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POLITICAL CO
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000/136/262 POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ, MINUTES OF MEETINGS, PAPERS & NOTES
DEC. 1943 – MAY 1945

[ 5 4 7 ]

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Office of the
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ALLIED COMMISSION

# LIST OF PAPERS

*File under No.* 1002-2 POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AFHQ
MINUTES OF MEETINGS: PAPERS & NOTES

PART II



Confidential

PAPERS & NOTES

| SERIAL NUMBER | FROM— | DATE | TO— | SYNOPSIS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17a | SAC (P) (45) 15 Revised | 25 Mar 45 | | Local German Surrender in Italy. |
| 18 | SAC (P) (45) 18 | 26 Mar 45 | | Psychological Warfare activities in Italy. |
| 18a | AFHQ, MJPS P/273 Final | 30 Mar 45 | | Status of personnel of It Fascist Force in event of enemy surrender. |
| 19 | SAC (P) (45) 19 | 3 Apr 45 | | Local German Surrender in Italy - Directive re Special operational aspects |
| 20 | SAC (P) (45) 20 | 3 Apr 45 | | Jugoslav org/missions in Italy. |
| 20a | AFHQ MJPS, P/275 Final | 7 Apr 45 | | Machinery for enforcement surrender. |
| 21 | SAC (P) (45) 21 | 9 Apr 45 | | Employment of It forces in occupation of Venezia Giulia. |
| 21a | SAC (P) (45) 22 | 9 Apr 45 | | Termination of Hostilities - Announcements and celebrations |
| 22 | SAC (P) (45) 23 | 10 Apr 45 | | Freedom of air passage in Austria & Germany during Allied occupation. |
| 23 | AFHQ MJPS, P/276 Final | 10 Apr 45 | | Allied Mission to Russian Armies in Austria. |
| 24 | AFHQ MJPS, P/278 Final | 15 Apr 45 | | Arrangements for acceptance of surrender of German C-in-C Southwest. |
| 25 | AFHQ MJPS, P/275, Revised | 18 Apr 45 | | Machinery for enforcement surrender. |
| 26 | AFHQ MJPS, P/279 Final | 18 Apr 45 | | Resistance movements in Austria. |
| 27 | AFHQ MJPS, P/280 Final | 22 Apr 45 | | Future Ops by Land Forces Adriatic. |
| 28 | AFHQ MJPS, P/284 Final | 24 Apr 45 | | Naval support for Jugoslav operations in the Fiume Area. |
| 29 | SAC (P) (45) 24 | 24 Apr 45 | | Allied Mil Control, Venezia Giulia. |
| | | | | KCAS |
| 30 | AFHQ MJPS P/288 Final | 8 May 45 | | W/drawal of Allied forces fr Zadar. |
| 31 | SAC(P) (45) 25 | 13 May 45 | | Records of 3 meetings: Tito & Morgan |
| 32 | SAC(P) (45) 26 | 16 May 45 | | Press & Propaganda Policy in respect relations with Jugoslavs. |

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1548

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MINUTES OF MEETINGS: PAPERS & NOTES

Part II

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| SERIAL NUMBER | FROM— | DATE | TO— | SYNOPSIS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SAC (P) (45) 1 | 7 Jan 45 | | Relations with Italian Partisans. |
| 2 | SAC (P) (45) 3(w/drawn) | 6 Feb 45 | | Redefiniation of resp. of PWB. |
| 3 | SAC (P) (45) 3 | 16 Feb 45 | | Revised Directive to Air Forces S/C. |
| 3a | SAC(P) (45) 4 | 17 Feb 45 | | New Directive on Functions of AC. |
| 4 | SAC (P) (45) 5 | 17 Feb 45 | | Italian Bread Ration. |
| 5 | SAC (P) (45) 6 | 17 Feb 45 | | Cipher, Bag Facilities for It Govt. |
| 5a | SAC (P) (45) 6 (Add.) | 19 Feb 45 | | Cipher, Bag facilities for It Govt. |
| 6 | SAC (P) (45) 7 (Rev. 26/2) | 17 Feb 45 | | Privileges & facilities accorded the Soviet Delegations in Italy. |
| 6a | SAC(P) (45) 8 | 18 Feb 45 | | Agreement bet Greek Govt & EAM. |
| 6b | SAC (P) (45) 8 (Add.) | 19 Feb 45 | | Brief for visit of SAC to Belgrade. |
| 7 | SAC (O) (45) 9 | 17 Feb 45 | | Measures to deal w Patts in N.Italy. |
| 7a | AFHQ MJPS, P/265 Final | 18 Feb 45 | | Brief for visit of SAC to Belgrade. |
| 8 | SAC (O) (45) 9 (Add.) | 19 Feb 45 | | Allid Military Control in Venezia G. |
| 8a | AFHQ MJPS P/266 Final | 24 Feb 45 | | Transfer Currency Responsibility to Italian Government. (Ans to TAM 445) |
| 9 | SAC (P) (45) 9 | 27 Feb 45 | | Currency Responsibility of IG. |
| 9a | SAC (P) (45) 9 (Add.) | 20 Mar 45 | | Directive to Naval S/C, AC. |
| 10 | SAC (P) (45) 10 | 27 Feb 45 | | Allied Mil Control in Venezia Giulia. |
| 11 | SAC (P) (45) 11 | 28 Feb 45 | | Organization for Dealing with Inter-Service & Political Questions at AFHQ |
| 12 | SAC (P) (45) 12 | 1 Mar 45 | | Alleged Jugoslav Deserters. |
| 13 | SAC (P) (45) 13 | 6 Mar 45 | | Jugoslav Organizations & Mission in Italy |
| 13a | SAC (P) (45) 14 | 7 Mar 45 | | Organization for Dealing with Inter-service and Political Questions, AFHQ |
| 14 | SAC (P) (45) 12(Add.) | 13 Mar 45 | | Local German Surrender in Italy. |
| 15 | SAC (P) (45) 15 | 19 Mar 45 | | Local German Surrender in Italy. |
| 15a | SAC (P) (45) 15(Add.) | 21 Mar 45 | | PWB Activities towards the Balkans. |
| 16 | SAC(P) (45) 16 | 19 Mar 45 | | Jugoslav Nationals in Italy. |
| 17 | SAC(P) (45) 17 | 20 Mar 45 | | |

5614

## TOP SECRET

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P/288 (Final)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 42

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

8 May 1945.

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ZADAR AREA

(for SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting 10 May)

OBJECT.

1. We have been directed:

a. To examine the withdrawal of Allied forces from ZADAR in the light of Balkan Air Force paper BJPS (45) 11 (Final) and to submit recommendations.

b. To prepare a reply to BAF 767 of 1 May.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

2. The agreement with TITO for the establishment of our forces in the ZADAR area stated "The object of the air base is to facilitate our common operations for the destruction of the enemy, and the air forces and other auxiliary units will be withdrawn when no longer required for this purpose."

The subsidiary reason for which the air base was established was to provide a convenient airfield where aircraft damaged in operations over enemy territory might be able to land if they could not reach their proper base.

3. There is now little doubt that Jugoslav territory will very soon be completely cleared of the enemy and in any event such air support as TITO may still require for his operations against the Germans could best be provided from the UDINE area. Similarly the ZADAR area has now ceased to have any particular advantage as a possible landing ground for our own returning aircraft damaged in operations.

4. The only future use to which the ZADAR airfield is likely to be put is for the training and possibly the accommodation of one or more of the Jugoslav Air Force squadrons, which is a matter for the Jugoslavs. The British commitment in this respect is a diminishing one and is likely to be a Wing HQ with the necessary administrative and maintenance backing. We are not in a position to say at present whether the resources required can be found entirely from the RAF, or whether some assistance from the Army will be necessary.

5643

5. Although ZADAR was used as a forward base for raiding force operations by LFA in the Northern ADRIATIC, the main purpose of the army garrison established there is the local administration and maintenance of the air base. Raiding force operations having ceased, the army garrison is only required so long as the air

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5643

5. Although ZADAR was used as a forward base for raiding force operations by LFA3 in the Northern ADRIATIC, the main purpose of the army garrison established there is the local administration and maintenance of the air base. Raiding force operations having ceased, the army garrison is only required so long as the air base is maintained.

6. From the naval point of view, there is no requirement for shore based personnel at ZADAR. The port will be used as required in the same way as any other port belonging to an Ally; for example, as an anchorage for minesweepers.

7. From the political point of view, SACMED was instructed in FAN 536 to ensure that the interim administration of ZADAR is conducted in the name of the Allies, although in practice the actual functions of administration might be performed by the Jugoslavs. It is clearly not possible in present circumstances to impose Allied military government in ZADAR without using considerable force. Moreover to retain the present base and garrison in ZADAR for this purpose would be a flagrant breach of SACMED's agreement with TITO, referred to in para 2.

8. We conclude from the foregoing that from every point of view all Allied forces (except those required for the backing for the Jugoslav squadrons) should be withdrawn from ZADAR with the least possible delay, and we agree with the view expressed by BAF in their signal BAF 767, that there will be much advantage in taking the initiative in this matter ourselves rather than waiting for the Jugoslavs to invite us to depart.

(30)

If this is accepted, it remains only to consider the method of withdrawal.



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METHOD OF WITHDRAWAL.

9. The BJPS paper under examination (forwarded separately under MJPS/66 dated 4 May) is an appreciation of the factors involved in carrying out the withdrawal of our forces from the ZADAR area and is the basis, therefore, on which the necessary plan can be drawn up. The main points which emerge from this appreciation are:

a. Army Stores at ZADAR.

Twenty days supplies are held, with an additional twenty days reserve, making an overall total of forty days stocks. The BJPS have assumed that such balance of these stocks as remains when we complete our withdrawal from ZADAR should be handed over to the Jugoslavs. Any other course would be wasteful in shipping and we, therefore, recommend that this assumption should be confirmed. If this is accepted, it is clear that we should endeavor to eat down stocks in such a way that only a small balance is likely to remain when withdrawal is completed.

b. RAF Stores.

These are held on the same basis as Army stores and again the BJPS assume that the balance remaining on final withdrawal from ZADAR should be handed over to the Jugoslavs. For the same reasons as given in a above, we recommend that this assumption should also be confirmed.

c. Rate of Withdrawal.

Provided Army and RAF stores are dealt with as recommended in a and b above, evacuation from ZADAR could be completed in 21 days provided two LST are made available. This can be done with effect from 15 May.

10. Forces evacuated from ZADAR will be required in general as under:

Air forces in the BARI area
Army units in the ANCONA area

Detailed disposal of units should be decided by the appropriate MAAF and AFHQ Staff Sections, and notified to BAF and LFA.

11. There are a number of Jugoslavs from Southern FRANCE in the BARI area awaiting shipment to JUGOSLAVIA to join the Jugoslav forces. The opportunity should be taken to evacuate them in returning shipping to ZADAR.

CONCLUSIONS.

12. In accordance with SACMED's agreement with Marshal TITO, Allied forces should be withdrawn with the least possible delay. We should take the initiative in the matter and inform Marshal TITO of our intentions.

13. It should be possible to begin withdrawal about 15 May aiming at completion by 7 June at latest. Two LSTs can be made available for this purpose.

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13. It should be possible to begin withdrawal about 15 May aiming at completion by 7 June at latest. Two LSTs can be made available for this purpose.

14. Army and RAF stores and supplies in ZADAR should be "eaten down" so that the minimum is left when the withdrawal is completed.

15. BAF and LFA should be informed of the above and instructed to plan and carry out the withdrawal accordingly.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

16. That the signals to Marshal TITO, BAF, LFA and FOTALI, attached as Appendices A & B, should be approved and dispatched.

for Brig GS.

G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

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Staff Officer, Plans

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P/288 (Final) D R A F T APPENDIX A

FROM: AFHQ

TO : MACMIS

RPTD: BAF, LFA, FOTALI

---

Pass following to Marshal TITO personal from Field Marshal ALEXANDER.

Begins.

You will remember that our agreement for the establishment of Allied forces in the ZADAR area was based on the understanding that my air forces and other auxiliary units would be withdrawn when no longer necessary for our common operations against the enemy. Since the enemy has now surrendered unconditionally, I propose to withdraw my forces from ZADAR, and in fact, some units have already left. I understand that some of my RAF units and possibly some army maintenance units will continue to be required at ZADAR for some little time to administer and maintain your air force squadrons. Except for these units all my other air force and auxiliary units will be withdrawn as rapidly as possible but in view of the limited shipping that I can make available for the task I do not anticipate that it will be completed before 7 June.

Ends.

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already left. I understand that some of my RAF units and possibly some army maintenance units will continue to be required at ZADAR for some little time to administer and maintain your air force squadrons. Except for these units all my other air force and auxiliary units will be withdrawn as rapidly as possible but in view of the limited shipping that I can make available for the task I do not anticipate that it will be completed before 7 June.

Ends.

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P/288 (Final) D R A F T APPENDIX D

FROM: AFHQ

TO : BAF, LFA and FOTALI

---

1. Ref BAF/767 of 1 May. Operation RESIDUE should be planned forthwith with view to beginning 15 May. You should endeavor to complete as early as possible and in any event not later than 7 June. It is however likely that some air force units will have to be left to meet the Jugoslav Air Force commitment.

2. In general, Army units will be evacuated to ANCONA and RAF units to BARI. Detailed instructions follow. For your information returning shipping is likely to be used to convey Jugoslav personnel now at BARI awaiting evacuation to JUGOSLAVIA.

3. Your paragraph 7.

   a. Agreed and action in hand.

   b. All stocks will be eaten down to a level to be notified separately.

   c. Agreed and already dealt with separately.

   d. Two LST will be made available to you from about 15 May, details follow.

4. Detailed arrangements should be made direct with the appropriate staff branches at this headquarters.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

to be used to convey Jugoslav personnel now at [illegible]

JUGOSLAVIA.

3. Your paragraph 7.

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APR 25 1945 at 1600

K 152

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 24
24th April 1945

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 14

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have still not defined their policy in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. However, events have now moved to such an extent that it is imperative to make detailed plans and preparations. A draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is self-explanatory, is therefore attached at Appendix 'A'.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested :-

(a) To approve as his policy for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA the proposals outlined in Appendix 'A'.

(b) To authorise the despatch of this signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he intends to take.

(intd) L.L.L.

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| Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters | 6 |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF | 7 |
| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | |

5840

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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CHIEF COMMR.

APR 25 REC'D

K 152

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 24
24th April 1945

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COPY NO 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

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| Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters | 6 |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF | 7 |
| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | 8 |
| Chief of Staff | 9 |

5640

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| Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters | 6 |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF | 7 |
| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | 8 |
| Chief of Staff | 9 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 10-11 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff | 12 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 13-14 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 15-16 |
| Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff | 17 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 | 18-19 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 20 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF | 21-25 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 26-28 |
| British Resident Minister | 29-32 |
| Director, PWB | 33 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 34-36 |
| Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat | 37-39 |
| Spares | 40-42 |

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Exec Comm R (35)
Pol Advrs (36)

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APPENDIX 'A'

DRAFT SIGNAL

TO: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff

RPTD: SHAEF Main

This is NAF 432

Subject is occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA reference signals ending with NAF 872.

1. Events are moving rapidly in this theatre and I am likely to be faced in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. I must now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary, these will be as follows.

2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to occupy the entire compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA under the direction of 15 Army Group. Allied Military Government will be set up in the wake of the occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking provided as far as possible equally from US and British resources. It will work through such local authorities as may be found functioning in VENEZIA GIULIA regardless of nationality.

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3. Before the task force enters VENEZIA GIULIA I will inform Marshal TITO of my intentions and will request his cooperation in withdrawing all Jugoslav forces from the entire compartment. If necessary I will explain to him that it

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3. Before the task force enters VENEZIA GIULIA I will inform Marshal TITO of my intentions and will request his cooperation in withdrawing all Jugoslav forces from the entire compartment. If necessary I will explain to him that it is my further intention to disarm all forces remaining, regardless of nationality, and to carry out any other measures required to ensure the orderly government and pacification of the compartment. I shall explain that my action is dictated by the agreed policy of the United Nations to reserve all questions of territorial revision until the peace conference, and by the paramount operational need for ensuring a peaceful and secure L of C for the Allied forces carrying out the occupation of AUSTRIA. It will in no way prejudice a decision on any territorial claims which he (Marshal TITO) may make at the final peace settlement

Changed

See folio 27 in file 1008/w.

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Arranged

See folio 27 in file 1008/m.-gh

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APR 27 HECD

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P/284 (Final)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

24 April 1945

NAVAL SUPPORT FOR JUGOSLAV OPERATIONS IN THE FIUME AREA

In accordance with Terms of Reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff dated 23 April, the MJPS have examined the question of Allied naval support for JUGOSLAV operations in the FIUME area, and have prepared the attached paper.

5

G. L. EEERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

for L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

for W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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5 Gen. Bragg

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

24 April 1945.

NAVAL SUPPORT FOR JUGOSLAV OPERATIONS IN THE FIUME AREA

1. We have been instructed to examine the question of Allied naval support for Jugoslav operations in the FIUME area.

2. Possible naval support falls under two heads:

   a. Assistance in opening the port of FIUME.

   b. Assistance in further combined operations.

GENERAL.

3. It is in our interests to preserve good relations with TITO, and we should therefore meet his requests for support so far as operational requirements elsewhere permit.

ASSISTANCE IN OPENING THE PORT OF FIUME.

4. In view of current operational developments, it is considered that there may be a requirement for the opening of TRIESTE during the last half of May. This and the sweeping of the main ANCONA - TRIESTE channel on which the opening of the port depends, must have absolute priority.

5. No naval or military assistance can be given for the operation of FIUME or for salvage in the port.

6. It is probable, however, that certain minesweeping resources will be surplus to the task in para 4 above and some assistance should therefore be given in opening FIUME. It is estimated that it would be possible with the resources likely to be available to open the port in one week. It is considered that this or even a longer delay would be acceptable in view of the fact that the small harbors from inclusive SENJ to inclusive KRALJEVICA are now open for the emergency introduction of supplies.

NAVAL ASSISTANCE FOR FURTHER COMBINED OPERATIONS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1563

a. Assistance in opening the port of FIUME.

b. Assistance in further combined operations.

GENERAL.

3. It is in our interests to preserve good relations with TITO, and we should therefore meet his requests for support so far as operational requirements elsewhere permit.

ASSISTANCE IN OPENING THE PORT OF FIUME.

4. In view of current operational developments, it is considered that there may be a requirement for the opening of TRIESTE during the last half of May. This and the sweeping of the main ANCONA - TRIESTE channel on which the opening of the port depends, must have absolute priority.

5. No naval or military assistance can be given for the operation of FIUME or for salvage in the port.

6. It is probable, however, that certain minesweeping resources will be surplus to the task in para 4 above and some assistance should therefore be given in opening FIUME. It is estimated that it would be possible with the resources likely to be available to open the port in one week. It is considered that this or even a longer delay would be acceptable in view of the fact that the small harbors from inclusive SENJ to inclusive KRALJEVICA are now open for the emergency introduction of supplies.

1527

NAVAL ASSISTANCE FOR FURTHER COMBINED OPERATIONS.

7. a. We have already given naval assistance in the capture of certain Italian owned islands. There would therefore appear to be no political objection to naval assistance for further operations against the eastern coast of ISTRI

b. Such assistance must, however, be subject to the considerations set out in para 4 above. The availability of minesweepers is likely to be the limiting factor.

CONCLUSION.

8. Our policy should be to give such naval support and assistance in the opening of the port of FIUME and towards Jugoslav operations against ISTRIA as TITO may request and as we can conveniently spare from resources available after absolute priority has been given to all operations and preparations necessary to enable us to enter and open the port of TRIESTE during the last half of May.



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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P/224 (Final)

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RECOMMENDATIONS.

9. It is recommended:

a. That FOTALI be informed that on TITO's request assistance as in para 6 above can be given for the minesweeping of FIUME, but that assistance is subject to withdrawal in the event of urgent operational requirements elsewhere. In this event the Jugoslavs should further be informed that no naval or military assistance for opening or operating the port can be given. It should at the same time be made clear to the Jugoslavs that we may require the use of the port at a later date.

b. That we should be prepared on request to support further Jugoslav combined operations in the FIUME area, subject to the absolute priority of requirements for the battle of ITALY.

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1568

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

22 April 1945

FUTURE OPERATIONS BY LAND FORCES ADRIATIC

In accordance with Terms of Reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff dated 15 April, the MJPS has investigated the future employment of LFA and has prepared the attached paper on the subject.

G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

for L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

for W. A. ADAIR
Commander
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

22 April 1945

# FUTURE OPERATIONS BY LAND FORCES ADRIATIC

## OBJECT

1. To investigate the present and possible future employment of LFA, with a view to submitting recommendations as to how its component units can be most profitably employed in the future.

## COMPOSITION OF LFA

2. The strengths and dispositions of the principal sub-units of LFA are as follows:

| Sub-Unit | Approx. Strength Officers | ORs | ITALY | ZADAR | 8th Army |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. SBS | | | | | |
| (1) 1 Sqn | 7 | 53 | | | X |
| (2) 1 Sqn | 7 | 53 | | X | |
| (3) SBS (less two Sqns) | 14 | 119 | X | | |
| b. RSR | | | | | |
| (1) 4.2 Mortar Tp | 2 | 37 | | | X |
| (2) 75 mm Btry (including one Tp (5 and 63) enroute from ZADAR) | 12 | 122 | | | X |
| (3) Vickers Tp (2nd Vickers Tp NOT activated) | 3 | 32 | | X | |
| (4) Mule Pack Tp & Increment (Part formed) | Approx 250 | | | X | |
| (5) HQ and Rear Details (Incl. 1st Reinforcements) | 17 | 134 | | X | |
| c. LRDG | | | | | |
| (1) 1 Sqn | 16 | 137 | | X | |
| (2) LRDG (less one Sqn) | 18 | 190 | X | | |
| d. SIS/FORCE | | | | X | |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | 1 Sqn | 7 | 53 | | X | |
| (2) | 1 Sqn | 7 | 53 | | | X |
| (3) | SBS (less two Sqns) | 14 | 119 | X | | |

b. RSR

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | 4.2 Mortar Tp | 2 | 37 | | | X |
| (2) | 75 mm Btry (including one Tp (5 and 63) enroute from ZADAR) | 12 | 122 | | | X |
| (3) | Vickers Tp (2nd Vickers Tp NOT activated) | 3 | 32 | | X | |
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c. LRDG

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | 1 Sqn | 16 | 137 | | X | |
| (2) | LRDG (less one Sqn) | 18 | 190 | X | | |

d. STICKFORCE

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT OF LFA

3. a. Stickforce: Maintaining the Air Base at ZADAR (Operation BINGHAM.)

b. LNFA: Execution of combined reconnaissance and raiding operations in ISTRIA. Based on ZADAR (Operation GREENLAW).

c. HQ LFA: Situated in ITALY. Their primary concern is controlling and coordinating the activities of STICKFORCE and LNFA and with training. In addition they are responsible for the replacements and reinforcements of their units under command of Eighth Army.

4. On 15 and 16 April, such of the SBS Sqn. as was in ISTRIA and the four LRDG patrols operating there were arrested by Jugoslav 43 Division. Strong protests lodged in BELGRADE by MACMIS have resulted in these personnel being released from confinement and permitted to retain their arms and wireless sets; however, they were refused liberty of action. Orders were received by 43 Jugoslav Division from 4 Jugoslav Army on 21 April to restore full freedom of movement and action to all British troops in ISTRIA and to apologize for the treatment accorded them.

27



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5. The rapid progress made by the 4 Jugoslav Army in their operations in Northern DALMATIA and CROATIA, point to an early offensive designed to capture FIUME and the whole Istrian Peninsula. Any success in this direction will progressively decrease the value of LRDG shipping watches on the coast of ISTRIA.

6. Aside from any political considerations which may arise from the events referred to in paragraph 5, it is considered that:

   a. The reconnaissance and shipping watches carried out by the LRDG are likely to have operational value as long as the enemy holds the main ports, i.e., FIUME, POLA, and TRIESTE. The actual period cannot be predicted.

   b. The raiding and sabotage operations of the SBS on the Eastern ADRIATIC have now ceased to have the material operational value they had in the past.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT

7. With Eighth Army. The value of LRDG to Eighth Army would probably be small since there is little scope on their front for reconnaissance and shipping watches of the type which the LRDG carry out. On the other hand, SBS Squadrons would be of considerable value because of their specialized commando-type training, and the fact that they are parachute troops. Further, one of these squadrons is already with Eighth Army, and it would be advantageous to have the unit complete. Similarly, the RSR would be of considerable value to Eighth Army, where the major part of it is already.

8. With SEAC. In the interests of the overall war effort, it is considered essential to ensure that the forces in question be employed in their most profitable role. Such consideration might lead to the conclusion that they should be offered to SEAC, where they could probably be very profitably employed. In view of the length of time necessary for reorganization, rest and shipping, this should be investigated at once.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM LFA

9. The political problem in Northeast ITALY and particularly in ISTRIA, is extremely delicate and difficult. Withdrawal of all Anglo-American forces operating in this area might be interpreted by the Jugoslavs as an admission of some degree of recognition of their territorial claims in this area.

10. In March 1945, BAF were told that troops would not be withdrawn from LFA while they could be employed profitably in trans-ADRIATIC operations. They were directed to make recommendations regarding such withdrawals according to the situation from time to time.

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10. In March 1945, BAF were told that troops would not be withdrawn from LFA while they could be employed profitably in trans-ADRIATIC operations. They were directed to make recommendations regarding such withdrawals according to the situation from time to time.

CONCLUSIONS

11. Disregarding political considerations, military considerations lead to the following conclusions:

a. Units included in Stickforce should remain as at present allotted.

b. For the time being, the LRDG should remain carrying out its present mission of reconnaissance and shipping watches in ISTRIA and the adjacent islands.

c. Temporarily, the SBS and RSR should be allotted complete to Eighth Army.

d. Subparas b and c are subject to the question of these units being allotted to SEAC.

e. HQ LFA should remain performing its present functions but the possibility of immediate reduction and final disbandment in the near future should be investigated.



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P/280 (Final)

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. That a signal should be dispatched to BAF and LFA informing them of the proposals in paragraph 11 a, b and c, requesting their concurrence or alternative recommendations, and instructing them to carry out the investigation referred to in paragraph 11 e. Draft signal attached.



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FROM: AFHQ

TO : BAF

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PRIORITY

RFTD: LFA

---

1. Subject is future employment of LFA. Now under consideration are the following proposals:

   a. To continue Stickforce as constituted and employed at present.

   b. To continue LRDG patrols presently employed in reconnaissances and shipping watches in ISTRIA.

   c. To allot SBS and RSR complete to Eighth Army.

2. Request your concurrence or alternative recommendations on above proposals. Also desire you to investigate and report on possibility of immediate reduction and final disbandment Headquarters LFA in near future.

3. Also under consideration proposal to offer SBS, LRDG and RSR to SEAC. Request your views on this with statement of implications involved.

5433

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c. To allot SBS and RSR complete to [illegible]

2. Request your concurrence or alternative recommendations on above proposals. Also desire you to investigate and report on possibility of immediate reduction and final disbandment Headquarters LFA in near future.

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ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

18 April 1945

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN AUSTRIA
Cover Note by MJPS

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 15 April 45, the MJPS considered in conjunction with FWD, the question of the future resistance movements in AUSTRIA and the attached paper was approved.

G. L. ERRLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

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Staff Officer, Plans

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ALLIED FORCE HEAD QUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

18 April 1945

# RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN AUSTRIA

OBJECT

1. a. To determine whether it is desirable and feasible to build up large scale and specific Austrian resistence movements now or in the near future.

   b. To determine, in the light of a above, on what lines PWB activities towards AUSTRIA should be directed.

EXISTING RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

2. O.F.F. (Austrian Freedom Front). This movement although nominally all-party is communist sponsored and has for some time had the active support of Russian radio propaganda. TITO claims to be in touch with it, but it has not been possible to obtain any direct confirmation of this. It is thought that, at any rate before the Russian entry into AUSTRIA, O.F.F. had little solid basis in fact. This conclusion, however, may well not hold since Russian entry into VIENNA.

3. P.O.E.N. (Provisional Austrian National Committee) and the F.F.Oe. its Military Arm. There has been direct contact with this organization, which is mainly under Social Democratic control. While the movement has a certain degree of organization and cohesion, it is not in any sense set up as a resistance movement on the lines of the Italian and Jugoslav partisan armies. Its main strength was in VIENNA.

4. Partisans in the INNSBRUCK Area. There is reported to be an independent armed group of partisans, variously estimated at from 300 to 1,000 in the mountains south of INNSBRUCK.

5. Slovene Partisans. There are groups of Slovene partisans in the SAU and KOR ALPS. Their aim is, however, primarily to get these portions annexed to JUGOSLAVIA.

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PRESENT POLICY REGARDING SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS.

...build up large scale resistance movements in ... scale, mostly

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2. O.F.F. (Austrian Freedom Front). This movement [illegible] Communist sponsored and has for some time had the active support of Russian radio propaganda. TITO claims to be in touch with it, but it has not been possible to obtain any direct confirmation of this. It is thought that, at any rate before the Russian entry into AUSTRIA, O.F.F. had little solid basis in fact. This conclusion, however, may well not hold since Russian entry into VIENNA.

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5631

PRESENT POLICY REGARDING SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS.

6. It is not our present policy to build up large scale resistance movements in AUSTRIA. OSS and SOE are represented in the country on a small scale, mostly for intelligence and FREELORN purposes. Such agencies are also charged with making contact with resistance movements. There is at present, however, no organization for the large scale introduction of supplies for partisans and there is no possibility of setting up such an organization in the immediate future.

7. The present PWB policy regarding AUSTRIA is:

   a. To give publicity to the Allied intention to establish a free and independent AUSTRIA.

   b. To point out to Austrians that in order to attain this, they must be prepared to "work their passage".

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING FUTURE POLICY AND SUPPORT

8. Many Austrians have throughout been hostile to the Nazis and the number now desirous of bringing about their fall is no doubt rapidly increasing. The majority of Austrians are reported by agents to be "indulging in spiritual resistance" and there have been a number of acts of sabotage and disobedience to Nazi orders which have been ruthlessly suppressed. Nevertheless, some Austrians are reported to resent continued instructions in our propaganda to "work their passage" on



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the grounds that they are at present doing so and suffering the consequences. On the same grounds, they are resentful of the destruction of non-military targets by air bombardment.

9. Thus the Austrian people on the whole do not offer a promising field for building up large scale resistance movements. Apart from this aspect, the following factors weigh against any attempt to do so:

a. In view of the present weakness of indigenous Austrian resistance organizations, it is unlikely that resistance as a whole could be built up at this late stage in the war in sufficient time to have any material effect on military operations.

b. Any attempt to build up armed resistance movements is likely to result in arms getting into hands of Austriens whose political inclinations do not conform with Anglo-American intentions in AUSTRIA, and further, we shall put ourselves under some obligation to Austrians whose services have been of very little value. This would result in increasing our difficulties when we eventually occupy AUSTRIA without gaining any real compensating military advantage in the meantime.

CONCLUSIONS

10. a. No large scale organized resistance movement exists in AUSTRIA on the lines of the Italian and Jugoslav partisan armies.

b. It is not feasible or desirable to build up large scale Austrian resistance movements now and it will not be so in the future.

c. In view of a and b above, and in the light of paragraphs 8 and 9, there should be no change in PWB activities in regard to AUSTRIA.

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AFHQ Med Joint Planning Staff

P/275 (Revised) 18 April 1945

MACHINERY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ENEMY SURRENDER IN ITALY

Document Filed in 1112/CC

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CROSS INDEX SHEET

AFHQ Med Joint Planning Staff

P/278 (Final) 15 April 1945

ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF SURRENDER OF GERMAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTHWEST

Documents will be found in CC file 1112.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

10 April 1945

ALLIED MISSION TO THE RUSSIAN ARMIES IN AUSTRIA

In accordance with Terms of Reference received from the Chief of Staff dated 31 March, the MJPS have examined the question of an Allied Mission to the Russian Armies in AUSTRIA in the event of their early occupation of VIENNA. The attached paper has been prepared and is forwarded.

G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

for L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
RAAF Plans

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

10 April 1945.

## ALLIED MISSION TO THE RUSSIAN ARMIES IN AUSTRIA

OBJECTS.

1. To consider:

   a. The functions and composition of an Allied military mission to the Russian Armies in AUSTRIA, with particular reference to the inclusion of:

      (1) Allied PW repatriation and Graves Registration teams.

      (2) Token military occupational forces.

   b. The arrangements which should be made to fly in such a mission in the event of early Russian occupation of VIENNA.

2. To draft such communications as appear appropriate in order that the necessary approach may be made to the Russians.

CHARACTER, FUNCTIONS AND COMPOSITION OF MISSION.

3. Character of Mission.

   a. In the light of previous experience, it is unlikely that the Russians will accept anything other than a small mission of strictly military character; we are not in a position to compel them to do otherwise. We have however been informed (*) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it is the desire of the US and British Governments that as soon as VIENNA has been occupied by any Allied forces, the Tripartite Control Council should be immediately established. It would therefore clearly be desirable from our point of view to include in the mission certain key personnel of the Allied Commission, British and US elements. They would have to be introduced under some military guise.

   b. The mission should be as impressive as possible and for this reason it should be headed by a Lieutenant General. Should the officer selected be American, his deputy should be British and vice versa. Impression may further be made by including in the mission two infantry guard companies to perform normal police and ceremonial guard duties.

Functions of Mission.

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b. The arrangements which should be made to fly in such a mission in the event of early Russian occupation of VIENNA.

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Impression may further be made by including in the mission two infantry guard companies to perform normal police and ceremonial guard duties.

4. Functions of Mission.

During the period that operations are still in progress and until British and US forces enter AUSTRIA, the primary function of the mission will be one of contact and liaison with a view to:

a. Facilitating entry into their respective zones by the British and US occupational forces.

b. Facilitating the setting up of the initial machinery for the joint Anglo/American/Russian military control of AUSTRIA.

c. Obtaining intelligence and information of all types.

In view of the foregoing, PW repatriation and Graves Registration teams should not be included in the mission. One military representative conversant with the PW repatriation problem should be included for contact and liaison purposes;



(*) Signal WX 30818 of 2 Feb 45.

23

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he could also cover Graves Registration points.
The work undertaken by the mission will not be such as will require - or indeed be suitable for - press coverage. Moreover, an attempt to introduce press correspondents at the early operational stage contemplated, is likely to be strongly resisted by the Russians and would therefore delay their agreement to the mission. On the other hand, one PWB and one INC representative could carry out useful preliminary action.

5. Composition of Mission.

Having regard to paras 3 and 4 preceding, it is considered that a mission composed as outlined in Appendix A attached would be suitable.

TOKEN MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL FORCES.

6. While they are still conducting military operations in AUSTRIA, the Russians are unlikely to agree to the entry of any token occupational forces. In any case, such forces should not be less than one British and one US battalion, and their accommodation, supply and maintenance would present an increased commitment which it would be difficult to meet. It is considered therefore that token military occupational forces should not accompany the mission.

AIR CONSIDERATIONS.

7. If no unforeseen situation arises, the size of the mission (and even the introduction of token military occupational forces of the size mentioned in para 6 above) need not be limited by the available air lift, provided transport is confined to jeeps.

8. In order to maintain the mission in VIENNA, it will be essential to obtain Russian agreement to the unrestricted Allied use of an airfield in VIENNA Gau. Such agreement must also cover the entry and operation of adequate ground-staff personnel.

ESTIMATED DATE WHEN MISSION WILL BE REQUIRED.

9. It is unlikely that the Russians will be in effective control of VIENNA before the end of April; therefore no mission is likely to be acceptable to the Russians before the middle of May.

CONCLUSIONS.

10. The mission should purport to be an Allied Military Mission and should be as impressive as possible; it should be headed by an American or British Lieutenant General. It should include the Deputy Commissioners designate (American and British), one of whom (depending on the nationality of the head) should be

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AIR CONSIDERATIONS.

7. If no unforeseen situation arises, the size of the mission (and even the introduction of token military occupational forces of the size mentioned in para 6 above) need not be limited by the available air lift, provided transport is confined to jeeps.

8. In order to maintain the mission in VIENNA, it will be essential to obtain Russian agreement to the unrestricted Allied use of an airfield in VIENNA Geu. Such agreement must also cover the entry and operation of adequate ground-staff personnel.

ESTIMATED DATE WHEN MISSION WILL BE REQUIRED.

9. It is unlikely that the Russians will be in effective control of VIENNA before the end of April; therefore no mission is likely to be acceptable to the Russians before the middle of May.

CONCLUSIONS.

10. The mission should purport to be an Allied Military Mission and should be as impressive as possible; it should be headed by an American or British Lieutenant General. It should include the Deputy Commissioners designate (American and British), one of whom (depending on the nationality of the head) should be deputy head of the mission. Composition of the mission should be as outlined in Appendix A and personnel filling Allied Commission appointments should be heads or deputy heads of Civil Divisions. All personnel should be in uniform and if necessary given suitable local rank.

11. The primary function of the mission should be to establish contact and liaison with the Russians with a view to facilitating the deployment of the US and British occupational forces in their respective national zones in AUSTRIA, and the setting up of the initial machinery of joint Anglo/American/Russian military control over AUSTRIA. Other duties should include the obtaining of information and intelligence, contact with the Russians on Allied PW repatriation problems and questions of Graves Registration and contact and preliminary action on PWB and INC matters.

12. The mission should be ready to fly into VIENNA during the first half of May. Negotiations with the Russians should therefore be undertaken forthwith to secure their agreement to the entry of the mission and in particular to grant the unrestricted Allied use of an airfield in the VIENNA Geu.



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13. Token occupational forces should not accompany the mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

14. That immediate action should be taken to set up the mission as indicated in paras 3 and 5 and Appendix A, with a target date for readiness by 1 May.

15. That MAAF should now make such arrangements as are necessary and possible to enable the mission to be flown in any time after 1 May.

16. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be informed of these proposals and requested to appoint the head of the Mission and to arrange for negotiations to be opened with the Russians without delay. Draft signal accordingly is attached at Appendix B.

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5626



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P/276 (Final)

APPENDIX A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

| | OFFICERS | OR/EM |
|---|---|---|
| Head of Mission representing SACMED and 15 Army Group | 1 | |
| M.A. | 1 | |
| Deputy Head of Mission (member of Allied Commission) | 1 | |
| Representatives Fifth and Eighth Armies | 2 | |
| Representatives MAAF | 5 | |
| Intelligence | 2 | |
| Disposal of Allied PW | 1 | |
| Control Commission | 6 | |
| INC | 1 | |
| PWB | 1 | |
| Signal Staff Officer | 1 | |
| Interpreters | 3 | 3 |
| Local Administration - to include Camp Commandant, M.O., Provost, clerks, drivers, mess staff, batmen and orderlies. | 2 | 70 |
| Signals Detachment | 3 | 17 |
| Guards | | |
| One British Coy | 5 | 120 |
| One American Coy | 5 | 120 |
| | 40 | 330 |

5625

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Intelligence | 2 | |
| Disposal of Allied PW | 1 | |
| Control Commission | 6 | |
| INC | 1 | |
| PWB | 1 | |
| Signal Staff Officer | 1 | |
| Interpreters | 3 | 3 |
| Local Administration - to include Camp Commandant, M.O., Provost, clerks, drivers, mess staff, batmen and orderlies. | 2 | 70 |
| Signals Detachment | 3 | 17 |
| Guards | | |
| One British Coy | 5 | 120 |
| One American Coy | 5 | 120 |
| | 40 | 330 |

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Air Force
Ground staff - - - details to follow.

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E/276 (Final) DRAFT APPENDIX B

FROM: AFHQ

TOP SECRET

TO : AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff

RPTD: SHAEF MAIN

---

NAF ____ in two parts.

Part 1.

1. I have had under consideration action to be taken in accordance with intentions expressed in Joint Chiefs of Staff signal WX 30818 of 2 February when Russians occupy VIENNA. In view of Russian reactions in past and their present attitude I consider that most we can hope that they will accept is a small Allied mission purporting to be of strictly military character. Primary functions of such a mission would be to establish contact and liaison with Russians with view to facilitating deployment of US and British occupational forces in respective zones and VIENNA Gau, and the setting up of initial machinery of joint Anglo/American/Russian military control over AUSTRIA. Secondary functions would include obtaining of information and intelligence, contact with Russians on Allied PW repatriation problems and questions of Graves Registration, and contact and preliminary action on PWB and INC matters.

2. In order to achieve its purpose it is essential that the mission be as impressive as possible and for this reason I recommend that it be headed by an American or British lieutenant general, whom I presume you will nominate. Part 2 of this signal gives the detailed composition which I recommend for this mission and [illegible] lieutenant general to head it and his personal staff officer all

5624

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I consider that most we can hope that they will accept is a small Allied mission purporting to be of strictly military character. Primary functions of such a mission would be to establish contact and liaison with Russians with view to facilitating deployment of US and British occupational forces in respective zones and VIENNA Gau, and the setting up of initial machinery of joint Anglo/American/Russian military control over AUSTRIA. Secondary functions would include obtaining of information and intelligence, contact with Russians on Allied PW repatriation problems and questions of Graves Registration, and contact and preliminary action on PWB and INC matters.

2. In order to achieve its purpose it is essential that the mission be as impressive as possible and for this reason I recommend that it be headed by an American or British lieutenant general, whom I presume you will nominate. Part 2 of this 5604 signal gives the detailed composition which I recommend for this mission and apart from the lieutenant general to head it and his personal staff officer all other personnel will be provided by detaching from existing establishments. The Allied Commission personnel will include the US and British deputy commissioners designate one of whom (the opposite nationality to the head of the mission) will be the deputy head of the mission.

3. Having regard to the probable development of Russian operations in AUSTRIA, I consider it likely that the Russians should be in a position to accept the mission in VIENNA during the first half of May. My ability to introduce the mission and subsequently to maintain it will depend on Russian agreement to permit the unrestricted Allied use of an airfield in VIENNA Gau including the location there of the necessary air force ground staff.



(23)

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4. I presume that if you approve generally of these proposals you will make the necessary approach to the Russians to secure their agreement. In the meantime I am taking action to ensure that a mission on the lines indicated will be ready to be flown into VIENNA any time after 1 May.

Part 2.

(This will be a summary of Appendix A)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K-145 (34-36)

SAC (P) (45) 23
10 April 1945

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COPY NO. 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

FREEDOM OF AIR PASSAGE IN AUSTRIA
AND GERMANY DURING ALLIED OCCUPATION.

Note by the Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF.

1. The question of the movement of Allied aircraft between the zones of occupation in GERMANY is under consideration at SHAEF. This question also affects AFHQ in that VIENNA lies within the Russian zone of occupation.

2. Up to the present as far as the Russians are concerned, all movement of aircraft in and out of Russian-occupied areas has had to be cleared through MOSCOW. This system prevails in the BALKANS at the moment, and an extension of it to cover the Russian zone in AUSTRIA would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers with zones in VIENNA.

3. British and U. S. aircraft based in AUSTRIA will require to fly North to BERLIN, and DENMARK, and NORWAY, and West to Western GERMANY, FRANCE, the Low Countries, and U. K. This will involve British and U. S. aircraft crossing territory occupied by the U. S. and British components of SHAEF, and the Russian occupational zone.

4. To ensure free air movement between BERLIN and VIENNA, and between the various national zones, the following mutual facilities are necessary:

(a) Free passage across zone boundaries subject only to flying control limitations;

5823

(b) landing and refuelling, both at terminals and at intermediary points en route as required;

(c) the use of navigational aids and repair facilities,

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NARA, Date 12-20-01

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2. Up to the present as far as the Russians are concerned, all movement of aircraft in and out of Russian-occupied areas has had to be cleared through MOSCOW. This system prevails in the BALKANS at the moment, and an extension of it to cover the Russian zone in AUSTRIA would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers with zones in VIENNA.

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4. To ensure free air movement between BERLIN and VIENNA, and between the various national zones, the following mutual facilities are necessary:

(a) Free passage across zone boundaries subject only to flying control limitations;

(b) landing and refuelling, both at terminals and at intermediary points en route as required;

(c) the use of navigational aids and repair facilities, as available, to the extent necessary for the continuation of a flight.

5. This agreement should cover not only the period of military government, but in addition, the whole period of Allied military occupation.

6. I recommend, therefore, that a signal be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting urgent action to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French governments ensuring:

(a) freedom of passage throughout GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all aircraft under the control of the U. S., British, Russian and French Air Forces, subject to the operational control of the formations to which they belong;

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1002-2/cc

HEADQUARTERS 1/1 A. Ex

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CHIEF COMMR (34)
EXEC COMMR (35)
POLITICAL ADVRS (36)



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(b) landing and refuelling rights for transit aircraft at any U.S., British, Russian and/or French occupied airfield in GERMANY and AUSTRIA;

(c) the use of navigational aids and repair facilities as available to the extent necessary for the continuation of the flight.

7. A draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached.

/init/ J. K. C.

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| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF | 7 |
| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | 8 |
| Chief of Staff | 9 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 10-11 |
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5622

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5622



(22)

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TOP SECRET K-145

D R A F T

TO: COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. During the period of occupation of GERMANY and AUSTRIA considerable freedom of air travel will be necessary between and through various international areas if adequate communications are to be maintained. Thus, British and U. S. aircraft based in AUSTRIA will require to fly North to BERLIN and West to Western GERMANY, FRANCE, the Low Countries, and U. K. This will involve U. S. and British aircraft crossing the Russian occupational zone. Under the system at present in force in the Russian occupied area in the BALKANS, all movements of Allied aircraft in and out of those occupied areas have to be specially cleared, entailing continuous delays. Any extension of this system to cover the Russian zones in AUSTRIA and GERMANY would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers.

2. It is therefore recommended that immediate action be taken to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French governments to ensure:

(a) Freedom of passage through GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all aircraft under the control of the U. S., British, Russian and French air forces, subject to the

5621

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1605

Russian occupational zone. Under the system at present in force in the Russian occupied area in the BALKANS, all movements of Allied aircraft in and out of those occupied areas have to be specially cleared, entailing continuous delays. Any extension of this system to cover the Russian zones in AUSTRIA and GERMANY would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers.

2. It is therefore recommended that immediate action be taken to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French governments to ensure:

(a) Freedom of passage through GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all aircraft under the control of the U. S., British, Russian and French air forces, subject to the operational control of the formations to which they belong.

(b) Landing and refuelling rights for transit aircraft at any U. S., British, Russian and French occupied airfields in GERMANY and AUSTRIA.

(c) That such navigational aids and repair facilities as are available in each zone can be used by transit aircraft as necessary during their flight.

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Item 2 K 141 cc 1805 APR 11 RECD 5128

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 22
9th April 1945

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COPY NO 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES - ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CELEBRATIONS

Note by Secretary

1. It has been suggested that an order should be issued, laying down a policy applicable to all troops in the theatre in regard to announcements of the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE, and appropriate celebrations and speeches which will result therefrom.

2. Attached at Appendix 'A' is an instruction issued on behalf of Field Marshal ALEXANDER in his capacity as commander of the British Land forces. It will be observed that this order is based on the policy that victory in EUROPE should not be marked by extravagant celebrations or by a general relaxation of discipline, but should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and gratitude. It also envisages the publication of a Special Order of the Day to all members of the Allied forces in the theatre.

3. The United States forces propose that, following the announcement of termination of hostilities, there should be broadcast a number of special radio programmes and announcements, including recorded speeches by the Supreme Allied Commander, and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to direct that the policy outlined at paragraph 2 above shall be adopted by all forces under his command and that all concerned in the arrangements for celebrations and the preparation of announcements and radio programmes should proceed in accordance with it.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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5620

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1607

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J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
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5620

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APPENDIX 'A'

COPY

CAO OFFICE

CAO/227

TO: See below

SUBJECT: Armistice Celebrations.

Various enquiries have been received at this HQ regarding plans for celebrating the armistice or cessation of hostilities against GERMANY.

When this event takes place the Supreme Allied Commander will probably issue a Special Order of the Day to all troops under his command. Meanwhile, I am instructed to inform Commanders of British troops as to the policy which the SAC will wish them to adopt.

The SAC considers that the achievement of final victory over GERMANY should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and heartfelt gratitude, but that it is not a fitting occasion for extravagant celebrations. Requests for the issue of additional rations or NAAFI supplies will not be approved. Discipline will not be relaxed.

The war with JAPAN will still remain to be won, and many other important and hard tasks will lie ahead. It will be very necessary to keep these matters in the minds of the troops and to discourage any feeling that no further efforts will be required from them.

B.H. ROBERTSON;
Lieutenant General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

31 March 45.

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2619

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The SAC considers that the achievement of final victory over GERMANY should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and heartfelt gratitude, but that it is not a fitting occasion for extravagant celebrations. Requests for the issue of additional rations or NAAFI supplies will not be approved. Discipline will not be relaxed.

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B.H. ROBERTSON,
Lieutenant General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

31 March 45.

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G-1(B) )
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 21
9th April 1945

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COPY NO 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although such French or Italian vessels could be detailed if

5618

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2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

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(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(c) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port.)

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.



(21)

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(b) Authorise, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paragraphs 4 (a), (b) and (c) above.

J.G. SHEETHAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 13-14 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 15-16 |
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1615

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CROSS INDEX SHEET

AFHQ JPS Study P/275 (Final)

MACHINERY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ENEMY SURRENDER IN ITALY

Document filed in 1112/CC

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137

CC 1602
APR 4 REC'D

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 20
3 April 1945

SECRET

COPY NO. 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUGOSLAV ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3, the Supreme Allied Commander:

(a) Invited the British Resident Minister and the U. S. Political Adviser to obtain the formal approval of the Jugoslav Government to the closure of the Royalist Jugoslav Missions in Rome, Naples and Bari, and to the disposition of the Jugoslav personnel of those missions in a manner agreeable to the Allies.

(b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to make representations to the Jugoslav military authorities, through 37 Military Mission, to the effect that the Jugoslav Army Military Mission in Rome should be closed and the similar delegation at Bari reduced in size.

2. The British Resident Minister subsequently reported at SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2, that although he had made arrangements for the matter of the closure of the Royalist missions to be taken up with the Jugoslav Government, he did not consider it was yet opportune to raise the question of the disposal of the Jugoslav personnel concerned. The Supreme Allied Commander, therefore, directed that the latter question should not be raised until the United States Ambassador had arrived in Belgrade, when joint representations on the subject would be possible.

3. The British ambassador in Belgrade has now reported that both he and Air Vice Marshal Lee consider that a request for the closure of the Jugoslav military mission in Rome should not be pressed, as it might react most unfavorably on the position of the Allied Sub-Commissions in JUGOSLAVIA. Mr. Stevenson states, for instance, that if questioned by the Jugoslavs, we might find it difficult to justify on military grounds the retention of certain of our intelligence officers in the field and at key points such as SKOPLJE.

4. The British ambassador further understands that so far as the military mission at Bari is concerned, the Jugoslavs themselves are only too anxious

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

(b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to make representations to the Jugoslav military authorities, through 37 Military Mission, to the effect that the Jugoslav Army Military Mission in Rome should be closed and the similar delegation at Bari reduced in size.

2. The British Resident Minister subsequently reported at SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2, that although he had made arrangements for the matter of the closure of the Royalist missions to be taken up with the Jugoslav Government, he did not consider it was yet opportune to raise the question of the disposal of the Jugoslav personnel concerned. The Supreme Allied Commander, therefore, directed that the latter question should not be raised until the United States Ambassador had arrived in Belgrade, when joint representations on the subject would be possible.

3. The British ambassador in Belgrade has now reported that both he and Air Vice Marshal Lee consider that a request for the closure of the Jugoslav military mission in Rome should not be pressed, as it might react most unfavorably on the position of the Allied Sub-Commissions in JUGOSLAVIA. Mr. Stevens states, for instance, that if questioned by the Jugoslavs, we might find it difficult to justify on military grounds the retention of certain of our intelligence officers in the field and at key points such as SKOPLJE.

4. The British ambassador further understands that so far as the military mission at Bari is concerned, the Jugoslavs themselves are only too anxious to cut down their establishment. He therefore considers that it is unnecessary for this subject to be raised at the moment.

5. The U. S. Political Adviser has received reports in similar terms from the head of the independent United States Military Mission in Belgrade.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested:

(a) To direct that in regard to the Royalist Jugoslav Missions his existing policy should not be changed, and that

(i) The formal approval of the Jugoslav Government to the closure of these missions should be obtained as soon as possible.

(ii) Joint representations should be made by the British and United States ambassadors, on the subject of the disposal of the Jugoslav personnel of these missions, as soon as the United States ambassador is established in Belgrade.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

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(b) To revise his previous policy in regard to the Jugoslav Army Military Missions, and to direct that

(i) No action should be taken to request the closure of the mission in Rome or the reduction of that at Bari.

(ii) The direction at SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3 (b), should be regarded as cancelled.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 13-14 |
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| Spares | 40-42 |

5614

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 19
3rd April 1945

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COPY NO 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY - DIRECTIVE REGARDING SPECIAL OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

17a

Note by Secretary

1. The initial orders, to be issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, to enemy forces in ITALY in the event of their surrender, contain certain instructions regarding the treatment of Allied liaison officers and Italian government forces in German-occupied ITALY. Paragraphs 18-20 of Appendix 'A' to paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised), which has now been issued as AG Instruction No. AG 387/147 SACS-O of 31 March, refer.

2. The Joint Planning Staff in their Study No. P/270 (Final) drew attention to their belief that separate instructions were required for issue to Allied liaison officers and CLNAI in the field. It was also considered desirable that a small mission composed of a representative of G-5, SOE and OSS should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief South-west for the purpose of coordinating all questions concerning partisans.

3. A detailed examination is being made separately of the complete machinery required, in respect of attachment of Allied officers to enemy Headquarters and vice versa, to ensure that orders, issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander to enemy forces, are implemented.

4. Meanwhile, A.C of S, G-3, with the concurrence of A.C of S, G-5, U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, recommend that the draft directive at Appendix 'A', amplifying the special operational aspects of enemy surrender, should be despatched to 15th Army Group.

5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to the issue of this directive is therefore requested.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

of Appendix 'A' to paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised), which has now been issued as AG Instruction No. AG 387/147 SACS-O of 31 March, refer. file 111/CC

2. The Joint Planning Staff in their Study No. P/270 (Final) drew attention to their belief that separate instructions were required for issue to Allied liaison officers and CLNAI in the field. It was also considered desirable that a small mission composed of a representative of G-5, SOE and OSS should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief South-west for the purpose of coordinating all questions concerning partisans.

3. A detailed examination is being made separately of the complete machinery required, in respect of attachment of Allied officers to enemy Headquarters and vice versa, to ensure that orders, issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander to enemy forces, are implemented.

4. Meanwhile, A.C of S, G-3, with the concurrence of A.C of S, G-5, U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, recommend that the draft directive at Appendix 'A', amplifying the special operational aspects of enemy surrender, should be despatched to 15th Army Group.

5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to the issue of this directive is therefore requested. 5513

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

E.C DIST - 4 Apr 45
CHIEF COMMR (34)
EXEC COMMR (35)
POLITICAL ADV (36)

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
JCS 1/4/77
BY Lewis NARS, Date 9/6/77

SUBJECT: Local German Surrender in North ITALY

TO: 15th Army Group

1. This instruction is designed to enlarge on special operations aspects detailed in paras 18-20 of Appendix 'A' to AG 387/147 SACS-O dated 31 March subject as above.

2. It is not unlikely that as soon as the terms of surrender are made known, fighting will break out :

(a) Between the Republican forces and forces of the CLNAI.

(b) Between Italians and French in the North West.

(c) Between Italians and Slovenes in the North East.

It is most desirable to avoid such happenings particularly in the North East - the area covering our approach to AUSTRIA and the eventual L of C.

3. Allied Liaison Officersin conjunction with CLNAI will play an important part in the early stages of surrender in facilitating the pacific occupation by Allied forces.

4. You will therefore issue to all Allied Liaison Officers in the field such instructions as you consider necessary in amplification of orders contained in paras 18-19-20 of Appendix 'A' to above cited memorandum. 5611

5. You will prepare in conjunction with PWB and AC the necessary proclamations in the name of the SAC for dropping [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(a) Between the Republican [illegible]

(b) Between Italians and French in the North West.

(c) Between Italians and Slovenes in the North East.

It is most desirable to avoid such happenings particularly in the North East - the area covering our approach to AUSTRIA and the eventual L of C.

3. Allied Liaison Officersin conjunction with CLNAI will play an important part in the early stages of surrender in facilitating the pacific occupation by Allied forces.

4. You will therefore issue to all Allied Liaison Officers in the field such instructions as you consider necessary in amplification of orders contained in paras 18-19-20 of Appendix 'A' to above cited memorandum. 55:11

5. You will prepare in conjunction with PWB and AC the necessary proclamations in the name of the SAC for dropping into North ITALY and issuing through the Italian Combatte Programme, the BBC, etc. These should be submitted to this HQ for approval.

6. In order to control relations of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and his subordinate commanders with members of the Italian Resistance in North ITALY prior to the arrival of Allied forces, it is intended that senior officers from OSS, SOE and AC return with the enemy delegation to the Headquarters of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest. It is desired that you, in conjunction with the other agencies concerned, take action to ensure that such officers are detailed and suitably briefed at the appropriate time to carry out this task effectively.

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III



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FOLIO 18a which is:

AFHQ Med. Joint Planning Staff
Paper P/273 (Final)

Subject: STATUS OF PERSONNEL OF ITALIAN FASCIST FORCES IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY SURRENDER

Dated: 30 March 1945

is now on Executive Comm'rs. File 8263/EC for ACTION. We must get a copy, when file is again available to us.



184

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K 126

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 18
26th March 1945

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COPY NO. 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES
IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting, Director PWB was instructed to submit recommendations regarding the future functions of PWB in liberated ITALY.

2. Discussions have therefore taken place between PWB and Allied Commission, United States and British Embassies, British Ministry of War Information and United States Office of War Information, and agreement has been reached in regard to certain proposals for reorganisation. These are summarised at Appendix 'A' in a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, whom it is considered should be informed accordingly.

3. In order to implement this policy Director, PWB, recommends, with the concurrence of the agencies mentioned at paragraph 2 above, that he should be given the detailed directions set out at Appendix 'B'.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to approve:-

(a) The despatch of the draft cable at Appendix 'A' to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) The issue to Director, PWB, of the detailed directions at Appendix 'B'.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Deputy Supreme Allied Commander | 2 |

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mission, United States and British Embassies, British Ministry of War Information and United States Office of War Information, and agreement has been reached in regard to certain proposals for reorganisation. These are summarised at Appendix 'A' in a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, whom it is considered should be informed accordingly.

3. In order to implement this policy Director, PWB, recommends, with the concurrence of the agencies mentioned at paragraph 2 above, that he should be given the detailed directions set out at Appendix 'B'.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to approve:-

(a) The despatch of the draft cable at Appendix 'A' to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) The issue to Director, PWB, of the detailed directions at Appendix 'B'.

HEADQUARTERS 2 5 MAR 45 A. C.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
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APPENDIX 'A'

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D R A F T

TO: AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: SHAEF MAIN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
JCS 4/17/74
BY ... NARS, Date 6/11/74

This is NAF_____. Subject is Psychological Warfare activities in ITALY.

1. During initial stages of occupation PWB, in addition to conducting combat propaganda, was responsible for distribution and control of all news, newspapers, moving pictures, books and other publications except for military censorship. PWB published newspapers in certain Italian cities and operated all Italian civilian radio stations. It also monitored enemy radio stations and collected and distributed intelligence required for its activities.

2. Recently PWB has been divided into :

(a) PWB 15 Army Group, responsible for operational propaganda in direct support of the armies and directed towards areas of ITALY north of the rear Army control line.

(b) PWB Liberated ITALY, responsible for activities in areas south of the control line and in regard to which it is not yet possible to relinquish allied control.

5608

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN 487, PWB has now :

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

military censorship. PWB published newspapers in certain Italian cities and operated all Italian civilian radio stations. It also monitored enemy radio stations and collected and distributed intelligence required for its activities.

2. Recently PWB has been divided into :

(a) PWB 15 Army Group, responsible for operational propaganda in direct support of the armies and directed towards areas of ITALY north of the rear Army control line.

(b) PWB Liberated ITALY, responsible for activities in areas south of the control line and in regard to which it is not yet possible to relinquish allied control.

5808

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN 487, PWB has now :

(a) Handed over the distribution of news to private news agencies, Italian and foreign.

(b) Relinquished control of newspapers which are now published under Italian editorial arrangements.

(c) Relinquished control of Italian radio network which is now operated by Italian Radio Agency.

(d) Handed over as appropriate informational activities in connection with Books, Plays, Copyrights, News features and photographic services to Allied Commission, OWI, MOI and British and United States Embassies.

(18)



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Similar action will be taken in respect of areas further north as soon as convenient after their liberation.

4. To conduct operational propaganda, it remains necessary to retain control of the following services in the liberated area : Central News Services, time on Italian radio transmitters, and facilities for leaflet printing, radio monitoring and collection of intelligence. Distribution of American and British films and preparation of documentary films required by Allied organisations must also remain Allied functions at present.

5. Your covering approval to these arrangements is requested.

5607

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5. Your covering [illegible]

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APPENDIX 'B'

DETAILED DIRECTIONS TO PWB

1. That responsibility for the introduction of news features and similar background material be transferred immediately to American and British Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

2. That responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British news photos be transferred to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information, as soon as convenient.

3. That responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British publications and all responsibilities concerning copyright be transferred immediately to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

4. That radio monitoring, other than that required for the servicing of AFHQ, and other Allied military organisations, be liquidated or that the facilities be passed to the Italian Press Secretariat as soon as convenient.

5. That PWB retain the technical facilities and accommodation required for the central servicing of the news operation towards North ITALY, AUSTRIA and the BALKANS. These facilities consist of five requisitioned Morse transmitters together with the necessary accommodation and the personnel required for their use.

6. That PWB retain on the Italian transmitters, ROME short wave and BARI I respectively three hours and forty-five minutes and four hours of transmitting time.

7. That PWB retain such requisitioned printing facilities as may be required for the preparation of operational leaflets.

8. That PWB retain responsibility for the distribution of films on existing lines, until such time as private distributors can take over.

9. That PWB retain responsibility for the preparation of news reels and other films required by other Allied organisations until such time as these can be handed over to private manufacturers, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

5606

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Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

4. That radio monitoring, other than that required for the servicing of AFHQ, and other Allied military organisations, be liquidated or that the facilities be passed to the Italian Press Secretariat as soon as convenient.

5. That PWB retain the technical facilities and accommodation required for the central servicing of the news operation towards North ITALY, AUSTRIA and the BALKANS. These facilities consist of five requisitioned Morse transmitters together with the necessary accommodation and the personnel required for their use.

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8. That PWB retain responsibility for the distribution of films on existing lines, until such time as private distributors can take over.

9. That PWB retain responsibility for the preparation of news reels and other films required by other Allied organisations until such time as these can be handed over to private manufacturers, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised)
25th March 1945

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COPY NO 34

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. As directed at SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 3, the directive, draft instrument of surrender, and initial orders to enemy land, naval and air forces, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15, have been redrafted.

2. The revised drafts are circulated for the further consideration of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political)

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Members of the Supreme Allied Co...

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
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| Deputy Chief of Staff | 12 |
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| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 15-16 |
| Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff | 17 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 | 18-19 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 20 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MMF | 21-25 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 26-28 |
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D R A F T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SUBJECT: Local German Surrender in ITALY.

TO: Commanding General, 15 Army Group
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
) For appropriate Naval and Air Commanders.

PROBABLE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER.

1. When the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders, the end of all organised German resistance is likely to be imminent, and it is probable therefore that FREEBORN conditions (Case B) will shortly arise. It is possible, however, that some German formations will refuse to obey the orders of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of ITALY.

2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganization throughout German occupied ITALY. It will be important to take advantage of this period and by rapid action before German forces and Italian and Slovene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the BRENNER Route are the two most important of such areas.

3. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (FREEBORN Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circum-

5604

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

1631

of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of ITALY.

2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganization throughout German occupied ITALY. It will be important to take advantage of this period and by rapid action before German forces and Italian and Slovene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the BRENNER Route are the two most important of such areas.

3. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (FREEBORN Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be forwarded as soon after signature as possible.

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TASKS OF LAND AND AIR FORCES IN ITALY.

4. The primary task of our land and air forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices A and C to the Instrument of Surrender. To this end, Commanding General, 15 Army Group and the Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF will issue and enforce such further orders as they may consider necessary. The first essentials will be to prevent any resumption of resistance by the enemy, to deal with any enemy forces that may continue to resist, and to prevent the withdrawal of any enemy forces from ITALY. With these objects in view, and in order to facilitate future

17a

II



TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

operations:

a. Commanding General 15 Army Group will in the first instance immediately position such forces as he considers necessary astride the enemy's lines of communication in the general area VERONA - PADUA - MANTUA. He will also seize TRIESTE and secure as much of the BRENNER Route as possible.

b. The Air Commander-in-Chief will be prepared to interdict all movement on routes leading out of ITALY.

The primary disarmament of enemy main bodies south of the PO will be carried out simultaneously with the above.

5. The secondary task of 15 Army Group in conjunction with MAAF Will be to carry out the occupation of AUSTRIA as rapidly as circumstances permit and in accordance with plans for FREEBORN.

6. The occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be carried out concurrently with the above tasks as rapidly as the resources of 15 Army Group will permit. In allotting resources, the initial policy will be to give such priority to the requirements of 15 Army Group as will ensure the rapid occupation of AUSTRIA, while at the same time allowing for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population in ITALY and providing for the establishment of effective control over the L of C areas behind Fifth and Eighth Armies. In extending such control subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

carry out the occupation of AUSTRIA as rapidly as circumstances permit and in accordance with plans for FREEBORN.

6. The occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be carried out concurrently with the above tasks as rapidly as the resources of 15 Army Group will permit. In allotting resources, the initial policy will be to give such priority to the requirements of 15 Army Group as will ensure the rapid occupation of AUSTRIA, while at the same time allowing for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population in ITALY and providing for the establishment of effective control over the L of C areas behind Fifth and Eighth Armies. In extending such control subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

803

7. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES.

8. The tasks of naval forces will be, in cooperation with the appropriate military and air commanders,

a. To enforce the orders set out in Appendix B to the Instrument of Surrender.

b. To support the advance of 15 Army Group in AUSTRIA.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER.

III

17a

TOP SECRET

1640

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

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ANNEXURE I

FREEBORN MEMORANDUM NUMBER 1

DRAFT INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER
OF GERMAN AND OTHER FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OR
CONTROL OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTHWEST

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest hereby surrenders unconditionally all the forces under his command or control on land, at sea and in the air and places himself and these forces unconditionally at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

2. All armed forces under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest will cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air at .....hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date). The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly.

3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in para 2 above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander is final.

5602

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest [illegible]

3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in para 2 above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander is final. 5602

6. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and shall be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.

| | |
|---|---|
| ..... | ..... |
| German Commander-in-Chief Southwest | Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations |
| Place ..... | |
| Date ..... | |
| Hour ..... | |

17a IV

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

SECRET D R A F T K-125 APPENDIX 'A'

ORDERS FOR GERMAN LAND FORCES

1. The term "German Land Forces" wherever used in these orders shall be deemed to include all German and Italian Republican military or para military forces or organisations, under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, who is hereafter referred to as "the German Authority."
2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all subordinate Allied Commanders.
3. The German Authority will send to HQ 15 Army Group, as soon as possible after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

"STAY-PUT" ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7.)
5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulance trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY is absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the line FIUME - VILLACH - Southernmost end of Lake GARDA - LUGANO will be liable to air at-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ence by the German Land Forces.

"STAY-PUT" ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7.)

5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulance trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY (601) absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the line FIUME - VILLACH - Southernmost end of Lake GARDA - LUGANO will be liable to air attack without warning.

DISARMAMENT OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

6. All German Land Forces will be completely disarmed. They will hand over their arms, ammunition, equipment and all war-like stores at places and times and in a manner to be further ordered by the Commanding General, 15 Army Group, or any of his subordinate Commanders.

MAINTENANCE OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

7. The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

17a V



SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET



STATUS OF SURRENDERED PERSONNEL

8. All personnel of the German Armed Forces shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the Supreme Allied Commander. At the Supreme Allied Commander's discretion, some or all of such personnel may be declared to be prisoners of war.

PROHIBITION OF DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE

9. The German Authority will prevent the removal, destruction of or damage to, and will safeguard in good condition at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives and warlike stores, equipment, vehicles, material of all kinds, fuel and oil stocks, and any items of supply used by or for members of the German land forces.

b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.

c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, waterways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.

d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories, experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products, buildings and civil property.

e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.

5600

1943

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

supply used by or for members of the German land forces.

b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.

c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, waterways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.

d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories, experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products, buildings and civil property.

e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian. 5600

f. All military, para military and civil documents, records and archives.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND FACILITIES

10. The German Authority will forthwith furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander:

a. Complete information regarding the German Land Forces and in particular such details as the Supreme Allied Commander may require concerning the numbers, locations, dispositions, stores and equipment of the German Land Forces wherever located.

b. Complete information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

17a

VI



SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

c. Such military, para military and civil documents, records and archives as the Supreme Allied Commander may require.

11. The German Authority will:

a. Maintain in operation all public utility and essential civilian services.

b. Clearly mark and maintain safety lanes through all minefields and other obstacles to movement.

c. Remove or render safe all demolition charges and all booby-traps.

d. Make available for the Supreme Allied Commander such military personnel with the necessary equipment, as he may require, for the clearance of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement; and such labor as he may require for any purpose.

DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY

12. The German Authority will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of these persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German Authority will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.

13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of national-

1647

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

and such labor as he may require for any pur-

DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY

12. The German Authority will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of these persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German Authority will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.

13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons as are not entitled to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention will be afforded comparable rights and amenities in accordance with their rank or official position.

5599

14. Without prejudice to any other provisions in these orders, the German Authority will hand over to the Supreme Allied Commander the control of all places of detention.

RADIO AND TELE-COMMUNICATIONS

15. Pending the institution of control by the Supreme Allied Commander, all German controlled military, para military and civilian wireless

17a

VII



SECRET

CASE
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

transmitters will cease transmission. They will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

16. The use of military and civil land line communication systems is permitted with the provisos that:

a. All messages and signals will be made in clear.

b. All forms of scrambling and secrecy equipment will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.

MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE

17. The German Authority will remain responsible for the maintenance of discipline throughout the German Land Forces as defined in para 1 above.

TREATMENT OF ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED ITALY

18. Italian Government forces in Northern ITALY comprise all partisan formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CLNAI, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied ITALY of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers are being instructed immediately to get in touch with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will receive and afford all facilities to these Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CLNAI for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following objects:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED ITALY

18. Italian Government forces in Northern ITALY comprise all partisan formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CLNAI, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied ITALY of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers are being instructed immediately to get in touch with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will receive and afford all facilities to these Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CLNAI for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following objects:

5598

a. The general maintenance of law and order.

b. The maintenance of all essential civilian services.

c. The provision of communications and transport which may be necessary for the adequate distribution of supplies and the continuance of local administration.

20. For the execution of the above functions all Allied Liaison officers will be considered as the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be afforded complete freedom of communication by any means.

17a



SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

K-125

SECRET

APPENDIX 'B'

D R A F T

ORDERS FOR GERMAN AND GERMAN CONTROLLED NAVAL FORCES AND MERCHANT SHIPPING

1. a. The term "German Naval Forces" wherever used in these orders will be deemed to include all German and Italian Republican naval or para-naval forces or organisations under the command or control of the German Naval Commander South or the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest.

b. The term "German Authority" wherever used in these orders will mean the German Naval Commander South and the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, both severally and jointly.

2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all his subordinate commanders.

3. The German Authority will cause:

a. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under his command or control, at sea at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port or base. Armaments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.

b. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain undarkened by night and show navigation lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GIBRALTAR, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

the German Naval Commander South and the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, both severally and jointly.

2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all his subordinate commanders.

3. The German Authority will cause:

a. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under his command or control, at sea at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port or base. Armaments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.

b. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain undarkened by night and show navigation lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GIBRALTAR, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at EUROPA point. Small enemy submarines at sea in the ADRIATIC or LIGURIAN Seas are to be ordered to return to POLA or GENOA respectively.

5507

c. All such warships, including submarines of all types, auxiliaries, and merchant vessels as are under his command or control, which are in harbour, to remain there.

d. All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of or under German control at the time of surrender, to proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

17a

SECRET



IX

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4. The German Authority will at once cause all such warships, surface or submarine, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft in harbour, as are under his command or control, to comply with the following orders:

a. No ship, vessel or craft of any description, including harbour craft, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building, is to be damaged or scuttled, nor is any damage to be done to its hull, machinery or equipment.

b. Ammunition is to be retained on board until further orders.

c. Armaments are to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential portions of the firing mechanisms, but such mechanisms, and the armament in general are not to be damaged or destroyed. Fire control equipment is to be maintained on board fully efficient. All weapons are to be trained fore and aft.

d. All small arms are to be landed, and safeguarded.

e. Ships are to remain undarkened by night.

f. Colours are to be struck and not rehoisted.

g. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (1). The officers and men removed are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

weapons are to be trained fore and aft. .

d. All small arms are to be landed, and safeguarded.

e. Ships are to remain undarkened by night.

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g. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (1). The officers and men removed are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.

5596

h. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament prescribed in sub para c above, but are to be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives, and are to be complete with fuel.

i. Wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus is to be damaged or destroyed.

j. All callsign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be removed from ships and placed under guard ashore. International code and callsigns are to be retained on board.

(17a)

SECRET



X

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5. The German Authority will cause all such warships, surface or submarine, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft at sea as are under his command or control to be instructed to comply with the orders in para 3 above immediately on return to harbour.

6. The German Authority will immediately ensure that German naval aircraft under his command or control:

   a. Do not leave the ground or base or ship until further orders are received from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

   b. Already in the air, land or alight forthwith.

7. The German Authority will immediately take action to ensure compliance with the following orders:

   a. No demolitions are to be carried out to harbour or port facilities of whatever nature; to naval establishments ashore; to scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; to telecommunication and radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.

   b. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

with the following orders:

a. No demolitions are to be carried out to harbour or port facilities of whatever nature; to naval establishments ashore; to scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; to telecommunication and radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.

b. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.

c. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

5595

d. All demolition charges in all ports and harbour works are to be removed or rendered ineffective, and their presence indicated by appropriate signs.

e. The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliancy, and lights shown only by special arrangement are to be exhibited continuously. Navigational lights which have been extinguished are to be exhibited as soon as possible with their former characteristics if practicable.

(17a)

SECRET



XI

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

f. All pilotage services are to continue to operate and all pilots are to be held at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with charts.

g. All small arms, explosives, and warlike stores, in naval barracks and shore establishments, are to be placed in magazines, under guard.

h. (1) German naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports and administrative services in ports are to remain at their stations and to continue to carry out their routine duties.

(2) German and German controlled naval personnel employed on seaward defense are to comply with the instructions given by the Supreme Allied Commander.

(3) A general order is to be given to all German and German controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the Supreme Allied Commander. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.

i. A certificate that the action required under sub paras c, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Authority to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

8. The German Authority will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(3) A general order is to be given to all German and German controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the Supreme Allied Commander. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.

i. A certificate that the action required under sub paras c, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Authority to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

8. The German Authority will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:

a. Positions of all minefields, both moored and ground mines, independent and controlled, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of minelaying craft including aircraft. Details of each mine or group of mines laid is to include:

(1) Type of mine.

(2) Number of mines laid.

(3) Spaces between mines.

(4) Depth setting.

(5) Date laid.

(6) Number and type of anti-sweeping devices laid.

(7) Types of anti-sweeping devices, if any, fitted to the mines themselves.

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SECRET



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(8) If snag lines have been fitted to mines.

(9) Polarity, delay, and number of actuations set on all ground mines.

(10) Details of the mines themselves, including drawings and photographs of all types of mines and minefittings.

b. Details of convoy routes, searched channels and approach channels.

c. Details of,

(1) Navigational lights which have been destroyed.

(2) Navigational lights which are in operation, giving details of operation, and by whom controlled.

(3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.

d. Details of buoys, indicating:

(1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.

(2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, including lights, if any.

(3) Buoys removed.

e. Details of booms and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

f. Details of all radio and radar navigational aids including all shore radar stations which could be used for this purpose.

g. A complete and up-to-date set of charts corrected to the latest

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

d. Details of buoys, indicating:

(1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.

(2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, including lights, if any.

(3) Buoys removed.

e. Details of booms and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

f. Details of all radio and radar navigational aids including all shore radar stations which could be used for this purpose.

g. A complete and up-to-date set of charts corrected to the latest information available, and showing all minefields, convoy routes, searched channels, approach channels, buoys, lights, navigational aids, booms, wrecks, obstructions and radar stations.

5503

h. A complete and up-to-date set of navigational publications corrected to the latest information available.

9. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the information set out in para 7 concerning the undermentioned two special areas is in any case required to be supplied by the German Authority at the date and time at which surrender becomes effective, to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authorities at a place and by means which will be decided at the meeting held prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender.

(17a)



16601

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The two special areas concerned are:-

a. LIGURIAN SEA - Area bounded on the west by meridian of 8°W. South by parallel of 43° 30' N. East and north by the coast of ITALY.

b. ADRIATIC SEA - Area bounded on the north, east and west by the coasts of ITALY, ISTRIA and JUGOSLAVIA. On the south by parallel of 44°N.

10. The German Authority is to furnish forthwith, exact information with regard to the disposition of German and German controlled naval formations and units under his command. Such information is to include the following:

a. Present locations of all Naval Staffs and Headquarters.

b. Full details of organization of German Naval Command in the Mediterranean.

c. Disposition, state of readiness, and crew lists of all warships, auxiliaries and merchant shipping.

d. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.

e. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

11. The German Authority will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under his command to comply with the following orders:-

a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

b. Full details of organization of German Naval Command in the Mediterranean.

c. Disposition, state of readiness, and crew lists of all warships, auxiliaries and merchant shipping.

d. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.

e. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

11. The German Authority will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under his command to comply with the following orders:-

a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.

b. All callsign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and guarded.

12. Detailed directions as to how and where the information required by the foregoing paras 8 and 9 is to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authorities will be notified separately to the German Authority at the meeting prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. The details of the methods which will be used by the German Authority to pass the necessary orders to ships at sea, are to be signalled to the Allied Naval

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Authorities in plain language, prior to the time and date at which this instrument takes effect.

13. The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain his own forces from his own resources.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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SECRET K-125 APPENDIX 'C'

D R A F T

ORDERS FOR THE GERMAN AND GERMAN CONTROLLED AIR FORCES

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, hereinafter referred to as the "German Authority", is hereby held responsible for the execution of the following orders.

2. All aircraft of any kind or nationality, including gliders and balloons, under the control of the German Authority, whether military, naval or civil, will remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ships pending further instructions.

3. The German Authority will forthwith cause all German or German controlled aircraft in the air over territories or water occupied or controlled by it to land at once and remain on the ground. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.

4. The German Authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.

5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersal areas.

6. All aircraft will be disarmed and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.

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it to land at once and remain on the ground. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.

4. The German Authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.

5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersal areas.

6. All aircraft will be disarmed and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.

7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the elevators, disconnecting the fuel and oil supply (to each engine, in the case of twin or multi-engined aircraft) and draining all fuel and oil tanks into suitable containers.

8. All aircraft together with the removed elevators, fuel and oil, spare parts, hangers, storehouses, airfield administrative and living accommodation, general airfield equipment, including lighting installations will be safeguarded intact.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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9. The German Authority will forthwith furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander complete information regarding German and German Controlled Air Forces and in particular such details as the Supreme Allied Commander may require concerning the numbers, units, locations, dispositions, stores and equipment of the German and German Controlled Air Forces wherever located.

10. Balloons.

All balloons will be hauled down, deflated, packed and safeguarded intact.

Fuel pumps and carburettors will be removed from all winch motors and safeguarded.

11. Explosives.

Information concerning all booby-traps, mines and other explosive devices on and in the vicinity of the airfields will be furnished immediately on demand to the responsible local Allied authorities.

All explosives, including bombs, will be rendered safe by the removal of fuzes and detonators.

12. All self-destroying devices, whether in aircraft, signals equipment or in any Luftwaffe equipment or installation will be removed.

13. Personnel.

All Luftwaffe personnel will be disarmed and will remain in their camps or at assigned sites until directed otherwise by the representatives of the local Allied Commander. The orders or instructions

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

and safeguarded.

11. Explosives.

Information concerning all booby-traps, mines and other explosive devices on and in the vicinity of the airfields will be furnished immediately on demand to the responsible local Allied authorities. All explosives, including bombs, will be rendered safe by the removal of fuzes and detonators.

12. All self-destroying devices, whether in aircraft, signals equipment or in any Luftwaffe equipment or installation will be removed.

13. Personnel.

All Luftwaffe personnel will be disarmed and will remain in their camps or at assigned sites until directed otherwise by the representatives of the local Allied Commander. The orders or instructions of any representative of the local Allied Commander will be obeyed.

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14. Motor Transport.

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized MT parking areas under guard.

15. Fuel and Oil.

Fuel and oil supplies and installations of all types will be safeguarded and handed over to the local Allied Authorities without contamination.

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16. Anti-Aircraft.

All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

17. All parts removed from AA under para 16 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

Any spare parts for AA guns held at Luftwaffe units will be segregated from guns and safeguarded intact.

18. Fire Control Equipment.

Instruments, directors and computors including Radar and all fire control equipment will be concentrated and stored intact.

19. Searchlights.

All carbon rods will be removed from the projectors. The fuel pumps will be removed from the generators. The carbons and fuel pumps together with all carbon and fuel pump spares will be stored and safeguarded intact.

20. Small Arms.

All small arms will be collected and safeguarded intact.

21. Gas Bombs and Equipment.

Normal precautions will be taken against leakage of gas from any gas bombs.

All gas equipment and decontamination material will be preserved and

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

18. Fire Control Equipment.

Instruments, directors and computors including Radar and all fire control equipment will be concentrated and stored intact.

19. Searchlights.

All carbon rods will be removed from the projectors. The fuel pumps will be removed from the generators. The carbons and fuel pumps together with all carbon and fuel pump spares will be stored and safeguarded intact.

20. Small Arms.

All small arms will be collected and safeguarded intact.

21. Gas Bombs and Equipment.

Normal precautions will be taken against leakage of gas from any gas bombs.

All gas equipment and decontamination material will be preserved and handed over to the Allied representatives on demand.

Gas spray containers will be collected and guarded, and where such containers are filled with gas, the normal precautions will be taken against leakage.

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22. Flying Bombs.

All stocks of flying bombs will be immobilized by the removal of fuzes, detonators, and fuel pumps. The items so removed will be segregated from flying bombs, concentrated and safeguarded intact, and all flying bombs and their equipment, spares and launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

23. Rocket-Propelled Weapons.

All weapons and projectiles propelled by rockets or similar devices will be immobilized by the removal and segregation of essential parts of the mechanism. The parts so removed will be segregated from such weapons and projectiles, concentrated, and guarded, and the weapons and projectiles, their equipment, spares, launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

24. Signals Equipment.

a. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication equipment used for code, voice, teletype or other electrical transmission will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

b. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of whatever nature or design, whether used for air warning, tracking, identification or flying control will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

25. Call and Code Signs.

All call and code sign systems used by GERMANY and/or her Allies in operating Luftwaffe telecommunication systems will be withdrawn from use, and all documents and/or associated coding devices will be stored and safeguarded intact.

26. Code and Cyphers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

electrical transmission will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

b. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of whatever nature or design, whether used for air warning, tracking, identification or flying control will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

25. Call and Code Signs.

All call and code sign systems used by GERMANY and/or her Allies in operating Luftwaffe telecommunication systems will be withdrawn from use, and all documents and/or associated coding devices will be stored and safeguarded intact.

26. Code and Cyphers.

All code and cyphers systems, including books, documents and cypher machinery, employed by the Luftwaffe will be withdrawn from use, stored and safeguarded intact.

27. Secrecy Equipment.

All forms of scrambling and secrecy equipment in use on any Luftwaffe telecommunication system will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.

28. All other Luftwaffe equipment, including that in experimental stations and laboratories, military or civilian, photographic equipment, furniture will be preserved intact and maintained in good condition. Special care will be taken to ensure the preservation of all documents, including technical manuals, files, plans, maps, card indices,

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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identity documents.

29. Maintenance of Luftwaffe.

The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 17
20th March 1945

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COPY NO 4

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUGOSLAV NATIONALS IN ITALY

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The SAC at his conference (Political) of 15 March 1945 directed that a report be prepared together with a draft communication for transmission by the Allied Commission to the Jugoslav Delegation, incorporating the points set out in paper No. SAC (P) (45) 13, together with a statement of Allied policy drafted in the light of the discussion at the conference.

2. In November 1944 the Jugoslav Delegation in ROME notified its desire to obtain custody of certain Jugoslav nationals residing in ROME on the grounds that they were deserters from the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation. It was then decided that the policy of this HQ should be :

a. that deserters from the Jugoslav armed forces should be apprehended and returned to Jugoslav military jurisdiction,

b. that the liberty of other persons whose custody might be sought by the Jugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.

3. After the formation of the joint provisional government for JUGOSLAVIA a letter was sent by this HQ to the Allied Commission instructing them to inform the Jugoslav Delegation that this HQ would assist in the apprehension of deserters from the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation but would require certain particulars to establish the identity of each deserter.

4. Before the substance of this letter had been communicated to the Jugoslav Delegate, a further letter dated 4 March 1945 was received by the Allied Commission from the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia to the Advisory Council. This letter stated that the instructions of the Jugoslav government were to the following effect :

a. That all males born between 1895 and 1927 are to report personally to the Jugoslav army for military duty.

b. That all other Jugoslav subjects are to report to the reception centre of the Jugoslav army in BARI for

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prehended and returned to Jugoslav military jurisdiction;

b. that the liberty of other persons whose custody might be sought by the Jugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.

3. After the formation of the joint provisional government for JUGOSLAVIA a letter was sent by this HQ to the Allied Commission instructing them to inform the Jugoslav Delegation that this HQ would assist in the apprehension of deserters from the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation but would require certain particulars to establish the identity of each deserter.

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a. That all males born between 1895 and 1927 are to report personally to the Jugoslav army for military duty.

b. That all other Jugoslav subjects are to report to the reception centre of the Jugoslav army in BARI for return to JUGOSLAVIA.

The letter further laid down the following policies of the Jugoslav government :

c. That all Jugoslav subjects unwilling to return to JUGOSLAVIA are not entitled to obtain assistance or relief in ITALY from any source.

d. That those Jugoslavs who collaborated with the enemy or "acted in any other way against the national liberation struggle of JUGOSLAVIA" or who have refused the call up should be interned and treated as enemies of the United Nations.

5. The Allied authorities are requested to support the Jugoslav authorities in carrying out these instructions.



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789015

6. A copy of this letter is attached at Annex I.

7. It is apparent that the instructions as to deserters from the Jugoslav government go considerably beyond the requests which have heretofore been made and run counter to the policy referred to in paragraph 2 b. It would also seem clear that the instructions requiring the Allied agencies, including non-military relief agencies, to withhold relief as a measure to assist enforcement of the Jugoslav call up and repatriation orders are not acceptable, nor should the Supreme Allied Commander apply principles as to internment in the case of Jugoslavs other than those which are applicable generally.

8. It is believed that the reply to the Deputy Delegate should be framed as a statement of the following policies :

a. Deserters from the Jugoslav Army. Assistance will be given in the apprehension of deserters from the Jugoslav army. The Jugoslavs must, however, conform substantially to the procedure for notification of deserters required of other armed forces in ITALY. The Allied Forces will, in principle, return deserters to the unit or formation from which they deserted.

b. Those failing to report for military service. These will not be treated as deserters nor interned except in accordance with the existing policies of this HQ regarding internment. Any further action required by the Jugoslav government in respect of such persons should be made through diplomatic channels. The call up regulations are understood to be inapplicable to Jugoslav nationals serving in or with the Allied Forces.

c. Assistance to the destitute. Relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief.

9. A draft letter to the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia is attached as Annex II. It is recommended that the Supreme Allied Commander approve the letter for despatch.

(intd) C.M.S.

| DISTRIBUTION | COPY NO |
|---|---|
| Supreme Allied Commander | 1 |
| Deputy Supreme Allied Commander | 2 |
| Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 3-4 |
| Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 5 |
| Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN | 6 |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 7 |

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

b. Those failing to report for military service. These will not be treated as deserters nor interned except in accordance with the existing policies of this HQ regarding internment. Any further action required by the Jugoslav government in respect of such persons should be made through diplomatic channels. The call up regulations are understood to be inapplicable to Jugoslav nationals serving in or with the Allied Forces.

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| Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN | 6 |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 7 |
| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | 8 |
| Chief of Staff | 9 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 10-11 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff | 12 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 13-14 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 15-16 |
| Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff | 17 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 | 18-19 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 20 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF | 21-25 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 26-28 |
| British Resident Minister | 29-32 |
| Director, PWB | 33 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 34-36 |
| Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat | 37-39 |
| Spares | 40-42 |

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ANNEX I

JUGOSLAV NATIONALS IN ITALY

Pr. br. 218/45

The Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia to the Advisory Council in Italy presents his compliments to the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, and has the honour to inform him of the following instruction received from the Jugoslav government referring to Jugoslav subjects in Italy :

1. All males born between 1895 and 1927 have forthwith to report personally to Representatives of the Jugoslav Army for the purpose of regulating their military duty.

2. All other Jugoslav subjects have forthwith to report personally to the Reception Centre of Base HQ of the Jugoslav Army (Prihvatna Stanica Staba Baze Jugoslavenske Armije), in Bari, which will care for their return to Jugoslavia.

3. Since there are a number of Jugoslav subjects in Italy not willing to return to Jugoslavia, may in their respect the following policy of the Jugoslav government please be noted :

Jugoslav subjects who are not willing to return to Jugoslavia are not entitled to obtain any assistance whatsoever (food, location, clothing, pecuniary means, etc) which refugees in Italy may get through the United Nations (i.e. Displaced Persons and Repatriation S/C of AC, UNRRA, IGCR, and any other similar Institution). The Jugoslav government insist on their objection to any kind of assistance to such persons. The Jugoslav government will moreover recognise no expenses for same subjects.

The Jugoslav government differentiate among those persons three groups

(a) who collaborated with the enemy or have acted in any other way against the national-liberation struggle of Jugoslavia;

(b) who have refused the government's call-up and are accordingly to be considered deserters;

(c) who, not belonging to either of the above two groups, do not want for any reason to return to Jugoslavia, but wish to stay in Italy.

The Jugoslav government request that persons belonging to groups under (a) and (b) be interned in camps and treated as enemies of the United Nations; those ones who are responsible for having committed war crimes should in due time be put on trial in Jugoslavia.

Subjects belonging to group under (c) who have to fear nothing if returned to Jugoslavia and yet refuse to do so, do not deserve any assistance

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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not entitled to obtain any assistance whatsoever (food, location, clothing, pecuniary means, etc) which refugees in Italy may get through the United Nations (i.e. Displaced Persons and Repatriation S/C of AC, UNRRA, IGCR, and any other similar Institution). The Jugoslav government insist on their objection to any kind of assistance to such persons. The Jugoslav government will moreover recognise no expenses for same subjects.

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(a) who collaborated with the enemy or have acted in any other way against the national-liberation struggle of Jugoslavia;

(b) who have refused the government's call-up and are accordingly to be considered deserters;

(c) who, not belonging to either of the above two groups, do not want for any reason to return to Jugoslavia, but wish to stay in Italy.

The Jugoslav government request that persons belonging to groups under (a) and (b) be interned in camps and treated as enemies of the United Nations; those ones who are responsible for having committed war crimes should in due time be put on trial in Jugoslavia.

Subjects belonging to group under (c) who have to fear nothing if returned to Jugoslavia and yet refuse to do so, do not deserve any assistance

It is requested that all competent Allied authorities support the Jugoslav authorities in carrying out these instructions for the sake of the common war effort of the United Nations.

4. This Delegation is only authorised to grant exceptionally subsidies or any other assistance to Jugoslav subjects in Italy who have duly reported to the Delegation, if latter finds that the person in question for medical reasons is unable to travel. This applies however only to those who are definitely in need, and is limited to an amount sufficient to meet minimum expenses for life.

5. Would you please inform of above all Allied Institutions concerned.

Rome, March 4th 1945

To: The Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission

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ANNEX II

DRAFT LETTER TO ALLIED COMMISSION

March 1945

SUBJECT: Jugoslav Nationals in Italy.

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission.

1. On 12 March 1945 a letter was forwarded to this Headquarters in which the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia to the Advisory Council in Italy set forth certain policies of the Jugoslav government with respect to Jugoslav nationals in Italy. Heretofore, under date of 30 November 1944 a letter from Major Koljensic of the Jugoslav Delegation in Rome, on the subject of Jugoslav deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.

2. You should advise the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia to the Advisory Council in Italy that it will be your policy to assist the Jugoslav government in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Jugoslav armed forces. It will be necessary for Jugoslav [redacted] authorities to conform to a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied forces, in order to establish the identity of each deserter. It is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to return deserters who have been apprehended to the formation from which they have deserted, whether military, naval or air force.

3. Prior to [redacted] any action towards the apprehension of a deserter you will require, in writing, the following particulars from the Commanding Officer of the man who is sought :

a. Name and rank of deserter.
b. [redacted] unit from which deserted and location thereof.
c. Date of enlistment or induction.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. You should advise the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia to the Advisory Council in Italy that it will be your policy to assist the Jugoslav government in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Jugoslav armed forces. It will be necessary for Jugoslav [redacted] authorities to conform to a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied forces, in order to establish the identity of each deserter. It is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to return deserters who have been apprehended to the formation from which they have deserted, whether military, naval or air force.

3. Prior to ~~taking~~ any action towards the apprehension of a deserter you will require, in writing, the following particulars from the Commanding Officer of the man who is sought :

a. Name and rank of deserter.
b. ~~Military~~ unit from which deserted and location thereof.
c. Date of enlistment or induction.
d. Date and circumstances of desertion.
e. Full description of deserter.
f. Probable whereabouts.

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Such affidavit will be required to be submitted within 90 days from the date of desertion.

4. The letter of the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavia also deals with the status of Jugoslav nationals in Italy who are not on active military service but who have failed to report for military service in accordance with existing Jugoslav military regulations, and those who have failed to report to appropriate Jugoslav authorities in accordance with Jugoslav regulations generally requiring the return of Jugoslav subjects to Jugoslavia. The letter of



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the Deputy Delegate also requests that all persons who have failed to report in accordance with the Jugoslav military service requirements or who have collaborated with the enemy or who have otherwise acted against the national liberation struggle of Jugoslavia be interned. You are requested to advise the Deputy Delegate that it is and will continue to be the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to detain, pending further investigation, any person suspected of committing or intending to commit any act hostile to the Allied Forces or engaging in any political or other activity in the interest of the enemy or hostile to the Allied Forces. You are further requested to advise the Deputy Delegate that with respect to the internment of any other persons the Jugoslav government may take appropriate steps through diplomatic channels.

5. The letter of the Deputy Delegate further requests that no aid of any kind be furnished to any Jugoslav national who refuses to return to Jugoslavia as such refusal constitutes a violation of existing Jugoslav law. The policy of the Supreme Allied Commander is that relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief. You are requested to advise the Deputy Delegate of this policy.

6. In communicating your reply to the Deputy Delegate you are requested to advise him further that it is the understanding of the Supreme Allied Commander will not be considered as deserters that the Jugoslav nationals now serving in or with the Allied Forces are not subject to the call-up referred to in paragraph 2 of his letter. If it is desired to know the identity of Jugoslav subjects in this class, this may be arranged through appropriate military channels.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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5. The letter of the Deputy Delegate further requests that no aid of any kind be furnished to any Jugoslav national who refuses to return to Jugoslavia as such refusal constitutes a violation of existing Jugoslav law. The policy of the Supreme Allied Commander is that relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief. You are requested to advise the Deputy Delegate of this policy.

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CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (P) (45) 16
19 March 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 4

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED TOWARDS THE BALKANS

Note by Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee

1. In accordance with instructions received from the former Chief of Staff, the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee has considered the question of the separation, along national lines, of Psychological Warfare activities directed to the Balkans, and reports as follows.

2. In October 1943 PWB founded an integrated U.S./British organization at BARI, mainly for the purpose of carrying out activities directed towards Balkan countries. As a result of the liberation of certain of these countries and the position taken by the United States State Department (with the concurrence of the U.S. Office of War Information) that the combined PWB operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of PWB activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. It is considered that to meet this situation three distinct organizations are required:-

a. An integrated U.S./British organization under PWB to carry on Psychological Warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. A purely United States organization)
) For propaganda in liberated
c. A purely British organization ) areas.

4. The necessary United States organization is already being provided by OWI and is operating entirely independent of PWB under an office which has been established in ROME. The British organization is at present being provided by PWB, personally responsible to the Deputy Director, PWB, in his British capacity; it is, however, envisaged that these British activities will shortly be turned over to the Ministry of Information and when this has occurred the British and United States

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

at BARI, mainly for the purpose of carrying out [illegible] towards Balkan countries. As a result of the liberation of certain of these countries and the position taken by the United States State Department (with the concurrence of the U.S. Office of War Information) that the combined PWB operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of PWB activities along national lines has already occurred.

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b. A purely United States organization )
c. A purely British organization ) For propaganda in liberated areas.

4. The necessary United States organization is already being provided by OWI and is operating entirely independent of PWB under an office which has been established in ROME. The British organization is at present being provided by PWB, personally responsible to the Deputy Director, PWB, in his British capacity; it is, however, envisaged that these British activities will shortly be turned over to the Ministry of Information and when this has occurred the British and United States organizations will be entirely parallel.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will however remain necessary as long as the Mediterranean continues to be a theater of war. It is felt that this control will best be effected if the respective British and United States governmental propaganda agencies, while carrying on the separate activities in the theater under the general guidance of their respective governments, are subject to the overriding authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

6. The Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee accordingly requests the Supreme Allied Commander:-

a. To direct that PWB, as an integrated organization, cease to participate in non-operational propaganda into ALBANIA, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREECE and the liberated portions of JUGOSLAVIA, except in so far as may necessarily result as an incident of operational propaganda directed to enemy occupied regions and enemy troops, and except in support of allied relief operations.

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b. To authorize the dispatch of draft cable at Appendix "A" to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them of the reorganization outlined above and requesting that the necessary representations be made to the British and United States governments in order that the foregoing arrangements may be carried into effect.

(intd) ..J. McC.

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| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 7 |
| Commanding General 15th Army Group | 8 |
| Chief of Staff | 9 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 10-11 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff | 12 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 | 13-14 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 | 15-16 |
| Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff | 17 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 | 18-19 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 20 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF | 21-25 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 26-28 |
| British Resident Minister | 29-32 |
| Director, PWB | 33 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 34-36 |
| Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat | 37-39 |
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| Spares | 41-45 |

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| Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 | 18-19 |
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APPENDIX "."

D R A F T

CONFIDENTIAL

This is N.F_____.

1. I have recently reviewed the organization required for Psychological Warfare activities in this Theater. Present cable deals with activities directed to liberated areas in Balkan and Central European countries. PWB activities in Italy will be subject of a separate signal.

2. As a result of the liberation of Balkan and Central European countries and the position taken by the United States State Department that combined Psychological Warfare operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of Psychological Warfare activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. Consequently, three distinct organizations are required:

a. An integrated U.S./British organization to carry on psychological warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. A purely United States organization for propaganda in liberated areas.

c. A purely British organization for the same purpose.

4. The necessary independent United States organization is already being provided by OWI. The separate British activities are at present being undertaken by PWB though it is envisaged that this will shortly be turned over to the British Ministry of Information.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United

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measure of separation of Psychological Warfare activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. Consequently, three distinct organizations are required:

a. An integrated U.S./British organization to carry on psychological warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. A purely United States organization for propaganda in liberated areas.

c. A purely British organization for the same purpose.

4. The necessary independent United States organization is already being provided by O.W.I. The separate British activities are at present being undertaken by P.E. though it is envisaged that this will shortly be turned over to the British Ministry of Information.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will, however, remain necessary as long as this continues to be a theater of war. This control will best be effected if these organizations, while carrying on separate activities under the general guidance of their respective governments, are subject to my overriding authority should it be necessary, for military reasons, to exert it.

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6. I have, therefore, directed that the integrated Psychological Warfare organization under my command shall cease to participate in non-operational propaganda directed into ..LB..NI.., RUM..NI.., BULG..RI.., HUNG..RY, CZECHOSLOV..KI.., GREECE and the liberated portions of JUGOSL..VI.., except in so far as operational propaganda directed to

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any of the occupied regions and enemy troops is concerned, and except in support of allied relief operations.

7. Your approval of these arrangements, and your intervention, by means of such representations to the British and United States Government as may be necessary to ensure that the separate national propaganda agencies conform to the above policy, is requested.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (P) (45) 15 Addendum
21st March 1945

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COPY NO 4

See JSPC (P) 1/5 Revised

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

THIS PAPER WILL BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) ON THURSDAY 22ND MARCH 1945

1. The draft papers on local German surrender in ITALY, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15, were produced in some haste. There has now been time to consider the matter further and the following suggestions for improvement and correction of errors are therefore notified.

2. In regard to the directive, it is suggested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that :-

(a) The first sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded as follows :-

"If the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders before sustaining a further major defeat at the hands of 15 Army Group, and while his forces still hold substantially their present line, it is probable that the end of all organised German resistance in EUROPE will soon follow, and therefore that FREEBORN conditions (Case B) will shortly arise".

(b) A new paragraph 2 should be added as under :-

"2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganisation throughout German-occupied ITALY. It will be important to take advantage of this period and, by rapid action before German forces and Italian and Slavene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the BRENNER Route are the two most important of such areas".

(c) The present paragraph 3 should be reworded as follows :-

"3. The primary task of our land and air forces will be to enforce

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2. In regard to the directive, it is suggested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that :-

(a) The first sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded as follows :-

"If the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders before sustaining a further major defeat at the hands of 15 Army Group, and while his forces still hold substantially their present line, it is probable that the end of all organised German resistance in EUROPE will soon follow, and therefore that FREEBORN conditions (Case B) will shortly arise".

(b) A new paragraph 2 should be added as under :-

"2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganisation throughout German-occupied ITALY. It will be important to take advantage of this period and, by rapid action before German forces and Italian and Slovene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the BRENNER Route are the two most important of such areas".

(c) The present paragraph 3 should be reworded as follows :-

"3. The primary task of our land and air forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices A and C to the Instrument of Surrender. To this end, Commanding General, 15 Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF, will issue and enforce such further orders as they may consider necessary. The first essentials will be to prevent any resumption of resistance by the enemy, to deal with any enemy forces that may continue to resist, and to prevent the withdrawal of any enemy forces from ITALY. With these objects in view, and in order to facilitate future operations :

a. Commanding General, 15 Army Group, will in the first instance immediately position such forces as he considers necessary astride the enemy's lines of communication in the general area VERONA - PADUA - MANTUA. He will also seize TRIESTE and secure as much of the BRENNER Route as possible.

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b. The Air Commander-in-Chief will be prepared to interdict all movement on routes leading out of ITALY

The primary disarmament of enemy main bodies south of the PO will be carried out simultaneously with the above".

(d) At paragraph 7 a the one word "orders" should be substituted for the words "naval terms of surrender".

3. In regard to the draft Instrument of local surrender (Annexure I) it is recommended by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that :-

(a) The title of the Instrument should be amended to read :

"INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER OF GERMAN AND OTHER FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OR CONTROL OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTHWEST"

(b) Paragraph 6 of this Instrument should be amended to read :

"6.This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and shall be superceded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole".

4. There are two typographical errors in the orders for German and German-controlled naval forces (Appendix B), in that the word "films at paragraph 3 j, line 1, and paragraph 10 b, line 2, should read "files" in each case.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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4. There are two typographical errors in the orders for German and German-controlled naval forces (Appendix B), in that the word "films at paragraph 3 j, line 1, and paragraph 10 b, line 2, should read "files" in each case.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

See SAC (P) 35

Note by Secretary

1. The papers on the subject of local German surrender in ITALY, which were distributed under MJPS Study No. P/270 (Final), have been revised on the instructions of the Chief of Staff and are circulated herewith.

2. The Joint Planning Staff also drew attention to their opinion that separate instructions should be issued to Allied Liaison Officers and the CLNAI in the field. In addition they considered it desirable that a small mission, composed of representatives of G-5, SOE and OSS, should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest for the purpose of co-ordinating all questions concerning partisans.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve,

(a) the draft papers attached hereto;

(b) the recommendation of the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff at para 2 above.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 7 |
| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | 8 |
| Chief of Staff | 9 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 10-11 |

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3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve,

(a) the draft papers attached hereto;

(b) the recommendation of the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff at para 2 above.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Commanding General, 15th Army Group | 8 |
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DRAFT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SUBJECT: Local German Surrender in ITALY

TO: Commanding General, 15 Army Group
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean ) For appropriate Naval
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean ) and Air Commanders.

PROBABLE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER

1. When the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders, the end of all organised German resistance is likely to be imminent, and it is probable therefore that FREEBORN conditions (Case B) will shortly arise. It is possible, however that some German formations will refuse to obey the orders of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of ITALY.

2. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (FREEBORN Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be forwarded as soon after signature as possible.

TASKS OF LAND AND AIR FORCES IN ITALY

3. The primary task of our Land and Air Forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices A and C to the instrument of surrender. To this end Commanding General, 15 Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief MAAF will issue and enforce such further orders as they may

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mand to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of ITALY.

2. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (FREEBORN Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be forwarded as soon after signature as possible.

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4. The secondary task of 15 Army Group in conjunction with MAAF will be to carry out the occupation of AUSTRIA as rapidly as circumstances permit and in accordance with plans for FREEBORN.

5. The occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be carried out concurrently with the above tasks as rapidly as the resources of 15 Army Group will permit. In allotting resources, the initial policy will be to give such priority to the requirements of 15 Army Group as will ensure the rapid occupation of AUSTRIA, while at the same time allowing for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population in ITALY and providing for the establishment of effective control over the L of C areas behind Fifth and Eighth Armies. In extending such control subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

6. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES

7. The tasks of naval forces will be, in co-operation with the appropriate military and air commanders,

a. To enforce the naval terms of surrender set out in Appendix B to the instrument of surrender.

b. To support the advance of 15 Army Group into AUSTRIA.

By command of FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

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available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

6. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES

7. The tasks of naval forces will be, in co-operation with the appropriate military and air commanders,

a. To enforce the naval terms of surrender set out in Appendix B to the instrument of surrender.

b. To support the advance of 15 Army Group into AUSTRIA.

By command of FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

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ANNEXURE I

FREEBORN MEMORANDUM NUMBER 1

DRAFT INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest hereby surrenders unconditionally all the forces under his command or control on land, at sea and in the air and places himself and these forces unconditionally at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

2. All armed forces under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest will cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air at .....hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date). The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly forthwith.

3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be punished in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in para 2 above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme

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at .....hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date).

The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly forthwith.

3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be punished in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in para 2 above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander is final.

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6. This instrument is independent of and without prejudice to any general instrument of surrender made by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.

| | |
|---|---|
| ..... | ..... |
| German Commander-in-Chief Southwest | Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations |
| Place ..... | |
| Date ..... | |
| Hour ..... | |

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SECRET DRAFT APPENDIX 'A'

ORDERS FOR GERMAN LAND FORCES

1. The term "German Land Forces" wherever used in these orders shall be deemed to include all German and Italian Republican milit ry or para military forces or organisations, under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, who is hereafter referred to as "the German Authority".
2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all subordinate Allied Commanders.
3. The German Authority will send to HQ 15 Army Group, as soon as possible after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

"STAY-PUT" ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7).
5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulance trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY

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after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

"STAY-PUT" ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7).

5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulance trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY is absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the line FIUME - VILLACH - Southermost end of Lake GARDA - LUGANO will be liable to air attack without warning.

DISARMAMENT OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

6. All German Land Forces will be completely disarmed. They will hand over their arms, ammunition, equipment and all war-like stores at places and times and in a manner to be further ordered by the Commanding General, 15 Army Group, or any of his subordinate Commanders.

MAINTENANCE OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

7. The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources;

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STATUS OF SURRENDERED PERSONNEL

8. All personnel of the German Armed Forces shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the Supreme Allied Commander. At the Supreme Allied Commander's discretion, some or all of such personnel may be declared to be prisoners of war.

PROHIBITION OF DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE

9. The German Authority will prevent the removal, destruction of or damage to., and will safeguard in good condition at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives and warlike stores, equipment, vehicles, material of all kinds, fuel and oil stocks, and any items of supply used by or for members of the German land forces.

b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.

c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, waterways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.

d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products.

e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.

f. All military, para military and civil documents, records and archives.

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b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.

c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, waterways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.

d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products.

e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.

f. All military, para military and civil documents, records and archives.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND FACILITIES

10. The German Authority will forthwith furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander:

a. Complete information regarding the German Land Forces and in particular such details as the Supreme Allied Commander may require concerning the numbers, locations, dispositions, stores and equipment of the German Land Forces wherever located.

b. Complete information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

c. Such military, para military and civil documents, records and archives as the Supreme Allied Commander may require.

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11. The German Authority will:

a. Maintain in operation all public utility and essential civilian services.

b. Clearly mark and maintain safety lanes through all minefields and other obstacles to movement.

c. Remove or render safe all demolition charges and all booby-traps.

d. Make available for the Supreme Allied Commander such military personnel with the necessary equipment, as he may require, for the clearance of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement; and such labor as he may require for any purpose.

DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY.

12. The German Authority will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of these persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German Authority will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.

13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons as are not entitled to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention will be afforded comparable rights and amenities in accordance with their

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons as are not entitled to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention will be afforded comparable rights and amenities in accordance with their rank or official position.

14. Without prejudice to any other provisions in these orders, the German Authority will hand over to the Supreme Allied Commander the control of all places of detention.

RADIO AND TELE-COMMUNICATIONS

15. Pending the institution of control by the Supreme Allied Commander, all German controlled military, para-military and civilian wireless transmitters will cease transmission. They will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

16. The use of military and civil land line communication systems is permitted with the provisos that:

TOP SECRET



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a. All messages and signals will be made in clear.

b. All forms of scrambling and secrecy equipment will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.

MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE.

17. The German Authority will remain responsible for the maintenance of discipline throughout the forces under its command.

TREATMENT OF ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES IN GERMAN OCCUPIED ITALY.

18. Italian Government forces in Northern ITALY comprise all partisan formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CLNAI, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied ITALY of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers will immediately get in touch with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will receive and afford all facilities to these Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CLNAI for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following objects:

a. The general maintenance of law and order.

b. The maintenance of all essential civilian services.

c. The provision of communications and transport which may be necessary for the adequate distribution of supplies and the continuance of local

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CLN.I, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied ITALY of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers will immediately get in touch with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will receive and afford all facilities to these Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CLN.I for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following objects:

a. The general maintenance of law and order.

b. The maintenance of all essential civilian services.

c. The provision of communications and transport which may be necessary for the adequate distribution of supplies and the continuance of local administration.

20. For the execution of the above functions all Allied Liaison officers will be considered as the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be afforded complete freedom of communication by any means.



TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

TOP SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX 'B'

D R A F T

ORDERS FOR GERMAN AND GERMAN CONTROLLED NAVAL FORCES AND MERCHANT SHIPPING

1. a. The "German Commander-in-Chief Southwest" is hereinafter referred to as the "German Authority".

b. The "German Naval Commander South" is hereinafter referred to as the "German Naval Command".

2. The German Authority and Naval Command will cause :

a. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, at sea at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port or base. Armaments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.

b. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain underkoned by night and show navigation lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GIBRALTAR, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at EUROPA point. Small enemy submarines at sea in the ADRIATIC or LIGURIAN Seas are to be ordered to return to POLA or GENOA respectively.

c. All such warships, including submarines of all types, auxiliaries, and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, which are in harbour, to remain there.

d. All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

render, wherever they may be, to resume their normal p[illegible]

Armaments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.

b. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain undarkened by night and show navigation lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GIBRALTAR, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at EUROPA point. Small enemy submarines at sea in the ADRIATIC or LIGURIAN Seas are to be ordered to return to POLA or GENOA respectively.

c. All such warships, including submarines of all types, auxiliaries, and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, which are in harbour, to remain there.

d. All ships andvessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of or under German control at the time of surrender, to proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

5566

3. The German Authority and Naval Command will at once cause all such warships, surface or submarine, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft in harbour, as are under their command or control, to comply with the following orders:



(15)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a. No ship, vessel or craft of any description, including harbour craft, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building, is to be damaged or scuttled, nor is any damage to be done to its hull, machinery or equipment.

b. Ammunition is to be retained on board until further orders.

c. Armaments are to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential portions of the firing mechanisms, but such mechanisms, and the armament in general are not to be damaged or destroyed. Fire control equipment is to be maintained on board fully efficient. All weapons are to be trained fore and aft.

d. All small arms are to be landed, and safeguarded.

e. Ships are to remain undarkened by night.

f. Colours are to be struck and not to be rehoisted.

g. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (1). The officers and men removed are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.

h. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament prescribed in sub para c above, but are to be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander's representa-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

e. Ships are to remain unlarkened by night.

f. Colours are to be struck and not to be rehoisted.

g. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (1). The officers and men removed are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.

h. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament prescribed in sub para c above, but are to be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives, and are to complete with fuel.

i. Wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus is to be damaged or destroyed.

j. All callsign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be removed from ships and placed under guard ashore. International code and callsigns are to be retained on board.



15

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

4. The German Authority and Naval Command will cause all such warships, surface or submarine, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft at sea as are under their command or control to be instructed to comply with the orders in para 3 above immediately on return to harbour.

5. The German Authority and Naval Command will immediately ensure that German naval aircraft under their command or control:

a. Do not leave the ground or base or ship until further orders are received from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

b. Already in the air, land or alight forthwith.

6. The German Authority and Naval Command will immediately take action to ensure compliance with the following orders:

a. No demolitions are to be carried out to harbour or port facilities of whatever nature; to naval establishments ashore; to scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; to telecommunication and radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.

b. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.

c. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

d. All demolition charges in all ports and harbour works are to be

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.

b. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.

c. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

d. All demolition charges in all ports and harbour works are to be removed or rendered ineffective, and their presence indicated by appropriate signs.

5564

e. The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliancy, and lights shown only by special arrangement are to be exhibited continuously. Navigational lights which have been extinguished are to be exhibited as soon as possible with their former characteristics if practicable.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

f. All pilotage services are to continue to operate and all pilots are be held at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with charts.

g. All small arms, explosives, and warlike stores, in naval barracks and shore establishments, are to be placed in magazines, under guard.

h. (1) German naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports and administrative services in ports are to remain at their stations and to continue to carry out their routine duties.

(2) German and German controlled naval personnel employed on seaward defense are to comply with the instructions given by the local Allied Commanders.

(3) A general order is to be given to all German and German controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the local Allied Commanders. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.

i. A certificate that the action required under sub paras c, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Naval Command to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

7. The German Authority and Naval Command will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following information in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:

a. Positions of all minefields, both moored and ground mines, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of minelaying craft including aircraft Details of each mine or group of mines laid is to include:

(1) Type of mine.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the local Allied Commanders. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.

8. A certificate that the action required under sub paras c, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Naval Command to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

7. The German Authority and Naval Command will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following information in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:

a. Positions of all minefields, both moored and ground mines, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of minelaying craft including aircraft Details of each mine or group of mines laid is to include:

(1) Type of mine.

(2) Number of mines laid.

(3) Spaces between mines.

(4) Depth setting.

(5) Date laid.

(6) Number and type of anti-sweeping devices laid.

(7) Types of anti-sweeping devices, if any, fitted to the mines themselves.

(8) If snag lines have been fitted to mines.

(9) Polarity, delay, and number of actuations set on all ground mines.

5563

(15)



TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(10) Details of the mines themselves, including drawings and photographs of all types of mines and minefittings.

b. Details of convoy routes, searched channels and approach channels to ports in the two areas specified in para 6, with charts showing these, namely:

(1) Mines area charts.

(2) Coastal channel charts.

(3) Approach route charts.

(4) New navigational charts issued as a result of recent surveys.

c. Details of,

(1) Navigational lights which have been destroyed.

(2) Navigational lights which are in operation, giving details of operation, and by whom controlled.

(3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.

d. Details of buoys, indicating:

(1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.

(2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, includir lights, if any.

(3) Buoys removed.

e. Details of booms and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

f. Appropriate navigational publications.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the information set out in para 7 concerning

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

operation, and by whom controlled.

(3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.

d. Details of buoys, indicating:

(1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.

(2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, includir lights, if any.

(3) Buoys removed.

e. Details of booms and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

f. Appropriate navigational publications.

8. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the information set out in para 7 concerning the undermentioned two special areas is in any case required to be supplied by the German Naval Command at the date and time at which surrender becomes effective, to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authorities at a place and by means which will be decided at the meeting held prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. 5562

The two special areas concerned are:-

a. LIGURIAN SEA - Area bounded on the west by meridian of 3°W. South by parallel of 43° 30' N. East and north by the coast of ITALY.

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

b. ADRIATIC SEA. - Area bounded on the north, east and west by the coasts of ITALY, ISTRIA and JUGOSLAVIA. On the south by parallel of 44°N.

9. The German Naval Command is to furnish forthwith, exact information with regard to the disposition of German and German controlled naval formations and units under its command. Such information is to include the following:

a. Present locations of all Naval Staffs and Headquarters.

b. Full details of organization of German Naval Command in the Mediterranean.

c. Disposition, state of readiness, and crew lists of all warships, auxiliaries and merchant shipping.

d. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.

e. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

10. The German Naval Command will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under its command to comply with the following orders:-

a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.

b. All callsign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and guarded.

[illegible] detailed directions as to how and where the information required by the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

auxiliaries and merchant shipping.

c. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

10. The German Naval Command will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under its command to comply with the following orders:-

a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.

b. All callsign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and guarded.

11. Detailed directions as to how and where the information required by the foregoing paras 7 and 9 is to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authoriti will be notified separately to the German Naval Command at the neces prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. The details of the methods which will be used by the German Naval Command to pass the necessary orders to ships at sea, are to be signalled to the Allied Naval Authorities in plain language, prior to the time and date at which this instrument takes effect.

12. The German Naval Command will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

(15)

TOP SECRET



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

auxiliaries and merchant shipping.

c. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

10. The German Naval Command will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under its command to comply with the following orders:-

a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.

b. All callsign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and guarded.

11. Detailed directions as to how and where the information required by the foregoing paras 9 and 9 is to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authoriti will be notified separately to the German Naval Command at the meeting prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. The details of the methods which will be used by the German Naval Command to pass the necessary orders to ships at sea, are to be signalled to the Allied Naval Authorities in plain language, prior to the time and date at which this instrument takes effect.

12. The German Naval Command will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

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TOP SECRET



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 786015

SECRET DRAFT APPENDIX 'C'

# TOP SECRET ORDERS FOR THE GERMAN AND GERMAN CONTROLLED AIR FORCES

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest is hereinafter referred to as the"German Authority".
2. All aircraft of any kind or nationality, including gliders and balloons, under the control of the German Authority, whether military, naval or civil, will remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ships pending further instructions.
3. The German Authority will forthwith cause all German or German controlled aircraft in the air over territories or water occupied or controlled by it to land at once and remain on the ground. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.
4. The German Authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.
5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersal areas.
6. All aircraft will be disarmed and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.
7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the elevators, disconnecting the fuel and oil supply (to each engine, in the case of twin or multi-engined aircraft) and draining all fuel and oil tanks into suitable containers.
8. All aircraft together with the removed elevators, fuel and oil, spare

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.

5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersal areas.

6. All aircraft will be disarmed and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.

7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the elevators, disconnecting the fuel and oil supply (to each engine, in the case of twin or multi-engined aircraft) and draining all fuel and oil tanks into suitable containers.

8. All aircraft together with the removed elevators, fuel and oil, spare parts, hangars, storehouses, airfield administrative and living accommodation, general airfield equipment, including lighting installations will be safeguarded intact.

5560

9. Balloons.

All balloons will be hauled down, deflated, packed and safeguarded intact.

Fuel pumps and carburettors will be removed from all winch motors and safeguarded.

10. Explosives.

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Information concerning all booby-traps, mines and other explosive devices on and in the vicinity of the airfields will be furnished immediately

TOP SECRET



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

demand to the responsible local Allied authorities. All explosives, including bombs, will be rendered safe by the removal of fuzes and detonators.

11. All self-destroying devices, whether in aircraft, signals equipment or in any Luftwaffe equipment or installation will be removed.

12. Personnel.

All Luftwaffe personnel will be disarmed and will remain in their camps or at assigned sites until directed otherwise by the representatives of the local Allied Commander. The orders or instructions of any representative of the local Allied Commander will be obeyed.

13. Motor Transport.

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized MT parking areas under guard.

14. Fuel and Oil.

Fuel and oil supplies and installations of all types will be safeguarded and handed over to the local Allied Authorities without contamination.

15. Anti-Aircraft.

All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

16. All parts removed from AA under para 15 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

Any spare parts for AA guns held at Luftwaffe units will be segregated



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized MT parking areas under guard.

14. Fuel and Oil.

Fuel and oil supplies and installations of all types will be safeguarded and handed over to the local Allied Authorities without contamination.

15. Anti-Aircraft.

All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

16. All parts removed from A.. under para 15 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

5559

Any spare parts for A.. guns held at Luftwaffe units will be segregated from guns and safeguarded intact.

17. Fire Control Equipment.

Instruments, directors and computors including Radar and all fire control equipment will be concentrated and stored intact.

18. Searchlights.

All carbon rods will be removed from the projectors. The fuel pumps will be removed from the generators. The carbons and fuel pumps together with all carbon and fuel pump spares will be stored and safeguarded intact.

19. Small Arms.

All small arms will be collected and safeguarded intact.



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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized MT parking areas under guard.

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All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

16. All parts removed from A.. under para 15 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

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19. Small Arms.

All small arms will be collected and safeguarded intact.

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

and Equipment.

Normal precautions will be taken against leakage of gas from any gas bombs.

All gas equipment and decontamination material will be preserved and handed over to the Allied representatives on demand.

Gas spray containers will be collected and guarded, and where such containers are filled with gas, the normal precautions will be taken against leakage.

21. Flying Bombs.

All stocks of flying bombs will be immobilized by the removal of fuzes, detonators, and fuel pumps. The items so removed will be segregated from flying bombs, concentrated and safeguarded intact, and all flying bombs and their equipment, spares and launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

22. Rocket-Propelled Weapons.

All weapons and projectiles propelled by rockets or similar devices will be immobilized by the removal and segregation of essential parts of the mechanism. The parts so removed will be segregated from such weapons and projectiles, concentrated, and guarded, and the weapons and projectiles, their equipment, spares, launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

23. Signals Equipment.

a. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication equipment used for code, voice, teletype or other electrical transmissi will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

b. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of what-



Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NND No. 782015

safeguarded intact.

22. Rocket-Propelled Weapons.

All weapons and projectiles propelled by rockets or similar devices will be immobilized by the removal and segregation of essential parts of the mechanism. The parts so removed will be segregated from such weapons and projectiles, concentrated, and guarded, and the weapons and projectiles, their equipment, spares, launching sites and facilities will be safeguarde intact.

23. Signals Equipment.

a. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication equipment used for code, voice, teletype or other electrical transmissi will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

b. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of whatever nature or design, whether used for air warning, tracking, identifi cation or flying control will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

5558

24. Call and Code Signs.

All call and code sign systems used by GERMANY and/or her Allies in operating Luftwaffe telecommunication systems will be withdrawn from use, and all documents and/or associated coding devices will be stored and safeguarded intact.

25. Code and Cyphers.

All code and cyphers systems, including books, documents and cypher machinery, employed by the Luftwaffe will be withdrawn from use, stored

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

and safeguarded intact.

26. Secrecy Equipment.

All forms of scrambling and secrecy equipment in use on any Luftwaffe telecommunication system will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.

27. All other Luftwaffe equipment, including that in experimental stations and laboratories, military or civilian, photographic equipment, furniture, will be preserved intact and maintained in good condition. Special care will be taken to ensure the preservation of all documents, including technical manuals, files, plans, maps, card indices, identity documents.

28. Maintenance of Luftwaffe.

The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

5557



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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief Commissioner HQ. H.C. 2570 (3) cc 696 225

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

MAR 14 RECD K-107

SAC (P) (45) 12 Addendum
13th March 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ORGANISATION FOR DEALING WITH INTER-SERVICE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS AT AFHQ

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

1. The Supreme Allied Commander has given further consideration to the present method of holding his conferences and has decided as follows :-

(a) Conferences will be held regularly each Thursday. In the event that there are political matters to be discussed, the Political Conference will commence at 1030 hours and the Operational Conference will follow immediately afterwards. If there are no political items requiring discussion, no Political Conference will be held and the Ope ational Conference will commence at 1030 hours.

(b) Subjects for consideration at these conferences will be restricted to important matters of theatre policy.

(c) Regular attendance at Operational Conferences will be as follows :-

CANCELLED by 42

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group (when necessary)
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Joint Planning Staff
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS 14 MAR 1945 G.

(d) Regular attendance at the Political Conference, in addition to the officers nominated in (c) above, will be as follows :-

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will commence at 1030 hours and the Operational Conference will follow immediately afterwards. If there are no political items requiring discussion, no Political Conference will be held and the Ope ational Conference will commence at 1030 hours.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group (when necessary)
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Joint Planning Staff
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

(d) Regular attendance at the Political Conference, in addition to the officers nominated in (c) above, will be as follows :-

U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

(e) Officers other than those listed above may be called in for the discussion on items in regard to which they are particularly concerned. The Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee and Director, PWB, will attend when Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee papers are under discussion; otherwise it will be the responsibility of the Service raising a subject for formal consideration to notify the Secretariat that the attendance of additional officers is desired during the discussion on that matter.



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Chief Commr.
Exec Commr
Political Adviser

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(f) In the event that no subjects for discussion at a Political or Operational Conference are previously placed on the agenda, the Supreme Allied Commander will hold a brief informal conference with the Commanders-in-Chief on Thursdays at 1030 hours. Attendance at these conferences will be as follows :-

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

For these conferences no agenda will be prepared and no minutes issued except that when an important policy decision is taken at these conferences appropriate publication thereof will be made to all agencies concerned.

SECRETARIAL ARRANGEMENTS

2. In order to implement the foregoing decisions, the following secretarial arrangements will apply :-

(a) Papers for discussion at the conferences must reach the Secretariat by 1700 hours, Tuesdays.

(b) Agendas will be published on Tuesdays.

(c) Papers and minutes will continue to be circulated on existing distributions.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCES

3. With reference to the direction at Minute 4 of paper No. SAC (E) (45) 12, further discussion between the three Services has now taken place and as a result it has been decided that these meetings will not be held.

4. The AFHQ Staff Conferences, held under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff at 1030 hours on Wednesdays and Saturdays, are not affected by this decision and will continue.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRETARIAL ARRANGEMENTS

2. In order to implement the foregoing decisions, the following secretarial arrangements will apply :-

(a) Papers for discussion at the conferences must reach the Secretariat by 1100 hours Tuesdays.

(b) Agendas will be published on Tuesdays.

(c) Papers and minutes will continue to be circulated on existing distributions.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCES

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J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.



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| Spares | 38-40 |

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 14
7th March 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUGOSLAV ORGANISATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. In early December a letter was received by MMIA from the Italian Ministry of War, alleging that representatives of the Jugoslav Partisans were inviting the desertion of Italian soldiers. At the same time other information suggested that the numbers and size of Jugoslav organisations and missions in ITALY had become excessive and that certain of these missions were undertaking improper activities. As a result paper No. PC (44) 150 was prepared and was considered at the Political Committee of the Supreme Allied Commander's conference on 9th December (PC (44) 35th Meeting, Minute 4). The Supreme Allied Commander directed that an interim reply be forwarded to the Italian Ministry of War and appointed a sub-committee composed of G-2, G -3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission to prepare a report as to the numbers, location and activities of unauthorised Jugoslav liaison officers and missions in ITALY and as a result of their investigation to recommend what further action should be taken when the United Provisional Jugoslav government was established.

2. This sub-committee has now completed its investigations and finds that, with the exception of one mission at NAPLES the abolition of which is recommended below, the Jugoslav liaison officers and missions at present established in ITALY were originally duly authorised by the Allied authorities. A list of Jugoslav liaison officers and missions which have been located is attached as an Annex to this paper.

3. The Sub-Committee makes the following recommendations as to action which may be taken to induce the Jugoslav government to reduce certain of its organisations in ITALY :-

(a) The so-called Royalist missions in ROME, NAPLES and BARI will, with the establishment of a United Provisional Jugoslav government, become redundant. The Allied Commission might therefore be directed formally to request the closure of these missions. There is evidence, however, that although the head of the Jugoslav delegation to the Advisory Council for ITALY, acting on instructions from Dr. Subasic, is already attempting to liquidate the Royal Jugoslav

(2) (3)

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Minute 4). The Supreme Allied Commander directed that an interim reply be forwarded to the Italian Ministry of War and appointed a sub-committee composed of G-2, G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission to prepare a report as to the numbers, location and activities of unauthorised Jugoslav liaison officers and missions in ITALY and as a result of their investigation to recommend what further action should be taken when the United Provisional Jugoslav government was established.

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(a) The so-called Royalist missions in ROME, NAPLES and BARI will, with the establishment of a United Provisional Jugoslav government, become redundant. The Allied Commission might therefore be directed formally to request the closure of these missions. There is evidence, however, that although the head of the Jugoslav delegation to the Advisory Council for ITALY, acting on instructions from M. Subasic, is already attempting to liquidate the Royal Jugoslav military mission in ROME he is encountering opposition from the Royalists. Should the latter continue to resist the disbandment of the missions it will be necessary to consider adoption of forceful measures.

(b) The Jugoslav Army of National Liberation delegation in BARI, while fulfilling certain useful functions, is unnecessarily large. It is thought that No. 3 District and 37 Military Mission should be requested to make detailed recommendations as to the reduction of this delegation. These recommendations if approved might then be passed to the new Jugoslav government.

(c) The Jugoslav Army of National Liberation delegation in ROME is fulfilling no useful purpose and its closure should be requested.

/(d).....



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CHIEF COMM
EXEC COMM
OFFICE, POLITICAL ADVISERS.

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(d) There is no objection to the small liaison department of the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation continuing to function at NAPLES. It is, however, suggested that the new Jugoslav government be requested to provide assurances :-

(i) That this organisation will not be increased.

(ii) That it is a regular detachment either of the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation delegation at B.RI or of the Jugoslav delegation to the Allied Advisory Council for ITALY.

(e) No reductions are at present necessary in the 4th Jugoslav Overseas Brigade, since this organisation is performing useful work on behalf of SCAF.

(f) There is not at present any evidence to justify a general recommendation for the removal of Jugoslav commissars from hospitals.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and as a result :-

(a) To direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to take action in accordance with paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c).

(b) To instruct the Chief of Staff to take appropriate action in regard to the remaining recommendations.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 7 |
| Chief of Staff | 8 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 9-10 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff | 11 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 12 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 13 |

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(a) To direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to take action in accordance with paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c).

(b) To instruct the Chief of Staff to take appropriate action in regard to the remaining recommendations.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ANNEX

JUGOSLAV ORGANISATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

1. Royal Jugoslav Military Mission in ROME

Strength : Approximately 60.

Location : Corso Trieste 10, ROME.

Activities : This mission, under Lieutenant Colonel VUKOTIC, was formed from the Royal Jugoslav Military Mission in BARI, permission for the establishment of which was given by Allied Force Headquarters early in 1944. Application for its despatch was received at Allied Force Headquarters from the Royal Jugoslav authorities in CAIRO, who desired to have representation in ITALY to superintend arrangements for the care of Jugoslav refugees arriving in Southern ITALY from JUGOSLAVIA. After its establishment in BARI the mission recruited a larger staff and widened the scope of its activities. The mission is primarily concerned with looking after the interests of Jugoslavs of Royalist sympathies as opposed to the Partisan organisations in ITALY which cater for Partisan adherents.

2. Royal Jugoslav Military Mission Liaison Centre NAPLES

Strength : 1 officer, 2 O.Rs

Location : 84 Riviera di Chiaia, NAPLES.

Activities : It is assumed that this liaison centre grew out of the Royalist Jugoslav military mission which was established in BARI. It looks after the interests of Jugoslavs of Royalist sympathies.

3. Royal Jugoslav Military Mission at BARI

Strength : Approximately 20 officers, 5 O.Rs

Location : Via Marchese di Montrone 47, BARI.

Activities : This mission is concerned with looking after the interests of Jugoslavs of Royalist sympathies. Sub-missions have been organised at LECCE and GALLIPOLI where the Internees and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission have permanent camps for refugees, and at TARANTO where the Sub-Commission operated a staging camp for refugees en route to the Middle East.

4. Jugoslav Army of National Liberation Delegation at BARI

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4. Jugoslav Army of National Liberation Delegation at BARI

5551

Strength : Approximately 1100.

Location : Via Piccini, BARI.

Activities : This organisation was formed in November or December 1943, under the auspices of Headquarters Force 266 , on the authority of Allied Force Headquarters. The delegation is in command of all Jugoslav Partisan forces in ITALY and is also responsible for liaison with the Allied forces in ITALY.

5. Jugoslav Army of National Liberation Delegation in ROME

Strength : Approximately 30

Location : 84 Via Garigliano, ROME.

Activities : Permission for the establishment of the delegation was given by the Allied Control Commission. It is suspected that this delegation concerns itself largely with politics, recruiting and black marketeering.



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6. Jugoslav Delegation to the Allied Advisory Council for ITALY

Strength : Approximately 50.

Location : Via Quintino Sella 5, ROME.

Activities : The normal duties of a delegation to the Allied Advisory Council are performed by this organisation.

7. Liaison Department of the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation at NAPLES

Strength : 3 officers, 12 O.Rs.

Location : Via Pergolesi No. I, NAPLES

Activities : This liaison department was established at NAPLES in the middle of December 1944. Its purpose is to look after refugees and reinforcements for the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation arriving in NAPLES from overseas.

8. Fourth Overseas Brigade

Strength : Approximately 1350.

Location : Headquarters MONOPOLI.

Activities : This organisation provides certain guards and also assistance in the packing of supplies for infiltration into the BALKANS for Headquarters Special Operations Mediterranean. Detachments of this organisation are believed to take part in recruiting for the Partisan forces.

9. Commissars in Hospitals

There are about seven hospitals in the BARI area in which there are Jugoslav patients. Each of these has a Jugoslav Partisan commissar who is responsible for the discipline and welfare of the Partisan inmates of the hospital. Commissars are also responsible for the political instruction of the Jugoslav patients. Authority for the establishment of semi-medical camps for Jugoslav Partisans in ITALY and for the acceptance of Partisans in British hospitals was given by Allied Force Headquarters.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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6th March 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ALLEGED JUGOSLAV DESERTERS

Note by Secretary

1. In conclusion 4(a) of PC (44) 35th Meeting, dated 9th December 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that action on paper No. PC (44) 148 be deferred pending the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations then proceeding in LONDON, which have resulted in the establishment of a joint provisional government of JUGOSLAVIA in BELGRADE. This paper notified the desire of the Jugoslav delegation in ROME to obtain custody of certain Jugoslav nationals residing in ROME on the grounds that they were deserters from the Jugoslav National Army of Liberation and suggested that a procedure be set up whereby the Jugoslav authorities would be required to set forth certain particulars in regard to each person. The paper further suggested that the Allied Commission should be instructed that policy should be :-

(a) That proven deserters from the Jugoslav Armed forces should be apprehended and returned to Jugoslav military jurisdiction.

(b) That the liberty of other persons whose custody might be sought by the Jugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.

A draft letter to the Allied Commission stating the procedure to be adopted was laid before the meeting.

2. Having regard to the recent developments in connection with the formation of the joint provisional government of JUGOSLAVIA the Chief of Staff has now approved and despatched the draft letter previously proposed and a copy of this letter is attached as an annex to this paper.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to take note of the despatch of this letter.

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS

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J.H. L'ESCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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CHIEF Comm
Exec Comm
C.A. Sec.

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ANNEX

4 March 1945

SUBJECT: Alleged Jugoslav Deserters

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394.

1. Under date of 30 November 4 (reference Dpr/2/G2/DP) a letter from Major KOLJENSIC of the Jugoslav Delegation in ROME, on the subject of Jugoslav deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.

2. You should advise Major KOLJENSIC that it will be your policy to assist him in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Jugoslav National Army of Liberation, but that it will be necessary for him to conform with a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied Armies. Each individual case will require to be considered separately, with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is sought.

3. It will therefore be necessary for the Jugoslav National Army of Liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and to furnish full particulars respecting his desertion. Prior to taking any action towards the apprehension of a deserter it is suggested that you require, in affidavit form, the following particulars :-

1. Name and rank of deserter.
2. Military unit from which deserted and location thereof.
3. Date of enlistment or induction.
4. Date and circumstances of desertion.
5. Probable whereabouts.

Such affidavit will be required to be submitted within 60 days from the date of desertion.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

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3. It will therefore be necessary for the Jugoslav National Army of Liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and to furnish full particulars respecting his desertion. Prior to taking any action towards the apprehension of a deserter it is suggested that you require, in affidavit form, the following particulars :-

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5. Probable whereabouts.

Such affidavit will be required to be submitted within 60 days from the date of desertion.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

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JOHN HARDING
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

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S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1400 - 250 000

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

MAR 3 RECD
K 94 cc 615

SAC (P) (45) 12
1st March 1945

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COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ORGANISATION FOR DEALING WITH INTER-SERVICE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS AT AFHQ

Record of a meeting held at 1500 hours on Tuesday 28th February 1945 in the G-3 War Room

---

PRESENT :-

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

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EXEC COMM
POLITICAL SEC

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY

Major J.G. Sweetman

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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

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Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY

Major J.G. Sweetman

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The meeting had before it a paper by the Chief of Staff on the subject of the organisation for dealing with inter-service and political questions at AFHQ.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the paper raised at least two different points, which he proposed to treat separately.

1. REORGANISATION OF INTER-SERVICE AND POLITICAL SECRETARIAT AND SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF

MR. OFFIE wished to see the present functions of Inter-Service and Political Secretariat adequately carried out. He did not, however, hold strong views on how the staff machinery required to do this should be organised provided it worked efficiently.

MR. BROAD agreed with Mr. Offie and stated he was satisfied with the arrangements proposed.

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HEADQUARTERS 2 APR 1945



/LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stressed that the proposed reorganisation was not a question of personalities. He merely intended to rationalise the existing system of two interlocking secretariats which produced duplication of work. The amalgamation would reduce staff overheads and result in a saving in personnel. The name "Secretary General Staff" should be changed on this amalgamation taking place and he suggested the title "Chief of Staff's Secretariat".

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM explained that he had previously opposed the idea because he had been under the impression that it was proposed to terminate the system of SACHED Operational and Political conferences. He now realised that the holding of such meetings would not be affected by the proposed reorganisation. He preferred, if the change took place, that the new secretariat should be termed "Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat". He thought, however, that it was a pity to change a system which was at present working efficiently, as, although there was a good deal to be said in logic for the amalgamation, he feared that the result of it would be a secretariat having too military a colour.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR agreed with Admiral Cunningham and regretted that it was in fact true that naval and air officers could not be made available to work in the new secretariat. He felt, however, that the important point was that the new secretariat, no matter what it was called, should adequately perform functions of an inter-service, inter-Allied and political nature.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with General Harding that the present system inevitably involved duplication as the two secretariats could not function efficiently unless there was very close co-ordination.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING, answering a point raised by Admiral Cunningham, stated that it would be quite in order for naval and air Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs to deal direct with the Lieutenant Colonel whom it was proposed should, within the new secretariat, act as secretary of the Supreme Allied Commander's conferences. He accepted Admiral Cunningham's suggestion for a name of the new secretariat.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to take the necessary steps for the reorganisation, on the lines set out in the paper before the meeting, of the Inter-Service and Political Secretariat and the office of the Secretary General Staff into a joint secretariat to be known as the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

2. INTER-SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

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2. INTER-SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER drew attention to paragraph 4 of the paper before the meeting and invited comments.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR considered that the Chief Administrative Officer must have inter-service responsibility and must co-ordinate requirements of such matters as accommodation, movement and transportation as between the Army and Air Forces. The Chief Administrative Officer could not of course give an over-riding administrative decision on a matter of inter-service policy but he had two functions, one of which was purely an Army matter and the other was of an inter-service nature.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the connection between the Navy and the Army regarding administrative matters was not as close as between the Army and the Air Force. He was not clear what powers the Chief Administrative Officer was requesting with regard to shipping, the control of which as a naval operational matter must remain his (Admiral Cunningham's) responsibility. He considered that paragraph 7(d) of the paper before the meeting would, as drafted, give too wide powers to the Chief Administrative Officer.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that he did not seek to carry out any inter-service functions other than those which he had in fact performed in

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/the past

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the past. He wished, however, to regularise the position and considered that he should be empowered to decide on staff level whether administrative plans of an inter-service nature were sound. In addition he wished to be authorised to brief the Joint Planning Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER took the view, which was generally agreed by the meeting, that senior officers of all services should refrain from any tendency to dictate to the Joint Planning Staff, whose papers should represent no more than the opinion of individual planners. He further pointed out that as Commanding General, MTOUSA, he had certain purely US administrative functions, which he did not delegate. Inter-Allied administrative problems were, however, properly a responsibility of the Chief Administrative Officer.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer be given official responsibility for co-ordinating the administrative aspects of inter-Allied, inter-service and political matters within approved policy.

3. ATTENDANCE AT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said that 15th Army Group and Balkan Air Force had been represented at the SACMED conferences held on 19th and 20th February and he had asked them also to be represented at the conferences to be held on 2nd March. Having been at AFHQ he felt that it would be of considerable assistance to Commanding General, 15th Army Group, to be regularly represented at SACMED conferences.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed concern at the continued increase in the numbers of those attending the Supreme Allied Commander's conferences and pointed out that large meetings prevented Commanders-in-Chief from speaking freely.

AIR MARSHAL SIESSOR agreed with Admiral Cunningham and said he would prefer that the more junior of the officers, who at present attended regularly, should not do so but should be called in for specific items as required.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that under present conditions Commanding General, 15th Army Group, was in practice in much the same position as an adviser to SACMED as were the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief, though he realised that constitutionally the position was different.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff,

(a) To arrange for the regular attendance of a representative 5545

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3. ATTENDANCE AT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that under present conditions Commanding General, 15th Army Group, was in practice in much the same position as an adviser to SACMED as were the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief, though he realised that constitutionally the position was different.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff,

(a) To arrange for the regular attendance of a representative of 5545 Commanding General, 15th Army Group, for such matters as affected him at SACMED conferences.

(b) To investigate the feasibility of restricting the attendance at SACMED conferences.

4. OPERATIONAL SUMMARIES AT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING raised the question of whether it was necessary to have operational summaries given at the commencement of Supreme Allied Commander's conferences. The abolition of these summaries would obviate the need for the presence at the meetings of certain of the officers who at present made these statements.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that these summaries had previously been necessary when the battle was more fluid and conferences were being held



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more frequently. Under present circumstances the summaries were interesting but possibly not sufficiently so to merit half an hour of the conference's time.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that operational summaries should be omitted from Supreme Allied Commander's conferences for the present.

5. SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S DAILY MEETINGS AND CHIEF OF STAFF'S BI-WEEKLY CONFERENCES

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the previous 9 a.m Chief's of Staff meetings had been useful to clear up certain day to day problems. He considered there was a requirement for regular meetings between the three service Chiefs of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer to settle matters which could be dealt with on staff level and need not be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander's conference.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING said that the present 9 a.m meetings were intended to be merely a presentation to the Supreme Allied Commander of the existing military situation by all three services. The meetings being informative in nature it was not necessary for Chiefs of Staff of other services to attend and all that was required was the presence of officers who could explain the naval and air aspects of current operations. He would gladly agree to regular meetings with the naval and air Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to arrange for regular meetings with the Chiefs of Staff of other services and the Chief Administrative Officer to discuss matters which could be settled on their staff level and for the attendance at these meetings of representatives of the U.S Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, when necessary.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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T.G. SWEETMAN,
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| Chief, G-3 Plans Section | 15 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 | 16-17 |
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (F) (45) 11
28th February 1945

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1 MAR 1945
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Deputy Air C-in-C, Med

I suggest that the following amendments should be made to the draft telegram circulated under JPS Paper No. P/266 (Final) :-

1. Paragraph 4, line 7. Delete the words "be withdrawn in default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained". There is no good our seeking an assurance that Jugoslav troops should be withdrawn, because Tito certainly would not agree and it would merely precipitate a row.

2. Paragraph 5. Delete sub-paragraph (c) and add at the end of sub-paragraph (a) "No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement".

3. Paragraph 5(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".

4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows :-

"7. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 6(a) and (b) above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Jugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, and Jugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Jugoslav forces will

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2. Paragraph 5. Delete sub-paragraph (c) and add at the end of sub-paragraph (a) "No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement".

3. Paragraph 5(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".

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In order, therefore, to meet the requirement in 6(c) as well as those in 6(a) and (b) above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the Provisional Jugoslav Government - as soon as it is formed - to participate,

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as an ally, in the Allied Military Government of such portions of ITALY as are so governed, including VENEZIA GIULIA, with an accredited Jugoslav representative on the Allied Commission. It should be arranged that British or American forces should occupy the L of C area and perhaps also FIUME and POLA; that the Jugoslav forces in other parts of VENEZIA GIULIA should come under the orders of the appropriate Allied Commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory who, if Jugoslav, Tito has already agreed should be responsible to AMG."

(intd) J.C.S.

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(intd) J.C.S.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-89

SAC (P) (45) 10
27th February 1945

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COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

DIRECTIVE TO HEAD OF NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Secretary

1. Until recently the Flag Officer Taranto and Liaison (Italy) was nominal Head of the Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission and a deputy acted for him in this capacity in ROME. This arrangement was terminated with the appointment on 19th February 1945 of Rear Admiral Warren as Head of the Naval Sub-Commission.

2. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, feels that it is appropriate at this time to issue a new directive to the Head of the Naval Sub-Commission, and submits for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander the draft at Appendix 'A'. When the directive has been approved Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, proposes to promulgate the substance of it to the Mediterranean Station by Station Message.

3. Rear Admiral Warren will also be acting as the representative in ROME of Flag Officer Liaison (Italy) and as senior British naval officer, Rome. In these capacities he will have responsibilities to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through normal naval channels.

HEADQUARTERS
28 FEB 1945

for J.H. LASCELLES,
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2. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, feels that it is appropriate at this time to issue a new directive to the Head of the Naval Sub-Commission, and submits for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander the draft at Appendix 'A'. When the directive has been approved Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, proposes to promulgate the substance of it to the Mediterranean Station by Station Message.

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APPENDIX 'A'

K-89

February 1945

TO: Rear Admiral Guy Langton Warren

1. You have been appointed Head of the Allied Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

2. The duty of the Naval Sub-Commission is to represent the Allied Navies on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner on such matters affecting the Italian Navy as are dealt with by the Commission. The function is a professional one and not a political one.

3. The Naval Sub-Commission is responsible for all administrative and material questions affecting the Italian Navy. These include :-

Employment of Personnel
Supplies of food, clothing, transport and naval stores
Disposal of war material
Requisitioning of Italian Naval property.

4. Effective this date all communications relating to matters of policy in connection with the Italian Navy under the Armistice Terms and the general administration of the Italian Navy, not directly affecting the operation of the Italian Fleet under the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, will be referred directly to the Sub-Commission.

5. You are authorised to deal direct with the Ministry of Marine, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Headquarters 15th Army Group and the various sub-commissions of the Allied Commission regarding all such administrative questions. Matters of policy or any question requiring decision by higher authority should be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander Through

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material questions affecting the Italian Navy. These include :-

Employment of Personnel
Supplies of food, clothing, transport and naval stores
Disposal of war material
Requisitioning of Italian Naval property.

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5. You are authorised to deal direct with the Ministry of Marine, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Headquarters 15th Army Group and the various sub-commissions of the Allied Commission regarding all such administrative questions. Matters of policy or any question requiring decision by higher authority should be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander through the Chief Commissioner.

40

6. For Naval Sub-Commission business, the channels of communication with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should also be through the Chief Commissioner.

7. Commodore H.J. Ziroli, United States Navy, will be your Deputy and will act on your behalf in your absence. The remainder of your staff is to be organised as you think best for the efficient performance of the above duties.

By Command of FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

JOHN HARDING,
Lieutenant-General
Chief of Staff

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Copies to :- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 9 Addendum
20 March 1945

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COPY NO. 4

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

CURRENCY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (P) (45), 2nd Meeting, Minute 6, it was directed that the subject of the currency responsibility of the Italian Government, as set out in paper number SAC (P) (45) 9, should be raised again when further details were available regarding the precise statement made by the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury and the reactions of the Italian Government and the Italian public.

2. It is now clear that the statement by the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury constitutes an unequivocal assertion that the U. S. Government is not in any way responsible for the Allied Military Lire, which is considered to be the currency of the Italian Government. The statement of the Secretary of the Treasury further points out that the Italian Government publicly accepted this responsibility in late 1943.

3. It is considered that in view of Allied statements such as the above, Italians now publicly recognize that they are responsible for the Allied Military Currency, but that they hope for some Allied financial support. Since this aspect of the matter is one of high policy, on which decision must be taken at an inter-governmental level, it appears to be desirable that, pending such decision, the Supreme Allied Commander should refrain from further comment.

4. G-5 (with the concurrence of the Allied Commission, the British Resident Minister, the U. S. Political Adviser, the Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief, and the Fiscal Director, AFTOUSA) therefore submit for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander the draft reply to the Combined Chiefs of Staff attached at Appendix "A".

529

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public.

2. It is now clear that the statement by the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury constitutes an unequivocal assertion that the U. S. Government is not in any way responsible for the Allied Military Lire, which is considered to be the currency of the Italian Government. The statement of the Secretary of the Treasury further points out that the Italian Government publicly accepted this responsibility in late 1943.

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4. G-5 (with the concurrence of the Allied Commission, the British Resident Minister, the U. S. Political Adviser, the Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief, and the Fiscal Director, NATOUSA) therefore submit for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander the draft reply to the Combined Chiefs of Staff attached at Appendix "A".

J. G. SHEETLAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Chief Administrative Officer | 10-11 |
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| Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff | 17 |
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| Chief, Liaison Section | 20 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ AAF | 21-25 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 26-28 |
| British Resident Minister | 29-32 |
| Director, PWB | 33 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 34-36 |
| Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat | 37-39 |
| Spares | 40-42 |

5538

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| | |
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| Director, P/B | 33 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 34-36 |
| Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat | 37-39 |
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II

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DRAFT

TO: AGWAR for CCS for COLC.

This is WAT 545.

Proposal to transfer currency responsibility to Italian Government is subject.

Paragraph One. WAT 554 gave the views of this Headquarters and A.C. on TAC 445, omitting para 1E and 2, which are commented on herein.

Paragraph Two. At the time of the dispatch of WAT 554 I found it difficult to give any clear reply on the broad political effect of entering upon the negotiations proposed in paragraph 1E of TAC 445. Some of my advisers felt that since the question of the ultimate disposition of A.M. lire was obscure in Italian minds, there was a good deal to be said for not disturbing this situation which to some extent was contributing to internal stability. Since then, however, the technical position with regard to A.M. lire has been made quite clear, and Italians generally must be coming to recognize the necessity for absorbing the currency with their own.

Paragraph Three. At the same time, the Italians no doubt hope for some financial support from the Allied Governments. This is a matter of high financial policy upon which decision must clearly be taken at an intergovernmental level, more especially as the Italian Government have now formally raised the issue in their memorandum of January 9 (refer WAT 568 of 2 March). Your reply to this memorandum may officially dispose of

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entering upon the negotiations proposed in paragraph 1E of T... 1225. Some of my advisers felt that since the question of the ultimate disposition of A.M.G. lire was obscure in Italian minds, there was a good deal to be said for not disturbing this situation which to some extent was contributing to internal stability. Since then, however, the technical position with regard to A.M.G. lire has been made quite clear, and Italians generally must be coming to recognize the necessity for absorbing the currency with their own.

Paragraph Three. At the same time, the Italians no doubt hope for some financial support from the Allied Governments. This is a matter of high financial policy upon which decision must clearly be taken at an intergovernmental level, more especially as the Italian Government have now formally raised the issue in their memorandum of January 9 (refer [illegible]537 568 of 2 March). Your reply to this memorandum may officially dispose of the question of dollar/sterling reimbursement and open the way to negotiations on currency responsibility and issue. In the meantime, therefore, I do not feel that any further comment of mine is necessary.

III

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

SAC (P) (45) 9
27th February 1945

COPY NO 32

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER CURRENCY RESPONSIBILITY
TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by C-S

1. In TAM 445 of 1 February the Combined Chiefs of Staff made certain proposals for the modification of the financial relations between the US/UK governments and the Italian government. Some of these proposals, relating to the Allied Financial Agency, the control of Italian foreign exchange, and other financial activities of the Allied Commission, were technical and non-political in character; and the comments of the Allied Commission and of this Headquarters were transmitted to the CCS in AMT 554 of 24 February.

2. Paragraph 1E of TAM 445 proposed that negotiations should be undertaken with the Italian government looking toward the centralisation in the government or its agencies of all lira currency issues, including the Allied Military lire. Thereafter the government would provide lira currency required by the Allied forces.

3. There is attached hereto as Annex 'A' a draft reply to paragraph 1E of TAM 445 and to paragraph 2, relating to the lira account. This draft agrees that from every technical point of view the Italian government should be made to assume responsibility for all lira currency and for the provision of currency to the Allied forces. However, the government has publicly stated that it intends to press for reimbursement in dollars and sterling of all lire spent by or for the Allied forces in ITALY, and may have created in the minds of the public the conviction that such reimbursement is essential to the stability of the lira. This being the case, the majority view in the Allied Commission and this Headquarters is that the political and popular reaction at this time to insistence on recognition by the government of its proper currency obligations may cause a government crisis and accelerate the depreciation of the lira, thus adversely affecting military operations.

4. This draft reply has been approved by the Allied Commission, the British Resident Minister, the U.S Political Adviser (whose dissenting view is stated therein) the U.S Fiscal Director, and the D/Paymaster-in-Chief.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to authorise its despatch.

See addendum

(intd) T.R.H.

5536

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

...ion the ... or its agencies of all lira currency issues, including ... Thereafter the Government would provide lira currency required by the Allied forces.

3. There is attached hereto as Annex 'A' a draft reply to paragraph 1E of TAM 445 and to paragraph 2, relating to the lira account. This draft agrees that from every technical point of view the Italian Government should be made to assume responsibility for all lira currency and for the provision of currency to the Allied forces. However, the Government has publicly stated that it intends to press for reimbursement in dollars and sterling of all lira spent by or for the Allied forces in ITALY, and may have created in the minds of the public the conviction that such reimbursement is essential to the stability of the lira. This being the case, the majority view in the Allied Commission and this Headquarters is that the political and popular reaction at this time to insistence on recognition by the Government of its proper currency obligations may cause a Government crisis and accelerate the depreciation of the lira, thus adversely affecting military operations.

4. This draft reply has been approved by the Allied Commission, the British Resident Minister, the U.S Political Adviser (whose dissenting view is stated therein) the U.S Fiscal Director, and the D/Paymaster-in-Chief.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to authorise its despatch.

See addendum

(intd) T.R.H.

9a

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| Deputy Chief of Staff | 11 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 12 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 13 |
| Chief, G-3 Operations Section | 14 |
| Chief, G-3 Plans Section | 15 |
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| Chief, Liaison Section | 18 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ NAAF | 19-23 |
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| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 32-34 |
| Secretary, General Staff | 35 |
| Inter-Service and Political Secretariat | 36-37 |
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Ref. ack.

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HEADQUARTERS 28FEB1945 G

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ANNEX 'A'

TO: AGWAR for CCS for CCAC

FROM: ALEXANDER cite_____

Proposal to transfer currency responsibility to Italian government is subject.

Para one. MAT 554 gave views of this Headquarters and AC on TAM 445 omitting para 1E and 2 which are commented on herein.

Para two. It is the concensus of opinion in the Allied Commission and this Headquarters that: (a) at some date Italian government must assume official responsibility for all lire currency. They have escaped this responsibility only because the Allies invaded from SICILY and the South and had no access to note-printing facilities for almost a year and found them destroyed when they were reached. (b) It is not now opportune officially to push the Italian government to give public recognition of its responsibility for all lire currency.

Para three. In support of the view expressed in 2(b) my advisers point out that the Italian government has publicly stated that it is seeking to be relieved of the financial obligations under Article 23 of the Armistice. On 9 January it handed to the AC and to both Embassies a strong memorandum on this subject which my Headquarters is studying preparatory to forwarding it to you. Unless, as my advisers do not think likely, the two governments propose to accept the Italian demand for dollar/sterling reimbursement for all lire ex-

5535

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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responsibility for all lire currency. They have escaped this responsibility only because the Allies invaded from SICILY and the South and had no access to note-printing facilities for almost a year and found them destroyed when they were reached. (b) It is not now opportune officially to push the Italian Government to give public recognition of its responsibility for all lire currency.

Para three. In support of the view expressed in 2(b) my advisers point out that the Italian Government has publicly stated that it is seeking to be relieved of the financial obligations under Article 23 of the Armistice. On 9 January it handed to the AC and to both Embassies a strong memorandum on this subject which my Headquarters is studying preparatory to forwarding it to you. Unless, as my advisers do not think likely, the two governments propose to accept the Italian demand for dollar/sterling reimbursement for all lire expended by or on behalf of the Allied force, the political repercussions of insistence on recognition of the government's currency obligation may be severe and may contribute to the downfall of the present government and to some increased measure of inflation. The U.S Political Adviser agrees that in view of the public statements of the Italian government the negotiations proposed will come as a nothing of a disappointment to the Italian government, but he considers that nevertheless, weighing all factors and taking into consideration the long run situation, it is desirable to undertake the proposed negotiations.

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Para four. I am reluctant at this time to have any negotiations undertaken with the Italian Government which may increase political unrest or financial difficulties in ITALY, to the point of prejudicing military operations. It is not possible for my advisers to weigh with exactness the effect which the proposed negotiations would have, but on balance I concur in the view that it would not be desirable, at the present time, to force the issue, in any event to the point of causing the fall of the present Government.

Para five. As to the establishment of a line account (your paragraph 2) all of the same considerations apply but in a reduced form.

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P/266 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

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Auth: SAC
Initials:
24 Feb 45
Copy No. 42

24 February 1945.

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(Cover Note By MJPS)

1. In accordance with directions received from the Chief of Staff, we have prepared a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analyzing the difficulties of the situation existing in VENEZIA GIULIA and putting forward the proposal of Air Marshal Slessor with supporting arguments as outlined in Minute 5 of SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting.

2. The draft telegram is attached as P/266 (Final).

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

/s/ W. A. Adair
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

/s/ W. A. Adair
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
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P/266 (Final)

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DRAFT CABLE

This is NAF ____

Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is subject.

1. Reference is made to MAT 418 of 23 November in which certain proposals were made for Allied military government of VENEZIA GIULIA. No reply has yet been received. Meantime the matter has been further considered in light of new information now available.

2. There is ample evidence to show that Slovene intention is to extend their hold over as large an area of NE ITALY as possible in order to create strong prima facie case for annexation to Federal JUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONSO the influence of JANL is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian partisan brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part of NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential the maintenance of law and order in and around the portof TRIESTE and in such L of C area as will contain the main roads and railways leading to AUSTRIA (excluding those through JUGOSLAVIA) and the international cable line from ROME to VIENNA. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding it is likely that the maintenance of law and order and the consequent security of the L of C can only be insured by the imposition of Allied military

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effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian partisan brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part of NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential the maintenance of law and order in and around the portof TRIESTE and in such L of C area as will contain the main roads and railways leading to AUSTRIA (excluding those through JUGOSLAVIA) and the international cable line from ROME to VIENNA. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding it is likely that the maintenance of law and order and the consequent security of the L of C can only be insured by the imposition of Allied military government at least upon that portion of NE ITALY which will comprise such L of C area.

4. If nothing but operational interests were concerned, an attempt would be made to conclude an agreement with Marshal Tito which fixed a military boundary running approximately north-south through VENEZIA GIULIA. The area to the west of this boundary would be under our military control. No mention would be made of administrative arrangements for the area to the east which would presumably come at once under de facto JUGOSLAV rule. An assurance would be sought that all Jugoslav and Slovene troops west of such boundary be withdrawn, in default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained would come under our oper-



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ational command. In any event it would be necessary to ensure thatnaval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or Jugoslav forces as appropriate.

5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement:

a. Any such agreement, expressly limited through it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal Tito, by the Italian Government, and by outside world to be de facto recognition of Jugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary.

b. Italian Government confidently expect that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied military government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

c. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.

6. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:

a. Provision for the security of the L of C to AUSTRIA.

b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

5531

c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Jugoslav or Slovene

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be placed under Allied military government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

c. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.

6. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:

a. Provision for the security of the L of C to AUSTRIA.

b. Avoidence of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

5531

c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Jugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

7. Policy in this matter has hitherto been that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should pass under Alliedmilitary government on liberation from Germans, and Italian Government has been notified accordingly. It is considered that this policy should be adhered to, since it would at least meet considerations in paras 6a and b above. In order to meet consideration in para 6c it is suggested that before the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government be invited to participate in the Allied military government which will be set up, on the grounds that they now share in responsibilities



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of the Allies for such government in those parts of ITALY (including VENEZIA GIULIA) upon which it is imposed. This could be done by inviting the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government to send to the Allied Commission an accredited Jugoslav representative with rights and functions similar to those of Soviet representative.

8. Approval is requested to the proposal made in paragreph 7 above so that early action can be taken to discuss the matter with Marshal Tito and the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government, in order to arrive at an agreement prior to the occasion for Allied occupation arising.



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P/266 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

26 February 1945

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL OF VENEZIA GIULIA

Supplementary Note by MJPS

1. At the request of the Naval Member, the last sentence in paragraph 4 of the draft telegram (P/266) should now read as follows:

> "In any event it would be necessary to ensure that naval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or JUGOSLAV forces as appropriate."

2. This amendment is agreed.

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

/s/ ~~W. A. Adair~~ A. L. Wylde
W. A. ADAIR
Commander

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the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or JUGOSLAV forces as appropriate."

2. This amendment is agreed.

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

A. L. Wylde
/s/ ~~W. A. Adair~~
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or JUGOSLAV forces as appropriate."

2. This amendment is agreed.

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

A. L. Wylde
/s/ ~~W. A. Adair~~
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (O) (45) 9(Addendum)
19th February, 1945

COPY NO. 28

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL)

BRIEF FOR VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE

---

Note by Secretary

(7)

1. As a result of discussion, at the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) on 19th February of paragraph 2 of the main brief for the Supreme Allied Commander's visit to Belgrade (Allied Military Requirements in VENEZIA GIULIA), it is proposed to secure an agreement with Marshal Tito in the following terms:-

> In order to facilitate the forward movements of the Anglo-American armies cooperating with the forces under the control of Marshal Tito, it is necessary to reach a working line of demarcation between the forces engaged. These military zones will be without prejudice to any arrangements made either for the temporary or the permanent administration of VENEZIA GIULIA at a governmental level. For the purpose of facilitating operations against GERMANY and AUSTRIA, including occupation of territory at present forming part, under international agreements, of ITALY, AUSTRIA or JUGOSLAVIA, the zone west of Line A--B will be considered as under the control of the Commanding General 15th Army Group, and the operational zone east of that line under appropriate officers appointed by Marshal Tito. Any Jugoslav forces operating by agreement west of the line will be placed under the operational control of the Commanding General 15th Army Group. Any Anglo-American land force east of that line will operate by a special arrangement under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

"NOT SENT"

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2. The above text will be discussed at the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) to be held on

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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following terms:-

In order to facilitate the forward movements of the Anglo-American armies cooperating with the forces under the control of Marshal Tito, it is necessary to reach a working line of demarcation between the forces engaged. These military zones will be without prejudice to any arrangements made either for the temporary or the permanent administration of VENEZIA GIULIA at a governmental level. For the purpose of facilitating operations against GERMANY and AUSTRIA, including occupation of territory at present forming part, under international agreements, of ITALY, AUSTRIA or JUGOSLAVIA, the zone west of Line A--B will be considered as under the control of the Commanding General 15th Army Group, and the operational zone east of that line under appropriate officers appointed by Marshal Tito. Any Jugoslav forces operating by agreement west of the line will be placed under the operational control of the Commanding General 15th Army Group. Any Anglo-American land force east of that line will operate by a special arrangement under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

"NOT SENT"

5598

2. The above text will be discussed at the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) to be held on 20th February. It is requested that any suggested modifications may be put forward at the meeting.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

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5597

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1797

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

18 February 1945

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

Cover Note by MJPS.

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from Chief of Staff on 16 February 1945, we have prepared the attached interim report on measures to deal with patriot problems in Northern ITALY.

2. In the time available it has not been possible to consult 15 Army Group, Allied Commission, or MMIA.

(Sgd) G. L. ERSKINE
Brig. General, U.S.A.,
G-3 Plans.

Representatives concurred in conference but the time factor has prevented signature being obtained

L.T.PANHURST,
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

W.A. ADAIR
Commander,
Staff Officer, Plans

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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander SOM
British Resident Minister
US Political Advisor
A/C of S, G-5

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74

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P/265 (Final)

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18 February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

OBJECT.

1. To examine all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern ITALY and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:

a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life or the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.

b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.

c. The prevention of fighting between Slovene and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern ITALY were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.

b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.

c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. By AFHQ.

4595

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

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c. The prevention of fighting between Slovene and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

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c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. By AFHQ.

(1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest ITALY" was issued on 21 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 26918 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.

(2) The covering approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the scales of food and clothing, envisaged in the instructions given to 15th Army Group, has been asked for in MAF 864 dated 15 February.

(3) A letter is being dispatched to [redacted], copy to 15th Army Group, which lays down a general policy for the introduction of patriots into the Italian Army to fill, as far as possible, the 48,000 existing vacancies under the present ceiling, and instructs [redacted] to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands for employment with the five Italian combat groups. (Patriots are now filtering through the lines at a rate of about 500 per week



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and it is anticipated that on the occupation of Northern ITALY it will be possible to absorb about 10,000 patriots in this manner into the Italian Army). Depending on the success with Italian combat groups, the use of Italian patriot reconnaissance companies with British and U.S. divisions is also envisaged.

b. By 15th Army Group in conjunction with Allied Commission.

It is understood that the following measures have been taken:

(1) Messages giving detailed anti-scorch instructions have been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.

(2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centres.

(3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LOs with patriot bands.

c. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

(1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CLN representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.

(2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.

(3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.

(4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.

(5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.

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g. By Allied Commission.

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(2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.

(3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.

(4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.

(5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.

(6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northwestern ITALY are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern ITALY are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the Slovene difficulty.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

4. To meet the object stated at paragraph 1 a above, the following additional measures are recommended:

a. The Establishment of Closer Links between the CLNAI and the ROME Government.

There will be advantages in representatives being credited from each of these organisations to the other, though the nomination of suitable persons will represent a difficulty. In this connection an exchange of missions between SACMED and the CLNAI has also been considered, but as our object is now to play down the patriots, such a course does not appear desirable.

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b. Informal Agreement as to Suitable Italians for Military Government Positions.

There will be advantages if the ROME Government and the CLNAI can be induced to agree on lists of suitable candidates for employment as Prefects, etc., under AMG. SACMED could then undertake that, when instituting an Allied Military Government, agreed nominees would be considered for such appointments.

5. In regard to the object of paragraph 1 b, we have assumed that this refers to riots and not to normal operations of war against Fascist formations which may be complying with German orders. In our opinion, the danger of armed disturbances developing between Fascists and patriots is small and the real danger is that of strife among patriots of diverse political opinions. The measures already taken, supplemented by those suggested at paragraph 4, should deal with this contingency.

6. In regard to the object given at paragraph 1 a, the best insurance will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions remain urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY. ~~subject to any agreement that may have been made at the QUEBEC Conference, we remain of the opinion that tri-partite government for VENEZIA GIULIA up to the 1939 frontier will prevent the best criticism.~~

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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Spare

SAC (O) (45) 9
17th February, 1945

COPY NO. 28

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL)

BRIEF FOR VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE

Note by Secretary

1. The Supreme Allied Commander proposes to visit Marshal Tito at BELGRADE shortly. Attached for discussion at the next Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is a draft brief for this visit. This brief is divided into three parts:-

(a) Major policy points which the Supreme Allied Commander will himself wish to discuss with Marshal Tito (paragraphs 1 to 6 of the brief, supported by Appendices A to D)

(b) Other points which should be discussed on Allied initiative at the Staff level during the visit (paragraph 7(a) to (d) of the brief, supported by Appendices E to H)

(c) Points which it is not proposed to raise with Marshal Tito but on which information will be required in case he raises them himself (paragraph 7(e) to (h) of the brief, supported by Appendices I to L)

2. The Conference is required to advise the Supreme Allied Commander whether the draft brief and appendices should be supplemented or modified in any way.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

See (2) for Lt Col Anderson

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(b) Other points which should be discussed on Allied initiative at the Staff level during the visit (paragraph 7(a) to (d) of the brief, supported by Appendices E to H)

(c) Points which it is not proposed to raise with Marshal Tito but on which information will be required in case he raises them himself (paragraph 7(e) to (h) of the brief, supported by Appendices I to L)

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J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

See (8) for Addendum

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| Chief, G-3 Plans Section | 15 |
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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DRAFT BRIEF FOR VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE

1. ALLIED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN JUGOSLAVIA

Now that major Allied land operations in JUGOSLAVIA are no longer possible, the only Allied operational undertakings in JUGOSLAVIA to be considered are the establishment of an air base at ZADAR, the possible establishment of a naval and raiding force base on LUSSIN PICCOLO and raids against enemy-held islands and enemy bases for light naval craft in the Northern Adriatic. It may also be desirable to extend the use by the Allies of airfields in JUGOSLAVIA.

An essential prerequisite is the smooth working of the naval agreement. If this agreement is not being satisfactorily carried out by the time of SACMED's visit to BELGRADE, Marshal Tito should be pressed to take energetic steps to ensure that his local Commanders, particularly in SPLIT and ZADAR, cooperate fully in its execution.

Marshal Tito has already agreed to the establishment in the ZADAR area of an air base for the operation of eight squadrons of aircraft. The original plan envisaged the introduction of some 3,700 air force personnel and some 3,000 army personnel. This was scaled down to the establishment of an advanced landing ground pending the development of the operational situation in JUGOSLAVIA, owing to the risk of enemy attack on a full-scale air base, and the airfield at PERUS, near ZADAR, has now been developed as an advanced landing ground. The air force view is that this airfield can be developed with small expenditure of effort as a base to accommodate all the air forces required as soon as the operational situation permits such a course without serious risk. Marshal Tito should be informed that it is proposed to operate the eight squadrons covered in the agree-

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sure that his local Commanders, particularly in SPLIT and ZADAR, cooperate fully in its execution.

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The operations of enemy light naval forces and minor submersibles based on POLA and LUSSIN PICCOLO endanger the security of our naval forces using ZADAR and other Adriatic ports. A short account of the action proposed is at Appendix 'A'.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Although some of the territory in question is not Jugoslav and is not inhabited by Jugoslav partisans, Marshal Tito should be informed in general terms of the action proposed and should be asked to give explicit instructions to his local commanders to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with the local Allied commanders.

2. ALLIED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

When Allied forces occupy AUSTRIA it will be necessary to maintain the British occupational force of three divisions through the port of TRIESTE and over the L of C passing through VENEZIA GIULIA. Marshal Tito is likely to claim as prospectively Jugoslav territory at least that part of ITALY lying east of the River ISONZO and probably in addition a portion of that lying east of the River TAGLIAMENTO. There is already very considerable Slovene influence in these areas, especially the former. The final disposal of this territory is a political question. However, regardless of political considerations, the port of TRIESTE and the L of C running thence to AUSTRIA, together with all territory to the West of it (affording communication with ITALY) must be under SACMED's control. SACMED must also control all Jugoslav troops, regular or irregular, remaining in this area. It is intended to secure a military agreement with Marshal Tito covering these points.

See (8)

3. FUTURE SERVICE ORGANISATION IN BELGRADE

The Air Ministry and the Foreign Office have agreed that, in view of HMG's policy in relation to the Jugoslav Air Force and the increased British responsibilities for training it, a RAF delegation should be established in BELGRADE under Air Commodore LEE. The Foreign Secretary desires that Brigade-

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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this territory is a political question. However, regardless of political considerations, the port of TRIESTE and the L of C running thence to AUSTRIA, together with all territory to the West of it (affording communication with ITALY) must be under SACMED's control. SACMED must also control all Jugoslav troops, regular or irregular, remaining in this area. It is intended to secure a military agreement with Marshal Tito covering these points.

3. FUTURE SERVICE ORGANISATION IN BELGRADE

The Air Ministry and the Foreign Office have agreed that, in view of HMG's policy in relation to the Jugoslav Air Force and the increased British responsibilities for training it, a RAF delegation should be established in BELGRADE under Air Commodore LEE. The Foreign Secretary desires that Brigadic MACLEAN shall be withdrawn from JUGOSLAVIA before Mr. STEVENSON, the British Ambassador to the Jugoslav government, goes in. Air Marshal SLESSOR has suggested that, since Brigadier MACLEAN's mission will then be without a proper head, Air Commodore LEE should double the roles of head of the RAF delegation and representative of SACMED at the head of an inter-service delegation in BELGRADE. As such, he would direct the MACLEAN mission until such time as the operational situation warranted its withdrawal. Subject to agreement by the War Office, the idea of an inter-service delegation is acceptable to the Army, though it may later be desired to supplement the delegation with a strong Movements detachment if it becomes necessary to use the line of communication passing through LJUBLJANA - MARIBOR - GRAZ. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

however, considers that it will be necessary to handle Jugoslav naval matters on the SACMED level through this inter-service delegation, more especially since he deals direct, on occasions on SACMED's behalf, with the British naval officers detailed to superintend the activities of the much larger French, Greek and Italian navies. He would therefore prefer that any British naval representative in BELGRADE, who would be a Captain RN, should be answerable to him and be independent of the inter-service delegation, with which, however, close liaison would be maintained. It might even be desirable to pool communications in the interest of saving personnel, though it would probably be preferable for the naval representative to set up his organisation in the British Embassy since at the later stage when Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, is no longer in operational control of all Allied ships in the Mediterranean, he would probably become the naval attache on the Ambassador's staff. Presumably at a later stage the War Office will also wish to appoint their own attache. The Foreign Office wish to be consulted before any decision is taken regarding these arrangements. Marshal Tito should be informed that in order to simplify communications and to assist in coordination it is proposed that Air Commodore LEE should direct the work of the Army mission pending its withdrawal, in addition to his responsibilities as head of the RAF delegation and that he should also be the channel through which SACMED will deal with Marshal Tito on all inter-service matters, purely naval matters being dealt with through naval channels, the precise nature of which is still under discussion.

4. FUTURE POLICY REGARDING SUPPLIES FOR JANL

A detailed statement on supplies which could be made available to JANL is

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

naval attache on the Ambassador's staff. Presumably at a later stage the War Office will also wish to appoint their own attache. The Foreign Office wish to be consulted before any decision is taken regarding these arrangements. Marshal Tito should be informed that in order to simplify communications and to assist in coordination it is proposed that Air Commodore LEE should direct the work of the Army mission pending its withdrawal, in addition to his responsibilities as head of the RAF delegation and that he should also be the channel through which SACMED will deal with Marshal Tito on all inter-service matters, purely naval matters being dealt with through naval channels, the precise nature of which is still under discussion.

4. FUTURE POLICY REGARDING SUPPLIES FOR J.NL

A detailed statement on supplies which could be made available to J.NL is at Appendix 'B'. Since it is proposed that the main responsibility for building up the Jugoslav army should be accepted by RUSSIA, and as J.NL operations against the withdrawing Germans are unlikely to be on a large enough scale to achieve decisive results and no major Allied land operations in JUGOSLAVIA are contemplated, it is recommended that the supply of armaments and other warlike stores to J.NL should henceforth be kept to the minimum and the tonnages sent in should comprise mainly clothing, medical stores, foodstuffs and P.O.L. This policy should be linked with that for relief. If necessary, requests by Marshal Tito for artillery and armour can be met by a reply to the effect that it would take too long to train Jugoslav personnel to maintain them to be of value against the enemy.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5. JUGOSLAV NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

Marshal Tito may raise questions concerning the future of Jugoslav naval vessels and merchant shipping. He should be told that S.C would prefer such matters to be discussed direct between the British and Jugoslav naval authorities. However, a brief covering such questions as are likely to crop up is attached at Appendix 'C' for information.

6. ANCONA - ZADAR CABLE

Marshal Tito has indicated that he wishes to discuss with S.C the restoration of the ANCONA - ZADAR cable. A brief on this is attached at Appendix 'D'. It is believed that Marshal Tito may require to pass messages over the cable to his detachments at BARI, and that he will press for the cable to be handed over to him when no longer required for operational purposes by the Allies. As regards the first point, he should be told that there is no objection to the use of the cable for communication between himself and BARI, provided this is done under Allied control, but that he will find this a very much slower channel of communication than his existing radio circuit. As regards the second point, he should be told that the use of the cable when no longer required by the Allies must be a matter for negotiation between the Jugoslav and Italian governments since the ownership of the cable remains Italian unless otherwise determined at the Peace settlement. It is emphasized that, as long as the cable is required for Allied use, it must be entirely controlled and operated by the Allies, even at the ZADAR terminal.

7. OTHER SUBJECTS

There are certain other matters which might suitably be discussed and arranged during S.CMED's visit between the two staffs.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

As regards the first point, he should be told that [illegible]
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7. OTHER SUBJECTS

There are certain other matters which might suitably be discussed and arranged during S.ACMED's visit between the two staffs.

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Those which might be raised on our initiative are :-

(a) Restrictions on movement of British personnel in JUGOSLAVIA (brief at Appendix 'E')

(b) Treatment of German sick and wounded held in JUGOSLAVIA by the J.NL (brief at Appendix 'F').

(c) Behaviour of Jugoslavs at BARI and elsewhere in ITALY (brief at Appendix 'G').

(d) Co-operation of J.NL with American and British intelligence agencies (brief at Appendix 'H').

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Those which may be raised by Marshal Tito are :-

(e) Transfer of Russian shont from Black Sea ports to Dalmatian ports in Jugoslav bottoms (brief at Appendix 'I').

(f) Return to Jugoslav military jurisdiction of alleged deserters from the J.N.L and of individuals of alleged Jugoslav origin serving in Italian Prisoner of War units (brief at Appendix 'J').

(g) Supply of Albanian Partisans operating in JUGOSLAVIA (brief at Appendix 'K').

(h) Progress of Relief (brief at Appendix 'L').

Note:- Outstanding air questions can be left to be dealt with by Air Commodore LEE.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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K 62

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APPENDIX 'A'

ALLIED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
IN JUGOSLAVIA

1. LUSSIN is at present a forward base for considerable numbers of enemy light craft and submersibles, operating from POLA, which have already attacked our shipping in the ZADAR and SPLIT areas and which may be expected to attack the ANCONA convoys with torpedos and mines as soon as the weather improves.

2. Courses of action proposed are:-

(a) Seizure and holding of LUSSIN in early April

(1) This would permit:

Neutralisation of enemy naval forces based on POLA.
Security of maintenance convoys.
Progress of minesweeping operations towards VENICE and TRIESTE.
Further raiding operations by LFA.

(2) It would require:-

Diverting from the main battle in ITALY forces equivalent to one infantry brigade.

An appreciable increase in naval commitment to maintain the force on LUSSIN including sweeping of each convoy in and out.

(b) Trans-ADRIATIC raiding operations by LFA

(1) This would permit:

Making available maximum number of useful units to 15th Army Group for main battle in ITALY.

Temporary reduction of the enemy's naval potential by a fair sized raid on LUSSIN, followed by a succession of small scale raids.

(2) It would require:

SBS, RSR, LRDG, possibly one commando and necessary administrative units. Meeting at ANCONA an increased naval commitment which

516

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Further raiding operations by LFA.

(2) It would require:-

Diverting from the main battle in ITALY forces equivalent to one infantry brigade.

An appreciable increase in naval commitment to maintain the force on LUSSIN including sweeping of each convoy in and out.

(b) Trans-ADRIATIC raiding operations by LFA

(1) This would permit:

Making available maximum number of useful units to 15th Army Group for main battle in ITALY.

Temporary reduction of the enemy's naval potential by a fair sized raid on LUSSIN, followed by a succession of small scale raids.

(2) It would require:

SBS, RSR, LRDG, possibly one commando and necessary administrative units. Meeting at ANCONA an increased naval commitment which would result in a reduction of up to twenty-five percent in the capacity to discharge supplies from April onwards. Any increase in the civil stock-pile for Northern ITALY would prove difficult.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX 'B'

## FUTURE POLICY REGARDING SUPPLIES FOR JUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

1. We are at present provisioning for the equipping and maintaining of up to 300,000 Jugoslav partisans on a guerilla scale until 31 March 1945. For the period April-June 1945 provision has been made for the maintaining only of 131,000 partisans on the same scale.

2. Guerilla scale is infantry weapons and ammunition (of such natures as could if necessary be transported by air), medical supplies, signal equipment, clothing and limited food supplies. At Annex I will be found figures giving an idea of an average month's deliveries on a guerilla scale.

3. Ten tons of meat and flour per month are being supplied through BAF for payment of Jugoslav labour in connection with the establishment of an advanced landing ground at ZADAR.

4. In addition to Guerilla Scale the following stores are held by AFHQ for delivery to Marshal TITO as and when required :-

(a) 2,000 tons of P.O.L. (may be going in this week).
50,000 suits of green battledress.
90 tons of Medical Stores.

(b) Equipment for three 600 bed hospitals and twelve 100 bed extensions.

(c) Considerable quantities of ammunition, explosives and fuzes.

5. The gross average tonnages being despatched per week are as follows :-

By Sea - 1,450
By Air - 250

6. In addition to the above items Civil Relief supplies have been or are being sent in accordance with Appendix 'K' to the overall brief.

7. (a) Equipment, etc, which can be made available in addition to what is provisioned for above without prejudice to the requirements of 15 Army Group is very limited.

(b) The following can be made available :-

250 Carriers universal
100 Carriers tracked towing

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

delivery to Marshal Tito as and when required :-

(a) 2,000 tons of P.O.L. (may be going in this week).
50,000 suits of green battledress.
90 tons of Medical Stores.

(b) Equipment for three 600 bed hospitals and twelve 100 bed extensions.

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By Sea - 1,450
By Air - 250

6. In addition to the above items Civil Relief supplies have been or are being sent in accordance with Appendix 'K' to the overall brief.

7. (a) Equipment, etc, which can be made available in addition to what is provisioned for above without prejudice to the requirements of 15 Army Group is very limited.

(b) The following can be made available :-

250 Carriers universal
400 Carriers, tracked towing
22 Armoured Cars (MARMON-HARRINGTON)
50 40 mm Bofors
25 3.7" A.A guns
12 25-pr guns
1,000 Sten guns
10 20 mm Oerlikons
100 PIATs

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No 25-pr or PIAT ammunition is available

No 'B' vehicles can be made available without serious prejudice in other directions.

(c) SOM have on hand certain commodities for future delivery, some of which could be accelerated if shipping were available. These include :-

75,000 sets Web equipment
600 Tents 180 lbs
1,000 Hurricane lamps
1,500 lbs Soap
1,000 Oil Stoves
40,000 prs Gloves
also tools (incl axes, shovels, etc).

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

K 62



The last month for which detailed figures are available is December. Deliveries that month included :-

59 Anti-tank guns

33 Two-inch Mortars

240 L.M.Gs

1,700 T.M.Gs

3,200 Rifles

and ammunition for above weapons.

Also :-

24 tons Explosives

4,000 Mines

35,000 Suits Battle dress and under-clothing

27,000 Greatcoats

40,000 Pairs boots

11 tons Medical equipment

100 tons Signal stores

500 tons Bulk Food

These figures represent a fair average of stocks held for delivery for February and March and deliveries in January were much on the same scale.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2.4" G.H. Carriages

| | |
|---|---|
| 4,000 | Mines |
| 35,000 | Suits Battle dress and under-clothing |
| 27,000 | Greatcoats |
| 40,000 | Pairs boots |
| 11 tons | Medical equipment |
| 100 tons | Signal stores |
| 500 tons | Bulk Food |

These figures represent a fair average of stocks held for delivery for February and March and deliveries in January were much on the same scale.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

K-62

APPENDIX "J"

# CHART BRIEF FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

# OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY

# AND

# THE JUGOSLAV MERCHANT MARINE

February, 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AND

THE JUGOSLAV MERCHANT MARINE

February 1, 1945.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

# I THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY

**Events up to and including December, 1943.**

All ships of the Royal Jugoslav Navy, with the exception of DURMITOR, KALMARCALAN, and the Submarine NEBOJSA, were captured by the enemy. The three ships named took refuge at Alexandria.

2. In May, 1943, the ex-Jugoslav ships in Italy were being sailed to Malta in groups, to be returned by the Italians to their proper owners. However, the Furio Government refused permission to allow the Royal Jugoslav Navy to assist TITO in any way, and on the 1st December the Allied Commander-in-Chief issued a "stop" order before all ships had been turned over. As a result of this order, the ships became divided into three main groups, one of which is still under the Italian Flag. General remarks on these groups, with details of the ships and men concerned, are contained in Appendix I.

**SUBASIC-TITO negotiations.**

3. In June 1944 conversations started between Dr. SUBASIC, TITO and the British authorities, in an endeavour to come to some arrangement whereby the ships of the Royal Jugoslav Navy and their crews could play their part in the war. These ended in agreement being reached, and a report to that effect being made to the British Prime Minister by Dr. SUBASIC and TITO on the 13th August, 1944. Copies of papers bearing on the above are contained in Appendix II.

4. It will be observed that the Royalist and Partisan elements of the Jugoslav Navy were to be amalgamated into one force to be known as the Royal Jugoslav Navy, with their own Commander-in-Chief but under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean; and that the plain national flag, with no star or crest would be used by all ships in the Adriatic.

**Developments since the SUBASIC-TITO agreement**

5. On the 10th September, 1944, Dr. SUBASIC sent telegrams to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and the Senior Officer, Royal Jugoslav Navy in Malta to the effect that the SUBASIC government had decided that the Royal Jugoslav Navy was to be employed under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in conjunction with the N.L.A., i.e., in accordance with the agreement. The red star and crest were to be removed from the ensigns of Partisan and Royal Jugoslav Navy ships respectively when operating in the Adriatic. A reply to Dr. SUBASIC was sent by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acknowledging his message and saying that action has been taken (Appendix III).

6. On 12th September, King Peter II broadcast to his people regarding the [illegible] and British Flag Officers concerned were informed by the [illegible] officers and men of the Royal

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

SUBASIC-TITO negotiations

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6. On 12th September, King Peter II broadcast to his people regarding the new agreement, and British Flag Officers concerned were informed by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that junior officers and men of the Royal Jugoslav Navy who up to date had been kept in ignorance of the situation, might be informed of the terms of the agreement.

5512

7. On the 5th October, the newly-arrived Royal Jugoslav Navy Liaison officer on the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's staff visited the Partisan Naval authorities at Vis. These individuals, headed by the notorious Major General CERNI, disclaimed all knowledge of the agreement and of the appointment of Captain ESSEN, Royal Jugoslav Navy, as Commander-in-Chief of the amalgamated forces. Furthermore, they refused to admit that the operational control of the Navy should be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and stated that this control must be exercised by the Partisans.

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

They also insisted that if ships of the Royal Jugoslav Navy came into the Adriatic, they would have to fly the plain national flag, while the ensign in partisan vessels, on the other hand, would retain the red star. (In this connection, the Royal Jugoslav Naval Liaison Officer before leaving London had received orders from Dr. SUBASIC that the star and the crest would be retained on the ensigns, which was not in accordance with the original agreement). Deadlock ensued and still persists.

8. Captain KEEN, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Jugoslav Navy by the SUBASIC government with, it is understood, the knowledge and agreement of TITO, arrived after the Vis incident, and endeavoured to report to the Marshal without success. After waiting for over a month at Bari, he discussed matters with Dr. SUBASIC when the latter passed through on his way to London from Moscow in December, and subsequently proceeded to the United Kingdom.

9. In connection with the above, a signal from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations to Brigadier MACLEAN (FX 54569 MC OUT 4743) received a somewhat lukewarm reply (No. 723 of the 29th November MC IN 22579).

10. On 13th January, 1945, while discussing Anglo-Jugoslav Naval matters, TITO remarked that the British had prevented the honouring of the SUBASIC-TITO agreement. He also suggested that, by the agreement, he should have had operational control of the Royal Jugoslav Navy. He was disillusioned and after hearing the true facts, stated that he would like to see Captain KEEN. The Admiralty and Foreign Office were informed accordingly, but a reply was received saying that Dr. SUBASIC preferred KEEN should not arrive at BELGRADE in advance of certain of the Jugoslav Ministers then in London.

11. On 6th February, 1945, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that KEEN hoped to leave for Caserta in the course of the next few days, in order to discuss the amalgamation of the Jugoslav navies before proceeding to Belgrade.

Possible future differences in opinion.

12. Recent correspondence between the Jugoslav Ambassador in London and an official at the Foreign Office has revealed that it is Dr. SUBASIC's intention to implement the TITO-SUBASIC agreement of 13th August and that Captain KEEN is being sent to BELGRADE to discuss matters with the Partisan authorities on this basis.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

received a somewhat lukewarm reply (No. 723 of the 29th November M. IN 22579).

10. On 15th January, 1945, while discussing Anglo-Jugoslav Naval matters, TITO remarked that the British had prevented the honouring of the SUBASIC-TITO agreement. He also suggested that, by the agreement, he should have had operational control of the Royal Jugoslav Navy. He was disillusioned and after hearing the true facts, stated that he would like to see Captain KEMM. The Admiralty and Foreign Office were informed accordingly, but a reply was received saying that Dr. SUBASIC preferred KEMM should not arrive at BELGRADE in advance of certain of the Jugoslav Ministersthen in London.

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Possible future differences in opinion.

12. Recent correspondence between the Jugoslav Ambassador in London and an official at the Foreign Office has revealed that it is Dr. SUBASIC's intention to implement the TITO-SUBASIC agreement of 15th August and that Captain KEMM is being sent to BELGRADE to discuss matters with the Partisan authorities on this basis.

13. It remains to be seen whether, in view of the probable formation of a united Government, the original arrangement will still be acceptable in BELGRADE. It is considered possible that the Partisans may consider that the Jugoslav navies must now be amalgamated into a cohesive whole, instead of into separate Partisan andRoyalist Sections. It is possible, therefore, that further difficulties lie ahead.

5511

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

11 THE JUGOSLAV MERCHANT MARINE

The Partisans have numerous vessels operating on their behalf under their own flag. There are, however, many Jugoslav merchantmen, some of considerable size, working on allied account in the Adriatic, Mediterranean and elsewhere, the owners of which are not necessarily in Jugoslavia or in sympathy with the Partisans or a United Government. A few Jugoslav ships are known to be in enemy hands and there is at least one vessel of which the ownership is in dispute.

2. The Representative of the Ministry of War Transport stated that the question of the composition and future of the Jugoslav Merchant Marine is one of great complexity, which cannot be settled on a Mediterranean level and he agreed to raise these matters with the competent authorities in London.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5510

# A P P E N D I X I

## JUGOSLAV SHIPS AND PERSONNEL

GROUP A- ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY SHIPS BASED AT MALTA AND GIBRALTAR

Corvette.

NAIA — Ex-British — Based on Gibraltar

Submarine.

NERONIA — Non-operational. Ex-Alexandria. Never captured by the Italians.

Torpedo Boats.

T 1 — MALTA
T 5 — MALTA

P.T. Boats.

6 — Lend-Lease ex-U.S. Based on MALTA but operating under C.C.I.S. at LEGHORN.

Minelayers.

ORJEN — MALTA

Minesweepers.

MSL 120?? — MALTA
MLCH — MALTA

Yachts.

BELI ORAO — Based on MALTA. Temporary Base Ship for P.T. boats at LEGHORN
VILA — MALTA

Motor Launches.

TWO SERBIAN )

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MEDUZA — captured by the Italians.

Torpedo Boats

T 1 — MALTA
T 5 — MALTA

P.T. Boats

2 — Land-lease ex-U.S. Based on MALTA but operating under S.O.I.S. at LEGHORN.

Minelayers

ORAO — MALTA

Minesweepers

KOLIJNE — MALTA
MLJET — MALTA

Yachts

BELI (ex) — Based on MALTA. Temporary base Ship for P.T. Boats at LEGHORN
VILA — MALTA

Motor Launches

IVO SENJANIN
JUG BAGDAN
MARCO KRALJEVIC
MILOS OBILIC
VID MASNJSKI — MALTA
MSC
MSC
MSC
MSC

Coastguard vessel

ANTE STARCEVIC

/The above ships ...

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX (Continued)

The above ships with the exception of "KAFR" "KEPPOSA" the Ex-U.S. S.T. Ross. M/S, M/S and M/L were transferred on to Royal Yugoslav Navy Flag from the Italians in Oct 1943. M/S, M/S and M/L arrived at MALTA under the Italian Flag, but were not transferred owing to the "Escape" never and remained as British be the until receipt of the SURRENDER (01900) September (Appendix III) when they were turned over to the Royal Yugoslav Navy by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

The ships are manned with Royal Yugoslav Navy personnel.

In addition to the crews for the above, there are some 500 officers and men of the Royal Yugoslav Navy at MALTA without ships. The Royal Yugoslav Navy authorities have always been hopeful that they would get British ships for their men, many of whom have been trained in British schools, but now (end of September) will not be needed as transfer of no ships [illegible] Royal Navy until the political situation is cleared with the Yugoslav Navy have been early removed.

Officers and men have frequently reported to Vice Admiral Malta and General Headquarters. They are pleased to be thoroughly loyal to the [illegible] and their flag, and to be declared by the latter (without important to visit the Mediterranean ordered by Mr. Churchill, and the controversy at Yalta) [illegible] also said to be anxious to fight the Germans, under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Morale unfortunately low, [illegible] reported that there is a strong pro-Italian element, as will exist among the officers, and it is not known to what extent the personnel will accept [illegible] policy of friendship with Yugoslavia. [illegible] Tomaso, a [illegible] Italian [illegible] The extent [illegible] be present [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] problem.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

5508

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX (Continued)

The above ships with the exception of "ALBA", "NARODJSA", the Ex-U.S. P.T. Boats, MTB, MGB and MAK were transferred to the Royal Jugoslav Navy flag from the Italian in Jan. 1943. MTB, MAS and MAS arrived at MALTA under the Italian flag, but were not transferred owing to the "stop" order and remained in British hands until receipt of Fo. SUSASEO 1019(G) 9 prember (Appendix III) when they were turned over to the Royal Jugoslav Navy by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

The ships are manned with Royal Jugoslav Navy personnel.

In addition to the crews for the above, there are some 400 officers and men of the Royal Jugoslav Navy at MALTA without ships. The Royal Jugoslav Navy authorities have always been hopeful that they would get British ships for their men, many of whom have been trained in British setools, but the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will not recommend the transfer of any ships from the Royal Navy until the political troubles in connection with the Jugoslav Navy have been satisfactorily solved.

Officers and men have been favourably reported on by Vice Admiral, Malta and Central Mediterranean. They are stated to be thoroughly loyal to the King and their flag, and to be devoted to the latter (which is important in view of the contradictory orders issued by Dr. SUBASIC and the controversy re Vis.) They are also said to be anxious to fight the Germans, under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Recent information has, however, revealed that there is a strong pro-TITO movement, at all events among the officers, and it is not known to what extent the personnel will accept Captain KARA with his policy of fighting in conjunction with TITO forces, as their Commander-in-Chief. The extent to which the personnel would obey orders from a combined national government is more problematical.

In connection with Dr. SUBASIC, Captain KARA has already taken steps to have replacement officers appointed away from MALTA. Station in EGYPT. Whether this step will prove successful remains to be seen.

GROUP 3. R.J.N. SHIPS AT ALEXANDRIA

S

R.J.N.

DESTROYER — of limited value
KARAKACAN

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

Officers and men have been favourably reported on by Vice Admiral, Malta and Central Mediterranean. They are stated to be thoroughly loyal to the King and their flag, and to be devoted to the latter (which is important in view of the contradictory orders issued by Dr SUBASIC and the controversy at Vis.) They are also said to be anxious to fight the Germans, under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Secret information has, however, revealed that there is a strong pro-MIHAILOVIC element, at all events among the officers, and it is not known to what extent the personnel will accept Captain KEPE with his policy of fighting in conjunction with TITO's forces, as their Commander-in-Chief. The extent to which the personnel would obey orders from a combined national government is also problematical.

In connection with Dr SUBASIC, Captain KEPE has already taken steps to have malcontent officers eliminated by posting them away from MALTA to duties in EGYPT. Whether this step will prove successful remains to be seen.

GROUP E. R.N. & SHIPS AT ALEXANDRIA

S

ADMIRAL

DE NEGRI — Of limited value

KLOBUCAR

Neither of the above was captured by the enemy.

Similar remarks to those regarding the officers and men at MALTA apply to the personnel at ALEXANDRIA. Here again, there are too many men for the ships available for them to man.

GROUP F. YUGOSLAV SHIPS FLYING BRITISH, ITALIAN OR PARTISAN FLAG.

Motor Gun Boats

HVAR — Augusta

SIBENIK — Brindisi (Partisan flag)

Minelayer

MARJAN — Malta (British flag)

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5508

APPENDIX (Continued)

The above ships with the exception of "NADA", "NEMOJSA", the Ex-U.S. P.T. Boats, MTC, MTL and MTK were transferred to the Royal Jugoslav Navy flag from the Italian in late 1943. MTC, MTL and MTK arrived at MALTA under the Italian flag, but were not transferred owing to the "stop" order and remained in British hands until receipt of Dr. SUBASIC's 1010/0 September (Appendix III) when they were turned over to the Royal Jugoslav Navy by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

The ships are manned with Royal Jugoslav Navy personnel.

In addition to the crews for the above, there are some 600 officers and men of the Royal Jugoslav Navy at MALTA without ships. The Royal Jugoslav Navy authorities have always been hopeful that they would get British ships for their men, many of whom have been trained in British methods, but the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will not recommend the transfer of any ships from the Royal Navy until the political troubles in connection with the Jugoslav Navy have been satisfactorily solved.

Officers and men have been favourably reported on by Vice Admiral, Malta and Central Mediterranean. They are stated to be thoroughly loyal to the King and their flag, and to be devoted to the latter (which is important in view of the contradictory orders issued by Dr. SUBASIC and the controversy over Vis.) They are also said to be anxious to fight the Germans, under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Recent information has, however, revealed that there is a strong pro-MIHAILOVIC element, at all events among the officers, and it is not known to what extent the personnel will accept Captain KERR, with his policy of fighting in conjunction with TITO's forces, as their Commander-in-Chief. The extent to which the personnel would obey orders from a combined national government is also problematical.

In conjunction with Dr. SUBASIC, Captain KERR has already taken steps to have reliable/ant officers appointed away from MALTA in duties in EGYPT. Whether this step will prove successful remains to be seen.

GROUP B. R.J.N. SHIPS AT ALEXANDRIA

6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

officers and men have been favourably reported on by Vice Admiral, Malta and Central Mediterranean. They are stated to be thoroughly loyal to the King and their flag, and to be devoted to the latter (which is important in view of the contradictory orders issued by Dr SUBASIC and the controversy about Vis.) They are also said to be anxious to fight the Germans, under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Recent information has, however, revealed that there is a strong pro-TITO element, at all events among the officers, and it is not known to what extent the personnel will accept Captain KERR, with his policy of fighting in conjunction with TITO forces, as their Commander-in-Chief. The extent to which the personnel would obey orders from a combined national government is also problematical.

In conjunction with Dr. SUBASIC, Captain KERR has already taken steps to have reliable/transhipped officers appointed away from MALTA to duties in EGYPT. Whether this step will prove successful remains to be seen.

GROUP B. R.I.N. SHIPS AT ALEXANDRIA

6

A.M.B.16

DUBROVNIK — Of limited value
KARAKACAM

Neither of the above was captured by the enemy.

Similar remarks to those regarding the officers and men at MALTA apply to the personnel at ALEXANDRIA. Here again, there are too many men for the ships available for them to man.

GROUP C. YUGOSLAV SHIPS FLYING BRITISH, ITALIAN OR PARTISAN FLAG.

Submarine Depot Ships.

HVAR — Augusta
SLUNJ — Brindisi (Partisan flag)

Minelayer.

MARJAN — Malta (British flag)

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

[illegible]

A.T.P.

[illegible] Tarawa (Beyond a doubt)

Considerable doubt (Almost as Tarawa)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [illegible] | } | [illegible] |
| [illegible] | | [illegible] |
| [illegible] | | [illegible] |
| [illegible] | | [illegible] |
| [illegible] | | [illegible] |

Probably Tarawa

[illegible] So close.

Probably Tarawa

[illegible] Tarawa. (Not certain of this)

Perhaps Tarawa

[illegible] Most probably (In very good order and working for effect)

Tarawa

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [illegible] | } | Three points (Not counting as before) |
| [illegible] | | |
| [illegible] | | |
| [illegible] | | |
| [illegible] | | |

No warships are known to belong to the Pacific, except Official [illegible]

While the 5 governments concerned, and officials are very shy, coy, with [illegible] of the [illegible] names, are not averse to having names & data [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

5507

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

[illegible]

A.T.B.-

CEPNIK Partisan (Royal) [illegible]

Government vessels (Ministry of Marine):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| SRBOBRAN | } | Royalist |
| KRALJICA | | Believed to be manned by |
| LIKA | | Mix. S.V.M. or Royalist crews |
| PARTIZAN | | Ministry of Agriculture |
| KVARNER | | These Italian ships were taken by the Allied [illegible] "Ship" order. |

Naval vessels:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [illegible] | | As above. |

Port Detachment
AKUD

Partisan. (Has worked a point)

Yugoslav Vessel
SPASILAC

Good party (in very good order and working for Allies)

Ships

| | |
|---|---|
| [illegible] | |
| M.5 | |
| M.11 | Good parties (All working in close co-operation with Allies) |
| [illegible] | |
| SMAZEN | |

No sabotage are known to belong to the Partisans, except SMAZEN

Naval crews.

OVEN, the 5 government vessels, and CPLJAK are very old, and, with the exception of the first named, are not worthy of being manned with trained R.Y.N. crews. They might, however, be of use to the Partisans, who have considerable interest in all ships in Group C.

Captain KUHN was told in July that there could be no question of handing the above ships over to the Yugoslavs, either Royalists or Partisans, until their [illegible] were satisfactorily settled and there was [illegible] Government. He was also told that in the event of a

Naiades Vessel

SVASTIAC — Naval party. (In very good order and working for Allies.)

Type

DEPATUR
N 2
N 21
VATY
SVAZMO

— Naval parties. (All working on behalf of Allies.)

No warships are known to belong to the Partisans, except SVARCOS listed above.

MVAC, the 3 government vessels, and CPLANIC are very old, and, with the exception of the first named, are not worthy of being manned with trained R I N crews. They might, however, be of use to the Partisans, who have been very friendly interested in all ships in Group D.

Captain PENN was told in 1944 that there could be no question of turning the above ships over to the Jugoslavs, either Royalists or Partisans, until their post war differences were satisfactorily settled and there was a recognised Jugoslav Government. He was also told that in the event of a mutiny being feared, the question as to which element of the navy obtained which ships would be his, as Commander-in-Chief.

The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean intends to discuss the question of mutiny and transfer of the ships with the Jugoslav naval authorities as soon as the British Government has been recognised. It will be essential for the vessels to remain under British operational control.

5507

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5507

(7)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

# APPENDIX II

MEETING AT 2000 ON 13th AUGUST, 1944, at ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

Present: Lt.General Sir James GAMMELL
Rear Admiral J.C.L. DUNDAS
Air Marshal Sir John STEGGOR.
Brigadier E.I.C. JACOB
Brigadier F.F. MACLEAN
Lt.Colonel N. STEFANOVITCH
Dr. I. SUBASIC
Marshal JOSIP BROZ TITO
Lt.General C. ZUJOVIC
Mme. HERIC.

---

The following agreement was reached :-

That in the event of the fusion of the Royal and Partisan naval forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation :-

(i) All ships of the combined Navy would be put under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through the normal British chain of command and would operate in areas decided upon by him.

(ii) The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would, however, so far as he was able, employ the ships of the combined Navy in operations connected with the liberation of Jugoslavia, to meet the desires of the Jugoslav authorities. Ships of the combined Jugoslav Navy operating in the Adriatic would be under the control of the British Naval Area Commander. For certain specified operations of a local nature, when control of Jugoslav Naval units concerned would be better carried out from Jugoslav territory, the British Area Commander, at his discretion, would be entitled to delegate the control of such ships to the Jugoslav authorities.

(iii) The Jugoslav authorities would appoint a Naval officer with whom the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would deal in all matters of an administrative nature affecting the combined Jugoslav Fleet.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

That in the event of the fusion of the Royal [illegible] forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Jugoslav Army of National Liberation:-

(i) All ships of the combined Navy would be put under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through the normal British chain of command and would operate in areas decided upon by him.

(ii) The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would, however, so far as he was able, employ the ships of the combined Navy in operations connected with the liberation of Jugoslavia, to meet the desires of the Jugoslav authorities. Ships of the combined Jugoslav Navy operating in the Adriatic would be under the control of the British Naval Area Commander. For certain specified operations of a local nature, when control of Jugoslav Naval units concerned would be better carried out from Jugoslav territory, the British Area Commander, at his discretion, would be entitled to delegate the control of such ships to the Jugoslav authorities.

(iii) The Jugoslav authorities would appoint a Naval officer with whom the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would deal in all matters of an administrative nature affecting the combined Jugoslav Fleet.

5506

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MEETING AT 1730 on 10th AUGUST, 1944, IN NAPLES.

Present: Mr. WINSTON CHURCHILL
Dr. I. SUBASIC
Marshal J.B. TITO
Brigadier MACLEAN
Major General VELEBIT
Dr. KOSANOVIC

etc.

Dr. SUBASIC stated that Marshal TITO and himself had agreed that the ships and men of the Royal Jugoslav Navy and those of the National Liberation Movement should be joined into one force to be used as far as possible for operation in the ADRIATIC under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Mr. CHURCHILL asked what flag the amalgamated Navy would fly, what badge the officers and men would wear, and whether the King's position was safeguarded.

Dr. SUBASIC answered that the constitutional red, white and blue flag with no defacement would be used and that the force would be called the Royal Jugoslav Navy. Officers and men of the present Royal Jugoslav Navy would wear their usual badges, personnel of the National Liberation Movement would wear theirs. The King of Jugoslavia, after a discussion with Dr. SUBASIC in LONDON, had agreed to this arrangement.

Dr. SUBASIC added that he and Marshal TITO would agree between them to nominate an officer to command this Naval force, which would be under the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's operational command. He added that he and the Marshal were anxious that the force should arrive in the ADRIATIC as quickly as possible and that they required vessels. They hoped for motor launches and similar light craft but the chief thing was that the Navy should get into action quickly and show the flag off the coast of Jugoslavia. If corvettes were available they should be the first type supplied.

Mr. CHURCHILL stated that the demands on British Naval resources were very high at the moment, but if things went well it was to be hoped that the vessels would be made available and promised to take the matter up with the British Naval authorities. He congratulated Dr. SUBASIC and

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

available for operation in the ADRIATIC under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Mr. CHURCHILL asked what flag the amalgamated Navy would fly, what badges the officers and men would wear, and whether the King's position was safeguarded.

Dr. SUBASIC answered that the constitutional red, white and blue flag with no defacement would be used and that the force would be called the Royal Jugoslav Navy. Officers and men of the present Royal Jugoslav Navy would wear their naval badges, personnel of the National Liberation Movement would wear theirs. The King of Jugoslavia, after a discussion with Dr. SUBASIC in LONDON, had agreed to this arrangement.

Dr. SUBASIC added that he and Marshal TITO would agree between them to nominate an officer to command this Naval force, which would be under the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's operational command. He added that he and the Marshal were anxious that the force should arrive in the ADRIATIC as quickly as possible and that they required vessels. They hoped for motor launches and similar light craft but the chief thing was that the Navy should get into action quickly and show the flag off the coast of Jugoslavia. If corvettes were available they should be the first type supplied.

Mr. CHURCHILL stated that the demands on British Naval resources were very high at the moment, but if things went well it was to be hoped that the vessels would be made available and promised to take the matter up with the British Naval authorities. He congratulated Dr. SUBASIC and Marshal TITO on the progress they had made in reaching agreement.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO JUGOSLAVIA

15th August 1944.

My dear Prime Minister.

As a result of the meeting on August 15th at Naples, Mr.Churchill understands that you and Marshal Tito are agreed that the ships and men of the Royal Jugoslav Navy and those of the National Liberation Movement should be amalgamated into one force. The ships of this force would fly the Constitutional Jugoslav flag, and the Force itself would be known as the Royal Jugoslav Navy. The personnel of the present Royal Jugoslav Navy would wear their customary insignia, and the personnel of the National Liberation Movement would wear theirs.

Mr. Churchill further understands that it is the intention of yourself and Marshal Tito to agree on the nomination of an officer to command the Royal Jugoslav Navy, which you have agreed should be under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, and the British Senior Officers in whose area they are operating.

It is also understood that the necessary instructions will be issued by His Majesty King Peter II to the Royal Jugoslav Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

I should be most grateful if you could inform me as soon as the above-mentioned action has been completed in order that steps may be taken to fulfil, so far as possible, Jugoslav naval requirements.

(sgd) R. SKRINE STEVENSON

H.M. Ambassador to Jugoslavia.

His Excellency Dr. Ivan Subasic,
Prime Minister of Jugoslavia.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

yourself and Marshal Tito to agree on the [illegible] command the Royal Jugoslav Navy, which you have agreed should be under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, and the British Senior Officers in whose area they are operating.

It is also understood that the necessary instructions will be issued by His Majesty King Peter II to the Royal Jugoslav Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

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(sgd) R. SKRINE STEVENSON

H.M. Ambassador to Jugoslavia.

His Excellency Dr. Ivan Subasic,
Prime Minister of Jugoslavia.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean,
Allied Force Headquarters.
28th August, 1944.

No.MED.00160/1.

The Vice Admiral Malta and Central Mediterranean.
The Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy. } Copy to each.
The Flag Officer, Levant and Eastern Mediterranean.

(Copy to: The Secretary of the Admiralty.
Submission No.5384.MED.00160/1)

THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

Negotiations between Marshal Tito and the Royalist Jugoslavs have progressed satisfactorily. For your personal information, it is now almost certain that the following arrangements will be made in the near future.

(a) All Jugoslav Naval vessels will be placed under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who will allocate them to areas as necessary. As far as possible they will be employed to assist in the liberation of Jugoslavia.

(b) The combined forces of the Partisans and Royalists will be known as the Royal Jugoslav Navy, and will fly the Royal Jugoslav Navy flag.

(c) Personnel will wear Royal Jugoslav Navy or Partisan distinguishing badges at their discretion.

(d) Ships will operate under the British Flag Officer and authorities in their area, but in certain circumstances the Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy, will be empowered to delegate control to Jugoslav authorities for particular operations.

(e) The Jugoslavs will appoint a Naval Commander-in-Chief to handle the administrative matters of the Royal Jugoslav Navy.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Negotiations between Marshal Tito and the Royalist Jugoslavs have progressed satisfactorily. For your personal information, it is now almost certain that the following arrangements will be made in the near future.

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(c) Personnel will wear Royal Jugoslav Navy or Partisan distinguishing badges at their discretion.

(d) Ships will operate under the British Flag Officer and authorities in their area, but in certain circumstances the Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy, will be empowered to delegate control to Jugoslav authorities for particular operations.

(e) The Jugoslavs will appoint a Naval Commander-in-Chief to handle the administrative matters of the Royal Jugoslav Navy.

2. It is probable that the Jugoslav Commander-in-Chief will have his headquarters at Malta. At present it is my intention that Vice Admiral, Malta, shall act as my representative with the Jugoslav Naval Commander-in-Chief on administrative matters, and also keep him in touch with the operational situation insofar as it concerns the Royal Jugoslav Navy.

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(sgd) H.A. PACKER

for ADMIRAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX III.

C IN C MED

ADMIRALTY
101908 Sept. 1944.

Following dated 9th September for C IN C MED from Jugoslav Prime Minister. Message begins :-

My dear Admiral. According to the agreement with which you are acquainted the Royal Jugoslav government have decided that the Royal Jugoslav Navy shall be employed at once in the Adriatic Sea with the aim of assisting the Military operations of the National Army of Liberation. It is evident that according to the above mentioned agreement the Royal Jugoslav Navy remains under your supreme command and I would therefore ask you to issue all necessary orders to the Senior Officer Royal Jugoslav Navy, Commander J. SAKSIDA at MALTA. Particularly I would be grateful if you would order Commander SAKSIDA to report to Marshal TITO on the arrival of the Fleet in the Adriatic and to place himself at the Marshal's disposal. The liaison officer at our headquarters appointed by agreement between Marshal TITO and myself is Commander L. SOSTARIC who will be sent to report at your headquarters at the earliest possible moment. May I take this opportunity my dear Admiral, of sending you my most cordial salutations and good wishes. (sgd.) Dr. I.A. SUBASIC. Prime Minister Royal Jugoslav Government. Message ends.

101908 Sept.

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C IN C MED. VAM

ADMIRALTY
101916 Sept. 1944.

A.M. 101908 (not to V.A. MALTA).

Following from Jugoslav Prime Minister for Senior Officer Royal Jugoslav Navy MALTA Commander J. SAKSIDA. Message begins :-

Carry out most strictly all orders issued to you by Admiral Sir John CUNNINGHAM in regard to sending the units of the Royal Jugoslav Navy to the Adriatic Sea for co-operation with the fighting forces of the National Army of Liberation in the battle for the liberation of our shores. To avoid any eventual confusion it has been decided in agreement with Admiral CUNNINGHAM that during the impending operations in the Adriatic the Royal Jugoslav Navy and the Navy of the National Army of Liberation shall sail under the blue-white-red ensign without the crest or star. In this also carry out in full the orders of Admiral CUNNINGHAM. As

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Marshal TITO and myself is Commander L. SOSTARIC who will be sent to report at your headquarters at the earliest possible moment. May I take this opportunity my dear Admiral, of sending you my most cordial salutations and good wishes. (sgd.) Dr. I.A. SUBASIC. Prime Minister Royal Jugoslav Government. Message ends.

101903 Sept.

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C IN C MED. VAM

ADMIRALTY
101916 Sept. 1944.

A.M. 101908 (not to V.A. MALTA).

Following from Jugoslav Prime Minister for Senior Officer Royal Jugoslav Navy MALTA Commander J. SAKSIDA. Message begins :-

Carry out most strictly all orders issued to you by Admiral Sir John CUNNINGHAM in regard to sending the units of the Royal Jugoslav Navy to the Adriatic Sea for co-operation with the fighting forces of the National Army of Liberation in the battle for the liberation of our shores. To avoid any eventual confusion it has been decided in agreement with Admiral CUNNINGHAM that during the impending operations in the Adriatic the Royal Jugoslav Navy and the Navy of the National Army of Liberation shall sail under the blue-white-red ensign without theerest or star. In this also carry out in full the orders of Admiral CUNNINGHAM. As Yugoslav liaison officer at the headquarters of Admiral CUNNINGHAM I have appointed Commander L. SOSTARIC who will be sent there at the earliest possible moment. O.BR.556. SUBASIC. Message ends.

101916B Sept.

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ADMIRALTY

C IN C MED (O)
121240B Sept.

Please pass following to Dr. I.A. SUBASIC, Prime Minister, Royal Jugoslav Government. Message begins :-

My dear Prime Minister. I thank you for your message dated 9th September conveying your agreement to the employment of the Royal Jugoslav Navy. I am assuming, as I am sure would be your wish, that your agreement to the employment of these ships in the Adriatic Sea is not intended to preclude their employment in such other areas as may appear to me to offer the best contribution to our joint war effort. Nevertheless, I can assure you that I will be only too ready to avail myself of their local knowledge and therefore to employ them as much as possible in the vicinity of their own home waters. I have passed your order to Commander J. SAKSIDA to report

/to.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Page 2 of APPENDIX III.

to Marshal Tito and I will welcome the arrival of Commander SOSTARIC at my Headquarters. I thank you most heartily for your salutations and good wishes which, my dear Prime Minister, I cordially reciprocate.

Signed: J.H.D. CUNNINGHAM
Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Theatre.

Message ends.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX 'D'

ANCONA-ZADAR CABLE

1. The desirability of restoring the ANCONA-ZADAR cable was first considered in connection with the Signal Plan for the proposed Operation FAIRFAX. Tests to determine the nature of the necessary repairs were made as the result of discussions between CSO AFHQ, Air SO-in-C and the Fleet Communications Officer.

2. On 10 December 1944 we signalled 37 Military Mission as follows (F66191):-

> "Restoration of cable from ANCONA to ZARA now under consideration. You should say to TITO that unless he will agree to this cable being under our sole control until it is no longer required for war purposes it will not be laid".

3. On 12 December 1944 37 Military Mission replied (799):-

> "TITO asks that proposal to restore ANCONA-ZARA cable be discussed simultaneously with operation FAIRFAX on occasion of Field Marshal ALEXANDER's visit to BELGRADE".

4. AFHQ Combined Signals Board have stated that in view of the agreements with TITO recently signed for the use of ZADAR, the cable would be of considerable value to the Navy and Air Forces.

MAAF (Director of Ops and Plans) considers that the repair of the cable is a matter of some importance for the following additional reasons :-

(a) As soon as Russian agreement has been obtained, it is the intention to establish forward operating facilities for the 15th Air Force in the BUDAPEST area.

(b) It is hoped also that closer co-operation with Russian air operations may yet be established.

. For both these projects good communications will be essential.

5. C-in-C Med (FCO) states that a siutable cable repair vessel will become available about mid-February, but that an early decision on its employment is required since its release for another theatre is under consideration.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ALEXANDER's visit to BELGRADE".

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APPENDIX 'E'

RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT OF BRITISH PERSONNEL IN JUGOSLAVIA

1. BAF signal No. 547 dated 11 Jan (copy at ANNEX I) raised the question of the desirability of an overall agreement designed to secure for British troops in JUGOSLAVIA approximately the same status as that held by JANL troops in ITALY.

2. At the same time BAF submitted a draft of the proposed agreement, copy of which is at ANNEX II). The Chief of Staff approved the text of this draft agreement, but ruled that it should not be submitted to Marshal Tito for the time being for fear of prejudicing the signing of the Naval Agreement.

3. U.S views are that American forces should not be covered in this agreement, but that if necessary a separate U.S-TITO agreement can be undertaken later.

4. The policy of the British Chiefs of Staff is in COSMED 202 (copy at ANNEX III).

5. Since the Chief of Staff's decision, mentioned in para 2 above, no new factors have arisen to lessen the desirability of concluding such an agreement, although at the moment JANL co-operation at ZADAR is satisfactory and JANL GHQ have approved the provision of passes for patrols of the LRDG.

6. It is considered, however, that a more satisfactory approach to this problem would be for SAC to discuss the points raised by BAF with Marshal Tito, with a view to coming to a verbal "gentleman's agreement" that,

(a) Marshal Tito would agree in principle to the employment in JUGOSLAVIA of such British forces as may be required to assist in the destruction of German forces and their ejection from that country.

(b) SAC would undertake to obtain Marshal Tito's approval before landing on Jugoslav territory any British forces additional to those already covered by the recent written agreements.

7. In order that under this agreement British forces operating in JUGOSLAVIA can have freedom of movement, it should also be mutually agreed that :-

(a) Parties of British troops on landing in JUGOSLAVIA should be in possession of movement orders giving the composition of each party. These would be available for examination by JANL authorities.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5. Since the Chief of Staff's decision, mentioned in para 2 above, no new factors have arisen to lessen the desirability of concluding such an agreement, although at the moment JANL co-operation at ZADAR is satisfactory and JANL GHQ have approved the provision of passes for patrols of the LRDG.

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7. In order that under this agreement British forces operating in JUGOSLAVIA can have freedom of movement, it should also be mutually agreed that :-

(a) Parties of British troops on landing in JUGOSLAVIA should be in possession of movement orders giving the composition of each party. These would be available for examination by JANL authorities.

(b) Each individual should be in possession of the normal identity document, i.e Identity Cards for officers and Pay Books in the case of O.Rs. These would be produced for examination on demand by JANL guards in the course of their duties.

Marshal Tito and SAC would be responsible for ensuring that their respective subordinate commanders comply with these instructions.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ANNEX I K 62

COPY OF TELEGRAM No. BAF/547 DATED
11 JANUARY 1945

1. The question of the restrictions imposed on the entry into JUGOSLAVIA and movement within the country of British Forces of all three services has been considered at a Commanders' Conference here at which Lieutenant Colonel DEAKIN and representatives of 37 Military Mission were present.

2. There have been frequent cases during the last two months of such restrictions being imposed upon British forces and these have caused considerable operational and administrative difficulties. The restrictions include the necessity for producing detailed lists of forces entering JUGOSLAVIA. The limitation upon the free movement of troops within the country and the necessity for troops to show JANL permits at frequent intervals to JANL patrols. FLOYDFORCE Military and Air Forces on VIS and Naval personnel at SPLIT and ZADAR have been among the units affected. In some cases the restrictions seem to have been imposed by local JANL commanders without reference to BELGRADE. In other cases to have been imposed as the result of instructions received from JANL GHQ.

3. The policy in the past has been to deal with each incident as it arises on an 'ad hoc' basis and to endeavour to obtain by representation to JANL GHQ a relaxation of the particular restriction imposed. This has proved unsatisfactory in every way because, even when assurances have been given in BELGRADE that the particular restriction will be relaxed or modified, the necessary instructions only reach the local JANL Commander after considerable delay. Moreover, this constant reference to JANL GHQ appears to be a method of handling this particular problem which is as cumbersome, as dilatory and as inconvenient to the JANL authorities as to ourselves.

4. Matters have been brought to a head by a signal which has now been received from VIS indicating that NO troops will be allowed to land on the island without GHQ JANL authority.

5. It seems evident that this question can NO longer be handled on an 'ad hoc' basis and a draft agreement to serve as a basis for discussion with Marshal Tito has been drawn up here and is submitted for approval. The text of this agreement is in my immediately following telegram.

6. The arrangements laid down in this agreement approximate to those which are applicable to JANL troops in ITALY and it is suggested that they do not impose any restrictions of the nature referred to in COSMED 202 which would cramp our style in any way in the future.

7. A settlement of the difficulties which have arisen over these restriction

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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7. A settlement of the difficulties which have arisen over these restriction appears to be urgently necessary in view of the impending employment in JUGOSLAVIA of British forces for the operation BAFFLE and of the possibility of some more ambitious project.

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ANNEX II

COPY OF TELEGRAM No. BAF/548 DATED 11 JANUARY 1945

Reference immediately preceding telegram following is text of agreement referred to :-

"1. It is agreed that freedom of entry into JUGOSLAVIA and movement while in the country, of members of British land, sea and air forces which are engaged in our common operations for the destruction of the enemy, shall be the subject of an agreement.



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. When members of British land, sea and air forces enter the country they will be accompanied by a movement order indicating the number of soldiers, sailors (other than ships companies) or airmen involved. This movement order will be open to inspection by the Jugoslav authorities but no other special document will be required by British forces entering JUGOSLAVIA.

3. British forces, while on active service, are in possession of British identity documents. These documents will be carried by all ranks in JUGOSLAVIA and they will be open to inspection by members of the JANL, at any recognised JANL Guard Post or Traffic Control Post. In any area in JUGOSLAVIA in which British forces are operating, there will be joint JANL and British Military Police Patrols and such patrols will have the right to examine identity documents at any time. Identity documents are NOT open to inspection by JANL Police or military personnel except in cases mentioned above.

4. Apart from the limitations referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, members of British land, sea and air forces will be free to travel in all parts of JUGOSLAVIA in which British troops are operating. In the event of British forces operating in more than one area, the visits of staff and communications personnel between these areas will be unrestricted."

ANNEX III

COPY OF TELEGRAM No. COSMED 202 from
CHIEFS OF STAFF

We are disturbed at the idea of the detailed formal agreement* which will limit our right to send forces of all kinds to any part of JUGOSLAVIA that we desire and in any strength that the operational situation demands. We consider that the policy should be as outlined in the Prime Minister's recent message to Marshal Tito, namely that we should be afforded "complete freedom to move sea, land and air forces to any part of JUGOSLAVIA where they could best kill most Germans".

2. In principle we consider that the conclusion of any agreement with Tito limiting and regimenting the scale and scope of our operations in JUGOSLAVIA is undesirable.

3. If, however, there is imperative operational reason for some formal agreement, it should be confined to the question of Command. On this basis the draft Naval agreement (MEDCOS 223) is not objectionable. That relating to land and air forces (MEDCOS 222) is open to the gravest ob-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

of British forces operating in more than one area, and communications personnel between these areas will be unrestricted."

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4. You should know that we have not found it necessary to enter into agreements in any way restricting the operation of our forces in other liberated countries, e.g. FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND.

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*Refers to proposed agreement for operation of Allied land and air forces in JUGOSLAVIA.

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APPENDIX 'F'

TREATMENT OF GERMAN SICK AND WOUNDED IN JUGOSLAVIA BY JANL

1. Officers of the Land Forces Adriatic returned from DUBROVNIK reported an alleged illegal execution of 200 German prisoners of war at GRAHOVO on 31 October or 1 November 1944 by JANL forces.

2. A medical officer of FLOYDFORCE in an LFA report, dated 27 November 1944, described the conditions prevailing at the "PW" wing of the Partisan Hospital at BILECA, where wounded German prisoners of war, officers and men, were kept with no heating or lighting and with almost non-existent medical facilities and under other general conditions in contravention of the Geneva Convention.

3. The fact that Commonwealth troops are fighting in places alongside the JANL may result in some measure of the responsibility and odium arising from such acts being transferred to GREAT BRITAIN, with resultant reprisal upon British or Allied prisoners of war in German hands.

4. Brigadier MACLEAN, head of 37 Military Mission, was therefore instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander on 27 November 1944 to represent these facts to TITO and call attention to an undertaking previously given to the Prime Minister that all Germans captured by JANL were to be treated in accordance with International Law.

5. Brigadier MACLEAN has not yet received any report in reply to the approach made to Marshal TITO, but there has, however, been some improvement in the treatment of German prisoners of war by JANL forces. He considers that if the matter is to be taken up again further evidence, preferably first hand, will have to be obtained.

(intd) M.V.M.M.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(intd) M.W.M.M.

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CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 'G'

DISCIPLINARY IRREGULARITIES AMONG JUGOSLAV PARTISANS

1. The incidence of indiscipline among soldiers of the National Liberation Army of JUGOSLAVIA has tended to increase in recent months, in the BARI area.

2. Complaints of incidents of the following kinds have arisen :

(a) Carrying of Arms. Though asked three times to conform with the standard local practice of all other Allied forces in placing a ban upon the carrying of arms, the Jugoslav Headquarters has taken no steps to prevent the practice on the grounds that the Allied Authorities could not guarantee the safety of Jugoslav personnel.

(b) Illegal picketing by Partisans.

(i) This is prevalent around buildings occupied by the Royal Jugoslav Government, including one case of attempted abduction therefrom on 11 October of a Madame PALGORIC.

(ii) It is also practised in the vicinity of aerodromes in occupation of the Balkan Air Force, some of whose personnel are members of the joint Jugoslav Royal Air Force and the Partisan Air Force.

(c) Kidnapping of Jugoslav individuals not within Partisan Ranks.

(i) Abduction in the streets of Jugoslav refugees working for the British Red Cross.

(ii) Threatening of American woman Red Cross worker on 27 September 1944 for alleged interference in preventing abductions.

(iii) Abducting or inducing to desert 18 Italians, soldiers from 901 Arty Coy, on night 18/19 August 1944 and refusal, when the men in question were located in a Jugoslav camp on 5 October 1944, to hand them over.

(d) Attempted interference by Partisan Commissars with the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(iii) Abducting or inducing to desert 18 Italians, soldiers from 901 Arty Coy, on night 18/19 August 1944 and refusal, when the men in question were located in a Jugoslav camp on 5 October 1944, to hand them over.

(d) Attempted interference by Partisan Commissars with the working of British hospitals, set aside for the reception of Jugoslav sick and wounded, by obstructing the working of the British administration and by undermining the discipline of the Jugoslav patients.

(e) Illegal interference with the free circulation of British transport, including incidents of firing at the drivers.

3. Enlistment of Italian Army Deserters into Jugoslav Army.

An Italian sailor who was one of a party of 54 Italian Deserters has stated that he and the party were forcibly enlisted into the Jugoslav Army, he being informed that the post war frontiers of ITALY would be the same as 1914, and that civilians who showed sympathies towards ITALY would have to answer to the Jugoslav authorities for their actions.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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4. Some of these matters have already been the subject of correspondence or conversation with the Jugoslav Headquarters authorities. From the tone of such correspondence, it would appear that the Partisans, under the leadership of General POLJANAC, are somewhat truculent and unhelpful, and as yet in no single instance have the names and identities of the miscreants been obtained.

5. It is therefore essential to ensure that Jugoslav discipline is now brought and then maintained under proper control.

(intd) M.W.M.M.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78601/5

4. Some of these matters have already been the subject of correspondence or conversation with the Jugoslav Headquarters authorities. From the tone of such correspondence, it would appear that the Partisans, under the leadership of General POLJANAC, are somewhat truculent and unhelpful, and as yet in no single instance have the names and identities of the miscreants been obtained.

5. It is therefore essential to ensure that Jugoslav discipline is now brought and then maintained under proper control.

(intd) M.W.M.M.

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APPENDIX 'H'

CO-OPERATION OF JANL WITH AMERICAN AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

1. Local Partisan units are reluctant to offer full facilities for OSS/SI and ISLD work. This has made intelligence work in JUGOSLAVIA difficult.

2. Allied intelligence requirements are as follows:-

(a) All military intelligence in Partisan possession to be made available to OSS and ISLD representatives who should, within the limits of security, be permitted to examine the original intelligence and to interrogate sources further.

(b) Allied intelligence officers to be allowed to contact directly the officers in charge of Partisan unit intelligence sections - not, as at present, the Chief of Staff or Commissar only.

(c) Subject to initial clearance by Partisan Supreme H.Q., Allied intelligence officers to be allowed to move freely in military zones and to visit combat areas, with the approval only of the local Army or Corps commander. This would obviate the delays now entailed by the need to refer to BELGRADE in each instance.

(d) Partisan field commanders to be permitted and encouraged to act on specific intelligence requests made by Allied intelligence officers.

(e) Adequate Jugoslav interpreters to be provided, or permission granted to provide Allied interpreters.

(f) All help to be given to Allied units and agents wishing to base intelligence operations into AUSTRIA on Jugoslav territory.

(g) All help to be given to Allied agents crossing into Partisan held territory from adjacent countries. Cases of doubtful identity to be referred to the nearest Allied intelligence liaison officer for authentication.

3. Marshal Tito should be requested:-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(c) Subject to initial clearance by Partisan Supreme H.Q., Allied intelligence officers to be allowed to move freely in military zones and to visit combat areas, with the approval only of the local Army or Corps commander. This would obviate the delays now entailed by the need to refer to BELGRADE in each instance.

(d) Partisan field commanders to be permitted and encouraged to act on specific intelligence requests made by Allied intelligence officers.

(e) Adequate Jugoslav interpreters to be provided, or permission granted to provide Allied interpreters.

(f) All help to be given to Allied units and agents wishing to base intelligence operations into AUSTRIA on Jugoslav territory.

(g) All help to be given to Allied agents crossing into Partisan held territory from adjacent countries. Cases of doubtful identity to be referred to the nearest Allied intelligence liaison officer for authentication.

3. Marshal Tito should be requested:-

(a) To agree to the requirements stated in paragraph 2 above.

(b) To issue a directive to his various Corps and Divisional H.Qs ordering them to meet these specific requirements when called on by Allied officers to do so, and to render every other possible assistance to them. 5493

(c) To sign personally a letter for delivery to each Allied field representative stating that the assistance to be expected from local Partisan commanders will be as indicated in paragraph 2 above.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX 'I'

TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN WHEAT FROM BLACK SEA PORTS
TO JUGOSLAV PORTS IN JUGOSLAV BOTTOMS

I. Discussion

1. In November 1944 Marshal Tito requested, through Brigadier Maclean, that the United Nations should release four Jugoslav ships now in Allied convoys for the transport of a minimum of 20,000 tons of wheat from Black Sea to Dalmatian coast ports.

2. This was referred to the CCS, who ruled (in WX-73839 of 7 December) that the Russian wheat should be accepted in diminution of Jugoslav requirements, but that they could not guarantee Jugoslav ships for the purpose because of the possibility of establishing a precedent with other liberated countries. The bids for shipping would be by normal procedure within theatre allocations.

3. A factor that prevented consideration of lifting the wheat at the time was that the Black Sea entrance had not then been swept free of mines. Brigadier Maclean was advised of this in November (F-50974 of 10 November) and in more detail in December (F-67914 of 13 December and F-70049 of 17 December). The Black Sea entrance is now clear and the Russians have safe routes to the ports concerned, i.e CONSTANTA, BRAILA and ISMAIL. There should be no difficulty in either obtaining these routes from the Russians or in having vessels escorted by them through the mine fields. Ice will be no problem by the time negotiations are completed.

4. There will be no restrictions as to equitable distribution or insistence on observers in respect of these shipments.

5. TROOPERS (in 63462 C6 of 27 Jan) instructed BMM ROUMANIA and SACMED to discuss direct with each other the question of this lift. A signal (FX 21347 of 5 Feb) was sent to BMM ROUMANIA requesting a phased programme together with a statement of all conditions and navigational restrictions effecting the offer. Subject to a suitable reply port acceptance and clearance in the Adriatic ports will be the only governing factor.

II. Action

None pending reply from BUCHAREST.

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II. Action

Nonependin; reply from BUCHAREST.

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APPENDIX 'J'

DISPOSAL OF CERTAIN ALLEGED JUGOSLAVS

A. ALLEGED DESERTERS FROM THE JANL

1. The Jugoslav delegation in ROME expressed to the Allied Commission in December, 1944, their desire to obtain custody of certain alleged Jugoslav nationals residing in ROME, on the ground that they were deserters from the JANL.

2. It was proposed at that time that the Allied Commission should be instructed to assist the Jugoslav delegation in every way, but to insist on the observance of a procedure similar to that in use in the Allied armies in regard to deserters. This involved establishing the identity of the individual deserter; furnishing particulars as to name, rank, unit, date of enlistment or induction, date and circumstances of desertion and probable whereabouts; notification of desertion within 60 days thereof. In this way it was hoped to safeguard the liberty of persons whose apprehension the Jugoslavs might desire for political or other reasons.

3. Action on this matter was deferred pending the results of the SUBASIC conversations in LONDON which have ended in the establishment of a joint provisional government of JUGOSLAVIA. Marshal Tito should be informed, if he raises this matter, that it is still under examination by the Allied authorities.

B. INDIVIDUALS OF ALLEGED JUGOSLAV ORIGIN SERVING IN ITALIAN PRISONER OF WAR UNITS

1. At the conference held on 10 August 1944 between SACMED and Marshal Tito, Marshal Tito referred to Italian troops of Jugoslav origin in Sardinia and Sicily and intimated he would like them to have the opportunity of enlisting in the Jugoslav Army. SACMED replied that the men were for the most part in Corsica where they were engaged under American Command on an important role which would occupy them for the next three months at least. It was also stated that the possibility of asking for volunteers after this period raised a legal question since the status of such Italians was under consideration by the Advisory Council for Italy and that it would be impracticable to take action without the approval of the Council. It was ruled by SACMED that for operational reasons permission "could not at present be granted for Italian prisoners of war of Jugoslav origin employed under American command in Corsica to volunteer for service in Jugoslav Army" SACMED further directed that the guidance of the Advisory Council for Italy

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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2. Subsequent to the above conference, it was reported to the Political Committee on 20 September that reference for guidance to the Advisory Council as proposed above would result in a difference of views on the Council itself. It was further pointed out that it would also involve reference to the Italian Government, who were sensitive regarding relations with Jugoslavia, and it was urged that the decision to seek the advice of the Council be rescinded. It was finally decided that reference to the Advisory Council be postponed indefinitely but that the matter be brought up again should this postponement have unfavourable repercussions. It has not been found necessary to raise the matter again up to the present time.

3. G-3 state that the troops in question are still in Corsica and are working there under American supervision. Their number is approximately 5,000, divided into 22 work companies. The policy is to send American service troops at present in Corsica to Southern France and then to follow them up with the Italian work companies at present in Corsica.

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It is stated that there is work in Corsica for the Italian labour companies until they can sail for Southern France and this is expected to be in February or March.

4. As background, it may be stated that in April last, Marshal Tito telegraphed to Moscow complaining of the treatment of the soldiers in question (who were then in Sardinia) and requested that they be released to fight for him. This telegram was shown to Marshal Badoglio by the Russian Minister in Italy. Badoglio adopted the attitude that under no circumstances would he surrender soldiers of Slav origin serving in the Italian Army if they were Italian nationals. At the end of April, Allied Commission reported that the Russians were recommending that the whole question of withdrawing Italian soldiers of Slav origin from the Italian forces for service with Tito be dropped. The matter was reported to the Political Committee on 9 May and the decision was then taken not to take further action in the matter. The next time the matter was raised was at the Conference on 10 August referred to in para 1 above.

5. If Marshal Tito raises this question he should be told that these troops have made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort since he last raised the matter in August of last year, and that they form an essential part of the plan for maintaining the Allied forces engaged on the Western front.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

effort since he last raised the matter in August of last year, that they form an essential part of the plan for maintaining the Allied forces engaged on the Western front.

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APPENDIX 'K'

SUPPLY OF ALBANIAN PARTISANS OPERATING IN JUGOSLAVIA

1. The overriding factors with regard to supplies to these Partisans are :-

(a) A precedent which has been established in NE ITALY whereby any Italian forces operating under JANL command becomes the responsibility of JANL for provisions. This should certainly apply to Albanians.

(b) That Albanian Partisans operating in the line will almost certainly be supplied on a guerilla scale and become a part of 300,000 for which SOM have taken provisioning action until the end of March and the 131,000 which have been provisioned for until the end of June.

2. It is recommended that no special supply action should be taken in the case of these Partisans.

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2. It is recommended that no special supply action should be taken in the case of these Partisans.

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APPENDIX 'L'

PROGRESS OF RELIEF IN JUGOSLAVIA

I. Background

1. At the end of October 1944 it appeared that the negotiations at BARI under the direction of AOC MAF between representatives of ML JUGOSLAVIA, representatives of Marshal Tito and of the Royal Jugoslav Government, had almost reached a successful conclusion. Two ships, each loaded with 3,500 tons of relief supplies for SPLIT and DUBROVNIK, were loaded in the ME and sailed to ITALY in order to introduce supplies to JUGOSLAVIA immediately the agreement was signed.

2. At the same time 300 tons of supplies were sent by schooner to SPLIT for distribution to the civilian population, in order to help relieve the starvation conditions existing there.

3. Early in November an impasse was reached in the negotiations over the question of "observers", and Major Geranovic, Tito's representative, returned to BELGRADE for instructions. Talks were held up pending his return, and the two ships were held in an Italian port. Major Geranovic's stay in BELGRADE was unduly protracted, and, after discussion at AFHQ, Tito was informed that the two ships would be sent to SPLIT and DUBROVNIK for the relief of the civil population, provided he complied with certain simple conditions. Tito, however, would not accept even these reduced conditions and insisted that all the supplies should be sent to SPLIT only

II. First Token Shipment

4. Eventually, on 1 December, it was decided that the two ships were to be unloaded, and that a small token shipment of 500 tons should be sent to SPLIT under ML auspices. The necessary arrangements were completed and, after a delay due to bad weather, the shipment reached SPLIT on 29 December.

5. A small party of ML personnel had previously been sent to SPLIT to liaise with the local authorities and to observe distribution. This party visited coastal areas on the Dalmatian coast between ZADAR and DUBROVNIK. They reported a cordial welcome in most places, and that distribution was carried out by the Jugoslavs in an efficient manner and in accordance with the basic principles of equitable distribution.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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III. Relief Agreement

6. Meanwhile it had been decided that the only solution to the question of the Relief Agreement was to take up the matter with Marshal Tito himself. Consequently, Major General Hughes, Brigadier General Sadler and the Commander of ML HQ JUGOSLAVIA visited BELGRADE. After a short discussion with Marshal Tito, the agreement was signed on 19 January 1945. 5495

7. The Relief Agreement as finally signed by Major General Hughes, Brigadier General Sadler, Marshal Tito and agreed by Professor Vukoslavljevic (representing the Royal Jugoslav Government), restricted to 300 the number of ML personnel who were to enter JUGOSLAVIA initially, with provision for upward revision if necessary. This is considered adequate for the present, since relief is of necessity limited to the Dalmatian coast.



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IV. Supplies for SPLIT

8. Arrangements had been made for a ship to be loaded immediately the agreement was signed, and this ship, containing 1,000 tons of food, medical supplies and relief stores, arrived at SPLIT on 24 January. Advanced HQ of ML JUGOSLAVIA has now been set up at SPLIT, and regular sailings are taking place.

9. Approximately 5,000 tons in all have now been despatched to SPLIT, and a further 14,000 tons have been called forward for March.

V. DUBROVNIK

10. No supplies have yet been despatched to DUBROVNIK, owing to the necessity for minesweeping. This, it is hoped, will be completed by 17 February. Approximately 4,000 tons of supplies have been arranged for February, and 14,000 tons for March.

VI. Distribution

11. A Jugoslav commission has been appointed to work with ML HQ JUGOSLAVIA, and all arrangements are made locally through this commission, to which Marshal Tito has given all necessary powers regarding relief. Distribution is carried out by the Jugoslavs themselves, who are being given motor transport to assist in the distribution inland. A total number of 1,200 vehicles has been made available, and 700 of these will be in use by the end of March. The remaining 500 will be sent later, if needed, when a full report on the transportation situation has been received.

VII. SALONIKA

12. It is planned to use SALONIKA for the introduction of relief supplies to SERBIA; but, owing to the poor communications in this area and the internal situation in Northern GREECE, this has not yet been possible.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1490 - 250.000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 8 (Addendum)
19th February, 1945

COPY NO. 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND EAM

Note by Secretary

Since receipt of the Agreement and Resume of draft law of Amnesty circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 8, three further papers have been received relating to this agreement. These are attached as follows for information:-

(a) Annex I - An extract from the Greek Constitution of 1911 comprising those articles referred to in Article III of the present Agreement.

(b) Annex II- A plan for the disarmament of ELAS forces and organisations which is believed to be included in the protocol referred to in articles 5 and 6 of the present agreement.
(Note:- No copy of this protocol has yet been received)

(c) Annex III- An agreement regarding demilitarisation and re-registration of ELAS/ELAN shipping.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL.
SECRETARY.

| Distribution | Copy No. |
|---|---|
| Supreme Allied Commander | 1 |
| Deputy Supreme Allied Commander | 2 |
| Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 3-4 |
| Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 5 |

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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| Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 5 |
| Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN | 6 |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean | 7 |
| Chief of Staff | 8 |
| Chief Administrative Officer | 9-10 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff | 11 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 | 12 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 | 13 |
| Chief, G-3 Operations Section | 14 |
| Chief, G-3 Plans Section | 15 |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 | 16-17 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 18 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF | 19-23 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 24-26 |
| British Resident Minister | 27-30 |
| Director, PWB | 31 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 32-34 |
| Secretary, General Staff | 35 |
| Inter Service and Political Secretariat | 36-37 |
| Spares | 38-40 |

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ANNEX I

EXTRACT FROM THE GREEK CONSTITUTION OF 1911

The following are the Articles of the Greek Constitution which the Greek Government has suspended for the time being. They are referred to in Article II of the political agreement.

Article 5

With the exception of persons taken in the act of committing an offence no one may be arrested or imprisoned without a warrant giving the reasons for the arrest, which must be presented at the moment of arrest or of imprisonment pending trial. A person arrested in the act or held in the virtue of a warrant must be brought before the competent examining magistrate without any delay, within 24 hours at the most after his arrest or, if the arrest has been made at a distance from the magistrate's official seat, within the time absolutely necessary for him to be brought there. The examining magistrate is obliged within three days at the most after his being brought before him either to release the arrested person or to issue an order for his imprisonment. If either of these time-limits expires, any warder or other person charged with his custody, whether he be a civilian or a military official, must release the arrested person immediately. Violators of the above orders will be punished for illegal detention and obliged to repair all damage resulting to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the judge but can never be less than ten drachmae for each day.

Article 10

Greeks have the right to assemble quietly and unarmed; only at public gatherings can the police be present. Gatherings in the open air can be forbidden if danger to public security would result therefrom.

Article 12

Every citizen has the right of sanctuary in his own home. No house search is allowed except when and as the law ordains.

Violators of these orders will be punished for abuse of authority and obliged to make full restitution of damages to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

...ently, within 24 hours at the most after his arrest or, if the arrest has been made at a distance from the magistrate's official seat, within the time absolutely necessary for him to be brought there. The examining magistrate is obliged within three days at the most after his being brought before him either to release the arrested person or to issue an order for his imprisonment. If either of these time-limits expires, any warder or other person charged with his custody, whether he be a civilian or a military official, must release the arrested person immediately. Violators of the above orders will be punished for illegal detention and obliged to repair all damage resulting to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the judge but can never be less than ten drachmae for each day.

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Violators of these orders will be punished for abuse of authority and obliged to make full restitution of damages to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the court but can never be less than one hundred drachmae.

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Article 20

The secrecy of private correspondence is absolutely inviolable.

Article 95

Political offences are tried by jury, as also offence of the Press whenever they do not regard private life.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ANNEX II

PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY HLAS, GREEK GOVERNMENT (THROUGH B.M.M.) AND H.Q. LAND FORCES AND MILITARY LIAISON, GREECE, FOR THE DISARMAMENT OF HLAS FORCES AND ORGANISATIONS SUBSIDIARY TO H.L.A.S. ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT CONFERENCE.

The following quantity of weapons are expected to be handed in by HLAS, which includes all subsidiary organisations such as POLITOPHYLAKI, etc., in accordance with the provisions below.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Rifles | - | 41,500 |
| Sub machine guns | - | 650 |
| Light machine guns | - | 1,050 |
| Heavy machine guns | - | 315 |
| Mortars, heavy | - | 55 |
| Mortars, light | - | 105 |
| Artillery, all types | - | 32 |
| Wireless sets | - | 15 |

The plan will consist of two phases:

PHASE 1.

1. "D" day will be the day on which the Agreement concluding the conference is signed.

2. On return to HLAS Headquarters, the HLAS delegation will be accompanied by a British Liaison Mission with communications established to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece. At the same time HLAS will appoint a senior Liaison Officer to be attached to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece.

3. A general order will be issued by HLAS "in clear" immediately on return to HLAS Headquarters forbidding the use of ciphers over the HLAS communication system. Orders for demobilisation of HLAS will be issued by HLAS immediately thereafter.

[illegible] British Officer appointed for the task of

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Sub machine guns | - | 650 |
| Light machine guns | - | 1,050 |
| Heavy machine guns | - | 315 |
| Mortars, heavy | - | 55 |
| Mortars, light | - | 10[illegible] |
| Artillery, all types | - | 32 |
| Wireless sets | - | 15 |

The plan will consist of two phases:

PHASE 1.

1. "D" day will be the day on which the Agreement concluding the conference is signed.

2. On return to TLS Headquarters, the TLS delegation will be accompanied by a British Liaison Mission with communications established to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece. At the same time TLS will appoint a senior Liaison Officer to be attached to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece.

3. A general order will be issued by TLS "in clear" immediately on return to TLS Headquarters forbidding the use of ciphers over the TLS communication system. Orders for demobilisation of TLS will be issued by TLS immediately thereafter.

4. TLS will inform a British Officer appointed for the task of the state of the civil communication systems, so that plans for rehabilitation and for linking up to the seat of Government may be undertaken without delay. Any communication equipment, military or civil, will be maintained in situ, and handed over to the Greek Government civil authorities on their arrival. This will include P.T.T. tools and equipment; these will not be regarded as military stores, although previously used by TLS as such.

5. All road blocks, demolitions, mines and booby traps will be removed and rendered safe by TLS by D plus 14. G.H.Q., TLS, will instruct an officer in each TLS Divisional Area to meet the British Forces as they move in to take over the area and report that this has been completed.

6. TLS will disclose to a British officer appointed for the purpose all roads obstructed by broken bridges, etc., so that plans can be made for their repair and in order that British

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

transport can move freely along all roads normally suitable for 3-ton transport and required to implement this plan.

7. Apart from the material excepted in paragraph 6 all rifles, revolvers, sub machine guns, light machine guns, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces, wireless sets, all unboxed ammunition and grenades, military vehicles and general military equipment, food stocks, animals (accompanied by appropriate unarmed personnel for their maintenance), and all material in general of whatever nature, under the control of TLS will be handed in to TLS guards for the safe custody of such arms, equipment, etc., at the following centres for TLS Headquarters and formations:-

| | |
|---|---|
| H.Q. | TRIKK.L. |
| O.M.M. | V'RRL. |
| 6th Division | K.V.L.. |
| Outstation | S'TR.I |
| Outstation | DE.M. |
| Outstation | .L'X.NDROPOLIS |
| 9th Division | KUCZ..VI |
| Outstation | GR.V'.. |
| Outstation | FLORIN. |
| Independent Regt, | KUCS..VI K.STORI.. |
| 10th Division | VIRRL. |
| Outstation | Y.NNITS.. |
| Outstation | 'DISS. |
| Outstation | K.'TRINI |
| 11th Division | KILKIS |
| Outstation | NIGRIT.. |
| Outstation | POLYGYROS |
| .M.M. 7th Division | M.UPEKTOS |
| Outstation | LIDORIKI |
| Outstation | K.S''LL. |
| Outstation | .GRINION |
| 13th Division | PL.STYSTOMON |
| Outstation | LL.NOKL..DI |
| 1st Division | L.RISS. |
| 3rd Cavalry Bde | K.RDITS.., TRIKK..L.. |
| 3rd Division | TRIPOLIS |
| Outstation | K.L.M..I |
| Outstation | SP.RT.. |
| Outstation | KY P.RISSI.. |
| th Division | Y.NNIN.. |
| Outstation | ..RT.. |
| | ...'V |

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Outstation | | FLORINA. |
| Independent Regt, | KOZ..NI | K.STORIA. |
| 10th Division | | V.RRIA. |
| Outstation | | Y.NNITS.. |
| Outstation | | ..D'SSA. |
| Outstation | | K.'TRINI |
| 11th Division | | KILKIS |
| Outstation | | NIGRIT.. |
| Outstation | | POLYGYROS |
| ..M.M. 7th Division | | N.UPLKTOS |
| Outstation | | LI.GRINI |
| Outstation | | K.S'.LL. |
| Outstation | | .GR.NION |
| 13th Division | | PL.STYSTOMON |
| Outstation | | LL.NOKL.DI |
| 1st Division | | L.RISS.. |
| 3rd Cavalry Bde | | K.RDITS.., T.IKK.L. |
| 3rd Division | | TRIPOLIS |
| Outstation | | K.L..N.I |
| Outstation | | SP.RT.. |
| Outstation | | KY P.RISSI.. |
| th Division | | Y..NNIN.. |
| Outstation | | ..RT.. |
| Outstation | | PRIVIZ.. |
| Outstation | | ..MPHILOMI.. |
| Island Guard | | MYTILINI |
| .Island Guard | | STYR.LONI., L'U.S, THASSOS. |

5483

All small dumps of ammunition will be collected at the disarmament centres.

Heavy ammunition will be listed in situ, and its location disclosed.

6. The handing in of all arms and equipment in accordance with paragraph 7 will be completed by D + 14, with the exception of arms retained for the following purposes:-

(a) For L.S guards over weapons, ammunition and equipment handed in. The maximum number of personnel for guard duties at any one point will be 30, under command of a responsible officer.

.../(b)



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) For ELAS guard companies which will be established at the following centres:-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| TRIPOLIS | IGOUMENITSA | KALAMAI |
| KYPARISSIA | SPARTA | PLATYSTOMON |
| LARISSA | MEGALOUPOLIS | TRIKKALA |
| KALAMPAKA | KARDITSA | EDESSA |
| ARDHITA | VITRINI | KILKIS |
| SERRAI | AXIOUPOLIS | DRAMA |
| KAVALA PHILIPPOKHION | SIDEROKASTRON | XANTHI |
| KOMOTINI | DIDIMOTYCHON | KAVALLA |
| GREVENA | KOZANI | FLORINA |
| KASTORIA | AGRINION | KARPENISSION |
| MESSOLONGHION | NAUPAKTOS | ARTA |
| PREVEZA | YANNINA | KONITSA |

The strength of such companies will not exceed 100 at any place. The task of these guard companies will be to maintain law and order in support of the civil power until such time as they are relieved by the National Guard, at dates which will be notified by the British Authorities. On relief, they will hand in their arms to an ELAS guard referred to in paragraph 7, and will then disperse to their homes.

On D plus 14 the officers in charge of the guards referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will render a certificate, in duplicate, to ELAS General Headquarters certifying the number of weapons, ammunition and equipment then in their charge as custodians for the Greek Government, also a nominal roll in duplicate of those soldiers who have failed to hand in their arms, together with full military particulars, so that the quantity of material under guard, with the addition of the numbers not handed in equals the total specified in the opening clause hereof. From these certificates a total of the ELAS arms, ammunition and equipment will be ascertained. A certificate will then be rendered to General SCOBIE by D plus 18 signed by M. SARAFIS and General SARAFIS, indicating that ELAS has disarmed, and that the arms, ammunition and equipment are held by the officer rendering the original certificate in safe custody for the Greek Government at the places indicated.

Providing that the terms of this certificate agree, within reasonable limits, with the figures given in the opening clause hereof, it will be publicly announced that ELAS has

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

National Guard, at dates which will be notified by the British Authorities. On relief, they will hand in their arms to an ELAS guard referred to in paragraph 7, and will then disperse to their homes.

On D plus 14 the officers in charge of the guards referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will render a certificate, in duplicate, to ELAS General Headquarters certifying the number of weapons, ammunition and equipment then in their charge as custodians for the Greek Government, also a nominal roll in duplicate of those soldiers who have failed to hand in their arms, together with full military particulars, so that the quantity of material under guard, with the addition of the numbers not handed in equals the total specified in the opening clause hereof. From these certificates a total of the ELAS arms, ammunition and equipment will be ascertained. A certificate will then be rendered to General SCOBIE by D plus 15 signed by M. SARAFIS and General SARAFIS, indicating that ELAS has disarmed, and that the arms, ammunition and equipment are held by the officer rendering the original certificate in safe custody for the Greek Government at the places indicated.

Providing that the terms of this certificate agree, within reasonable limits, with the figures given in the opening clause hereof, it will be publicly announced that ELAS has disarmed. Phase 1 will then have been completed.

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By D plus 21 ELAS General Headquarters will render to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece, detailed lists of arms, ammunition and equipment, by types, to enable disposal arrangements to be made. Wireless equipment will be maintained in serviceable order by ELAS until final disposal instructions are given. A copy of these lists will be retained by the ELAS Divisional Commander to be handed over to the British Authorities when required.

PHASE 2.

9. The Greek Government will re-assume control in Greece, area by area, as follows either simultaneously or stage by stage:-

(a) Southern PELOPONNESE and AETOLO-AKARNANIA.

.../(b)



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) That part of the Province of ETHIOTIS-VOKIS that lies beyond the Truce Boundary, and the Provinces of LARISSA and TRIKKALA.

(c) The Provinces of KHALKIDHIKI, THESSALONIKI, KILKIS and PELLA.

(d) The Provinces of SERRAI, KAVALLA, DRAMA, XANTHI and EVROS.

(e) The Provinces of FLORINA and KOZANI.

(f) The Governorate-General of EPIRUS.

(g) IONIAN ISLANDS.

(h) AEGEAN ISLANDS.

10. On a date or dates on or after D plus 18 to be decided mutually between the British Authorities and the Greek Government and previously notified to ELAS, British Authorities will move into such areas accompanied by units of the National Guard.

11. Arms, ammunition and equipment collected will then be handed over by the ELAS guards at the collecting centres to the British Authorities as agents for the Greek Government, in accordance with the certificates furnished by the officers in charge of such guards referred to in paragraph 8(a).

12. The National Guard units will proceed to the points at which ELAS guards have been maintained, and will relieve these guards of their responsibilities. ELAS guards will then hand in their weapons, as indicated by the British Authorities, and return to their homes. On the date appointed for the transfer of responsibility in each area, the Greek Government will assume responsibility for civil administration.

13. In view of the presence of German troops in CRETE, ELAS there will not be disarmed in accordance with this plan. The National Guard are already being called up in CRETE, and includes certain age groups of all ANDARTES now fighting the Germans. On formation of the National Guard all ANDARTES outside the age groups called up, will be

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mutually between the British Authorities and the Greek Government and previously notified to FLS, British Authorities will move into such areas accompanied by units of the National Guard.

11. Arms, ammunition and equipment collected will then be handed over by the FLS guards at the collecting centres to the British Authorities as agents for the Greek Government, in accordance with the certificates furnished by the officers in charge of such guards referred to in paragraph 8(a).

12. The National Guard units will proceed to the points at which FLS guards have been maintained, and will relieve these guards of their responsibilities. FLS guards will then hand in their weapons, as indicated by the British Authorities, and return to their homes. On the date appointed for the transfer of responsibility in each area, the Greek Government will assume responsibility for civil administration.

13. In view of the presence of German troops in CRETE, FLS there will not be disarmed in accordance with this plan. The National Guard are already being called up in CRETE, and includes certain age groups of all ANDARTES now fighting the Germans. On formation of the National Guard all ANDARTES outside the age groups called up, will be disbanded on a date to be agreed between the Greek Government and the British Government.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ANNEX III

# SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

# BY

# ELAS/ELAN SHIPS AND VESSELS

# AND

# RE-REGISTRATION OF ELAS/ELAN SHIPPING

1. SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

i. As from the date of the signature of the Agreement between the Greek Government and the EAM Central Committee, all ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels are to surrender all arms and munitions at one of the following ports:-

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CORFU | PATRAS | KALAMATA | PIRAEUS |
| VOLOS | SALONIKA | KAVALLA | MITYLENE. |

ii. Twenty days grace will be allowed for the completion of the surrender of arms and munitions.

iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions unless duly commissioned and authorised by the Greek Government.

iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authorities are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

2. RE-REGISTRATION

i. All ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels, whether engaged in the surrender of arms as in Section 1 or not, are to proceed at the earliest opportunity to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) for re-registration.

ii. Re-registration will be carried out by the Greek Harbour Master Service.

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the surrender of arms and munitions.

iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions unless duly commissioned and authorised by the Greek Government.

iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authorities are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

2. RE-REGISTRATION

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ii. Re-registration will be carried out by the Greek Harbour Master Service.

iii. No re-registration certificate will be issued until the legal ownership of the ship or vessel has been fully established.

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iv. Vessels captured from the enemy, Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, will be held in prize, and, subject to the decision of the Prize Court, become the property of the Greek Government.

(Ld)

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ii. [illegible] the surrender of arms and munitions.

iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions unless duly commissioned and authorised by the Greek Government.

iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authorities are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

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i. All ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels, whether engaged in the surrender of arms as in Section 1 or not, are to proceed at the earliest opportunity to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) for re-registration.

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iii. No re-registration certificate will be issued until the legal ownership of the ship or vessel has been fully established.

5480

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Chief Comm

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 71

RESTRICTED

COPY NO 32

SAC (P) (45) 8
18th February 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND EAM

Note by Secretary

As a result of discussions which have taken place recently in ATHENS between the Greek Government and EAM an agreement between the two parties has been concluded. Copy of this agreement is attached herewith for information.

See Addendum 6b

J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Deputy Chief of Staff | 11 |
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See above 6b

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND EAM

K 71

ARTICLE I

Liberties

The Government will secure in accordance with the Constitution and the democretic principles everywhere recognised, the free expression of the political and social opinions of the citizens, repealing any existing illiberal law. It will also secure the unhindered functioning of individual liberties such as those of assembly, association and expression of views in the press. More especially the Government will fully restore Trade Union liberties.

ARTICLE II

Raising of Martial Law

Martial law will be raised immediately after the signature of the present agreement. Simultaneously with this action there will be brought into force a Constitutional Act similar in all respects to Constitutional Act No. 24, whereby the suspension of those articles of the Constitution to which reference is made in Act 24 shall be permitted.

Articles 5, 10, 12, 20 and 95 of the Constitution shall be suspended forthwith throughout the country. This suspension shall continue until the completion of disarmament, and the establishment of administrative, judicial and military authorities throughout the country. As regards Article 5 in particular, this suspension shall not take effect in the cities of Athens and Piraeus and their suburbs. Especially, however, as regards persons arrested up to the present day it is agreed that Article 5 of the Constitution is not in force, and that they will be liberated within the shortest possible period of time, the necessary orders to this effect being given to the competent authorities.

Followers of EAM who may be held in captivity by other organisations shall be set free as soon as possible.

ARTICLE III

Amnesty

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December 1944, and the publication of the law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded common law crimes against life and property

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Followers of EAM who may be held in captivity by other organisations shall be set free as soon as possible.

## ARTICLE III

Amnesty

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December 1944, and the publication of the law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded common law crimes against life and property which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crime concerned. The necessary law will be published immediately after the signature of the present agreement. From this amnesty will be excluded any persons who, being under obligation to surrender their arms, as being members of the organisations of ELAS, the National Civil Guard or ELAN, shall not have handed them over by the 15th March 1945. This last provision concerning exclusion from the amnesty shall be annulled after verification of the fact that the disarmament of ELAS has been effected, since there will then be no further cause and justification for it. Guarantees and details of the amnesty to be provided are contained in the draft law attached to the present agreement.

## ARTICLE IV

Hostages

All civilians who have been arrested by ELAS or by the National Civil Guard (E.P), irrespective of the date on which they were arrested, shall be set at liberty immediately. Any who may be held on the charge of collaboration with the enemy or of commission of any crime shall be handed over to the justice of the State for trial by the competent Courts according to law (see draft law of amnesty attached).

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ARTICLE V

K 71

National Army

The National Army, apart from the professional officers and N.C.Os, shall consist of the soldiers of the classes which shall from time to time be called up. Reserve officers, N.C.Os and other ranks, who have been specially trained in modern weapons shall remain in service so long as there is a formation requiring them. The Sacred Squadron shall remain as at present, since it is under the immediate orders of the Allied High Command, and shall thereafter be merged in the united National Army in accordance with the above principle. The effort will be made to extend regular conscription to the whole of Greece in accordance with the technical facilities existing and the necessities which may arise. After the demobilisation of ELAS those men who belong to classes which are to be called up in accordance with the attached protocol*shall report for enrolment in the units already existing. All men who have been enrolled in the units now existing, without belonging to the classes being called up, shall be discharged. All members of the permanent cadres of the National Army shall be considered by the Councils for which provision is made in Constitutional Act No. VII. The political and social views of citizens serving in the Army shall be respected.

ARTICLE VI

Demobilisation

Immediately on the publication of the present agreement the armed forces of resistance shall be demobilised and in particular the ELAS, both Regular and Reserve, the ELAN and the National Civil Guard. The demobilisation and surrender of arms shall take place according to the detailed provisions of the protocol drawn up by the Committee of Experts, which duly initalled, is attached*hereto.

The State will settle all questions arising out of requisitioning carried out by ELAS. The goods requisitioned by ELAS, including beasts, motor vehicles, etc, which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached*hereto, will be regarded thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

ARTICLE VII

Purge of Civil Service

The Government will proceed, by means of Committees of Councils, to be established by a special law to the purging of the personnel of the public

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The State will settle all questions arising out of requisitioning carried out by ELAS. The goods requisitioned by ELAS, including beasts, motor vehicles, etc, which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached*hereto, will be regarded thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

ARTICLE VII

Purge of Civil Service

The Government will proceed, by means of Committees of Councils, to be established by a special law to the purging of the personnel of the public services, officials of public companies, local Government officials, and of those of other services dependent on the State or paid by it. The criteria of which the purge will take account will be either professional competence, or character and personality, or collaboration with the enemy or the utilisation of the official as an instrument of the dictatorship. Officials of the above services, who, during the occupation, joined the forces of resistance will return to their positions and will be considered in the same manner as other officials. The above-mentioned councils will also consider the cases of officials who have taken part or collaborated in the manifestations which have taken place between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the present agreement. Those of them who are found to have been concerned may be placed at the disposal of the State as provided by Law. The final disposal of such officials will be decided by the Government which shall result from the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Officials who have already been placed 'en diponibilité' by decisions of Ministers will be submitted to the decision of the Council above-mentioned. No official will be dismissed solely on account of his political opinion.

*NOT attached

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ARTICLE VIII

Purge of Security Services

The purge of the Security Services, the Gendarmerie and City Police will be carried out as soon as possible by special purge committees on the same basis as the purge of the Civil Service. All officers and other ranks of the above Corps who fell under the provisions of the Amnesty Law, who, during the period of the occupation, joined the ranks of ELAS, ELAN or the National Civil Guard, will return to their positions and will be considered by the Purge Councils in the same manner as the rest of their colleagues. All the officers and other ranks of the above Corps who left their positions between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the present document shall be placed 'en disponibilité', their final disposal being left for the decision of Councils to be constituted by the Government arising from the elections.

ARTICLE IX

Plebiscite and elections

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

Of this present agreement two similar copies have been made, whereof the one has been received by the Government delegation and the other by the delegation of E.M.

In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

12th February 1945.

1905

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Plebiscite and elections

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

Of this present agreement two similar copies have been made, whereof the one has been received by the Government delegation and the other by the delegation of EAM.

In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

12th February 1945.

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(64)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1071

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Resume of draft law of Amensty referred to in Article 4 of the Act of Agreement

K 71

Article 1.

Para 1. An amnesty is granted to the political offences committed between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of publication of the present law. Common offences against life and property connected with the political offence but not absolutely necessary for its accomplishment are excepted from the amnesty.

Para 2. Are excepted from this amnesty all those belonging to ELAS, ELAN and the Civil Guard who, though obliged to hand in their arms, have not done so before the 15th March 1945.

Article 2.

The Court of Appeal will settle any doubts as to the interpretation of Article 1.

Article 3.

Those who do not receive the amnesty cannot be prosecuted for the excepted offences after six months in the Athens area and after the end of 1945 in the rest of Greece .

Article 4.

These same persons who do not receive the amnesty cannot be held in custody pending trial for more than six months. After then they must be released.

Articles 5 and 6 settle some minor technical details of procedure.

Article 3.

Those who do not receive the amnesty cannot be prosecuted for the excepted offences after six months in the Athens area and after the end of 1945 in the rest of Greece .

Article 4.

These same persons who do not receive the amnesty cannot be held in custody pending trial for more then six months. After then they must be released.

Articles 5 and 6 settle some minor technical details of procedure.

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SECRET

Chief Commun. & A C

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

FEB 19 REC'D CC503 SECRET K 65 586

S.C (P) (45) 7
17th February 1945

COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The attached memorandum summarising the facts regarding the privileges and facilities accorded to the Soviet Delegations in ITALY was prepared at the request of the British Resident Minister for comparison with the treatment accorded by the local Soviet authorities to the parallel Allied Delegations in BULGARIA and ROUMANIA, where considerable difficulty has been encountered.

2. It is not at present proposed to base any action on this memorandum, of which the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is merely requested to take note.

J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

See revised paper hereunder

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| Chief, Liaison Section | 18 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HMLF | 19-23 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 24-26 |

1002-2/CC (Conf) [illegible] 1.5.0/

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2. It is not at present proposed to base any action on this memorandum, of which the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is merely requested to take note.

See revised page herewith

J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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| Chief Administrative Officer | 9-10 |
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EC List - 19 Feb 45

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

SAC (P) (45) 7 (Revised)
26th February, 1945

COPY NO. 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

In accordance with conclusion 11 of SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, paragraph 7 has now been revised to take account of the propaganda facilities afforded by PWB to the Russians.

Copies of the revised paper have been forwarded to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser for despatch to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied Missions elsewhere.

This paper supersedes Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should now be destroyed.

A G Lascelles Lt Col

for J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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Copies of the revised paper have been [illegible] Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser for despatch to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied Missions elsewhere.

This paper supersedes Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should now be destroyed.

for J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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| Chief of Staff | 8 |
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| Chief, G-3 Operations Section | 14 |
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# PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

For reference in connection with determining what privileges and facilities should be expected for British and US personnel accredited to the Allied Control Commissions in ROUMANIA and BULGARIA, there is presented herewith a summary of information concerning the privileges and facilities accorded to the various Russian delegations in ITALY. The information given applies to the Russian Embassy only to the extent so stated.

## 1. PERSONNEL

Soviet personnel (not including wives or children) are assigned or attached to the respective delegations in ITALY as follows:-

| | |
|---|---|
| (a) Allied Commission: | 1 Representative, 5 Officer Assistants, 1 Other Rank - Total 7 persons. |
| (b) Advisory Council : | 1 Representative (temporarily the same as for the AC), 1 Officer Assistant, 8 Civilian Assistants, 10 Other Ranks Total- 20 persons. |
| (c) Military Mission : (to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission of AC) | 1 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants (2 more about to be accredited) 4 Civilians, 15 Other Ranks - Total 39 Persons. |
| (d) Embassy : | 13 Civilians |

## 2. FUNCTIONS

(a) Under directive of the S.A.C. dated 26 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the AC are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.

(b) In addition to [illegible]

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Total- 20 persons.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| (c) Military Mission (to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission of AC) | : | 1 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants (2 more about to be accredited) 4 Civilians, 15 Other Ranks - Total 39 Persons. |
| (d) Embassy | : | 13 Civilians |

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(b) In addition to their observational functions, the personnel of the Military Mission to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission screen Soviet refugees and ex-prisoners of war, visit camps and arrange for repatriation of Soviet nationals.

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(c) The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council participates on an equal basis with other representatives in presiding at meetings and in the recommendations formulated by the Council.

(d) It follows from the fact that the function of the Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission is merely consultative, that no procedure is provided to ensure that he will have an opportunity to consult with his government prior to the taking of decisions by the Commission, or even to ensure that he or his staff may know of contemplated decisions before they are taken, except insofar as this occurs through attendence at meetings.

3. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

(a) Meetings.

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The Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission attends the Vice President's meetings (attended by heads of sections and sub-commissions) which are presided over by the Deputy President. For these he is permitted to be accompanied by an ADC and an interpreter. No Agendas are circulated for these meetings. Members of the Military Mission attend meetings of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission when invited to do so in connection with matters affecting Soviet interests. The Staff Officers assigned to the other Sub-Commissions have the privilege of attending Sub-Commission meetings but do not frequently do so. Prior to each meeting of the Advisory Council, an agenda is circulated, but it is not the practice to circulate prior to the meeting papers for consideration.

(b) Documents

All documentary information relative to the work of the Commission is made available on the initiative of the Commission to the Soviet Representative. He and his staff do not see:-

(1) Unparaphrased copies of cypher messages, and
(2) Matter which is likely to prejudice relations with the Soviet Government. Top Secret matter which it would be inadvisable to show to junior officers is shown only to the Soviet Representative. Soviet officers assigned to Sub-Commissions are not permitted to observe the work of Sub-Commissions other than those to which they are assigned. They are, upon request, shown documents at the discretion of the head of their Sub-Commission, but do not frequently avail themselves of this privilege.

All information affecting the Advisory Council that the delegation to it requires is made available to it on request.

(c) Information from Italian Sources

The extent to which the Soviet members of the various delegations interview personnel of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

4. MOVEMENT

(a) Freedom of Movement

(1) South of the line ANCONA-SIENNA-PIOMBINO, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within ITALY. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Liaison officer at [illegible] Headquarters, Allied Commission.

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Sub-Commissions are not p... Sub-Commissions other than those to which they are assigned. They are, upon request, shown documents at the discretion of the head of their Sub-Commission, but do not frequently avail themselves of this privilege.

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(c) Information from Italian Sources

The extent to which the Soviet members of the various delegations interview personnel of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

4. MOVEMENT

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(2) For travel north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group (Administrative Memorandum No. 55, AFHQ, 8 December 1944 now requires/71 concurrence of AFHQ also) is obtained for Soviet personnel, likewise through the appropriate liaison officer. Two such visits have been made north of the line by members of Soviet delegations at ROME during the last six weeks. The Military Mission has on at least one occasion sent officers into the forward areas without US or British authority.

(3) For inter-theatre travel, including that of Soviet diplomatic couriers, authority to travel is obtained by the appropriate British or US liaison officer at ROME from AFHQ, and travel orders are issued by HQ Allied Commission. Authority has in every case been obtained, though there have been some delays due to the making of applications at the last minute. Such authority consists of travel orders for use within the theatre, or when US or British facilities are used. No authorisation for the exit itself is required for Allied service personnel on duty, or for accredited diplomats and consular officials. (Letter, AFHQ AG 371.2/015 GEC-O, 7 November 1944)

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As to travel to ITALY from the Soviet Union, an Allied Force Permit for the trip, which may be issued by SO Military Mission or the US Military Mission in MOSCOW without AFHQ concurrence, is now theoretically required, except as to diplomatic and consular officials (Letter AFHQ, AF 371.2/011 GBI-0,5 January - August 1945) but this requirement has not yet actually been enforced.

(4) Entry of Soviet planes into the theatre requires clearance by HQ MAAF, which, however, is immediately given as a matter of routine.

(b) Transportation

(1) Vehicles permanently assigned to the Soviet delegations by U.S and British authorities are only two in number - one for the delegation to the AC and one for the Military Mission.

(2) The following Russian-owned vehicles are maintained:-

| | |
|---|---|
| Military Mission | 4 |
| Delegation to Advisory Council | 5 |
| Embassy | 1 |

(3) All of the above vehicles except the Embassy vehicle receive maintenance, motor fuel and lubricants from AC.

(4) The Soviet Representative on the AC and the Soviet Military Mission also have the use of vehicles in the AC HQ Commandant's pool.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Radio

The Soviet authorities maintain a transmitter in ROME, with which they can communicate directly with MOSCOW. The Soviet delegations can send signals by US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Liaison Officer, AC, but have only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services

U.S. and British services are made available through the AC, but the Soviet Delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communications inside and outside the theatre.

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6. SUPPLY

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(a) Supply for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| (1) Allied Commission | : | US rations; NAAFI facilities for all, PX facilities for 2. |
| (2) Advisory Council | : | ½ British and ½ US rations; NAAFI facilities for 10, PX facilities for 3. |
| (3) Military Mission | : | British rations; NAAFI facilities |
| (4) Embassy | : | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(b) The AC has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet Authorities have, however, made some importations by their own aircraft.

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/7...Propaganda.

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(a) Official Facilities Given

P.W.B. includes Russia in its general propaganda programme covering the United Nations. On occasions the Russians have asked PWB for special assistance and paper was given them for the publication of pamphlets celebrating the Defence of Stalingrad and Red Army Day. The Russians were also permitted to exhibit in ROME a Red Army Day documentary film. Extracts from the Tass Agency news file were included by PWB in news releases to the Italian newspapers and radio when such release was under PWB control. Since the admission of private news agencies to ROME, Tass has been permitted to supply its file to the Italian News agency and paper. The Soviet Embassy is allowed to import films for private showings to Italians.

(b) Other Russian Activities

There is little doubt that the Russians have given support, behind the scenes, to the Communist newspaper, UNITA. The Russians also distributed on one occasion moving pictures to the Italian public through a commercial agency, without previously obtaining permission from Allied authorities.

8. SOVIET INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE ROME

(a) No aircraft or airforce personnel are now maintained in ITALY by the Soviet Union.

(b) A part of the St. Andrews' Camp, TARANTO, is under Soviet control, for repatriation of ex-PWs.

(c) One officer is attached to the Allied Repatriation Unit, NAPLES.

9. ARMISTICE TERMS

The privileges and facilities enjoyed by the respective national components of the various Allied Commissions may depend to some extent upon the armistice provisions establishing each Commission. For comparison, these are briefly summarised:-

(a) The Italian armistice does not name the nations to be represented on the Commission, but simply provides for a Control Commission "representative of the United Nations" and placed the commission "under orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief"

(b) The Roumanian armistice provides for an "Allied Control Commission" which will undertake until the conclusion of the peace the control over the execution of the armistice terms "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers".

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(b) The Roumanian armistice provides for an "Allied Control Commission" which will undertake until the conclusion of the peace the control over the execution of the armistice terms "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers". The nations to be represented on the Commission are not named, but the fact that the armistice is signed on behalf of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the US implies the representation of all three.

(c) The Bulgarian armistice expressly provides for the participation of representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and further provides that during the whole period of the armistice the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command shall be chairman, and that until the cessation of hostilities with GERMANY the Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

(d) The Hungarian armistice contains the same provisions as those described in (c) above.



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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 6 (Addendum)
19th February, 1945

COPY NO. 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

CYPHER AND BAG FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Secretary

Reference paragraph 3 of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 6. Attached is a copy of Mr. Macmillan's reply dated 16th February, which was not received by G-5 in time for inclusion in the main paper. Attention is drawn in particular to paragraph 2 of this reply.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

TO: Chief of Staff, AFHQ

FROM: Mr. Macmillan

Your minute of the 14th February, CS/104.

I understand the position is as follows :-

(1) You will not permit outgoing cypher messages to be sent by the Italian Government to its representatives abroad.

(2) You are prepared to agree to bag facilities both inwards and outwards. I am most grateful for this concession, which I think will have a very good effect, and I am glad that you are able to accept the limited risk involved.

2. There is one further point. At present the Italian Ambassador in London, who holds a cypher approved by us, takes his cyphered messages to the Foreign Office to be despatched. This naturally somewhat cramps his style on reporting interviews, etc. I am informed that AFHQ have no objection to his sending them direct to the Italian Foreign Office in Rome through the normal telegraphic channel. It has been the practice to give a copy of the cyphered telegrams to the Allied Commission so that it may check incoming messages. I take it that you see no reason for insisting upon this on security grounds, and I propose to abandon it on political grounds. Outgoing telegrams will, however, be shown to the Allied Commission as before.

(intd) H.M

16th February 1945.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 6
17th February, 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

CYPHER AND BAG FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. In a cable dated 16 February Allied Commission suggested that the policy laid down in FAN 487 of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy and other Nations can only be implemented on the basis of far reaching relaxation of the restrictions on Italian diplomatic communications and the cable requested review of the position without delay. The restrictions referred to have in the past precluded the Italian Government from communicating in cypher undeposited with the Allied Authorities and have made them disclose the contents of their diplomatic bags to the Allied Authorities before despatch.

2. In fact the possibility of relaxing the above restrictions has very recently been the subject of detailed study at this HQ arising out of representations made by Mr. Macmillan. On the 14 February the Chief of Staff informed Mr. Macmillan by letter that for reasons of military security it was still not considered possible to recommend that the Italian Government should be allowed undeposited cypher facilities but that if considered politically desirable objection would not be taken to allowing the Italian Government secret bag facilities with their representatives abroad.

3. Mr. Macmillan's reply has not yet been received, but as it is known that he was in favour of relaxation of such restrictions as were possible, permission pending his reply has in fact been given for TARCHIANI, the Ambassador designate to the United States, to carry a sealed diplomatic pouch with him when he leaves Italy to take up his post.

4. It is recommended:-

(a) that cypher facilities continue to be denied to the Italian Government

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2. In fact the possibility of relaxing the above restrictions has very recently been the subject of detailed study at this HQ arising out of representations made by Mr. Macmillan. On the 14 February the Chief of Staff informed Mr. Macmillan by letter that for reasons of military security it was still not considered possible to recommend that the Italian Government should be allowed undeposited cypher facilities but that if considered politically desirable objection would not be taken to allowing the Italian Government secret bag facilities with their representatives abroad.

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4. It is recommended:-

(a) that cypher facilities continue to be denied to the Italian Government

(b) that in principle bag facilities be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their representatives abroad.

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(Intd) C.M.S.

EC List - 19 Feb 45

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COPY NO. 32

S.A.C (P) (45) 5
17th February, 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ITALIAN BREAD RATION
Developments Leading to Authorisation of the 300 Gram Ration

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. In May 1944 the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission recommended to the Supreme Allied Commander that the bread allowance be increased from 200 grams to 300 grams to provide an adequate bread ration for the people and to stimulate the amassment of the coming harvest. After studying the problem S.A.C advised the CCS on 8 June that he intended to authorise a bread ration of 300 grams, as a temporary measure only, the ration to apply during the winter 1944-45 to be the subject of a later recommendation.

2. Upon being informed of his action in proceeding with the authorisation the CCS pointed out that this was a high policy matter, and should not have been undertaken without the approval of the Governments of UK/US. Therefore the authorised increase must come from local resources.

3. In September S.A.C submitted to the CCS his recommendation that the 300 gram bread ration should be authorised for all of Italy (with the exception of Sicily which at that time was thought to be self-sufficient) for the balance of the harvest year. Also in September, 1944, the Chief of the Food Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, presented in person to the CCAC the food requirements for January/June 1945.

4. In October, referring to public announcements by the Prime Minister and the President that 300 grams was to be adopted as the ration for Italy, S.A.C asked for an early reply to his September message. In November, and three times in December, S.A.C called the attention of the CCS to the acuteness of the situation in Italy, and pressed for a favourable reply authorising the 300 grams. On December 9th the CCS replied that the subject was under urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government and by the U.S. Government.

5. In F.N 478 and W-22519 of 18 January 1945, the CCS authorised the establishment of the 300 gram bread ration for liberated Italy but placed

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2. Upon being informed of his action in proceeding with the authorisation the CCS pointed out that this was a high policy matter, and should not have been undertaken without the approval of the Governments of UK/US. Therefore the authorised increase must come from local resources.

3. In September S.C submitted to the CCS his recommendation that the 300 gram bread ration should be authorised for all of Italy (with the exception of Sicily which at that time was thought to be self-sufficient) for the balance of the harvest year. Also in September, 1944, the Chief of the Food Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, presented in person to the CCAC the food requirements for January/June 1945.

4. In October, referring to public announcements by the Prime Minister and the President that 300 grams was to be adopted as the ration for Italy, S.C asked for an early reply to his September message. In November, and three times in December, S.C called the attention of the CCS to the acuteness of the situation in Italy, and pressed for a favourable reply authorising the 300 grams. On December 9th the CCS replied that the subject was under urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government and by the U.S. Government.

5. In FAN 478 and W-22519 of 18 January 1945, the CCS authorised the establishment of the 300 gram bread ration for liberated Italy but placed on S.C the responsibility for deciding when it was practicable to do so in the light of "the currently approved Shipping Programme." S.C replied that his stock position and the advices for January and February shipments made it impracticable to increase the ration at an early date. He cited the serious condition due to the non-arrival of promised wheat shipments and stressed the absolute necessity for establishing the 300 gram ration immediately to avert unrest throughout the country. He emphasised the discrepancy between actual arrivals for the months of November, December and January and allocations, but stated that, provided the February programme were met in full, it would be possible to initiate the 300 gram ration in early March. EAR4

6. Arrivals of wheat scheduled for February totalled 136,000 tons. This provided a surplus for the month of 36,000 tons.

7. On 14 February the Chief Commissioner asked that the 300 gram ration be extended to all of occupied Italy, effective 1 March.

EC List - 19 FEB 45
Chief Comm — 32
Ex. Comm 33
Econ Sec 34

(4)



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8. A summary of the stock position (attached as an Annex) was prepared which indicated that the wheat in the Theatre, together with that which could confidently be counted upon to arrive, provided a margin of safety that would permit the immediate authorisation of the 300 gram ration.

9. As a result of this study SAC wired the Chief Commissioner, AC, on 16 February, giving authority for the extension of the 300 gram bread ration to all of occupied Italy effective 1 March 1945, stating that no announcement would be made until the wishes of the CCS regarding such public announcement were made known.

10. Simultaneously with this cable to the AC the SAC advised the CCS of his action and requested their instructions concerning the public announcement. As to the latter SAC advised that no major pronouncement be made on the subject at this time.

11. The Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is requested to take note of the above account.

(Intd) C.M.S.

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ANNEX

Recapitulation of Wheat Position - - - ITALY

(Including North Italy when Liberated - In Thousands of Tons)

| MONTH | A CONSUMPTION | B UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE STOCKS | C SCHEDULED IMPORTS | D BALANCE (A - B - C) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| February | 157 | 66 | 136* | 45 |
| March | 166 | 66 | 100** | 0 |
| April (Note) | 226 | 126(a) | 100** | 0 |
| May (Note) | 231 (b) | 66 | 165** | 0 |

(a) Includes Northern stockpile of 60

(b) Includes 65 for North.

* (in sight)

** (Called forward)

NOTE: Consumption figures for April and May have been increased by 60 and 65,000 tons respectively, reflecting the additional tonnages that might be made available in the North from (a) Northern Stockpile and (b) Imports called forward for May delivery. Actually distribution will be limited by transportation. Log Plans indicate maximum lift to railheads of 1,000 tpd or 30,000 tpm

| | STOCK POSITION | SCHEDULED RECEIPTS | CONSUMPTION LIBERATED ITALY | BALANCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| February | 454* | 136 | 157 | 433 |

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| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| April | (Note) | 226 | 126(a) | 100** | 0 |
| May | (Note) | 231 (b) | 66 | 165** | 0 |

(a) Includes Northern stockpile of 60

(b) Includes 65 for North.

* (in sight)

** (Called forward)

NOTE: Consumption figures for April and May have been increased by 60 and 65,000 tons respectively, reflecting the additional tonnages that might be made available in the North from (a) Northern Stockpile and (b) Imports called forward for May delivery. Actually distribution will be limited by transportation. Log Plans indicate maximum lift to railheads of 1,000 tpd or 30,000 tpm

| | STOCK POSITION | SCHEDULED RECEIPTS | CONSUMPTION LIBERATED ITALY | BALANCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| February | 454* | 136 | 157 | 433 |
| March | 433 | 100 | 166 | 367 |
| April | 367 | 100 | 166 | 301 |
| May | 301 | 165 | 166 | 302 |

* Includes 60 reserve



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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

NEW DIRECTIVE ON FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

IMPLICATIONS OF FAN 487 - file 390/2c

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting forth the revised policy for Italy is based on the continuation in effect of the Armistice and Surrender Instrument. These instruments, therefore, are to continue to be the basis of the relationships between Italy and the United Nations. The new policy is stated, however, to be that the rights under the Armistice and Surrender Instrument will be held in reserve, subject to overriding military needs, and that the controls provided for will be relaxed in the interests of developing in the Italian authorities greater responsibility and a greater measure of self-sufficiency.

2. In the light of the foregoing, policy directives on political, administrative and economic matters are included. A directive on financial matters is still under consideration.

Political Matters.

3. The relative responsibilities of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the civilian agencies of the respective governments are generally delineated (paragraph 2 A), it being stated that the directive is not intended to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who will continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments in matters of major policy and on such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission. The Ambassadors, in addition to dealing with the Italian Government on matters not falling within the foregoing categories, will serve as Political Advisors to the Allied Commission, the Political Section accordingly being eliminated.

4. As a step in removing the controls on the Italian Government's external relations, direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives is permitted (paragraph 2 B). Also, it is stated to be the Allied desire [illegible] cultural interchange between Italy and the United Nations be facili- [illegible] (paragraph 2 F).

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continue to be the basis of the relationships between [illegible]
Nations. The new policy is stated, however, to be that the rights under the Armistice and Surrender Instrument will be held in reserve, subject to overriding military needs, and that the controls provided for will be relaxed in the interests of developing in the Italian authorities greater responsibility and a greater measure of self-sufficiency.

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4. As a step in removing the controls on the Italian Government's external relations, direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives is permitted (paragraph 2 B). Also, it is stated to be the Allied desire that cultural interchange between Italy and the United Nations be facilitated as far as exigencies of the military situation permit (paragraph 2 F).

5. In the direction of removing internal controls upon the Italian Government, the present practice of the Allied Commission of approving decrees and legislation and approving appointments in territory under Italian Government jurisdiction is to be abandoned, with certain saving clauses in each case. With the same object, it is laid down that all Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in Italian Government territory are to be withdrawn as soon as possible, reserving, however, the right of sending personnel into such territory when Allied interests so require. 5461

6. The previous suggestion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that arrangements be entered into with the Italian Government looking to the modification of the status of Italian prisoners repatriated to Italy is reaffirmed, such status to be terminated only upon terms satisfactory to SAC (paragraph 2 H).

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Administrative Matters.

7. While the directive recognizes that the internal organization of the Allied Commission is primarily the responsibility of SAC, guidance is given as to the reorganization of the Commission in certain respects. The policy appears to be to confine the activities of the Allied Commission with respect to the Italian Government territory to advice and consultation (paragraphs 2 A and B). This is to be exercised at high levels and in certain specified instances only when requested by the Italian Government. The Commission is to be "civilianized" to the extent practicable, except in the case of the service Subcommissions and as to functions related to AMG. With respect to the latter, it is suggested that officers dealing with such functions should be physically separated from the AC Headquarters (paragraph 2 D).

Economic Matters.

8. The Economic Section of the directive stresses the necessity of maximum internal production. It reserves the right of the Allies to take the necessary steps if appropriate economic controls are not adopted and implemented by the Italian Government.

9. The economic directive also reaffirms that basic supplies (food, fuel, clothing, medicine, etc.) will continue as a military responsibility for the duration of combined operations. Also specifically made part of the military program are supplies (fertilizer, raw materials, etc.) which will reduce imports of basic supplies under the disease and unrest formula. It is made clear, however, that the effect of these supplies need not be felt during the period of combined military responsibility. There are also included as within the military responsibility supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against Germany and Japan.

10. The preparation of the non-military rehabilitation program, to be procured and financed by the two Governments through other than military channels, is to be the responsibility of the Italian Government and is to be transmitted to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee through CCAC with comments by the AC, but will not be subject to screening by this Headquarters.

11. The economic section of the directive also contains answers to two of the three questions raised in NAF 778. The responsibility for the control of inflation is, in line with the general purposes of the directive, made the primary responsibility of the Italian Government (paragraph 7 A). It is also provided (paragraph 7 B) that industrial rehabilitation should be carried out by the Italian Government in accordance with priorities deter-

1638

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12. A general saving clause appears (paragraph 8) with regard to shipping. The directive is not to be taken as a commitment in respect of shipping or as affecting the existing procedure for shipping allocations. 5460

13. Detailed directives to the Allied Commission implementing FAN 487 are under consideration in this Headquarters.

(Intd) C.M.S.

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16th February, 1945

FEB 18 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION
OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Deputy Air Commander - in - Chief

1. In accordance with what I understand to be the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions and giving the Italians themselves more responsibility, it has been thought necessary to revise the directive (Annex II) to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

2. The revised directive (Annex I) which it is proposed to issue is attached hereto for the consideration of the Political Committee who, I suggest should be asked to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-

(a) Whether the underlying conception is in accordance with the general policy now being followed by the Allied Commission.

(b) Whether this directive in any way conflicts with the policy under which the Italian Army and Navy are controlled.

and

(c) Whether it provides for adequate safeguards against the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, such as it is, being ruined by political activities among Italian Air Force officers.

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K-60
ANNEX I

TO : Air Vice-Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, C.B.E., D.F.C.
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

FROM : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on 7th December 1944, under reference No. JCS.1821.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

As representative of Air C-in-C on theAllied Commission your functions will be as follows :-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorised manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY .

Your primary function, in general is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorised resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts

2457

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1941

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorised manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY .

Your primary function, in general is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorised resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the I.A.F; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any I.A.F personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the I.A.F; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which I.A.F personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the I.A.F authorities themselves.

Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under AFHQ whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.



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1942

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5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of M.A.F concerned with organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate ACC and his staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

6. Five squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the I.A.F authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against GERMANY, in which should be included such Communications units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is one for the Air C-in-C acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry do not maintain any units in excess of those authorised by the Air C-in-C.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate M.A.F subordinate Commander.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organisation, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ, M.A.F. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the M.A.F Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorised, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organising the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the I.A.F and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.

5456

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the

1943

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administration and maintenance of the Italian ...
normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the MAAF Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

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10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.

11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of HQ, MAAF, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at HQ MAAF.

Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

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ANNEX II

TO: Air Vice Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, CBE, DFC.
Air Force Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Date: 7th December, 1944. Ref: JCS.1821.

Your duties as senior officer of the Air Forces Sub-commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should hence-forth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.

5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.

6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorised ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any

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in-Chief, Mediterranean. [illegible] of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.

5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.

6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorised ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any Intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

(sgd) J.C. SLESSOR,
Air Marshal
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 3. (Withdrawal)
6th February, 1945

COPY NO. 36

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

REDEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF PWB

Note by Secretary

1. In consequence of the issue of Staff Memorandum No. 13 on 5 February defining responsibilities for Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theatre, the Chief of Staff has directed that Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 be withdrawn.

2. Copy holders are accordingly requested to return their copies as soon as possible to this Secretariat.

3. Points of detail covered in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 which are not explicitly dealt with in Staff Memorandum No. 13 will be handled through the usual channels in accordance with the procedures laid down in Staff Memorandum No. 13.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
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2. Copy holders are accordingly requested to return their copies as soon as possible to this Secretariat.

3. Points of detail covered in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 which are not explicitly dealt with in Staff Memorandum No. 13 will be handled through the usual channels in accordance with the procedures laid down in Staff Memorandum No. 13.

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| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 | 16-17 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 18 |
| Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF | 19-23 |
| U.S. Political Adviser | 24-26 |
| British Resident Minister | 27-30 |
| Director, PWB | 31-35 |
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| Secretary, General Staff | 39 |

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7 January 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO. 31

HEADQUARTERS
8 JAN 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by the Secretary

1. It was stated by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission at SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting (Minute 3) that the Italian Government was about to issue a statement concerning the agreements executed between the Committee of National Liberation for NORTHERN ITALY, on the one hand, and the Allied Command and the Italian Government, respectively, on the other.

2. Attached at ANNEX "A" is a translation by the Allied Commission of the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944 after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note.

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COLONEL,
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| Chief of Staff | 15 |

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| Chief Administrative Officer | 16 |
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| British Resident Minister | 21-24 |
| Director, PWB | 25 |
| Secretary, General Staff | 26 |
| Secretary, IS & PS | 27-29 |
| Chief, Liaison Section | 30 |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission | 31-33 |
| G-1 (A) | 34 |
| G-1 (B) | 35 |
| G-2 | 36-37 |
| G-3 | 38-39 |
| G-3 Special Operations | 40 |
| G-4 (A) | 41 |
| G-4 (B) | 42 |
| G-5 | 43-45 |
| Spares | 46-50 |

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ANNEX "A"

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PRESS OFFICE

The President of the Council informs to have received the following message from the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy:

"The Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy, confronted with the urgent task that the anti-Nazi liberation war imposes on the new Italian democracy, conscious of the responsibilities of all people anxious for a free men's peace in this moment in which war is nearing its ultimate phase;

"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties

5453

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"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties in enemy occupied territory, is inaccurate. The Allied military authorities have not accorded any form of political recognition of the aforesaid Committee of Northern Italy, but they have agreed with it on military measures aiming to the prosecution of the war behind the enemy lines. On the other hand the Italian Government, having a wider sphere of action, has recognized the CLNAI as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the still occupied territories. As the consequence of this the Government have delegated the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy to represent them in the struggle that the patriots are waging against the Fascists and the Germans in the not yet liberated territories.

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
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| SERIAL NUMBER | FROM— | DATE | TO— | SYNOPSIS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | PsWSC (45) 1 AFHQ | 3 Jan 45 | | Note by PWB - Liquidation of PWB Functions in Italy |
| 5a | PsWSC (45) 2 AFHQ | 9 Jan 45 | | Propaganda to Balkans, respons. for. |
| 6 | PsWSC (45) Agenda 1st Meeting | 12 Jan 45 | | Agenda: Liquidation of PWB Functions in Italy |
| 7 | Minutes | 12 Jan 45 | | 1st Mtg on 'Reorganization of PWB IT. |
| 8 | Minutes | 17 Jan 45 | | 2nd Mtg on 'Reorganization of PWB It' |
| 9 | Ltr Griffing Bancroft | 18 Jan 45 | Edman | Recommendations for opn PWB News Div after press-radio in AC Italy is retd to commercial control. |
| 10 | Ltr Bancroft/Joe King | 20 Jan 45 | Edman | Needed frequencies & transmitters for opn of PWB News Div after press-radio in AC It is retd to commercial control |
| 11 | Ltr PWB, Passaglia | 22 Jan 45 | Edman, Barnes | New activities of PWB Unit 12 Monitoring Division. |
| 12 | Ltr, Geo Edman | 3 Feb 45 | Stone | Servicing of PWB 15th Army Group (Drft |
| 13 | Memo Macmillan | 8 Feb 45 | DC | Position as between PWB & AC. |

5452

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