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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (SAC, 45, 46)
AUG. 1945 – MAR. 1946

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LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the Chief Commissioner

File under No. 1002-2 SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (SAC (45)) (46)

ALLIED COMMISSION

Vol. IV Page 4

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77	SAC (45) 24	19 Nov 45		Directive to Commander, MMIA
78	SAC (45) 9th Mtg	26 Nov 45		ADDENDUM Location of AFHQ (see 579/CC)
* 79	AFHQ MJPS P/318 (Final)	29 Nov45		
80	SOP C-in-C Med	23 Nov 45		Disposal of Italian Military
80a	Sacmed Political Con	11 Dec 45		Future of the Allied Commission
81	AFHQ MJPS P/319 (Final) (Revised)	15 Dec 45		Italian Air Force
82	AFHQ MJPS P/320 (Final) (Revised)	15 Dec 45		Italian Navy
83	AFHQ MJPS P/323 (Final)	21 Dec 45		AFHQ Boundaries
84	AFHQ MJIS P/324 (Final)	3 Feb 46		Military Commitment in Italy After The Signing of the Peace Treaty
85	Memo Yates	12 Feb 46		Mil Maintenance fm Trieste to Venice RCOG
86	Memo Stone 633/26/EC	5 Mar 46		AGENDA for conference No. 4 and paper P/324 (Final) of 26 Feb 46
86a	Memo SAC (46) 1 Curme	10 Mar 46		Recomds as to command in Italy after disbndmt of AFHQ GHQ and CMF in prs fm
87	Memo 633/26/EC	11 Mar 46	CC	Functs of suggested G-5 Sec AFHQ Rome and residual functs of Alcom

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57a	SAC (45) 12	20 Aug 45		Repat of Soviet citizens in MTO.
58	SAC (45) 13	21 Aug 45		Formtn of Med Allied Air Committee.
59	SAC (45) 14	21 Aug 45		Directive for Air Forces S/C, AC.
60	SAC (45) 15	21 Aug 45		Policy for Ital Civil Aviation.
61	SAC (45) 16	27 Aug 45		Charter for Med Allied Air Committee.
62	SAC (45) 17	30 Aug 45		Repat of Soviet Citizens in Med TO.
63	SAC (45) 18	4 Sep 45		Handover of Bolzano & Udine to IG.
63a	AFHQ MJPS P/310 (Final)	Sep 45		Doc to replace existing It Armistice.
64	SAC (45) 19	4 Sep 45		Photographic Survey in the Balkans.
64a	AFHQ MJPS P/311 (Final)	17 Sep 45		Move of AFHQ to Rome.
65	SAC (45) 20	22 Sep 45		Directive to AOC RAF Italy.
66	SAC (45) 21	24 Sep 45		Move of AFHQ to Rome.
67	AFHQ MJPS P/312 (Final)	23 Sep 45		Draft Mil & CA Agreement UK & Italy.
68	AFHQ MJPS P/313 (Final)	26 Sep 45		DraftMil & CA Agreement US & Italy.
69	AFHQ MJPS P/312(Revised)	2 Oct 45		Mil & CA agreement w It (Br comment)
70	AFHQ MJPS P/313/Revised)	2 Oct 45		Mil & CA agreement w It (US comment)
71	AFHQ SAC (45) 22	12 Oct 45		Repatriation of Rus Cit in Med Theatre
72	AFHQ MJPS P/315 (Final)	16 Oct 45		Command in It after dissolution Hq MTOUSA.
73	AFHQ MJPS P/314 (Final)	17 Oct 45		Possible Jug aggression in V-G.
				KCR5
74	SAC (45) 23	9 Nov 45		Film Distributio n in Italy
75	SAC (45) 23	10 Nov 45		Film Distribution in Italy
76	AFHQ MJPS P/317	11 Nov. 45		Trnsf of Military Maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Ref: 633/26/EC

MEMORANDUM BY THE ALLIED COMMISSION ON THE RELATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE SUGGESTED G-5 SECTION AFHQ IN ROME AND THE RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

1. Before discussing the detailed functions of the two organizations we think it may be helpful to examine the basis of the proposed relations between SACI and the Italian Government.

2. It is the policy of the Allied governments that the Italian Government should assume the fullest possible responsibility for the government of the country compatible with Allied military needs, and that Allied military intervention shall only take place where or when Allied military interests are concerned. This policy, initiated by the Moscow Declarations and continued in FAN 487, make Italy different from, say, Germany and Austria, which are under full military occupation. Moreover, such intervention can only be carried out under the Armistice Terms. SAC's sole instrument for executing the Armistice Terms, and therefore for intervening with the Italian Government, is the Allied Commission, vide Article 37 of the Long Terms which reads as follows:

> "There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."

3. The origin of the G-5 staff sections at Army Headquarters was the necessity of creating <u>military government</u> sections at Army Headquarters. It is true that, as has happened at AFHQ, the G-5 Section may assume staff responsibilities for matters which do not pertain to military government itself. But in this theatre the Deputy President of the Commission as such remains the principal advisor to SAC on civil affairs in the area under Italian administration. G-5 has rightly had no direct contact with the Italian Government and without changing the Armistice Terms it does not seem possible to alter this state of affairs. It has been mooted that G-5 should deal through the Embassies but the Embassies can only represent the views of their respective governments. They are not SAC's channel to the Italian Government nor can they be used as instruments to execute the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or SAC under the Armistice Terms.

4. If we now consider the proposed functions of G-5 in Rome in connection

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4. If we now consider the proposed functions of G-5 in Rome in connection with the subjects which the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose to pass over to AFHQ we find:

(a) Communications. The main interest that AFHQ have in communications is the protection of Allied military interests by the utilization of civilian lines. This is an implementation of the Armistice Terms.

(b) Public Safety. Except as a member of or through the Allied Commission an officer of G-5 could not bring pressure on or ask the Italian Government to adopt public safety measures in the interests of the Allied forces.

(c) Captured Enemy Materials. The function of this branch as regards Italian materials is an implementation of the Armistice Terms (not as regards German materials).

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(d) Transportation. Here again the use of the Italian State Railways and their ports is an implementation of the Armistice Terms. It is true that AFHQ have been dealing direct from the Railway Board with the ISR but the representation of the Allied Commission has been strong and essential because of the Armistice Terms.

(e) Finance. The whole of the Allied financial policy in this country depends from the Armistice Terms.

5. It would seem therefore that the setting up of a G-5 AFHQ of SACI in Rome would merely represent duplication of functions by a body which has no authority to deal with the Italian Government. Quite apart from the legality of the situation, the Italian Government would regard the arrival of a G-5 Section of SACI as a retrogressive movement smacking of increased military control and contrary to declared policies of the Allies. The Russian and French Governments would have to be consulted in any such change in the procedure for the implementation of the Armistice Terms, which, inter alia, would greatly reduce the role of their representatives on the Allied Commission. Moreover, the transfer of civil affairs functions from the Allied Commission to a staff section of a military commander might provoke a similar move on the part of the Soviet Command in the Balkans to the disadvantage of U.S. and U.K. representation on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

6. As was originally contemplated for G-5 Sections at Army Headquarters the primary task of any G-5 Section established by SACI would be to deal with AMG matters in Venezia Giulia and Udine. Even on these matters the Section would have to use the Allied Commission as their agent in Rome for any dealings with the Italian Government. If in spite of the arguments put forward in the Allied Commission paper of March 5th it is decided not to effect considerable delegation to the Deputy President but to establish a G-5 Section to advise SACI as President, there would appear to be no reason for the considerable waste of manpower in duplicating the section by establishing part of it in Rome, where SACI's Deputy and instrument for civil affairs already exists. In the opinion of the Allied Commission, however, the greatest conservation of manpower will be effected by adopting the proposals put forward in their paper mentioned above dated March 5th.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
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Ref: 633/26/EC.

5th March 1946.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION ON AFHQ AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE No.4 AND MJPS PAPER P/326 (FINAL) of 26 FEBRUARY 46.

1. It seems to us that SAC, whose responsibilities will - as we see it - be confined entirely to ITALY and VENEZIA GIULIA, whose location will be far removed from the centre of ITALY and the Italian Government, whose military commitments will be directed chiefly towards VENEZIA GIULIA and will be very limited in ITALY, must rely far more than hitherto on the Allied Commission as opposed to G-5 Section for advice on both AMG in VENEZIA GIULIA and on civil affairs in ITALY.

2. The above reasons, coupled with the over-riding necessity of conserving manpower, appear to us to be very strong arguments for SAC, as President (ex officio), delegating to the Chief Commissioner, as Deputy President, a number of responsibilities connected with civil affairs which he now carries and empowering the Chief Commissioner to act in his name both in communication with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other authorities outside the theatre, e.g., the Economic Councils in Europe, ECITO, ECO, International Postal Conference, etc., and, in fact, using for these matters the Chief Commissioner as his deputy. This is entirely consistent with his title of Deputy President.

3. We take it that the intention is to restrict the size of the new Allied Force Headquarters to a minimum. Use of the Allied Commission, in spite of its distance from main HQ, as a virtual Staff Section of the new HQ, employing the technical officers and their long experience of civil affairs, would help greatly to limit the staff at Allied Force Headquarters provided that SAC is prepared to authorise the Allied Commission to perform the functions now duplicated by Sections at AFHQ. This effects not only G-5 but other Sections such as G-3, SD, G-4, JAG, Finance, etc.

4. Under the new dispensation we would recommend, for instance, that the final adviser to SAC on all matters connected with the Armistice Terms, civil affairs in ITALY, Italian armed services, should be the Chief Commissioner acting on the advice of his political and technical advisers, e.g., US and British Ambassadors, legal, financial and economic advisers,

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5. Discussing now specific paragraphs of the Agenda, in addition to the technical matters referred to in para 9(a), we can add such matters as:

(a) Restrictions under FAN 583:

(i) Remittances from neutral countries,
(ii) ~~FF~~ debt repayments,
(iii) Italian exchange rates.

(b) All transactional correspondence.

(c) RCL items.

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(d) Many telecoms and all postal matters.

(e) Italian representation on Combined European Organisation Committees and Boards.

(f) Technical matters arising if and when civil aviation is allowed.

(g) Matters of policy affecting the organisation, but not operations, of the Italian Armed Services.

(h) Matters affecting Italian merchant shipping.

6. With regard to para 9(b) of the Agenda, we recommend as in para 4 above, that on all policy matters the Chief Commissioner should be empowered to communicate in the name of SAC, either having delegated to him by direction or leaving to his discretion as to what matters he should seek the specific concurrence of SAC before taking action.

7. With regard to Displaced Persons, we recommend that the whole responsibility should be accepted by the Allied Commission in which the experienced experts now exist on an existing War Establishment.

8. With the above in mind we recommend that there should be no G-5 Section at the new AFHQ but that we should revert to the practice adopted with AAI and later with 15 Army Group by which a Civil Affairs Section was provided by the Allied Commission to advise the Commanding General on all aspects of military government and civil administration, and to afford liaison between the Military HQ and HQ Allied Commission. This representative group would ensure mutual interpretation of views between SAC and the Chief Commissioner and their staffs, leaving to the Allied Commission the executive and staff functions now carried out by G-5 and, in certain respects connected with the Service Sub-Commissions, by other Staff Sections.

9. We recommend that there should be no change in the organisation of, nor the directives issued to, the Service Sub-Commissions. The operation of our plan may lead to modification of these directives in due course. But there is no intention, or recommendation, of departing from the principle that for operational matters the Service Sub-Commissions must be under the command of SAC.

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10. We recommend also that assuming SAC's responsibilities will be limited to ITALY, his political advice should be communicated to him by the Chief Commissioner and his representatives after consultation with the US and UK Ambassadors who are also SAC's principal political advisers. This would not alter the present arrangement by which representatives of the US and UK political advisers are retained in VENEZIA GIULIA for matters affecting that area only.

11. We recommend that the principle of the present directive regarding VENEZIA GIULIA be maintained, that is to say, that the area be administ-

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concurrence of SAC before [illegible]

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11. We recommend that the principle of the present directive regarding AMG in VENEZIA GIULIA be maintained, that is to say, that the area be administered as a separate Region under command of 13 Corps, i.e., the new AFHQ, subject to the technical direction of the Allied Commission.

12. We recognise that the above recommendations present problems chiefly connected with the separation of the new AFHQ from the AC and difficulties of communication. We do not believe that many of the problems which would be delegated to the Chief Commissioner would have military implications involving elaborate coordination, but we do recognise that the delegation of powers to the Allied Commission, which we recommend, involves a change of procedure in AFHQ which, from the point of view of manpower alone, we feel will be acceptable. We consider, moreover, and on this point the Political Advisers feel strongly, that this is in the best interests of both the Allies and ITALY, and is a natural evolution consequent on reduction of military strength and in preparation for the total withdrawal of Allied forces and military control after the Peace Treaty.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 1
10th March 1946

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER DISBANDMENT OF CHQ CMF AND AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

Note by Secretary

1. The War Office issued a directive* on 15th February 1946 ordering that CHQ CMF be disbanded by 1st June 1946. As a result of this a series of conferences was held in CMF on 6th and 7th March 1946 by Allied Force Headquarters, to consider JIPS Paper No. P/326 (Final) - 'Command in ITALY after the disbandment of CHQ CMF'** - and to prepare recommendations for consideration by the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on Saturday, 16th March 1946.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve these recommendations.

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4 10/46

T. P. C. CURTIS,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

* TROOPERS Signal 97731 SPAA dtd 15 Feb 46.
** Already circulated.

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E.C. CURTIS,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

* TROOPERS Signal 97731 SD24 dtd 15 Feb 46.
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFHQ CONFERENCES HELD IN ROME
6/7 MARCH 1946

The following recommendations are submitted for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander :-

1. (a) The appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander be retained until the Peace Treaty with ITALY is ratified.

(b) An Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the Peace Treaty is ratified.

(c) The Allied chain of command be as shown at ANNEXURE I.

(d) The chain of command for all British military matters in ITALY after 1st June 1946 be as shown at ANNEXURE II.

(e) The chain of command for all United States military matters in ITALY after 1st June 1946 be as shown at ANNEXURE III.

2. (a) The name "AFHQ" be retained for this new Allied Headquarters.

(b) This new Allied Headquarters be composed of appropriate elements of HQ MTOUSA and HQ 13 Corps.

(c) A Naval Liaison Detachment be included.

(d) An Air HQ, RAF, ITALY, be included.

(e) A British Political Adviser be included.

(f) A United States Political Adviser be included.

3. The transfer of operational and administrative command from AFHQ in its present form take place on 7th May 1946 or as soon after that date as the new AFHQ be fully ready to function.

4. The location of this new Headquarters be NOT further West than the area TREVISO-MESTRE-PADUA, subject to the two following provisos :-

(a) The location of this Headquarters be further discussed between Commander, 13 Corps, and Commanding General, MTOUSA.

(b) The site decided upon for this new Headquarters be such that it

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until the Peace Treaty is ratified.

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(a) The location of this Headquarters be further discussed between Commander, 13 Corps, and Commanding General, MTOUSA.

(b) The site decided upon for this new Headquarters be such that it does not prejudice the provision of good communications between the Naval Liaison Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander and Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at MALTA.

5. Rome Area Allied Command continue in existence after the disbandment of GHQ CMF and AFHQ in its present form.

6. A paper by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, be considered at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16th March 1946, with a view to the despatch of a signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the future functions of a Rear G-5 Section, AFHQ, in ROME and the residual functions of the Allied Commission.

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7. In order to ensure smooth working in an Allied integrated Intelligence section in the new Headquarters it is desirable that the areas covered for Intelligence purposes by HQ ETOUSA and HQ 13 Corps be made to coincide.

8. The draft telegram at ANNEXURE IV be approved by the Supreme Allied Commander for despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

D.C. Currie.
D.C. CURRIE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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
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ANNEXURE I

ALLIED CHAIN OF COMMAND



* Operations, Intelligence, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.


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$ Under command for all purposes.

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ANNEXURE II

CHAIN OF COMD FOR ALL BRITISH MILIT RY MATTERS IN ITALY
AFTER 1 JUN 46



* Under AFHQ for Operations, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.

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ANNEXURE III

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015


Internal Security only.

$ Under command for all purposes.

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ANNEXURE II

CHAIN OF COMD FOR ALL BRITISH MILIT BY MATTERS IN ITALY
AFTER 1 JUN 46




* Under AFEQ for Operations, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.

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ANNEXURE III

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR ALL U.S. MILITARY MATTERS IN ITALY
AFTER 1 JUN 46



* Except for Operations and Intelligence, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

TOP SECRET

ANNEXURE IV

DRAFT SIGNAL

TOP SECRET

TO : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CABINET OFFICE WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is N AF .....

Ref FAN 631.

1. In the light of the probable course of events in ITALY and a War Office proposal to disband GHQ CMF by 1 Jun I have re-examined the allied command arrangements which will be required in ITALY after that date.

2. Until such time as the Peace Treaty with ITALY is ratified by the four major powers JUGOSLAVIA and ITALY I am convinced that an Allied C in C in ITALY and an AFHQ will be required. It now appears likely that ratification may not take place before the autumn of 1946 and possibly not until the Spring 1947.

3. Experience in the past has shewn the value both from an operational and political point of view of a Supreme Allied Commander. In view of the possibility of operations in VENEZIA GIULIA until the Peace Treaty is ratified and the delicate political situation affecting ITALY and her neighbours I consider that a Supreme Allied Commander in ITALY should be retained but in view of his decreased area of responsibility his title might appropriately be modified accordingly to Supreme Allied Commander ITALY.

4. The War Office has proposed that with the dissolution of GHQ CMF all British troops in ITALY should come under command of HQ 13 Corps.

5. Any assumption of responsibility by USFET for U S forces in ITALY would unduly complicate administrative and supply arrangements which function most effectively at present. HQ MTOUSA reduced in size should therefore continue as the major US HQ in ITALY .

2077

6. In the event of the dissolution of GHQ CMF it would be practicable to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785115

an AFHQ will be required. It now appears [illegible]

take place before the autumn of 1946 and possibly not until the Spring 1947.

3. Experience in the past has shewn the value both from an operational and political point of view of a Supreme Allied Commander. In view of the possibility of operations in VENEZIA GIULIA until the Peace Treaty is ratified and the delicate political situation affecting ITALY and her neighbours I consider that a Supreme Allied Commander in ITALY should be retained but in view of his decreased area of responsibility his title might appropriately be modified accordingly to Supreme Allied Commander ITALY.

4. The War Office has proposed that with the dissolution of GHQ CMF all British troops in ITALY should come under command of H Q 13 Corps.

5. Any assumption of responsibility by USFET for U S forces in ITALY would 2077 unduly complicate administrative and supply arrangements which function most effectively at present. H Q MTOUSA reduced in size should therefore continue as the major US H Q in ITALY .

6. In the event of the dissolution of GH Q CMF it would be practicable to setup a new Allied HQ in N . ITALY by integrating as necessary the appropriate staff sections of H Q MTOUSA and H Q 13 Corps. In the interests of prestige and continuity the new Allied H Q should retain the title of AFHQ. Political representation will be required.

7. The matters for which the new Allied H Q will be responsible are broadly :

Operations

Intelligence

86a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Internal Security

Civil Affairs

Coordination of matters of an Allied or Political nature.

In these matters the actions of the new Allied HQ must be governed by Allied policy. It is therefore considered that in all the above matters the new AFHQ should answer direct to Combined Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with existing procedure.

8. In my study I have taken into account the comparatively short time during which an Allied Commitment in ITALY will continue and have endeavoured to draw up my proposals so as to accomplish the disbandment of CMH CMF in such a way as to entail a minimum of change in the present system, which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

(a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HQ MTOUSA and H Q 13 Corps, integrated where necessary.

(c) There should be located with this Headquarters a Naval Liaison Detachment, a H Q MAF ITALY and a British and an American Political Adviser.

(d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to Combined Chiefs of Staff for all matters affecting operations Intelligence,

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 755015

during which an Allied Commitment in ITALY will continue and have endeavoured to draw up my proposals so as to accomplish the disbandment of CHC CAF in such a way as to entail a minimum of changes in the present system, which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

(a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HC MTOUSA and H C 13 Corps, integrated where necessary.

(c) There should be located with this Headquarters a Naval Liaison Detachment, a H C RAF ITALY and a British and an American Political Adviser. *276

(d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to Combined Chiefs of Staff for all matters affecting operations Intelligence, Internal Security, Civil Affairs and matters of Allied or Political nature.

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765415

TOP SECRET

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:CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
: BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
:::::::::::::::::::::

B 34

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (46) 3rd Meeting
15th March, 1946

TOP SECRET
COPY NO 18

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

REVISED AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HRS ON SATURDAY, 16TH MARCH, 1946

---

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (46) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)

2. REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

(Oral report by Allied Commission)

3. BASSOVIZZA PIT - CESSATION OF INVESTIGATIONS

(US POLAD will raise orally the question as to whether a public statement on the lines authorised in FAN 634 should be made at this time)

4. THE RETURN OF THE NINETEEN JUGOSLAV DESERTERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA TO THE JUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES

5. * POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Paper by G-3, AFHQ - G-3 AFHQ/140/3 dated 14 Mar 46 - already circulated)

6. ** RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF GHQ CMF AND AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM

(Paper No. SAC (46) 1 - already circulated)

7. RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AFTER THE DISBANDMENT OF AFHQ IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

(Paper on Allied Commission and draft telegram for approval and despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff - already circulated)

1002-2/cc

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765015

THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1100 HRS ON SATURDAY,
16TH MARCH, 1946

---

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (46) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)

2. REVIEW OF FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

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(Paper on Allied Commission and draft telegram for approval and despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff - already circulated)

D.C. CURME,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

* Revised Appendix 'C' attached.
** Revised Annexure IV attached.

DISTRIBUTION :

Normal, plus
Commander-in-Chief, BTA.
Commander, 13 Corps.

1002-2/CC

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Surplus
1002-2/CC

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Revised Appendix 'C'

DRAFT CABLE

TOP SECRET

ACTION : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND CABINET OFFICES

LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : C-IN-C MED, C-IN-C RAF MED/ME

- -

This is NAF _____

Further to NAFs 1116 and 1118.

1. Jugoslav Forces in Zone 'B' now amount to approximately nine divisions, including two tank bdes with a total of at least 800 tanks. Official Jugoslav explanations regarding the size of these forces are unconvincing. There is, in addition, the Jugoslav Detachment some 2,000 strong with a detachment of tanks located in Zone 'A' in accordance with the MORGAN -JOVANOVICH Agreement (.) In the absence of further evidence of Jugoslav intentions my appreciation regarding the real explanation for the concentration of these forces remains as stated in paras 3 and 4 of NAF 1116.

2. If the Jugoslavs intend to achieve their ends in VENEZIA GIULIA by force either in the immediate future or at any time before the Allied commitment in that area is terminated by the Peace Treaty I consider that open hostilities may come about either :

(a) As a result of grave internal disorder in Zone 'A' fomented by Jugoslav underground elements which would give the Jugoslavs an excuse for direct intervention with armed forces,

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or

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

divisions, [illegible]

Official Jugoslav explanation regarding the size of these forces are unconvincing. There is, in addition, the Jugoslav Detachment some 2,000 strong with a detachment of tanks located in Zone 'A' in accordance with the MORGAN -JOVANOVICH Agreement (.) In the absence of further evidence of Jugoslav intentions my appreciation regarding the real explanation for the concentration of these forces remains as stated in paras 3 and 4 of MAF 1116.

2. If the Jugoslavs intend to achieve their ends in VENEZIA GIULIA by force either in the immediate future or at any time before the Allied commitment in that area is terminated by the Peace Treaty I consider that open hostilities may come about either :

(a) As a result of grave internal disorder in Zone 'A' fomented by Jugoslav underground elements which would give the Jugoslavs an excuse for direct intervention with armed forces,

or

(b) By a direct Jugoslav attack across the MORGAN Line without further warning.

3. Formations of 13 Corps are NOT tactically disposed but are deployed for the purpose of implementing the MORGAN - JOVANOVICH agreement. This involves occupying a large number of road posts on the MORGAN Line virtually as a police force. 13 Corps could therefore offer little effective resistance to a sudden attack in strength by the Jugoslavs. One brigade moreover is isolated in the POLA enclave and in the event of hostilities would have to be withdrawn as rapidly as possible.

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TOP SECRET

4. Restrictions placed on the employment of such Allied forces as remain in ITALY have now left me with virtually NO reserve force immediately available in my own hands. Moreover for political reasons the large force represented by 2 Polcorps can not even be strategically concentrated nor can any build up of reserve stocks be made for their possible employment in an emergency. In addition as a result of release, redeployment of administrative units and disposal of surpluses it would not at present be possible to support active operations by more than a maximum of two British and two US Divisions in NE ITALY for a limited period. To squeeze down

5. The movement of large scale Allied reinforcements into Zone 'A' in the near future would place Allied forces there on a sound military basis and might possibly dissuade the Jugoslavs from any agressive intentions. Large scale reinforcement however does not appear a practical proposition and reinforcement on the small scale immediately available would I believe only aggravate an already delicate situation. 6 Armd Div is the only readily available Allied reserve and I do not consider therefore, in the absence of further evidence of Jugoslav intentions, that it would be wise to move it eastwards at this stage.

6. From the foregoing it is obvious that Jugoslav aggression in VENEZIA GIULIA would place my forces there in a dangerous Military situation and one which I could do little to alleviate with the present means at my disposal. Although I do not consider the reinforcement of 13 Corps by one division advisable at this stage it may well be militarily essential to 5273 reinforce 13 Corps to a much greater extent at short notice in the future. I request therefore that I may be informed as a matter of urgency what policy the Br and US Govts intend to adopt in the event of Jugoslav agression in Zone 'A'. In such circumstances I presume that I should be required to at least

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basis and might possibly dissuade the Jugoslavs from any agressive [illegible]
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6. From the foregoing it is obvious that Jugoslav aggression in VENEZIA GIULIA would place my forces there in a dangerous military situation and one which I could do little to alleviate with the present means at my disposal. Although I do not consider the reinforcement of 13 Corps by one division advisable at this stage it may well be militarily essential to reinforce 13 Corps to a much greater extent at short notice in the future. I request therefore that I may be informed as a matter of urgency what policy the Br and US Govts intend to adopt in the event of Jugoslav agression in Zone 'A'. In such circumstances I presume that I should be required to restore the status quo by force and I therefore request that I may be informed what land, sea and air resources will be made available to me for the purpose and at what stage I may expect to receive them.

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7. I consider that it would minimise present tension and almost certainly have a long term effect if the US and UK Govts made a declaration that they intent fully to discharge their obligations in VENEZIA GIULIA pending the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and are prepared to employ

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

all means necessary. I strongly urge that a statement of this nature be issued at an early date.

Distribution :

SACS	G-4 MTO
SAO	NLO
G-2	AIR HQ
G-5	BR POLAD
C/S MTO	US POLAD
G-3 MTO	NAV & TN
G(SD)	SIGNALS

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3(SB)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

TOP SECRET

ANNEXURE IV

TOP SECRET

DRAFT SIGNAL

TO : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CABINET OFFICES WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is NAF .....

Ref FAN 631.

1. In accordance with a War Office proposal to disband GHQ CMF by 1 Jun I have re-examined the allied command arrangements which would be required in ITALY after that date.

2. Until such time as the Peace Treaty with ITALY is ratified by the four major powers JUGOSLAVIA and ITALY I am convinced that an Allied C in C in ITALY and an AFHQ will be required. It now appears likely that ratification may not take place before the autumn of 1946 and possibly not until Spring 1947.

3. Experience in the past has shown the value both from an operational and political point of view of a Supreme Allied Commander. In view of the possibility of operations in VENEZIA GIULIA until the Peace Treaty is ratified and the delicate political situation affecting ITALY and her neighbours I consider that a Supreme Allied Commander in ITALY should be retained but in view of his decreased area of responsibility his title might appropriately be modified accordingly to Supreme Allied Commander ITALY.

4. The War Office has proposed that with the dissolution of GHQ CMF all British troops in ITALY should come under command of HQ 13 Corps.

5. Any assumption of responsibility by USFET for US forces in ITALY 0071 would unduly complicate administrative and supply arrangements which function most effectively at present. HQ MTOUSA reduced in size should therefore continue as the major US HQ in ITALY.

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four major powers JUGOSLAVIA and ITALY I am convinced that an Allied C in C in ITALY and an AFHQ will be required. It now appears likely that ratification may not take place before the autumn of 1946 and possibly not until Spring 1947.

3. Experience in the past has shewn the value both from an operational and political point of view of a Supreme Allied Commander. In view of the possibility of operations in VENEZIA GIULIA until the Peace Treaty is ratified and the delicate political situation affecting ITALY and her neighbours I consider that a Supreme Allied Commander in ITALY should be retained but in view of his decreased area of responsibility his title might appropriately be modified accordingly to Supreme Allied Commander ITALY.

4. The War Office has proposed that with the dissolution of GHQ CMF all British troops in ITALY should come under command of HQ 13 Corps.

5. Any assumption of responsibility by USFET for US forces in ITALY would unduly complicate administrative and supply arrangements which function most effectively at present. HQ MTOUSA reduced in size should therefore continue as the major US HQ in ITALY.

6. In the event of the dissolution of GHQ CMF it would be practicable to set up a new Allied HQ in N. ITALY by integrating as necessary the appropriate staff sections of HQ MTOUSA and HQ 13 Corps. In the interests of prestige and continuity the new Allied HQ should retain the title of AFHQ. Political representation will be required.

7. The matters for which the new Allied HQ will be responsible are broadly :

Operations

Intelligence

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

Internal Security

Civil Affairs

Coordination of matters of an Allied or Political nature.

In these matters the actions of the new Allied HQ must be governed by Allied policy. It is therefore considered that in all the above matters the new AFHQ should answer direct to Combined Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with existing procedure.

8. In my study I have taken into account the comparatively short time during which an Allied Commitment in ITALY may continue and have endeavoured to draw up my proposals so as to accomplish the disbandment of GHQ C.F in such a way as to entail a minimum of changes in the present system, which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

(a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HQ MTOUSA and HQ 13 Corps, integrated where necessary.

(c) There should be located with this Headquarters : Naval Liaison Detachment, : HQ RAF ITALY and : British and an American Political Adviser.

(d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to Combined Chiefs of Staff for all matters affecting operations,

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Internal Security

Civil Affairs

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8. In my study I have taken into account the comparatively short time during which an Allied Commitment in ITALY may continue and have endeavoured to draw up my proposals so as to accomplish the disbandment of GHQ C.F in such a way as to entail a minimum of changes in the present system, which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

(a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HQ MEDITERRANEAN and HQ 15 Corps, integrated where necessary.

(c) There should be located with this Headquarters a Naval Liaison Detachment, a HQ AAF ITALY and a British and an American Political Adviser.

(d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to Combined Chiefs of Staff for all matters affecting operations,

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765115

8. In my study I have taken into account the comparatively short time during which an Allied Commitment in ITALY may continue and have endeavoured to draw up my proposals so as to accomplish the disbandment of GHQ C.F in such a way as to entail a minimum of changes in the present system, which has functioned so successfully in the past.

9. I recommend therefore that :

(a) A Supreme Allied Commander should be retained in ITALY until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(b) Allied Force Headquarters should continue in existence until the ratification of this Treaty and should be composed of the appropriate elements of HQ MTOUSA and HQ 13 Corps, integrated where necessary.

(c) There should be located with this Headquarters a Naval Liaison Detachment, a HQ RAF ITALY and a British and an American Political Adviser.

(d) The new Headquarters should be directly subordinate to Combined Chiefs of Staff for all matters affecting operations, Intelligence, Internal Security, Civil Affairs and matters of Allied or Political nature.

10. FAN ..... gives my views on the situation in this theatre. On the evidence at my disposal, to carry out by 1 Jun the plan outlined above, would entail running serious risks. I recommend that the change over be effected gradually, by moving elements of AFHQ progressively to N. ITALY and carrying out the final fusion with 13 Corps at a later date.

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COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 633/26/EQ

5th March 1946

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION ON AFHQ AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE No.4 AND MJPS PAPER P/326 (FINAL) of 26 FEBRURARY 46

86

SEE 13 IN 1002-2/CC

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Surplus
1002-2/CC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 633/26/EC

5th March 1946

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION ON AFHQ AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE NO.4 AND MIS PAPER F/326 (FINAL) of 26 FEBRUARY 46

Item 15 IN 1002-2/CC

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1002-2/CC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

P/325 (FINAL)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

COPY NO 32

12 Februrary 1946

TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE

85
SEE ~~116~~ IN 1002-2/CC

TOP SECRET

5067

Surplus
1002-2/CC

P/325 (FINAL) TOP SECRET TOP SECRET FEB 2 6 REC'D

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

COPY NO 32

12 February 1946

TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff, the M.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

DISTRIBUTION

List 'A'
plus:- "Q"
UNRRA

1002-2/12

5966

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

In accordance with terms of reference resulting [illegible] of Staff, the J.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

DISTRIBUTION

List 'A'
plus:- "Q"
UNRRA

1002-2/12

5966

TOP SECRET

3

85

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

P/325 (REVISED)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

12 February 1946

TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE

OBJECT

1. To re-examine the desirability of switching all tonnages now being handled through TRIESTE on Military account to VENICE and if this is considered desirable, to recommend the date by which it should be completed.

INTRODUCTION

2. This matter was previously discussed in P/317 in which despite strong operational and administrative arguments in favour of such a step it was concluded that in view of the political objections there should be no transfer of Military Maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE.

3. The political arguments which were applied to the proposal were briefly as follows:-

(a) The cessation of military maintenance through the port of TRIESTE would rob the ANGLO ERA of its raison d'etre - i.e. that the use of the port was essential to our military L of C to AUSTRIA.

(b) Any appreciable reduction of Allied activity in the port of TRIESTE would result in unemployment and would therefore increase the likelihood of disorder.

(c) It would be undesirable and contrary to existing policy to reassume military control of the port of VENICE, and the large increase in military tonnage then to be shipped through that port would have had an adverse effect on Italian economy.

4. The situation has now changed, and of the above arguments (b) [illegible] no longer valid and (c) no longer applicable. In the case of (b), the increased quantity of UNRRA supplies passing through TRIESTE would more than offset the withdrawal of military traffic. There would therefore be no cause for unemployment. In the case of (c), it has now been decided that it would not be necessary to reassume military control of the Port of VENICE and the quantity of military stores involved will be comparatively small by April.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 750015

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2. This matter was previously discussed in P/317 in which despite strong operational and administrative arguments in favour of such a step it was concluded that in view of the political objections there should be no transfer of military maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE.

3. The political arguments which were applied to the proposal were briefly as follows:-

(a) The cessation of military maintenance through the port of TRIESTE would rob the ORGAN LINE of its raison d'etre - i.e. that the use of the port was essential to our military L of C to AUSTRIA.

(b) Any appreciable reduction of Allied activity in the port of TRIESTE would result in unemployment and would therefore increase the likelihood of disorder.

(c) It would be undesirable and contrary to existing policy to reassume military control of the port of VENICE, and the large increase in military tonnage then to be shipped through that port would have had an adverse effect on Italian economy.

4. The situation has now changed, and of the above arguments (b) and (c) no longer valid and (c) no longer applicable. In the case of (b), the increased quantity of UNRRA supplies passing through TRIESTE would more than offset the withdrawal of military traffic. There would therefore be no cause for unemployment. In the case of (c), it has now been decided that it would not be necessary to reassume military control of the Port of VENICE and the quantity of military stores involved will be comparatively small by April.

5. The argument in para 3(a) still holds good, and from the political point of view it will be less desirable than ever during the coming period of Peace Conferences and Frontier arbitration to give the Jugoslavs an opening for propaganda or any pretext to disturb the status quo.

6. The operational argument in favour of a transfer outlined in para 6 of P/317, i.e. that in view of possible operations it would be sounder for 13 Corps L of C to be permanently established through VENICE, still applies.

The administrative arguments outlined in para 7 of P/317 are greatly strengthened by the appearance of additional factors as elaborated below.

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OTHER FACTORS

7. Port Capacities and Port Workings of TRIESTE and VENICE

Appendix "A" to this paper contains a statement of port capacities and port workings, and from this Appendix the following facts are deduced:

(a) Imports through TRIESTE and VENICE will increase substantially during February and subsequent months. This is mainly due to increased imports on UNRRA account.

(b) Owing to limitations in the port capacity of TRIESTE part of the UNRRA tonnage to be imported during February will be imported through VENICE. UNRRA would prefer to import this tonnage through TRIESTE, but this cannot happen unless military tonnages now being handled through TRIESTE is transferred to VENICE, which is the only other possible port.

(c) Coal and POL imported through TRIESTE are handled through civil agencies on behalf of the military and there is no necessity to transfer the import of these commodities to VENICE.

(d) At the present time the military are responsible for import and handling, exclusive of coal and POL, some 51,000 tons per month through TRIESTE. On 1 April 46 it is anticipated that this military commitment will shrink to 21,000 tons per month, as a result of UNRRA assuming responsibility for supplies for ACAMIT.

(e) There may also be a further reduction in the commitment to be handled by military personnel to 12,000 tons per month, if it is found practicable for UNRRA to assume responsibility for civil supplies for VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE or alternatively, if it is found possible for civil manpower to relieve military manpower of this commitment.

8. Effect on Italian economy of transferring military tonnage from TRIESTE to VENICE.

(a) Providing the military tonnage transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE does not exceed 40,000 tons per month, no cut would be necessary in respect of the Italian Government bid on the capacity of VENICE for Feb 46 and subsequent months.

(b) The Italian Government would have to be warned that additional military tonnages were going to be imported through VENICE, but it would not be necessary to assume military control of that port. TRIESTE would remain a military controlled port.

9. MANPOWER

US manpower in this theatre has already been reduced to a minimum. The rate of run down in British manpower has considerably exceeded the rate of run down in our commitments. This has resulted in manpower of

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(c) At the present time [illegible] military are responsible for import and handling, exclusive of coal and POL, some 51,000 tons per month through TRIESTE. On 1 April 46 it is anticipated that this military commitment will shrink to 21,000 tons per month, as a result of UNRRA assuming responsibility for supplies for ACAMIT.

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9. MANPOWER

US manpower in this theatre has already been reduced to a minimum. The rate of run down in British manpower has considerably exceeded the rate of run down in our commitments. This has resulted in manpower deficiencies which have been partially made good by a variety of means including deferment of release of certain officers, and a few senior NCO's and specialists. Availability of British manpower will further decrease very considerably in the next few months, and it is therefore essential that the layout of troops in C.M.F should be as economical as possible in manpower.

10. There will be no saving in military manpower unless all tonneges which must be handled by military personnel, are transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE. The immediate manpower saving resultingfrom such action is small, but there will be a further saving later. Most of this saving will be in categories in which there is the greatest manpower deficiency, e.g. Staff Officers, Clerks, Port Staffs, Signals personnel etc. Such a saving is important in our present straitened manpower position.

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11. TIMING

(a) Certain adjustments of troops and military installations in XIII Corps area will be necessary before VENICE could handle the increased military tonnage. These adjustments would take about one month to complete.

(b) As it is anticipated that UNRRA will take over responsibility for ACC/BRIT supplies on 1 April 1946, and as it is not desirable to transfer a greater military tonnage to VENICE than necessary it is considered that 1 April 1946 would be the most suitable date for transferring to VENICE all tonnages which continue to be handled by military personnel on that date

CONCLUSIONS

12. The transfer from TRIESTE to VENICE of all tonnages which are a military commitment would :

(a) provide a small, but important saving in military manpower.

(b) simplify the administrative layout in NW ITALY by enabling military imports which must be handled by military personnel to be concentrated on one port.

(c) concentrate military maintenance on the port which would be used in the event of trouble breaking out in VENEZIA GIULIA.

13. Coal and POL (incl POL for AUSTRIA) should continue to be imported through TRIESTE and military control of the Port should be retained.

14. The political views on the desirability of transferring military maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE are diametrically opposed to the military. We have, however, in the past reduced our forces in VENEZIA GIULIA very substantially with an even greater reduction in the military use of the port of TRIESTE. The Jugoslavs have not reacted to these reductions and a further reduction in the military use of the port should therefore pass unnoticed.

15. In view of paras 12, 13 and 14 above it is considered that the advantages to be gained by the transfer about 1 April from TRIESTE to VENICE of such military maintenance as must be handled by military personnel outweigh the political objections.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

16. That the import of all tonnages which must be handled by military personnel should be transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE wef 1 April 1946.

17. That AFHQ be requested in due course to advise the Italian Government what additional military tonnages will be imported through VENICE after 31 March 1946.

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12. The transfer from TRIESTE to VENICE of all tonnages which are a military commitment would :

(a) provide a small, but important saving in military manpower.

(b) simplify the administrative layout in N. ITALY by enabling military imports which must be handled by military personnel to be concentrated on one port.

(c) concentrate military maintenance on the port which would be used in the event of trouble breaking out in VENEZIA GIULIA.

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APPENDIX "A" to R/325 (FINAL)

Port Capacity and Port Workings at TRIESTE and VENICE

TOP SECRET

1. Port Capacities.

a. The estimated port clearance capacities including POL and coal of VENICE and TRIESTE are at present as follows:-

Port	Capacity in tons per month.
VENICE	240,000
TRIESTE	210,000

b. From Apr 46 onwards the capacity of TRIESTE is likely to increase to 270,000 tons per month.

2. Port Workings.

a. The tonnages including bulk POL and coal at present being handled through VENICE and TRIESTE are as follows:-

	Tons per month.
VENICE - On military account	40,000
- On civil account - Italian Government	100,000
TOTAL	140,000

This left 100,000 tons per month capacity spare.

TRIESTE - On military account incl AMGOT and UNRRA supplies	80,000
- On civil account- UNRRA for JUGOSLAVIA	80,000
TOTAL	160,000

This left 50,000 tons per month capacity spare increasing to 110,000 tons per month as from 1 Apr 46.

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b. The following additional tonnages have been bid through NE ITALY ports during the coming months:-

Month	For whom	Tons per month.
Feb	UNRRA JUGOSLAVIA	47,000 (TRIESTE)
	UNRRA AUSTRIA	30,000 (VENICE)

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a. The tonnages including bulk POL and coal at present being through VENICE and TRIESTE are as follows:-

	Tons per month.
VENICE - On military account	40,000
- On civil account - Italian Government	100,000
TOTAL	140,000

This left 100,000 tons per month capacity spare.

TRIESTE - On military account incl ACABRIT and AMG supplies	80,000
- On civil account - UNRRA for JUGOSLAVIA	80,000
TOTAL	160,000

This left 50,000 tons per month capacity spare increasing to 110,000 tons per month [illegible] Apr 46.

5063

b. The following additional tonnages have been bid through NE ITALY ports during the coming months:-

Month	For whom	Tons per month.
Feb	UNRRA JUGOSLAVIA	47,000 (TRIESTE)
		30,000 (VENICE)
	UNRRA AUSTRIA	15,000 (VENICE)
	UNRRA CZECHOSLOVAKIA	80,000 (VENICE)
	Italian Government - Civil	6,000 (VENICE)
	AMG supplies for French Zone in VIENNA	2,000 (TRIESTE)
	TOTAL	181,000
Mar	additional UNRRA tonnage over Feb bid (Not yet allocated to a port)	40,000
	TOTAL	40,000

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The above are only bids on port capacity and it is very doubtful whether the full tonnages will in fact be shipped. As UNRRA will be importing through TRIESTE and VENICE there should be no insuperable difficulty for UNRRA to transfer VENICE tonnages to TRIESTE and vice versa. UNRRA would prefer to use TRIESTE for the bulk of the above tonnages rather than VENICE.

3. Extent of military tonnages now being imported through TRIESTE which could be handled more economically through VENICE.

a. Coal and POL being imported through TRIESTE on military account are being handled on behalf of the military by civil agencies and as the coal and POL are mainly required for local consumption in and around TRIESTE no useful purpose would be served in transferring the import of these commodities from TRIESTE to VENICE.

b. The only tonnages on military account now being handled through TRIESTE which would effect a saving in military manpower if they were transferred to VENICE are :-

	Tonnages per month.
Military maintenance of ET.	8,500
Military maintenance of XIII Corps	3,500
AC.BrIT supplies	30,000
CMG supplies for VENEZIA GIULIA & UDINE	9,000
TOTAL	51,000

c. Of the tonnages set out in para 3b. above, UNRRA are planning to undertake responsibility for the import of AC.BrIT supplies on 1 Apr 46. The practicability of UNRRA assuming responsibility for import of civil supplies for VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE is also under examination. If the latter transfer to UNRRA does not materialise, it may still be possible to relieve military manpower of the responsibility for handling civil supplies for VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE by using civil agencies and civil manpower in lieu.

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were transferred to VENEZ. are :-

	Tonnages per month.
Military maintenance of ET.	8,500
Military maintenance of XXII Corps	3,500
ACABIT supplies	30,000
AG supplies for VENEZ. GIUL. & UDINE	9,000
TOTAL	51,000

c. Of the tonnages set out in para 3b. above, UNRRA are planning to undertake responsibility for the import of ACABIT supplies on 1 Apr 46. The practicability of UNRRA assuming responsibility for import of civil supplies for VENEZ. GIULIA and UDINE is also under examination. If the latter transfer to UNRRA does not materialise, it may still be possible to relieve military manpower of the responsibility for handling civil supplies for VENEZ. GIULIA and UDINE by using civil agencies and civil manpower in lieu.

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Allied Commission

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P/324 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

3 February 1946

COPY NO. 20

MILITARY COMMITMENT IN ITALY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the M.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman

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MILITARY COMMITMENT IN ITALY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the M.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.S.,
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P/324 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

MILITARY COMMITMENT IN ITALY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY

OBJECT

1. To examine the special problems which will arise from the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with a view to asking the Combined Chiefs of Staff for such information or decisions as may be available for the early planning of the withdrawal of Allied Troops from Italy, together with an estimate of when the present role of Allied troops in Italy will change.

PEACE TREATY PROCEDURE

2. The date when the Peace Treaty becomes effective is naturally a factor of prime importance. It is understood that the Peace Conference, which it is hoped will approve a treaty with Italy, is to assemble in May. The length of time which will elapse between the first meeting of the conference, the signing of the terms of the treaty, and the final ratification by the Governments of the signatory powers is unpredictable. It may be that the treaty will not come into force until well into the second half of 1946, until when the role of Allied troops in N.W. Italy will presumably remain unchanged. The matter is further complicated by the uncertainty whether the Treaty will be planned to come into force before or after the frontier problem is settled and the Italian and Jugoslav authorities have consolidated their positions within their new areas.

ALLIED ROLE DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE TREATY

3. It is to be expected that the greatest tension in VENEZIA GIULIA will exist from the time of the announcement of the terms of the Peace Treaty, through the period of its signing and of the demarcation of the new frontier to the final ratification. If the frontier decisions are particularly displeasing to either Italy or Jugoslavia, there may well be continued tension for some time after the ratification and until the movement of nationals into the new territories has been completed. It will be during this period that the presence of Anglo - U.S. forces will be most necessary to keep the peace.

PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY.

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4. The main problems affecting the withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy on conclusion of the Peace Treaty will naturally depend to a large extent on the actual provisions of the Treaty. Relevant information at present available at AFHQ on this subject is limited to proposed military clauses prepared in LONDON and WASHINGTON for the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff respectively. Although the two drafts appear to differ fundamentally in their approach to the problem

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RETENTION OF ALLIED TROOPS IN ITALY AFTER THE PEACE TREATY.

5. There are however certain possibilities which may be outside the terms of the Peace Treaty. These can be summarised as follows :-

(a) The retention of British and U.S. forces and hence of an Allied Headquarters in N.E. Italy for some time after the Peace Treaty to ensure peace in VENEZIA GIULIA while demarcation of the new frontier is

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proceeding and while ITALIAN & JUGOSLAV authorities are taking over their respective areas.

(b) The fact that it would not be physically possible to withdraw all British and U.S. troops from Italy immediately the Peace Treaty comes into force.

(c) The retention of British forces to operate the British L of C from Trieste and Venice to Austria, if an alternative L of C across N.E. Europe cannot be arranged.

The retention of troops for any of the above reasons would probably be regularised by Civil and Military Affairs agreements to accompany the Peace Treaty. A draft of these agreements was examined by the MJPS (see P/512). In view of the uncertainty regarding the terms of the Peace Treaty or when it will take effect it is not considered that any reliable information could be obtained from the CCS on the above possibilities at this stage.

6. Retention of Allied Forces in NORTH and NORTH EAST ITALY after mid 1946 has major political and economic implications. These troops are at present accommodated largely in schools, private houses and industrial premises and Italian military barracks. Considerable pressure is constantly being brought to bear upon the Allied Military authorities to release much of this accommodation which is required to facilitate the rehabilitation of the economic life in the area. The Allied Forces in ITALY have not however the manpower or material to proceed with large scale building of hutted accommodation. Assuming manpower and material were made available such a project would require War Department and Treasury approval, and it is considered to be extremely unlikely that such approval would be given in view of the short term nature of the commitment. Furthermore, to move troops out of the moderately comfortable quarters in which they are now located, into hutted or tented camps would have a most detrimental effect on morale and should not be contemplated. In order that the economic life of the area can be planned and the necessary action taken to advise the appropriate authorities of the accommodation which the Allies must necessarily retain in the event of troops remaining in the area after mid 1946 as envisaged in para 5 above, it is desirable that early information of future intentions be made available.

CONCLUSIONS

7. In view of the uncertainty regarding the terms of the Peace Treaty or when it will take effect no useful purpose will be served in approaching the CCS at this stage regarding information or decisions depending on the Peace Treaty or accompanying documents.

8. At this stage, it is not practicable to estimate when the present role of Allied troops in Italy will change.

9. While in the interests of Italian rehabilitation it is desirable to return to the Italians buildings and installations in N.E. Italy occupied by Allied Forces, for planning purposes it must be assumed that 13 Corps will retain its present scale of accommodation until the completion of the Anglo-US Military Commitment.

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8. At this stage, it is not practicable to estimate when the present role of Allied troops in Italy will change.

9. While in the interests of Italian rehabilitation it is desirable to return to the Italians buildings and installations in N.E. Italy occupied by Allied Forces, for planning purposes it must be assumed that 13 Corps will retain its present scale of accommodation until the completion of the Anglo-US Military Commitment.

RECOMMENDATION

10. That no signal be sent at this time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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Chief Commissioner
A.C.
c/o SDCS.

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Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

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21 December 1945

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AFHQ BOUNDARIES

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the M.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier GS.,
Chairman.

HTHS/rw

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

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21 December 1945

AFHQ BOUNDARIES

OBJECT

1. To examine the implications of FAN 631 and to make appropriate recommendations, with particular reference to Command and Staff arrangements in those areas, previously included within the boundaries of AFHQ, but now excluded.

BOUNDARIES

2. Prior to FAN 631 the boundaries were as follows:-

a. AFHQ. ITALY including SARDINIA, SICILY, PANTELLARIA, LAMPEDUSA, and LINOSA, FRENCH NORTH AFRICA, CORSICA, HUNGARY, RUMANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, BULGARIA and GREECE.

b. MTOUSA. The entire Mediterranean Sea (excluding the Island of CYPRUS and the Turkish Islands, adjacent to the Turkish mainland and the DODECANESE Islands), ITALY, HUNGARY, RUMANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, BULGARIA and GREECE.

c. CMF. These boundaries have never been laid down, but are presumed to be substantially the same as "a" above.

3. The following territories previously within the boundaries of AFHQ are now excluded by FAN 631:-JUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, ALBANIA, GREECE, CORSICA and FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

4. The boundaries of MTOUSA and CMF have not coincided in the past and no difficulties have arisen. Since the MTOUSA and CMF boundaries are unchanged by FAN 631, no future difficulties are envisaged.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. The only external threat to the security of Allied Forces in ITALY is [illegible] Any operations against the JUGOSLAVS in VENEZIA GIULIA would [illegible] at an early stage. It would

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BOUNDARIES

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a. AFHQ. ITALY including SARDINIA, SICILY, PANTELLARIA, LAMPEDUSA, and LINOSA, FRENCH NORTH AFRICA, CORSICA, HUNGARY, RUMANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, BULGARIA and GREECE.

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c. CAF. These boundaries have never been laid down, but are presumed to be substantially the same as "a" above.

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4. The boundaries of MTOUSA and CAF have not coincided in the past and no difficulties have arisen. Since the MTOUSA and CAF boundaries are unchanged by FAN 631, no future difficulties are envisaged.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. The only external threat to the security of Allied Forces in ITALY is from JUGOSLAVIA. Any operations against the JUGOSLAVS in VENEZIA GIULIA would certainly involve air operations over JUGOSLAVIA at an early stage. It would therefore be desirable to include JUGOSLAVIA within SACMED'S area of responsibility.

6. FAN 631 defines SACMED's theatre as "All of ITALY including the occupied part of VENEZIA GIULIA". Confusion may arise as to whether this includes that part of VENEZIA GIULIA East of the MORGAN LINE. The Supreme Allied Commander was however given certain rights East of the MORGAN LINE by the MORGAN - JOVANOVIC Agreement and it would appear illogical that this area should not now be within his responsibility. In addition, in order to conform to the present policy of not prejudging claims on Italian territory, it is considered that "All of ITALY" should include the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA.

INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS

7. Events in JUGOSLAVIA directly affect the security of Allied Forces in VENEZIA GIULIA and it is considered desirable that AFHQ should remain responsible for collection and collation of intelligence therein. This is also in

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line with the operational considerations in paragraph 5 above. Since the intelligence staffs of GHQ CMF and MTOUSA must remain integrated in AFHQ, there are no practical intelligence objections to the exclusion of the more distant Balkan countries from S.ACMED's area of responsibility provided they remain within the boundaries of CMF and MTOUSA.

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONS

8. As the area of responsibility of the Allied Naval Area Commander which has always extended beyond that of SACMED is unaltered by FAN 631, it is considered that the operational control of the British, U.S., French and Greek Navies, and of the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean, is not affected.

SPECIAL AIR CONSIDERATIONS

9. Control of the Greek Air Force by Air Commander in Chief R.A.F. MED/ME is unaffected by F.N 631 since this was vested in him as a result of an agreement between the British and Greek Governments and has been delegated by him to AOC, RAF Italy.

INTER-SERVICE COMMAND IN AREAS NOW OUTSIDE S.ACMED's BOUNDARIES

10. FAN 631 terminates Supreme Allied inter-service command in those areas excluded from S.ACMED's new boundaries.

11. From the U.S. point of view there are virtually no U.S. ground or air forces in the areas now excluded from The Supreme Allied Commander's command, and it would appear therefore that no special command arrangements need be made for these areas.

12. From the British point of view the areas excluded from The Supreme Allied Commander's authority, in which inter-service interests remain, are GREECE and FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. The latter however is a very minor and diminishing commitment and it is hoped to liquidate CMF interests there altogether in the near future. It is considered that inter-service command in these areas now excluded from S.ACMED's boundaries should therefore be conducted by C. in C. MED, C in C, CMF and Air C in C, RAF/AFDME or their representatives acting in committee. Machinery for this committee exists within the British side of AFHQ.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

13. FAN 631 presents no administrative implications.

CONCLUSIONS

14. S.ACMED's area of responsibility should include the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA and JUGOSLAVIA.

15. The boundaries of CMF should be defined.

16. Command of U.S. Forces in MTOUSA is unaffected by FAN 631.

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him to AOC, RAF Italy.

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CONCLUSIONS

14. SACMED's area of responsibility should include the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA and JUGOSLAVIA.

15. The boundaries of CMF should be defined.

16. Command of U.S. Forces in MTOUSA is unaffected by FAN 631.

17. British inter-service Command outside SACMED's area but inside the boundaries of CMF should be exercised by a Commanders-in-Chief Committee consisting of C-in-C Med, C-in-C CMF and Air C-in-C RAF/MEDME or their representatives. The machinery to operate this Committee already exists in the British side of AFHQ.

RECOMMENDATION

18. That attached draft cables to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff be approved.

SECRET

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SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT CABLE

ACTION: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO CABINET OFFICES
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is NAF _____

FAN 621 refers.

1. Uncertainty has arisen as to whether that part of VENEZIA GIULIA east of the MORGAN LINE is included in my area of Allied responsibility. The MORGAN-JOVANOVIC agreement of 20 June 45 gives me certain rights east of the MORGAN LINE. I presume therefore that my area of Allied responsibility includes the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA.

2. Since the only external threat to the security of Allied Forces in N.E. Italy can come from Jugoslavia I consider that I should be responsible for the collection and collation of all intelligence therein. In addition if operations against the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA were ever forced upon us it would be necessary to conduct at least air operationsover Jugoslavia.

3. I recommend therefore that my area of Allied responsibility should include Jugoslavia and I request that you confirm that this area also includes the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA.

5958

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2258

SECRET

(83)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

SECRET

DRAFT CABLE

SECRET

ACTION: CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF REPEATED BRITISH WASHINGTON

This is MEDCOS _____

In view of FAN 631 I request that the boundaries of CHF may be defined.

2057

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

785015

NLC 3-3-5

Chief Commissioner, A.C.
c/o SACS DEC 17 REC'D
1215

P/320 (Final) (Revised)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 31

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, subject: "Italian Navy and Air Force", the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff has prepared the attached final revised paper on the Italian Navy. The Italian Air Force is the subject of P/319 (Final) (Revised) distributed at the same time as this paper.

for D. [illegible] YATES,
Brigadier, GS.,
Chairman

DISTRIBUTION:

1.

1002-12/cc

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

1002-2/EC

EQ56

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Italian Air Force is [illegible]
[illegible] the Italian Air Force as this [illegible]
distribution at this same time as this [illegible]

Sincerely yours,

Friedheim
Chairman

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

P/320 (FINAL) (Revised) TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN NAVY

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Navy pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Navy to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Navy.

ITALIAN NAVY - DIRECTIVE FOR CONTROL

2. The Italian Navy is employed in accordance with the Cunningham-de Courton Agreement and the Appendix to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Paper 515/1 dated 19th March 1944.

3. Under these orders such of the Italian ships as are of use to the Allies are kept running and the others laid up.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that the Admiralty, in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, through the head of the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D.C., will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Action by the executive agency will conform with the policies laid down in this directive or such specific instructions as may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

5. This directive then proceeds to lay down that the Allied Naval Area Commander will have the responsibility for operational control and administration of the Italian Navy.

6. It is to be noted that the area under the command of the Allied Naval Area Commander in the Mediterranean (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) is not co-terminous with the area under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive does not specify that the Italian Navy shall be employed within the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean's command.

5955

PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY

7. The present strength of the Italian Navy is:

5 Battleships
9 Cruisers

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de Coastal Forces, Mediterranean, dated 19th March, 1943, and 515/1 dated 19th March, 1943.

3. Under these orders such of the Italian ships and flotillas are kept running and the others laid up.

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2955

PRESENT STRENGTH OF ITALIAN NAVY

7. The present strength of the Italian Navy is:

5 Battleships
9 Cruisers
1 Aircraft Tender
11 Destroyers
22 Torpedo Boats
19 Corvettes, including 8 being converted for minesweeping
1 Sloop
36 Submarines

.. number of auxiliaries and small surface craft including four groups of minesweepers.

Personnel at present total 52,000.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

(82)

8. In accordance with the terms of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive

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the Italian ships are employed under the operational command of the Allied Naval Area Commander. The two newer battleships "ITALIA" and "VITTORIO VENETO" are laid up in the BITTER Lakes; of the other three, two are at TARANTO and one at SYRACUSE, but these three have reduced complements and only two are capable of steaming. Four of the cruisers and one destroyer are operated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean direct as required for the carriage of Naval drafts or other services. The Italian ships in the Mediterranean except those mentioned above are operated by the Italians under the overall control of the Flag Officer, ITALY and Liaison subject to the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. These ships are used to a large extent in the carriage of ex POW's and displaced persons and are almost entirely operated on duties of direct benefit to the Italians; their use is of assistance to the Allied shipping programme.

9. Italian Naval personnel are being used to replace British personnel in certain duties in Italian ports as the use of the ports permits.

10. In general, the administration of the Italian Navy is under Italian Naval Authorities subject to the overall control of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean which is normally only exercised to the minimum extent necessary.

11. The Italian Navy has operated satisfactorily under the present system of control and has proved of value to the United Nations and to ITALY. The retention of the present control will ensure the continued use of this service to the best advantage.

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS UNTIL CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY

12 Until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty the requirements of the United Nations and of ITALY will necessitate the employment of the Italian Navy on duties similar to those which it now performs. It can be expected, however, that the Allied requirements will decrease to some extent and that certain of the Italian requirements, notably minesweeping, will increase. Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive vessels for which no immediate employment has already been, or can be, found will be laid up as arranged by the Allied Naval Area Commander. Decreases in requirements will permit of ships being laid up and reductions being made in the personnel of the Italian Navy. . . .

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

13. Repair, Maintenance and Supply.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive lays down that as the Mediterranean is an area of British operational responsibility the United Kingdom is primarily responsible, on behalf of the United Nations, for the necessary repair, maintenance and supply of Italian Naval vessels in that area. Maintenance of Italian naval vessels is in all cases subject to the provisos that:

a. Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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a. Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

b. No facilities or stores are used which would prejudice United States or British operational requirements.

A considerable quantity of stores of all kinds has been supplied to the Italian Navy to bring it to an efficient state and to permit of its operation in the interests of the United Nations and of ITALY.

14. Rations.

It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Navy. It is therefore desirable that the responsibility for provision of victuals should be assumed by the Italian Government as soon as possible. This

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It is at present a British commitment to provide the Allied Military element of the ration. The Italian Navy is now a reasonably efficient force and is considered to be a stabilising factor in the country. If the Navy is to remain in an efficient state, it is important that a satisfactory scale of rations should be maintained. It should be noted that on assuming ration responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration. It is important that the Italian Government should maintain the ration scale of the Armed Forces at a satisfactory level. The handling and accounting for supplies for the Italian Navy involve a manpower commitment for the British Army which can no longer be met owing to the British Army's diminishing manpower ceiling. It is also likely that the British Army will shortly have to move out of their area in S. ITALY on which the bulk of the Italian Navy is based. The British Army must, therefore, be relieved of this commitment as soon as possible, which however cannot be assumed by any other Allied Force.

SUMMARY

15. The present system of Allied control of the Italian Navy has functioned satisfactorily. The control now exercised is no more than that required for the proper operation and administration of this service.

CONCLUSIONS

16. a. No change in the present system of control of the Italian Navy is required.

b. That the responsibility for the rations of the Italian Navy must be assumed by the Italian Government as it is essential that CMF be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17 a. No change should be made in the present system of control of the Italian Navy.

b. That the Italian Government assume responsibility for the supply of rations for the Italian Navy at as early a date as possible on a scale equivalent to that provided for the other Italian Armed Forces in order that CMF may be relieved of its present responsibility and that the Allied Commission be instructed to inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the earliest date on which the Italian Government can assume this responsibility.

8854

March 31st

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Manli 31 27

Dear Brown
Feb 1

(82)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chief Commissioner, A.C.
C/o S.A.C.S.

DEC 1945
1215

P/319 (Final) (Revised)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 31

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, subject: "Italian Navy and Air Force", the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff has prepared the attached final revised paper on the Italian Air Force. The Italian Navy is the subject of P/320 (Final) (Revised) distributed at the same time as this paper.

2. A draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached to the paper for approval.

for D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, GS.,
Chairman

1002-2/2c

DISTRIBUTION:

'A'

5253.

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DISTRIBUTION:

'A'

(81)
961

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

P/319 (Final) (Revised) TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

15 December 1945

ITALIAN AIR FORCE

OBJECT

1. To examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Air Force, to make recommendations as to the future policy which should be adopted in respect of the Italian Air Force pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and to examine the desirability or otherwise of returning the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, and to examine the desirability and feasibility of making the Italian Government responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Air Force.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The policy to be adopted towards the Italian Air Force between cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and the announcement of the Peace Terms are contained in AFHQ 091.711/231 S.CO-O of 23 September 1945 addressed to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (distributed to all interested sections). It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force. In regard to the Italian Government's needs after the present Armistice period, S.A.C.M.E.D. in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the size of the Italian Armed Forces must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers, particularly that with JUGOSLAVIA.

c. They must NOT be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interest of the principal Allied powers.

3. It is undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY. When the Allies finally withdraw from ITALY, she will require an efficient and trained Air Force to be able to maintain internal security and to defend her frontiers The successful equipping and training of this Air Force will take a considerable time to accomplish; therefore present examination of the relationship of Allied Forces to the Italian Air Force must consider the organisation of the Italian Air Force of a size not larger than might be

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CURRENT DIRECTIVE

4. At the end of hostilities in EUROPE the Italian Air Force as an operational force ceased to exist. On the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, certain units were, however, kept in employment under Allied control in order to save Allied manpower and equipment. The employment of these units is at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has been the intention that the Italian Air Force (within the authorised ceiling, as it may from time to time be determined), shall be self-supporting in all respects with the following exceptions - tyres, rations and such technical equipment as is necessary for the maintenance of Allied aircraft in their possession. To this

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end an interim policy directive referred to in paragraph 2 was given to the ..O.C. .ir Forces Sub-Commission, .ll .llied aircraft handed over to the Italians, either to assist their participation in the war against GER..NY, or to help them carry out various post-hostility functions for the .llies, are to be considered as a loan.

PR.SENT CEILING OF THE IT.LI.N .IR FORCE

5. The present ceiling of the Italian .ir Force as authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 31,000. The division of this ceiling was originally as under:-

Operational .ir Force	22,000
.mployed by the R.F	2,500
Employed by the US..F	6,500

The extent to which the above figures will be implemented at any given time will be subject to the requirements of the R.F and US..F.

PR.S.NT FUNCTIONS OF THE IT.LI.N .IR FORCE

6. Operational .ir Force. This is employed in the working of a Transport and Courier Service and on .ir Sea Rescue duties. Some of these functions would otherwise have been carried out by the .llied .ir Forces. Use of the Italian .ir Force on these services results in saving of manpower and some equipment to the .llied Forces. Personnel are employed on the staff of the Italian .ir Ministry and other Headquarters, in providing the necessary administrative service, maintenance building and training, (including refresher schools, cadet college, flying control school, R/T school and several Engineering establishments in the LUCCA area. Personnel are also employed on guard duties on aircraft factories, airfields and installations, etc.. The former Bomber Squadrons assist the Italian courier and transport services. Sea Plane Squadrons are now used for .ir Sea Rescue duties and transport. The Fighter Squadrons are virtually grounded, but up to 6 hours flying per pilot per month is authorised to enable flying personnel to be kept in flying practice.

7. Personnel of the Italian .ir Force are employed in substitution of R.F manpower as follows:-

a. To fill existing R.F establishment vacancies where practicable.

b. To give further assistance to R.F Units who by reason of their nature and location require additional guards and/or labour.

8. Personnel of the Italian .ir Force employed by the US..F are being employed on similar lines and circumstances to those employed by the R.F

FUTURE .IMS .ND IT.LI.N REQUIREMENTS FOR IT.LI.N .IR FORCE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

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FUTURE ALLIED AND ITALIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE

9. Short-term policy

a. So long as the Allies remain in ITALY the direct requirements of the Italian Government for an Air Force are limited to air assistance to the Land Forces in the maintenance of internal security and air support for the Army in the guarding of such frontiers as are not already guaranteed by the Allies. Since the only frontiers not so guarded are with SWITZERLAND and FRANCE it is not considered that this latter requirement is a very formidable one. However, to permit of these requirements being properly satisfied, it will be necessary to modify in favour of the Italian Air Force certain of the regulations regarding its organization and training.

b. There is an indirect requirement for the creation of a foundation on which any Italian Air Force that may be allowed by the Peace Treaty can be based. To satisfy this requirement it is necessary

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that the re-organisation of the Italian Air Force should proceed apace.

c. It is envisaged that we shall continue to make use of the Air Courier Service and that we shall possibly extend it to take over some of the internal Allied Air Transport Services in ITALY. Such Italian courier services would not be allowed to operate in the vicinity of the disputed territories, nor to demilitarised zones except with the authority of AFHQ. The Italian Air Force will continue to take over responsibility for Air Sea Rescue operations around the shores of ITALY (SARDINIA and SICILY) with the intention that it will ultimately be the sole organisation undertaking this international task in this area. It is anticipated that there may be further substitution of Italian Air Force personnel for R.F and USAF personnel ~~in all possible trades. This would assist us to fill larger gaps created in our own organisation occasioned by accelerated release.~~ Continued employment of the Italian Air Force administrative machinery is envisaged, with the aim of creating as soon as possible, an operational and administrative Italian Air Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained may be used by the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against air attack emanating from areas outside her frontiers.

10. Long-term policy

a. The strength of the Italian Air Force must depend on a compromise between two opposing factors :

(i) ITALY must not be in a position to threaten sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.

(ii) ITALY should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.

b. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be ~~a~~ purely defensive force. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the immediate post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. SACMED in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the

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Force that will be self-supporting. It is possible that Italian
Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained may be used by
the Allies for the protection of certain parts of ITALY against
air attack emanating from areas outside her frontiers.

10. Long-term policy

a. The strength of the Italian Air Force must depend on a compromise between two opposing factors :

(i) ITALY must not be in a position to threaten sea communications through the Mediterranean or to become aggressive again.

(ii) ITALY should be strong enough to deter aggression on herself.

b. It is considered that the post-war Italian Air Force should be organised on purely defensive lines. This should serve as a damper to any possible recrudescence of Italian territorial ambitions and will also act as a palliative to her neighbours. During the immediate post-war period, which has been estimated at about 5 years, the Italian Air Force should be restricted to a force only sufficiently large to provide air defence to vital areas, to assist its Army in the maintenance of internal security, and in addition to help the Allies to safeguard her frontiers. It can also be used, as now, in substitution for certain Allied Air Forces and personnel. Beyond the Combined Chiefs of Staff's ceiling of 31,000 - laid down as an interim measure - there is no policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force. It is therefore necessary, when considering the best use that can be made of the Italian Air Force, to avoid the possibility of creating an organisation which would be larger than that which might be allowed by the Peace Treaty. S.C.C.C.D in his comments on the draft Peace Treaty prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the ceiling figure of the Italian Air Force should be a maximum of 12,000, but this was an arbitrary figure as no examination had been made of the establishments necessary to support the first line Squadrons to be permitted. However, since ITALY is to be allowed a post-war Army it is clear that she must be allowed an Air Force commensurate with the former. The size of the post-war Italian Air Force must depend partially on the economic ability of ITALY to maintain fighting forces. There will also be a requirement for Air Sea Rescue and Coastal reconnaissance aircraft in view of ITALY's lengthy sea coasts. These duties can be combined in General Reconnaissance Squadrons. Assuming that Italian civil aviation is permitted there will also be a requirement for Air Force Transport Squadrons to enable Air Forces and Italian Army Forces

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to be moved rapidly. The Italian Air Force should not contain aircraft that are a serious menace to the sea lines through the Mediterranean. The size of this force is discussed in detail at Appendix "A".

11. Air Transport.

In order to assist in the rehabilitation of ITALY all forms of internal transport are needed and at the present time the Italian Air Force is running a courier service with its bomber transport and sea plane squadrons. These squadrons are in effect fulfilling tasks that would normally be done by civil aviation. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganised into an efficient operational service it should be relieved of this duty and the transport squadrons should be trained and used in their proper Air Force role which would be transportation of troops, stores and equipment. In order to relieve the Italian Air Force of its current air transport commitments it would be necessary to restart Italian Civil Aviation. This could be done by transferring transport aircraft and aircrews to civil aviation. In the present state of ITALY civil aviation should be governed so that the Air Forces Sub-Commission may keep it under observation and see that it is not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which it is desired to operate. This organisation of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of SAC.

A. LIST OF ITEMS OF MILITARY NATURE INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

12. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

2. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retain complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by regulating the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force envisaged is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of spare aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, signals and other equipment, etc..

aircraft for operational

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commitments it would be necessary to restart Italian civil aviation. This could be done by transferring transport aircraft and aircrews to civil aviation. In the present state of ITALY civil aviation should be government controlled so that the Air Force Sub-Commission may keep it under observation and see that it is not used as a reserve to the Italian Air Force. When Italian Civil Aviation is running efficiently permission could be granted for external air lines negotiated through diplomatic channels with the countries to which it is desired to operate. This organisation of the Italian Air Force and creation of a civil aviation organisation will not in any way permit gliding. Private flying will only be permitted with the authority of AFHQ. A.C.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

12. Aircraft and ancillary equipment.

a. It is considered that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be bought from either the United States or Great Britain. This should ensure that the Allies retain complete control over the operational strength of the Italian Air Force, since if desired it would be possible either to increase or to restrain its operations by regulating the supply of aircraft and spare parts. Further the strength of the Italian Air Force envisaged is not large enough to make it economical to run aircraft factories for the provision of combat aircraft. It is considered that non-combat aircraft such as elementary training and transport aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. Consideration must be given to the purchase of reserve aircraft, spare parts, technical stores, signals and radar equipment, etc..

b. It is considered that immediate reserve aircraft for operational squadrons should amount to 20% of the first line strength when these squadrons are equipped with modern aircraft. Until obsolete and obsolescent Italian aircraft are replaced immediate reserves may be allowed to remain at 40% of the first line strength.

c. No modern fighter force can be of any practical value unless the necessary signals and certain radar organisation are provided. It is unlikely that Italian armament industry can provide sufficient radar and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain. There will be a need for the Air Sea Rescue squadrons to be provided with certain modern Anglo-American wireless equipment if they are to perform their Air Sea Rescue duties efficiently in combination with other Nations operating Air Sea Rescue in the Mediterranean.

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13. Clothing and other requirements.

Provision of clothing, MT tyres and other day to day requirements should be the responsibility of the Italian Government.

14. Rations.

a. The provision of the military element of the rations for the Italian Air Force is at present a CMF and MTOUSA responsibility. The present strength of the Italian Air Force is approximately as follows :-

Type of Personnel	Strength	Nation responsible for military element of ration.
Iti/Iti	25,300	British
Br/Iti	4,000	British
US/Iti	2,800	US

The increase of numbers above the authorised ceiling of 31,000 is caused by the Italian Air Force cooperator companies being added to the strength of the Italian Air Force during the period of their disbandment which is currently taking place (FAN 621 refers).

b. It is a requirement under the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that Italian resources are used to the maximum possible extent in the supply of the Italian Air Force. The Italian Government will shortly assume responsibility for the provision of the whole ration for Iti/Iti Army personnel. The handling and accounting for supplies for Italian Air Force personnel involves a manpower commitment for the British and US Armies which it will become increasingly more difficult to meet, particularly in respect of the larger British commitment, owing to diminishing manpower ceilings. From an Army point of view, it is therefore essential that they are relieved of this commitment at the earliest possible date.

c. Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working with RAF and USAAF units scattered throughout ITALY. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not considered possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations. The practicability of substituting Italian civilians or possibly German PW should be considered.

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d. It should be noted that on assuming ration responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration. It is important that, if the Italian Air Force is to be organized into an efficient force, the Italian Government

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c. Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel are being used in lieu of British and US manpower and are working with R.A.F and US.A.F units scattered throughout IT.A.Y. So long as such personnel are employed in British and US units in substitution for British and US manpower it is not considered possible or reasonable for the Italian Government to assume responsibility for provision of their rations. The practicability of substituting Italian civilians or possibly German P/W should be considered.

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d. It should be noted that on assuming ration responsibility, the Italian Government would in all probability lower the ration scale. The effect of this on efficiency and morale must be taken into consideration. It is important that, if the Italian Air Force is to be organized into an efficient force, the Italian Government should maintain the ration scale at a satisfactory level.

5. Capability of Italian economy.

For some time to come, in order to maintain the Italian Air Force in equipment, it would be necessary, as in the case of the Italian Army, to augment, from Allied stocks, the material and supplies which could be provided from indigenous sources. The Italian civil aircraft industry, subject to receiving raw material, should be fully capable of maintaining any civil aviation organisation permitted, provided that the Italian Government considered it economical to do so.

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FUTURE OF AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

16. The Air Forces Sub-Commission is the vehicle set up under Article 37 of the Armistice Terms with ITALY as the Allied Organisation to regulate and execute the terms thereof for the control of the Italian Air Force. It is considered that it should remain in its present form until a Peace Treaty is concluded, as the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be required to act as adviser to the Chief Commissioner on Italian Air matters, as long as the Allied Commission remains in being. In the event of the Italian Air Force being reorganised and eventually handed over to the control of the Italian Government it should undertake parallel duties to the Military Mission of the Italian Army and that part of it which performs mission duties should be known as the Air Mission to the Italian Air Force (AMIAF).

CONCLUSIONS

17. a. That it is desirable that the Italian Air Force should be reorganised to such a size and state of efficiency that it will be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces infrustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organisation and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control.

e. Italian Civil Aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.

f. That the responsibility for the rations of all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel must be assumed by the Italian government as it is essential that C.A.F. be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible.

g. That solely from the aspect of rationing, RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should release Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel and they should be replaced by Italian civilians or possibly by German

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be able to maintain internal security and to take its place with the other Italian Armed Forces infrustrating any attacks from across her borders.

b. That the Order of Battle of this Air Force should not be greater than that which would be allowed at the Peace Treaty.

c. That consideration should be given to the fact that it would be undesirable to give the Italians more or better treatment from the point of view of supplying equipment than is provided for members of the United Nations such as GREECE, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and NORWAY.

d. That until such time as the command, organisation and training of the Italian Air Force are of a sufficiently high standard, it is undesirable that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control.

e. Italian Civil Aviation should be permitted with a view to relieving the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments, and thus freeing it to concentrate on its operational training and functions.

f. That the responsibility for the rations of all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel must be assumed by the Italian government as it is essential that C.C.F. be relieved of this responsibility as soon as possible.

g. That solely from the aspect of rationing, RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should release Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel and they should be replaced by Italian civilians or possibly by German P/W so that C.C.F and AFTOUSA can be relieved of their responsibility for the supply of rations to Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. a. That the Italian Air Force should not be returned to Italian Government control at this time, but that the reorganisation and training of the Italian Air Force should begin forthwith to the Order of Battle and organisation outlined at Appendix "A" in order to form a basis for a well organised and efficient Air Force that can be used for defence in cooperation with the other services; that, when a sufficiently high standard of organisation and training has been reached the Italian Air Force should be handed back to Italian Government control.

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b. That the Italian Government be permitted to start internal civil aviation and that the necessary aircraft, aircrew and maintenance personnel should be discharged from the Italian Air Force to form the civil aviation organisation.

c. That the Italian Government assume responsibility for the supply of rations for all personnel of the Italian Air Force except Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel at as early a date as possible on a scale equivalent to that provided for the Italian Armed Forces in order that C.A.F. may be relieved of its present responsibility and that the Allied Commission be instructed to inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the earliest date on which the Italian Government can assume this responsibility. Only those Italian Air Force personnel who are serving as an integral part of RAF and USAAF units should be regarded as Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

d. That RAF ITALY and USAAF ITALY should examine the feasibility of replacing Br/Iti and US/Iti Air Force personnel by Italian civilians or possibly German PW at the earliest possible date in order that C.A.F. and AFTOUSA can be relieved of their responsibility for providing rations for Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

e. That the Air Forces Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the peace treaty and assume corresponding responsibilities to those of AMLA.

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replacing Br/Iti and US/Iti [illegible] at the earliest possible date in order that or possibly German F; CLF and TOTOA can be relieved of their responsibility for providing rations for Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel.

e. That the Air Forces Sub-Commission should remain in its present form till the peace treaty and assume corresponding responsibilities to those of M.I.A.

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P/319 (Final) (Revised)

APPENDIX 'A'
TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

10 December 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE - ORGANIZATION AND CEILING

1. Type of Sqdn	Aircraft	No. of Sqdns.	I.E. per Sqdn.
Fighter/Bomber	P-38	5	16
Tac/R.	Spitfire	1	16
ASR & GR.	Flying Boat	2	18
Transport Sqdns	Civil Type	2	16
Training School	Elementary & Service Types	1	30
Communication	Obsolescent Service & Civil Types	1	16

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organised into an interceptor fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the USAAF should sell a number of P-38 and F-5 aircraft to the Italian Government. The F-5 is a photographic version of the P-38 and by changing the nose can be converted to P-38 which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons likewise will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a sever menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

3. Tac/R. The Tac/R squadron for administrative purposes can form part of the Fighter/Bomber Wing but different training is necessary and it should be operated by whatever Air Headquarters would work in parallel with the Italian Army. It should be equipped with single seater aircraft of the Spitfire or Mustang type and it should be noted that one squadron of the Italian Air Force is already equipped with Spitfire V. This squadron would need to be mobile. It will need photographic and adequate R/T equipment if it is to operate satisfactorily.

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4. Air Sea Rescue and G.R. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats or seaplanes so that in performance of their Air Sea Rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One Squadron should be based to cover the West Coast of ITALY and one the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and capable of working in [illegible] with the RAF operating from MALTA and the French Air Force from

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Transport Sqdns	Civil Type	2	30
Training School	Elementary & Service Types	1	30
Communication	Obsolescent Service & Civil Types	1	16

2. Fighter/Bomber Squadrons. The 5 Fighter/Bomber squadrons should be organised into an interceptor fighter sector of 3 squadrons and a wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber squadrons for use in Tactical Support. A suggestion is currently under consideration that the USAAF should sell a number of P-38 and F-5 aircraft to the Italian Government. The F-5 is a photographic version of the P-38 and by changing the nose can be converted to P-38 which can be used as an interceptor and tactical support Fighter/Bomber. The interceptor fighters will need radar, early warning and adequate wireless equipment if they are to be of any value at all. The Fighter/Bomber squadrons likewise will need mobile radar and wireless equipment if they are to operate effectively in support of the Army. It is not considered that these squadrons should be trained in the use of rockets since rocket firing fighters provide a sever menace to shipping particularly in the closed waters of the Mediterranean.

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4. Air Sea Rescue and G.R. Squadrons, should be equipped with flying boats or seaplanes so that in performance of their Air Sea Rescue duties they can land on the sea and pick up survivors. One Squadron should be based to cover the West Coast of ITALY and one the East Coast. They will need to be adequately equipped with radio aids to navigation and capable of working in conjunction with the AAF operating from MALTA and the French Air Force from the South Coast of FRANCE.

5. Transport Squadrons. These should be equipped with a normal civil type of aircraft and their normal use should be to provide mobility for the Italian Air Force and to lift Italian Army Forces where necessary. Until such time as civil aviation is working in ITALY they should have an establishment of 30 aircraft per squadron. When, however, Italian civil aviation begins they should be reduced to an initial equipment of 16 aircraft per squadron and the balance of aircrews and aircraft could be transferred to Italian civil aviation and completely discharged, without any reserve obligation, to civil life.

6. Flying Training. There will be a need for a flying training school for the Italian Air Force as there must be a continuous small new intake. This training school should consist of 2 branches, elementary and service training

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and it will require approximately 15 elementary training aircraft and 15 service type aircraft. Operational training should take place in the squadrons.

7. Italian Air Ministry. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and employs a relatively large number of Italian Air Force personnel, a rather higher proportion than is normal in British Service Ministries, in view of the fact that the Italian Air Ministry use officers in many cases where British Service Ministries would use civil servants.

8. Subordinate Headquarters. At present the Italian Air Headquarters are organised on a territorial basis. It is ~~not~~ may not considered that the size of the Italian Air Force envisaged will justify 4 Territorial Headquarters, but until are matters left over from the late war liquidated these Headquarters will have to remain. It is suggested that the Italian Air Force should be controlled by the Air Ministry direct through:

(a) An interceptor fighter sector with 3 squadrons.

(b) A Fighter/Bomber Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R Squadron.

(c) A Transport Wing of 2 squadrons.

(d) A G.R/A.S.R. Wing of 2 squadrons.

(e) A Training Wing responsible for flying and technical training.

(f) A Maintenance Wing.

The above Wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

9. Ceiling. The current ceiling of the Italian Air Force is 31,000 which is approximately the strength of the Italian Air Force that came over to the Allies when ITALY surrendered. Should the above suggested Order of Battle be accepted it will be necessary to work out the establishment required to operate an Air Force of such nature and this should form the ceiling of the Italian Air Force to be handed over to the Italian Government at or before the Peace Treaty. Any expansion permitted by the Peace Treaty must lead to an increase of establishment. The Italian Air Force is at the moment performing certain functions for the Allies in that they are providing guards and labour for both the USAAF and RAF and are establishing small detachments at various airfields which might be required by Allied aircraft for emergency use. When the Allies leave ITALY this requirement will no longer exist but the permitted ceiling pending the Peace Treaty must depend on these requirements and the establishment for any Italian Air Force permitted and until these establishments are worked out it is impossible to make an arbitrary

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(b) A Fighter/Bomber Wing of 2 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons and 1 Tac/R Squadron.

(c) A Transport Wing of 2 squadrons.

(d) A G.A/A.S.A. Wing of 2 squadrons.

(e) A Training Wing responsible for flying and technical training.

(f) A Maintenance Wing.

The above Wings and sector are capable of expansion to meet any increase permitted by the Peace Treaty.

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TOP SECRET

D R A F T C A B L E

ACTION: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO CABINET OFFICES
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

This is NAF_____

1. I have been examining whether it is desirable or feasible to return the Italian Air Force to Italian Government control, as has been done in the case of the Italian army.

2. The Armistice Terms grounded the Italian Air Force, but this policy has been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force, which is now employed in the working of courier services and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Certain personnel are employed within NAF and JBAAF units and on guard duties on Allied air fields and installations.

3. Immediate Operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are not under Allied control. Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of Italy against air attack.

4. As a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be organized for defensive ~~force~~, and that it should be large enough to provide air defense to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

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5. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized forthwith into the following flying units:

5 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons, Light Bomber Squadron
1 Tac/R Squadron
2 Air Sea Rescue & Ground Reconnaissance Squadrons

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has been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air [illegible] now employed in the working of courier services and on Air Sea Rescue duties. Certain personnel are employed within RAF and USAAF units and on guard duties on Allied air fields and installations.

3. Immediate Operational requirements for the Italian Air Force are limited to air assistance to the land forces in the maintenance of internal security and guarding such frontiers as are not under Allied control. Italian Air Force Fighter Squadrons if adequately trained might be used by the Allies to protect certain parts of Italy against air attack.

4. As a long term policy, I consider that the post war Italian Air Force should be ~~organized~~ Organized as a defensive force, and that it should be large enough to provide air defense to vital areas and to give air support to the other services. The capabilities of Italian economy will limit its size.

5. I recommend that the Italian Air Force should be reorganized forthwith into the following flying units:

~~5~~ Fighter/Bomber Squadrons + Light Bomber Squadron
~~1~~ Tac/R Squadron
2 Air Sea Rescue & ~~Ground~~ General Reconnaissance Squadrons
2 Transport Squadrons (Flying Tedders)
1 Training School
1 Communication Squadron

This will form a basis on which the expansion of the Italian Air Force to meet the commitments described in paragraph 4 above can take place if permitted by the Peace Treaty.

6. An Italian Air Ministry already exists and it is proposed that the Italian Air Force should be ~~controlled~~ operated by the Air Ministry under my direction ~~direct~~ through functional sub-commands, ~~under my overall direction~~.

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7. The ceiling of the Italian Air Force must depend on the require-
ments for and strength of units necessary to command, administer and maintain
the flying units described above, and Anglo - U.S. Air Force requirements.

8. If the Italian Air Force is to be reorganized into an efficient
operational service it should be relieved of its present commitment in running
courier services to meet largely civil government commitments. I therefore
recommend that Italian civil aviation, including limited private flying, should be permitted to the extent
necessary to relieve the Italian Air Force of air-line commitments and that
it should be controlled by the Italian Government, under the supervision of
Sub Commission, so that the Air Forces keep it under observation.
permitted until Italian civil aircraft safety and operation have reached
international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

9. With regard to the supply of aircraft, spare parts and equipment,
I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture
and should be procured from either the United States or Great Britain so that
the Allies retain full control over the first line strength of the Italian
Air Force. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option
for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or
Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a
civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that
the Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and signal
equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the
United States or Great Britain.

10. I do not consider that the Italian Air Force should be returned to
a sufficiently high standard of organiza-

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it should be ~~controlled~~ regulated by the Italian Government, so that the Air Forces Sub Commission, may keep it under observation. External air-lines will not be permitted until Italian civil aircraft safety and operation have reached international standards and then can be negotiated through diplomatic channels.

9. With regard to the supply of aircraft, spare parts and equipment, I consider that combat aircraft should be of Allied design and manufacture and should be procured from either the United States or Great Britain so that the Allies retain full control over the first line strength of the Italian Air Forces. Non-combat aircraft can be of Italian manufacture with the option for the Italian Government to buy such aircraft from the United States or Great Britain should they feel that it would be uneconomical to maintain a civil aviation industry for such a small requirement. It is unlikely that the Italian armament industry can provide efficient radar and signal equipment and the Italians should be encouraged to procure this from the United States or Great Britain.

10. I do not consider that the Italian Air Force should be returned to Italian Government control until a sufficiently high standard of organisation and training has been reached in the use of certain modern equipment, radar, etc. I therefore request your authority to proceed with the reorganization of the Italian Air Force as described above, and to permit the Italian Government to start internal civil air lines.

Pietro Badoglio

RECEIVED DEC 15 1945 JACS AFHQ 1/4900

transmitted CM-IN-11103 2 Dec. 45

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SECRET

SACMED'S POLITICAL CONFERENCE
11 December 1945

Papers Re

FUTURE OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

1. TAM 719 - Draft Directive to AC.
2. AFHQ draft MAT and AC draft for MAT.
3. Draft Part II to MAT.
4. Minutes of Meeting at AC 6 Dec. 45 to discuss TAM 719 and AFHQ draft.

all will be found in file 102/cc

102-2/CC

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

MEDITERRANEAN JOINT PLANNING STAFF.

MJPS/66.

23rd November, 1945.

TO: S.C.P., C-in-C Med.
Chief Air Plans, Air HQ ITALY,
Log Plans
G-5.

1. The following terms of reference have been received by the MJPS from the Chief of Staff:-

1. The Joint Planning Staff are directed to examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force and to make recommendations, as to the future policy which would be adopted in respect of these services, pending conclusion of the peace treaty.

2. Your examination and recommendations should in particular cover the desirability or otherwise of returning these Italian armed forces to Italian Government control, as is being doen with the Italian Army.

3. Your study should also deal with the question of administrative responsibility for the Italian Navy and Air Force, on which subject you have already received separate terms of reference.

2. Your attention is invited to MJPS Paper 306 (Final) and NAF 1051, which led up to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the hand-back of the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

3. It is suggested that the first draft of the present study should be prepared on the lines of J/306 (Final) under the following headings:-

a. Object.

b. General Considerations.

c. Italian Navy - Current Directive, strength, functions.

d. Italian Air Force - Current Directives, strength, functions.

e. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Navy.

f. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Air Force.

g. Italian Government Naval and Air Force needs - present and post war.

h. Future of Naval and Air Sub-Commission.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chief of Staff:-

1. The Joint Planning Staff are directed to examine the future Allied requirements for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force and to make recommendations, as to the future policy which would be adopted in respect of these services, pending conclusion of the peace treaty.

2. Your examination and recommendations should in particular cover the desirability or otherwise of returning these Italian armed forces to Italian Government control, as is being doen with the Italian Army.

3. Your study should also deal with the question of administrative responsibility for the Italian Navy and Air Force, on which subject you have already received separate terms of reference.

2. Your attention is invited to MIPS Paper 306 (Final) and MAF 1051, which led up to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the hand-back of the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

3. It is suggested that the first draft of the present study should be prepared on the lines of P/306 (Final) under the following headings:-

a. Object.

b. General Considerations.

c. Italian Navy - Current Directive, strength, functions.

d. Italian Air Force - Current Directives, strength, functions.

e. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Navy.

f. Future Allied Requirements for Italian Air Force.

g. Italian Government Naval and Air Force needs - present and post war.

h. Future of Naval and Air Sub-Commission.

i. Administrative considerations including supplies and equipment.

4. It is requested that addressees prepare paragraphs under these headings and any other headings considered necessary as follows, for consolidation by G-3 AFHQ in a first draft:-

C-in-C Med - headings under para 3c, 3e, 3g, 3h, and 3i above.
Air HQ ITALY - headings under para 3d, 3f, 3g, 3h and 3i above.
G-5 - headings under para 3g and 3h above. Suggested paragraph for 3i has already been received.
Log Plans - heading under para 3i above.

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5. A first draft will be prepared by this Section in two parts, one dealing with the Italian Navy and one with the Italian Air Force. It would, therefore, assist this Section if G-5 and Log Plans prepared separate papers for the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force.

6. Reference para 3 of the terms of reference, this paper will also incorporate the terms of reference received on 16 November, copy to all, on the subject of the rationing of the Italian Navy and Air Force.

7. It is requested that addressees forward their paragraphs to this Section by Wednesday November 26th.

Sgd ????????????
for D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.B.,
AC of S, G-3.

HTHS/tap

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Sgd ??????????????
for D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, G.B.,
AC of S, G-3.

HTHS/tap

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ALCOM

P/313 (Final)

RESTRICTED 33

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

29 November 1945

LOCATION OF AFHQ

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff the M.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier,GS.,
Chairman.

1002-2 /cc

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

29 November 1945

LOCATION OF AFHQ

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff the M.J.P.S. has prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, GS.,
Chairman.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

P/318 (Final)

RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

29 November 1944

LOCATION OF AFHQ

OBJECT

1. To examine the desirability of moving AFHQ and its associated headquarters from CASERTA to a location other than one in the vicinity of ROME.

Factors Governing Desirability of Move.

2. Our arguments in favour of moving AFHQ to ROME were largely based on the necessity for maintaining close touch with the Italian Government and associated Headquarters and Institutions. There is no practicable site nearer ROME than CASERTA and as it is not possible to move to the ROME area, a move elsewhere would only be desirable in order to improve accommodation and welfare amenities.

3. Owing to the difficulty of installing Signals communications and preparing accommodation a move of AFHQ would not be possible before 1 February at the earliest. Shortage of manpower will preclude the simultaneous preparation of accommodation in a new area and the necessary improvements to accommodation at CASERTA. If it were decided to move AFHQ, therefore, personnel would have to remain in unsuitable quarters throughout the worst of the winter months. On the other hand, if it is decided to remain in CASERTA, an all-out effort can be made forthwith to improve living conditions. We should begin to reap the benefit of this work before Xmas and not have to wait until March in a new site.

Naval Considerations.

4. If AFHQ were to move from the NAPLES area to any place other than ROME, it would not be practicable to provide Naval representation by more than a small liaison party and that only if the Admiralty agreed to provide the necessary [illegible] personnel.

Air Force Considerations.

5. It is not possible to move the Air Transport terminals from NAPLES, as to do so would disrupt entirely the whole of Transport [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

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Naval Considerations.

4. If AFHQ were to move from the NAPLES area to any place other than ROME, it would not be practicable to provide Naval representation by more than a small liaison party and that only if the Admiralty agreed to provide the necessary personnel.

Air Force Considerations.

5. It is not possible to move the Air Transport terminals from NAPLES, as to do so would disrupt entirely the whole of Transport Command's network and schedules covering the whole of Europe and North Africa. In order to obviate the necessity for travel within ITALY as a preliminary to journeys to N. AFRICA, GREECE, and ENGLAND it is desirable that AFHQ remain in the NAPLES area.

Conclusion.

6. It is not desirable to move AFHQ to any location other than one in the vicinity of ROME.

Recommendation.

7. That AFHQ remain in its present location.

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

NOV 28 RECD

B-1147

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (45) 9th Meeting (Addendum)
26th November 1945

COPY NO 7

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

ADDENDUM

Recipients of the Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference held on 22nd November 1945, are requested to amend their copies as follows :-

Item 3. 4th line of Brigadier General HAMBLEN's statement - delete the word "not",

Item 10. After "LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY said that he was entirely in agreement with the Chief of Staff's suggestion" insert -

"MR. BYINGTON confirmed that the State Department did not wish the present operations to cease while there remained indications of further bodies in the pit, as it was not known what evidence further investigation might produce".

1002-2/cc

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Recipients of the Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference held on 22nd November 1945, are requested to amend their copies as follows :-

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"MR. BYINGTON confirmed that the State Department did not wish the present operations to cease while there remained indications of further bodies in the pit, as it was not known what evidence further investigation might produce".

1002-2/CC

J.G. SKELTON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SECRET

SAC (45) 24
19th November 1945

COPY NO 28

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

Note by Secretary

1. The attached draft Directive to Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army, has been prepared as a result of consultations by interested Staff Sections of AFHQ.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the Directive for issue.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

Note by Secretary

1. The attached draft Directive to Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army, has been prepared as a result of consultations by interested Staff Sections of AFHQ.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the Directive for issue.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

1002-2/22

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

DRAFT

FILE G-3 AFHQ/126

SECRET

SUBJECT: Directive to the Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army.

TO : Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (MMIA).

INTRODUCTION

1. It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army, ~~of such a size as can reasonably be maintained as a charge against the Italian Government~~ shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is to maintain the authority of the Italian Government, to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order and to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY. With this end in view, an Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMIA) will be maintained. ~~In order to economize in manpower,~~ the functions of this Military Mission will be exercised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, acting in a dual capacity.

2. This directive deals solely with your functions as Commander MMIA, which will be confined to matters in connection with the formation, organization, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. In other respects, including any alterations to the approved ceiling, you will function as Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. This Headquarters letter AG 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 October 1944 refers, and

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

INTRODUCTION

1. It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army, ~~of such a size as can reasonably be maintained as a charge against the Italian Government~~ shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is to maintain the authority of the Italian Government, to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order and to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY. With this end in view, an Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMIA) will be maintained. In order to economize in manpower, the functions of this Military Mission will be exercised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, acting in a dual capacity.

2. This directive deals solely with your functions as Commander MMIA, which will be confined to matters in connection with the formation, organization, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. In other respects, including any alterations to the approved ceiling, you will function as Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. This Headquarters letter AG 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 October 1944 refers, and this directive is intended only to amplify the provisions regarding MMIA in the light of the reorganization of the Italian Army as set out in this Headquarters letter AG 091.711 GSD-O of 2 November 1945.

3. The term "Italian Army" includes the Carabinieri, except where the operational functions and instructions in purely civil police duties of the Carabinieri are concerned. Such matters are the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

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OBJECTS

4. The objects of your Mission will be:

a. To advise and assist the Italian Ministry of War and subordinate Italian Headquarters in the formation, organization, training, and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. Your responsibilities in these respects will be limited to advice and assistance only: all necessary executive work must remain the responsibility of Italian authorities concerned. The Italian Government normally will be expected to accept your advice. If it should feel unable to do so you will refer the matter to AFHQ.

b. To advise AFHQ on such Italian Army matters as come within the scope of Subpara a above, and, should the occasion arise, on the employment of any Italian units or formations under Allied Command.

COMMAND

5. As far as the terms of this directive are concerned you will be directly subordinate as MMIA to AFHQ. In all other respects, as Land Forces Sub-Commission of Allied Commission, you will be directly subordinate to the Allied Commission.

ORGANIZATION OF MMIA

6. To enable you to carry out the objects of your Mission you will be provided with a suitable staff of British and U.S. officers, other ranks and enlisted men. These will be organized into:

a. Military Mission to the Italian Army (also functioning as Land Forces Sub-Commission.)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

advice. If it should feel unable to do so you will refer the matter to AFHQ.

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a. Military Mission to the Italian Army (also functioning as Land Forces Sub-Commission.)

b. British liaison units for attachment to Italian Army formations and training establishments.

7. At the present time no termination can be forseen to the period during which the services of your Mission ~~[will be required by the Italian Government.]~~ You will, however, keep constantly under review the numbers of British and U.S. officers, other ranks and enlisted men required to carry out your objects efficiently and make such recommendations for progressive decrease as may be possible.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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8. British Liaison units are placed under your command and you are authorized to exercise the disciplinary, financial and administrative powers of a General Officer Commanding a District in respect of the personnel and stores of these units. For this purpose the Military Mission to the Italian Army will be your Headquarters. Who administers US affairs. See 4f

9. You will make it clear to all personnel under your command that they are to take no part in Italian political activities of any kind. Lack of impartiality may gravely impair Allied-Italian understanding, and will, in any case, render the individual or individuals concerned incapable of carrying out properly the duties entrusted to them.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

10. As far as possible the Italian Army will be organized, equipped, commanded and administered on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army. This policy is subject to such modification as may be dictated by:

a. Nature of the tasks which the Italian Army are intended to carry out.

b. Nature and amount of the equipment which the British and U.S. Governments have undertaken to provide.

c. National characteristics of the Italian Military system.

With reference to "c." above, it is not the intention to interfere with or modify the Italian system in regard to honors and awards and the "etat civil" of military personnel except in-so-far as it is necessary to 5027 bring them in line with other changes in the organization. It may, however, be necessary to advise the Italian Government to modify the present system

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

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With reference to "c." above, it is not the intention to interfere with or modify the Italian system in regard to honors and awards and the "etat civil" of military personnel except in-so-far as it is necessary to bring them in line with other changes in the organization. It may, however, be necessary to advise the Italian Government to modify the present system of promotion, selection of officers, pay and allowances, financial responsibility, discipline and military law, so that these shall not hamper the efficient reorganization of the Italian Army.

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11. The ceiling of the Italian Army will be decided from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the advice of AFHQ based on the recommendations of the Allied Commission. The detailed order of battle of the Italian Army within this ceiling will be decided from time to time by AFHQ based on your recommendations.

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SECRET

TRAINING

12. The training ~~policy for~~ the Italian Army ~~will be laid down by~~ the Italian Ministry of War, but will be carried out under your advice and supervision. You should ensure that it conforms generally with British training policy and that British methods and standards are adopted as far as is practicable. The principal British staff officer for training at AFHQ will keep you informed of current British training policy and methods.

ADMINISTRATION

13. The approved policy regarding the administration, including maintenance and supply, of the Italian Army, is shown in this Headquarters letter AG 091.711 GSD-O of 2 November 1945, paragraphs 10 to 13 inclusive. Any alteration to these arrangements will be notified to you from time to time.

14. You will be responsible for screening the demands of the Italian Ministry of War for such equipment and supplies as continue to be found from Allied Military sources. You also will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

15. You will ensure that copies of all establishments and equipment tables drawn up by the Italian Ministry of War on your advice, are forwarded to AFHQ for information, and you will assist the Italian Ministry of War to introduce into the Italian Army a system of unit accounting and individual responsibility for stores, similar to that in the British Army.

16. You will be advised of the financial arrangements under which the provision of any equipment or supplies is undertaken by the British and U.S. Governments.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

(17)

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Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
c/o SACS

TOP SECRET

F/317 (Final)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 8

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

11 November 1945

TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff, the MJPS have prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

1002-2/CC

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D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

1002-2/CC

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G/317 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

11 November 1945

TRANSFER OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE FROM TRIESTE TO VENICE

OBJECT

1. To examine the desirability of closing the port of TRIESTE for military maintenance with effect from 1 January 1946.

INTRODUCTION

2. Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA is governed by the agreement signed at BELGRADE on 9 June 1945 and the MORGAN-JOVANOVIC agreement signed at DUINO on 20 June 1945. In persuading the Jugoslavs to accept these agreements it was made clear to them that full control of the port of TRIESTE and of the L of C from there into AUSTRIA was essential to the Supreme Allied Commander, in order to enable him to maintain the forces with which he had been directed to occupy AUSTRIA. The underlying reason, however, for Allied insistense on retaining TRIESTE and a portion of VENEZIA GIULIA was a matter of political principle, i.e. the U.S. and UK were determined to discourage the use of force by nations wishing to acquire territory.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3. The agreements governing the Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA did not stipulate any reason for their necessity or the duration for which they would remain in force. Both agreements, however, included a statement that they in no way prejudice the ultimate disposal of any part of VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. The cessation of military maintenance through the port of TRIESTE would rob the MORGAN LINE of its raison d'etre, although the question of political principle is unaltered. This would certainly give the Jugoslavs an opportunity to indulge in further anti-Allied propoganda and they would probably produce a case for modification or even abrogation of the agreements governing Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. It is important however that the status quo in VENEZIA GIULIA should be maintained until a final settlement is reached at the Peace Treaty. Any appreciable reduction of Allied activities in TRIESTE would tend to convey an impression of weakening Allied intentions and would have inevitable repercussions on the unemployment problem in TRIESTE, giving further cause for internal unrest and disorder. An adverse psychological effect on the Italian population in VENEZIA GIULIA in particular and in ITALY in general would also have to be expected.

R024

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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5. From the political point of view therefore it is considered that the cessation of military maintenance through the port of TRIESTE would be most undesirable.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6. In the event of Jugoslav aggression in VENEZIA GIULIA it has been agreed that 13 Corps should be maintained through VENICE or by rail from the South, though the port of TRIESTE could be opened at short notice in order to maintain any forces in the immediate vicinity. Should the L of C for 13 Corps not be transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE until an emergency arises some time would be required for administrative preparations and the operations of 13 Corps would inevitably be prejudiced. From the operational point of view therefore a fully developed L of C from VENICE should be established as soon as possible.

(16)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. To examine the desirability of closing the port of TRIESTE [illegible] maintenance with effect from 1 January 1946.

INTRODUCTION

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5. From the political point of view therefore it is considered that the cessation of military maintenance through the port of TRIESTE would be most undesirable.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6. In the event of Jugoslav aggression in VENEZIA GIULIA it has been agreed that 13 Corps should be maintained through VENICE or by rail from the South, though the port of TRIESTE could be opened at short notice in order to maintain any forces in the immediate vicinity. Should the L of C for 13 Corps not be transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE until an emergency arises some time would be required for administrative preparations and the operations of 13 Corps would inevitably be prejudiced. From the operational point of view therefore a fully developed L of C from VENICE should be established as soon as possible.

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ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

7. From a purely administrative point of view there are considerable advantages in closing TRIESTE for military maintenance and establishing an L of C for 13 Corps and BTA from VENICE. This could be done from 1 January 1946. It should be borne in mind, however, that apart from external influences TRIESTE remains the most convenient port from which to maintain forces in VENEZIA GIULIA and South AUSTRIA. In view, however, of the possibility that TRIESTE might be closed by Jugoslav intervention a shadow organisation has to be maintained at VENICE in order to enable the port to function efficiently as an alternative at short notice. It is only for this reason that the closing of TRIESTE for military maintenance and the opening of VENICE to the full extent necessary, would result in increased efficiency and economy in manpower.

8. The port of VENICE has now been handed back to Italian control. Should the maintenance of 13 Corps and BTA be transferred from TRIESTE to VENICE it would be desirable from the military point of view for military control of the port of VENICE to be resumed. This would however be contrary to existing policy and is undesirable politically. In addition it would be most undesirable from the point of view of the Allied civil shipping authorities.

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONS

9. The small size of the existing naval organization in VENICE would be no bar to the use of VENICE for maintenance of 13 Corps and BTA nor to the resumption of military control of the post.

CONCLUSION

10. From the operational and administrative points of view the transfer of military maintenance from TRIESTE to VENICE is both desirable and practicable. On the other hand there are very strong political objections to a reduction of Allied activities in TRIESTE. On balance it is considered that the political objections outweigh the military considerations and that existing arrangements for the maintenance of 13 Corps and BTA should continue.

RECOMMENDATION

11. That there should be no change in the existing arrangements for military maintenance through TRIESTE.

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chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
(27-29)

NOV 13 RECD

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat AF 799

SAC (45) 23 Amendment
10th November 1945

RESTRICTED

COPY NO 77

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FILM DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

Reference para 2 b. SAC (45) 23 of 9 November 1945.

For "Allied Intelligence Service"

Read "Allied Information Service"

12 NOV 1945

William M Haas Maj
for J. G. SWILTMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

NORMAL

1002-2/cc
5932

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Reference para 2 b. SAC (45) 23 of 9 November 1945.

For "Allied Intelligence Service"

Read "Allied Information Service"

12 NOV 1945

William Dil Haas Maj

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

NORMAL

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Chf Comm. Allied Commission (3)(27-29) Exhm

NOV 13 RECD

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 792

SAC (45) 23
9th November 1945

RESTRICTED

COPY NO 77

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FILM DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

SAC (P) (45) 32 of 21 June 1945 refers.

1. The entrance of foreign film representatives and the release of PWB from responsibility for film distribution in ITALY were discussed at several meetings of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, ending with SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting Minute 7. PWB was accordingly authorized to withdraw from this activity as soon as foreign film representatives were in a position to assume the responsibility.

2. The Director, PWB, now advises that arrangements have been initiated for the handover of film distribution in ITALY to representatives of American and British commercial interests and to the Italian Ministry of Information.

a. The responsibility of PWB for distribution of films in ITALY with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA area will therefore cease at 2359 hours on 25 November 1945.

b. Arrangements are being made to insure the continuance of a satisfactory supply of British and American films for distribution by Allied Intelligence Service in VENEZIA GIULIA.

3. The above is circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference.

SUGGEST FOR INFORMATION

10 NOV 1945

J. G. SWEETMAN,

1002-2 file 320

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785115

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SUBSTITUTE "INFORMATION"

SEE SAC(45)73 AMENDMENT

10 NOV 1945

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No.____

17 October 1945.

POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

In acccrdance with their terms of reference, the MJPS have prepared the attached final paper.

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

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List A

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D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

17 October 1945.

POSSIBLE JUGOSLAV AGGRESSION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

INTRODUCTION.

1. In his signal O-320 of 24 September, Commander 13 Corps has asked for a directive as to course he should adopt in the event that the security of his forces should be in danger. He has visualised such a situation arising under two conditions:

   a. In the event of an attack in strength by the Jugoslav armed forces.

   b. A state of disorder developing in VENEZIA GIULIA without the direct intervention of the Jugoslav armed forces (although inspiration from BELGRADE is implied).

OBJECT.

2. To prepare a draft directive to Commander 13 Corps in the light of possible hostile action by the Jugoslavs.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

3. The prevention of any unilateral Jugoslav occupation of TRIESTE prior to a definite decision regarding TRIESTE at the Peace Conference is a factor of great political importance. Established at the highest level at the time of the Belgrade Agreement, this policy was confirmed during the subsequent development of the VENEZIA GIULIA situation, when it was decided to prevent Jugoslav occupation of the TRIESTE area, by force if necessary.

4. It is impossible at this stage to state how much support the Jugoslavs would receive from the SOVIET UNION in the event of an open conflict with the Allies over TRIESTE. It is considered, however, that the extent to which RUSSIA will support JUGOSLAVIA will largely depend upon the degree of firmness shown by the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN in opposing any unilateral action on the part of the Jugoslavs.

JUGOSLAV FORCES AVAILABLE.

Land Forces.

5. The Jugoslav army has an overall strength of fifty to fifty three divisions

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JUGOSLAV FORCES AVAILABLE.

Land Forces.

5. The Jugoslav army has an overall strength of fifty to fifty three divisions distributed throughout the country, with a total strength of between 400,000 and 450,000. These divisions however have only an average strength of about 6,500 men. So long as there were no major external threats elsewhere JUGOSLAVIA could eventually concentrate a very strong force in VENEZIA GIULIA.

6. Along the MORGAN LINE and in ISTRIA it is estimated that there are two Jugoslav divisions and elements equivalent to a third. The bulk of these troops are to the East and South of GORIZIA. Four and possibly five further Jugoslav divisions are believed to be located in the LJUBLJANA area and serve as a tactical reserve for the troops manning the MORGAN LINE. It is possible that there are also some tanks in the LJUBLJANA area, probably not more than fifty. Two further divisions previously located in the area were reported moving out in August. This report is believed to be correct, but the possibility of these divisions still being present cannot be totally disregarded. A strategic reserve of 7 or 8 divisions is believed to be located in the ZAGREB - FIUME area.

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7. The Jugoslavs therefore have 7 to 10 divisions immediately available for operations in VENEZIA GIULIA tog ther with a further 7 or 8 divisions in strategic reserve.

8. In addition, there is a detachment of 2,000 Jugoslav soldiers under Allied command near CASTAGNAVIZZA, the potential nuisance value of whom is disproportionate to their actual strength.

Naval Forces.

9. The Jugoslav Navy contains no effective major units. There are however a number of smaller units including minesweepers, PT boats (without torpedo tubes), 2 MTBs and some MLs.

The recent amalgamation of the RYN and the Jugoslav Navy under TITO resulted in a considerable percentage of the old RYN officers and men refusing to return to JUGOSLAVIA. In consequence the efficiency of the vessels of the Jugoslav Navy will have decreased due to the lack of trained personnel for maintenance and the threat from these vessels will not be great. However it must be expected that in the event of hostilities the smaller units, in particular the PT boats and MTBs, would be resolutely handled by men having considerable local knowledge of the waters in which they would operate.

Air Forces.

10. On the ZAGREB, ZARA and LJUBLJANA aerodromes there are approximately 60 Yak fighters, 30 Stormovik fighter-bombers, 16 Spitfire and 16 (RP) Hurricane fighters and fighter-bombers. Serviceability is likely to be about 60%.

A further 30 Yaks and 60 Stormoviks and 20-30 Pe 2's (light bombers) are located on the SKOPLJE - BELGRADE aerodromes.

Armed Civilians.

11. There exists in Allied-occupied VENEZIA GIULIA a large pro-Jugoslav irredentist movement organized locally by the Giulian Communist Party (PCG) on the inspiration and direction of the Jugoslav, and possibly the Russian Communist Party. Recently this movement has taken a more aggressive and anti-Allied turn. The exact strength of the movement is difficult to estimate but includes a core of at least 1,000 members in TRIESTE and some 1,500 in the hinterland. It enjoys, in addition, the support of a much greater number of sympathisers, who are not inscribed party members. It should be noted also that this movement is closely associated with OZNA (Jugoslav Secret Police). Hidden arms dumps are at the disposal of the movment in TRIESTE and probably also in the hinterland. Also to be considered in this connection is the fact that in the vital coastal area between TRIESTE and MONFALCONE the population is largely Slovene and strongly pro-Slav. The bulk of the Italian Communists appear to have joined the Jugoslav controlled PCG, which is the only organised Communist Group in VENEZIA GIULIA. There is no indication of any activity by the Italian Communist Party as a separate entity. Insofar as they act as an organised group they can therefore

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INTELLIGENCE.

12. Allied intelligence sources are such that they cannot be counted upon to provide adequate warning of the concentration of the tactical reserve of 7 to 10 divisions in preparation for an attack. On the other hand, it is possible that such a radical change in Jugoslav policy as would involve open aggression in VENEZIA GIULIA would be accompanied by other developments, particularly in the political sphere, which would throw some light on Jugoslav intentions.

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POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

13. Direct aggression by Jugoslav armed forces is considered improbable, particularly so long as the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA remains a combined Anglo-US commitment. However, the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. In the event that the Jugoslavs decided to risk war with the US and UK the most likely objective would be the port of TRIESTE, coupled with the occupation of POLA. Adequate warning of such an intention cannot be counted upon and the Jugoslavs would be capable of deploying 7-10 divisions initially. Any direct attack by the Jugoslavs would certainly be accompanied by serious internal disorder in Allied occupied VENEZIA GIULIA.

14. Whether the Jugoslavs decided upon open aggression or not it is always possible that the internal security situation in VENEZIA GIULIA might deteriorate as a result of underground Jugoslav direction and encouragement. These conditions would be brought about by:

a. Intensification of anti-Allied propaganda.

b. Strikes.

c. Terrorist activity.

and would be designed to cause such confusion and embarrassment to AMG and the Allied forces in VENEZIA GIULIA that

a. AMG and the Allied forces would be forced to withdraw.

b. Allied forces would be provoked into armed action locally thereby giving an excuse for Jugoslav intervention.

c. A situation would be created which would damage Allied prestige in the eyes of the world and which would favour the claims of the Jugoslavs.

15. There is little positive evidence at the moment that would indicate any immediate internal or external threat to the general security of Allied occupation forces in VENEZIA GIULIA. However, there are some reports, the accuracy of which it is difficult to assess, that such action may be contemplated.

ALLIED FORCES AVAILABLE.

Land Forces.

16. 13 Corps consists of an Anglo-American force of two divisions and attached troops. One brigade is in POLA and the remainder of the Corps is deployed along the MORGAN LINE. Available in reserve within this theatre are 6 British Armoured Division and 2 Polish Corps of two infantry divisions and one armoured

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Naval Forces.

17. A small naval force usually consisting of 2 destroyers or frigates is normally maintained in the Northern ADRIATIC but some reinforcement would be made should the situation deteriorate. The extent of these reinforcements depends on the situation elsewhere but it should be possible to ensure the presence of a cruiser and 2 additional destroyers within 3 to 4 days. A small force to provide an amphibious lift for one Brigade Gp/RCT is maintained at 8 days notice on the station but the availability of this force for operations in the Northern ADRIATIC is also to some extent dependent on the requirements elsewhere. In the event of general hostilities breaking out with JUGOSLAVIA it is presumed that reinforcements from outside the Mediterranean Station would be forthcoming.

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18. Ships stationed in the Northern ADRIATIC will be immediately available to cover military targets up to a maximum of approximately 10 miles from the coast, subject to necessary bombardment liaison officers and FOB personnel being available. These FOB personnel would require time to concentrate as some of them are at present at ALEXANDRIA.

19. Before warships could approach the coast either in the vicinity of TRIESTE or of POLA for bombardment purposes any heavy coast defense batteries situated in the vicinity of these positions would require to be effectively neutralized. In particular, in the TRIESTE area, batteries situated in the vicinity of PIRANO, and in the POLA area those in the BRIONI ISLANDS are of importance.

20. Subsidiary action against Jugoslav shipping traffic on the DALMATIAN COAST in the event of hostilities would be on a minor scale in the early stages owing to shortage of coastal forces, but could probably be considerably augmented later.

21. The considerations of the state of coast defence batteries also affect the possibility of evacuation of TRIESTE and POLA should this be necessary. Provided the batteries commanding the ports had been neutralized and a bridgehead sufficiently deep to prevent heavy shelling of the port area had been secured, evacuation could at any rate commence through the ports. If these conditions were not realized evacuation would have to be undertaken from open beaches. As stated above, an amphibious lift is available at 8 days notice but the time required to concentrate it in the Northern ADRIATIC is dependent on considerations of the overall needs of the Station, and to a great extent, on the weather which in the ADRIATIC in winter months is frequently bad. Should the necessity arise it might be possible to evacuate personnel, but not heavy equipment, from the vicinity of POLA in the minesweeping and other small ships employed in the area.

22. The possibility of maintaining TRIESTE by sea in the event of hostilities also depends on the retention of an adequate bridgehead round the port. There are two approach channels through the mined areas to TRIESTE: the northern channel passes within 14,000 yards of land in the vicinity of PIRANO. It should be possible to supply the forces in and around TRIESTE by sea using this northern channel. The effective neutralization of any heavy batteries remaining in the area of PIRANO would allow this channel to be used with greater freedom. The southern approach channel passes within 4,000 to 5,000 yards of land for a distance of some 12 miles in the vicinity of PIRANO and SALVORE POINT. The use of this channel by shipping would be very precarious at any time and impracticable except on nights with no moon.

Air Forces.

23. The Desert Air Force, consisting of nine Fighter/Bomber squadrons and one Tac/R squadron is located in Northeastern ITALY and AUSTRIA, and would be

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24. In the event of hostilities, the Desert Air Force would immediately be available to attack the Jugoslav Air Force with a view to destroying it. It could then continue to give tactical support to 13 Corps with a view to destroying the lines of communication of the Jugoslav land forces, in order to destroy the organisation of the Jugoslav Army and force it to disperse. The movement of reinforcing squadrons should be given the widest publicity in order to emphasize the threat to JUGOSLAVIA inherent in such reinforcement. Should aggression not cease with the destruction of the Jugoslav Air Force and attacks on the Army, then strategical attacks could be launched, after due warning, on targets in JUGOSLAVIA. It should be noted that effective support by DAF is entirely dependent upon the security of the UDINE group of airfields.

ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS.

25. The maintenance of BTA and civil supplies for the British Zone in AUSTRIA, at present routed through TRIESTE and UDINE, could be routed through the BRENNER without serious delay in the event of the rail route through UDINE being cut. This new route would be the responsibility of GHQ CMF. It might also be possible, if need arose, after a short period to open a new L of C for AUSTRIA through Northwest EUROPE.

26. In the event of 13 Corps forming a bridgehead round TRIESTE the maintenance of this bridgehead, including civil supplies for the TRIESTE area could be carried out through TRIESTE, provided that an adequate bridgehead was retained.

27. Should TRIESTE however be unusable, the maintenance of 13 Corps would have to be carried out through VENICE and by rail from the SOUTH. In the event of Jugoslav attack the maintenance of the main forces of 13 Corps would probably be transferred to this latter L of C.

28. If it was necessary to undertake offensive operations with 13 Corps, plus reinforcement divisions, some time would be required for administrative preparations, including the build-up of stocks and the provision of additional service troops. As administrative troops are redeployed it will become increasingly necessary to draw on resources outside this theatre and the time required for administrative preparations will increase.

ALLIED REQUIREMENTS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

29. Should action by the Jugoslavs compel the Allies to relinquish their control, even temporarily, over any part of VENEZIA GIULIA west of the MORGAN LINE, the continued retention of TRIESTE would be of primary importance from the political viewpoint. The effective conduct of active operations in VENEZIA GIULIA would be largely dependent on air support. In turn this depends for its effectiveness on the security of the UDINE airfields, the retention of

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ALLIED CAPABILITIES.

30. It is necessary to consider to what extent the available Allied forces would be capable of dealing with:

a. Serious internal disorder, such as has been envisaged by GOC 13 Corps.

b. Direct attack by Jugoslav armed forces.

(13)

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It is not believed that internal disorder in VENEZIA GIULIA would reach such proportions as to endanger the security of our forces there. However should this ever be the case there would be no great difficulty in providing adequate and timely reinforcements.

31. It has already been shown that the Jugoslavs might, in the event that they decide to attack the United Nations, be able to launch a surprise attack in strength. The question of whether 13 Corps would be capable of withstanding a direct attack by Jugoslav armed forces depends entirely on whether adequate warning is received or whether the attack comes as a complete surprise. If adequate warning was received, 13 Corps could be reinforced by 6 Armd Div and 2 Pol Corps together with any other Allied troops available at the time. The deterrent effect of such a show of force might well discourage the Jugoslavs from direct aggression. Any premature withdrawal from the MORGAN LINE or the POLA enclave would probably be interpreted by the Jugoslavs as a sign of weakness, and 13 Corps should therefore continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA up to the MORGAN LINE and the POLA enclave until directly attacked.

32. Should a show of force fail to deter the Jugoslavs from direct aggression, it is considered that 13 Corps would be capable of securing the vital area TRIESTE-GORIZIA-UDINE, but that they might not be able to ensure the security of the L of C via UDINE and TARVISIO into AUSTRIA until further reinforcements were available. POLA cannot be adequately defended by the Brigade Gp now stationed there and even if reinforced, a hazardous maintenance commitment would be entailed. The Brigade Group therefore should be evacuated.

33. 13 Corps as at present constituted and disposed is totally incapable of withstanding a direct Jugoslav attack. If this attack came, in addition, as a surprise it is impossible to say to what extent 13 Corps would be able to concentrate adequate forces for the defence of the TRIESTE and UDINE areas and the action to be taken in this eventuality should be left to the discretion of Comd 13 Corps.

CONCLUSIONS

34. The possibility envisaged by Comd 13 Corps that internal disorder may assume such serious proportions as to endanger the security of Allied forces, and possibly necessitate a general withdrawal, is not likely. Moreover it could be obviated by the provision of such reinforcements as are now available.

35. The possibility that 13 Corps might be directly attacked by Jugoslav armed forces is unlikely but cannot be excluded. Should such an attack develop, the Jugoslavs might be able to launch a surprise attack with some 7 to 10 divisions, which could be further reinforced.

36. In the event of adequate warning of any Jugoslav attack 13 Corps should be

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LINE or the POLA enclave would probably be interpreted by the Jugoslavs as a sign of weakness, and 13 Corps should therefore continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA up to the MORGAN LINE and the POLA enclave until directly attacked.

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36. In the event of adequate warning of any Jugoslav attack 13 Corps should be reinforced by 6 Armd Div and 2 Pol Corps and any other available Allied troops. 13 Corps should then continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA up to the MORGAN LINE and the POLA enclave. If this show of force does not deter the Jugoslavs and they attack, 13 Corps should:

a. Secure the vital TRIESTE-GORIZIA-UDINE area.

b. Protect the L of C from VENICE to UDINE and TRIESTE.

c. Evacuate POLA.

d. Prepare to take the offensive as soon as possible with a view to re-opening and securing the L of C into AUSTRIA from TRIESTE via UDINE and TARVISIO.

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37. In the event of a Jugoslav attack developing without adequate warning being received, it is of primary importance that no substantial portion of 13 Corps should be overwhelmed.

38. It would be possible to continue the maintenance of forces in TRIESTE through that port, provided an adequate bridgehead was secured, and provided that the coast defence batteries capable of commanding the port were effectively neutralized.

39. It would be possible to supply the British Zone in AUSTRIA through the BRENNER route, without any serious delay, should the L of C via UDINE and TARVISIO be closed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

40. That the draft cable attached be approved for dispatch to 13 Corps.

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40. That the draft cable attached be approved for dispatch to [redacted]

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DRAFT

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION: 13 CORPS

Ref your O-320 of 24 Sep.

1. The possibility that internal disorder in VENEZIA GIULIA may assume such serious proportions as to endanger the security of your forces and perhaps necessitate a general withdrawal from VENEZIA GIULIA is not considered likely. However, if the situation becomes such as to make this probable, you will be reinforced to the extent necessary by 6 Armd Div, 2 Pol Corps (incl two inf divs and one armd div) and by such other Allied forces as could be made available at the time. In this case, you will continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA, up to the MORGAN LINE, and the POLA enclave.

2. It is also considered unlikely that the Jugoslavs would go to war with United Nations by launching direct attack on your forces in VENEZIA GIULIA. Should this possibility materialise, and it cannot be excluded, it is appreciated that TRIESTE would be the most likely objective, coupled with an attempt to occupy POLA. If in fact launched, adequate warning of this attack cannot be guaranteed.

3. It is possible therefore that you might be attacked in strength by the Jugoslavs without previous warning or reinforcement. In this event you will of course act on your own initiative but should at all costs maintain your forces as far as possible intact.

4. If adequate warning of an impending attack is received, you will be reinforced as in para 1 above and you will continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA, up to the MORGAN LINE, and the POLA enclave until actually attacked.

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(incl two inf divs and one armd div) and by such other Allied forces as could be made available at the time. In this case, you will continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA, up to the MORGAN LINE, and the POLA enclave.

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3. It is possible therefore that you might be attacked in strength by the Jugoslavs without previous warning or reinforcement. In this event you will of course act on your own initiative but should at all costs maintain your forces as far as possible intact.

4. If adequate warning of an impending attack is received, you will be reinforced as in para 1 above and you will continue to occupy VENEZIA GIULIA, up to the MORGAN LINE, and the POLA enclave until actually attacked.

5. Should a Jugoslav attack develop despite the show of force envisaged in para 4 you will

a. Secure the vital area TRIESTE-GORIZIA-UDINE.

b. Protect the L of C from VENICE to UDINE and TRIESTE.

c. Evacuate POLA.

d. Prepare to take the offensive as soon as you have been adequately reinforced with a view to ~~re-opening and securing the L of C from TRIESTE~~ via UDINE and TARVISIO into AUSTRIA.

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6. In the event of hostilities with the Jugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. An amphibious lift for one bde Gp/RCT is maintained in the Mediterranean at eight days notice. Availability of naval forces in your suport is, however, dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of TRIESTE be made direct with NOIC TRIESTE and in the case of POLA with RNO POLA.

7. In the event of hostilities with the Jugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. DAF will be immediately available for tactical support, but its effectiveness depends on the security of the UDINE airfields. In addition one U.S. Hy Bomb Gp is remaining in ITALY and Hy Bombers of RAF MED/ME would be moved back to ITALY together with such other air force reinforcements as might be available.

8. In the event of Jugoslav attack, the maintenance of your main forces is likely to be transferred to an L of C from VENICE and by rail from the SOUTH. If it was necessary for you to undertake major offensive operations against the Jugoslavs with 13 Corps plus reinforcement divisions, some time would have to be allowed for administrative preparations including the build-up of stocks and the provision of additional service troops.

9. Maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the TRIESTE area could however still be undertaken by sea provided an adequate bridgehead round the port is secured and provided also coast defence batteries capable [illegible] the port are neutralized.

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9. Maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the TRIESTE area could however still be undertaken by sea provided an adequate bridgehead round the port is secured and provided also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are neutralized.

10. If the L of C through UDINE and TARVISIO to AUSTRIA is interrupted by Jugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in AUSTRIA could be transferred to the BRENNER route without serious delay and would become the responsibility of GHQ CMF.

11. The Jugoslav detachment now at CASTAGNAVIZZA should be located in the most convenient area to enable it to be disarmed in the event of open hostilities with the Jugoslavs.

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P/315 (Final)

SECRET

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9.20 Commissioner
Ex Commissioner

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 71

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

16 October 1945.

OCT 19 1945

COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF HQ MTOUSA

1. In accordance with their terms of reference, the MJPS have examined the above problem and have prepared the attached paper P/315 (Final).

2. It will be seen that the MJPS are of the opinion that a small US HQ in ITALY, as a sub-command of USFET, is required to replace MTOUSA. Action, however, understood to have been taken already, would indicate that alternative command arrangements have received approval, at least in principle. Some readjustment of the US component of the Allied HQ in ITALY, as envisaged under these alternative arrangements, would therefore be required in order to provide the organization recommended in the attached paper.

3. On the question of the termination of Supreme Interservice Command, a minority view of the MJPS considered that the reasons advanced for the retention of Supreme Command were not sufficiently strong. Although agreeing that the Supreme Command is essential for the efficient conduct of active operations it was felt that in the absence of stronger reasons for its retention, Supreme Interservice Command should be terminated. It was considered moreover in this connection that there should be little difficulty or delay in re-appointing a Supreme Commander should the situation ever warrant it.

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman MJPS

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D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman MJPS

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F/315 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

16 October 1945

COMMAND IN ITALY AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF HQ MTOUSA

OBJECT.

1. To examine the arrangements which should be adopted for Anglo-American command in ITALY after the dissolution of HQ MTOUSA and to make appropriate recommendations.

INTRODUCTION.

2. This subject embraces two distinct problems, namely command of Allied land forces and the question of the Interservice Command. Of these, it is considered that the Allied implications are fundamentally the more important. Furthermore, they include certain aspects of the interservice considerations, and for these reasons they have been examined before the interservice arrangements have been investigated.

3. Accordingly this paper has been divided into two main sections as follows:

Section I - Arrangements necessary for command of Allied land forces.
Section II - Interservice command arrangements.

SECTION I - ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR COMMAND OF ALLIED LAND FORCES

Relationship with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. ITALY is an Allied commitment and a responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The existence of an Allied Commander in the person of SAC facilitates the presentation of a US/UK point of view to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and similarly assists the implementation of their instructions. If there was an in adequate US participation in the Allied HQ in ITALY the Combined Chiefs of Staff would probably consider, with some justification, that it presented a British viewpoint rather than a combined US/UK opinion.

Operational Considerations.

5. The generally unsettled condition of ITALY is largely due to economic factors which require time before remedial action can be effective. This state of affairs is further aggravated by the tension existing in VENEZIA GIULIA, and to a lesser extent on the Franco-Italian frontier, and by the delay in the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. Serious internal disorder in ITALY would endanger the security of Allied forces in ITALY. The comparatively well organized Communists [illegible] are being encouraged by foreign-

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6. Allied forces in ITALY are therefore confronted with the possibility of internal security operations in ITALY and of active operations against the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA. To present a united Anglo-American front it is considered essential that operational command of all British and US land forces in ITALY should be vested in one Allied commander.

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Allied Responsibilities Vis-a-Vis Italian Government.

7. The rights of all Allied forces in ITALY are based ultimately on the terms of the Armistice, subject to such modifications as may have been made from time to time. These rights are accorded to the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

8. Policy decisions affecting the Allied occupation of ITALY and for controlling the situation on ITALY'S frontiers are essentially a US/UK commitment. Up to now the SAC has always been able to act in the name and with the full backing of the US and UK Governments. This fact has enabled military and political action to be effectively coordinated and has undoubtedly affected our dealings with ITALY and her neighbours most favourably.

9. By 1 December the whole of ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE and possibly BOLZANO will probably have been returned to Italian Government control. In these areas, however, Allied Military Government will be retained until the Peace Treaty. Although therefore relieved from direct responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout most of ITALY, the Allied CinC will be responsible for ensuring the security of the Allied forces in ITALY and the L of C into AUSTRIA, and might therefore be compelled to intervene in the event of serious internal disorders.

10. It is thus apparent that, until the Peace Treaty, the Allies must be able to enforce their rights under the Armistice through an Allied CinC, and the authority vis-a-vis the Italian Government, presently vested in the Supreme Allied Commander must therefore be exercised by an Allied CinC. This Allied CinC would also be responsible for controlling Allied Military Government.

It follows also that two separate national commanders, working in Committee, would not prove equally effective.

Composition and Command of British Forces.

11. By 1 December, and for some time thereafter, considerable British and British sponsored forces will remain in ITALY, i.e.

HQ 13 Corps
6 Armd Div
56 Div
L of C Troops
2 Pol Corps (of three Divs)

In addition there will be certain Imperial troops in the course of movement out of the Theatre. GHQ CMF will also be responsible for British troops in GREECE and, to a considerable extent, for BTA. The retention of a large British HQ (GHQ CMF) in ITALY will therefore be inevitable for some considerable time.

Composition and Command of US Forces.

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Composition and Command of US Forces.

12. By 1 December the following US forces will remain in ITALY:

88 Div and attached troops (in 13 Corps)
PBS (approx 22,000 but gradually reducing to 7,000)
One Fy Bomb Group USAAF
AAFSC (Residue)

HQ MTOUSA is due to be dissolved on 1 December, when all US Land and Air Forces in ITALY will come under the command of USFET.

13. Certain US land forces, however, must continue to be under Allied operational control. In particular, 88 Division and attached troops in 13 Corps has an operational role and PBS has territorial responsibilities in ITALY. In view of the possibility of hostilities in VENEZIA GIULIA and of internal disorder in ITALY,

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all US land forces in ITALY should therefore be under the operational command of an Allied CinC in ITALY. It has been suggested that PBS, which includes the NAPLES and LEGHORN areas, should be placed under the complete command of USFET, except under certain conditions for operations when they would be under the Allied CinC. ITALY is an Allied commitment and it is considered illogical that an Allied CinC should not have complete operational control over portions of Central ITALY including the ports of NAPLES and LEGHORN. The question of the administrative command of these troops is considered below with other administrative factors.

14. Should the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander be terminated upon the dissolution of HQ MTOUSA, command of USAAF forces in ITALY could appropriately be vested in USAFE, provided adequate arrangements were made for the effective use of such forces in ITALY should the situation ever require it.

Additional Support for US Forces in ITALY.

15. A situation might well arise in ITALY when rapid reinforcement of the US troops there would be necessary. Such US reinforcements, whether of land or air forces, would probably come from USFET. Preliminary plans for such a contingency must be made and it is important that CG USFET should be kept fully acquainted with the situation in ITALY so that he can assess rapidly the respective needs of his troops there and elsewhere in EUROPE. Arrangements must therefore be made for CG USFET to be adequately represented at the Allied HQ in ITALY.

Intelligence Factors.

16. If CG USFET, War Department, and other United States Agencies and interests are to be kept properly informed on intelligence matters in ITALY, there must be a balanced US intelligence representation at the Allied Headquarters in ITALY. Counterintelligence Corps personnel form a part of the Allied intelligence network which, integrated with the British equivalent, FSS personnel, covers the whole of ITALY.

17. To ensure that intelligence is properly collated and coordinated, it is considered essential that the Intelligence Staff Section of the Allied Headquarters should be integrated.

Administrative Factors.

18. While PBS can be responsible for the administration of all Zone of Communication troops in ITALY they cannot properly assume such responsibility in respect of the US ground forces in VENEZIA GIULIA; neither can they assume responsibility for the many political and economic matters for which the Military Commander in ITALY is responsible. When MTOUSA is dissolved those administrative functions which cannot be performed by PBS must pass to USFET unless a subordinate command of USFET is appointed for ITALY.

19. It is most desirable that a commander having operational control

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19. It is most desirable that a commander having operational control should also have control over the maintenance and supply arrangements for his land forces. In addition there are many other administrative matters on which experience has shown there must be a common Allied policy, i.e. control of movement and transportation facilities, accommodation, employment of labour, use of local resources, political and economic matters. If there is no US command in ITALY with appropriate powers, considerable delay, inconvenience, and misunderstandings are likely to occur in effecting a common Allied policy.

20. It is considered, therefore, that administration in ITALY would be greatly facilitated if there were a small US HQ in ITALY as a subordinate command of USFET but having the necessary powers to affect coordination on all Allied administrative matters in ITALY.

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Possible Forms of Allied Land Force HQ.

21. There are three possible arrangements for the command of Anglo-American ground forces in ITALY when MTOUSA is dissolved, called for simplicity "A", "B" and "C" HQs. In the succeeding paragraphs these HQs are referred to by these letters only. In examining them, it is assumed that the Supreme Allied Commander will remain and that each would therefore still be designated AFHQ. However, should the Supreme Command be terminated, each might be known as HQ Allied Forces, ITALY (AFI) or by some similar title.

22. "A" HQ.

This would consist primarily of GHQ CMF, working with which there could be a small but separate US Liaison Section.

"A" HQ would then exercise operational command over all British and British sponsored land forces in ITALY and GREECE and operational command over all US land forces in ITALY. Except as above, all British and British sponsored land forces would be under command GHQ CMF, and all US land forces in ITALY would be under command of USFET.

23. This solution is undoubtedly economical in US manpower. On the other hand, a US Liaison Detachment exercising no command, having no authority or responsibility for decisions reached, and acting in an advisory capacity only would inevitably result in a purely British HQ in fact if not in name. This would deprive it of the prestige of being an Allied HQ and might have an adverse effect on the morale of US troops if they were to feel that decisions were reached without authoritative US responsibility for those decisions. Operational and intelligence requirements would not fully be satisfied, the efficient administration of US troops in ITALY would be impeded and effective Allied control of essentially Allied administrative matters would be difficult.

24. "B" HQ.

This again would consist primarily of GHQ CMF. Working in the HQ would be a number of US officers as an integral part of all necessary branches of the staff, including a Deputy Commander-in-Chief and a Deputy Chief of Staff. "B" HQ would therefore function on the same general lines as did HQ AAI. In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that HQ AAI, although undoubtedly a sound and efficient organisation, had the advantage of being responsible to AFHQ with its strong MTOUSA component.

25. In this case AFHQ would exercise operational command over all British and British sponsored land forces in ITALY and GREECE and US land forces in ITALY. Except as above, all British and British sponsored land forces would be under command GHQ CMF and all US land forces in ITALY would be under command of USFET.

26. This solution would also be economical in US manpower and some Allied flavour would be achieved. This would be assisted by the presence of a Deputy CinC.

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"A" HQ would then exercise operational command over all British and British sponsored land forces in ITALY and GREECE and operational command over all US land forces in ITALY. Except as above, all British and British sponsored land forces would be under command GHQ CMF, and all US land forces in ITALY would be under command of USFET.

23. This solution is undoubtedly economical in US manpower. On the other hand, a US Liaison Detachment exercising no command, having no authority or responsibility for decisions reached, and acting in an advisory capacity only would inevitably result in a purely British HQ in fact if not in name. This would deprive it of the prestige of being an Allied HQ and might have an adverse effect on the morale of US troops if they were to feel that decisions were reached without authoritative US responsibility for those decisions. Operational and intelligence requirements would not fully be satisfied, the efficient administration of US troops in ITALY would be impeded and effective Allied control of essentially Allied administrative matters would be difficult.

24. "B" HQ.

This again would consist primarily of GHQ CMF. Working in the HQ would be a number of US officers as an integral part of all necessary branches of the staff, including a Deputy Commander-in-Chief and a Deputy Chief of Staff. "B" HQ would therefore function on the same general lines as did HQ AAI. In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that HQ AAI, although undoubtedly a sound and efficient organisation, had the advantage of being responsible to AFHQ with its strong MTOUSA component.

25. In this case AFHQ would exercise operational command over all British and British sponsored land forces in ITALY and GREECE and US land forces in ITALY. Except as above, all British and British sponsored land forces would be under command of USFET.

26. This solution would also be economical in US manpower and some Allied flavour would be achieved. This would be assisted by the presence of a Deputy CinC. Operational and intelligence requirements would again only partially be realized and, although control of common user administrative facilities would be simplified, effective administration in ITALY would suffer through the lack of a central US command in ITALY.

27. "C" HQ.

This would consist of GHQ CMF and a small US HQ which would replace MTOUSA and which would be a sub-command of USFET. It would involve practically no change in the existing system of command. Appropriate staff sections of these two HQs would be combined and would form an integrated HQ. "C" HQ would function as AFHQ does at present.

SECRET

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28. This solution would provide a real Allied HQ with a CinC and Deputy CinC, etc. Allied administrative matters would be settled in the simplest way, as at present, and administration in ITALY would be on a sound and logical basis. From the operational and intelligence point of view also, "C" HQ is considered to be the most satisfactory solution, while from the manpower aspect it should prove reasonably economical.

29. On balance it is considered that "C" HQ is the best solution and should be adopted as the basis for command of Allied land forces in ITALY when MTOUSA is dissolved.

SECTION II - INTERSERVICE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

30. The primary reason for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean was to enable one Commander to exercise a unified command over all Allied land, sea and air forces in the Theatre, in order to conduct a major campaign. With the cessation of hostilities such a Supreme Allied Commander remained essential in order to bring the maximum weight and authority to bear when dealing with the unsettled conditions which prevailed throughout EUROPE, and in particular within the boundaries of this Theatre. These conditions are still far from settled, and the possibility of large-scale operations, although improbable, remains. Additionally, the internal situation in ITALY, discussed more fully in para 5 above, may deteriorate to such an extent that Allied intervention may become essential.

31. The unsettled condition of the Mediterranean makes desirable the continuance of the present Allied Naval Command, under which CinC Mediterranean exercises operational control of the Allied (including French and Greek) naval forces in the Mediterranean. This operational control is derived from the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. If it is to continue it must therefore involve the retention of the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, unless an Allied naval command in the Mediterranean were to be negotiated with the governments concerned.

32. From the Air Force point of view, bearing in mind the possibilities of active operations in this Theatre, it is considered that the effective integration of Air Force efforts with those of the Land and Naval Forces can best be achieved by retaining Supreme Interservice Command.

33. Politically, the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander has in the past proved a most effective method of imposing the Allied will throughout the Theatre. This same authority may well prove essential, until the conclusion of the final Peace Treaty, in the continued achievement of our purpose. In particular, the abolition of the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander might be interpreted by potential enemies outside ITALY as an encouraging sign. Similarly, in the case of the Italian Government, the power and prestige of the Allied Commander has been, and remains, of great importance. In this [illegible] supporting the position and

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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32. From the Air Force point of view, bearing in mind the possibilities of active operations in this Theatre, it is considered that the effective integration of Air Force efforts with those of the Land and Naval Forces can best be achieved by retaining Supreme Interservice Command.

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34. It is therefore considered that, until such time as the general situation in the Mediterranean and the internal security problem in ITALY show a considerable improvement, a Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should be retained, and hence that the Interservice Command should not be terminated at the precent time.

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[illegible]D15 (Final)

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS (SECTIONS I AND II).

35. a. The appointment of Supreme Allied Commander should be continued for the present.

b. On the dissolution of HQ MTOUSA, there should remain an integrated AFHQ. This HQ should be formed from GHQ CMF and from a small US HQ, which should be organized as a sub-command of USFET and which should command all US land forces in ITALY.

c. The US component of AFHQ should be provided from this small US HQ.

d. AFHQ should continue to function as at present.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

36. a. That the cable attached at Appendix 'A' be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That detailed study should be made to determine the composition of the US HQ in ITALY.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

RECOMMENDATIONS.

36. a. That the cable attached at Appendix 'A' be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That detailed study should be made to determine the composition of the US HQ in ITALY.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

315 (Final)

D R A F T

APPENDIX A

TO : AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
CABINET OFFICES for British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

381

RPTD: USFET

This is MAF _____.

Reference FAN 601 and 608.

1. I have had under consideration the question of what arrangements should be made for the command of British and US forces in this theatre when MTOUSA is dissolved about 1 December and whether supreme Allied interservice command is any longer necessary. My views are given below.

I. ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMAND OF ALLIED LAND FORCES

2. ITALY is an Allied commitment and is in a generally unsettled condition. Serious internal unrest involving the security of Allied forces in ITALY is a distinct possibility and the chances of a clash with the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA can not be excluded. It might be possible for Allied responsibilities in ITALY and for dealing with the Italian Government to be vested in British and US Commanders-in-Chief acting as a committee. Such an arrangement might lead to a lack of coordination and to misunderstandings and would detract from the weight which an Allied Commander-in-Chief representing both US and UK Governments can now bring to bear in dealings with ITALY and her neighbours. I consider therefore that an Allied Commander-in-Chief ITALY must be retained and he should exercise operational command over all British and US land forces in ITALY.

3. On dissolution of MTOUSA about 1 December all US forces in ITALY will come under command of CG USFET although, as I have recommended above, operational command should be exercised by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It is desirable that a commander having operational control should also have control over maintenance

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longer necessary. My views are given below.

I. ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMAND OF ALLIED LAND FORCES

2. ITALY is an Allied commitment and is in a generally unsettled condition. Serious internal unrest involving the security of Allied forces in ITALY is a distinct possibility and the chances of a clash with the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA can not be excluded. It might be possible for Allied responsibilities in ITALY and for dealing with the Italian Government to be vested in British and US Commanders-in-Chief acting as a committee. Such an arrangement might lead to a lack of coordination and to misunderstandings and would detract from the weight which an Allied Commander-in-Chief representing both US and UK Governments can now bring to bear in dealings with ITALY and her neighbours. I consider therefore than an Allied Commander-in-Chief ITALY must be retained and he should exercise operational command over all British and US land forces in ITALY.

3. On dissolution of MTOUSA about 1 December all US forces in ITALY will come under command of CG USFET although, as I have recommended above, operational command should be exercised by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It is desirable that a commander having operational control should also have control over maintenance and supply arrangements for his land forces. With two nationalities this can not be completely effective except through a deputy commander. In addition experience in ITALY has shown that there must be a common Allied policy for certain administrative matters, i.e. control of movement facilities, accommodation, labour, local resources, political and economic matters. If there was no US commander in ITALY with appropriate powers, and means of exercising those powers, considerable delay, misunderstandings and inconvenience would result and Allied Commander-in-Chief would be deprived of the backing and assistance of a US Commander-in-Chief having full command responsibilities in respect of all US land forces in ITALY. I consider therefore that with the dissolution

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of MTOUSA a small US HQ in ITALY should be set up as a subordinate command of USFET but having appropriate powers of command over all US land forces in ITALY.

4. It is important that CG USFET should be kept fully informed on all matters which concern US troops in ITALY. It is considered that this can most effectively be accomplished by the establishment of a sub-command of USFET in ITALY, as outlined above.

II. INTERSERVICE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

5. As already noted there is still a possibility that operations in this theatre involving all three services will be necessary. These unsettled conditions make continuation of Allied command of naval forces desirable. This operational command is derived from authority of Supreme Allied Commander, and if supreme command were abolished further negotiations with governments concerned would be necessary.

6. Abolition of supreme interservice command would probably be interpreted by ITALY and especially her neighbours as a sign of weakness and would undoubtedly make dealings with the Italian Government over the armistice complicated. I consider therefore that in view of the possibility of operations involving all three services and of the political aspects supreme interservice command should be retained for the present.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. To summarise, I recommend that

a. Supreme Allied interservice command and therefore AFHQ be retained for the present.

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II. INTERSERVICE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

5. As already noted there is still a possibility that operations in this theatre involving all three services will be necessary. These unsettled conditions make continuation of Allied command of naval forces desirable. This operational command is derived from authority of Supreme Allied Commander, and if supreme command were abolished further negotiations with governments concerned would be necessary.

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III. RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. To summarise, I recommend that

a. Supreme Allied interservice command and therefore AFHQ be retained for the present.

b. On the dissolution of MTOUSA a small US HQ in ITALY as a sub-command of USFET should be set up, which would have command of all US land forces in ITALY.

c. The US component of AFHQ should be provided by this small US HQ.

d. AFHQ should continue to function as at present.

DISTRIBUTION

AFHQ	SACS	CINC MED	CMF	G(SD)	MTOUSA	C/S MTO
	C.O	RAF ITALY		"A"		G-1
	G-2	RAF MEDME		Q(Maint)		G-3
	G-3	POLAD				G-4
	G-5	RESMIN				

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SACS AFHQ

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28. This solution would provide a real Allied HQ with a CinC and Deputy CinC, etc. Allied administrative matters would be settled in the simplest way, as at present, and administration in ITALY would be on a sound and logical basis. From the operational and intelligence point of view also, "C" HQ is considered to be the most satisfactory solution, while from the manpower aspect it should prove reasonably economical.

29. On balance it is considered that "C" HQ is the best solution and should be adopted as the basis for command of Allied land forces in ITALY when MTOUSA is dissolved.

SECTION II - INTERSERVICE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

30. The primary reason for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean was to enable one Commander to exercise a unified command over all Allied land, sea and air forces in the Theatre, in order to conduct a major campaign. With the cessation of hostilities such a Supreme Allied Commander remained essential in order to bring the maximum weight and authority to bear when dealing with the unsettled conditions which prevailed throughout EUROPE, and in particular within the boundaries of this Theatre. These conditions are still far from settled, and the possibility of large-scale operations, although improbable, remains. Additionally, the internal situation in ITALY, discussed more fully in para 5 above, may deteriorate to such an extent that Allied intervention may become essential.

31. The unsettled condition of the Mediterranean makes desirable the continuance of the present Allied Naval Command, under which CinC Mediterranean exercises operational control of the Allied (including French and Greek) naval forces in the Mediterranean. This operational control is derived from the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. If it is to continue it must therefore involve the retention of the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, unless an Allied naval command in the Mediterranean were to be negotiated with the governments concerned.

32. From the Air Force point of view, bearing in mind the possibilities of active operations in this Theatre, it is considered that the effective integration of Air Force efforts with those of the Land and Naval Forces can best be achieved by retaining Supreme Interservice Command.

33. Politically, the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander has in the past proved a most effective method of imposing the Allied will throughout the Theatre. This same authority may well prove essential, until the conclusion of the final Peace Treaty, in the continued achievement of our purpose. In particular, the abolition of the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander might be interpreted by potential enemies outside ITALY as an encouraging sign. Similarly, in the case of the Italian Government, the power and prestige of the Supreme Allied Commander has been, and remains, of great importance. In this [illegible] determining factor in supporting the position and

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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remained essential in order to bring the maximum weight and authority to bear when dealing with the unsettled conditions which prevailed throughout EUROPE, and in particular within the boundaries of this Theatre. These conditions are still far from settled, and the possibility of large-scale operations, although improbable, remains. Additionally, the internal situation in ITALY, discussed more fully in para 5 above, may deteriorate to such an extent that Allied intervention may become essential.

31. The unsettled condition of the Mediterranean makes desirable the continuance of the present Allied Naval Command, under which CinC Mediterranean exercises operational control of the Allied (including French and Greek) naval forces in the Mediterranean. This operational control is derived from the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. If it is to continue it must therefore involve the retention of the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, unless an Allied naval command in the Mediterranean were to be negotiated with the governments concerned.

32. From the Air Force point of view, bearing in mind the possibilities of active operations in this Theatre, it is considered that the effective integration of Air Force efforts with those of the Land and Naval Forces can best be achieved by retaining Supreme Interservice Command.

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34. It is therefore submitted that, until such time as the general situation in the Mediterranean and the internal security problem in ITALY show a considerable improvement, a Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should be retained, and hence that the Interservice Command should not be terminated at the present time.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS (SECTIONS I AND II).

35. a. The appointment of Supreme Allied Commander should be continued for the present.

b. On the dissolution of HQ MTOUSA, there should remain an integrated AFHQ. This HQ should be formed from GHQ CMF and from a small US HQ, which should be organized as a sub-command of USFET and which should command all US land forces in ITALY.

c. The US component of AFHQ should be provided from this small US HQ.

d. AFHQ should continue to function as at present.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

36. a. That the cable attached at Appendix 'A' be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That detailed study should be made to determine the composition of the US HQ in ITALY.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785115

RECOMMENDATIONS.

36. a. That the cable attached at Appendix 'A' be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That detailed study should be made to determine the composition of the US HQ in ITALY.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735015

SECRET

315 (Final) D R A F T APPENDIX A

361

TO : AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff SECRET
CABINET OFFICES for British Chiefs of Staff
RPTD: USFET

This is NAF _____.

Reference FAN 601 and 608.

1. I have had under consideration the question of what arrangements should be made for the command of British and US forces in this theatre when MTOUSA is dissolved about 1 December and whether supreme Allied interservice command is any longer necessary. My views are given below.

I. ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMAND OF ALLIED LAND FORCES

2. ITALY is an Allied commitment and is in a generally unsettled condition. Serious internal unrest involving the security of Allied forces in ITALY is a distinct possibility and the chances of a clash with the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA can not be excluded. It might be possible for Allied responsibilities in ITALY and for dealing with the Italian Government to be vested in British and US Commanders-in-Chief acting as a committee. Such an arrangement might lead to a lack of coordination and to misunderstandings and would detract from the weight which an Allied Commander-in-Chief representing both US and UK Governments can now bring to bear in dealings with ITALY and her neighbours. I consider therefore that an Allied Commander-in-Chief ITALY must be retained and he should exercise operational command over all British and US land forces in ITALY.

3. On dissolution of MTOUSA about 1 December all US forces in ITALY will come under command of CG USFET although, as I have recommended above, operational command should be exercised by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It is desirable that a commander having operational control should also have control over maintenance and supply arrangements for his land forces. With two nationalities this can not be

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solved about 1 December and whether supreme Allied interservice command [illegible] longer necessary. My views are given below.

I. ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMAND OF ALLIED LAND FORCES

2. ITALY is an Allied commitment and is in a generally unsettled condition. Serious internal unrest involving the security of Allied forces in ITALY is a distinct possibility and the chances of a clash with the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA can not be excluded. It might be possible for Allied responsibilities in ITALY and for dealing with the Italian Government to be vested in British and US Commanders-in-Chief acting as a committee. Such an arrangement might lead to a lack of coordination and to misunderstandings and would detract from the weight which an Allied Commander-in-Chief representing both US and UK Governments can now bring to bear in dealings with ITALY and her neighbours. I consider therefore that an Allied Commander-in-Chief ITALY must be retained and he should exercise operational command over all British and US land forces in ITALY.

3. On dissolution of MTOUSA about 1 December all US forces in ITALY will come under command of CG USFET although, as I have recommended above, operational command should be exercised by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It is desirable that a commander having operational control should also have control over maintenance and supply arrangements for his land forces. With two nationalities this can not be completely effective except through a deputy commander. In addition experience in ITALY has shown that there must be a common Allied policy for certain administrative matters, i.e. control of movement facilities, accommodation, labour, local resources, political and economic matters. If there was no US commander in ITALY with appropriate powers, and means of exercising those powers, considerable delay, misunderstandings and inconvenience would result and Allied Commander-in-Chief would be deprived of the backing and assistance of a US Commander-in-Chief having full command responsibilities in respect of all US land forces in ITALY. I consider therefore that with the dissolution

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of MTOUSA a small US HQ in ITALY should be set up as a subordinate command of USFET but having appropriate powers of command over all US land forces in ITALY.

4. It is important that CG USFET should be kept fully informed on all matters which concern US troops in ITALY. It is considered that this can most effectively be accomplished by the establishment of a sub-command of USFET in ITALY, as outlined above.

II. INTERSERVICE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

5. As already noted there is still a possibility that operations in this theatre involving all three services will be necessary. These unsettled conditions make continuation of Allied command of naval forces desirable. This operational command is derived from authority of Supreme Allied Commander, and if supreme command were abolished further negotiations with governments concerned would be necessary.

6. Abolition of supreme interservice command would probably be interpreted by ITALY and especially her neighbours as a sign of weakness and would undoubtedly make dealings with the Italian Government over the armistice complicated. I consider therefore that in view of the possibility of operations involving all three services and of the political aspects supreme interservice command should be retained for the present.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. To summarise, I recommend that

a. Supreme Allied interservice command and therefore AFHQ be retained for the present.

b. MTOUSA a small US HQ in ITALY as a sub-command of

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5. As already noted there is still a possibility that operations in this theatre involving all three services will be necessary. These unsettled conditions make continuation of Allied command of naval forces desirable. This operational command is derived from authority of Supreme Allied Commander, and if supreme command were abolished further negotiations with governments concerned would be necessary.

6. Abolition of supreme interservice command would probably be interpreted by ITALY and especially her neighbours as a sign of weakness and would undoubtedly make dealings with the Italian Government over the armistice complicated. I consider therefore that in view of the possibility of operations involving all three services and of the political aspects supreme interservice command should be retained for the present.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. To summarise, I recommend that

a. Supreme Allied interservice command and therefore AFHQ be retained for the present.

b. On the dissolution of MTOUSA a small US HQ in ITALY as a sub-command of USFET should be set up, which would have command of all US land forces in ITALY.

c. The US component of AFHQ should be provided by this small US HQ.

d. AFHQ should continue to function as at present.

DISTRIBUTION

AFHQ	SACS	CINC MED	CMF	G(SD)	MTOUSA
	C.O	RAF ITALY		"A"	
	G-2	RAF MEDME		Q(Maint)	
	G-3	POLAD			
	G-5	RESMIN			

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SACS AFHQ

C/S MTO
G-1
G-3
G-4

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CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 772

SAC (45) 22
12th October 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO 30

REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE AT 1100 HOURS, 11 OCTOBER 1945

PRESENT:-

Major General Y.D. Basilov,
Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate for Repatriation

Colonel F.G. Jakovlev,
Permanent Soviet Repatriation Representative in ITALY

Colonel Briukhanov,
Staff Officer to Major General Basilov

Major General L. L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff to Acting Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFH

Major General M.W.M. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, GHQ CMF

Major General M.G. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MTOUSA.

Brigadier General A.L.Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

INTERPRETERS:-

Captain Saunders (British)
Captain Bekreneva (Russian)

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman

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1. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR SOVIET OFFICERS IN ITALY

CC DIST 22 Oct
CC EK.comm.
CC P/L

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE AT 1100 HOURS, 11 OCTOBER 1945

PRESENT:-

Major General Y.D. Basilov,
Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate
for Repatriation

Colonel P.G. Jakovlev,
Permanent Soviet Repatriation
Representative in ITALY

Colonel Briukhanov,
Staff Officer to Major General
Basilov

Major General L. L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff to Acting Supreme
Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFH

Major General M.W.H. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, GHQ CMF

Major General M.G. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,
MTOUSA.

Brigadier General A.L.Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,
AFHQ.

INTERPRETERS:-

Captain Saunders (British)
Captain Bekreneva (Russian)

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Sweetman

- - - - - -

1. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR SOVIET OFFICERS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV handed over a nominal roll of Russian officers working in the group of Colonel Jakovlev, Permanent Soviet Repatriation Representative in ITALY. He (Major General Basilov) had applied on 17th September, through Allied Commission, for movement orders to permit these officers to move freely throughout ITALY and had indicated the places to which they would go. He requested that these movement orders should be issued immediately.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that it was not at present possible to give a blanket permit to any Russian officer to allow permanently free movement throughout ITALY. Separate movement orders were necessary for each specific journey. This was also the regulation for all allied officers, including Britis and American. He understood that the letter to which Major General Basilov referred had been received at AFHQ considerably after that date, and he thought that, in some respects, a reply had already been given. He believed that

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

certain of the requests made could not be granted, as they were contrary to the already stated policy of the Supreme Allied Commander. He undertook that a full reply to Major General Basilov's letter would be furnished to him as a matter of urgency.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV stated that American and British officers were permitted complete freedom of movement in BULGARIA, ROUMANIA and HUNGARY, without the necessity of obtaining movement orders. He wished to refute a statement made in a letter dated 9th October addressed to him by General Lemnitzer that Russian officers were making journies without authorisation. It was his interpretation that Article 2 of the YALTA Agreement undertook to allow Russian officers to move freely. A further undertaking in this sense had been given by the British Ambassador in MOSCOW. The Russian officers in ITALY had considered that these statements provided adequate authorisation for their movement and had proceeded accordingly to their duties at the Russian-organised collecting points for Soviet citizens in ITALY. They only moved away from these points when they received news of Russian citizens located in certain districts and requiring to be repatriated. They then went to see that these persons came to the collecting points.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that the YALTA Agreement provided only a general authority for freedom of movement. In accordance with its provisions movement orders would be issued allowing Russians to move on all reasonable occasions. However, such local movement orders for specific journies remained required in accordance with theatre regulations. If Russian officers were proceeding with such authority they would be offered all facilities made available to any other allied officer.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

- Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, GHQ CMF, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MTOUSA, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to draft for his approval as a matter of urgency a complete reply to Major General Basilov's request for permission for Russian officers to move in ITALY.

2. <u>RUSSIAN COLLECTING POINTS IN ITALY</u>

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV named several places throughout ITALY where collecting points for Russian citizens had formerly been set up by Russian officers. These officers had recently been ordered to return to ROME as not being in possession of authorisation to remain. They had been located at some of these collecting points since May. He wished these collecting points to continue in existence and requested that the officers, mentioned on the nominal roll which he had handed over, should be authorised to remain in the towns in question.

5918

MAJOR GENERAL MACLEOD said, and Major General WHITE and Brigadier General HARLEN agreed, that it appeared that this Russian organisation of collecting [illegible] without the knowledge or the overall authority of the [illegible]

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Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, GHQ CMF, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MTOUSA, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to draft for his approval as a matter of urgency a complete reply to Major General Basilov's request for permission for Russian officers to move in ITALY.

2. RUSSIAN COLLECTING POINTS IN ITALY

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5918

MAJOR GENERAL MACLEOD said, and Major General WHITE and Brigadier General HAMBLEN agreed, that it appeared that this Russian organisation of collecting points had been set up without the knowledge or the overall authority of the allied authorities. They were in no way official allied collecting points for Russian citizens and were not recognised as having any official status. Moreover he could not agree that they were Russian citizens, according to the British and United States interpretations, located at the various points throughout ITALY to which Major General BASILOV had referred.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV explained that the network was not a permanent organisation. It was organised by Colonel Jakovlev. The Russians put out advertisements both in the press and on the Russian radio that Russian officers were located in these places and then Russian citizens wanting to be repatriate were collected at these points and passed on. The collecting points often consisted simply of a flat in which these Russian citizens gathered. The Russian officers were in the habit of reporting to the local allied command all about these people and rations for the Russian personnel concerned had been obtained from the local allied authorities.

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF said it was now becoming clear why the misunderstanding about unauthorised Russian movement had arisen. The allied authorities at AFHQ had known nothing about this system of Russian collecting points, whereas the Russian officers had believed they were authorised to move about ITALY in order that this organisation might function. He asked Major General BASILOV to submit in writing complete details of his plan for collecting points in ITALY, together with an estimate of the numbers to be handled at each place, so that proper arrangements for accommodation could be made. This plan should be based on handling only persons recognised as Soviet citizens by the United States and British Governments. It would then be thoroughly examined by the staff and a decision would be given as to whether the organisation was to be allowed to continue. Such a decision could not, however, be given until a full study could be made of the implications. He also asked Major General BASILOV to arrange for one of his officers to go with a staff officer from AFHQ to one or more of these collecting points, so that the allied authorities might have a clear idea of the way the organisation worked.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Invited Major General Basilov to submit in writing full details of his plan for Russian collecting points for Soviet citizens in ITALY.

3. SPECIAL HOSPITAL FACILITIES FOR RUSSIANS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked if one hospital, or if that was not possible one department or ward of a hospital, could be set aside for Russian citizens. He said that Russian sick and wounded were at present located in various hospitals over ITALY and it would be better if they could be put in one place. He pointed out that in ODESSA special American and British hospitals had been set up.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF said that he would have this proposal examined by the staff. He understood that in certain areas it was already in force. However, the provision of facilities in any particular area would necessarily depend on the number of Soviet citizens requiring treatment, as it was essential that hospitalisation facilities should be economically arranged.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to examine the feasibility of the provision of special hospitalisation facilities for Russian citizens in ITALY and to inform the Russian Repatriation Mission accordingly in due course.

4. SOVIET CITIZENS IN POLISH CAMPS

5017

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said there were some 300 Soviet citizens, according

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Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to examine the feasibility of the provision of special hospitalisation facilities for Russian citizens in ITALY and to inform the Russian Repatriation Mission accordingly in due course.

5017

4. SOVIET CITIZENS IN POLISH CORPS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said there were some 300 Soviet citizens, according to the United States and British definition, held in the camps around CERVIARO where personnel of the Polish Corps who had elected to return to POLAND were at present concentrated. These 300 personnel wished to return to RUSSIA and he asked that their return should be arranged, in accordance with the instructions which Field Marshal Alexander had given that all personnel, who were Soviet citizens on the United States and British definition and who wished to return to RUSSIA, should be so returned.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that this had been a general direction of Field Marshal Alexander's. Particular arrangements for personnel of the Polish Corps were governed by further specific instructions from the British government as this corps was a British commitment.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF said that all personnel who had been in the Polish Corps had been enlisted into that formation as Poles. Some 14,000 had volunteered to

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return to POLAND and had been withdrawn from the Polish Corps for that purpose. The British government had undertaken to return these individuals to POLAND and it was his responsibility to see that this decision was carried out. If the 300 personnel to whom Major General Basilov referred wished to go to RUSSIA when they got back to POLAND, that was a matter for negotiation between the Soviet and Polish governments. The instructions of the British government, as confirmed by the Supreme Allied Commander, were completely clear that all of these 14,000 personnel were to be returned to POLAND.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he was only asking that agreed Soviet citizens who wanted to go to RUSSIA should be handed over to his agencies fo repatriation.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF repeated that his instructions were that all 14,000 personnel should be returned to POLAND. Any variation of these instructions must be arranged between the Russian and British governments. However, he was most anxious that the whole 14,000 should get back to POLAND as quickly as possible. He was finding great difficulty in making the train arrangements for this move and he asked Major General Basilov if he could obtain any assistance from his government in regard to the journey from VIENNA onwards.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked if he himself or one of his officers could go into the camps around CERVIGNA to identify Russian citizens.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF replied that, as all the men in these camps were being sent back to POLAND, visit to them by Russian officers would serve no useful purpose.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

> Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to write to the Soviet Repatriation Mission in ITALY, reiterating the British position and rejecting Major General Basilov's requests in regard to this matter.

5. PERMISSION FOR SOVIET OFFICERS TO ENTER PRISONS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that in his letter of 29th September he had given details of Soviet citizens detained in prisons in ITALY. He asked if Soviet officers could visit such prisons.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that in order to visit civilian prisons in areas which had been turned back to the Italian government the Russian mission should approach that government. Permission would certainly be given for Russian officers to visit any British or United States military prisons in which Russian citizens (on the British and United States inter-

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, GHQ CMF, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MTOUSA, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, to investigate the report contained in Major General Basilov's letter of 29th September, that Russian citizens were confined in certain prisons in ITALY, and if these proved to be military prisons to take appropriate action.

6. RUSSIAN CITIZENS ON SOVIET DEFINITION RETAINED IN ITALY

(71)

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked what was the intention in regard to the disposal of personnel, at present held in camps in ITALY, who were not Soviet citizens according to the British and American definition and therefore not at present eligible for repatriation.

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF replied that the problem had been put up to the British and United States governments but no answer had as yet been received. In the meantime these personnel would be properly taken care of in Allied camps pending a decision as to their disposition.

7. FACILITIES FOR PERMANENT RUSSIAN REPATRIATION MISSION

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV suggested that Colonel Jakovlev, the Chief of the normal Russian Repatriation Mission in ITALY, should come to AFHQ each week for consultation with a suitable British or American Staff officer who dealt with repatriation matters.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF said he would be exceedingly glad for such interviews to take place, as many points could be settled on staff level which were not suitable for discussion at a meeting such as the present one. Colonel Jakovlev would be received at AFHQ at any time on giving reasonable notice.

MAJOR GENERAL M.CLEOD said that the officer with whom Colonel Jakovlev could probably best deal was the Head of the A2 Section of his staff. He understood that Colonel Jakovlev had in the past visited this staff section and knew how to find it. He would also be glad to have Colonel Jakovlev visit Headquarters, 218 Special Area who were responsible for the running of the Russian camp in the RIMINI area.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Invited Major General Basilov to arrange for Colonel Jakovlev to contact an appropriate staff officer at AFHQ and Commander, 218 Special Area, as suggested above.

8. DEPARTURE OF MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV AND PARTY FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he wished to return to MOSCOW by road via VIENNA, starting on 14th October. He gave details of the composition of his party. He requested that he be given a route and travel orders and that arrangements for his passage be made.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF observed that it would be necessary to obtain the permission of Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in AUSTRIA, but that this would be done as a matter of urgency.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Secretary to take immediate steps to arrange, subject to the agreement of Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in Austria, for Major General Basilov's movement to VIENNA in accordance with his request.

5915

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5915

(NOTE: The following matters were touched on during the conference, but as they were left for detailed discussion between Colonel Jakovlev and the appropriate Allied staffs, they are not recorded :

(1) Alleged ejection of a Russian officer from his hotel in the LEGHORN-PISA area.

(2) Appointment of a Russian officer to work with the British authorities at Camp 5c near RIMINI.

(3) Anti-Soviet articles by Polish newspapers.)

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY

71

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6 Extra spares to S.C.S

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P/313 (Final) (Revised)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 25

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

2 October 1945

MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT WITH ITALY (US COMMENT)

1. As a result of the S.A.C Conference held on Thursday, 27 September 1945, the MJPS have revised their paper P/313 (Final) which contained comment upon the US proposals, already circulated with paper P/313 (Final).

2. The attached Annexures cover the revised recommendations of the MJPS:-

a. Annexure 1. A draft signal stating the general views of CG MTOUSA, to be dispatched by him.

b. Annexure 2. A follow-up letter to this signal covering the minor comment and suggested modifications in drafting, to be dispatched by CG MTOUSA.

c. Appendix 'A' to Annexure 2 above. Detailed drafting comments.

3. The following Appendix will require to be provided.

Appendix 'B' to Annexure 2 above. British Draft Military and Civil Agreement.

4. The following Appendix will require to be provided from paper P/312 (Final) (Revised) when that paper has been approved.

Appendix 'C' to Annexure 2 above. British comments on 3 above.

for D. PEEL YATES, Brigadier, G.S., Chairman M.J.P.S.

5012

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Judge Advocate General MTOUSA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

the US proposals, already circulated with paper P/319 (Final).

2. The attached Annexures cover the revised recommendations of the MJPS:-

a. Annexure 1. A draft signal stating the general views of CG MTOUSA, to be dispatched by him.

b. Annexure 2. A follow-up letter to this signal covering the minor comment and suggested modifications in drafting, to be dispatched by CG MTOUSA.

c. Appendix 'A' to Annexure 2 above. Detailed drafting comments.

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Appendix 'B' to Annexure 2 above. British Draft Military and Civil Agreement.

4. The following Appendix will require to be provided from paper P/312 (Final) (Revised) when that paper has been approved.

Appendix 'C' to Annexure 2 above. British comments on 3 above.

for D. PEEL YATES, Col GSC
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman M.J.P.S.

5912

DISTRIBUTION:
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Judge Advocate General MTOUSA

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

SECRET

S/313 (Final Revised) D R A F T ANNEXURE 1

TO : AGWAR for US Joint Chiefs of Staff SECRET

INFO: Cabinet Offices for British Chiefs of Staff

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1. I understand from a personal letter received here by Brigadier General Hamblen my views as Commanding General MTOUSA on draft Civil and Military Affairs Agreement would be appreciated.

2. I agree generally with the agreement as drafted with the following major exceptions:

   a. Para 2a mentions certain airfields by name as being the ones required exclusively for American use. These are not however the ones that it is planned here to use. Suggest para should be redrafted to avoid specific mention of particular airfields.

   b. Para 6d does not appear to be clear. The first sentence states no payment to be made for "facilities". The second one provides for credit to be given for "public service facilities".

   c. Para 11 a and b. The provisions of this para are dependent on governmental policy of which I have no information. However it is believed undesirable to include in the agreement any reference to the term 'net troop pay procedure'.

   d. Para 17. In view of redeployment I am unable to continue the processing of all such claims mentioned in this para and consider it should be redrafted to place the onus of investigating such claims on the Italian Government.

   e. My detailed comments follow by air.

3. In addition to the American draft a copy of the British agreement has been received in this HQ and Field Marshal Alexander has made a copy available for my information. 5011

4. There are two major differences between the two:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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e. My detailed comments follow by air.

3. In addition to the American draft a copy of the British agreement has been received in this HQ and Field Marshal Alexander has made a copy available for my information. 5011

4. There are two major differences between the two:

a. The British agreement is to run initially for five years with an option for a further unstated period after consultation between both parties; the duration of the American agreement is unspecified.

b. The British agreement provides for free lire supplies and services, including costs for caring for displaced persons; the American agreement provides that no payment will be made for facilities (undefined) but that an agreed

(70)

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rental value for fixed installations and the cost of public service facilities used by the US forces shall be credited to the Italian Government against its obligations to the Government of the United States (6d). Furthermore a separate agreement, whose terms are not indicated, is envisaged for the supply of lire and in the meantime the troop pay procedure will obtain which means dollar credit (para 17). These divergent financial policies appear irreconcilable..

In addition there are several other variations in the drafting of clauses common to both agreements and certain additional points included in the American draft which are not in the British one.

5. I am including a copy of the British agreement with the Field Marshal's comments thereon in my letter forwarding my detailed comments on the US one and have included also a note of the main variations and omissions.

6. In view of the fundamental differences in financial policy, a joint Anglo-American agreement seems impracticable. I recommend that, insofar as is possible, all clauses common to both agreements should be drafted in the same form and that the time elements of both agreements should be the same.

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~~SECRET~~ P/312 (Final)(Revised)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No. 35

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

2 October 1945.

MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY (BRITISH CONTENT).

1. As a result of the SAC Conference held on Thursday, 27 September 45, and in the light of the supplementary direction received from the Chief of Staff on 29 September 45, the MJPS have revised their paper P/312 (Final), which contained comment upon the British proposals outlined in TROOPERS signals 74075 CA(B) and 74076 CA2(B), both of 15 September 45.

2. The attached annexures cover the revised recommendations of the MJPS:

   a. Annexure 1. A draft signal stating the general views of Field Marshal Alexander, to be dispatched by C-in-C, CMF, on his behalf.

   b. Annexure 2. A follow-up letter to this signal, covering the minor comment and suggested modifications in drafting. This letter to be dispatched by C-in-C, CMF.

   c. Appendix 'A' to Annexure 2 above. Detailed drafting comments.

3. The following appendix will require to be provided:

   Appendix 'B' to Annexure 2 above. Copy of US draft Military and Civil Affairs Agreement.

4. The following appendix will require to be provided from paper P/313 (Final) (Revised) when that paper has been approved:

   Appendix 'C' to Annexure 2 above. US comments on 3 above.

for D. PEEL YATES, Lt Col
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

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2. The attached Annexures cover the following:

a. Annexure 1. A draft signal stating the general views of Field Marshal Alexander, to be dispatched by C-in-C, CMF, on his behalf.

b. Annexure 2. A follow-up letter to this signal, covering the minor comment and suggested modifications in drafting. This letter to be dispatched by C-in-C, CMF.

c. Appendix 'A' to Annexure 2 above. Detailed drafting comments.

3. The following appendix will require to be provided:

Appendix 'B' to Annexure 2 above. Copy of US draft Military and Civil Affairs Agreement.

4. The following appendix will require to be provided from paper P/313 (Final) (Revised) when that paper has been approved:

Appendix 'C' to Annexure 2 above. US comments on 3 above.

for D. PETRE BATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

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(69)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

P/312 (Final) (Revise

D R A F T

ANNEXURE 1

TO : Cabinet Offices for British Chiefs of Staff SECRET

RPTD: BRITMAN WASHINGTON for US Joint Chiefs of Staff

- -

This is MEDCOS _____.

I understand from TROOPERS Signal 74075 CA(B) from the Director of Civil Affair that my views on the draft Military and Civil Affairs Agreement with ITALY contained in TROOPERS Signal 74076 CA2(B) would be appreciated.

1. I am generally in agreement with the draft agreement with the following major exceptions:

   a. In view of possible difficulties over transport of supplies to AUSTRIA from ITALY the right to take complete control of any section or sections of the railways should be reserved. A similar right in the case of ports and airfields is already reserved in Section III, paras 2 and 3.

   b. The right to arrest and detain or call upon the Italian Government to arrest and detain any one in ITALY who is deemed to be a danger to the security of British forces should be reserved. I suggest a new para 3 be added to Section XI to cover this.

   c. The ban on operating radio and radar stations in Section IVB appears most undesirable and I consider the first part of the sentence should read "the right to construct, maintain and operate" etc.

   d. My detailed comments follow by air.

2. In addition to the British draft a copy of the American agreement has been received in this HQ and CG MTOUSA has made a copy available for my information.

SQ13

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

contained in TROOPERS Signal 74076 CA2(B) would be appreciated.

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   c. The ban on operating radio and radar stations in Section IVB appears most undesirable and I consider the first part of the sentence should read "the right to construct, maintain and operate" etc.

   d. My detailed comments follow by air.

2. In addition to the British draft a copy of the American agreement has been received in this HQ and CG MTOUSA has made a copy available for my information.

5913

3. There are two major differences between the two:

   a. The British agreement is to run initially for five years with an option for a further unstated period after consultation between both parties (para 2 of the Memorandum attached to the Agreement) the duration of the American agreement is unspecified.

   b. The British agreement provides for free lire supplies and services, including costs for caring for displaced persons (Section XVIII): the American agreement provides that no payment will be made for facilities (undefined) but that an agreed rent l value for fixed installations and

(69)

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the cost of public service facilities used by the US forces shall be credited to the Italian Government against its obligations to the Government of the United States. Furthermore a separate agreement, whose terms are not indicated, is envisaged for the supply of lire and in the meantime the troop pay procedure will obtain which means dollar credit.

In addition there are several other variations in the drafting of clauses common to both agreements and certain additional points included in the American draft which are not in the British one.

4. Paragraph XVIII in the British Agreement is fundamentally different from the U.S. method of dealing with this problem. With the knowledge and advice available in Italy I do not feel competent to comment upon this paragraph, except to state that any form of Agreement requiring a balance to be struck between services rendered to the Italians by the British and vice versa would be impracticable. Further, any reduction in the services to be provided free by the Italian Government would result in there having to be a reduction in the services now being provided for the accommodation and welfare of the British troops in Italy.

5. I am including a copy of the American agreement with CG MTOUSA's comments thereon in my letter forwarding my comments on the British one and have included in the letter a note of the main variations and omissions.

6. In view of the fundamental differences in financial policy, a joint Anglo-American agreement seems impracticable. I recommend that, insofar as is possible, all clauses common to both agreements should be drafted in the same form, and that the time element of both agreements should be the same.

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American draft which are not in the British one.

4. Paragraph XVIII in the British Agreement is fundamentally different from the U.S. method of dealing with this problem. With the knowledge and advice available in Italy I do not feel competent to comment upon this paragraph, except to state that any form of Agreement requiring a balance to be struck between services rendered to the Italians by the British and vice versa would be impracticable. Further, any reduction in the services to be provided free by the Italian Government would result in there having to be a reduction in the services now being provided for the accommodation and welfare of the British troops in Italy.

5. I am including a copy of the American agreement with CC AMTOUSA's comments thereon in my letter forwarding my comments on the British one and have included in the letter a note of the main variations and omissions.

6. In view of the fundamental differences in financial policy, a joint Anglo-American agreement seems impracticable. I recommend that, insofar as is possible, all clauses common to both agreements should be drafted in the same form, and that the time element of both agreements should be the same.

SECRET

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P/313/Final

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Copy No.____

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

26 September 1945

DETAILED DRAFTING COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICAN AND ITALY

References in the left hand margin are to paras of the draft agreement forwarded.

First Para of Preamble — The protocol dated the 9th day of November 1943 agreed that the document signed by Italy would not be referred to as the instrument of surrender. It is therefore recommended that the words "and Instrument of Surrender" be omitted in the first sentence and the word "agreements" substituted.

Fourth Para of Preamble — When the proposed document is signed it is very doubtful whether there will be a "Commanding General, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations" and it is suggested that the words "the Commanding General of the US Forces in Italy" should be substituted.

Para 1 — Although para 18 may cover the impositions of any taxes it is suggested that the word "free" should be inserted after the word "full" in the first sentence of this para to remove any doubt. Furthermore the word "designated" in the last part of the first sentence might be too restrictive and it is suggested that it should be omitted and the word "such" substituted for it and the words "as may be required" inserted after the word "bases".

Para 2 (a) — (i) In the second sentence the words "services and" should be inserted before the word "facilities" to give it a broader meaning, and the word "drydocks" inserted after "dockyards" to remove any doubt as to the extent of the present words in parenthesis. In addition the words "coastwise shipping" should be inserted between the words "railroads", and "inland waterways", since it may be necessary to continue the services facilities and priorities used in connection therewith.

(ii) No mention is made of any "lodger" rights which the American forces may require over any airfields which are not under their exclusive control. It is suggested that the following sentence should be added to cover this.

"On such airfields as the American forces require the status of "lodger rights" only, the Italian Government will furnish all facilities as may be required for the operation and protection of US Government aircraft and property."

(iii) The second sentence of this paragraph specifically mentions [illegible] of certain airfields but the ones mentioned are

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Fourth Para of Preamble

When the proposed document is signed it is very doubtful whether there will be a "Commanding General, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations" and it is suggested that the words "the Commanding General of the US Forces in Italy" should be substituted.

Para 1

Although para 18 may cover the impositions of any taxes it is suggested that the word "free" should be inserted after the word "full" in the first sentence of this para to remove any doubt. Furthermore the word "designated" in the last part of the first sentence might be too restrictive and it is suggested that it should be omitted and the word "such" substituted for it and the words "as may be required" inserted after the word "bases".

Para 2 (a)

(i) In the second sentence the words "services and" should be inserted before the word "facilities" to give it a broader meaning, and the word "drydocks" inserted after "dockyards" to remove any doubt as to the extent of the present words in parenthesis. In addition the words "coastwise shipping" should be inserted between the words "railroads", and "inland waterways", since it may be necessary to continue the services facilities and priorities used in connection therewith.

(ii) No mention is made of any "lodger" rights which the American forces may require over any airfields which are not under their exclusive control. It is suggested that the following sentence should be added to cover this.

"On such airfields as the American forces require the status of "lodger rights" only, the Italian Government will furnish all facilities as may be required for the operation and protection of US Government aircraft and property."

(iii) The second sentence of this paragraph specifically mentions the retention of certain airfields but the ones mentioned are not those which it is considered in this HQ will be used. Consequently it is thought better that no specific mention should be made in this sentence of the airfields to be used and this sentence and the final one should be deleted and the following substituted.

"Such airfield facilities and accommodations, and the right to make necessary extensions and improvements thereto, as are required for the purpose of military aviation will be provided at the request of the Commanding General. Such air bases will be under the exclusive control of the US forces during such temporary period.

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Para 2 (b) — No comment.

Para 2 (c) — It is suggested that the word "depots" should be inserted between the words "shops" and "staging areas". It is also felt that the words "may be necessary" in the last part of the sentence tend to throw the burden of proof onto the US forces and they should be deleted and the words "he may determine to" substituted.

Para 2 (d) — No comment.

Para 2 (e) — No comment.

Para 3 — The word "technical" before telecommunications in the first sentence appears to impose unnecessary limitations and should be deleted. Furthermore the words "and services" should be added after the words "following facilities" to give it a wider meaning.

Para 3 (a) — Insert the words "facilities and" before the word "services".

Para 3 (b) — Again the words "may from time to time prove to be necessary" throw the burden of proof on the US forces and it is suggested that the words "the Commanding General may from time to time deem to be necessary" should be substituted.

Paras (4) & (5) — No comment.

Para 6 (a) — In order to widen the scope of this para it is suggested that the word "installations" be inserted after the word "building" and "maintenance" between the words "operation, housing" in the first sentence. In order to clear up any doubt it is suggested that the words "at the request of the Commanding General" should be added at the end of the last sentence.

Para 6 (b) — It is suggested that the words "utilities and" be inserted between "services" and "facilities".

Para 6 (d) — The meaning of this para is not clear. The first sentence states that no payment shall be made for "facilities"; the second sentence states that credit will be given for the cost of "public service facilities". Does this mean that any facility other than a public service facility is free to the US forces and if so do the Italian Government have to reimburse private owners of facilities which are used by the US forces. The answer depends on governmental policy which is not known here and therefore it is not possible to suggest a redraft. 5617

Para 6 (c) — No comment.

Paras 7, 8 & 9 — No comment.

Para 10 (a) — The right to contest for such services found [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785115

Para 3 (b) — Again the words "may from time to time prove to be necessary" throw the burden of proof on the US forces and it is suggested that the words "the Commanding General may from time to time deem to be necessary" should be substituted.

Paras (4) & (5) — No comment.

Para 6 (a) — In order to widen the scope of this para it is suggested that the word "installations" be inserted after the word "building" and "maintenance" between the words "operation, housing" in the first sentence. In order to clear up any doubt it is suggested that the words "at the request of the Commanding General" should be added at the end of the last sentence.

Para 6 (b) — It is suggested that the words "utilities and" be inserted between "services" and "facilities".

Para 6 (d) — The meaning of this para is not clear. The first sentence states that no payment shall be made for "facilities"; the second sentence states that credit will be given for the cost of "public service facilities". Does this mean that any facility other than a public service facility is free to the US forces and if so do the Italian Government have to reimburse private owners of facilities which are used by the US forces. The answer depends on governmental policy which is not known here and therefore it is not possible to suggest a redraft. 5607

Para 6 (c) — No comment.

Paras 7, 8 & 9 — No comment.

Para 10 (a) — The right to contact for such services as laundry, etc in Italy should be reserved to the US forces and it is suggested that the words "and to contract for services" should be inserted between "manufactured goods" and "in Italy" in the first sentence.

Para 10 (b) — The words "in Italy or elsewhere" appear unnecessary and should be omitted.

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Para 11 (a) & (b) — This is a matter that the MJPS do not feel competent to comment on and owing to the shortness of time it was not possible to get the detailed recommendations of the Joint Finance Committee. The matter has been referred to them for their recommendations. As a question of government policy which is not known in this HQ is involved in 11 (b) it may be that no recommendation should be made but that the views of the Joint Finance Committee forwarded when received in case they may be of value when the final draft of this agreement is prepared).

Para 12 (a) — The words "or serve with" should be inserted after the words "who accompany" in this subpara to cover all persons who may be connected with the US forces.

New subpara — No provision is made to cover anyone in Italy who is likely to prove a danger to the security of the US forces and it is suggested that the following new subpara be inserted.

"United States military authorities should have the right to arrest and detain or require the Italian Government to arrest and detain any persons deemed to be a danger to the security of US forces or their installations in Italy"

(N.B. If this new para is accepted the references to para 12 which occur in subsequent paras in this agreement will require amendment).

Para 12 subpara (b) — The word "US" should be inserted between the words "Allied" and "Military" since the trials may be concluded by US Military Tribunals as opposed to Allied Military Tribunals. No provision is made for persons who may be charged after the date of this agreement with offences committed before this date and it is suggested the word "now" be inserted between "any persons" and "charged" and the words "or hereafter to be charged" added after the word "charged". Furthermore no provision is made for the trial by Allied Or US Tribunals of persons who have committed offences against the laws of war and to cover this it is suggested that the words "or the laws of war" be added after "Italian law". Since it may be necessary to try persons by US Military Tribunals for offences under AMG proclamations the following new sentence should be added.

5808

"In the event of the trial of any such case by a US Military Court the consent of the British Commander in Italy to the proceedings shall been deemed to confer upon such court an Allied jurisdiction within the provisions of the said proclamations"

Para 12 subpara (c) — No comment.

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New subpara

No provision is made to cover anyone in Italy who is likely to prove a danger to the security of the US forces and it is suggested that the following new subpara be inserted.

"United States military authorities should have the right to arrest and detain or require the Italian Government to arrest and detain any persons deemed to be a danger to the security of US forces or their installations in Italy"

(N.B. If this new para is accepted the references to para 12 which occur in subsequent paras in this agreement will require amendment).

Para 12 subpara (b)

The word "US" should be inserted between the words "Allied" and "Military" since the trials may be concluded by US Military Tribunals as opposed to Allied Military Tribunals. No provision is made for persons who may be charged after the date of this agreement with offences committed before this date and it is suggested the word "now" be inserted between "any persons" and "charged" and the words "or hereafter to be charged" added after the word "charged". Furthermore no provision is made for the trial by Allied Or US Tribunals of persons who have committed offences against the laws of war and to cover this it is suggested that the words "or the laws of war" be added after "Italian law". Since it may be necessary to try persons by US Military Tribunals for offences under AMG proclamations the following new sentence should be added.

5808

"In the event of the trial of any such case by a US Military Court the consent of the British Commander in Italy to the proceedings shall been deemed to confer upon such court an Allied jurisdiction within the provisions of the said proclamations"

Para 12 subpara (c)

No comment.

Para 12 subpara (d)

In order that this subpara may be in line with subpara (b) above the words "Allied Military Tribunals or US Military Courts" should be amended to read "Allied or US Military Tribunals"

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SECRET

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SECRET

Para 13 (a) In order to avoid any question of the Italian authorities placing a guard on property which already has an American guard the word "exclusive" should be inserted before 'rights.' To cover all US areas the word "installations" should be inserted before camps in the first and second sentences.

Para 13 (b) It is noted that no power is given to the Italian authorities to arrest any American military person who commits a serious crime outside US areas. It may be that this is a point which should be left to the Italian Government to raise. In order to come into line with the second amendment to para 13 subpara (a) the word "installations" should be inserted before the word "camps" in the first sentence. Owing to the possibility of non military personnel subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of US Military Courts being detained in Italian prisons without trial it is essential that early warning of any such arrests should be given to the US authorities. It is therefore suggested that a new sentence be inserted after the first sentence as follows.

"Immediate notification of any such arrest will be given to the nearest US Military installation".

It may be that there will be small detachments of American forces widely separated from any other American forces and commanded by an officer between field rank. It is therefore suggested that the words "of field rank or its equivalent" be omitted.

Para 14 In order to safeguard against any dilatoriness of the Italian legal system the words "without delay" should be added after the word "trial" at the beginning of the sentence.

Para 15 & 16 No comment.

Para 17 At the present time the United States army investigates and processes all tort claims arising against the United States or members of the U.S. Forces, and certifies approved claims to the Italian Government for payment or disallows those which have not been approved. With respect to labor claims, those which are covered by the Italian Workmen's Compensation Law are certified to the Italian Government for payment and those which are not so covered are processed by the U.S. Claims Service and certified to the Italian Government for payment.

In view of redeployment and the dissolution of this theater it is no longer deemed feasible for the United States to continue to process such claims. For this reason a fresh para designed to eliminate the necessity of U.S. Claims Service investigating or processing the claims in question is suggested in place of the present 17. as follows:

"a. The Italian Government agrees to establish the necessary [illegible] to investigate, process and to pay or otherwise [illegible] arising

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new sentence be inserted after the first sentence.

"Immediate notification of any such arrest will be given to the nearest US Military installation".

It may be that there will be small detachments of American forces widely separated from any other American forces and commanded by an officer between field rank. It is therefore suggested that the words "of field rank or its equivalent" be omitted.

Para 14 — In order to safeguard against any dilatoriness of the Italian legal system the words "without delay" should be added after the word "trial" at the beginning of the sentence.

Para 15 & 16 — No comment.

Para 17 — At the present time the United States Army investigates and processes all tort claims arising against the United States or members of the U.S. Forces, and certifies approved claims to the Italian Government for payment or disallows those which have not been approved. With respect to labor claims, those which are covered by the Italian Workmen's Compensation Law are certified to the Italian Government for payment and those which are not so covered are processed by the U.S. Claims Service and certified to the Italian Government for payment.

In view of redeployment and the dissolution of this theater it is no longer deemed feasible for the United States to continue to process such claims. For this reason a fresh para designed to eliminate the necessity of U.S. Claims Service investigating or processing the claims in question is suggested in place of the present 17. as follows:

"a. The Italian Government agrees to establish the necessary organization to investigate, process and to pay or otherwise dispose of any and all claims of whatever kind or nature arising against the United States Government or members of the United States Forces presented to it by United States authorities or by persons including, but not limited to, corporations, partnerships and similar entities, residing or whose principal place of business is Italy or Italian territory.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

...in all cases in which property of the respective Governments is damaged or destroyed or in which one government might otherwise assert against the other claims for deaths, injuries or loss (as distinct from claims of individuals), it is agreed that the respective governments will each bear their own losses where they fall, and will mutually forbear from asserting any claim against the other. It is understood that mutual forbearance is not limited to cases of damage, injury or death caused by members of U.S. Forces only, but extends to all cases of damage, injury or death caused by personnel or employees of the respective governments."

Para 18 — It is suggested that this should become subpara (a) and the word "also" inserted between "shall" and "apply" in the second sentence. In addition the last five words of the sentence do not appear clear and it is suggested that the words "in Italy or elsewhere" should be substituted for the words "or otherwise elsewhere in Italy".

New sub-para — It is suggested that provision should be made to ensure that the sale of surplus U.S. Government material in Italy is not frustrated by the imposition of prohibitive taxes. On the other hand, it may be necessary to ensure that the economic rehabilitation of Italy is not upset by the Italian markets being flooded by the sale of surplus goods. Owing to the question of policy involved, no attempt has been made to draft this subpara.

Para 19 — Suggest adding the word "additional" after "selected".

Para 20 — No comment.

Para 21 — It is thought that the scope of this para should be widened to cover all types of personnel intended to be catered for here as follows, insert the words "and stateless" between the words "displaced" and "persons", "refugees" after "persons", "recalcitrants" after "war criminals" and the word "refugee" after "prisoner of war". There are some security suspects who are not of enemy nationality at present held by the Allied forces and it is suggested that the words "of enemy nationality" should be omitted.

Para 21 (c) — No comment.

Para 21 (d) — The words "upon the request of the Commanding General the" should be inserted between the words "and" and "trial" in the first sentence to safeguard against the Italian Government attempting to cooperate in trials of war criminals when they have not been invited.

5910

Para 22 — Since this is the principal agreement the words "will be" should be substituted for the words "are being".

Paras 23, 24 & 25 — No comment.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

words "in Italy or elsewhere" should be substituted for the words "or otherwise elsewhere in Italy".

New sub-para — It is suggested that provision should be made to ensure that the sale of surplus U.S. Government material in Italy is not frustrated by the imposition of prohibitive taxes. On the other hand, it may be necessary to ensure that the economic rehabilitation of Italy is not upset by the Italian markets being flooded by the sale of surplus goods. Owing to the question of policy involved, no attempt has been made to draft this subpara.

Para 19 — Suggest adding the word "additional" after "selected".

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Para 21 (c) — No comment.

Para 21 (d) — The words "upon the request of the Commanding General the" should be inserted between the words "and" and "trial" in the first sentence to safeguard against the Italian Government attempting to cooperate in trials of war criminals when they have not been invited.

5010

Para 22 — Since this is the principal agreement the words "will be" should be substituted for the words "are being".

Paras 23, 24 & 25 — No comment.

New Para — Certain definitions appear to be necessary to clarify the use of certain terms used in this document and it is suggested that a new para of definitions be added as follows

The term "US Forces" when used in this agreement shall be defined as "US Armed Forces and governmental organizations and accredited agencies operating under or in conjunction with such forces" whenever applicable. The term "Italy" shall be deemed for the purposes of this agreement to include all territories under Italian Sovereignty and the territorial waters around them.

(68)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

S E C R E T

APPENDIX A

F/312 (Final)

D R A F T

TO : AMSSC for British Chiefs of Staff

FREE: EMBRAN WASHINGTON for US Joint Chiefs of Staff

This is MEDCOS _____.

I understand from TROOPERS Signal 74075 CA(B) from The Director of Civil Affairs that my views on the draft Military and Civil Affairs Agreement with ITALY contained in TROOPERS Signal 74076 CA2(B) would be appreciated.

1. I am generally in agreement with the draft agreement with the following exceptions:

a. In view of possible difficulties over transport of supplies to AUSTRIA from ITALY the right to take complete control of any section or sections of the railways should be reserved. A similar right in the case of ports and airfields is already reserved in SectionIII, paras 2 and 3.

b. The right to arrest and detain or call upon the Italian Government to arrest and detain any one in ITALY who is deemed to be a danger to the security of British forces should be reserved. I suggest a new para 3 be added to Section IX to cover this.

c. The ban on operating radio and radar stations in Section IV B appears most undesirable and I consider the first part of the sentence should read "the right to construct, maintain and operate" etc.

d. I cannot agree with Section XVIII which in my opinion will militate very strongly against the economic recovery of ITALY.

e. Control drafting amendments and comments and these follow by air.

R805

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

tained in TROOPERS Signal 74076 CA2(B) would be appreciated.

1. I am generally in agreement with the draft agreement with the following exceptions:

a. In view of possible difficulties over transport of supplies to AUSTRIA from ITALY the right to take complete control of any section or sections of the railways should be reserved. A similar right in the case of ports and airfields is already reserved in SectionIII, paras 2 and 3.

b. The right to arrest and detain or call upon the Italian Government to arrest and detain any one in ITALY who is deemed to be a danger to the security of British forces should be reserved. I suggest a new para 3 be added to Section IX to cover this.

c. The ban on operating radio and radar stations in Section IV B appears most undesirable and I consider the first part of the sentence should read "the right to construct, maintain and operate" etc.

5205

d. I cannot agree with Section XVIII which in my opinion will militate very strongly against the economic recovery of ITALY.

2. I have made certain drafting amendments and comments and these follow by air.

3. Although the views in this signal are expressed by me in my capacity as British Commander in Chief I have consulted with the Commanders in Chief of the US forces who are also in general agreement except that they feel even more strongly than I do that SectionXVIII is completely contrary to the US policy of assisting ITALY in her economic rehabilitation. My American colleagues have however received no directions from their own Government on the subject.

(67)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759815

F/312 (Final) SECRET APPENDIX B

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

29 September 1945.

DRAFT MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT

Reference in the left hand mar in are to Sections and paras of draft agreement contained in Signal 7075 CA2(B) from TROOPERS.

SECTION I

Para 1. The expression "Armed forces under British High Command" does not include such governmental organisations as Ministry of War Transport, etc. Suggest that the words "and other government organisations working on behalf of such British forces" be inserted after the words "British High Command".

Para 2. Omit the word "that" between "ensure" and "the appropriate privileges".

SECTION II This sentence does not appear to read correctly although this may be caused by faulty transmission. It is suggested that the words "in passage" be omitted after the words "to fly over Italy" and "and of" be inserted in their place. Also the use of the word "sanctions" in the sentence in brackets is misleading and the words "notifying such sanctions to Italian authorities" should be deleted and "implementing the above" substituted.

SECTION III

Para 1. In order to remove any doubt the words "dry docks" should be inserted after "dockyards". At present British forces are employing Italian coastwise shipping and it is felt that they may need to continue to have facilities and priorities in connection with their use. It is suggested therefore that the words "coastwise shipping" be included after the word "railways".

Para 3. It is felt that the words "special airfield alighting areas, their facilities in Italy" does not express fully what is required. It is suggested therefore that these words be omitted and "airfields in Italy with all their facilities and accommodations" be substituted.

New Para. In view of possible difficulties over transport of supplies to Austria from Italy the right to take complete control of any section or sections of the railways should be reserved. The following new para is suggested:

"The British High Command will have the right, if they so require, to control the operation of certain sections of the railways in Italy. These sections would be designated by the British High Command, if

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

etc. Suggest that the words "and other governmental [illegible] working on behalf of such British forces" be inserted after the words "British High Command".

Para 2. Omit the word "that" between "ensure" and "the appropriate privileges".

SECTION II This sentence does not appear to read correctly although this may be caused by faulty transmission. It is suggested that the words "in passage" be omitted after the words "to fly over Italy" and "and of" be inserted in their place. Also the use of the word "sanctions" in the sentence in brackets is misleading and the words "notifying such sanctions to Italian authorities" should be deleted and "implementing the above" substituted.

SECTION III

Para 1. In order to remove any doubt the words "dry docks" should be inserted after "dockyards". At present British forces are employing Italian coastwise shipping and it is felt that they may need to continue to have facilities and priorities in connection with their use. It is suggested therefore that the words "coastwise shipping" be included after the word "railways".

Para 3. It is felt that the words "special airfield alighting areas, their facilities in Italy" does not express fully what is required. It is suggested therefore that these words be omitted and "airfields in Italy with all their facilities and accommodations" be substituted.

New Para. In view of possible difficulties over transport of supplies to Austria from Italy the right to take complete control of any section or sections of the railways should be reserved. The following new para is suggested:

"The British High Command will have the right, if they so require, to control the operation of certain sections of the railways in Italy. These sections would be designated by the British High Command, if necessity occurred."

Para 4. It is considered that the words "may participate" is not strong enough and the words "shall have the right to participate" should be substituted.

SECTION IV The word "technical" in front of "signals" is considered to be an unnecessary limitation and should be omitted.

SECTION IVB It is considered absolutely essential that the British High Command should retain the right to operate all radio and radar stations which they may construct and that the word "and" should be substituted for the words "but NOT".

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SECTION V — The words "by the British Controller" are not understood and since the Italian Government act on instructions received from the British High Command they appear unnecessary and should be omitted.

SECTION VI — It is considered that the words "and stateless" should be added after the word 'displaced'. It is also for consideration whether provision should not be made to include PW, surrendered enemy personnel, recalcitrants and internees.

SECTIONS VII & VIII — No comment.

SECTION IX — In view of political difficulties it should be made quite clear that Polish troops are included in this Section. There is no doubt that they are part of the British forces, but they are not subject to British service courts in the strict sense as they are tried under Polish law by Polish service courts.

SECTION X — No comment.

SECTION XI

Para 1. — The word "exclusive" should be inserted before the words "right to police" to avoid any difficulty over the Italian authorities also attempting to mount guards. The word "installations" should be added between the words "own" and "camps" in the first sentence, and between the words "such" and "camps" in the second sentence.

Para 2. — To correspond with para 1 above the word "installations" should be inserted between "outside" and "camps".

Fresh Para — In order to safeguard the security of British forces which may be threatened by anyone in Italy it is considered that British authorities should retain the right to arrest or to require the Italian Government to arrest any such persons and that the following para be added:

"British military authorities should have the right to arrest and detain or require the Italian Government to arrest and detain any persons deemed to be a danger to the security of British forces or their installations in Italy."

SECTION XII — It is suggested that the words "without delay" should be added after the word "trial" in the first sentence.

SECTIONS X - XIII — It is assumed that the rights necessary for any further investigation of war crimes will be provided for in the Peace Treaty or some other

5803

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

British service courts in the strict sense as they are tried under Polish law by Polish service courts.

SECTION X — No comment.

SECTION XI

Para 1. — The word "exclusive" should be inserted before the words "right to police" to avoid any difficulty over the Italian authorities also attempting to mount guards. The word "installations" should be added between the words "own" and "camps" in the first sentence, and between the words "such" and "camps" in the second sentence.

Para 2. — To correspond with para 1 above the word "installations" should be inserted between "outside" and "camps".

Fresh Para — In order to safeguard the security of British forces which may be threatened by anyone in Italy it is considered that British authorities should retain the right to arrest or to require the Italian Government to arrest any such persons and that the following para be added:

"British military authorities should have the right to arrest and detain or require the Italian Government to arrest and detain any persons deemed to be a danger to the security of British forces or their installations in Italy."

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SECTION XII — It is suggested that the words "without delay" should be added after the word "trial" in the first sentence.

SECTIONS X - XIII — It is assumed that the rights necessary for any further investigation of war crimes will be provided for in the Peace Treaty or some other agreement.

SECTION XIV — No comment.

SECTION XV — The words "will make" appear to have been omitted after "the British High Command" in the second sentence and the words "to take relevent steps" in the same sentence appear redundent and should be omitted.

SECTION XVI — If this paragraph is allowed to remain it appears that "the secrecy" of the Secret Service is likely to be seriously imperilled when the Italian Government receive the list of all persons claiming immunity from taxation under this clause.

SECTION XVII — The remarks in Section XVI apply equally to this Section if Section XVI is not omitted.

SECTION XVIII — While the provisions laid down in this Section may be the policy of the British Government it appears to militate most strongly against the economic recovery of Italy.

(67)

SECTION XIX — The words "British Military Authority" should be changed to "British Authorities" to include all services and departments effected.

SECTION XX & MEMORANDUM — No comments.

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SEP 26 RECD
C-in-C/026 Allied Commission

Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Lacs

AF752

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 21
24th September 1945

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COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MOVE OF AFHQ TO ROME

Note by Chief of Staff

1. By 1 December AFHQ will be a comparatively small Headquarters, and will be mainly British. It will continue to decrease rapidly in size, but it is likely to continue in some form at least until the summer of 1946.

2. Many of its important duties would be considerably lightened by being in close contact with the British and U.S. Ambassadors, the Allied Commission and M.M.I.A. In fact, in every respect it would be able to carry out its duties more economically and efficiently if located in ROME rather than in CASERTA.

3. The morale factor must also be considered. Winter accommodation and facilities for recreation in CASERTA are very poor. It is important now that the war is over to house and entertain all ranks as well as can be economically arranged.

4. It is, therefore, recommended that the move to ROME should be agreed and the telegram at Appendix 'A' notifying all concerned should be approved for despatch.

(intd) T.D.M.

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(intd) T.D.M.

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Chief Counsel Bulgaria

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APPENDIX 'A'

TO: AG AR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CABINET OFFICES WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : MIDEAST FOR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF
USFET MAIN
TSFET MAIN
ALCOM

This is NAF 1015.

1. In view of FAN 601 and FAN 608, it is thought desirable to report the present status of plans for the future of AFHQ and its associated Headquarters.

2. GHQ, CMF, is being activated effective 1 October 1945 to conduct purely British Army matters in this Theatre. United States matters will continue to be handled by HQ MTOUSA. AFHQ as such will then become a comparatively small integrated Headquarters whose activities will be restricted to essentially Allied matters.

3. Subject to any directions that you or the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff may give, as a result of the review of the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander foreshadowed in FAN 608, ~~it is intended that~~ Headquarters MTOUSA will should be dissolved about 1 December 1945. It is understood that a detachment of United States personnel under the administrative control of USFET will then be provided to play their part in the remaining Allied activities ~~of AFHQ.~~ in Italy.

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Naval Headquarters of CINC MED is already in

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5801

4. Meanwhile the British Naval Headquarters of CINC MED is already in the process of moving to MALTA and Headquarters RAF MEDME will have completed its move to MIDEAST by the end of October, leaving a smaller subordinate Air Headquarters in ITALY. GHQ, CMF, will also decrease in size as British commitments in ITALY are reduced.

5. It has always been true that the location in ROME of the Military Headquarters responsible for ITALY would have considerable advantages, particularly by facilitating closer contact with the Allied Commission

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and its Sub-Commissions and with the British and United States Ambassadors. Up till now, however, the practical difficulties of moving and accommodating a Headquarters so large as AFHQ have prevented such a step. After the dissolution of MTOUSA the Headquarters will be sufficiently reduced for these difficulties no longer to be prohibitive. It is intended, therefore, that at this stage, AFHQ and the Headquarters remaining associated with it should move to ROME.

5800

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no longer to be prohibitive. It is intended, [illegible]

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OCT 011900A

IMMEDIATE

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHCOS

(1) AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF. (2) CABINET OFFICES WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF (3) INFO MIDEAST FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF (4) USFET MAIN. (5) TOFET MAIN (6) AFHQ

SECRET.

1. In view FAN 601 and FAN 608, it is thought desirable to report the present status of plans for the future of AFHQ and its associated headquarters. (This is NAF 1075).

2. CBH, CMF, is being activated effective 1 October 1945 to conduct purely British Army matters in this theatre. United States matters will continue to be handled by HQ MTOUSA. AFHQ as such will then become a comparatively small integrated HQ whose activities will be restricted to essentially Allied matters.

3. HQ MTOUSA will be dissolved about 1 December 1945. Subject any directions that you or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff may give as a result of the review of the appointment Supreme Allied Commander foreshadowed in FAN 608, it is understood that a detachment of U.S. personnel under the administrative control USFET will then be provided to play their part in the remaining Allied activities in ITALY.

4. Meanwhile the British Naval Headquarters of C in C MED is already in the process of moving to MALTA and HQ RAF MIDDLE will have completed its move to CAIRO by the end of October, leaving a small subordinate air headquarters in ITALY. CBH, CMF, will also decrease in size as British commitments in ITALY are reduced.

5. Location in ROME of the military headquarters responsible for ITALY would have substantial military advantages and would facilitate closer contact with ALLIED

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(EX 46681 cont'd)

COMMISSION and its sub commissions and with British and United States Ambassadors. Up till now however practical difficulties moving and accommodating headquarters so large as AFHQ has prevented such a step.

6. After dissolution of MTOUSA these difficulties will no longer be serious. It is estimated location headquarters in ROME would then involve at the most the move of the following approximate numbers of personnel:

AFHQ British personnel 150 all ranks AFHQ U.S. personnel 100 all ranks CMF, CMF, and associated units (additional British personnel 1,500 all ranks air HQ RAF ITALY 750 all ranks.

7. My U.S. and British political advisers have pointed out that move to ROME raises political issues which State Department and Foreign Office will represent to you. I do not however consider these factors override military advantage which I have referred to above. Moreover in the event of reduction function of the ALLIED COMMISSION location Allied military headquarters in ROME would be all the more desirable in order contact would be made with the Italian Government through the appropriate channels.

8. It is therefore intended that unless you issue instructions to the contrary headquarters listed in paragraph 6 above should after dissolution of MTOUSA move to ROME.

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DIST

INFO-ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
INFO: Chief Commissioner
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
Pat Sec
CA Sec
Econ Sec 2
File

SECRET

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P/311 (Final)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS CC/610 Copy No. 35

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

17 September 1945.

MOVE OF AFHQ TO ROME

OBJECT.

1. To examine:

   a. Whether AFHQ could more efficiently carry out its functions if it were located in ROME than if it remained in CASERTA?

   b. If the move to ROME is desirable, is it practicable to move the Headquarters and what would be the most convenient time for a move to be carried out?

2. Definition of AFHQ.

For the purpose of this paper the term "AFHQ", except where otherwise stated, will include "AFHQ, GHQ, CIC, HQ TOUSA and associated Naval and Air HQs" if still in being.

FACTORS AFFECTING DESIRABILITY OF MOVE.

3. Operational Considerations.

The main operational problems in ITALY will affect the Northern Provinces. Three of the principal Subordinate Commands, XIII Corps, 2 District and Desert Air Force are located in this area. By the end of September or soon afterwards most of ITALY will have been handed back to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and it has also been recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the control of the Italian Army should be vested in the Italian Government at the same time. Increased liaison with the Italian Government will thus be necessary: this could be carried out (through the Allied Commission and MMIA) more efficiently if AFHQ was located in ROME.

4. Intelligence Considerations.

As the Italian Government takes over the administration of the country, the intelligence responsibilities of AFHQ in regard to internal security tend to increase, and from the intelligence aspect it is essential that AFHQ should be in close contact with the Italian Government and Italian Ministry for War. Internal security is largely dependent on the political and economic situation, and requires very close liaison with the Embassies in ROME. Intelligence organisations such as ISLD and CSDIC Interrogation units have already moved to ROME which is, in fact, the centre of Intelligence activity in ITALY.

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5. Administrative and Political Considerations.

a. The principal problems of AFHQ are now largely economic and political. Although the overall amount of work which will be carried out by AFHQ in the future will be considerably reduced, the problems to be dealt with will become increasingly of an economic and political nature. These problems centre in ROME where the agencies which deal with them, except for AFHQ, are now located.

b. The Army and Navy Liquidation Committee and the Ministry of Supply, which are the respective US and British agencies appointed to handle the disposal of surplus assets, are both located in ROME. As the amount of assets for disposal increase during the coming months the efficiency and speed of disposal of these surpluses will to a large extent depend on the closeness of contact which can be established between staff branches of AFHQ and the respective Allied disposal organisations.

RETURN TO

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c. The HQ of the Allied Military Railway Service and the British Transportation Directorate are already located in ROME. As military staffs are reduced, it will be more difficult to maintain the necessary liaison between these HQs and AFHQ. Further as transportation facilities are progressively handed over to civilian control, it becomes increasingly necessary that Mov & Tn should also have direct contact with Transportation Sub-Commission, Allied Commission and with the Italian transport authorities. If Military Railway Service supervision of Italian State Railway operations is removed as is probable by early 1946, then a large part of the rail section of Mov & Tn will have to move to ROME even if AFHQ does not move.

d. It is necessary for the Principal Sea Transport Officer, Mediterranean, to be alongside AFHQ wherever AFHQ may be situated. This would be unlikely to present any considerable difficulty. It is desirable for the Ministry of War Transport and War Shipping Administration to be alongside AFHQ although this is not entirely necessary. In the event of a decision being made to move AFHQ to ROME it would then be decided if it was required for the Ministry of War Transport and War Shipping Administration to move with AFHQ or whether such representation as they have at ROME or decide to locate there would be sufficient. The question of the availability of the necessary communications and accommodation may be the deciding factors in making their decision.

e. It has already been found necessary to divide the personnel of other AFHQ Sections between CASERTA and ROME, e.g. G-2, Coalsec, UNRRA AFHQ, and this process will continue during the coming months as the Italian Government assumes responsibility for the civil economy in ITALY. This division of offices is wasteful in manpower and impedes efficiency.

f. The activities of UNRRA in ITALY are likely to increase considerably during the coming months. HQ UNRRA ITALY is located in ROME. It already has considerable dealings with UNRRA AFHQ and these will show a marked increase.

g. From the political point of view the establishment of AFHQ at ROME would enable the closest touch to be maintained with Italian affairs and with the Embassies.

6. MTOUSA Considerations.

MTOUSA's main responsibilities are now connected very largely with the problems of redeployment including disposition of theatre stocks and equipment. The responsibilities of MTOUSA which remain on 1 December 45 are scheduled to be taken over by USFET on about that date. The dis-organisation resulting from a move of AFHQ to ROME prior to the disbandment of MTOUSA would seriously affect the progress of US redeployment and would delay the winding up of MTOUSA.

7. Naval Considerations.

The majority of the staff of C-in-C Med[illegible]

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Ministry of War Transport and War Shipping Administration to move with AFHQ or whether such representation as they have at ROME or decide to locate there would be sufficient. The question of the availability of the necessary communications and accommodation may be the deciding factors in making their decision.

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7. Naval Considerations.

The majority of the staff of C-in-C Med is moving to MALTA by the end of September. Thereafter C-in-C Med intends to retain a small command post at NAPLES as long as the appointment of SACMED continues. When the period of SACMED's responsibilities ceases, C-in-C Med intends only to be represented in ITALY by FOIL, who is located in ROME.

8. Air Considerations.

The major Royal Air Force Headquarters in ITALY will remain alongside AFHQ. Apart from airfield accommodation, for which see para 15 below, the actual location of the Headquarters is not a materiel consideration, though the further north AFHQ is the better, since the main concentration of Air Forces will continue to be in Northern ITALY. On present planning, Headquarters AAF/MTO is to be dissolved about 1 October. There will thereafter be no requirement for an American Air HQ alongside AFHQ, although a liaison section may be attached. Headquarters RAF MEDIT is to begin to move to CAIRO about

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mid-September, but the Air C-in-C will remain with AFHQ until approximately mid-October, when this move will have been completed. Thereafter the major RAF Headquarters in ITALY will be Air Headquarters, Royal Air Force, ITALY, which will be located with AFHQ.

9. Composition of the HQ to be moved.

After the dissolution of MTOUSA, AFHQ will probably consist of a Commander's Staff representing the British and the US with an integrated secretariat, G-2, G-3 and G-5 Division including certain integrated sections such as Mov & Tn, Signals and Petsec. The remaining Army element of the HQ to be moved will be GHQ MTF. If the move of AFHQ to ROME were delayed until after the dissolution of MTOUSA the total strength of the HQ to be accommodated in ROME would be approximately as follows:

		Officers	ORs
a.	GHQ CMF (including personnel in AFHQ)	622	1745
b.	Other British Sections not on WE GHQ CMF	250	850
c.	US representation at AFHQ	50	150
d.	PSTO (Med) and Shipping Authorities	30	30
e.	Air Headquarters, Royal Air Force, ITALY	(200 (WAAF 10	600 150
f.	249 Wing, RAF	50	250
g.	British Signals Unit	(46 (WAAS 4	900 220
h.	British Car Coy	8	340
i.	US HQ Company	5	124
j.	British Engineer Unit attached AFHQ	6	250
	TOTAL	1,231	5,449

10. Accommodation Considerations.

a. A considerable amount of labour and expenditure has been involved in the present accommodation at CASERTA. At present, however, the majority of British officers and RAF other ranks are living in tents; on the other hand a large amount of covered accommodation will become available with the disbandment of MTOUSA and the other reductions that are already taking place.

b. The provision of office and living accommodation in ROME should present no [illegible] Air Ministry building, certain barracks, and

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a.	GHQ CMF (including personnel in AFHQ)	622	1745
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d.	PSTO (Med) and Shipping Authorities	30	30
e.	Air Headquarters, Royal Air Force, ITALY	(200	600
		(WAAF 10	150
f.	240 Wing, RAF	50	250
g.	British Signals Unit	(46	000
		(WAAS 4	220
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b. The provision of office and living accommodation in ROME should present no great difficulties. The Air Ministry building, certain barracks, and hotels form a compact block near the Railway Station which would provide good office and living accommodation for a considerable proportion of the HQ and units likely to be moved. There is also other good accommodation within 4 or 5 miles of this block in which the remaining personnel likely to be moved could be provided with office and living accommodation. Accommodation in ROME will, however, be more scattered than that available in CASERTA after 1 December and will necessitate substantial ferry services.

11. Morale Considerations.

Recreational facilities and welfare amenities in ROME are much better than those available at CASERTA. A move to ROME, provided that it does not take place during the Christmas period, would certainly have a beneficial effect on the morale of all ranks.

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12. Financial Considerations.

A move of AFHQ to ROME would involve considerable expenditure of labour, material and finance.

13. Engineer Considerations.

It is not possible to give an accurate estimate of the time required to carry out the necessary work involved in the move until a detailed inspection of the various buildings has been made, but a minimum of 6 weeks should be allowed as even 'minor' alterations are not to be considerable. Due to the shortage of RE personnel, no concentrated engineer effort will be possible. November would be the best month for the work to be started so far as the availability of RE units is concerned.

14. Signal Considerations.

a. Any move of AFHQ from CASERTA will entail a temporary reduction in the efficiency of its signal communications. A considerable communications layout already exists in the Air Ministry building in ROME, but the telephone switchboard there can cater for a maximum number of 600 subscribers; that is for a HQ half the size of AFHQ on 1 September 45, including ancillary troops, and considerably smaller than that envisaged in para 9.

b. Shortage of Signals installation personnel will not permit of the layout in the Air Ministry building being completed in less than eight weeks from the date of a decision to move. A similar shortage of signals operating personnel and of equipment will not admit the running of a 'Rear' HQ at CASERTA and a HQ at ROME, which means that if it is decided to move, all staff sections and ancillary troops must move from CASERTA together and that the HQ in CASERTA must close at the same time as that in ROME opens. Further, the first staff flight to reach ROME must be capable of running the HQ until the move is complete. If it is decided that no general move shall be made, but that certain staff sections must move to ROME, such sections can only be provided with communications from such installations as already exist and then only while these remain manned.

c. Wide dispersion of AFHQ in ROME would doubtless lead to signal difficulties in personnel and in equipment, but a firm statement on this could be made only after reconnaissance on site.

d. A few working telephones could be left in CASERTA for administration clearing up purposes if a move is made.

e. It should be noted that whether the move to ROME is to take place or not, US require to remove the TRETDOM switchboard and certain other equipment as soon as possible after 1 December 45.

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e. It should be noted that whether the move to ROME is to take place or not, US require to remove the TEETDOG switchboard and certain other equipment as soon as possible after 1 December 45.

f. It is, therefore, essential that an early decision should be made, since if it is decided not to move, the switchboard now in ROME will have to be transferred to CASERTA.

g. In certain respects the Signal problem will be simplified if a move to ROME is made in that installations and circuits in the CASERTA - NAPLES area will be available for closure, and in the case of certain circuits, return to the Italian Government.

15. Time and Space.

CASERTA is 120 miles from ROME. The establishment of AFHQ in ROME would shorten the road and air mileage to XIII Corps and 2 District as follows:

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	Miles from CASERTA		Miles from ROME		Percentage saving by move to ROME	
	Air	Road	Air	Road		
XIII Corps	395	520	285	400	27%	23%
2 District	405	400	295	370	27%	24%

On the other hand by moving to ROME the distance from 3 District would be increased by 120 miles.

16. Airfield Accommodation.

The main centre of RAF and USAAF transport services is at present based in NAPLES area (POMIGLIANO and CAPODICHINO) and could not be moved to ROME on account of the lack of suitable airfield accommodation. If AFHQ was located in ROME, it would therefore be necessary in many cases to travel to NAPLES area as a preliminary to further journeys outside ITALY.

17. Future Developments.

An Allied HQ will be required in ITALY for about six months after the conclusion of the final Peace Treaty with ITALY. This treaty might be signed at the end of the year. On the shortest estimate, therefore, AFHQ would be in ROME for approximately six months, but this would be extended as the conclusion of the Peace Treaty is delayed.

18. Conclusions.

a. AFHQ has functioned efficiently at CASERTA but could carry out its functions more efficiently if it were located in ROME.

b. The move of AFHQ to ROME is desirable.

c. The move of AFHQ to ROME is probably practicable, but this cannot be fully assessed pending detailed Engineer and Signal reconnaissances.

d. Subject to sub-para c above, the move should take place after MTOUSA closes down.

19. Recommendations.

It is therefore recommended that:

5793

a. Detailed reconnaissances in ROME on an integrated and interservice basis be made now.

b. Provided that detailed reconnaissances show that the move of AFHQ to ROME is practicable, AFHQ and units move to ROME as soon as possible after

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a. Detailed reconnaissances in ROME on an integrated and interservice basis be made now.

b. Provided that detailed reconnaissances show that the move of AFHQ to ROME is practicable, AFHQ and units move to ROME as soon as possible after NTOUSA has closed down, and that an outline plan for this move be prepared now.

c. In the meantime, no accommodation in ROME at present requisitioned by the Allies be de-requisitioned until it is certain that it will not be required by AFHQ.

D. PEEL YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP 748 (31-33)

SECRET

SAC (45) 20
22nd September 1945

COPY NO ____

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE TO AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, RAF, ITALY

Note by Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note of the attached directive which has been issued to the Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.

(intd) R.B.P.
for A.C.G.

SECRET

Normal

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EC List - 24 Sep 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Note by Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note of the attached directive which has been issued to the Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.

(intd) R.B.P.
for A.G.G.

DISTRIBUTION

Normal

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EC DIST - 24 SEP 45

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33 AIR FORCES S.C.

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ROYAL AIR FORCE,
MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST,
CASERTA, C.M.F.

To: Air Vice Marshal J. WHITFORD, C.B. C.B.E.,
Air Headquarters, Royal Air Force, ITALY

With effect from 1st October, 1945, you are appointed Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, ITALY.

2. With effect from the date when the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force, Mediterranean and Middle East transfers his Headquarters to C.M.F., you will be his deputy with the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, with Allied Force Headquarters and with General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in the Central Mediterranean. You will keep the C-in-C, R.A.F., MED/ME fully informed of any proposed changes of policy or action taken.

3. With effect from 1st October 1945 you will have operational control over all formations and units operating from bases on the mainland of ITALY and in GREECE with the exception of 205 Group, 214 Group and 216 Group. Desert Air Force and Royal Air Force, GREECE will be under your command. You will be responsible for certain administrative services for 214 Group, as already laid down, and for the local administration of 216 Group units; and, when Headquarters 205 Group moves to the MIDDLE EAST, of No. 205 Group Units left in ITALY.

4. You will be responsible for making all necessary preparations for action against external aggressors of AUSTRIA, ITALY and GREECE.

5. According to the prevailing circumstances, you will render every assistance you can, to A.O.C., R.A.F., AUSTRIA in the maintenance of internal security in AUSTRIA.

5706

6. With regard to AUSTRIA, except for R.A.F. units located there, your responsibilities are limited to those administrative services [illegible] R.A.F. and A.O.C., R.A.F.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

To: Air Vice Marshal J. WHITEHEAD, C.B. C.B.E.,
Air Headquarters, Royal Air Force, ITALY

With effect from 1st October, 1945, you are appointed Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, ITALY.

2. With effect from the date when the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force, Mediterranean and Middle East transfers his headquarters to CAIRO, you will be his deputy with the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, with Allied Force Headquarters and with General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in the Central Mediterranean. You will keep the C-in-C, M.A.F., AFHQ/AB fully informed of any proposed changes of policy or action taken.

3. With effect from 1st October 1945 you will have operational control over all formations and units operating from bases on the mainland of ITALY and in GREECE with the exception of 205 Group, 214 Group and 216 Group. Desert Air Force and Royal Air Force, GREECE will be under your command. You will be responsible for certain administrative services for 214 Group, as already laid down, and for the local administration of 216 Group units; and, when Headquarters 205 Group moves to the MIDDLE EAST, of No. 205 Group Units left in ITALY.

4. You will be responsible for making all necessary preparations for action against external aggressors of AUSTRIA, ITALY and GREECE.

5. According to the prevailing circumstances, you will render every assistance you can, to A.O.C., R.A.F., AUSTRIA in the maintenance of internal security in AUSTRIA.

5796

6. With regard to AUSTRIA, except for D.A.F. units located there, your responsibilities are limited to those administrative services deriving from A.F.H.Q. Directives to A.O.C., D.A.F. and A.O.C., R.A.F. AUSTRIA, copies of which are attached, give details of their responsibilities.

7. You will establish your Headquarters in close proximity to Allied Force Headquarters or any Allied Land Force Headquarters that may succeed it.

(sgd) J.H. EDWARDES JONES

A/Cdr

for Air Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief,
Royal Air Force,
Mediterranean and Middle East.

65

22nd September, 1945.

SECRET

AMME/S.50/AP.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785915

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SEP 7 RECD
CC 1130

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat B-1069

SAC (45) 19
4th September 1945

TOP SECRET
COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY IN THE BALKANS

Note by Secretary

1. CINC RAF/MEDME has received a request from the Director of Survey, AFHQ, to complete the photographic survey of GREECE. To do this successfully, it would be necessary for aircraft to cross the frontiers of neighboring States.

2. In view of the political factors involved, CINC RAF/MEDME has prepared the paper at APPENDIX 'A' and requests that it be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference. In order to give effect to the recommendations of this paper, if approved, a draft telegram has been prepared by this Secretariat and is at APPENDIX 'B'.

3. It is understood that on the American side, the U.S. Air Forces European Theatre have been charged with the responsibility of photographing the Balkans and CG, AAF/MTO, was approached in regard to the survey of ALBANIA. It is, however, the present U.S. policy not to make reconnaisance flights over that country without obtaining prior clearance from the Albanian authorities.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited:

a. To approve the recommendations of CINC RAF/MEDME as contained in the paper at APPENDIX 'A' and if so,

b. To authorize the dispatch of the signal at APPENDIX 'B'.

5792

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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4. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited:

a. To approve the recommendations of CINC RAF/MEDME as contained in the paper at APPENDIX 'A' and if so,

b. To authorize the dispatch of the signal at APPENDIX 'B'.

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J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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E-1069
APPENDIX 'A'

TOP SECRET

POST WAR PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY IN THE BALKANS

Note by Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDME

INTRODUCTION

1. To complete the photographic survey of GREECE will involve crossing the border into all the BALKAN countries bounding on GREECE, i.e., ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA and TURKEY, as it is not possible to photograph up to the border without flying over it. It is stated that the actual areas to be covered are small and although it is not possible to state the exact number of sorties required, it is anticipated that twelve successful missions would probably be sufficient. There is, in addition, a small commitment to complete the survey within ALBANIA itself, which will involve crossing the JUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN border.

2. The Director of Survey stresses the importance to all branches of the Allied Forces of having accurate maps. He points out that most of the current maps are of very poor quality indeed, and the only way in which they can be quickly improved is by air photography.

DISCUSSION

3. At the moment flying over JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and all RUSSIAN occupied territory is specifically forbidden on orders of SACMED; these restrictions were imposed as the result of complaints by the JUGOSLAVS, the ALBANIANS and the RUSSIANS in BULGARIA. While Air Ministry are anxious for these surveys to be completed they are prepared to leave the decision regarding flying over these territories to MEDME.

4. The objections to Allied aircraft flying over JUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA were directed against normal transport aircraft that were either landing in those two countries or else overflying them to other countries. Flights were for the most part made at a low altitude and were not detected by Radar.

5. During the first week in July, however, the RUSSIAN section of the ACC in BULGARIA transmitted a written complaint to the British Delegation to the effect that British aircraft had violated RUSSIAN controlled territory on 27 June. This was followed by a complaint of a previous

57791

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

crossing the border into all the BALKAN countries bounding on GREECE, i.e., ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA and TURKEY, as it is not possible to photograph up to the border without flying over it. It is stated that the actual areas to be covered are small and although it is not possible to state the exact number of sorties required, it is anticipated that twelve successful missions would probably be sufficient. There is, in addition, a small commitment to complete the survey within ALBANIA itself, which will involve crossing the JUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN border.

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5. During the first week in July, however, the RUSSIAN section of the ACC in BULGARIA transmitted a written complaint to the British Delegation to the effect that British aircraft had violated RUSSIAN controlled territory on 27 June. This was followed by a complaint of a previous violation on 22nd June. The accurate information given by the RUSSIANS regarding the P.R. flights which they had detected at an altitude of 20,000 feet, indicated conclusively that there is in existance good Radar or aircraft reporting cover of the area. 5791

6. As stated in para 1 above the nature of the frontier on the Northern Borders of GREECE makes it virtually impossible to complete a survey of that country without violation of the boundaries of adjacent states. It is clear, therefore, that if the survey is completed without the concurrence of the adjacent states, detection of P.R. flights over the GRECO-BULGARIAN border is almost certain, but unlikely in the case of ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA and TURKEY.

7. As far as the survey on the ALBANIAN, JUGOSLAV and TURKISH borders is concerned, it is considered safe to proceed, but the risk of detection on the Bulgarian border necessitates an examination of the courses open to us to complete the survey in this sector.

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COURSES OF ACTION IN REGARD TO THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER B- 1069

8. Ask permission from the RUSSIANS. If permission were granted, the problem would be solved. There are, however, no grounds for anticipating their concurrence in our request, and the very fact of consulting them direct would have the effect of putting them on the alert, especially in view of the present concentrations of RUSSIAN Air Force and ground units in S. BULGARIA.

9. Attempt completion of the survey without permission. This could be easily attempted, but the following factors should be taken into consideration.

a. It is anticipated that twelve successful missions will be required. In practice this may mean flying considerably more than twelve sorties with a corresponding increase in the likelihood of detection.

b. Past experience shows that there is an adequate aircraft reporting system or Radar cover along the BULGARIAN frontier. This makes detection almost certain, unless the Radar screen is not operating, and this is unlikely for the whole period during which the operation is taking place. With the detection of only one flight, the RUSSIANS would have grounds for further complaints.

On balance it is considered that to attempt to complete the survey without RUSSIAN approval is bound to occasion further protest.

10. Abandon the completion of the survey project for the present. This could, of course, be done, but in the absence of reliable intelligence it would be difficult to decide when it would be safe to complete the work. Detection at a later date may cause even more embarrassment and render impossible the completion of the task in a reasonable time, if at all.

11. Leave the survey incompleted (i.e. - untrimmed at the Borders). This alternative has the advantage of being 'trouble free'. It means however, that the inter-state boundaries will not be accurately covered. Present long term military considerations or even future boundary delineations may well make this undesirable.

12. Clear project with the appropriate authorities in LONDON. This would ensure that the importance of the survey would be balanced against the political implications. If it was decided that the survey is to proceed, then the Foreign Office would be prepared for any complaints that were received.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

detection.

b. Past experience shows that there is an adequate aircraft reporting system or Radar cover along the BULGARIAN frontier. This makes detection almost certain, unless the Radar screen is not operating, and this is unlikely for the whole period during which the operation is taking place. With the detection of only one flight, the RUSSIANS would have grounds for further complaints.

On balance it is considered that to attempt to complete the survey without RUSSIAN approval is bound to occasion further protest.

10. Abandon the completion of the survey project for the present. This could, of course, be done, but in the absence of reliable intelligence it would be difficult to decide when it would be safe to complete the work. Detection at a later date may cause even more embarrassment and render impossible the completion of the task in a reasonable time, if at all.

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12. Clear project with the appropriate authorities in LONDON. This would ensure that the importance of the survey would be balanced against the political implications. If it was decided that the survey is to proceed, then the Foreign Office would be prepared for any complaints that were received.

R790

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. a. Proceed with the survey on the ALBANIAN, JUGOSLAV and TURKISH borders.

b. Obtain the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, before proceeding with the survey on the GRECO-BULGARIAN border.

(Initd) R. B. P.

For A. G. G.

(64)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

D R A F T

B- 1062

APPENDIX 'B'

TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION: ALSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO FOR INFO : BRITMAN WASHINGTON FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MIDEAST FOR COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF

This is MEDCOS _____.

1. As current maps of GREECE are of very poor quality, it is desired to complete the photographic survey of that country. The photo-reconnaisance flights necessary for this purpose can be provided from the resources of CINC RAF MEDME, through whom I understand that the Air Ministry are anxious for the survey to be completed.

2. The nature of the Northern Greek frontier, however, makes it virtually impossible to complete the survey without violation of the boundaries of adjacent States. My previous policy has been to forbid flights (other than standard courier flights and special missions for which clearance is obtained) over JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and all Russian occupied territory. This policy was adopted as a result of complaints by the Jugoslavs and Albanians and by the Russians in regard to BULGARIA.

3. Detection of photo-reconnaisance flights in the areas of the ALBANIAN, JUGOSLAV and TURKISH frontiers of GREECE is unlikely and I have, therefore, ordered the survey of these areas to be com-

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

The photo-reconnaissance

provided from the resources of CINC RAF MEDITERRANEAN. I understand that the Air Ministry are anxious for the survey to be completed.

2. The nature of the Northern Greek frontier, however, makes it virtually impossible to complete the survey without violation of the boundaries of adjacent States. My previous policy has been to forbid flights (other than standard courier flights and special missions for which clearance is obtained) over JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and all Russian occupied territory. This policy was adopted as a result of complaints by the Jugoslavs and Albanians and by the Russians in regard to BULGARIA.

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4. It is my information, however, that the Russians have in existence a good radar or aircraft reporting cover of the GRECO-BULGARIAN border area and that photo-reconnaisance flights on this frontier, if made without prior Russian permission, are likely to be detected. On the other hand, the Russians, if approached, may refuse the necessary permission.

TOP SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

completed.

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5789

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4. It is my information, however, that the Russians have in existence a good radar or aircraft reporting cover of the GRECO-BULGARIAN border area and that photo-reconnaisance flights on this frontier, if made without prior Russian permission, are likely to be detected. On the other hand, the Russians, if approached, may refuse the necessary permission.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5. I request, therefore, that, if you consider it desirable, you should obtain Russian clearance for the completion of the survey on the GRECO-BULGARIAN frontier. Meanwhile, I am instructing CINC RAF MEDME that photographic flights are not to be undertaken on this frontier until I receive your further guidances.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785.15

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AP-768

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

RESTRICTED

4th October 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

INTERIM DOCUMENT TO REPLACE EXISTING ITALIAN ARMISTICE TERMS

1. In accordance with the direction at SAC (45) 7th Meeting, Minute 9, all copies of JIS Study No. F/310 (Final) should be returned to the Secretary, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff, for custody.

2. The Secretary, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff, is requested to inform this Secretariat of any copies not so returned by 9th October 1945.

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Action: SO to [illegible] 786 (28)

Info to: Legal Comm (29)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RESTRICTED

8 October 1945

Subject: Transmittal of paper P/310 (Final)

To : Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat,
Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.

1. Reference letter AP-768, 4th October.

2. Returned herewith is copy No 35 of JPS Study No. P/310 (Final), the only copy received by this Headquarters.

/s/ L. W. Stearns

L. W. STEARNS
Major, AGD
Staff Officer to CC

cc: Exec. Comm R.

5787 7/12.

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APPENDIX 'A'

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : ALCOM

This is NAF _____

1. Subject is handback of BOLZANO and UDINE provinces to Italian Government jurisdiction. FAN 536 laid down that the whole province of BOLZANO, and TARVIS and the surrounding area in the province of UDINE, were to remain indefinitely under Allied Military Government.

2. I now consider that BOLZANO could with advantage be handed back to Italian jurisdiction at same time as other Northern Italian territories, the handback of which was proposed in NAF 1069. Reasons are:

a. The frontier marches with Allied occupied AUSTRIA and SWITZERLAND, and there is, therefore, little likelihood of aggressive movement from outside by force of arms or propaganda. Position is thus different from that in other disputed territories.

b. It is not considered that any internal separatist movement is likely to arise with which the Italian Government should not be able to deal.

c. Risk of appearing to prejudice outcome of Peace Conference is not considered sufficiently serious to justify maintaining Allied Military Government for that reason alone.

d. Handover of this territory will be in accordance with the spirit of para 1 of FAN 536.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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b. It is not considered that any internal separatist movement is likely to arise with which the Italian Government should not be able to deal.

c. Risk of appearing to prejudice outcome of Peace Conference is not considered sufficiently serious to justify maintaining Allied Military Government for that reason alone.

5783

d. Handover of this territory will be in accordance with the spirit of para 1 of FAN 536.

3. For following reasons, however, I do not consider handback of UDINE province is at present feasible:

a. Owing to delicate situation in VENEZIA GIULIA, it remains necessary for the Allied corps in that area, with its supporting air forces, to be disposed semi-operationally and to be capable of operational deployment at short notice. As the portion of VENEZIA GIULIA under Allied Military Government does not allow sufficient depth for this purpose, the retention of full military control in the adjoining territory of UDINE is essential.

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III

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b. To maintain quiet conditions in Northeast ITALY, direct frontier contact between the Italian and Jugoslav Governments should be avoided. It is, therefore, at present undesirable to hand back the area round TARVIS to the Italian Government. However, it is not administratively advisable to separate this area from the rest of the province of UDINE. The whole province should, therefore, be retained under Allied Military Government until the Italo-Jugoslav situation is more settled.

c. It is necessary to safeguard the lines of communications from TRIESTE and VENICE into the British zone of AUSTRIA. Both run through UDINE. The security of this base area is, therefore, important under existing conditions and would be even more so in the event of further trouble with the Jugoslavs.

4. Your approval is, therefore, requested for:

a. The handback of BOLZANO province with the remainder of Northern ITALY (except UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA) on the date proposed in NAF 1069.

b. The retention of AMG in the whole province of UDINE until further notice.

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TRIESTE and VENICE into the [illegible]

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4. Your approval is, therefore, requested for:

a. The handback of BOLZANO province with the remainder of Northern ITALY (except UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA) on the date proposed in NAF 1069.

b. The retention of AMG in the [illegible] province of UDINE until further notice.

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IV (63)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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cc 1045

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP706

SECRET

SAC (45) 18
4th September 1945

COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

HANDOVER OF ~~PROPERTIES IN~~ PROVINCES OF BOLZANO AND UDINE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Chief of Staff

1. By NAF 1069, the Supreme Allied Commander recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that Northern ITALY, with the exception of the provinces of BOLZANO and UDINE and the Allied occupied portion of VENEZIA GIULIA, should be handed back to Italian Government control on 30 September or 21 days after receipt of orders to do so from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The handback of the remaining areas, when raised in a Staff Study by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, disclosed a considerable divergence of view and it has, therefore, appeared that the subject should be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference.

3. The current directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN 536) is that, when the remainder of Italian Metropolitan territory is returned to Italian administration, VENEZIA GIULIA, BOLZANO, and the area around TARVIS (which before 1919 formed part of the Austrian province of CARINTHIA and now is part of the Italian province of UDINE) should be retained under Allied Military Government.

4. The retention of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is not at issue.

5. In regard to the province of BOLZANO:

a. There appears to be no adequate military reason why BOLZANO province should be retained under Allied Military Government.

b. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the U.S. Political Adviser recommend that this province should be

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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4. The retention of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is not at issue.

5. In regard to the province of BOLZANO:

a. There appears to be no adequate military reason why BOLZANO province should be retained under Allied Military Government.

b. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the U.S. Political Adviser recommend that this province should be returned to Italian Government control.

c. The British Resident Minister, however, states that the Foreign Office are inclined to favor the retention of Allied Military Government in this province, but would be reluctant to press this point of view if it were found difficult to meet the military commitment involved.

6. In regard to the province of UDINE:

a. It appears militarily essential to retain AMG in the whole province for the present.

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b. U. S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister are however, most anxious for political reasons, that the province should be returned to the Italian Government at the same time as the rest of Northern ITALY. They realize, however, that this turnover may be prohibited by over-riding military necessity.

c. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, while agreeing to the retention of AMG in UDINE for the present, has recommended that such Government should be terminated on 1 December 1945. It is considered, however, that the Supreme Allied Commander should not, at present, commit himself to any particular date.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested to approve the dispatch of the draft signal at Appendix 'A' recommending:

a. The handback of BOLZANO province.

b. The retention of AMG in UDINE.

(Intd) J.D.M.

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(Intd) A.D.M.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP 695 3-(31-33)

cc 1050

SAC (45) ~~17~~
30th August 1945

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COPY NO. 31

REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE AT 1100 HOURS, 29 AUGUST 1945

PRESENT:

Major General Y. D. Basilov,
Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate
for Repatriation

Major General A. Vasiliev,
Soviet Representative
Allied Commission for Italy

Lieutenant Uraevsky,
Interpreter.

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold
R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. G. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General M.W.M. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, G-1(Br)

Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier A. P. Block,
Commander, 21 Armoured Brigade

Colonel E. E. Hyde,
G-1, MTOUSA

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SECRETARIES

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

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for Repatriatio

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5781

SECRETARIES

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. SEGREGATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS INTO A SEPARATE CAMP

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he had stated that he wished to discuss the matter of the personnel at present held in Camp 5C and the internal administration (British and Soviet) of Soviet personnel in this cage. He had, however, been informed by signal that these subjects should not be raised as they had been fully covered at the last meeting. Nevertheless he still wished to discuss these matters if possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed his willingness to discuss any such matters.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF, in response to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that there were in Camp 5C certain personnel who were Soviet citizens according to the British and United States definition, and certain other persons who were claimed as Soviet citizens by the Russians.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that these personnel must be separated at once. All Soviet citizens (according to the Anglo-American interpretation) must be removed from Camp 5C and put in a camp completely separate from any other Nationals. The determination as to who was a Soviet citizen was a matter for him and his subordinate officers to decide, but he asked that the Russian Mission should in this regard give assistance to the British Authorities responsible for Camp 5C. He emphasised that this separation would take place according to his current orders from his superiors as to who should be considered a Soviet citizen.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV, in reply to a query from the Supreme Allied Commander, agreed that such a segregation would be advisable as a first step.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER further pointed out that it would also be necessary to segregate those Soviet citizens who were still not willing to return to RUSSIA from those who did wish to do so, for as he had previously explained, he was not allowed to use force to effect this repatriation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to effect:

(1) The immediate removal from Camp 5C of all Soviet citizens (as defined by the British and United States Governments) and the concentration of these persons, together with any other Soviet citizens at present held by British Authorities in other camps in ITALY, in one Soviet citizen camp.

(2) The continued segregation (either within that camp or into separate camps) of those Soviet citizens who were willing to return to RUSSIA from those who could not be so repatriated without the use of force.

(b) Directed that in any camp or camps for Soviet citizens organised in accordance with (a)(1) above,

(1) The Soviet citizens should be allowed to organise their own internal camp administration.

(2) Officers of the Russian Mission, on application through the normal channels, should be allowed free access to the Soviet citizens contained therein.

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2. ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN CERTAIN CAMPS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that among the personnel interned in Camp 5C were some 400 Fascist-minded people, who were spreading anti-Russian propaganda and endeavoring to dissuade Soviet citizens from returning to RUSSIA.

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MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that among the personnel interned in Camp 5C were some 400 Fascist-minded people, who were spreading anti-Russian propaganda and endeavoring to dissuade Soviet citizens from returning to RUSSIA. He asked that these anti-Soviet agitators, who numbered some 400, should be segregated, so they could not influence the other persons in the camp.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that after the segregation of Soviet citizens (see Minute 1 above) he would naturally be completely responsible for the non-Soviet citizens. General Basilov could rest assured that he would take effective measures to stop both anti-Soviet propaganda and propaganda directed against any other Ally. If investigation should prove that the best method to do this was to separate the agitators, it would be done and they would be punished if necessary.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER instructed:

(67) The Chief Administrative Officer to ensure that propaganda activities within Prisoner of War and Displaced Person

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Camps, directed against the USSR or any other Allied nation, were suppressed and to report to him in due course as to what measures had been found necessary to this end.

3. DURATION OF VISIT OF RUSSIAN MISSION

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that it was clear from the difficulties that had arisen that the completion of measures for the repatriation of Soviet citizens from ITALY would take considerably longer than had at first been expected. He asked, therefore, that he should himself be allowed to remain in the Theatre for a further period and that Russian officers of his Mission should be permitted to work in Camp 5C and elsewhere for a further period of two months.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the Russian Repatriation Mission should remain until its work was completed, rather than for any specific period of time. The Russian officers would be allowed access to Camp 5C until the segregation of Soviet citizens was complete. After that there would be no reason for them to visit this camp and they would not, therefore, be permitted to do so. Their work in ITALY would then be completed. In the meanwhile, as long as the process of separation was going on, he was anxious to have the assistance of these Russian officers in determining what persons should be treated as Soviet citizens.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Invited Major General Basilov to raise again the question, of the length of time for which the Russian Mission should remain in operation in ITALY, as soon as the separation of Soviet citizens and their concentration into one camp had been effected.

4. TREATMENT OF MINORS IN REPATRIATION CAMPS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said there were in Camp 5C some 400 minors of the age of 17 or below. They were treated on the same basis as the adult personnel Their youth, however, made them particularly susceptible to propaganda and they were being affected by the anti-Soviet influences which he had already mentioned (see Minute 2 above). He did not consider that these young persons could properly be treated as prisoners of war. He asked, therefore, that all these young people should be separated and sent to the camp for Soviet citizens. If this were not possible, they should be separated and concentrated in a different camp. For humanitarian reasons he felt responsible for these young people, as the conditions under which they were at present living at 5779 Camp 5C were not satisfactory.

BRIGADIER BLOCK, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that the youngest of these boys were aged 14 or 15. For the most part they had borne arms in German formations against the Russians.

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BRIGADIER BLOCK, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that the youngest of these boys were aged 14 or 15. For the most part they had borne arms in German formations against the Russians.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he could not declare that all boys under a certain age were to be treated as Soviet citizens. Their citizenship must be decided on the same rules as were appropriate for adults. It was undesirable to introduce an additional process by first separating these boys from the adults and then subdividing them into Soviet and non-Soviet citizens. Those boys who were Soviet citizens would be moved to the Soviet camp and those who were not would remain in Camp 5C. These boys had been associated with adults in armed formations for some time and it was administratively difficult to subdivide further.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV reiterated his contention that all the boys ought first be separated into one camp before they were segregated into Soviet citizens and otherwise.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said he could not see that the process suggested by Major General Basilov would make any ultimate difference to these minors, unless it was intended to bully them, in regard to their decision as to whether they wished to return to Russia or not, once they were separated from the adults. He fully understood that it was General Basilov's duty to bring as many young men as possible back to RUSSIA. However, he (Field Marshal Alexander) was not prepared to allow any intimidation.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV handed over a document, in Russian, setting out details of conditions as he had found them in Camp 5C.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Directed that when the segregation of Soviet citizens was taking place, minors should be segregated in the same way and at the same time as adults.

(b) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to make an examination into the conditions in Camp 5C, with special reference to the treatment of minors and in the light of the document handed over by Major General Basilov, with a view to improving these conditions if necessary and desirable.

5. PERMISSION FOR OFFICERS OF RUSSIAN MISSION TO VISIT THE BRITISH ZONE OF AUSTRIA

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he understood there were certain Russian citizens held in the British zone of AUSTRIA, particularly in camps near JUDENBURG and KLAGENFURT. He wished to be allowed to visit these camps.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF, in reply to a question from the Supreme Allied Commander, said that no Russian citizens were held in Prisoner of War Camps in the British Zone of AUSTRIA. However, certain Russian citizens were held in Displaced Persons Camps there and he understood that some 900 such persons were in a camp near VILLACH.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that the British zone of AUSTRIA was no longer under his command. As far as he (Field Marshal Alexander) was concerned, he believed Russian officers should be allowed to visit Austrian camps where Soviet citizens were definitely held and he would take the matter up with the commander of the British troops in AUSTRIA on this basis.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer,

(a) To despatch a signal to Commander, British Troops in [illegible] that Russian officers be allowed

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER: 5078

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer,

(a) To despatch a signal to Commander, British Troops in AUSTRIA requesting that Russian officers be allowed entrance into the British zone of AUSTRIA for the purpose of visiting the camps in which Soviet citizens (on the Anglo-American definition) were held.

(b) To inform the Russian Mission in ROME, through the Allied Commission, of the reply of Commander, British Troops AUSTRIA, when received.

6. ACCESS BY RUSSIAN OFFICERS TO CAMPS CONTAINING NON-SOVIET NATIONALS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked for permission to visit a number of camps in ITALY which he believed might contain certain Soviet citizens.

BRIGADIER BLOCK, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that General Basilov's party had already been allowed access into Camps 5C and 16 where the bulk of the Soviet citizens were held. At all the other camps under his command any men considered to be Soviet citizens and other

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men whom General Basilov had asked to see had been paraded for his inspection outside the cage.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reiterated his statement at the previous meeting that he would not grant permission for Russian officers to circulate in camps containing non-Russian nationals. If he did so, similar permission would have to be given to all Allied nations, including Poles, Jugoslavs, and French. In accordance with the instructions he had given, all Soviet citizens would shortly be concentrated in one camp where the Russian officers could visit them. However, any personnel located in other camps whom General Basilov specifically wished to see would be brought to him for interview.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1(B), to arrange:

(a) For the submission to General Basilov and to officers of the Russian Mission of lists of personnel held in German Prisoner of War Camps.

(b) For such personnel, as the Russian Mission might have reasonable grounds to consider as possible Soviet citizens, and consequently might wish to contact, to be brought before Russian officers for interview outside the camp precincts.

7. MEASURES TO DISCOVER RUSSIAN CITIZENS IN GERMAN PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS

(Previous reference SAC (45) 12, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked if any progress had been made in regard to discovering Soviet citizens in German Prisoner of War Camps.

MAJOR GENERAL MACLEOD said that instructions had been issued to the officers in charge of these camps to carry out a complete re-screening of their personnel and to declare any persons who might be considered to be Russian citizens on either the Russian or the Anglo-American definition. It would however, take a little time to ascertain the results produced by these measures.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Informed Major General BASILOV that he would be notified of the results of the re-screening process as soon as they were available.

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8. DEFINITION OF SOVIET CITIZENS ELIGIBLE FOR REPATRIATION

(Previous reference SAC (45) 12, Minute 1)

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV inquired whether the Supreme Allied Co

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MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV inquired whether the Supreme Allied Commander had had any further instructions from the United States and British Governments on this matter.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that these matters had been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER informed Major General BASILOV that signals, asking for further instructions with regard to the definition of Soviet citizens and the use of force to effect repatriation, had been despatched immediately subsequent to their previous meeting, but that no reply had as yet been received.

9. REPATRIATION OF PERSONNEL OF 2 POLISH CORPS TO POLAND

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked whether any information was available as to the number of personnel of 2 Polish Corps to be repatriated to POLAND.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the segregation of the Polish personnel, who wished to be repatriated, was proceeding. According to his present information, the number was likely to be about 12,000.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked whether an indication could be given as to the number of these personnel who would be Polish citizens and the number who would be Soviet citizens (on the Russian definition).

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the Polish Corps was composed of personnel who were Poles according to the pre-war boundaries of POLAND. The personnel to be repatriated would not therefore contain any Soviet citizens on the Anglo-American interpretation of this term. He could not, however, estimate what proportion of their numbers were domiciled to east or to the west of the new Russo-Polish frontier.

10. ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT BY POLISH TROOPS

(Previous reference SAC (45) 12 Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV, in accordance with the Supreme Allied Commander's invitation at the previous meeting, handed over details in writing of instances in which he alleged Polish troops had ill-treated Russian nationals. He also stated that he had personally been subjected to unseemly and improper conduct by Polish troops in ROME, even though he was escorted by Military Police.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he was indeed sorry to hear that anything of this sort had occurred. If General BASILOV experienced any more unpleasant incidents he should at once report the details, to the Allied District Commander of the area in which they occurred.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1(B):

To investigate General BASILOV's allegations concerning Polish troops and to submit a report in due course.

11. RUSSIAN CITIZENS IN CRETE

(Previous reference SAC (45) 12, Minute 7)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a query by Major General BASILOV said he had just returned from a visit to GREECE where he had investigated this matter. Certain Soviet citizens had been serving with the German forces in CRETE and had come into Allied hands when the British forces accepted the German surrender in that island. However, all these Russian citizens, with the exception of two, had been accounted for and had already been repatriated.

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12. FURTHER MEETINGS

In conclusion, THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER informed Major General BASILOV

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12. FURTHER MEETINGS

In conclusion, THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER informed Major General BASILOV that he would be glad to give him a further interview in about a fortnight's time when the Russian Mission had carried their investigations further.

J. G. SWEETLAND
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Plus Deputy Adjutant General, G-1(B) - 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 MTOUSA - 2

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SAC(45) 16
27th August 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

CHARTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

Note by Secretary

1. As a result of the direction at SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 5, the Charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was re-drafted and has finally been approved in the form attached.

2. This Charter is, therefore, circulated for information.

J.G. SWEDTMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Hist - 30 Aug 45

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SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Hist - 30 Aug 45

32 Chief Comnr

33 Exec Comnr

31 Air Forces
(Direct from N.C.)

M/c Note
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1 copy forwarded to Air Forces 3/c

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL 27 August 1945

SUBJECT: Charter for Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

TO : The Secretaries,
The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1. The Commanding General, AAF/MTO and Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDME, in Committee, are hereby designated as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

2. On matters of a common Allied air interest the Committee will act as Air Advisers to the Supreme Allied Commander and will be responsible for the coordination of all action to be taken thereon.

3. The staff of Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of the existing staffs of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME who will present coordinated papers to the Committee through its Secretariat.

4. The Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of two officers, one being designated by the Commanding General, AAF/MTO, and the other by Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDME.

5. Papers on matters of common Allied air interest will be forwarded by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat. The latter secretariat will forward papers approved for further transmission by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee to the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat who will be responsible for their appropriate disposition.

6. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate staff sections of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME. This Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate staff sections of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

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7. The establishment of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee

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7. The establishment of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and its secretariat is not intended to alter the normal procedure for staff consultation between Naval, Army and Air Force staff officers.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

W. D. MORGAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

(61)

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TOP SECRET

B 1050

aerial weapons.

In view of economic conditions of Italy and presently slight armament potential, rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry on other than a very small scale is most unlikely.

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TOP SECRET

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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 665 (31-33)
SAC (45) 14
21st August 1945

SECRET

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Secretary

1. On the dissolution of Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its two national components, it has become necessary to revise the existing directive for the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

2. The draft directive at Appendix 'A' has therefore been prepared by Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME in conjunction with Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and has received the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

J.G. SMEETHAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

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5772

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 759015

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3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

J.G. STRETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

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SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

APPENDIX 'A'

D R A F T

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

TO : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, OBE,
Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

THRU : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supercede and cancel the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AG 334/111 IS&PS-C.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

3. a. The Italian Air Force has been permitted to remain at a ceiling laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until a final policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force is decided either by a revision of the Armistice Terms or a Peace Treaty with Italy.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorised resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them ~~in accordance with the policy laid down by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.~~ You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the ~~policy instructions~~ of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, and secondly, to assist the Italian Air Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

Amended as amended

71

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. The following instructions supercede and [illegible] which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AG 334/111 ISAPS-O.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

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Amended, 71

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the Officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves.)

b. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

6. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained is one for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Maintenance of these units will be regulated by instructions from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. for the present

7. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorised. All the Italian Air Force units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee who will authorise them to be used as they consider fit.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organisation, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organisation, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner, for information and on matters which are his direct concern. The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

5279

9. Over and above the requirements of the authorised flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organising such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this Theatre. The decision as to the proportion to be em-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 750015

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5770

9. Over and above the requirements of the authorised flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organising such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this Theatre. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively rests with the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

10. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of RAF/MEDME and AAF/MTO.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C.W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

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III

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief Com-
Allied Com-

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

(3)(31-33)

AUG 22 RECD
CC 1020

AF 664

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 31

SAC (45) 13
21st August 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN
ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

Note by Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDME
and Commanding General, AAF/MTO

1. The dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its United States and British national components (AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME) renders necessary the formation of an Allied Committee to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on all air matters of common interest to the two air forces. To this end it is recommended that the Commanding General, AAF/MTO and the Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDME, in Committee, shall form the "Mediterranean Allied Air Committee".

2. The successful functioning of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces has forcibly demonstrated the paramount importance of the cooperation and coordination with the Allied services. It is therefore considered that as the two air forces are now split into their national components, the matter of coordination has become of even greater importance and it is felt that great attention should be paid to this matter by the Staffs of the Committee. To this end it will be necessary for the respective Staffs of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME to continue working in close cooperation on all air matters of common interest as heretofore and to present coordinated proposals to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee through its Secretariat.

3. Apart from routine matters of allied air interest which will continue to arise from time to time and which will be dealt with in the manner described in para 2 above, there is now in being the Air Forces Sub-commission of the Allied Commission for Italy which has been directed to address all reports and correspondence required under existing arrangements to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. In order that proper routing of correspondence may be insured, it is recommended that a Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat be formed and that all correspondence addressed to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee be routed through the Allied Liaison Section (RAF/MEDME) inasmuch as the Allied Liaison Section is familiar with and has been dealing with all routine matters apertaining to the Air Forces Sub-commission of the Allied Commission for Italy. It is recommended that this Section be designated as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat.

5769

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785615

1. The dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its United States and British national components (AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME) renders necessary the formation of an Allied Committee to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on all air matters of common interest to the two air forces. To this end it is recommended that the Commanding General, AAF/MTO and the Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDME, in Committee, shall form the "Mediterranean Allied Air Committee".

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5769

4. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate Staff Sections of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME. The Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate Staff Sections of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Papers approved by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee for further transmission will be forwarded by the Secretariat.

5. A proposed charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee is attached at Appendix 'A'.

6. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to these arrangements is requested.

Intd. R.A. F.
for A.G. G.

Intd. J.A. K.

DISTRIBUTION:

58

Normal.

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APPENDIX 'A'

CHARTER FOR
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

1. The Commanding General, AAF/MTO and Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDME, in Committee, are hereby designated as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

2. On matters of a common Allied air interest the Committee will act as Air Advisors to the Supreme Allied Commander and will be responsible for the coordination of all action to be taken thereon.

3. The Staff of Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of the existing Staffs of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME who will present coordinated papers to the Committee through its Secretariat.

4. The Allied Liaison Section (RAF/MEDME) will act as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat and will receive all correspondence addressed to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

5. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriat Staff Sections of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME. The Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate Staff Sections of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDME and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Papers approved by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee for further transmission will be forwarded by the Secretariat.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795615

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2298

20 August 1945

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Soviet Citizens in Mediterranean Theater.

TO : Major General A. Vasiliev,
Representative of the Soviet Union,
Advisory Council for Italy.

I am directed by the Supreme Allied Commander to forward for your information and that of Major General Basilov, the attached two copies of the record of the meeting which you attended here on 18 August 1945.

J. E. BASTION, JR.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

Incl:
Copies No. 49 and
50 of above mentioned
meeting, dated 18 August.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Incl:
Copies No. 31, 32 and
33 of above mentioned
meeting, dated 18 August.

RETURN TO
Chief Commissioner

CONFIDENTIAL

717

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief Com- Allied Commission
(3)(31-32)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 660

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COPY NO 31

SAC (45) 12
20th August 1945

REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S OFFICE AT 1130 HOURS, 18 AUGUST 1945

PRESENT:

Major General Y. D. Basilov,
Special Soviet Delegate on
Repatriation Matters

Major General A. Vasiliev,
Soviet Representative
Allied Commission for Italy

Captain Uraevsky,
Interpreter

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold
R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Deputy Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer,
AFHQ.

Major L.F.G. Ferguson
G-1 (British) AFHQ.

SECRETARY
Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman

Major General Vasiliev introduced Major General Basilov to the Supreme Allied Commander and explained that he had come from MOSCOW on a special mission in regard to repatriation of Soviet citizens from the Mediterranean Theater.

1. DEFINITION OF SOVIET CITIZENS ELIGIBLE FOR REPATRIATION

(x-1505-2/1)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Captain Uraevsky,
Interpreter

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold
R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Deputy Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. C. Duff,
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AFHQ.

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Major General Vasiliev introduced Major General Basilov to the Supreme Allied Commander and explained that he had come from MOSCOW on a special mission in regard to repatriation of Soviet citizens from the Mediterranean Theater.

1. DEFINITION OF SOVIET CITIZENS ELIGIBLE FOR REPATRIATION

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he had information that there were ten thousand Russian citizens in an Allied Camp near CESINATICO. He inquired as to when it would be possible to repatriate these persons.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that on his information there were not anything approaching 10,000 Soviet citizens awaiting repatriation. He asked what the Russians considered to be the definition of the term Soviet Citizen and stated that his instructions from the United States and British Governments were that only these persons who resided in the area east of the 1939 Russian frontier were to be considered as Soviet citizens for purposes of repatriation.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV replied that his government considered as Soviet citizens all persons resident to the east of the Soviet-Polish frontier as recently drawn substantially along the CURZON Line. As inter-governmental agreement in regard to these frontiers had now been reached, he asked for an explanation as to how any contrary definition of Soviet Citizenship could be reconciled with that agreement.

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(57) RETURN TO
Chief [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that it was not a matter for him to explain. It was a matter to be decided between MOSCOW, LONDON and WASHINGTON. Meanwhile, he could only carry out his orders, which were quite clear that only persons living to the east of the 1939 frontier should be considered Soviet citizens. For himself, he would be only too pleased to arrange for the disposal of the personnel in question once he had received orders. At present, these personnel were a charge on his administrative services.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he was informed that the status of these personnel as Soviet citizens has been agreed at the POTSDAM Conference. It was on this understanding that he was sent from MOSCOW and he had expected that military authorities in the Mediterranean Theater would have received similar information. He also understood that a further decision had been taken at POTSDAM that Polish citizens would be repatriated through the same channels as Russian citizens, but that the Russians would take priority. He believed that the whole question of repatriation of the various European nationalities had been discussed at POTSDAM and the Russians, for their part, were preparing to repatriate Italians to the areas under British and American control.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, with the agreement of Chief Administrative Officer and the Deputy Chief of Staff, confirmed that no such instructions had been received from the British and U.S. Governments. He emphasized that two points required to be settled before the repatriation could be completed. The first was the difference in interpretation, as between the Soviet Government on X the one hand and the British and U.S. Governments on the other, as to what persons were to be considered Soviet citizens. In the second place he required precise instructions as to the extent to which he was authorized to use force to compel Soviet citizens to return to RUSSIA against their will. The present situation was that, of the Russian citizens in the theatre, some wished to return and some did not. He was not, however, at present empowered to make people return to RUSSIA against their will.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's second point, stated that it was the Russian view that, in accordance with Article I of the Crimean Conference, personnel should be repatriated whether they wished to go back or not.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that if ordered to do so, he would use force to effect repatriation. At present however he had not received orders to this effect. In reply to a request by Major General Basilov, he agreed that he would at once dispatch a signal to his superiors requesting further instructions. He pointed out, however, that he had already asked for such instructions over a month ago and had had no reply.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

a. Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to draft for his approval signals to the authorities concerned stressing the two points of divergence between the Russian and Anglo-American views as stated at X above, and requesting further

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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X

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

a. Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to draft for his approval signals to the authorities concerned stressing the two points of divergence between the Russian and Anglo-American views as stated at X above, and requesting further instructions.

5765

b. Invited Major General Basilov to dispatch a signal in similar terms to the Soviet Government.

2. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS THROUGH AUSTRIA

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that about 900 persons, who, in accordance with his present instructions, were to be considered Russian citizens and who wished to return to RUSSIA, were at present in ITALY awaiting repatriation. He had proposed that they should be returned as soon as possible by the shortest route, namely, via JUDENBURG into the Soviet Zone of AUSTRIA. However, the Soviet authorities in AUSTRIA had refused to accept them and had suggested that they be routed via the US Zone of GERMANY. Shortage of transportation facilities precluded dispatch by such a roundabout route and he saw no reason why they should not be accepted via JUDENBURG.

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MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said he was not aware of this matter. He would endeavour to arrange with the Soviet authorities concerned for the acceptance of these persons into the Soviet Zone of AUSTRIA as rapidly as possible.

3. VISITS OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS TO PRISONER OF WAR AND DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATER.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked if he and other Russian officers could visit various camps in ITALY and AUSTRIA in order to look after the welfare of Soviet Citizens and to inform them of conditions in RUSSIA. He also wished to search for Soviet citizens, who had previously not been reported, in order to notify the Allied authorities as their status as such.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that Russian officers were welcome to visit any camps containing personnel classified as Russian citizens in accordance with his present directive in this respect. In connection with such visits General BASILOV and any of his officers would be given every possible facility. However, the position was that he (Field Marshal Alexander) was responsible for screening the various prisoners and displaced persons who had come into his hands and deciding what their nationality was. He could not permit interference, by any officers not under his command, in the methods by which he administered these persons captured by his armies. He could not allow Russian officers access to non-Russian citizens without the agreement of the countries whose citizens they would be contacting. If he were to allow the Russians such access he would have to offer similar facilities to all other Allied Nations. This would, for example, involve permitting visits by Polish officers to camps containing Russian citizens.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked whether permission could be given to visit certain specific camps.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that details in this regard must be furnished to his staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER instructed:-

> The Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), to arrange immediately, in accordance with the normal procedure, for Major General Basilov (and such other Russian officers as he desired) to have full facilities for visiting any camp in which Soviet Citizens (as at present defined by the British and United States Governments) are at present held.

4. MEASURES TO DISCOVER RUSSIAN CITIZENS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV, in connection with his request that Russian officers should visit German Prisoner of War camps said that it was not always easy to pick out Soviet citizens from among the surrendered enemy personnel. They had been terrorized by the Germans for some time and they were afraid of declaring their Russian nationality.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that while he could not allow Russian officers to have access to these German prisoners, he would have his Staff examine the problem most carefully so as to determine the best machinery for discovering such Russian citizens. When such an examination had been made he would do his best to meet the Russian wishes in this respect as soon as practicable.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER instructed:-

> The Chief Administrative Officer to investigate the matter and report as a matter of urgency as to what machinery could best be employed in order to discover Soviet citizens in German Prisoner of War and similar camps.

5. SEGREGATION OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR CAMP ADMINISTRATION

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked that as soon as possible Russian citizens should be accommodated in camps separate from other nationalities.

CONFIDENTIAL

(51a)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed and said that this was already taking place in respect of persons who, in accordance with his present instructions, were recognized as Russian citizens.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked that Russian citizens be given facilities to organize their own internal administration within camps in the same way as similar facilities had been given to US and British personnel to administer their own camps at ODESSA. He quoted an instance where it was alleged that 470 citizens were subject to German camp administration.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer

(a) To arrange for the concentration of Soviet citizens (as defined in accordance with British and American policy) into specific camp areas, in which they should be given facilities to organize their own camp administration.

(b) Invited Major General Basilov to bring to notify AFHQ in writing of any instances in which he had information that the above policy was not being carried out in order that such instances might be further investigated.

6. MATTERS AFFECTING II POLISH CORPS

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that, according to his information, there were some thirty thousand Soviet citizens in the Polish Corps. He asked for permission for Russian officers to visit units of the Polish Corps (and especially the Polish base camp) in order to search for Soviet citizens. At the same time he stated that Polish military personnel continued to maltreat Russian citizens in ITALY and alleged certain recent incidents. One of these had involved the shooting of a Russian citizen by Poles and another had led to a fight in which one hundred and fifty persons had been wounded. Furthermore, he considered that the newspaper of the II Polish Corps was conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. He asked what measures had been taken by Allied Authorities in ITALY to prevent such incidents. He also wished to know the numbers of personnel of the II Polish Corps who would be repatriated to the Russian controlled areas of EUROPE and the time at which this repatriation might be expected to start.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that he presumed Major General Basilov in referring to thirty thousand Soviet citizens in the Polish Corps was adopting the Russian definition of the Soviet citizens as all persons resident east of the CURZON Line.

MAJOR GENERAL VASILIEV confirmed that this was so.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that, for the reasons he had already [illegible] these people as Soviet citizens. He re-

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should be given facilities to organise [illegible] camp administration.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that, for the reasons he had already given, he could not at present regard these people as Soviet citizens. 5.763 Regard to Major General Basilov's remarks concerning anti-Soviet incidents by Polish soldiers, Field Marshal Alexander observed that some very serious allegations had been made. He wished to have full details of these incidents in writing so that they could be investigated and so that appropriate action could be taken if the allegations should be found to be true. The matter of the return of personnel of the Polish Corps to POLAND was already in hand and, as soon as the numbers to be repatriated were determined, he would inform the Russian authorities accordingly. Referring to Major General Basilov's request for Russian officers to visit Polish units, Field Marshal Alexander stated that it must be clearly understood that the Poles were Allies. Their forces formed a Corps, which had fought exceedingly well, in the armies under his Command. They must, therefore, be treated exactly as any other Allies were. He would not dream of ordering an Allied Corps under his command to submit to inspection by officers of another nationality. That was not the way he was in

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the habit of exercising his supreme command. If General Anders should invite Russian officers to visit the Polish Corps, then Field Marshal Alexander would have no objection whatever. It would, however, be most improper for him to order General Anders to receive such officers uninvited, and he was most surprised that Major General Basilov had requested him to do such a thing.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :-

Invited Major General Basilov to furnish him with full details in writing regarding the alleged incidents involving Polish troops and Soviet citizens.

7. RUSSIAN CITIZENS IN CRETE

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he believed that there were certain Soviet citizens still in CRETE. Some two or three hundred such citizens had been evacuated from the Island to the mainland of GREECE. When the Russian representative in GREECE had requested permission to visit CRETE, however, such permission had been refused.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed surprise that any Russian citizens should be in CRETE and considered that any such citizens who might remain on the Island should be repatriated if they wished.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :-

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to investigate the alleged existence of Russian citizens in CRETE and should the existence of such citizens be confirmed to make appropriate recommendations to him regarding their repatriation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in terminating the meeting, assured Major General Basilov and Major General Vasiliev that he would always be pleased to receive them and to discuss their problems.

J.G. Smeeman

J.G. SMEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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