnel will be made when this proposal is approved in principle.

8. Representative of Resident Minister is telegraphing similar recommendations to the Foreign Office.

Coordinated with: POLAD
RESMIN
G-3
MHQ BALKANS.

5293

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

Coordinated with: POLAD

RESMIN

G-3

MHQ BALKANS.

5293

SECRET

(22)

1408

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET 478

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

PC (44) 242
29th November 1944

COPY NO. 40

RECEIVED
30 NOV 1944
G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.
17.29

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

WHEAT FOR SICILY

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

BACKGROUND

1. In a letter dated 24 September 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander conveyed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff his views on the bread ration for ITALY as a whole. He stated that, in the case of SICILY,

a. the current crop was sufficient to feed the island

b. the amassment was not going well.

2. He proposed in consequence "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available".

CONSIDERATIONS.

3. The original amassing estimate was 297,000 tons to June 30, 1945, a figure well within the amassing totals of the years 1937-40. Subsequently, this estimate was reduced to 221,000, and then to 200,000 tons; but present information shows that not more than 150,000 tons is likely to be obtained without repressive measures.

4. It is estimated that, if the bread ration for SICILY is to be maintained at 300 grammes, it will be necessary to import 160,000 tons between January and June 1945. Pending a decision on the matter, the Allied Commission proposes to bring into SICILY one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the Island must support itself until 15 January.

5. The reasons for the failure of the amassment are in the main as follows:

5392

a. political activities, and in the particular the failure of a weak administration to control strong agrarian interests.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1409

b. the amassment was not going well.

2. He proposed in consequence "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available".

CONSIDERATIONS.

3. The original amassing estimate was 297,000 tons to June 30, 1945, a figure well within the amassing totals of the years 1937-40. Subsequently, this estimate was reduced to 221,000, and then to 200,000 tons; but present information shows that not more than 150,000 tons is likely to be obtained without repressive measures.

4. It is estimated that, if the bread ration for SICILY is to be maintained at 300 grammes, it will be necessary to import 160,000 tons between January and June 1945. Pending a decision on the matter, the Allied Commission proposes to bring into SICILY one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the Island must support itself until 15 January.

5. The reasons for the failure of the amassment are in the main as follows:

5292

a. political activities, and in the particular the failure of a weak administration to control strong agrarian interests.

b. resentment of the farmers at receiving only 1000 lire per quintal against an alleged cost of production of 1400 lire per quintal.

c. the natural resistance of the peasant to amassment.

COURSES OPEN.

6. The following courses appear to be open to the Supreme Commander:

a. to reduce the bread ration to 200 grammes; which appears to be unacceptable politically.

b. to resort to force in an attempt to increase the amassment; which would be unacceptable militarily and politically, as well as of doubtful effectiveness.

c. to increase the price offered for wheat; a course whose success could not be guaranteed, and which might set an undesirable precedent for other parts of ITALY.

File 21a

SECRET

FILES

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

d. to adhere to the action which is proposed (Para 2 above) and to place the onus of collection of resources on the local administration; thereby to accept the political and economic consequences which might arise from their failure to carry out their responsibilities.

e. to provide the estimated quantities of wheat to make up the deficiency, and to accept the conflict of the consequent shipping demands with other urgent operational commitments.

RECOMMENDATION.

7. No recommendation is made. It is considered, however, that this opportunity should be taken of presenting SICILY to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a test case. SICILY is not only a complete economic unit but policy towards it will constitute an important precedent in the rest of ITALY, and possibly in other territory as well. It is therefore desired to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Commander regarding the policy to be followed.

(init) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
	34-35

5291

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

for C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION:	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)	40-42
Spares	43-47

5291

21w

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 991
NOV 25 RECD 3995

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL EQUALS BRITISH CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 455

PsFSC (44) 18
23rd November 1944

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 19

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUBCOMMITTEE

POSSIBLE ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Note by Director, PWB

A definite policy line is requested by PWB for guidance in the handling of news of possible Italian participation in the war against Japan.

The request is made because confusion exists in the public mind as result of conflicting statements regarding the degree of Italian participation.

The statements range from declarations that only Italian industrial capacity will be utilized to other assertions that Italian land and naval forces will be sent to the Pacific.

Clarification would be in the public interest.

(intd) R. B.

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO.

Chief, INC 1
Director, PWB 2-3

1002-2 (C
(copy
290

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The request is made because confusion exists in the public mind as result of conflicting statements regarding the degree of Italian participation.

The statements range from declarations that only Italian industrial capacity will be utilized to other assertions that Italian land and naval forces will be sent to the Pacific.

Clarification would be in the public interest.

(intd) R. B.

10022-2/(cc
(copy 1 ~
5290/(cc)

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Chief, INC	1
Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U. S. Political Adviser	6-8
British Resident Minister	9-11
IS & PS	12-14
G-2	15-16
G-5	17-18
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	19-20
Spares	21-25
G-3	26-27

Copy sent to - P.R.O.

(21)

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL EQUALS BRITISH CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

IC (44) 141

23rd November 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

TOP SECRET

COPY NO A1

K 459

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER AT 1600 HOURS ON THURSDAY 23RD NOVEMBER, 1944.

PRESENT:-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre

BRITISH

Major General T.A.M. Stawell,
Commander, S.O.M.T.O.

Commander G.R. Holdsworth,
No. 1. Special Force

Major H. Vincent,
No. 1 Special Force.

ITALIAN

Signor Longhi,
President, CLNAI

Signor Parri,
Joint Deputy Commander,
Military Committee,
CLNAI

Signor Mare,
Representing Joint
Deputy Commander,
Military Committee,
CLNAI.

SECRETARY

Colonel J.H. Lascelles

1. STRENGTH OF PARTISAN MOVEMENT

SIGNOR LONGHI, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that the total number of Partisans under the control of CLNAI now amounted to almost 90,000, most of whom were located in the mountains. There were approximately twice as many Partisans in the towns, who for the most part were unarmed and difficult to organise. The movement was strongest in PIEDMONT but efforts were being made to reinforce the movement in EMILIA and VENETO. The movement was not so strong in TRENTINO or VENEZIA GIULIA, where there were respectively considerable Austrian and Slovene populations.

100 2-12-1 X 5289 320

2. FUTURE POLICY FOR ITALIAN PARTISANS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Military Committee,
CLN.I.

SECRET.RY

Colonel J.H. Lascelles

1. STRENGTH OF P.RTIS.N MOVEMENT

SIGNOR LONGHI, in reply to a question by the Supreme .llied Commander, stated that the total number of Partisans under the control of CLN.I now amounted to almost 90,000, most of whom were located in the mountains. There were approximately twice as many Partisans in the towns, who for the most part were unarmed and difficult to organise. The movement was strongest in PIEDMONT but efforts were being made to reinforce the movement in EMILI. and VENETO. The movement was not so strong in TRENTINO or VENEZI. GUILLI., where there were respectively considerable .ustrian and Slovene populations.

2. FUTURE POLICY FOR IT.LI.N P.RTISANS

THE SUPREME .LLIED COMM.NDER said that it was difficult to predict how operations in IT.LY would develop over the next few months, but his policy was to assist the Partisans as much as possible to enable them to carry out their activities throughout the winter. They should not, however, expect a great increase in their numbers during the winter. There was a limit to the tonnage of supplies which could be sent in during the winter months, owing to bad weather and the limited number of aircraft available. He considered that the Partisans should carry on their activities against the enemy within the capabilities allowed by the volume of supplies and should try to build up against the time when the Germans withdrew.

5289

100-2-2/cc
X 3201/cc

See (16)

:TOP SECRET BY :
:.UTHORITY OF SAC b :

(20) File "Pol Papers"

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

TOP SECRET

K 459

COMMANDER HOLDSWORTH said that the Committee much regretted General Alexander's recent proclamation urging the Partisans to limit their activities during the winter. It was unprofitable to lay restraint upon Partisans operating at some distance from their homes. It was necessary, in order to maintain Partisan Formations in being and at a high level of efficiency to conduct active operations at all times.

SIGNOR LONGHI pointed out that the situation of the Italian Partisans was different from that of the Partisans in FRANCE or YUGOSLAVIA in that the Italian Partisans had to deal with the Italian fascists as well as with the Germans. While the composition of the Fascist military formations was mixed and deserters were frequent, there were some thousands of desperadoes who constituted a formidable opposition.

4. RECOGNITION OF CLN.I

SIGNOR LONGHI urged that official recognition should be given to the CLN.I, which had united all anti-fascist Partisan groups. General Cadorna had been placed in command of their operations. The Committee required an appropriate mandate from the Italian Government, which should carry the explicit approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. Conversations had already taken place with members of the Italian Government, who supported the need for recognition completely and unreservedly.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that the Allied Commission would shortly be suggesting to the Italian Government that the time was now ripe for recognition of the Committee. He recognised the urgency of this question from the delegation's point of view and the terms of recognition would shortly be discussed with the Italian Government. Questions for determination would include finance, supplies and the laying down of arms after liberation. The procedure for dealing with Partisanss after liberation would also be discussed.

SIGNOR LONGHI said that the Committee wished the Partisans after liberation to be incorporated in the Italian Army up to the numbers permissible.

5. ANTI SCORCH POLICY

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER enquired what steps were being taken to prevent the enemy from carrying out a scorched earth policy when he withdrew.

SIGNOR LONGHI replied that, passively, essential machinery parts were being hidden in the country. Actively, precise defense tasks had been assigned to formations in industrial areas, but they were short of automatic weapons and of resources for defence against tanks and armoured cars.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that workers should be armed in advance to prevent the operation of German demolition squads, which were usually small in number. He instanced the successes achieved by French and Greek workers in this connection.

6. FINANCE

5988

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

include finance, supplies and the laying down of arms after [illegible] procedure for dealing with Partisanss after liberation would also be discussed.

SIGNOR LONGHI said that the Committee wished the Partisans after liberation to be incorporated in the Italian Army up to the numbers permissible.

5. ANTI SCORCH POLICY

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER enquired what steps were being taken to prevent the enemy from carrying out a scorched earth policy when he withdrew.

SIGNOR LONGHI replied that, passively, essential machinery parts were being hidden in the country. Actively, precise defense tasks had been assigned to formations in industrial areas, but they were short of automatic weapons and of resources for defence against tanks and armoured cars.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that workers should be armed in advance to prevent the operation of German demolition squads, which were usually small in number. He instanced the successes achieved by French and Greek workers in this connection.

5288

6. FINANCE

MAJOR GENERAL STEWELL observed that the Partisans would be incurring expenditure in the towns to amass stocks of food in the factories, and that this expenditure could not satisfactorily be covered if payment to the Partisans were made on a 'per caput' basis as had been suggested.

SIGNOR LONGHI said that he had heard the sum of 100 million lire per month mentioned as an appropriate payment to the Committee. He did not consider that this was enough and estimated that 160 million lire per month would be required. He added that discussions with members of the Italian Government indicated that the Italian Government were willing to pay this amount.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that a block grant to each specific area might be made in addition to payment on a 'per caput' basis.

(V)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

K 459

SIGNOR LONGHI said that, owing to the difficulty of communication and other reasons, it would be difficult to designate areas other than by splitting Northern Italy into the MILAN, GENOA and VENICE areas.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the necessity for carrying on Partisan activities behind the enemy lines even after part of the territory had been liberated, adding that this called for a series of dispersal centres from which funds could be distributed.

SIGNOR LONGHI undertook to discuss further the possibility of forming a series of areas of appropriate size in Northern Italy for the disbursement of funds in connection with the Committee's anti-scorch policy. He added that, owing to the difficulty of arranging for funds to be available at the appropriate place and time, reasonable latitude must be allowed to the Committee. The ceiling agreed would not be exceeded, and within this ceiling no more would be disbursed than was necessary.

7. B.B.C. BROADCASTS

COMMANDER HOLDSWORTH pointed out that the timing and the consistency of BBC programmes for the Partisans in ITALY could be materially improved.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that he was prepared to write to London on this subject and instructed Commander Holdsworth to provide him with the necessary material.

8. ALLIED EX-PRISONERS OF WAR WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

SIGNOR LONGHI, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that there were from 4 to 5 thousand British and United States ex-prisoners of war at large in Northern Italy, but not more than 5 to 6 hundred of these were fighting with the Partisans.

J. H. LASCELES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander Eighth Fleet	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16

5287

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8. ALLIED EX-PRISONERS OF WAR WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

SIGNOR LONGHI, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that there were from 4 to 5 thousand British and United States ex-prisoners of war at large in Northern Italy, but not more than 5 to 6 hundred of these were fighting with the Partisans.

J. H. LASCELES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander Eighth Fleet	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 (Sp Ops)	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-36
IS & PS	37-39
Chief, Liaison Section	40
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	41
Commander, SOMTO (incl. 1 copy for Commander Holdsworth)	42-44
Spares	45-49

5287

20

:::::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET BY :
: AUTHORITY OF SAC:
:::::::::::::::::::

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1420

SECRET
K 440

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

FC(44) 140
20 November 1944

SECRET

COPY NO. 40

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

CONVERSATIONS WITH YUGOSLAV DELEGATES

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. Advices from BAF and ML (Yugoslavia) are that the conversations with the Yugoslav Delegates have reached an impasse on the question of permitting adequate unrestricted observation by ML (Yugoslavia) of the distribution in Yugoslavia of imported and local relief supplies. The Yugoslav delegates have repeatedly insisted that the right of observation must be limited, by restricting the number of observers, limiting the areas into which they may go, or by other restraints. They have been informed that there can be no restriction imposed upon the number of observers or their freedom of movement to observe all distribution throughout the territory.

As a result of this conflict, the conversations are suspended in this point and the principal representative of JANL has departed for BELGRADE for further instructions.

2. It is recommended that there should be no compromise on this basic principle of adequate observation of distribution and that the CCS be informed of the status of the matter and that no compromise is recommended.

(intd) N.P.S.
for C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAV	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24

5286

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. It is recommended that there should be no compromise on this basic principle of adequate observation of distribution and that the CCS be informed of the status of the matter and that no compromise is recommended.

(intd) N.P.S.
for C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS&PS)	40
Spares	41-45

5286 [illegible] 2 - 2/c c

SECRET

(19)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

SECRET

K 441

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

FC (44) 139
20th November 1944

COPY NO 40

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELIEF INTO ALBANIA

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. FAN 428 from CCS on 23 September stated in part:

"In the absence of a government recognized by the British and American Governments as representing all Albanian people, you should deal on matters concerning relief and rehabilitation essential to relief in ALBANIA with such local groups as you may find to be in effective control in the various parts of ALBANIA as they are liberated.

Prior to the liberation of ALBANIA, you are authorized to discuss, subject to security and other military considerations, with representatives of such groups as are collaborating with the Allies, matters concerning relief and rehabilitation essential to relief for areas under their control."

2. On the same date and before the receipt of the above, a directive was issued by the SAC to BAF which inter alia stated that the Allied aims are to introduce supplies and relief to the people of ALBANIA as early as circumstances permit, and directed joint planning by LFA and ML (ALBANIA) on the basis of a joint HQ to be supported by a Bde Gp. It now appears that no forces will be available for use in ALBANIA.

3. The military situation has also now altered to the extent that the area of ALBANIA south of the SHKUMBI River is free of the enemy and a general evacuation is taking place northwards. The approaches to the port of VALONA have also been swept. From a military point of view therefore, there does not seem to be any reason to prevent the introduction of relief supplies, of which the need is already apparent and will become more so with the approach of winter.

4. General Hughes and General Sadler recommend that relief should begin at the earliest possible moment, not later than 1 December 1944.

5. On the assumption that relief supplies are to be introduced or at least offered, consideration as to the procedure is necessary. In the absence of a force the following appear to be the only alternatives:

a. FNC representative to be called out for discussion:

5385

1002

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

1423

2. On the same date and before the receipt of the above, a directive was issued by the S.C to B.F which inter alia stated that the Allied aims are to introduce supplies and relief to the people of ALB.NL. as early as circumstances permit, and directed joint planning by LF. and ML (ALB.NL.) on the basis of a joint HQ to be supported by a Bde Gp. It now appears that no forces will be available for use in ALB.NL.

3. The military situation has also now altered to the extent that the area of ALB.NL. south of the SHKUMBI River is free of the enemy and a general evacuation is taking place northwards. The approaches to the port of VALONA have also been swept. From a military point of view therefore, there does not seem to be any reason to prevent the introduction of relief supplies, of which the need is already apparent and will become more so with the approach of winter.

4. General Hughes and General Sadler recommend that relief should begin at the earliest possible moment, not later than 1 December 1944.

5. On the assumption that relief supplies are to be introduced or at least offered, consideration as to the procedure is necessary. In the absence of a force the following appear to be the only alternatives:

a. FNC representative to be called out for discussion:

b. ML (ALB.NL.) representative to go in for discussion:

c. to initiate relief without negotiation but with notification of intended entry.

6. The disadvantages of a. and b. are that recognition of FNC is thereby accorded and the relationship between TITO and HOXHA is such that negotiations might then well follow the protracted terms of the discussion at present being carried on with YUGOSLAVIA. The third alternative therefore, seems to be the only practicable one.

7. It is suggested that the memorandum agreement approved for use in such circumstances by the Political Committee on 11 October might subsequently prove embarrassing due to its form which suggests recognition due to references to areas under control, maintenance of public order and imposition of taxes, and a modification (as attached) is therefore proposed in substitution.

(15)

SECRET

5385

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

8. It is therefore, recommended:

a. that ML (ALBANL) be directed to initiate relief forthwith:

(i) on the basis of the ML plan and under the existing CCAC conditions of supply, using VALONA until such time as DURAZZO can be opened.

(ii) on the basis of arrival at the port with a first consignment of stores, without negotiation but with notification of intended entry.

b. that the memorandum agreement as attached be approved for use.

(intd) N.P.S.
for C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAF	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS & PS)	40
Spares	41-45

5284

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

425

Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVMED	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS & PS)	40
Spares	41-45

5284

(18)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT AGREEMENT

1. This agreement is made between the undersigned in order to assist the Commander Military Liaison (Albania) and UNRRA, as the agency of the military, to carry out the task of the Commander of bringing into Albania certain essential supplies and relief services in order to alleviate the distress resulting from the war and to assist the people of Albania towards the rehabilitation of their country.

2. The undersigned announce it is their mutual objective that such supplies, and all such supplies available locally, are fairly and equitably distributed to all people without distinction of race, creed or political affiliations and solely in accordance with their needs.

3. The undersigned Albanian therefore agrees to ensure the fulfilment of this objective by whatever means may be appropriate, and to co-operate fully with the Commander in all respects to enable him to carry out his task. The Commander may observe and check the distribution of supplies in order to satisfy himself that they are being equitably distributed in accordance with this agreement.

4. The Commander will not interfere with internal politics or administration but will take such action for the protection of personnel under his command as he may find necessary.

5. The Commander will enter into such agreements with other parties as may be necessary to the accomplishment of his task.

6. Questions not covered by this agreement, including financial settlement, etc., will be the subject of further agreement.

Albanian Signator

5283

Representing the Commander
Military Liaison
(Albania).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

satisfy himself that they are being equitably distributed in accordance with this agreement.

4. The Commander will not interfere with internal politics or administration but will take such action for the protection of personnel under his command as he may find necessary.

5. The Commander will enter into such agreements with other parties as may be necessary to the accomplishment of his task.

6. Questions not covered by this agreement, including financial settlement, etc., will be the subject of further agreement.

Albanian Signator

5283

Representing the Commander
Military Liaison
(Albania).

(18)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 439

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 138
20 November 1944

SECRET

COPY NO. 40

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR
IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AND OF ITALIAN
COOPERATORS IN BRITISH CUSTODY SERVING IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

In accordance with Conclusion 8 of PC(44) 32nd Meeting of 15 November, the Prisoners of War Sub-Committee have reviewed this subject and:-

(a) Endorse the British Resident Minister's suggestion (as recorded in Minute 8 of PC(44) 32nd Meeting) that the stigma of prisoner of war status be removed.

(b) Recommend, therefore, that the telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and letter to the Allied Commission, as submitted by G-5 under Paper No.PC(44) 134 and now attached for reference, be dispatched.

(c) Desire to emphasize that the Italian Government's views which it is thus proposed to request will have to be considered in the light of administrative necessities. These will include the maintenance of the present conditions of service regarding command and man-power.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3 - 4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5 - 11
COMNAVNAW	12 - 13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U. S. Political Adviser	17 - 19
British Resident Minister	20 - 22
Director, P.W.B.	

5282

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(c) Desire to emphasize that the Italian Government's views which it is thus proposed to request will have to be considered in the light of administrative necessities. These will include the maintenance of the present conditions of service regarding command and man-power.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3 - 4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5 - 11
COMNAVNAT	12 - 13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U. S. Political Adviser	17 - 19
British Resident Minister	20 - 22
Director, P W B	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27 - 28
G-3	29 - 30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34 - 35
Secretary, IS & PS	36 - 38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS & PS)	40
Spares	41 - 45

5282

SECRET

(17)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DRAFT CABLE K-412

TO: Combined Chiefs of Staff

This is NAF_____

Status of Italian PWs is subject.

1. Premier Bonomi has requested consideration of the status of Italian prisoners of war. The Italian Government takes the position that maintenance in British and U.S. custody of Italian prisoners of war is inconsistent with United Nations declarations concerning ITALY and argues for a return of PW personnel to Italian Command.

2. The recent decision to move Italian PWs in US custody from AFRICA to ITALY in order to release U.S. Service troops for combat duties makes the problem more acute as the position of Italian PWs in ITALY is more anomalous than elsewhere.

3. Premier Bonomi has been advised that this Headquarters would be interested to learn of any concrete proposals the Italian Government may wish to make for making Italian PWs available to Allied forces under substantially similar conditions of service without reduction of manpower, efficiency or control. Premier Bonomi has also been advised that any change in the status of prisoners of war would require your authorisation.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a return of PW personnel to Italian Command.

2. The recent decision to move Italian PWs in US custody from AFRICA to ITALY in order to release U.S. Service troops for combat duties makes the problem more acute as the position of Italian PWs in ITALY is more anomalous than elsewhere. (As was done earlier — The case of Italian PWs in US custody)

3. Premier Bonomi has been advised that this Headquarters would be interested to learn of any concrete proposals the Italian Government may wish to make for making Italian PWs available to Allied forces under substantially similar conditions of service without reduction of manpower, efficiency or control. Premier Bonomi has also been advised that any change in the status of prisoners of war would require your authorisation. 2381

4. Instructions are requested respecting scope of negotiation upon receipt of Italian proposals.

(12)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM K-412

SUBJECT : Status of Italian Prisoners of War.

TO : [redacted] Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. Your letter of 27 October 1944 forwarding a translation of Premier Bonomi's letter of 8 October 1944, on the above subject, is at hand.

2. It is requested that you will inform Premier Bonomi that the Supreme Allied Commander has learned with gratification of the report made by General Dapino of his visit to Prisoner of War units in ITALY, and of his satisfaction with the conditions which he found. It is requested that you will further indicate to Premier Bonomi the views of the Headquarters along the following lines : The objections raised to the maintenance of Italian Prisoners of War in ITALY in British or American custody at this time are fully appreciated. However, in order to make any change in their status as prisoners of war, it will be necessary to refer the matter to higher authority, ~~and steps are now being taken to present the problem to the Combined Chiefs of Staff~~. Meanwhile, we should be glad to have any suggestions which the Italian Government may wish to advance as to the manner in which the prisoners presently held in this theatre, and which it may be necessary to return to ITALY, can be made available to service units under British and American control and under substantially similar conditions of service.

5280

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

satisfaction with the conditions which he found. It is requested that you will further indicate to Premier Bonomi the views of the Headquarters along the following lines : The objections raised to the maintenance of Italian Prisoners of War in ITALY in British or American custody at this time are fully appreciated. However, in order to make any change in their status as prisoners of war, it will be necessary to refer the matter to higher authority, ~~and steps are now being taken to present the problem to the Combined Chiefs of Staff~~. Meanwhile, we should be glad to have any suggestions which the Italian Government may wish to advance as to the manner in which the prisoners presently held in this theatre, and which it may be necessary to return to ITALY, can be made available to service units under British and American control and under substantially similar conditions of service.

5280

By command of General WILSON:

J.A.H. GAMMELL
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

Hd. Emp. Co.

× Mod. cat. cc

(11)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

TOP SECRET

TOPSECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 437

PC (44) 137
20th November, 1944

COPY NO. 42

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. Consequent on the discussion at the last meeting of the Political Committee on the Status of Italian Partisans (PC (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 9), Commander, Special Operations Mediterranean, has prepared, on the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander, the attached memoranda on:-

(a) Relations between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy

(b) Disposal of liberated Italian patriots.

2. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-

(a) To approve the draft memorandum of recognition circulated under Appendix "A" of the attached note and to direct that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, advise the Italian Government to issue it.

(b) To approve the disposal procedure set out in peragraph 3 of Appendix "B" of the attached note and to direct that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for this procedure to be adopted.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12

5279

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

(a) Relations between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy

(b) Disposal of liberated Italian patriots.

2. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-

(a) To approve the draft memorandum of recognition circulated under Appendix "A" of the attached note and to direct that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, advise the Italian Government to issue it.

(b) To approve the disposal procedure set out in paragraph 3 of Appendix "B" of the attached note and to direct that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for this procedure to be adopted.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO. 5279

Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
G-1 (A)	27
G-1 (B)	28
G-2	29-30
G-3	31-32
G-3 (Special Operations)	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35
G-5	36-37
Secretary, IS & PS	38-40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	42
Commander, SOM	43-
Spares	44-48

See (2)

(16)

CLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF THE SAC

X-3245-1

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

H.Q. S.O.M.
18th November, 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
A.F.H.Q.

K 437

In accordance with your instructions I forward herewith for consideration at the next Political Meeting:-

(a) A memorandum (Appendix A) which it is suggested the ITALIAN Government be advised to forward to the COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION for NORTHERN ITALY.

(b) A note (Appendix B) on the disposal of ITALIAN Patriots liberated by the Allied Armies.

(sgd) W. STAWELL

Major General
Comd. S. O. M.

5278

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

(b) A note (Appendix B) on the disposal of ITALIAN Patriots liberated by the Allied Armies.

(sgd) W. STAWELL

Major General
Comd. S. O. M.

5278

(4)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

K 437
APPENDIX "A"

SUBJECT:- Recognition of the Committee of National Liberation for NORTHERN ITALY by the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government.

INTRODUCTION

In Northern ITALY a Committee of National Liberation has been in existence for some time past. It is composed of representatives of the five main anti-Fascist parties. Its main object is to coordinate resistance to the enemy in occupied territory. It is especially powerful in the large industrial districts.

It is considered that the time is now appropriate when this Committee should receive official recognition both by the Supreme Allied Command and the Italian Government.

It is thought that by working through the Committee and its Sub-Committees a considerable measure of success will be achieved in organising anti-scorch and in maintaining law and order until the Allied Military Government can take charge.

It is proposed therefore that the ITALIAN Government be advised to recognise the Committee of National Liberation and a draft memorandum to this effect is attached for consideration.

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING RECOGNITION OF AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

---

1. The Italian Government appoints the CLNAI (Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy) as their agents in enemy occupied territory of Northern Italy for the purposes and period specified below.

2. The Italian Government recognizes the CLNAI as the constituent body representing the five anti-fascist parties i.e. (in alphabetical order) Action, Party, Christian-Democratic Party, Communist Party, Liberal Party and Socialist Party.

3. The Italian Government wishes the utmost cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The Italian Government instructs the CLNAI to establish and maintain such cooperation which will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the five anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.

5277

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

It is proposed therefore that the ITALIAN Government be advised to recognise the Committee of National Liberation and a draft memorandum to this effect is attached for consideration.

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING RECOGNITION OF AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

---

1. The Italian Government appoints the CLNAI (Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy) as their agents in enemy occupied territory of Northern Italy for the purposes and period specified below.

2. The Italian Government recognizes the CLNAI as the constituent body representing the five anti-fascist parties i.e. (in alphabetical order) Action, Party, Christian-Democratic Party, Communist Party, Liberal Party and Socialist Party.

3. The Italian Government wishes the utmost cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The Italian Government instructs the CLNAI to establish and maintain such cooperation which will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the five anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations. 5277

4. During the period of enemy occupation the CLNAI will carry out the instructions of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND which will direct the Patriots in their operations against the enemy. It is the wish of the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory at present occupied by the enemy.

5. When the enemy withdraws from occupied territory the CLNAI and its attendant committees will exercise their best endeavours to maintain law and order and to safeguard the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government takes charge.

6. The Italian Government notifies the CLNAI that the SUPREME ALLIED GOVERNMENT is pleased to accept General Raffaele CADORNA as head of the Military Committee of the CLNAI and Messrs. PARRI and GALLO as General CADORNA's joint deputy commanders. The Italian Government instructs the CLNAI to proceed with the appointment of General CADORNA, of Mr. PARRI and Mr. GALLO to their respective posts.

(16)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

K 437

7. The Italian Government will give its utmost assistance to the CLNAI to meet the needs of the patriots who are engaging the enemy in occupied territory.

During the period of enemy occupation of Northern ITALY the Italian Government is willing to make a monthly contribution to the expenses of the CLNAI.

To meet current needs the sum of 100 million lire will be made available.

This sum will be apportioned as follows:-

LIGURIA PIEDMONTE LOMBARDY EMILIA VENETO	(Amounts to be specified after consultation with representatives from the North)
100,000,000	

In deciding the magnitude and apportionment of each subsequent monthly contribution the Italian Government will be guided by the military and economic situation obtaining in each Province.

8. Allied missions, attached to the CLNAI and its sub-committees, will be consulted in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch, and maintenance of law and order. The detailed orders issued by Allied Military Authority to the missions concerned will be respected by CLNAI.

PARTE

(1000 l per month per man)

5376

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

by the military and economic situation.

8. Allied missions, attached to the CLNAI and its sub-committees, will be consulted in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch, and maintenance of law and order. The detailed orders issued by Allied Military Authority to the missions concerned will be respected by CLNAI.

5276

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

SUBJECT: DISPOSAL OF ITALIAN PATRIOTS LIBERATED BY THE ALLIED ARMIES. K 437

1. The present arrangements for the reception and disposal of ITALIAN Patriots liberated by the Allied Armies are inadequate.

There are indications that the resistance movement in Northern ITALY is being adversely affected by the apparent lack of consideration shown to Patriots when liberated.

It is suggested therefore in view of the very much larger numbers of Patriots who will have to be dealt with in the near future, the present machinery should be strengthened.

2. The Patriots Branch of the Allied Commission is the official body dealing with this problem.

It is understood that this Branch has not the executive authority or facilities to deal adequately with Patriots when liberated.

3. It is suggested therefore that arrangements on the following lines are required:-

(a) In the zone of the Armies patriots should be received, rationed, accommodated and, when necessary, clothed until their possible future, military or civil, can be ascertained. Arms and equipment, if any, should be collected and handed over to the Air Packing Station to be established at MALIGNANO in the vicinity of SIENA, from whence it will be redelivered to patriots in occupied territory. It would appear that AMG is the more appropriate parent body for the Patriots Branch.

(b) Arrangements should be made to reserve a proportion of the ceiling allotted to the ITALIAN Army for those Patriots suitable and willing to enlist in the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Alternatively, should the ceiling be complete, arrangements should be made to make room for those patriots of high medical category by eliminating personnel of lower medical category or of skilled personnel.

(c) Those Patriots not wishing to undertake military duty should be provided, when necessary, with suitable clothing and the means to proceed to their homes or to places where work can be found for them.

5375

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3. It is suggested therefore that arrangements on the following lines are required:-

(a) In the zone of the Armies patriots should be received, rationed, accommodated and, when necessary, clothed until their possible future, military or civil, can be ascertained. Arms and equipment, if any, should be collected and handed over to the Air Packing Station to be established at MALIGNANO in the vicinity of SIENA, from whence it will be redelivered to patriots in occupied territory. It would appear that AMG is the more appropriate parent body for the Patriots Branch.

(b) Arrangements should be made to reserve a proportion of the ceiling allotted to the ITALIAN Army for those Patriots suitable and willing to enlist in the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Alternatively, should the ceiling be complete, arrangements should be made to make room for those patriots of high medical category by eliminating personnel of lower medical category or of skilled personnel.

(c) Those Patriots not wishing to undertake military duty should be provided, when necessary, with suitable clothing and the means to proceed to their homes or to places where work can be found for them.

5375

(W)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEAD UARTERS

PC (44) 136
20th November 1944

K 434
SECRET

COPY NO 42

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

SECURITY SITUATION IN ROME

Note by Secretary

1. G-2 believe that the security situation in ROME is serious enough to warrant consideration of precautionary measures.

2. It must be explained that any activities detrimental to the military efforts are not caused by anti-Allied sentiments. The underlying causes are lack of food, clothing and heat. These are aggravated by a weak government and a venal police force. They are furthered by a lack of political and social unity in the population as a whole. Inaccurate and biased newspapers only add fuel to the flames of discontent.

3. It is considered that there may be incidents in ROME of an even more serious nature than that of PALERMO. It is believed that public utilities employees will strike and that crowds will demonstrate and riot. It is doubtful that the police will be able to handle the situation as they form an ineffective force due to poor pay, lack of ability, discontent, epuration and other causes.

4. There are three active organisations which, although communist inspired, are much more extremist than even the Russians may desire. They constitute a potential danger. They are (1) Communist Youth Group, (2) Movimento Comunista d'Italia and (3) Movimento Partigiano. These groups very in size but each is believed to be around 4000 or possibly more. They are well armed with weapons, ammunition and sabotage material secured either from the Allies prior to the fall of ROME, from the ANZIO area or from German stocks. The members are well trained, very active and believe strongly in the theory of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat". So far they have not advocated violenc but are leaning that way.

5. Leftist propaganda is becoming more and more outspoken in its criticism of the Allies and the Bonomi Government. Conditions in ITALY are contrasted to those in BULGARIA and ROUMANIA, to Russia's benefit. Peasants are being urged openly to seize the land of large landowners. To some extent this is tacitly approved by the Government.

6 The

524

1 C 2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

445

5. It is considered that there may be incidents in ROME of an even more serious nature than that of PALERMO. It is believed that public utilities employees will strike and that crowds will demonstrate and riot. It is doubtful that the police will be able to handle the situation as they form an ineffective force due to poor pay, lack of ability, discontent, epuration and other causes.

4. There are three active organisations which, although communist inspired, are much more extremist than even the Russians may desire. They constitute a potential danger. They are (1) Communist Youth Group, (2) Movimento Communista d'Italia and (3) Movimento Partigiano. These groups vary in size but each is believed to be around 4000 or possibly more. They are well armed with weapons, ammunition and sabotage material secured either from the Allies prior to the fall of ROME, from the ANZIO area or from German stocks. The members are well trained, very active and believe strongly in the theory of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat". So far they have not advocated violenc but are leaning that way.

5. Leftist propaganda is becoming more and more outspoken in its criticism of the Allies and the Bonomi Government. Conditions in ITALY are contrasted to those in BULGARIA and ROUMANIA, to Russia's benefit. Peasants are being urged openly to seize the land of large landowners. To some extent this is tacitly approved by the Government.

5224

6. There are cases of armed robbery of individuals, "hi-jacking" of Allied military trucks and thefts from Allied supply dumps. These acts are committed by bands of Allied deserters, both American and British, by Italian deserters and by civilians.

7. Civilian morale is spiralling downward at an increasing rate. This is du to the lack of essentials for the coming winter and the extremely high cost of goods on the Black Market. There is some decrease in pro-Allied sentiments. This is caused by communist propaganda, Mr. Eden's latest speech regarding Italian colonies, and the Allies' failure to fulfill PWB promises of adequate food.

8. The Political Committee is invited to recommend that the Supreme Allied Commander :-

(a) Direct that the Chief Administrative Officer investigate the circumstances outlined in paragraphs 2 and 6 above and recommend any corrective measures that may be necessary.

/(b).....

SECRET

(15)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 434

(b) Direct that G-3 examine the present internal security scheme for ROME and recommend any additional precautionary measures which they may consider necessary.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
G-1 (A)	27
G-1 (B)	28
G-2	29-30
G-3	31-32
G-3 Special Operations	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35
G-5	36-37
Secretary, IS & PS	38-40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS & PS)	42
Spares	43-47

5273

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Director, PWB	24
Secretary, General Staff	25
G-1 (A)	26
G-1 (B)	27
G-2	28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31-32
G-4 (A)	33
G-4 (B)	34
G-5	35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-37
Chief, Liaison Section	38-40
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS & PS)	41
Spares	42
	43-47

5373

(15)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 438
TOP SECRET
COPY NO 42

PC (44) 132 (Annexe)
20th November 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

Note by Secretary

1. In accordance with the Supreme Allied Commander's direction in Conclusion 10 of PC (44) 32nd Meeting of 15th November, G-5 have redrafted the proposed telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as attached. Changes from the original draft telegram circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 132 of 11 November are underlined, and it will be noted that the question of negotiations with the Yugoslavs on a governmental level has been dealt with in the new paragraph 3.

2. The Political Committee is invited to recommend that the Supreme Allied Commander :

(a) Direct that G-5 despatch the attached telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the NAF series.

(b) Direct that paragraph 2 of the telegram as redrafted be accepted as an interim basis for planning.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO
SupremeAllied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
	17

5272 -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

2. The Political Committee is invited to recommend that the Supreme Allied Commander :

(a) Direct that G-5 despatch the attached telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the NAF series.

(b) Direct that paragraph 2 of the telegram as redrafted be accepted as an interim basis for planning.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
SupremeAllied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
G-1 (A)	27
G-1 (B)	28
G-2	29-30
G-3	31-32
G-3 Special Operations	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35
G-5	36-37
Secretary, IS & PS	38-40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o IS & PS)	42
Spares	43-47

: : : : : : : : : : : : :
:CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
: BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
: : : : : : : : : : : : :

(14)

5372 - 100 2 - 2/cc
X - 1014/cc

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

2nd DRAFT CABLE K 438

21 November 1944

TO : AGWAR FOR CCS

Subject is Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA.

1. In August 1944 Marshal Tito was informed that it was SAC's intention to establish and maintain Allied Military Government this area until its disposition could be determined by negotiation between the governments concerned. Tito objected to this while agreeing fully to and pledging assistance in the matter of Allied military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and L of Cs required by Allied Forces occupying AUSTRIA or HUNGARY. Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.

2. It is proposed that Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are suggested as follows :

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian Carabinieri or troops. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in [illegible] importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NND No. 785015

slav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.

2. It is proposed that Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are suggested as follows :

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian Carabinieri or Troops. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops may have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.

(c) The basic law will be Italian, but all laws discriminating against the Yugoslavs and the right of recourse beyond local courts will be suspended and certain Italian national legislation may be excluded from the area.

(d) Similarly, a certain degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters might evolve. Italian lire will continue legal tender but new supplies of currency will be Allied Military Lire.

(14)

/(e).....

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

TOP SECRET

(e) Local advisory committees consisting of indigenous Italians and Slavs, which the Allied regional authorities could consult at their discretion, might be formed.

3. Developments may be such that, unless Yugoslav agreement is secured in advance, we may ~~not be in a position or may not find it expedient~~ (with it politically militarily difficult) to impose Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA. ~~In our view, political rather than military issues are in question in this connection.~~ Accordingly, we invite your consideration as to the advisability of negotiations being undertaken at a governmental level with the Yugoslav authorities in this matter.

4. Your approval is requested of the proposal for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA outlined in Paragraph 2 as a basis for planning here.

5. The above relates to VENEZIA GIULIA proper. ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute were not specifically subject of discussion with Tito in August. Allied Military Government is not envisaged there although operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav. It is assumed that ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute will, in default of Allied action, pass to Yugoslav administration, as also CORFU to the Greeks. Your approval of our negative course in these subsidiary matters is requested.

370

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4. Your approval is requested of the proposal for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA outlined in Paragraph 2 as a basis for planning here.

5. The above relates to VENEZIA GIULIA proper. ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute were not specifically subject of discussion with Tito in August. Allied Military Government is not envisaged there although operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav. It is assumed that ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute will, in default of Allied action, pass to Yugoslav administration, as also CORFU to the Greeks. Your approval of our negative course in these subsidiary matters is requested.

5370

(14)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1455

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JAQ/dfe

CC 1002-2

18 November 1944

Subject: Distribution of Political Committee Papers

To: Inter-Service and Political Secretariat, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

Will you kindly add the following to distribution of all Political Committee Papers -- Agenda and Minutes -- which would normally be sent to this Commission:

1 - Acting President, Allied Commission
1 - Chief of Staff, Allied Commission

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

cc: C/S
A Files ✓

5249

(13)

FILES A

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEAD UARTERS

K-416

FC (44) 135
13th November 1944

SECRET
COPY NO 43

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

STATUS OF ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have suggested in FAN 434 that if the Italian Partisans fulfill the conditions of the regulations annexed to the Hague convention it would be desirable for the Italian Government so to declare, and to demand for the Partisans treatment as prisoners of war in the event of capture. The Combined Chiefs of Staff authorised the Theatre Commander, if he deemed it desirable, to make a supporting statement. COSMED 193 requested that any statement made by the Italian Government be submitted to the Foreign Office before approval by this Headquarters

2. Objection respecting the alleged danger of further strengthening a patriot movement which may become difficult to handle under a military government is raised by the Allied Commission. The Commission has taken the position that we should not further build up partisan bands, as when the territory in which they function is taken over by Allied Forces a difficult problem is created for AMG and for Military authorities. The political position of the Yugoslav partisans and the French Maquis are instanced as examples to be avoided. The force of this argument is granted but it is questioned whether the post-liberation control and assimilation of these groups does not depend on a number of other and more important factors. The added measure of future political difficulty which recognition of protected status of the patriots might involve must be measured against the present political and military consequences of action or failure to act on the Allied side. Also it is suggested that if the Allies are encouraging the patriots by radio to armed resistance and are furnishing them with arms, it is not seen how as a matter of fairness the Allied command can fail to attempt to obtain for them the full protection to which they are entitled under the laws of war.

3. The views of AAI have been requested. It is the position of AAI that there are Partisan bands organised with responsible control and bearing arms openly who might be persuaded to wear appropriate insignia, and become entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. Certain bands could easily be brought into conformity with the required rules. On the other hand there are partisan bands who do not meet the requirements for combatant

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. Objection respecting the alleged danger of further strengthening a patriot movement which may become difficult to handle under a military government is raised by the Allied Commission. The Commission has taken the position that we should not further build up partisan bands, as when the territory in which they function is taken over by Allied Forces a difficult problem is created for AMG and for Military authorities. The political position of the Yugoslav partisans and the French Maquis are instanced as examples to be avoided. The force of this argument is granted but it is questioned whether the post-liberation control and assimilation of these groups does not depend on a number of other and more important factors. The added measure of future political difficulty which recognition of protected status of the patriots might involve must be measured against the present political and military consequences of action or failure to act on the Allied side. Also it is suggested that if the Allies are encouraging the patriots by radio to armed resistance and are furnishing them with arms, it is not seen how as a matter of fairness the Allied command can fail to attempt to obtain for them the full protection to which they are entitled under the laws of war.

3. The views of AAI have been requested. It is the position of AAI that there are Partisan bands organised with responsible control and bearing arms openly who might be persuaded to wear appropriate insignia, and become entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. Certain bands could easily be brought into conformity with the required rules. On the other hand there are partisan badds who do not meet the requirements for combatant status. It would be necessary to differentiate between responsible and irresponsible bands.

AAI also state that the Volkstum movement must be considered in this regard. It is suggested that the law of war imposes independent obligations on each belligerent and if members of the Volkstum meet the requirements of the provisions of the Hague Convention we are obliged to treat them as prisoners of war without regard to German treatment of Italian Partisans. If Volkstum personnel are not comprised within the provisions referred to, we shall be free to treat them without reference to the Geneva Convention.

4. It is believed that a statement from the Italian Government could be so phrased as to demand treatment for Italian Partisans as prisoners of war in such cases as are within the provisions of the Hague Convention and would thus differentiate between regular and irregular partisan bands.

/5.....

(12)

SECRET

FILES A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K-416

5. It is recommended that the Allied Commission be requested to take up with the Italian Government the preparation of an appropriate statement for approval by this Headquarters. It is further recommended that AMI be advised to propose the wearing of distinctive insignia to Italian partisan bands in all cases where such procedure is at all possible.

(s-d) C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAT	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-23
Director, PWD	24
Secretary, General Staff	25
G-1 (A)	26
G-1 (B)	27
G-2	28-29
G-3	30-31
G-3 Special Operations	32
G-4 (A)	33
G-4 (B)	34
G-5	35-36
Secretary, IS & PS	37-39
Chief, Liaison Section	40
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	41
Spares	42-46

5367

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Deputy Chief of Staff	17-19
U.S. Political Adviser	20-23
British Resident Minister	24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
G-1 (A)	27
G-1 (B)	28-29
G-2	30-31
G-3	32
G-3 Special Operations	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35-36
G-5	37-39
Secretary, IS & PS	40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	42-46
Spares	

5367

(12)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-412

PC (44) 134
13th November 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 44

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The broad issue of the status of Italian prisoners of war is again presented in a letter from Premier Bonomi dated 8 October 1944, which was forwarded to this Headquars by Commodore Stone with a covering letter dated 27 October 1944. Premier Bonomi indicates that the present status of Italian prisoners of war is not satisfactory, and argues that these persons should be returned to Italian command. The Premier maintains strongly that the status of prisoners of war is, under the present circumstances, wholly inconsistent with United Nations declarations concerning the status of ITALY and Italians.

2. The Italian Government has repeatedly protested against the prisoner of war status of Italian nationals in view of the cobelligerent status of the Italian Government, and the matter has been before the Political Committee on several occasions. Marshal Badoglio protested against the continuance of prisoner of war status for Italians on 10 May 1944. On 23 June the protest was substantially repeated by Signor Bonomi. No steps have been taken to meet the grievances of the Italian Government in this regard.

3. It is arguable that the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (set forth in FAN 359 of 5 May) to make use of Italian manpower in Allied hands without the consent of the Italian Government was never intended to apply to the use of Italian prisoners of war in SICILY or the Italian Mainland. Military considerations have so far prevailed over the political considerations involved and the Italian prisoners of war have been utilized in ITALY both in dilution of British units and in Italian PW (cooperator) units. At the present time Italian prisoners of war in U.S. custody are being moved into ITALY, where there have for some time been a substantial number of British "cooperator" units.

4. The arguments of the Italian Government, which were more than merely plausible during the period of cobelligerency, are more telling at a time when full diplomatic representation has been accorded to the Italian Government and in the light of the policies towards ITALY announced during the past month.

5366

1460

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. The Italian Government has repeatedly protested against the prisoner of war status of Italian nationals in view of the cobelligerent status of the Italian Government, and the matter has been before the Political Committee on several occasions. Marshal Badoglio protested against the continuance of prisoner of war status for Italians on 10 May 1944. On 23 June the protest was substantially repeated by Signor Bonomi. No steps have been taken to meet the grievances of the Italian Government in this regard.

3. It is arguable that the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (set forth in FAN 359 of 5 May) to make use of Italian manpower in Allied hands without the consent of the Italian Government was never intended to apply to the use of Italian prisoners of war in SICILY or the Italian Mainland. Military considerations have so far prevailed over the political considerations involved and the Italian prisoners of war have been utilized in ITALY both in dilution of British units and in Italian PW (cooperator) units. At the present time Italian prisoners of war in U.S. custody are being moved into ITALY, where there have for some time been a substantial number of British "cooperator" units.

5366

4. The arguments of the Italian Government, which were more than merely plausible during the period of cobelligerency, are more telling at a time when full diplomatic representation has been accorded to the Italian Government and in the light of the policies towards ITALY announced during the past month.

5. The objection of the Italian Government was always most pressing with respect to the use of Italian nationals in ITALY and continues to be so. It may be added that the legal position of Italian prisoners of war in ITALY is anomalous and must inevitably remain so while they are in law prisoners of war. The Geneva Convention hardly envisaged that prisoners of war would be held in custody of one nation and used as service troops in territory governed by the nation from which they were captured.

6. It is believed that any attempt at a solution of this problem cannot be entirely successful unless the American and British authorities work along closely similar lines, with only such detailed variations as may be required by local conditions.

7.....

FILES

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K-412

7. It is therefore recommended that, in reply to Premier Bonomi's letter of 8 October 1944, he be advised that we would be glad to receive any suggestions the Italian Government would care to make towards a solution of this problem, and further advise him that the matter is being referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Draft letter and cable are annexed.

(intd) C.M.S.

NOTE: Shortage of time has prevented co-ordination of this paper, or of the draft letter and cable attached, with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-23
Director, PWB	24
Secretary, General Staff	25
G-1 (A)	26
G-1 (B)	27
G-2	28-29
G-3	30-31
G-3 Special Operations	32
G-4 (A)	33
G-4 (B)	34
G-5	35-36
Secretary, IS & PS	37-39
Chief, Liaison Section	40
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	41
Spares	42-46

5285

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	12-13
COMNAVMED	14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17-19
U.S. Political Adviser	20-23
British Resident Minister	24
Director, PWB	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
G-1 (A)	27
G-1 (B)	28-29
G-2	30-31
G-3	32
G-3 Special Operations	33
G-4 (A)	34
G-4 (B)	35-36
G-5	37-39
Secretary, IS & PS	40
Chief, Liaison Section	41
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	42-46
Spares	

5285

(11)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DRAFT CABLE K-412

TO: Combined Chiefs of Staff

This is NAF_____

Status of Italian PWs is subject.

1. Premier Bonomi has requested consideration of the status of Italian prisoners of war. The Italian Government takes the position that maintenance in British and U.S. custody of Italian prisoners of war is inconsistent with United Nations declarations concerning ITALY and argues for a return of PW personnel to Italian Command.

2. The recent decision to move Italian PWs in US custody from AFRICA to ITALY in order to release U.S. Service troops for combat duties makes the problem more acute as the position of Italian PWs in ITALY is more anomalous than elsewhere.

3. Premier Bonomi has been advised that this Headquarters would be interested to learn of any concrete proposals the Italian Government may wish to make for making Italian PWs available to Allied forces under substantially similar conditions of service without reduction of manpower, efficiency or control. Premier Bonomi has also been advised that any change in the status of prisoners of war would require your authorisation.

5364

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a return of PW personnel to Italian Command.

2. The recent decision to move Italian PWs in US custody from AFRICA to ITALY in order to release U.S. Service troops for combat duties makes the problem more acute as the position of Italian PWs in ITALY is more anomalous than elsewhere.

3. Premier Bonomi has been advised that this Headquarters would be interested to learn of any concrete proposals the Italian Government may wish to make for making Italian PWs available to Allied forces under substantially similar conditions of service without reduction of manpower, efficiency or control. Premier Bonomi has also been advised that any change in the status of prisoners of war would require your authorisation.

5264

4. Instructions are requested respecting scope of negotiation upon receipt of Italian proposals.

(11)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM K-412

SUBJECT : Status of Italian Prisoners of War.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. Your letter of 27 October 1944 forwarding a translation of Premier Bonomi's letter of 8 October 1944, on the above subject, is at hand.

2. It is requested that you will inform Premier Bonomi that the Supreme Allied Commander has learned with gratification of the report made by General Dapino of his visit to Prisoner of War units in ITALY, and of his satisfaction with the conditions which he found. It is requested that you will further indicate to Premier Bonomi the views of the Headquarters along the following lines : The objections raised to the maintenance of Italian Prisoners of War in ITALY in British or American custody at this time are fully appreciated. However, in order to make any change in their status as prisoners of war, it will be necessary to refer the matter to higher authority, and steps are now being taken to present the problem to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, we should be glad to have any suggestions which the Italian Government may wish to advance as to the manner in which the prisoners presently held in this theatre, and which it may be necessary to return to ITALY, can be made available to service units under British and American control and under substantially similar conditions of service.

5263

By command of General WILSON:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

the following lines : The objections raised to the maintenance of Italian Prisoners of War in ITALY in British or American custody at this time are fully appreciated. However, in order to make any change in their status as prisoners of war, it will be necessary to refer the matter to higher authority, and steps are now being taken to present the problem to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, we should be glad to have any suggestions which the Italian Government may wish to advance as to the manner in which the prisoners presently held in this theatre, and which it may be necessary to return to ITALY, can be made available to service units under British and American control and under substantially similar conditions of service.

5263

By command of General WILSON:

J.A.H. GAMMELL
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

(11)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1468

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

JAQ/dfe

17 November 1944

Subject: Political Committee Papers

To: Inter-Service and Political Secretariat, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.

Reference your K-413 of 13 November, returned herewith is copy No. 41 of paper No. PC (44) 133 (Allied Prisoners of War in HUNGARY).

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

1 Incl.

FCC 2 CC

5282

(10)

SECRET

FILES A

SECRET

CC 915
NOV 16 1944
3236

23

K-413 ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS SECRET

Inter-Service and Political Secretariat

13th November 1944

SUBJECT : Political Committee Papers

TO : See Distribution List

Paper No. PC (44) 133 (Allied Prisoners of War in HUNGARY) was issued in error. It is requested that all copies be returned forthwith to this Secretariat. The reference number will be cancelled and re-issued subsequently.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVNAV
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PWB
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3

5361

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

cancelled and re-issued subsequently.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVNAV
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PWB
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
SOMLO

5361

(10)

HEADQUARTERS
15 NOV 1944
A C.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-407

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 40

PC (44) 132
11th November 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

See file 1014/6

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The establishment of occupational forces and of Allied Military Government is envisaged in Venezia Giulia, in connection with Freeborn Operations in AUSTRIA (Freeborn-Directive 11 October 1944. AG 381/079-O).

2. SAC's intention in this matter, also to the effect that Allied Military Government would be maintained until the question of post-war territorial jurisdiction has been settled, was communicated to Marshal Tito in August 1944 and subsequently to both the Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments. Marshal Tito objected to the imposition of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA, while agreeing to and pledging co-operation in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and L of Cs to AUSTRIA. (SAC (44) Special (5) 13 August 1944 and annexure).

3. The Allied Commission has submitted a definitive programme for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (Appendix A). The basic administrative pattern will be as elsewhere in ITALY except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside will be avoided and responsible local officials, Italian or Slav, will be retained in office. No Italian troops will be employed. Restraint will be exercised in the employment of Carabinieri and Italian provincial police; and the local police will be directly controlled by the Allied authorities. A considerable autonomy in legal, fiscal and currency matters is envisaged. Generally, the stamp of Allied control will be emphasised. The plan as above contemplates minor variations depending upon the situation found upon Allied entry, in which connection three major possibilities are envisaged :-

(a) Allied troops enter before partisan control has crystalised;

(b) Local Slav partisans have assumed localised control; or

(c) An organised Yugoslav force has entered and established military government.

5260

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

Tito objected to the imposition of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA, while agreeing to and pledging co-operation in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and L of Cs to AUSTRIA. (SAC (44) Special (5) 13 August 1944 and annexure).

3. The Allied Commission has submitted a definitive programme for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (Appendix A). The basic administrative pattern will be as elsewhere in ITALY except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside will be avoided and responsible local officials, Italian or Slav, will be retained in office. No Italian troops will be employed. Restraint will be exercised in the employment of Carabinieri and Italian provincial police; and the local police will be directly controlled by the Allied authorities. A considerable autonomy in legal, fiscal and currency matters is envisaged. Generally, the stamp of Allied control will be emphasised. The plan as above contemplates minor variations depending upon the situation found upon Allied entry, in which connection three major possibilities are envisaged :-

(a) Allied troops enter before partisan control has crystalised;

(b) Local Slav partisans have assumed localised control; or

(c) An organised Yugoslav force has entered and established military government.

To ensure transition to Allied Military Government in the last case above, the Allied Commission foresees the need for agreement in advance with the Yugoslav authorities and recommends that this take the form of an understanding that any Yugoslav forces which may cross the 1939 frontier into ITALY shall operate as an expeditionary force under Allied command.

4. General Alexander's comments on the Allied Commission programme are attached (Appendix B). He takes the view that, to ensure Allied control of requisite ports and communications in VENEZIA GIULIA and in the interests of administrative continuity, Allied Military Government on Italian lines should extend up to the 1939 frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustment has been arrived at. If any part of VENEZIA GIULIA is previously occupied by Marshal Tito's troops, control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to AMI upon arrival. General Alexander also suggests that any Yugoslav or Russian forces entering the tactical zone of AMI should come under the operational control of AMI. He considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the above lines should be taken in hand promptly with Marshal Tito and the Russian Government.

: : : : : : : : : : : : :
:CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
: BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
: : : : : : : : : : : : :

/5.....

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

5. This section approves the plan submitted by the Allied Commission for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA. We are fully in accord that the basic objective should be to retain all the practical advantages of proceeding along familiar administrative lines, and at the same time to provide appropriate local adaptions and safeguards to ensure impartial administration. We propose, however, greater rigidity in adherence to the following principles :

(a) The administrative status quo found upon Allied entry, Italian or Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be preserved provided it affords responsible government and is responsive to local public opinion;

(b) Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office; and

(c) No Italian troops or Carabinieri will be employed in police duties, for which a special force will have to be recruited locally to take over part of the burden initially assumed by Allied garrison troops.

The plan as approved by this section for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is set forth in somewhat greater detail (para 2 of Appendix C) for consideration and submission to the CCS.

6. This section also concurs in the recommendation that negotiations be undertaken with the Yugoslav authorities to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. In our judgement, such agreement need not of necessity be in the form suggested by the Allied Commission, and we do not feel in a position to comment on General Alexander's remarks, insofar as they raise the question of the military command relationship between Allied and Yugoslav/Russian forces operating in VENEZIA GIULIA.

7. In recommending negotiations as above, we accept the view that, to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and AUSTRIA, the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA is desirable. We also appreciate that anything short of this increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslavs in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. However, if necessary, the August agreement with Marshal Tito would afford an adequate modus operandi from the military security standpoint. In summary, our recommendation in favour of negotiation is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Unless they are prepared to make a public declaration to the effect that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute, we do not think there is much chance of success in a negotiation with Marshal Tito on this sensitive issue. It is submitted, accordingly, that the matter be presented in the above light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (paras 3 and 4 of Appendix C). It is

5259

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

taken with the Yugoslav authorities to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. In our judgement, such agreement need not of necessity be in the form suggested by the Allied Commission, and we do not feel in a position to comment on General Alexander's remarks, insofar as they raise the question of the military command relationship between Allied and Yugoslav/Russian forces operating in VENEZIA GIULIA.

7. In recommending negotiations as above, we accept the view that, to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and AUSTRIA, the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA is desirable. We also appreciate that anything short of this increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslavs in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. However, if necessary, the August agreement with Marshal Tito would afford an adequate modus operandi from the military security standpoint. In summary, our recommendation in favour of negotiation is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Unless they are prepared to make a public declaration to the effect that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute, we do not think there is much chance of success in a negotiation with Marshal Tito on this sensitive issue. It is submitted, accordingly, that the matter be presented in the above light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (paras 3 and 4 of Appendix C). It is also suggested that the question of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA might appropriately be raised as a subsidiary issue in negotiations which will have to be undertaken with Marshal Tito in respect of important Military operations now under consideration.

5259

8. The above discussion concerns VENEZIA GIULIA proper. Related questions are submitted, for consideration and presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (para 6 of Appendix C) in the matter of ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute. Allied Military Government is not envisaged in these areas, which it is assumed will pass to Yugoslav administration in default of Allied action, although it is appreciated that operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav.

(9)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

9. It is recommended :-

(a) That the plan for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (para 2 of Appendix C) be approved.

(b) That a cable, substantially as attached (Appendix C) be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(intd) C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAV	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	40
Spares	41-45

5258

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	40
Spares	41-45

5258

9

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B" TO PC (44) 32 K-407

TOP SECRET

CCS/459

Advanced Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

26th October 1944.

Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

1. In reply to your letter No. 504/62/COS dated 18 Oct 44, regarding problems likely to be encountered in the administration of N.E. ITALY, the C-in-C wishes to emphasise the following principles :

(a) When TRIESTE and FIUME have been captured our troops will be maintained through these ports and the road and rail communications radiating from them. These ports and communications must therefore be under the direct operational and administrative control of the C-in-C. This was accepted by Marshal Tito when he visited the C-in-C in August.

(b) To provide the measure of control required to give full effect to the principle stated in (a) above, the Allied Military Government in the areas concerned must also be under the C-in-C's control. For continuity the system of government must be in extension of the AMG for ITALY, not a separate organisation superimposed to deal with those areas. The AMG for ITALY should therefore extend up to the 1939 Italian frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustments in that area have been accepted by the Allied Governments.

(c) If any part of the area in question is occupied by Marshal Tito's forces before the arrival of AAI, control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to AAI on the arrival of our troops.

5253

(d) If any of Marshal Tito's forces or Russian forces enter the tactical zone of AAI they should automatically come under the operational control of General ALEXANDER.

2. The C-in-C considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the lines of para 1 above with Marshal Tito and the Russian Government should be taken in hand now, and completed as quickly as possible to ensure that

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

when he visited the C-in-C in August.

(b) To provide the measure of control required to give full effect to the principle stated in (a) above, the Allied Military Government in the areas concerned must also be under the C-in-C's control. For continuity the system of government must be in extension of the AMG for ITALY, not a separate organisation superimposed to deal with those areas. The AMG for ITALY should therefore extend up to the 1939 Italian frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustments in that area have been accepted by the Allied Governments.

(c) If any part of the area in question is occupied by Marshal Tito's forces before the arrival of AAI, control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to AAI on the arrival of our troops.

5223

(d) If any of Marshal Tito's forces or Russian forces enter the tactical zone of AAI they should automatically come under the operational control of General ALEXANDER.

2. The C-in-C considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the lines of para 1 above with Marshal Tito and the Russian Government should be taken in hand now, and completed as quickly as possible to ensure that there are no unfortunate misunderstandings when the occasion arises.

(sgd) Harding,

Lieut-General,
C.G.S.

Copy to: CAO
BGS(Ops)
BGS(I)

9 APP B

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

K-407

APPENDIX "C" TO PC (44) 132

DRAFT CABLE TO AGWAR FOR C.C.S

Subject is Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA.

1. In August 1944 Marshal Tito was informed that it was SAC's intention to establish and maintain Allied Military Government this area until its disposition could be determined by negotiation between the governments concerned. Tito objected to this while agreeing fully to and pledging assistance in the matter of Allied military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and L of Cs required by Allied Forces occupying AUSTRIA or HUNGARY. Royal Yugoslav and Italian governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.

2. It is proposed that Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are planned, as follows :

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) No Italian Carabinieri or troops will be employed. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops may have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.

52-2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. It is proposed that Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are planned, as follows :

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) No Italian Carabinieri or troops will be employed. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops may have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.

52-2

(c) The basic law will be Italian, but all laws discriminating against the Yugoslavs and the right of recourse beyond local courts will be suspended and certain Italian national legislation may be excluded from the area.

(d) Similarly, a certain degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters might evolve. Italian lire will continue legal tender but new supplies of currency will be Allied Military lire.

(e) Local advisory committees consisting of indigenous Italians and Slavs, which the Allied regional authorities could consult at their discretion, might be formed.

/(e).....

9 APP C

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

3. If local Slav partisans and/or outside contingents of Tito's forces are in effective control of VENEZIA GIULIA before the Allied forces arrive, we might not be in a position or might not find it expedient to superimpose Allied Military Government. We propose to undertake a negotiation with Tito and representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout the whole area. This is desirable to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and in AUSTRIA. Also, absence of agreement increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslavs in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. If necessary, however, the August agreement with Tito would afford an adequate working basis from the military security angle. In summary, our decision to raise this sensitive issue with the Yugoslavs is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make a public declaration to the effect that that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 2, the creation of an Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from that in ITALY and possibly even admitting Yugoslav and Italian participation at the top as well as at the local level. Aside from certain practical difficulties, it is

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make a public declaration to the effect that that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 2, the creation of an Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from that in ITALY and possibly even admitting Yugoslav and Italian participation at the top as well as at the local level. Aside from certain practical difficulties, it is possible that such a step might be interpreted as a prejudgement of the territorial issue and might constitute a precedent in other situations where mixed nationalities or minorities are involved.

5. Your approval is requested of the plan for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA outlined inparagraph 2 and of the course proposed in paragraph 3.

(9) ARP C

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make a public declaration to the effect that that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 2, the creation of an Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from that in [illegible] and possibly even admitting Yugoslav and Italian participation at the top as well as at the local level. Aside from certain practical difficulties, it is possible that such a step might be interpreted as a prejudgement of the territorial issue and might constitute a precedent in other situations where mixed nationalities or minorities are involved.

5. Your approval is requested of the plan for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA outlined inparagraph 2 and of the course proposed in paragraph 3.

9 AAP C

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. The above relates to VENEZIA GIULIA proper. ZARA and Italian Adriatic islands in dispute were not specifically subject of discussion with Tito in August. Allied Military Government is not envisaged there although operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which isproperly Yugoslav. It is assumed that ZARA and Italian Adriatic islands in dispute will, in default of Allied action, pass to Yugoslav administration, as also CORFU to the Greeks. Your approval of our negative course in these subsidiary matters is requested.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'A' TO PC (44) 1 K-407

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

TOP SECRET

Ref: 504/83/COS

29 October 1944

SUBJECT : Administration of Frontier Provinces - N.E. ITALY

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. On 26 September 1944 under reference 808/20/CA - A/CC I wrote you a letter setting forward certain aspects of the problem of applying military government in the provinces of FIUME, POLA, TRIESTE and GORIZIA, forming together the area known as VENEZIA GIULIA.

2. Since the despatch of that letter further conferences have been held and it now appears desirable to put forward for your concurrence plans based on a series of possible eventualities. At the same time I shall ask your assistanc in preliminary negotiations.

3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the Annexure to SAC (44) Special 5. memorandum of 13 August wherein was declared the policy of the Allied Government to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. It is clear that Yugoslav national aspirations cannot be left out of accour I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Yugoslav annexation.

5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugoslav officials might have such a result. The central and declared aim of the Allied administration should be impartial fair dealing to Italian and Slav alike.

6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged :-

Situation "A". "Allied Military Forces" - that is to say, forces under AAI or AFHQ - enter the country after a rapid advance, before any entry of organised Yugoslav formations has taken place, and before there has been any crystalisation of partisan control. Local administration based on the Italian system continues to function to a greater or lesser degree.

5357

Situation "B". "Allied Military Forces" enter the country after a period of vacuum during which local Yugoslav partisans have assumed localised con-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. It is clear that Yugoslav national aspirations cannot be left out of accour I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Yugoslav annexation.

5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugoslav officials might have such a result. The central and declared aim of the Allied administration should be impartial fair dealing to Italian and Slav alike.

6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged :-

Situation "A". "Allied Military Forces" - that is to say, forces under AAI or AFHQ - enter the country after a rapid advance, before any entry of organised Yugoslav formations has taken place, and before there has been any crystalisation of partisan control. Local administration based on the Italian system continues to function to a greater or lesser degree.

Situation "B". "Allied Military Forces" enter the country after a period of vacuum during which local Yugoslav partisans have assumed localised control.

Situation "C". A formed Yugoslav military force enters the country in advance of any other "Allied Military Force ".

It is clear that all three situations may exist at one time within the confines of VENEZIA GIULIA.

7. In the circumstances of Situation "A" it is proposed that Allied Military Government should generally follow normal lines with the following special features :-

(a) The continued operation of existing Italian administration would be subject to the non-introduction of officials from other parts of ITALY, and would be dependent solely on those already found within the territor

9 APP A

TOP SECRET

5257

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) No Italian troops will be used as such in the area. The use of CC.RR and GG.FF as such will be left to the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Local municipal police will be used under direct orders of AMG.

(c) Italian law would be applied, and local Courts would be re-opened under existing approved judges, but the Court of Appeal at TRIESTE and the detached section at FIUME would be final Courts. The right of recourse to the Court of Cassation in ROME would be suspended.

(d) Italian legislation since 8 September 1943 would not be implemented as is now done in other parts of ITALY. Any legislation deemed necessary would be achieved by publication of General or Regional Orders. However, they might follow current Italian legislation.

(e) The Provinces would be financed entirely by AFA funds. Existing banks would be used but Italian Government funds would not be introduced from outside.

8. In the circumstances of situation "B" a similar policy will be adopted with the difference that :-

(a) No Italian police would be re-employed in partisan areas.

(b) That any working de facto administrative machinery whether using Italian or Yugoslav officials or both would be kept in being.

(c) As with "A", importation of officials from outside would be avoided.

(d) Courts of law would be initially closed and re-opened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Offences against Allied proclamations would be tried by AMG Courts. Any Courts permitted to re-open would, under International Law, have to apply the Italian Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "A", final appeal would be to the local Courts of Appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at ROME being suspended.

9. The essential consideration both in Case "A" and Case "B" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of parties outside the territory, that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a visible indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

10. In the case of "C", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Yugoslav invading army operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugoslav administration set up, with legal sanction under International Law, under Yugoslav officers. It would be entirely

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) That any working de facto administrative machinery Italian or Yugoslav officials or both would be kept in being.

(c) As with "A", importation of officials from outside would be avoided.

(d) Courts of law would be initially closed and re-opened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Offences against Allied proclamations would be tried by AMG Courts. Any Courts permitted to reopen would, under International Law, have to apply the Italian Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "A", final appeal would be to the local Courts of Appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at ROME being suspended.

9. The essential consideration both in Case "A" and Case "B" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of parties outside the territory, that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a visible indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

10. In the case of "C", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Yugoslav invading army operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugoslav administration set up, with legal sanction under International Law, under Yugoslav officers. It would be extremely difficult, if not wholly impolitic, for AMG officers on the spot to displace such an administration or locally to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Yugoslav Government that any Yugoslav army crossing the 1939 frontier into ITALY should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining the Allied troops under command of General Alexander. This formula would cover the legal position of the installation of an Anglo-American AMG under the authority of General Alexander. It is, however, clear that some agreement must be made with the Yugoslav authorities which will include a clause to the effect that civil administration will be carried out by Angl-American Military Government officers, in order to avoid difficulties, embarrassment and probably unfortunate incidents in the area, and I would ask that at the appropriate moment this be done. It is also clear that a token force of American or British troops, or both, should be moved into the area at the earliest possible opportunity. An undertaking should also be obtained from the Yugoslav authorities that in the event of a Yugoslav force occupying any part of the territory no attempt would be made to alter laws in force as on 8 September 1943 In all three cases the Regional Commissioner and his staff will have full discretion to consult local opinion in the conduct of civil affairs.

TOP SECRET

G APP A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

11. It is evident that the imposition of Allied Military Government, whether under conditions "A", "B" or "C", will require a considerably higher concentration of officers and men than has been available lately. Moreover, a fundamental prerequisite for the execution of this plan under "A", "B" or "C", is the provision of an adequate force of Allied Military Police to be placed at the disposal of the Provincial Commissioners. The minimum numbers deemed necessary for this are shown in Annexure. In any event it is proposed to concentrate available resources on three main centres :-

(a) The port of TRIESTE.

(b) The port of POLA and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern ISTRIA.

(c) The port of FIUME.

It is felt that a fair, firm and consistent Allied administration in these three important centres will have a steadying effect on the remainder of the area, much of which is sparsely populated and will be, under winter conditions, difficult of access.

12. It is further requested that, should circumstances permit, full opportunity be taken of Allied naval power to make rapid and demonstrative landings in the three ports of TRIESTE, FIUME and POLA.

13. The small Province of ZARA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Dalmatian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organisation for VENEZIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier Provinces, the four of VENEZIA GIULIA and the two of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA react not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Yugoslavs and Italians precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle the organisation of administration for VENEZIA GIULIA as for VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII, with sub-Regions for VENEZIA GIULIA and VENEZIA TRIDENTINA if such be found necessary.

5355

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Yugoslav authorities that in the event that any Yugoslav troops cross the 1939 frontier into ITALY they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI.

16. I enclose letter containing views of Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

13. The small Province of ZARA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Dalmatian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organisation for VENEZIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier Provinces, the four of VENEZIA GIULIA and the two of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA react not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Yugoslavs and Italians precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle the organisation of administration for VENEZIA GIULIA as for VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII, with sub-Regions for VENEZIA GIULIA and VENEZIA TRIDENTINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Yugoslav authorities that in the event that any Yugoslav troops cross the 1939 frontier into ITALY they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI. 5355

16. I enclose letter containing views of Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in ITALY.

(sgd) ELLERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: Chief of Staff, AFHQ
The Hon Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles, KCMG, MC
R.C. Region XII
SCAO Eighth Army
Political Section
Civil Affairs Section

9 APP A

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

13. The small Province of ZARA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Dalmatian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organisation for VENEZIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier Provinces, the four of VENEZIA GIULIA and the two of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA react not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Yugoslavs and Italians precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle the organisation of administration for VENEZIA GIULIA as for VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII, with sub-Regions for VENEZIA GIULIA and VENEZIA TRIDENTINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Yugoslav authorities that in the event that any Yugoslav troops cross the 1939 frontier into ITALY they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI. 5355

16. I enclose letter containing views of Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in ITALY.

(sgd) ELLERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: Chief of Staff, AFHQ
The Hon Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles, KCMG, MC
R.C. Region XII
SCAO Eighth Army
Political Section
Civil Affairs Section

9 - APP A

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

K-407

ANNEXURE TO 504/83/COS dated 29 Oct 44

It is considered that, to carry out the above policy, the following additions to normal ACC strength would be required :-

(a) Military Police: For TRIESTE - 4 Provost Companies.
For GORIZIA, POLA and FIUME - 1 Company each.

(b) Additional AMG Legal Officers: For TRIESTE - 6
For GORIZIA, POLA and FIUME - 2 each.

(c) CAOs to be on the basis of :

TRIESTE Province	(30 Communes)	
City of TRIESTE		4
Remainder		5
GORIZIA Province	(42 Communes)	7
POLA Province		
City of POLA		2
Remainder		7
FIUME Province		
City of FIUME		2
Remainder		3
		30

(d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other Commissions will be submitted at an early date.

5254

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

GORIZIA Province	(42 Communes)	7
POLA Province		
City of POLA		2
Remainder		7
FIUME Province		
City of FIUME		2
Remainder		3
		30

(d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other Commissions will be submitted at an early date.

5254

(1) APP A INTL

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to Office of Chief Censor

SD to A/CC NOV/cc 881 NOV 11 1944

K 386

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 128
2nd November 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 45

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MOTION PICTURE POLICY FOR ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. Since the Armistice PWB has been the sole medium for the procurement of films for liberated ITALY and for their physical delivery to picture houses.

2. It is now considered desirable :-

(a) That a Temporary Film Board be started whose main function would be to set up and control an epurated Italian film producing industry. It would consist of equal representation from the Allied Commission, PWB and the Italian Government

(b) That PWB should continue to handle the distribution of all films until such time as plans have been formulated by the proposed Temporary Board for the handling of commercial films by Italian private agencies.

3. PWB has accordingly been directed by the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee to invite the Allied Commission to set up a Temporary Film Board for the purposes outlined above.

4. The Political Committee is invited to take note of and endorse the above action.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4

5359

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1495

Commission, PWB and the

(b) That PWB should continue to handle the distribution of all films until such time as plans have been formulated by the proposed Temporary Board for the handling of commercial films by Italian private agencies.

3. PWB has accordingly been directed by the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee to invite the Allied Commission to set up a Temporary Film Board for the purposes outlined above.

4. The Political Committee is invited to take note of and endorse the above action.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAV	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Chief, INC	40
Spares	41-45

5259

1202-2/cc (carrying G2 5-4/cc)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

PC (44) 131
6 November 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 397

SECRET

COPY NO 41

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AS SERVICE UNITS IN ITALY

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (A).

1. Due to the great demand for service troops to support military operations in Italy under present supply conditions and the greater than planned withdrawal of service troops to support DRAGOON forces, the Commanding General, MTOUSA, has decided to bring upwards of 15000 Italian service units, composed of prisoners of war who have volunteered for such duty, to the Italian mainland. The arrival of these troops will begin immediately.

2. It is desirable that the present status of these Italian troops be continued under United States Army supervision. The status is analogous, except for peculiarities of local army administration, to the British "Cooperators" which have been infiltered into British formations by the "dilution" method.

3. It is anticipated that the Italian Government will make protests, as a matter of principle, juxtaposed to conditions of servitude, pertaining to these Italian nationals. Representations were recently made to SACMED concerning the British "Cooperators". This matter was temporarily solved by inviting the Italian Government to inspect the conditions under which these troops were being used, and to date they had accepted the status of the Cooperators as satisfactory as pertains to physical, spiritual and economic well-being.

4. The Italian Prime Minister has, by letter, again raised the question of release from POW status. The presentation of this matter to the Political Committee evolves into two parts, both closely related and proper subjects for joint consideration. The first is:

a. The matter of notification to the Italian Government of the United States Army intent to return these Italian service units composed of technical prisoners of war to the Italian mainland;

The second is:

5358

b. The formulation of an appropriate [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1497

"Cooperators" which have been infiltered into British formations by the "dilution" method.

3. It is anticipated that the Italian Government will make protests, as a matter of principle, juxtaposed to conditions of servitude, pertaining to these Italian nationals. Representations were recently made to SACMED concerning the British "Cooperators". This matter was temporarily solved by inviting the Italian Government to inspect the conditions under which these troops were being used, and to date they had accepted the status of the Cooperators as satisfactory as pertains to physical, spiritual and economic well-being.

4. The Italian Prime Minister has, by letter, again raised the question of release from POW status. The presentation of this matter to the Political Committee evolves into two parts, both closely related and proper subjects for joint consideration. The first is:

a. The matter of notification to the Italian Government of the United States Army intent to return these Italian service units composed of technical prisoners of war to the Italian mainland;

The second is:

b. The formulation of an appropriate reply to the Italian Prime Minister's letter.

5. The United States State Department has continuously pressed the United States War Department for the repatriation of Italian prisoners of war held in this Theater, leaving the matter of procuring further useful service from this source of manpower to the War Department. In the past, the United States War Department has firmly resisted the State Department's representations on the grounds of operational necessity. Conditions have so changed however that it is not possible for the United States War Department to further defend the "operational expedience" position against the proposals of the United States State Department.

6. To avoid the possibility of a direct order from the United States Government to summarily repatriate all United States held Italian prisoners of war in the Mediterranean Theater, with the possible loss of service troops to military operations in the Theater, it is believed advisable that the Political Committee lay before the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, a proposal to enter into exploratory discussions with the Italian Government to determine if it is feasible to grant the military release of all Italian prisoners of war brought to the Italian mainland as service

SECRET

5358

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

troops under either United States or British sponsorship, while still assuring a firm legal basis for the continued employment of these troops by the respective Allied nations in support of the military position, with no loss of efficiency or reduction in the numbers of such personnel.

7. It is therefore recommended with the concurrence of the U.S. Political Adviser and A C of S, G-5, that the Political Committee recommend to SACMED that exploratory discussions be authorized and entered into, on a military basis, to determine what assurances the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, can be given by the Italian Government that with the repatriation of Italian prisoners of war returned to the Italian mainland in military service units, they will continue in an equally satisfactory status of employment with the Allied Forces.

(Intd) M.G.T.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAF	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Advisor	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Spares	40-44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMLVNAF	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Advisor	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Chief, Liaison Section	39
Spares	40-44

18

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

SO to A/CC 2852
A/CC 880
K 371 NOV 11 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 127
25th October 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 45

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

POLICY REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

AFHQ Policy regarding the Press

1. Briefly, present aims are :-

(a) Not to abuse military censorship.

(b) To continue without political censorship.

(c) To ensure that editors develop, but do not abuse, the limited freedom given them.

(d) By allocating suitable priorities, to make newsprint available as widely as possible.

2. Long term policy is to ensure conditions favourable to the eventual establishment of complete freedom of the press in ITALY;

(a) By stimulating among both editors and readers understanding of and desire for freedom of the press.

(b) By obtaining a satisfactory expression in Italian law of the provisional nature of present restrictions and of the rights and responsibilities of the press after the war.

(c) By providing for all papers in ITALY access to uncensored and unbiased news.

Non-Governmental News Agencies

3. At present all news distributed in ITALY is brought in and disseminated by PWB. Private news agencies, such as Reuters, however, have been exerting considerable pressure to obtain the right to start up business in ITALY.

4. The Psychological Warfare Sub Committee feel that it would cause considerable embarassment in censorship and possibly elsewhere if private

5356

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

(d) By allocating suitable priorities [illegible] as widely as possible.

2. Long term policy is to ensure conditions favourable to the eventual establishment of complete freedom of the press in ITALY;

(a) By stimulating among both editors and readers understanding of and desire for freedom of the press.

(b) By obtaining a satisfactory expression in Italian law of the provisional nature of present restrictions and of the rights and responsibilities of the press after the war.

(c) By providing for all papers in ITALY access to uncensored and unbiased news.

Non-Governmental News Agencies

3. At present all news distributed in ITALY is brought in and disseminated by PWB. Private news agencies, such as Reuters, however, have been exerting considerable pressure to obtain the right to start up business in ITALY.

4. The Psychological Warfare Sub Committee feel that it would cause considerable embarassment in censorship and possibly elsewhere if private agencies were allowed to bring in and disseminate news while fighting continues in ITALY.

Recommendations

5. PWB desire endorsement of the policy outlined above and the Psychological Warfare Sub Committee accordingly recommend that :-

(a) Private news agencies should not be allowed to start up in ITALY so long as ITALY remains a theatre of operations.

(b) PWB should endeavour to promote the long term policy at 2 above by preparing the ground for the establishment of an Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function when privately owned agencies begin to operate. This co-operative agency would be owned and operated by member papers and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

for J.H. LASCELLES, Major
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/DISTRIBUTION

5256

5709

- 1 -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

K 371

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAV	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
Chief-INC	40
Spares	41-45

5355

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
Chief-INC	40
Spares	41-45

5255

(10)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

52 to AFHQ 2867
NOV 11 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 369

PC (44) 125
25th October 1944

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO 44

POLITICAL MEETING

REVIVAL OF THE ITALIAN BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT.

Note by British Resident Minister

The Foreign Office have been approached by the Boy Scouts International Bureau in the interests of the revival of the Catholic Boy Scouts Association of Italy, which the International Bureau has now recognised as the successor of the original Italian Association which was dissolved by Mussolini in 1928.

2. It has been suggested to the Foreign Office that much good might be done if contacts between Scout Leaders in the United Kingdom and the Italian Scout organisation were established and developed. A beginning might be made, it is thought, by sending a delegation to help and advise on the reorganisation of the Scout movement in Italy. If this is considered impracticable in present circumstances a message from the Chief Scout, accompanied by a present of uniforms and scouting material would no doubt be useful.

3. The Foreign Office wish to know whether any objection is seen to the above proposals.

4. While there may be some doubt as to the immediate feasibility of the despatch of a Scout delegation from the United Kingdom, it is clear that as an eventual substitute for the Fascist Youth organisations a Boy Scouts movement ought to receive such support as it is possible to accord it in present circumstances. It is for consideration whether a small delegation could be accepted in Italy at the present time, and what arrangements could be made for its reception in the more important centres in the liberated areas.

5. A note on the Catholic Boy Scouts Association of Italy is attached.

Initialed: H.M.

5254 c 2

DISTRIBUTION. COPY NO

Supreme Allied Commander 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

3. The Foreign Office wish to know whether any objection is seen to the above proposals.

4. While there may be some doubt as to the immediate feasibility of the despatch of a Scout delegation from the United Kingdom, it is clear that as an eventual substitute for the Fascist Youth organisations a Boy Scouts movement ought to receive such support as it is possible to accord it in present circumstances. It is for consideration whether a small delegation could be accepted in Italy at the present time, and what arrangements could be made for its reception in the more important centres in the liberated areas.

5. A note on the Catholic Boy Scouts Association of Italy is attached.

Initialed: H.M.

DISTRIBUTION.	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNA	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 (Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
Spares	40-44

(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

5699

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

In the afternoon a program was transmitted over Radio Palermo specially dedicated to the scouts of the world. A message was read from Cardinal Lavitrano to Pope Pius XII followed by a greeting of the scouts of Palermo to the scouts of all the world. The program continued with an historical anecdote in scouting; several investitures were made and finally scout songs were sung.

The Palermo Scout Committee has recognised ten Scout troops with more than 300 inscribed Scouts. Only about 100 Scouts have uniforms however.

While in other parts of the island the committees are busy starting scout troops, in Palermo the work of instruction is going ahead in spite of the fact that material for camping and for instruction is lacking.

The scouts come together for scout meetings twice a week: once at Headquarters and once in the open country.

Several excursions and displays have already been made by the different troops.

The Regional Committee has fixed its program for the immediate future, as follows:

a) Propaganda by means of discussions, radio talks, leaflets, etc.
b) The publication of a Scout journal "La Scolta" (The Sentinel).
c) The establishment of healthy Scout centres.
d) Special courses for pioneering, fire fighting, first aid, signalling and topography.
e) Correspondence courses during June and July for Scout leaders, with a final examination in a Scout training camp.
f) Scout Day (Jamboree) with competitions for the different troops and individual scouts on August 15th, 1944.
g) Interdiocesan camps and provincial camps for instructors and leaders in August and September.
h) Regional Scout meetings.

5353

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

The Regional Committee has fixed its program for the [illegible] future, as follows:

a) Propaganda by means of discussions, radio talks, leaflets, etc.
b) The publication of a Scout journal "La Scolta" (The Sentinel).
c) The establishment of healthy Scout centres.
d) Special courses for pioneering, fire fighting, first aid, signalling and topography.
e) Correspondence courses during June and July for Scout leaders, with a final examination in a Scout training camp.
f) Scout Day (Jamboree) with competitions for the different troops and individual scouts on August 15th, 1944.
g) Interdiocesan camps and provincial camps for instructors and leaders in August and September.
h) Regional Scout meetings.

5353

(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

CATHOLIC BOY SCOUT ASSOCIATION OF ITALY. K 369

In August 1943, shortly after the fall of Mussolini and even before the Armistice was signed, the Badoglio Government authorised Professor Gedda, President of the Central Youth Organisation of the Azione Cattolica to reconstitute in Italy the Catholic Boy Scout Association of Italy (Associazione Scautistica Cattolica Italiana or A.S.C.I.)

The A.S.C.I. was founded in 1916 and adhered to the Boy Scouts International Bureau. It sent its representatives to several meetings convened in London by the founder of Scouting, Robert Baden Powell. In 1928 it was dissolved by the Fascist Government, having at the time several thousand troops throughout the country.

As soon as liberty of association was permitted again in Sicily, a number of scout troops reconstituted themselves. In January 1944, under the patronage of Cardinal Lavitrano, President of the Government Council of the Azione Cattolica, a Regional Committee for Sicily of the A.S.C.I. was formed in Palermo.

Up to now thirteen diocesan scouting committees have been formed out of the total of eighteen dioceses in Sicily, namely at: Palermo, Catania, Messina, Siracusa, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Caltagirone, Cefalu, Noto, Acireale, Mazara, Nicosia, and Piazza Armerina.

These Committees have been active in reconstituting former scout troops and a number of new ones have also come into existence.

The Regional Committee has already taken steps:

1. To publish: a) A monthly bulletin called ASCI.
   b) A pamphlet called "La Traccia" which is an introduction to scouting.
   c) A serial Manual of Instructions for scouts called "Le Prove" (the tests).
   d) Scout membership cards and personal record cards.

2. To distribute membership cards to the following categories of scouts:

   a) Scout leaders
   b) Scouts (Rovers, Scouts and Cubs)
   c) Honorary members.

3. To produce the badge of the Association in metal. In the absence of

5252

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1509

Up to now thirteen diocesan scouting committees have been formed out of the total of eighteen dioceses in Sicily, namely at: Palermo, Catania, Messina, Siracusa, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Caltagirone, Cefalu, Noto, Acireale, Mazara, Nicosia, and Piazza Armerina.

These Committees have been active in reconstituting former scout troops and a number of new ones have also come into existence.

The Regional Committee has already taken steps:

1. To publish: a) A monthly bulletin called ASCI.
   b) A pamphlet called "La Traccia" which is an introduction to scouting.
   c) A serial Manual of Instructions for scouts called "Le Prove" (the tests).
   d) Scout membership cards and personal record cards.

2. To distribute membership cards to the following categories of scouts:

   a) Scout leaders
   b) Scouts (Rovers, Scouts and Cubs)
   c) Honorary members.

3. To produce the badge of the Association in metal. In the absence of a uniform this is the only distinctive sign for the scouts at present.

4. To create associations of ex-scouts and committees of patrons.

The Regional Committee for Sicily has also contacted the other Regional Committees formed in Liberated Italy and has sent a letter to London requesting admission again to the Boy Scouts International Bureau.

A first course of instruction for scout leaders was held at Palermo at which some 20 took part.

On the 23 of April 1944, the first great festival took place in Palermo to commemorate the anniversary of the universal patron of Boy Scouts, St. George.

After mass in the Cathedral at which both Allied and Italian military and civil authorities took part, Cardinal Lavitrano handed back to the representatives of the troops of Palermo the identical "fiamme" or troop banners left there in 1928 when the troops were suppressed.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 123
14th October 1944

K-337

SECRET 48

COPY NO

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE BALKANS

Note by Secretary

1. The situation regarding the provision of relief supplies for GREECE, YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA has recently deteriorated, owing to advice received from WASHINGTON that the shipment of many commodities previously agreed to has now been delayed.

2. In view of the demands now being made in GREECE for relief supplies and public statements, which may give the impression that adequate resources are available, Commander, N HQ (BALKANS) has prepared the attached paper, as he considers that the Political Committee should know the unsatisfactory situation, particularly as regards clothing. He adds that representations regarding this situation have been made through all possible channels.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAV	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

he considers [illegible] situation, particularly as regards clothing. [illegible] regarding this situation have been made through all possible channels.

William H. C. Tuapse

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAV	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
Commander, [illegible] HQ (Balkans)	40-45
Commander, 3 Corps	46-47
Spares	48-52

5351 C.C.S. 1-13

(6)

FILE

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K-337

STATEMENT ON RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE BALKANS

FOOD

1. On 15 August, Washington issued instructions for the call forward of some 50,000 tons sundry foodstuffs, 2,800 tons soap, and sundry Medical Supplies, to complete the Balkan stockpile requirements.

2. Some delay took place in placing the requisitions, due to clarification of certain procedures at AFHQ, but requirements were finally called forward in September, for delivery in November/December.

3. Washington has now advised that, due to non-availability of supplies, requirements cannot be met for delivery in November, but will be loaded subject to shipping early in November for delivery in December, with the exception of soap which substantially is not available until January 1945.

4. This position will result in Balkan commitments not being fully met.

5. The exact extent to which the present stockpile will prove inadequate to meet requirements will depend upon the rate of liberation, and the resulting demands from GREECE, YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA.

6. Wheat/Flour is adequately covered until early December, when the forward arrival of December requirements is promised by London/Washington.

7. Arrangements are in hand to meet the position by loan ex Theatre stocks, and to date a loan of some 3,700 tons sundry foodstuffs has been arranged from ACC and MIDEAST.

8. MIDEAST are also helping to bridge the gap until December by the provision of foodstuffs from army stocks.

CLOTHING

9. In response to lengthy and persistent urgent demands for meeting clothing deficiencies, CCAC advised on 29 August that a portion of clothing requirements was available, and was to be called forward from UK, and that approximately 230,000 pairs of shoes (for child age group categories) and 1,200,000 blankets were available, and were to be called forward from US. In addition they advised that balance of requirements would be made available ex US on 15 October, subject to necessary adjustments.

10. Immediate call forward action was taken accordingly, for delivery November/December. 5350

11. CCAC have now advised that, insofar as US availability is concerned,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. Wheat/Flour is adequately covered until early December, when the forward arrival of December requirements is promised by London/Washington.

7. Arrangements are in hand to meet the position by loan ex Theatre stocks, and to date a loan of some 3,700 tons sundry foodstuffs has been arranged from ACC and MIDEAST.

8. MIDEAST are also helping to bridge the gap until December by the provision of foodstuffs from army stocks.

CLOTHING

9. In response to lengthy and persistent urgent demands for meeting clothing deficiencies, CCAC advised on 29 August that a portion of clothing requirements was available, and was to be called forward from UK, and that approximately 230,000 pairs of shoes (for child age group categories) and 1,200,000 blankets were available, and were to be called forward from US. In addition they advised that balance of requirements would be made available ex US on 15 October, subject to necessary adjustments.

5950

10. Immediate call forward action was taken accordingly, for delivery November/December.

11. CCAC have now advised that, insofar as US availability is concerned, programme for their total European commitments cannot be met with the exception of 230,000 pairs shoes and reallocations between various European Theatres are necessary. Proposals submitted are being examined, but allocations to AFHQ for their total Theatre needs are, in many cases, less than are required and were agreed for the Balkans alone.

12. This position is now being examined, but it is inevitable that reductions and delay will result.

MEDICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

13. (a) Medical supplies, other than Hospital requirements, are adequately covered, but Hospital and surgical equipment will, on present progress, be seriously delayed.

(b) Miscellaneous items, such as fishing requirements, refugee camp stores, civil garage requirements, etc, are unlikely to be available for two or three months, but requisitions have in all cases gone forward.

[redacted] SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

(c) Technical Stores for engineer, transportation and telecommunication requirements, are still in abeyance

(d) The bulk of engineer and transportation stores required for the opening of ports, and restoration of minimum essential communications, will now pass as a responsibility of the Task Force entrusted with the operations, which would otherwise have been a responsibility of ML Staff and the remaining items are, to a large extent, being made available from Theatre stocks.

(e) In the case of telecommunication stores, no authority has yet been received, nor have any items been called forward in view of War Office and War Department requiring a downward revision of estimated scales, which have been furnished, but on which they have not yet commented.

AGRICULTURAL REQUIREMENTS

14. Complete requirements for autumn needs were cancelled, and requirements for spring programme have been called forward according to instructions for delivery December onwards. To date no advice has been received of the probability of shipment, other than to the effect that Agricultural machinery will become available from now onwards, and will be shipped accordingly.

FUEL

15. The situation regarding fuel, both coal and POL, is satisfactory.

5249

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ments for spring programme have been called forward according to instructions for delivery December onwards. To date no advice has been received of the probability of shipment, other than to the effect that Agricultural machinery will become available from now onwards, and will be shipped accordingly.

FUEL

15. The situation regarding fuel, both coal and POL, is satisfactory.

5349

6.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U.S. SECRET
DRAFT CABLE

K 318
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

TO: AGWAR FOR CCS FOR CCAC, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

FROM: SIGNED WILSON, CITF FGCAO.

THIS IS MAT _____.

Payment for supplies, services, and facilities in Italy is subject.

1. Since December 1943 Allied local procurement of supplies, services, and facilities in Italy has been governed by an Administrative Memorandum of this Headquarters (Number 95 of 1943) premised on the obligation of Italian Government under Armistice Terms to facilitate Allied war effort. Consequently general policy was to avoid payment by Allies except in combat zones or for minor day to day procurement.

2. This policy of nonpayment has been subject to numerous exceptions due to serious shortcomings of Italian Government procurement services, and to difficulties arranging Italian Government financing for firms supplying services, goods, or facilities to Allies and needing cash to maintain operations.

3. To meet this situation, Administrative Memorandum 95 modified 1 August by Administrative Memorandum 31 of 1944 which directs the A.C.C. to require Italian Government (a)

5346

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

under Armistice Terms to facilitate Allied war effort. Con-
sequently general policy was to avoid payment by Allies except
in combat zones or for minor day to day procurement.

2. This policy of nonpayment has been subject to numer-
ous exceptions due to serious shortcomings of Italian Govern-
ment procurement services, and to difficulties arranging
Italian Government financing for firms supplying services,
goods, or facilities to Allies and needing cash to maintain
operations.

3. To meet this situation, Administrative Memorandum 95
modified 1 August by Administrative Memorandum 31 of 1944
which directs the A.C.C. to require Italian Government (a)
to improve procurement services and (b) to set up a lira ac-
count to enable Allied Forces to make cash payments for supplies,
services, and facilities where recourse to Italian procure-
ment agencies is impracticable. General policy of nonpayment
wherever feasible is preserved.

5246

4. Advantage of lira account, which would operate com-
parably to franc account in North Africa) is that payment
would be made out of funds provided by Italian Government
thus reducing expenditure funds drawn by Allied Forces from

(5)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 318
Washington

AFA which are charged to Armed Forces appropriations and London. Also would facilitate payments to local enterprises serving Allied Forces which under present conditions are going unpaid because reluctance on Allied side to pay and long delays on Italian Government part in arranging direct reimbursement. Also feel lira account may operate (as did franc account in North Africa) to encourage Italian Government to improve procurement services to Allied Forces.

5. From protracted discussions ACC and this Headquarters the following political objections to establishment at this time of lira account have emerged:

(a) That it would reveal to Italian Government quantity and value of Allied procurement, supplies, services, and facilities in Italy; and

(b) By rendering visible the present invisible deficit that is currently accruing to the Italian Government, it would focus attention on the obligations generally of the Italian Government under the armistice.

6. This Headquarters considers establishment lira account desirable from financial policy and technical viewpoint, and is discussing it informally with Italian Government. But action is being delayed pending advice from you as to whether political objections override advantages.

5345

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

tity and value of Allied procurement, supplies, services, and facilities in Italy; and

(b) By rendering visible the present invisible deficit that is currently accruing to the Italian Government, it would focus attention on the obligations generally of the Italian Government under the armistice.

6. This Headquarters considers establishment lira account desirable from financial policy and technical viewpoint, and is discussing it informally with Italian Government. But action is being delayed pending advice from you as to whether political objections override advantages.

5345

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

SECRET

K 318

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
DPIC	40-41
Financial Adviser (B)	42-43
Fiscal Director (US)	44-45
Allied Control Commission	46-47
Spares	48-52

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
DPIC	40-41
Financial Adviser (B)	42-43
Fiscal Director (US)	44-45
Allied Control Commission	46-47
Spares	48-52

5217

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

A/cc to 'A' File

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC(44) 120
10 October 1944

SECRET K 318

COPY NO. 47

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

PAYMENT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

5 1002-1/cc

1. In accordance with the instructions on page 5 of the Minutes of the Political Committee, 4 October 1944, the attached draft cable was prepared to ascertain the views of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and was forwarded on 6 October to the British Resident Minister and to the U. S. Political Adviser for concurrence.

2. On 9 October the Acting Chief Commissioner of the A.C.C. advised (ACC-352) that Prime Minister Bonomi stated to him that the political effect of the proposed lira account would be "disastrous". The Acting Chief Commissioner, estimating that the drawings against the lira account would be not less than one milliard lira monthly, recommends that implementation of Administrative Memorandum No. 31 be deferred.

3. G-5 has, in view of the above message from the Acting Chief Commissioner, proposed to the British Resident Minister and the U. S. Political Adviser that the draft cable to the CCAC be appropriately modified to indicate the opposition of Prime Minister Bonomi to the proposed lira account.

4. G-5 is of the opinion that notwithstanding the unfavorable reaction of the Italian Prime Minister, the proposal of a lira account should be presented to the CCAC as planned. Admitting the possibility that adverse short-run political disadvantages might develop were Allied expenditures to be revealed, sight must not be lost of the longer-run disadvantages of continued concealment of the level of Allied expenditure. Continuation of the present policy invites speculation and rumor and unfavorable comparison with the German indemnity (which was always made known to the Italians), which would not exist if the facts were disclosed. Moreover, in view of the likelihood that

CCS/1, X-1/cc 248

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1523

advised (ACC-352) that Prime Minister Bonomi stated to him that the political effect of the proposed lira account would be "disastrous". The Acting Chief Commissioner, estimating that the drawings against the lira account would be not less than one milliard lira monthly, recommends that implementation of Administrative Memorandum No. 31 be deferred.

3. G-5 has, in view of the above message from the Acting Chief Commissioner, proposed to the British Resident Minister and the U. S. Political Adviser that the draft cable to the CCAC be appropriately modified to indicate the opposition of Prime Minister Bonomi to the proposed lira account.

4. G-5 is of the opinion that notwithstanding the unfavorable reaction of the Italian Prime Minister, the proposal of a lira account should be presented to the CCAC as planned. Admitting the possibility that adverse short-run political disadvantages might develop were Allied expenditures to be revealed, sight must not be lost of the longer-run disadvantages of continued concealment of the level of Allied expenditure. Continuation of the present policy invites speculation and rumor and unfavorable comparison with the German indemnity (which was always made known to the Italians), which would not exist if the facts were disclosed. Moreover, in view of the likelihood that Allied expenditures in Italy will increasingly take forms more distantly related to the war against Germany, such as repairs and actual production of equipment and supplies for use in other Theaters, there is an added reason for not long postponing the financing of this Italian aid on a more regular basis.

(Intd) C. H. S.

Incl: Draft Cable

/DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

(57)

CCS 1-1-X-1000 (3-24-43)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

A/CC 595
12 Oct 44
File

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 321

CONFIDENTIAL

PC (44) 122
10th October 1944

COPY NO 41

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FORCES

Note by Secretary

1. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has been requested by the New York Office of OWI, through PWB, to make an appreciative statement on the contribution of the Italian Fleet during the first year of liberated Italy's war against GERMANY, the anniversary of which will fall on 13 October.

2. It is understood that a similar request is being sent to :-

The Supreme Allied Commander
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander-in-Chief, AAI
Commanding General, Fifth Army

regarding the Italian forces which have served under them.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on the above.

William Vic
for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	152

5244

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The Supreme Allied Commander
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander-in-Chief, AAI
Commanding General, Fifth Army

regarding the Italian forces which have served under them.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on the above.

for J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	152
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Liaison Section	39
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	40-41
Spares	42-46

5944

HEADQU... 12 OCT 1944 A.C.C.

4

→ Political file

File HQP

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

[redacted] SECRET

R 367

MAF to A/cc 599/A&C

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PC (44) 116
6th October 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 49

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

CONTROL OF UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA IN ROME

Note by Chief, Liaison Section

1. There are in ROME military and political authorities representing many of the United Nations. A prominent feature of the work of these authorities is the dissemination of propaganda in favour of their respective countries by printed publications, communiques to the press of other nations, the holding of cultural exhibitions and other means.

2. Recently cases have occurred where the propaganda disseminated by one nation has included material liable to discredit the good name of another nation. The following are examples :-

(a) On 15th August, Major General VASSILIEV, Soviet Deputy Representative Plenipotentiary to the Advisory Council, made a protest to the Deputy Commander, ROME Area Allied Command, against an exhibition of Polish art and culture held by Polish Public Relations Branch in ROME without the consent of the Allied authorities. This exhibition was considered by Major General VASSILIEV to contain material hostile to the SOVIET, and was closed on 17 August 1944. On 1 September 1944, Major General VASSILIEV made a further protest against a map exhibited in ROME by Polish Public Relations, advocating a Central European Union which he contended infringed upon the sovereign territories of the SOVIET Union.

(b) On 13 August 1944, the Italian Communist paper, "L'Unita" published a front page article entitled "Towards the Liberation of POLAND", being a reprint from the Soviet periodical "War and the Working Classes". This article contained statements derogatory to the Polish Government (recognized by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States) and to the Polish Commander-in-Chief, and was the subject of a letter of protest from General ANDERS, Commander, 2 Polish Corps, to General ALEXANDER, who forwarded the letter to the Supreme Allied Commander.

HEADQUARTERS 15 OCT 1944 A. C. C.

(c) On 18 September 1944, Major General VASSILIEV, during what was ostensibly a courtesy visit to the Supreme Allied Commander, took occasion to protest against the display by the Polish Public Relations Branch of certain maps and photographs in the Corso Umberto, ROME.

5243

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(a) On 15th August, Major General VASSILIEV, Soviet Deputy Representative Plenipotentiary to the Advisory Council, made a protest to the Deputy Commander, ROME Area Allied Command, against an exhibition of Polish art and culture held by Polish Public Relations Branch in ROME without the consent of the Allied authorities. This exhibition was considered by Major General VASSILIEV to contain material hostile to the SOVIET, and was closed on 17 August 1944. On 1 September 1944, Major General VASSILIEV made a further protest against a map exhibited in ROME by Polish Public Relations, advocating a Central European Union which he contended infringed upon the sovereign territories of the SOVIET Union.

(b) On 13 August 1944, the Italian Communist paper, "L'Unita" published a front page article entitled "Towards the Liberation of of POLAND", being a reprint from the Soviet periodical "War and the Working Classes". This article contained statements derogatory to the Polish Government (recognized by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States) and to the Polish Commander-in-Chief, and was the subject of a letter of protest from General ANDERS, Commander, 2 Polish Corps, to General ALEXANDER, who forwarded the letter to the Supreme Allied Commander.

(c) On 18 September 1944, Major General VASSILIEV, during what was ostensibly a courtesy visit to the Supreme Allied Commander, took occasion to protest against the display by the Polish Public Relations Branch of certain maps and photographs in the Corso Umberto, ROME.

The incidents outlined at para 2(a) and 2(b) above have already been considered by the Political Committee; Minute 2 of the 22nd Meeting (1 September) and Minute 2 of the 23rd Meeting (7 September) refer.

3. It is obviously undesirable that the Allied authorities should be embarrassed by repeated protests from Polish and Russian authorities against propaganda activities which tend to discredit their respective countries. Furthermore, the continuance of conditions under which Polish and Russian Public Relations authorities can either directly or indirectly goad each other repeatedly into approaching the Allied authorities on this subject, can only render a solution of the present Polish-Russian question even more difficult and impair the war effort of each of these two nations.

/4.....

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 15 OCT 1944 A. C. C.

5243

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4. In considering a solution to this problem, the following factors must be borne in mind :

(a) The Russian authorities do not, themselves, publish or exhibit any material in ITALY. They can, therefore, officially evade responsibility for the issue of any material derogatory to the Poles which may appear in ROME. The Soviet Press published in the USSR itself does, however, certainly print material as frankly hostile to Polish interests as any material published by the Poles is hostile to the USSR. Moreover, there is little reason to doubt that the Russian representatives in ROME go to some length to inspire sections of the Italian press, and other Italian organisations, to reproduce Russian material, including anti-Polish material.

(b) Polish Public Relations Branch is a military organisation and therefore can be, and is in fact, subject to a censorship which can stop publication of any material liable to embarrass the Allied authorities. Italian organisations are subject to a military censorship by the Allied Control Commission, but the scope of this censorship is not construed by the Allied Control Commission as extending to material which, though politically embarrassing to the Allied Military authorities or to troops of one of the United Nations under their command, is unobjectionable on grounds of military security. It is, therefore, impossible at present to assure the Poles that they are receiving treatment on a equal basis with other nationalities in the matter of censorship.

(c) As a matter of principle it is undesirable to impose a censorship except in the interests of military security, or in cases where publication might be detrimental to the war effort. It is, however, often difficult exactly to define the limits of military security; anything which may seriously impair the morale of a contingent from one of the United Nations serving under the Allied Command can be either prejudicial to military security, or detrimental to the war effort.

5. While the imposition of a censorship equally applicable to the various authorities and organisations of all the United Nations therefore presents some difficulty, treatment on an equal basis is essential. As an equitable solution to this dilemma, it is suggested that our object might be achieved if the representatives of the various United Nations on the Allied Advisory Council, and of the Italian Government, would adhere, on behalf of their Governments, to some form of self-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

stop publication of any material liable to embarrass the Allied authorities. Italian organisations are subject to a military censorship by the Allied Control Commission, but the scope of this censorship is not construed by the Allied Control Commission as extending to material which, though politically embarrassing to the Allied Military authorities or to troops of one of the United Nations under their command, is unobjectionable on grounds of military security. It is, therefore, impossible at present to assure the Poles that they are receiving treatment on a equal basis with other nationalities in the matter of censorship.

(c) As a matter of principle it is undesirable to impose a censorship except in the interests of military security, or in cases where publication might be detrimental to the war effort. It is, however, often difficult exactly to define the limits of military security; anything which may seriously impair the morale of a contingent from one of the United Nations serving under the Allied Command can be either prejudicial to military security, or detrimental to the war effort.

5. While the imposition of a censorship equally applicable to the various authorities and organisations of all the United Nations therefore presents some difficulty, treatment on an equal basis is essential. As an equitable solution to this dilemma, it is suggested that our object might be achieved if the representatives of the various United Nations on the Allied Advisory Council, and of the Italian Government, would adhere, on behalf of their Governments, to some formof self-denying ordinance by the terms of which they would undertake to restrain such activities of their nationals as are likely to be derogatory to others of the United Nations. The Soviet authorities in ROME can scarcely object to adherence to such an ordinace, since, officially, they do not issue any publications or other propaganda material.

6. Draft of such a self-denying ordinance is attached as Annex 'A'.

7. It is requested that the Political Committee approve this draft and that, if approved, the Supreme Allied Commander direct that it be forwarded to the Allied Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commission to secure the adherence of representatives of the United Nations and of the Italian Government in ROME.

(intd) F.G.B-N

/DISTRIBUTION

U.K. SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 307

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Advisor	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G -4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
Commander, Balkan Air Force	44-47
Spares	48-52

5941

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G -4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
Commander, Balkan Air Force	44-47
Spares	48-52

5241

(3)

[redacted] SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K 307

ANNEX A

DRAFT AGREEMENT

The representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ..... accredited to the Allied Advisory Council in Italy, have agreed jointly and severally with each other as follows :

1. The representatives of the above mentioned nations, while resolved to maintain the rights of their respective nationals in their own countries to give public expression to their individual opinions according to the laws of their respective countries, are anxious that these rights should not be abused in Italy for the end or with the result of bringing any other of the above-mentioned countries or its nationals into discredit or disrepute, to the prejudice of the joint war effort of the United Nations.

2. For this purpose the said representatives agree :

(a) To do everything in their joint and several power to restrain the dissemination of propaganda in Italy which is derogatory to any of the United Nations or which is likely to cause dissension among them.

(b) Not to reproduce or circulate or permit to be reproduced or circulated in written or pictured form in Italy any book, picture, drawing, photograph or other representation which

5240

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

vidual opinions according to the laws of their respective countries, are anxious that these rights should not be abused in Italy for the end or with the result of bringing any other of the above-mentioned countries or its nationals into discredit or disrepute, to the prejudice of the joint war effort of the United Nations.

2. For this purpose the said representatives agree :

(a) To do everything in their joint and several power to restrain the dissemination of propaganda in Italy which is derogatory to any of the United Nations or which is likely to cause dissension among them.

(b) Not to reproduce or circulate or permit to be reproduced or circulated in written or pictured form in Italy any book, pifture, drawing, photograph or other representation which has been published or circulated outside Italy and which tends to bring any of the United Nations or their Nationals as such into discredit or disrepute.

5240

(c) Not to hold or permit to be held in Italy any exhibition, display or meeting at which material originating from outside Italy is shown to the public which tends to bring any of the United Nations or their Nationals as such into discredit or disrepute.

(3)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-292

PC (44) 113
2nd October 1944

SECRET

COPY NO 44

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

Note by Secretary

1. ACC advise in their telegram No. 4027 of 29th September that the Italian Government understand that it is planned to employ about 30,000 Italian prisoners of war as labour battalions in rear of first line French units operating in FRANCE. ACC request information as to the position.

2. G-1(A) state that about 28,000 Italian prisoners of war in United States custody are scheduled to move from NORTH AFRICA to FRANCE, or are already in FRANCE, to be used as service troops in support of DRAGOON and will continue on this duty during the war against GERMANY. This is in accord with the Badoglio proclamation and has been presented to the French administration as a military necessity to assist in the liberation of FRANCE.

3. G-1(A) point out that no question of combat or combat support arises since none of these units will be forward of the communications zone, i.e., none will be employed directly in rear of either 7th Army or Armee B. These individuals retain the status of prisoners of war and under the Geneva Convention are accorded all rights thereunder except in relation to those articles which as a result of the Badoglio proclamation are not in effect.

4. G-1(A) add that Commanding General, Communications Zone, NATOUSA, affirms that these Italian service troops in DRAGOON will be required during the prosecution of the war against GERMANY. It is planned to evacuate them to ITALY soon after the end of the war with GERMANY. There can be no question of using any Italians as combat troops, except through the usual prescribed channels and it is not contemplated at present that Italians should be used for combat roles outside ITALY.

5. No notification of the intended use of the 28,000 prisoners of war scheduled for DRAGOON was made in any quarter solely on grounds of military security. G-1(A) consider that no security or other reasons preclude notification at this time and recommend that an appropriate notice concerning the use of Italian prisoners of war as service support troops in the communications zone in Southern FRANCE be sent to the Allied Control Commission for forwarding to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. G-1(A) state that about 28,000 Italian prisoners of war in United States custody are scheduled to move from NORTH AFRICA to FRANCE, or are already in FRANCE, to be used as service troops in support of DRAGOON and will continue on this duty during the war against GERMANY. This is in accord with the Badoglio proclamation and has been presented to the French administration as a military necessity to assist in the liberation of FRANCE.

3. G-1(A) point out that no question of combat or combat support arises since none of these units will be forward of the communications zone, i.e., none will be employed directly in rear of either 7th Army or Armee B. These individuals retain the status of prisoners of war and under the Geneva Convention are accorded all rights thereunder except in relation to those articles which as a result of the Badoglio proclamation are not in effect.

4. G-1(A) add that Commanding General, Communications Zone, NATOUSA, affirms that these Italian service troops in DRAGOON will be required during the prosecution of the war against GERMANY. It is planned to evacuate them to ITALY soon after the end of the war with GERMANY. There can be no question of using any Italians as combat troops, except through the usual prescribed channels and it is not contemplated at present that Italians should be used for combat roles outside ITALY.

5. No notification of the intended use of the 28,000 prisoners of war scheduled for DRAGOON was made in any quarter solely on grounds of military security. G-1(A) consider that no security or other reasons preclude notification at this time and recommend that an appropriate notice concerning the use of Italian prisoners of war as service support troops in the communications zone in Southern FRANCE be sent to the Allied Control Commission for forwarding to the Italian Government. 383.9

6. G-1(B), G-2, G-5 and the U.S. Political Advisor concur in this recommendation.

7. The British Resident Minister feels that if the Italians were informed now regarding the employment of these prisoners of war, they would be encouraged to make further complaint and to enquire about the employment and location of other Italian prisoners of war. He points out that it is possible to return no reply to the request for information addressed to the ACC by the Italian Government but that to do this would leave the Italians under the impression that the prisoners of war were in fact working in the front line. He feels that in view of these considerations the Political Committee should decide whether or not a reply should be made to the Italian Government.

8. G-1(A) maintain their recommendation, pointing out that the protecting power for any nationals retained as prisoners of war is entitled to specific information concerning their location and status.

(2)

2 G-1

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

SECRET

9. The Political Committee is requested to advise the Supreme Allied Commander whether a reply should be made to the Italian Government concerning the 28,000 Italian prisoners of war scheduled for use in Southern FRANCE and if so in what terms the reply should be couched.

/s/ J. H. Lascelles
/t/ J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section,	43
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	44 → This copy is held by WMD + Italian POW Sub-Com.
Spares	45-49

5228

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section,	43
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	44 → This copy is held by WNSI + Italian POW Sub-Com.
Spares	45-49

5248

(2)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ ACC, APO 464 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 16 Oct 1200
By D. E

C.S.O. 9674

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 281

PC (44) 112
28th September 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 48

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

PAYMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Folio 29

1. At its meeting on 26th September, the Economic Sub-Committee considered the recommendation of the Allied Control Commission that Administrative Memorandum No. 31 be rescinded, in favour of the continuance of the present procedure whereby the Allied Forces in general directly procure and pay cash for all goods, services and facilities needed by them in ITALY.

2. The Chairman of the Economic Sub-Committee, after hearing the discussion, directed that the political questions involved be reported to the Political Committee for decision, and that G-5 prepare a brief statement of those questions.

3. Administrative Memorandum No. 31, in brief, required the Italian Government to set up a procurement agency to which the Allied Forces would normally resort for goods, services and facilities, and which would pay for such procurement; and to set up a lira account which the Allied Forces would use to pay for all goods, services, and facilities which the Italian agency did not or could not procure. Certain classes of procurement would in any case not be paid for.

4. The Allied Control Commission is of the opinion that the Italian Government is incapable of setting up an effective procurement agency, and objects to the lira account on the grounds that Allied vouchers would thereby come into the hands of the Italian Government, with undesirable political consequences. These undesirable consequences assertedly would result from Italian Government objection to the nature, magnitude or cost of Allied procurement in ITALY.

5. The U.S. Fiscal Director urges the setting up of the lira account in order to relieve the present necessity of passing all American expenditures in ITALY through the U.S. Army or Navy appropriations. The

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

15396

procure and pay cash for all goods, services and facilities needed by them in ITALY.

2. The Chairman of the Economic Sub-Committee, after hearing the discussion, directed that the political questions involved be reported to the Political Committee for decision, and that G-5 prepare a brief statement of those questions.

3. Administrative Memorandum No. 31, in brief, required the Italian Government to set up a procurement agency to which the Allied Forces would normally resort for goods, services and facilities, and which would pay for such procurement; and to set up a lira account which the Allied Forces would use to pay for all goods, services, and facilities which the Italian agency did not or could not procure. Certain classes of procurement would in any case not be paid for.

4. The Allied Control Commission is of the opinion that the Italian Government is incapable of setting up an effective procurement agency, and objects to the lira account on the grounds that Allied vouchers would thereby come into the hands of the Italian Government, with undesirable political consequences. These undesirable consequences assertedly would result from Italian Government objection to the nature, magnitude or cost of Allied procurement in ITALY.

5. The U.S. Fiscal Director urges the setting up of the lira account in order to relieve the present necessity of passing all American expenditures in ITALY through the U.S. Army or Navy appropriations. The British services state that they do not suffer from this difficulty, but on the other hand have no objection to the lira account.

6. Apart from the advantages to the American side which the procedures in Administrative Memorandum No. 31 will yield, there would appear to be certain broad policy advantages gained from shifting to the Italian authorities - so far as practicable - the acts of procurement and payment.

7. It is therefore recommended that a prompt decision be reached as to the political aspects of Administrative Memorandum No. 31. The technical details which will be involved in implementing the Memorandum can then be worked out primarily between the ACC and the pay services of the Allied Forces.

(intd) C.E.L. L-H

. /DISTRIBUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

1540

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

K 281

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVNAW	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer,	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PWB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
G-4 (Mov & Tn)	44
G-4 (Log Plans)	45
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	46
Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief	47
Financial Adviser (British)	48
Fiscal Director (U.S.)	49
Spares	50-54

5246

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

G-1 (A)	26
G-1 (B)	27-28
G-2	29-30
G-3	31
G-3 Special Operations	32
G-4 (A)	33
G-4 (B)	34-35
G-5	36-38
Secretary, IS & PS	39-42
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GHQ MEF	43
Liaison Section	44
G-4 (Mov & Tn)	45
G-4 (Log Plans)	46
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	47
Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief	48
Financial Adviser (British)	49
Fiscal Director (U.S.)	50-54
Spares	

5246

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1543

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

000.7-2

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 000.7-2 PRB Weekly Bulletins

PART II

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS

53:5


1544