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ADMINISTRATION OF NE ITALY, POLICY
JAN. – MAY 1945

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Chief Commissioner

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54	Ltr Grafftey-Smith	13 May 45	CC	Bank of Italy report Slavs taking over banks in Trieste. ENCL: Ltr Einaudi, 12 May 45, to CS.
55	Memo, Stone	14 May 45	Spofford	Bank of Italy report Slavs taking over banks in Trieste.
56	Memo, Stone	14 May 45	Finance SD	Slavs taking over Trieste banks - AC cannot act w/out request fr Bonomi.
57	152/EC, Llewellyn	14 May 45	AFHQ	Sitrep on Treviso (dtd 7 May)
58	CC 1008, Quayle	14 May 45	AFHQ	Trieste papers clippings.
58a	Cbl AFHQ FX-75848	15 May 45	15,8,AC	AM Lire not for use in Ven.Giulia.
59	Memo, Quayle	16 May 45	Cittadini	Julian Action Committee;CC passed their ltr to SAC with favorable comment
59a	SAC (P)(45) 26	16 May 45		Pres-Propaganda policy in respect of relations with Jugoslavs (over Ven G).
60	Cbl Mil Govt(Austria) M.1015	17 May 45	AFHQ,AC,Ven Reg	Sitn Austria-Ital frontier provinces: sending refugees fr Austria into Italy.
60a	Cbl AC Fin, 7806	17 May 45	AFHQ	Bank of Italy report on Trieste.
61	Cbl AFHQ, FX-77553	18 May 45	AMG(A),AC	Unlikely can accept refugees from Austria in Italy
62	Cbl AFHQ FX-77867	18 May 45	15,AC	Partisan persecution of church and clergy in Venezia Giulia to be investig
63	Cbl AC FRB, 7934	18 May 45	AFHQ	Rome press comments on British-US notes to Tito.
63a	SAC (P) (45) 11th Mtg	18 May 45		Relations with Jugoslavs;press-propaganda policy;Morgan-Tito's conferences
64	AFHQ IMC FRB	19 May 45	Press	SACMED's message to Allied troops.
64a	Draft AFHQ	19 May 45		Draft SACMED message to Allied troops.
65	Cbl MEDUSA FX-78090	19 May 45	AC,12AF,Repl	SACMED's msg to Allied tps on Triest.
66	CC 1008, Stone	19 May 45	Spofford	Julian Committee(Trieste CLN)aide memoire on conditions in Venezia Giulia, dated 9 May 45.

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41	Cbl AMG 8 Army, M 942	7 May 45	15 AG, AC	Summary position VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE
41a	Cbl AC 7176 Ex Comm	7 May 45	8 Army	Monfalcone starving. Distribute food
42	Cbl AC ExC, 7138	7 May 45	AFHQ G5 POL-AD, RESMIN, 15AG, 8 Army	Prov Comsr reports personal observations in Gorizia Province.
42a	Cbl AC 7168 Ex Comm	7 May 45	AFHQ	Situation in Udine.
43	Cbl AC ExC, 7186	8 May 45	ditto	Who feeds VENEZIA GIULIA
44	Cbl AC 7205 Ex Comm	9 May 45	Benson 8 Army	We must have fuller sitreps
44a	3/758, Prunas	9 May 45	Stone	Trieste papers clippings fr de Gasperi
45	Cbl AFHQ FX 72841	9 May 45	AC	No Allied food for Venezia Giulia
45a	Giulian Action Committee	9 May 45	Stone(?)	Situation in Venezia Giulia; Slavs "persecuting" Ital population.
46	Cbl AC 7209 Stone	9 May 45	AFHQ SAC	Bonomi & De Gasperi protest affairs in Trieste. Fall of govt looms if Allies do not fulfill pledge to set up AMG in Venezia Giulia.
46a	SAC (P) (45) 10th Mtg	10 May 45		SAC's decisions on Ven.Giulia matter.
47	Cbl FJN/1 Scholtz	10 May 45	AC	Suggest no food for Trieste
47a	Memo, Talbot (fr Milan)	10 May 45	ExC	Sitrep on Trieste, Venice, Bolzano, etc.
48	Ltr 152/EC	10 May 45	G-5 AFHQ	Sitrep, Venice. Undamaged.
48a	Cbl AMG 8/A, M-973	10 May 45	AC, Ven Reg,	Sitrep, Tarvisio, Ven. G., Trieste, Gorizia.
49	Cbl AC 7300 Ex Comm	10 May 45	AFHQ	Sitrep: Venezia Giulia & Udine.
49a	Cbl AMG 8/A, M-984	11 May 45	AC, etc	Patriots in Udine area
50	Statement, Joseph Grew	11 May 45	Press	N/Secy of State, statement on US views on Trieste quarrel.
50a	Cbl AC ExC, 7389	11 May 45	AFHQ, 15 AG	Sitrep on Trieste and Gorizia.
50b	DO Ltr 850.081, Dunlop	11 May 45	Lush	Dunlop taking over fr Benson in 8/A.
51	Cbl AFHQ FX-74762	13 May 45	15 AG, AC, 8/A MACMIS	Policy on feeding Venezia Giulia and Udine Province.
52	Cbl AC ExC, Stone, 7503	13 May 45	AFHQ	Rome press plays up Grew's statement& Bonomi-de Gasperi appeal to Kirk & CC.
53	Cbl AFHQ, FX-74813	13 May 45	Cmda, AC	Policy for use ports Trieste & Venice
53a	SAC (P)(45) 25	13 May 45		Record of 3 Mtgs - Tito & Gen Morgan.

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26	SAC (P) (45) 24	24 Apr 45		Allied Mil Control in Venezia Giulia.
27	Cbl RESMIN, 732	27 Apr 45	FO London	Allied Mil Control in Venezia Giulia.
28	Cbl AFHQ, FX-68387	30 Apr 45	Clark & Stone	CCS order AMG in Venezia Giulia
29	4/42A/CA, Upjohn	30 Apr 45	Venezia Reg	CA Sec Plan for Occupation NE Italy.
29a	Cbl AC G-1B, 6615	1 May 45	AC	Parity of Br-US officers in Ven.Giulia
30	Cbl AMG 8 Army, M-885	2 May 45	AC,MMLA,etc	Instructions needed for Trieste.
30a	AFHQ 091.711/173 GCT-O	1 May 45	AMG 8 Army	Empl It tps outside Italy, policy.
31	Cbl AC ExC, 6662	3 May 45		CG 8 Army has copy instr on Ven Giulia
31a	SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting	3 May 45	AC,8A,15AC,5A	SAC directs occupation of Ven.Giulia.
31b	Cbl AFHQ FX-69803	3 May 45	AC,AMG 8 Army	Ven Reg personnel under comd 8 Army.
31c	Cbl Venezie Reg,C-33	3 May 45	AC 15 AG Armies	Parity of US-Br offrs in Ven.Giulia.
32	Cbl AFHQ, FX-69950			CC.RR may be used Ven.Giulia only in cases where It admin functioning....
32a	Cbl Rear 8/A, Q-5020	3 May 45	AFHQ etc	Siting board for Trieste.
33	Cbl AMG Main 8/A, M-911	4 May 45	15AG,AC,VenReg	Sitrep on Trieste,Gorizia,Monfalcone
33a	Cbl AMG 8 Army R/512	4 May 45	AFHQ,AC,15AG	Tonnages for Trieste.
34	Cbl AC ExC, 6899	4 May 45	AFHQ Spofford	Sitrep on Trieste,Gorizia,Monfalcone
34a	Cbl AFHQ, FX-70380	4 May 45	15 AG,AC	No steps to establish AMG east of Isonzo River until further direction.
34b	War Correspondents	4 May 45	US & UK	Dispatches by AP etc on TRIESTE
35	Tampo	4 May 45		Togliatti's statement on Trieste.
36	Ltr Lannin	5 May 45	Spofford	News article "Istria liberated by Allied Troops".
36a	Cbl M 925 AMG 8th Army	5 May 45	AC	Situation in Udine
37	152/EC, Quayle	6 May 45	Distr	Sitrep on Jugoslavs in Trieste,Gorizia and Monfalcone up to 2359, 5 May.
38	Cbl AC ExC, 7114	6 May 45	AFHQ G-5 POL-AD,RESMIN	Sitrep on Jugoslavs in Trieste,Gorizia,Monfalcone.
39	Cbl AC ExC, 7112	6 May 45	AFHQ G5 POL-AD, RESMIN	Should CC advice confidentially PM of conditions in Venezia Giulia?
40	Cbl AFHQ, F-71706	6 May 45	AC Stone	CC shd not discuss estab of AMG in Venezia Giulia with It Prime Minister.
40a	Cbl M 957 AMG 8 Army	7 May 45	AC	Archbishop of Gorizia Jailed

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14	SAC(P)(45) 11	28 Feb 45		Allied Military Control in Venezia Giulia. Note by DAGinC
15	SAC(P)(45)2nd Mtg	2 Mar 45		Extract: Par 5, Allied Militar y Control in Venezia Giulia.
16	Cbl AFHQ, NAF 872 FX-36545	2 Mar 45	CCS	AMG in Venezia Giulia;need for decision at govt'l level.
17	SAC(P)(45) 3rd Mtg	16 Mar 45		SAC conference studies draft directive to CG 15 Army Group submitted by AFHQ MJPS - (JPS P/267)
18	504/184/EC,Talbot	20 Mar 45	AFHQ	Proposed setting up of tripartite governmental auth in NE Italy. INCL: Memo, D/CLA, 12 Mar 45.
19	AG 323/061 GDS-O AFHQ	3 Apr 45	CG, 15 Army Gp CC, AC; COC's No. 1 & 2 Districts	Occupation of Northeast ITALY, administrative instructions corresponding ops directives.
20	Cbl 15 A/G,CAS-122	6 Apr 45	AC for CA Sec	Request you prepare "Stand-still Orders" for Refugees & Disper, and for Patriots.
21	AFHQ AG 323/061	9 Apr 45	CG 15 A/G,CC,etc	Amendment to Adm Instructions(19)
21a	SAC(P) (45) 21	9 Apr 45		Employment of It forces in occupation of Venezia Giulia.
21b	G/6,MAJA Browning	10 Apr 45	AFHQ via AC	Employment of It forces in occupation of Venezia Giulia.
22	SAC(P)(45) 7th Mtg	12 Apr 45		
23	DO Ltr RC Venezie	17 Apr 45	Stone	Trieste expedition.
24	Cbl AC Stone 5720	19 Apr 45	RC Venezie	Trieste expedition.
25	522/29/EC, Fiske	24 Apr 45	AFHQ G-5	Venezia Giulia - Questions & Answers - Draft establishment for integrated independent HQ.

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1	File Memo			All previous material & references to NE Italy to be found in CC files 1013 & 1014
2	Ltr Southern Reg R/1456 Dunlop	17 Jan 45	Hq AC COS	Planning for Venezia: location of Hq etc. Use of officers.
3	Memo 504/102/COS	18 Jan 45	A/Pres AC	Memo on North East Italy: policy of SACMED, political aspect, AMG
x-ref 4	Ltr G-3 AFHQ	30 Jan 45		Minutes of mtg re occupation of No. Italy: including NE ITALY
5	504/134/COS, Lush	5 Feb 45	DC, DCOSs, AMG, RC,	CAO AFHQ advances info on Ports, Railways, Inland Water Transport, Gasoline, Mil Adm HQ, in NE Italy.
6	AC/4134/L, Behrens	6 Feb 45	CC	Proposed setting up of tripartite governmental auth in NE Italy.
7	504/COS, Stone	12 Feb 45	COS AFHQ	Proposed setting up of tripartite governmental auth in NE Italy.
8	Draft (Not Sent)	19 Feb 45	?	SAC-Tito agreement on line of demarcation. Draft, not sent.
9	Memo			AMG Requirements in Ven. Giulia.
10	504/145/EC, Lush	19 Feb 45	CC	Study on Venezia Giulia supposing SAC-Tito estab boundary West of 1939 international boundary.
10a	SAC(P)(45) 1st Mtg	20 Feb 45		Extract: Para 5. SAC visit to Belgrade.
10b	AFHQ MJPS P/266	24 Feb 45		Allied MilControl in Venezia Giulia
11	Cbl AFHQ F-33726	26 Feb 45	AC	Comment pls on suggestion place civ govt Machinery of Tito in Ven. Giulia under AMG.
12	Cbl AC 2542	26 Feb 45	AFHQ	Comments on proposal to put Tito machinery in Ven. Giulia under AMG.
13	DRAFT Cbl AFHQ NAF_____	28 Feb 45	CCS	AMG in Venezia Giulia

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CC 1006

19 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Venezia Giulia.

TO : Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, U.S.A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

At their request, I received a delegation from the Trieste CLN on 17 May 1945. They left with me an Aide Memoire, a translation of which I am forwarding herewith for your information.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
Ellery W. Stone
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

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A N N E X I

The "Comitato di Azione Civiliano" has been informed by absolutely reliable sources that following the occupation of part of the Venezia Giulia by forces of Tito:

a) - In Trieste turbolent Jugoslav elements have entered the city together with Tito's troops, staging great demostrations pro Jugoslavia; the hoisting of the Italian flag has been forbidden; shots have been fired against the windows from which the Italian flag was flown; a ruthless persecution of Italians has begun with mass of arrests (with the aid of lists carefully prepared and without distinction between fascists and antifascists) and executions; even the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale is being actively searched for and has been compelled to seek refuge; the city is lacking of food and the population is terrorized.

b) - In Gorizia and surroundings the violences committed are even worse; arrests are on a tremendous scale (even among priests) and summary executions are countless; all men above 16in good physical shape (including the pupils of the ecclesiastical seminary) have been mass deported to Jugoslavia and forced to join Tito's Army; the terrified population escapes westward.

c) - Here has been the scene of mass murders and indescribable atrocities.

d) - From Istria and Fiume there is no information, but from

(66)

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that has trickled through the situation appears to be as serious if not worse.

a) - The unhappy Italian population of the region, after the many persecutions suffered under the nazi-fascists domination, is now undergoing the violences of the Jugoslavs; it is natural ly abandoned to itself because the Jugoslav partisans have set up control posts along the Isonzo river preventing any aid from Italy, while the anglo-american troops that have been hailed enthusiastically by the people, although benevolent towards the Italian collectivity, do not intervene in order to avoid political complications.

b) - The Italians of the Venezia Giulia are in the greatest despair and they implore immediate help from their Government.

On account of these grave facts the "Comitato di Salone Giuliano", formed exclusively by democratic antifascist individuals and representing the opinion of all refugees from the Venezia Giulia begs the Government to see that the following measures be taken without delay:

1) Extension of the anglo-american military occupation to the whole of the Venezia Giulia up to the italo-jugoslav boundary of 1939.

2) Maintenance of public order, and especially of the executive power, to be intrusted to the anglo-american authorities, eventually in collaboration with members of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale.

3) Official assurance to the Italian population of the Venezia Giulia (through radio, leaflets, etc.) that they will be protected from all arbitrary acts, and specific indication of military Commands and Authorities from which the population may obtain protection if necessary.

(6b)

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4) Dispatch on the spot of stern allied officials with precise instructions and assisted by reliable persons (eventually appointed by Italian Government) fully aware of places and the situation.

The Committee wishes to stress the fact that it is intol lerable that on the very day ending the bloody six years war which has half destroyed Europe and was waged to punish an aggressor, there should be committed under the eyes of the Allies themselves acts of force against a helpless people, and that a region claimed by two Nations should be allowed to be occupied militarily by one of these Nations alone, just like Danzig at the beginning of the war.

Furthermore the Committee points out that what is requested should come within the interest of the Slavs, as the longed for fraternal cohabitation and collaboration of the Italian and Slav people in the Venezia Giulia risks to be compromised again, digging an abyss between Italians and Slavs and jeopardizing the pacific relations between Italy and Jugoslavia and the European peace itself.

Finally the "Comitato di Azione Giuliano" deems it its duty to state that it intends not to abandon in any case its fellowmen who are pleading for help and that if it should not succeed in obtaining within a very short time, the requested measures, it will use all legal means at it disposal to point out to the Italian and world public opinion what is happening in the Venezia Giulia and to bring all help in its power to those populations.

Roma, 3/5/1947

(Ale)

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OP PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED MCNARNEY CITE NAAF
CG ALCOM, CG 12 AF, CG MEFL & TN CCRD

CONFIDENTIAL.

The following is a special message from the Supreme Allied Commander to all the Allied Armed Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre:

"The territory around THIESTE and GORIZIA and east of the ISONZO River is part of ITALY known as VENEZIA GIULIA. The territory around VILLACH and KLAGENFURT is part of AUSTRIA. The above Italian and Austrian territory is now claimed by Marshal TITO who wishes to incorporate it in JUGOSLAVIA. We have no objection to claims being put forward by Marshal TITO to this territory. His claims will be examined and finally settled with fairness and impartiality at the peace conference, in exactly the same manner as other disputed areas throughout Europe. Our policy, as has been publicly proclaimed, is that the territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various government concerned. It is, however, Marshal TITO's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of HITLER, MUSSOLINI and JAPAN. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems; this is one of the cardinal principles for which the peoples of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifices in an endeavour to obtain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which our representatives, with the approbation of world public

CONFIDENTIAL

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(FX 78090 cont'd)

opinion, are now at work at SAN FRANCISCO to build a system of world security. We can not now throw away the vital principles for which we have all fought. Under these principles it is our duty to hold these disputed territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the peace conference. Within these territories our duty and responsibility is to keep law and order by our military forces and to ensure a peaceful and secure life for their peoples through our Allied military government. We may be relied on to act impartially as we do not cover these territories ourselves. In this situation I tried my best to come to a friendly agreement with Marshal TITO, but did not succeed. The UNITED STATES and British Governments have therefore taken the matter up directly with Marshal TITO. The Soviet Government have been kept fully informed. We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal TITO is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement of this territorial claims, or whether he will attempt to establish them by force. It has always been my policy to keep you all, whatever your rank, fully informed about the general situation and the objects for which you have fought. I send you this message so that you may know the issues which are now at stake."

This message will be released to all troops under your command at 1200B hours 19 May.

DIST

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Ext Sec
GA Sec
Econ Sec
PR Br
File 2
Fleet

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DRAFT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A SPECIAL MESSAGE FROM THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO THE ALLIED ARMED FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

1. The territory around TRIESTE and GORIZIA and east of the Isonzo River are part of ITALY known as VENEZIA GIULIA. Up to the end of the last World War this area was part of the old Austrian-Hungarian Empire, but under the terms of the Peace Treaties which broke up the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, it was given to ITALY. The areas around VILLACH and KLAGENFURT are and always have been part of AUSTRIA.

See sketch map on reverse side.

2. The Italian and Austrian territory mentioned above is now claimed by Marshal TITO who wishes to incorporate it in JUGOSLAVIA. We have no objection to claims being put forward by Marshal TITO to this territory. His claims will be examined by the victor powers and finally settled with fairness and impartiality at the Peace Conference, in exactly the same manner as other disputed areas throughout EUROPE.

3. What we do object to is Marshal TITO's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation - methods all too reminiscent of Hitler and Japan and to prevent which we have been fighting this war. The policy of conquest and unilateral proclamation of sovereignty through military occupation has been definitely and solemnly repudiated by the Allied Governments participating in this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems; this is one of the cardinal principles for which the peoples of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifices in an endeavour to obtain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which our representatives, with the approbation of world public opinion, are now at work at San Francisco to build a

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4. Now that the Germans have laid down their arms, our duty is to march in and occupy these disputed lands, holding them as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the Peace Conference.

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5. Within these territories our duty and responsibility is to keep law and order by our military forces and to ensure a peaceful and secure life for their peoples through our Allied Military Government. We may be relied on to act impartially as we do not covet these areas ourselves.

6. In order that we can carry out our responsibilities, Marshal TITO's Jugoslav forces, both military and civilian, must either withdraw or Marshal TITO must place them under my command.

7. In this situation I have used every endeavour to come to an amicable agreement with Marshal TITO, but I have not so far succeeded. The United States and British Governments have therefore taken the matter up direct with Marshal TITO. The Russians have been kept fully informed. ~~and their support has been asked for.~~ We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal TITO is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement of his territorial claims, or whether he will attempt to establish them by force.

8. It has always been my policy to keep you all, whatever your rank, fully informed about the general situation and the objects for which you have fought. I am addressing you this message so that you may know the issues which are now at stake.

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6. In order that we can carry out our responsibilities, Marshal TITO's Jugoslav forces, both military and civilian, must either withdraw or Marshal TITO must place them under my command.

7. In this situation I have used every endeavour to come to an amicable agreement with Marshal TITO, but I have not so far succeeded. The United States and British Governments have therefore taken the matter up direct with Marshal TITO. The Russians have been kept fully informed. ~~and their support has been asked for.~~ We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal TITO is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement of his territorial claims, or whether he will attempt to establish them by force.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information News and Censorship Section
Public Relations Branch
APO 512, U.S. Army

RELEASE AT 1200B HOURS
SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1945

RELEASE AT 1200B HOURS
SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, Italy, May 19——Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, issued today the following special message to the Allied Armed Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations:

1. The territory around Trieste and Gorizia and east of the Isonzo River is part of Italy known as Venezia Giulia. The territory around Villach and Klagenfurt is part of Austria.

2. The above Italian and Austrian territory is now claimed by Marshal Tito who wishes to incorporate it in Jugoslavia. We have no objection to claims being put forward by Marshal Tito to this territory. His claims will be examined and finally settled with fairness and impartiality at the Peace Conference, in exactly the same manner as other disputed areas throughout Europe. Our policy, as has been publicly proclaimed, is that territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various governments concerned.

3. It is, however, Marshal Tito's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems; this is one of the cardinal principles for which the peoples of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifices in an endeavor to obtain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which our representatives, with the approbation of world public opinion, are now at work at San Francisco to build a system of world security. We cannot now throw away the vital principles for which we have all fought. Under these principles it is our duty to hold these disputed territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the Peace Conference.

4. Within these territories our duty and responsibility is to keep law and order by our military forces and to ensure a peaceful and secure life for their peoples through our Allied Military Government. We may be relied on to act impartially as we do not covet these territories ourselves.

5. In this situation I tried my best to come to a friendly agreement with Marshal Tito, but did not succeed. The United States and British Governments have therefore taken the matter up directly with Marshal Tito. The Soviet Government have been kept fully informed. We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal Tito is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement [illegible]

SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, Italy, May 19--Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, issued today the following special message to the Allied Armed Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations:

1. The territory around Trieste and Gorizia and east of the Isonzo River is part of Italy known as Venezia Giulia. The territory around Villach and Klagenfurt is part of Austria.

2. The above Italian and Austrian territory is now claimed by Marshal Tito who wishes to incorporate it in Jugoslavia. We have no objection to claims being put forward by Marshal Tito to this territory. His claims will be examined and finally settled with fairness and impartiality at the Peace Conference, in exactly the same manner as other disputed areas throughout Europe. Our policy, as has been publicly proclaimed, is that territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various governments concerned.

3. It is, however, Marshal Tito's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems; this is one of the cardinal principles for which the peoples of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifices in an endeavor to obtain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which our representatives, with the approbation of world public opinion, are now at work at San Francisco to build a system of world security. We cannot now throw away the vital principles for which we have all fought. Under these principles it is our duty to hold these disputed territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the Peace Conference.

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6. It has always been my policy to keep you all, whatever your rank, fully informed about the general situation and the objects for which you have fought. I send you this message so that you may know the issues which are now at stake.

(END)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information News and Censorship Section
Public Relations Branch
APO 512, U.S. Army

Release at 1200B Hours
Saturday, May 19, 1945

ON BEFORE BACKGROUND

As early as July 1944, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, then commanding the Allied Armies in Italy, invited Marshal Tito to his Headquarters at Lake Bolsena north of Rome. The talks were informal at that time and on a purely military basis. Field Marshal Alexander pointed out to Marshal Tito that their two forces would probably meet at a point somewhere along the coast at the head of the Adriatic Sea and that a line dividing occupational zones should be established to facilitate operations and administration.

In the discussion that followed it was mutually agreed for military reasons that this line should run roughly due north of Fiume with Marshal Tito's forces controlling the Port of Fiume and territory to the east of the line and Field Marshal Alexander's troops controlling Venezia Guilia.

More detailed discussions of the zones of occupation for the two forces after the defeat of Germany were held at meetings between Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito in February 1945, at Belgrade. The same general principles, outlined in the talks at Lake Bolsena, were again agreed to by Marshal Tito. He also agreed to an Allied Military Government for the Trieste area. Allied planning for the occupation of northeast Italy and Austria was based on Jugoslavia adhering to the commitments made by Marshal Tito at both these meetings.

At the Belgrade meeting Field Marshal Alexander informed Marshal Tito that, when forces under the Supreme Allied Commander occupied Austria, it would be necessary for him to control the lines of communication to and from Trieste as well as Trieste itself. The Field Marshal further pointed out that this might readily involve the control of all territory west of the 1939 frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia and certainly would involve the establishment of Allied Military Government in the areas in question. He emphasized to Marshal Tito that this would be done without prejudice to the final Peace Settlement.

Marshal Tito replied that he agreed and accepted the idea of an Allied Military Government, provided such civil administration as was already established would remain. At the same time he agreed that his civil authorities should be responsible to Allied Military Government.

Field Marshal Alexander reported the results of the conferences to the Allied Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Approximately two months later, the predicted juncture of the two forces had taken place and on May 3, 1945, Field Marshal Alexander congratulated Marshal Tito on his successes against the common enemy and informed him:

1. That New Zealand troops under General Freyberg entered Trieste on

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1. That New Zealand troops under General Freyberg entered Trieste on the afternoon of May 2, 1945, capturing some 7,000 Germans, who were part of the enemy garrison.

2. That due to the recent successes of both forces an overlap of operational areas had resulted, but that this overlap should not cause any serious difficulties in view of the agreements reached at the Lake Bolsena and Belgrade meetings.

3. That the Allied military interests in the compartment of Venezia Guilia remained exactly the same as had been outlined at the Belgrade meeting, namely, to use Trieste as the base for the large forces with which the Allies intended to proceed to Austria; that, as agreed, the Allies must have effective control of Trieste through Allied Military Government and the road and rail communications leading from and into Austria.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

To avoid any possibility of a misunderstanding over commitments agreed upon at Belgrade and at Lake Bolsena, Field Marshal Alexander sent Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan, Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters, to Belgrade on May 8, 1945, to meet Marshal Tito. General Morgan carried with him a written document outlining all the points previously agreed upon by Marshal Tito and Field Marshal Alexander. All of Marshal Tito's previous requests were incorporated and the purpose of the written agreement was merely to verify once more, briefly and concisely, all the terms of the two previous meetings.

The agreement provided:

1. That the Allies, under Field Marshal Alexander, were to control the Port of Trieste and the railways and roads from there to Austria via Gorizia and Tarvisio to maintain Allied forces in northeast Italy and in Austria, and were to control the portion of the compartment of Venezia Giulia required to safeguard this line of communication.

2. That all Naval, Military and Air Force units in the area were to be placed under Field Marshal Alexander's command.

3. That Field Marshal Alexander should govern this area using an Allied Military Government. Use would be made of any Jugoslav civil administration already set up and working satisfactorily.

4. That to facilitate and simplify the workings of the agreements in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, Marshal Tito would withdraw the Jugoslav regular forces now in this area.

5. That any irregular forces in this area would either hand in their arms to the Allied Military Government authorities and disband or would be withdrawn from the area.

6. That in order to establish safe shipping lanes in the North Adriatic and particularly the approaches to Trieste, the Port of Pola and the anchorages on the west coast of Istria between Pola and Trieste would be open to unrestricted use by Allied Naval Forces.

7. That this agreement was limited purely to military matters, and in no way would prejudice or affect long-term policy regarding the ultimate disposal of Venezia Guilia.

On reading the document Marshal Tito said that an understanding could not now be reached on the basis suggested and that recent events had changed the position.

Marshal Tito said that, owing to the changed situation, the problem was now a political one and not a military one. He considered that Jugoslavia had a right, as one of the Allies, to occupy those territories which it had conquered. He therefore did not intend to withdraw his forces from the area east of the Isonzo River which they now occupy and he insisted that his civil administration should remain in control there. He added that at the peace conference he would also claim territory west of the Isonzo.

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Although he offered to Field Marshal Alexander facilities in the Port of Trieste and on the road and rail line of communication leading from there into Austria, Marshal Tito insisted that this area must remain under Jugoslav control. The essence of his counter-proposal was that the territory should be occupied by Jugoslav troops and that Jugoslav administration would be established.

(64)

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General Morgan replied that he would submit a report of the meeting to Field Marshal Alexander, who in turn would have to consult with the Allied governments because of the new political aspects raised by Marshal Tito. He also told Marshal Tito that Field Marshal Alexander would be disappointed in the outcome of the meeting because he had expected, in view of the previous agreements, that matters would proceed differently.

When General Morgan returned to Allied Force Headquarters, he reported to Field Marshal Alexander that, because of Marshal Tito's attitude, further military conversations would avail nothing.

On receiving General Morgan's report, Field Marshal Alexander sent a message to Marshal Tito stating that since the latter's counter proposal raised a political issue the matter would have to be referred to the British and United States governments. Meanwhile, he informed Marshal Tito that he would continue to use the Port of Trieste and to maintain Allied forces in the northeast of Italy and in Austria. He further told Marshal Tito that he trusted he would take steps to assure that no regrettable incidents took place.

On May 11, 1945, Field Marshal Alexander informed Marshal Tito that he had been ordered by the British and American Governments to occupy and administer the Austrian provinces of Styria and Carinthia. He further stated that Allied troops had occupied Klagenfurt and Villach in Austria, where Allied Military Government had been established, and had made a junction with the Russians at Voitsberg, west of Graz.

In the same message Field Marshal Alexander requested Marshal Tito to forbid his troops to move over the Austrian Frontier and to withdraw those already across. This request has so far not been complied with.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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64

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356 SECTION 3.3/NND No. 785075

TOP SECRET

K 173

EXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting
18 May 1945

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

* * *

5. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER outlined developments in the Jugoslav situation in VENEZIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA which had taken place since the last meeting.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that he had been advised that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received Marshal Tito's reply to the note presented to him by the British Ambassador to BELGRADE. This reply merely re-stated the counter-proposals which Marshal Tito had given to the Chief of Staff at the recent BELGRADE conferences.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that since the whole matter was now being handled on a governmental level, no further action, other than to prepare for hostilities, could be taken pending the receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He reiterated, however, that Marshal Tito's counter-proposals were quite unacceptable to him.

MR. OFFIE reported that he had received information that the State Department had also received Marshal Tito's reply.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

6. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 26)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper outlining a proposed press and propaganda policy designed to acquaint our forces and the general public with the situation in regard to the Jugoslavs in VENEZIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA and further directed to influencing the Jugoslavs towards accepting our demands.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that when the possibility of hostili-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3(NND) No. 785015

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that when the possibility of hostilities with the Jugoslavs had first arisen, he had decided that it was most desirable, before hostilities should begin, to tell our forces why it might become necessary for them to fight. He was most anxious to avoid a repetition of events in GREECE last December, when hostilities had commenced without either the troops or the people at home having been informed of the true situation. This had been an unfortunate experience, as in the beginning neither the Press nor the public had supported the operations and in consequence the morale of the troops had been affected. It was essential that a similar situation did not arise in regard to JUGOSLAVIA. However, as our troops in VENEZIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA had been forced to stand by and watch Jugoslav forces carrying out all sorts of maltreatment, there were

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

already indications that, during the past ten days, the opinion of the troops had become more and more hostile toward the Jugoslave. Nevertheless he thought it wise to issue a special message to all United States and British forces in the Theatre informing them of the situation. He had, therefore, prepared a draft message which he placed before the Conference.

GENERAL McNARNEY agreed in principle to the issue of such a message. However he considered that certain detailed amendments were required. He also questioned the wisdom of issuing it until a formal reply had been received by the Governments from Marshal Tito.

GENERAL CLARK expressed the view that the message should be issued as soon as possible in order that the troops could be kept abreast of the situation. He considered that if it were delayed until a reply were received from Marshal Tito, it might then be too late properly to orient our soldiers. The message would, moreover, tend to allay the many rumours which were now prevalent in forward areas.

MR OFFIE pointed out, and Mr. Macmillan agreed, that as Marshal Tito had already replied to the United States and British notes, the issue of the Supreme Allied Commander's message in the immediate future would not be inopportune.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, referring to the paper on press and propaganda policy, considered that the entire matter should be handled with extreme care, so that any statements issued should not appear to be part of an organized propaganda campaign.

MR. HARNDS was of the opinion that it would be advantageous to give publicity by press and radio to suitable statements by responsible citizens in the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN, who were respected by the Jugoslavs. It would be unwise to institute a radio propaganda campaign locally, since only transmitters on Italian soil would be available and this would have an unfortunate effect on the Jugoslavs. Replying to a question by the British Resident Minister, he said that the statements, to which he had referred, could be obtained by requesting OWI and MOI to secure them.

BRIGADIER GENERAL McCHRISTAL considered that some misunderstanding existed and the separate functions of press publicity and propaganda activities were not wholly understood. The press campaign would be entirely factual but must begin from AFHQ by a message to the troops and a press release by the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter was necessary so that War Correspondents in ITALY could be told something of the facts of the case, so that they could help by intelligent reporting.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that a Committee consisting of the Chief of Staff (Chairman), the Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief PWB and Director PWB, with representatives of the British Resident Minister and U.S. Political Adviser should:

(a) Redraft for his approval his proposed message to troops

(b) Establish a press and propaganda policy in respect or relations with the Jugoslavs.

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* * *

10. CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25)

53a

THE CONFERENCE had before them records of the meetings held between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito in BELGRADE on the 8th and 9th of May 1945.

THE CONFERENCE:

63a

Took note of the above.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FOR ACTION AFHQ FOR G-5

7934 18 May 1945 ROUTINE

RESTRICTED FD

PARA ONE FD FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM ROME PRESS OF COMMENT ON BRITISH HYPHEN AMERICAN NOTES TO TITO FD

PAREN TO FOR ACTION AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACPTO PAREN

PARA TWO FD ALL PAPERS OF ONE FIVE MAY PAREN EXCEPT UNITA CHA COMMUNIST PAREN GIVE PROMINENT HEADLINES TO REPORT OF DELIVERY OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN NOTES TO TITO FD ALL STRESS ALLEGEDLY VIGOROUS TONE OF NOTES CLN AVANTI PAREN SOCIALIST PAREN REFERS TO QUOTE EXTREMELY ENERGETIC LANGUAGE UNQUOTE SAGLN GIORNALE DEL MATTINO PAREN GOVERNMENT PAREN SAYS NOTE QUOTE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ULTIMATUM UNQUOTE SAGLN IL MOMENTO PAREN INDEPENDENT PAREN SPEAKS OF A QUOTE CATEGORICAL REQUEST UNQUOTE SAGLN TEMPO PAREN INDEPENDENT RIGHT PAREN DESCRIBES STEP AS QUOTE ALMOST AN ULTIMATUM UNQUOTE SAGLN ETC FD

PARA THREE FD EDITORIAL COMMENT HIGHLY APPROVING CLN QUOTE SHOWS ANGLO HYPHEN AMERICANS WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY SOLUTION BROUGHT ABOUT BY VIOLENCE UNQUOTE PAREN ITALIA NUOVA CHA DEMOCRAT PAREN SAGLN

(63)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

QUOTE IS EVIDENCE OF DAWN OF NEW JUSTICE IN INTERCOURSE AMONG NATIONS UNQUOTE PAREN INDEPENDENT OMA GOVERNMENT PAREN

PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
478197

NICHOLAS PICCIANO
CWO, U.S.A.
ASS'T ADJUTANT

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

FX 77867
MAY 1809278

E/1321
MAY 1818408
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHQEC

15 ARMY GROUP INFO AICOM ROME

CONFIDENTIAL

Advice received here through U. S. Embassy ROME that Monsignor GIUSEPPE NOGARA, Archbishop of UDINE, has reported to Holy See alleged persecution by Partisans in his area of church and clergy. Archbishop observes that Archbishop of GORIZIA was arrested and that enlistment has already started of men in 1896-1927 classes and since no exceptions are being made, will include priests and seminarists. While Archbishop of GORIZIA is now in ROME, desired to know whether he was in fact arrested by Partisans and circumstances thereof. Also request you investigate other allegations of Archbishop of UDINE regarding mistreatment generally of church and clergy.

Dist

Action - Exec Comm 2
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
File

(62)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C. COMMISSIONER MAY 18 RECD
CC #727

TOP SECRET

Copy No 4

FX 77553
MAY 181246B

R/1269
MAY 181540B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FWD MB

ACTION MILITARY GOV STAFF AUSTRIA INFO MAIN 8TH ARMY: ALCOMS ROME

(60)

TOP SECRET.

Rmur M 1015 of 17 May 45.

Appreciate gravity of position and grateful for information but consider unlikely can accept further refugees ITALY. Food can be made available when transportation possible. Phased requirements should be bid 1 8th Army and by latter on AFHQ copy ALCOM from whose stocks food will be borrowed.

DIST

Copy No 1 INFO-ACTION: Disptr & Rep S/C
" " 2 " " Food S/C
" " 3 INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
4 Executive Commissioner
5 CA Sec
6 Econ Sec
7 File
8
9 INF-ACT TN S/C
10 " WMD2PON S/C
11 INF POLAD (A)
12 " POLAD (B)

(1 2 2 01/ FF) 8/CC

TOP SECRET

(61)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

7806 17 May 1945 PRIORITY

SECRET FD

PARA ONE PD FOLLOWING INFORMATION REGARDING TRIESTE RECEIVED BY GOVERNOR BANCA DITALIA FROM VERY RELIABLE SOURCE PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACFIN PAREN

PARA TWO PD THE YUGOSLAV ARMY HAS ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE CITY SEMICOLON UP TO NOW THE BRITISH COMMAND HAS NOT INTERESTED ITSELF IN THE SITUATION WHICH IS CHAOTIC PD BANKS ARE OCCUPIED SEMICOLON COMMISSIONERS OF THE BANQUE NATIONALE DU ROYAUME DE YUGOSLAVIE ARE INSTALLED IN THE BANK OF ISSUE WHERE THEY INTEND GRADUALLY TO SUBSTITUTE THEMSELVES PD

Finance Sub-Commission
478604

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO,
CWO, USA,
Asst Adjutant

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 16 REC'D CC 1200

COPY TOP SECRET

FROM MAIN 8 ARMY FROM MIL GOVT STAFF (AUSTRIA) 16 NIL

TO FREEDOM FOR G-5 SECTION (FOR ACTION)

HQ ALCOM FOR ACEXC. PADOA FOR VENEZIA REGION AMG FOR REG COMM (FOR INFORMATION)

Ref. No. M.1015. TOPSEC.

FIRST. PRESENT AND FUTURE MAINTENANCE COMMITMENTS WILL PROBABLY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE ARMY UNDERTAKE ANY FURTHER CIVILIAN SUPPLIES FOR PROVINCES IN N.E. ITALY. THIS PARTICULARLY REFERS TO UDINE PROVINCE. IT FOLLOWS THEREFORE ANY REQUIREMENTS FOR VENEZIA REGION WILL HAVE TO BE HAULED BY LOCAL TRANSPORT AND ANY TRANSPORT THAT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE BY ALLIED COMMISSION ROME.

SECOND. AUSTRIAN FLOUR SITUATION REGARDING AVAILABILITIES IN PRESENT BRITISH OCCUPIED ZONE IS ALREADY SERIOUS. MY SITREP OF 14 MAY REFERS REPORTS FROM MY LIAISON OFFICER WHO HAS CONTACTED AMERICAN FORCES ARE THAT SUPPLY POSITION THEIR AREA NO BETTER IF NOT WORSE. HAVE NO EXACT INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN ARMY BUT CANNOT COUNT ON ANY ALLEVIATION FROM THAT QUARTER. RATIONS AUSTRIA IS BEING CUT MINIMUM TO SUPPORT EXISTENCE. IMPONDERABLES ARE REMOVAL OF EXISTING FOOD BY JUGOSLAVS IN COUNTRYSIDE OVER WHICH IMPOSSIBLE AT PRESENT KEEP CONTROL AND INFLUX REFUGEES.

THIRDLY. PRESENT POSITION REFUGEES AS FAR AS CAN BE ASCERTAINED AS FOLLOWS. MIXED NATIONALITIES UP TO 25000
ANTI TITO SLOVENES 65000 TOTAL 90000. PROBABILITY COMINGIN FURTHER ANTI TITO SLOVENES 40000. POSSIBILITY ARRIVAL CROATS CIVILIANS 200000. WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FEED THESE NUMBERS IN AUSTRIA THEREFORE MAY BE FORCED EVACUATE TO ITALY WHERE FOOD AVAILABLE OR CAN BE BROUGHT IN. ALTERNATIVE FORCE BACK OR HAND OVER TO JUGOSLAVIA ANTI TITO SLOVENES WHOSE STANDING IS UN CLEAR. MY SITREP OF 14 MAY REFERS SUMMARY. ITALY THEREFORE MAY BE FACED TAKING 130000 REFUGEES WITH POSSIBILITY 200000 ADDITIONAL

IMMEDIATE

EC DISTRIBUTION - 18 May 45

A/President
Chief Commissioner
Econ Sec
C.A. Sec
Tn. S/C
Food S/C
D.P.& R.S/C
WMD & IPW S/C
Pol Adv (A)
" " (B)
File 4815/EC
File 2216/EC

See (A)

(D)

CC 1200

TOP SECRET

MAY 17 RECD

K 169

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 26
16 May 1945.

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff.

OBJECT

1. The objects of our publicity in regard to the Jugoslav situation would be:

to

a. Press campaign/be directed to condition and prepare Allied troops in the theater and the public at home for the possible use of arms against Marshal TITO's forces in Northeast ITALY and Southern AUSTRIA.

b. Propaganda campaign to be directed towards influencing Jugoslavs so as to reduce their capacity and will to resist.

c. Both press and propaganda would be handled so that Jugoslavs are not put in a situation in which, for reasons of honor, they are bound to resist our forces, but rather so as to build up a psychological atmosphere in which the Allied demands may be agreed without it being necessary to employ force.

TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT

2. The main arguments which would be adduced to justify the use of force if necessary are:

a. Marshal TITO has shown that he has no intention of permitting a peaceful solution of the territorial problems in Northeast ITALY and Southern AUSTRIA at the peace conference. He appears determined that his forces should remain, no matter what the legal position is, in areas occupied by them in the course of battle against the Germans. He is also taking every step to infiltrate his forces into areas already occupied by Anglo-American troops, evidently with a view of seizing these areas also.

b. The arguments which Marshal TITO put forward to justify his seizing of the disputed areas are entirely similar to those given by JAPAN prior to the invasion of MANCHURIA, by MUSSOLINI before the invasion of ABYSSINIA and by HITLER in regard to the SUDETEN LAND. TITO is therefore putting himself in the position of being the first post-war aggressor. The Allies

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JUGOSLAVS

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff.

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c. Marshal TITO by his occupation of GORIZIA and TRIESTE and other areas has broken his word to the Supreme Allied Commander. At Lake BOLSENA last July, Marshal TITO agreed that when their two armies met on the head of the ADRIATIC, the territory west of a north-south line drawn through FIUME

(59a)

-1-

See (63)a, para 6

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

would come under Anglo-American control. When the two met again in BELGRADE in February, Marshal TITO offered that the Supreme Allied Commander should have full control of the port of TRIESTE and the communications running from it into AUSTRIA and said that any Jugoslav forces remaining in this area would be placed under Field Marshal ALEXANDER's command. In fact the two armies met in TRIESTE and GORIZIA, and the surrender of TRIESTE was taken by Allied troops, but Marshal TITO has not kept his word and is not willing for the Supreme Allied Commander to control this area.

d. The Supreme Allied Commander has honored his undertakings to Marshal TITO to the full. He has provided enormous help for Jugoslav forces while they were operating against the Germans, not only in the provision of supplies but also by naval and air support.

METHODS OF PUBLICITY

3. Press publicity would be given as follows:

a. The campaign would be started off with a press release by the Supreme Allied Commander. This statement would be a factual review of the case against Marshal TITO as set out above.

b. President Truman and Prime Minister would be requested to issue statements backing up the Supreme Allied Commander.

c. The statements made in accordance with the above, subsequent more detailed statements from Allied Force Headquarters, and favorable material appearing in the press and radio in the UNITED KINGDOM and UNITED STATES, would be hammered home continuously by using every available medium of dissemination of information.

4. The method of providing propaganda support would be as follows:

a. PWB would provide normal support for 15th Army Group in the operational area.

b. PWB would submit draft directives covering its activities for approval by the various agencies at Allied Force Headquarters in the normal way.

c. PWB activities would be carried out with a view to retaining the local character of the conflict and avoidance of a general war with JUGOSLAVIA. Leaflet dropping to districts outside the combat areas would not be undertaken without special authorization from Allied Force Headquarters. Radio propaganda would, however, be directed to all points in JUGOSLAVIA.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

a. To approve the general lines of the press and propaganda campaign as

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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RECOMMENDATIONS

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

a. To approve the general lines of the press and propaganda campaign as set out above.

b. To lay down a time at which this campaign shall commence.

(init) L. L. L.

59a

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
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Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, FWB	34
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	35-37
Chief, ENC	38
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EC List - 17 May 45

35 - Chief Comm R

36 - Exec Comm R

37 - Pol Advisers

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Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief,	8
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	9
Chief of Staff	10-11
Chief Administrative Officer	12
Deputy Chief of Staff	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	15-16
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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	42-44
Spares	

EC DIST - 17 MAY 45

35 - CHIEF COMM R

36 - EXEC COMM R

37 - POL ADVISERS

(59a)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

16 May 1945

456

Baroness Ditthalvi-Cone

Subject: Julian Committee

Would you please tell the Julian Committee that the Admiral has passed on their letter to Field-Marshal Alexander with favorable comments and that, therefore, unless it is really important, he would prefer not to see them at present, as he is extremely busy. If, however, they really press for an interview, then we will arrange one for 1000 on Friday.

Will you let me know later?

s/J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

JAQ/ED

cc: EC
CC

cc/ecl

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

VERY-URGENT

Rome, 11 May, 1945

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

GABINETTO

Ufficio di Collegamento
con la C.A.

M E M O R A N D U M

To : The Office of the Chief Commissioner.

Subject : Comitato Giuliano.

The "Comitato Giuliano" an association of persons originating from the Venezia Giulia, have applied to the Minister for Foreign Affairs' requesting him to obtain for them an audience by Admiral Stone.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me to put up the request and warmly recommends the granting of the said audience.

Cittadini.

(marchese Cittadini Cesi)

59 Appl

This committee has been received by American, Russian + British ambassadors. (Count Cittadini)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FX 75848
MAY 151458B

E/870
MAY 152025B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED MACMED CITE FHCSG
ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP INFO MAIN 8 ARMY, REAR 8 ARMY FOR STAFF
PAYMASTER, AICOM ROME

SECRET

Allied Military lire should not be used in TRIESTE or other parts of VENEZIA GIULIA until such time as proclamations can be posted making them legal tender. Pending further instructions Metropolitan lire only be used for all purposes in that area including pay of personnel. Such lire available at TCN Area cash office ANCONA.

Dist

Info-Action - Finance SC
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm 2
Est Sec
Econ Sec
File

108/001

68a

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JAQ/dfe

CC 1008 14 May 1945

Subject: Newspaper cuttings from Trieste

To: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

44a

The attached letter No. 3/758 dated 9 May and its enclosed newspaper cuttings have been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are now forwarded to you for your information.

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ J. A. Quayle
J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

Encl: Ltr 3/758, 9 May 45, from Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with 3 inclosures.

Exec Comm.

58

c/s/20.1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Tel: 47821

Ref: 182/30.

14 May 1945.

SUBJECT: AMG Eighth Army Sitrep.

TO : G-5, AFHQ.

The following sitrep on TREVISO has been received from HQMG AMG Eighth Army dated 7 May:

"1. I visited TREVISO on my way back from VENEZIA GIULIA. There are no serious problems there and the town is not badly damaged excepting on the outskirts.

2. The patriot position is well under control and considerable quantities of arms have already been returned. Two parades have already been held and further parades throughout the province are being arranged, to try and get in more arms, of which there are still a lot openly being carried about. It is very probable that some of the UDINE patriots who are not disarmed, are drifting back into TREVISO Province.

3. Bank of Italy has 44,000,000 lire in cash. Railway line from TREVISO to VENICE is completely undamaged and trains could run."

For the Chief Commissioner:

R. Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

57

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(SECRET

SECRET

14 May 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier A. P. Grafftey-Smith,
Joint Director, Finance Sub-Commission.

(54)

With reference to your memorandum of yesterday regarding Signor Governor Luigi Einaudi's letter on Trieste, he should be informed that the Commission will not be able to take action unless a request is received from the office of the President of the Council.

Governor Einaudi may be informed, however, that I have brought the substance of his letter to the attention of SACMED's headquarters.

(55)

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: Exec. Comm'r.

(56)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

14 May 1945.

TO : Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, U.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,
Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512.

(54) INCL

There is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter from

H.E. LUIGI EINAUDI, Governor of the Banca d'Italia.

The Governor has been informed that the Commission will not take action on his letter but will await a communication from the office of the President of the Council.

However, the attached letter is forwarded to you in the nature of an intelligence report on conditions in Trieste.

(56)

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: Exec. Comm'r.

SECRET

Incl - Letter 12 May 45
from Governor of the Bank
of Italy to Brig G-5

(55)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 14 RECD
CC 0900

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION.

13 May 1945.

TO: The Chief Commissioner.

I attach a translation of a letter addressed to me by the Governor of the Banca d'Italia. You will see that he wishes that you should be informed of its contents.

With your approval I propose to reply that the contents of the letter are noted; and that it would be highly undesirable to send an Italian representative to Trieste at this time.

There is no doubt that the Italians will derive considerable comfort from the statement of Under-Secretary Grew.

A.P. Grabham Smith

Brigadier,
Joint Director,
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION.

Sec 57

cc: EXEC. COMMR.

54

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 14 RECD
CC 0900

SECRET & URGENT

TRANSLATION.

Bank of Italy,
The Governor.

Rome, 12 May 1945.

Dear Brigadier Grafftey-Smith,

I hasten to inform you of a communication which has just been received from a very reliable source in Trieste and which is regarded as exceptionally important:

"The Yugoslav Army has assumed command of the city; up to now the British Command has not interested itself in the situation which is chaotic. Banks are occupied; Commissioners of the Banque Nationale du Royaume de Yugoslavie are installed in the Bank of Issue where they intend gradually to substitute themselves. The presence of an Italian representative with powers to safeguard banking interests is urgent".

I have informed the Italian Government of the above-information and I would be grateful if you will pass on the information to Admiral Stone, keeping me informed of what will be done.

I beg you to accept my regards,

(Sgd) LUIGI EINAUDI.

604

TO: Brig. A.P. Grafftey-Smith,
Joint Director,
Finance Sub-Commission. A.C.

AC will ~~quote~~ await reply

(54)

cc: Exec. Comm.

INU

TOP SECRET

MAY 17 [illegible]
ec/1.5 C C

XL65

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

MAY 15 RECD

SAC (P) (45) 25
13 May 1945

TOP SECRET
COPY NO 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS

Note by Secretary

Records of the meetings held recently in BELGRADE between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito are circulated herewith for information.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

See 63
Para 10

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
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Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	7
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21

EC List
15 MAY 45

35 Chief Cmnr
36 Ex Cmnr
37 Pol Advrs

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

MAY 17 [illegible]
ec/, J c c

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

MLGS

MAY 15 RECD

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 35

S/S (P) (45) 25
13 May 1945

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(POLITICAL)

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15 May 45

35 Chief Cmnr
36 Ex Cmnr
37 Pol Advrs

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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See 63 Para 10

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U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, PWB	34
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	35-37
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	38-40
Spares	41-43

EC List 15 May 45

35 Chief Comm R

36 Ex Comm R

37 Pol Advrs

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

KLC5 ANNEXURE I

RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO
IN BELGRADE AT 1700 HOURS ON TUESDAY 8TH MAY 1945

PRESENT:-

JUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Jugoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic,
Chief of Staff

Lieut-General Arsic,
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Manola,
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petricki,
Liaison Staff

Captain Brkic,
Liaison Staff

A.F.H.Q.

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme
Allied Commander

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief Administra-
tive Officer

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,
Commander, 37 Military
Mission

Lieut-Colonel F.. Lindsay,
Commander, US Military
Mission in Belgrade

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN introduced himself and conveyed greetings to Marshal Tito on behalf of Field Marshal Alexander. He then handed Marshal Tito a draft agreement containing Field Marshal Alexander's proposals in regard to arrangements in VENEZIA GIULIA as attached at Appendix 'A'.

MARSHAL TITO after examining this document said that an understanding could not be reached on the basis suggested. That solution might have been applicable previously, but recent events had changed the position. As the war was over the problem was now a political and not a military one. Jugoslavs had a right to those sections of their country which were formerly under Italian rule and which they had freed. These territories were Jugoslav and he believed that they would be obtained by JUGOSLAVIA at the Peace Conference. Under Field Marshal Alexander's proposal, he would be required to withdraw his troops. He believed that it would be possible to find a better solution for these matters. Ethnologically and geographically the territories belonged to JUGOSLAVIA. He had no controversy with the Allies, but he did have with ITALY. He considered the whole matter was not a military but a political one. He agreed that the Allies should use the port of TRIESTE and the communications. A joint commission could be set up to coordinate matters

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Marshal of Jugoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic,
Chief of Staff

Lieut-General Arsic,
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Mancia,
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petricki,
Liaison Staff

Captain Brkic,
Liaison Staff

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief Administrative Officer

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,
Commander, 37 Military Mission

Lieut-Colonel F.A. Lindsay,
Commander, US Military Mission in Belgrade

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he could not discuss the matter from a political standpoint. From a military aspect, however, the British and American forces had found from experience that as long as one commander did not have full control in an area, it was not possible to operate efficiently. For example, in FRANCE certain cities were directly under British and others under American control. Similarly in ITALY, ANCONA was under British control and other ports under American control. A similar position existed even in ENGLAND where certain areas were under complete American control. For corres/ponding

53a
II

TOP SECRET

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military reasons, the Supreme Allied Commander seeked to be the controlling authority in the area of his communications in VENEZIA GIULIA. The final status of the whole province would, undoubtedly, be decided by the Peace Treaty.

MARSHAL TITO repeated that he could not approve the agreement in the form proposed. He could not see why the Allies would not agree to the idea of a joint command. This had worked very well on VIS. The Jugoslav authorities would give full assistance to the Allies and he guaranteed that everything would be in order in the presence of the Jugoslav troops.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that neither he nor Field Marshal Alexander were authorised to do anything other than claim the area stated. The Allies required complete control of TRIESTE.

MARSHAL TITO was willing to offer complete control of the communications and the Port, but that was the most that he could concede. He was sorry to see a disagreement arising between Field Marshal Alexander and himself, but just as Field Marshal Alexander was not in a position to go any further, so he (Marshal Tito) had a duty to the interests of his country. He indicated that a line, considerably to the west of that proposed by Field Marshal Alexander, would be recognised at the Peace Conference as the boundary of SLOVENIA. Ethnologically all this territory belonged to SLOVENIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that he was restricted to considering the matter from a military standpoint. He asked if Marshal Tito realised the privileges which JUGOSLAVIA would obtain if the port of TRIESTE was opened by the Allies. They could not, however, open the port until they had full control. He also asked Marshal Tito to explain more fully what he had in mind in saying that the Allies could have full use of the port of TRIESTE.

MARSHAL TITO said that he meant use of the coast, the port itself, ships, the warehouses at the port, and all that is necessary for war materials for supplying the army and all defences of the port or harbour. The harbour included the city, buildings in the city and other things. A Jugoslav command would also be operative in the area and a joint command could be set up, under which the Jugoslav civil authority would produce the necessary civil labour to assist the Allies in handling large tonnages through the port.

The essence of the arrangement which he suggested was that the territory would be occupied by Jugoslav troops. The Jugoslav government had sent a note a month ago to the USSR, American and English governments asking that a part of AUSTRIA be turned over for occupation by Jugoslavs. No answer had as yet been received from ENGLAND and AMERICA, though the consent of the U.S.S.R. had been obtained. In regard to VENEZIA GIULIA the Jugoslavs themselves had liberated this area and accordingly under military law they could rightfully occupy it, even if it had not yet been legally given to them by the Peace Conference. The area had been con-

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In reply to questions by Lieutenant General Morgan, he said that he would be agreeable to Allied troops being stationed at any important points necessary to safeguard their communications. The Allies were also at liberty to bring in service troops. However, the Jugoslavs would require freedom of movement, and the Allied troops could not restrict this. All matters of controversy between the two forces would be settled by the Joint Coordinating Commission. For the present, Italian metropolitan lire would be the currency in the area. The civil administration would be through National Liberation Committees and

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TRIESTE would be an autonomous city within Federal SLOVENIA. Allied soldiers would, however, be subject to their own military courts.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he must submit his report on their meeting to Field Marshal Alexander, who would in turn have to consult with the United States and British governments. Field Marshal Alexander would be disappointed because he had expected that matters would proceed differently, as the Allies had reduced their demands to the minimum.

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APPENDIX 'A'
to
ANNEXURE I

DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN ON BEHALF OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER TO MARSHAL TITO IN BELGRADE AT 1800 HOURS, TUESDAY, 8th MAY 1945.

1. As it is agreed, Field Marshal ALEXANDER requires the port of TRIESTE and the railways and roads from there to AUSTRIA via GORIZIA and TARVISIO to maintain his forces in NE ITALY and in AUSTRIA, the portion of the compartment VENEZIA GIULIA West of the line on the attached map will be under his Command.

2. All Naval, Military and Air force West of the line on the attached map will be placed under his Command from the moment at which this comes into force.

3. Field Marshal ALEXANDER will govern this area using an Allied Military Government. Use will be made of any Jugoslav civil administration which is already set up and working satisfactorily.

4. To facilitate and simplify the working of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, Marshal TITO will withdraw the Jugoslav regular forces now in the portion of VENEZIA GIULIA by a double line on the attached map 11 May 1945.

5. Any irregular forces in this area will either hand in their arms to the Allied military authorities and disband, or will be withdrawn from the area.

6. In order establish safe shipping lanes in the North ADRIATIC and particularly the approaches to TRIESTE, the port of POLA and the anchorages on the West Coast of ISTRIA between POLA and TRIESTE will be open to unrestricted use by Allied Naval forces.

7. This agreement is purely military, and in NO way prejudices or affects long term policy regarding the ultimate disposal of the compartment VENEZIA GIULIA.

Declassified/Released under the provisions of E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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XI

ANNEXURE II

RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO
IN BELGRADE AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 9TH MAY 1945

PRESENT :-

JUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Jugoslavia
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic,
Chief of Staff

Lieut-General Arsic,
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Mancla,
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petricki,
Liaison Staff

Captain Brkic,
Liaison Staff

A.F.H.Q.

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme
Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
DSMC, G-4 (British)

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief Administrative
Officer

Captain M.B. Laing,
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

Colonel D.S. Jackling,
G-5 Section

Lieut-Colonel L.M. Cooper,
AQMG Mov & Tn (Br)

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,
Commander, 37 Military Mission

Lieut-Colonel F.A. Lindsay,
Head of U.S. Military Mission
in Belgrade

A draft summary of the proposals put forward by Marshal Tito at the first meeting had been prepared by the AFHQ delegation and translated into Croat. This paper was handed to Marshal Tito.

MARSHAL TITO asked whether the minutes of the previous meeting which had been prepared by his staff, and which contained all his views, had yet been read by General Morgan.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN pointed out that these minutes had not yet been translated into English. He asked Marshal Tito to say where he disagreed with the draft paper so that it could be altered to represent an accurate statement of his proposals.

JUGOSLAVIA

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Major General Djuric,
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Liaison Staff

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme
Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
DCMG, G-A (British)

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN pointed out that these minutes had not yet been translated into English. He asked Marshal Tito to say where he disagreed with the draft paper so that it could be altered to represent an accurate statement of his proposals.

MARSHAL TITO said that the territory was Slovene and his forces had liberated it. On account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause, he considered that his forces had a right as an Allied Army to occupy this territory. He therefore requested that the draft be amended accordingly. He also considered the Commission referred to should be called a Joint Military Commission as it would coordinate with the Jugoslav military as well as civil authorities. He had no other comments to make.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN asked exactly what was meant by "full and unrestricted" use of the port of TRIESTE.

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MARSHAL TITO replied that the Allies could operate the port as they chose. He would agree to it being placed under control of an Allied Naval officer who would be responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would be assisted by a port committee on which there would be Jugoslav representation. He also agreed that use of the harbour at POLA and the anchorages between POLA and TRIESTE could be granted to the Allies. He further stated the Allies could have full use of the railways between TRIESTE and GORIZIA. The right to operate, maintain and repair the underground cable from ROME to VIENNA would also be granted.

Replying to a question about the use of airfields, he said there was no airfield at TRIESTE but there was one at GORIZIA. This should be used jointly by Jugoslav and Allied air forces and should be under their joint control.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he was now clear as to the Marshal's views and all that remained for him was to return and report accordingly to the Supreme Allied Commander.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NSC No. 78-015

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K155 ANNEXURE III

RECORD OF THE THIRD MEETING BETWEEN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO
IN BELGRADE AT 2300 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 9th MAY 1945

PRESENT:-

JUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Jugoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito

Major-General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet

A.F.H.Q.

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Brig-General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief Administrative
Officer

The Paper setting out the draft proposals made by Marshal TITO, which had been handed to him at the 2nd Meeting, had been revised in the light of his remarks at that meeting and had been re-submitted to him at 2030 hours. As a result, Marshal TITO had requested this third and final meeting with Lieutenant General MORGAN.

MARSHAL TITO requested that the word "unrestricted", which appeared in the draft in relation to the use of the ports of TRIESTE and POLA, should be deleted and the word "full" inserted. He said that his reason was that "unrestricted" had a more far-reaching meaning in the Jugoslav language. In all other respects, he accepted the draft as fairly representing his views.

This summary of Marshal Tito's views, as so accepted by him, is attached as Appendix 'A' to these Minutes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he wished to make it clear to Marshal Tito that his failure to accept the proposals, presented to him on the previous day on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, was a great disappointment to the latter. As a result, the matter was now out of the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander who would have to refer it to the authorities in WASHINGTON and LONDON.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reminded Marshal Tito that the Supreme Allied Commander had always been a good friend of his, as the Marshal must have realized from the amount of materiel and military aid which he had received. This had only been achieved by the close personal contact which the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito had had in the past. As Marshal Tito would not deal with the Supreme Allied Commander along the lines of the agreement which the Chief of Staff had presented on his behalf, Field Marshal Alexander would not be able to go further in the

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Marshal of Jugoslavia,
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K165

APPENDIX 'A'
to
ANNEXURE III

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS WHICH MARSHAL TITO MADE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY LIEUT-GENERAL MORGAN* ON BEHALF OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER

1. Marshal TITO said he was sorry he could not accept Field Marshal ALEXANDER's proposals. His reason for this was that as his troops had liberated territory which is Slovene, he considered that they had a right to occupy it as an Allied Army on account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause. He further mentioned that at the Peace Conference he would claim territory to the West of the ISONZO.

In view of this he pointed out that the matter had taken on a predominantly political significance.

2. He offered to Field Marshal ALEXANDER full use of the Port of TRIESTE and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

3. He suggested that there should be a joint commission in TRIESTE which would coordinate with the Jugoslav civil and military authorities all military matters in TRIESTE and throughout the lines of communication. This joint commission would have overriding powers over the civil and military authorities in matters pertaining to military interest.

4. Civil government would be carried out by National Liberation organisations which had been set up previously and were now functioning.

5. Allied personnel would have extra territorial rights under their own commanders.

6. Italian metropolitan lire would be the currency for the time being.

7. Allied personnel would have full liberty to operate TRIESTE as a base, including shore facilities and railways as they deemed necessary. Local labour and employees would be provided as required.

8. An Allied naval officer, responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would be in charge of the Port of TRIESTE. He would be assisted by a Port Committee, on which there would be Jugoslav representatives. Naval forces under Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would have full use of the harbour at POLA and anchorages between POLA and TRIESTE.

9. The Allies would be at liberty to operate any airfield at TRIESTE or along the lines of communication. Such airfields would be under joint control.

10. Allied forces necessary for service and garrison purposes would be

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9. The Allies would be at liberty to operate any airfield at TRIESTE or along the lines of communication. Such airfields would be under joint control.

10. Allied forces necessary for service and garrison purposes would be stationed in TRIESTE and on the lines of communication.

*Lieut-General MORGAN pointed out that these proposals differed fundamentally from the draft agreement put forward by Field Marshal ALEXANDER. He would refer the matter to Field Marshal ALEXANDER, who would almost certainly have, in turn, to refer it to the United States and British Governments.

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VIII

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Copy #3 MAY 14 RECD
CL 1509
CHIEF Comm.

FX 74813
MAY 13/1600

E/726
MAY 14/1400B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FWDG.

REAR 8 ARMY INFO: 15 ARMY GROUP, MAIN 8 ARMY, 13 CORPS, 86 AREA, 55 AREA, DISTONE, ADRIATIC BASE COMMAND, REAR MACMIS, AICOM

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

TOP SECRET.

Subject is policy for use of ports TRIESTE and VENICE. This cable is broad outline primarily for information and to enable authorities affected to plan in accordance with AFHQ policy. Fuller and more comprehensive instructions follow.

1. Both ports to be seaheads.

2. TRIESTE primarily for maintenance 13 CORPS and for civil supplies if any to VENEZIA GIULIA. Initially forces in AUSTRIA may receive part supplies through TRIESTE but ultimately AUSTRIA will be maintained as in third below.

3. VENICE primarily for maintenance 8TH ARMY less 13 CORPS and secondly as alternative for TRIESTE should use of latter become impracticable.

4. Reserve stock will not be held at TRIESTE or VENICE. Small maintenance stock details to be notified will be held as below.

5. TRIESTE. To be held west of river ISONZO in respect of forces ultimately based on TRIESTE.

6. VENICE. To be held in area PORTO MARGHERA - MESTRE.

7. Initially control of both ports vested in 8TH ARMY. Subsequently 8TH ARMY responsible supplies clearance from docks to depots UNITED STATES tonnages for maintenance 91 Division.

8. No formal sittings board for TRIESTE but AFHQ representative will visit earliest. VENICE formal sittings board instructions follow.

(DIST OVER)

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DIST

Copy Number 1/ ACTION : ECON SEC

2 INFO : A/PRESIDENT
3 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
4 EA COMMISSIONER
5 FILE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FLOAT

MAY 18

AFHQ

7503 13 MAY 45 OF PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL FD

ROME PRESS YESTERDAY CARRIED DE GASPERI APOSTROPHES SUGAR REPORT TO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON THE APPEAL MADE BY PRIME MINISTER AND HIMSELF TO AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF FD

PAKEN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM FROM STONE FD

TODAY MAY THIRTEEN MOST PAPERS CARRY REPORTED CATEGORICAL STATEMENT MADE BY MISTER CHEW THAT TRIESTE WOULD REMAIN UNDER ALLIED CONTROL FD THIS ALSO REPORTED SHORTLY ON BAKER BAKER CHARLIE ZERO EIGHT ZERO ZERO HOURS

Int Distribution

US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
A/President
Ex Comsec
Pol Adv (A)
Pol Adv (B)
File
Float

CF 800.1

Executive Commissioner

289

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TOP SECRET

C. Commissioner

Copy No 3

MAY 14 RECD
CC 0916
E/642

FX 74762
MAY 131435B

MAY 140845
URGENT

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGAG

ACTION (1) 15 ARMY GROUP INFO: (2) ALCOM (3) MAIN 8 ARMY (4) MACMIS.

Ref: (45) & (43)

TOP SECRET.

Subject feeding civil population in VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE Province.

1. Pending instructions from Combined Chief of Staff policy feeding in VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE Province will be as follows:-

(a) No AMG supplies to civil population will be despatched east of the ISONZO.

(b) Distribution AMG supplies for civil population in UDINE Province will be rigidly controlled to ensure such supplies are not appropriated by YUGOSLAV raiding parties.

(c) Requisitioning in UDINE Province by YUGOSLAVS will be prevented by all means available to you except that your forces will not resort to the use of arms unless attacked without reference to this Hq.

2. Your official attitude will be that hardship to the civilian population is deplored but that situation has arisen entirely through the attitude of YUGOSLAVS who by refusing the establishment of Allied Military Government have prevented the distribution of Allied foodstuffs already earmarked and stockpiled ready to put in.

3. To 15 ARMY GROUP and MAIN 8 ARMY. Above is statement of this Hq policy and refers to message No AQ311 of 10 May from MAIN 8 ARMY. to 15 ARMY GROUP information this Hq.

(5) 4. To MACMIS. (1 corrupt group) U.S. and British Ambassadors.

(DIST OVER)

See (68)

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TOP SECRET

AC DIST

Copy No 1 INFO-ACTION - FOOD S/C
" " 2 INFO - A/PRESIDENT
" " 3 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
" " 4 EX COMMISSIONER
" " 5 ECON SEC
" " 6 FILE
" " 7

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 166 JKD/day (6)

MAIN HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 534

File No: RAII/890.031 (5) 11 May 1945

MAY 14 REC'D

My dear Maurice.

This letter is a sequel to a letter which I dictated yesterday. Yesterday's letter, however, comes down by todays courier airplane and therefore both will , I think, arrive simulteneously.

Late last night I met Con Benson at HQ 8 Army at Mestre. Con had just returned from Villach. As I suggested in my previous letter, it has now been realized that Con cannot be expected to look after the affairs of Austria and also the affairs of the frontier. I know he feels that he would have preferred to hand over the frontier affairs in a more tidy condition. However, that cannot be helped. 13th Corps (Lt.Gen. Sir John Harding) with their Headquarters just west of Trieste have asked me to come forward urgently. I had previously arranged three conferences this morning, one of them with all the neighboring Prefects, on the very serious question of refugees, but I am able to get away from here at two o'clock and I will be with 13th Corps this evening. I shall go into Trieste tomorrow morning.

I assume that my official status is that of acting SCAC 8th Army, but I think we can tackle the problem first and discuss the status afterwards.

I shall send you a full report of what I find at the earliest possible opportunity.

The twenty semi-trained American combat officers have not arrived, and I gather from Col. Southerland that there will be some delay in getting them away from 5th Army. From my conversation with Con Benson I am convinced that an immediate reinforcement of 15 CACs, American or British, would be of the utmost value in preventing the development of a serious and dangerous situation. Please do what you can.

Yours ever

Lt Col CAC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

simultaneously.

Late last night I met Con Benson at HQ 8 Army at Mestre. Con had just returned from Villach. As I suggested in my previous letter, it has now been realized that Con cannot be expected to look after the affairs of Austria and also the affairs of the frontier. I know he feels that he would have preferred to hand over the frontier affairs in a more tidy condition. However, that cannot be helped. 13th Corps (Lt.Gen. Sir John Harding) with their Headquarters just west of Trieste have asked me to come forward urgently. I had previously arranged three conferences this morning, one of them with all the neighboring Prefects, on the very serious question of refugees, but I am able to get away from here at two o'clock and I will be with 13th Corps this evening. I shall go into Trieste tomorrow morning.

I assume that my official status is that of acting SCAC 8th Army, but I think we can tackle the problem first and discuss the status afterwards.

I shall send you a full report of what I find at the earliest possible opportunity.

The twenty semi-trained American combat officers have not arrived, and I gather from Col. Southerland that there will be some delay in getting them away from 5th Army. From my conversation with Con Benson I am convinced that an immediate reinforcement of 15 CAOs, American or British, would be of the utmost value in preventing the development of a serious and dangerous situation. Please do what you can.

Yours ever,

Brigadier M.S. Lush, CB, CBE,
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters Allied Commission.

501

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC No. 785075

1151

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

7399 11 May 1945 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET FD

SUBJECT TO EITHER DATED ONE ZERO MAY TWO ONE ZERO ZERO HOURS FROM MAIN ARLE

MIKE GROUPS EIGHTEEN OR TWENTY AND CORFU FD

PARAS TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE PAPA FIVE NOT ONE FIVE AFHQ GROUP FOR GEORGE PAPA FIVE FROM HQ ALCOA CITY MUSIC PAPA

YUGOSLAVS ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE AUTHORITY IN GORIZIA PROVINCE WEST OF RIVER ISONZO FD SITUATION DETERIORATING FD MILITARY GOVERNMENT CAN BE ENFORCED WEST OF ISONZO AND TAGLIO AREA ONLY IF WE HAVE MILITARY FORCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO RESIST ARMED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FD ALTERNATIVELY WILL HAVE TO WITHDRAW WHENEVER YUGOSLAVS COME ON FD EACH DAY OF DELAY ON DECISION MAKES POSITION MILITARY FORCE

Office of Exec. Comm.

735

11 May 1945

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE GREW'S STATEMENT

"One of the most difficult problems to be solved in coming months will be the just and equitable solution of the many territorial questions which have for so many years plagued europe. It is the firm policy of the United States as its allies have been officially informed, that territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various Governments concerned. Only on this basis can adequate consideration be given to the human, economic, and political elements involved and a just and stable solution be found.

There are thirty or more territorial questions in Europe which require careful study before satisfactory decisions can be reached.

Among these is the question of the much disputed Northeastern Frontiers of ITALY. Many months ago it was decided that the best way to avoid hasty and precarious territorial solutions in the Anglo-American theater of operations would be to establish and maintain an allied military government in the disputed areas pending settlement by the orderly processes to which the United Nations are pledged.

Apart from the fact that this is an Anglo-American theater of operations, and that Anglo-American troops forced the surrender of their German garrison at TRIESTE, the disputed areas are temporarily of prime importance from a military point of view. Since the Allied Occupation Forces require a zone of administration to include adequate port facilities and lines of communication and supply leading to central Europe, it was deemed particularly essential to establish Allied Military Control in this part of ITALY.

Aware of Yugoslav interest in the VENEZIA-GIULIA area, proposals along the above lines were presented to, and accepted by Marshal Tito last February. Notwithstanding this agreement, claims have now been advanced that by virture of conquest Yugoslav forces are entitled forthwith to occupy and control the administration of this region. These claims are put forward regardless of the operations of Field Marshal Alexander's forces in bringing about the defeat of the Germans in that area. According to radio reports, Yugoslav elements are already setting up a "National Federal Government of Slovenia" in TRIESTE.

Aside from the extent of the facilities required by the Allied Military Forces in this area, this Government reiterates its views that disinterested military government is essential in VENEZIA-GIULIA in order not to prejudice, through sudden unilateral action taken in the flush of victory, a final

Declassified E.O. 13356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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I am convinced that no territorial problem can be solved by proclamations issued in the wake of an army on the march".

(50)

740.00119 EW/3001 1/2

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356 SECTION 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNDB No. 785015

SECRET

CITE NM84
NAT 1116309

P/390
NAT 1209308
OP PRIORITY

NAIN ASS S ARMY

ACTION MG ATOUS FOR ASSIS FOR TWO SPEC PERIOD FOR G-5 SECTION.
NAIN S ARMY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF. PARTY FOR TURKIA SECTION FOR SPC
CONF (ANS)

SECRET

Subject Patriots ~~EXCEPT~~ Area. Patriots are demanding payments. As previously stated impossible discuss either Communist or Nationalist groups whilst present situation prevails. Neither group is operational, therefore not paid as members of Armed Forces, both groups are cooperating in helping Military Govt and the Allies. This applies to Communists in practically their entirety and to Nationalist to a lesser degree. Impossible to state numbers, Communists believed to be about 6,000, Nationalist claim larger numbers. Total combined Patriots reputed to be round 30,000 though this is doubtful, the amount payments asked for by Patriots is 10,000,000 lire a month. Emphasise this request is free then and the figures have not and cannot be checked accurately nor have any discussions taken place with Patriots regarding rates or any other subject. Request policy of Mily Govt and AC on this matter. Question of feeding Patriots also arises. At present they are feeding on a considerably higher ration scale than civilians, and consider to abruptly cut off supply and bring them down to ordinary civilian level would be impolitic if not impracticable at this stage. Request guidance on this matter also. All the

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

above based upon these Patriots not being made operational which is extremely unlikely in view of Combined Chief of Staffs decision that the feeding of Patriot Forces on military scale shall be discontinued far as possible.

Dist

Action - Tree Comm ?
Info - S/Presidents
Chief Commissioner
SI Section
Room 760
Land Forces ?
Patriots Br
File

49a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 1010
MAY 11 RECD
Copy No. 5

AFHQ

7300 (41) 10 May PRIORITY

TOP SECRET PD

1

SUBJECT IS SITREP VENEZIA GIULIA AND UDINE POSITION AS AT EIGHT MAY PD

PARA ONE PD ALL ALLIED OFFICERS OTHER THAN THOSE NECESSARY FOR LIAISON ONLY WITH FIVE FIVE AREA TRIESTE AND DIVISIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY VENEZIA GIULIA PD IN MONFALCONE FOOD SITUATION IS ALREADY VERY SERIOUS AND RESCUING SERIOUS IN TRIESTE PD

PARAS TO AFHQ FOR OPERS PARA FIVE SECTION FROM FX ALCOM ONE ACHD PARAS

PARA TWO PD IF VENEZIA GIULIA NOT UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT CONTROL URGENTLY REQUIRE POLICY ON FEEDING BEARING IN MIND FOLLOWING ONE PARIS ONE MARCH GORIZIA AND TRIESTE PROVINCES ARE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON PO VALLEY FOR SUPPLIES ONE PARIS TWO PARIS IN UDINE RAIDING PARTIES ARE ALREADY OBTAINING ACROSS AND SEIZING FOOD AND WILL PROBABLY DO SO IN VENEZIA GIULIA PD ONLY FOUR EIGHT DAYS SUPPLY LEFT IN MONFALCONE FIVE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO INHABITANTS PD IN EASTERN UDINE PROVINCE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS HAVE ALREADY REQUISITIONED VERY LARGE QUANTITIES FOOD PD SUFFICIENT FOOD ONLY UNTIL MAY ONE TWO IN UDINE PROVINCE PD ONE TWO ZERO ZERO TONS BEING SENT IN TO UDINE CAA ONE FOUR ZERO TO MONFALCONE PD

Continued Sheet 2.

(49)
10 May

Executive Commissioner

343

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

A.

C 7/8 e

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

7300 10 May PRIORITY

Sheet 2.

TOP SECRET FD

PARA THREE FD NOTHING MORE ON POLITICAL SITUATION EXCEPT ALBANIAN REFUGEES FD APPARENTLY SOUTHERN ITALIANS ARE BEING PERMITTED BY YUGOSLAVS TO LEAVE TRIESTE CBA ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ORDER THROUGH NOW FD

PARA FOUR FD PATRIOT POSITION UNCHANGED AS FOLLOWS FD PATRIOTS ARE BEING KEPT ARMED REGARDLESS OF POSITION ON BORDER FD PARTISANS OF OSOOPPO ARE COOPERATING AND FIRST CLASS FD GARIBALDI ARE LESS GOOD BUT SITUATION IN HAND FD AS REGARDS TRANSPORT AND FOLLIS HAVE HOPES OF UTILISING OSOOPPO AND GARIBALDI WELL FD CHARLIE LOVE HAS REASONABLY COOPERATIVE AND POLITICAL SITUATION FRIENDLY BUT THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND POSITION FD

PARA FIVE FD POSITION REGARDING REFUGEES MAY BECOME VERY SERIOUS FD OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ALREADY ESTIMATED IN UDINE AND EVEN GREATER NUMBERS COMING OVER ALPS DAILY FD DIFFICULT TO FEED THEM FD AM TEMPORARILY USING CAPTURED ENEMY DUMPS ON AUTHORITY FIVE CORPS FD

PARA SIX FD OWING TO LOCATION OF YUGOSLAV TROOPS AND PARTISANS IN UDINE AND SURROUNDING DISTRICTS SITUATION DELICATE FD

Continued Page 3.../

(49)

Ex.Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

7300 10 May PRIORITY

Sheet 3.

TOP SECRET

PARA SEVEN FD ONE SIX ZERO MILLION IN CASH IN UDINE FD CITY VERY SLIGHTLY DAMAGED AND WELL UNDER CONTROL FD

PARA EIGHT FD NO YUGOSLAV CURRENCY DELIVERED TO BE CIRCULATING FY AMG LIRE NOT ACCEPTED IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND YUGOSLAVS USE ONLY METROPOLITAN LIRE FD AMG LIRE IS CIRCULATING THOUGH THOUGH TO A CERTAIN EXTENT FD SUGGEST POINT OF WITHDRAWING THIS BE CONSIDERED FD REGARDING PAYMENT OF TROOPS IN TRIESTE UNDERSTAND ARMY HAVE ASKED FD

PARA NINE FD IN ORDER TO TRY AND STOP INFILTRATION OF YUGOSLAVS INTO EAST UDINE HAVE SENT IN AS MANY CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AS POSSIBLE

XXXXX

Copy to: Copy No.1 + 2 - Signals
No.3 - US Ambassador
No.4 - Br Ambassador
No.5 - C.Commissioner
No.6 - File

(19)

Executive Commissioner

M.3

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

M 973
MAY 102100B

E/338
MAY 111550B
IMMEDIATE

MAIN AMG 8 ARMY

ACTION HQ ALCOM FOR ACHEXC INFO 8 ARMY MAIN FOR G OF S PADOVA FOR FEB COMM VENEZIA REGION AMG

SECRET.

Subject is TARVISIO and VENEZIA GIULIA. Jugoslavs in TARVISIO but military Govt functioning and Jugoslavs under control. Important tin mine at LAVA DEL PREDIL under guard troops with Jugoslavs also present. Mine British owned and notices being posted. Manager Signor NOFARA cooperating with AMG. Request inform BENICK DORING (?) 62 LONDON WALL this effect. Refugee situation as follows. Large numbers coming over mountains and being routed down to UDINE. Capacity accommodation UDINE 22000. Feeding being arranged and line down from TARVISIO Via PONTEBBA arranged by ERC. Evacuation by 5 Corps backloading to MESTRE. TRIESTE, GORIZIA situation. Deteriorating in GORIZIA as Yugoslavs attempt impose their authority on that portion GORIZIA Province west of ISONZO River. Summary. Every day of delay in coming to settlement makes position military worse. We can enforce military govt west of ISONZO and in TARVISO Area but to do so must have military force with instructions to resist behind military govt. Alternative is to retreat wherever Yugoslavs choose to come in.

Sec 50 G

DIST

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
File

49 G

SECRET

1160

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

E.C.

Ref: 152/10. 10 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Sitrep - VENICE.

TO : G-5, AFHQ.

The following information on VENICE covering the period up to 3 May 1945 may be of interest to you. It was received from AMG Eighth Army on 7 May.

"This city is completely undamaged. The figure of 400,000 given as the estimated population is incorrect, and it looks as if there are only 250,000 in the town and 350,000 in the commune. This figure included 70,000 refugees, mostly from the surrounding country and North.

State of utilities is that the light and power are functioning normally but are naturally overtaxed - water supply is also normal.

There are 230 Vigili Urbani and 1,000 questura. The prison has at the moment 400 so called political prisoners who are being examined by F.S.S. There are only 30 criminal cases.

Medical situation is good, and there are 350 doctors and four hospitals with a capacity of 1,800 beds.

On the financial side the Banca d'Italia has 300,000,000 lire and the various other banks between them have approximately another 20,000,000 lire. In addition there are said to be some 8,000,000 lire in the Post Office.

The food situation is satisfactory and it looks as if there is sufficient food for two months, but, of course, there is the usual shortage of oils and fats. There is however nothing to worry about.

On the political side the CLN is working well and have been cooperative.

Patriots have proved somewhat exuberant. There are said to be some 12,000 in two factions, with rather different views. It was feared that this might lead to incidents so that their disarmament was commenced immediately. These fears appear to have been groundless, although some patriots have let off steam by firing at the windows of houses in which they claim, Fascists are hiding. A good excuse but noisy. The situation is well in hand and the bulk of the arms not yet handed in will be dealt with at a Parade to be held on 5th May, in the Piazza San Marco and towards which all VENICE seems to be looking forward with pleasure and anticipation."

For the Chief Commissioner:

(48)

10 May

Executive Commissioner.

TOP SECRET.

MILAN.

10 May 45.

TRIESTE.
The New Zealanders are in the port area and the Yugoslavs in the main town. Another division - I believe British - has been ordered up there. It is very tricky but the general feeling up here is that there is a lot of bluffing going on by the Yugoslavs who have only got three rather weak straggling Divisions in VENEZIA GIULIA. It very much depends on the behaviour of our troops. If their behaviour is really good it would have a tremendous effect in contrast to the rather ragged behaviour of the Yugoslavs. They are operating in TRIESTE a very rough Military Government which practically amounts to Martial Law.

VENICE.
Completely normal and not a tile loose or a gondola damaged. Prices are definitely lower for articles like shoes, stockings, artificial jewellery, woolleh goods etc. Antolini will report on this fully. The economic barrier cannot work since the Armies have set up NO repeat NO road blocks.

People's Courts.
Being set up and the decree being implemented. They are popular.

BOLZANO and TRENTO.
David Mynors has just returned from a trip up there and has written an excellent report, a copy of which is enclosed. He is sending one to A.C. in any case. The situation in BOLZANO itself is very interesting. He told me that there are 40,000 civilians and 120,000 armed Germans. German M.Ps control the traffic and police the streets and German transport is being used on German petrol. It is thought that the area has six months supply of petrol. You have got the curious situation of the CLN, the German HQ and AMG Provincial team all sitting alongside each other. David said you see Allied officers walking about unarmed with the Germans all armed. But it seems to be very orderly with an excellent prefect - BRUNO de ANGELIS. The rest of the information on this that I got from David is in the report.

VAL D'AOSTA.
Brig.Gen. HUME had just returned from a visit up there. He told me that the French have posted proclamations announcing that a plebiscite will take place. It is more than a little tricky. To help deal with the situation Fifth Army have lent AMG 98 officers who are all going up to VAL D'AOSTA. This is interesting as an indication of the help we can expect from the Army in an emergency now that the fighting has stopped. I will no doubt hear more of this situation in TURIN to which I go on Monday.

CC.RR.
650, who did not take the oath to the Fascist Republicans, are functioning in MILAN City. David Mynors refers to the TRENTO and BOLZANO CC.RR in his report. I saw Col. BYE, who confirmed that the CC.RR from the South look like scarecrows alongside these northern men.

Medical Supplies.
Situation is on the whole satisfactory in VENEZIA and LOMBARDIA - according

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

definitely lower for [illegible] woollen goods etc. Antolini will report on this fully. The economic barrier cannot work since the Armies have set up NO repeat NO road blocks.

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Medical Supplies.
Situation is on the whole satisfactory in VENEZIA and LOMBARDIA - according to Fifth Army. There is, however, a definite shortage of Insulin.

Local Government.
Brig. DUNLOP showed me a signal he had sent to A.C., giving details of Prefects.

3

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Patriots.

They are being disarmed quite well in the big towns but there are hundreds roaming about the Country with arms and much is hidden. They do NOT appear to be a problem at the moment and in fact in BELLUNO, Northern TREVISO, Northern VICENZA and UDINE they are performing an excellent service. This particular lot are very well disciplined and are keeping order and rounding up scattered German armed groups and Republican Fascists. The latter have mostly melted into the countryside but some of the leaders are being hunted out. Brig. DUNLOP said that when he becomes responsible for the Northern Provinces in his Region he will leave the patriots there with their arms until the Germans are all mopped up. DUNLOP is on very good terms with the local Patriot Commander who was in his office in PADUA yesterday. The Commander said he would see to it that the Patriots did not walk about with arms in the Southern Provinces, even if he couldn't guarantee that all the arms would be handed in.

Refugees.

Everyone with whom I talked - SUTHERLAND and DUNLOP and TREVOR BEER in particular - were emphatic that so long as we can keep them moving and avoid checking on them or sorting them until they are South of the PO and across the Army line there is no real problem. Food points are being established but they are not real camps and the refugees are pressed to move on to the next point. They all know where they want to go so no sorting is necessary. They are mostly able-bodied men without women or children. Many of them are expected to swing West towards MILAN, TURIN and GENOA. It is again strongly urged that the Disper plan be implemented immediately but the slogan must be "keep them moving": feed them on the road but keep them moving". Dont interfere and the problem will solve itself.

General.

I discussed the question of an early hand back and the consensus of opinion so far is that once the Germans have all been concentrated in the Concentration area there is little more that AMG can usefully do. This opinion does not however apply to the TRENTO, BOLZANO or TRIESTE areas. Furthermore, Brig. DUNLOP takes the view that so long as the hope remains there must be partial military government in his Region. In short, from local government and supply and food points of view, the whole of North ITALY can be handed back as soon as the Germans are concentrated except for the Frontier districts, VENEZIA GIULIA and the AUSTRIA L. of C. - that is the view up here. DUNLOP told me as an indication of the goodwill towards AMG of CLN in his Region that the President of the C.L.N. for VENETO Compartimento is moving out of VENICE into PADUA to be near Regional HQs. Black out, curfew and token rule are abolished in Provinces of ROVIGO, PADUA, VENEZIA and TREVISO. Curfew is still 10 p.m. here. Trams are running in every Provincial capital in North ITALY. Trains run from MILAN to GENOA. Since it is now nearly 1 a.m. I shall go to bed and try to get this off to you by air tomorrow.

(Sgd) E. TALBOT,
Lt.Col.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(Sgd) E. TALBOT,
Lt.Col.

P.S. DUNLOP has proposed to 5 Army that he be allowed tocut out going through HUME in respect of the Provinces of VENEZIE Region which are in 5 Army area. If agreed he would be - for these provinces - the SCAO AMG 5 Army responsible directly to TRUSCOTT. BENSON has handed over so he is also, in effect, SCAO 8 Army ! You are being sent a copy of his letter to 5 Army on this.

E.C. DISTRIBUTION - 12 May

Chief Commissioner
Pol Adv (A)
" " (B)

47a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3(b)(1) No. 78-5015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FJA/1
MAY 101200B

R/303
MAY 111600B
IMMEDIATE

LT COL SCHOLTZ

ACTION ALCOM ANCONA INFO HQ ALCOM TRS

SECRET.

Reference your TW/h/DR.

AMG not operating in TRIESTE owing to political situation. Suggest you contact higher authority before shipping food supplies to TRIESTE.

DIST

ACTION: Tn S/C 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Econ Sec
Food 2
File

(45)

SECRET

(47)

10 Army

EXTRACT

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting
10th May, 1945

K 163

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

• • •

3. SITUATION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting - Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER outlined the development in the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA, which had taken place since the last meeting. He pointed out that the Jugoslavs appeared to be increasing their forces in VENEZIA GIULIA and had taken control of villages over the Austrian border in the KLAGENFURT area, though British forces had forestalled them in that town. Meanwhile, the latest signals from the Chief of Staff in BELGRADE indicated that Marshal Tito would not sign an agreement on the lines proposed by the Supreme Allied Commander but had suggested a form of dual command in the area of TRIESTE and GORIZIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the Jugoslav proposals for dual command were not militarily acceptable to him. His military requirement, to have his L of C under his own control, was a normal one for any commander. On Marshal Tito's proposals the long L of C into AUSTRIA would be dependent for its safety on the goodwill of the Jugoslavs. This could not be satisfactory in the long run, and a clear demarkation line, all forces on the west of which would be under his (Field Marshal Alexander's) command, was therefore required.

There were, therefore, only two courses open - either to turn out Tito by force or to accept a diplomatic defeat. From the military point of view such a diplomatic defeat would not be serious as we could develop VENICE and maintain our forces in AUSTRIA from that port, at any rate for a period. He thought, however, that consideration should be given to the maintenance of the force in the British zone from the west through the SHAEF area, as any occupation of AUSTRIA from the Southwest would never be satisfactory as long as the Jugoslavs maintained claims on the TRIESTE and KLAGENFURT areas.

In connection with any proposal to use force against the Jugoslavs, he pointed out that on present governmental policies, of the divisions in the Italian theatre only United Kingdom divisions were likely to be available. Such a force alone would not be adequate. Moreover, it was necessary to

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

3. SITUATION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting - Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER outlined the development in the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA, which had taken place since the last meeting. He pointed out that the Jugoslavs appeared to be increasing their forces in VENEZIA GIULIA and had taken control of villages over the Austrian border in the KLAGENFURT area, though British forces had forestalled them in that town. Meanwhile, the latest signals from the Chief of Staff in BELGRADE indicated that Marshal Tito would not sign an agreement on the lines proposed by the Supreme Allied Commander but had suggested a form of dual command in the area of TRIESTE and GORIZIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the Jugoslav proposals for dual command were not militarily acceptable to him. His military requirement, to have his L of C under his own control, was a normal one for any commander. On Marshal Tito's proposals the long L of C into AUSTRIA would be dependent for its safety on the goodwill of the Jugoslavs. This could not be satisfactory in the long run, and a clear demarkation line, all forces on the west of which would be under his (Field Marshal Alexander's) command, was therefore required.

There were, therefore, only two courses open - either to turn out Tito by force or to accept a diplomatic defeat. From the military point of view such a diplomatic defeat would not be serious as we could develop VENICE and maintain our forces in AUSTRIA from that port, at any rate for a period. He thought, however, that consideration should be given to the maintenance of the force in the British zone from the west through the SHAEF area, as any occupation of AUSTRIA from the Southwest would never be satisfactory as long as the Jugoslavs maintained claims on the TRIESTE and KLAGENFURT areas.

In connection with any proposal to use force against the Jugoslavs, he pointed out that on present governmental policies, of the divisions in the Italian theatre only United Kingdom divisions were likely to be available. Such a force alone would not be adequate. Moreover, it was necessary to consider the effect of such hostilities on the morale of troops, who were expecting to return home and who would have every sympathy with the Jugoslavs as our press and redio had built up their prestige as Allies fighting for their liberation against the Germans.

As an interim measure and pending receipt of further directions, he proposed, therefore, to use TRIESTE without any formal agreement with the

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Jugoslavs, acting as we had already been doing. Meanwhile, as a second priority we should also develop VENICE, so as to have it available for use if required. He thought that the Jugoslavs would in fact be anxious to avoid open clash at present, and use of TRIESTE on this basis should work until the governments had made their decision. Meanwhile, his forces would remain deployed in the TRIESTE-GORIZIA area as they were at present. He further proposed to send a full military appreciation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, estimating the resources that would be required if it were decided to use force against the Jugoslavs, so that the British and United States governments should take this into account when making their decision. In reply to questions by Rear Admiral Stone he said that while the interim measure was being adopted in TRIESTE we would not occupy the whole of the town, but only the port and essential installations. AMG would not be established in the area we occupied as this could not be done without hostilities.

MR. KIRK observed the arguments now being put forward by Marshal Tito were precisely similar to those advanced by the Japanese prior to their invasion of MANCHURIA and by Mussolini before the invasion of ABYSSINIA. There was every indication, therefore, that the Jugoslavs proposed to carry out what would be the first act of post-war agression. He considered that the issue at stake was larger than that merely affecting the territory concerned. It was the principle, for which the British and American peoples had been fighting, of the adjustment of disputes by legal procedure and not by unilateral action. He also thought that the reaction of the Italian people to a Jugoslav diplomatic victory would be such as to cause serious unrest in ITALY, which would prejudice the use of the country as a base for military operations or the maintenance of military forces.

GENERAL MCNARNEY did not believe that public opinion in the United States would support hostilities against the Jugoslavs. In fact such hostilities would mean siding with the Italians, our enemies, in regard to territory they seized after the last war, against the Jugoslavs who were our Allies. He thought that if a plebiscite was taken in the area there was little doubt that the result would be favourable to the Slovenes. He had therefore a certain sympathy with Marshal Tito who had been fighting a long, hard war and now demanded the right to occupy a certain amount of enemy territory which his forces had won, in the same way as the French had demanded to participate in the occupation of AUSTRIA and GERMANY. The Jugoslavs could, therefore, say that it was merely a choice as to whether the territory should be occupied by one Ally or another.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the Supreme Allied Commander's proposal to Marshal Tito merely amounted to a slight readjustment of their two occupational areas from those which their forces had reached in the course of battle. This was entirely reasonable and similar to the adjustments which had been effected between SHAEF and the Russians. In regard to the opening of VENICE he pointed out that it could not be an alternative to TRIESTE within the next six weeks. Both the approaches and the inside of the harbor were mined and it would require that period, from the time when the decision was taken to divert to it some of the resources at present employed for TRIESTE,

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MR. MACMILLAN observed that the task of the conference was to advise the Supreme Allied Commander and not to make political decisions, which were matters for their governments. Marshal Tito had refused reasonable military proposals. The Supreme Allied Commander's first duty was to report accordingly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Marshal Tito had suggested as an alternative a type of condominium. The difficulty in accepting his proposals was that the United States and United Kingdom governments would be put in the

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position of appearing to condone undesirable Jugoslav actions in VENEZIA GIULIA. In regard to the political issue it was relevant that both the United States and British Ambassadors at BELGRADE had now telegraphed their governments recommending that Marshal Tito be presented with an ultimatum.

The governments really had only two courses open to them. The first was to give in and accept the consequences of a political defeat. The second was to enforce the will of the United States and British governments by military action. The first course could be carried out either by acceptance of Marshal Tito's proposals or, with less loss of face, by means of the course the Supreme Allied Commander had suggested, namely temporary use of TRIESTE and development of VENICE. The latter method would probably have the same result in the end, but it would be possible for the governments, at the same time, to show their disapproval by economic sanctions and withdrawal of their ambassadors.

He felt sure that the two governments would be at first somewhat hesitant and that they would probably approach the Russians in regard to the matter. However, it was most important that the governments in making their decision had before them complete military information of what the use of force would involve. It was the Supreme Allied Commander's duty to supply them with this information. The governments would receive the necessary political advice through other channels.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD considered that we should not be frightened by the idea of using force against the Jugoslavs as this would result in a wrong approach to the problem. He considered that Marshal Tito was placing himself in the position of the first post-war criminal requiring to be brought under police control. The use of force, and considerable air forces were available, would therefore be a police action.

GENERAL MCNARNEY observed that Marshal Tito was our ally and that until he had refused to abide by the Peace Treaty he could not be regarded as a criminal. The position was that two Allied governments wanted to do one thing and one Allied government wanted to do another.

MR. MACMILLAN said that unless the British and American and Russian governments agreed on this matter, the whole question of police control would not arise. In addition, many governments other than those of the United States were involved, and in particular the South African and New Zealand governments, owing to the possibility of their troops being employed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff,

(i) To despatch a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the Jugoslav refusal to accept his military proposals and stating that his military appre-

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(ii) To prepare for his approval a draft telegram* to the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving his military appreciation of the resources required to impose the will of the United States and British governments, by force, should it be decided to do so.

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(b) Directed that, pending further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

(i) First priority sould be given to the development of TRIESTE and the discharge through that port of such tonnages as might be possible and desirable in view of the local situation.

(ii) As second priority, and as far as might be possible consistent with (i) above, the port of VENICE should be opened and developed.

(iii) The Allied forces should retain their present dispositions in VENEZIA GIULIA and no attempt should be made to establish Allied military government east of the ISONZO.

* Despatched as NAF 957 of 10 May 1945

*2 Despatched as NAF 960 of 11 May 1945

* * *

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

AFHQ FOR SACMED, US POLAD, BRITISH RESMIN, G-5

7209 9 MAY 1945 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET PD

AT MEETING WITH BONOMI TODAY TO EXECUTE TRANSFER DOCUMENTS CMA HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER DEGASPERI STATED THEY HAD BEEN CHARGED BY THE COUNCIL TO PROTEST TO ME AND SEPARATELY TO THE UNCLE SUGAR AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS NOW EXISTING IN TRIESTE PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACMED CMA US POLAD CMA BRITISH RESMIN CMA GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACCCC FROM ADMIRAL STONE PAREN

DEGASPERI REFERRED TO MY LETTER OF SEPTEMBER CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT PD THEY SHOWED ME TRIESTE NEWSPAPER ISSUED RECENTLY GIVING COMPOSITION OF SLOVENE GOVERNMENT FOR ISTRIA PD BASED ON EYEWITNESS REPORT OF RETURNED ALLIED JOURNALIST THEY STATED THAT YUGOSLAVS WERE ABOUT TO CONSCRIPT ALL MEN OVER SIXTEEN YEARS TO FIGHT AGAINST CETNICKS IN YUGOSLAVIA PD JOURNALIST STATED THAT ITALIAN NONFASCIST POLITICAL LEADERS IN TRIESTE WERE DISAPPEARING AND THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY GOVERNMENT STATED THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERED AS PRISONERS OF WAR PD THEY STATED THAT GOVERNMENT UNANIMOUSLY REPEAT UNANIMOUSLY FELT THAT IF ALLIES DID NOT FULFILL THEIR PLEDGE TO SET UP ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT SO THAT TRIESTE COULD BE REMOVED FROM YUGOSLAV DOMINATION IT MIGHT HAVE TO RESIGN SINCE TRIESTE WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH ALL ITALIANS WERE UNITED PD AFTER THE MEETING

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

TOGLIATTI PRIVATELY STATED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT HE FELT THE ITALIAN POSITION WAS WEAK SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT TITO WOULD NOT HAVE SET UP HIS ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE UNCLE SUGAR AND UNCLE KING GOVERNMENTS

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Chief Commissioner

222

(46)

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 11 1945
CC 1555

PRESIDENCY

Julian action committee
Rome, Via de Ina Aloma, 20
tel 380141

This Committee learnt from reliable source that after the occupation of part of the Venezia Giulia by Tito's military forces, the following facts took place:

Following Tito's troops, turbulent Slav elements have entered Trieste where they staged great pro-Slav demonstrations; the tricoloured flag was forbidden, and shots were fired against the windows which had the National flag; a merciless persecution was started against the Italians who were arrested in mass (according to carefully prepared lists and without discrimination between fascists and anti-fascists); many of them were shot; the committee for Liberation itself is being actively looked for and has had to hide; the town is without food; the population is being terrorized.

In Gorizia and in the neighbourhood, worse acts of violence are being committed; there have been number less arrests, (also 9 priests) and a great many mysterious executions; all able men over 16 (including the pupils of the ecclesiastical seminary) have been deported in mass to Yugoslavia to be compulsorily enrolled in Tito's militia; the terrified population is flying towards the west.

In Istria, there have been mass massacres and undescribable atrocities.

We lack information about Istria and Fiume, but, from what we gathered, it seems that the situation is quite as serious, if not worse.

After undergoing so many persecutions under the nazi-fascist domination, the unfortunate Italian population of the region must now suffer from the violence of the Slavs. They are practically prohibited to evacuate, for the Yugoslav partisans have established control posts along the frontier, which make it quite impossible to send relief from the Italian side, while the anglo-american troops which were received with enthusiastic demonstrations of sympathy, though they show benevolence towards the Italian population, do not intervene to avoid political complications.

The Italians of the Venezia Giulia are getting quite desperate and ask for decisive help from the Government.

The Italian Government must therefore intervene IMMEDIATELY AND STRONGLY with the Allied Authorities, asking them to take without delay the following action:

1) extension of the Anglo American military occupation to the whole of Venezia Giulia up to the Italo-Yugoslav border of 1937.

2) The Anglo-American Authorities should assume the maintenance of public order, and the executive power, possibly in collaboration with the members of the Committee for National Liberation.

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See 60 See 66 inc A

CC 28/2 1 Encl

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c) The Italian population of Venezia Giulia should be given the official assurance (through the radio and by means of newspapers, manifests, etc) that it will be protected against arbitrary acts of all kind, and the military Commands and Authorities to which the population may appeal for the necessary protection should be mentioned.

d) A certain number of very energetic allied officers, with precise orders, and with trustworthy assistants (possibly suggested by the Italian Government) with a sound knowledge of the place and of the situation, should be sent on the spot.

The Italian Committee points out to the Government that the worse repercussions are to be expected if action is not taken without delay for the question of Venezia Giulia (question of [illegible]).

The Italian Committee feels it is its duty to inform the Government that it [illegible] IN THE REGION THE ITALIAN POPULATIONS WHICH ARE ASKING FOR HELP, and in case it shouldn't obtain without delay that the required action be taken for their protection, it will [illegible] to bring to the notice of of the world's and Italy's public opinion what is taking place in Venezia Giulia, and give all the help it can to these populations.

Rome, 9 May 1945

DIST - 14 May
Chief Comm
Exec Comm

[illegible]

COMITATO D'AZIONE GIULIANO
Roma - Regina Elena 20 - Tel. 469141

Traduzione Doc.

MAY 1 1 1945
CC 1555

Questo Comitato ha appreso da fonti ineccepibili che dopo l'occupazione di una parte della Venezia Giulia da forze militari di Tito :

A TRIESTE sono entrati, al seguito delle truppe di Tito, degli elementi turbolenti sloveni che hanno inscenato grandi manifestazioni slavofile; è stata proibita l'esposizione del tricolore ed è stato sparato contro le finestre alle quali era esposta la bandiera nazionale; si è iniziata una spietata persecuzione contro gli italiani, procedendo ad arresti in massa (secondo liste accuratamente preparate e senza far distinzione tra fascisti ed antifascisti) e pure a numerose fucilazioni; lo stesso Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale è attivamente ricercato ed ha dovuto nascondersi; la città è prive di viveri; la popolazione è terrorizzata.

A GORIZIA e nel circondario le violenze commesse sono ancora peggiori : gli arresti sono stati innumerevoli (anche tra i sacerdoti) e moltissime le esecuzioni sommarie; tutti gli uomini validi al di sopra dei 16 anni (compresi gli allievi del Seminario Ecclesiastico!) sono stati deportati in massa in Jugoslavia per essere arruolati con la forza tra le milizie di Tito; la popolazione atterrita fugge verso occidente.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785045

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Su (66) INC ./.

(Via)

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A ZARA sono stati compiuti massacri in massa ed atrocità indescrivibili.

Dall'ISTRIA e da FIUME mancano informazioni, ma da quanto è trapelato pare che la situazione sia altrettanto grave se non peggiore.

Le disgraziate popolazioni italiane della regione, che dopo aver subito già tante persecuzioni sotto il dominio nazi-fascista debbono ora sottostare alle violenze degli slavi, SONO PRATICAMENTE ABBANDONATE A SE' STESSE, perchè i partigiani jugoslavi hanno collocato dei posti di controllo lungo l'Isonzo che impediscono ogni soccorso da parte italiana, mentre d'altro canto le truppe anglo-americane, accolte con entusiastica manifestazione di simpatia, pur mostrandosi benevole alla collettività italiana, non intervengono per evitare delle complicazioni politiche.

Gli italiani della Venezia Giulia sono in preda alla più profonda disperazione ED INVOCANO SOCCORSO IMMEDIATO DAL GOVERNO.

E' quindi assolutamente necessario che il Governo italiano INTERVENGA IMMEDIATAMENTE CON ENERGIA presso le supreme Autorità Alleate chiedendo alle stesse di prendere, SENZA INDUGIO I SEGUENTI PROVVEDIMENTI :

1°) Estensione dell'occupazione militare anglo americana a tutta la Venezia Giulia fino al confine italo jugoslavo del 1939.

Declassified E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) NARS, Date 7-25-05

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2°) Assunzione da parte delle Autorità anglo-americane del mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico, ed in particolare del potere esecutivo, eventualmente in collaborazione con i membri del Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale.

3°) Assicurazione ufficiale data alla popolazione italiana della Venezia Giulia (mediante la radio, i giornali, manifesti ecc.) che essa sarà tutelata da ogni forma di arbitrio, ed indicazione specifica dei Comandi militari e delle Autorità ai quali la popolazione si potrà rivolgere per ottenere la protezione necessaria.

4°) Invio sul posto di un certo numero di ufficiali alleati molto energici, muniti di precise istruzioni, ed assistiti da persone di fiducia (eventualmente segnalate dal Governo italiano) che conoscano bene i luoghi e le situazioni.

Il Comitato Giuliano fa presente al Governo che qualora questi provvedimenti di estrema urgenza per la questione della Venezia Giulia (che è questione di IMPORTANZA NAZIONALE CHE DEVE ANDARE INNANZI A QUALSIASI ALTRA) non saranno ottenuti sono purtroppo da prevedersi le peggiori ripercussioni.

Infine il Comitato Giuliano sente il preciso dovere di avvertire il Governo che esso NON INTENDE ABBANDONARE IN NESSUN CASO I FRATELLI GIULIANI CHE INVOCANO SOCCORSO, e che qualora non riuscirà a conseguire, entro brevissimo termine, i provvedimen-

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esecutivo, eventualmente in collaborazione con i membri del Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale.

3°) Assicurazione ufficiale data alla popolazione italiana della Venezia Giulia (mediante la radio, i giornali, manifesti ecc.) che essa sarà tutelata da ogni forma di arbitrio, ed indicazione specifica dei Comandi militari e delle Autorità ai quali la popolazione si potrà rivolgere per ottenere la protezione necessaria.

4°) Invio sul posto di un certo numero di ufficiali alleati molto energici, muniti di precise istruzioni, ed assistiti da persone di fiducia (eventualmente segnalate dal Governo italiano) che conoscano bene i luoghi e le situazioni.

Il Comitato Giuliano fa presente al Governo che qualora questi provvedimenti di estrema urgenza per la questione della Venezia Giulia (che è questione di IMPORTANZA NAZIONALE CHE DEVE ANDARE INNANZI A QUALSIASI ALTRA) non saranno ottenuti sono purtroppo da prevedersi le peggiori ripercussioni.

Infine il Comitato Giuliano sente il preciso dovere di avvertire il Governo che esso NON INTENDE ABBANDONARE IN NESSUN CASO I FRATELLI GIULIANI CHE INVOCANO SOCCORSO, e che qualora non riuscirà a conseguire, entro brevissimo termine, i provvedimenti invocati a loro tutela, esso ricorrerà A TUTTI I MEZZI LEGALI

./.

45a

declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

A SUA DISPOSIZIONE, per segnalare all'opinione pubblica italiana e mondiale quanto avviene nella Venezia Giulia, e per portare a quelle popolazioni ogni aiuto che sta in suo potere.

Roma, 9 maggio 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



Xerox 2 mark
Photocopied with 5 pt

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Copy no 4

MAY 10 RECD
CC 1120

FX 72841
MAY 9/1327B

E/174
MAY 10/1000B
PRIORITY

FREEDOM SIGNED SACMED CITE FHQEG

AICOM ROME INFO: 15 ARMY GROUP FOR G-5 8TH ARMY MAIN FOR AEG

(43)

TOP SECRET.

Reference your radio 7186 cite ACEXC. Pending further instructions agreed that no food be supplied by Allied authorities.

See 81

DIST

Copy Number 1 & 2 ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)
" " 3 INFO : A/PRESIDENT
" " 4 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
" " 5 FILE
US Ambassador
British Ambassador
US Pol Adviser.
British Pol Adviser.
Econ. Sec. (2)

(45)

9 May

TOP SECRET

1/236 15 agosto 1944

Caro Ammiraglio,

Gli avvenimenti militari in corso, cosi' gloriosi per le Nazioni che insieme combattono contro la Germania lasciano prevedere come non lontano il giorno in cui le terre tuttora invase potranno finalmente essere liberate.

Il Governo italiano molto si preoccupa della possibilità che nel momento della liberazione della Venezia Giulia, contrasti fra bande armate e pacifici cittadini possano insanguinare città e villaggi di una regione che già ha tanto sofferto.

Ad evitare la possibilità di violenze e di eccidi reputiamo dover nostro di richiamare l'interesse dei Governi Alleati su tale dolorosa eventualità per quelle misure che essi reputassero di dover predisporre.

A ciò ci guida un senso di alta solidarietà umana, l'ansia di vedere evitare violenze e disordini ed altresì il desiderio di prevenire nuove ragioni di dissenso e nuove cause di rancore fra popolazioni che dovranno nell'avvenire nel loro stesso interesse e nell'interesse della pace europea, dimenticare le recenti lotte e stringere fra di loro vincoli di feconda collaborazione.

Con i più cordiali saluti

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Caro Ammiraglio,

Ammir. glio

Gli avvenimenti militari in corso, così gloriosi per le Nazioni che insieme combattono contro la Germania lasciano prevedere come non lontano il giorno in cui le terre tuttora invase potranno finalmente essere liberate.

Il Governo italiano molto si preoccupa della possibilità che nel momento della liberazione della Venezia Giulia, contrasti fra bande armate e pacifici cittadini possano insanguinare città e villaggi di una regione che già ha tanto sofferto.

Ad evitare la possibilità di violenze e di eccidi reputiamo dover nostro di richiamare l'interesse dei Governi Alleati su tale dolorosa eventualità per quelle misure che essi reputassero di dover predisporre.

A ciò ci guida un senso di alta solidarietà umana, l'ansia di vedere evitare violenze e disordini ed altresì il desiderio di prevenire nuove ragioni di dissenso e nuove cause di rancore fra popolazioni che dovranno nell'avvenire nel loro stesso interesse e nell'interesse della pace europea, dimenticare le antiche lotte e stringere fra di loro vincoli di feconda collaborazione.

Con i più cordiali saluti

ft° VISCONTI VENOSTA

Ammir. glio Ellery W. STONE, U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

Roma

44a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785045

Translation

' OUR FUTURE '

Trieste 4 MAY 1945

MILITARY AGENT
Chief of Command of the Yugoslav
Command of the town of Trieste

O R D E R N. 1

1. In the town of Trieste, the power is assumed by the Command of the town of Trieste which proclaims the state of war.

2. Till further orders, the civilian population is allowed to circulate in the town from 10 till 15 hours; military people from 7 till 19 hours.

3. Only the cars which have a special authorization from the Command of the town of Trieste are allowed to circulate through the city.

4. All motor-vehicles must be declared, in writing, within five days to the Command of the town of Trieste.

5. To-morrow, May 5th, at 1 a.m., all clocks will be put back one hour and that time will be the same as in the rest of Yugoslavia.

6. All disobedience to the orders of the Command of the town will be punished by the court-martial of the Yugoslav Army.

The seat of the town Command is in the Palazzo Comunale

Trieste, 3 May 1945

DEATH TO FASCISM

FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

Major General
Josip Smodlaka m.p.

Franc STOKA m.p.

O R D E R N. 2

1) All those who belong to the units of the German army of occupation, to groups in the service of the occupant and to all other armed groups which are not in the cadres of the Yugoslav Army, will have to present themselves within 24 hours after the publication of this order, with all their arms and military outfit, in group or singly, to the nearest military unit of the Yugoslav Army or to the town Command. Proceedings will be taken against the culprits in accordance with international laws.

2) The population of the liberated territory is required to indicate at once to the units of the Yugoslav army or to the town Command the localities where groups or individuals of the above mentioned armed units are to be [illegible] hiding-places for arms, foodstuffs, and all kind

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. In the town of Trieste, the power is assumed by the command of the town of Trieste which proclaims the state of war.

2. Till further orders, the civilian population is allowed to circulate in the town from 10 till 24hours; military people from 7 till 19 hours.

3. Only the cars which have a special authorisation from the command of the town of Trieste are allowed to circulate through the city.

4. All motor-vehicles must be declared, in writing, within five days to the Com.and of the town of Trieste.

5. To-morrow, May 4th, at 1 a.m., all clocks will be put back one hour so that time will be the same as in the rest of Yugoslavia.

6. All disobedience to the orders of the command of the town will be punished by the court-martial of the Yugoslav army.

The seat of the town command is in the Istrian Comunale

Trieste, 3 May 1945

DEATH TO FASCISM
FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
Major General
Josip Duncl M.P.

O R D E R N. 2

1) All those who belong to the units of the German army of occupation, to groups in the service of the occupant and to all other armed groups which are not in the orders of the Yugoslav army, will have to present themselves within 24 hours after the publication of this order, with all their arms and military outfit, in group or singly, to the nearest military unit of the Yugoslav army or to the town Command. Proceedings will be taken against the culprits in accordance with international laws.

2) The population of the liberated territory is required to indicate at once to the units of the Yugoslav army or to the town command the localities where groups or individuals of the above mentioned armed units are to be found. This also applies to hiding-places for arms, foodstuffs, and all kind of military material. Those who know of such depots and stores have to keep them under watch till the military authorities take possession of them.

3) To hide the above mentioned individuals and materials is strictly forbidden, and the culprits will be punished by the Yugoslav court-martial.

Trieste, 3 May 1945

DEATH TO FASCISM
The Political Commissioner
Frank STOKA m.p.

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Town Commander
Major General
Josip DUNCL m.p.

44a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

O R D E R N. 3

1) All arms, whether they can still be used or not, all ammunitions, explosives, and their pieces must be handed over 24 hours at the latest after the publication of the present order.

2) All military outfit, vehicles, tools, aircrafts, material, engine fuel, lubricants, inventory, archives, all currency, valuable objects, foodstuffs, cattle, cigarettes, cigars and whatever belonged to the enemy army of occupation and to the auxiliary military units of the occupant is war booty of the Yugoslav army and has to be handed over within the above mentioned delay, or declared to the Town Command.

3) Whoever within the last few days has arbitrarily taken any object whatever which is military or state property, or of public or private interest is obliged to hand over everything within three days to the Town Command, otherwise, he will be punished in accordance with military laws.

4) Whoever will be caught in the act of stealing or looting will be shot on the spot.

5) All weapons which are not for military use must be handed over by their owners to be put temporarily in custody of the nearest military authority.

6) Should the kind or the amount of the arms, ammunitions, explosive and other materials prevent their being transported or transferred, the owner or whoever knows their position has to inform the nearest military command within the prescribed delay.

7) In Trieste, the above mentioned material must be delivered in the following sectors of the Trieste Town Command:

I sector - Piazza, in the building of the elementary school.
II " - in S. Giovanni, in the v. Cilino, n. 27.
III " - in the ex-barracks of the Italian carabineers, via dell'Istria.
IV " - in Scoglietto, in the Marin restaurant.

8) Disobedience to these orders will be punished by the peculiar court-martial.

Trieste, 4 may 1945

Member of Politburo
the Political Commissioner
Frank STARC m.p.

Marshal of the People
The Town Commander
Major General
Josip SMILJ m.p.

O R D E R N. 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNG No. 785015

[illegible], inventory, archives, all currency, valuable objects, [illegible], cattle, cigarettes, wines and whatever belonged to the enemy army of occupation and to the military militia units of the occupant is war booty of the Yugoslav army and has to be handed over within the above mentioned delay, or declared to the town command.

3) Whoever within the last few days has arbitrarily taken any object whatever which is military or state property, or of public or private interest is obliged to hand over everything within three days to the Town Command, otherwise, he will be punished in accordance with military laws.

4) Whoever will be caught in the act of stealing or looting will be shot on the spot.

5) All weapons which are not for military use must be handed over by their owners to be put temporarily in custody of the nearest military authority.

6) Should the kind or the amount of the arms, ammunitions, explosive and other materials prevent their being transported or transferred, the owner or whoever else in their position has to inform the nearest military command within the prescribed delay.

7) In Trieste, the above mentioned material must be delivered in the following sectors of the Trieste Town Command.

I	sector	- Roiano, in the building of the elementary school.
II	"	- in S. Giovanni, in via G. Gilino, n. 27.
IIII	"	- in the ex-barracks of the Italian Carabineers, via dell'Istria.
IV	"	- in Colloverde, in the Giardin restaurant.

8) Disobedience to these orders will be punished by the Yugoslav Court-Martial.

Trieste, 4 May 1945

[illegible] TO [illegible]
The Political Commissioner
Great STUKA n.p.

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Town Commander
Major General
Josip GRUDI n.p.

O R D E R N. 4

1) The Trieste Town Command orders all the employees, workers and staff of the Public Services (water, electricity, gas and other services of the municipal administration);
Hospitals, chemists shops, and other sanitary organizations;
Harbour master's offices, and all maritime services;
Railway administration and workshops;
Post, telegraph, telephone and wireless services;
Industrial and artisan enterprises;
Shops and firms;
As well as all other enterprises and institutions;

TO [illegible] WORK AS USUAL AND CARRY ON WITHOUT INTERRUPTION.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4) All banks and insurance firms will remained closed till further orders; their respective offices and safes will be sealed by officials of the Trieste town command. The directors and managers of the said institutes will be personally responsible for the regular situation of the safes.

5) All action aiming at preventing the execution of the present order, on the part of hostile fascist elements will be punished by the Court-martial of the Yugoslav army

DEATH TO FASCISM
The Political Commissioner
Frank STARC m.p.

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Town Commander
Major General
Josip CLAUT m.p.

' OUR FUTURE ' (Trieste, 6 May 1945)

O R D E R N. 6

The civilian population is authorized, till further orders, to circulate in town from 7 to 18 hours.

Trieste, 7 May 1945

DEATH TO FASCISM

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Commander:
Major General
Josip CLAUT m.p.

O R D E R N. 7

1) Demonstrations of nationalist intolerance of any kind, from any side whatever, are strictly forbidden.

2) Till further orders, gatherings in the streets or in public places are forbidden.

3) All the people who will be found in possession of arms without a special permission from the Yugoslav military authorities will be punished by the Yugoslav court martial.

4) This ordinance will be in force from the day of its publication.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.4(b)(1) NND 78S015

DEATH TO FASCISM
The political Commissioner
Vitali Copic m.p.

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Town Commander
Major General
Josip Gumz m.p.

" OUR PURPOSE " (Trieste, 6 May 1945)

ORDER N. 6

The civilian population is authorized, till further orders, to circulate in town from 7 to 18 hours.

Trieste, 6 May 1945

DEATH TO FASCISM

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Commander:
Major General
Josip Gumz m.p.

ORDER N. 7

1) Demonstrations of nationalist intolerance of any kind, from any side whatever, are strictly forbidden.

2) Till further orders, gatherings in the streets or in public places are forbidden.

3) All the people who will be found in possession of arms without a special permission from the Yugoslav military authorities will be punished by the Yugoslav court martial.

4) This ordinance will be in force from the day of its publication.

Trieste, 6 May 1945

DEATH TO FASCISM

FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
The Town Commander
Major General
Josip Gumz m.p.

44a

n.c.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785045

OUR FUTURE

Trieste, Tuesday 8 May 1945

Constitution of the first Slovene government

Historical meeting of representatives of the people in the village of Kidričine, in the presence of high ranking personalities of the Federation, of the Allied Military Missions, representatives of the Army forces, of the political organizations and of the citizens of the coast.

On May 8th 1945, at 15 hours, an important meeting of the presidency of the Slovenian national liberation council took place in liberated Kidričine. The meeting was opened by president Josep Vidmar stated that its main duty was the constitution and the oath of the first Slovenian national government. All the members of the Slovenian national liberation council who could do so attended the meeting, as well as a few guests of honour, among whom the president of the A.V.N.O.I., dr. Ivan Ribar, the Vice-President of the central Yugoslav government, Edvard Kardelj, the chief of the high command of the Yugoslav army, Lieutenant General, Arso Jovanovic, the president of Serbia, Dr. Slobin Stankovic, the great Minister of interior, Vicko Krstulovic, the president of the regional A.V.N.O. for the Slovenian coast, Franz Bevk; the minister of the central government, Sava Kosanovic and dr. Drago Marusic; the Minister for Slovenia, Edvard Kardelj; the representative of the Italian minority within the C.N. regional committee, Eugenio Laurenti; the chief of the Soviet military mission to the high command, Col. Bogomolov; the representative of the Red Army to the great high command, Col. Mak; the chief of the British mission, Maj. Pears, and the chief of the American mission, Capt. Klatuik. The opening speech of president Josip Vidmar was followed by the opening speeches of dr. Ribar, of Arso Jovanovic, of dr. Slobin Stankovic, Vicko Krstulovic, Franz Bevk, Eugenio Laurenti and Col. Bogomolov. This was the opening part of the solemn meeting.

The report of the secretary of the I.N.O. F., Boris Kidric, was then read, and president Josip Vidmar opened the debate. The minister for informations and propaganda to the central government, Sava Kosanovic, the religious adviser to the Slovenian high command, dr. Matej Klinar, the commissioner of the 7th Corps James Kribar, Lidia Šentjurčeva in the name of Slovenian women, Ivan Regent in the name of the Slovenians of Trieste, Maj. Pears in the name of the English mission and Capt. Klatuik in the name of the American military mission made speeches.

After an interval, president Josep Vidmar proceeded with the constitution of the government. First, the secretary of the presidency of the A.V.N.O.I. comrade Kidrič read the status on the constitution of the Slovenian national government, which the presidency unanimously approved. Then, President Josep Vidmar offered to confer a mandate for the constitution of the government to comrade Boris Kidric. The mandatary, after conferring with the members of the executive committee, accepted the mandate. President Josep Vidmar then read an order on the constitution of the government.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

political organizations and of the [illegible]

On May 7th 1945, at 17 hours, an important meeting of the presidency of the Slovenian national liberation council took place in liberated Ajdovsina. The meeting was opened by president Josip Vidmar stated that its main duty was the constitution and the oath of the first slovenian national government. All the members of the slovenian national liberation council who could do so attended the meeting, as well as a few guests of honour, among whom the president of the A.V.N.O.J., dr. Ivan Ribar, the Vice-President of the central yugoslav government, Edvard Kardelj, the chief of the high command of the yugoslav army, Lieutenant General, Arso Jovanovic, the president of Serbia, dr. Slobodan Jovanovic, the Great Minister of Interior, Vicko Krstulovic, the president of the regional N.O.O. for the Slovenian Coast, Franc Leskovsek; the Minister of the central government, Dusan Kvaternik and dr. Drago Marusic; the Minister for Slovenia, Edvard Kocbek; the representative of the Italian minority within the O.N. regional committee, Augusto Laurenti; the chief of the soviet military mission to the high command, Col. Pogumolov; the representative of the Red Army to the Great command, Col. Gak; the chief of the British mission, Maj. Peara, and the chief of the American mission, Capt. Klatnik. The opening speech of president Josip Vidmar was followed by the opening speeches of dr. Ribar, of Arso Jovanovic, of dr. Slobodan Jovanovic, Vicko Krstulovic, Franc Leskovsek, Augusto Laurenti and Col. Pogumolov. This was the opening part of the solemn meeting.

The report of the secretary of the I.O.O. F., Boris Kidric, was then read, and president Josip Vidmar opened the debate. The Minister for Information and propaganda to the central government, Dusan Kvaternik, the religious adviser to the Slovenian high command, dr. Ignac Lenkum, the commissioner of the 7th Corps Franc Kribar, Lidia Sentjurcevu in the name of Slovenian women, Ivan Regent in the name of the Slovenians of Trieste, Maj. Peara in the name of the English mission and Capt. Klatnik in the name of the American military mission made speeches.

After an interval, President Josip Vidmar proceeded with the constitution of the Government. First, the secretary of the presidency of the S.N.O.S. comrade Lubej read the status on the constitution of the Slovenian national Government, which the presidency unanimously approved. Then, President Josip Vidmar offered to confer a mandate for the constitution of the Government to comrade Boris Kidric. The mandatary, after conferring with the members of the executive committee, accepted the mandate. President Josip Vidmar then read an order on the constitution of the Government.

The Government is formed:

President	Boris Kidric
Vice-President	Dr. Marjan Brecelj
Minister for Interior	Edvard Kocbek
Minister for Justice	Dr. Josip Vilfan
Minister for Instruction	Fedor Gosak
Minister of Finance	Dr. Ales Bebler
Minister for Industry and Mines	Franc Leskosek
Minister for Commerce and Economy	Dr. Lado Vavpetic
Minister for Agriculture	Janez Hribar

44a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Minister for Forests — Jose Velasc
Minister for Public Health — Dr. Marjan Klein
Minister for Social Policy — Vida Tomsic
Minister for Constructions — Mr. Mika Pandic
Minister for Local Communications Franc Snoj

The new Government took its oath to the people, and signed the oath, then, President Josep Vidmar, [illegible] and [illegible] Kardelj, the other members of the central government who were present, and the representatives of the other civilian and military authorities congratulated the new ministers. The secretary of the S.F.R.J. presidency spoke and suggested to send a wire to Marshal Tito.

The solemn meeting was closed by President Josep Vidmar who asked all those who were present to participate in the demonstration which took place on the square of Ljubljana.

E.C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

...en, President Josep ... and the other members of the central government who were present, and the representatives of the ... civilian and military authorities congratulated the new ministers. The secretary of the ...U.C.D. presidency spoke and suggested to send a wire to General Diaz.

The ... meeting was closed by President Josep Suñer who asked all those who were present to participate in the demonstration which took place on the Square of Atocha.

E.C.

44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC Ltr. 78-0175

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Translation

MAY 12 RECD

State Department
The Secretary General

S/736

Rome, 9 May 1945

Dear Admiral,

I enclose the newspaper cuttings which His Ex. Minister De Gasperi mentioned to you in your conversation of to-day.

The letter mentioned by His Ex. the Minister in the same conversation is the one which you sent Marchese Visconti Venosta on September 11th 1944, n. W/CC. 521, in answer to the letter he sent you on August 15th 1944, n. 1/256.

I enclose a copy of both letters.

Sincerely,

E. N. Thomas

See 46
See 58

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.
Chief of the Allied Commission
A P O 6

14/V
cc Distribution:

~~Pol. Advisor (A) 44a~~
Ex Com (1)
" (1)
G-5 AFHQ (1) (with covering letter)
Pol. Adviser (A)

44a

1008/C/800

1201

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

Translation

MAY 12 RECD

State Department
The Secretary General

3/738

Rome, 9 May 1945

Dear Admiral,

I enclose the newspaper cuttings which His Ex. Minister De Gasperi mentioned to you in your conversation of to-day.

The letter mentioned by His Ex. the Minister in the same conversation is the one which you sent Ambassador Visconti Venosta on September 11th 1944, n. 3/30. 321, in answer to the letter he sent you on August 15th 1944, n. 1/256.

I enclose a copy of both letters.

Sincerely,

S. D. Primas

See 46
See 58

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.
Chief of the Allied Commission
Rome

14/II
CC Distribution:

~~Pol Advisers (2) AFHQ~~
Ex Com (1)
C.C. (1)
CC (1)
G-5 AFHQ (with covering letter)
Pol. Adviser (A)

44a

NARA Date 8/2001

MAY 12 RECD

1

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

11.9.44

A/CC.321

My dear Marchese Venosta,

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.

HALLEY G.STONE
Captain USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3(b)(1) NND 963215
NARS, Date 12-18-96

My dear Marchese Venosta,

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.

Sincerely yours,

ELLERY W. STONE
Capt. in USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Marchese G.Visconti Venosta
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government

H+a

NND 787015 By NARS, Date 12/28/76

1206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Translation

17 August 1944

1/230

Dear Admiral,

The military events which are taking place and are so glorious for the nations which are fighting together against Germany show that the day in which the invaded territories will finally be liberated is coming near.

The Italian Government is greatly worried by the possibility that when Venezia Giulia will be liberated, contacts between armed bands and peace-loving citizens may bring about bloodshed in the cities and villages of a region which has already suffered so much.

To avoid the possibility of violence and mass unrest, we think it is our duty to draw the attention of the Allied Governments on this painful possibility, for whatever action they may deem advisable to take.

This, out of human solidarity and to avoid violence and trouble, as well as new reasons for discord and new causes of rancour among the populations, which in future, in their interest as well as in the interest of European peace, will have to forget old strives and get linked by bonds of fruitful collaboration.

I remain,

Yours very truly,

s. Visconti Venosta

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
R O M E

W.C.

44a

1205

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

IL SEGRETARIO GENERALE

3/758

MAY 12 1980

Roma, li'

Caro Ammiraglio,

le invio qui accluso le copie dei ritagli di giornali di cui le ha parlato S.E.il Ministro De Gasperi nella sua odierna conversazione.

La lettera alla quale S.E.il Ministro ha alluso nella stessa conversazione è quella da lei diretta al Marchese Visconti Venosta l'11 settembre 1944 sotto il n.A/CC.321, in risposta alla lettera da lui direttale il 15 agosto 1944, sotto il n.1/236.

Le accludo ad ogni buon fine copia di entrambe le lettere.

Molto cordialmente

R. Ruini

All'Ammiraglio Ellery W. STONE, U.S.N.R.
Capo della Commissione Alleata

R o m a

4/4/a

" IL NOSTRO AVVENIRE "

Trieste 4 maggio 1945

ESERCITO JUGOSLAVO
Comando Supremo della Slovenia
Comando città di Trieste

O R D I N E N. 1

1. Nella città di Trieste ogni potere viene assunto dal Comando città di Trieste, che proclama lo stato di guerra.

2. Alla popolazione civile viene permesso, fino a nuovo ordine, la circolazione per la città dalle ore 10 fino alle 15; ai militari invece dalle 7 fino alle ore 19.

3. Gli autoveicoli possono circolare per la città solo muniti di autorizzazione speciale del Comando città di Trieste.

4. Tutti gli autoveicoli devono venir notificati, per iscritto, nel termine di cinque giorni, al Comando città di Trieste.

5. Domani, 4 maggio, alle ore 1 di mattina tutti gli orologi vengono spostati indietro di un'ora in modo da uniformare il tempo con quello del resto della Jugoslavia.

6. Ogni non ottemperanza agli ordini del Comando città sarà punita dai tribunali militari dell'Armata Jugoslava.

La sede del Comando città è nel Palazzo Comunale.

Trieste, 3 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO
Bruno STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI
Maggior generale
Josip VIDALI m.p.

O R D I N E N. 2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

O R D I N E N. 1

1. Nella città di Trieste ogni potere viene assunto dal Comando città di Trieste, che proclama lo stato di guerra.

2. Alla popolazione civile viene permesso, fino a nuovo ordine, la circolazione per la città dalle ore 10 fino alle 15; ai militari invece dalle 7 fino alle ore 19.

3. Gli autoveicoli possono circolare per la città solo muniti di autorizzazione speciale del Comando città di Trieste.

4. Tutti gli autoveicoli devono venir certificati, per iscritto, nel termine di cinque giorni, al Comando città di Trieste.

5. Domani, 4 maggio, alle ore 1 di mattina tutti gli orologi vengono spostati indietro di un'ora in modo da uniformare il tempo con quello del resto della Jugoslavia.

6. Ogni non ottemperanza agli ordini del Comando città sarà punita dai tribunali militari dell'Armata Jugoslava.

La sede del Comando città è nel Palazzo Comunale.

Trieste, 3 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO
Franc STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI
Maggior generale
Josip VIDALI m.p.

O R D I N E N. 2

1) Tutti gli appartenenti alle unità dell'Esercito tedesco di occupazione, ai gruppi al servizio dell'occupatore e a tutti gli altri gruppi armati, che non si trovano nei quadri dell'Esercito

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jugoslavo, devono, entro 24 ore dalla pubblicazione di questo ordine, presentarsi con tutto l'armamento ed equipaggiamento militare, sia in gruppo che singolarmente, alla più vicina unità militare dell'Esercito jugoslavo oppure al Comando di città. Contro i colpevoli si procederà a termini delle leggi internazionali.

2) La popolazione del territorio liberato è invitata a indicare subito alle unità dell'esercito jugoslavo o al Comando di città le località dove si trovano gruppi o individui delle unità armate sopra citate. Questo vale altresì per i nascondigli delle armi, dei viveri e di ogni altro materiale militare. Chi conosce tali depositi o magazzini è comandato custodirli fino alla presa di possesso delle autorità militari.

3) Qualsiasi occultazione dei sopra citati individui e materiali è severamente proibita e i colpevoli saranno puniti dai Tribunali militari jugoslavi.

Trieste, 3 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO
Il Commissario Politico:
Frank STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI
Il Comandante di città
Maggior generale
Josip OBLAK m.p.

O R D I N E N. 3

1. Tutte le armi, servibili o non servibili, tutte le munizioni, esplosivi e loro pezzi devono venir consegnati al più tardi entro 24 ore dopo la pubblicazione del presente Ordine.

2. Qualsiasi equipaggiamento militare, veicoli, ordigni, velivo-

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tro i colpevoli si procederà a termini delle leggi internazionali.

2) La popolazione del territorio liberato è invitata a indicare subito alle unità dell'esercito jugoslavo o al Comando di città le località dove si trovano gruppi o individui delle unità sopra citate. Questo vale altresì per i nascondigli delle armi, dei viveri e di ogni altro materiale militare. Chi conosce tali depositi o magazzini è comandato custodirli fino alla presa di possesso delle autorità militari.

3) Qualsiasi occultazione dei sopra citati individui e materiali è severamente proibita e i colpevoli saranno puniti dai Tribunali militari jugoslavi.

Trieste, 3 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO

Il Commissario Politico:
Frank STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI

Il Comandante di città
Maggior generale
Josip ODNIL m.p.

O R D I N E N. 3

1. Tutte le armi, servibili o non servibili, tutte le munizioni, esplosivi e loro pezzi devono venir consegnati al più tardi entro 24 ore dopo la pubblicazione del presente Ordine.

2. Qualsiasi equipaggiamento militare, veicoli, ordigni, velivoli, materiale, combustibili per motori, lubrificanti, inventario, archivio, tutte le monete, valori e preziosi, viveri, bestiame, manufatti di tabacco e tutto quanto apparteneva all'esercito d'occu-

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pazione nemico ed alle unità militari ausiliarie dell'occupatore, è bottino di guerra dell'armata jugoslava e deve venir consegnato nel termine sopra prescritto oppure notificato al Comando di città.

3. Chiunque negli ultimi giorni si è impossessato arbitrariamente di qualsiasi oggetto di proprietà militare, statale, di interesse pubblico o privato, è obbligato a consegnare il tutto entro tre giorni al Comando di città, altrimenti sarà punito ai sensi delle leggi militari.

4. Chiunque sarà sorpreso in flagrante furto o rapina, sarà passato sul posto per le armi.

5. Tutte le armi di uso non militare devono dai proprietari essere date in custodia temporanea all'autorità militare più vicina.

6. Qualora la qualità o quantità delle armi, delle munizioni, degli esplosivi ed altri materiali non ne consentano il trasporto o il trasferimento, il proprietario, oppure chiunque conosce la loro ubicazione è obbligato di notificare ciò nel termine sopra prescritto al Comando Militare più vicino.

7. A Trieste deve avvenire la consegna del materiale sopra indicato nei seguenti settori del Comando città di Trieste :

I settore - Roiano, nell'edificio della scuola elementare.
II " - a S.Giovanni, nella Via S. Cilino n.27
III " - nell'ex caserma dei Carabinieri italiani in Via dell'Istria.
IV " - a Colloveo, nella trattoria Nardin.

8. Le trasgressioni degli ordini suddetti saranno punite dai Tribunali militari jugoslavi.

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3. Chiunque negli ultimi giorni si è impossessato di qualsiasi oggetto di proprietà militare, statale, di interesse pubblico o privato, è obbligato a consegnare il tutto entro tre giorni al Comando di città, altrimenti sarà punito a sensi delle leggi militari.

4. Chiunque sarà sorpreso in flagrante furto o rapina, sarà passato sul posto per le armi.

5. Tutte le armi di uso con militare devono dai proprietari essere date in custodia temporanea all'autorità militare più vicina.

6. Qualora la nobilità o quantità delle armi, delle munizioni, degli esplosivi ed altri materiali non ne consentano il trasporto o il trasferimento, il proprietario, oppure chiunque conosce la loro ubicazione è obbligato di notificare ciò nel termine sopra prescritto al Comando militare più vicino.

7. A Trieste deve avvenire la consegna del materiale sopra indicato nei seguenti settori del Comando città di Trieste :

I settore - Roiano, nell'edificio della scuola elementare.

II " - a S.Giovanni, nella Via S. Cilino N.27

III " - nell'ex caserma dei Carabinieri italiani in Via dell'Istria.

IV " - a Colorcovez, nella trattoria Nordin.

8. Le trasgressioni degli ordini suddetti saranno punite dai Tribunali militari jugoslavi.

Trieste 1 maggio 1945.

MORTE AL FASCISMO!
Il Commissario Politico
Frank STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !
Il Comandante di città
Maggior generale
Josip CRNI m.p.

(4+c)

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O R D I N E N. 4

1) Il Comando città di Trieste ordina a tutti gli addetti, operai ed altro personale dei :

Servizi pubblici (acqua, elettricità, gas e di altri servizi dell'Amministrazione comunale);

Ospedali, farmacie e delle altre istituzioni sanitarie;

Capitaneria del porto e di tutti gli altri servizi marittimi;

Amministrazione e officine ferroviarie;

Servizi postelegrafonici, telefonici e radiofonici;

Imprese industriali ed artigiane;

Negozi ed aziende commerciali;

come pure di tutte le altre imprese ed istituzioni;

DI MANTENERE IMMEDIATAMENTE IL LAVORO E CONTINUARLO SENZA INTERRUZIONI.

2) Tutti gli istituti bancari e assicurativi restano chiusi fino a nuovo ordine, i rispettivi locali e le casse saranno sigillate da funzionari del Comando città di Trieste. I direttori, rispettivamente gli amministratori, di questi istituti risponderanno di persone della situazione regolare delle casse.

3) Ogni azione tendente a turbare l'esecuzione del presente ordine, da parte di elementi fascisti ostili sarà punita dai Tribunali militari dell'armata jugoslava.

MORTE AL FASCISMO!
Il Commissario politico
Frank STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !
Il Comandante di città
Maggior generale
Josip ČERNI m.p.

" IL NOSTRO AVVENIRE " (Trieste 6 maggio 1945)

O R D I N E N. 6

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Ospedali, farmacie e delle altre istituzioni sanitarie;
Capitaneria del porto e di tutti gli altri servizi marittimi;
Amministrazione e officine ferroviarie;
Servizi postelegrafonici, telefonici e radiofonici;
Imprese industriali ed artigiane;
Negozi ed aziende commerciali;
come pure di tutte le altre imprese ed istituzioni;

DI RIPRENDERE IMMEDIATAMENTE IL LAVORO E CONTINUARLO SENZA INTERRUZIONI.

2) Tutti gli istituti bancari e assicurativi restano chiusi fino a nuovo ordine, i rispettivi locali e le casse saranno sigillate da funzionari del Comando città di Trieste. I direttori, rispettivamente gli amministratori, di questi istituti rispondono di persona della situazione regolare delle casse.

3) Ogni azione tendente a turbare l'esecuzione del presente ordine, da parte di elementi fascisti ostili sarà punita dai tribunali militari dell'armata jugoslava.

MORTE AL FASCISMO!
Il Commissario politico
Frank STOKA m.p.

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !
Il Comandante di città
Maggior generale
Josip GERNI m.p.

" IL NOSTRO AVVENIRE " (Trieste 6 maggio 1945)

O R D I N E N. 6

Alla popolazione civile è permessa, fino a nuovo ordine, la circolazione per le città dalle ore 7 alle ore 18.

Trieste 5 maggio 1945.

A MORTE IL FASCISMO !

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !
Il Comandante :
Generale Maggiore
Josip GERNI m.p.

(4/a)

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O R D I N E N. 7

1) Viene severamente proibita ogni manifestazione di intolleranza nazionalistica, da qualunque parte essa provenga.

2) E' vietato fino a nuovo ordine ogni raggruppamento per le strade e nei locali pubblici.

3) Ogni persona che verrà trovata in possesso di armi senza uno speciale permesso delle autorità militari jugoslave sarà punita dai Tribunali militari dell'esercito jugoslavo.

4) Questa ordinanza entra in vigore il giorno della sua pubblicazione.

Trieste 6 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO !

LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !

Il Comandante di città :
Maggior generale
Josip GERSI m.p.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

O R D I N E N. 7

1) Viene severamente proibita ogni manifestazione di intolleranza nazionalistica, da chiunque parte essa provenga.

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3) Ogni persona che verrà trovata in possesso di armi senza uno speciale permesso delle autorità militari jugoslave sarà punita dai Tribunali militari dell'esercito jugoslavo.

4) Questa ordinanza entra in vigore il giorno della sua pubblicazione.

Trieste 6 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO ! LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !

Il Comandante di città :
Maggior generale
Josip OERNI m.p.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ai e dei locali pubblici.

3) Ogni persona che verrà trovata in possesso di armi senza uno speciale permesso delle autorità militari jugoslave sarà punita dai Tribunali militari dell'esercito jugoslavo.

4) Questa ordinanza entra in vigore il giorno della sua pubblicazione.

Trieste 6 maggio 1945

MORTE AL FASCISMO ! LIBERTA' AI POPOLI !

Il Comandante di città :
Maggior generale
Josip DEKIĆ m.p.

(4a)

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IL NOSTRO AVVENIRE

Trieste, martedì 8 maggio 1945

LA COSTITUZIONE DEL PRIMO GOVERNO SLOVENO

Storica assemblea di rappresentanti del popolo nella ridente borgata di Aidussina, alle presenza di alte personalità della Federazione, delle Missioni militari alleate, di rappresentanti delle forze armate, delle organizzazioni politiche e degli italiani del Litorale.

Il 5 maggio 1945 alle ore 13 ha avuto luogo in Aidussina liberata una importante seduta della presidenza del Consiglio liberatore nazionale sloveno. La seduta è stata aperta dal presidente Josep Widmar, il quale ha affermato che suo compito principale era la costituzione ed il giuramento del primo governo sloveno nazionale. Hanno partecipato alla seduta tutti i membri del consiglio di liberazione nazionale sloveno che si sono potuti radunare ed alcuni ospiti d'onore fra cui il presidente dell'A.V.N.O.I. dott.Ivan Ribar, il vicepresidente del Governo jugoslavo centrale Edvard Kardelj il capo del comando supremo dell'armata jugoslava luogotenente generale Arsa Jovanovic, il presidente della Serbia dott.Sinisa Stankovic, il Ministro degli interni croato Vicko Krstulovic, il presidente del N.O.O. regionale per il Litorale sloveno Franz Bevk ; il ministro del governo centrale Save Kossanovic ed il dott.Drago Marussig, il ministro per la Slovenia Edvard Kozbek, il rappresentante della minoranza italiana in seno al comitato regionale dell'O.F. del litorale sloveno Eugenio Laurenti, il capo della missione militare sovietica presso il comando supremo, col.Bogomolov, il rappresentante dell'Armata Rossa presso il comando supremo croato col.Rak, il capo della missione inglese magg.Pears ed il capo della missione americana cap.Blatnik. Al saluto del presidente Josip Widmar hanno seguito i discorsi di saluto del dott.Ribar, di Arsa Jovanovic, del dott.Sinisa Stankovic, di Vicko.Krstulevic,di Franz Bevk, di Eugenio Laurenti e del col. Bogomolov. Con cio' è stata conclusa la parte inaugurale della solenne

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zioni militari alleate, di rappresentanti delle forze armate, delle organizzazioni politiche e degli italiani del Litorale.

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E' stato letto quindi il rapporto del segretario dell'I.O.O.F. Boris Kidric, dopo di che il presidente Josip Widmar ha aperto le discussioni. Hanno preso la parola il ministro per le informazioni e la propaganda pres-

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so il governo centrale Sava Kossancvic, il referente religioso presso il comando supremo della Slovenia dott.Metod Mikuz, il commissario del 7° Corpo Janes Hribar, Lidia Sentjurceva in nome delle donne slovene, Ivan Regent in nome degli sloveni di Trieste, il magg.Pears in nome della missione inglese ed il capitano Bletnik in nome della missione militare americana.

Dopo un intervallo il presidente Josip Widmar ha dato seguito alla costituzione del Governo. Anzitutto il segretario della presidenza del S.N.O.S. compagno Lubej ha letto lo statuto sulla costituzione del governo nazionale sloveno, che la presidenza ha approvato unanimamente . In seguito il presidente Josip Widmar ha proposto di conferire il mandato per la costituzione del Governo al compagno Boris Kidric. Il mandatario, dopo un consiglio con i membri del comitato esecutivo ha accolto il mandato. Quindi il presidente Josip Widmar ha letto l'ordine sulla costituzione del Governo.

Il Governo è costituito :

Presidente - Boris Kidric
Vicepresidente- Dott.Marjan Brezelj;
Ministro degli interni - Zoran Kolic;
Ministro della giustizia - Dott.Jose Pokorn;
Ministro dell'istruzione - Ferdo Kosak;
Ministro delle finanze - Dott.Ales Bebler;
Ministro per l'industria e le miniere - Franz Leskosek;
Ministro per il commercio e l'economia - Dott.Lado Vavpetic;
Ministro per l'agricoltura - Janes Hriber;
Ministro per le foreste - Tone Fajsar;
Ministro per la sanità - Dott.Marjan Ahcin;
Ministro per la politica sociale, Vida Tomsic;
Ministro per le costruzioni - Dott. Miha Kandic;
Ministro per le amministrazioni locali - Franz Snoj.

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Dopo un intervallo il presidente Josip Widmar ha dato seguito alla costituzione del Governo. Anzitutto il segretario della presidenza del S.N.O.S. compagno Lubej ha letto lo statuto sulla costituzione del governo nazionale sloveno, che la presidenza ha approvato unanimamente . In seguito il presidente Josip Widmar ha proposto di conferire il mandato per la costituzione del Governo al compagno Boris Kidric. Il mandatario, dopo un consiglio con i membri del comitato esecutivo ha accolto il mandato. Quindi il presidente Josip Widmar ha letto l'ordine sulla costituzione del Governo.

Il Governo è costituito :

Presidente - Boris Kidric
Vicepresidente- Dott.Marjan Brezelj;
Ministro degli interni - Zoran Kolic;
Ministro della giustizia - Dott.Jose Pokorn;
Ministro dell'istruzione - Ferdo Kosak;
Ministro delle finanze - Dott.Ales Bebler;
Ministro per l'industria e le miniere - Franz Leskosek;
Ministro per il commercio e l'economia - Dott.Lado Vavpetic;
Ministro per l'agricoltura - Janes Hribar;
Ministro per le foreste - Tone Fajsar;
Ministro per la sanità - Dott.Marjan Ahein;
Ministro per la politica sociale, Vida Tomsic;
Ministro per le costruzioni - Dott. Miha Kandic;
Ministro per le comunicazioni locali - Franz Snoj.

Il nuovo Governo ha giurato fedeltà al popolo ed ha firmato il giuramento, dopo di che si sono congratulati con i nuovi ministri il presidente Josip Widmar, il presidente dott.Ivan Ribar, gli altri membri del governo centrale presenti ed i rappresentanti delle altre autorità civili e militari. Ha preso la parola il segretario della presidenza del S.N.O.S. che

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ha proposto di inviare un telegramma di saluto al Maresciallo Tito.

La solenne seduta è stata chiusa dal presidente Josip Widmar il quale ha invitato tutti i presenti a prendere parte alla manifestazione che si è svolta sulla piazza di Aidussina.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

e. c.

10 REC'D

FOR ACTION PERSONAL FOR AIR COMMODORE HENDON AND KIRBY ARMY

7206 9 May 1945 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD I REALISE DIFFICULTY OF COMMUNICATIONS BUT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT WE SHOULD RECEIVE THE FULLEST DAILY INFORMATION FROM ABLE MIDDLE GEORGE LIAISON OFFICERS IN VENEZIA GIULIA AS TO LOCAL SITUATION PD

PARA TO FOR ACTION PERSONAL FOR AIR COMMODORE HENDON AND KIRBY ARMY FROM FD ALEXANDER ACKNOWLEDGE PARA

PARA TWO PD REPORTS ARE BEING RECEIVED BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WITH FULLER INFORMATION THAN WE HAVE AT OUR DISPOSAL SUBSTANCE EASY POINT CROSSING POINT TRIESTE PRIORITY OF MAY EIGHT PD GRATEFUL IF YOU CAN HELP

Executive Commissioner

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M. S. LUSH, Brigadier
Executive Commissioner.

NICHOLAS PIZZUTO
CWO, USA,
Asst. Adjutant.

(44)

9 Nov 45

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MAY 8 8PM
ec. 1500.

TO : AFHQ for G-5 (ACTION) and for British Rosmin and US Polad (INFO) rptd 15th Army Group for G-5(INFO), 8th Army Main for AMG (INFO)

Ref No. 7186. 8 May PRIORITY

TOP SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS WHO FEEDS VENEZIA GIULIA PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE SECTION (ACTION) AND FOR BRITISH RESULT AND US POLAD FOR INFO RPTD FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FOR INFO AND EIGHTH ARMY MAIN FOR AMG FOR INFO FROM HQ ALCOM CITY ACHKG PAREN SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER EIGHTH ARMY WHO HAS TOURED PART OF TERRITORY STATES THAT PEOPLE ARE DEFINITELY SHORT OF FOOD PD IF THE ALLIES BRING IN FOOD HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE MISAPPROPRIATED BY YUGOSLAVS WHO HAVE ALREADY STOLEN TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO TONS OF SUPPLIES FROM UDINE PROVINCE PD I RECOMMEND THAT NO REPEAT NO FOOD BE SUPPLIED BY ALLIED AUTHORITIES AT PRESENT

Copy to: US Ambassador
BR Ambassador
US Pol Adv
BR Pol Adv
Acting President
Chief Commissioner
Economic Section (2)
File

2cc (45)

Executive Commissioner.
343

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

TOP SECRET

43

1225

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

7868 7 May 45

[illegible] PD

PARA 6BB PD POLLUTING PARAMECIA SIZED FISH ARE KNOWN AFFT BOMBS FEWS MAY PD

[illegible]

UNITS PD SITUATION NOT FULLY KNOWN PD LIGHT AND RADAR FUNCTIONING TO UNMET ADMINISTRATIVE PERILS PD PID SLAV HOSPITALS IN UNITS THEY CAA CITIZENS CAA WANDERED AND SOUTH EAST UNITS PROVIDE BY CLOTHS INTACHMENTS WITH CANADIAN PERSONS PD RENOVATIONS HOPKINS OF LOSING AND VIOLATION BY SLAVONIC IN SOUTH EAST FRONT PD BEING INVESTIGATED AND GENERAL REPORT SUBJECT PD

[illegible]

(36) a

L

(42) a Office of Base Commissioner

735

5

14

3 Copies

7 Army

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 7 RECD
CC 1930

AFHQ for G-5, British Element & US Mainl, rptd 15th Army Group for G-5,
8th Army Main for A-G.

7130 7 May OF PRIORITY

TOP SECRET FD

PROVISIONAL OCCUPATION DECISIONS OCCUR FOR NEWS SOURCE FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION IN CORFU PAPER AS FOLLOWS FD BAN OF ENEMY YUGOSLAV MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN FULL EFFECT FD ENEMY YUGOSLAV PROCLAMATIONS POSTED IN CORFU CEASED BY ORDER OCCUPATION OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS EVEN EASY CASE A YUGOSLAV MILITARY COMMISSION WAS POSTED EVACUATION PROVIDE BASE OF LARGE SCALE GUERILLA OR GOVERNMENT CIA MEETINGS WAR CRIMES CAN ESTABLISHING CERTAIN CASE PROVISIONS SURRENDER ARMS MUNITIONS FD OFFENDERS WILL BE TRIED BY MILITARY COURTS FD ALL PUBLIC BUILDINGS QUARTERS AND YUGOSLAV FLAGS FLYING IN PLACE TO ARE FOR CHANGE MUST FIVE A SECTION CAN BRITISH EQUIP AND BE POLAR ELSE FLYING ARMY CHIEF FOR CHANGE MUST FIVE CAN MOVEMENT MAIN USE ARE FLAG FD ALSO CITY AGREE PAPER ITALIAN NOMENCLATURE OF TOWN SQUARES REPLACED BY YUGOSLAV FD IN CORFU TOWN ITALIAN CHARLIE LOVE HAS REPLACED BY YUGOSLAV CHARLIE LOVE HAS FD LARGE NUMBER PERSONS ARRESTED AND REMOVED INCLUDING KNOWN ITALIAN SYMPATHIZERS CAN NO REPORTS OF EXECUTIONS YET FD PUBLIC SERVICES WORKING FD POST ARMISTICE PERIOD REQUISITIONING BY YUGOSLAVS UNIVERSAL FD FEW YUGOSLAV TROOPS BUT NUMBER YUGOSLAV PARTISANS FD SLOVENE POPULATION NATURALLY HOSTILE MOST ITALIAN MOST AUTHORITATIVE

Copy to: US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
Acting President
Chief Commissioner
File

Executive Commissioner

M.S.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

(42)

1221

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

831/ops

BIGHTH ARMY ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR REGGIO REPT IMMEDIATELY

FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP AFHQ

7176 .7 MAY 1945 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL FD

REGGIO FROM MGAL[illegible] STATES STOP AUTHORITIES ISSUE SUFFICIENT FOOD

ESTABLISH CMR RATIONS GRAM INTAKE RATION MINIMUM NUMBER CONTAINERS STATES FD

FAILURE EIGHTH ARMY ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR REGGIO REPT IMMEDIATELY TO

FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP AFHQ WILL RESULT FOOD RIOTS LOOTING AND

DISTRIBUTION STORES MAY HAVE TO BE MADE BY FORCES UNDER RED CROSS AUSPICES AND NOT THROUGH

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OR YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES

Copy to: [illegible]

(41) Co

[illegible]

OFFICE OF THE [illegible]

7 Mar

1228

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET Copy No 7 2 Com MAY 6 HELD CC-1025

M 942
MAY 7/2020Z

D/9992
MAY 8/0925Z
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MAIN AND EIGHTH ARMY CITE M 942

ACTION ELINT FOR G-5 SECTION INFO: HQ AAICO, HC VENEZIA REGION FOR REGIONAL COMMISSION

33

TOP SECRET.

1. Since my M 911 have sent several signals which owing congestion of line may not have reached you.

2. Following is a summary of position in VENEZIA GIULIA and FVG.

3. VENEZIA GIULIA have removed all Military Government Officers other than those necessary for liaison only with 55 Area TRIESTE and Divisional liaison Officers. Understand food situation TRIESTE becoming serious and already very serious MONFALCONE.

4. Require urgently policys on feeding VENEZIA GIULIA if not under Military Government control, bearing in mind following, firstly provinces TRIESTE and GORIZIA largely depend for supplies on PO Valley. Secondly raiding partisans will probably come across and seize food, anyway they are already doing so UDINE. MONFALCONE 55000 inhabitants only 48 hours supply left. Yugoslav partisans have already requisitioned very large quantities food from eastern UDINE province. UDINE province sufficient food only until May 12. Am sending in 1200 tons, am sending 140 tons MONFALCONE.

5. Political situation no more than have already reported. Yugoslavs seem to be allowing southern Italians to leave TRIESTE ISOC coming through now.

6. UDINE Province patriot position as follows. Keeping patriots armed because of border position. OSOPPO partisans first class and cooperating. GARIBALDI Brigade not so good but situation in hand. Have hopes that will turn both OSOPPO and GARIBALDI to good use both as regards transport and police. Political position all friendly and committee of liberation reasonably cooperative but do not understand the position.

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TOP SECRET

7. Refugee position may get very serious. Estimates of over 100000 already in UDINE are given and more enlarged numbers coming daily over the Alps. Feeding them is difficult. Authority Five Corps ant temporarily using captured enemy dumps.

8. Situation delicate owing to location of Yugoslav troops and partisans in GORIZ and surrounding districts.

9. Currency in cash in U.DINE 160 million. city well under control and very slightly damaged.

10. Do not believe any Yugoslav currency circulating. Yugoslavs only use Metropolitan lire in VENEZIA GIULIA and AMG lire not accepted. Certain amounts AMG lire in circulation through troops. You should consider policy of withdrawing this. Understand army have asked assurance payment of troops in TRIESTE.

12. May put as many CAOS as possible into Eastern UDINE to try and stop infiltration Yugoslavs.

DIST

COPY Number 1 & 2 ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER

3 Info : CA SEC
4 ECON SEC
5 POL SEC
6 A/POLITICAL
7 CHIEF COM
8 FILE

TOP SECRET

(41)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

SECRET

M 937
MAY 071815B

D/9995
MAY 080930B
OP PRIORITY

MAIN AMG 8 ARMY FROM BENSON

AI/COM CITE M937

SECRET

Ref my V/19/30 Secret of 6 May text corrupt.

Text should read Archbishop of GORIZIA gaoled by Yugo-slaves.
Please use all your influence. I can do nothing.

Dist

Action - Exec Comm 2
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
File

C/2001

SECRET

(40) a

7 May

1231

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CC 0950
MAY 7 RECD

TOP SECRET

COMMISSIONER

Copy no 4

F 71706
MAY 062255B

D/9874
MAY 070700B
CP PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FMGEG
HQ ALCOM FOR STONE

TOP SECRET

Reur 7112 of 6 May cite ACMKO.

1. You should not discuss the establishment of AMG in VENEZIA GIULIA with Prime Minister.

2. The delicacy of the situation is fully realised and we are in close touch with WASHINGTON and LONDON. A statement will be authorised as soon as practicable.

Dist

Copy No 1 & 2 Action - Exec Comm 2
3 Info - A/President
4 Chief Commissioner
5 File

TOP SECRET

AFHQ for G-5, British Resadv and US Polad

7112 6 May GP PRIORITY

see 1014/cc

TOP SECRET FD

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS I INFORMED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON ONE OCCASION WHETHER OBSERVATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA TWO WOULD BE SET UP IN VENEZIA GIULIA OR OCCUPATION BY ALLIED TROOPS FD

PARA TWO AFHQ FOR SENIOR BRAM FIVE ADVISORS GSA BRITISH RESADV AND US POLAD FROM HQ ALSOS GIVE ACTED PARTS

BIOGRAPHIES HAVE REPORT THAT ORG HAS BEEN SET UP AND PUBLIC GENERALLY BELIEVE IT FD SHOULD BE GLAD OF INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD ADVISE PRIME MINISTER CONFIDENTIALLY THAT ORG HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED FD I MUST POINT OUT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF PRESENT REPORTS ARE ALLOWED TO GO UNCONTRADICTED FD I MUST ALSO EMPHASIZE THE DEPLORABLE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OF THE ALLIES IN THIS COUNTRY IF WE FAIL TO CARRY OUT OUR COMMITMENT ENTERED TO ABOVE ORG AT LEAST TO EXTENT OF SETTING UP ANG IN TRIESTE FD

REPRESENTATIVE OF US AND BRITISH PRESSMEN JUST RETURNED FROM NORTH ITALY REPORT THAT FEELING ON THIS QUESTION IS EXTREMELY STRONG IN NORTH ITALY

Copy to: US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
A/President
C/Commissioner
File

Re Commissioner

BJ

10008/cc

See (10)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

[see 1014/66]

TOP SECRET PD

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS I INFORMED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON 6TH 6TH SEPTEMBER ONE MAIN POINT WHICH WAS WOULD BE SET UP IN VENEZIA GIULIA ON OCCUPATION BY ALLIED TROOPS PD

PARAS TO APPX FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF FIVE SECTION ONE REVISED ISSUED AND BE PULLED FROM BY ALSOS SEPT ACTIVE PAPER

NEWSPAPERS HERE REPORT THAT AMG HAS BEEN SET UP AND PUBLIC GENERALLY BELIEVES IT PD WOULD BE GLAD OF INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD ADVISE PRIME MINISTER CONFIDENTIALLY THAT AMG HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED PD I MUST POINT OUT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF PRESENT REPORTS ARE ALLOWED TO GO UNCONTRADICTED PD I MUST ALSO EMPHASIZE THE DEPLORABLE EFFECT ON POSITION OF THE ALLIES IN THIS COUNTRY IF WE FAIL TO CARRY OUT OUR COMMITMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE AMG AT LEAST TO EXTENT OF SETTING UP AMG IN TRIESTE PD REPRESENTATIVES OF US AND BRITISH EMBASSIES JUST RETURNED FROM NORTH ITALY REPORT THAT FEELING ON THIS QUESTION IS EXTREMELY STRONG IN NORTH ITALY

Copy to: US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
A/President
C. Commissioner
File

Ex. Commissioner

345 M. E. LOSH Brig. Ex. Com.

See (10)

(39)

TOP SECRET

7

008/66

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC No. 785045

TOP SECRET

CC 1556

AFHQ for G-5, British Mission and US Poland

7114 6 May OP PRIORITY

(37)

TOP SECRET FD

FOLLOWING SUMMARY WRITTEN REPORT FROM AMG EIGHT ARMY (false) MAY FD

PARA ONE FD YUGOSLAV FORCES AND PARTISANS HAVE SET UP COMPLETE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN THE AREA OF TRIESTE AND GORIZIA (CMA) AND IN MONFALCONE VISITED BY AMG OFFICER ON TWO MAY CMA IT WAS FOUND TO BE FUNCTIONING VERY EFFICIENTLY FD REPORTS INDICATE THAT YUGOSLAV SPONSORED ADMINISTRATION IS EQUALLY EFFICIENT IN OTHER AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEIR AND BRITISH FORCES FD

PARAS TO ADD FOR BRITISH INFO SECTION GMA BRITISH FORCES ARE BY FOLLOWED FROM BY ALLIED MILITARY FORCES

PARA TWO FD TITO'S INTENDED ADMINISTRATION IN TRIESTE IS REPORTED TO BE NOT SO FAR ADVANCED AS IN MONFALCONE CMA BUT IT IS NEVERTHELESS IN CONTROL CMA WHILE IN GORIZIA IT IS REPORTED TO BE IN COMPLETE CONTROL FD

PARA THREE FD THIS ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS BEEN IN UNDERGROUND EXISTENCE FOR SOMETIME IS BACKED BY THE PRESENCE OF YUGOSLAV FORCES AND PARTISANS CMA WHOSE OBVIOUS INTENTION IS CMA OF COURSE CMA TO DEMAND THE TRANSFERENCE OF THIS AREA FROM ITALY TO YUGOSLAVIA FD

PARA FOUR FD INFORMATION IN REGARD TO GORIZIA ISSUE IS FROM MILITARY SOURCES AND NOT FROM AMG OFFICERS FD

Continued...../

Executive Coordinator:

343

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

7114 6 May OP PRIORITY

TOP SECRET PD

(37)

FOLLOWING SUMMARY WRITTEN REPORT FROM AMG ZONE ARMY [illegible] PD

PARA ONE PD YUGOSLAV FORCES AND PARTISANS HAVE SET UP COMPLETE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN THE AREA OF TRIESTE AND GORIZIA AND IN MONFALCONE VISITED BY AMG OFFICERS ON TWO MAY CMA IT WAS FOUND TO BE FUNCTIONING VERY EFFICIENTLY PD REPORTS INDICATE THAT YUGOSLAV SPONSORED ADMINISTRATION IS EQUALLY EFFICIENT IN OTHER AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEIR AND REGULAR FORCES PD

PARES TO ARMG FOR GROUP MEN ZONE SECTION CMA BRITISH ZONE AND HQ ROAR FROM HQ ALCOM CITE AFHQ PARES

PARA TWO PD TITO SPONSORED ADMINISTRATION IN TRIESTE IS REPORTED TO BE NOT SO FAR ADVANCED AS IN MONFALCONE CMA BUT IT IS EXTREMELY IN CONTROL CMA WHILE IN GORIZIA IT IS REPORTED TO BE IN COMPLETE CONTROL PD

PARA THREE PD THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS BEEN IN UNDERGROUND EXISTENCE FOR SOMETIME IS BACKED BY THE PRESENCE OF YUGOSLAV FORCES AND PARTISANS CMA WHOSE OBVIOUS INTENTION IS CMA OF COURSE CMA TO DEMAND THE TRANSFERENCE OF THIS AREA FROM ITALY TO YUGOSLAVIA PD

PARA FOUR PD INFORMATION IN REGARD TO GORIZIA [illegible] IS FROM MILITARY SOURCES AND NOT FROM AMG OFFICERS PD

Continued...../

Executive Commissioner

343

Brig
Executive Commissioner

TOP SECRET

(38)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

AFHQ for G-5, British Zonadin and US Poland

7114 6 May OF PRIORITY

Sheet 2.

Para FIVE NO IN HER OPINION OF THE AAG OFFICER ANY ATTEMPT TO EXPOSE
AMG WOULD PRODUCE A CRISIS CAN ITEM PART CMA A CLASH BETWEEN BRITISH AND
YUGOSLAV TROOPS NO IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISARM YUGOSLAV PARTISANS
IMMEDIATELY WHICH COULD NOT BE DONE WITHOUT MILITARY AID AND PROBABLY FORCE

Copy to: US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
A/President
C.Commissioner
File

Executive Commissioner

Declassified per E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Para FIVE (c) IN THE OPINION OF THIS AND OTHERS ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE
AND WOULD PRODUCE A CRISIS ONE ITEM BEAT ONE A CLASH BETWEEN BRITISH AND
YUGOSLAV TROOPS (d) IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISARM YUGOSLAV PARTISANS
IMMEDIATELY WHICH COULD NOT BE DONE WITHOUT MILITARY AID AND PROBABLY FORCE

Copy to: His Ambassador
Mr Ambassador
A/President
U.Commissioner
File

Executive Commissioner
AG
(Sgd) J A Ray Lt/Col
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

TOP SECRET

(38)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy No. 7

HEADQUARTERS ~~ALLIED~~ COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

TOP SECRET

CC/5555

Ref: 152/52. 6 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Situation AMG 8 Army - VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Distribution below.

Following is copy of HQ AMG Eighth Army report on the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA up to 23.59 hours, 3 May 45:

1. My signal [illegible] of 3 May gives an outline of the position obtaining in that part of VENEZIA GIULIA at present occupied by British troops. As far as can be ascertained Yugoslav armed forces are also in all the towns and communes occupied.

2. Though the strength of the Yugoslav forces (IX Corps) in TRIESTE and GORIZIA may not be very great, there are nevertheless considerable numbers of Yugoslavs and Pro-Yugoslav Italian partisans.

3. The Yugoslav forces and partisans have set up a complete local government administration in the area, and in MONFALCONE which I visited yesterday, I found it to be functioning very efficiently. Reports indicate that Yugoslav sponsored administration is equally efficient in the other areas occupied by their and British forces.

4. The TITO inspired administration in TRIESTE is reported to be not so far advanced as MONFALCONE, but it is nevertheless in control, while in GORIZIA it is reported to be in "complete control".

5. The administration which has been in underground existence for sometime, is backed by the presence of Yugoslav forces and partisans, whose obvious intention is, of course, to demand the transference of the area from ITALY to YUGOSLAVIA.

6. My information in regard to GORIZIA itself is from military sources, and is not yet confirmed by AMG officers who could only have arrived there today at the earliest, and may not in fact have arrived yet. The officers sent consist of the Provincial Commissioner designate, Major GRIFFITH and 12 officers from AMG Eighth Army, but owing to the distance and paucity of communications, no report had been received or is expected from them for the next two or three days.

7. My instructions for VENEZIA GIULIA to my officers, which are based on AFHQ directives to Eighth Army, are to impose Allied Military Government, using as a medium whatever administration is found, irrespective of nationality and to post AMG proclamations.

8. With the situation as described above, to attempt to impose Military Government by the initial symbol of posting Allied proclamations, would in my opinion produce a crisis, possibly precipitating a clash between British and Yugoslav forces. It would be necessary to disarm Yugoslav partisans immediately which could not be done without military aid and possibly force. It might well

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Following is copy of [illegible]
in VENEZIA GIULIA up to 23.59 hours, 3 May.45

1. My signal [illegible].941 of 3 May gives an outline of the position obtaining in that part of VENEZIA GIULIA at present occupied by British troops. As far as can be ascertained Yugoslav armed forces are also in all the towns and communes occupied.

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8. With the situation as described above, to attempt to impose Military Government by the initial symbol of posting Allied proclamations, would in my opinion produce a crisis, possibly precipitating a clash between British and Yugoslav forces. It would be necessary to disarm Yugoslav partisans immediately which could not be done without military aid and possibly force. It might well also be necessary to remove all Yugoslav troops.

9. Under the circumstances, I consider that there is no alternative other than to accept the situation as it is found, and not to aggravate it by attempting any form of Allied Military Government, until the whole question of principle has been discussed by higher authority. It is understood that AFHQ are sending representatives tomorrow to 13 Corps to attempt to find a solution of the problem.

10. I have discussed the matter with GOC Eighth Army, who in turn has consulted GOC 13 Corps, and I am acting in my decision not to impose Allied Military Government, with his full knowledge and concurrence.

11. I shall return to 13 Corps tomorrow, May 4th, so as to be there when the officers from AFHQ arrive.

J. A. Quarrie Major
for Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

(37)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RESTRICTED

MAY 6

2025
MAY 0516008

D/9780
MAY 0609008
OF PRIORITY

MAIN AMG 8TH ARMY

HQ ALCOM INFO HQTS VENEZIA REGION ADV HQ AMG FOR FRG CORPS(BY HAND) 5TH ARMY FOR AMG

RESTRICTED.

Situation UDINE not yet fully reported. No immediate admin problems in town. Water light functioning. SLOVENE dots with GARIBALDI patriots/Active with pro Slav propaganda in areas UDINE town. CIVIDALE. TARCENTO and south east UDINE Province. Reports of looting and violence in NE UDINE by these Slovene being investigated earliest.

LIST

INFO-ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
" " CAS
" " Polcon
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Nat Sec
PW Br
File 2
Fleet

36a

5 May.

RESTRICTED

1241

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5 May 1945.

To : Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, U.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,
Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512.

Admiral Stone has directed me to forward to you for your information the enclosed translation of an article appearing in this morning's GIORNALE DEL MATTINO.

/s/ J. Lamkin

J. LAMKIN
Lieutenant, USNR
Aide

cc: Exec. Comm'r.
CC —

(36)

1242

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

ISTRIA LIBERATED BY ALLIED TROOPS

London, May 4th (Reuter).— The Jugoslav radio broadcast today an order of the day of Marshal Tito announcing that Allied troops have liberated Istria, a zone not included in the jurisdiction of General Wietinghoff. Marshal Tito reported that two German divisions (20,000 men) were completely destroyed in the operations ending in the taking Pisino.

A communique from Marshal Tito's Headquarters, after protesting against the entry of the Allied troops into Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia, goes on to say that the Allies have acted in this matter without previous agreement with the Jugoslav military authorities. This misunderstanding must be cleared up, adds the communique, if unpleasant consequences are to be avoided.

The situation created by the surrender of German troops south of the Alps is now the subject of much discussion in the best informed circles of the capital. The first sense of satisfaction created by the exchange of messages between Churchill and Bonomi has been intensified by the rumours of other significant contacts between Italian and Allied authorities, as for example, the recent conversation between Bonomi and Alexander, which is reported to have been most cordial. It is felt that, with the end of military operations, the international situation of Italy will undergo rapid development and that Italian expectations will not be disappointed.

The news that Trieste has been occupied by Eighth Army troops and that more are coming in from central Italy is regarded as a confirmation of the assumption that, from the point of view of Washington and London, Trieste is an integral part of Italy. It is known that Trieste is destined to become an important base for Anglo-American occupation troops in central Europe and

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for this reason Allied occupation can ot be limited merely to the city and the port. It is expected here that the zone to be occupied by General Clark's forces will extend to the watershed of the Julian Alps, including Istria, just as it will extend as far as the old Italian boundary of the Brenner.

.... GIORNALE DEL MATTINO, 5 May 1945.

(31)

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before the council, in a meeting with the Italian committee of action, Minister Pacciardi who attended the meeting was asked about the future fate of Trieste; after saying he agreed about the Italianity of the Julian city, he added:

'Its fate doesn't depend from us. Ask Churchill and Victor Emanuel the will to account for it'.

(Trieste, May 4th)

o.o.

35

1245

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AP DISPATCH BY BILL KING

associated press new york censored by mladenovitch willkings 11500 belgrade 4/5 degree tenseness existed belgrade over clouded situation trieste dash which yugoslavia considers rightfully with in her postwar boundaries dash after conflicting announcements that important port city been liberated by yugoslav troops later occupied by new zealand division operating italy paragraph there little doubt that situation trieste which vital supply port future allied military operations well in hand stop it only in political implications that difficulties might possibly arise peragreph allied sources here said new zealand commander received surrender germen garrison was in occupation port stop yugoslav sources declined elaborate army communique which said port quote could not repeat not been occupied by mentioned bracket new zealand unbracket division because these towns were liberated by yugoslav army after bloody and bitter fighting

---- -

yugoslav communique referring to alexander communique listing trieste trizic and gorica occupied by new zealanders said further quote also in these towns no repeat no germen garrison could have surrendered because on april thirtieth these towns were completely cleaned of enemy troops by our forces paragraph requote fact is certain allied forces without our accordance entered above mentioned towns and this could have undesired consequences if this misunderstanding were not repeat not immediately cleared by mutual agreement unquote stop communique signed for general staff by lieut gen velimir terzig

1008pcc

(AP DISPATCH BY BILL KING)

(34) 1

4 Orms

1256

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associated press new york

earlier yugoslav communique said yugoslav forces captured entire region istra and slovene litoral and continued westward advance to contact allied troops on river sotcha bracket isonzo unbracket west of trzic bracket monfalcone unbracket paragraph there was no repeat no authoritative answer to the question whether yugoslav forces still in trieste peregraph trieste is main city in stretch italian rerritory claimed by yugoslav government stop this area roughly designated as venezia giulia province includes whole istria stop sotcha bracket isonzo unbracket river roughly boundary line territory which traditional yugoslav claim

(34) b

1243

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

associated press new york censored by mladenovitch will kings 41500 british occupation trieste does not repeat not necessarily reflect any reaction to yugoslav claims since port vital for military purposes and all action taken so far purely military stop britain amrerica have however contended no boundary lines should changed until peace conference stop there been no repeat no official yugoslav announcement they sought effect fait accompli by occupeying area they claim paragraph no repeat no indication here what type occupation government be setup in area stop since it part prewar italy might run by allied military government stop otherhand yugoslav local committees of national liberation equally capable taking over job stop also suggested area might governed by amg group including yugoslav representatives

(34) 6

1243

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associated press new york

much responsibility for keeping down friction in potentially explosive situation up to british and yugoslav commanders on spot pending agreement on political implications stop pointed out here alexander tito in telegraphic communication and probaly reach agreement on basis talks during recent alexander visit yugoslavia paragraph editorial todays politika said ~~m~~quote trst bracket trieste unbracket been freed not only from italian and german fascism but also from italian imperialism which in 1919 imprisoned this town and prevented its normal economic development asterisks liberation trst has given yugoslavia big task stop this one of largest yugoslav towns and in addition it typical commercial industrial town and seaport stop policy liberation authorities must strive to raise economic and cultural life in collaboration will be positive slovene and italian elements

(34) 6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

associated press new york censored by mladenovitch willkings sixhh 1500 polintka requote italians of triest must realize that with yugoslav army new spirit of national and social justice is arriving dash spirit with which this town was not inspired by either imperialist or fascist italy but which tried at any price to destroy every thing that was slav stop our people did not fear italians even when they were under their yoke and still less have reason fear now when as victors are bringing new fairer national and social order unquote paragraph belgrade papers 30/4 gave publicity to proposals of organ of communist party slovenia quote lyudska pravitza unquote for autonomous trieste quote in framework new yugoslavia unquote paragraph quote better and more just solution could hardly be thought out for this town with italian majority but which owing to its geographical position belongs to its slovene hinterland asterisks if we should consider origin towns population we should see more than half them were slovene origin or are slovenes stop although it is indisputable that majority feels italian unquote paper said

END

(34) G

1250

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Editlad newschronicle london
4/5 pere graph trieste is a frightened city comma frightened of future frightened of present stop predominantly italian it feers domination yugoslavs stop there not italian flags now flying in city all have disappeared stop and italians tell you houses flying italian flag are fired upon stop pictures tito plaster every well yet italians sidle up to you in street and ask if british awill stay because it be dangerous them to remain if yugoslavs incorporate city stop there will be trouble if italians given back city thare will be trouble if tito given it stop only hope peaceful future they declare is if trieste becames freecity stop people are scared to express any joy at coming eight army troops and newzealanders and britishers receiving cold welcome stop but frigidity in streets melts in privacy homes where usual italain vivacity bubbles up unrestricted by fear that their attitude will be seen and noted by yugoslavs and they be marked down for future stop yugoslav soldiers stolidly parade streets bristling with arms and their little honey tanks rattle through the centrel square aye reminder of how much they have achieved with so little stop itelians have no leaders and their partisans do not venture abroad stop italians say that their leaders who escaped germans were carried off by titos men stop they staged uprising before tito partisans within city but it premature and crushed by germans stop following day tito supporters within city were more successful and gradually reduced enemy garrisons more southwellkeely

(END)

(346)

4 January

1251

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

times london

trieste friday para here is one of europes cities where end of war has not brought beginnings of peace fullstop in point of time alone twas some eight or nine hours after official cessation of hostilities in italy that the real fighting in trieste began fullstop twas then pitched battle dash or series of them undash at different buildings where last remenants of german garrison were holding out willing to surrender to british but determined not to surrender to titos forces fullstop eight army troops part of newzealand division entered trieste that night and battles came to swift end fullstop that was night before last and by yesterday afternoon our troops had practically completed garrisoning of city fullstop their role here is confined to garrisoning city semicolon their purpose is to make and keep it safe and usable as supply base for allied armies moving north para thus british recognise occupation of trieste by titos forces as fait accompli which indeed it was before our arrival here fullstop none of sussidiary branches of army are here semicolon allied military covernement psychological warfare branch allied commission for example have not entered city fullstop apart from newzealand division troops royal navy has sent in large party to get port into use again fullstop that promises to be difficult job as harbour is very heavily mined

(34) 1—

1252

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND 96. 785015

times london

trieste second para as for civil life of trieste twould be idle deny city is in state of tension fullstop on surface tis admittedly fairly quiet fullstop groups of titos soldiers move about city armed and with determined but unagressive air fullstop all day long processions mainly of youths march round carrying flags of titos army and banners with slogans in italian pd yugoslav languages fullstop theyre quiet processions rather like those of young folk at some conference and extremely well ordered para today not ices have been posted by yugoslav command ordaining that civilians shall not be on streets except between ten oclock and three and military until seven oclock fullstop all italian flags have disappeared from buildings except such as bear red star dash instead of cross of savoy undash in middle of italian green red white colours fullstop red star is being worn by large proportion of citizens on lapel of coats or in hat fullstop many others look on at endless processions with appearance of rather tired indifference fullstop shops are all closed except bakers and food stores where long queues were forming this morning para at time of writing there seems fair hope that life of trieste will be restored to something like normal reasonably soon fullstop yugoslav military authorities have been persuaded to come into conference with british at general freybergs headquarters which was first notable step in this direction fullstop two factors that count grete deal towards prospects of orderly peace here are first friendship and understanding which exist between alexander and tito comma secondly supreme authority that tito has over his soldiers and followers

END

(34) 6-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET COPY No. 2

MAY 5 RECD CC 1095

ALLIED COMMISSION — Incoming Message

Time sent: 041435

Ref: FX 70300

Cite: FREE3

FROM : SACMED

TO : 15 ARMY GROUP (ACTION)
ALCOM for Stone (INFO)

TOP SECRET.

Understand that by reason of conditions existing on entry Eight Army forces in occupied areas VENEZIA GIULIA, AMG has not been established east of ISONZO.

Refer FX 68387 of 30 April. This policy should be continued and no steps to establish AMG in areas East of ISONZO taken until further direction.

28

EC DISTRIBUTION - 4 May 45

	Copy No.
ACTION - Ex Secretr	1
INFO - Chief Counsr	2
US Embassy	3
Br Embassy	4
C.A. Sec	5
Econ Sec	6

CC/1095

TOP SECRET

34c

1234

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Chief Comm C

CC 1137

No 4 MAY 5 RECD

AFHQ

6899 4 May 45 URGENT

(33)

TOP SECRET FD

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF SIGNAL DATE TIME ZERO FOUR ZERO ZERO ONE ZERO FROM AMG KRAITH ARMY FD

PARTH TO AFHQ FOR AIR GEORGE FIVE FOR SPOTTORD FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACEXC PARIS

TRIESTE AREA AND GORIZIA IS SUBJECT FD ALLIED FORCES AND YUGOSLAVS ARE BOTH IN TRIESTE FD ADHERENTS OF TITO SET UP YUGOSLAV ADMINISTRATION BEFORE OUR ARRIVAL FD THE POSITION IS DESCRIBED AS VERY DELICATE FD AMG IS NOT FUNCTIONING ALTHOUGH AMG OFFICERS ARE THERE FD FOLLOWING IS THE POSITION IN MONFALCONE AND DISTRICT FD THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF TITO ADHERENTS IS FUNCTIONING WELL AND HAS COMPLETE CONTROL FD PLEBISCITE IS TO BE HELD TODAY MAY HOUR FD YUGOSLAV PARTISANS IN LARGE NUMBERS AND FULLY ARMED ARE PARADING STREETS CMA ALSO YUGOSLAV ARMY FD DEMONSTRATION IS TAKING PLACE IN FAVOUR TITO BUT WELL BEHAVED FD STRENGTH OF LOCAL FEELING FOR TITO CANNOT YET BE ASSESSED OR NUMBERS OF PARTISANS FD DISARMING OF PARTISANS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE EXCEPT BY STRONG MILITARY FORCES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO EXPLOSIVE SITUATION FD YUGOSLAVS SAID TO BE IN CONTROL AT GORIZIA FD IT IS REPORTED THAT YUGOSLAVS HAVE DISARMED ITALIAN PARTISANS AND ARRESTED THEM FD AFTER CONSULTATION AMG THIRTEEN CORPS A STAND STILL HAS BEEN ORDERED ON AMG ADMINISTRATION

Cont'd Page 2/....

(34)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC No. 785015

6899

UNTIL VISIT BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES FROM AFHQ EXPECTED TODAY FOUR MAY PD IN CONSEQUENCE NO PROCLAMATIONS POSTED AND NO MILITARY GOVERNMENT IMPOSED AT ANY PLACE IN VENEZIA GIULIA PD THIS DECISION APPROVED BY ARMY COMMANDER IN CONSULTATION WITH CORPS COMMANDER PD SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER RETURNING TO THIRTEEN CORPS MAY FOUR PD FOREGOING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Distribution

	Copy
Signal M.C.	1
Af President	3
Chief Secret	4
File	2
Spare	5

Office of Exec Commissioner

735

(34)

Maj.

1256

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C. Comm

TOP SECRET Copy No 3.

MAY 5 2 REGD

R/512
MAY 041100B

D/9710
MAY 051130B
ROUTINE

HR AMG REAR 8TH ARMY

ACTION FREEDOM FOR G5 INFO 15 ARMY GP FOR G5. HR AC AMG MAIN 8TH ARMY

TOP SECRET.

Not recd AC Hq

Tonnages for TRIESTE. Reference 8TH ARMY sig 04984 of 1 May. Following is breakdown for AMG NIDS.

A. Flour 400 meat 20 soup 10 sugar 20 lard 20 powdered milk 10 salt 20 total 500.

B. Flour 399 meat 29 sugar 29 lard 19 powdered milk 7 salt 17 total 500.

All figures dead weight tons.

LIST

Copy No 1 INFO-ACTION: (N) Pers S/C
" " 2 INFO: A/President
" " 3 Chief Commissioner
" " 4 Executive Commissioner
" " 5 Econ Sec
" " 6 Pers To S/C
" " 7 File

1/8/53

33a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

TOP SECRET

C Com
Copy No 4

MAY 4 RECD
C C 0930

CITE M 911
MAY 0400108

D/9563
MAY 040830B
OP PRIORITY

MAIN AMG 8TH ARMY

ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP FOR G-5 SECTION INFO HQ ALCOM, HQ VENEZIA GIULIA

TOP SECRET.

Subject is TRIESTE area and GORIZIA. Both Yugoslav and Allied forces are in TRIESTE. Yugoslav administration has been set up by adherents TITO before our arrival. Position is very delicate. AMG officers are in town but not functioning. Position MONFALCONE and District. Civil administration of TITO adherents in complete control and functioning well. They have made arrangements for plebiscite to be held tomorrow May 4. Large numbers Yugoslav partisans pereding streets fully armed also Yugoslav Army. Well behaved demonstration in favour TITO taking place. Impossible yet assess strength of local TITO feeling or number partisans. In any case would be impossible disarm partisans unless carried out by strong military force which would be tantamount to setting off gunpowder. Position GORIZIA understood to be Yugoslavs in complete control. Italian partisans are reported to have been disarmed by Yugoslavs and arrested. In view of all above and after consultation AMG 13 Corps have ordered a standstill on AMG until position examined by higher authorities coming from AFHQ tomorrow. Therefore no proclamations have been posted and no military government has been imposed anywhere in VENEZIA GIULIA. Army commander has approved above decision in consultation with Corps commander. Am returning 13 Corps tomorrow May 4.

DIST
Copy No 1 & 2 ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
" " 3 INFO: A/President
" " 4 Chief Commissioner
" " 5 File

(34) (33)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Q 5020
MAY 03 1034Z

D/0501
MAY 04 1734Z
IMMEDIATE

REAR 8 ARMY
ACTION FRIDGE ADV DESERT AIRFORCE INFO 5 ARMY GP, BISTONE, 55 AREA, 61 AREA, NOV AFCONA, AMPHATIC BASE, CMD ALLIED COMMISSION, MAAF REAR DESERT AIRFORCE, MAIN 8 ARMY FOR BRIG GEN A/C

SECRET

Subject in siting board for TRIESTE. Your FX 69415 of 2 May refers. Above siting board assemble 6 May. Suggest reps rendezvous Hq 55 AREA 0900 hrs 6 May addressees to inform 55 AREA number for whom accomodation required giving date. Question of suitable airfield in TRIESTE area being investigated with Desert Air Force and report will follow. For Desert Adv Air Force. Please notify soonest nearest airfield to TRIESTE suitable for DAKOTAS available for 8 May.

Dist

Info-Action - Econ Sec ?
Establishment Sec
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm
File
Plot

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNp No. 785015

TOP SECRET

C Commissioner
Copy No 3
CC 0932
MAY 4

FX 69950
MAY 0316538

D 4561
MAY C40830B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHQEG
ALLIED COMMISSION ROME INFO 15 ARMY GROUP 8 ARMY, 5 ARMY

TOP SECRET.

Carabinieri may be employed VENEZIA GIULIA only in cases where an Italian ministration is operating. In other instances Allied military personnel will be employed for duties as circumstances demand supervising local police where they are found functioning satisfactory.

Dist

Copy No 1 Action - ~~P. Safety~~ Exec Com
2 Info - A/President
3 Chief Commissioner
4 ~~Exec Comm~~ Public Safety
5 CA Section
6 File

37

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

C. COMM.
Copy No 4

CITE C-33
MAY 031200B

D/9549
MAY
OF PRIORITY

ADVANCED HQ REGION VENEZIE
ACTION HQ ALCOM INFO AMG 8 ARMY

TOP SECRET.

Reference your ACCIB 6615 of 011441 received yesterday.

Situation entirely understood. Had already taken action lines indicated by you. SCHOLTZ party which left Sunday 29 exactly half American half British. Next party now standing by under CHURCHOOD also equally divided. GORIZIA in first instance looked after by 8 ARMY team under Major JAMES GRIZZARD American. Eventually will exhaust available American provincial officers unless you can help on lines our TOP SECRET telegram 2 May regarding officer establishment. Assume you concur our idea keep some American officers in provinces on BRENNER Route. Our C 91 refers. Can you please expedite promotion Captain E A VALENTINE otherwise difficult PEE (please ?) This excellent U 3 officer as provincial commissioner PULA.

DIST

Copy No 1 & 2 ACTION: G-1(B) 2
" " 3 INFO: A/President
" " 4 Chief Commissioner
" " 5 Executive Commissioner
" " 6 Eat Sec
" " 7 File

TOP SECRET

1261

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

PX 69803
MAY 031354B

MAY 031910B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FWGEG
ACTION AIRCOM - 8 ARMY FOR INFO 15 ARMY GROUP, 5 ARMY

SECRET

In order to enable 8 ARMY to carry out its responsibility for Military Govt both in the British zone of AUSTRIA and in its area of responsibility in North ITALY essential supplement present Military Govt resources of 8 ARMY. The following action will therefore be taken forthwith.

1. AIRCOM will place under comd 8 ARMY forthwith the whole VENEZIA Region Military Govt team less personnel as required to operate in 5 ARMY area.

2. All detached personnel will be ordered to rejoin VENEZIA Region earliest.

3. Method of employment personnel in para 1 above to be decided by 8 ARMY, but personnel will not be employed outside VENEZIA Region.

4. As Army rear boundaries move forward personnel of VENEZIA Region will rever to comd AIRCOM.

Dist

Action - Exec Comm 2
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Ext Sec
File

31b

SECRET

COPY TOP SECRET COPY

EXTRACT M 159

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commanders' Secretariat

EXTRACT
TOP SECRET

SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting

3 May 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

(EXTRACT) MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 3RD MAY 1945

* * * *

2. OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

THE CONFERENCE had before them a series of signals on the subject of the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, ending with a personal message from Marshal Tito to Field Marshal Alexander.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER read certain further signals which had passed since publication of the agenda and which included one from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff requesting an examination as to whether it would be feasible to maintain the British forces in AUSTRIA without the use of the port of TRIESTE and communications through VENEZIA GIULIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that there were three possible methods of maintaining British forces in their zone in AUSTRIA. The first was the TRIESTE-TARVISIO route which would be the best and by far the quickest. The second was the VENICE-TARVISIO route which would be slower and the L of C would still run through certain disputed areas in the northwest portion of VENIZIA GIULIA. The third was the BRENNER route and there was no doubt that if we were restricted to it the buildup of our forces in AUSTRIA would be a very slow process. It would be necessary to bridge the PO at OSTIGLIA and prepare a long L of C, which would involve a long term commitment. He therefore suggested that an interim reply should be made to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the foregoing lines and that meanwhile a detailed examination should be carried out. He considered that political rather than administrative considerations were the fundamental factors in this problem. However, if we were going to use TRIESTE we must have full control of the port. The Jugoslavs by themselves were quite incapable of opening and rehabilitating the port and repairing the communications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER felt that the best course would be quietly to push ahead, avoiding open clashes with the Jugoslavs, and occupy the militarily important areas of VENEZIA GIULIA. We now had the 2nd New Zealand Division in the area and as soon as the administrative situation would permit we would move up the 91st U.S. Division. The personnel and equipment, normally required for opening a port and establishing our military communications, should be brought in as required. He did not consider Tito's reply unfavourable and he proposed to assume that the intention of it was, as Tito had previously agreed both at BOLSENA and BELGRADE, that Jugoslav forces in the immediate area of his (Field Marshal Alexander's) military communications would come under his command. He felt that if the matter was handled with tact and firmness no difficulty need arise in the [illegible] and the area of such communications, though there might be

1908/2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNB No. 785015

2. [illegible]

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See 46a

31a

TOP SECRET

WO 204/8201

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC No. 78-015

TOP SECRET

MR. MACMILLAN thought that events had travelled some way since the earlier discussions and any proposal to occupy the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA was no longer practicable. It was quite clear that the British and U.S. Governments did not propose to launch a war with the Jugoslavs in order to secure control of the area. It was, therefore, now of importance to occupy rapidly as much of the area as could be seized without a major clash with the Jugoslav forces. He thought it would be advisable to despatch a considered reply to Marshal Tito, re-stating the course which the Supreme Allied Commander proposed to take, and at the same time to proceed with firmness and tact to occupy areas of military importance, relying on the judgment of local Allied Commanders to avoid serious clashes.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER observed at this point that he had just received a message to the effect that the German garrison in TRIESTE had surrendered to the New Zealand Division at 1630 hours on 2nd May. No Jugoslav troops had been concerned and no unusual incidents had been reported.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM observed that it was not without interest that the reports now received from the New Zealand Division were quite contrary to those recently put out from Jugoslav sources.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that it was quite evident that the Jugoslavs had been claiming to have occupied larger areas than they had in fact done. He was fully in favour of the policy of going ahead firmly and securing the areas vital to us, while avoiding serious clashes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, agreeing with the Chief of Staff, suggested that POLA might be occupied by sea.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that General Clark had just informed him by telephone that New Zealand troops were proceeding towards POLA. He had, however, warned General Clark to be particularly careful to avoid a clash in connection with this movement. In reply to a question by Rear Admiral Stone he said that if POLA was occupied as a naval port we should control ti and Allied military government should be installed. He considered that, as suggested by the British Resident Minister, a telegram should be despatched to Tito, thanking him for his communication, saying that all appeared to be going well and that the Allied forces would go ahead on the lines previously agreed upon. These should then be reiterated on the basis of setting out our military requirements. In response to a query by Mr. Macmillan he agreed that it would be best to avoid mentioning Allied military government, though this would be established in the areas we occupied.

MR. KIRK agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander's proposal to despatch a telegram on these lines.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that instead of mentioning Allied military government it should be stated that we would send forward the necessary organisation to permit the opening of the port and the rehabilitation of communications.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that there should be no change in his instructions on this subject to 15th Army Group, whose forces should continue to secure the areas of VENEZIA GIULIA of military importance, proceeding firmly and with tact and avoiding serious clashes with the Jugoslavs.

(b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to draft for his approval a telegram to Marshal Tito in accordance with his remarks at 'X' above.

(c) Directed that full Allied military government be set up in the normal way in areas occupied by Allied forces, in accordance with the policy at (a) above.

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* Subsequently despatched as F 70164 of 3 May 1945.

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1266

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 2 RECD

AMG MAIN 8 ARMY

MAY 1 RECD

6662 1 MAY 45 PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

REFERENCE YOUR MIKE EIGHT EIGHT FIVE OF ONE MAY PD

PASSED TO AMG MAIN EIGHT ARMY FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACKC SIGNED STONE PASS

COMMANDING GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY HAS COPY OF FULL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT CHA

SENT BY SACMED TO COMMANDING GENERAL FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP PD TOPSEC SIGNAL

FX SIX EIGHT THREE EIGHT SEVEN OF THIRTY APRIL REPEAT

Executive Commissioner

300 /s/ J. A. Quarles

E. TALBOT, Major

N. H. DRABKIN
Lt.Col, AGD
Adjutant

1263

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/173 GCT-O

2 May 1945

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops Outside Italy.

TO: President, Allied Commission
President, Allied Commission For: Land Proces Sub-Commission, MMIA
CG, 15th AG, APO 777
Hq 5th Army Brit Increment
Hq 8th Army
GOC, No. 1 District
No. 2 District
No. 3 District

1. Reference is made to letter, MMIA file G/6 dated 10 April 1945.

2. The following general policy has been established regarding the employment of Italian troops outside Italy:

a. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian troops in VENEZIA GIULIA.

b. The following exceptions to the above policy will be authorized:

(1) Use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and employment of Italian personnel at that port.

(2) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as, for military reasons, might be unavoidable.

3. British Headquarters and units to which Italian troops are attached will ished such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

/s/ Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RESTRICTED

M 885
MAY 011130B

T/9292
MAY 011515B
PRIORITY

AMG MAIN 8 ARMY
HQ ALCOM

RESTRICTED

In view operational picture essential be given policy and direction on attitude to be adopted in TRIESTE. Particularly if Yugoslave control has been imposed is much control to be accepted under Allied Military Government alone or jointly with Jugoslav representation. Advance party for TRIESTE gone by road following Armed Forces and are at this moment no longer in touch. You have received copy instruction given officer in charge party.

List

Action - Exec Comm 2
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
File 2
Fleet

See 21

30

RESTRICTED

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FOR ACTION EIGHTARMY MAIN FOR AMG VENEZIE REGION

6615 1 MAY 1945 PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PAREN TO FOR ACTION EIGHTARMY MAIN FOR AMG VENEZIE REGION FROM AICOM CITE AGGIB PAREN

PARA ONE PD FOR POLITICAL REASONS AND ACCORDING TO EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY CMA YOU MUST HAVE EQUAL NUMBER OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN OFFICERS IN YOUR TEAM FOR VENEZIA GIULIA CMA EVEN IF THIS CAUSES DISPROPORTION ELSEWHERE PD

PARA TWO PD PLEASE PLAN ACCORDINGLY PD

PARA THREE PD ACKNOWLEDGE

G-1(B)

573

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
ASST ADJUTANT

CC FILES
CC 0845

MAY 1 [illegible]

SECRET

H/A2 1/C2

30 Apl 45

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION PLAN FOR THE OCCUPATION OF NORTHEAST ITALY

1 OBJECT

To set up AMG and Civil Administration of North East Italy.

Note: These plans do not include matters connected with the Economic field.

2 OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

Whatever may be the circumstances of the enemy's withdrawal or surrender, the final object to be attained in setting up AMG will, in broad outline, be carried out in accordance with established practice and procedures which have hitherto obtained in the occupation of ITALY.

There are, however, special circumstances connected with the sudden collapse or evacuation of N.E. Italy that require special consideration. There are too, special considerations to be taken into account, i.e. Frontier towns, industrial areas, large patriot organisations, etc.

3 N.E. ITALY is defined as comprising the following area:
(1) VENETIA Region
(2) MANTOVA Province
(3) EMILIA Region less the Provinces of PIACENZA and PARMA, FORLI and RAVENNA.

4 METHOD

The normal method of existing Civil Affairs policies will govern the occupation of N.E. Italy through Regional Control. Plans of the following Sub-Commissions are attached:

Legal	Enclosure I
Local Government	II
Public Health	III
Public Safety	IV
Displaced Persons & Repatriation	V

Directives on the following have been published already:

Taxation	Ref: DF/3A/CA of 10 Apl 45
Mine Clearance Plan for N.ITALY of 23 Apl 45.	
Monuments & Fine Arts	Ref: AFHQ Administrative Memo No. 20
Education	Administration Instruction No. 1.

6 PERSONNEL

The allotment of personnel to Regions will be issued as a seperate instruction by Establishment Section.

CC 18001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC FILES
CC OPNS
MAY 1 RECD

SECRET

A/G2 A/CA

30 Apl 45

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION PLAN FOR THE OCCUPATION OF NORTHEAST ITALY

1 OBJECT

To set up AMG and Civil Administration of North East Italy.

Note: These plans do not include matters connected with the Economic field.

2 OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

Whatever may be the circumstances of the enemy's withdrawal or surrender, the final object to be attained in setting up AMG will, in broad outline, be carried out in accordance with established practice and procedures which have hitherto obtained in the occupation of ITALY.

There are, however, special circumstances connected with the sudden collapse or evacuation of N.E. Italy that require special consideration. There are too, special considerations to be taken into account, i.e. Frontier terms, industrial areas, large patriot organisations, etc.

3 N.E. ITALY is defined as comprising the following area:
(1) VENETIA Region
(2) MANTOVA Province
(3) EMILIA Region less the Provinces of PIACENZA and PARMA, FORLI and RAVENNA.

4 METHOD

The normal method of existing Civil Affairs policies will govern the occupation of N.E. Italy through Regional Control. Plans of the following Sub-Commissions are attached:

Legal	Enclosure I
Local Government	II
Public Health	III
Public Safety	IV
Displaced Persons & Repatriation	V

Directives on the following have been published already:

Evacuation Ref: AF/3A/CA of 10 Apl 45
Mine Clearance Plan for N.ITALY of 23 Apl 45.
Monuments & Fine Arts Ref: AFHQ Administrative Memo No. 20
Education Administration Instruction No. 1.

6 PERSONNEL

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Note: These plans do not include matters connected with the Economic field.

2 OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

Whatever may be the circumstances of the enemy's withdrawal or surrender, the final object to be attained in setting up AMG will, in broad outline, be carried out in accordance with established practice and procedure which have hitherto obtained in the occupation of ITALY.

There are, however, special circumstances connected with the sudden collapse or evacuation of N.W. Italy that require special consideration. There are too, special considerations to be taken into account, i.e. Frontier towns, industrial areas, large patriot organisations, etc.

3 N.W. ITALY is defined as comprising the following areas:
(1) VENETIA Region
(2) VENICE Province
(3) EMILIA Region less the Provinces of PIACENZA and PARMA, FORLI and RAVENNA.

4 METHOD

The normal method of existing Civil Affairs policies will govern the occupation of N.W. Italy through Regional Control. Plans of the following Sub-Commissions are attached:

	Enclosure
Legal	I
Local Government	II
Public Health	III
Public Safety	IV
Displaced Persons & Repatriation	V

Directives on the following have been published already:

Evacuation — Ref: AF/3A/G4 of 10 Apl 45
Mine Clearance Plan for N.ITALY of 23 Apl 45.
Monuments & Fine Arts — Ref: MFAA Administrative Memo No. 20
Education — Administration Instruction No. 1.

6 PERSONNEL

The allotment of personnel to Regions will be issued as a separate instruction by Establishment Section.

C.R. UPJOHN, Brig.,
VP G4 Section.

See Distribution over.

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TO: 15th Army Group, G-5 Section.
CCAO 7th Army
CCAO 3d Army
HQ [redacted]ZIS Region (3)
HQ "ZILLY Region (3)
Executive Commissioner (2)
Economic Section (2)
Political Adviser (2)
No. 2 District (1)
No. 1 District (1)

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SECRET

ENCLOSURE I

(to G/42A/GA of 30 Apl 45)

NORTH EAST ITALY PLAN: LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

ALLIED MILITARY COURTS.

1 The operation of Allied Military Courts raises problems, similar to those already encountered in newly occupied territory, although these problems are likely to be intensified by the relatively small number of legal officers available for these areas. These problems will not, however, be simplified by any wider delegation of powers either for the purpose of reviewing of court cases or for the constituting or convening of courts.

2 A panel for General Courts will be appointed.

3 The local military authorities should, whenever possible, be requested to make available officers to sit on General Courts, and if required, also on Superior Courts and to act as prosecuting and, when necessary, defencing officers in such Courts.

ITALIAN COURTS.

4 The great majority of judicial officials in N.E. Italy is believed to have refused the oath of allegiance to the Republican Fascist Government and it is thought that there should be no substantial shortage of judicial personnel who can be retained in office. Some 12 officials of varying grades who hold appointments in N.E. Italy are at present in Italian Government territory and can be returned to their seats when required.

5 In addition to the normal courts Special Courts of Assize will be set up to deal with fascist criminals collaborating with the Germans. An Italian Government decree has been passed for the constitution of these courts: this decree has been implemented for AMG territory and the Courts should be brought into operation as soon as possible in order to assist the maintenance of law and order.

6 The provision of judicial personnel for these Courts and for general epuration purposes is likely to involve a heavy strain on the total personnel available. It will be necessary however to ensure that personnel are provided for these purposes and for the subordinate Courts as soon as possible. It will depend upon the numbers available, how soon the Superior Courts can be opened.

7 In any case it will be necessary for the local HQs to make temporary appointments of judicial personnel locally available to fill magisterial vacancies. These appointments by HQs will, in view of communication difficulties, have to be treated as the rule rather than the exception, but they should be reported to Legal Sub-Commission for ratification in the usual way.

8 The Italian Government has appointed by decree a Tribunale Militare Ter-

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1 The operation of Allied Military Courts raises problems, similar to those already encountered in newly occupied territory, although these problems are likely to be intensified by the relatively small number of legal officers available for these areas. These problems will not, however, be simplified by any wider delegation of powers either for the purpose of reviewing of court cases or for the constituting or convening of courts.

2 A Panel for General Courts will be appointed.

3 The local military authorities should, whenever possible, be requested to make available officers to sit on General Courts, and if required, also on Superior Courts and to act as prosecuting and, when necessary, defending officers in such Courts.

ITALIAN COURTS.

4 The great majority of judicial officials in N.S. Italy is believed to have refused the oath of allegiance to the Republican Fascist Government and it is thought that there should be no substantial shortage of judicial personnel who can be retained in office. Some 12 officials of varying grades who hold appointments in N.S. Italy are at present in Italian Government territory and can be returned to their posts when required.

5 In addition to the normal courts Special Courts of Assize will be set up to deal with fascist criminals collaborating with the Germans. An Italian Government decree has been passed for the constitution of these courts: this decree has been implemented for AMG territory and the Courts should be brought into operation as soon as possible in order to assist the maintenance of law and order.

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7 In any case it will be necessary for the local HCs to make temporary appointments of judicial personnel locally available to fill magisterial vacancies. These appointments by HCs will, in view of communication difficulties, have to be treated as the rule rather than the exception, but they should be reported to Legal Sub-Commission for retification in the usual way.

8 The Italian Government has appointed by decree a Tribunale Militare Territoriale for Northern Italy. Sections may be established where required. It may be desirable for a Section to be set up in N.E. Italy.

9 It will be necessary to secure close liaison in the work of the AMG Courts, the Italian Civil Courts and the Military Tribunals to ensure that prompt disposition is made of the urgent cases. It may be necessary for AMG Courts, at least in the early stages, to handle cases which would normally be left for the Italian Courts.

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ENCLOSURE II
(to 4/422/CA of 30 Apl 45)

NORTH EAST ITALY PLAN - LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB-COMMISSION

1. The responsibility of this Sub-Commission is confined to the following matters:
a) the establishment of a temporary system of democratic local government:
b) ensuring the efficient working of the Prefecture and, where necessary, supplying personnel to fill official posts therein.

2. With regard to (a) the intended system will follow the plan which has hitherto been operating in Central and Southern Italy and which is also intended for N.W. Italy. Such plan is contained in PBL 111 and full details, instructions and directives thereon have been issued to and are in the possession of HQs and IGs.

Whilst the plan itself and the details thereof remain unchanged, the method of its application in the whole of Northern Italy may be affected by the CLC, particularly in areas where they have set up a form of provincial and/or communal administration. The policy to be followed and the attitude to be adopted towards the CLC in relation to local government administration to be established by AAC is contained in a directive addressed to all officers, Ref. 9/20.1/CA of 27 April.

3. a) With regard to 1 (b) the procedure for filling vacancies varies according to the importance of the post.

b) As to Prefects the agreed policy is that where a vacancy is found or a new appointment otherwise necessary the RO is empowered to fill the office by the appointment of a suitable person from the particular province concerned. He is governed by 9/20.1/CA of 27 April.

c) Owing to difficulties of communication, etc. ROs for Northern Italy will (by Amendment 1 of Executive Memorandum 30) appoint and remove Prefetti Reggenti on their own authority and without the prior approval of HQ AC, provided they report any such action with full particulars as soon as possible thereafter.

d) Where no local person as referred to in 3 (b) is available, or if it is otherwise impossible to secure such an appointment, the Sub-Commission will, on request, send to the RO/G or RO a Prefect from a reserve or "pool", which has been established in collaboration with the Italian Government. Such pool is to serve both N.W. & N.E. Italy. It is intended that, if possible, a proportion of the officials in the pool will be kept in Rome (employed at the Ministry) available to proceed North at say 24 hours' notice, the remainder being distributed about the Prefectures in Italian Government Territory whence they can be called to Rome to replace those sent forward. This paragraph should, again, be read in conjunction with 9/20.1/CA of 27 Apl.

e) As to Vice Prefects, a similar "pool" has been established.

f) With regard to Consiglieri and Segretari Capi, any vacancies will be notified by Prefects direct to the Ministry of the Interior (through AC channels) in accordance with the procedure contained in CA Section circular 4/30/45 of 1 April 1945.

g) Vacancies in subordinate ranks will be filled by temporary staff recruited by the Prefect from local persons, so far as possible. If the Prefect is unable to recruit locally, he will apply to the Ministry of Interior as in part (f).

4. [illegible] forward under 3 will be conveyed by AC transport from [illegible] by this Sub-Commission with [illegible]

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b) ensuring the efficient working of the Prefecture and, where necessary, supplying personnel to fill official posts therein.

2 With regard to (a) the intended system will follow the plan which has hitherto been operating in Central and Southern Italy and which is also intended for N.W. Italy. Such plan is contained in MAG 111 and full details, instructions and directives thereon have been issued to and are in the possession of HQs and SUs.

Whilst the plan itself and the details thereof remain unchanged, the method of its application in the whole of Northern Italy may be affected by the CLN, particularly in areas where they have set up a form of provincial and/or communal administration. The policy to be followed and the attitude to be adopted towards the CLN in relation to local government administration to be established by AMG is contained in a directive addressed to all Officers, Ref. 9/30.1/CA of 27 April.

3 a) With regard to 1 (a) the procedure for filling vacancies varies according to the importance of the post.

b) As to Prefects the agreed policy is that where a vacancy is found or a new appointment otherwise necessary the CC is empowered to fill the office by the appointment of a suitable person from the particular province concerned. He is governed by 9/30.1/CA of 27 April.

c) Owing to difficulties of communication, etc. HQs for Northern Italy will (by amendment 1 of Executive Memorandum 30) appoint and remove Prefetti Delegati on their own authority and without the prior approval of HQ AC, provided they report any such action with full particulars as soon as possible thereafter.

d) Where no local man as referred to in 3 (a) is available, or if it is otherwise impossible to secure such an appointment, the Sub-Commission will, on request, send to the SCAO or HQ a Prefect from a reserve or "pool", which has been established in collaboration with the Italian Government. Such pool is to serve both N.W. & N.E. Italy. It is intended that, if possible, a proportion of the officials in the pool will be kept in Rome (employed at the Ministry) available to proceed North at any 24 hours' notice, the remainder being distributed about the Prefectures in Italian Government Territory whence they can be called to Rome to replace those sent forward. this paragraph should, again, be read in conjunction with 9/30.1/CA of 27 Apl.

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f) With regard to Consiglieri and Segretari Capi, any vacancies will be notified by Prefects direct to the Ministry of the Interior (through AC channels) in accordance with the procedure contained in CA Section circular 4/30/AC of 1 April 1945.

g) Vacancies in subordinate ranks will be filled by temporary staff recruited by the Prefect from local persons, so far as possible. If the Prefect is unable to recruit locally, he will apply to the Ministry of Interior as in para (f).

4 Italian personnel sent forward under 3 will be conveyed by AC transport from Rome to HQ Venezia Region under arrangements made by this Sub-Commission with Transport Dispatch Office of HQ Commandant, this HQ. The staging point for the first night of the journey will be Florence where arrangements have been made for the official's (and driver's) accomodation. Rations will be carried. The journey from Florence onwards is dependent on condition of roads, bridges, etc. but subject to this it is intended to proceed to Regional HQ on the second day. On arrival there, Region will assume responsibility for conveyance to the Province concerned. If necessary, an intermediate staging point will be fixed according to circumstances.

If airfields are available and other conditions permit, air transport of officials will be arranged.

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ENCLOSURE III

NORTH WEST ITALY REGION - PUBLIC HEALTH SUB-COMMISSION

PUBLIC HEALTH

1 RPHOs will be furnished with the last known names of Medical Provincials.

2 RPHOs will be furnished with a list of all the Civil and Italian Red Cross Hospitals with their bed capacity.

3 Information as to the latest known conditions, concerning damage to hospitals, efficiency and numbers of medical personnel, lack of supplies, etc. are forwarded as received.

4 10 lbs. of DDT and a spray gun for every province in the Region are being stockpiled with the Regional medical supplies. These are for the distribution to and the instruction of every Medico Provinciale in methods of Typhus control.

5 A small supply of Paris Green, to meet current anti-malaria needs, will also be stockpiled with the Regional medical supplies.

6 Supplies of liquid chlorine for water sterilising purposes if required should be requested from the HQ, Industry Sub-Commission.

7 It is accepted by all RPHOs that should any serious epidemic arise, staff may be moved in from adjacent Regions to render assistance.

8 RPHOs have been furnished with copies of all instructives and directives issued both by this HQ and the Public Health Division, Italian Government, to date.

MEDICAL SUPPLIES

9 A requisition for six months medical supplies for this area was made in August 1944 and these supplies are expected to arrive some time in middle of May 1945.

10 There will be on hand at all times at least two months medical supplies in the event that the supplies requisitioned for this area do not arrive. These supplies will be drawn from the M.T.O. stockpile in Naples.

11 When these areas are first occupied all supplies will be handled by A.M.G. in the same manner as is present and in accordance with Executive Memorandum No 24 and its amendments.

12 The medical depot now being operated in Florence will be closed at such time when suitable warehouse space will be available at Genova. The space required will be between 20/25,000 square feet. It is anticipated that additional warehouse space will be secured on the Adriatic Coast.

13 All medical supplies are requisitioned and initially delivered on a population basis. Using the regular formula, Venezia Region will require about 100 tons of supplies per month and Emilia Region 50 tons per month. Initial shipments have been made to Emilia Region and supplies are being requisitioned as them in accordance with their needs.

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6 Supplies of liquid chlorine for water sterilising purposes if required should be requested from the HQ, Industry Sub-Commission.

7 It is accepted by all RMOs that should any serious epidemic arise, staff may be moved in from adjacent Regions to render assistance.

8 RMOs have been furnished with copies of all instructives and directives issued both by this HQ and the Public Health Division, Italian Government, to date.

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11 When these areas are first occupied all supplies will be handled by A.M.G. in the same manner as at present and in accordance with Executive Memorandum No 54 and its amendments.

12 The medical depot now being operated in Florence will be closed at such time when suitable warehouse space will be available at Genova. The space required will be between 20/25,000 square feet. It is anticipated that additional warehouse space will be secured on the Adriatic Coast.

13 All medical supplies are requisitioned and initially delivered on a population basis. Using the regular formula, Venezia Region will require about 100 tons of supplies per month and Emilia Region 50 tons per month. Initial shipments have been made to Emilia Region and supplies are being requisitioned by them in accordance with their needs.

14 Senior Public Health Officers of the Army areas will give RMOEMA every possible assistance in establishing a distribution system which will be put into effect as the areas are released to the Regions, when it will then be the responsibility of the Regional Public Health Officers of the Regions to assist RMOEMA in an efficient distribution of medical supplies.

VETERINARY (Northwest and Northeast Italy)

15 Veterinary problems are expected to increase about three-fold upon liberation of Northern Italy. As approximately half of all Italian livestock was located in this area before 1940 it is assumed that approximately the same ratio will be found there upon its liberation.
At least 50% of the livestock as recorded by the 1940 census is expected to be found.

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16 There are expected to be 2000 Italian veterinarians in the areas and a list of all known veterinarians has been furnished to the Regional Public Health officers.

17 The livestock population is estimated for veterinary purposes to be about 5 million and the animal disease problems certain to appear include swine erysipelas, anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, swine cholera, blackleg and laryngo tracheitis. A back-log of veterinary biologics has been built up to take care of anticipated needs. A six months supply of Allied Veterinary medical supplies for this area is expected to arrive in June.

18 Veterinary laboratories are expected to be found in Milan, Brescia, Padova and Torino and immediate steps will be taken to activate these laboratories.

WELFARE

19 It is anticipated that welfare needs will be greater in North Eastern Italy than in Southern Italy. If the factories of this highly industrial section are destroyed, serious unemployment with attending suffering will follow. If the factories are intact, the lack of raw materials for production will cause some unemployment.

Plans of the Welfare Branch are based on the assumption that there will be large scale destruction and that 40% of the people will be in dire need.

20 Clothing furnished by the American Relief for Italy and to be distributed by the National Italian Committee known as ENDSI, is in warehouses in Leghorn. It is assumed that passes into Army areas can be obtained for the 50 trucks now operating under ENDSI, but owned by American Relief for Italy. These trucks will also carry vitamin rich food, especially milk for children.

21 Every effort is made to eliminate stockpiling of needed materials. Distribution of all essential materials will be made in areas the moment they are liberated. We have been promised 180,000 blankets for Northern Italy. As soon as they are received they will be turned over to Regions for distribution to hospitals and institutions.

22 The American Red Cross under the direction of the Senior Public Health Officers will continue to distribute their clothing which is already at Leghorn.

23 American Red Cross clothing will meet the first and pressing needs as the different areas are liberated. American Relief for Italy Inc. clothing will be supplied to the liberated areas after the American Red Cross distribution has been completed and after the American Red Cross moves on to new areas.

24 The supplementary feeding plans will be similar to those used in Rome, Naples and Florence with public feeding stations being set up in the largest cities to meet the immediate needs. As information reaches this office as to emergency food requirements such information will be immediately passed to the Food Sub-Commission.

25 Immediate contact will be made with existing CMH and HLAs for the purpose of having them function under food management as quickly as possible.

26 Labour, Industry and Commerce Sub-Commissions will be kept informed of the numbers and locations of employables on Relief.

27 This Sub-Commission, with verbal agreements already made, will coordinate the work and efforts of the following and by so doing it is hoped to eliminate as nearly as possible all duplication of effort and distribution.

a) The American Joint Distribution Committee whose funds come from the people of Jewish faith in America.
b) The British and American Red Cross.
c) [illegible] International Organization set up to receive and distribute

[illegible] Torino and immediate steps will be taken to activate these [illegible]

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and Florence and immediate steps will be taken to activate those laboratories.

WELFARE

19 It is anticipated that welfare needs will be greater in North Eastern Italy than in Southern Italy. If the factories of this highly industrial section are destroyed, serious unemployment with attending suffering will follow. If the factories are intact, the lack of raw materials for production will cause some unemployment.

Plans of the Welfare Branch are based on the assumption that there will be large scale destruction and that 40% of the people will be in dire need.

20 Clothing furnished by American Relief for Italy and to be distributed by the National Italian Committee known as UNRCI, is in warehouses in Leghorn. It is assured that passes into Army areas can be obtained for the 50 trucks now operating under UNRCI, but owned by American Relief for Italy. These trucks will also carry vitamin and food, especially milk for children.

21 Every effort is made to eliminate stockpiling of needed materials. Distribution of the essential materials will be made in areas the moment they are liberated. We have been promised 100,000 blankets for Northern Italy. As soon as they are received they will be turned over to Regions for distribution to needy and institutions.

22 The American Red Cross under the direction of the Senior Public Health Officers will continue to distribute their clothing which is already at Leghorn.

23 American Red Cross clothing will meet the first and pressing needs as the different areas are liberated. American Relief for Italy Inc. clothing will be supplied to the liberated areas after the American Red Cross distribution has been completed and after the American Red Cross moves on to new areas.

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25 Immediate contact will be made with existing CMFI and MCAs for the purpose of having them function under good arrangement as quickly as possible.

26 Labour, Industry and Commerce Sub-Commissions will be kept informed of the numbers and locations of employables on Relief.

27 This Sub-Commission, with verbal agreements already made, will coordinate the work and efforts of the following and by so doing it is hoped to eliminate as nearly as possible all duplication of effort and distribution.

a) The American Joint Distribution Committee whose funds come from the people of Jewish faith in America.
b) The British and American Red Cross.
c) UNRCI, the Italian National Organization set up to receive and distribute clothing, food and medicines for the needy.

28 A letter from the President of the Italian Red Cross to Red Cross workers in this area, giving these workers complete instructions for immediate activation, is being held and will be immediately delivered as areas are liberated.

G.D. PARKINSON, Brigadier
Director,
Public Health Sub-Commission

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1 Major	12 3-ton Trucks
3 Captains	12 Armoured Cars.
6 Lieutenants	
6 Marescialli	
12 N.C.O's.	
277 CC.RR.	

Total 305

All the vehicles (with the exception of 7 armoured cars which are now being procured) are available and the Battalion is in course of being mobilised.

CARABINIERI PERSONNEL FOUND IN NORTHERN ITALY

9 CC.RR. reporting for duty will be sent to CC.RR. Screening Centres established in forward areas, where they will be investigated by a Commission of specially selected CC.RR. Officers. If found suitable they may be re-enlisted, provided an equal number of auxiliary or over-age CC.RR. in Southern Italy are dismissed. In the interval between reporting for duty and acceptance into the CC.RR, it is proposed to pay and feed these men as partisans. (But this arrangement has not yet been confirmed.)

AGENTS OF PUBLIC SECURITY

10 It is proposed to allow the existing organisation to continue. However, it is likely that several Questori and senior Officials may have fled or may have been removed by partisans or by the CMAI. The appointment of substitutes will be made, or confirmed, by the AMG Provincial Commissioner with the advice of the local Public Safety Officer.

FINANCE GUARDS

11 The existing organisation will be retained. Senior Officers are available in Rome for transfer to the North if necessary.

12 It is expected that a large proportion of the GG.FF. strength will be found intact in the North, but a reserve of 600 men is available for transfer if the need arises.

The authorised strength of GG.FF. in Venezia is as follows:

Officers	NCO's	Men	Total
171	1,591	6,074	7,836

RATIONS

13 CC.RR. will draw rations at the Italian Army scale, while other Police Agencies will be supplied with rations at the special scale set out in Memorandum AC/ G-1/Econ of 18 Oct 44.

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CARABINIERI MOBILE BATTALION.

8 A Mobile Battalion of CC.RR. will be organised for patrolling Venezia Region to prevent civil disturbances and banditry.

Personnel		Transport.	
1	Major	1	Motor Car
9	Captains	12	8-ton Trucks
6	Lieutenants	12	Armoured Cars.
6	Marescialli		
12	N.C.O's.		
277	CC.RR.		
Total 305			

All the vehicles (with the exception of 7 armoured cars which are now being procured) are available and the Battalion is in course of being mobilised.

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AGENTS OF PUBLIC SECURITY

10 It is proposed to allow the existing organisation to continue. However, it is likely that several Questori and senior Officials may have fled or may have been removed by partisans or by the CLNAI. The appointment of substitut will be made, or confirmed, by the AFHQ Provincial Commissioner with the advice of the local Public Safety Officer.

FINANCE GUARDS

11 The existing organisation will be retained. Senior Officers are available in Rome for transfer to the North if necessary.

12 It is expected that a large proportion of the GG.FF. strength will be found intact in the North, but a reserve of 600 men is available for transfer if the need arises.

The authorised strength of GG.FF. in Venezia is as follows:

Officers	NCO's	Men	Total

CARABINIERI MOBILE BATTALION.

8 A Mobile Battalion of CC.RR. will be organised for patrolling Venezia Region to prevent civil disturbances and banditry.

Personnel		Transport.	
1	Major	1	Motor Car
3	Captains	12	3-ton Trucks
6	Lieutenants	12	Armoured Cars.
6	Marescialli		
12	N.C.O's.		
277	CC.RR.		
Total	305		

All the vehicles (with the exception of 7 armoured cars which are now being procured) are available and the Battalion is in course of being mobilised.

C/RABINIERI PERSONNEL FOUND IN NORTHERN ITALY

9 CC.RR. reporting for duty will be sent to CC.RR. Screening Centres established in forward areas, where they will be investigated by a Commission of specially selected CC.RR. Officers. If found suitable they may be re-enlisted, provided an equal number of auxiliary or over-age CC.RR. in Southern Italy are dismissed. In the interval between reporting for duty and acceptance into the CC.RR. it is proposed to pay and feed these men as partisans. (But this arrangement has not yet been confirmed.)

AGENTS OF PUBLIC SECURITY

10 It is proposed to allow the existing organisation to continue. However, it is likely that several Questori and senior officials may have fled or may have been removed by partisans or by the CLNAI. The appointment of substitut will be made, or confirmed, by the AMG Provincial Commissioner with the advice of the local Public Safety Officer.

FURNACE GUARDS

11 The existing organisation will be retained. Senior Officers are available in Rome for transfer to the North if necessary.

12 It is expected that a large proportion of the GG.FF. strength will be found intact in the North, but a reserve of 600 men is available for transfer if the need arises.

The authorised strength of GG.FF. in Venezia is as follows:

Officers [illegible]

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1 Major	1 Motor Car
3 Captains	12 3-ton Trucks
6 Lieutenants	12 Armoured Cars.
6 Marescialli	
12 N.C.O's.	
277 CC.RR.	

Total 305

All the vehicles (with the exception of 7 armoured cars which are now being procured) are available and the Battalion is in course of being mobilised.

C/RABINIERI PERSONNEL FOUND IN NORTHERN ITALY

9 CC.RR. reporting for duty will be sent to CC.RR. Screening Centres established in forward areas, where they will be investigated by a Commission of specially selected CC.RR. Officers. If found suitable they may be re-enlisted, provided an equal number of auxiliary or over-age CC.RR. in Southern Italy are dismissed. In the interval between reporting for duty and acceptance into the CC.RR. it is proposed to pay and feed these personnel. (But this arrangement has not yet been confirmed.)

AGENTS OF PUBLIC SECURITY

10 It is proposed to allow the existing organisation to continue. However, it is likely that several Questori and senior officials may have fled or may have been removed by partisans or by the CLNAI. The appointment of substitutes will be made, or confirmed, by the AMG Provincial Commissioner with the advice of the local Public Safety Officer.

FINANCE MATTERS

11 The existing organisation will be retained. Senior Officers are available in Rome for transfer to the North if necessary.

12 It is expected that a large proportion of the GC.FF. strength will be found intact in the North, but a reserve of 600 men is available for transfer if the need arises.

The authorised strength of GC.FF. in Venezia is as follows:

Officers	NCO's	Men	Total
171	1,591	6,074	7,836

RATIONS

13 CC.RR. will draw rations at the Italian Army scale, while other Police Agencies will be supplied with rations at the special scale set out in Memorandum AC/A 3-1/Food of 18 Oct 44.

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PRISONS

22 A list of prisons in the area is shown in Appendix "F", together with accommodation and classification. In this connection, attention is drawn to AC Directive 317/122/CA in regard to the requisition of such institutions.

FIRE AND CIVIL DEFENCE.

23 Italian Fire and Civil Defence organisations will be reorganised. At the earliest convenient moment the Civil Defence personnel will be reduced to numbers commensurate with the duties to be performed.

24 Six trucks with portable pumps are stationed in Rome ready to be sent forward to Venezia. Each truck carries two men. Trained crews of 10 men for each truck are available in Rome and can be sent forward with the vehicles if there is any shortage of trained personnel in Venezia.

25 Public Safety Officers will maintain liaison with Allied Military Fire and RAD Services, particularly in the Ports.

CONTROL OF CIVILIAN MOVEMENT.

26 For the purposes of the control of civilian movement newly occupied territory will continue to be regarded as being within the Army Zone until higher military authority authorises a change-over from Army Zone to Restricted Zone, or from Restricted Zone to Free Zone.

27 Proclamation No. 1, Article 16, will apply until the territory is turned over to Regional Control. General Order No. 2 will then be posted.

28 Local adjustments to the 10 Km. restriction may be considered necessary in the case of towns with large built up areas. Such adjustments are subject to the permission of the local military commander.

29 It is anticipated that the frontier provinces will continue to be regarded as a restricted zone for an indefinite period.

30 The provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 77 will be complied with by all concerned on all occasions.

31 With regard to civilians wishing to leave Italian territory, application for Military Travel Authorisations will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 61.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AMG AND AC.

32 It is expected that all forms of local government will come under

FIRE AND CIVIL DEFENCE.

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FIRE AND CIVIL DEFENCE.

23 Italian Fire and Civil Defence organisations will be reorganised. At the earliest convenient moment the Civil Defence personnel will be reduced to numbers commensurate with the duties to be performed.

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28 Local adjustments to the 10 Km. restriction may be considered necessary in the case of towns with large built up areas. Such adjustments are subject to the permission of the local military commander.

29 It is anticipated that the frontier provinces will continue to be regarded as a restricted zone for an indefinite period.

30 The provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 77 will be complied with by all concerned on all occasions.

31 With regard to civilians wishing to leave Italian territory, application for Military Travel Authorisations will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 61.

ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS FOR AMG AND AC.

32 It is expected that all forms of local government will come under the control of civil agencies at an earlier date than in the present liberated portions of Italy. All public buildings and equipment will be reserved for the service named below and put at the disposal of Civil Government as early as is commensurate with military necessity.

Prefettura, Municipi,	Prisons,
Carabinieri Caserme,	Reformatories,
Police Stations,	Fire Stations,
Court Houses,	U.N.R.R.A. (Bomb Disposal and Mine Clearance organisations.)
Police Barracks,	

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TRANSPORT

14. Apart from the Mobile Battalions of CC.RR. described in paragraph 8 above, no vehicles will be sent to Northern Italy. Use will be made of such transport as is found in the possession of the local Police or can be obtained from military sources or by requisitioning.

FRONTIER CONTROL

15. The frontiers to be considered are those of Austria and Yugoslavia.

The control of the frontiers is the responsibility of AFHQ. and no instructions have yet been published. However, the following principles are likely to be adopted:-

(a) The enforcement of the control will be carried out by Allied personnel - possibly C.I.C. - and not by AMG.
(b) The assistance of Italian Police will be sought to augment Allied Personnel in controlling the frontiers.
(c) As soon as Northeast Italy is occupied the frontiers will be closed.
(d) At a later stage civilians in possession of Military Travel Authorisations or Allied Forces Permits will be allowed to cross the frontiers.
(e) At a very much later stage the frontiers may be opened to the conveyance of merchandise in accordance with plans made by Finance Sub-Commission.

16. The task of Public Safety will be to provide the Italian Police to work under Allied Military supervision. The Fascist Frontier Militia will be disbanded and its place taken by CC.RR. and CC.FF. At the moment it is not proposed to use Agents of Public Security. The main work will be done by CC.FF. and it is expected that most of them will be found at their frontier posts.

17. No firm arrangements can be made until AFHQ plans have been settled but the following reserves are being held in readiness:

CC.RR. 200 (to be available within a few days.)
CC.FF. 600 (to be available within a few days.)

CO-OPERATION WITH THE MILITARY.

18. Public Safety Officers in Northeastern Italy will keep in the closest touch with Allied Military Police (including C.I.E. and C.I.D.) and also with the Allied Military Security Services (FSS and CIC). In the event of situations arising with which the Italian Police are unable to cope, Allied Military assistance will be obtained.

19. No information is available as to the number of Allied or Italian Garrison Troops likely to be stationed [illegible]

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The control of the frontiers is the responsibility of AFHQ, and no instructions have yet been published. However, the following principles are likely to be adopted:-

(a) The enforcement of the control will be carried out by Allied personnel - possibly C.I.C. - and not by AMG.

(b) The assistance of Italian Police will be sought to augment Allied Personnel in controlling the frontiers.

(c) As soon as Northeast Italy is occupied the frontiers will be closed.

(d) At a later stage civilians in possession of Military Travel Authorizations or Allied Forces Permits will be allowed to cross the frontiers.

(e) At a very much later stage the frontiers may be opened to the conveyance of merchandise in accordance with plans made by Finance Sub-Commission.

16 The task of Public Safety will be to provide the Italian Police to work under Allied Military supervision. The Fascist Frontier Militia will be disbanded and its place taken by CC.RR. and GG.FF. At the moment it is not proposed to use Agents of Public Security. The main work will be done by GG.FF. and it is expected that most of them will be found at their frontier posts.

17 No firm arrangements can be made until AFHQ plans have been settled but the following reserves are being held in readiness:

CC.RR. 200 (to be available within a few days.)
GG.FF. 600 (to be available within a few days.)

CO-OPERATION WITH THE MILITARY.

18 Public Safety Officers in Northeastern Italy will keep in the closest touch with Allied Military Police (including P.I.B. and C.I.D.) and also with the Allied Military Security Services (FSS and CIC). In the event of situations arising with which the Italian Police are unable to cope, Allied Military assistance will be obtained.

19 No information is available as to the number of Allied or Italian Garrison Troops likely to be stationed in Northeast Italy.

SECURITY

20 It has been agreed that Regional Commissioners will have a Security Officer working under the Regional Public Safety Officer to advise and assist him with Security problems. A separate directive will be issued as to their functions.

Briefly, these will consist of screening local officials and Allied Commission civilian employees, liaison with other Military and Civil Security agencies, enquiries in regard to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities, liaison between Patriot officers and intelligence agencies, etc.

(24)

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PRISONS

22 A list of prisons in the area is shown in Appendix "B", together with accommodation and classification. In this connection, attention is drawn to AG Directive 317/1c2/CA in regard to the requisition of such institutions.

FIRE AND CIVIL DEFENCE.

23 Italian Fire and Civil Defence organisations will be reestablished. At the earliest convenient moment the Civil Defence personnel will be reduced to numbers commensurate with the duties to be performed.

24 Six trucks with portable pumps are stationed in Rome ready to be sent forward to Venezia. Each truck carries two men. Trained crews of 10 men for each truck are available in Rome and can be sent forward with the vehicles if there is any shortage of trained personnel in Venezia.

25 Public Safety Officers will maintain liaison with Allied Military Fire and RAD Services, particularly in the Ports.

CONTROL OF CIVILIAN MOVEMENT.

26 For the purposes of the control of civilian movement newly occupied territory will continue to be regarded as being within the Army Zone until higher military authority authorises a change-over from Army Zone to Restricted Zone, or from Restricted Zone to Free Zone.

27 Proclamation No. 1, Article 16, will apply until the territory is turned over to Regional Control. General Order No. 2 will then be posted.

28 Local adjustments to the 10 Km. restriction may be considered necessary in the case of towns with large built up areas. Such adjustments are subject to the permission of the local military commander.

29 It is anticipated that the frontier provinces will continue to be regarded as a restricted zone for an indefinite period.

30 The provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 77 will be complied with by all concerned on all occasions.

31 With regard to civilians wishing to leave Italian territory, application for Military Travel Authorisations will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 61.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMG AND AC.

32 It is expected that all forms of local government will come under the control of civil agencies at an earlier date than in the present

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AIRS AND CIVIL DEFENCE.

23 Italian Fire and Civil Defence organisations will be resuscitated. At the earliest convenient moment the Civil Defence personnel will be reduced to numbers commensurate with the duties to be performed.

24 Six trucks with portable pumps are stationed in Rome ready to be sent forward to Venezia. Each truck carries two men. Trained crews of 10 men for each truck are available in Rome and can be sent forward with the vehicles if there is any shortage of trained personnel in Venezia.

25 Public Safety Officers will maintain liaison with Allied Military Fire and RAD Services, particularly in the Ports.

CONTROL OF CIVILIAN MOVEMENT.

26 For the purposes of the control of civilian movement newly occupied territory will continue to be regarded as being within the Army Zone until higher military authority authorises a change-over from Army Zone to Restricted Zone, or from Restricted Zone to Free Zone.

27 Proclamation No. 1, Article 16, will apply until the territory is turned over to Regional Control. General Order No. 2 will then be posted.

28 Local adjustments to the 10 Km. restriction may be considered necessary in the case of towns with large built up areas. Such adjustments are subject to the permission of the local military commander.

29 It is anticipated that the frontier provinces will continue to be regarded as a restricted zone for an indefinite period.

30 The provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 77 will be complied with by all concerned on all occasions.

31 With regard to civilians wishing to leave Italian territory, application for Military Travel Authorisations will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 61.

ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS FOR AMG AND AMG/CC.

32 It is expected that all forms of local government will come under the control of civil agencies at an earlier date than in the present liberated portions of Italy. All public buildings and equipment will be reserved for the service named below and put at the disposal of Civil Government as early as is commensurate with military necessity.

Prefettura, Municipi,	Prisons,
Carabinieri Caserma,	Reformatories,
Police Stations,	Fire Stations,
Court Houses,	U.N.R.R.A. (Bomb Disposal and Mine Clearance
Police Barracks.	organisations.)

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ANNEX "A"
(to ENCLOSURE IV
to I/H2A/CA of 30 Apl 45)

AUTHORISED STRENGTH OF CC.RR.

Province		Spearhead	55,000 Ceiling
VENETO -	UDINE	152	523
	BELLUNO	45	239
	PADUA	55	897
	TRENTO	78	850
	VERONA	120	499
	VICENZA	116	269
	PADOVA	199	400
	TREVISO	119	284
	VENEZIA	138	336
	ROVIGO	50	193
VENEZIA GIULIA -			
	POLA	62	651
	TRIESTE	80	1,175
	FIUME	32	269
	GORIZIA	41	483
	ZARA	22	151
		1,250	7,508

If a ceiling of 65,000 is approved, the total strength for Venezia will be increased from 7,508 to 9,508.

PLAN FOR FURNISHING THE STRENGTH

Mobile CC.RR.	Already attached to 5th Army	285	
	Already attached to 8th Army	208	493
Spearhead	On reserve at RIMINI	500	
	On reserve at PESARO	446	
	On reserve at FLORENCE	254	
	On reserve at ANCONA	50	1,250
			2,000

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VENETO -	UDINE	152	523
	BELLUNO	45	228
	ROVIGO	55	297
	PADUA	78	850
	VERONA	120	499
	VICENZA	116	269
	TREVISO	139	400
	VENEZIA	119	281
	VENEZIA	138	336
	ROVIGO	56	193
VENEZIA GIULIA -			
	POLA	62	651
	TRIESTE	80	1,475
	FIUME	32	269
	GORIZIA	41	489
	ZARA	22	151
		1,250	7,508

If a ceiling of 45,000 is approved, the total strength for Venezia will be increased from 7,508 to 9,512.

PLAN FOR FURNISHING THE STRENGTH

Mobile Ce.Mi.	Already attached to 5th Army	285	
	Already attached to 8th Army	208	493
Spearhead	On reserve at RIMINI	500	
	On reserve at TREVISO	446	
	On reserve at FLORENCE	254	
	On reserve at ANCONA	50	1,250
Earmarked	On duty in Southern Legions		2,000
Remainder	To be provided from Servening Centres or from Southern Legions as the situation develops		3,765
		TOTAL	7,508

(29)

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APPENDIX "B"
(to Enclosure IV
to A/A21/CI of 30 Apl 45)

MINISTRY OF GRACE AND JUSTICE

ITALY

Ref. No.	Situation	Type	Capacity before the war.	Name and surname of the last director.
1	Belluno	C.C.	134	Sedda Alessandro
2	Padova (a)	S.P.	450	D'Otri Temistocle
	Padova (b)	C.G.	270	
3	Pordenone	C.G.	90	(1)
4	Rovigo	C.G.	110	(1)
5	Tolmezzo	C.G.	36	(1)
6	Treviso	C.G.	80	(1)
7	Udine	C.G.	307	D'Orso Michele
8	Venezia (a)	C.L. uomini	380	Pinzaro Guglielmo
	(b)	C.G.	519	
	(c)	C.R. donne	415	
	(d)	C.L. donne	150	
	(e)	C.A. donne	35	
	(f)	CoR.M.	218	
9	Verona	C.G.	231	Olga Sergio
10	Vicenza	C.G.	218	Finiani Salvatore
11	Capodistria (a)	C.R.	400	Mazzona Concetto
	(b)	C.G.	160	
12	Piano	C.G.	90	(1)
13	Gorizia	C.G.	200	(1)
14	Pola	C.R.	230	(1)
15	Trieste	C.G.	521	Rostivo Vincenzo
16	Zara	C.G.	100	(1)
17	Bolzano	C.G.	119	Vautro Sebastiano
18	Rovereto	C.G.	70	(1)
19	Trento	C.G.	209	Celavito Francesco

N.B. C.G. please read Judicial Prison
C.R. please read Penal Prison
CoR.M. please read Reformatory for minors.
Rif. Giud. please read Judicial Reformatory.

(1) The direction is entrusted to the local Judicial authority (Praetor or Prosecutor of the Kingdom.)

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Ref. No.	Situation	Type	Capacity before the war.	Name and surname of the last director.
1	Milano	C.C.	194	Vedda Alessandro
2	Padova (a)	C.R.	550	D'Atri Temistocle
	Padova (b)	C.C.	270	
3	Pordenone	C.C.	90	(1)
4	Rovigo	C.C.	110	(1)
5	Tolmezzo	C.C.	36	(1)
6	Treviso	C.C.	88	(1)
7	Udine	C.C.	307	D'Ufreo Michele
8	Venezia (a)	C.L. centrale	348	Pinnery Guglielmo
	(b)	C.C.	519	
	(c)	C.R. donne	415	
	(d)	C.L. donne	150	
	(e)	C.A. donne	35	
	(f)	CoR.M.	218	
9	Verona	C.C.	291	Olea Sergio
10	Vicenza	C.C.	218	Bordieni Salvatore
11	Capodistria (a)	C.R.	400	Mazzone Concetto
	(b)	C.C.	160	
12	Pisino	C.C.	90	(1)
13	Gorizia	C.C.	200	(1)
14	Pola	C.C.	230	(1)
15	Trieste	C.C.	521	Nastivo Vincenzo
16	Zara	C.C.	100	(1)
17	Bolzano	C.C.	119	Ventre Sebastiano
18	Rovereto	C.C.	70	(1)
19	Trento	C.C.	209	Calavito Francesco

N.B. C.C. please read Judicial Prison
C.R. please read Penal Prison
CoR.M. please read Reformatory for minors.
Rif. Giud. please read Judicial Reformatory.

(1) The direction is entrusted to the local Judicial authority (Pretor or Prosecutor of the Kingdom.)

(39)

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Enclosure 1

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPATRIATION SUB COMMISSION

DPR/1-8/AM.

SUBJECT : D.P.R.S.C. Plan for Northern Italy.

1. Area Covered.

As it is impossible to divide Northern Italy into two parts either for dealing with refugees during operations or later repatriating Italians from outside the Frontiers, this plan deals with Northern Italy as a whole and concerns the five Regions of EMILIA, LIGURIA, LOMBARDIA, PIEMONTE and VENEZIA.

2. General Plan.

This general plan is divided into two phases. The first phase being the operational phase, when the most important task is the care of war refugees. The second phase is mainly repatriation. These two phases may have to function conjointly if North West Italy is liberated before North East Italy.

3. PHASE I (Operational)

Refugee Centres handled as previously in 5th and 8th Armies' areas, and in the rear of these, by the three existing Groups of Centres, Allied Nationals in large towns to be cared for by Forward Representatives of D.P.R.S.C. who will accompany A.M.G. spearheads, and in addition by mobile Forward Groups, who will deal with both Italian and Allied Nationals, as required. As far as possible centres selected for this phase will be those which will also be required in Phase II.

4. PHASE II (Repatriation)

a) Italian. There are approximately one million Italians to be returned to Italy from outside the Northern Italian Frontiers. It is impossible at present to forecast by which route most of the Italian now in Germany will arrive - Viz:- by train through Switzerland, or from the North East.

They may consist of:-

(i) Former Italian Soldiers.
(ii) Ex-Italian P.W.
(iii) Italian workmen, including some women

It has been agreed in view of the difficulties of distinguishing repatriates, that D.P.R.S.C. in conjunction with the High Commissioner for Italian Refugees, will establish an organisation to deal initially with all repatriates arriving in Northern Italy. After the initial processing of repatriates, those who are found to be Former Italian soldiers or Italian ex-P.W. will be handed over to be dealt with by the Military Organisation concerned, either in part of the same centre or another centre as is convenient.

b) Non-Italian. It is estimated that at present there are some 30,000 non-Italian Displaced Persons in Northern Italy who will require to be

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concerns the five Regions of EMILIA, LIGURIA, LOMBARDIA, PIEDMONT and VENETIA.

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This general plan is divided into two phases. The first phase being the operational phase, when the most important task is the care of war refugees. The second phase is mainly repatriation. These two phases may have to function conjointly if North West Italy is liberated before North East Italy.

3. PHASE I (Operational)

Refugee Centres handled as previously in 5th and 8th Armies' areas, and in the rear of these, by the three existing Groups of Centres. Allied Nationals in large towns to be cared for by Forward Representatives of D.P.R.S.C. who will accompany A.M.G. spearheads, and in addition by mobile Forward Groups, who will deal with both Italian and Allied Nationals, as required. As far as possible centres selected for this phase will be those which will also be required in Phase II.

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It has been agreed in view of the difficulties of distinguishing repatriates, that D.P.R.S.C. in conjunction with the High Commissioner for Italian Refugees, will establish an organisation to deal initially with all repatriates arriving in Northern Italy. After the initial processing of repatriates, those who are found to be former Italian soldiers or Italian ex-P.W. will be handed over to be dealt with by the Military Organisation concerned, either in part of the same centre or another centre as is convenient.

b) Non-Italian. It is estimated that at present there are some 30,000 non-Italian Displaced Persons in Northern Italy who will require to be returned to their own countries. The centres as proposed will deal with these, and in addition there will be centres at G.H.Q. and TRIESTE from which Allied Nationals can be repatriated. These may be part of centres outlined in this plan, or separate centres according to available accommodation. Two further Allied National Centres to be selected later on.

/ 2. Centre.

(29)

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5. ORGANISATION.

a) Advanced Repatriation Headquarters consisting of advanced Representatives of H.Q. D.P.R.S.C. with such representatives of War Material Disposal and Italian P.W. Sub-Commission and Land Forces Sub-Commission if required, as are considered necessary, and their opposite numbers in the Italian Government, will be set up either at MILAN or in the vicinity of the Allied Military Organisation concerned.

b) Group Headquarters will be set up at each Allied Commission Region Headquarters, except EMILIA. D.P.R.S.C. Centres in EMILIA would be eventually controlled from the Group Headquarters in VENEZIA Region.

c) Each Group Headquarters will control several Collecting and Transit Centres, which in turn will control certain Frontier Repatriation Posts.

Collecting and Transit Centres	- Capacity 5,000 persons.
Frontier Repatriation Posts	- Capacity 1,000 persons.

The most suitable accommodation is ex-P.W. Camps, Barracks, Schools, Hotels, or other large buildings. Such places are essential for centres as NO canvas is available. Centres to be in or near to the places named, and if possible not more than ten miles away and sited on or near main communications.

d) Establishments of D.P.R.S.C. Group Headquarters and various D.P.R.S.C. Centres are shown in the attached Appendices "A", "B" and "C". These Appendices do not include the necessary personnel for handling and documenting Italian P.W.'s and soldiers. A further Appendix will be issued to show this requirement. Additional personnel required have been requested from A.F.H.Q. C.C.R.R. if not available, will be replaced by Italian Military personnel.

Collecting and Transit Centres and Frontier Repatriation Posts are shown on the sketch map (Appendix "D") and listed by Regions (Appendix "E").

6. MEDICAL.

10 bedded Sick Bay - each Frontier Repatriation Post.
50 bedded Centre Reception Station - each Collecting or Transit Centre.
100 bedded hospitals will be installed at GENOA and TRIESTE for Allied Nationals.

Medical stores required will be supplied through Public Health Sub-Commission. Equipment as available locally and to be brought up to scale by what may be obtainable from Army or A.C. sources.

7. TRANSPORTATION.

The normal method of moving refugees is by back-loading Army and Allied Commission transport. As this will be insufficient, one G.T. Coy. of 100 vehicles, 10 ambulances and 10 water carts for each Group Headquarters has been requested from A.F.H.Q.-

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Headquarters, except ANCONA. D.P.R.S.C. Centres in ANCONA would be eventually controlled from the Group Headquarters in VENEZIA Region.

c) Each Group Headquarters will control several Collecting and Transit Centres, which in turn will control certain Frontier Repatriation Posts.

Collecting and Transit Centres - Capacity 5,000 persons.
Frontier Repatriation Posts - Capacity 1,000 persons.

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d) Establishments of D.P.R.S.C. Group Headquarters and various D.P.R.S.C. Centres are shown in the attached Appendices "A", "B" and "C". These Appendices do not include the necessary personnel for handling and documenting Italian P.W.'s and soldiers. A further Appendix will be issued to show this requirement. Additional personnel required have been requested from A.F.H.Q. C.C.R.R. if not available, will be replaced by Italian Military personnel.

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7. TRANSPORTATION.

The normal method of moving refugees is by back-loading Army and Allied Commission transport. As this will be insufficient, one G.T. Coy. of 100 vehicles, 10 ambulances and 10 water carts for each Group Headquarters has been requested from A.F.H.Q.-

8. FEEDING.

a) Centres will be on the "Allied Commission Italian Refugees Scale". Supplies have been requested from Food Sub-Commission and will be included in bulk supplies to Regions.

b) In special centres set up for Allied Nationals, rations will be A.F.H.Q. Scales 24 - 30.

/ 8. Contd.

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9. ACCOMMODATION STORES FOR CENTRES.

To supplement stores at present in possession of this Sub-Commission local purchase and Army sources will be utilised.

10. DUTIES OF D.P.R.S.C.

Officers Commanding Group Headquarters of D.P.R.S.C. will work in close touch, and will be available to assist and advise Regional Headquarters on Italian Refugee or Allied National problems.

In view of their limited numbers D.P.R.S.C. personnel are normally only responsible for inmates, or those refugees moving to and from D.P.R.S.C. Centres. Refugees and Displaced Persons in Provinces and Communes will continue to be the responsibility of the Italian Authorities, supervised by Regional and Provincial Welfare Officers or such other persons as the Regional Commissioner may direct.

C.F. WHITNEY,
Colonel,
Director.

27 February 1945.

Reprinted 18 April 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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U.R. WHITNEY,
Colonel,
Director.

27 February 1945.

Reprinted 18 April 1945

D.P.L.S.C. ESTABLISHMENT PERSONNEL FOR NORTHERN ITALY
EXCLUDING OFFICERS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ACCOMMODATION
CENTRES IN SOUTH & CENTRAL ITALY & H.Q. D.P.R.C.C. ROMA.

APPENDIX "A" — Establishment for Centre for 5,000 Persons.
(22 Collection or Transit Centres) *

	Officers	O.R.'s	Medical	Red Cross	Chaplains	C.C.R.R.
Allied	3 **	4	-	2	-	-
Italian	12	90	4	20	1	20

** 10 Centres at 2.
12 " at 3.

* 2 Allied National Centres without Italian Personnel.

Total Requirements for 22 Collection or Transit Centres.

Allied	56	88	-	44	-	-
Italian	240	1900	80	400	20	400

APPENDIX "B" — Establishment for Frontier Repatriation Post for 1,000 Persons. (20 Frontier Repatriation Posts).

Allied	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italian	4	35	1	4	1	6

Total Requirements for 20 Frontier Repatriation Posts.

Italian	80	700	20	80	20	120

APPENDIX "C" — Establishment for Group Headquarters.
(5 Group Headquarters)

Allied	3	4	1	1	-	-
Italian	3	12	-	-	-	-

Total Requirements for 5 Group Headquarters.

Allied	15	20	5	5	-	-
Italian	15	60	-	-	-	-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

** 10 Centres at 2.
12 " at 3.

* 2 Allied National Centres without Italian Personnel.

Total Requirements for 22 Collection or Transit Centres.

Allied	56	88	-	44	-	-
Italian	240	1800	60	400	20	400

APPENDIX "B". Establishment for Frontier Registration Post for 1,000 Persons. (20 Frontier Registration Posts).

Allied	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italian	4	35	1	4	1	6

Total Requirements for 20 Frontier Registration Posts.

Italian	80	700	20	80	20	120

APPENDIX "C" Establishment for Group Headquarters.
(5 Group Headquarters)

Allied	3	4	1	1	-	-
Italian	3	12	-	-	-	-

Total Requirements for 5 Group Headquarters.

Allied	15	20	5	5	-	-
Italian	15	60	-	-	-	-

/ 2 Contd.

(29)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS.

APPENDICES "A", "B" & "C".

	Officers	O.R.'s	Medical	Red Cross	Chaplains	C.C.R.R.
Allied	72	108	4	49	-	-
Italian	335	2650	100	450	40	520

a. Total Allied Military 184
" " Red Cross 49
233

b. Total Italian Military 3075
" " Red Cross 460
CC.RR. 520
4035

NOTES :-

(i) Italian Military Personnel available for release from D.P.R.S.C. Centres in Central Italy - 750.

(ii) Italian Red Cross Personnel available for release from D.P.R.S.C. Centres in Central Italy - 45.


(iii) C.C.R.R. available for release from D.P.R.S.C. Centres in Central Italy - 50.

(iv) The number of Italian Military required as shown above does NOT provide for Italian Military staff for handling and documentation of Italian ex P.W. and former Italian soldiers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785075

1303

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX "F"

LOCATION OF D.P.R.S.C. COLLECTING AND TRANSIT CENTRES AND FRONTIER REPATRIATION POSTS.

REGION	Group H.Q.	5,000 Capacity Collecting and Transit Centres.	1,000 Capacity Frontier Repat. Posts.
EMILIA		* RICCIONE * CARPI (MODENA) * PARMA BOLOGNA * PIACENZA	
LIGURIA	GENOA	** GENOA BUSALLA/ERA	GRIMALDI
LOMBARDIA	MILANO	MILANO NOVARA VARESE COMO	TRIVIA CRESCIO CHIASSO CHIAVENNA TIRANO
PIEMONTE	TORINO	TORINO CUNEO SUSA AOSTA RIVOLI	S.MAURIZIO DI TENDA VINADIO OULX BARDONECCHIA DOMODOSSOLA
VENEZIA	H.Q. Romion	* PADUA VENEZIA VERONA TRENTO ** TARVISIO GORIZIA UDINE BOLZANO BELLUNO	FIUME VILLA DEL BOSCO POSTUMIA GORIZIA S.PIETRO DI FORNINO TARVISIO S.GIOVANNI VIPITENO SPONDIGNA

NOTE

* - PHASE I only. Other temporary "centres" will be required in Phase I.

** - Centres for Allied Nationals in addition. Plus two to be

HQ. 785/45

EMILIA		*	RICCIONE	
		*	CARPI (MODENA)	
		*	PARMA	
			BOLOGNA	
		*	PIACENZA	
LIGURIA	GENOA	**	GENOA	GARIBALDI
			BORDIGHERA	
LOMBARDIA	MILANO		MILANO	TRIESTA
			MONZA	CUNEO
			VARESE	CHIASSO
			COMO	CHIAVENNA
				TIRANO
PIEMONTE	TORINO		TORINO	S.MAURIZIO DI TENDA
			CUNEO	VIGEVANO
			SUSA	CUNEO
			AOSTA	BARDONECCHIA
			SAVIGNO	DONODOSSOLA
VENEZIA	H.Q. Region	*	PADUA	FIUME
			VENEZIA	VILLA DEL NEVOSO
			VERONA	POSTUMIA
			TRIESTE	ZOLLA
		*	TARVISIO	S.LUCIA DI TORMINO
			GORIZIA	TARVISIO
			UDINE	S.CANDIDO
			BOLZANO	VIPITENO
			BELLUNO	BRUNICO

NOTE:

* - PHASE I only. Other temporary "centres" will be required in Phase I.

** - Centres for Allied Nationals in addition. Plus two to be selected later.

(39)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785075

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPATRIATION SUB-COMMISSION

DPR/1-8/ADM. Tel.486081 Ext.392 4/ April,1945.

SUBJECT : D.P.R.S.C. Plan for Northern Italy - AMENDMENT No. 1

TO : DISTRIBUTION.

Please make the following amendments to "D.P.R.S.C. Plan for Northern Italy", forwarded under cover of this H.Q. letter of even number dated 28 February, 1945.

1. At APPENDIX "F" under "Establishment for Frontier Repatriation Post for 1,000 Persons"

ADD

	Officers	O.R.'s
"Allied	1	2 "

and under "Total Requirements for 20 Frontier Repatriation Posts"

ADD

	Officers	O.R.'s
"Allied	20	40 "

2. APPENDICES "D" and "E" to be amended in accordance with alterations enumerated below:-

Region	Amendment
LIGURIA	Substitute VENTIMIGLIA for GRIMALDO as Frontier Post. Substitute SAN REMO for BORDIGHERA as Collecting Centre.
PIEMONTE	Add PINEROLO (the Italian Equitation School, with extensive barracks) as a Collecting Centre. SUSA and AOSTA are re-classified from Collecting Centres to Frontier Posts. Note. BARDONECCHIA will not be opened as a Frontier Post in the first stages.
LOMBARDIA	Substitute BERGAMO for MONZA as a Collecting Centre for 5,000.

For the Director.

C.F.FOTHERGILL
Lieut.Colonel
Deputy Director.

DISTRIBUTION
N.W. Italy Planning Section A.C. (6)
C.A. Section, H.Q.A.C.
H.Q. EMILIA Region (3)
H.Q. LIGURIA Region (3)
H.Q. LOMBARDIA Region (3)
H.Q. VENEZIA Region (3)

Food Sub-Commission, A.C.
Public Health Sub-Commission A.C.
Transportation Sub-Commission, A.C.
G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q. (2)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Northern Italy", forwarded under cover of this H.Q. letter of even number dated 28 February, 1945.

1. At APPENDIX "B" under "Establishment for Frontier Repatriation Post for 1,000 Persons"

ADD

	Officers	O.R.'s
"Allied	1	2 "

and under "Total Requirements for 20 Frontier Repatriation Posts"

ADD

	Officers	O.R.'s
"Allied	20	40 "

2. APPENDICES "D" and "E" to be amended in accordance with alterations enumerated below:-

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LOMBARDIA	Substitute BERGAMO for MONZA as a Collecting Centre for 5,000.

For the Director.

C.F.FOTHERGILL
Lieut.Colonel
Deputy Director.

DISTRIBUTION

N.W. Italy Planning Committee A.C. (5)
C.A. Section, H.Q.A.C.
H.Q. EMILIA Region (2)
H.Q. LIGURIA Region (3)
H.Q. LOMBARDIA Region (3)
H.Q. VENEZIA Region (3)
No. 2 Sub-Section D.P.W.S.C. (1 per Officer)
A.M.G. 5th Army
A.M.G. 8th Army
[illegible] D.P.W.S.C. in the office of [illegible] D.C.C.C.O., H.Q. 15 Army Group
A.M.G. 5th Army for D.P.W.S.C. Forward Representative (2)
H.Q. No. 2 District
H.Q. 57 Area
War Material Disposal & Italian P.W. Sub-Commission, A.C.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
Food Sub-Commission, A.C.
Public Health Sub-Commission A.C.
Transportation Sub-Commission, A.C.
G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q. (2)
British Red Cross War Relief
Inter Governmental Committee on Refugees
File
Fleet

(24)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MAY 8 1105 REC'D

TOP SECRET

MSC Center No: H 130/30
Classification: TOP SECRET
Precedence: URGENT
From: AFHQ
To: Admiral STONE - Information.

Time Recd: 302139
Time Sent: 3019108
Ref. No. FX 68387
Cite: FHCCT

TOP SECRET.

NOT RECVD BY AC

Further to my F 66775 of 27 April. FX 68387 signed SACMED cite FHCCT. Addressed 15 Army Group for General CLARK repeated AIRCOM for Admiral STONE for information.

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided to establish and maintain US/UK AMG in:

(a) The Compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA including FIUME and the QUARNERO Islands (but excluding the Province of ZARA).

(b) TARVISIO and surrounding areas which before 1919 formed part of Austria and have since been incorporated in Italy, i.e. up to 1939 Italian frontiers.

2. A successful working of plan in para.1 depends on Soviet cooperation. US and UK Governments are therefore seeking Soviet concurrence to join them in requesting Jugoslav Government to withdraw all Jugoslav Forces from the Compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA.

3. Action in para.2 is unlikely to be completed before you enter VENEZIA GIULIA. You will however implement such portions of the plan in para.1 as your operations require.

4. In amplification of para.4 in F 6675, the object of your operations in VENEZIA GIULIA for the present will be as follows:

(a) Secure TRIESTE and L of C through Italy leading to it.

(b) Secure L of C from TRIESTE to Austria via GORIZIA-TARVISIO.

(c) Secure POLA, anchorages between TRIESTE and POLA, and the L of C between those ports.

5. Concurrently with operations indicated para.4 above, you will continue operations against the enemy until you have completely cleared VENEZIA GIULIA or linked up with regular Jugoslav Armed Forces.

6. In linking up with regular Jugoslavs, maximum care will be exercised to avoid armed clashes.

(2.8) 7-1

See (34a)

1312

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

7. During the Supreme Allied Commander's recent visit to BELGRADE, Marshal TITO agreed that any of his Forces in those portions of VENEZIA GIULIA required by the Supreme Allied Commander for his operational purposes would be placed under his (Supreme Allied Commander's) command.

8. Allied Military Government in areas under your control will function through such local authorities as may be found in effective operation irrespective of nationality.

9. MACMIS is being instructed to obtain from the Jugoslavs information regarding the means their Forces will employ to identify themselves to your Forces when they link up. MACMIS is also being instructed to inform the Jugoslavs that in such event your Forces will identify themselves as stated in your SD 2347 dated 26 April.

10. In planning operations involving the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, you will arrange that the Forces and AMG personnel required are provided jointly from US and British resources.

Distr.
A/President
Chief Commr.
Exec. Commr.

28

TOP SECRET

copy for Admiral Stone

APR 30 RECD
CC 0950

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM RESIDENT MINISTER TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

NO. 732 of 27th April, 1945.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Addressed to Foreign Office, telegram No. 732 repeated to Belgrade and Rome.

My telegram No. 728.

TOP SECRET.

[redacted] Following is S.A.C.'s signal.

Begins: Events are moving rapidly in this theatre and I am likely to be faced in the near future with necessity for action in respect of Allied occupation of Venezia Giulia. I must therefore now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary these will be as follows:

2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to seize those, repeat those parts of Venezia Giulia, which are of importance to my military operations. The area so occupied will include Trieste and Communications leading to this port and from it into Austria. Pola will also be required.

3. Within the above area Allied Military Government will be set up in the wake of occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking provided as far as possible equally from the United States and British resources. It will work through such suitable local personnel whether Italian or Yugoslav as may be found in the area and will be part of the military government organisation which controls other areas of Italy.

4. Before task force enters Venezia Giulia, I will inform Marshal Tito of my intentions and will explain to him that if any of his forces remain in this area, they must necessary come under my command.

5. I consider course of action outlined above will adequately fulfil my military purposes. If however it is the intention of the British and United States Government that any other course is, for political reasons, to be adopted in Venezia Giulia, I must have immediate notification of the extent of my commitments so that I may assess the resources required. Ends.

10081/c c

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

TOP SECRET.

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(27)

TOP SECRET

A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC Nr. 78-5015

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K-154
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting
26th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

* * *

10. OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them that, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, the Supreme Allied Commander proposed to occupy with an Anglo-American task force the entire compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA and set up Allied Military government throughout this area.

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that he understood the course proposed in the telegram was the most likely, of the four courses suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, to be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the success of the course proposed would entirely depend upon Russian approvel. Unless the Russians exerted pressure, Marshal TITO would refuse to withdraw from the area if asked to do so and would fight if we attempted to disarm his forces.

MR. MACMILLAN said that the only reasons which could be put forward for taking the course suggested in the draft telegram were political ones. He himself believed that the course suggested was politically desirable. However, he thought the Supreme Allied Commander should in his signal restrict himself to outlining what action would be necessary for military reasons and state that, if his armies were to be used for political ends, he must have early instructions in order that he might appreciate the forces required. These forces would differ according to whether the Russians agreed or disagreed. He felt that a telegram along these lines would have the required result, namely, to produce further directions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that he would agree to a telegram stating what would be necessary for military reasons. He felt that the intention, which should be stated in this case, was to occupy such parts of VENEZIA GIULIA as would be required to ensure the military Lines of Communication.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24 in accordance with the

Declassified E.O. 13526, Section 3.3(b)(6) NND No. 785015

* * *

10. OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA (26)

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them that, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, the Supreme Allied Commander proposed to occupy with an Anglo-American task force the entire compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA and set up Allied Military government throughout this area.

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GENERAL MCNARNEY said that he would agree to a telegram stating what would be necessary for military reasons. He felt that the intention, which should be stated in this case, was to occupy such parts of VENEZIA GIULIA as would be required to ensure the military Lines of Communication.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24 in accordance with the above discussion and to transmit the revised draft for their approval.*

* Subsequently despatched as NAF 932. (27)

* * *

TOP SECRET

(26a)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EXTRACT TOP SECRET COPY

K 152

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 24
24th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have still not defined their policy in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. However, events have now moved to such an extent that it is imperative to make detailed plans and preparations. A draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is self-explanatory, is therefore attached at Appendix 'A'.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested :-

(a) To approve as his policy for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA the proposals outlined in Appendix 'A'.

(b) To authorise the despatch of this signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he intends to take.

(intd) L.L.L.

EXTRACT TOP SECRET COPY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

SO to CC

CC 1800

APR 26 RECD

Ref: 522/29/SC.

24 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Planning for VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
(Attn: G-5 Section)

1. I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to reply to your letter dated 10 April 1945, para 4.

2. For the purpose of study within the various Sections of this Headquarters certain questions were circulated and these together with their answers are to be found in Appendix "A" to this letter.

3. Appendix "B" contains a draft establishment for an integrated independent Headquarters. This you will note provides for a total of 117 officers. Our original allowance for VENEZIA GIULIA was 60 officers, assuming that it would be part of the Region of VENETIA. This Commission would be unable to meet the additional commitment from its existing T/O/E.

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ Norman E. Fiske

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel
Acting Executive Commissioner

Encl:
Appx "A" & "B".

Copy to: SO to CC
G4 Sec
Econ Sec

1800/1

25

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

PLANNING FOR VENEZIA GIULIA

Question	Answer
1. CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.	
(a) Local Government.	
(i) Are Prefects and Sindaco to be appointed. If so, what styles are to be used. (ii) Is the complete Italian administrative machinery of Capo di Gabinetto, Vice Prefetto etc to be followed.	VENEZIA GIULIA remains part of ITALY unless con… COS policy demands an alternative it will be fo… national law and practice to continue the exist… titles Prefect, Sindaco etc would continue to b… some different system of administration is dic… it will be convenient to continue that system.
(b) Legals.	
(i) Will the Court of Appeals at TRIESTE also act as ultimate Court of Appeal.	The Court of Appeals at TRIESTE cannot act as t… The Military Governor could, however, suspend t… Court of Cassation in ROME during the period of… COS policy demanded it.
(ii) To what extent, if any, are Italian Government decrees to be carried into VENEZIA GIULIA.	Decrees of the Italian Government since 8 Sep 4… desired. If decrees are not implemented it wi… publish and post a large number of General Orde… has been the practice of this Commission for th… Italian Government decree (implemented in AMG t… otherwise have been done by General Order.
(c) Public Safety.	
(i) What CC.MR problems are foreseen ?	The maintenance of law and order in a large po… trained police and the situation cannot be met … It is therefore urged :
	(a) That CC.MR in VENEZIA GIULIA should not be… present ceiling of 55,000.
	(b) That all existing police forces be retained…

(c)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX "A".

PLANNING FOR VENEZIA GIULIA

ANSWER

...ts and Sindaco to be appointed. ...t styles are to be used. ...plete Italian administrative ... of Capo di Gabinetto, Vice ...ts to be followed.

VENEZIA GIULIA remains part of ITALY unless ceded. Therefore unless COS policy demands an alternative it will be in accordance with international law and practice to continue the existing administration. The titles Prefect, Sindaco etc would continue to be used. If, however, some different system of administration is discovered to be in operation it will be convenient to continue that system.

...Court of Appeals at TRIESTE ...as ultimate Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeals at TRIESTE cannot act as the ultimate Court of Appeal. The Military Governor could, however, suspend the right of appeal to the Court of Cassation in ROME during the period of military occupation if COS policy demanded it.

...rtant, if any, are Italian ...t decrees to be carried into ...ZIA.

Decrees of the Italian Government since 8 Sep 43 may be implemented if so desired. If decrees are not implemented it will be necessary to draw up, publish and post a large number of General Orders for the reason that it has been the practice of this Commission for the last year to carry out by Italian Government decree (implemented in AMG territory) that which would otherwise have been done by General Order.

...R problems are foreseen ?

The maintenance of law and order in a large port area like TRIESTE requires trained police and the situation cannot be met by immediate recruiting. It is therefore urged :

(a) That CC.RR in VENEZIA GIULIA should not be held against the present ceiling of 55,000.

(b) That all existing police forces be retained.

(c) That all CC.RR/.....

1321

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Question	Answer
	(c) That all CC.RR or other police agencies whi… be collected and used to reinforce the exist…
	(d) Until the situation found on arrival can be … the view that full reliance can only be plac… and therefore its strength should be as lar…
2. ECONOMIC SECTION.	
(a) Finance.	
(i) How is the Region to be financed. Presumably the Italian Government will refuse to accept its financing as a charge against the Italian Budget.	As the machinery of public finance is on the I… agencies must be utilised and the method of fi… that currently followed in AMG territory. Th… pate any difficulty in separating the accounts … from those of established Italian territory. … term and long-term debt will continue to be se… for reasons of revenue and inflation control t… Treasury bills should continue to be sold.
(ii) AM lire currency will be used. Are any difficulties foreseen ?	The existing currency circulating in VENEZIA GI… therefore desirable that AM lire currency shou… accounts can be kept showing the amount of AM l… or to public government authorities; it will … keep track of the exact amount of AM lire notes … should be borne in mind that AM lire notes are … Government, so that an adjustment may eventuall…
(iii) Are the local (TRIESTE) branches of North Italian Commercial Banks to be allowed to communicate with their head offices, or is the banking system to be autonomous.	The difficulties of making the local banking s… able and it is strongly recommended that branc… cial banks should be allowed to communicate wi… From experience in both SICILY and SARDINIA, … financial machine to operate although cut off … a system, however, leads to considerable compl… difficulty.
	(b) Transpor…

1322

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Answer

(c) That all CC.RR or other police agencies which may have been disbanded be collected and used to reinforce the existing police.

(d) Until the situation found on arrival can be readily appreciated it is the view that full reliance can only be placed on Allied Military Police and therefore its strength should be as large as possible.

region to be financed.
the Italian Government will
accept its financing as a
nst the Italian Budget.

As the machinery of public finance is on the Italian model all existing agencies must be utilised and the method of financing will be similar to that currently followed in AMG territory. There is no need to anticipate any difficulty in separating the accounts for the VENEZIA GIULIA from those of established Italian territory. Italian Government short-term and long-term debt will continue to be serviced; and it is recommended for reasons of revenue and inflation control that Italian Government Treasury bills should continue to be sold.

rrency will be used.
ifficulties foreseen ?

The existing currency circulating in VENEZIA GIULIA is the lira. It is therefore desirable that AM lire currency should be used. As in (i), accounts can be kept showing the amount of AM lire issued to the banks or to public government authorities; it will not, however, be possible to keep track of the exact amount of AM lire notes expended by troops. It should be borne in mind that AM lire notes are an obligation of the Italian Government, so that an adjustment may eventually have to be made.

nal (TRIESTE) branches of
lian Commercial Banks to be
communicate with their head
r is the b anking system to
ible.

The difficulties of making the local banking system autonomous are considerable and it is strongly recommended that branches of North-Italian commercial banks should be allowed to communicate with their head offices. From experience in both SICILY and SARDINIA, it is possible for the local financial machine to operate although cut off from its head office; such a system, however, leads to considerable complication and administrative difficulty.

(b) Transportation/.....

1323

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Question	Answers
(b) Transportation. It is understood that the opening and management of the Port of TRIESTE will be an Army responsibility. Will it deal with civilian supplies ?	It is assumed that the Port will be available
(c) Labour. How far will Italian Government legislation regarding rates and conditions of labour be implemented by AMG decree?	Present labour and wages policy for North Ita implementation of existing Italian decrees on in the North. The adjustment of wages is t basis in the light of prevailing conditions. should arise provided that care is taken with for offices and advisory committees who should should not be too pro-Italian.
3. COMMUNICATIONS. Are Post Offices to be reopened? If so, are Italian stamps etc to be sold ?	Equally with banks it is considered essential, Apart from the carrying of mail and telegrams connection with the payments of salaries, pen to the continuance of normal economic life. As to the question of stamps, existing stocks certainly be Republican fascist new issues or native a large reserve is held of AMG stamps. Postage" on the faces and in this theatre are this surcharging might be considered objectio native would be to endeavour to obtain suppl This action would need to be taken at once. printing is not recommended. At this stage civil censorship requires consi an APHQ function but is organised by and resp Commission of this Headquarters.

1328

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Question	Answer
Transportation.	
It is understood that the opening and management of the Port of TRIESTE will be an Army responsibility. Will it deal with civilian supplies ?	It is assumed that the Port will be available for civilian supplies.
Labour.	
How far will Italian Government legislation regarding rates and condition of labour be implemented by AMG decree?	Present labour and wages policy for North Italy does not imply the implementation of existing Italian decrees on labour question anywhere in the North. The adjustment of wages is to be dealt with on a Regional basis in the light of prevailing conditions. Therefore no difficulty should arise provided that care is taken with the selection of personnel for offices and advisory committees who should be accepted locally and should not be too pro-Italian.
Communications.	
Post Offices to be reopened? If so, Italian stamps etc to be sold ?	Equally with banks it is considered essential for Post offices to reopen. Apart from the carrying of mail and telegrams they perform many duties in connection with the payments of salaries, pensions, taxes etc., essential to the continuance of normal economic life. As to the question of stamps, existing stocks in the area will almost certainly be Republican Fascist new issues or overprints. As an alternative a large reserve is held of AMG stamps. These have "Allied Military Postage" on the face and in this theatre are surcharged "Italy". However, this surcharging might be considered objectionable. The only other alternative would be to endeavour to obtain unsurcharged issues from the U.S. This action would need to be taken at once. Any special issues or overprinting is not recommended. At this stage civil censorship requires consideration. As you know it is an AMG function but is organised by and reports to Communication Sub-Commission of this Headquarters.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

REGIONAL HQ.

Commissioner	1	
Deputy Commissioner	1	
Staff Officers	2	
Commander, CO. I, 2675 Regt	1	
Commander, British Detachment	1	
Purchasing Officer	1	
Communications	2	
Total:	9	

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

Education	1	
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives	1	
Legal	13	(3 Reg. HQ) (4 Trieste) (2 each others)
Public Health and Welfare	8	
Public Safety	15	(3 Reg. HQ) (6 Trieste) (2 each others)
Total:	38	

ECONOMIC SECTION.

Finance	10	(Incl. Property Control)
P.W.B.	6	
Agriculture	2	
Commerce	2	
Industry	2	
Labour	1	
Food	7	(2 Reg. HQ) (2 Trieste) (1 each others)
Transportation	6	
Total:	36	

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS. 4

C.A.O's

Trieste	10
Gorizia	8
Pisano	4
Pola	8
Total:	30

TOTAL: 117

Compared with present establishment of 60

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Legal	13	(3 Reg. HQ) (4 Trieste) (2 each others)
Public Health and Welfare	8	
Public Safety	15	(3 Reg. HQ) (6 Trieste) (2 each others)
Total:	36	

ECONOMIC SECTION.

Finance	10	(Incl. Property Control)
P.W.E.	6	
Agriculture	2	
Commerce	2	
Industry	2	
Labour	1	
Food	7	(2 Reg. HQ) (2 Trieste) (1 each others)
Transportation	6	
Total:	36	

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS. 4

C.A.C's

Trieste	10
Gorizia	8
Fiume	4
Pola	8
Total:	34

TOTAL:_____ 117

Compared with present establishment of_____ 60

(25)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

[redacted]

5720 19 Apr 45 [redacted]

[redacted]

(23)

[redacted] YOUR [redacted] LETTER (NR 30878) APRIL 45

[redacted] YOUR PLAN FOR AN AIR TRANSPORTABLE [redacted]

[redacted]

YOUR PLAN FOR IS APPROVED

100 Ltr

Ltr Instr.

Copy to: Chief Commander

Executive Commander

300

(24)

[redacted]
CMO, USA,
Asst Adjutant.

Q

TOP SECRET

APR 19 RECD
CC 1810

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS
REGION VENEZIE
Allied Military Government

17 April, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to report for your private information that I was today asked by 8 Army to submit my proposals for an AMG party to accompany a possible expedition by water to Trieste.

I was informed, on a top-secret level, that the proposal contemplated the securing of the city and a limited surrounding area only. It was also emphasized that the matter was only at the exploratory stage and it was by no means likely that such an operation would take place. As landing craft would be used, numbers would be cut to a minimum and limited to essentials.

I have therefore submitted a bid for a party of thirty-five officers, twenty-five men and nine vehicles. This will constitute a reinforced Trieste Provincial Team.

Subject to your concurrence I propose that both Lt. Col. Sholtz and I go in with the initial party.

The officers and men whom I propose to include in the party are either now with the Region, or could be assembled without undue stir.

I shall not fail to keep you informed of any developments.

1028/E

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NSC no. 785015

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I shall not fail to keep you informed of any developments.

I am, yours very sincerely,

J. K. Dunlop, Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

See (24)

(23)

Rear Admiral Ellery M. Stone
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

MAJOR GENERAL AIREY considered that any introduction of Italian personnel would be undesirable from the counter-intelligence viewpoint.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it would be detrimental to Allied prestige if we were to remove Italian personnel, normally employed by any headquarters, simply because that headquarters was moving into VENEZIA GIULIA. Such personnel would not, however, be employed in AUSTRIA and could therefore be removed from headquarters destined for that country. In reply to a question by the U.S. Ploitical Adviser as to whether this view applied to the use of cooperator companies, he stated that even though it might be necessary to use them in TRIESTE, they should not be moved to AUSTRIA.

GENERAL McNARNEY stated that the employment of Italians in TRIESTE was analogous to the use of Italians in FRANCE, and since we had found it necessary to use them in the latter country, the precedent so established could be applied to the area of our communications in VENEZIA GIULIA if necessary. He added that he had recently been pressed by the United States Chiefs of Staff to commence redeployment of certain American service troops to the FAR EAST. Lack of sufficient American service units might therefore require the employment of Italians in the occupation of the U.S. zone of AUSTRIA and the development of the L of C into it.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Reaffirmed the general policy that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces in the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, and,

(b) Authorized as exceptions to the above policy:

(i) The use of TRIESTE by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

(ii) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as might, for military reasons, be unavoidable.

(c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British Units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to shed such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British Units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to shed such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

(22)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

SECRET

SUBJECT: Policy - Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Com., A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: G/6

10 April 1945.

TO : AFHQ (2)
through A.C. (1 copy for retention)

I wish to raise the question of the employment of Italian Forces outside ITALY.

1. The immediate problem concerns EIGHTH Army.

2. (a) Today, four Italian Combat Gps (approx 10,000 each) are committed. The fifth moves into the operational area in the next few days.

Presumably these Groups will remain in ITALY for internal security.

(b) This Combat Force has an authorised strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11,250.

There are in addition :-

(i) The proposed force of five patriot reece battalions - ceiling 2,500.

(ii) The proposed GARIBALDI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaing - which might well prove a steadying influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,700.

3. 44,000 Service Troops in the national categories BR-ITI and US-ITI are also employed in the Army Areas and are directly under command of the Army concerned.

(a) 27,000 of these are BR-ITI.

(i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer Companies (6,700 personnel).

(ii) 16,000 are now under command FIFTH Army (Br.Incr), 10,566 of these are authorised for labour.

(iii) There are 14 BR-ITI Pack Transport Companies serving in the Army Areas - each 500 strong - a total of 7,000 Muleteers.

(b) The remaining 17,000 are US-ITI and are under command FIFTH Army. The Engineer Combat Group for example has an authorised strength of 1962. There are 15 Pack Transport Companies each on

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(b) The remaining 17,000 are US-ITI and are under command FIFTH Army. The Engineer Combat Group for example has an authorised strength of 1962. There are 15 Pack Transport Companies each on a T/O of 400 all ranks, a total of 6,00 Italian soldiers.

(c) There are in addition a proportion of hospitals and Adm installations some of which are in the ITI-ITI Category. These however, except for the Guard Bns, are under command of the Army for local Adm only.

See 30a

...2/..

SECRET

21b

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SECRET

4. I do not know how EIGHTH Army would be affected operationally if the Italian Service Troops did not accompany it across the border into AUSTRIA.

5. The international aspect is of importance. If Italian Forces, cobelligerents, cross the border and assist in conquering and occupying enemy country a political handle might be given to the Italian Government. If it is essential that Italian manpower be made available to the Allies outside Italian borders it may be considered desirable to take the risk of greater demands being made by ITALY at the Peace Treaty, the general outline of which may of course have already been arranged.

6. (a) The size and composition of the Italian Army after the war is a further factor. The date by which the new Army is to be implemented is the governing factor, and whether Italian Soldiers could remain operating outside ITALY at that time.

(b) Control of the Army will no doubt be handed over to the Italian Government again, but the question remains whether we or ITALY should maintain a large number of Italian Soldiers outside the country - perhaps for some time.

7. As this matter is imminent I would greatly appreciate an early answer.

/s/ L. BROWNING
Major General
M. M. I. A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNB No. 785015

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/s/ L. BROWNING
Major General
M. M. I. A.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785045

SECRET SECRET COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 140

SAC (P) (45) 21
9th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 372 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC(P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(b) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port.)

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC(P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

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5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.

(b) Authorise, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paragraphs 4 (a), (b) and (c) above.

21a

Sec 22

/s/ J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

SECRET COPY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APR 1 1 RECD
CC 1609

Chief Comm (1)

SECRET
SECRET

JC:sl
AP 512

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
Auth: SAC MT
Initials:
9 April 1945

9 April 1945

16

AG 323/061 GDS-O

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northeast ITALY

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
General Officer Commanding, No. 1 District
General Officer Commanding, No. 2 District

(19)

Paragraph 9 b (1) of letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 3 April 1945, is amended to read as follows:

"9 b (1) By rail northward from ANCONA to railheads on line 86 and extensions of this line in the FERRARA area, and by road FERRARA-PADUA-UDINE."

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

HEADQUARTERS
A. C.

Jack Carter.
JACK CARTER
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
See Reverse Side

E.C. DIST - 11 April 45

No. 16 - Chief Commr.
No. 17 - Exec Commr.
No. 18 - Econ Sec.
No. 19 - C.A. Sec.
No. 20 - Venezia Region
No. 21 - Emilia Region.

(21)

SECRET
SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/001 GDS-O,
dtd 9 April 44 (cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
CG 15th Army Group	1 - 15
CC Allied Commission	16 - 21
GOC No 1 District	22 - 27
GOC No 2 District	28 - 31
CG PBS	32 - 35
SAC Med	36
D/Sec, Med	37
Chief of Staff	38
CAO	39
A/CAO	40
C/S MTOUSA	41
CinC Med	42 - 46
Commander, Eighth Fleet	47
Air CinC Med	48 - 51
G-1 (A)	52 - 53
G-1 (B)	54 - 56
G-2	56 - 57
G-3	58 - 64
G-4 (A)	65
G-4 (B)	66
G-4 (Plans)	67
Log Plans	68
G-4 (Mov & Tn)	69 - 72
Q(Maint)	73 - 74
Q(AE)	75 - 76
G-5	77 - 79
Engrs (A)	80 - 81
Engrs (B)	82 - 83
Signals	84 - 85
Ar. & CD	86
PAD & CD	87
Survey	88
Liaison	89 - 90
Works	91 - 92
S & T	93
Surgeon	94
Medical (B)	95
Ord (A)	96
Ord (B)	97
REME	98

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
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DMRS	100
PMG (A)	101
Provost Marshal (B)	102
Judge Advocate	103
DJAG (B)	104
Pay	105
Labor	106
AG Postal	107
Postal (B)	108
EMT	109
Hq RAC	110
Fld Arty	111
FA	112
QM	113 - 115
Pet Sec	116
Coal Sec	117
CEMS	118
US GCC	119
Fiscal Dir	120
5 Airborne Div Plans	121
PSTO	122
Med Shipping Board	123
US POLAD	124
Br Res Min	125
Hq AFLRS, Rome	126
Hq MTOUSA (for distribution as required)	127 - 136
Hq No 3 District	137 - 139
Land Forces Sub-Comm	140
SHAEF	141 - 143
AG Records AF	144
AG Records MTO	145
Spares (Log Plans)	146 - 200

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 GES-O,
dtd 9 April 44 (cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
CG 15th Army Group	1 - 15
CC Allied Commission	16 - 21
GOC No 1 District	22 - 27
GOC No 2 District	28 - 31
CG PBS	32 - 35
SAC Med	36
D/Snc, Med	37
Chief of Staff	38
CAO	39
A/CAO	40
C/S MTOUSA	41
CinC Med	42 - 46
Commander, Eighth Fleet	47
Air CinC Med	48 - 51
G-1 (A)	52 - 53
G-1 (B)	54 - 55
G-2	56 - 57
G-3	58 - 64
G-4 (A)	65
G-4 (B)	66
G-4 (Plans)	67
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G-4 (Mov & Tn)	69 - 72
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Q(AE)	75 - 76
G-5	77 - 79
Engrs (A)	80 - 81
Engrs (B)	82 - 83
Signals	84 - 85
AA & CD	86
PAD & CD	87
Survey	88
Liaison	89 - 90
Works	91 - 92
S & T	93
Surgeon	94
Medical (B)	95
Ord (A)	96
Ord (B)	97
REME	98

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Tn (B)	99
DMRS	100
PMG (A)	101
Provost Marshal (B)	102
Judge Advocate	103
DJAG (B)	104
Pay	105
Labor	106
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APR 7 RECD

CA/422
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ATH 070500B

IMMEDIATE

15 ARMY GROUP
ALLOC FOR CA SECTION

19

TOP SECRET

Refer AFHQ A9323/CA1 dated 3 April. Subject occupation North West ITALY.

Request you prepare North West ITALY standstill order to be issued for refugees and displaced persons also prepare separate standstill order for Patriots. This latter order may not be issued but it is wanted in case it is decided to stop all Patriot movements.

Dist

Copy No 1, 2 & 3 - Action - CA Sec (3)
" 4 Info - A/President
5 Chief Commissioner
6 Exec Comm
7 File

CCA/CC

Q

(W)

TOP SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

~~TOP~~ SECRET

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16

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

Declassified SECRET per Ltr
AFHQ AG 323/061 SACS-O
of 13 June 1945 J-1

AG 323/061 GDS-O

~~TOP~~ SECRET
Auth: SAC MT
Initials: C.W.G.
3 April 1945

3 April 1945

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northeast ITALY

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
General Officer Commanding, No. 1 District
General Officer Commanding, No. 2 District

1. GENERAL. Operational Directives on the occupation of Northeast ITALY have been issued as follows:

a. AFHQ letter, AG 323/061 SACS-O, dated 18 March 1945, subject: "Directive - Occupation of NE ITALY", which deals with the situation which will arise in the event of the withdrawal of the enemy from the PO Valley to some general Alpine line.

b. AFHQ letter, AG 387/147 SACS-O, dated 31 March 1945, subject: "Local German Surrender in ITALY", (not to all addressees) which deals with the situation which will arise should German forces in ITALY surrender on or about their present line.

2. OBJECT. Object of this memorandum is to give the administrative instructions corresponding to the operational directives in paragraph 1.

3. PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED. Administrative instructions in respect to the occupation of Northwest ITALY are given in AFHQ letter, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dated 25 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW ITALY", as amended by AFHQ letter, same file, dated 30 January 1945. These instructions remain unchanged in the event of a German withdrawal (paragraph 1 a, above). In the event of a German surrender or collapse, they will be subject to certain modifications as given in the following paragraphs.

4. SCOPE OF THIS INSTRUCTION. Northeast ITALY is defined as follows:

Compartimenti of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA
VENEZIA PROPRIA
VENEZIA GIULIA
EMILIA (except the province of PIACENZA)

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TOP SECRET

Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 ODB-O, dtd 3 Apr 45
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

Provincia of SONDRIO)
BRESCIA)
BERGAMO) in the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA
MANTOVA)
CREMONA)

APUANIA/MASSA)
LUCCA) in the Compartimento of TOSCANA
PISTOIA)

i.e., that part of NORTH ITALY not covered in the instructions referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5. PHASES

a. The definition of "phases" of the occupation of NE ITALY given in the AFHQ directive referred to in paragraph 1 a above, is also followed in this instruction.

b. Phase I will be deemed to be complete, and Phase II to start, in respect to any particular territory, when the rear boundary of Armies is moved forward and the territory passes from control of Armies to HQ 1 District, HQ 2 District, or CG PBS.

6. TERRITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HEADQUARTERS

a. In the case of progressive liberation of NORTH ITALY as a result of enemy withdrawal:

(1) The territory to be controlled by HQ 2 District will be as given in the administrative instructions on NW ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above.

(2) HQ 1 District and CG PBS will take over the responsibilities of the Armies as the rear army boundaries are moved forward.

(3) At a later stage, on completion of enemy withdrawal from NORTH ITALY and when the Army rear boundaries have been moved forward to the Austrian frontier and VENEZIA GIULIA, boundaries of static HQs will be adjusted to correspond with those laid down in sub-paragraph b, below.

b. In the case of the simultaneous liberation of NORTH ITALY, as would occur as a result of enemy surrender or collapse, the eventual territories to be controlled by static HQs in ITALY will be as defined in AFHQ directive referred to in paragraph 1 a, above.

c. Initially, VENEZIA GIULIA will be the responsibility of [redacted] Army. Subsequent responsibility for this Compartimento will be notified later.

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d. Instructions giving the territorial responsibilities of PBS and District HQs will be issued separately in amplification of instructions already issued in paragraph 15, AFHQ letter, AG 091.711-OSS GCT, dated 3 January 1945, subject: "Reorganization of British Command and Static Headquarters", and AFHQ letter referred to in paragraph 1 a, above.

7. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES. Within their respective areas, Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for:

a. The administration of ground forces under their command and such maintenance of Air Forces located in the Army area as is a ground force responsibility.

b. The initiation, in conjunction with Army AMG organizations, of civil administration and relief measures.

c. The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

8. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HQs in NE ITALY

a. HQ 1 District will be responsible for:

(1) The local administration of all British troops in its territory and in that of PBS, North of the northern boundary of the Compartimento of TOSCANA.

(2) The coordination, in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission, of matters being undertaken in its territory jointly by military and civil authorities.

(3) The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

b. HQ 2 District will be responsible for the local administration of all British troops in the territory of PBS, within the boundaries of the Compartimento of TOSCANA, in addition to the responsibilities defined in the administrative instruction referred to in paragraph 3 above.

c. CG PBS will be responsible for:

(1) Supply matters in respect to US Forces in Fifth Army in accordance with normal administrative procedure.

(2) Supply matters in respect to US Forces in the territory under its control.

(3) The coordination, in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission, of matters being undertaken in its territory jointly by military and civil authorities.

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(4) The execution of specific tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

d. HQ Allied Commission will be responsible for:

(1) The continuation of civil relief measures

(2) The development and operation in accordance with policies laid down by AFHQ of essential communications, industries and public utilities which are not a military responsibility.

9. DEVELOPMENT OF Ls OF C IN NORTH ITALY. Subject to changes which may be dictated by the course of operations, relative state of damage to communications or other considerations:

a. The US CZ will be by rail and road from LEGHORN through BOLOGNA and the BRENNER to AUSTRIA.

b. The British Ls of C will be:

(1) By rail northward from ANCONA to railheads on line 87 and extensions of this line in the FERRARA area, and by road FERRARA-PADUA-UDINE.

(2) By sea, through the port of TRIESTE, and thence by the least damaged road and rail route to AUSTRIA.

10. PORTS.

a. It is not planned to open the port of VENICE immediately on capture. Later, when resources can be spared for the purpose, it will be opened for the importation of civil supplies.

b. TRIESTE will be developed as a military port and opened as a higher priority than VENICE.

c. With reference to the administrative instructions on NW ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above, there are sufficient naval and military resources available to enable GENOA and TRIESTE to be opened simultaneously. However, should any conflict arise in the allocation of resources between these two ports, TRIESTE will have priority.

d. Naval responsibilities in respect to the opening and operation of TRIESTE and VENICE have been given to FOTALI.

e. TRIESTE

(1) TRIESTE will be developed to enable 6,000 tpd to be discharged and cleared through it.

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(2) The opening and operation of the port will be a British responsibility in respect of all tonnages handled. Should it be necessary to handle US tonnages the US will give countervailing assistance in discharge and clearance at a port elsewhere in ITALY.

(3) TRIESTE will be developed as a transit port forming the southern end of the L of C to AUSTRIA and only the minimum necessary installations will be established at the port.

(4) Responsibility under a (1), (2) and (3) will be undertaken initially by HQ Eighth Army subject to the following reservations:

(a) The key plan for the port will be prepared by AFHQ in conjunction with HQ Eighth Army, CG US base section concerned and FOTALI.

(b) Chairman of the Siting Board, on which the HQs given in (a) above will be represented, will be provided by AFHQ.

(c) Allocation of tonnages between HQ Eighth Army and other bidders, whose requirements are not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, will be made by AFHQ.

f. VENICE

(1) The opening and operation of the port will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission in all respects other than those which are a naval responsibility (see sub-paragraph d above).

(2) Other than certain organizational assistance of a supervisory nature, it is unlikely that any military resources can be allotted to HQ Allied Commission for this purpose. The extent of this assistance will be notified later.

11. RAILWAYS.

a. The general order of priority of repair and construction will be as follows:

First Priority : PRATO-BOLOGNA
Single line FAENZA-BOLOGNA
FAENZA-FERRARA

Second Priority : BOLOGNA-VERONA-BRENNER
BOLOGNA-PARMA
Double line FAENZA-BOLOGNA

Third Priority : PARMA-ALESSANDRIA-TURIN
Easiest route to MILAN
VERONA-ALESSANDRIA

(10)

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b. In addition to the above a line leading north to AUSTRIA from TRIESTE will be repaired. This line will be inserted into the above priorities according to operational requirements and the time required to move such locomotives and rolling stock, as may be necessary, to put the line into operation.

c. The above order of priority will be subject to adjustment in accordance with the speed and manner in which NORTH ITALY is occupied and whether the occupation follows a progressive enemy withdrawal or surrender.

12. ROADS

a. Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for road repair and construction within their own areas to meet the operational requirements of CG 15th Army Group.

b. Should the whole of NORTH ITALY be liberated simultaneously as a result of enemy surrender or collapse, responsibility and priority for repair of roads during Phase II will be as follows:

	Responsibility
Priority 1	
BOLOGNA-MODENA-VERONA	CG PBS
BOLOGNA-FERRARA-PADUA	HQ 1 District
Priority 2	
VERONA-BRENNER	CG PBS
Priority 3	
Best route PADUA-UDINE-TRIESTE	HQ 1 District
MODENA-PIACENZA	US HQ, designated at the time by CG MTOUSA and HQ 2 District in their respective territories
Priority 4	
GENOA-ALESSANDRIA	HQ 2 District
Priority 5	
PIACENZA-ALESSANDRIA-TURIN	HQ 2 District
Best route to MILAN	HQ 2 District

c. Responsibility for the subsequent repair of the road L of C leading north from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA will be allotted in the separate instructions referred to in paragraph 5 c.

13. IWT. HQ Allied Commission will be responsible for the restoration and operation of the IWT system to the maximum extent possible for the movement of civil supplies.

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GPS-O, dtd 8 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NW ITALY" (cont'd)

14. POL BULK STORAGE AND PIPELINES

a. Bulk storage facilities will be developed as follows:

(1) At TRIESTE, to supply military and civil requirements. This will be a military responsibility.

(2) At VENICE, to supply civil requirements. This will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission. The provision of facilities at TRIESTE will have first priority.

b. Pipeline construction will take place to provide the following four-inch lines:

(1) From ANCONA - one via BOLOGNA to FERRARA) One of these lines
-) to be extended to
- one via RAVENNA to FERRARA) ROVIGO.

(2) From LEGHORN - one to BOLOGNA
- one via BOLOGNA to MODENA
- one via BOLOGNA to VERONA

15. CIVIL SUPPLIES

a. In Phase I the provision of supplies for the civil population will be the responsibility of Armies, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations.

b. In Phase II the provision of supplies for the civil population will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission.

c. Should German forces in ITALY surrender or collapse on or about their present line, and subject to overriding operational requirements, the following will be undertaken as a military responsibility to assist HQ Allied Commission in the movement of civil supplies:

(1) Movement of 350 tpd to PADUA. This will be a British responsibility to be undertaken by HQ Eighth Army in Phase I and HQ 1 District in Phase II.

(2) Movement of 400 tpd to VERONA. This will be a US responsibility to be undertaken by CG Fifth Army in Phase I and CG PBS in Phase II.

This assistance is in addition to the movement of 500 tpd to PADUA which has been accepted as a British military responsibility in the administrative instructions on NW ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above.

(17)

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d. AFHQ/MTOUSA will be responsible for the allocation of the necessary resources to enable the responsibilities allotted to the HQs concerned in sub-paragraphs c (1) and (2) above, to be implemented. These resources will be subject to recall and should be assumed to be available for a period not exceeding one month.

16. ADMINISTRATION OF ENEMY FORCES FOLLOWING A CAPITULATION IN ITALY.

a. General. The policy will be that the surrendered enemy forces will carry out their own administration. To this end enemy forces will retain or, where they have disintegrated, be reformed into formation and unit organizations. In accordance with this general policy, as amplified in sub-paragraphs b and g below, the arrangements for the concentration, holding and maintenance of enemy surrendered forces will be the responsibility of Fifth and Eighth Armies under the coordinating direction of CG 15th Army Group. When the Army rear boundaries are moved forward (Phase II) this responsibility will pass to AFHQ/MTOUSA. Separate instructions on this subject will be issued at the time.

b. Concentration of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will be concentrated where they can be easily maintained and where they can be put to work in accordance with the Terms of Surrender, in relief of Allied administrative resources. The most suitable area, from these points of view, is that between the River PO and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route, major towns in the area and the malarial coastal belt adjoining the ADRIATIC Coast). Subject to operational requirements, this area should be the main concentration area for enemy forces surrendering south, and in the general vicinity of, the PO. As soon as it is operationally possible, forces surrendering north of the PO should be moved to this concentration area.

c. Holding and Evacuation of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will be held in the main concentration area. Recalcitrant enemy personnel will be evacuated to PW cages south of the APPENINES. Movement of these recalcitrant elements out of Army areas will be the responsibility of AFHQ/MTOUSA. Ultimate disposal of surrendered enemy forces will be the subject of separate instructions as required.

d. Accommodation of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will accommodate themselves, using their own resources. Use will be made of warehouses, large buildings, etc., only if these are not required for Allied military or civil purposes. There will be no requisitioning of houses for the accommodation of enemy forces.

e. Maintenance of Surrendered Enemy Forces. The maximum use of enemy administrative resources will be made for this purpose. When these resources are exhausted these forces will be maintained from Allied depots. Except for such items as are declared surplus to Allied military and civil requirements, local resources will not be used for the maintenance of these forces without the authority of AFHQ.

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 8 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

f. Use of Enemy Transport and Service Units. Enemy transport and service units will be used for the maintenance of the surrendered enemy forces regardless of whether they are being maintained from their own resources or from Allied depots. Maximum use of enemy animal transport will be made for this purpose in place of enemy motor transport units. The latter units will be used to assist in the movement of civil supplies in relief of Allied military transport employed on this task (see paragraph 15 c).

g. Disposal of Surrendered Enemy Material. Separate instructions will be issued on this subject.

17. PARTISANS. Policy regarding partisans is defined in AFHQ signal F 26916, dated 14 February 1945 to HQ 15th Army Goup only. Instructions regarding their feeding, clothing, payment and hospitalization will be issued separately.

18. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

a. Initially, refugees and displaced persons will be subject to a "standstill" order, to be issued through military channels by CG 15th Army Group.

b. In Phase I, Armies, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations, and in Phase II, HQ Allied Commission, will be responsible for screening, registering and maintaining displaced persons.

c. Overall plans for the disposal of these persons will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission in conjunction with the military HQ concerned in matters affecting their movement within ITALY.

19. RUSSIAN CIVILIANS. Feeding, clothing and hospitalization of Russian civilians will be a military responsibility to be implemented in Phase I by Armies, and in Phase II by PBS and the District HQ concerned.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

(D)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O,
"Occupation of NE ITALY"

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C.C. 143

MAR 29 [illegible]

TOP SECRET

Ref: 504/13/20.

29 March 1945.

Subject: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

To: G-5 Section,
AMZON.

1. The Deputy Chief Legal Adviser of this Commission has considered the opinion expressed by Col. Hancock and sent to this Commission in your letter G-5; 387.4-1 dated 6 March 45, and I attach his memorandum in reply thereto for your records.

2. In view of the statement made in paragraph (3) of your letter, I suggest that the whole matter may be allowed to rest for the time being.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

Major E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl.

Copy to: C.A. Sec.

(18)

A/a

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Legal Sub-Commission

12 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

To: C.A. Section.

1. I have read the opinion of Col. Hammond of 19 February 1945 but find myself unable to accept his arguments.

2. Col. Hammond's opinion is founded upon the contentions:

(a) That the Armistice does not require the Allied Commission to take any particular form and that the Commission could be established in different sections for different parts of Italy.

(b) That the appointment of Mr. Macmillan as Acting President of the Commission can be revoked by SAC.

3. In my opinion Col. Hammond's first contention ignores the fact that under the Armistice terms there is to be set up "a Control Commission" to the HQ of which the Italian Government will send a delegation to represent Italian interests. The function of the Commission was the regulation and execution of the Armistice terms, including Art.20 which provides for the administration of occupied territory. These terms were fulfilled and by their fulfilment the Commission and its one HQ were established for the discharge of these appointed functions. To adopt now, or in the future, the policy that this Commission was not the sole body for this purpose would be to ignore the established course of conduct, and to increase the difficulties of the Italian Government and would in my opinion be inconsistent with the Armistice terms.

4. So far as the revocation of Mr. Macmillan's appointment is concerned I am of opinion that since the delegation by SAC was made in pursuance of a declaration by UK and US, which declaration was formally and publicly announced to the Italian Government, this delegation cannot be revoked at the will of SAC. It is irrelevant to this issue that the implementation of this declaration by SAC may have been made in a particular form which appears to enable SAC to revoke the appointment.

5. Since, however, no action is contemplated at the present time on the basis of Col. Hammond's opinion, it appears that no immediate reply is necessary.

(Sgd.) W.E. RAMSAY,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Officer.

(18) INCL

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EXTRACT

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K 111

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting
16th March 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

* * *

4. OCCUPATION OF NORTH EASTERN ITALY

(JFS Study No. P/267 (Final)) — ...

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Commanding General 15th Army Group, on the occupation of Northeast ITALY in the event of the withdrawal of the enemy on some general Alpine Line.

MR. OFFIE said that he had been advised by the State Department that the whole matter of the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA was being taken up actively on governmental level.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY, referring to paragraph 7 a of the JFS Study, considered that the communications over the BRENNER route should
Z be named together with those leading to TRIESTE and UDINE, since the BRENNER would be of vital importance in the line of communications for the United States forces deployed in AUSTRIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft directive circulated under JFS Study No. P/267 (Final) in accordance with General McNarney's remarks at 'Z' above and issue it to all concerned.

* * *

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(1)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AMSSC FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR INFO : SHAEF

REF NO : FX 36545

SIGNED : ALEXANDER CITE: FHCIC

This is NAF 872

Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is subject.

1. Reference is made to MAT 418 of 23 November in which certain proposals were made made for Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA. I have just returned from a meeting with Marshal TITO in BELGRADE. While there I tried to extract from him his views on the subject of VENEZIA GIULIA. In opening the discussion I stated that when forces under my command occupy AUSTRIA the control of the L of C to TRIESTE would seem to demand my occupation of all territory west of the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA and the establishment of Allied Military Government in that area. In reply Marshal TITO offered the following comments:

A. He accepted the idea of Allied Military Government within the zone of my communication provided his civil administration already installed in the areas in question was retained, his reason being that unless such civil authorities were allowed to function chaos would ensue. He was prepared to agree that his civil authorities should be responsible to the Allied Military Government.

B. Assuming that the object was to protect the L of C between TRIESTE and AUSTRIA he did not consider it necessary for the Allies to occupy the ISTRIAN Peninsular.

C. He offered me the use of communications running through LJUBLJANA though he pointed out that these of course were well within the frontiers of JUGOSLAVIA.

2. From information obtained over a period of several months there is ample evidence to show that Slovene intention is to extend their hold over as large an area of NE ITALY as possible in order to create a good case for annexation to Federal JUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONZO the influence of JANL is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian Partisan Brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part on

Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SIGNED : ALEXANDER CITE: FHCIC

This is NAF 872

Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is subject.

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B. Assuming that the object was to protect the L of C between TRIESTE and AUSTRIA he did not consider it necessary for the Allies to occupy the ISTRIAN Peninsular.

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2. From information obtained over a period of several months there is ample evidence to show that Slovene intention is to extend their hold over as large an area of NE ITALY as possible in order to create a good case for annexation to Federal JUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONZO the influence of JANL is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian Partisan Brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part on NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when the Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential that the port of TRIESTE, and railways leading from it into AUSTRIA be under my control, and that I have full powers to maintain law and order in that area. The international

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cable line from ROME to VIENNA must also be under my control. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding, these requirements and the consequent security of the L of C can only be assured by the imposition of Allied Military Government at least upon that portion of NE ITALY which will comprise such L of C area.

4. If nothing but operational interests were concerned, an attempt could be made to conclude an agreement with Marshal TITO which fixed a military boundary running approximately north-south through VENEZIA GIULIA. The area to the west of this boundary could then be under my military control. In that case no mention need be made of administrative arrangements for the area to the east which would presumably come at once under Jugoslav rule. An assurance could be sought that all Jugoslav and Slovene troops west of such boundary would come under our operational command.

5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement:

A. Any such agreement, expressly limited though it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal TITO, by the Italian Government and by outside world as recognition of Jugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary. No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement.

B. Italian Government has been assured that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied Military Government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

6. In any event it would be necessary to ensure that naval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE both inclusive be vested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander, 15 Army Group or Jugoslav Forces as appropriate.

7. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must take accounts are:

A. Provision for the control and security of the port of TRIESTE and L of C thence to AUSTRIA.

B. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

C. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied Forces and Jugoslav or Slovene Forces under command of Marshal Tito.

8. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 7A and B above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be

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5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement:

A. Any such agreement, expressly limited though it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal TITO, by the Italian Government and by outside world as recognition of Jugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary. No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement.

B. Italian Government has been assured that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied Military Government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

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A. Provision for the control and security of the port of TRIESTE and L of C thence to AUSTRIA.

B. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

C. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied Forces and Jugoslav or Slovene Forces under command of Marshal Tito.

8. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 7A and B above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Jugoslav (Slovene) Forces are already in occupation of large areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, and Jugoslav Civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Jugoslav Forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country, before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some other force in TITOS contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue. In order, therefore, tomeet the requirement in 7C as well as those in 7A and B above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite

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the Provisional Jugoslav Government -- as soon as it is formed -- to participate, as an ally, in the Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA. In that event, I recommend that the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government be asked to send representatives to consult with members of my staff in formulating plans for the Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA, and that it should be arranged that British or American Forces occupy the L of C area and perhaps also FIUME and POLA; that the Jugoslav Forces in other parts of VENEZIA GIULIA come under the orders of the appropriate Allied Commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory.

9. In my view the acceptance of this plan will depend entirely upon an agreement to the general scheme between the three great powers, the UNITED STATES, the UNITED KINGDOM and RUSSIA, before the invitation is made to the provisional Jugoslav Government. I therefore request that urgent steps be taken to secure agreement between the three great powers.

ORIGINATOR: SAC-IN-C AUTH: W B HEASTON, Major

INFORMATION:	G-2	G-3
	CAO	G-4
	G-4 (B)	MATN
	G-5	LOG PLANS
	CINC MED	USN
	MAAF	RES MIN
	US POLAD	SGS
	IS & PS	SIGNALS

MC OUT 641 2 Mar 45 2038A Ref No FX 36545 rs/D/J

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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MC OUT 641 2 Mar 45 2038A Ref No FX 36545 RE/D/J

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785075

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Extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Political Conference of 2 March 1945, circulated under Ref: SAC (P) (45) 2nd Meeting of 2nd March 1945.

5. ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

(10) (JPS Study No. P/266 (Final)) Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 11. (14)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggesting the lines on which agreement should be sought for Allied military control in VENEZIA GIULIA, together with certain amendments to this telegram proposed by Air Marshal Slessor.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in his conversations with Marshal Tito he had approached this subject by stating that when Allied troops were operating in or on the borders of AUSTRIA, he (Field Marshal Alexander) would require the use of the port of TRIESTE and road and rail communications leading from it into AUSTRIA. He must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently garrison the area with his own troops and install his own military government. He had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military government over the whole area of VENEZIA GIULIA up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in these areas and he had set up his civil administration, this organisation could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he had wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northeastern ITALY east of the ISONZO. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of ISTRIA as control of the entire area was not essential for military communications. Marshal Tito had further offered to make the Jugoslav communications through LJUBLJANA available to the Allies.

It had become clear from these conversations that the key to obtaining Marshal Tito's agreement for any proposed arrangement in VENEZIA GIULIA was to procure Russian approval for such an arrangement before it was presented to the Jugoslavs. He considered that the draft telegram circulated under JPS Study No. P/266 (Final) should be redrafted to take account of these conversations and to explain that it was as a result of them that proposals were now being made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Mr. Office, the Supreme Allied Commander said he felt sure that, without Russian agreement, Marshal Tito would not agree to placing under Allied control his troops and his civil administration in those parts of eastern VENEZIA GIULIA which did not contain communications of military importance.

[illegible] considered that the best hope of a solution lay along the [illegible] the essential

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNS No. 785015

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MR. MACMILLAN considered that the best hope of a solution lay along the lines suggested by Air Marshal Slessor at the previous meeting.* The essential point was that the Jugoslav administration in the area should be merged in Allied military government and not remain as a separate organisation acting as the agent of the Allied administration. This might be achieved if an occupation of the area the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA was made a military government region, under a US or British military governor, who might have a Jugoslav deputy. Under these officers there could be two provinces. In western VENEZIA GIULIA full Allied military control could be established under a US or British provincial governor, with certain personnel of Tito's civil administration merged in this organisation. The eastern province might be under a Jugoslav provincial governor and Marshal Tito's administration would, with certain British and US officers associated with it, form the basis of the government machinery. He pointed out that the Royal Jugoslav Government were already

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* SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 5.

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represented on the Advisory Council of the Allied Commission and this representation would pass to the joint provincial government when recognised. He suggested that in addition this government might be offered representation on the Allied Commission itself and the Jugoslav officer nominated to this appointment might be charged with the planning of military government for VENEZIA GIULIA in conjunction with the Allies. He considered that Marshal Tito would obtain appreciable advantages from being associated with Allied military government, particularly in regard to civil supplies for his supports in VENEZIA GIULIA and rehabilitation of communications in that area.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY considered that Jugoslav representation on the Allied Commission itself would make Marshal Tito one of the co-governors of ITALY. He did not think it right to offer participation in the government of ITALY to Marshal Tito, when the latter was in fact proposing to seize certain portions of Italian territory. Such an arrangement would have serious repercussions in ITALY and might lead to the fall of the Italian government. As this would have military consequences he could not agree to such action while hostilities against GERMANY continued.

MR. OFFIE thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Commander's full control of the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA. He failed to see why special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree the demarkation line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought we should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italians. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's partisans in fact possessed the strength in northeast ITALY which they claimed.

MR. MACMILLAN said he would go further than Mr. Offie in that Marshal Tito's administration ought not only to be prevented from dominating Italian areas but it should be completely merged in the AMG system. He agreed with Lieutenant General McNarney that it was not essential to have a Jugoslav representative accredited to the Allied Commission itself, the important point being that some authorised Jugoslav officer should cooperate in the necessary planning.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR considered, and the Supreme Allied Commander and Mr. Macmillan agreed, that no dividing line between eastern and western zones should be proposed, but that arrangements should be suggested whereby the whole area would be under the Supreme Allied Commander's control. He considered that if the final paragraph of the telegram circulated [illegible] P/266 (Final) were amended, substantially as suggested in his paper SAC (P) (45) 11, this would convey the required impression to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING, referring to paragraph 3 of the telegram circulated under JPS Study No. P/266(Final), observed that the requirement was not merely for the maintenance of law and order in the areas of the vital communications leading from TRIESTE into ISTRIA, but also for full control of these transportation facilities.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief of Staff to redraft the telegram circulated under JPS Study No. P/266 (Final), taking into account the above discussion and the substance of the amendments proposed by Air Marshal Slessor and, after obtaining the necessary naval, air force and political concurrences, to submit the revised draft for his approval. X

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(15) X Subsequently despatched as MAP 872.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 11
28th February 1945. SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL).

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

Note by Deputy Air C-in-C Med.

(10) 1-

I suggest that the following amendments should be made to the draft telegram circulated under JPS Paper No. P/266 (Final):-

1. Paragraph 4, line 7. Delete the words "be withdrawn in default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained". There is no good our seeking an assurance that Jugoslav troops should be withdrawn, because Tito certainly would not agree and it would merely precipitate a row.

2. Paragraph 5. Delete sub-paragraph (c) and add at the end of sub-paragraph (a) "No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement".

3. Paragraph 5(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".

4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows:-

"7. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the consideration in 5(a) and (b) above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Jugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, and Jugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Jugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be armed forces in Italy's contention that, unless his civil

See (11)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785045

Note by Foreign Office (10)

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3. Paragraph 5(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".

4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows:-

"7. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the consideration in 6(a) and (b) above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Jugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, and Jugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Jugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some force in Tito's contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue.

In order, therefore, to meet the requirement in 6(c) as well as those in 6(a) and (b) above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the Provisional Jugoslav Government - as soon as it is formed - to participate, as an ally, in the Allied Military Government of such portions of ITALY as are so governed, including VENEZIA GIULIA, with an

See (15)

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24 Feb

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accredited Jugoslav representative on the Allied Commission. It should be arranged that British or American forces should occupy the L of C area and perhaps also FIUME and POLA; that the Jugoslav forces in other parts of VENEZIA GIULIA should come under the orders of the appropriate Allied Commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory who, if Jugoslav, Tito has already agreed should be responsible to AMG".

(intd) J.C.S.

AFHQ Distbn: Chief Com, HQ AC - Copy Nos. 32-34.

HQ AC Distbn: Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Political Section.

(14)

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CABLE

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THIS IS NAF 372 — Redtyped — Secret — Sec (16) + (15)

Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is subject.

1. Reference is made to AMT 418 of 23 November in which I made certain proposals for the Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA. To this I have not yet received a reply. In the meantime I have considered the matter further in the light of information now available.

2. It is reported to me that the Slovene intention is

a. To extend their hold over as large an area of N.E. Italy as possible.

b. To create a strong prima facie case for annexation of as large a territory as possible in N.E. Italy to Federal Jugoslavia.

East of the ISONSO the influence of J.N.L is paramount in all areas not under the effective control of the enemy, and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. The process includes the subversion of Italian Partisan Brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area.

3. The occupation of Austria and the safeguarding of lines of communication for my occupying forces make essential the maintenance of law and order in and around the port of Trieste and in the corridor which contains the main roads and railways leading to Austria, and the international cable line from Rome to Vienna.

4. In view of para 2 above, I consider that it is essential for purely operational military reasons to impose Allied Military Government upon the area indicated in para 3 above.

5. If nothing but (military) operational interest were concerned, I would attempt to conslude an agreement with Marshal Tito which fixed a

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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4. In view of para 2 above, I consider that it is essential for purely operational military reasons to impose Allied Military Government upon the area indicated in para 3 above.

5. If nothing but (military) operational interest were concerned, I would attempt to conslude an agreement with Marshal Tito which fixed a military boundary running approximately North-South (through) Venezia Giulia. The area to the West of this boundary would be under my military control. No mention would be made of administrative arrangements for the area to the East which would presumably come at once under de facto Jugoslav rule. I should attempt to ensure that all Jugoslav or Slovene troops West of such boundary be withdrawn, in default of which I should insist that any such ar

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remain come under my operational command.

6. There are, however, the following political considerations which appear to me to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement:

a. Any such agreement, expressly limited through it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal Tito, by the Italian Government, and by the outside world to be de facto recognition of Jugoslav sovereignty over territory east of the proposed boundary.

b. The Italian Government confidently expect me to place the whole of Venezia Giulia under Allied Military Government similar to that already obtaining in Italy.

c. My U.S. Political Advisor informs me that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from advising me to take any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia.

7. The essential conditions of any proposed operations appear to me to demand:

a. That my lines of communication to Austria are secure.

b. That I avoid armed conflict with Jugoslav or Slovene forces under the command of Marshal Tito.

c. That faith with the Italian Government is not broken.

8. I suggest that an acceptable method of reconciling these conditions would be to place the whole of Venezia Giulia under Allied Military Government. In addition, I suggest that an invitation be extended to the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government to participate on the grounds that they must share in the responsibilities of the Allies for Allied Military Government in those parts of Italy (including Venezia Giulia) upon which it is based. This could be done by inviting to the Allied Commission an accredited Jugoslav representative with rights and functions parallel to those of the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3(NND) No. 785015

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9. May I have approval for discussion with Marshal Tito on the lines of para 8 above, with a view to concluding an agreement with the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government prior to the necessity for occupation. I ask that the matter be treated as urgent in view of the necessity for immediate detailed planning.

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AFHQ FOR SACMED

2542 26 FEB 1945 PRIORITY

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PARA ONE PD YOUR FOX THREE THREE SEVEN TWO SIX REFERS PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACMED FROM ALCOM SIGNED STONE CITE ACSCC PAREN

PARA TWO PD PROPOSAL FEASIBLE BUT STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT MARSHAL TITO AGREE THAT SACMED AS MILITARY GOVERNOR WOULD BE IN SUPREME COMMAND OF AMG REPEAT AMG IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND TITOS OCCUPATIONAL FORCES ARE UNDER SACMEDS ORDERS INSOFAR AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENFORCE HIS AMG REPEAT AMG PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDERS PD THIS IS PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO ENSURE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN SUPPLIES AND EQUAL TREATMENT TO ALL ELEMENTS OF POPULATION PD

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FILE.

Deputy Executive Commissioner
(Col. Fiske)

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FEB 26 RECD
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D/3367
FEB 261337

PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED

ALCOM FOR ACTION

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Suggestion made to place civil governmental machinery of Marshal TITO now functioning in Venezia Giulia under Allied Military Government.

Please comment urgently on feasibility.

See 12

ALCOM DIST:
ACTION: Exec. Comm. (Copies No. 1 & 2)

INFO: A/President Copy No. 3
Chief Comm. " " 4
Pol. Sec. " " 5
CA Sec. " " 6

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P/266 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

TOP SECRET
Auth: SAC
Initials:
24 Feb 45
Copy No. 42

24 February 1945.

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA
(Cover Note By MJPS)

1. In accordance with directions received from the Chief of Staff, we have prepared a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analyzing the difficulties of the situation existing in VENEZIA GIULIA and putting forward the proposal of Air Marshal Slessor with supporting arguments as outlined in Minute 5 of SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting.

2. The draft telegram is attached as P/266 (Final).

(10) a

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

Amended - see (14)

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

/s/ W. A. Adair
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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the proposal of Air Marshal Slessor with supporting arguments as outlined in Minute 5 of SAC (P) #45) 1st Meeting.

2. The draft telegram is attached as P/266 (Final).

(10) a

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

Annexure - 2a (14)

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

/s/ W. A. Adair
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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P/266 (Final)

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DRAFT CABLE

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Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is subject.

1. Reference is made to MAT 418 of 23 November in which certain proposals were made for Allied military government of VENEZIA GIULIA. No reply has yet been received. Meantime the matter has been further considered in light of new information now available.

2. There is ample evidence to show that Slovene intention is to extend their hold over as large an area of NE ITALY as possible in order to create strong prima facie case for annexation to Federal JUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONSO the influence of JAHL is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian partisan brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part of NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential the maintenance of law and order in and around the portof TRIESTE and in such L of C area as will contain the main roads and railways leading to AUSTRIA (excluding these through JUGOSLAVIA) and the international cable line from ROME to VIENNA. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding it is likely that the maintenance of law and order and the consequent security of the L of C can only be insured by the imposition of Allied military government at least upon that portion of NE ITALY which will comprise such L of C area.

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4. If nothing but operational interests were concerned, an attempt would be made to conclude an agreement with Marshal Tito which fixed a military boundary running approximately north-south through VENEZIA GIULIA. The area to the west of this boundary would be under our military control. No mention would be made of administrative arrangements for the area to the east which would presumably come at once under de facto JUGOSLAV rule. An assurance would be sought that all Jugoslav and Slovene troops west of such boundary be withdrawn, in default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained would come under our oper-

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ational command. In any event it would be necessary to ensure thatnaval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or Jugoslav forces as appropriate.

5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement:

a. Any such agreement, expressly limited through it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal Tito, by the Italian Government, and by outside world to be de facto recognition of Jugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary.

b. Italian Government confidently expect that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied military government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

c. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.

6. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:

a. Provision for the security of the L of C to AUSTRIA.

b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Jugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

7. Policy in this matter has hitherto been that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should [illegible]

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5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement;

a. Any such agreement, expressly limited through it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal Tito, by the Italian Government, and by outside world to be de facto recognition of Jugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary.

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a. Provision for the security of the L of C to AUSTRIA.

b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Jugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

7. Policy in this matter has hitherto been that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should pass under Alliedmilitery government on liberation from Germans, and Italian Government has been notified accordingly. It is considered that this policy should be adhered to, since it would at least meet considerations in paras 6a and b above. In order to meet consideration in para 6c it is suggested that before the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government be invited to participate in the Allied military government which will be set up, on the grounds that they now share in responsibilities

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of the Allies for such government in those parts of ITALY (including VENEZIA GIULIA) upon which it is imposed. This could be done by inviting the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government to send to the Allied Commission an accredited Jugoslav representative with rights and functions similar to those of Soviet representative.

8. Approval is requested to the proposal made in paragraph 7 above so that early action can be taken to discuss the matter with Marshal Tito and the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government, in order to arrive at an agreement prior to the occasion for Allied occupation arising.

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8. Approval is requested to the proposal made in paragraph 7 above so that early action can be taken to discuss the matter with Marshal Tito and the Joint Provisional Jugoslav Government, in order to arrive at an agreement prior to the occasion for Allied occupation arising.

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P/266 (Final)

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* Auth: SAC *
* Initials ILR *
* 26 Feb 45 *
* Copy No. 37 *
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

26 February 1945

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL OF VENEZIA GIULIA

Supplementary Note by MJPS

1. At the request of the Naval Member, the last sentence in paragraph 4 of the draft telegram (P/266) should now read as follows:

> "In any event it would be necessary to ensure that naval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or JUGOSLAV forces as appropriate."

2. This amendment is agreed.

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Penkhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

A. L. Wylde
/s/ ~~W. A. Adair~~
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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2. This amendment is agreed.

/s/ G. L. Eberle
G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
C-3 Plans

/s/ L. T. Pankhurst
L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

A. L. Wylde
/s/ ~~W. A. Adair~~
W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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Extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Conference (Political) of 20 February 1945. Ref: SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting dated 20th February (Original on 217/SC).

5. BRIEF VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE. (Paper No. SAC (O) (45) 9 and Addendum) — SEE 1002-2/cc

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft brief for the Supreme Allied Commander's projected visit to Marshal TITO at BELGRADE, together with the text of a draft agreement regarding the establishment of Allied military control in VENEZIA GIULIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that there had been much discussion regarding the form of government which should be set up in VENEZIA GIULIA at the time when the port of TRIESTE would be required as a base from which to maintain Allied occupational forces in AUSTRIA. It was essential that any arrangement agreed should be acceptable to Marshal Tito, since there was Jugoslav Partisan forces in the area and it was known that Marshal Tito wished to incorporate the area in the new JUGOSLAVIA. During the recent conferences he had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and others on this matter and it had been agreed that he should endeavour to make an arrangement with Marshal Tito on purely military grounds. He intended, therefore, to propose to Marshal Tito that a military boundary should be established which would run north and south over certain well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the lines of communication required by the Allies. It would be stated that territory to the west of this boundary would be administered under Allied Military Government, but no reference would be made to the form of administration east of the boundary. An effort would be made to induce Marshal Tito to remove any Jugoslav troops west of the boundary, but if he insisted that they should remain west of the boundary, then he must agree that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Similarly, it would be agreed that any Allied troops which it was found necessary to station ~~west~~ east of the boundary would come under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

MR. KIRK said that his instructions from the State Department indicated that the United States Government wished Allied Military Government to be extended to all disputed areas which in 1939 were part of ITALY, including ZARA and the Italian islands in the ADRIATIC. No action should therefore be taken which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA. The President had given no indication during his recent discussions with him that he wished to revise his view in this respect. He feared that the intention announced by the Supreme Allied Commander would imply that the Allies were prepared to restore some of VENEZIA GIULIA to JUGOSLAVIA, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt that, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal Tito, he should be told at first that it was the intention to establish Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Moreover, there was no indication as yet that the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the area would not be acceptable to the Russians. If it were acceptable to the Russians, it would also presumably be accepted by Marshal Tito.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that the Italian Government had been notified that <u>all</u> VENEZIA GIULIA would pass under Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans. This was in accordance with proposals which had been made by the previous Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that the proposal now put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander would have an unfortunate effect as regards the surrender instrument concluded with the Italian Government, by his predecessor on behalf of the United Nations, since the implied invitation to Marshal Tito (who was not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander) to occupy territory which was previously Italian could be considered as a breach of the spirit, if not of the terms, of the surrender instrument. He added that, however much it was desired to conduct discussions on a purely military basis, an agreement of the kind contemplated would of necessity have political implications.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that the establishment of a working military arrangement for the area was nevertheless essential and urgent.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that, from the practical viewpoint, an arrangement of the kind proposed would in fact benefit the Italians, since their retention of the port of TRIESTE would be immediately assured. He agreed, however, that theoretically such an arrangement might be held to imply the 'de facto' right of the Jugoslavs to occupy that part of VENEZIA GIULIA lying to the east of the proposed boundary. Mr. Eden had raised this question in a recent note to Mr. Stettinius but unfortunately opportunity had not been found to discuss the matter at the recent conferences. He felt that there were three courses open:

(a) The Supreme Allied Commander might carry out the intention he had expressed above. This course carried the risk that, since the Jugoslavs would certainly assume control of the territory to the east of the proposed boundary, the Supreme Allied Commander would be in the position of having taken the first step precipitating the assumption of Jugoslav control without authority from both governments. Moreover, the eviction of Jugoslav forces by the United States and Britain after the collapse of GERMANY could not be envisaged.

(b) The Supreme Allied Commander might refer his proposed draft agreement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before discussion with Marshal Tito.

(c) The United States and British Governments might approach the Russians with the object of obtaining their agreement to the proposed line and asking for their co-operation in establishing it.

There was little doubt that the Russians would wish to transfer the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA to JUGOSLAVIA, including especially the port of TRIESTE, since this would given them a Russian controlled outlet to the Mediterranean. He considered that the best course was that indicated at (b). It should be pointed out to the Chiefs of Staff that, if they wished to occupy AUSTRIA from the south, it would be necessary that Marshal Tito should accept the 1939 frontier or the boundary now proposed, and that the alternative to his acceptance of at least the latter boundary was to fight the Jugoslav Army for possession of the disputed territory.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY pointed out that an agreement with Marshal Tito had already been concluded in respect of ZADAR, which in 1939 was Italian territory. This Italian possession was therefore already compromised. The Jugoslavs were already in possession of large parts of VENEZIA GIULIA and it might be necessary to move into AUSTRIA and to make use of the port of TRIESTE before the matter could be settled in accordance with courses (b) or (c) proposed by Mr. Macmillan. He regarded the early conclusion of some arrangement providing for the Supreme Allied Commander's control over the L of C from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA as a matter of urgent military necessity and considered that the view held by the State Department regarding this territory was not entirely realistic.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that, if it were decided to negotiate with Marshal Tito the agreement as proposed in SAC (O) (45) 9 (Addendum), a paragraph should be added to the effect that the naval control of the ports be-

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(a) The Supreme Allied Commander might carry out the intention he had expressed above. This course carried the risk that, since the Jugoslavs would certainly assume control of the territory to the east of the proposed boundary, the Supreme Allied Commander would be in the position of having taken the first step precipitating the assumption of Jugoslav control without authority from both governments. Moreover, the eviction of Jugoslav forces by the United States and Britain after the collapse of GERMANY could not be envisaged.

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that, if it were decided to negotiate with Marshal Tito the agreement as proposed in SAC (O) (45) 9 (Addendum), a paragraph should be added to the effect that the naval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE inclusive would be vested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close co-operation with the Commanders of 15 Army Group or of the Jugoslav forces as appropriate. He pointed out that the existing Anglo-Jugoslav naval agreement covered Jugoslav ports only.

X AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR suggested that the most promising course appeared to be, once a joint provisional government had been established in JUGOSLAVIA, to point out to them that they now shared in the responsibility of the Allies for Allied Military Government in those parts of ITALY (including VENEZIA GIULIA) in which it was exercised.

MR. MACMILLAN supported Air Marshal Slessor's suggestion, pointing out that the joint provisional Jugoslav government would be required to participate in the obligations of the United Nations once it was established and that

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these obligations included being parties to the Italian surrender instrument, which provided for the establishment of Allied Military Government over all VENEZIA GIULIA. There would be no difficulty in appointing to the Allied Commission an accredited Jugoslav representative parallel to the present Soviet representative. He suggested that he and Mr. Kirk should make no report to their respective departments until the return of the Supreme Allied Commander, when a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be drafted, and reports made to the State Department and Foreign Office, in the light of the views already expressed and of the Supreme Allied Commander's visit.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE also supported Air Marshal Slessor's suggestion but pointed out that any Jugoslav occupying forces or occupational administration established in VENEZIA GIULIA would have to come under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander through the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that Marshal Tito had already agreed in principle to Allied control of TRIESTE and the L of C to AUSTRIA. It would be possible to inform Marshal Tito that military necessity demanded that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA be subjected to Allied Military Government and that Marshal Tito's forces in the area must come under Allied control. There were bound, however, to be complications in respect of any Jugoslav occupational forces. On balance it appeared that the best course during his visit to BELGRADE was to raise the question of VENEZIA GIULIA only in the most general military terms, without seeking any form of agreement, and to endeavour to ascertain Marshal Tito's views on the question. The direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff could then be sought on his return.

Turning to paragraph 4 of his brief, he enquired whether it was considered undesirable that Marshal Tito should be informed that Allied action against LUSSIN PICCOLO was possible, since this was Italian territory. He pointed out that Marshal Tito's Partisans had operated in these islands and that considerable assistance might be expected from them.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR observed that, provided there was no implication that LUSSIN PICCOLO was regarded as at present, or likely in the future to be, Jugoslav territory, there should be no objection to informing him that such operations were a possibility. There was general agreement with this view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Agreed that the question of VENEZIA GIULIA should be raised only in the most general military terms during his forthcoming discussions with Marshal Tito and instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with other appropriate authorities, to prepare on his return a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analysing the difficulties of the situation existing in VENEZIA GIULIA and putting forward the suggestion made by Air Marshal Slessor at 'X' above, with supporting arguments.

(b) Accepted the brief circulated under paper No. SAC (0) (45) 9 subject to (a) above and to the considerations recorded in the above minute and in Minute 3 of SAC (0) (45) 3rd Meeting.

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Turning to paragraph 1 of his brief, he enquired whether it was considered undesirable that Marshal Tito should be informed that Allied action against LUSSIN PICCOLO was possible, since this was Italian territory. He pointed out that Marshal Tito's Partisans had operated in these islands and that considerable assistance might be expected from them.

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FEB 23 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner.
++

Ref: 504/145/EC.

19 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Administration of N.E. ITALY.

TO : Chief Commissioner.

1. The Acting President suggested that we should explore once more the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA on the supposition that Field Marshal ALEXANDER by agreement with Marshal TITO, established the eastern boundary of his military administration somewhere West of the 1939 international boundary.

2. I must point out that the inevitable result of such an agreement will be that forces under Marshal TITO will enter Italian territory up to the agreed boundary line and establish (as they legally may by right of military occupation) a military government in such territory which will not be under the authority of SACMED. It is indeed not too much to say that such an agreement would be construed by Marshal TITO and by the Italian Government as implying an invitation to Marshal TITO to enter such territory and set up military government there.

3. The effect of such an agreement would therefore be unfortunate in the extreme. SACMED's predecessor executed the armistice terms on behalf of the United Nations and set up a body, the Allied Commission, to execute these terms. SACMED is the person to whom the Italian Government may rightly look on all matters arising out of their defeat and surrender. It may be strongly argued from a strictly legal point of view, and is certainly apparent from a moral point of view, that an implied invitation to Marshal TITO, who is not under SACMED's command, to occupy any part of Italy would be a serious breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the armistice terms. It would certainly be so understood by the Italian Government who looked to the Allied Commission as the proper authority to administer AMG in all parts of metropolitan Italy.

4. It must not be overlooked, too, that you on behalf of SACMED have already informed the Italian Government of SACMED's intention to set up an Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA. An administration under Marshal TITO would not, in my view, be such an administration.

5. Apart from the foregoing and while fully appreciating the difficulties in reaching any agreement with Marshal TITO and the probability that whatever may be proposed, in fact, part of VENEZIA GIULIA, if not all, will be overrun by Yugoslav forces, we must as an Allied Commission point out the very serious reactions which will be provoked on all sides in Italy by any action which prejudges the ultimate fate of VENEZIA GIULIA.

6. I can foresee the overthrow of any Italian Government which acquiesced [illegible] of territory. I can foresee grave disorders with an anti-

1028/EC

declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. The Acting President suggested that we should explore once more the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA on the supposition that Field Marshal ALEXANDER by agreement with Marshal TITO, established the eastern boundary of his military administration somewhere West of the 1939 international boundary.

2. I must point out that the inevitable result of such an agreement will be that forces under Marshal TITO will enter Italian territory up to the agreed boundary line and establish (as they legally may by right of military occupation) a military government in such territory which will not be under the authority of SACMED. It is indeed not too much to say that such an agreement would be construed by Marshal TITO and by the Italian Government as implying an invitation to Marshal TITO to enter such territory and set up military government there.

3. The effect of such an agreement would therefore be unfortunate in the extreme. SACMED's predecessor executed the armistice terms on behalf of the United Nations and set up a body, the Allied Commission, to execute these terms. SACMED is the person to whom the Italian Government may rightly look on all matters arising out of their defeat and surrender. It may be strongly argued from a strictly legal point of view, and is certainly apparent from a moral point of view, that an implied invitation to Marshal TITO, who is not under SACMED's command, to occupy any part of Italy would be a serious breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the armistice terms. It would certainly be so understood by the Italian Government who looked to the Allied Commission as the proper authority to administer AMG in all parts of metropolitan Italy.

4. It must not be overlooked, too, that you on behalf of SACMED have already informed the Italian Government of SACMED's intention to set up an Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA. An administration under Marshal TITO would not, in my view, be such an administration.

5. Apart from the foregoing and while fully appreciating the difficulties in reaching any agreement with Marshal TITO and the probability that whatever may be proposed, in fact, part of VENEZIA GIULIA, if not all, will be overrun by Yugoslav forces, we must as an Allied Commission point out the very serious reactions which will be provoked on all sides in Italy by any action which prejudges the ultimate fate of VENEZIA GIULIA.

6. I can foresee the overthrow of any Italian Government which acquiesced with any surrender of territory. I can foresee grave disorders with an anti-Allied basis against any action on the part of the Allies which would prejudge the VENEZIA GIULIA issue. We do not ask that the impossible should be achieved but we should press, in my opinion, for the utmost to be done to prevent the serious troubles, political and administrative, which must arise if VENEZIA GIULIA or part of it is handed over to Yugoslav military government before the peace treaty.

7. If it is impossible to prevent partition, then we should urge in the strongest manner for the ports of TRIESTE and FIUME to be in Allied (Anglo-American hands).

8. I think you should also make it clear that the Allied Commission has no official intimation from AFHQ that the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief (then General ALEXANDER) and yourself, transmitted to AFHQ on 29 October, had not been approved and that any other scheme of separate administration was being

(10)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC No. 78-5015

considered; and I think you should demand that the Allied Commission should be notified officially and in good time of any change in basic policy - or consideration thereof, so that the authority set up to administer the country and execute the terms of surrender (which is the Allied Commission and not the Staffs sections at AFHQ) may have the opportunity to study the problem in good time.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785045

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FEB 2 5 to file

A.M.G. Requirements in VENEZIA GIULIA.

When Allied forces occupy Austria it will be necessary to maintain the British Occupational Force of 3 Divisions throughout the port of Trieste and over the L. of C. passing through Venezia Giulia. Tito is likely to claim prospectively as Jugoslav territory at least that part of Italy lying east of the river Isonzo and probably in addition a portion of that lying east of the river Tagliamento. There is already very considerable Slovene influence in these areas, especially the former. The final disposal of this territory is a political question. However, regardless of political considerations, the port of Trieste and the L. of C. running thence to Austria, together with all territory to the west of it (affording communication with Italy) must be under Saamed's control. Saamed must also control all Jugoslav troops regular or irregular remaining in this area. It is intended to secure a military agreement with Marshal Tito covering these points.

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TOP SECRET

D R A F T

In order to facilitate the forward movements of the Anglo-American armies co-operating with the forces under the control of Marshal Tito, it is necessary, for purely operational reasons, to agree a working line of demarcation between the forces engaged. The military zones so delineated will be without prejudice to any arrangements to be made either for the temporary or the permanent administration of Venezia Giulia at a governmental level. For the purpose of facilitating operations against Germany and Austria, the zone west of Line A - B will be under the control for all purposes of the General Officer Commanding 15th Army Group. Any forces of the Jugoslav Government operating by agreement west of the line will be placed under the operational control of the General Officer Commanding 15th Army Group.

Not sent

22/2

SUGGESTED CHANGES UNDERLINED.

Circulated at Pol Mtg 2/19/45

(2)

→ SEE FILE 1002-2/cc
Paper SAC(O)(45) 9 + addendum
Visit of SAC to Belgrade

1393

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy No. 7

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

504/005

12 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attention: Chief of Staff. (Copy No. 1)

1. It is understood that the possibility of establishing a tripartite governmental authority in certain portions of North-eastern Italy has been under discussion at AFHQ. This governmental control authority, it was suggested, would be independent of the Allied Commission and responsible directly to AFHQ.

2. The attached memorandum from the Legal Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, with which I entirely concur, would seem to point to the undesirability of such a proposed course.

(6)

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Enc.-1

Copy to: The Honorable Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador. - No. 2
Sir Noel Charles, Bt., K.C.M.G., British Ambassador. - " 3
Acting President, Allied Commission. - No. 4
COS - No. 5
POL Section - No. 6
CC FILES - No. 7

Decltd, JS AFHQ - per (2)
Fwg Dunlop

per (18)

TOP SECRET

(7)

CC/8001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

FEB 17 RECD CC

CC

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394.
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 504/242/EC. 16 February 1945.

Subject: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

To: Brigadier J.E. Dunlop,
Regional Commissioner,
Southern Region.

For your information I enclose copy of the Chief Commissioner's letter to AFHQ dated 12 February '45 on the responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

(1)

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

CC/2

(Similar letter sent to PCCAO 15 Army Group). - 504/243/EC.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 504/143/EC.

16 February 1945.

Subject: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

To : DCMAO
15 Army Group.

For your information I enclose copy of the Chief Commissioner's letter to AFHQ dated 12 February 45 on the responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

(7)

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

(Similar letter sent to HQ Southern Region - 504/142/EC).

(1)

TOP SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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TOP - SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
AFO 394
LOCAL SUB-COMMISSION

AC/4134/L 6 February 1945

SUBJECT :- Responsibilities of the Allied Commission

TO :- Chief Commissioner, HQ Allied Commission

1 This sub-commission has been asked to advise whether it would be in order for a governmental authority to be established, independent of the Allied Commission and dependent directly upon AFHQ, which should assume responsibility for administration and control of a portion of Italian territory, either by itself or in conjunction with some foreign power.

2 Under Articles 37 and 42 of the Instrument of the Surrender of Italy it is provided that a Control Commission will be appointed representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing, under the orders of SACMED, the instrument of surrender, and that the Italian Government will send a delegation to the HQ of the Control Commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities.

3 In the opinion of this sub-commission it is clear from the general terms of the Instrument of Surrender that the provisions thereof extend to the whole of Italian territory within the limits prescribed by Article 41. This territory, for the purpose of this opinion, includes all territory which before the outbreak of the present war formed part of the mainland of Italy.

4 It is the further opinion of this sub-commission that the effect of these Articles is, by treaty with the Italian Government, to establish the Allied (Control) Commission as the sole authority, within the territory of Italy as so defined, for administering and executing the terms of the Instrument of Surrender of Italy under the orders of SACMED, and as the channel of communication between SACMED and the Italian Government for this purpose. Any portion of Italy which is, or may hereafter be, liberated by the Allied Forces is, or will become, subject to the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, and subject to control thereunder through the Allied Commission.

5 It would seem clear that this is the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, since in the appointment of Mr MACMILLAN as Acting President of the Allied Commission it was publicly announced that he should become the responsible head of the Commission and that in order to effect this, General WILSON would delegate to Mr MACMILLAN his functions as President of the Commission.

(6) See (7)

/6 It is...

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6 It is assumed that General WILSON did in fact so delegate his functions. On this assumption, it is considered that SACMED would have no authority thereafter to establish a different Governmental institution separate from the Allied Commission or not under the control of Mr MACMILLAN.

7 On each of the above grounds, therefore, it is the opinion of this sub-commission that the creation of such an authority as is envisaged in paragraph 1 hereof would be irregular and improper.

W. E. BRIGGS,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

Copy No 1

FEB 5 RECD
CC 317

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ref: 504/134/COS.

5 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Planning - NE ITALY.

TO : Distribution Below.

1. CAO, AFHQ yesterday gave me some advance information regarding the military administrative organisation for NE ITALY:

(a) Ports.

(i) TRIESTE will be operated by 8 Army as a military port.

(ii) VENICE will not be operated as a military port and the minimum of military assistance will be available. This may be restricted simply to mine clearance. If the Allied Commission requires the port it must be prepared to clear it and operate.

(b) Railways. The following railways will be opened:

FAENZA - BOLOGNA
BOLOGNA - PARMA
Boat Route from BOLOGNA to the BRENNER PASS.

The railway BOLOGNA - VENICE - TRIESTE will not be opened under military administration.

(c) Inland Water Transport. CAO directed close attention to the possibilities of inland water transport.

(d) Gasoline. No pipe line will be laid further than 100 miles North of BOLOGNA, ie, just across the PO. AFHQ may assist in the rehabilitation of the extensive bulk installations in VENICE.

(e) Military Administrative Boundaries. No.1 District will operate on the right flank as far as VENEZIA GIULIA but will not include VENEZIA GIULIA. PBS will operate from BOLOGNA to the BRENNER PASS leaving FERRARA on the East with No.2 District's Eastern boundary as their Western boundary.

(f) BOLOGNA and FLORENCE will become International HQ under PBS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

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Best Route from BOLOGNA to the BRENNER PASS.

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(f) BOLOGNA and FLORENCE will become International HQ under PBS.

2. Heads of Sections and RC, VENEZIA Region will bear the above points in mind for planning for NE ITALY. Planning should now be accelerated in order that AFHQ may be advised.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MSL/JG.

DISTRIBUTION:
Chief Commissioner
DCOS, Econ Sec
DCOS, Est Sec
DCOS, CA Sec
AMG 5 Army.
NW Italy Coordinating Committee
RC, VENEZIA Region
RC, EMILIA, Region
DCOAC, 15th Army Group.
RC, Southern Reg (Attn. Brig.Dunlop).
AMG 8 Army

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1402

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD No. 785015

FILE UNDER NO. 1008/CC Admin of NE Italy

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

Ltr G-3 AFHQ Plans/134 30 Jan 45

Minutes of mtg of 29 Jan 45 re OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

Paragraphs 13 thru 15: NORTHEAST ITALY

Occupational Forces

Cooperation with Titp

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 1014/CC Admin of Frontier Areas

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on to consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

1403

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FILE UNDER NO. 1008/CC Admin of NK Italy

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

Ltr G-3 AFHQ Memo/134 30 Jan 45

Minutes of mtg of 29 Jan 45 re OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN ITALY

Paragraphs 13 thru 15: NORTHEAST ITALY

Occupational Forces

Cooperation with Tito

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 1014/CC Admin of Frontier Areas

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on to consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

TOP SECRET

Ref: 50/102/GCS.

18 January 1945.

To: Acting President.

LEGISLATION ON NORTH EAST ITALY

1. Description of the Area.

The area covered by the term "North East Italy" originally comprised the 6 Provinces of BELLUNO, UDINE, PIAVE, POLA, ZARA and GORIZIA. It has been assumed by Allied Commission that the two extra Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO should be added.

The Italian Government has been informed that it is our intention to impose Allied Military Government on the first six named Provinces. No query has ever been raised by them on the other two Provinces, which they presumably have assumed were not the subject of argument, having been Italian since 1866.

2. Policy of SACMED.

The policy of SACMED is as follows: "To impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. This automatically suspends Italian sovereignty. The Military Governor will be the General Officer Commanding the Allied Armies in the area. It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned". This intention was communicated to Marshal TITO on 15 August, but he has objected to it

3. Present Organisation of the Area under German Rule.

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6 Provinces of [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]. It has been assumed by Allied Commission that the two extra Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO should be added.

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3. Present Organisation of the Area under German Rule.

The Germans are believed to have organised the area into two parts:-

(a) Fore Adriatic Operational Area: [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]

(b) Litorale Adriatico Group: UDINE, [redacted], GORIZIA, [redacted] and FIUME.

4. Political Aspect of the Problem.

This is obviously vital, but is only briefly mentioned here. The three outstanding points are as follows:-

(a) A memorandum from Mr. [redacted], Yugoslav Member of the Advisory Council, asking for special treatment for VENEZIA GIULIA and ZARA, but saying

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he would agree to "an exclusively Allied transitional administration, without the least direct or indirect contact or even collaboration with the Italian authorities", such administration to remain in force until a final settlement of the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Italy.

(b) Marshal TITO's speech of 12 September claiming: ISTRIA and the Slovene littoral.

(c) A Resolution of the CLN in VENEZIA GIULIA forwarded by ROLO. Their conclusions are briefly:

(1) Administrative autonomy for VENEZIA GIULIA.

(2) Equality between Italians and Yugoslavs with a guarantee to preserve Yugoslav national characteristics.

(3) An international committee to run the port of TRIESTE, composed of all nationalities interested in the port.

5. Allied Military Government Plan.

Allied Commission's plan now awaits CCS approval, having received the previous assent of General Alexander at AAI. It will be convenient to treat the area in two parts, namely VENEZIA GIULIA (corresponding roughly to the Litorale Adriatico Group) and VENEZIA TRIDENTINA (corresponding roughly to the Pre-Alpine Operational Area). The salient features of this plan are as follows:

6. VENEZIA GIULIA.

Three different situations were envisaged:

A. We get there before the Yugoslavs.

B. We arrive to find Yugoslav Partisans have assumed some local control, but there are no regular Yugoslav or Russian troops.

C. Yugoslav or Russian troops get there before we do.

A combination of all three of these situations in the whole area is

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(3) An international committee to run the port of TRIESTE, composed of all nationalities interested in the port.

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Three different situations were envisaged:

A. We get there before the Yugoslavs.

B. We arrive to find Yugoslav Partisans have assumed some local control, but there are no regular Yugoslav or Russian troops.

C. Yugoslav or Russian troops get there before we do.

A combination of all three of these situations in the whole area is considered possible.

7. Under situation A. Allied Military Government is to follow normal lines except:

(1) No officials to be imported into the area, only indigenous inhabitants being used.

(2) No Italian troops to be used, the use of C.C.R. as such to be left to the Regional Commissioner.

(3)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSD Nov. 78-0265

(3) Italian law to be applied.

(4) Provinces to be financed entirely by AFA.

8. Under situation B, a similar policy would be adopted with the following modifications:

(1) No Italian police would be employed in Partisan areas.

(2) Any existing administrative machinery would be kept in being regardless of whether it was using Italian or Yugoslav officials.

(3) Courts of law would initially be closed and only reopened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner.

It is important that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants in both these cases that the only government authority is the Allied Military Government. To indicate this only American and British flags would be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

9. Under situation C, we might find a Yugoslav administration legally set up under Yugoslav officers. To avoid this it was recommended to AFHQ that an agreement be negotiated with TITO that any Yugoslav troops crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy should come immediately under the orders of AAI. This recommendation had the strong support of AAI in view of the importance to them of TRIESTE and FIUME.

10. One final important point was made. Allied Commission require a much higher concentration of officers than elsewhere in Italy, and, in addition, the provision of an adequate force of military police.

11. VENEZIA TRIDENTINA.

The three Provinces of BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO differ from each other, BOLZANO being entirely Italian, TRENTO mildly Austrian, and BOLZANO predominantly

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC Memo. 7/5/82

(2) Any existing administrative machinery would be kept in being regardless of whether it was using Italian or Yugoslav officials.

(3) Courts of law would initially be closed and only reopened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner.

It is important that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants in both these cases that the only government authority is the Allied Military Government. To indicate this only American and British flags would be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

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10. One final important point was made. Allied Commission require a much higher concentration of officers than elsewhere in Italy, and, in addition, the provision of an adequate force of military police.

11. VENEZIA GIULIA.

The three Provinces of UDINE, TRIESTE and GORIZIA differ from each other, GORIZIA being entirely Italian, TRIESTE mildly Austrian, and UDINE predominantly Austrian. AFHQ have ruled that all three should be administered alike under the same form of Allied Military Government as we have hitherto applied everywhere in Italy, and the same basic principles should be applied as in the case of VENEZIA GIULIA.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NSC No. 785015

12. Present Situation.

(a) VENEZIA GIULIA.

Allied Coordination plans await COS approval. AFHQ cabled to ACMAB for COS in November stressing in particular the following points:

(1) The importance of making an agreement with TITO.

(2) The need for a public declaration by Allied Governments that the area would be held in trust.

(3) The inadvisability of a separate Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA.

(b) VENEZIA TRIDENTINA

The plan for VENEZIA TRIDENTINA was recently approved by AFHQ for interim guidance and for planning purposes only.

Copy to: 319/008.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778015

that the area would be held in trust.

(3) The feasibility of a separate Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA.

(b) VENEZIA TRIDENTINA

The plan for VENEZIA TRIDENTINA was recently approved by AMG for interim guidance and for planning purposes only.

Copy to: 219/GSG.

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HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

R/1456

17 January 1945

SUBJECT: Planning for Venezia

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission
ATTN: Chief of Staff

1. Your 504/III/COS of 1 January was forwarded to me by Colonel T.N.Page, Acting Regional Commissioner, Venezia.

2. I have been studying the implication of this letter and I wish to put forward to you a suggestion which I have already had an opportunity of discussing with Colonel Fiske and Lt. Col. Shipp.

3. This proposal is submitted, on the assumption that I shall return to Venezia Region when the northerly move takes place. I believe that to be your present plan.

4. Based on this assumption, I wish to suggest, for your consideration, that Tactical H.Q. Venezia, move from its present H.Q. at Mondaino, near Rimini, to Naples.

5. In making this suggestion, I wish to make it absolutely clear beyond any doubt, that I have complete confidence in Colonel T.N. Page, and that I should most willingly endorse any plans made by him. I feel, however, that Colonel Page himself will feel, in the weeks to come, that many points arise in which he will wish to consult me.

6. Such a move South of Tactical H.Q., would have the disadvantage of loss of contact with 8 Army, and 5 Army (contact with the latter is by difficult roads). It would have the advantage of closer contact with H.Q. A.C., with A.F.H.Q., with Austrian Planning Group at Portici, and with the Jugoslav Mission at Bari.

7. You will also appreciate that many officers who will hold important positions in Venezia, such as, Lt. Col. Orpwood, Lt. Col. Armstrong, and possibly Colonel Howell are, or will shortly be workers in Southern Region.

8. My suggestion would be that only a planning H.Q. should move South. This to consist of Colonel T.N. Page, Jnr Cdr Proby, possibly one P.W.B. officer, and two or three clerks with necessary transport for a quick move. Main Headquarters would remain, with all stores, at its present location at Mondaino.

9. I suggest, that unless he is required by Rome, Lt. Col. Archibald might be the Liaison Officer at H. Q. No. 1 District.

10. In this connection, I wish to bring to your notice, the desira-

10 Office

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

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9. I suggest, that unless he is required by Rome, Lt. Col. Archibald might be the Liaison Officer at H. Q. No. 1 District.

10. In this connection, I wish to bring to your notice, the desirability of settling, so far as possible, the key personnel of Venezia Region. We have already lost Colonel Gevers, Lt. Col. Craig, and I understand that we shall lose other officers for Austria. With all respect to all the important problems of Austria, I do feel that the frontier provinces of Venezia contain nearly as many difficult problems and nearly as much explosive material as exist in Austria.

11. I should therefore appreciate it, if the make-up of Venezia Regional Team could be settled as soon as possible. You know how far below strength we are. If reinforcements are to be available from A.A. and other units, I

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COS/VCC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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should like to have them as soon as possible. We could train them in Southern Region on the olive oil campaign.

12. I am sending this letter forward in triplicate so that, if you think fit, you can forward one copy to Colonel T.N. Page with your view.

Signed: John K Dunlop
Brigadier,. Regional Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Signed: John K Dunlop
Brigadier,. Regional Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF COMMISSIONER
APO 394

FILE MEMORANDUM

FOR : "A" File (Revised) # 1008
Subject: Admin in NE Italy, Policy

Material covering this subject will be found in "A" File (Rev) #1013 & 1014

L. W. Shenfield
T/4, File Clerk

(1)