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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (SAC 45)
MAY - AUG. 1945

1957

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1002-2/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

=ALLIED COMMISSION=

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File under No. 1002-2 SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (SAC (45))

PAPERS & NOTES

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
52	AFHQ MJPS P/306 Final	31 Jul 45		Interim policy for future of Italian Armed Forces.
53	AFHQ MJPS P/309 Final	31 Jul 45		Peace treaty with Italy.
54	SAC (45) 8	7 Aug 45		Jug War Booty in Venezia Giulia.
55	SAC (45) 9	7 Aug 45		Peace treaty with Italy.
56	SAC (45) 10	8 Aug 45		Anglo-American Association, proposed.
57	SAC (45) 11	11 Aug 45		Peace treaty with Italy.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
33	SAC (P) (45) ~~29~~ 28	29 May 45		Dissolution of PWB in Italy.
34	SAC (P) (45) ~~28~~ 27	29 May 45		Italian Production Advisory Board.
34a	MJPS P/296 Final	3 Jun 45		Policy for occupation Venezia Giulia.
35	SAC (P) (45) 29	4 Jun 45		Policy in regard to Venezia Giulia.
36	SAC (P) (45) 30	12 Jun 45		Withdrawal of French fr NW Italy.
37	SAC (P) (45) 31	16 Jun 45		Transfer of resp for news distr frPWB
38	SAC (P) (45) 32	21 Jun 45		Film distribution in Italy.
39	SAC (P) (45) 33	3 Jul 45		Command in the Mediterranean Theater
40	SAC (P) (45) 34	10 Jul 45		Sailing of Merchant Vessels to Jugoslavia Ports
41	SAC (P) (45) 35	17 Jul 45		Italian Institutional Question
42	SAC (P) (45) 36	17 JUL 45		POSTWAR COMMITMENTS IN MED - REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY
	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ + +
43	SAC (45) 1	20 Jul 45		((P) & (O) Conferences discontinued - Only "SAC's CONFERENCE" now).
44	SAC (45) 2	22 Jul 45		Command in the Mediterranean Theater.
45	SAC (45) 3	22 Jul 45		Future Policy Toward Italy.
46	AFHQ MJPS P/307 Final	23 Jul 45		Retention amphibious lift in MTO.
47	AFHQ MJPS P/308 Final	23 Jul 45		Future Policy Toward Italy.
48	SAC (45) 4	24 Jul 45		Ital claims in regard to Venezia Giulia
49	SAC (45) 5	24 Jul 45		Reorganization of RAF comd in Italy.
50	SAC (45) 6	24 Jul 45		It Institutional Question;Nenni speech
51	SAC (45) 7	27 Jul 45		Future Policy Toward Italy.

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Chief Cook

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (45) 11
11th August 1945

COPY NO. 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. With reference to the discussion at SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5, a copy of the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff is attached. This letter, a draft of which was circulated as Paper No. SAC (45) 9, was despatched on 10 August 1945.

2. The documents are therefore circulated for information.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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EC DIST - 13 Aug 45

31 Chief Cook

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SECRETARY.

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EC List - 13 Aug 45

31 Chief Cmnr
32 Exec Cmnr
33 Political Advisers

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

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CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1945

DECLASSIFIED
JCS 1/4/74
LEWIS 7/31/74

SUBJECT: Peace Treaty with ITALY.

TO : The Secretary,
The British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Reference your COS/999/5 of 10 July 1945.

1. I have had the paper, prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, studied on an Allied basis by my staff. Although the views which follow are my own, in formulating them, I have consulted Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, AOC-in-C RAF MEDME and the Co manders-in-Chief of the US forces in this Theatre. My American colleagues have however received no directions from their own government on the subject.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report, and on which the proposed military clauses are based, it appears that the treaty is to have the following objects:

a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous state.

b. To encourage ITALY to be friendly towards us and to be a member of any Western European system which may emerge.

c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.

d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile completely with c and d. As a result it appears that a compromise between these aims is to be adopted. I feel therefore that we shall be running a considerable risk of achieving none of our aims if we attempt such a course of action.

5757

3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can

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3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can have few illusions left as to the wisdom of aggression. I believe, therefore, that objectives c and d have already been sufficiently achieved. However, if we are to attain objects a and b action is urgently required now by the US and UK Governments to avert the crisis in Italian affairs which will otherwise be inevitable in the course of the next few months. T is will involve assisting ITALY as a matter of urgency to reactivate her essential industries before unrest gives way to anarchy.

4. ITALY has been led to believe that the terms to be imposed at the Peace Treaty would be dependent on the way in which she has worked her passage since the Armistice. She has done her best, and has in fact provided us with considerable material assistance in the war against GERMANY. She has declared war on JAPAN. She therefore has some right to expect leniency, and no moderate Italian Government could accept a harsh treaty.

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5. The imposition of unacceptable terms on ITALY besides nullifying our present efforts to rehabilitate her, would inevitably precipitate conditions of anarchy in the country which would in the end reduce ITALY to the level of a Balkan state largely under Russian influence. Taking a long view I consider that this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the risk of ITALY being left in a condition where she might possibly, in the remote future, exercise some armed threat.

6. In this connection, I might mention that I am perturbed by the apparent intention of the phrasing of the draft military clauses, to give to RUSSIA, in ITALY, equal rights with the United States and the United Kingdom. I presume that this can only have been contemplated in exchange for similar rights for the United States and United Kingdom in the Peace Treaties with the Eastern and Southeastern European States. The advisability of such a "quid pro quo" is not a matter for me to judge. I can only state that the effect in ITALY will be most unfortunate.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

7. In my opinion the size of the Italian armed forces to be permitted by the Peace Treaty must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to deter an attack upon her frontiers, particularly from JUGOSLAVIA. (It follows that, should ITALY be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, her requirements for armed forces would be appropriately increased.)

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principle Allied powers.

8. In attempting to apply fully the consideration in paragraph 7 c above, there is the danger, referred to above, that we might impose on ITALY an unduly harsh peace. This must be resisted and I am of the opinion that certain of the restrictions which it is suggested should be imposed on the Italian armed forces should therefore be modified so as to make them rather less harsh. 5756

9. My detailed comments on the draft clauses prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff are attached in the Appendix to this letter. I emphasize that they are based on the assumption that the draft political clauses of the treaty, on which I have not been asked to comment, will require ITALY to cede the territories listed in paragraph 4 of the report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff.

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H.R. Alexander
Field Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

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APPENDIX A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

Reference in the left hand margin are to Sections and paras of draft heads of naval, military and air clauses.

Section I

1 & 2. The present draft Section I would permit US, UK, USSR and FRANCE to station troops in ITALY and to demand full military facilities there. It is considered that the stationing of Russian or French troops in ITALY would be a deplorable step and one which might precipitate a most dangerous situation. Further, in the case of the Russians, such a step would be wholly at variance with our object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

It is considered that no provision should be made for the stationing of Russian or French troops in ITALY. It would be most difficult, and probably undesirable, to word clauses which give USA and UK the right to station troops in ITALY and denied this right to USSR and FRANCE. It is considered therefore that such arrangements as are required for the period while British and US forces remain in ITALY, should be made the subject of a separate civil and military affairs agreement, between USA and UK on one hand and ITALY on the other. The whole of Section I should therefore be deleted from the treaty and included in this alternative agreement.

The duration of Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA is at present undetermined. If and when suggested civil and military affairs agreement with ITALY is concluded it is suggested that we should not limit our right to station troops in ITALY only up to 1950 but rather for as long as we consider necessary. Besides granting full facilities necessary to maintain such forces as we consider necessary in ITALY, ITALY should also grant full freedom of movement to these forces. It is important also that besides obtaining the use of all port, airfield and other facilities in ITALY while we continue to station forces there, ITALY should also grant us the control of these facilities.

Section II

3. In view of the comments on Section I above and of the fact that ITALY

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troops in ITALY would be a deplorable step and [illegible]
precipitate a most dangerous situation. Further, in the case of the Russians, such a step would be wholly at variance with our object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

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Section II

3. In view of the comments on Section I above and of the fact that ITALY has declared war on JAPAN it is agreed that para 3 should be deleted from the military clauses and its provisions except para 3 a should be covered by mutual agreement with such of the Allies as are at war with JAPAN. If the provisions of Section I amended as suggested above are made the subject of a civil and military affairs agreement between USA, UK and ITALY para 3 a would be adequately covered.

There are in ITALY certain blue-prints and experimental models which could be of considerable value to the Allies in the war against JAPAN. It is suggested therefore that a new para 3 should be substituted as follows: "ITALY to render to the principal Allied powers all information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations in the war against JAPAN, whether such information be publicly or privately owned."

4. The Allies may wish to use Italian manpower in some of the Italian

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territory which is taken away from her by this treaty. On the other hand, the right to use Italian manpower for labour outside Italian territories, as at present worded, is too wide, as the Russians, having declared war against JAPAN, would be in a position to deport Italians for labour in SIBERIA. The right of USA and UK to use Italians in their own countries where they are at present employed should also be safeguarded. It is suggested therefore that the provisions of para 4 should also be omitted from these draft clauses and included in the military and civil affairs agreement.

5. It is not desirable to require ITALY to furnish supplies for the Russian and French forces in AUSTRIA and GERMANY. Moreover, ITALY is in any event incapable of producing such supplies in any quantity. It is, therefore, recommended that this paragraph be deleted.

6. No comment.

Section III

7. No comment.

8. No comment.

9. No comment

10. It would be difficult to determine what weapons are of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature. It is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

11 & 12. The desirability of stating that the short term limitations will last "until 1950 or for such lesser period as the principal Allied Powers may decide" is open to question. The removal of these limitations should, as indicated at para 12, be dependent on a change of circumstances rather than on the mere passage of time. Such a change of circumstances may occur either before or after 1950. On the other hand, the stipulation of a definite date, although probably more acceptable to the Italian Government, will tend to prevent pressure being exercised towards effecting the removal of the limitations unduly early. On balance, it is considered that the following one paragraph should be substituted for the draft paragraphs 11 and 12.

5754

"Additional Limitations"

" Until such time as the principal Allied Powers may decide otherwise, the Italian Armed Forces will be subject to the limitations set out in Sections IV to VII below. Some or all of these limitations will be removed when the principal Allied Powers are satisfied that circumstances obtaining do not require their retention and that ITALY has complied with the Peace Treaty."

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7. No comment.

8. No comment.

9. No comment

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Alterations in this sense should be made throughout the remaining sections of the draft treaty.

Section IV

13. The Italian Navy is the only one of the three Italian armed Services which has maintained a good esprit de corps. It is important therefore that, while the Italian Navy must be reduced this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian morale unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships, or other warships to RUSSIA would for example have a most unfortunate effect. It is believed that most thinking people in ITALY realise that the financial strain involved

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will in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. It may not be difficult therefore to persuade ITALY to do without battleships altogether and accept additional cruisers instead. It is considered that ITALY should be allowed to break up or sink such capital ships as she is not allowed to retain.

14. The recommendation that the Italian Navy should be manned on a voluntary long term engagement is not concurred in, since the long-term volunteer is of greater efficiency than the short-term conscript. Long term engagements tend to create a highly-trained nucleus suitable to rapid expansion in time of war. Moreover, ITALY is unlikely to be able to support financially a long-term Navy, and it is considered that the system of manning, should, therefore, remain unchanged, i.e. conscription.

The ceiling of 12,000 will probably be sufficient for manning the sea-going ships which it is proposed that ITALY should be allowed to keep. In view however of the commitments recently assumed ashore by the Italian Navy some small increase may be needed, and should be authorised if so recommended by the Allied Inspectorate.

It is therefore recommended that para 14 should be redrafted as follows : -

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 12,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a conscription basis as at present."

15. In the past the Italians have shown considerable aptitude for individual naval assault operations. It is suggested therefore that the last sentence should be deleted and the following substituted : - "No aircraft carriers, submarines, or submersible or surface craft intended for use on operations of a nature heretofore carried out by Italian "special assault craft" to be retained or constructed".

16. No comment.

17. No comment.

18. No comment.

Section V

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19. No comment.

20. No comment.

21. No comment.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

It is therefore recommended that para 14 should be redrafted as follows : -

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 18,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a conscription basis as at present."

15. In the past the Italians have shown considerable aptitude for individual naval assault operations. It is suggested therefore that the last sentence should be deleted and the following substituted : - "No aircraft carriers, submarines, or submersible or surface craft intended for use on operations of a nature heretofore carried out by Italian "special assault craft" to be retained or constructed".

16. No comment.

17. No comment.

18. No comment.

5753

Section V

19. No comment.

20. No comment.

21. No comment.

22. No comment.

23. It would be difficult to determine what weapons were of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature and it is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

Section VI

24. It is considered that provision should be made for an air-sea rescue squadron and for training aircraft. It is therefore suggested that new sub-paras as under should be added : -

"c. One air-sea rescue squadron".

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"d. A training school of such capacity as the Allied Inspectorate considers necessary together with sufficient training aircraft to maintain the above squadrons."

Provision should also be made for reserve aircraft for each squadron and the following addition is suggested to the last sentence of para 24:-

"together with a reserve of aircraft which will not exceed 20% of the types in the squadrons."

25. In view of the suggested addition of an air-sea rescue squadron and training school a ceiling of "approximately 10,000" should become "a maximum of 12,000."

26. No comment.

27. No comment.

28. No comment.

29. No comment.

Section VII

30. Paras 11 and 12 imply that the provisions of Sections IV and VII contain only short-term limitations. Further it is considered that the provisions of para 30 are adequately covered in para 10. It is suggested that para 30 should be deleted altogether.

31. It is possible that an attempt might be made to evade certain of the limitations by claiming that war material was privately owned. The words "either publicly or privately" should, therefore, be inserted between "own" and "any" in para 31 a.

Section VIII

32. German war material should be expressly stated to include blue-prints and experimental models. It is suggested therefore that para 32 should read: -

"All German war material, including blue-prints, prototypes, experimental models and plans, unless expressly excluded by the Allied Inspectorate to be placed at the disposal of the principal Allied Powers."

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33. See comment in para 13 above regarding the disposal of surplus capital ships.

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29. No comment.

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33. See comment in para 13 above regarding the disposal of surplus capital ships.

Section IX

34. It should be noted that if BOLZANO is retained in ITALY under the Peace Treaty a large number of people who have been German nationals will become Italian nationals. Under the provisions of this clause such individuals will be precluded from employment or training as technicians.

Section X

35. No comment.

36. No comment.

Section XI

37. No comment.

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38. No comment.

Part XIV

39. No comment.

40. No comment.

41. No comment.

GENERAL

There are certain points which may already be included in the Peace Treaty or which might more conveniently be included in separate agreements, such as the proposed civil and military affairs agreement, which may be concluded with ITALY. In order that they shall not be over-looked these points are set out below: -

a. Allied Inspectorate

The Allied Inspectorate should be afforded full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities. The question of payment and status including the granting of diplomatic immunity should also be included.

b. Taxes

All Allied Forces stationed in ITALY should be expressly exempt from Italian taxes.

c. Legal Proceedings

All Allied Forces stationed in ITALY should be expressly exempt from liability to Italian legal proceedings.

Enforcement of Orders

d. Provision should be made for a method of dealing with Italian nationals who violate any orders or regulations issued by the Allied Inspectorate.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

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BCS for AC
AUG 10 RECD

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 10
8th August 1945

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

Note by Secretary

1. The latest views of United States and British Commands in Northwest EUROPE, in regard to the scope and organization of the proposed Anglo-American Association of members of Allied Commands, are contained in USFET signal S-97287 of 13 July.

2. In order to concert views of this subject, a conference was held at Headquarters, Fifth Army, at which all three services and the principal subordinate commands in this theatre were represented.

3. As a result of this meeting the Chief Administrative Officer recommends that the Supreme Allied Commander should approve the dispatch of the draft signal at Annexure 1.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Northwest EUROPE, in regard to the proposed Anglo-American Association of members of the [illegible] contained in USFET signal S-97287 of 13 July.

2. In order to concert views of this subject, a conference was held at Headquarters, Fifth Army, at which all three services and the principal subordinate commands in this theatre were represented.

3. As a result of this meeting the Chief Administrative Officer recommends that the Supreme Allied Commander should approve the dispatch of the draft signal at Annexure 1.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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DRAFT

ANNEXURE 1

ACTION: USFET MAIN, C.M.L.

INFO : USFET REAR

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

Further to our C 7421 of 16 Jul, not to all, and your S 97287 of 13 Jul.

1. Commanders wholly in accord with proposed Association and this thea tre will provide whole-hearted cooperation. Following comment offered on proposals your S 97287.

2. Object of Association. Prefer wording to permit wider membership than Europe and Mediterranean theatres. Suggest "To preserve and perpetuate the spirit of cooperation and amity which has existed between those personnel of the United States and the British Empire who have served together during the present war."

3. Membership:

a. Initial Charter Membership to be open to all personnel of Armed Forces of United States and British Empire who have served in present war and to those civilians of either nationality who have served in a recognised capacity under control of Allied ground, naval or air commander.

b. Future expansion of membership to be decided by Association after forming, but recommend policy be adopted of admitting all future members of armed forces of United States and British Empire.

5749

4. Functions of Association:

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ship than Europe and Mediterranean theatres. Suggest [illegible]

perpetuate the spirit of cooperation and amity which has existed between those personnel of the United States and the British Empire who have served together during the present war."

3. Membership:

a. Initial Charter Membership to be open to all personnel of Armed Forces of United States and British Empire who have served in present war and to those civilians of either nationality who have served in a recognised capacity under control of Allied ground, naval or air commander.

b. Future expansion of membership to be decided by Association after forming, but recommend policy be adopted of admitting all future members of armed forces of United States and British Empire.

5749

4. Functions of Association:

a. While agreeing your third para, suggest that initial organisation and functions are not on too ambitious scale. Early activities might include:-

(1) Maintenance of small secretariats in NEW YORK and LONDON, with duties to compile and publish information on the addresses of members and to assist visiting members wherever possible.

(2) Preparation by those Secretariats of regular periodical giving information on members and their movements.

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(3) Provision for members of a distinguishing badge.

(4) Organisation of a Central Reunion, if found possible, to be left to decision of members.

b. Subsequent development to be left to decision of members, but two avenues apparent:-

(1) Encourage mutual exchange of students from Navy, Army and Air Force Colleges.

(2) Encourage similar exchange, in temporary attachment, of personnel serving in Armed Forces of two nations.

Such exchanges to be organised by two governments.

5. Organisation. Your sixth para agreed. Minority suggestion put forward by General Mark Clark urges further organisation into 'chapters', each 'chapter' on basis of army or equivalent formation.

6. Subscription. Consider flat rate on joining most feasible.

7. Immediate development.

a. Present command responsibility to continue until production of Charter of Association.

b. Initiative to start Association to be taken by USFET/CINCFE and AFHQ. To this end grateful any further information you now have and your views on meeting suggested in our C 7421

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Such exchanges to be organised by the g...

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b. Initiative to start Association to be taken by USFET/C.L.L. and AFHQ. To this end grateful any further information you now have and your views on meeting suggested in our C 7421

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 9
7th August 1945

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COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. In view of the discussion at SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 9, the Joint Planning Staff were instructed to revise their study No. P/309 (Final).

2. An examination of their revised study has also been made and as a result it is recommended that the attached reply be despatched to the Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the despatch of this letter.

J.C. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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(Final).

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3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the despatch of this letter.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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To: Secretary, British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Reference your COS/999/5 of 10 July 45.

1. I have had the paper, prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, studied on an Allied basis by my staff. Although the views which follow are my own, in formulating them, I have consulted Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, AOC-in-C RAF MEDME and the Commanders-in-Chief of the US forces in this Theatre. My American colleagues have however received no directions from their own government on the subject.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report, and on which the proposed military clauses are based, it appears that the treaty is to have the following objects:

a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous state.

b. To encourage ITALY to be friendly towards us and to be a member of any Western European system which may emerge.

c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.

d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile completely with c and d. As a result it appears that a compromise between these aims is to be adopted. I feel therefore that we shall be running a considerable risk of achieving none of our aims if we attempt such a course of action.

3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can have few illusions left as to the wisdom of aggression. I believe therefore that objectives c and d have already been suffi c-

2776

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3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can have few illusions left as to the wisdom of aggression. I believe therefore that objectives c and d have already been sufficiently achieved. However, if we are to attain objects a and b action is urgently required now by the US and UK Governments to avert the crisis in Italian affairs which will otherwise be inevitable in the course of the next few months. This will involve assisting ITALY as a matter of urgency to rehabilitate her essential industries before unrest gives way to anarchy.

4. ITALY has been led to believe that the terms to be imposed at the Peace Treaty would be dependent on the way in which she has worked her passage since the Armistice. She has done her best, and has in fact provided us with considerable material assistance in the war against GERMANY. She therefore has some right to expect leniency, and no moderate Italian Government could accept a harsh treaty.

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5. The imposition of unacceptable terms on ITALY besides nullifying our present efforts to rehabilitate her, would inevitably precipitate ~~anarchist~~ conditions in the country which would in the end reduce ITALY to the level of a Balkan state largely under Russian influence. Taking a long view I consider that this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the risk of ITALY being left in a condition where she might possibly, in the remote future, exercise some armed threat.

6. In this connection, I might mention that I am perturbed by the apparent intention of the phrasing of the draft military clauses, to give to RUSSIA, in ITALY, equal rights with the United States and the United Kingdom. I presume that this can only have been contemplated in exchange for similar rights for the United States and United Kingdom in the Peace Treaties with the Eastern and Southeastern European States. The advisibility of such a "quid pro quo" is not a matter for me to judge. I can only state that the effect in ITALY will be most unfortunate.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

7. In my opinion the size of the Italian armed forces to be permitted by the Peace Treaty must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to deter an attack upon her frontiers, particularly from JUGOSLAVIA.

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.

8. In attempting to apply fully the consideration in paragraph 7 c above, there is the danger, referred to above, that we might impose on ITALY an unduly

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5745

for the United States and United Kingdom in the Peace Treaties with the Eastern and Southeastern European States. The advisibility of such a "quid pro quo" is not a matter for me to judge. I can only state that the effect in ITALY will be most unfortunate.

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b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to deter an attack upon her frontiers, particularly from JUGOSLAVIA.

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers. 5745

8. In attempting to apply fully the consideration in paragraph 7 c above, there is the danger, referred to above, that we might impose on ITALY an unduly harsh peace. This must be resisted and I am of the opinion that certain of the restrictions which it is suggested should be imposed on the Italian armed forces should therefore be modified so as to make them rather less harsh.

9. My detailed comments on the draft clauses prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff are attached in the Appendix to this letter. I emphasize that they are based on the assumption that the draft political clauses of the treaty, on which I have not been asked to comment, will require ITALY to cede the territories listed in paragraph 4 of the report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff. Should ITALY be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, her requirements for armed forces would be appropriately increased.

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APPENDIX

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

IT.LIAN PEACE TREATY

Reference in the left hand margin are to Sections and paras of draft heads of naval, military and air clauses.

Section I

1 & 2. The present draft Section I would permit US, UK, USSR and FRANCE to station troops in ITALY and to demand full military facilities there. It is considered that the stationing of Russian or French troops in ITALY would be a deplorable step and one which might precipitate a most dangerous situation. Further, in the case of the Russians, such a step would be wholly at variance with our object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

It is considered that no provision should be made for the stationing of Russian or French troops in ITALY. It would be most difficult, and probably undesirable, to word clauses which gave USA and UK the right to station troops in ITALY and denied this right to USSR and FRANCE. It is considered therefore that such arrangements as are required for the period while British and US forces remain in ITALY, should be made the subject of a separate civil and military affairs agreement, between USA and UK on one hand and ITALY on the other. The whole of Section I should therefore be deleted from the treaty and included in this alternative agreement.

The duration of Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA is at present undetermined. If and when the suggested civil and military affairs agreement with ITALY is concluded it is suggested that we should not limit our right to station troops in ITALY only up to 1950 but rather for as long as we consider necessary. Besides granting full facilities necessary to maintain such forces as we consider necessary in ITALY, ITALY should also grant full freedom of movement to these forces. It is important also that besides obtaining the use of all port, airfield and other facilities in ITALY, while we continue to station forces there, ITALY should also grant us the control of these facilities.

Section II

3. In view of the comments on Section I above and of the fact that ITALY has declared war on JAPAN it is agreed that para 3 should be deleted from the military clauses and its provisions except para 3 a should be covered by mutual agreement with such of the Allies

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There are in ITALY certain blue-prints and experimental models which could be of considerable value to the Allies in the war against JAPAN. It is suggested therefore that a new para 3 should be substituted as follows: "ITALY to render to the principal Allied powers all information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations in the war against JAPAN."

4. The Allies may wish to use Italian manpower in some of the Italian territory which is taken away from her by this treaty. On the other hand, the right to use Italian manpower for labour outside Italian territories, as at present worded, is too wide, i.e. in the event of the Russians declaring war against JAPAN they would be in a position to deport Italians for labour in SIBERIA. The right of USA and UK to use Italians in their own countries where they are at present employed should also be safeguarded. It is suggested therefore that the provisions of para 4 should also be omitted from these draft clauses and included in the military and civil affairs agreement.

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5. No comment.

6. No comment.

Section III

7. No comment.

8. No comment.

9. No comment.

10. It would be difficult to determine what weapons are of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature. It is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

11. No comment.

12. No comment.

Section IV

13. The Italian Navy is the only one of the three Italian armed services which has maintained a good esprit de corps. It is important therefore that, while the Italian Navy must be reduced this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian ~~prestige~~ morale unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships, or other warships to RUSSIA would for example have a most unfortunate effect. It is believed that most thinking people in ITALY realise that the financial strain involved will in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. It may not be difficult therefore to persuade ITALY to do without battleships altogether and accept additional cruisers instead. It is considered that ITALY should be allowed to break up or sink such capital ships as she is not allowed to retain.

14. The recommendation that the Italian Navy should be manned on a voluntary long term engagement is not concurred in, since the long-term volunteer is of greater efficiency than the short-term conscript. Long term engagements tend to create a highly-trained nucleus suitable to rapid expansion in time of war. Moreover, ITALY is unlikely to be able to support financially a long-term Navy, and it is considered that the system of manning, should, therefore, remain unchanged, i.e. conscription.

The ceiling of 18,000 will probably be sufficient for manning the sea-going ships which it is proposed that ITALY should be allowed to keep. In view however of the commitments recently assumed ashore by the Italian Navy some small increase may be needed, and should be authorised if so recommended by the Allied Inspectorate. 27/43

It is therefore recommended that para 14 should be redrafted as

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12. No comment.

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It is therefore recommended that para 14 should be redrafted as follows:-

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 18,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a conscription basis as at present."

15. In the past the Italians have shown considerable aptitude for individual naval assault operations. It is suggested therefore that the last sentence should be deleted and the following substituted:- "No aircraft carriers, submarines, or submersible or surface craft intended for use on operations of a nature heretofore carried out by Italian "special assault craft" to be retained or constructed".

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16. No comment.

17. No comment.

18. No comment.

Section V

19. No comment.

20. No comment.

21. No comment.

22. No comment.

23. It would be difficult to determine what weapons were of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature and it is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

Section VI

24. It is considered that provision should be made for an air-sea rescue squadron and for training aircraft. It is therefore suggested that new sub-paras as under should be added:-

"c. One air-sea rescue squadron."

"d. A training school of such capacity as the Allied Inspectorate considers necessary together with sufficient training aircraft to maintain the above squadrons."

Provision should also be made for reserve aircraft for each squadron and the following addition is suggested to the last sentence of para 24:-

"together with a reserve of aircraft which will not exceed 20% of the types in the squadrons."

25. In view of the suggested addition of an air-sea rescue squadron and training school a ceiling of "approximately 10,000" should become "a maximum od 12,000."

26. No comment.

27. No comment.

28. No comment.

29. No comment.

5742

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22. No comment.

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26. No comment.

27. No comment. 5742

28. No comment.

29. No comment.

Section VII

30. Paras 11 and 12 imply that the provisions of Sections IV and VII contain only short-term limitations. Further it is considered that the provisions of para 30 are adequately covered in para 10. It is suggested that para 30 should be deleted altogether.

31. No comment.

Section VIII

32. German war material should be expressly stated to include blue-prints and experimental models. It is suggested therefore that para 32 should read:-

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"All German war material, including blue-prints, prototypes, experimental models and plans, unless expressly excluded by the Allied Inspectorate to be placed at the disposal of the principal Allied Powers."

33. See comment in para 13 above regarding the disposal of surplus capital ships.

Section IX

34. It should be noted that if BOLZANO is (~~returned to~~ retained in) ITALY under the Peace Treaty a large number of people who have been German nationals will become Italian nationals. Under the provisions of this clause such individuals will be precluded from employment or training as technicians.

Section X

35. No comment.

36. No comment.

Section XI

37. No comment.

38. No comment.

Part XIV

39. No comment.

40. No comment.

41. No comment.

GENERAL

There are certain points which may already be included in the Peace Treaty or which might more conveniently be included in separate agreements, such as the proposed civil and military affairs agreement, which may be concluded with ITALY. In order that they shall not be over-looked these points are set out below:-

a. Allied Inspectorate

The Allied Inspectorate should be afforded full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities. The question of payment and status including the granting of diplomatic immunity should also be included.

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b. Tax

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Section XI

37. No comment.

38. No comment.

Part XIV

39. No comment.

40. No comment.

41. No comment.

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a. Allied Inspectorate

The Allied Inspectorate should be afforded full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities. The question of payment and status including the granting of diplomatic immunity should also be included.

5741

b. Taxes

All Allied Forces stationed in ITALY should be expressly exempt from Italian taxes.

c. Legal Proceedings

All Allied Forces stationed in ITALY should be expressly exempt from liability to Italian legal proceedings.

Enforcement of Orders.

d. Provision should be made for a method of dealing with Italian nationals who violate any orders or regulations issued by the Allied Inspectorate.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
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SAC (45) 8
7th August 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

JUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Secretary

1. At Annexure 1 is Appendix 'F' of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement which, subject to the provisions of international law, gave the Jugoslavs certain rights in connection with war booty in the Area of VENEZIA GIULIA coming under Anglo-American occupation.

2. There was initially some disagreement within this Headquarters as to whether goods, which were siezed by the Jugoslavs upon their occupation of the area and which prior to such occupation were considered to be the property of the neo-Fascist Italian government in Northern Italy, should be regarded as Jugoslav war booty.

(a) On the one hand it was argued that these goods were the de jure property of the Italian government in Rome and as this government was not at war with Jugoslavia such goods could not be classified as war booty.

(b) However, as it was considered that the Italian government in Rome could not dispose of property over which neither it nor the Allies had secured physical control, and also in view of the fact that the admission in principle of the Jugoslav claim to such property was a basic conception of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement, the point of view at (a) above was over-ruled.

3. Accordingly recommendations were made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in NAF 1026, relevant paragraphs of which are:

"4. It is proposed to release, with exceptions in para 5, property of governments or governmental agencies of nations at war with Jugoslavia, including Italy.

"5. Items essential to maintenance of law and order, to prevention of unrest and disease, to maintenance of public

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(a) On the one hand it was argued that these goods were the de jure property of the Italian government in Rome and as this government was not at war with Jugoslavia such goods could not be classified as war booty.

(b) However, as it was considered that the Italian government in Rome could not dispose of property over which neither it nor the Allies had secured physical control, and also in view of the fact that the admission in principle of the Jugoslav claim to such property was a basic conception of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement, the point of view at (a) above was over-ruled.

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"4. It is proposed to release, with exceptions in para 5 property of governments or governmental agencies of nations at war with Jugoslavia, including Italy.

"5. Items essential to maintenance of law and order, to prevention of unrest and disease, to maintenance of public utilities would not be released. Not released also would be such items as would necessitate replacement in kind by Allies. Enemy owned lire would be blocked for ultimate disposition on a governmental basis".

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, by FAN 599, approved the proposals of MAF 1026, except paragraph 5, in regard to which clarification was requested as to the relationship between these provisions and those of paragraph 1 of Annexure 1. This clarification has since been given by MAF 1053 and the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to paragraph 5 of MAF 1026 is awaited.

5. Meanwhile direction on shipping aspects of the war booty problem has been requested from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in MAF 1047.

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6. Assistent Chief of Staff, G-5, with the concurrence of G-4(B), G-4 (A), U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister accordingly propose that the draft directive at Annexure 2 should be issued to 13 Corps. This directive orders the release to the Jugoslavs of items which were captured by their forces and which were the property of governments (including Italy) at war with Jugoslavia. It places a temporary restriction on the return of any shipping items or items covered by paragraph 5 of NAF 1026, in regard to which the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is awaited.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the despatch of the directive at Annexure 2.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Normal

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ANNEXURE I

APPENDIX 'I' TO MORGAN-JOVANOVIC AGREEMENT

WAR BOOTY

1. It is agreed that enemy war material, captured by the Jugoslav forces in the area now coming under Allied military control, may be considered Jugoslav war booty, in accordance with the normal provisions of international law.

2. It is agreed that appropriate machinery must be set up to determine at the earliest possible moment Jugoslav claims respecting war booty. In view of the apparently complicated nature of the cases presented, the nature, constitution and powers of any commission or other tribunal which may be established to consider these matters will be reserved for later agreement upon fuller examination of the types of cases involved.

3. Meanwhile, officers representing Allied and Jugoslav Military Commands will dispose of as many cases as possible by mutual agreement locally. Names of Officers designated to conduct these negotiations will be exchanged within one week of the signing of this agreement.

4. The Allied commanders will have the right to forbid the removal of equipment claimed to be war booty until agreement has been reached under paragraph 3, or a decision rendered in accordance with paragraph 2. The Allied forces agree not to evacuate any war material or equipment which is claimed by the Jugoslav Army as war booty, until such an agreement or decision has been reached.

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D R A F T

ANNEXURE II

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

7 August 1945

SUBJECT: Jugoslav Claims for War Booty in Allied Occupied VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Headquarters XIII Corps.

1. There is attached hereto the initial list (Appendix *) of items claimed by the Jugoslavs as war booty under the provisions of Appendix 'F' (Appendix *) of the MORGAN-JOVANOVIC Agreement. You already have been provided with a copy of that Agreement.

2. It is desired that you open negotiations and effect releases as indicated herein below with the proper Jugoslav agency through the Jugoslav Mission at Headquarters XIII Corps for the return of such items as are authorized herein below.

3. In connection with paragraph 2 of Appendix 'F' of the Agreement it is desired that the "appropriate machinery" set up by you to deal with war booty shall include the Naval Officer in Charge, TRIESTE. Whether this machinery shall be one of the committees set up by Appendix 'I' of the Agreement or another organized solely in connection with war booty questions is a matter for your determination.

4. Early representations should be made to the Jugoslav authorities that any additional lists which they desire to submit must be submitted at an early and definite date to be determined by you. A period of two weeks after you have established your working organization is considered reasonable.

5. The following class of items will not for the present be released; those required to maintain law and order; to prevent disease and unrest; those required to maintain public utilities; and those which, if removed, would have to be replaced in kind for these aforementioned uses. Enemy owned lire and lire accounts will not be released but blocked for ultimate disposition on a governmental basis. For the present no ships (whether war or commercial) or port-operating equipment will be released. The matter of releases of the lire and shipping mentioned above in this paragraph is being given further consideration and you may expect authority to release certain ships and port equipment in the near future.

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6. Except for the lire and lire accounts and the shipping, the restrictions on release have little effect on the present claims as none of the items appearing on the present Jugoslav list seem to be within the categories to be withheld.

7. The Jugoslavs must of necessity show that the items claimed as war booty were the property of governments or governmental agencies at war with JUGOSLAVIA. The fact in itself that an item was of Italian governmental or governmental agency ownership is no bar to release to the Jugoslavs.

8. Full records will be kept at Headquarters XIII Corps of all items released to the Jugoslavs. All captured enemy material surplus after the demands of Marshal TITO have been considered will be disposed of in accordance with this Headquarters directive AG 386.3/163 LOG-O of 22 June 1945. "Disposition of Captured Enemy Material in ITALY." with amendments to date.

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9. In case the Jugoslavs raise the issue as to the failure to release all items listed in their original demand, they should be informed that items withheld, if any, under the restrictions of law and order, disease and unrest, and maintenance of public utilities are withheld in accordance with International Law, that the International Law in connection with the release of lire and lire accounts and shipping is so unclear that advice is being urgently sought.

10. For your information only, there is attached the recommendations (Appendix *) of C-in-C Med on shipping matters. These recommendations have been agreed and forwarded to the CCS for action.

11. Also for your information only is the fact that the CCS has questioned the compatibility of our proposed restrictions on release of items and para 1 of Appendix 'F' of the MORGAN-JOVANOVIC Agreement. A paraphrase of NAF 1026 (Appendix *) to CCS and of FAN 599 (Appendix *) from CCS are enclosed herewith.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Incls:
As above.

Copies to: C-in-C MED
C/S, AFHQ
CAO
G-5
ALCOM

*-NOTE: Appendices referred to are not attached to this draft.

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C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Incls:
As above.

Copies to: C-in-C MED
C/S, ARFHQ
CAO
G-5
ALCOM

*-NOTE: Appendices referred to are not attached to this draft.

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TOP SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SECRET
P.H.P.(45)2(Final).
June, 1945

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

Post Hostilities Planning Staff

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff

1. We have been instructed to report on the matters to be included in the naval, military, air and civil aviation clauses of the draft final Peace Treaty with Italy now being prepared by the Foreign Office. Our report is below, and at Annex are tentative heads for the clauses in question.

Political Background.

2. The Foreign Secretary has stated* that the Peace Treaty must be final as far as Italy is concerned, although it will not be possible to include in the settlement such matters as the final allocation of Italian territories.

He points out that it is in our interest that Italy should be re-established as a useful and prosperous European state, with a reasonable chance of livelihood and economic development, in order to prevent her turning to any form of communism and falling under Soviet influence. Further, owing to her geographical position, it is important that Italy should be friendly towards us and become a member of any Western European system which emerges after the war.

On the other hand, Italy must give up all pretences to be a Great Power, and we must prove to Italy and the world that aggression does not pay and that just retribution must be made for her past misdeeds.

3. From the above considerations the Foreign Secretary concludes that the Peace Treaty should provide for surrender of territory, a measure of disarmament and reparations from Italy, but these provisions should not be carried to such lengths as to endanger the internal stability of the country, or so to wound Italian susceptibilities as to make her permanently hostile towards us.

4. The draft political heads for the Peace Treaty prepared by the Foreign Office therefore propose that Italy should be required to cede to the Governments of the UK, USA, USSR and France, all right in respect to:

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a. Venezia Giulia;

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military, air and civil aviation. Our reports on Italy now being prepared by the Foreign Office. Our reports on Italy now being prepared by the Foreign Office. Our reports on Italy now being prepared by the Foreign Office

TOP SECRET

is to our advantage that this area should remain in Italy rather than under Soviet influence. We agree with this view.

The Foreign Office do not exclude the possibility that Italy may ultimately be granted a measure of responsibility for the administration of some of the territories she loses, e.g., some form of territorial trusteeship under the aegis of the World Organisation.

Military desiderata in relation to post-war Italy.

5. The lack of raw material in her territory and her difficult economic situation make it unlikely that Italy, by herself, will be in a position seriously to threaten world peace in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, owing to Italy's strategic position in the Central Mediterranean, it is most desirable that she should not again come under the control of a hostile or potentially hostile power. We conclude that it is in our long term strategic interest that we should be on friendly terms with Italy, and that she should be encouraged to look to the Western Powers for any assistance she may require.

Moreover, on the short term view, imposition of unduly harsh peace terms might lead to considerable unrest in Italy, particularly in the North, the suppression of which might devolve on us and form an unacceptable military commitment while we were preoccupied in the Far East and elsewhere. For the same reason Italy should not be so militarily weak as to be entirely unable to defend her frontiers against local aggression.

Rights and Facilities required by the Allies in Italy.

6. While it is highly desirable that the allied military commitment in Italy should be liquidated as rapidly as possible, nevertheless the right must be secured to the Allies to maintain forces in Italy as long as they find it necessary, in order to:

a. Safeguard Allied base areas and L of C into Austria.

b. Enforce, if necessary, the terms of the Peace Treaty.

In addition, the Allies may be called on to assist Italy to maintain law and order on her frontiers.

7. The Allies will require:

a. Full facilities in Italy to maintain their forces.

b. Port, airfield and other facilities and full transit rights by land, sea or air, e.g., for their L of C to zones of occupation in Austria.

We understand that the Foreign Office consider that these rights and facilities might be secured by a civil affairs agreement between the UK, USA and Italy, to

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7. The Allies will require:

a. Full facilities in Italy to maintain their forces.

b. Port, airfield and other facilities and full transit rights by land, sea or air, e.g., for their L of C to zones of occupation in Austria.

We understand that the Foreign Office consider that these rights and facilities might be secured by a civil affairs agreement between the UK, USA and Italy, to be concluded at the same time as the peace treaty. For political reasons the Foreign Office would prefer such an arrangement which would be acceptable from a military point of view.

Military Assistance required by the Allies from Italy.

8. The Chiefs of Staff have already expressed the view* that military assistance required from Italy for use in the war against Japan should be limited to the production of such war materials, and making available such of her dockyard and other facilities, including the use of her mercantile marine, as the Allies need. The direct use of Italian armed forces for this purpose is not envisaged, but the use of Italian manpower will be necessary.

9. The Allies may also require Italian co-operation in providing assistance in such matters as preventing the passage of war criminals across her frontiers and supplies for Allied forces occupying Austria. We have made no reference at

* C.O.S.(44)141.

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Annex to Italian participation in measures of relief and rehabilitation in, e.g., the Balkans, for such assistance as may be required by UNRRA or other bodies, since the Foreign Office will no doubt be taking appropriate action.

LIMITATIONS ON ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

10. Since the Allies do not wish to be burdened with an unacceptable military commitment, Italy should be allowed, even in the years immediately following the defeat of Germany, sufficient armed forces to maintain internal security, and to ensure that she is not an easy victim of local aggression, e.g., from Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, we cannot risk having trouble from Italy during this period, when our resources will be fully employed in the war with Japan, in occupational duties in Europe and in commitments in the Middle East and elsewhere. In particular, Italy must not have sufficient forces to threaten our Mediterranean communications, and her forces should not be so large as to encourage an aggressive policy on her part, for example, an attempt to pre-judge the final disposal of the territories she loses under the Peace Treaty.

Short Term Policy until 1950.

11. We therefore consider that the Italian armed forces should be progressively reduced (at a speed considered appropriate by the Allied Inspectorate) to what is necessary to preserve internal security, and to safeguard Italy's frontiers from local aggression by her neighbours. This limitation should be enforced for some five years, that is until 1950. During this period it will be impracticable for Italy to be required to provide additional armed forces for the World Organisation since such forces would defeat the purpose of these restrictions.

12. The size of the armed forces which Italy should be allowed during this time will clearly be considerably influenced by the nature of the territorial settlement eventually made by the Allies; this cannot be known for some time. The numerical limitations on the Italian armed forces, which we have recommended at Annex, are based on the assumption that Italy will lose all her overseas territories; ∅ and that such settlements will be made regarding her disputed frontier areas as will ensure reasonable stability during this period.

13. Navy. We are advised by the Foreign Office that the Italians regard the possession of a Navy as important to their prestige. The numerical assessment of the restrictions on the Italian Navy, proposed at Annex, is based on the consideration that while Italy will require sufficient surface ships to protect her shipping and her long coastline, her Navy should not, at any rate until 1950, be so strong as to upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean. We have also been guided by the fact that some of her ships have already been promised to the USSR, whilst other Powers (notably Greece) have requested an allocation of 578 warships as reparations.

In view of the extreme vulnerability of surface ships to submarine attack in the narrow seas of the Mediterranean, nothing short of the total prohibition of submarines and submersible craft will provide us with the necessary degree of security in these waters.

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In view of the extreme vulnerability of surface ships to submarine attack in the narrow seas of the Mediterranean, nothing short of the total prohibition of submarines and submersible craft will provide us with the necessary degree of security in these waters.

14. Army. Italian Land Forces will be required for two main purposes:

a. To maintain internal security;

b. To deter local aggression on the frontiers.

For these purposes we consider that, in addition to Carabinieri at their pre-war strength of 65,000, Italy should be allowed to retain an Army not exceeding 200,000.

This restricted figure will only operate for some five years; if the Italian Army were raised by conscription no substantial trained reserve of conscripts could be accumulated within this period. It is therefore immaterial whether the Army is raised by conscription or by voluntary enlistment, and we consider Italy should be permitted to adopt either system.

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Ø Sicily and Sardinia are not included.

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We are not in favour of the prohibition of certain types of equipment, such as tanks and heavy artillery. One of the purposes of the Italian Army will be to deter aggression by neighbouring states; this requires a balanced force with a proper proportion of tanks and heavy artillery in accordance with its defensive role.

15. Air Forces. Our object will be to discourage Italy from developing her Air Forces other than for her own defence until 1950. We consider that this object could be attained by restricting the Italian Air Force to a defensive force of Fighter Aircraft and possibly a small internal air transport force during this period. It will be necessary to ensure that the specifications of aircraft used or manufactured for the Italian Air Force during the continuance of these restrictions, are subject to the approval of the Allied Inspectorate.

16. War Material. It will be necessary to impose restrictions on the amount of Italian and Allied war material which Italy should be allowed to retain, corresponding to the limitations imposed on the size of her armed forces, and to control the manufacture, import and export of war material during this period. Italy should not be allowed to retain, or to continue to manufacture mines, torpedoes or any type of German or other ex-enemy war material, or to employ or train German or Japanese technicians.

17. Military Installations. It should not be necessary to destroy fortifications, airfields or other military installations in Metropolitan Italy, except in Sardinia and Sicily, where they would constitute a direct threat to our Mediterranean communications. Any increase in existing fortifications should be subject to the permission of the Allied Inspectorate.

Long Term Policy.

18. It is impracticable from a military point of view to commit ourselves now on the policy to be followed regarding the Italian forces after 1950, since it is impossible to foresee the conditions which will then prevail. It would, however, be difficult to enforce all the above restrictions indefinitely, and an attempt to do so would be likely to arouse considerable resentment in Italy, and prevent the co-operation with us, which is in our long term strategic interests. It would, at least by implication, throw the responsibility for the defence of Italian territory on the Allied Powers. Moreover, since economic factors are likely to prevent Italy becoming a major threat to world peace there would appear to be no good reason for the Allies to assume the burden of enforcing such restrictions in perpetuity. We therefore consider that should Italy wish to increase her armed forces after 1950, the Allied Powers should be prepared to agree to the removal of the majority of these restrictions, subject to confirmation that Italy has carried out the terms of the Peace Treaty, and in conformity with any general arrangements regarding the level of armaments which the World Organisation may have laid down.

19. We suggest, however, that Italy should in any case be required to observe the following restrictions in perpetuity:

a. Permanent [illegible]

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19. We suggest, however, that Italy should in any case be required to observe the following restrictions in perpetuity:

a. Permanent prohibition on naval, military and air installations in Sicily and Sardinia, except for such facilities as might be required by the World Organisation or for internal security purposes. Permanent limitation of the number and type of civil airfields in Sicily and Sardinia. We regard these restrictions as essential, in order to prevent the preparation of bases in this area which might be used to threaten our Mediterranean communications.

b. Prohibition on construction, or experiments for long-range weapons or similar installations of an offensive nature, and on mines, torpedoes and submarines or other submersible craft.

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(c) Prohibition on the employment or training of technicians who are, or have ever been, nationals of Germany or Japan.

Further, the Allies should take powers in the treaty to continue indefinitely such of the short term restrictions as shall seem necessary to them in the light of the circumstances then obtaining.

Allied Inspectorate.

20. It will be necessary to maintain an Allied Inspectorate in Italy, for so long as the short-term restrictions on Italian armed forces and war material production, outlined in paragraphs 11 to 17 above, are maintained. We presume that the Foreign Office will in due course examine the composition, organisation and functions of this Inspectorate.

Consideration will also have to be given to the machinery required to ensure that the permanent prohibitions referred to in the preceding paragraph are maintained, whether through the World Organisation or not.

CIVIL AVIATION

21. The use of civil aircraft by Italy in the immediate future may well prove necessary to supplement her communications system which has been largely destroyed. Further, since Italy is to be allowed military aircraft, we see no reason to forbid her participation in civil aviation inside Italian territory. We understand, however, that the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Civil Aviation think it desirable, in view of the provisions of the Final Act of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, to forbid Italian participation in Civil Aviation, outside her territory, until she has been admitted to membership of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation.

We should ensure that civil aircraft manufactured or used by Italy are not of German or Japanese design and do not embody German or Japanese components. Moreover, in order to prevent the manufacture of civil aircraft which could be used to supplement the Italian Air Force, it will be desirable to ensure that until 1950, specifications for Italian Civil Aircraft should be subject to approval by the Allied Inspectorate.

MERCANTILE MARINE AND SHIPBUILDING

22. The conclusion of hostilities will find Italy with a greatly depleted Mercantile Marine,* the necessity for limitation will therefore hardly arise before 1950. We shall in any case require the full control of the Italian Mercantile Marine during the war against Japan.

Militarily, we would only require to limit Italian shipbuilding and her Mercantile Marine if there were a danger of her coming under the influence of a hostile power. Further, we understand that there are strong economic reasons for not reducing the Italian Mercantile Marine below the minimum required to sustain her economy.

Since it is in our strategic interest to be on friendly terms with Italy, and in view of economic considerations, we consider that no limitations should

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Since it is in our strategic interest to be on friendly terms with Italy, and in view of economic considerations, we consider that no limitations should be imposed on Italy's Mercantile Marine or shipbuilding capacity, providing that her shipbuilding and the operation of her Mercantile Marine should not be subsidised in any form.

DRAFT HEADS

23. Tentative draft heads for the Naval, Military and Air Clauses and for the Clauses regarding Civil Aviation, the Mercantile Marine and Shipbuilding, drawn up in the light of foregoing considerations, are at Annex. Clauses regarding Prisoners

* Pre-war Italian Mercantile Marine - 3,400,000 Tons.
Present Italian Mercantile Marine - 650,000 Tons (of which Allies hold 332,000 Tons).
Pre-war shipbuilding capacity - 200,000 Tons per Annum.

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War and War Graves are being prepared by the Foreign Office, and reparations generally are being dealt with by the Economic and Industrial Planning Staff. The requirements of Allied forces which will remain in Italy after the Peace Treaty, and questions in connection with the liquidation of Military Governments in Italy and O.E.T.A. are being dealt with directly between the War Office and the Foreign Office.

RECOMMENDATION

14. We recommend that this paper should be forwarded to Field Marshal Alexander in his capacity as British Commander-in-Chief, for his comments prior to its communication to the Foreign Office.

(SIGNED) C.C.A. ALLEN.
F.C. CURTIS.
P. WARBURTON.

June, 1945.
1, Richmond Terrace,
S.W.1.

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June, 1945.
1, Richmond Terrace,
S.W.1.

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ANNEX

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY.

Part IV*- Draft Heads of Naval, Military and Air Clauses.

Section I: Allied Military Rights in Italy.

1. The Principal Allied Powers$^{\emptyset}$ to have the right until 1950, to station armed forces anywhere on Italian soil or in Italian territorial waters, in order to:

   a. Safeguard Allied base areas and the L of C into Austria.

   b. Enforce if necessary the terms of the Peace Treaty.

   Italy to grant full facilities necessary to maintain these forces.

2. The Principal Allied Powers to have the use of all port airfield and other facilities, and full transit rights by land, sea or air which they may require. Note: These rights and facilities may be covered by a Civil Affairs Agreement.

Section II: Military Assistance Required by the Allies from Italy.

3. Italy to render to the Principal Allied Powers all assistance required by them in the war against Japan, including:

   a. Use and control of Italian transport system, airfields, ports, dockyard and other facilities, for movement of Allied forces and material to the Far East.

   b. Provision of such war material in Italy's possession as the Allies may require.

   c. Production of such war material as may be required by the Allies.

   d. Full control of the Italian Navy.

   e. Full control of Italian Mercantile Marine in accordance with existing shipping protocol.

   Note: Should Italy declare war against Japan, these points would probably be covered by mutual agreement with the Allies.

4. The Principal Allied Powers to retain the right to use Italian manpower on Italian territory, or for labour purposes outside the Italian territories, as they may require. (This should be co-ordinated with Part V of Foreign Office heads.)

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c. Production of such war material as may be required by the Allies.

d. Full control of the Italian Navy.

e. Full control of Italian Mercantile Marine in accordance with existing shipping protocol.

Note: Should Italy declare war against Japan, these points would probably be covered by mutual agreement with the Allies.

4. The Principal Allied Powers to retain the right to use Italian manpower on Italian territory, or for labour purposes outside the Italian territories, as they may require. (This should be co-ordinated with Part V of Foreign Office heads.)

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5. Italy to give such assistance regarding supplies as the Principal Allied Powers may require for their forces occupying Austria and Germany. (This might be covered by the Civil Affairs Agreement mentioned in Note to paragraph 2 above.)

6. Italy to maintain control of her frontiers as required by the Principal Allied Powers, to prevent the passage of war criminals and other specified enemy persons.

Section III: Limitations to be imposed on the Italian Armed Forces.

7. All Fascist or Nazi military, semi-military or para-military organisations to be disbanded. (This might be covered under the Political clauses.)

* Part numbering to conform to the present Foreign Office draft.
ϕ UK, USA, USSR, France

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Permanent Limitations

8. Permanent prohibition on naval, military and air installations in Sicily and Sardinia, except for such facilities as may be required by the World Organization, or for internal security pruposes.

9. Permanent limitation of the number and type of civil airfields in Sicily and Sardinia.

10. No construction or experiments for long range weapons or similar installations of an offensive nature, or for mines, torpedoes and submarines or other submersible craft, to be undertaken.

Short Term Limitations.

11. Until 1950, or for such lesser period as the Principal Allied Powers shall decide, the Italian armed forces will be subject to the limitations set out in Sections IV to VII below.

(These limitations to be based on the principle that Italy shall only be allowed to maintain sufficient forces to maintain law and order throughout Italy and for defence against local aggression.)

Removal of Limitations.

12. After 1950, the limitations set out in Sections IV to VII below will be removed, provided that the Principal Allied Powers are satisfied that circumstances then obtaining do not require their retention, and that Italy has complied with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

Section IV: Limitations to be imposed on the Italian Navy.

13. The following limitations to be imposed until 1950, or for such lesser period as the Principal Allied Powers shall decide:

The Italian Navy to be limited to a fleet of:

2 Old battleships
5 6" Cruisers
2 Fleet destroyers
20 Torpedo boats
20 Corvettes

(These figures may be adjusted in the light of circumstances.)

Such number of small surface craft as can be manned and maintained in full commission within the limits of a manpower allocation of 3,000 officers and men.

14. Personnel to be limited to approximately 10,000 on voluntary long-term engage-

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in Sections IV to VII below.

(These limitations to be based on the principle that Italy shall only be allowed to maintain sufficient forces to maintain law and order throughout Italy and for defence against local aggression.)

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12. After 1950, the limitations set out in Sections IV to VII below will be removed, provided that the Principal Allied Powers are satisfied that circumstances then obtaining do not require their retention, and that Italy has complied with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

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2 Fleet destroyers
20 Torpedo boats
20 Corvettes

(These figures may be adjusted in the light of circumstances.)

Such number of small surface craft as can be manned and maintained in full commission within the limits of a manpower allocation of 3,000 officers and men.

14. Personnel to be limited to approximately 18,000 on voluntary long-term engagements. Compulsory naval service to be forbidden.

15. The Italian Navy, in excess of that permitted under para 13 above, to be placed at the disposal of the Principal Allied Powers. No aircraft carriers, submarines, submersible craft, and specialised types of assault craft to be retained or constructed.

16. Replacements of the ships enumerated in para 13 above to be limited as follows:

a. No replacement battleship to be laid down until after 1950.

b. No restriction on replacement of other types of ships, provided that any ship being replaced is always scrapped before its successor is launched.

17. Personnel other than those forming part of the Italian Navy, not to receive any form of naval training.

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TOP SECRET

18. Such naval fortifications and installations as the Allied Inspectorate may direct, to be destroyed. No new naval fortifications or installations to be constructed, and no new armaments or other defences to be added to existing fortifications or installations without permission of the Allied Inspectorate.

Section V: Limitations to be imposed on the Italian Army.

The following limitations to be imposed until 1950 or for such lesser period as the Principal Allied Powers may decide:

19. The Italian Army to be limited to a force of:

200,000 Troops
65,000 Carabinieri

(These figures can be increased by the Principal Allied Powers should Italy be made responsible at any time for the administration of any of her former territories which she gives up under this Treaty.)

20. The Italian Army, in excess of that permitted under para 19 above to be disbanded as the Allied Inspectorate shall direct.

21. Personnel other than those forming part of the Italian Army not to receive any form of military training.

22. Such fortifications and military installations as the Allied Inspectorate may direct, to be destroyed. No new fortifications or military installations to be constructed, and no new armaments or other defences to be added to existing fortifications or military installations without permission of the Allied Inspectorate.

23. All long-range weapons of a range of 30 miles and similar installations of an offensive nature to be destroyed.

Section VI: Limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force.

The following limitations to be imposed until 1950, or for such lesser period as the Principal Allied Powers may decide.

24. The Italian Air Force to be limited to:

a. 6 squadrons of S/E fighter aircraft.

b. 2 squadrons of transport aircraft for internal transport purposes.

Each squadron to consist of a maximum of 16 aircraft.

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25. Personnel to be limited to a ceiling of approximately 10,000 on voluntary long term engagements. Compulsary air force service to be forbidden.

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territories which she gives up under this Treaty.)

20. The Italian Army, in excess of that permitted under para 19 above to be disbanded as the Allied Inspectorate shall direct.

21. Personnel other than those forming part of the Italian Army not to receive any form of military training.

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b. 2 squadrons of transport aircraft for internal transport purposes.

Each squadron to consist of a maximum of 16 aircraft. 5795

25. Personnel to be limited to a ceiling of approximately 10,000 on voluntary long term engagements. Compulsary air force service to be forbidden.

26. The Italian Air Force in excess of that permitted under paras 24 and 25 above to be disbanded as the Allied Inspectorate shall direct.

27. Personnel other than those forming part of the Italian Air Force not to receive any form of military air training.

28. Specifications of military aircraft owned or manufactured by Italy during this period to be submitted to the Allied Inspectorate for approval.

29. Such military airfields and air installations as the Allied Inspectorate may direct, to be destroyed. No new military airfields or air installations to be constructed without the permission of the Allied Inspectorate.

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Section VII: Limitations on War Material.

30. Permanent prohibition on the manufacture of mines or torpedoes and on the manufacture or use of war materials of German or Japanese design, or embodying German or Japanese components.

31. The following limitations to be imposed until 1950 or for such lesser period as the Principal Allied Powers may decide:

a. Italy not to manufacture or own any war material, including warships and military aircraft, in excess of that required for the forces permitted under paras 13, 19 and 24 above, except as provided for in Section II, para 3c above.

b. All armament factories in excess of those required for the production of war material permitted under subpara a above to be dealt with as decided by the Allied Inspectorate.

c. The Allied Inspectorate to exercise control over the manufacture, import, export and transit of war material in Italy.

Section VIII: Disposal of War Material.

32. All German war material, unless expressly excluded by the Allied Inspectorate, to be placed at the disposal of the Principal Allied Powers.

33. All Italian or Allied war material, including warships and aircraft, in use by the Italian armed forces, in excess of that permitted for the armed forces specified under paras 13, 19 and 24 above, to be placed at the disposal of the Principal Allied Powers, and Italy to renounce all rights to same.

Section IX: Prohibitions on employment or training of technicians.

34. Italy not to employ or train any technicians (including military or civil aviation personnel) who are or have been nationals of Germany or Japan, or any other personnel specified by the Allied Inspectorate.

Section X: Setting up of an Allied Inspectorate in Italy.

35. An Allied Inspectorate to be set up in Italy, and to remain in being for so long as the Principal Allied Powers shall decide.

36. The task of the Allied Inspectorate shall include the supervision of the carrying out of the naval, military, air and civil aviation clauses of the Peace Treaty.

Section XI: Provision of forces or facilities required by World Organisation.

37. After 1950 (or such earlier date as the Principal Allied Powers may decide), Italy to provide any forces required by the World Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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by the Allied Inspectorate.

c. The Allied Inspectorate to exercise control over the manufacture, import, export and transit of war material in Italy.

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36. The task of the Allied Inspectorate shall include the supervision of the carrying out of the naval, military, air and civil aviation clauses of the Peace Treaty.

Section XI: Provision of forces or facilities required by World Organisation.

37. After 1950 (or such earlier date as the Principal Allied Powers may decide), Italy to provide any forces required by the World Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

38. Italy to make available such bases or other facilities in Italian territory as may be required by the World Organisation, whether Italy is admitted to membership of World Organisation or not.

Part XIV - Draft heads of Civil Aviation Clauses

39. No restriction to be placed on Italian civil aviation inside Italian territory. Italy not to participate in civil aviation outside Italian territory until she is admitted to membership of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation.

40. No restriction to be placed on the use or manufacture of civil aircraft by Italy except:

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a. Italy not to use or manufacture civil aircraft of German or Japanese design or embodying any German or Japanese components.

b. Until 1950 all specifications for Italian civil aircraft to be subject to approval by the Allied Inspectorate.

Part ... Draft heads of Mercantile Marine and Shipbuilding Clauses.

41. No restriction to be placed on the Italian Mercantile Marine or Shipbuilding, excepting that:

Italy

a. Italian shipbuilding and the operation of the Italian Mercantile Marine shall not be subsidised in any form.

b. Such ships and material as are constructed shall not embody German or Japanese components.

c. Until 1950 all specifications for Italian merchant ships shall be subject to approval by the Allied Inspectorate.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No. 7

31 July 1945

ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff we have examined the draft Naval, Military, Air and Civil aviation clauses and have prepared a draft reply to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee together with our suggested amendments.

2. Our investigation was conducted on an Allied basis and the American repre attending the M.J.P.S. were in general agreement with the amendments we have recommended. Division of opinion on the policy to be adopted towards ITALY was apparent on service rather than national lines.

3. Appendix B (the original Post Hostilities Planning Staff report and draft clauses) has been issued separately and copies have only been forwarded to the persons who attend the S.A.C Conference.

4. Copies of the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report which have already been distributed for the M.J.P.S. meetings will be returned to the M.J.P.S. Secretary not later than 1600 hours on Thursday August 2nd.

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

For J B Burwell
R. B. PARKENHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

5725

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Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

For R. B. PARKENHAM
Group Captain
R.A.F Plans

5725

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

31 July 1945.

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

OBJECT.

1. To examine the draft naval, military, air and civil aviation clauses of the draft final Peace Treaty with ITALY forwarded to Field Marshal Alexander by the Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff and to prepare a draft reply to them: the investigation to be conducted on an Allied basis and where possible to include Allied recommendations or, where divergences on national viewpoint occur, to report accordingly.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

2. The political clauses on which the proposed military terms for ITALY are based appear to have the following objects:

   a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous European state.

   b. To encourage ITALY to be friendly towards us and become a member of any Western European system which may emerge.

   c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.

   d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

   Of these objects a and b are notoriously to reconcile with c and d.

3. At the moment ITALY is a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. Her country has been ravaged for 18 months by a land campaign and she can have few illusions as to the wisdom of aggression. If we are to attain objects a and b action is urgently required by the USA and the UK to avert the crisis in Italian affairs which will otherwise be inevitable in the course of the next few months.

4. The MJPS have only been instructed to comment on the military clauses of the proposed Treaty and in examining these clauses and recommending the following amendments have endeavoured to reconcile the somewhat conflicting aims quoted in para 2.

MILITARY CLAUSES.

5724

5. The report and draft clauses are set out in Appendix B and our detailed comments

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4. The MJPS have only been instructed to comment on the military clauses of the proposed Treaty and in examining these clauses and recommending the following amendments have endeavoured to reconcile the somewhat conflicting aims quoted in para 2.

5724

MILITARY CLAUSES.

5. The report and draft clauses are set out in Appendix B and our detailed comments and suggested amendments where applicable are shown at Appendix C.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

6. That the draft letter attached as Appendix A and the comments, etc., at Appendix C be approved for dispatch.

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APPENDIX 'A'

TO: Secretary, British Chiefs of Staff Committee

Reference your COS 999/5 of 10 July.

1. Field Marshal Alexander has instructed me to forward his detailed comments on the naval, military, air and civil aviation clauses of the draft Peace Treaty with ITALY and these are attached in the Appendix to this letter. The military clauses proposed by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff are based on the political clauses prepared by the Foreign Office. Although he has not been asked to comment on the political clauses Field Marshal Alexander wishes to draw your attention to an aspect of these clauses which may have considerable military repercussions.

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff's report it appears that the Treaty is to have the following objectives:

a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous European state.

b. To encourage ITALY to be friendly towards us and to become a member of any Western European system which may emerge.

c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.

d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile with c and d.

3. At the moment ITALY is a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. Her country has been 5723

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on the political clauses prepared by the Foreign Office.

been asked to comment on the political clauses Field Marshal Alexander wishes to draw your attention to an aspect of these clauses which may have considerable military repercussions.

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a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous European state.

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c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.

d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile with c and d.

3. At the moment ITALY is a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. Her country has been ravaged for 18 months by a land campaign and she can have few illusions as to the wisdom of aggression. If we are to attain objects a and b action is urgently required by the USA and the UK to avert the crisis in Italian affairs which will otherwise be inevitable in the course of the next few months.

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4. As a result of the conflicting aims in para 2 it appears that a compromise between these aims is to be adopted. Field Marshal Alexander's view is that we shall be running a very considerable risk of achieving none of our aims in attempting such a compromise. He feels, however, that as the whole matter is bound up with the future foreign policy and strategic aims of GREAT BRITAIN it would be inappropriate for him to make any further comments at this stage.

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APPENDIX 'C'

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

Reference in the left hand margin are to Sections and paras of draft heads of naval, military and air clauses.

Section I

1. (i) Since the necessity for an L of C through ITALY into AUSTRIA may be dependent on the duration of the occupation of AUSTRIA and this date is at present undetermined the Allies should not be limited to a period ending in 1950. It is therefore suggested that the words "for as long as they consider necessary" should be substituted for "until 1950".

(ii) Insert the words "freedom of movement and all" between the words "full" and "facilities".in the last sentence.

2. It is suggested that the words "and control" should be inserted between the words "the use" and "of all ports".

Section II

3. (i) At present all the principal Allies are not at war with JAPAN, therefore "such of the principal Allied Powers as are at war with JAPAN" should be substituted for "the principal Allied Powers"

(ii) In view of the addition suggested to para 2 above para 3 a. would now appear to be superflous and should be omitted.

(iii) There are in ITALY certain blueprints and experimental models which could be of considerable use to the Allies in the war against JAPAN and the following new sub clause is suggested to cover this. "All information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations shall be made available by the Italian Government."

4. The Allies may wish to use Italian manpower in some of the Italian territory which is taken away from her by this treaty. On the other hand, the right to use Italian manpower for labor outside Italian

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is at present undetermined the Allies [illegible] period ending in 1950. It is therefore suggested that the words "for as long as they consider necessary" should be substituted for "until 1950".

(ii) Insert the words "freedom of movement and all" between the words "full" and "facilities".in the last sentence.

2. It is suggested that the words "and control" should be inserted between the words "the use" and "of all ports".

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(iii) There are in ITALY certain blueprints and experimental models which could be of considerable use to the Allies in the war against JAPAN and the following new sub clause is suggested to cover this. "All information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations shall be made available by the Italian Government."

4. The Allies may wish to use Italian manpower in some of the Italian territory which is taken away from her by this treaty. On the other hand, the right to use Italian manpower for labor outside Italian territories is too wide, e.g. in the event of the Russians declaring war against JAPAN they would be in a position to deport Italians for labor in SIBERIA. It is also necessary to safeguard the right of BRITAIN and AMERICA to use Italians in their own countries where they are at present employed. The following amendments are therefore suggested. For "on Italian territory" read "within the 1939 boundaries of Italian territory or in countries in which they were employed prior to the signing of this treaty" and insert "on a voluntary basis only" between the words "labor purposes" and "outside". Add at the end of the sentence "in the war against JAPAN".

5. No comment.

6. No comment.

Section III

7. No comment.

8-12 It is not considered practicable to impose limitations which are

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specified as permanent. As part of our conciliatory policy towards ITALY the imposition of permanent terms could only act as an irritant. In addition we might wish in the future to relax certain of the permanent limitations. It is felt that greater flexibility would result and our requirements would still be met if we simply impose limitations which will be subject to review from time to time.

It is therefore suggested that paras 8-12 should be deleted and the following substituted.

"8. The Italian armed forces will be subject to the limitations set in Sec IV-VII below. These limitations will be reviewed in 1950 and at intervals thereafter, and may be removed provided the principal Allied powers are satisfied that the circumstances then obtaining do not require their retention and that ITALY has complied with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. This shall not prevent the principal Allied powers from removing any of the limitations prior to 1950 if they should think fit."

(Paras 13 onwards will require renumbering 9 etc but the old numbers are retained for ease of reference).

Section IV

13. In view of the amendments suggested to paras 8-12 above the first sentence of para 13 down to the words "shall decide" should be omitted.

14. The recommendation that the Italian Navy should be manned on a voluntary long term engagement is not concurred in, since the long-term volunteer is of greater efficiency than the short-term conscript. Long term engagements tend to create a highly-trained nucleus suitable to rapid expansion in time of war. Moreover, ITALY is unlikely to be able to support financially a long-term Navy, and it is considered that the system of manning, should, therefore, remain unchanged, i.e. conscription.

The ceiling of 18,000 will probably be sufficient for manning the sea-going ships which it is proposed that ITALY should be allowed to keep. In view however of the commitments recently assumed ashore by the Italian Navy some small increase may be needed, and should be authorised if so recommended by the Allied Inspectorate.

It is therfore recommended para 14 should be redrafted as follows:-

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 18,000 or as

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with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. This shall not prevent the principal Allied powers from removing any of the limitations prior to 1950 if they should think fit. "

(Paras 13 onwards will require renumbering 9 etc but the old numbers are retained for ease of reference).

Section IV

13. In view of the amendments suggested to paras 8-12 above the first sentence of para 13 down to the words "shall decide" should be omitted.

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It is therfore recommended para 14 should be redrafted as follows:-

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 18,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a conscription basis as at present."

15. Omit the last sentence and substitute the following:

"No aircraft carriers, submarines, or submersible or surface craft intended for use on operations of a nture heretofore carried out by Italian "special assault craft" to be retained or constructed".

16 & 17. No comment.

18. In view of the suggested deletion of the para 8 in the original clauses it is necessary to insert at the beginning of this para "All naval installations on SICILY and SARDINIA except as may be required by the World Organisation and such other naval fortifications

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P/309 (Final). APPENDIX 'C'

Section V In view of the amendments suggested to paras 8-12 above the first sentence down to the words "may decide" should be omitted.

19, 20 & 21. No comment.

22. In view of the suggested deletion of para 8 of the original clauses it is necessary to insert at the beginning of the para "all military installations in SICILY and SARDINIA except as are required by the World Organisation for internal security purposes and such other fortifications and military———

23. It would be difficult to determine what weapons were of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature and it is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

Section VI In view of the admendments suggested to paras 8-12 above the first sentence down to the words "may decide" should be omitted.

24. Provision should be made for an air sea rescue squadron and for training aircraft and a new 24c and d is suggested as follows:

"c. One air sea rescue squadron."

"d. A training school of such capacity as the Allied Inspectorate considers necessary together with the appropriate training aircraft to maintain the above mentioned squadrons."

Provision should also be made for reserve aircraft for each squadron and the following addition is suggested to the last sentence of para 24:

"together with a reserve of aireraft which will not exceed 20% of the types in the squadrons".

25. In view of the suggested addition of an air sea rescue squadron

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SICILY and SARDINIA [illegible]
Organisation for internal security purposes and such
fortifications and military———

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Provision should also be made for reserve aircraft for each squadron and the following addition is suggested to the last sentence of para 24:

"together with a reserve of aircraft which will not exceed 20% of the types in the squadrons".

25. In view of the suggested addition of an air sea rescue squadron and training school the ceiling figure of approximately 10,000 should become a maximum of 12,000.

26, 27 & 28 No comment.

29. In view of the suggested deletion of para c of the original clauses it is necessary to insert at the beginning of the para "all air force installations on SICILY and SARDINIA except as are required by the World Organisation or for internal security purposes and such other military airfields———

Section VII

30. In view of the amendments suggested to paras 8-12 above it is suggested the word "permanent" in the first line be omitted. A new sentence should also be added.

"No experiments for long range weapons or similar installations or for mines, torpedoes or submarines or other submersible craft to be undertaken".

31. (53) In view of the amendments suggested to paras 8-12 above it is suggested that the first sentence down to the words "may decide" should be omitted.

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APPENDIX 'C'

Section VIII

32. German war material should be expressly stated to include blueprints and experimental models. It is suggested that the words "including blueprints, prototypes, experimental models and plans" should be added after the words "war material".

33. No comment.

Section IX

34. It should be noted that if BOLZANO is returned to ITALY under the Peace Treaty a large number of people who have been German nationals will become Italian nationals but under the provisions of this clause none of these persons can be employed or trained as technicians.

Section X

35 & 36 No comment.

Section XI

37 & 38 No comment.

Part XIV

39. In view of the suggested deletion of para 8 in the original clauses a new subpara to this clause is suggested as follows:-

"Limitation of the number and type of civil airfields in SICILY and SARDINIA until this subpara is abrogated by the principal Allied Powers".

40. It is suggested that the period of limitation in para 40b should be dependent on review by the principal Allied Powers and not on the expectation of a definite period. It is suggested therefore that the words "until 1950" be omitted and "until this clause is abrogated by the principal Allied Powers" substituted.

41. The remarks on para 40b. apply to 41c and a similar amendment is suggested.

N.B. There are certain points which may already be included in other clauses in the Peace Treaty but which are set out

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as technicians.

Section X

35 & 36 — No comment.

Section XI

37 & 38 — No comment.

Part XIV

39. In view of the suggested deletion of para 8 in the original clauses a new subpara to this clause is suggested as follows:-
"Limitation of the number and type of civil airfields in SICILY and SARDINIA until this subpara is abrogated by the principal Allied Powers".

40. It is suggested that the period of limitation in para 40b should be dependent on review by the principal Allied Powers and not on the expectation of a definite period. It is suggested therefore that the words "until 1950" be omitted and "until this clause is abrogated by the principal Allied Powers" substituted.

41. The remarks on para 40b. apply to 41c and a similar amendment is suggested.

N.B. There are certain points which may already be included in other clauses in the Peace Treaty but which are set out below to ensure that they are not over looked.

a. Payment and status including the question of diplomatic immunity of the Allied Inspectorate.

b. Exemption of Allied forces stationed in ITALY from Italian taxes.

c. Liability of Allied forces to Italian legal proceedings.

d. Method of dealing with Italian nationals who violate any orders or regulations issued by the Allied Inspectorate.

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TOP SECRET Copy No 37

F/309 (Final) TOP SECRET APPENDIX 'B'

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff

By direction of the Chief of Staff, special attention is drawn to the TOP SECRET classification of this paper.

No unauthorised copies or extracts of its contents will be made.

No copy of the paper will be distributed outside AFHQ without the approval of the Chief of Staff.

All copies of this paper will be returned to the SAC's Secretariat after the SAC Conference on 2 August 1945.

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Assistant Chief of Staff G-2	16
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3	17
SACs Secretariat	20,21,22
G-5	33
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Assistant Chief of Staff G-3	17
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

31 July 1945.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff the attached paper has been prepared dealing with the interim policy for the future of the Italian Armed Forces.

2. A meeting is being held on Thursday afternoon, 2 August, under the direction of the D/CAO to complete the administrative details of the interim policy.

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

For R. B. PAKENHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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G-3 Operations.

R. B. PAKENHAM
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

30 July 1945.

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE
FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

OBJECT.

1. In the light of the proposal to hand over responsibility for the civil administration of Northern ITALY, less VENEZIA GIULIA, UDINE and BOLZANO, to the Italian Government by 30 September, to examine the present constitution of the Italian armed forces, and, pending a final settlement at the Peace Conference, to make recommendations regarding the policy which should be adopted towards these forces and the method by which they should be supplied and equipped.

INTERNAL SITUATION IN ITALY.

2. a. Responsibilities of the Italian Government.

The administration of territory has been progressively handed back to the Italian Government with the advance of the Allied armies from south to north. The present situation is that the Italian Government administer the Italian mainland as far north as inclusive the Provinces of PESARO, AREZZO, FIRENZE, PISTOIA, PISA and the Islands of SARDINIA and SICILY, but with the exception of the Communes of NAPLES, ANCONA, LIVORNO, PISA and COLLE SALVETTI. By 30 September it is anticipated that the Italian Government will have received back the remainder of Metropolitan ITALY less the special areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, UDINE and BOLZANO and certain of the communes above. ITALY will then become responsible for the maintenance of law and order throughout most of ITALY and for controlling the Italo-Swiss and a small portion of the Italo-Austrian frontiers. The special areas VENEZIA GIULIA, UDINE and BOLZANO will probably be retained under Allied control until the final Peace Treaty.

b. The overall economic situation in ITALY is extremely grave. The wheat harvest is expected to be only two-thirds of the average yield; there is an acute shortage of raw materials, especially coal, and the situation is not likely to improve. In particular it is expected that the industrial cities of MILAN, TURIN and GENOA will be the scenes of labor disturbances arising in the first instance from economic causes but liable at any time to be used by political parties for their own ends. Disturbances have in fact already begun and may reach serious proportions within two months and certainly with the onset of winter.

c. The Allies have guaranteed to retain Allied troops on the Franco-Italian border as long as such troops are available, probably until the end of the year. The frontier commitments to be assumed by the Italian Government are not therefore serious.

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c. The Allies have guaranteed to retain Allied troops on the Franco-Italian 5292 border as long as such troops are available, probably until the end of the year. The frontier commitments to be assumed by the Italian Government are not therefore serious.

3. The Italian Navy.

a. The Italian navy is employed in accordance with the instructions contained in the Appendix to COS paper 515/1 of the 19th March, 1944, which is an amplification of the CUNNINGHAM/DE COURTEN Agreement. This Appendix states that the British Admiralty, in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and further delegates this responsibility to the Allied Naval Area Commander.

b. Arrangements are already in force whereby the Italian Ministry of Marine has a large say in the employment of a number of the small Italian warships, merely obtaining the approval of the British Flag Officer, Italy and Liaison

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at ROME before the actual moves take place. The actual size and employment of the Italian navy does not therefore have any bearing on the proposal to hand over further territorial responsibility in ITALY to the Italian Government, and is not considered further in this paper.

4. Italian Army and Carabinieri.

a. The Italian army at present consists nominally of three categories:

BRITIS
USITIS
ITI-ITIS

BRITIS and USITIS are under complete control of the Allies. The ITI-ITIS were intended for employment under the Italian Government but a proportion is now also under Allied control. A large part of the Italian army is therefore under complete Allied control. Details of the present composition of the Italian army are given in Appendix A.

b. Included in the ITI-ITI Category is the Italian Intelligence Service. This organisation is still tainted with Fascism and has a strong right wing bias. Its present strength is 3123 of which approximately 700 are officers.

c. The Italian army cannot be rated very highly. Whilst the rank and file are hardy and respond quickly to any interest taken in them, the standard of officers especially the senior officers is extremely low. Furthermore there are inherent weaknesses in the Italian staff and administrative systems. Any transfer of forces to the Italian army must therefore take into account this relative inefficiency by Allied standards.

d. The present establishment of the Carabinieri is 65,000. This force has however never been either popular or efficient, even in pre-Fascist days. It is unreliable, corrupt and incapable of dealing with any serious disturbance. In particular it is believed that the designation Carabinieri stands, in the eyes of most Italians for repression and an organisation which can only be regarded with contempt.

5. Italian Air Forces.

A summary of the present state of the Italian air force is given at Appendix B.

FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE.

6. In NAF 1013 the Combined Chiefs of Staff were urgently asked to state their policy regarding the future of the Italian army. The provisions of the final Peace Treaty with ITALY are now under consideration but an early decision on the military terms to be imposed is unlikely. The terms currently being considered by the British Chiefs of Staff provide that

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a. The Italian army may be limited eventually to a ceiling of approximately 200,000 men plus 65,000 Carabinieri.

b. The Italian air force may be limited eventually to a ceiling of approximately 10,000 men.

FUNCTIONS REQUIRED OF ITALIAN ARMY.

7. The functions which will be required of the Italian army until the Peace Treaty can be divided into

a. Allied requirements

b. Italian Government requirements.

These are discussed in detail below.

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ALLIED REQUIREMENTS.

8. With the turnover of all Italian metropolitan territory except special areas t the Italian Government the only troops we shall require to retain under Allied control are

a. Service troops which will be progressively reduced as follows:

(1) BRITIS (108,000) administrative units in direct support of British forces. These will be reduced to 96,000 by the end of August and thereafter by 6,000 per month until the end of the year.

(2) USIIIS (83,000) administrative units in direct support of US forces reduced to 30,000 by the first of August with further reductions thereafter.

b. Guard units which will gradually be reduced as Allied dumps, installations, etc., are taken up or closed down:

ITI-ITIS (24,000) guard units on British installations and other miscellaneous units including such proportion of the Italian Intelligence Service as is necessary.

9. In considering Allied requirements of the Italian army it should be borne in mind that any failure on the part of the Carabinieri and Italian army to maintain law and order will inevitably necessitate the intervention of Allied troop while we continue to occupy portions of ITALY. Moreover the Allied force avai able in ITALY is diminishing rapidly. This situation can best be remedied by taking steps now to raise the standard of efficiency of the Italian forces. It is considered that a strong Allied police mission is required to reorganize radically the Carabinieri as quickly as possible under a new name. MMIA should also be retained with the Italian army at least until the final Peace Treaty. This mission should be composed of officers with the highest qualifications whose task should be to establish an efficient and self-confident Italian army. Some re-organisation of the functions of the existing mission may be necessary.

10. a. Italian Government Requirements.

The maintenance of law and order in ITALY is likely to become acute in the autumn, i.e. about the same time as the northern provinces, less special areas, are handed back to the Italian Government. Such interim forces as are considered necessary should therefore be transferred to the operational control of the Italian Government by this time. It is not possible to separate operational and administrative command. The Italian Government must therefore be prepared to administer any forces turned over to their control at the same time as they assume operational control. The probable loss of administrative efficiency must as far as possible contrary be provided for but should in any case be accepted.

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for the maintenance of law and order is an adequate

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5. Guard units which will [illegible] etc., are eaten up or closed down:

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b. The primary requirement for the maintenance of law and order is an adequate police force deployed all over the country. The establishment of the Carabinieri has been 65,000 for some years. Although this force has already been shown as corrupt and inefficient there is no reason to propose any alteration in the strength of the force at present. Any alteration should be aimed at increasing efficiency rather than numbers.

c. In view of the size of ITALY and the disruption of communications caused by the war it is considered that a local reserve to back up the Carabinieri is required at least in each territorial region. Two Italian Security Divisions (each of 5,000 men) already exist in SICILY and one in SARDINIA. These have proved adequate and should remain. No such organisations exist elsewhere on the Italian mainland and it is considered that one Italian Security Brigade (each 2,500 men) should now be raised in each of the ten territorial regions on the mainland.

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d. The most likely areas in which disorders will occur are the industrial areas around MILAN and TURIN, ROME, and the area round BARI. It is considered that the Internal Security Divisions and Brigades should be capable of dealing with local disorders. We must however be prepared for a much more general break-down of government control especially in the areas mentioned above. It is considered therefore that a mobile reserve is also required to deal with any serious uprisings. This reserve should consist of a combat force of all arms, and can be provided from the existing force of five combat groups and the Garibaldi Regiment now under Allied control. It is also considered that this reserve should be concentrated mainly in the MILAN area but with elements in Central and SE ITALY. A suitable layout might be three combat groups in the Northwest, one combat group and the Garibaldi Regiment in the centre and one combat group in the Southeast.

e. The above forces and the sources from which they can be provided are summarised in Appendix C. It may be argued that an army of 140,000 may not be adequate in view of its poor quality and the serious situation confronting it. However as in the case of the Carabinieri it is considered that the answer is to improve its quality rather than increase its numbers.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

11. It is not considered that any elements of the Italian Air Force need be returned to the Italian Government when further territory is handed over to them. There will, however, continue to be certain Allied requirements as shown in Appendix B. The constitution of the Italian air force as shown in Appendix B should be subject to early reductions and this should be a matter for separate investigation. Meanwhile it is considered that the Italian Air Force should remain at its present ceiling/and under existing administrative arrangements. The investigation referred to above should include an examination of the possibility of making the Italian Government responsible for at least part of the administration of, and provision of maintenance for, the Italian Air Force.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.

12. Italian Army Service and Guard Troops Employed to meet Allied Requirements.

These are summarised in para 8 above. No change should be made to the present responsibilities of the US Army, British Army and Italian Government for the supply of food and equipment for these troops. Similarly existing control of these troops, exercised either direct by the British and US Army or through MMIA, should continue so as to ensure that they are able to perform their operational roles efficiently.

13. Italian Army Employed to meet Italian Government Requirements (excluding Carabinieri).

a. Composition of the Italian Army.

The Italian army should be established as a self sufficient force, complete

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13. Italian Army Employed to meet Italian Government Requirements (excluding Carabinieri).

a. Composition of the Italian Army.

The Italian army should be established as a self sufficient force, complete with its own administrative services and capable of fulfilling its operational role without assistance from Allied administrative units. On the basis that the army of 140,000, which includes a due allotment of administrative troops

(1) will be composed partly of internal security troops, which need only be semi-mobile, and partly of a mobile combat force, and

(2) will be able, subject to the prior requirements of the Allies, to make use of civilian operated facilities such as railways, ports, communications and workshops,

should be self-sufficient. Steps at present being taken to train the necessary service units should enable this army to be self-sufficient as regards administrative units by the end of September 45.

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b. Supply of Maintenance and Equipment.

The Italian Government should be made responsible for the provision of maintenance and equipment for the army of 140,000. The provision of rations should be from Italian Government sources and requirements, as necessary, should be included in the Italian Government's civil import programme. Petrol should similarly be imported with civil requirements. Clothing, transport, warlike and non-warlike equipment, at present in possession of those units of the Italian army from which will be found the army of 140,000, should be retained, including items of lend-lease origin. Additional requirements of these items should be found from the following sources and in the following order of priority:-

(1) Indigenous resources including manufacture from Italian industry. Raw materials for this purpose should be demanded by the Italian Government on the appropriate civil agencies in US and UK for import with that part of the Italian Government programme termed category B items.

(2) Purchase of items either from military stocks in ITALY which have been declared surplus by the US and British disposals organisation, or, where the required items are not available from this source, from provisioning agencies in US and UK.

It is not proposed to differentiate between the provisioning of warlike and non-warlike equipment as it is assumed that the Italian Government will be allowed to manufacture, subject to Allied control, warlike equipment including the appropriate natures of ammunition. The provisioning agencies in US and UK referred to in subpara (2) above, with whom the Italian Government should deal, and the channels of commercial negotiation with these agencies, can be decided only by the US and British Governments. The date when the Italian Government should assume full provisioning responsibility can not be determined by this HQ and may well have to be undertaken in stages in respect of the different items of provisioning. The responsibility of AFHQ in this respect, however, should cease by the end of September or as soon thereafter as practicable, but in any event, not later than 31 December 45.

c. Administrative Control.

All items for the Italian army provided from sources outside ITALY should be imported on Italian Government account to be received and handled by the Italian Government through their own organisation and as their own responsibility. Items made available from surplus stocks in this theatre through the US and British disposal organisation should be handed over by the US and British Army to the appropriate Italian army base depot.

d. Administrative functions of MMIA or any Organisation succeeding it.

From the end of September the functions of MMIA should be largely those of advice to, and liaison with, the Italian Government, subject to their right

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d. Administrative functions of MMIA or any Organisation succeeding it.

From the end of September the functions of MMIA should be largely those of advice to, and liaison with, the Italian Government, subject to their right to inspect the Italian army, its administrative organisation and arrangements, to enable them to report to this HQ on matters which are prejudicial to Allied interests or are contrary to the provisions of any peace treaty which may be signed. Insofar as provisioning is concerned it may be necessary for MMIA to assist the Italian Government in the preparation and screening of its requirements from Allied sources after 30 September. However, as soon as channels for commercial negotiation with US and British agencies have been established, MMIA's role vis-a-vis the Italian Government in respect of provisioning should be that of advice only.

14. Carabinieri.

Except in respect of the provision of the US/Br element of the ration which is a US and British responsibility, the Carabinieri are already largely the admin-

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istrative responsibility of the Italian Government. The latter should assume complete responsibility for the administration including maintenance and provisioning for this force at the same time as it assumes responsibility for provisioning for supplies in respect of the Army. (See para 13 above).

CONCLUSIONS.

15. There is every indication that the Italian Government will be faced with considerable problems of unrest from both political and economic causes after the handback of the northern provinces.

16. To be able to deal effectively with its tasks during this period the Italian Government will require adequate and efficient land forces at its disposal. These forces must be sufficiently strong to maintain law and order and to control the frontiers but they should not exceed any probable ceiling to be allowed by the Peace Treaty. The estimated forces required are given in para 10 and Appendix C. Every effort must be made to increase their efficiency.

17. The operational control of these forces should be transferred to the Italian Government with the remainder of ITALY, i.e. by 30 September.

18. Simultaneously the Italian Government should assume full responsibility for the administration and maintenance of the army of 140,000 and all Carabinieri. It should also if possible at the same time assume responsibility for budgeting for supplies and as many items as possible of warlike and non-warlike equipment. Complete responsibility for provisioning action should, in any event, be taken over by the Italian Government by 1 January 46.

19. A strong Allied military mission should be retained with the Italian army to supervise its reorganisation and to assist in its operational and administrative training. From the end of September the administrative functions of this mission towards the Italian Government should be largely of an advisory and liaison nature.

20. The Carabinieri are corrupt, inefficient and at present cannot be relied upon to deal effectively with civil disturbances. They should be completely reorganised and retrained on sound lines, if necessary under a new name. To supervise this an Allied Police Mission should be established.

21. Allied requirements for service and guard troops will gradually be reduced, but existing administrative responsibilities of British and US Armies for these troops should continue.

22. At this stage the Italian Government does not require an operational air force under its own control. There is however an Allied requirement for the retention of elements of the Italian Air Force as given in Appendix 'B'. The size of the force to be retained, pending the Peace Treaty, should form the subject of further investigation.

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allowed by the Peace Treaty. The estimated forces required [illegible]
10 and Appendix C. Every effort must be made to increase their efficiency.

17. The operational control of these forces should be transferred to the Italian Government with the remainder of ITALY, i.e. by 30 September.

18. Simultaneously the Italian Government should assume full responsibility for the administration and maintenance of the army of 140,000 and all Carabinieri. It should also if possible at the same time assume responsibility for budgeting for supplies and as many items as possible of warlike and non-warlike equipment. Complete responsibility for provisioning action should, in any event, be taken over by the Italian Government by 1 January 46.

19. A strong Allied military mission should be retained with the Italian army to supervise its reorganisation and to assist in its operational and administrative training. From the end of September the administrative functions of this mission towards the Italian Government should be largely of an advisory and liaison nature.

20. The Carabinieri are corrupt, inefficient and at present cannot be relied upon to deal effectively with civil disturbances. They should be completely reorganised and retrained on sound lines, if necessary under a new name. To supervise this an Allied Police Mission should be established.

21. Allied requirements for service and guard troops will gradually be reduced, but existing administrative responsibilities of British and US Armies for these troops should continue.

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ACTION RECOMMENDED.

23. That the draft NAF at Appendix D be approved.

24. That CG AAF/MTO and AOC-in-C RAF MEDME should be instructed to carry out the investigation envisaged in para 22, and submit recommendations.

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C/306

APPENDIX A. (6)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

PRESENT STATUS OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

GENERAL.

1. The Italian Army is largely under Allied operational control and is dependent on a major measure of Allied administrative assistance to perform its operational role.

PRESENT POSITION.

2. Composition of the Italian Army.

a. There is no clear cut definition of the various categories of the Italian forces which together form the present Italian Army.

They have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which it is maintained are now matters of considerable complexity.

b. The Italian Army can be divided into the following general categories:

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti Iti/Iti	Figures (round numbers)	Operational Control	Remarks
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Allied	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garibaldi Regt and certain auxiliary combat units and ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance. 719
2.	Servic[illegible] units	Br/Iti	106,000	Allied	Consisting of administrative

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2.	Service units	Br/Iti US/Iti	106,000 83,000	Allied	Consisting of administrative units on Allied WE/TO employed in direct support of British and US forces. They are under complete Allied control though their administration is largely effected through the Italian administrative organisation (Serials 5 and 6). In this category are included the Italian Administrative Division Headquarters which in some degree are responsible for the administration of these service units.

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APPENDIX A

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti Iti/Iti	Figures (round numbers)	Operational Control	Remarks
3.	Italian security divisions	Iti/Iti	15,000	Italian	Comprising two divisions in SICILY and one division in SARDINIA.
4.	Italian units under Allied operational command	Iti/Iti	24,000	Allied	Comprising guard units on Allied installations, intelligence units, certain AC transport units, mine clearance and "refugee" units. These units, while Iti/Iti, are in effect borrowed from the Italian Government and are under Allied operational control.
5.	Italian Command and control machinery	Iti/Iti	3,000	Italian	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ.
6.	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000		Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army uni and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7.	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	Italian & AMG	These are under the control of the Italian Government where territory has been handed back to the government, and under Allied Military Government control where the territory is still administered by Allied Military Government.
		TOTAL	364,000		

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5.	Italian Command control machinery	Iti/Iti	3,000	Italian	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ.
6.	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000		Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army uni and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7.	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	Italian & AMG	These are under the control of the Italian Government where territory has been handed back to the government, and under Allied Military Government control where the territory is still administered by Allied Military Government.
		TOTAL	384,000		

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795415

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APPENDIX B (5)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. The ceiling of the Italian air force, as fixed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000 with an addition of 3,000 to allow for the ex-co-operator companies now released from PW status. The division of this ceiling is as under:

Operational Air Force	22,000
Employed by the RAF	5,500
Employed by the USAAF	6,500

The extent to which the above ceiling figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the RAF and USAAF. These will decrease as operational requirements decrease.

2. a. Operational Air Force (22,000).

At the end of hostilities in EUROPE, the Italian Air Force as an operational force, ceased to exist. Certain units were, however, kept in being for employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment These personnel are employed on the workings of a Transport and Courier Service and Air/Sea Rescue duties, which work would normally be carried out by the Allied air forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in a saving of manpower and equipment to the Allied forces. Personnel are employed on the staffing of the Italian Air Ministry, providing the necessary administrative services, providing the necessary maintenance backing and training (including Refresher Schools, a Cadet College, Flying Control School, W/T School and several engineering establishments in the LECCE area). Personnel are also being employed on guard duties in the North of ITALY on aircraft factories and installations, etc. The former bomber squadrons are now used for the Courier and Transport Services; the seaplane squadrons are now used for Air/Sea Rescue duties. The fighter squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice

b. Employed by the RAF (5,500).

These personnel of the Italian Air Force are employed in substitution for RAF manpower as follows:

(1) To fill existing RAF establishment vacancies.

(2) To replace personnel who are required to return to UK or proceed to another theatre of war.

(3) To give further assistance to RAF units who by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and/or labour.

c. Employed by the USAAF (6,500).

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2. a. Operational Air Force (

At the end of hostilities in EUROPE, the Italian Air Force as an operational force, ceased to exist. Certain units were, however, kept in being for employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment These personnel are employed on the workings of a Transport and Courier Service and Air/Sea Rescue duties, which work would normally be carried out by the Allied air forces. Use of the Italian Air Force on these services results in a saving of manpower and equipment to the Allied forces. Personnel are employed on the staffing of the Italian Air Ministry, providing the necessary administrative services, providing the necessary maintenance backing and training (including Refresher Schools, a Cadet College, Flying Control School, W/T School and several engineering establishments in the LECCE area). Personnel are also being employed on guard duties in the North of ITALY on aircraft factories and installations, etc. The former bomber squadrons are now used for the Courier and Transport Services; the seaplane squadrons are now used for Air/Sea Rescue duties. The fighter squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice

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(1) To fill existing RAF establishment vacancies.

(2) To replace personnel who are required to return to UK or proceed to another theatre of war.

(3) To give further assistance to RAF units who by reason of their nature and location, require additional guards and/or labour.

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c. Employed by the USAAF (6,500).

The personnel of the Italian Air Force employed by the USAAF are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the RAF.

3. With regard to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force, it is the intention that the IAF shall be self-supporting in all respects, with the following exceptions:

POL and tyres.
Rations.
Technical equipment. necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft which are on loan to the Italian Air Force, plus provision of electric goods, such as wet and dry batteries, on a small scale, until conditions within the country become easier.

Reference is also made to clothing and providing the present bid for clothing, etc, is fully met, it is stated that the Italian Air Force will be self-supporting in respect of clothing thereafter.

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APPENDIX C

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

INTERIM ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

1. Summary of Requirements.

a. Internal Security Troops.

SICILY (as now), 2 IS divisions	10,000	
SARDINIA (as now), 1 IS division	5,00	
Ten IS brigades (1 per territorial region excluding SICILY)	25,000	
b. Mobile Reserve.		
Five combat groups and Garibaldi Regt.	50,000	
c. Control.		
SHG and H of W	2,000	
Territorial Regional Headquarters	7,000	
Total operational troops		99,000
d. Administration and Training.		
Services	31,000	
Training and reinforcements	10,000	
Total administrative troops		41,000
e. Carabinieri.	65,000	65,000
Total interim force		205,000

2. Provision.

This interim force can be provided as follows:

Combat forces (BR-ITI)	64,000

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region excluding [redacted]

b. Mobile Reserve.

Five combat groups and Garibaldi Regt.	50,000	

c. Control.

SMG and H of W	2,000	
Territorial Regional Headquarters	7,000	
Total operational troops		99,000

d. Administration and Training.

Services	31,000	
Training and reinforcements	10,000	
Total administrative troops		41,000
	65,000	65,000

e. Carabinieri.

Total interim force		205,000

2. Provision.

This interim force can be provided as follows:

Combat Forces (BR-ITI)	64,000
Security Divisions (ITI-ITI)	15,000
Italian Command) Adm Control Machinery)	3,000
Italian Adm Services (ITI-ITI)	24,000
Carabinieri (ITI-ITI)	65,000
Necessary recruitments or transfer of [redacted] ITIS or USIDIS	34,000
Total	205,000

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APPENDIX D (3)

DRAFT

TOr SECRET

TO : AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
ABSEC for British Chiefs of Staff

This is NAF 105

1. I have had under consideration the interim policy which should be adopted pending a final settlement at the Peace Treaty towards the Italian armed forces in the light of our intention to hand over responsibility to the Italian Government for civil administration of ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA, UDINE, and BOLZANO by 30 September.

2. Internal Situation in ITALY

With a poor harvest and a general shortage of raw materials, especially coal, the economic situation in ITALY is deteriorating and the position is not likely to improve. This will cause labor disturbances and internal unrest which is already beginning. The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied troops which are being steadily reduced. If we are to avoid having to interfere in order to maintain law and order in ITALY the Italian Government must be given adequate forces whose efficiency must be increased as much as possible.

3. Allied Requirements

In order to save Allied manpower there will for some time continue to be an Allied requirement for the employment in ITALY of certain Italian Army and Airforce Units. This requirement is summarized in paras 4 and 5 below.

4. Italian Army Units in support of British and U.S. Forces

The requirements of the Italian Army amount to :- 5716

- 10,000 BASILs in service units in direct support of British Army.
- [illegible] by 6,000 per month

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2. Internal Situation in ITALY

With a poor harvest and a general shortage of raw materials, especially coal, the economic situation in ITALY is deteriorating and the position is not likely to improve. This will cause labor disturbances and internal unrest which is already beginning. The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied troops which are being steadily reduced. If we are to avoid having to interfere in order to maintain law and order in ITALY the Italian Government must be given adequate forces whose efficiency must be increased as much as possible.

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In order to save Allied manpower there will for some time continue to be an Allied requirement for the employment in ITALY of certain Italian Army and Airforce Units. This requirement is summarized in paras 4 and 5 below.

4. Italian Army Units in support of British and U.S. Forces

The requirements of the Italian Army amount to :- 5716

a. 106,000 BRITIs in service units in direct support of British Army. This will be reduced to 96,000 by end of August and by 6,000 per month thereafter.

b. 83,000 USITIs in service units in direct support of U.S. Army. This will be reduced to 30,000 early in August with further reduction thereafter.

c. 24,000 ITI-ITIs in guard units on ~~British~~ Allied installations and in other miscellaneous units. These will gradually be reduced as dumps and installations are eaten up or closed down.

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APPENDIX D

F/306

5. Italian Air Force (Units) in Support of Allied Air Forces.

There will for some time be a diminishing requirement for the Italian Air Force to support Allied Air Forces in relief of Allied manpower.

6. Requirements of Italian Government.

The Armed forces which it is considered will be required by the Italian Government in order to assume responsibility for civil administration of Metropolitan ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA, UDINE and BOLZANO are shown in paras 7 and 14 below.

7. Italian Navy.

The size and employment of the Italian Navy does not have any bearing on the proposal to turn over further responsibility for civil administration to the Italian Government. Further, the Italian Navy is employed in accordance with CCS paper 515/1 of 19 March 1944. This arrangement should continue. Measures are already in force whereby the Italian Ministry of Marine has a large say in the employment of small Italian warships after obtaining the approval of the appropriate Allied naval authorities.

8. Italian Land Forces.

The requirements of the Italian Government for the maintenance of law and order can be summarized as:

a. An efficient and adequate police force deployed over the whole country.

b. Local reserves in each territorial region in order to back up the police force in quelling local disturbances.

c. A general reserve strategically located in order to undertake suppression of major uprisings.

d. Command and administrative machinery.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

7 and 14 below.

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The size and employment of the Italian Navy does not have any bearing on the proposal to turn over further responsibility for civil administration to the Italian Government. Further, the Italian Navy is employed in accordance with CCS paper 515/1 of 19 March 1944. This arrangement should continue. Measures are already in force whereby the Italian Ministry of Marine has a large say in the employment of small Italian warships after obtaining the approval of the appropriate Allied naval authorities.

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a. An efficient and adequate police force deployed over the whole country.

b. Local reserves in each territorial region in order to back up the police force in quelling local disturbances.

c. A general reserve strategically located in order to undertake suppression of major uprisings.

d. Command and administrative machinery.

9. The present establishment of the Carabinieri is 65,000. This force is corrupt and inefficient. It is not however considered that any overall alteration to its establishment is necessary. The remedy lies in increasing its efficiency rather than its numbers. For this purpose an Allied Police Mission should be provided urgently to reorganize and train the Carabinieri.

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APPENDIX D

(2)

10. It is considered that the Italian Government should be allowed an army of 140,000 made up as follows:

Local Reserves	40,000	organized into ten internal security brigades each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland and two IS Divs in SICILY and one in SARDINIA each of 5,000 men.
Mobile Reserves	50,000	Five combat groups and Garibaldi Regiment.
Command	9,000	Ministry of War and Territorial Region HQ.
Administration	31,000	
Training and reinforcements	10,000	
Total	140,000	

11. The Italian Army has never been an ~~impressive~~ effective force but as in the case of the Carabinieri we should rely on increasing the efficiency of a small force which can be maintained by the Italians themselves rather than allow them a larger ~~army~~ interim army. Refer TOMMY

12. Operational and administrative control of the force in para 10 should be assumed by the Italian Government at the time the remaining Northern provinces less special areas are handed over, i.e. by 30 September.

13. Administration.

Recommendations regarding administrative arrangements for the forces to be handed over to the Italian Government will be the subject of a seperate communication.

14. Italian Air Force.

The disposal of the Italian Air Force does not have any bearing on the proposal [illegible] facilities to the Italian Government. However, a

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F/306

APPENDIX D

(2)

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Mobile Reserves	50,000	Five combat groups and Garibaldi Regiment.
Command	9,000	Ministry of War and Territorial Region HQ.
Administration	31,000	
Training and reinforcements	10,000	
Total	140,000	

11. The Italian Army has never been an ~~impressive~~ effective force but as in the case of the Carabinieri we should rely on increasing the efficiency of a small force which can be maintained by the Italians themselves rather than allow them a larger ~~army~~ internal army. Refer TOMMY

12. Operational and administrative control of the force in para 10 should be assumed by the Italian Government at the time the remaining Northern provinces less special areas are handed over, i.e. by 30 September.

13. Administration.

Recommendations regarding administrative arrangements for the forces to be handed over to the Italian Government will be the subject of a separate communication.

14. Italian Air Force.

The disposal of the Italian Air Force does not have any bearing on the proposal to turn over further responsibilities to the Italian Government. However, a

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

Command	9,000	Ministry of War and Territorial Region HQ.
Administration	31,000	
Training and reinforcements	10,000	
Total	140,000	

11. The Italian Army has never been an ~~impressive~~ effective force but as in the case of the Carabinieri we should rely on increasing the efficiency of a small force which can be maintained by the Italians themselves rather than allow them a larger ~~army~~ interim army. Refer TOMMIH

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13. Administration.

Recommendations regarding administrative arrangements for the forces to be handed over to the Italian Government will be the subject of a separate communication.

14. Italian Air Force.

The disposal of the Italian Air Force does not have any bearing on the proposal to turn over further responsibilities to the Italian Government. However, a separate investigation is now being carried out with a view to reducing the Italian Air Force. Meanwhile it should remain at its present ceiling under existing administrative arrangements.

15. I urgently request that you will approve the policy set out above.

All constituted as maintenance of supplies.
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Ch. Commissioner, Allied Comm
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CC 1700
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AP561

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 7
27th July 1945

SECRET

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. With reference to the decision at SAC (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 7, the Memorandum by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, (which was circulated as Paper No. SAC (45) 3), was dispatched to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff under cover of the letter at Appendix 'A'.

2. This letter is therefore circulated for information.

28 JUL 1945

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

5714

EC List - 28 July 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795115

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. With reference to the decision at SAC (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 7, the Memorandum by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, (which was circulated as Paper No. SAC (45) 3), was dispatched to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff under cover of the letter at Appendix 'A'.

2. This letter is therefore circulated for information.

28 JUL 1943

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

5715

Ec Dist - 28 July 45

DISTRIBUTION

NORMAL

31 Chief Comm.
32 Exec Comm
33 Political Advisers.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

APPENDIX 'A'

SECRET
27 July 1945

SUBJECT: Memorandum Entitled "Future Policy Toward ITALY"

TO : The Secretaries,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee,
1901 Constitution Avenue,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. I forward herewith 6 copies of a memorandum written by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission on "Future Policy Toward ITALY".

2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward ITALY. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In FAN 487 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "relax control.....thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist ITALY towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in ITALY is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards ITALY.

4. Finally, I wish to say that I consider this memorandum to be a most valuable contribution towards the solution of the Italian problem. While I do not wish, in this letter, to be taken as endorsing every proposal made in it, I do urge that it should be studied with great care, and I will send my detailed comments on the naval, military and air aspects raised by the Chief Commissioner at a later date.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

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JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
General, U.S.A.
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean Theater

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Copies to: Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff,
Cabinet Offices,
Great George Street,
LONDON, S. W. 1

(Ltr & encl)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785415

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Ch. Commissions Allied Commission (3)(31-33)
c/o AFHQS

cc.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP551

SAC (45) 6
24th July 1945

SECRET
COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGNOR NENNI

Note by Chief of Staff

1. It is reported by Associated Press that Signor Nenni, the Italian Vice Premier and the Minister responsible for preparing the Constituent Assembly and for anti-fascist sanctions, in an address to a large political meeting in MILAN on 22nd July 1945, campaigned vigorously for a republic. Such action contravenes the undertaking, not to raise the institutional question, signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Italian government as a whole and the oath which was taken by Signor Nenni on assuming office.

2. If the report by Associated Press is confirmed, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be instructed to protest strongly, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, to the Italian Prime Minister. He should emphasise that Signor Nenni has violated his oath and that any repetition of such action would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested :

(a) To approve the course of action recommended in paragraph 2 above.

(b) To authorise the despatch of the signal at Appendix 'A' reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the incident and the action taken in regard to it.

(intd) W.D.M.

CX 12002

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. It is reported by Associated Press that Signor Nenni, the Italian Vice Premier and the Minister responsible for preparing the Constituent Assembly and for anti-fascist sanctions, in an address to a large political meeting in MILAN on 22nd July 1945, campaigned (vigorously) for a republic. Such action contravenes the undertaking, not to raise the institutional question, signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Italian government as a whole and the oath which was taken by Signor Nenni on assuming office.

2. If the report by Associated Press is confirmed, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be instructed to protest strongly, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, to the Italian Prime Minister. He should emphasise that Signor Nenni has violated his oath and that any repetition of such action would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested :

(a) To approve the course of action recommended in paragraph 2 above.

(b) To authorise the despatch of the signal at Appendix 'A' reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the incident and the action taken in regard to it.

(intd) H.D.M.

5712

EC Dist - 25 July 45

31 Chief Comm

32 Exec Comm

33 Political Advisers

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785115

SECRET

APPENDIX 'A'

TO: AGLR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff

This is MAF 1148

1. Pursuant to policy permitting political meetings in AMG territory, NENNI, Italian Vice Premier and Minister responsible for preparation of the Constituent Assembly, was allowed to address large meeting in MILAN 22 July purpose of which was announced as treasury bond campaign and wheat amassing. In fact NENNI campaigned (vigorously) for a republic.

2. Such action contravenes the undertaking not to raise institutional question signed on behalf of Italian government as whole and the oath taken by NENNI on taking office.

3. I have instructed Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to protest strongly to the Italian Prime Minister, emphasising that Signor NENNI has violated his oath and that any repetition would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

4. Above reported for your information.

5711

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

NENNI, Italian Vice Premier and Minister responsible for preparation of the Constituent Assembly, was allowed to address large meeting in MILAN 22 July purpose of which was announced as treasury bond campaign and wheat amassing. In fact NENNI campaigned (vigorously) for a republic.

2. Such action contravenes the undertaking not to raise institutional question signed on behalf of Italian government as whole and the oath taken by NENNI on taking office.

3. I have instructed Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to protest strongly to the Italian Prime Minister, emphasising that Signor NENNI has violated his oath and that any repetition would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

4. Above reported for your information.

5711

See (1)

(50.)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

APPENDIX 'A'

Translation

State Department
3/999

Rome, 21 June 1945.

Dear Admiral,

Thank you for your kind letter C.C. 1003 of June 16th.

I have observed that the demarcation line between Allied and Jugoslav occupation, which is drawn on the map enclosed with your letter, stops, in the South, in the immediate neighbourhood of Muggia.

I have also observed that the agreement signed by Marshal Alexander and Tito, (art. 1) states nevertheless that "Pola and anchorages on the west coast of Istria will be under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Command". And that Art. 3 repeats "the Supreme Allied Command will govern... Pola and such other areas on the west coast of Istria as he may deem necessary".

I therefore suppose that, besides the one marked on the map which you kindly forwarded to me, the allied occupation line will also include a further line in Western Istria, as well as the islands which are mostly Italian.

On this subject, I already had the opportunity of expressing to the American and British Ambassadors a few considerations which have a fundamental interest for us, i.e.:

1. Besides Pola, the anchorages on the West coast include the following towns which are all Italian: Muggia, Capodistria, Pasana, Isola, Pirano, Umago, Cittanova, Parenzo, Orsera, Rovigno, and Lussiono. Besides, in the immediate hinterland of West Istria, there are Italian villages such as Dignano, Buie, Gallesano, Valle, Montona, Visignano. These cities and villages at least, which are all exclusively Italian should be placed in the zone which is under Allied control. Most of them would be included in it by taking the national Trieste-Pola road, which passes by Monte Tondo, or even better, the Trieste-Pola railroad, as demarcation line.

2. After examining the executive details, we think that some form of guarantee for the Italians beyond the demarcation line, and of Fiume principally, should be introduced, such as, at least, the organization of a commission of observers as it has been foreseen for the zone occupied by Jugoslavia.

I repeat to you what I wrote on this subject to the British and American Ambassadors: we are fully conscious of the dangers and risks that the question presented and is still presenting for the Allies, and of the great and serious effort which has been and is necessary to overcome them. The full consciousness of these dangers and risks has certainly increased and deepened the sense of gratitude of the Italian people because of the solidarity shown to it by the Washington and London Governments in these difficult circumstances. I therefore beg you to keep in mind the friendly confidence and spirit of close collaboration which [illegible]

5708

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

And that Art. 3 repeats "the Supreme Allied Command will govern... [illegible] such other areas on the west coast of Istria as he may deem necessary".

I therefore suppose that, besides the one marked on the map which you kindly forwarded to me, the allied occupation line will also include a further line in Western Istria, as well as the islands which are mostly Italian.

On this subject, I already had the opportunity of expressing to the American and British Ambassadors a few considerations which have a fundamental interest for us, i.e.:

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2. After examining the executive details, we think that some form of guarantee for the Italians beyond the demarcation line, and of Fiume principally, should be introduced, such as, at least, the organization of a commission of observers as it has been foreseen for the zone occupied by Jugoslavia.

I repeat to you what I wrote on this subject to the British and American Ambassadors: we are fully conscious of the dangers and risks that the question presented and is still presenting for the Allies, and of the great and serious effort which has been and is necessary to overcome them. The full consciousness of these dangers and risks has certainly increased and deepened the sense of gratitude of the Italian people because of the solidarity shown to it by the Washington and London Governments in these difficult circumstances. I therefore beg you to keep in mind the friendly confidence and spirit of close collaboration which inspires our work, when reading these considerations; kindly consider them as the expression of our deep persuasion that Europe can only be pacified by fair and just solutions.

I shall be most grateful if you kindly draw the attention of the Supreme Allied Command on the above mentioned indications, to be taken in the greatest possible consideration when the occupation programs already established or to be established will be carried out.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

S. D. Gasperi.

SECRET

Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
ROME.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

(Chief Cor)/Allied Com-
(3)(31-33)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SECRET

COPY NO 31

SAC(45) 4
24 July 1945

AP 544

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Secretary

1. Item Number 5 of the 16th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to bring forward to the next meeting a letter, which had been sent by the Italian Foreign Minister to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission expressing concern in regard to certain islands off the west coast of Istria and coastal villages on the mainland, the population of which was claimed to be Italian. A draft reply was also to be submitted.

2. The letter in question is reproduced at Appendix 'A'.

3. It has been ascertained that apart from a formal acknowledgement no reply has been made by the Allied Commission to the above letter.

4. At the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, in conjunction with U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister has prepared the draft reply to Signor de Gasperi, which is reproduced at Appendix 'B'.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the terms of this reply and instruct the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to despatch it.

E. C. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.
SECRETARY.

5709

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. Item Number 5 of the 16th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to bring forward to the next meeting a letter, which had been sent by the Italian Foreign Minister to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission expressing concern in regard to certain islands off the west coast of Istria and coastal villages on the mainland, the population of which was claimed to be Italian. A draft reply was also to be submitted.

2. The letter in question is reproduced at Appendix 'A'.

3. It has been ascertained that apart from a formal acknowledgement no reply has been made by the Allied Commission to the above letter.

4. At the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, in conjunction with U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister has prepared the draft reply to Signor de Gasperi, which is reproduced at Appendix 'B'.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the terms of this reply and instruct the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to despatch it.

R. G. STEPTIAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

5709

LC DIST - 25 JULY 45

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31 CHIEF COMMR

32 EXEC COMMR

33 POLITICAL ADVISERS.

48

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief Comm/ [illegible]

(3)(31-33)

C.C.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP 545

SAC (45) 5
24th July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

REORGANISATION OF R.A.F COMMAND IN ITALY

Note by Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF

1. Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces is now composed entirely of R.A.F and Dominion units and is no longer an Allied Air Force. The Allied title will, therefore, be dissolved on 1 August 1945 at the same time as the dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Force into its national elements.

2. It is, therefore, proposed on 1 August 1945 to rename Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces "Air Headquarters, R.A.F, ITALY". This headquarters will command all ITALY based R.A.F aircraft, including the Desert Air Force when HQ R.A.F MEDME withdraws to CAIRO.

3. The forces to come under Air Headquarters, R.A.F, ITALY, at present include one coastal squadron. This squadron will be withdrawn to M.A.T. in due course. However, Air Headquarters, R.A.F, ITALY, will then still be responsible for arranging to provide, on application, such minespotting and other coastal sorties as the naval authorities in ITALY may require.

4. When Headquarters R.A.F MEDME withdraws to CAIRO, Air Headquarters, R.A.F, ITALY, will be responsible for the command of all R.A.F units and personnel remaining in the theatre of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to these arrangements is requested.

(intd) R.B.P.
for A.G.C.

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5710

EC List - 25 July 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces is now composed entirely of RAF and Dominion units and is no longer an Allied Air Force. The Allied title will, therefore, be dissolved on 1 August 1945 at the same time as the dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Force into its national elements.

2. It is, therefore, proposed on 1 August 1945 to rename Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces "Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY". This headquarters will command all ITALY based RAF aircraft, including the Desert Air Force when HQ RAF MEDME withdraws to CAIRO.

3. The forces to come under Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY, at present include one coastal squadron. This squadron will be withdrawn to MALTA in due course. However, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY, will then still be responsible for arranging to provide, on application, such minespotting and other coastal sorties as the naval authorities in ITALY may require.

4. When Headquarters RAF MEDME withdraws to CAIRO, Air Headquarters, RAF, ITALY, will be responsible for the command of all RAF units and personnel remaining in the theatre of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to these arrangements is requested.

(intd) R.E.P.
for A.G.G.

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EC List - 25 July 45

31 Chief Comm R

32 Exec Comm R

33 Political Advisers

(19)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795615

SECRET

APPENDIX 'B'

DRAFT REPLY TO ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
FOR DESPATCH BY CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION

"1. On 30th June I wrote to inform you of the action I had taken in regard to your letter of 21st June, in which you suggested that the existing agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito, in respect of the area known as VENEZIA GIULIA, should be modified to provide special protection for the interests of Italians living beyond the demarcation line.

2. The contents of your letter have been considered by the Supreme Allied Commander, who has directed me to inform you as follows:-

(a) The areas coming under Allied control are defined in the Agreement of 9th June as the Territory of VENEZIA GIULIA West of the line drawn on the map, of which you have a copy. These areas include TRIESTE, the railways and roads from there to Austria via GORIZIA, CAPORETTO and TARVISIO, as well as Pola and anchorages on the west coast of ISTRIA. They do not include the islands and coastal towns to which you refer in your letter. There is no intention of extending the zone of occupation to include further territory in Western ISTRIA.

(b) As you are no doubt aware, it is specifically noted in the (two) agreement(s), signed at BELGRADE on 9th June ~~(and in VENEZIA GIULIA on 20th June 1945)~~ that the final disposition of the whole territory is not determined by the present areas of occupation. The claim that the populations of certain towns, villages and islands are predominantly Italian should be submitted through diplomatic channels for consideration at the Peace Conference or whenever the disposition of the disputed territories is finally decided.

(c) It is not the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to seek

5707

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

2. The contents of [illegible]

Allied Commander, who has directed me to inform you as follows:-

(a) The areas coming under Allied control are defined in the Agreement of 9th June as the Territory of VENEZIA GIULIA West of the line drawn on the map, of which you have a copy. These areas include TRIESTE, the railways and roads from there to Austria via GORIZIA, C. PORETTO and TARVISIO, as well as Pola and anchorages on the west coast of ISTRIA. They do not include the islands and coastal towns to which you refer in your letter. There is no intention of extending the zone of occupation to include further territory in Western ISTRIA.

(b) As you are no doubt aware, it is specifically noted in the (two) agreements, signed at BELGRADE on 9th June ~~and in VENEZIA GIULIA on 20th June 1945~~ that the final disposition of the whole territory is not determined by the present areas of occupation. The claim that the populations of certain towns, villages and islands are predominantly Italian should be submitted through diplomatic channels for consideration at the Peace Conference or whenever the disposition of the disputed territories is finally decided.

(c) It is not the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to seek revision of his existing military ~~agreement~~ arrangements with the Jugoslav Army.

(d) The Italian Government are of course at liberty to raise the question at any time through diplomatic channels. In this connection it is noted that you have in fact already addressed communications on the subject to the British and American Ambassadors".

48

SECRET

5707

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 750615

F.'206 (Final)

SECRET

e.e.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No. 28

23 July 1945.

FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS ITALY

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff we have examined the paper prepared by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the covering letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff drafted by the CAO. We have redrafted the suggested covering letter and have deleted from it any comments on particular points raised in the paper. We consider that there are so many contentious points raised in the naval, military and air clauses which are already under detailed examination by us that it would be unwise to commit ourselves at such short notice on any of these points. Comment in the covering letter on any one particular point might be construed as tacit agreement on other points not commented on.

It is our view that it would be better to forward any detailed comments after the various MJPS papers at present in course of preparation have been considered and agreement reached on the issues raised in them.

James H Devereux f/o
Col

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

See

R B Pakenham

R. B. PAKENHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

W. A. Adair

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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List A plus G-5) Copy of paper by Chief Commissioner

5706

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

which are already under detailed examination by us that it would be premature to commit ourselves at such short notice on any of these points. Comment in the covering letter on any one particular point might be construed as tacit agreement on other points not commented on.

It is our view that it would be better to forward any detailed comments after the various MJPS papers at present in course of preparation have been considered and agreement reached on the issues raised in them.

for D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

R. B. PAKENHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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5206

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28 Chief Comm

31 Exec Comm

40 Political Advisers

(47)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

SECRET

F 308 (Final)

D R A F T

SECRET

TO: The Secretaries,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee,
1901 Constitution Avenue,
Washington, D.C.

COPY TO: Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff
Cabinet Offices,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.

1. I forward herewith 6 copies of a memorandum written by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission on "Future Policy Toward ITALY".

2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward ITALY. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In FAN 487 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "relax control .....thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist ITALY towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in ITALY is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I may favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards ITALY.

5705

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Allied policy toward ITALY. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In FAN 487 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "relax control .....thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist ITALY towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in ITALY is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I may favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards ITALY.

5705

4. I wish, however, to mention one matter to which specific reference is not made by Admiral Stone. There is, I believe, a proposal under consideration, that the responsibility for civil supply in ITALY, now vested in the Allied Commission and this headquarters, should be taken over by UNRRA. I feel very strongly that such a step would not be compatible with the policy of active interest. I am sure, and Governor Lehman with whom the matter has been discussed agrees, that UNRRA are incapable of shouldering this responsibility. This, however, concerns questions of supply and economic rehabilitation with which I will deal in a later communication.

(9)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5. Finally, I wish to say that I consider this memorandum to be a most valuable contribution towards the solution of the Italian problem. While I do not wish, in this letter, to be taken as endorsing every proposal made in it, I do urge that it should be studied with great care, and I will send my detailed comments on the naval, military and air aspects raised by the Chief Commissioner at a later date.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX A

SECRET

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station,
Allied Force Headquarters.
13th July, 1945.

Med.No.00405/3

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S SECRETARIAT.

MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - RETENTION OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT - NOTE BY THE COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN

The antagonisms aroused by the European War are such that it appears likely that the Military Authorities will be faced with a considerable security problem in the MEDITERRANEAN area for some time to come, with the possibility of disturbances serious enough to require the presence of troops or reinforcements occuring in such diverse areas as GREECE, CYPRUS, ITALY, or EGYPT.

2. It is understood that of the remaining amphibious lift - (8 L.S.T., including 3 Greeks and "THRUSTER", 1 Flotilla L.C.I. (L), 2 Flotillas L.C.T.(3)) - the L.S.T. will be withdrawn by the end of the year for refit and service in the FAR EAST, and the L.C.I.(L) and L.C.T. either withdrawn or laid up in order to release the crews. Furthermore, as the size of the armed forces in the theatre is reduced by redeployment the amount of shipping employed on internal Mediterranean sailings, and hence available in emergency for use as M.T. shipping, will correspondingly be reduced. The bulk of the shipping in the MEDITERRANEAN will eventually be transit shipping already loaded for the FAR EAST. In addition, alongside berths suitable for unloading M.T. shipping are not available in all MEDITERRANEAN harbours. It is evident therefore, that we are in danger of losing our flexibility in the transport of reinforcements in emergency and that we may reach a stage in which we cannot make effective use of our Military reserves.

3. It is considered necessary, therefore, to retain a small amphibious lift in the MEDITERRANEAN, until at least after the Peace Conference, to ensure the Army the necessary mobility. This lift should be in L.S.T. only, as the inferior sea-keeping qualities of L.C.T. make them unsuitable for this requirement, since they might be required to operate at any time of the year, and they represent a heavy maintenance and manning commitment out of proportion to their value. It is considered, however, that a small force of L.C.I.(L) should also be retained for use in a case where a small lift of personnel only is required.

4. In view of the known heavy requirements for this type of craft in the FAR EAST it is unlikely any L.S.T. could be made available from outside the Station. Furthermore, of the 8 L.S.T. now operational on the Station, "THRUSTER's" draught renders her unsuitable for the purpose under consideration. The remaining 7 L.S.T.(2) would provide a lift of approximately 2500 personnel and 420 vehicles, which would approximate to a lift of one Brigade Group/R.C.T.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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come, with the possibility
the presence of troops or reinforcements occuring in such diverse areas
as GREECE, CYPRUS, ITALY, or EGYPT.

2. It is understood that of the remaining amphibious lift - (8 L.S.T., including 3 Greeks and "THRUSTER", 1 Flotilla L.C.I. (L), 2 Flotillas L.C.T.(3)) - the L.S.T. will be withdrawn by the end of the year for refit and service in the FAR EAST, and the L.C.I.(L) and L.C.T. either withdrawn or laid up in order to release the crews. Furthermore, as the size of the armed forces in the theatre is reduced by redeployment the amount of shipping employed on internal Mediterranean sailings, and hence available in emergency for use as M.T. shipping, will correspondingly be reduced. The bulk of the shipping in the MEDITERRANEAN will eventually be transit shipping already loaded for the FAR EAST. In addition, alongside berths suitable for unloading M.T. shipping are not available in all MEDITERRANEAN harbours. It is evident therefore, that we are in danger of losing our flexibility in the transport of reinforcements in emergency and that we may reach a stage in which we cannot make effective use of our Military reserves.

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4. In view of the known heavy requirements for this type of craft in the FAR EAST it is unlikely any L.S.T. could be made available from outside the Station. Furthermore, of the 8 L.S.T. now operational on the Station, "THRUSTER's" draught renders her unsuitable for the purpose under consideration. The remaining 7 L.S.T.(2) would provide a lift of approximately 2500 personnel and 420 vehicles, which would approximate to a lift of one Brigade Group/R.C.T. However, it must be borne in mind that of these 7 L.S.T.(2), three are Greek, and although at present they are under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN, a situation might arise where it would be politically undesirable to employ them. They might, in fact, already be in use by the Greeks for Military purposes.

5. It would not be possible to keep the 4 British L.S.T. in a fully manned state. It would be planned to maintain permanent skeleton crews aboard, the crews being completed in emergency, within 8 days, from Station shore-based personnel and crews of ships refitting. Reserves of Naval manpower in the MEDITERRANEAN until the end of the Japanese War will be very small, and it might be necessary to call upon the Army Authorities to assist with men to carry out some of the less skilled duties on the upper deck, and to act as guns' crews.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX A

Page 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN's letter No. Med.00405/3 dated 13th July, 1945.

6. The complement of an L.S.T.(2) is 4 Officers and 58 men. The size of the skeleton crew it would be necessary to maintain in each of the 4 British L.S.T. would be 2 Officers and 22 men.

7. The foregoing appreciation is drawn to the attention of the Supreme Allied Commander in order that he may consider requesting the retention of the 7 remaining L.S.T.(2), when reviewing his requirements for amphibious forces in July in accordance with MEDCOS 259, should he so desire.

(Signed) J. H. D. CUNNINGHAM,
A D M I R A L

5697

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Signed) J. H. D. CUNNINGHAM,

A D M I R A L

5697

(10)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

P/307 (Final) D R A F T APPENDIX B

SECRET

TO : AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff.

RPTD: BRITMAN WASHINGTON for US Joint Chiefs of Staff
MIDEAST

This is MEDCOS ___ further to MEDCOS 259 and 261.

1. Following British landing craft remain in this theatre:

8 LST (including 3 Greek and "Thruster")
1 Flotilla LCI(L)
2 Flotillas LCT(3)

2. The antagonisms aroused by the European war are such that it appears likely that a considerable security problem in the Mediterranean area, especially in GREECE and the LEVANT, must be faced for some time to come. If the emergency justifies it, it is felt that forces will be made available, either from within the theatre or elsewhere, requiring transportation by sea.

3. As the size of the armed forces in this theatre is reduced by redeployment, the amount of merchant shipping here, available in an emergency for use as MT shipping, will be correspondingly reduced. In addition alongside berths suitable for unloading MT shipping do not exist in all Mediterranean harbours. Further owing to likelihood of damage to road and rail bridges by insurgents it is highly desirable to be able to land forces where required. It is evident therefore that there is grave danger of losing flexibility in transport of reinforcements in an emergency and a stage may be reached when effective use cannot be made of military reserves unless amphibious lift available.

4. C-in-C Med has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) remaining in this theatre be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.

5. 3 Greek LST are required to meet shipping demands for rapid movement of [illegible] from IT/JY to GREECE to reequip Greek Army.

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4. C-in-C Med has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) remaining in this theatre be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.

5. 3 Greek LST are required to meet shipping demands for rapid movement of vehicles and equipment from ITALY to GREECE to reequip Greek Army.

5696

6. Recommend therefore to meet needs set out in paras 2, 3, 4 and 5 that 4 British LST, 3 Greek LST and 8 LCI(L) be retained in this theatre. If agreed skeleton crews only would be maintained on board British vessels owing to manpower shortage. If required in an emergency crews would be provided with assistance from military resources.

7. It would thus be possible to release forthwith

LST "Thruster"
The remaining 5 LCI(L)
Two Flotillas LCT

46

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P/307 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 21

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

23 July 1945.

RETENTION OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT IN THIS THEATRE

OBJECT.

1. To examine the future requirements for amphibious lift in this theatre and to prepare a draft signal in the MEDCOS series as a follow up to MEDCOS 259 & 261.

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT.

2. The amphibious lift now available is considered to be adequate to meet all likely requirements. It consists of 8 LST (including 3 Greek and "Thruster") 1 flotilla of LCI(L), and 2 flotillas of LCT(3). The future of the Greek LST is not yet known. However, under present plans, the balance of this force will be withdrawn progressively. By the end of 1945 all will have been withdrawn for refit and service in the FAR EAST, or withdrawn and laid up in order to release the crews. Any decision to request their retention in this theatre must be made in the near future. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean suggests that it is necessary to retain a small amphibious lift comprising 7 of the above mentioned LST plus eight of the LCI(L). ("Thruster" is not included in the LST to be retained as her draft makes her unsuitable for employment in many of the Mediterranean harbours.) This would provide an amphibious lift capable of transporting approximately 4000 personnel and 420 vehicles at a time, which represents the approximate strength of one Brigade/Regiment with supporting arms. (At Appendix A is an appreciation on the subject by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean).

FACTORS INVOLVED.

3. In considering the requirement for amphibious lift in this theatre the following factors are pertinent:

a. The political situation.

b. Purposes for which lift might be required.

c. Troops available.

d. Other shipping available.

e. Air lift available.

5703

4. Political Situation.

a. It appears likely that the Allied authorities in the Mediterranean area will be faced with a continuing threat of potential security problems in

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1 flotilla of LCI(L), and 2 flotillas
is not yet known. However, under present plans, the balance of this force
will be withdrawn progressively. By the end of 1945 all will have been with-
drawn for refit and service in the FAR EAST, or withdrawn and laid up in order
to release the crews. Any decision to request their retention in this theatre
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that it is necessary to retain a small amphibious lift comprising 7 of the
above mentioned LST plus eight of the LCI(L). ("Thruster" is not included in
the LST to be retained as her draft makes her unsuitable for employment in
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3. In considering the requirement for amphibious lift in this theatre the follow-
ing factors are pertinent:

a. The political situation.

b. Purposes for which lift might be required.

c. Troops available.

d. Other shipping available.

e. Air lift available.

5203

4. Political Situation.

a. It appears likely that the Allied authorities in the Mediterranean area
will be faced with a continuing threat of potential security problems in
widely scattered areas throughout the theatre such as VENEZIA GIULIA, NW
ITALY, the Greek frontiers and the LEVANT.

b. It is not unlikely that attempts may be made by Jugoslav, Albanian or
Bulgarian elements to create frontier incidents with a view to future
annexation of Greek territory adjacent to their common frontiers. Althoug
it is desirable that Greek forces should be entirely responsible for guard
ing their own frontiers it is nevertheless considered that we should adopt
a strong line as in VENEZIA GIULIA and that we should continue to support
the Greek Government in the event of such violations of Greek frontiers by
concentrating the maximum force possible in the affected area. In this
connection GREEKMIL have been instructed along these lines and the Combino
Chiefs of Staff have been requested to approve such a policy.

46 Sec Dist - 25 July 45
31 Chief Commissioner
32 Exec Commissioner
35 Political Advisers

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c. Recurrence of the recent disorders in SYRIA and the LEBANON, as well as related or unrelated disturbances in PALESTINE must be considered a strong possibility at least until major decisions have been reached regarding the political status of these countries.

5. Purposes for Which Lift Might Be Required.

a. Of the areas mentioned in 4a above, the first two are not likely to involve the use of amphibious lift. A possible exception to this would be a requirement to reinforce or evacuate an Allied force in the POLA area. This is considered unlikely and not sufficient reason to retain an amphibious lift in the theatre. Again if the political situation in ITALY deteriorates, it may be necessary to move some of the forces, when released from GREECE, back to ITALY as quickly as possible.

b. As mentioned in para 4b the policy with respect to British forces in GREECE is now before the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. It is considered that unless JUGOSLAVIA declares war on GREECE, the present British troops in GREECE will be able to cope with any emergency that may arise, without substantial reinforcements. Should trouble arise however it may be that owing to the poor state of road communications and the likelihood of these communications being disrupted by wintry weather, troops will have to be moved rapidly by sea from one part of GREECE to another. An amphibious lift would be necessary for this, especially if the area threatened was NW GREECE since this area is devoid of suitable harbours. Present plans call for the retention of British forces at least until the end of 1945. In event of frontier violations after their withdrawal it might be necessary to reintroduce Allied forces into GREECE from this theatre or from MIDEAST.

c. C-in-C Mediterranean is responsible for the LEVANT as well as those parts of the Mediterranean Theatre which are under command of SACMED. Similarly the control of merchant shipping for the whole of the Mediterranean is exercised by this HQ. Requirements for movement of personnel and vehicles for which the employment of LST and LCI(L) would be of value must be considered on a wider basis than the requirement of this theatre alone. It may be necessary to reinforce the LEVANT or MIDEAST rapidly from this theatre or elsewhere in the Mediterranean and C-in-C Med would be responsible for the provision of naval craft.

d. It may be that, wherever disturbances occur, those responsible will indulge in large scale bridge blowing activities. It will therefore be desirable to be in a position to land Allied troops as near as possible to the disturbed areas. If a force cannot be landed in the desired place it will probably have to carry with it so much bridging material as to detract considerably from its use as a fighting force.

e. Apart from the operational requirement for amphibious lifts there are certain other requirements which must be met. There is a requirement now to move some 1300 vehicles to GREECE in order to equip the Greek Army. The more rapidly this is done, the sooner the hand of the Greek Government

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e. Apart from the operational requirement for amphibious lifts there are certain other requirements which must be met. There is a requirement now to move some 1300 vehicles to GREECE in order to equip the Greek Army. The more rapidly this is done, the sooner the hand of the Greek Government will be strengthened and British troops can be withdrawn. There are also, from our experience in the Mediterranean, always many requirements for the movement of small parties of personnel and vehicles by LST and LCI(L). It is therefore desirable that sufficient flexibility for quick movement by sea be retained to enable such forces to be carried in landing craft.

6. Availability of Forces.

a. According to information now available there will be located in ITALY after completion of the main redeployment plans the following troops:

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1 Inf Div (US)
1 Inf Div (Br)
1 Armd Bde (Br)
1 Armd Car Regt
8 Arty Regts

These will later be reduced to:

1 Inf Div (US)
1 Inf Div (Br)
4 Arty Regts (Br)

This does not take into consideration Italian troops nor the possibility that all or part of the Polish Corps might remain in the theatre. Furthermore in NAF 1030 the SAC recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that a portion of the mobile reserve be located in ITALY. Should this recommendation be approved the forces listed above might be increased by one division and one armoured regiment.

b. In addition to the troops in ITALY there will be a garrison in MIDEAST of at least one infantry division and one armoured division. By May 1946 the British Central European Reserve will be established there also, and a portion of this force might be available for dispatch to GREECE.

c. In the event of frontier incidents in GREECE after the departure of British troops, it is extremely likely that such incidents would have a strong Jugoslav flavor, with a consequent deterioration of stability in VENEZIA GIULIA. Under such circumstances, it would more than likely be impossible to detach a force of any effective striking power from the occupational forces in VENEZIA GIULIA. Thus, at best, a token force, at the maximum a Brigade Group/RCT, could be dispatched to GREECE from ITALY. However should the CCS agree to a mobile reserve being located in ITALY or should troops be made available from AUSTRIA, the size of the force might be substantially increased.

d. There is a possibility that political objections to the employment of the Polish Corps in GREECE might be overcome or they might be transferred to MIDEAST at short notice in order to relieve forces required to deal with trouble in the LEVANT. LST and LCI(L) would be necessary if such movement were to be accomplished rapidly.

e. In any case, provided the emergency justified it, forces would certainly be made available either from this theatre, EUROPE or MIDEAST to meet the situation especially if the threatened area was GREECE.

7. Other Shipping Available. 5701

a. There will be available in the Mediterranean at any one time relatively

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a portion of the mobile reserve be located in ITALY. Should this recommendation be approved the forces listed above might be increased by one division and one armoured regiment.

b. In addition to the troops in ITALY there will be a garrison in MIDEAST of at least one infantry division and one armoured division. By May 1946 the British Central European Reserve will be established there also, and a portion of this force might be available for dispatch to GREECE.

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e. In any case, provided the emergency justified it, forces would certainly be made available either from this theatre, EUROPE or MIDEAST to meet the situation especially if the threatened area was GREECE.

5701

7. Other Shipping Available.

a. There will be available in the Mediterranean at any one time relatively few merchant ships which could at short notice be used to meet any emergency requirement for movement of vehicles or stores. Any large scale diversion of this shipping would be likely to interfere with carriage of supplies to the FAR EAST. In any event the use of merchant shipping is inevitably a slow method of movement as these ships take time to position and load. Also there are many ports in the Mediterranean, particularly in GREECE, which are not suitable, by reason of their draught, for the discharge of MT ships. The only feasible manner in which these areas could be reinforced would be by the use of shallow draught LST.

b. Transport of forces by warship, while a possibility, has the great disadvantage that no heavy weapons or vehicles can be carried and any force so transported is relatively immobile upon arrival.

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8. Air Lift Available.

There is at present available in the MEDITERRANEAN-MIDEAST area the following air lift:

a. 3 transport squadrons of the RAF.

b. Parts of 10 heavy bomber squadrons of 205 Group RAF.

c. Fifth Wing (3 bomber groups) of USAAF - under operational command of USAFIME

All or the greater part of the above air lift will be available during the first six months of 1946 and from these resources an ample air lift could be provided to move the equivalent of a Brigade Group/RCT on short notice. There are adequate airfields within reasonable distance of the Greek frontiers. Any force so transported however would be comparatively immobile upon arrival and would lack heavy weapons.

9. Naval Manpower Shortage.

If it is agreed that an amphibious lift can be retained, it is not planned to keep the 4 British LST and British LCI(L) in full commission owing to the shortage of British Naval manpower. They would be kept in care and maintenance reserve manned by skeleton crews at 8 days notice for movement. If they were required for an emergency, military assistance could be made available towards completing the crews. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.

CONCLUSIONS.

10. It is concluded that:

a. The most likely areas in the Mediterranean for which an amphibious lift for a combat force is likely to be required are GREECE and MIDEAST.

b. If trouble arose forces of a sufficient size would indubitably be made available either from this theatre or elsewhere and these forces would require to be transported by sea at short notice.

c. There would be considerable danger that road and rail communications would be disrupted by insurgents blowing up bridges and forces being delayed unless they could be landed as close as possible to the required area.

d. There would be relatively few merchant ships available in the Mediterranean for lifting this force and in addition many Mediterranean harbours, particularly in GREECE, are not suitable for the discharge of MT ships. It is therefore most desirable to retain an amphibious lift for this purpose. 700

e. Personnel could be transported by air, warships or personnel ships all of which are available in the Mediterranean areas. A force so transported would be immobile, be lacking in heavy weapons and hence be

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d. There would be relatively few merchant ships available in the Mediterranean for lifting this force and in addition many Mediterranean harbours, particularly in GREECE, are not suitable for the discharge of MT ships. It is therefore most desirable to retain an amphibious lift for this purpose.

700

e. Personnel could be transported by air, warships or personnel ships all of which are available in the Mediterranean areas. A force so transported would be relatively immobile, be lacking in heavy weapons and hence be capable of limited employment only.

f. It is most desirable that sufficient LST and LCI(L) be retained in this theatre to permit continued flexibility in sea movements for such unforeseen commitments as are certain to arise. In particular it is desirable that the Greek LST be retained to transport vehicles and equipment for the Greek Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

11. It is recommended that:

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a. 4 British LST, 3 Greek LST and 8 LCI(L) be retained in the Mediterranean to provide a lift for forces required urgently to meet any emergency.

(Note: If the proposal of the C-in-C Med is approved by the Admiralty 4 of the LCI(L) will be Greek.)

b. The draft MEDCOS at Appendix B be approved for dispatch, including a copy to MIDEAST.

James F. Torrance Jr
for D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

R. B. Pakenham
R. B. PAKENHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

W. A. Adair
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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R. B. PAKENHAM
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MAAF Plans

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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AP 533

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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COPY NO 31

SAC (45) 3
22 July 1945

JUL 23 RECD

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The attached letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, is circulated for information.

2. It is proposed that copies of this letter, together with the Supreme Allied Commander's comments, should be forwarded officially to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to the British Chiefs of Staff.

3. A draft covering letter is, therefore, in preparation and will be circulated shortly for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

J. G. SHEETLAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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32 EXEC COMMR

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

23 June 1945

CC 1001

SUBJECT: Future Policy Toward Italy.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

1. Italy is at the parting of the ways. Defeated in 1943, she has been fought over and occupied by Allies or Germans for two years; she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 per cent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph -- possibly by force.

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2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are

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the new Italian Army.

cal parties with membership of less than 10 per cent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph -- possibly by force.

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2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are both material and moral, the only hope of restraining it in Italy is to ameliorate these conditions -- to assist Italy economically, and to lift her morale by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

3. It can be argued that the expiation of Italy's crime of 1940 must rightly be prolonged: indeed, her defeat and the course of battle since 1943 have tended to ensure that. Circumstances, if

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not the will of the United Nations, will see to it that she will not revert again to the artificial position of a great power which Mussolini's regime achieved. But already her people have shown, by their profession and acts of co-belligerency with the Allies, not only in the armed forces of the post-Armistice Italian Government, but among the Partisans in the North, that they are willing to abandon totalitarianism and work for the same freedoms as the Allies who liberated them. The great majority of Italians desire to see a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear -- since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country -- or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others; they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military, political and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly [illegible] years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they

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a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear -- since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country -- or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others; they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military, political and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly two years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they have ensured freedom from hunger; they have not yet provided freedom from fear. Posterity would judge harshly if the endeavors of two great democratic states were to result in the institution of a second dictatorship in the first European country to be liberated from Fascism and Nazism.

5. An expression of positive policy towards Italy by the US and UK Governments is necessary. The policy should be one which,

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by restoring confidence in herself and in the Allies, will assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically. Moreover, it is in the interests of the Allies to make use of Italy. She is geographically important in any strategic plans for regional security in the Mediterranean. She owned a naval fleet (which still exists) which, if properly employed, would be an important addition to regional security. She has a small army which, reorganized under Allied guidance, has won merit and would improve greatly under further Allied help. The industries in Northern Italy lack only raw materials and coal to be employed immediately for Allied war production and to supplement in the Mediterranean the commodities necessary for the clothing and rehabilitation of Europe.

6. But a change in relationship between the three nations must be effected. Having "worked her passage", Italy must be allowed to emerge from defeat through co-belligerency to the position of an active partner, however lowly, in the maintenance of post-war security. If she is to serve as a bastion of democracy in Southern Europe, such a recovery is essential and must be encouraged.

7. The implementation of this policy would require certain positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surrender as a prelude to her joining the United Nations now or in the near future. The agreement might include, among others, the

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7. The implementation of this policy would require certain positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surrender as a prelude to her joining the United Nations now or in the very near future. The agreement might include, among others, the following provisions:

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(a) Italy to regain control of her naval fleet for employment under any regional security scheme which might be evolved for the Mediterranean.

The fleet consists of 5 battleships, 9 cruisers, 11 fleet destroyers, 40 small craft and 28 submarines. Two of the battleships are now in the Bitter Lakes.

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three in Taranto. It is estimated that it would cost five hundred million lire each to make them fit for service. 13 Submarines are in Allied operations overseas. It would require a Navy of 50,000 to maintain the fleet without the battleships, and of 75,000 with them. Even having regard to the comparative ineffectiveness of the fleet, its physical presence would be an assurance towards regional security. But its retention would be a major contribution to Italian morale.

(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength (say 200,000 or 250,000 men).

In my memorandum 8251/180/EC of 7 June 1945 I have suggested the maintenance of the Italian Army at an interim strength of 140,000 men consisting of five combat groups and one reserve regiment (50,000), three internal security divisions for Sicily and Sardinia, and one internal security brigade for each of ten military regions (40,000), with the remainder to be control and administrative units. In addition, the present strength of 65,000 men of the Royal Carabinieri should be maintained. Such a strength would suffice so long as Allied troops, mentioned in subpara (f) below, remained, but should be increased as these are withdrawn.

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(c) The Italian Air Force to be maintained at a token strength, or at present strength.

It is presumed that no military air force will be maintained but it is suggested that sufficient aircraft be allocated to the Navy and Army for reconnaissance and spotting purposes. If, however, it were considered possible to permit an air force, then it is recommended that it be maintained at its present strength. Restor-

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ation of civil air transport domestically and in the Mediterranean should be encouraged.

(d) To enable her to fill her role as a "junior partner" in the maintenance of Mediterranean security, the Allies would agree to furnish a military mission to assist in the training and organization of the Italian land, sea, and air forces, similar to the pre-war military and naval missions provided by the United States for certain South American republics.

(e) Similarly, an Allied Police Mission to assist the Italian Government in the reorganization and training of the Police Forces of Italy could be offered.

The introduction of an Allied Police Mission of high quality is essential. Although in two years of occupation the Allies have been compelled to employ the existing Italian Police Forces, they still lack the confidence of themselves, the public, or the Allies. With the difficulties of military occupation it may not have been possible to achieve this. It is essential, however, that immediate steps be taken to overhaul and possibly reconstitute the whole of the public security agencies in Italy, based on democratic principles.

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Italy of an Allied Military Force of five

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(f) The retention in Italy of an Allied Military Force of five Divisions (excluding Allied Forces in VENEZIA GIULIA) until such time as revitalized Italian civil and military services were in a position to ensure democratic security in Italy.

The role of the Allied troops at all times would be as representatives of the democracies and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs

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except in the gravest emergency would be avoided and the greatest care would be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation and requisitioning. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government: to strengthen merely by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of undemocratic methods by force.

(g) The establishment of an Allied economic organization (joint or separate) to assist Italy in correcting the basic defects of her former economy, in the procurement of raw materials and the rehabilitation of her commerce and industry; and

(h) The provision of an annual quota of coal sufficient to enable Italian industry to function.

A prerequisite for a healthy Italy is the immediate provision of sufficient coal and raw materials to maintain a modicum of the industries of Italy at work and to prevent unemployment on such a vast scale that it must lead to disorder. Provision of raw materials

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A prerequisite for a healthy Italy is the immediate provision of sufficient coal and raw materials to maintain a modicum of the industries of Italy at work and to prevent unemployment on such a vast scale that it must lead to disorder. Provision of raw materials and coal must be assured and equally the retention of an Allied economic organization (or separate U.S. and British missions) to ensure procurement and to advise the Italian Government on the proper use and distribution of such imports is essential. It would contain, of course, a financial section. Some such body as NAJEB or LEESC is envisaged with strong Italian representation dependent from the Allied Commission, or

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its successor. Alternatively, separate U.S. and U.K. economic missions depending from the Embassies or the Governments could be provided. The economic problems of post-war Italy are immense and unless Allied assistance by means of imports and guidance is provided, all other measures to preserve the country may be discounted.

(i) The reassurance of credits in the U.S. and an increase in credits in the U.K. The latter might well take the form of financial assistance with regard to the import of coal.

(j) The replacement of the Allied Commission by a small Allied Mission to coordinate (d) to (h) above and to function as advisors to the Italian Government.

(k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense.

Little perhaps can be said for the return of any of her colonies to Italy. But if she were to achieve the position of an active partner in regional security in the Mediterranean then it might be possible to allow her, under the same regional agreement, to administer the colony of Tripolitania. She might also be per-

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

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9. The first and last of these suggested conditions are of course the assurances that would create most satisfaction in Italy and restore the self respect of her people.

10. A further safeguard to preserve Italy among the free nations of democracy, and indeed a duty of the Allies, is the education of the minds of the Italians towards a democratic way of life. Not enough has been done in this direction. We have established freedom

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of speech and of the press -- but freedom without the self-imposed restraints of a democratically educated nation tends to become license. We have done much in the schools and universities. But the people, the Government, and the local authorities, after 20 years of Fascism, need advice on the interpretation of democracy. We cannot expect, nor should we try, to impose Anglo-American methods on a Latin country: but in the field of national and local government, of justice and police methods, of agriculture and labor, of electoral systems and social welfare, the Allies still have much to teach and the Italians much to learn. If the Italians are to become partners with the Allies they must be prepared to assimilate their national characteristics with the principles of democracy and take advice from the two democratic powers who are willing to help them materially.

11. Much can be done in this way by institutions such as the British Council, the interchange of American cultural representatives, and by sympathetic treatment of Italian problems in the Allied press. The Military mission and the Police Mission would represent direct forms of advice. The Allied Mission referred to in subpara 7(j) should contain a very small number of highly qualified men who, without semblance of control, would be accepted by the Italian Government and act to them as advisors in their task of setting up a democratic form of administration. Such men might be supplemented by special missions to advise on especial problems.

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12. The Allied Commission, therefore, should be succeeded by an Allied Mission for the following purposes: Except in VENEZIA GIULIA, and possibly in the Southern Tyrolean provinces, Allied Military Government should have disappeared by September 1945. In order to ensure free elections and a free referendum, it will be recommended that a number of Allied officers, under the direction of the Commission or its successor, remain in the provinces, and a considerable number may be required in connection with the rehabilitation of

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industry. But by the end of 1945 both the redeployment of Allied troops, except those recommended in para 7(f) above, and the removal of Allied Commission officers in the field, will probably have been completed. It is recommended that the Head of the Mission with access to the United States and British Governments should be charged with the following functions:

(a) As Chief Civil Affairs Officer, the administration of VENEZIA GIULIA and any other areas under AMG.

(b) As Head of the Allied Mission:

(i) To coordinate the work of the military mission or missions.

(ii) To supervise the Allied Police Mission.

(iii) To supervise the Economic Board or to coordinate independent economic missions.

(iv) To coordinate the work of the Displaced Persons and Refugees Sub-Commission with UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, and other organizations until such time as UNRRA took over all such functions.

(v) To supervise the work of the Enemy War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission.

(vi) To interpret to the Italian Government the conditions of any agreement made, vide para 7, and to safeguard Allied interests under such an agreement.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(v) To supervise the work of the Enemy War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission.

(vi) To interpret to the Italian Government the conditions of any agreement made, vide para 7, and to safeguard Allied interests under such an agreement.

(vii) To provide liaison between Allied Military Commander or Commanders and the Italian Government.

13. To sum up, in order to prevent Italy from leaning toward the USSR and succumbing to its influence, an expression of positive, non-vindictive policy by the US and UK Governments is necessary. This policy should make Italy a useful partner of the Allies in the Mediterranean and so create a healthy Italy. Important conditions are: the rebuilding of her morale by restoring to her the control

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of her fleet and a non-punitive policy with regard to her colonies; the retention of 5 divisions of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military and Police Missions to enable her to regain internal security under a democracy; and practical economic assistance. More must be done to encourage the education of the Italians towards the democratic way of life: the Allied Commission should be replaced by an Allied Mission.

14. In short, neither a laissez-faire attitude toward Italy by the U.S. and the U.K. nor the imposition of a harsh peace is compatible with a policy of preserving Italy as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean area.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:
U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
U.S. POLAD, AFHQ
British RESMIN, AFHQ

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Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:
U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
U.S. POLAD, AFHQ
British RESMIN, AFHQ

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 2
22nd July 1945

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Note by Secretary

1. As a result of the discussion and direction at SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting, Minute 11, the attached letter has been signed by the Chief of Staff and dispatched to the Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff, with copies to the Secretary of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, MIDDLE EAST.

2. The papers are therefore circulated for information.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

NORMAL

CC DIST - 24 Jul 45

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SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

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32 - EXEC. COMMR

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B 1801

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

21 July 1945

SUBJECT: Command in the Mediterranean

TO : The Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the War Cabinet
Great George Street
S. W. 1, London, England

Further to this Hq letter of 20 June in reply to your memorandum of 1 June enclosing 308(45)369(O), I have been instructed to submit the following comments on the note from the Commanders-in-Chief MIDDLE EAST dated 27 June, Ref MIL/18/1. References below are to paragraphs of that note.

Para 3. The proposal that PSTC MIDDLE EAST should now control all intra-MEDITERRANEAN shipping allocated for military purposes is not agreed. The proposal takes no account of the fact that much of the intra-MEDITERRANEAN shipping is operated by PSTC MED as a pool to meet anglo-American needs.

These anglo-American needs will continue for some months to come and the allocation of shipping to meet them must therefore be controlled by an Allied Headquarters, advised and assisted by the senior representatives of the shipping authorities. Among these authorities the Principal Sea Transport Officer (Med) is the most essential from the military point of view.

Para 4. A reply to the letter attached as Annexure to MIL/18/1 has already been sent to GHQ MIDEAST with a copy to the War Office under reference AFHQ/700/5/Q Admin dated 6 July. A copy of this reply is attached for easy reference and from this it will be seen that the requests made by MIDEAST have been substantially met.

Para 5. There will always the possibility of incidents on the Greek frontier with ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. The political problems of all Balkan countries are inseparably mixed and RUSSIA has a dominating influence

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of 1 June enclosing 303(45)369(0), I have been [illegible] from the Commanders-in-Chief MIDDLE EAST the following comments on the note dated 27 June, Ref MIL/18/1. References below are to paragraphs of that note.

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Para 5. There will always the possibility of incidents on the Greek frontier with ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. The political problems of all Balkan countries are inseparably mixed and RUSSIA has a dominating influence over the whole area. The BALKANS should therefore be

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B 1061

dealt with as a whole by one HQ. For this purpose the following are considered as Balkan countries: GREECE, ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA and ROUMANIA. Whichever Headquarters is responsible for the Balkans should therefore be responsible for the collection and coalition of intelligence appertaining thereto. As stated in this Headquarter's letter dated 26 June, it is recommended that this responsibility should remain with AFHQ. However, it is agreed that MIDDLE EAST should continue to be responsible for the collection of intelligence in TURKEY. MIDDLE EAST has also in practice been responsible for the DODECANESE and this should continue.

Paras 6, 7, 8 and 9. agreed.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

W. B. MORGAN
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

Copies to:

Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee,
GHQ, MEF

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and this should continue.

Paras 6, 7, 8 and 9. Agreed.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

W. D. MORGAN
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

Copies to:

Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee,
GHQ, MEF

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B 1001

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Q (MAINT) BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

AFHQ/700/5/Q(Maint)

Subject: Commitments in Middle East for C.M.F.

6 Jul 45

To: GHQ, M.E.F.

Copy to: War Office

Reference your 92255/Q(P) of 20 Jun 45.

1. Your difficulties in relation to shortage of shipping and manpower are fully appreciated since they apply equally to this theatre. Every effort has however been made to reduce your commitments on our behalf but these have been governed by War Office policies. As you are aware these have now been reviewed and a reduction is possible.

SUPPLIES

2. You will now have received a copy of War Office Urgent Memorandum Gen/28/Q(Ops) dated 26 Jun 45. This proposes the eating down of AFHQ reserves in Middle East by calling forward of certain commodities to make good the backlog from U.S.A. This HQ is in agreement with the proposals which will be implemented departmentally.

R.E.M.E.

3. The position for period Jul - Sep 45 was discussed with D.M.E., AFHQ at a meeting held in the office of Brigadier Q(AE), GHQ, MEF on 12 Jun:-

(a) Overhaul of tank engines was reduced from a monthly task of 422 to 253. It is necessary to maintain this figure in order that the commitment of repaired tanks for INDIA may be met.

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(b) The reorganisation of Armoured formations in this theatre from Tanks to Armoured Cars for occupational duties

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To: GHQ, MTOT

Copy to: War Office

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(a) Overhaul of tank engines was reduced from a monthly task of 422 to 253. It is necessary to maintain this figure in order that the commitment of repaired tanks for INDIA may be met.

(b) The reorganisation of Armoured formations in this theatre from Tanks to Armoured Cars for occupational duties will entail the continuation of the present output of repaired engines for these vehicles.

(c) 'B' vehicles were reviewed and a cut in the monthly output from 758 to 403 was agreed. This figure is necessary in order to maintain the forces left in CMF.

4. It is hoped that before Sep 45 the position will have clarified and that further reductions will then be possible.

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B 1001

AMMUNITION

5. Reserve levels for occupational forces have been received from War Office which are covered by present holdings in ITALY. All earmarks for AFHQ reserve are cancelled by War Office cables 99248 WS 2 of 5 Jun, and 54072 WS 2 of 22 Jun. It is presumed that you will obtain the necessary disposal instructions from the War Office.

A.C. DUFF, Major General,
for Field Marshall,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

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G-4 (Br)
Q(AE)
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DME
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Distribution

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G-4 (Br)
Q(AE)
DST
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War Diary.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 1
20th July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 21

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Note by Secretary

1. In accordance with the decision taken at SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting, Minute 13, the distinction between the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) and (Political) will henceforth be discontinued, and there will accordingly be only one series of conferences, at which the following officers will normally attend or be represented :-

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, US Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME
Commanding General AAF/MTO
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

2. When the Agenda is such that the Chief of Staff considers that any of the above officers are not required or that any other officers should attend, the officers affected will be notified accordingly by the Secretariat.

(14) 1

3. The normal distribution of Conference papers and minutes will be the same as the distribution of this paper.

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4. The provisions of SAC (P) (45) 12 (Addendum) are hereby cancelled.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765015

will normally attend or be represented :-

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, US Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME
Commanding General AAF/MTO
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
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(14) 3. The normal distribution of Conference papers and minutes will be the same as the distribution of this paper.

5679

4. The provisions of SAC (F) (45) 12 (Addendum) are hereby cancelled.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Ec Distr - 21 July 45

31 Chief Comm

32 Exec Comm

(13)

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
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Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters	5
Commander-in-Chief, R/F MEDME	6-8
Commanding General, AAF/MTO	9-11
Chief of Staff	12
Chief Administrative Officer	13
Deputy Chief of Staff	14
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer	15
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	16-17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	18-19
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U.S. Political Adviser	24-26
British Resident Minister	27-30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-32
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Chief, Liaison Section	34
Director, PWB	35
Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, GHQ MEF	36
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	37-39
Spares	40-43

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Assistant Chief of Staff,	27-30
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Director, PWB	40-43
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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	
Spares	

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JUL 18 RECD

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (P) (45) 36
17 July 1945

COPY NO 24

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

POST-WAR COMMITMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

Note by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

1. The duties now being carried out by the Royal Naval Port Parties in Italian Ports have been under detailed examination, in order to determine to what extent the impending assumption of control by the UNITED NATIONS MARITIME SHIPPING AUTHORITY (U.M.A.) of merchant shipping will permit of the withdrawal of these parties.

Formation of the Parties.

2. Naval Port Parties were originally formed and equipped for the rapid opening and operation of newly-captured ports essential for the supply of the Army, in circumstances in which communications were likely to have been destroyed, and where no assistance from the local port personnel could be anticipated.

Responsibilities of the Naval Officer-in-Charge

3. Besides being responsible for the seaward defence of the port, the Naval Officer-in-Charge was the final authority empowered to issue orders for the berthing and movement of all shipping and craft within the port limits, the defence of the port and the safety of the shipping from all dangers being solely within his discretion. So far as attacks on harbours and shipping therein are concerned these special powers are no longer required.

4. Once the operation of the port became a matter of routine it became the custom to decentralise the orders for berthing, so as to suit the working of the port. The berthing of ships in safety from marine dangers is a normal function of the local Port Authorities and their pilots, and these have, in general, been doing this work at ports under the direction of the Naval 577 Officer-in-Charge. With the cessation of hostilities a stage has now been reached when the direct assistance rendered by the Navy in support of the Army in the ports is comparatively small, and is moreover delaying assumption by the Commercial Authorities of the Ports of their normal functions.

Admiralty Release Plan

5. Continual pressure is being exerted on the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterr-

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Admiralty Release Plan

5. Continual pressure is being exerted on the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean by the Admiralty for the reduction of Naval Shore-based commitments in the Mediterranean, and it has recently been represented with increased urgency that the rate of release of personnel must be accelerated, or the working of the Naval release plan will be jeopardised with resulting injury to the Navy as a whole.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has been instructed that, by March 1946, T.R.M.T.O is to be the only port in ITALY with Royal Naval representation; this port being retained as a major refitting port in support of the fleets in the East. Compliance with this instruction will involve the Royal Navy withdrawing from the majority of the ports earlier than the dates on which current Army planning contemplates handing-over complete control to the local Italian Authorities.

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7. The following ports are concerned:-

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ANCONA
BARI
BRINDISI
GENOA
LEGHORN
NAPLES
TARANTO
VENICE

Considerations affecting the withdrawal of Naval Port Parties

8. There are two considerations which affect the reduction of British Naval Commitments in Italian ports.

(a) the ability of the local Italian Port Authorities to take over the running of their port from the British Port Party.

(b) the transfer to Commercial Agencies of certain merchant shipping responsibilities, which are now undertaken by Naval Authorities.

9. With regard to paragraph 8 (a) above it is understood that the Port Authorities at GENOA and VENICE are available as they were undisturbed by hostilities, and in the case of the Southern Italian Ports the pilots and Port Authorities have been assisting in conducting the business of the Port for some time. It will however be necessary to retain British Naval Control Service Officers to issue routes to Merchant ships until Italian Naval Officers can be trained to relieve them, and the call forward of merchant ships for discharge will be effected through these officers at request of the Port Executive Committee. The existing procedure for calling forward merchant ships would therefore be unaffected.

WSA

10. Withdrawal of the British Naval Port Party does not therefore affect the existing control of the port exercised by the Army, or the ability of th Army to ensure that the Italian Port Authorities do what they are told, since the local Ministry of War Transport Representative or, in his absence, the Army Port Commandant will assume Chairmanship of the Port Executive Committee, the Italians being granted increased representation on the Committee. This method has proved successful at ALGIERS. Reasonably efficient Italian Naval communications are already available at the majority of ports.

11. With regard to paragraph 8 (b) it now appears that U.M.A. will be operating on a commercial basis within the next six weeks, and that this will have a direct and important effect on the question of the reduction of British Naval Port Parties. Under U.M.A. Control the interposition of a Naval Officer-in-Charge and Naval channels of communication in commercial procedure would be a hindrance rather than a help; it is therefore desirable that the Navy should relinquish control of ports in order that the normal machinery of commercial practice may be resumed. Army cargoes, which are becoming increasingly less in proportion to UNRRA, Allied Commission, and civil relief cargoes, would continue to be moved efficiently, and the

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(b) the transfer to Commercial Agencies of certain merchant shipping responsibilities, which are now undertaken by Naval Authorities.

9. With regard to paragraph 8 (a) above it is understood that the Port Authorities at GENOA and VENICE are available as they were undisturbed by hostilities, and in the case of the Southern Italian Ports the pilots and Port Authorities have been assisting in conducting the business of the Port for some time. It will however be necessary to retain British Naval Control Service Officers to issue routes to Merchant ships until Italian Naval Officers can be trained to relieve them, and the call forward of merchant ships for discharge will be effected through these officers at request of the Port Executive Committee. The existing procedure for calling forward merchant ships would therefore be unaffected.

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Assumption of Control by U.M.A.

12. The following is the suggested division of responsibilities after the U.M.A. organisation is functioning:-

(i) The working of the port is controlled by Ministry of War Transport Representative (or the Army Port Commandant) in his capacity as Chairman of the Port Executive Committee.

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(ii) British Naval Control Service Officer remains responsible for the safe routeing of all merchant ships and for the dispatching of VESCA telegrams reporting merchant ship movements until relieved by a trained Italian Officer. This would continue to be handled by Naval communication, either British or Italian.

(iii) All signals ordering movements of merchant ships (i.e. those now originated by the Shipping Diversion Room in the name of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) would be exchanged between the U.M.A. zone 3 committee and their agents and brokers at ports, via commercial communication channels.

Censorship regulations will shortly be relaxed within Italy (except for the disputed VENEZIA GIULIA) and it is merely a matter of local arrangement to introduce a system whereby shipping agents can file their telegrams at Italian commercial telegraph offices. In the case of telegrams to addressees outside Italy, the question of censorship still exists. This could probably be overcome by according the agents adequate official status to permit them to file such messages in the clear.

Merchant Ship Repairs

13. Control and supervision of merchant ship repair facilities at ports vacated by the Navy will be turned over completely to Ministry of War Transport, Mediterranean, if this is requested. Otherwise these repair facilities will revert to a commercial basis.

14. Proposals for the commercial operation of fuelling installations are under discussion in Washington and London, nevertheless the assumption of responsibility for the supply of liquid fuels to merchant shipping by F.S.A. and M.W.T.R. in bases from which it is now proposed Royal Naval interests be withdrawn is earnestly desired as this results in a further reduction in naval personnel.

15. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve the attached programme of withdrawal of British Naval Port Parties. Adjustment of the programme will be made should minesweeping difficulties delay the discharge of the Navy's accepted tasks at GENOA and VENICE.

(Intld) J.H.D.C.

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A No.	B Port	C Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions	
1	Ancona	Commence hand-over of the port to the local Italian port Authorities now. It is anticipated withdrawal of all Admiralty owned stores, machinery, and equipment will take up to 2 months. Target date for completion 1st October, 1945.	All ret M.W for Cha
2	Bari	Commence hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities now. Target date for completion 1st week in August.	Rem
3	Brindisi	Commence hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities now. Target date for completion 1st week in August. A small Naval supervisory staff will remain for control of the local repair facilities, but these will have no connection with the discharge and loading activities of the port.	Re:
4	Genoa	Hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities as soon as minesweeping and salvage operations necessary to permit discharge of 8000 t.p.d. through the port, for which the Navy accepted responsibility, have been completed. Target date for completion 1st September.	Rema Targ mine rend
5	Leghorn	(a) Present NOIC and Port Party will remain while mine clearance forces are operating from the Port. (b) On completion of minesweeping operations hand-over port to the local Italian Port Authorities. The date of this hand-over will depend on the progress of minesweeping operations.	If C Army No. that will Comm

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C	D
ander-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions	Remarks
r of the port to the local Italian port Authorities ipated withdrawal of all Admiralty owned stores, uipment will take up to 2 months. Target date t October, 1945.	Allied control of port operations will be retained by Port Executive Committee of which M.W.T. Representative will take Chairman. Call forward of shipping by N.C.S.O. at request of Chairman Port Executive Committee.
r to local Italian Port Authorities now. completion 1st week in August.	Remarks for No. 1 Col. D. apply.
r to local Italian Port Authorities now. completion 1st week in August. pervisory staff will remain for control of the local s, but these will have no connection with the ading activities of the port.	Remarks for No. 1 Col. D. apply.
l Italian Port Authorities as soon as minesweeping ations necessary to permit discharge of 8000 t.p.d. for which the Navy accepted responsibility, have Target date for completion 1st September.	Remarks for No. 1 Col. D apply. Target date will be readjusted if minesweeping or salvage operations render this necessary.
and Port Party will remain while mine clearance ting from the Port. (b) On completion of minesweeping over port to the local Italian Port Authorities. hand-over will depend on the progress of minesweeping	If Col. C (b) occurs before the U.S. Army is ready to withdraw remarks in No. 1 Col. D will apply, except that it is presumed WSA representative will take chairman of Port Executive Committee.

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A	B	C	
No.	Port	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions	
6	Naples	Reduce Naval Port Party progressively. Target date for final hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities to be not later than March 1946.	Wh
7	Taranto	Situation at this port is complicated as some discharging and loading is done in the Arsenal. Extent to which commercial port can be handed over to the local Italian Port Authorities, and the future of the N.O.I.C. organisation, is under detailed examination.	
8	Venice	Hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities when minesweeping operations to open Porto Lido entrance, and Porto Marghera to Liberty Ships are complete. Target date for completion mid-August.	Wh To t
9	Trieste and Pola	For political reasons it will be necessary to retain present NOIC's and port party organisation until future ownership of these ports is settled at the Peace Conference.	In ma op

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C	D
der-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions	Remarks
arty progressively. Target date for final hand-over rt Authorities to be not later than March 1946.	When handed over remarks in No. 1 Col. D apply.
ort is complicated as some discharging and loading is . Extent to which commercial port can be handed over n Port Authorities, and the future of the N.O.I.C. der detailed examination.	
Italian Port Authorities when minesweeping operations entrance, and Porto Marghera to Liberty Ships are late for completion mid-August.	When handed over remarks in No. 1 Col. D apply. Target date may require adjustment according to progress of minesweeping operations.
ons it will be necessary to retain present NOIC's anisation until future ownership of these ports Peace Conference.	In addition Trieste will become the main minesweeping base for mine clearance operations in the Northern Adriatic.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	12-13
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	14-15
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	17-18
Assistant Chief of Staff, (Br)	19
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 35 17 July 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

(DOCUMENT FILED IN: 200/SC)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 34
10 July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

SAILING OF MERCHANT VESSELS TO JUGOSLAVIA PORTS

Note by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

1. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has received a request from the Jugoslav authorities in BELGRADE to withdraw the British Naval Liaison Officers at SPLIT. He has complied with this request.

2. Reports from various sources have revealed that the Jugoslavs on the coast have recently been very unco-operative and uncivil and the withdrawal of the Liaison Officers, together with the Sea Transport and Movements Officers, who have also received orders to return to ITALY, may make the position of masters of Allied merchant vessels in ports in JUGOSLAVIA untenable. It may, therefore, become necessary at some future date to suspend sailings to such ports until the Jugoslav attitude becomes more reasonable.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander, in conference, is requested to take note of the above.

11 JUL 1943

(Initd) J. A. H.
for J. H. D. C.

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Chief of Staff	8
Chief Administrative Officer	9-10
Deputy Chief of Staff	11
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	12-13
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	14-15

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Officers at SPLIT. He has complied with this request.

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(Initd) J. A. H.

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Assistant Chief of Staff (BR)	19
Chief, Liaison Section	20
Director of Operations and Intelligence, M. NAAF	21-25
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34 CHIEF COMMR
35 EXEC COMMR
36 POLITICAL ADVISERS

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3 July 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

(POLITICAL)

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

Note by Secretary

The attached letter is circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

Command in Med. Theater
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J. E. BASTION, JR.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

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Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
	18-19

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J. E. BISTION, JR.,
Lt Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

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EC List - 4 July 45

35 Chief Cook
36 Exec Cook
37 Political Advisers

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. _____

26 June 1945.

TO: Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

With reference to your memorandum of 1 June forwarding a report (COS(45)369(O by the British Chiefs of Staff on the future organisation of command in the Mediterranean, I have been instructed by Field Marshal Alexander to submit the attached paper giving his views on this subject. In addition Field Marshal Alexander offers the following comments on certain points dealt with in the British Chiefs of Staff Report.

a. GREECE and the DODECANESE (Paras 8, 17 b, and 17(c)(iii) of the Report).

(1) GREECE

It is agreed that the commitment in GREECE is no valid reason for the continuation of AFHQ but there would be considerable administrative disadvantages in transfer of responsibility to MIDDLE EAST for some time yet. Moreover it is preferable for political reasons that GREECE should not pass to MIDDLE EAST at present.

(2) DODECANESE

The general question of division of territorial responsibility between SACMED and MIDDLE EAST is dealt with in the attached paper, where it is argued that the DODECANESE (in common with all other Italian territory in EUROPE) should continue to be the responsibility of SACMED. Although this is the logical solution, the fact that MIDDLE EAST has in practice handled the DODECANESE situation, and is now responsible for administering Allied Military Government there, is good reason for recognising officially the de facto position.

b. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (Paras 7 and 17(c)(ii) of the Report)

The French are already responsible for FRENCH NORTH AFRICA, except that we have retained certain rights in respect of ports and airfields and the stationing of the necessary garrisons to operate them.

The same remarks apply to CORSICA.

c. NAVAL and AIR COMMAND (Paras 17(c)(vi)(vii) and (viii)). 5668

(1) These proposals are generally agreed, but it is suggested that the possibility of giving the three Cs-in-C MIDDLE EAST the same territorial responsibility should be examined. The MEDITERRANEAN, BALKANS and MIDDLE EAST in fact constitute and form one integral area on imperial communications to INDIA and the FAR EAST.

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(2) As regards the position of C-in-C MED, it has been considered hitherto here that he is already the Naval member of the Cs-in-C Committee MIDDLE EAST, and that in his absence from meetings he has been represented by Flag Officer LEVANT and EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

W. D. MORGAN
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

JGN/rg/Plans

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COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

PRESENT SYSTEM OF COMMAND

1. A note outlining the present system of command in this theatre is attached at Appendix 'A'. The main points which emerge from this note are:

   a. SACMED's Command Group, which is the machinery through which he exercises inter-Allied inter-service command, is a very small organisation. Its retention or abolition would have no effect on reduction in the size of AFHQ.

   b. Matters of exclusively US Army concern are handled by the US Theatre Headquarters MTOUSA. On the British side there is no separate theatre command designated as such. The difference between the US and the British arrangements is not as great as would appear, but it has some effect on practical working particularly in regard to the distribution of correspondence and channels of general staff control.

FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

2. The choice of future system of command lies between the following broad alternatives:

   A. The retention of SACMED and Allied inter-service command generally on present lines.

   B. Command through an inter-Allied inter-service committee as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'B'. The only material change from the present system is that the authority now vested in one man would be vested in a committee.

   C. Command through an Allied military Commander and Allied staff, coordinating with the two other services. This is shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'C'.

   D. Command through national inter-service committees as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'D'.

3. It will be observed that the main points to be decided in choosing between the above alternatives are whether the system is

   a. To be Allied,

   b. To be inter-service; and it so, whether command is to be vested in one supreme commander or in an inter-service committee. F6667

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

4. The primary reason for which a Supreme Allied Commander was appointed in the

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arrangements is not as great as would appear, but it has some [illegible] practical working particularly in regard to the distribution of correspondence and channels of general staff control.

FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

2. The choice of future system of command lies between the following broad alternatives:

A. The retention of SACMED and Allied inter-service command generally on present lines.

B. Command through an inter-Allied inter-service committee as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'B'. The only material change from the present system is that the authority now vested in one man would be vested in a committee.

C. Command through an Allied military Commander and Allied staff, coordinating with the two other services. This is shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'C'

D. Command through national inter-service committees as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'D'.

3. It will be observed that the main points to be decided in choosing between the above alternatives are whether the system is

a. To be Allied,

b. To be inter-service; and it so, whether command is to be vested in one supreme commander or in an inter-service committee. 5667

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

4. The primary reason for which a Supreme Allied Commander was appointed in the Mediterranean Theatre was to exercise unified command over Allied sea, land and air forces in order to conduct a major campaign. Even though actual hostilities have now ceased, the whole of EUROPE is in a most unsettled state. This applies particularly to Southern EUROPE and the BALKANS where the ultimate ownership of territories on the frontiers of BULGARIA, GREECE, JUGOSLAVIA, AUSTRIA, ITALY and FRANCE is in dispute. The general situation will inevitably be uneasy until the final European peace settlement. The possibility of having to use force to impose the terms of that settlement, or to prevent unilateral military action by any of the interested nations in the meantime, cannot be ruled out.

Responsibility for controlling this situation is an Allied commitment. It involves the three fighting services and the coordination of Allied political action. The authority vested in and consequent prestige enjoyed by a Supreme

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Allied Commander together constitute a powerful means of "putting over" Anglo-American policy and of ensuring that it is accepted without delay and without resistance. The recent settlement of the disputes with the Jugoslavs and French in NE and NW ITALY respectively are good examples. For these reasons alone there is evident advantage in retaining for the time being unified Allied command over the three fighting services as at present set up in this theatre.

5. The choice of the future system of command is also affected by the following:

a. Command of the Allied Occupational Forces in ITALY

It has been proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in MAF 1013 that an Allied corps of two divisions should be retained in NE ITALY at least until the end of the year, and probably until the final peace settlement in EUROPE. Either Allied command in some form (alternatives A, B, or C) must be retained, or the corps commander must report back direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Control of the Allied Commission and Administration of AMG

Control of the Allied Commission can only be vested in an Allied representative or an Allied committee; executive responsibility for the operation of AMG can only be vested in an Allied commander. If, therefore, one of the alternatives B or D is adopted, it would be necessary to appoint an Allied Military Governor for ITALY reporting direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Operation of the Anglo-French Naval Agreement

Under CCS 358 (revised) operational control of the French fleet is vested in the Allied Naval Area Commander who is a subordinate of SACMED. It would appear, therefore, that if either or both SACMED and an Allied Naval Area Commander are abolished, a fresh agreement would have to be made with the French Government. The French are unlikely to accept any change without protracted and difficult negotiations, which might have serious adverse naval repercussions.

d. Execution of Allied Administrative Responsibilities

Any system of command which does not provide for retention of an Allied commander in some form would make the execution of Allied administrative responsibilities so difficult as to be unworkable in practice. These responsibilities, such as repair and docking of war and merchant ships, civil affairs, communications, labour, solid and liquid fuel, local resources and financial matters, form the greater part of the day-to-day work in this theatre. If there is no form of Allied command, action could only be taken after coordination and agreement between the British and US staffs concerned. This would probably become so cumbersome and slow a procedure as to make impossible the orderly execution of Allied administrative responsibilities. Alternative D is not therefore practicable.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING BRITISH NAVAL, ARMY AND AIR COMMAND

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Chiefs of Staff.

b. Control of the Allied Commission and Administration of AMG

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PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING BRITISH NAVAL, ARMY AND AIR COMMAND

6. British Naval and Air Command

While for the reasons given in paragraph 4 there is advantage in the retention of unified command over the three fighting services for the present, it will probably be desirable towards the end of the year for C-in-C Med and Air C-in-C RAF Medme to establish their headquarters in MALTA and the MIDDLE EAST respectively. There is no difficulty in the release of either the naval or air Cs-in-C from the control of SACMED at any time that it is decided that this is the appropriate course. At the same time the physical move of their headquarters away from ITALY does not necessitate such release, provided arrangements are

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made for appropriate representation to remain at SACMED's headquarters. The time of release should be decided later in accordance with the way in which the Mediterranean situation develops, and with regard to the considerations set out in para 4. When release is effected, the system of command in Alternative B or C should be adopted.

7. British Army Command

Attention is drawn to paragraph 1 b and Appendix A where it is explained that SACMED, in his purely British capacity, exercises his British command functions through an Allied headquarters. It is considered that the US system, whereby the US Theatre Commander exercises command through a US Theatre HQ within the general framework of AFHQ is preferable. It is accordingly considered that a British headquarters should be organized on similar lines to MTOUSA. This involves no increase in personnel. The main advantage is that it would produce a direct British command and staff channel for dealing with British theatre problems. This is of increasing importance in the post-hostilities and redeployment phase on which we have now entered.

TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF THEATRE COMMAND

8. The future territorial extent of the theatre command depends mainly on the system of command it is decided to adopt. If it is decided to terminate Supreme Allied inter-service command, there would be good reason to reduce the Allied command in ITALY to the smallest possible size, and to pass responsibil for the BALKANS to the US and the British MIDDLE EAST commands. If it is decided to retain Supreme Allied inter-service command, it is evident that in the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 4, there is advantage in continuing SACMED's responsibilities for the whole of ITALY, all Mediterranean islands (excluding MALTA and CYPRUS), and all BALKAN countries. Both politica and from the intelligence aspect the BALKANS should be dealt with as a whole b one HQ. Jugoslav affairs and reactions will continue to affect ITALY and ALBANIA; and there is always the possibility of difficulties and incidents ove JUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN-BULGAR-GREEK relations. Over the whole of the BALKANS there is the predominating influence of RUSSIA. In these circumstances it is suggested that the appropriate division between SACMED on the one hand and the US and British commands in the MIDDLE EAST on the other, is that the former should be responsible for EUROPE and European affairs, and the latter for territories in ASIA, AFRICA and the Arab and Moslem countries (including TURKE When Supreme Allied inter-service command is terminated, the above division of responsibilities should be reconsidered and adjustment made in the light of th situation obtaining at the time.

CONCLUSIONS

9. The discharge of Allied responsibilities in general makes advantageous, and of administrative responsibilities in particular necessitates, the retention of some form of Allied command in ITALY for a considerable period yet, and probably until the peace settlement in ITALY.

10. For so long as it remains advantageous to concert naval, military and air action through a supreme inter-service commander, the appointment of SACMED

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CONCLUSIONS

9. The discharge of Allied responsibilities in general makes advantageous, and of administrative responsibilities in particular necessitates, the retention of some form of Allied command in ITALY for a considerable period yet, and probably until the peace settlement in ITALY.

10. For so long as it remains advantageous to concert naval, military and air action through a supreme inter-service commander, the appointment of SACMED should be retained and the system of command in the Mediterranean should continue as at present. When these considerations no longer apply, the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief should be released from subordination to SACMED At this stage the system of command outlined in Appendix 'B' or 'C' should be set up.

11. a. For so long as Supreme Allied Inter-Service Command is retained, the territorial extent of the theatre command should be

The whole of ITALY, all Mediterranean islands (excluding MALTA and CYPRUS) and all BALKAN countries (JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, GREECE, BULGARIA and ROUMANIA).

Responsibility for territories in ASIA, AFRICA and for the Arab and Moslem countries (including TURKEY) should be made that of MIDDLE EAST.

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b. When suprene Allied inter-service command is terminated, the above division of responsibilities should be reconsidered and adjustment made in the light of the situation obtaining at the time.

12. A British theatre command and staff should be organized within the existing framework of AFHQ on similar lines to the US Theatre Headquarters, MTOUSA.

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APPENDIX 'A'

NOTE ON PRESENT SYSTEM OF COMMAND IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

1. a. Allied Force HQ is an Allied army HQ, headed by a small Command Group exercising operational command and coordination over the three services. This Command Group consists only of Supreme Allied Commander, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Chief of Staff, CAO and Deputy CAO, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat, and the Joint Planning Staff. A great deal of the staff work of the Command Group is, however, done by AFHQ.

   b. The naval and air theatre HQs are self contained organizations, completely separate from and independent of AFHQ.

   c. Political guidance is given to the Supreme Allied Commander and the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief through the office of the US and British Political Advisers.

2. In its purely army aspect, AFHQ is the headquarters through which:

   a. The Supreme Allied Commander exercises Allied command over the US and British land forces.

   b. The Supreme Allied Commander, being the Commander of the British land force in this theatre, exercises command over such forces.

   The US counterpart to b above is the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (who is also CG MTOUSA) working through MTOUSA. It should be noted here that US portions of certain integrated staff sections of AFHQ constitute the corresponding staff sections of MTOUSA. G-2 is an example.

3. Actual integration in AFHQ is of necessity confined to those general and special staff sections and to certain divisions of staff sections which deal with matters that are of common concern to both Allies. Intelligence, operations, movements and civil affairs are examples. Other matters, such as personnel questions, are handled by separate and parallel US and British general staff sections (e.g. G-1 American and G-1 British). In some cases, there are separate and parallel US and British divisions within an integrated general staff section (e.g. G-3 Org American and G-3 Org British).

4. Apart from facilitating the coordinated discharge of Allied functions, integration results in a considerable economy in both British and US staffs which would otherwise be duplicated.

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a. The Supreme Allied Commander exercises Allied command over the US and British land forces.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander, being the Commander of the British land forces in this theatre, exercises command over such forces.

The US counterpart to b above is the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (who is also CG MTOUSA) working through MTOUSA. It should be noted here that US portions of certain integrated staff sections of AFHQ constitute the corresponding staff sections of MTOUSA. G-2 is an example.

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
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APPENDIX B

COMMAND THROUGH AN INTER-ALLIED AND INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEE



Key: Chain of Allied Command _____


Notes: (a) One British, one American

(b) do

(c) Existing integration to be retained

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Key: Chain of Allied Command _____

Notes: (a) One British, one American

(b) do

(c) Existing integration to be retained

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
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COMMAND THROUGH AN ALLIED MILITARY COMMANDER AND ALLIED STAFF, CO-ORDINATING WITH THE OTHER TWO SERVICES.



Key: Chain of

Note: (a) One US

(b) One US


(c) One US

(d) Exist

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APPENDIX C

COMMAND THROUGH AN ALLIED MILITARY COMMANDER AND ALLIED STAFF, CO-ORDINATING WITH THE OTHER TWO SERVICES.



Key: Chain of Allied Command _____

Chain of inter-service Coordination . . . .

Chain of National Command (R.F) — — —

Note: (a) One US, one British

(b) One US, one British

(c) One US, one British


(d) Existing integration to be retained.

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COMMAND THROUGH NATIONAL INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEES



Note (*). Found from MTOUSA and AIR MED COMD


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APPENDIX D

COMMAND THROUGH NATIONAL INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEES



Note (F). Found from MTOUSA and BR MED COMD

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17 JUNE '45
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P)(45) 31
16 June 1945

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COPY NO 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS FROM PWB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (P)(45) 13th Meeting, Minute 7 b, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander directed that, when it became possible to recommend a definite date for the transfer of responsibility for the distribution of press and radio news from PWB to private news agencies, the matter should again be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander for final decision.

2. The Technical Sub-Committee set up by Allied Commission to examine the problems involved in the admission of private news agencies to North ITALY in all but the VENEZIA GIULIA region, has completed its investigations and finds that sufficient communications facilities will be available to permit adequate coverage of North ITALY by private news agencies beginning 1 July 1945. A detailed scheme for the control of Italian press and radio in North ITALY after the cessation of PWB activities is attached as Annexure 1.

3. The recommendations of the Technical Sub-Committee apply only to press and radio. The question of distribution of films will be examined separately.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander, in conference, is requested to approve the hand-over of responsibility from PWB to private news agencies with effect from 1 July 1945.

Robert T. Handy

J. E. BASTION, JR.,
COLONEL, G.S.C.
SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS
17 JUN 1945
A. F. C.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. At S.C (P)(45) 13th Meeting, Minute 7 b, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander directed that, when it became possible to recommend a definite date for the transfer of responsibility for the distribution of press and radio news from P.W.B to private news agencies, the matter should again be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander for final decision.

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Robert T. Hartley Lt Col

J. E. BASTION, JR.,
COLONEL, G.S.C.
SECRETARY.

17 JUN 1945

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See

35 — CHIEF
36 — Ex Comm
37 — P.R.B.

Transfer from PWB 38

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DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater	7
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (BR)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, PWB	34
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	35-37
Chief, INC	38
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	39-41
Spares	42-44

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	20
Assistant Chief of Staff (BR)	21
Chief, Liaison Section	22-26
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MLF	27-29
U.S. Political Adviser	30-33
British Resident Minister	34
Director, PWB	35-37
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	38
Chief, INC	39-41
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	42-44
Spares	

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ANNEXURE 1

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PROPOSAL FOR THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF ITALIAN PRESS AND RADIO ON CESSATION OF PWB ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN ITALY

1. Italian Press and Radio in North ITALY will be free to use any news and information available from official sources and private agencies subject to the requirements of military censorship.

2. The elimination of material likely to inflame public opinion and the objective presentation of contentious issues to the Italian population resident in areas under Allied Military Government will be secured through Allied Press Officers whose functions and status are defined below:

3. Allied Publications Board, which will continue to meet at ROME, will appoint from among the civilian and military personnel at present employed by PWB, Allied Press Officers. These will be stationed in areas in which there is a Regional Commissioner, with whom they will act in close cooperation.

4. The Press Officers will act in accordance with directives prepared by Allied Publications Board concurred by AC/AFG and approved by the Chief of Staff, AFHQ. In case of emergency when public safety is endangered the Press Officer will act on the instructions of the Regional Commissioner; in the event of these instructions being at variance with the directives of Allied Publications Board, the matter will be referred back to higher authority for decision.

5. The Press Officers will be under the command of the Chief Press Officer, who is directly responsible to the Chairman of Allied Publications Board. The Chief Press Officer will be a member of Allied Publications Board and will act as Deputy to the Chairman as required.

6. The direction and control of the Italian Press and Radio, vested in Allied Publications Board, will be additional to that exercised by military censorship; it will normally be carried out by means of post publication scrutiny. In cases likely to inflame public opinion, and in controversial issues, which will be the subject of directives from AFHQ, Press Officers will have the right to demand from the non-political information newspapers, which will be authorized in each region, the pre-publication submission of editorial articles and comment and will be entitled to delete from such articles matter liable to inflame public opinion. Press Officers will also be entitled to require these non-political information papers to publish, in full or in part, official

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below:

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7. The Press Officer will have the power to exercise similar control over Radio scripts in any circumstances when he may consider this necessary.

8. Licensing of the press, including weekly and monthly magazines, and the allotment of circulation to newspapers and posters, will be the responsibility of Regional Allied Publications Boards, whose decisions will be subject to confirmation by ~~the Central Allied~~ Publications Board.

9. Regional Allied Publications Boards will include the following:-

Press Officer	Chairman
Asst. Press Officer	Secretary
Representative of Regional Commissioner	
Representative of Military Censorship	

The Chairman, Allied Publications Board, will be ex officio a member of all regional boards and may delegate the Chief Press Officer to attend

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as his representative.

10. The Control of Paper Supplies and Production will be the responsibility of AC/AFG.

11. The Press Officers will, if desired, act as the agents for OWI and MOI for the distribution of American and British publications within their areas, OWI and MOI providing the Italian staff necessary for this purpose.

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CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

AFHQ SACMED's Political Conference - Paper

16 June 1945

SAC (P) (45) 31
16 June 1945

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS FROM PWB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

DOCUMENT FILED IN 9262/CC

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CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

AFHQ Political Conference held by SACMED

SAC (P) (45) 30

12 June 1945

WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH FORCES FROM NORTHWEST ITALY

Record of a meeting between Lieutenant General Morgan and Major General Carpentier in the C-3 War Room at 1600 hours on Monday 11th June 1945.

DOCUMENT FILED IN 1007/CC

CCS/POLITICAL/2

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CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

4th June 1945

SAC (P) (45) 29

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

POLICY IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

Record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff in the G-3 WAR ROOM at 1145 Hours on Monday, 4th June 1945.

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F/Z-2001

F653

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MJPS/P/296/Final

3 June 1945

EIGHT ARMY MEMORANDUM ON VENEZIA GIULIA, with answers by AFHQ

DOCUMENT FILED IN CC 1008

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(31a)

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Ex Commissioner (3)

Chief Comm 1626

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 183

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COPY NO 36

S.C (P)(45)28
29th May 1945

cc 1838
MAY 31 RECD

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

DISSOLUTION OF PUB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At Annexure 1 is a paper which, after discussion at the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee was submitted to the Chief of Staff by the Chairman of that Sub-Committee.

2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director P B should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from P.B.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

J.G. SMEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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EC List

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J.G. SWEETMAN,
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SECRETARY.

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Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, P B	34
INC	35
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	36-38
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ANNEXURE 1

K 183

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: PWB Functions in North ITALY.

TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 536 that informational activities in liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical problem which can be most easily studied by a technical sub-committee similar to that appointed to arrange the detailed transfer of facilities in ROME and Southern ITALY.

4. Radio and Press

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4. Radio and Press

a. In Southern ITALY, the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of the radio network to Italian control, and the transfer of PWB controlled newspapers to private Italian companies. The return of the whole radio network would place in the hands of the R.A.I. and so indirectly of the Italian Government a powerful propaganda organ and the relinquishment of all Allied control over this organ and over the press might place Allied Military Government at a serious disadvantage should any tension develop. In such circumstances even the restoration of the pre-Fascist newspapers as non-political information papers would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

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b. But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by PWB might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by Allied Publications Board, on which AC, OWI, MOI and PWB are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, those officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North ITALY by means of licensing, allotments of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.W. Italy, and Austria

a. Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.W. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b. PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North ITALY, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That Allied Publications Board be instructed to prepare and recommend a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and radio in North ITALY, and of such Italian-controlled stations as are audible in North ITALY, (including Rome II) through press officers working in close cooperation with the Regional Commissioners, and that it prepare and recommend a directive to govern the work of these press officers.

3. That PWB be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of OWI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease

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economic pressure.

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3. That PWB be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of CCI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA, except for film distribution and activities required by para 3 above.

(intd) A. J. McC.
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

III
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SAC (P) (45) 27

29 May 45

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

Copy No. 43 to Brigadier Anderson

with May items.

Rec'd: Lois Wukasch

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SAC (P) (45) 26

16 May 45

SACMED's Political Conference

PRESS & PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS

Note by Gen Lemnitzer DCOS

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SAC (P) (45) 25 13 May 1945

SACMED's Political Conference, paper.

CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS

Lt. Gen. Morgan's talks with Tito in Belgrade 8 & 9th May 45.

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