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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
MAR. - OCT. 1946

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
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Q. M. C. Form 323 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1945

LIST OF PAPERS

1002-2/CC

Office of the
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ALLIED COMMISSION

PAPERS AND NOTES

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
100	AFHQ MJPS F/334	8 Oct 46	Confid <i>Copy made for report</i>	Possible operations in VG
101	AFHQ MJPS	16 Oct 46		Add to possible operations in VG

K053

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Q. M. C. Form 353 (OM No. 490)
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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
88	Memo B 28 Curme	11 Mar 46		Command in Italy after disbandment of GHQ CMF
89	Memo 633/EC	15 Mar 46		AIDE MEMOIRE on G-5 Paper
90	AFHQ MJPS P/327 F	3 May 46		Possible Operations in Ven Giu
91	AFHQ MJPS P/327 F	8 May 46		Possibl Operts in Ven Giu (Revision)
+ 92	AFHQ MJPS P/328 F	14 Jun 46		Spec Sec to assume functs of AC re Serv S/Cs
+ 93	Memo	14 Jun 46		AC comments on MJPS Paper P.328
+ 94	Ltr P/329 (Final)	15 Jun 46		Brt & US Civ Affs Agrmts , Analysis of Final Reports
+ 95	Ltr AFHQ MJPS P/328 (2nd Draft)	20 Jun 46		Proposed replacement fr AC
+ 96	Ltr 131/1 Yates	20 Jun 46		MJPS P/328 (2nd Draft) "Proposed replacement fr AC
97	AFHQ MJPS P/331 F	3 Jul 46		Location of AFHQ
98	Memo	5 Jul 46		Statement made by Key at SAC's Conference, AFHQ 5 Jul 46
99	Cbl 469 SACM	5 Jul 46		SAC views re new "set-up" to re- place Alcom

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

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3 copies
87
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16 October 1946

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENIZIA GIULIA

The following addendum will be made to MJPS P/334 (FINAL) dated 6 October 1946 :-

After para 8 (b) (ii) on page 5 insert new sub para as follows.



(c) Allied Bases

The British and United States forces are based on VENICE and LEGHORN respectively. In the event of active operations and a withdrawal of British and United States forces along their own L of C, should one force extricate itself and the other be lost Anglo-United States relations might be impaired by the apparent abandonment of one force by the other.

K. C. Cooper

fn K. C. COOPER
Brigadier GS
Chairman

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36 to EC

34

Copy No. _____

8 October 46

F/134 (F.R.L.).

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the MJPS has prepared the attached final paper.

6/5050

K.C. COOPER,
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman.

8050

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P/34 (FINAL).

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8 October 46

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GRILL

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the MJPS has prepared the attached final paper.

K.C. COOPER,
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

SUBJECT

1. To examine the current Allied operational policy and to make appropriate recommendations as to any revision in that policy made necessary by the political situation and changes in the military situation.

YUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES

2. In spite of a recent slight increase it is still estimated that Yugoslav forces in the general area of Zone 'B' amount to approximately 50,000 (6 infantry divisions and 1 tank division), which shows no material change since last February. These troops constitute the best equipped divisions of the Yugoslav Army. Moreover, every Slovene in Zone 'A' is a potential fifth columnist.

It is considered therefore, that the Yugoslav Army still in a position to mount a major operation or to attempt a coup-de-main. It is appreciated that a coup-de-main could be effected with little warning but that a major operation could not be mounted without previous warning.

YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS

3. It is considered that the Yugoslav intentions are NOT to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-de-main, although a possibility, is unlikely. It is still believed that the primary reason for the presence of so large a force is to intimidate those elements in Venezia Giulia who are not in sympathy with the Yugoslav Government, and in addition to be able to take over as quickly as possible any territory ceded to Yugoslavia by the Paris Peace Conference.

2049

ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

The present internal situation in Italy as affecting Allied commitments has not materially changed since it was summed up in the latest J.I.C. appreciation of 30 August, which reads as follows :-

disturbed state of public

1. To examine the current Allied operational policy and to make appropriate recommendations as to any revision in that policy made necessary by the political situation and changes in the military situation.

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ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

4. The present internal situation in Italy as affecting Allied commitments has not materially changed since it was summed up in the latest J.I.C. appreciation of 30 August, which reads as follows :-

" (a) Taking into consideration the very disturbed state of public feeling in Italy during the past few months, in view of the acute domestic problems and of the decisions being taken in regard to Italy at the Peace Conference, it can be said that the population on the whole has showed a commendable restraint. The widespread strikes have mostly passed without incident. Anti-Allied demonstrations have been poorly attended and have in most cases remained orderly. The number of incidents of an anti-Allied nature has been small, and very few have taken a serious turn.

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- (b) In recent months there has been a considerable increase in hostile feelings towards the Allies in general and towards Allied forces in Italy. The expression of this, however, has largely been confined to an intense press campaign and to the bitter comments of the public in general.
- (c) There have been comparatively few cases of assault on Allied military personnel. There is the possibility of a slight increase in such cases when the final Peace Conference terms are announced. It is not believed, however, that these will be on any large organized scale, but rather will take the form of a few isolated and spontaneous expressions of indignation. The importance is to be stressed of the good behaviour of Allied troops to avoid giving cause for provocation.
- (d) In the past twelve months no instances have been reported of raids on Allied installations, other than for motives of theft. In the event of hostilities breaking out in Venezia Giulia it is believed that sabotage of Allied installations and lines of communication might be carried out by Pro Slav elements in Italy or possibly by a small section of the Italian Communist Party.
- (e) Isolated attacks on French troops are possible on the Italo - French borders should certain zones at present Italian be occupied by the French, as a result of the Peace Conference decisions.
- (f) When the time comes for handing over elements of the Italian Fleet to the United Nations it is possible that a few ships will be scuttled, and demonstrations of an anti-Allied nature may ensue, particularly in the Naval Centres.
- (g) Further worker's strikes fomented by the Communist Party are to be expected. Also further demonstrations by unemployed unless the Italian Government is able to take strong measures to resolve at least some of the present economic problems.
- (h) On the whole, it is not at present considered that there exists any serious threat to the security of Allied troops in Italy. "

Although it is considered that the Italian Nation as a whole would rally against the Yugoslavs in the event of hostilities, we must be prepared for the possibility of extensive sabotage by Yugoslav agents against Allied installations and our L of C in general. 2048

ALLIED POLICY

5. SAC's public statement made at the end of March summarizes the present Allied policy. In this statement it was made clear that it is the firm intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to maintain their present position in Venezia Giulia until an agreed settlement of the territory has been reached and put into effect.

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By the end of May the situation in Venezia Giulia had deteriorated and in N.F. 1147 SAC warned the CCS that the Yugoslav attitude had definitely stiffened. In N.F. 1151 (6 Jun 46) SAC informed the CCS that "Tension in Venezia Giulia particularly in Trieste has continued to heighten" and also that XIII Corps had asked for reinforcement by 6 Armoured Division and one U.S. Parachute Regiment. He did not consider, however, that the situation justified such reinforcement but 6 Armoured Division was moved forward to the Isonzo. In N.F. 1156 SAC reaffirmed the possibility of a coup-de-main by the Yugoslavs and requested reinforcement immediately by one RCT.

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As a result of the SAC's tour of inspection in Venezia Giulia, NAF 1166 was despatched to CCS in 25 June, which stated that although the situation at the time was quiet, if current negotiations in Paris led to a frontier solution unfavourable to the Yugoslavs an immediate deterioration in the situation would take place. SAC recommended that the RCT from USFET should be moved to Italy and that the Yugoslav Detachment in Zone 'A' should withdraw. He also asked for permission to withdraw the POLA Garrison at his discretion and finished by saying that unless the measures recommended in this NAF were taken, he considered that the United States and United Kingdom Governments were "taking grave military risks in Venezia Giulia".

In answer to these NAFs the CCS in F.A. 678 (5 July 46) stated that they did NOT approve the move of 1 RCT from USFET, that the probability of a Yugoslav attack was unlikely, that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Detachment was considered politically impracticable and the owing to strong political objections the withdrawal from POLA was NOT approved unless hostilities broke out.

PRESENT DIRECTIVE

6. Allied policy as summarized above is reflected in the existing directive to XIII Corps issued on 15 May 40 (attached at appendix 'A'). At that time it was appreciated that the presence of Yugoslav forces in Zone 'B' was designed to ensure that Zone 'B' was firmly held and to intimidate the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'. It was NOT considered that the Yugoslav intended to go to war with the United Nations, but that Yugoslav fifth column activities would continue in Zone 'A' and N.E. Italy. Consequently, in the absence of hostilities, XIII Corps' tasks were to maintain law and order in Zone 'A' and maintain the security of the MORGAN LINE and the Italian frontier in Udine Province, while in the event of a direct attack they were to secure a firm hold in the area TRIESTE - GORIZIA - UDINE, protect the L of C from VENICE, evacuate POLA and conduct limited offensive operations pending a policy decision from the United States and United Kingdom Governments. These tasks were however, subject to the overriding proviso that should a Yugoslav attack in strength take place without warning, GOC XIII Corps was to act in such a way as to maintain his forces intact.

CHANGE IN MILITARY SITUATION

(a) Ground Forces

MARCH

XIII Corps

5th London Div (Br)
88 Div (US)

6 Arm Div (Br)

OCTOBER

XIII Corps

88 Div (US)
1 Arm Div (Br)

Two Inf Bde Groups

K917

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CHANGE IN MILITARY SITUATION

(a) Ground Forces

MARCH

XIII Corps

5th London Div (Br)
88 Div (US)

6 Arm Div (Br)

II Polish Corps (of three divs)

Warsaw Arm Div
5 Kresowa Div
3 Carpathian Div

OCTOBER

XIII Corps

88 Div (US)
1 Arm Div (Br)
Two Inf Bde Groups

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7. (a) Ground Forces (continued)

MARCH

REINFORCEMENTS

One US Corps of 2 Divs (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET) - Authorized by CCS up to 1 Sep 46 but will no longer be available after middle of October on commencement of outphasing.

One RCT (from USFET)

Five Italian Inf Divs (Ex GRUPPI)

(of questionable value except as service troops).

Five Italian Divs (Ex GRUPPI)

(Understrength, untrained personnel, equipment short. Value even as service troops questionable).

(b) Air Forces

MARCH

Located in Theatre

Desert Air Force
(9 F/B Sqns
1 Tac/R Sqn)

Reinforcements on Call

(1) RAF Uncertain on strength as they were stated to depend on the overall situation throughout the whole of the MED/VE Command and B.A.F.O.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational) plus 10 night fighters.

OCTOBER

Located in Theatre

9 F/B Sqns
1 Tac/R Sqn

Reinforcements on Call

(1) RAF 135 Wing (B.A.F.O.) (3 Tempest F/B Sqns each 16 aircraft). Up to 4 Heavy Bomber Sqns (each 8 aircraft) operating from Malta. might be made available. Transports - 10 Dakotas at present based at BARI.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational). Transports - 110 by

One US Corps of 2 Divs (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET) - Authorized by CCS up to 1 Sep 46 but will no longer be available after middle of October on commencement of outphasing.

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(3 Tempest F/B Sqns each 16 aircraft).
Up to 4 Heavy Bomber Sqns (each 8 aircraft) operating from MUXA might be made available. Transports - 10 Dakotas at present based at BARI.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational) plus 10 night fighters. RCN - 23 planes. Transports - 110 planes. Heavy Bombers - 36 planes.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational). Transports - 110 by complete cessation of EITS.

(c) Naval Forces

1 LST is at present immediately available for the evacuation from POLA by sea, otherwise the situation as regards Naval forces available is unchanged.

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LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS

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8. (a) British The situation since March has altered in that :-

(i) Manpower resources have been concentrated by the elimination of Naples Base and the 1 of C to M.S. Italy and also by the concentration of fighting manpower into one division (1 Arm Div).

(ii) As a result of (i) above there is less flexibility in the administrative machine; resources in Naples which might have been used to support XIII Corps have now been disposed of and would have to be obtained from outside the theatre (especially ordnance stores which are held in Austria). This would be either by overland route from BaOR, whose own resources are limited and movement by rail over such long distances is unreliable, or by sea from UK or ELF which besides requiring time to initiate involves reliance on the port of Venice: this port might well attract attention from saboteurs or air attack.

(b) United States

(i) Manpower resources have been reduced and recent directives from the War Department indicate that there will be a further reduction by 1 January of five thousand in the troops available in this theatre but that the 88th Division will be maintained at full strength. Resources from outside the theatre have also been reduced.

(ii) With the long line of communications from the Base port, Leghorn, to Zone 'A', it appears that the reduction in (i) above, all of which will have to be absorbed in headquarters and service type troops, will probably preclude adequate logistical support of active operations by the 88th Division. United States study underway indicates that the maximum that can be accomplished by United States service type troops remaining after the reduction of 1 January may be the continued supply and support of the 88th Division in its present passive position, and that in case of active operations the Division might become non-effective operationally soon after supplies of any type then in the 88th Division area are exhausted.

ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL FACTORS

9. (a) British

(i) Additionally large quantities of ammunition (approx 15,000 tons) are being held in excess of authorised theatre

(ii)

As a result of (i) above there is less flexibility in the administrative machine; resources in Naples which might have been used to support XIII Corps have now been disposed of and would have to be obtained from outside the theatre (especially ordnance stores which are held in Austria). This would be either by overland route from BAOR, whose own resources are limited and movement by rail over such long distances is unreliable, or by sea from UK or VTLF which besides requiring time to initiate involves reliance on the port of Venice: this port might well attract attention from saboteurs or air attack.

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ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL FACTORS

9. (a) British

(i)

Additionally large quantities of ammunition (approx 15,000 tons) are being held in excess of authorised theatre reserves. This is also the case over vehicles where a total of some 500 are being held against operational re-equipment requirements. In both cases appreciable manpower is involved in maintaining these items at the required standards. The reduction in manpower resources will also eventually render the maintenance of this quantity of stores impossible.

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ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL FACTORS (continued)

9. (e) British (continued)

- (ii) A number of units and quantities of stores which are unnecessary except in the case of major operations in N.E. Italy, are also being retained. The personnel are required to bring other units up to strength and it is important to dispose of all possible stores as early as possible.

(b) United States

Besides normal theatre reserves the United States forces are holding approx 20,000 tons of ammunition, 60 2 1/2 ton trucks and sufficient quantities of other items to provide a 40 day combat reserve for theatre troops plus planned reinforcement. Personnel required to maintain these excess stocks and vehicles will be lost after 1 January.

- (c) In connection with (a) and (b) above only 90 days is allowed for the withdrawal of UK and US forces after ratification of the Peace Treaty and this period would be insufficient to deal with the total quantities of stores and ammunition at present in N.E. Italy.

MANPOWER FACTORS

10. (a) Both British and United States manpower resources have steadily decreased. This has left a very high proportion of German units remaining as administrative troops. Similarly a large proportion of United States administrative work is undertaken by German manpower.

In the light of the present low proportion of British troops and the low proportion of United States troops which will occur when service troops are reduced by 5,000 on 1 January, the reliability of these German troops in the event of hostilities could not be guaranteed; moreover their lack of weapons means that they are an additional protection commitment.

K044

- (b) Approach to the Italian Government with a view to earmarking and training service type units of the Italian Army to lend logistical support has been forbidden.

PROPOSALS

11. In view of the political situation and the changes in the military situation, it is for consideration whether to

required to bring other units up to strength and it is important to dispose of all possible stores as early as possible.

(b) United States

Besides normal theatre reserves the United States forces are holding approx 20,000 tons of ammunition, 60 2½ ton trucks and sufficient quantities of other items to provide a 40 day combat reserve for theatre troops plus planned reinforcement. Personnel required to maintain these excess stocks and vehicles will be lost after 1 January.

- (c) In connection with (a) and (b) above only 90 days is allowed for the withdrawal of UK and US forces after ratification of the Peace Treaty and this period would be insufficient to deal with the total quantities of stores and ammunition at present in N.E. Italy.

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KQ44

- (b) Approach to the Italian Government with a view to earmarking and training service type units of the Italian Army to lend logistical support has been forbidden.

PROPOSALS

11. In view of the political situation and the changes in the military situation as reflected in paras 7 - 10 above, it is for consideration whether the allied operational policy as set forth in the 15 May 1945 directive to XIII Corps should now be modified. The three following operational policies are unacceptable to the Venetian Council situation:

- (a) Preparation for major operations as the primary policy with the maintenance of internal security a secondary function. This policy involves planning and logistical preparations on a large scale and the retention of all possible ex-theatre reserves. This is the current policy.

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~~SECRET~~ (Continued)

11. (b) Preparation for operations within the capabilities of our own theatre resources and earmarked reinforcements. This is considered to be the maintenance of internal security and the prevention of a coup-de-main only.
- (c) Maintenance of internal security as the sole function of our forces. In case of aggression by the Yugoslavs these forces to be extricated and withdrawn pending reinforcements on the requisite scale. Adoption of this policy would result in release of ex-theatre reinforcements and cessation of logistical preparations and would permit rundown of operational stocks now held.

CONCLUSIONS

12. Our operational forces in Venezia Giulia have been reduced by two Arm'd Regts, two Inf Bns and service units and the only foreseeable ground reinforcements available is one Parachute Infantry Regiment from USFET, which will not be available much longer. Polish troops are no longer available to guard the Allied L of C which in the event of hostilities may be subjected to sabotage. Furthermore, the logistical situation, particularly if 5,000 United States service type troops are withdrawn from the theatre, is not considered capable of supporting a major operation.

13. In view of the reduction of our forces it is considered that we are no longer capable of carrying out a major operation in Venezia Giulia although the Yugoslavs are in a position to do so. However, to say that our function is solely one of maintaining Internal Security might be interpreted as a weakening of our policy in Venezia Giulia and NOT in accordance with the positive attitude which we have adopted heretofore. It is considered therefore that our policy should be to prepare for operations within our present capabilities, and in the event of a Yugoslav attack in strength, to conduct operations in order to maintain our forces intact. This will necessitate a redistribution of our forces prior to a major attack which will entail giving up security of a great portion of the Morgen Line. Such a policy would enable us to reduce the logistical support of present ground and air forces, and that of our anticipated air reinforcements, to that which can be effectively and economically maintained.

5043

In the event of a major operation forcing a withdrawal of our forces a policy as to the line of our withdrawal is required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. That the attached draft NAF at appendix 'B' be despatched to the CCS informing them of the present position and that the draft NAF at appendix 'C' be sent as a follow up, requesting the CCS to state their policy in the event of a withdrawal.

scale. Adoption of this policy would result in release of ex-theatre reinforcements and cessation of logistical preparations and would permit run-down of operational stocks now held.

CONCLUSIONS

12. Our operational forces in Venezia Giulia have been reduced by two Arm'd Regts, two Inf Bns and service units and the only foreseeable ground reinforcements available is one Parachute Infantry Regiment from USFET, which will not be available much longer. Polish troops are no longer available to guard the Allied L of C which in the event of hostilities may be subjected to sabotage. Furthermore, the logistical situation, particularly if 5,000 United States service type troops are withdrawn from the theatre, is not considered capable of supporting a major operation.

13. In view of the reduction of our forces it is considered that we are no longer capable of carrying out a major operation in Venezia Giulia although the Yugoslavs are in a position to do so. However, to say that our function is solely one of maintaining Internal Security might be interpreted as a weakening of our policy in Venezia Giulia and NOT in accordance with the positive attitude which we have adopted heretofore. It is considered therefore that our policy should be to prepare for operations within our present capabilities, and in the event of a Yugoslav attack in strength, to conduct operations in order to maintain our forces intact. This will necessitate a redistribution of our forces prior to a major attack which will result in giving up security of a great portion of the Morgan Line. Such a policy would enable us to reduce the logistical support of present ground and air forces, and that of our anticipated air reinforcements, to that which can be effectively and economically maintained.

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14. In the event of a major operation forcing a withdrawal of our forces a policy as to the line of our withdrawal is required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. That the attached draft NAF at appendix 'B' be despatched to the CCS informing them of the present position and that the draft NAF at appendix 'C' be sent as a follow up, requesting the CCS to state their policy in the event of a withdrawal.

16. That the attached directive at appendix 'D' be despatched to GHQ CMF.

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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NO 381

SUBJECT: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia

TO : General Officer Commanding Headquarters XIII Corps

This Headquarters F50372 of 25 October is hereby cancelled.
It is appreciated that the continued presence of large Yugoslav forces in Zone 'B' is designed to:

a. Ensure that Zone 'B' is firmly held whatever form the political settlement of Venezia-Giulia takes.

b. Intimidate as far as possible the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'.

It is to be expected that Yugoslav sponsored underground activities in Zone 'A' and North East Italy will continue but it is not considered that the Yugoslavs intend to go to war with the United Nations by launching a direct attack on your forces in Venezia-Giulia. However such a possibility cannot be excluded and plans will continue to be made to meet it.

In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with Armed Forces in Zone 'A', our tasks are to:

a. Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

b. Maintain the security of the Morgan Line and the Italian frontiers in the province of Udine.

Should the state of law and order deteriorate to such an extent that the forces at present available to you become inadequate for these tasks or if it appears desirable to make a show of force, the Armored Division will be placed at your disposal.

In the event of a direct attack by Yugoslav forces across the Morgan Line you will:

a. Secure firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia -

b. Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

c. Evacuate ROLs.

d. Conduct such limited offensive operations as may be possible with the forces at your disposal.

This Headquarters F50372 of 25 October is hereby cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the continued presence of large Yugoslav forces in Zone 'B' is designed to:

a. Insure that Zone 'B' is firmly held whatever form the political settlement of Venezia-Giulia takes.

b. Limitate as far as possible the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'.

2. It is to be expected that Yugoslav sponsored underground activities in Zone 'A' and North West Italy will continue but it is not considered that the Yugoslavs intend to go to war with the United Nations by launching a direct attack on your forces in Venezia-Giulia. However such a possibility cannot be excluded and plans will continue to be made to meet it.

3. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with Armed Forces in Zone 'A', our tasks are to:

a. Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

b. Maintain the security of the Julian Line and the Italian frontiers in the province of Udine.

Should the state of law and order deteriorate to such an extent that the forces at present available to you become inadequate for these tasks or if it appears desirable to make a show of force, a Armored Division will be placed at your disposal.

4. In the event of a direct attack by Yugoslav forces across the Julian Line you will:

a. Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

b. Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

c. Re-occupy FOLA.

d. Conduct such limited offensive operations as may be possible with the means at your disposal, pending a policy decision regarding the provisions of reinforcements in men and material by the United States and United Kingdom Governments.

5. The above tasks will however be subject to the overriding proviso that, should a Yugoslav attack in strength take place without warning and before your forces are tactically disposed, you will act in such a way as to maintain your forces intact.

6. To accomplish the tasks set out in paragraph 4 the forces available to you will be limited at least initially to:

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15 May 1946, AG 381
Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia.

6 Armored Division (Br)	(Less one LAm Regt)
50 Division (Br)	(Less one LAm Regt)
38 Division (US)	(and attached troops)
7 Armored Bde (Br)	(Less one Regt)
60 RCT (US)	
508 Para Bde (US)	
1 AGRA (Br)	(Two or three Med Regt)

7. It is estimated that 60 RCT and 508 Para Regt could be concentrated in your area in approximately five days from receipt by USFET of Combined Chiefs of Staff approval for their move to Italy. It is possible that these reinforcements will be available only until 1 September 1946.

8. Plans for defense in your area will be prepared by 2nd Bde after consultation with you and on the following general priorities:

- airfields
- Venice port
- Po and Adige bridges

Minimum essential CG for Venice: port will be provided by 2nd Bde with AA only added in full role.

9. In the event of hostilities 2 POLGAPS will continue to provide static guards for Allied installations throughout Italy, so long as the CG remains available. It is intended moreover in these circumstances to make the Italian Army responsible for the security of the road, rail and telephone I or C from Naples and Leghorn to North East Italy. In addition one British Unit will be earmarked by you till further notice for employment in an emergency on essentially British Guard commitments in 3 District and A.D.A.C.

10. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. An amphibious lift for one Brigade Group/AGT at light scales is maintained in the Mediterranean at 8000 tons. A force of two destroyers or frigates is normally maintained in the Northern Adriatic, reinforcement by one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of Trieste be made direct with JCLC Trieste and in the case of POL with RUC POL.

11. AIR FORCES

In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be sup-

7 Armored Bde (Br) (less one Regt)
 60 RCT (US)
 508 Para Bde (US)
 1 AGRA (Br) (Two or three Med Regt)

7. It is estimated that 60 RCT and 508 Para Regt could be concentrated in your area in approximately five days from receipt by USFT of Combined Chiefs of Staff approval for their move to Italy. It is possible that these reinforcements will be available only until 1 September 1946.

8. Plans for defense in your area will be prepared by 2 ... Ede after consultation with you and on the following general priorities:

- a. Airfields
- b. Venice port
- c. Po and Adige bridges

Minimum essential C4 for Venice: port will be provided by 2 ... Ede with AA arty allotted in the 1 role.

9. In the event of hostilities 2 ... CLOGRPS will continue to provide static guards for allied installations throughout Italy, so long as the C's remains available. It is intended moreover in these circumstances to make the Italian army responsible for the security of the road, rail and telephone L or C from Naples and Leghorn to North East Italy. In addition one British Unit will be earmarked by you till further notice for employment in an emergency on essentially British guard commitments in 3 District and ...

10. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. An amphibious lift for one ... Group/RCT at light scales is maintained in the Mediterranean at ... Force of two destroyers or frigates is normally maintained in the ... reinforcement by one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of Trieste be made direct with RCTC Trieste and in the case of POL with RCT POL.

11. AIR FORCES

In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. Desert Air Force R.F. is immediately available for operations in North East Italy or Austria and consists of:

- 9 Fighter/Bomber Sqns.
- 1 Tac/R Sq

These aircraft to be based on existing airfields in the vicinity of Udine.

12. "Reinforcements the following United States Air Forces will be made available by USFT:

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Air, JIN, dtd 15 May 1946, C 361
subj: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia

a. Fighters (under comd D.F.)

55 in 24 hours, building up to 110 in 48 hours.
10 P-51 light fighters in 12 hours.

b. Accompaniment (under Comd D.F.)

20 P-6 in 12 hours.
3 P-6 in 12 hours.

c. Bombers (under Comd US FB)

6 B-17 in 24 hours, building up to
24 B-17 in 48 hours, and building up to
36 B-17 in 10 days.

d. Transports (under Comd US FB)

80 C-47 in 24 hours, building up to -
100 C-47 in 48 hours, and building up to -
120 C-47 in 7 days.

* Aircraft listed in a and b will be based on airfields in the vicinity of Treviso, those listed in c and d will be based on Germany.

13. The availability of R.A.F. reinforcements from outside Italy is uncertain as it depends on the situation in the remainder of the R.A.F. IED/12 Command and in D.A.F.O.

14. The tasks of the R.A.F. forces in the event of hostilities in order of priority will be as follows:

(1) Neutralisation of Yugoslav Air Force and Coast Defence Batteries covering approaches to POLA.

(II) Tac/R and XIII Corps front and close support.

(III) Harassing actions on targets disclosed by Tac/R. **RG 70**
15. The R.A.F. forces in the event of hostilities in the Trieste area could be undertaken by sea provided an adequate bridgehead round the coast is secured. It is also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are authorized.

16. The R.A.F. forces do not already exist British reserves will be built up over a period of 40 days at contact rates in respect of ammunition and 30 days for other items (British Ordnance Stores which are British Ordnance Stores in the event of hostilities in the Trieste area).

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10 F-61 Light Fighters in 12 hours.

b. Reconnaissance (under Comd US F3)

20 F-6 in 12 hours.
30 F-6 in 12 hours.

c. Comms (under Comd US F3)

6 B-17 in 24 hours, building up to
24 B-17 in 48 hours, and building up to
24 B-17 in 10 days.

d. Transports (under Comd US F3)

80 C-47 in 24 hours, building up to -
100 C-47 in 48 hours, and building up to -
100 C-47 in 7 days.

12. Aircraft listed in a and b will be based on airfields in the vicinity of Treviso, those listed in c and d will be based on Germany

13. The availability of R.A.F. reinforcements from outside Italy is uncertain as it depends on the situation in the remainder of the R.A.F. MED/13 Command and in S.A.F.O.

14. The tasks of the R.A.F. forces in the event of hostilities in order of priority will be as follows:

(1) Neutralisation of Yugoslav Air Force and Coast Defence Batteries covering approaches to POLA.

(2) Tac/R or Hill Corps front and close support.

(3) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R. **NO. 0**

15. The maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the Trieste area could be undertaken by sea provided an adequate bridgehead round the area is secured. It is provided also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are neutralized.

16. It is assumed that these do not already exist. British reserves will be built up into your area to the scale of 60 days at contact rates in respect of ammunition and 30 days for other items (except British Ordnance Stores which are held in Austria) for the British forces in paragraph 6 and 2 ... Sde. War Office have been asked to confirm that certain vital reinforcements can be provided at short notice and that provision of maintenance will be arranged to allow support of forces in paragraph 6 plus 2 ... Sde for a minimum period of two months. Even if a satisfactory reply is received from the War Office it must be borne in mind that theater resources are progressively dwindling with the closing of the Naples base and the reduction in manpower. To let the major elements of administrative support will be furnished certain detailed requirements will have to await movement from other theaters after commencement of operations and improvisation will be necessary.

17. Within the theater a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types of ammunition is being maintained. The

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Ltr. Sub, dtd 15 May 1946, AC 381
Subj: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia.

United States forces in paragraph 6 (less 60 RCT & 508 Para Regt for whom a 4-day reserve is being maintained). Of these reserves the following are to be maintained in 86th Division area:

- a. For artillery and mortar, 1000 rounds per gun.
- b. For small arms, as determined by the Division Commander.
- c. For all other supplies a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- d. For reinforcing units a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 38th Division in event of active operations, but, subject to War Department directive, service troops will be made available from outside the theater on 30 days notice until 1 September 1946.

16. If the line of communication through Udine and Tarvisio to Austria is interrupted by Yugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in Austria could be transferred to the route, Brenner - Innsbruck - Mallnitz without serious delay and would become the responsibility of General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Forces. As an alternative temporary solution the route, Fortezza - San Candido - Spittal could be used.

17. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to Polish or Italian personnel.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

R. LPH C. TILLEY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

2079

- a. For artillery and mortar, 1000 rounds per gun.
- b. For small arms, as determined by the Division Commander.
- c. For all other supplies a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- d. For reinforcing units a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations, but, subject to War Department directive, service troops will be made available from outside the theater on 30 days notice until 1 September 1946.

16. If the line of communication through Udine and Tarvisio to Austria is interrupted by Yugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in Austria could be transferred to the route, Brenner - Innsbruck - Mallnitz without serious delay and would become the responsibility of General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Forces. As an alternative temporary solution the route, Fortezza - San Candido - Spittal could be used.

17. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to Polish or Italian personnel.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

5049

R. J. PH. C. TILLEY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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Appendix 'B'

DRAFT

TO : CCS

This is NAF _____.

Subject is policy in the event of operations in Venezia Giulia.

1. Recent reductions in Allied manpower in Italy have necessitated a review being made of the action it would be possible to take to counter possible aggression by Jugoslavs.

2. This review has brought out the following main factors :-

(a) The operational forces under General Harding have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm'd Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Gp, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 ACFA.

(b) Foreseeable ground reinforcements from USFLT have been reduced by one Corps of two divisions and one RCT, leaving one Parachute Infantry Regiment which will cease to be available in the near future.

(c) 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.

(d) Owing to the general contraction of administrative resources ~~5048~~ and manpower, the administrative machinery would not be capable of supporting any major operation.

(e) Recent directive from the War Department indicates a probable reduction by 1 January of 5000 United States troops in this

This is NMF _____.

Subject is policy in the event of operations in Venezia Giulia.

1. Recent reductions in Allied manpower in Italy have necessitated a review being made of the action it would be possible to take to counter possible aggression by Jugoslavs.

2. This review has brought out the following main factors :-

(a) The operational forces under General Harding have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm'd Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Gp, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 ACIA.

(b) Foreseeable ground reinforcements from USFET have been reduced by one Corps of two divisions and one RCT, leaving one Parachute Infantry Regiment which will cease to be available in the near future.

(c) 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.

(d) Owing to the general contraction of administrative resources ⁵⁰⁴⁸ and manpower, the administrative machinery would not be capable of supporting any major operation.

(e) Recent directive from the War Department indicates a probable reduction by 1 January of 5000 United States troops in this theatre. United States study of implications now under way indicates that this may limit logistical support to 88 Division to maintaining them in their present static position and in event of operations it might become operationally non-effective shortly after it had exhausted supplies in its own area.

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3. I consider that the Jugoslavs, although capable of it, do not intend to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-de-main although a possibility is unlikely. I still believe that their primary intention is to intimidate the anti-TITO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.

4. The weakened Allied military position through reduction in my forces and the lack of manpower to maintain them, makes it impossible for me in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia. If, therefore, a major attack becomes imminent, in order to keep my forces intact I will be forced to redispense them to hold initially the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

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4. The weakened Allied military position through reduction in my forces and the lack of manpower to maintain them, makes it impossible for me in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia. If, therefore, a major attack becomes imminent, in order to keep my forces intact I will be forced to redispense them to hold initially the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

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Appendix 'C'

DRAFT

TO : CCS

This is NAF _____.

1. In NAF _____ I informed you that in view of my depleted resources I would be unable in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia.
2. Should I be forced to withdraw my forces in the face of strong Yugoslav attacks I request that I may be informed as to the direction of my withdrawal, bearing in mind the fact that the British are based on VENICE and the United States forces on LEGHORN.

8048

This is NAF ____.

- i. In NAF ____ I informed you that in view of my depleted resources I would be unable in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia.
2. Should I be forced to withdraw my forces in the face of strong Yugoslav attacks I request that I may be informed as to the direction of my withdrawal, bearing in mind the fact that the British are based on VENICE and the United States forces on LEGHORN.

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Appendix 'D'

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFHQ 512

SUBJECT : Possible Operations in Venezia Giulia.

TO : General Officer Commanding in Chief,
CHQ. CHF

This headquarters directive to GOC, XIII Corps, reference AG 381

dated 15 May 1946 is cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the Yugoslavs are capable of mounting a major operation, although this is unlikely. It is considered that an attempt at a coup-de-main in Trieste is less unlikely and that it is probable that the real reason for their continued strength in Zone 'B' is to intimidate anti-TITO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.

2. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with armed forces in Zone 'A' your tasks are to :

(a) Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in

Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

(b) Maintain the security of the Morgan Line.

3. Should it be considered by this headquarters that a direct attack by the Yugoslavs appears imminent, your tasks will be to :-

(a) Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

(b) Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

4. In the event of a direct attack by the Yugoslavs, in addition to the tasks given you in para 3 above, you will :

This headquarters directive to GOC, XIII Corps, reference AG 381 dated 15 May 1946 is cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the Yugoslavs are capable of mounting a major operation, although this is unlikely. It is considered that an attempt at a coup-de-main in Trieste is less unlikely and that it is probable that the real reason for their continued strength in Zone 'B' is to intimidate anti-TITO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.

2. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with armed forces in Zone 'A' your tasks are to :

(a) Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in

Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

(b) Maintain the security of the Morran Line.

3. Should it be considered by this headquarters that a direct attack by the Yugoslavs appears imminent, your tasks will be to :-

(a) Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

(b) Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

4. In the event of a direct attack by the Yugoslavs, in addition to the tasks given you in para 3 above, you will :

(a) Evacuate POLA.

(c) In the event of the Yugoslavs attacking in such strength that you are no longer able to fulfil your tasks as outlined in para

3 (c) above, you will conduct operations in such a way as to maintain your forces intact and prepare to withdraw on your Lines of Communication.

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5. To accomplish the tasks set out in paras 3 and 4 above, the forces available to you are :

1 Arm'd Div	(Br)	(less one LAA Regt)
88 Division	(US)	(and attached troops)
2 AA Bde	(Br)	(one heavy and one LAA Regt)
13 Inf Bde Gp	(Br)	
24 Cds Bde Gp	(Br)	
1 AGRA	(Br)	(two Med Regts).

6. Plans for AA defence in your area will be prepared on the following general priorities :

- (a) Airfields
- (b) Venice Port
- (c) Po and Adige bridges.

Minimum essential CD for Venice; port will be protected by AA Arty sited in dual role.

7. In the event of hostilities it is expected that lines of communication and remaining Allied installations in Italy will be subjected to sabotage. It is intended to make the Italian army responsible for protecting these Is of C, but apart from them no other troops will be available. In view of this, protection cannot be guaranteed and you should be prepared for contingency in planning operations.

8. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. A force of one cruiser and at least two destroyers or frigates and one IST is normally maintained in the Northern

13 Inf Bde Gp (Pr)
 24 Gds Bde Gp (Pr)
 1 AGEM (two Med Regts).

6. Plans for AA defence in your area will be prepared on the following general priorities:

- (a) Airfields
- (b) Venice Port
- (c) Po and Lidge bridges.

Minimum essential CD for Venice; port will be protected by AA Arty sited in dual role.

7. In the event of hostilities it is expected that lines of communication and remaining Allied installations in Italy will be subjected to sabotage. It is intended to make the Italian Army responsible for protecting these Ls of C, but apart from them no other troops will be available. In view of this, protection cannot be guaranteed and you should be prepared for ~~contingency~~ ^{contingency} in planning operations.

8. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. A force of one cruiser and at least two destroyers or frigates and one LST is normally maintained in the Northern Adriatic; reinforcements by at least two destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should be made with Senior Naval Officer, Adriatic.

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9. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. R.A.F. immediately available for operations in N.E. Italy consists of :

9 Fighter/Bomber Sqns
1 Tac/R Sqn

These aircraft are based on existing airfields in N.E. Italy.

10. The following air reinforcements will be made available by USAFE (subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff) and R.A.F. :

- 1 Thunderbolt Fighter/Bomber Sqns (each 18 aircraft) - USAFE
- 3 Tempest Fighter/Bomber Sqns (each 16 aircraft) - R.A.F.
- 110 C-47 Transports (US)
- 10 C-47 Transports (Br)

Additionally up to a total of 4 Heavy Bomber Sqns (minimum 8 aircraft each) operating from Italy would be made available subject to the overriding MED/ME theatre commitments.

11. It has been provisionally decided that the following tasks, in order of priority, will be carried out by the Allied Air Forces :

- (a) Neutralisation of the Yugoslav Air Force.
- (b) Neutralisation of coast defence batteries covering approaches to FOLA.
- (c) Attacks on targets as requested by GHQ.
- (d) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.
- (e) Air cover for own troops movements and special operations.

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9 Fighter/Bomber Sqs

1 Tac/R Sq

These aircraft are based on existing airfields in N.E. Italy.

10. The following air reinforcements will be made available by US/FE (subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff) and R/AF :
- 4 Thunderbolt Fighter/Bomber Sqs (each 18 aircraft) - US/AF
 - 3 Tempest Fighter/Bomber Sqs (each 16 aircraft) - R/AF

110 C-47 Transports (US)

10 C-47 Transports (Br)

Additionally up to a total of 4 Heavy Bomber Sqs (minimum

8 aircraft each) operating from BLFH. would be made available subject to the overriding MED/AF theatre commitments.

11. It has been provisionally decided that the following tasks, in order of priority, will be carried out by the Allied Air Forces :

- (a) Neutralisation of the Yugoslav Air Force.
- (b) Neutralisation of coast defence batteries covering approaches to POLA.
- (c) Attacks on targets as requested by GHQ.
- (d) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.
- (e) Air cover for own troops movements and special operations.
- (f) Supply dropping.

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12. You should seek from the War Office the administrative support you consider necessary to maintain the British forces at your disposal in the roles prescribed by this directive, reporting any limiting factors to this Headquarters.

13. Within the theatre a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types, based on authorized theatre strength, plus an additional training allowance of ammunition is being maintained for the United States forces. Of these reserves the following are to be maintained in the 88th Division area :

- (a) For artillery and mortar - 1000 rounds per gun.
- (b) For small arms - as determined by the Division Commander.
- (c) For all other supplies - a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- (d) For possible reinforcements - a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations; in such an event the War Department will be requested to make the required service units immediately available, but there is no assurance that they will be forthcoming.

14. The information contained in this directive will on no 5042 be disclosed to Italian personnel.

in the roles prescribed by this directive, reporting any limiting factors to this Headquarters.

13. Within the theatre a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types, based on authorized theatre strength, plus an additional training allowance of ammunition is being maintained for the United States forces. Of these reserves the following are to be maintained in the 88th Division area:

- (a) For artillery and mortar - 1000 rounds per gun.
- (b) For small arms - as determined by the Division Commander.
- (c) For all other supplies - a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- (d) For possible reinforcements - a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations; in such an event the War Department will be requested to make the required service units immediately available, but there is no assurance that they will be forthcoming.

14. The information contained in this directive will on no **5942** be disclosed to Italian personnel.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

OCT 18 1946

16 October 1946

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENIZIA GIULIA

The following addendum will be made to MJPS P/334 (FINAL) dated
8 October 1946 :-

After para 8 (b) (ii) on page 5 insert new sub para as follows

9. (c) Allied Bases

The British and United States forces are based on VENICE and LEGHORN respectively. In the event of active operations and a withdrawal of British and United States forces along their own L of C, should one force extricate itself and the other be lost Anglo-United States relations might be impaired by the apparent abandonment of one force by the other.

K. C. Cooper

for K. C. COOPER
Brigadier GS
Chairman

K041

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

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Copy No.

8 October 46

E/234 (FINAL).

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the MJPS has prepared the attached final paper.

K.C. COOPER,
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman.

E/SWS

5040

EXEMPTION :

Dist. 13

8 October 46

P/34 (FINAL).POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZUELA, GUYANA

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the MJPS has prepared the attached final paper.

J.E./SW

K.C. COOPER,
Brigadier, G.S.,
Chairman.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

SUBJECT

1. To examine the current Allied operational policy and to make appropriate recommendations as to any revision in that policy made necessary by the political situation and changes in the military situation.

JUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES

2. In spite of a recent slight increase it is still estimated that Yugoslav forces in the general area of Zone 'B' amount to approximately 50,000 (6 Infantry divisions and 1 tank division), which shows no material change since last February. These troops constitute the best equipped divisions of the Yugoslav Army. Moreover, every Slovene in Zone 'A' is a potential fifth columnist.

It is considered therefore, that the Yugoslavs are still in a position to mount a major operation or to attempt a coup-de-main. It is appreciated that a coup-de-main could be effected with little warning but that a major operation could not be mounted without previous warning.

JUGOSLAV INTENTIONS

3. It is considered that the Yugoslav intentions are NOT to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-de-main, although a possibility, is unlikely. It is still believed that the primary reason for the presence of so large a force is to intimidate those elements in Venezia Giulia who are not in sympathy with the Yugoslav Government, and in addition to be able to take over as quickly as possible any territory ceded to Jugoslavia by the Paris Peace Conference.

ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

4. The present internal situation in Italy as affecting Allied commitments has not materially changed since it was summed up in the latest J.I.C. appreciation of 30 August, which reads as follows :-

" (.) Taking into consideration the very disturbed state of public feeling in Italy during the past few months, in view of the acute

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1. To examine the current Allied operational policy and to make appropriate recommendations as to any revision in that policy made necessary by the political situation and changes in the military situation.

JUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES

2. In spite of a recent slight increase it is still estimated that Yugoslav forces in the general area of Zone 'B' amount to approximately 50,000 (6 Infantry divisions and 1 tank division), which shows no material change since 1st February. These troops constitute the best equipped divisions of the Yugoslav Army. Moreover, every Slovene in Zone 'A' is a potential fifth columnist.

It is considered therefore, that the Yugoslavs are still in a position to mount a major operation or to attempt a coup-d'etat. It is appreciated that a coup-d'etat could be effected with little warning but that a major operation could not be mounted without previous warning.

JUGOSLAV INTENTIONS

3. It is considered that the Yugoslav intentions are NOT to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-d'etat, although a possibility, is unlikely. It is still believed that the primary reason for the presence of so large a force is to intimidate those elements in Rumania and Bulgaria who are not in sympathy with the Yugoslav Government, and in addition to be able to take over as quickly as possible any territory ceded to Yugoslavia by the Paris Peace Conference.

ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

4. The present internal situation in Italy as affecting Allied commitments has not materially changed since it was summed up in the latest J.I.C. appreciation of 30 August, which reads as follows :-

" (..) Taking into consideration the very disturbed state of public feeling in Italy during the past few months, in view of the acute domestic problems and of the decisions being taken in regard to Italy at the Peace Conference, it can be said that the population on the whole has showed a commendable restraint. The widespread strikes have mostly passed without incident. Anti-Allied demonstrations have been poorly attended and have in most cases remained orderly. The number of incidents of an anti-Allied nature has been small, and very few have taken a serious turn.

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- (b) In recent months there has been a considerable increase in hostile feelings towards the Allies in general and towards Allied forces in Italy. The expression of this, however, has largely been confined to an intense press campaign and to the bitter comments of the public in general.
- (c) There have been comparatively few cases of assault on Allied military personnel. There is the possibility of a slight increase in such cases when the final Peace Conference terms are announced. It is not believed, however, that these will be on any large organized scale, but rather will take the form of a few isolated and spontaneous expressions of indignation. The importance is to be stressed of the good behaviour of Allied troops to avoid giving cause for provocation.
- (d) In the past twelve months no instances have been reported of raids on Allied installations, other than for motives of theft. In the event of hostilities breaking out in Venezia Giulia it is believed that sabotage of Allied installations and lines of communication might be carried out by Pro Slav elements in Italy, or possibly by a small section of the Italian Communist Party.
- (e) Isolated attacks on French troops are possible on the Italo - French borders should certain zones at present Italian be occupied by the French, as a result of the Peace Conference decisions.
- (f) When the time comes for handing over elements of the Italian Fleet to the United Nations it is possible that a few ships will be scuttled, and demonstrations of an anti-Allied nature may ensue, particularly in the Naval Centre.
- (g) Further worker's strikes fomented by the Communist Party are to be expected. Also further demonstrations by unemployed unless the Italian Government is able to take strong measures to resolve at least some of the present economic problems.
- (h) On the whole, it is not at present considered that there exists any serious threat to the security of Allied troops in Italy.

Although it is considered that the Italian Nation as a whole would rally against the Yugoslavs in the event of hostilities, we must be prepared for the possibility of extensive sabotage by Yugoslav agents against Allied installations and our L of C in general.

ALLIED POLICY

5. SAC's public statement made at the end of March summarizes the present Allied policy. In this statement it was made clear that it is the firm intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to maintain their present position in Venezia Giulia until an agreed settlement of the

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By the end of May the situation in Venezia Giulia had deteriorated and in N F 1147 SAC warned the CCS that the Yugoslav attitude had definitely stiffened. In NAF 1151 (6 Jun 46) SAC informed the CCS that "tension in Venezia Giulia particularly in Trieste has continued to heighten" and also that XIII Corps had asked for reinforcement by 6 Armoured Division and one U.S. Parachute Regiment. He did not consider, however, that the situation justified such reinforcement but 6 Armoured Division was moved forward to the Isonzo. In N F 1156 SAC reaffirmed the possibility of a coup-de-main by the Yugoslavs and requested reinforcement immediately by one RCT.

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As a result of the SAC's tour of inspection in Venezia Giulia, NAF 1166 was despatched to CCS in 25 June, which stated that although the situation at the time was quiet, if current negotiations in Paris led to a frontier solution unfavourable to the Yugoslavs an immediate deterioration in the situation would take place. SAC recommended that the RCT from USFTT should be moved to Italy and that the Yugoslav Detachment in Zone 'A' should withdraw. He also asked for permission to withdraw the POLA Garrison at his discretion and finished by saying that unless the measures recommended in this NAF were taken, he considered that the United States and United Kingdom Governments were "Taking grave military risks in Venezia Giulia".

In answer to these NAFs the CCS in F.M. 678 (5 July 46) stated that they did NOT approve the move of 1 RCT from USFTT, that the probability of a Yugoslav attack was unlikely, that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Detachment was considered politically impracticable and the owing to strong political objections the withdrawal from POLA was NOT approved unless hostilities broke out.

PRESENT DIRECTIVE

6. Allied policy as summarized above is reflected in the existing directive to XIII Corps issued on 15 May 46 (attached at Appendix 'A'). At that time it was appreciated that the presence of Yugoslav forces in Zone 'B' was designed to ensure that Zone 'B' was firmly held and to intimidate the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'. It was NOT considered that the Yugoslav intended to go to war with the United Nations, but that Yugoslav fifth column activities would continue in Zone 'A' and N.E. Italy. Consequently, in the absence of hostilities, XIII Corps' tasks were to maintain law and order in Zone 'A' and maintain the security of the TORGAN LINE and the Italian frontier in Udine Province, while in the event of a direct attack they were to secure a firm hold in the area TRIESTE - GORIZIA - UDINE, protect the I of C from VERULCE, evacuate POLA and conduct limited offensive operations pending a policy decision from the United States and United Kingdom Governments. These tasks were however, subject to the overriding proviso that should a Yugoslav attack in strength take place without warning, GOC XIII Corps was to act in such a way as to maintain his forces intact.

PLANET IN MILITARY SITUATION

1. (a) Ground Forces

MARCH

XIII Corps

56 London Div (Br)
88 Div (US)

4 Armd Div (Br)

II Polish Corps (of three divs)

OCTOBER

XIII Corps

88 Div (US)
1 Armd Div (Br)
Two Inf Bde Groups

K037

In answer to these N.F.s the CCS in F.A. 678 (5 July 46) stated that they did NOT approve the move of 1 RCT from USFET, that the probability of a Yugoslav attack was unlikely, that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Detachment was considered politically impracticable and the owing to strong political objections the withdrawal from POLA was NOT approved unless hostilities broke out.

PRESENT DIRECTIVE

6. Allied policy as summarized above is reflected in the existing directive to XIII Corps issued on 15 May 46 (attached at appendix 'A'). At that time it was appreciated that the presence of Yugoslav forces in Zone 'B' was designed to ensure that Zone 'B' was firmly held and to intimidate the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'. It was NOT considered that the Yugoslav intended to go to war with the United Nations, but that Yugoslav fifth column activities would continue in Zone 'A' and I.E. Italy. Consequently, in the absence of hostilities, XIII Corps' tasks were to maintain law and order in Zone 'A' and maintain the security of the MORGAN LINE and the Italian frontier in Udine Province, while in the event of a direct attack they were to secure a firm hold in the area TRIESTE - CORIZIA - UDINE, protect the L of C from VENICE, evacuate POLA and conduct limited offensive operations pending a policy decision from the United States and United Kingdom Governments. These tasks were however, subject to the overriding proviso that should a Yugoslav attack in strength take place without warning, GOC XIII Corps was to act in such a way as to maintain his forces intact.

MOVEMENT IN MILITARY SITUATION

7. (a) Ground Forces

MARCH

XIII Corps

56 London Div (Br)
88 Div (US)

6 Arm Div (Br)

II Polish Corps (of three divs)

Warsaw Arm Div
5 Kresowa Div
3 Carpathian Div

OCTOBER

XIII Corps

88 Div (US)
1 Arm Div (Br)
Two Inf Bde Groups

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7. (a) Ground Forces (continued)

MARCH

REINFORCEMENTS

One US Corps of 2 Divs (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET)

OCTOBER

One PIR (from USFET) - Authorized by CCS up to 1 Sep 46 but will no longer be available after middle of October on commencement of outphasing.

One RCT (from USFET)

Five Italian Inf Divs (Ex GRUPPI)
(of questionable value except as service troops).

Five Italian Divs (Ex GRUPPI)

(Understrength, untrained personnel, equipment short. Value even as service troops questionable).

(b) Air Forces

MARCH

Located in Theatre

Desert Air Force
(9 F/B Sqns
1 Tac/R Sqn)

OCTOBER

Located in Theatre

9 F/B Sqns
1 Tac/R Sqn

Reinforcements on Call

(1) RAF Uncertain on strength as they were stated to depend on the overall situation throughout the whole of the MTO/ME Command and B.A.F.C.

Reinforcements on Call

(1) RAF 135 Wing (B.A.F.C.)
(3 Tempest F/B Sqns each 16 aircraft).
Up to 4 Heavy Bomber Sqns (each 8 aircraft) operating from MALTA might be made available.
Transports - 10 Dakotas at present based BARI.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational) plus 10 night fighters.
RCN - 23 planes.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational).
Transports - 110 by complete cessation

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One US Corps of 2 Divs (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET)

One PIR (from USFET) - Authorized by CCS up to 1 Sep 46 but will no longer be available after middle of October on commencement of outphasing.

One RCT (from USFET)

Five Italian Inf Divs (Ex GRUPPI)

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(of questionable value except as service troops).

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(9 F/B Sqn
1 Tac/R Sqn)

OCTOBER

Located in Theatre

9 F/B Sqn
1 Tac/R Sqn

Reinforcements on Call

(1) RAF Uncertain on strength as they were stated to depend on the overall situation throughout the whole of the MED/EE Command and E.A.F.O.

Reinforcements on Call

(1) RAF 135 Wing (B.A.F.O.)
(3 Tempest F/B Sqn each 16 aircraft).
Up to 4 Heavy Bomber Sqn (each 8 aircraft) operating from MLTA might be made available.
Transports - 10 Dakotas at present based ~~4038~~ BARI.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational) plus 10 night fighters.
RCN - 23 planes.
Transports - 110 planes.
Heavy Bombers - 36 planes.

(11) US Fighters - 110 (72 operational).
Transports - 110 by complete cessation of TATS.

(c) Naval Forces

1 LST is at present immediately available for the evacuation from POLA by sea, otherwise the situation as regards Naval forces available is unchanged.

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LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS

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8. (a) British The situation since March has altered in that :-

(i) Manpower resources have been concentrated by the elimination of Naples Base and the I of C to M.E. Italy and also by the concentration of fighting manpower into one division (1 Arm Div).

(ii) As a result of (i) above there is less flexibility in the administrative machine; resources in Naples which might have been used to support XIII Corps have now been disposed of and would have to be obtained from outside the theatre (especially ordnance stores which are held in Austria). This would be either by overland route from BAOR, whose own resources are limited and movement by rail over such long distances is unreliable, or by sea from UK or M.E. which besides requiring time to initiate involves reliance on the port of Venice: this port might well attract attention from saboteurs or air attack.

(b) United States

(i) Manpower resources have been reduced and recent directives from the War Department indicate that there will be a further reduction by 1 January of five thousand in the troops available in this theatre but that the 88th Division will be maintained at full strength. Resources from outside the theatre have also been reduced.

(ii) With the long line of communications from the Base port, Leghorn, to Zone 'A', it appears that the reduction in (i) above, all of which will have to be absorbed in headquarters and service type troops, will probably preclude adequate logistical support of active operations by the 88th Division. United States study underway indicates that the maximum that can be accomplished by United States service type troops remaining after the reduction of 1 January may be the continued supply and support of the 88th Division in its present passive position, and that in case of active operations the Division might become non-effective operationally soon after supplies of any type then in the 88th Division area are exhausted.

(c) United States (see [])

ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL FACTORS

9. (a) British

(i) Additionally large quantities of ammunition (approx 15,000 tons) are being held in excess of authorised theatre

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one division (I and Div)

(ii) As a result of (i) above there is less flexibility in the administrative machine; resources in Naples which might have been used to support XIII Corps have now been disposed of and would have to be obtained from outside the theatre (especially ordnance stores which are held in Austria). This would be either by overland route from B.A.C.R. whose own resources are limited and movement by rail over such long distances is unreliable, or by sea from UK or M.E.L.F. which besides requiring time to initiate involves reliance on the port of Venice: this port might well attract attention from saboteurs or air attack.

(b) United States

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(c) United States (see K935)

ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL FACTORS

9. (a) British

(i) Additionally large quantities of ammunition (approx 15,000 tons) are being held in excess of authorised theatre reserves. This is also the case over vehicles where a total of some 500 are being held against operational re-equipment requirements. In both cases appreciable manpower is involved in maintaining these items at the required standards. The reduction in manpower resources will also eventually render the maintenance of this quantity of stores impossible.

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ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL FACTORS (continued)

9. (a) British (continued)

- (ii) A number of units and quantities of stores which are unnecessary except in the case of major operations in N.E. Italy, are also being retained. The personnel are required to bring other units up to strength and it is important to dispose of all possible stores as early as possible.

(b) United States

Besides normal theatre reserves the United States forces are holding approx 20,000 tons of ammunition, 60 2 1/2 ton trucks and sufficient quantities of other items to provide a 40 day combat reserve for theatre troops plus planned reinforcement. Personnel required to maintain these excess stocks and vehicles will be lost after 1 January.

- (c) In connection with (a) and (b) above only 90 days is allowed for the withdrawal of UK and US forces after ratification of the Peace Treaty and this period would be insufficient to deal with the total quantities of stores and ammunition at present in N.E. Italy.

MANPOWER FACTORS

10. (a) Both British and United States manpower resources have steadily decreased. This has left a very high proportion of German units remaining as administrative troops. Similarly a large proportion of United States administrative work is undertaken by German manpower.

In the light of the present low proportion of British troops and the low proportion of United States troops which will occur when service troops are reduced by 5,000 on 1 January, the reliability of these German troops in the event of hostilities could not be guaranteed; moreover their lack of weapons means that they are an additional protection commitment.

- (b) Approach to the Italian Government with a view to earmarking and training service type units of the Italian Army to lend logistical support has been forbidden.

PROPOSALS

11. In view of the political situation and the changes in the military

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required to bring other units up to strength and it is important to dispose of all possible stores as early as possible.

(b) United States

Besides normal theatre reserves the United States forces are holding approx 20,000 tons of ammunition, 60 2½ ton trucks and sufficient quantities of other items to provide a 40 day combat reserve for theatre troops plus planned reinforcement. Personnel required to maintain these excess stocks and vehicles will be lost after 1 January.

- (c) In connection with (a) and (b) above only 90 days is allowed for the withdrawal of UK and US forces after ratification of the Peace Treaty and this period would be insufficient to deal with the total quantities of stores and ammunition at present in N.E. Italy.

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- (b) Approach to the Italian Government with a view to earmarking and training service type units of the Italian Army to lend logistical support has been forbidden.

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PROPOSALS

11. In view of the political situation and the changes in the military situation as reflected in paras 7 - 10 above, it is for consideration whether the Allied operational policy as set forth in the 15 May 1940 directive to XIII Corps should now be modified. The three following operational policies are susceptible to the Venetian Rialto situation:

- (a) Preparation for major operations as the primary policy with the maintenance of internal security a secondary function. This policy involves planning and logistical preparations on a large scale and the retention of all possible ex-theatre reserves. This is the current policy.

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11. (b) Preparation for operations within the capabilities of our own theatre resources and earmarked reinforcements. This is considered to be the maintenance of internal security and the prevention of a coup-de-main only.
- (c) Maintenance of internal security as the sole function of our forces. In case of aggression by the Yugoslavs these forces to be extricated and withdrawn pending reinforcements on the requisite scale. Adoption of this policy would result in release of ex-theatre reinforcements and cessation of logistical preparations and would permit rundown of operational stocks now held.

CONCLUSIONS

12. Our operational forces in Venezia Giulia have been reduced by two Arm'd Regts, two Inf Bns and service units and the only foreseeable ground reinforcements available is one Parachute Infantry Regiment from USFET, which will not be available much longer. Polish troops are no longer available to guard the Allied I of C which in the event of hostilities may be subjected to sabotage. Furthermore, the logistical situation, particularly if 5,000 United States service type troops are withdrawn from the theatre, is not considered capable of supporting a major operation.

13. In view of the reduction of our forces it is considered that we are no longer capable of carrying out a major operation in Venezia Giulia although the Yugoslavs are in a position to do so. However, to say that our function is solely one of maintaining Internal Security might be interpreted as a weakening of our policy in Venezia Giulia and NOT in accordance with the positive attitude which we have adopted heretofore. It is considered therefore that our policy should be to prepare for operations within our present capabilities, and in the event of a Yugoslav attack in strength, to conduct operations in order to maintain our forces intact. This will necessitate a redistribution of our forces prior to a major attack which will entail giving up security of a great portion of the Morgan Line. Such a policy would enable us to reduce the logistical support of present ground and air forces, and that of our anticipated air reinforcements, to that which can be effectively and economically maintained.

14. In the event of a major operation forcing a withdrawal of forces a policy as to the line of our withdrawal is required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. That the attached draft NAF at appendix 'B' be despatched to the CCS informing them of the present position and that the draft NAF at appendix 'G' be sent as a follow up, requesting the CCS to state their policy

forces. In case of aggression by the Yugoslavs these forces to be extricated and withdrawn pending reinforcements on the requisite scale. Adoption of this policy would result in release of ex-theatre reinforcements and cessation of logistical preparations and would permit rundown of operational stocks now held.

CONCLUSIONS

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14. In the event of a major operation forcing a withdrawal of **REF 33** forces a policy as to the line of our withdrawal is required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. That the attached draft NAF at appendix 'B' be despatched to the CCS informing them of the present position and that the draft NAF at appendix 'C' be sent as a follow up, requesting the CCS to state their policy in the event of a withdrawal.

16. That the attached directive at appendix 'D' be despatched to GHQ CUP.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

Appendix 'A'

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SUBJECT: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia

TO : General Officer Commanding Headquarters ALLI Corps

This Headquarters F50372 of 25 October is hereby cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the continued presence of large Yugoslav forces in Zone 'B' is designed to:

a. Ensure that Zone 'B' is firmly held whatever form the political settlement of Venezia-Giulia takes.

b. Intimidate as far as possible the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'.

It is to be expected that Yugoslav sponsored underground activities in Zone 'A' and North East Italy will continue but it is not considered that the Yugoslavs intend to go to war with the United Nations by launching a direct attack on your forces in Venezia-Giulia. However such a possibility cannot be excluded and plans will continue to be made to meet it.

2. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with Armed Forces in Zone 'A' our tasks are to:

a. Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

b. Maintain the security of the Morgan Line and the Italian frontiers in the province of Udine.

Should the state of law and order deteriorate to such an extent that the forces at present available to you become inadequate for these tasks or if it appears desirable to make a show of force, 6 Armored Division will be placed at your disposal.

3. In the event of a direct attack by Yugoslav forces across the Morgan Line you will:

a. Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia

b. Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

c. Evacuate POL.

d. Conduct such limited offensive operations as may be possible with the means at your disposal, pending a policy decision regarding the

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a. Ensure that Zone 'A' is firmly held whatever form the political settlement of Venezia-Giulia takes.

b. Intimidate as far as possible the non-Slav population in Zone 'A'.

c. It is to be expected that Yugoslav sponsored underground activities in Zone 'A' and North West Italy will continue but it is not considered that the Yugoslavs intend to go to war with the United Nations by launching a direct attack on your forces in Venezia-Giulia. However such a possibility cannot be excluded and plans will continue to be made to meet it.

2. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with Armed Forces in Zone 'A', our tasks are to:

a. Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

b. Maintain the security of the German Line and the Italian frontiers in the province of Udine.

Should the state of law and order deteriorate to such an extent that the forces at present available to you become inadequate for these tasks or if it appears desirable to make a show of force, 6 Armored Division will be placed at your disposal.

3. In the event of a direct attack by Yugoslav forces across the German Line you will:

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a. Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia

b. Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

c. Evacuate COLs.

d. Conduct such limited offensive operations as may be possible with the means at your disposal, pending a policy decision regarding the provisions of reinforcements in men and material by the United States and United Kingdom Governments.

5. The above tasks will however be subject to the overriding proviso that, should a Yugoslav attack in strength take place without warning and before your forces are tactically disposed, you will act in such a way as to maintain your forces intact.

6. To accomplish the tasks set out in paragraph 4 the forces available to you will be limited at least initially to:

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Ref: JTC, dtd 15 May 1946, AG 361
subj: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia.

6 Armored Division (Br)	(Less one L.A. Regt)
56 Division (Br)	(Less one L.A. Regt)
88 Division (US)	(and attached troops)
7 Armored Bde (Br)	(less one Regt)
60 RCT (US)	
508 Para Regt (US)	
1 ACRA (Br)	(Two or three Med Regt)

7. It is estimated that at 60 RCT and 508 Para Regt could be concentrated in your area in approximately five days from receipt by USFET of Com-bined Chiefs of Staff approval for their move to Italy. It is possible that these reinforcements will be available only until 1 September 1946.

8. Plans for defense in your area will be prepared by 2nd Ede after consultation with you and on the following general priorities:

- a. Airfields
- b. Venice port
- c. Po and Adige bridges

Minimum essential CD for Venice: port will be provided by 2nd Ede with AA Artillery sited in dual role.

9. In the event of hostilities 2 POLCORPS will continue to provide static guards for allied installations throughout Italy, so long as the Corps remains available. It is intended moreover in these circumstances to make the Italian Army responsible for the security of the road, rail and telephone line from Naples and Leghorn to North East Italy. In addition one British Unit will be earmarked by you till further notice for employment in an emergency on essentially British guard commitments in 3 District and R.A.M.C.

10. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. An amphibious lift for one Brigade Group/RCT at light scales is maintained in the Mediterranean at 8 days notice. A force of two destroyers or frigates is normally maintained in the Adriatic, reinforcement of one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of Trieste be made direct with JTC Trieste and in the case of PCL with RMO PCL.

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7 Armored Bde (Br) (less one Regt)
 60 RCT (US)
 508 Para Regt (US)
 1 AGRA (Br) (Two or three Med Regt)

7. It is estimated that 60 RCT and 508 Para Regt could be concentrated in your area in approximately five days from receipt by USFET of Combined Chiefs of Staff approval for their move to Italy. It is possible that these reinforcements will be available only until 1 September 1946.

8. Plans for the defense in your area will be prepared by 2nd Ede after consultation with you and on the following general priorities:

- a. Airfields
- b. Venice port
- c. Po and Adige bridges

Minimum essential CD for Venice: port will be provided by 2nd Ede with AA units sited in dual role.

9. In the event of hostilities 2 POLCORPS will continue to provide static guards for Allied installations throughout Italy, so long as the Corps remains available. It is intended moreover in these circumstances to make the Italian Army responsible for the security of the road, rail and telephone L of C from Naples and Leghorn to North East Italy. In addition one British Unit will be earmarked by you till further notice for employment in an emergency on essentially British Guard commitments in 3 District and R.....C.

10. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval Forces. An amphibious lift for one Brigade Group/RCT at light scales is maintained in the Mediterranean at 8 days notice. A force of two destroyers or frigates is normally maintained in the home waters. Reinforcement by one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of Trieste be made direct with COMC Trieste and in the case of POL. with RNO POL.

IN PAROLE

In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. Desert Air Force RAF is immediately available for operations in North East Italy or Austria and consists of:

- 9 Fighter/Bomber Sqns.
- 1 Tac/R Sq

These aircraft to be based on existing airfields in the vicinity of Udine.

12. The reinforcements the following United States Air Forces will be made available by USAF:

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Dir. Staff, 406 15 May, 1946, AG 301
sub: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia

a. Fighters (under comd D.F.)

55 in 24 hours, building up to 110 in 48 hours.
10 P-61 Night Fighters in 12 hours.

b. Reconnaissance (under Comd D.F.)

20 P-6 in 12 hours.
3 P-6 in 12 hours.

c. Bombers (under Comd US.F3)

6 B-17 in 24 hours, building up to
24 B-17 in 48 hours, and building up to
36 B-17 in 10 days.

d. Transports (under Comd US.F3)

30 C-47 in 24 hours, building up to -
100 C-47 in 48 hours, and building up to -
120 C-47 in 7 days.

* Aircraft listed in a and b will be based on airfields in the vicinity of Treviso, those listed in c and d will be based on Germany

13. The availability of R.A.F. reinforcements from outside Italy is uncertain as it depends on the situation. The remainder of the R.A.F. MED/PT Command and in S.A.F.O.

14. The tasks of the Air Forces in the event of hostilities in order of priority will be as follows:

(1) Neutralisation of Yugoslav Air Force and Coast Defence Batteries covering approaches to POLA.

(II) Tac/R on XIII Corps front and close support.

(III) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.

15. Maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the Trieste area could be undertaken by you, provided an adequate bridgehead round the port is secured and provided also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are maintained.

16. Where there is not already exist British reserves will be built up into your area to the extent of 6 days at contact rates in respect of ammunition and 20 days for other items (except British Ordnance Stores which are maintained for the British forces in paragraph 6 and 2 and 3 Ede. War

55 in 24 hours, building up to 100
10 F-61 Night Fighters in 12 hours.

b. Reconnaissance (under Comd D.F.)

20 F-4 in 12 hours.
3 F-26 in 12 hours.

c. Bombers (under Comd US.F3)

6 B-27 in 24 hours, building up to
24 B-17 in 48 hours, and building up to
36 B-17 in 10 days.

d. Transports (under Comd US.F3)

20 C-47 in 24 hours, building up to -
100 C-47 in 48 hours, and building up to -
120 C-47 in 7 days.

13. Aircraft listed in a and b will be based on airfields in the vicinity of Treviso, those listed in c and d will be based on Germany

14. The availability of R.A.F. reinforcements from outside Italy is uncertain as it depends on the situation. In the remainder of the R.A.F. (I) (II) Command and in S.A.F.O.

15. The tasks of the Air Forces in the event of hostilities in order of priority will be as follows:

(1) Neutralisation of Yugoslav Air Force and Coast Defence Batteries covering approaches to POLA.

(II) Tac/R on XIII Corps front and close support.

(III) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.

R030

16. Maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the Trieste area could be undertaken by you, provided an adequate bridgehead round the port is secured and provided also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are maintained.

17. Where these are not already exist British reserves will be built up into your area to the scale of 48 days at contact rates in respect of ammunition and 30 days for other items (except British Ord Stores which are held in Austria) for the British forces in paragraph 6 and 2 ... Bde. War Office have been asked to confirm that certain vital admin reinforcements can be provided at short notice and that provision of maintenance will be arranged to allow a port of 2000 tons in paragraph 6 plus 2 ... Bde for a minimum period of two months. Even if a satisfactory reply is received from the War Office it must be borne in mind that theater resources are progressively dwindling with the closing of the Naples base and the reduction in manpower. While the major elements of administrative support will be furnished certain detailed requirements will have to await movement from other theaters and a commitment of operations and improvisation will be necessary.

18. Within the theater a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types of ammunition and training allowance of ammunition is being maintained.

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Ltr, JMB, dtd 15 May 1946, G 381
subj: Possible Operations in Venezia-Giulia

United States forces in paragraph 6 (less 60 RCT & 508 Para Regt for whom a 40 day reserve is being maintained). Of these reserves the following are to be maintained in 88th Division area:

- a. For artillery and mortar, 1000 rounds per gun.
- b. For small arms, as determined by the Division Commander.
- c. For all other supplies a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- d. For reinforcing units a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations, but, subject to War Department directive, service units will be made available from outside the theater on 30 days notice until 1 September 1946.

18. If the line of communication through Udine and Tervizio to Austria is interrupted by Yugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in Austria could be transferred to the route, Brenner - Innsbruck - Salzburg without serious delay and would become the responsibility of General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Forces, as an alternative temporary solution the route, Fortezza - San Candido - Spittal could be used.

19. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to Polish or Italian personnel.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

RALPH C. TILLEY
Colonel, JGD
Adjutant General

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- c. For small arms, as determined by the Division Commander.
- d. For all other supplies a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- e. For reinforcing units a 10 day level of all types of supplies.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 38th Division in event of active operations, but, subject to War Department directive, service units will be made available from outside the theater on 30 days notice until 1 September 1946.

If the line of communication through Udine and Tarvisio to Austria is interrupted by Yugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in Austria could be transferred to the route, Brenner - Innsbruck - Salzburg without serious delay and would become the responsibility of General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Forces. As an alternative temporary solution the route, Fortezza - San Candido - Spittal could be used.

- 19. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to Polish or Italian personnel.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

R. LPH C. TILLEY
Colonel, GDC
Adjutant General

K029

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Appendix 'B'

DRAFT

TO : CCS

This is NAF _____.

Subject is policy in the event of operations in Venezia Giulia.

1. Recent reductions in Allied manpower in Italy have necessitated a review being made of the action it would be possible to take to counter possible aggression by Juroslavs.

2. This review has brought out the following main factors :-

(a) The operational forces under General Harding have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm'd Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Gp, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 AGFA.

(b) Foreseeable ground reinforcements from USFET have been reduced by one Corps of two divisions and one KOT, leaving one Parachute Infantry Regiment which will cease to be available in the near future.

(c) 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.

(d) Owing to the general contraction of administrative resources and manpower, the administrative machinery would not be capable of supporting any major operation.

(e) Recent directive from the War Department indicates a probable reduction by 1 January of 5000 United States troops in this

5028

Subject is policy in the event of operations in Venezia Giulia.

1. Recent reductions in Allied manpower in Italy have necessitated a review being made of the action it would be possible to take to counter possible aggression by Jugoslavs.

2. This review has brought out the following main factors :-

(a) The operational forces under General Harding have been reduced by two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions, leaving 1 Arm Div, 88 Division, 2 AA Brigade, 13 Infantry Bde Gp, 24 Guards Bde Gp and 1 AGRA.

(b) Foreseeable ground reinforcements from USFET have been reduced by one Corps of two divisions and one KCT, leaving one Parachute Infantry Regiment which will cease to be available in the near future.

(c) 2 Polcorps are no longer available for guarding L of C and installations in Italy.

(d) Owing to the general contraction of administrative resources **5028** and manpower, the administrative machinery would not be capable of supporting any major operation.

(e) Recent directive from the War Department indicates a probable reduction by 1 January of 5000 United States troops in this theatre. United States study of implications now under way indicates that this may limit logistical support to 88 Division to maintaining them in their present static position and in event of operations it might become operationally non-effective shortly after it had exhausted supplies in its own area.

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3. I consider that the Yugoslavs, although capable of it, do not intend to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-de-main although a possibility is unlikely. I still believe that their primary intention is to intimidate the anti-TITO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.
4. The weakened Allied military position through reduction in my forces and the lack of manpower to maintain them, makes it impossible for me in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia. If, therefore, a major attack becomes imminent, in order to keep my forces intact I will be forced to redispense them to hold initially the vital areas Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

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attention is to intimidate the anti-F/NO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.

4. The weakened Allied military position through reduction in my forces and the lack of manpower to maintain them, makes it impossible for me in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia. If, therefore, a major attack becomes imminent, in order to keep my forces intact I will be forced to redispense them to hold initially the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

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Appendix 'C'

DRAFT

TO : CCS

This is MAF _____.

1. In MAF _____ I informed you that in view of my depleted resources I would be unable in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia.
2. Should I be forced to withdraw my forces in the face of strong Yugoslav attacks I request that I may be informed as to the direction of my withdrawal, bearing in mind the fact that the British are based on VENICE and the United States forces on LEGHORN.

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Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 1.3/6ND No. 785015

resources I would be unable in the event of major operations to hold and maintain my present positions in Venezia Giulia.

2. Should I be forced to withdraw my forces in the face of strong Yugoslav attacks I request that I may be informed as to the direction of my withdrawal, bearing in mind the fact that the British are based on VENICE and the United States forces on LEBNORN.

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Appendix 'D'

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SUBJECT : Possible Operations in Venezia Giulia.

TO : General Officer Commanding in Chief,
CHQ. CHF

This headquarters directive to GOC, XIII Corps, reference AG 381

dated 15 May 1946 is cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the Yugoslavs are capable of mounting a major operation, although this is unlikely. It is considered that an attempt at a coup-de-main in Trieste is less unlikely and that it is probable that the real reason for their continued strength in Zone 'B' is to intimidate anti-TITO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.

2. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with armed forces in Zone 'A' your tasks are to :

(a) Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in

Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

(b) Maintain the security of the Morgan Line.

3. Should it be considered by this headquarters that a direct attack by the Yugoslavs appears imminent, your tasks will be to :-

7(c) Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

(b) Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

4. In the event of a direct attack by the Yugoslavs, in addition to the tasks given you in para 3 above, you will :

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7(c)

(b)

Udine

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This headquarters directive to GOC, XIII Corps, reference AG 381 dated 15 May 1946 is cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the Yugoslavs are capable of mounting a major operation, although this is unlikely. It is considered that an attempt at a coup-d'etat in Trieste is less unlikely and that it is probable that the real reason for their continued strength in Zone 'B' is to intimidate anti-TITO elements and to take over quickly the territory that will be ceded to them by the Peace Treaty.

2. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with armed forces in Zone 'A' your tasks are to :

(a) Maintain Allied Military Government and law and order in

Zone 'A' and the province of Udine.

(b) Maintain the security of the Morgan Line.

3. Should it be considered by this headquarters that a direct attack by the Yugoslavs appears imminent, your tasks will be to :-

(a) Secure a firm hold on the vital area Trieste - Gorizia - Udine.

(b) Protect the L of C from Venice to Udine and Trieste.

4. In the event of a direct attack by the Yugoslavs, in addition to the tasks given you in para 3 above, you will :

(a) Evacuate POLA.

(b) In the event of the Yugoslavs attacking in such strength that you are no longer able to fulfil your tasks as outlined in para

3 (a) above, you will conduct operations in such a way as to

maintain your forces intact and prepare to withdraw on your Lines of Communication.

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5. To accomplish the tasks set out in paras 3 and 4 above, the forces available to you are :

1 Arm'd Div	(Br)	(less one LAA Regt)
88 Division	(US)	(and attached troops)
2 AA Bde	(Br)	(one heavy and one LAA Regt)
13 Inf Bde Gp	(Br)	
24 Gds Bde Gp	(Br)	
1 AGM	(Br)	(two Mod Regts).

6. Plans for AA defence in your area will be prepared on the following general priorities :

- (a) Airfields
- (b) Venice Port
- (c) Po and Lagoon bridges.

Minimum essential CD for Venice; port will be protected by AA arty sited in dual role.

7. In the event of hostilities it is expected that lines of communication and remaining allied installations in Italy will be subjected to sabotage. It is intended to make the Italian army responsible for protecting these Ls of C, but apart from them no other troops will be available. In view of this, protection cannot be guaranteed and you should be prepared for contingency in planning operations.

8. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. A force of one cruiser and at least two destroyers or frigates and one LST is normally maintained in the Northern

- 13 Inf Bde Gp (Br)
- 24 Gds Bde Gp (Br)
- 1 AGR (Br) (two Med Regts).

6. Plans for AA defence in your area will be prepared on the following general priorities :

- (a) Airfields
- (b) Venice Port
- (c) Po and Adige bridges.

Minimum essential CD for Venice; port will be protected by AA arty sited in dual role.

7. In the event of hostilities it is expected that lines of communication and remaining Allied installations in Italy will be subjected to sabotage. It is intended to make the Italian army responsible for protecting these Lo of C, but apart from them no other troops will be available. In view of this, protection cannot be guaranteed and you should be prepared for this contingency in planning operations.

8. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. A force of one cruiser and at least two destroyers or frigates and one LST is normally maintained in the Northern Adriatic; reinforcements by at least two destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should be made with Senior Naval Officer, Adriatic.

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9. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. R.A.F. immediately available for operations in N.E. Italy consists of :

9 Fighter/Bomber Sqn
1 Tac/R Sqn

These aircraft are based on existing airfields in N.E. Italy.

10. The following air reinforcements will be made available by US/FE (subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff) and R.A.F. :

- 4 Thunderbolt Fighter/Bomber Sqn (each 18 aircraft) - USAFE
- 3 Tempest Fighter/Bomber Sqn (each 16 aircraft) - R.A.F.
- 110 C-47 Transports (US)
- 10 C-47 Transports (Br.)

Additionally up to a total of 4 Heavy Bomber Sqn (minimum 8 aircraft each) operating from M.I.T. would be made available subject to the overriding MED/ME theatre commitments.

11. It has been provisionally decided that the following tasks, in order of priority, will be carried out by the Allied Air Forces :

- (a) Neutralisation of the Yugoslav Air Force.
- (b) Neutralisation of coast defence batteries covering approaches to POLA.
- (c) Attacks on targets as requested by GHQ.
- (d) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.
- (e) Air cover for own troops movements and special operations.

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9 Fighter/Bomber Sqn

1 Tac/R Sqn

These aircraft are based on existing airfields in N.E. Italy.

10.

The following air reinforcements will be made available by US/FE (subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff) and R/AF :

4 Thunderbolt Fighter/Bomber Sqn (each 18 aircraft) - US/FE

3 Tempest Fighter/Bomber Sqn (each 16 aircraft) - R/AF

110 C-47 Transports (US)

10 C-47 Transports (Br.)

Additionally up to a total of 4 Heavy Bomber Sqn (minimum

8 aircraft each) operating from M.L.T. should be made available subject to the overriding MED/HE theatre commitments.

11.

It has been provisionally decided that the following tasks, in order of priority, will be carried out by the Allied Air Forces :

(a) Neutralisation of the Yugoslav Air Force.

(b) Neutralisation of coast defence batteries covering approaches to FOIA.

(c) Attacks on targets as requested by GHQ.

(d) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.

(e) Air cover for own troops movements and special operations.

(f) Supply dropping.

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12. You should seek from the War Office the administrative support you consider necessary to maintain the British forces at your disposal in the roles prescribed by this directive, reporting any limiting factors to this Headquarters.
13. Within the theatre a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types, based on authorised theatre strength, plus an additional training allowance of ammunition is being maintained for the United States forces. Of these reserves the following are to be maintained in the 88th Division area :
- (a) For artillery and mortar - 1000 rounds per gun.
 - (b) For small arms - as determined by the Division Commander.
 - (c) For all other supplies - a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
 - (d) For possible reinforcements - a 10 day level of all types of supply.
- Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations; in such an event the War Department will be requested to make the required service units immediately available, but there is no assurance that they will be forthcoming.
14. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to Italian personnel.

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13. Within the theatre a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types, based on authorized theatre strength, plus an additional training allowance of ammunition is being maintained for the United States forces. Of these reserves the following are to be maintained in the 88th Division area :

- (a) For artillery and mortar - 1000 rounds per gun.
- (b) For small arms - as determined by the Division Commander.
- (c) For all other supplies - a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- (d) For possible reinforcements - a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations; in such an event the War Department will be requested to make the required service units immediately available, but there is no assurance that they will be forthcoming.

14. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to Italian personnel.

Paraphrase of telegram No. 469 from Caserta, dated July 5.

At Political Meeting today SAC made decision to recommend to CCS that when ALCOM was abolished a special section of AFHQ would be set up in Rome, called "Italian Military Affairs Section" with chief acting as SAC's deputy for coordination of service sub-commissions and control of armament production. There will also be recommended the establishment in Rome of branch of G-5 AFHQ as described in paragraph four of FAN 650. This would be entitled "Liaison and Civil Affairs Branch, G-5, AFHQ", providing representation in Rome for SAC to control military functions now being performed by ALCOM separate from those connected with Italian Armed Forces and also for channel of communication to Italian Government in questions of combined Allied interest, including day to day matters arising out of US and British Civil Affairs Agreements with Italian Government.

MFPS plan prepared on basis of UK-US political advice was therefore rejected by SAC, in favor of G-5 setup described above, vigorously supported by G-4, section, and approved by General Lee.

At request of SAC, British Ambassador and U.S. Charge d'Affaires attended the conference, as well as POLAD. Key stated State Dept agreed with views expressed heretofore by British and American Embassies Rome and by American and British Polads at AFHQ, i.e., that there should be only one agency in Rome to represent SAC and not two or more separate organizations with individual heads all competent to deal with the Italian Prime Minister. Therefore it was State Dept's view that Chief of proposed Italian Military Affairs Section in Rome who would have responsibility for functions provided formerly

performed by ALCON and which may be required under other sections of armistice modification agreement. Sir Noel Charles said he had no instructions from FOROFF but that he agreed completely with views expressed by Key and that he was sure FOROFF would support these views.

In announcing decision, SAC said he felt he should be guided by recommendations of his staff sections in which General Lee concurred and said that State Dept and FOROFF would have a chance to make their views known in Washington.

Since SAC has not accepted Dept's views re future organization of AFHQ representation in Rome, since he proposed to create two separate agencies in that city, and since organizations of the functions which will be provided for under agreement modifying armistice is first of all of political rather than military importance, it is hoped Dept will find it opportune to ask GCS to give instructions to SAC to arrange for one and not two representatives with authority to negotiate with Prime Minister of Italy.

Statement made by Mr. Key at SAC's Conference, AFHQ,

July 5, 1946

I have received instructions from the Department of State that it is in agreement with the views that heretofore have been expressed by both British and U.S. Embassies in Rome and by the U.S. and British Political Advisers here at AFHQ, namely, that there should be only one agency in Rome representing the Supreme Allied Commander, and not two or more separate bodies with individual heads all authorized to deal with the Italian Prime Minister.

Accordingly, it is the Department of State's view that the chief of the proposed Italian Military Affairs Section in Rome, who would be responsible for the functions provided under paragraph 3a of the Agreement Modifying the Italian Armistice Terms, should also be responsible for any remaining functions formerly performed by the Allied Commission and which may be required under the other Sections of the Armistice Modification Agreement.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

P/331 (FINAL)

3 July 46

Copy No. 32

LOCATION OF AFHQ

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the MJPS has prepared the attached final paper.

AMT/rf.

DISTRIBUTION:

List "A".

501g

1002-2/cc

[Signature]

D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier, GS.
Chairman.

E/331 (FINAL)

3 July 46

Copy No. 32

LOCATION OF AFHQ

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the WPS has prepared the attached final paper.

A:II/af.

DISTRIBUTION:

List "A".

KQ18

TOP SECRET

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F/331 (FINAL)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

LOCATION OF AFHQ

OBJECT

1. To examine the practicability of establishing AFHQ in the PADUA, BOLOGNA or FLORENCE areas by approximately 15 September 46.

ALLIED COMMITMENTS IN ITALY

2. By the end of September 46 the main Allied commitments in Central and Southern ITALY will have been largely liquidated. In the circumstances, the continued location of AFHQ at CASERTA is anomalous. The residual commitments will be in the Northern Provinces of ITALY and mainly operational. It is desirable therefore that the geographical proximity of AFHQ, XIII Corps and possibly BTK should be such as to enable SAC and his Staff to control with the maximum efficiency the operational forces under command, in the event of hostilities.

DIVISION OF AFHQ

3. To enable SAC to control his operational forces, the division of AFHQ into an advanced and rear headquarters might be a possibility. However, this alternative has been the subject of a careful examination and has been proved impracticable owing to shortage of manpower, particularly of Signal personnel. In view of this, AFHQ must be concentrated in one area. Any possibility that AFHQ might be split between PADUA and BOLOGNA or BOLOGNA and FLORENCE, etc. is therefore ruled out. It would however, be practicable to accommodate GHQ. 2nd Echelon elsewhere.

FORECAST OF COMPOSITION OF AFHQ AND

OBJECT

1. To examine the practicability of establishing AFHQ in the PADUA, BOLOGNA or FLORENCE areas by approximately 15 September 46.

ALLIED COMMITMENTS IN ITALY

2. By the end of September 46 the main Allied commitments in Central and Southern ITALY will have been largely liquidated. In the circumstances, the continued location of AFHQ at CASERTA is anomalous. The residual commitments will be in the Northern Provinces of ITALY and mainly operational. It is desirable therefore that the geographical propinquity of AFHQ, XIII Corps and possibly BTA should be such as to enable SAC and his Staff to control with the maximum efficiency the operational forces under command, in the event of hostilities.

DIVISION OF AFHQ

3. To enable SAC to control his operational forces, the division of AFHQ into an advanced and rear headquarters might be a possibility. However, this alternative has been the subject of a careful examination and has been proved impracticable owing to shortage of manpower, particularly of Signal personnel. In view of this, AFHQ must be concentrated in one Area. Any possibility that AFHQ might be split between PADUA and BOLOGNA or BOLOGNA and FLORENCE, etc. is therefore ruled out. It would, however, be practicable to accommodate GHQ, 2nd Echelon elsewhere.

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FORECAST OF COMPOSITION OF AFHQ AND ASSOCIATED HQs AS AT 1 SEPTEMBER 46.

4.	HQ.	Officers	EM/ORS	Civ Employees
<u>BRITISH ELEMENT</u>				
(a)	GHQ CLF	231	787	
(b)	GHQ Sigs	34	618	
(c)	GHQ, 2nd Echelon	40	700	
(d)	GHQ, Car Company	10	500	

TOP SECRET

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HQ. Officers EM/ORs Civ Employees

TOP SECRET

(e) Naval Liaison Officer	2	9	
(f) Air HQ. RAF ITALY (including administrative Units)	100	500	
(g) British Political Adviser	1	3	9
(h) British PW/SEP		1100	-
TOTAL British Element:-	<u>418</u>	<u>4217</u>	<u>9</u>

U.S. ELEMENT

(j) HQ MTOUSA including Signals	250	1446	325
(k) U.S. Car Company	5	129	
(l) U.S. Truck Company	5	105	
(m) U.S. Political Adviser	1		8
(n) U.S. PW/SEP		1100	
TOTAL U.S. Element:-	<u>261</u>	<u>2780</u>	<u>343</u>
GRAND TOTAL:-	<u>679</u>	<u>6997</u>	<u>352</u>

5. FORECAST OF NUMBERS OF DEPENDANTS/MARRIED FAMILIES AS AT 1 SEPTEMBER 46.

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ORs/EM</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>
	<u>Families</u> <u>Children</u>	<u>Families</u> <u>Children</u>	<u>Families</u> <u>Children</u>
(a) U.S.	75 54 (involves 38 families)	42 11 (involves 11 families)	7 4 (involves 1 family)
(b) British	111 47 (involves 36 families)	27 12 (involves 8 families)	
TOTAL:-	Families Children	Families Children	Families Children
	262 128	262 128	

TOTAL British Element:-

418	4217	2
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	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ORs/EM</u>		<u>OTHERS</u>	
	<u>Families</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Families</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Families</u>	<u>Children</u>
(a) U.S.	75	54 (involves 38 families)	42	11 (involves 11 families)	7	4 (involves 1 family)
(b) British	111	47 (involves 36 families)	27	12 (involves 8 families)		
TOTAL:-	Families 262	Children 128	Families with children 94			

TOP SECRET

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FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.

United States

The U.S. Army goes on a strict budget 1 July. Appropriations are made in advance by Congress for specific purposes. In estimates submitted by HQs MTOUSA no funds were set up for a move of the headquarters. While overall allotments will probably be able to cover certain phases of a move, the Engineer and Signal allotments are particularly restricted. Recent instructions state that any new project must be submitted to the Budget Office, War Department, with exact estimates and full justification.

7.

British

The British Army has been on normal peace time accounting since 1 Apr 46, long term estimates for the theatre expenditure having been submitted in November 45. Owing to the uncertainty which existed at that time with regard to the future of CEF, provision in the budget for expenditure in CEF is very limited and the cost of EE and Signals work involved in moving and re-establishing the Headquarters in a new location could not be met from existing allocations.

8. Paras. 6 and 7 have been inserted as it is desirable to include all aspects of this move. However, we should not be unduly influenced by financial considerations, since this move is being undertaken for operational reasons and has at least the implied backing of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN 671).

BOLOGNA

9. The outskirts of BOLOGNA were subjected to heavy bombing during the final stages of operations in ITALY and are severely damaged. It is considered that even with the most extensive requisitioning it would NOT be possible to find suitable accommodation for AFHQ in the BOLOGNA area.

FLORENCE

10. From the U.S. point of view a considerable economy in staff could be effected in HQ. MTOUSA and HQ PES if AFHQ were to be located in FLORENCE, owing to the proximity of LEGHORN.

11. From the British point of view the location of AFHQ in

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FLORENCE

10. From the U.S. point of view a considerable economy in staff could be effected in HQ. MTOUSA and HQ PES if AFHQ were to be located in FLORENCE, owing to the proximity of LEGHORN.

11. From the British point of view the location of AFHQ in FLORENCE would be impracticable owing to manpower shortage since FLORENCE is not on the existing L of C and a number of administrative units would be required in order to maintain GHQ CMF. These units are not, however, available.

12. There is virtually no accommodation available in FLORENCE presently under requisition and it would be necessary to acquire at the expense of Italian economy and civilians practically the whole of the accommodation required for AFHQ.

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13. There is an all weather air field at FLORENCE suitable for two engined aircraft with an alternative field at PISA, forty miles away. Being South of the APENNINES the probable availability of these fields during winter flying conditions has many advantages in communicating with Rome and the outside world. A good motor road to Rome exists as an alternative route.

14. Although FLORENCE is approximately 300 miles nearer than CASERTA to the possible zone of future operations, it is still not considered near enough as a location for an operational HQ. If it were selected a move further North would be necessary in the event of hostilities.

PADUA - ACCOMMODATION

15. It is believed that sufficient accommodation might be found in PADUA and the immediate vicinity for all essential parts of AFHQ, though the situation would be aggravated if it be decided that the greater portion of Air HQ is also to be established in the same location as AFHQ. In any case it would be necessary to requisition additional accommodation involving the eviction of civilians and closing down of civilian enterprises, to which there will undoubtedly be opposition. The standard of the accommodation would not be good, particularly for Officers and the U.S. MD civilians for whom accommodation on the same standard as for Officers must be provided. Furthermore, even with requisitioning it is unlikely that sufficient accommodation could be found for more than a small percentage of the British or United States families/dependants and it is probable that most of these would have to be accommodated at Lake Garda or possibly VENICE or VENICE LIDO.

16. The accommodation in PADUA would be scattered throughout the town and would be extravagant in manpower for administrative overhead and guards in particular. Living accommodation for all personnel will be some distance from the office area, and ferry services will be required between living quarters and offices. Much of the accommodation is in a bad state of repair and if the move is to be completed by 15 Sep 46, it is considered that work must start not later than 1 Aug 46.

17. Of the three possibilities examined above it is considered that PADUA offers the best solution. The factors examined subsequently therefore concern PADUA only.

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONS

14. Although FLORENCE is approximately 300 miles nearer than CASERTA to the possible zone of future operations, it is still not considered near enough as a location for an operational HQ. If it were selected a move further North would be necessary in the event of hostilities.

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17. Of the three possibilities examined above it is considered that PADUA offers the best solution. The factors examined subsequently therefore concern PADUA only.

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONS

18. C in C MED will continue to maintain a Naval Liaison Officer at AFHQ as at present. It is important that the existing channels of communication between C in C MED and his Naval Liaison Officer should be retained in any new location of AFHQ. These existing channels of communication are:-

- (a) Teleprinter through the Military Teleprinter system.
- (b) Telephone via CATANIA and R/T link with MALTA.

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TOP SECRET

LOCATION OF AIR HEADQUARTERS

19. Contracting establishments have compelled the RAF to fuse the Desert Air Force, Air Headquarters Austria and Air Headquarters Italy into one Headquarters. The considerable distance and uncertain communications between CASAFIA and the TRIVISO/UDINE area (where the wings are located) has necessitated an advanced Headquarters being set up at UDINE. It is considered, however, that if AFHQ were located at PADUA or at some other location equally distant from the scene of potential operations the need for this advanced Headquarters might no longer exist. It would, however, be necessary to locate forward of the main Headquarters a Tactical Headquarters consisting of approximately 35 Officers and 230 other ranks. This would leave about 100 Officers and 500 other ranks as the main headquarters located with AFHQ. In view of the known accommodation restrictions in PADUA it might be possible to locate the major portion of Air Headquarters in the UDINE area and provide a Liaison Detachment at AFHQ in PADUA.

AIRFIELD

20. PADUA Airfield has a grass surface, is low lying and small. The best possible run is about 900 yards in an East to West direction. It is considered that this field is only fit for very light communication aircraft. The nearest good all weather airfield to PADUA is situated at TRIVISO, 30 miles away. This field is suitable for four engine aircraft and could be made an air terminal.

MORALE CONSIDERATIONS

21. The recreational facilities available in PADUA are limited although they are probably adequate for the comparatively small British garrison that has occupied the town hitherto. If AFHQ were established in PADUA, the total strength of troops in the area would be considerably increased and this would overstrain available facilities; the position would be further aggravated by the necessity of providing separate British and United States facilities.

ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS

22. To produce accommodation and all other necessary facilities at PADUA, on a par with those now available at CASAFIA, very considerable Engineer work will be necessary. Practically all buildings will require extensive rehabilitation and provision

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ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS

22. To produce accommodation and all other necessary facilities at PADUA, on a par with those now available at CASELFA, very considerable Engineer work will be necessary. Practically all buildings will require extensive rehabilitation and provision of cookhouses, mess rooms, etc. In some cases it may be necessary to erect hutting to bring the site up to the necessary capacity. Full details of the commitment can only be assessed after a detailed reconnaissance on the ground. The critical factors are likely to be:-

- (a) Shortage of Engineer labour.
- (b) Shortage of essential stores
- (c) Provision of necessary funds on both British and United States account.

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ALLIED SIGNAL CONSIDERATIONS

23. Internal and external communications can be provided only on a limited scale compared with CASERTA at present, but reliability of communications to XIII Corps in particular, and elsewhere to other formations in NE ITALY would be greatly enhanced, although communications to ROME would be less efficient than at present.

24. The construction of overhead and underground cables would present considerable difficulties due to the fact that the streets in PADUA are cobbled and narrow, and the buildings stone.

25. A civilian automatic exchange is available in PADUA, and in the event of being used, one-fifth of the telephones and lines would have to be requisitioned.

26. It is considered that a military exchange should eventually be established in PADUA for AFHQ; until this is installed it will be necessary to rely on the existing civil exchange. The automatic exchange previously used by 2 DISTRICT in MILAN would be adequate if it could be re-requisitioned; it could be dismantled and then installed in PADUA within 3 months.

27. Long distance facilities from PADUA are limited and to have an acceptable standard of adequacy it may be necessary to requisition certain civilian lines.

28. Transmitting and receiving stations would have to be constructed outside the town. This would be a major project and would have to be budgeted and approved by the War Office and War Department. On the other hand, so long as AFHQ remains at CASERTA, the cost of telephone facilities will be very great. A move to PADUA would result in a considerable saving of this expenditure.

29. It would not be possible to guarantee the quality of speech for any Naval telephone link between C in C LED and his NIO at any new location of AFHQ in the NORTH of ITALY, owing to the increased length of circuit, which would have to be civil maintained.

RELOCATING OF UNITS NOW IN PADUA

30. The first reconnaissance of PADUA as a location for AFHQ was based on the assumption that 1 Armoured Division would not be in ITALY for the winter 1946/47 and this assumption is no longer valid. Consequently if PADUA is selected as the future location of AFHQ it will be necessary to seek suitable alternative accommodation for HQ, 1 Armoured Division and other Units which would otherwise use the present facilities in PADUA for winter accommodation.

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31. The readjustment of accommodation will almost certainly necessitate additional requisitioning and most probably additional hutting and new construction. The resiting of the Units affected will entail additional engineer work and it is anticipated that the provision of the engineer resources will be a matter of great difficulty, having regard to the present XIII Corps winter accommodation programme.

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CONCLUSIONS

32. For the reasons stated in paras 9 to 14 above, it is not considered practicable to establish any part of AFHQ in the BOLOGNA or FLORENCE areas, although in the case of FLORENCE there are compensating advantages on the United States side.

33. Subject to a detailed reconnaissance it is believed that sufficient accommodation might be found in PADUA for AFHQ and the main portion of its associated headquarters. This accommodation is, however, barely suitable and in any case would require a considerable degree of requisition and much expenditure on money and labour. In the event of AFHQ moving to PADUA, additional accommodation elsewhere would have to be found for units necessarily displaced.

34. In the event of sufficient accommodation not being available in PADUA for AFHQ and its associated Headquarters, less GHQ. 2nd Echelon, it may be practicable for Air HQ representation to be confined to a small detachment with main Air HQ. Italy located in the UDINE area.

35. Signal communications at PADUA will be limited in comparison with those currently available and civilian local telephone services will have to be relied upon if the move takes place with less than 3 months notice. The reliability of communications to other HQs in the North would be materially improved and a considerable saving of operating costs would be effected.

36. Any request for a move of this Headquarters will have to be accompanied by an estimate of the cost entailed in establishing AFHQ at PADUA since existing allocation of funds will not cover the expenditure involved by such a move.

37. In the event of a move to PADUA not being practicable the only alternative would be for AFHQ to remain at CASERTA. However, it must be borne in mind that considerable administrative difficulties will arise on the British side in maintaining GHQ CAF in CASERTA after October.

RECOMMENDATIONS

38. That a joint United States - British reconnaissance of the PADUA area should be made forthwith to determine whether it is practicable to accommodate AFHQ and its associated Headquarters in the PADUA area and to estimate the costs involved.

39. That, should the reconnaissance prove that it is impracticable to establish AFHQ at PADUA in the present circumstances, plans should be prepared to

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39. That, should the reconnaissance prove that it is impracticable to establish AFHQ at PADUA in the present circumstances, AFHQ remain at CASERTA, but that plans should be prepared to enable AFHQ to move to the PADUA area under active service conditions in the event of hostilities.

TOP SECRET

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET**SECRET**

20 June 46

BY SLRSECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

FILE: 131/1

SUBJECT: MJPS P/328 (2nd Draft) "Proposed Replacement for Allied Commission"

TO: CC, AC

FROM: Yates

⁶
SEE 5 in 116/CC**SECRET**

1002-2/CC

(96)

0108

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

SECRET

F/328 (2nd Draft)

20 June 1946

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

MJB

PROPOSED REPLACEMENT FOR ALLIED COMMISSION

SEE 5 in 116/cc

1002-2/cc

SECRET

copy

95

0103

785015

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

15 June 46

REF: F/329 (Final)

SUBJECT: "Brit and US Civ Affs Agmts, ANALYSIS OF FINAL DRAFTS"

¹⁶
See ~~20~~ in 102-2/cc (file 10000/136/73)

✓

1002-2/cc

5000

94

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

ALLIED COMMISSION COMMENTS ON MJPS PAPER P.328
dated 14th June 1946

92

---SEE 116/CC---

1002-2/c

93

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CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Ref. P/328 F

14 June 1946

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

A SPECIAL SECTION TO ASSUME THE
FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AS
REGARDS THE SERVICE SUB-COMMISSIONS

Subject: Terms of reference.

FERRY McC. SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chairman.

1002-2/CC

See

(93)

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(92)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

P/327 (FINAL)

8 May 1946

Copy No. 32

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

The following amendments should be made to P/327 (Final) issued on 3 May 1946.

1. Page 1, para 6, delete "7 Arm'd Bde (possibly less one Regt)" and substitute "7 Arm'd Bde (less one Regt)".
2. Appendix 'A', para 6, delete "7 Arm'd Bde (Br) (possibly less one Regt)" and substitute "7 Arm'd Bde (Br) (less one Regt)".

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D. P. YATES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

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POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

90

The following amendments should be made to P/327 (Final) issued on 3 May 1946.

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MAY 9 1946

104. [91]

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

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Mr. Forster
D. PEEBLES
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

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104-911

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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1. Exec Comm ^{TM/13/5}
2. Comdr. L.F. S/k

→ LB 14 May

Pls return to

WWS
CC

11/1

0114

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

1905 Chief Commissioner 1136
TOP SECRET Allied Commission

MAY 9 1946
TOP SECRET
1510

ALLIED FORCE HQ BARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

F/327 (FINAL)

5 May 1946

Copy No 32

MAY 9 1946

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the JPO has prepared the attached final paper.

HH/coc.

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plus 1st.

1002-2/cc

[Handwritten signature]
D. PAUL V. T. S.
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

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5097

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MAY 9 1946

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

In accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff, the HJPs has prepared the attached final paper.

HH/coc.

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plus 'Q'.

D. PAUL Y. L. S.,
Brigadier, G.S.
Chairman.

1002-2/10

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G-3 SECTION
AF Hq

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

2/327 (Final)

3 May 1946

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

OBJECT

1. To modify the directive issued to XIII Corps on 25 Oct 45 (AFHQ F 50372) in the light of changes in the Allied military situation in Italy during the last six months.

JUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES

2. Yugoslav troops in the general area Zone 'B' are estimated at about 50,000. This concentration was effected at the expense of the Tactical Reserve, 4 Army. It is not considered a Yugoslav capability to engage in a major operation without first reconstituting this reserve. First indications of such reconstitution have now been received. The Yugoslavs are however, capable with their present strength in Zone 'B' of attempting a coup-de-main with the object of capturing TRIESTE, confronting the Allies with a fait accompli and relying upon the resistance of the American and British people against commitment to another war to tie them in retaining TRIESTE.

JUGOSLAV INTENTIONS

3. It is considered that Yugoslav intentions are not to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-de-main, though a possibility, is unlikely. Rather it is believed the troop concentrations are part of a war of nerves designed to ensure the retention of Zone 'B' regardless of the final settlement of the boundary dispute and as far as possible to intimidate the population of Zone 'A'.

ALLIED POLICY

4. By NAF 1122 SAC asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff what policy the US and UK Governments intend to adopt in the event of Yugoslav aggression. This resulted in FPM 653 authorizing SAC's public statement making it clear that it is the firm intention of the US-UK Governments to maintain their present position in VENEZIA GIULIA until an agreed settlement of the territorial dispute has been reached and put into effect. COMJAG 254, also in reply to NAF 1122, listed the forces known to be available for operations, but did not indicate how Allied policy, as announced in SAC's statement, is to be implemented in the event of Yugoslav aggression on a major scale. Further direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff is therefore unlikely until aggression has taken place. It has been AFHQ policy up to now to formulate operational plans based on an attack by the Yugoslavs on a major scale. This point has now been reached where the requirements of the rundown of this are at variance with plans for major operations.

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1. To modify the directive issued to XIII Corps on 25 Oct 45 (AFHQ F 59372) in the light of changes in the Allied military situation in Italy during the last six months.

JUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES

2. Yugoslav troops in the General area Zone 'B' are estimated at about 50,000. This concentration was effected at the expense of the Tactical Reserve, 4 Army. It is not considered a Yugoslav capability to engage in a major operation without first reconstituting this reserve. First indications of such reconstitution have now been received. The Yugoslavs are however, capable with their present strength in Zone 'B' of attempting a coup-de-main with the object of capturing TRIESTE, confronting the Allies with a fait accompli and relying upon the resistance of the American and British people against commitment to another war to aid them in retaining TRIESTE.

JUGOSLAV INTENTIONS

3. It is considered that Yugoslav intentions are not to engage the Allies in a major operation and that a coup-de-main, though a possibility, is unlikely. Rather it is believed the troop concentrations are part of a war of nerves designed to ensure the retention of Zone 'B' regardless of the final settlement of the boundary dispute and as far as possible to intimidate the population of Zone 'A'.

ALLIED POLICY

4. By MAP 1122 SAC asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff what policy the US and UK Governments intend to adopt in the event of Yugoslav aggression. This resulted in FIM 653 authorizing SAC's public statement making it clear that it is the firm intention of the US-UK Governments to maintain their present position in Venezia Giulia until an agreed settlement of the territorial dispute has been reached and put into effect. COMJED 254, also in reply to MAP 1122, listed the forces known to be available for operations, but did not indicate how Allied policy, as announced in SAC's statement, is to be implemented in the event of Yugoslav aggression on a major scale. Further direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff is therefore unlikely until aggression has taken place. It has been AFHQ policy up to now to formulate operational plans based on an attack by the Yugoslavs on a major scale. This point has now been reached where the requirements of the rundown of this are at variance with plans for major operations.

NAVAL FORCES

5. The situation as regards Navy forces available is unchanged from 25 Oct and remains as stated in para 6 of AFHQ F 59372.

LAND FORCES

6. The following Allied ground forces are likely to remain available in Italy as long as the VENEZIA GIULIA commitment lasts:-

HQ 13 Corps	56 Div (Plus 752 Tk Bn and Serv Tps) (Final)
13 Corps Troops	7 Arm'd Bde (less one Regt)
6 Arm'd Div (less one L.A. Regt)	1 AGRA (of two or three L.A. Regts)
56 Div (less one L.A. Regt)	2 L.A. Bde (at present of two Hqs & two L.A. Regts)

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Practically all the above forces are now located in 13 Corps area and with the exception of 6 Arm Div & 2 AA Bde are under command 13 Corps for all purposes. 6 Arm Div & 2 AA Bde are under command AFHQ for operations and under command 13 Corps for all other purposes. It should be noted however that 2 AA Bde has only just been relieved from guard duties on which it has been employed for about a year. The bde is to start training forthwith but will not be reasonably effective for approx three months.

7. The u/m Allied forces have been earmarked as reinforcements for this theatre in the event of an emergency. These formations are in USFET and could be concentrated in 13 Corps area in approx five days from receipt of the order to move:-

60 BCT
508 Para Regt

8. 2 Pol Corps consisting of two inf and one arm divs, an independent arm div & Corps troops is still located in Italy and with the exception of the Arm Div is virtually fully equipped and in a high state of operational efficiency. At the present time the two inf Divs are fully employed on guard duties throughout ITALY. The Corps is however due for disbandment and the War Office has refused to permit the preparation of any plans for its possible employment in active operations in VENEZIA GIULIA. No reserves can therefore be held in the theatre on account of the Corps and if an emergency arises before the Corps is disbanded, its employment in active operations would be dependent on the provision of certain British service units and a build up of maintenance stocks particularly anti.

9. The Italian Govt has stated its wish that the Italian Army should be employed actively in any operations against the Yugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA. A non-committal reply has been made but in view of the present state of the Italian Army regarding reorganization and equipment and its lack of proper adm backing it is most unlikely that more than a token force, of about a brigade/regt, could be effectively employed. Meanwhile, for security reasons, it is inadvisable to make any plans for such a contingency with the Italian Min of War or MILA.

AIR FORCES

10. The Desert Air Force, RAF, is immediately available for operations in NE ITALY or ABSTELA and consists of:

9 Fighter - Bomber Sqns
1 TAC/R Sqdn

These aircraft to be based on existing airfields vicinity UDINE.

11. As reinforcements USAFV is prepared to furnish:

(a) Fighters (under command DAF)

55 in 24 hours; building up to-
110 in 48 hours.

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7. The u/m Allied forces have been earmarked as reinforcements for this theatre in the event of an emergency. These formations are in USFET and could be concentrated in 13 Corps area in approx five days from receipt of the order to move:-

60 RCT
508 Para Regt

8. 2 Pol Corps consisting of two inf and one arm'd divs, an independent arm'd bde & Corps troops is still located in Italy and with the exception of the Arm'd Bde is virtually fully equipped and in a high state of operational efficiency. At the present time the two Inf Divs are fully employed on guard duties throughout ITALY. The Corps is however due for disembarkment and the War Office has refused to permit the preparation of any plans for its possible employment in active operations in VALLEZIA GIULIA. No reserves can therefore be held in the theatre on account of the Corps and if an emergency arises before the Corps is disbanded, its employment in active operations would be dependent on the provision of certain British service units and a build up of maintenance stocks particularly amm.

9. The Italian Govt has stated its wish that the Italian Army should be employed actively in any operations against the Yugoslavs in VALLEZIA GIULIA. A non-committal reply has been made but in view of the present state of the Italian Army regarding reorganization and equipment and its lack of proper arm'd backing it is most unlikely that more than a token force, of about a brigade/ regt, could be effectively employed. Meanwhile, for security reasons, it is inadvisable to make any plans for such a contingency with the Italian Min of War or MIA.

AIR FORCES

10. The Desert Air Force, RAF, is immediately available for operations in NE ITALY or AUSTRIA and consists of:

9 Fighter - Bomber Sqns
1 TAC/R Sqn

These aircraft to be based on existing airfields vicinity UDINE.

11. As reinforcements USAFE is prepared to furnish:

(a) Fighters (under comd DAF)

55 in 24 hours; building up to-
110 in 48 hours.

10 F-61 Night Fighters in 12 hours.

(b) Reconnaissance (under comd DAF)

20 F-6 in 12 hours
3 A-26 in 12 hours

(c) Bombers (under comd USAFE)

6 B-17, in 24 hours; building up to-
24 B-17 in 48 hours and building up to a total of-
36 B-17 in 10 days

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(d) Transports (under comd USAF)

80 C-47 in 24 hours; building up to-
100 C-47 in 48 hours and building up to a total of-
120 C-47 in 7 days

(e) Aircraft listed in (a) & (b) will be based on airfields
vicinity TERNI; those in (c) & (d) will be based on
GERMANY.

AA and CD DEFENSES

12. In addition to 2 AA Bde (two HAA & two LAA Regts) there are in
ITALY five Polish AA units, (one HAA & four LAA) virtually ready for combat.
As already noted however, no reserves can be held on account of these Polish
units but until 2 AA Bde is ready for operations, Polish AA units as long as
they remain in ITALY, would probably have to be employed in an emergency, in
lieu of British, within the limitations of ammunition supply.

In the event of operations, the main VFs requiring AA pro-
tection would be:-

- (a) Air Fields
- (b) VENICE Port
- (c) PO & ADIGE Bridges

A total of four units (Br or Polish) would not give full scale protection to
all these localities but in view of the small scale threat presented by the
Jugoslav Air Force, it would be reasonable to accept a comparatively minor
degree of protection for (a) & (b) and if necessary none at (c).

No CD guns are available but AA guns for the protection of VENICE
could be sited in a dual role. This would provide reasonable CD in view of
the small scale threat of the Jugoslav Navy.

GUARDS

13. In the event of operations in VENEZIA GIULIA, a higher scale
of static guards will probably be required throughout the I of C than was the
case in ITALY during the German War. In addition it would be desirable to pro-
vide guards for all major bridges, tunnels, telephone exchanges etc. on the
rd, rail & telephone I of C from Naples and Leghorn to 13 Corps. For the
time being at least, sufficient Polish & Italian troops will be available to
undertake all likely guard commitments and it is considered that:

(a) 2 Pol Corps should provide all troops required to guard Allied
installations though one British unit will be required for essentially British
guards in 3 District and KAAO. This unit must be found from the troops in
para 6.

(b) The Italian Army should be made responsible for the security
of the rd, rail & telephone I of C from Naples and Leghorn to 13 Corps. For
the reasons stated in para 9 no plans for this commitment should be made with
the Italian Army until it has actually started.

12. In addition to 2 AA Bde (two HAA & two LAA Regts) there are in ITALY five Polish AA units, (one HAA & four LAA) virtually ready for combat. As already noted however, no reserves can be held on account of these Polish units but until 2 AA Bde is ready for operations, Polish AA units as long as they remain in ITALY, would probably have to be employed in an emergency, in lieu of British, within the limitations of ammunition supply.

In the event of operations, the main VPs requiring AA protection would be:-

- (a) Air Fields
- (b) VENICE Port
- (c) PO & ADIGE Bridges

A total of four units (Br or Polish) would not give full scale protection to all these localities but in view of the small scale threat presented by the Yugoslav Air Force, it would be reasonable to accept a comparatively minor degree of protection for (a) & (b) and if necessary none at (c).

No CD guns are available but AA guns for the protection of VENICE could be sited in a dual role. This would provide reasonable CD in view of the small scale threat of the Yugoslav Navy.

GUARDS

13. In the event of operations in VENEZIA GIULIA, a higher scale of static guards will probably be required throughout the L of C than was the case in ITALY during the German War. In addition it would be desirable to provide guards for all major bridges, tunnels, telephone exchanges etc. on the rd, rail & telephone L of C from Naples and Leghorn to 13 Corps. For the time being at least, sufficient Polish & Italian troops will be available to undertake all likely guard commitments and it is considered that:

(a) 2 Pol Corps should provide all troops required to guard Allied installations though one British unit will be required for essentially British guards in 3 District and RAAC. This unit must be found from the troops in para 6.

(b) The Italian Army should be made responsible for the security of the rd, rail & telephone L of C from Naples and Leghorn to 13 Corps. For the reasons stated in para 9 no plans for this commitment should be made with the Italians until active operations are imminent or have actually started.

MAINTENANCE

British

14. As of 1 June 1946, British administrative resources available within the theatre will be barely sufficient to support the British troops shown in para 6 and even then some service troops will be required as reinforcements from outside the theatre if 6 Armd Div is to be effectively maintained in active operations for more than a few weeks; it will be necessary to request the War Office to earmark these reinforcements and to be prepared to move them into the theater at short notice.

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15. Apart from personnel, the main ~~firm~~ ^{factor} is ammunition. War Office reserves, authorized for this theatre are 30 days at contact rates. GHQ CMF have authorized, for 13 Corps, incl 6 Armd Div, 60 days at contact rates. The balance of 30 days in excess of War Office authorized theatre reserves has been found by taking into account ammunition earmarked for expenditure in training subsequent to 1 June 46. Thus if reserves of ammunition are to be maintained at 60 days after this date it will be necessary either:-

- (a) to forego training ammunition in certain natures in short supply, or,
- (b) obtain War Office approval to the increased scales of ammunition reserves and take provision action accordingly.

16. Subject to the above limitations and to the probability that ammunition expenditure would have to be restricted, at least initially, the forces in para 6 could be maintained with resources available in ITALY for a period of approximately two months in active operations.

U.S.

17. While it is estimated that adequate stocks are available in ITALY for U.S. forces in para 6 and 7 for 60 days of operation at active rates, corps type supporting troops necessary for normal support of combat operations are lacking. Since no troops are available from P.B.S. for the operation of depots or dumps in the operational area the 88th Div will have to assume this responsibility. Certain auxiliary troops have been assigned to the division for this purpose but these are not adequate for the maintenance of forces engaged in full scale or mobile operations. The additional service troops could be made available by USFET, on War Dept directive, within a period of approximately 30 days until 1 Sep 1946. Requisitions for critical items for which shortages would immediately exist in the event of operations are being prepared and will be filled by USFET. Requisitions for less critical items are being prepared and items will be earmarked by USFET for shipment on call.

CONCLUSIONS

18. It is estimated that, although it is a capability of the Jugoslavs, it is not their intention to engage in major operations against the Anglo-Americans. Rather it is estimated they hope to gain their ends through a threatening show of force. However, the possibility of aggression by the Jugoslavs cannot be excluded and we should therefore be prepared to meet a Jugoslav attack in force.

19. AFHQ policy in the case of Jugoslav aggression must necessarily be dependent upon the policy of the US & UK governments. Until aggression has actually taken place it is not believed that the govts will go further than the recent statement by SAC, that they intend to maintain the Allied position in VENEZIA GIULIA pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

20. Planning for possible operations in VENEZIA GIULIA must be reasonably to expect that the

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- Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No. 785015
- (a) to forego training ammunition in certain natures in short supply, or,
 - (b) obtain War Office approval to the increased scales of ammunition reserves and take provision action accordingly.

16. Subject to the above limitations and to the probability that ammunition expenditure would have to be restricted, at least initially, the Br forces in para 6 could be maintained with resources available in ITALY for a period of approximately two months in active operations.

U.S.

17. While it is estimated that adequate stocks are available in ITALY for U.S. forces in para 6 and 7 for 30 days of operation at active rates, corps type supporting troops necessary for normal support of combat operations are lacking. Since no troops are available from P.B.S. for the operation of depots or dumps in the operational area the 88th Div will have to assume this responsibility. Certain auxiliary troops have been assigned to the division for this purpose but these are not adequate for the maintenance of forces engaged in full scale or mobile operations. The additional service troops could be made available by USFET, on War Dept directive, within a period of approximately 30 days until 1 Sep 1946. Requisitions for critical items for which shortages would immediately exist in the event of operations are being prepared and will be filled by USFET. Requisitions for less critical items are being prepared and items will be earmarked by USFET for shipment on call.

CONCLUSIONS

18. It is estimated that, although it is a capability of the Yugoslavs, it is not their intention to engage in major operations against the Anglo-Americans. Rather it is estimated they hope to gain their ends through a threatening show of force. However, the possibility of aggression by the Yugoslavs cannot be excluded and we should therefore be prepared to meet a Yugoslav attack in force.

19. AFHQ policy in the case of Yugoslav aggression must necessarily be dependent upon the policy of the US & UK governments. Until aggression has actually taken place it is not believed that the govts will go further than the recent statement by SAC, that they intend to maintain the Allied position in VENEZIA GIULIA pending conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

20. Planning for possible operations in VENEZIA GIULIA must be based on the means readily available. It is reasonable to expect that the CCS will retain the forces shown in para 6 in NE ITALY as long as the commitment in VENEZIA GIULIA continues, but the reserve in para 7 may no longer be available after 1 Sep 46.

21. Attack by the Yugoslavs may be forecast or may come without warning. In case adequate warning is received it is considered that the planned reinforcement of XIII CORPS can be effected and XIII CORPS will be capable of holding the vital area TRIESTE - GORIZIA - UDINE. Should the Yugoslavs attack without warning it is considered that the security of XIII CORPS forces now on the MORGAN LINE is paramount and GOC XIII CORPS should be given authority to take such action as he deems best to preserve his forces. POLA should be evacuated in any event.

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22. At the present time, subject to the provision of certain reinforcements in an emergency and with certain other slight reservations, adequate resources exist in ITALY for the maintenance of the forces in paras 6 & 7 for a period of approx two months in active operations. HQ authority must now be sought to maintain after 1 June am reserves at 60 days at contact rates for the Br forces in para 6 & 2 AA Bde. It is not considered that the HQ or WD would agree to maintain a larger reserve in ITALY than two months supply for the forces allotted to or earmarked for AFHQ.

23. In view of the impracticability of altering the present plans for the close down of Allied military commitments in ITALY the role of XIII CORPS in the event of aggression by the Yugoslavs must now be limited to an offensive defense designed to secure a firm hold on the vital area TRIESTE - GORIZIA - UDINE. This policy must hold good until the governments decide to make offensive operations possible by the provision of the necessary resources in men and materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS

24. That the draft directive at Appx 'A' be approved for dispatch.

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Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.3/MND No. 785015

23. In view of the impracticability of altering the present plans for the close down of Allied military commitments in ITALY the role of XIII COMUS in the event of aggression by the Yugoslavs must now be limited to an offensive defense designed to secure a firm hold on the vital area TRIESTE - GORIZIA - UDINE. This policy must hold good until the governments decide to make offensive operations possible by the provision of the necessary resources in men and materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS

24. That the draft directive at Appx 'A' be approved for dispatch.

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APPENDIX 'A'

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT : Possible Operations in VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : HQ XIII CORPS.

This HQ F 50372 of 25 Oct is hereby cancelled.

1. It is appreciated that the continued presence of large Yugoslav forces in ZONE 'B' is designed to:-

(a) ensure that ZONE 'B' is firmly held whatever form the political settlement of VENEZIA GIULIA takes.

(b) intimidate as far as possible the non-slav population in ZONE 'A'.

2. It is to be expected that Yugoslav sponsored underground activities in ZONE 'A' and N.E. ITALY will continue but it is not considered that the Yugoslavs intend to go to war with the UNITED NATIONS by launching a direct attack on your forces in VENEZIA GIULIA. However such a possibility cannot be excluded and plans will continue to be made to meet it.

3. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with Armed Forces in ZONE 'A' your tasks are to:-

(a) maintain law and order in ZONE 'A' and the province of UDINE.

(b) maintain the security of the AUSTRIAN LINE and the Italian frontiers in the province of UDINE.

Should the state of law and order deteriorate to such an extent that the forces at present available to you become inadequate for these tasks or if it appears desirable to make a show of force, 6 Arm Div will be placed at your disposal.

4. In the event of a direct attack by Yugoslav forces across the AUSTRIAN

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1. It is appreciated that the continued presence of large Yugoslav

forces in ZONE 'B' is designed to:-

- (a) ensure that ZONE 'B' is firmly held whatever form the political settlement of VERONA GIULIA takes.
- (b) intimidate as far as possible the non-slay population in ZONE 'A'.

2. It is to be expected that Yugoslav sponsored underground activities in ALL 'A' and N.W. ITALY will continue but it is not considered that the Yugoslavs intend to go to war with the UNITED NATIONS by launching a direct attack on your forces in VERONA GIULIA. However such a possibility cannot be excluded and plans will continue to be made to meet it.

3. In the absence of direct Yugoslav intervention with armed forces in ZONE 'A' your tasks are to:-

- (a) maintain law and order in ZONE 'A' and the province of UDINE.
- (b) maintain the security of the MORGAN LINE and the Italian frontiers in the province of UDINE.

should the state of law and order deteriorate to such an extent that the forces at present available to you become inadequate for these tasks or if it appears desirable to make a show of force, 6 Arm Div will be at your disposal.

4. In the event of a direct attack by Yugoslav forces across the MORGAN LINE you will:-

- (a) Secure a firm hold on the vital area TRIESTE - CORRIJA - UDINE.
- (b) Protect the L of C from VENICE to UDINE and TRIESTE.
- (c) Evacuate POLA.
- (d) Conduct such limited offensive operations as may be possible with the means at your disposal, pending a policy decision regarding the provision of reinforcements in men and material by the US and UK governments.

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5. The above tasks will however be subject to the overriding proviso that, should a Yugoslav attack in strength take place without warning and before your forces are tactically disposed, you will act in such a way as to maintain your forces intact.

6. To accomplish the tasks set out in para 4 the forces available to you will be limited at least initially to:-

- 6 Arm'd Div (Br) (Less one LAA Regt)
- 56 Div (Br) (Less one LAA Regt)
- 88 Div (Us) (and attached troops)
- 7 Arm'd Bde (Br) (~~Presently~~ less one Regt).
- 60 RCT (Us)
- 508 Para Bde (Us)
- 1 AGRA (Br) (Two or three Med Regts).

POOTHY P/327 (FINRA) 8 May 46

7. It is estimated that 60 RCT and 508 Para Bde could be concentrated in your area in approximately five days from receipt by VANCE of Combined Chiefs of Staff approval for their move to ITALY. It is possible that these reinforcements will be available only until 1 Sept 1946.

8. Plans for the defence in your area will be prepared by 2 AA Bde after consultation with you and on the following general priorities:-

- (a) Airfields
- (b) VANCE port
- (c) PO and DICE bridges.

Minimum essential CD for VANCE port will be provided by 2 AA Bde 5900 AA Army-sited in dual-role.

9. In the event of hostilities while it remains in ITALY, 2 POL CORPS will be provided with dual-role installations throughout

to maintain your forces intact.

6. To accomplish the tasks set out in para 4 the forces available to you will be limited at least initially to:-

6 Arm Div (Br)	(Less one Lm Regt)
56 Div (Br)	(Less one Lm Regt)
88 Div (Us)	(and attached troops)
7 Arm Bde (Br)	(~~Presently~~ less one Regt).
60 RCT (US)	
508 Para Regt(Us)	
1 AGRA (Br)	(Two or three Med Regts).

Authy P/327 (FMRB) 8 May 46

7. It is estimated that 60 RCT and 508 Para Regt could be concentrated in your area in approximately five days from receipt by U.S.A.F. of Combined Chiefs of Staff approval for their move to ITALY. It is possible that these reinforcements will be available only until 1 Sept 1946.

8. Plans for AA defence in your area will be prepared by 2 AA Bde after consultation with you and on the following general priorities:-

- (a) Airfields
- (b) V-NICE port
- (c) PO and ADICE bridges.

Minimum essential CD for V-NICE port will be provided by 2 AA Bde ~~300~~ **900** AA arty-sited in dual-role.

9. In the event of hostilities while it remains in ITALY, 2 POL CORPS will continue to provide static guards for Allied installations throughout ITALY. It is intended moreover in these circumstances to make the Italian Army responsible for ^{the} security of food, rail and telephone L of C from NAPLES and LECORNO to N.S. ITALY. In addition one British Unit will be earmarked by you till further notice for employment in an emergency on essentially British guards commitments in 3 District and R.A.A.C.

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10. In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Naval forces. An amphibious lift for one Brigade Group/ACF at light scales is maintained in the MEDITERRANEAN at 3 days notice. A force of two destroyers or frigates is normally maintained in the Northern ATLANTIC; reinforcement by one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of TRIESTE be made direct with NOLC TRIESTE and in the case of POLA with ANO POLA.

11. AIR FORCES

In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. Desert Air Force RAF is immediately available for operations in N.E. ITALY or AUSTRIA and consists of:-

9 Fighter/Bomber Sqns.

1 Tac/R Sqdn.

These aircraft to be based on existing airfields in the vicinity of UDINE.

12. As reinforcements the following U.S. Air Forces will be made available by USAF:

a. Fighters (under comd DAF)

55 in 24 hours, building up to

110 in 48 hours.

10 F-61 Night Fighters in 12 hours.

b. Reconnaissance (under Comd DAF)

20 F-6 in 12 hours

3 A-26 in 12 hours.

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in the Northern ADRIATIC; reinforcement by one cruiser and two additional destroyers or frigates could probably be made within three or four days. Further reinforcement is dependent on the situation and overall requirements of the station. Detailed arrangements regarding Naval support, movement of troops by sea and maintenance by sea should in the case of TRISTE be made direct with NOIC TRISTE and in the case of POLA with ANO POLA.

11. AIR FORCES

In the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs you will be supported by all available Air Forces. Desert Air Force RAF is immediately available for operations in N.E. ITALY or AUSTRIA and consists of:-

9 Fighter/Bomber Sqns.

1 Tac/R Sqn.

These aircraft to be based on existing airfields in the vicinity of UDINE.

12. As reinforcements the following U.S. Air Forces will be made available by USAFE:

a. Fighters (under Comd DAF)

55 in 24 hours, building up to

110 in 48 hours.

10 F-61 Night Fighters in 12 hours.

b. Reconnaissance (under Comd DAF)

20 F-6 in 12 hours

3 A-26 in 12 hours.

c. Bombers (under Comd USAFE)

6 B-17 in 24 hours, building up to

24 B-17 in 48 hours, and building up to

36 B-17 in 10 days.

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d. Transports (under Comd US/FE)

- 80 C-47 in 24 hours, building up to -
- 100 C-47 in 48 hours, and building up to -
- 120 C-47 in 7 days.

e. Aircraft listed in a and b will be based on airfields in the vicinity of TRIESTE, those listed in c and d will be based on GERMANY.

13. The availability of R.A.F. reinforcements from outside ITALY is uncertain as it depends on the situation in the remainder of the R.A.F.

HEAD/VE Command and in R.A.F.O.

14. The tasks of the Air Forces in the event of hostilities in order of priority will be as follows:-

(i) Neutralisation of enemy Air Force and Coast Defence

Batteries covering approaches to FOLA.

(ii) Tac/R on XII Corps front and close support.

(iii) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.

15. Maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the TRIESTE area could be undertaken by sea provided an adequate bridgehead round the port is secured and provided also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are neutralized.

16. Where these do not already exist British reserves will be built up into your area to the scale of 60 days at contact rates in respect of ammunition and 30 days for other items (except Brit Ord Stores which are held in AUSTRIA) for the British forces in para 6 and 2 AA Bde. **5290**

Offices have been asked to confirm that certain vital admin reinforcements can be provided at short notice and that provision of maintenance will be

provided at short notice and that provision of maintenance will be

0. Aircraft listed in a and b will be based on airfields in the vicinity of TREVISO, those listed in c and d will be based on GERMANY.

13. The availability of R.A.F. reinforcements from outside ITALY is uncertain as it depends on the situation in the remainder of the R.A.F. MED/ME Command and in B.A.F.O.

14. The tasks of the Air Forces in the event of hostilities in order of priority will be as follows:-

(i) Neutralisation of Yugoslav Air Force and Coast Defence

Batteries covering approaches to FOIA.

(ii) Tac/R on XIII Corps front and close support.

(iii) Harassing attacks on targets disclosed by Tac/R.

15. Maintenance of your forces and of the civil populace in the TRIESTE area could be undertaken by sea provided an adequate bridgehead round the port is secured and provided also coast defence batteries capable of covering the port are neutralized.

16. Where these do not already exist British reserves will be built up into your area to the scale of 60 days at contact rates in respect of ammunition and 30 days for other items (except Brit Ord Stores which are held in AUSTRIA) for the British forces in para 6 and 2 AA Bde. **Page** Office have been asked to confirm that certain vital adm reinforcements can be provided at short notice and that provision of maintenance will be arranged to allow support of forces in para 6 plus 2 AA Bde for a minimum period of two months. Even if a satisfactory reply is received from the War Office it must be borne in mind that theatre resources are progressively dwindling with the closing of the Naples base and the reduction in manpower. Whilst the major elements of administrative support will be furnished certain detailed requirements will have to await movement from other theatres after commencement of operations and improvisation will be necessary.

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17. Within the theatre a 60 day reserve of supplies of all types plus an additional training allowance of ammunition is being maintained for the U.S. forces in para 6. Of this reserve the following is to be maintained in 88 Division area:-

- (a) For artillery and mortar, 1000 rounds per gun.
- (b) For small arms, as determined by the Division Comdr.
- (c) For all other supplies a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- (d) For reinforcing units a 10 day level of all types of supply.

Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 88th Division in event of active operations, but, subject to War Dept directive, service troops will be made available from outside the theatre on 30 days notice until 1 Sept 1946.

18. If the line of communication through UDINE and TARVISIO to AUSTRIA is interrupted by Yugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in AUSTRIA could be transferred to the route, BREMER - INSBRUCK - GALLNITZ without serious delay and would become the responsibility of GHQ CWP. As an alternative temporary solution the route, FORTEZZA - SAN CAUDIDO - SPITAL could be used.

19. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to POLISH or ITALIAN personnel.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUT GENERAL SIR A.D. MORGAN.

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- (b) For small arms, as determined.
- (c) For all other supplies a 10 day minimum and a 40 day maximum.
- (d) For reinforcing units a 10 day level of all types of supply.
- Lack of service units precludes normal support of the 68th Division in event of active operations, but, subject to War Dept directive, service troops will be made available from outside the theatre on 30 days notice until 1 Sept 1946.

18. If the line of communication through UDINE and TARVISIO to AUSTRIA is interrupted by Yugoslav action, the supply of the British Zone in AUSTRIA could be transferred to the route, BRENNER - LAUSBRUCK - MALLNITZ without serious delay and would become the responsibility of GHQ CMT. As an alternative temporary solution the route, PORTOZZA - SAN CANDIDO - SPIGHEL could be used.

19. The information contained in this directive will on no account be disclosed to POLISH or ITALIAN personnel.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUT GENERAL SIR W.D. MORGAN.

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Signed by A.G.

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Ref: 633/2C.

15th March 1946.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

1. Paragraph 8 of G-5 paper contains a slight mis-statement. By recent direction from AMHQ (and CCS) VENEZIA GIULIA is considered as part of ITALY in the economic field.

Paragraph 11 also contains a slight over-statement. AFA has been nominally handed over to AFHQ (although in fact it works closely with MO) but there remain certain residual financial functions with which the Chief Financial Adviser continues to deal.

2. I am in general agreement with the action recommended by G-5 especially as the proposals would appear to comply with the wishes of XIII Corps Commander as expressed in their paper 5855/G of 4 March 46.

3. Turning to paragraph III:

(a) I agree and note that this is in line with the channel of command shown in Appendix "A" to XIII Corps paper. It will be necessary to differentiate between UDITE and VENEZIA GIULIA in practice all aspects of administration. Advice, service and coordination of Allied Commission will be readily available to XIII Corps.

(b) I agree. Again this agrees with 2(b) and Note 2 of Appendix "A" of XIII Corps paper.

(c) I agree. The subjects mentioned comply with the general principles laid down by XIII Corps in 2(b) of their paper in that they have "no direct or indirect bearing on the security or supply of Allied forces in ITALY and the administration of military government in UDITE or VENEZIA GIULIA."

4. Clearly the composition of the new G-5 at AMHQ and of the Allied Commission will require consideration and I suggest that G-5, XIII Corps, and Allied Commission, discuss this at a separate meeting. I recommend that in order to avoid redundancy of functions and waste of manpower the new G-5 be maintained at a low figure (smaller than Appendix "B" of G-5 paper, Agenda for No. 4 Conference) and I shall recommend the retention of the technicians on ALCOM staff in ACHE. I am quite prepared to accept XIII Corps conception that ALCOM should be regarded as that part of G-5 Section which for convenience is at ACHE.

In this connection, although in principle I would raise no objection to the transfer of Displaced Persons to AMHQ, I think it will be found more convenient in view of their close association with UDITE,

1002-2/10

P/326 FINRA (copy that has only copy)

1002-2/11

Paragraph 14 also contains a slight over-statement. AFHQ has been nominally handed over to AFHQ (although in fact it works closely with AC) but there remain certain residual financial functions with which the Chief Financial Adviser continues to deal.

2. I am in general agreement with the action recommended by G-5 especially as the proposals would appear to comply with the wishes of XIII Corps Commander as expressed in their paper 5835/G of 4 March 46.

3. Turning to paragraph III:

(a) I agree and note that this is in line with the channel of command shown in Appendix "A" to XIII Corps paper. It will be necessary to differentiate between UDINEZ and VENEZIA GIULIA in practically all aspects of administration. Advice, service and coordination of Allied Commission will be readily available to XIII Corps.

(b) I agree. Again this agrees with 2(b) and Note 2 of Appendix "A" of XIII Corps paper.

(c) I agree. The subjects mentioned comply with the general principles laid down by XIII Corps in 2(b) of their paper in that they have "no direct or indirect bearing on the security or supply of Allied forces in ITALY and the administration of military government in UDINEZ or VENEZIA GIULIA."

4. Clearly the composition of the new G-5 at AFHQ and of the Allied Commission will require consideration and I suggest that G-5, XIII Corps, and Allied Commission, discuss this at a separate meeting. I recommend that in order to avoid redundancy of functions and waste of manpower the new G-5 be maintained at a low figure (smaller than Appendix "B" of G-5 paper, Agenda for No. 4 Conference) and I shall recommend the retention of the technicians on MCOM staff in ROME. I am quite prepared to accept XIII Corps conception that MCOM should be regarded as that part of G-5 Section which for convenience is at ROME.

In this connection, although in principle I would raise no objection to the transfer of Displaced Persons to AFHQ, I think it will be found more convenient, in view of their close association with UNRRA, IGCE, and the Italian Government, all of whom have their HQ in ROME, to retain them within the Allied Commission.

5. I suggest a slight amendment to the draft telegram by changing the second sentence of para 2 to read: "In this connection I assume that, as laid down in FAN 457, 2.a., you will as occasion requires continue to transmit, either to me or to the Deputy President of the Allied Commission as recommended below, directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy connected with Italian political and economic affairs, even although they have increasingly few strictly military implications."

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BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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Coordinated recommendations of AFHQ Conferences held in
ROME on 6/7 Mar 46 to discuss the AFHQ paper P/326 (Final)
- COMBAT IN ITALY AFTER THE DISMANTLING OF GHF CTF.

Present :

Major General MacLEOD
Major General DUFF
Major General JAMES
Colonel MILLER
Brigadier MITCHELL
Colonel TUFF
Colonel NICHOLLS
Brigadier YATES
Colonel SMITH
Colonel OAK
Brigadier SHARP
Brigadier General HAZELDEN
Brigadier PASCUS
Captain GARDNER, R.N.
Major Commodore FLETCHER
Major General STELTON
Brigadier REWITSCH
Brigadier THURBURN
Brigadier BUSTIN
Lt. Colonel FORRESTER
Brigadier General DASH
Brigadier LOY
Colonel POSTER
Colonel LAURET
Brigadier LUSH

Chief of Staff, AFHQ
C.O., AFHQ
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ
G-1, AFHQ
AD/AS (C), GHF CTF
GS (I), GHF CTF
G-2, AFHQ
G-3, AFHQ
G-4, AFHQ
G-5, AFHQ
G-6, AFHQ
G-7, AFHQ
G-8, AFHQ
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G-100, AFHQ

Secretaries

Lt. Colonel CURRIE
Captain B. BOCK
Deputy Secretary to SAC
Assistant Secretary to SAC

1. The following series of conferences were held in ROME on 6/7 Mar 46.

- Conference No. 1 - to consider on broad lines the implication of AFHQ paper P/326 (Final) - 'Command in ITALY after dismantling of GHF CTF' - and to provide a framework for the subsequent conferences.
- Conference No. 2 - to consider 'U.S. and SD (Manpower) questions dealing with transfer of administration of British Forces in CTF from GHF to AFHQ.
- Conference No. 3 - to examine the transfer of administration of British Forces in CTF (excluding Manpower, 'U.S.

0141

- Colonel MILLER
 - Brigadier MITCHELL
 - Colonel TUFF
 - Colonel NICHOLLS
 - Brigadier YATES
 - Colonel SMITH
 - Colonel OMA
 - Brigadier SHARP
 - Brigadier General HUBBARD
 - Brigadier P. JOHNS
 - Captain GUTHRIE, R.N.
 - Air Commodore HILTON
 - Major General STATION
 - Brigadier HENRIKSEN
 - Brigadier THURBER
 - Brigadier BASTIN
 - Lt. Colonel FORRESTER
 - Brigadier General D. SMITH
 - Brigadier LOW
 - Colonel POSTER
 - Colonel LAURIE
 - Brigadier LUSH
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Secretaries

- Lt. Colonel CUMPT
- Captain RIMCOCK
- Deputy Secretary to S.C
- Assistant Secretary to SAC

1. The following series of conferences were held in HONE on 6/7 Mar 46.

- Conference No.1 - to consider on broad lines the implication of UNRS paper P/326 (Final) - 'Command in ITALY after disbandment of GHQ CEF' - and to provide a framework for the subsequent conferences.
- Conference No.2 - to consider U.I, U.S. and SD (Manpower) questions dealing with transfer of administration of British Forces in CEF from GHQ to HF MIA.
- Conference No.3 - to consider the transfer of administration of British Forces in CEF (excluding Manpower, U.I. and 2nd Echelon questions).
- Conference No.4 - to consider the transfer of responsibility of G-5, AFHQ and the future relations between HQOT, 13 Corps and Allied Commission.
- Conference No.5 - to consider Intelligence matters appertaining to hand over of responsibilities from the present AFHQ.
- Conference No.6 - Coordinating conference to coordinate recommendations of these conferences which would be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference at the proposed meeting on 16 Mar 46.

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The Chief of Staff, AFHQ opened the series of conferences by stating that the recommendations of conferences one to five would be considered at the final conference No. 6. The recommendations put forward by these conferences would then be submitted to the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16 May 46 for discussion and approval.

2. The Chief of Staff opened Conference No. 6 by referring to the terms of reference of the War Office signal 97731 SP21 of 15 Feb 46 which stated that GCH CEF was to be disbanded by 1 Jun 46. After this it was proposed that a new Allied Headquarters, based on HQ 13 Corps and HQ ITOUSI, would take over.

The recommendations of Conferences Nos. 2 and 3, on GCH and GCH matters respectively, had recommended that GCH, GCH, and GCH Services responsibilities and some GCH responsibilities should pass to BTM or 13 Corps as the case might be, on 7 May 46, whilst operational command remained vested in the present AFHQ.

In the event of operations it would obviously be unsatisfactory to have GCH and GCH matters coming under BTM whilst operational control was still vested in the present AFHQ.

He considered, therefore, that operational and administrative responsibility must both pass at one and the same time. The Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ, the NLO, the HQ, BTM and 13 Corps were in complete agreement with this.

It was, therefore, recommended that the passing of operational control and of GCH and GCH matters should take place at one and the same time, and that this should take place on 7 May 46, or as soon after that date as the new AFHQ was fully ready to function.

The question of what would happen should operations arise during the next two months was not discussed as it was decided by the Chief of Staff to raise this, if necessary, at the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference proposed for 16 May 46.

3. Included in Conference No. 4 was a recommendation that a signal should be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff asking that the new Directive, which it was understood was being considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be delayed so as to enable them to consider the issue of this directive in the light of such recommendations as might be put forward after the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference had considered the matter on 16 May 46.

The Chief of Staff considered that the question of the Allied Comms would not have any great effect on the other recommendations being put forward except possibly on the question of the functions of the Political Advisers. This was agreed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and Brigadier General HANLEY, G-5, AFHQ.

4. The Chief of Staff stated that it had been recommended that a slight modification was necessary to the British chain of communication shown in

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5. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WTCUSA commented on Appendix 'C' of LTRC paper F/226 (Final) (Annexure III to this paper) and said that a small alteration to the chain of command was necessary in that 88 Division and RAC should be shown as under HQ WTCUSA, except for Operations and Intelligence, Internal Security and matters of a political or Allied nature for which they were under AFHQ as shown in Appendix 'A' of the above paper. (Annexure I to this paper).

6. Command was made by Conference No. 5, on Intelligence, that although the Allied Intelligence responsibility for intelligence was confined to ITALY, that of WTCUSA or 13 Corps might embrace different spheres of interest.

It was agreed that in order to ensure smooth working in an integrated section that it was desirable that the areas covered for Intelligence purposes by WTCUSA and 13 Corps should coincide.

7. The Chief of Staff then stated that a paper would be produced and tabled for consideration at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16 Mar 46 together with a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval embodying the recommendations which had been arrived at.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It was recommended that :

- (a) The appointment of Supreme Allied Commander be retained until ratification of the Peace Treaty with ITALY.
- (b) An Allied HQ should continue in existence until the Peace Treaty was ratified.
- (c) That the Allied Chain of Command be as shown in Annexure I.
- (d) That the Chain of Command for all US Military matters in ITALY after 1 Jun 46 be as shown in Annexure III.
- (e) The Chain of Command for all British Military matters in ITALY after 1 Jun 46 be as shown in Annexure II.
- (f) The Chain of Command for all matters (British) should be as shown in Annexure IV to this paper.
- (g) The Chain of Command in 'C' matters (British) should be as shown in Annexure V to this paper.

9. It was recommended that :

- (a) The name AFHQ be retained for this new Allied HQ.
- (b) This new Allied HQ be composed of appropriate elements of HQ WTCUSA and HQ 13 Corps.
- (c) A Naval Liaison Detachment be included.

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of MTOUSA or 13 Corps might witness different spheres of interest.

It was agreed that in order to ensure smooth working in an integrated section that it was desirable that the areas covered for intelligence purposes by MTOUSA and 13 Corps should coincide.

7. The Chief of Staff then stated that a paper would be prepared and tabled for consideration at the Supreme Allied Commanders Conference on 16 Mar 46 together with a draft circular to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval embodying the recommendations which had been arrived at.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It was recommended that :
 - (a) The appointment of Supreme Allied Commander be retained until ratification of the Peace Treaty with ITALY.
 - (b) An Allied HQ should continue in existence until the Peace Treaty was ratified.
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 - (d) That the Chain of Command for all US Military matters in ITALY after 1 Jun 46 be as shown in Annexure III.
 - (e) The Chain of Command for all British Military matters in ITALY after 1 Jun 46 be as shown in Annexure II.
 - (f) The Chain of Command for 'I' matters (British) should be as shown in Annexure IV to this paper.
 - (g) The Chain of Command in 'O' matters (British) should be as shown in Annexure V to this paper.

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9. It was recommended that :
 - (a) The name AFHQ be retained for this new Allied HQ.
 - (b) This new Allied HQ be composed of appropriate elements of MTOUSA and 13 Corps.
 - (c) A Naval Liaison Detachment be included.
 - (d) An Air HQ USAF ITALY be included.
 - (e) A British Political Advisor be included.
 - (f) A US Political Advisor be included.
10. It was recommended that the transfer of operational and administrative command from AFHQ in its present form should take place on 7 May 46 or as soon after that date as the new AFHQ was fully ready to function.

- (h) It was recommended that CCE would also be at C. STAFF and open at BTA on 2 May 46.

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TOP SECRET

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11. It was recommended that the location of this new HQ should be not further west than the area TUVISO - WESTER - FADU, subject to the two following provisos:

(a) That the location of this HQ should be the subject of further discussions between Commander, 13 Corps, and Commander General TUVISO.

(b) That the site decided upon for this new HQ should be such that it does not prejudice the provision of good communication between HQ to the Supreme Allied Commander and Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, AFMCM.

12. It was recommended that HQ should continue in existence after the disbandment of AFMCM in its present form.

13. It was recommended that a paper be produced by Allied Commission to be considered at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16 Mar 46 with a view to despatching a signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the future function of the suggested HQ in 1946 and the residual functions of the Allied Commission.

14. It was recommended that, in order to ensure smooth working in an Allied Intelligence section in the new HQ, it was desirable that the areas covered for Intelligence purposes by AFMCM and 13 Corps should coincide.

15. It was recommended that after further consideration had been given to these recommendations at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16 Mar 46 a telegram be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

AFHQ
11 March 1946

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STOCKPORT.

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12. It was recommended that the Supreme Allied Commander in existence after the disbandment of SHAF in 1946 should continue in its present form.

13. It was recommended that a staff be provided by Allied Commission to be considered at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16 Mar 46 with a view to developing a staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the future function of the suggested SHAF 2-5 in 1946 and the residual functions of the Allied Commission.

14. It was recommended that, in order to ensure smooth working in an Allied integrated intelligence section in the new HQ, it was desirable that the staffs covered for intelligence purposes by HQUS, and 13 Corps should coincide.

15. It was recommended that after further consideration had been given to these recommendations at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 16 Mar 46 a telegram be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

AFHQ
11 March 1946

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L. E. CULLEN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
STONEMAN.

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
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ANNEXURE I

ALLIED CHAIN OF COMMAND



* Operations, Intelligence, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.


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\$ Under command for all purposes.

ANNEXURE II

CH. OF CMD FOR ALL BRITISH MILITARY MATTERS IN ITALY

ATTN 1 JUN 46



* Under AFHQ for Operations, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.

ANNEXURE III

CH. OF CMD FOR ALL U.S. MILITARY MATTERS IN ITALY

ATTN 1 JUN 46

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* Operations, Intelligence, Internal Security and matters of a Political or Allied nature.


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\$ Under command for all purposes.

ANNEXURE II

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR ALL BRITISH MILITARY MATTERS IN ITALY

APR 1 JUN 46




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ANNEXURE III

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR ALL U.S. MILITARY MATTERS IN ITALY


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
* Note: Special arrangements to be made by 13 Corps.


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CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEXURE V

PROPOSED CHANNELS FOR Q ADM RETURN
BM - 13 CORPS - 8 DISTRICT





CONFIDENTIAL

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22

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