

ACC

10000/136/283

1082

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/RND No.

785015

10000/136/283

SICILIAN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT
SEPT. 1944 - NOV. 1945

1010/00

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1010 SICILIAN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

~~SECRET~~

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
16	Cbl, Finnochiaro Aprile	8 May 45	Stone	"Movement cannot express feeling due lack of freedom...."
17	COMNAVNAV AB-2, Horan	17 Sep 45	Stone	Proposed militarization of Separatist Movement.
18	Cbl AC Ex C, 6116	26 Sep 45	AFHQ, Palermo	Recrudescence of movmt; arrest of 3 of the leaders, among them Aprile, Restoccia
19	Cbl AC Ex C, 6122	26 Sep 45	AD LO Palermo	Recrudescence of movmt; arrest of 3 of the leaders, among them Aprile, Restoccia
20	Cbl AC CC, 6135	26 Sep 45	AD LO Palermo	Recrudescence of movmt; arrest of 3 of the leaders, among them Aprile, Restoccia
21	Cbl AC LO Palermo	28 Sep 45	AC	Alleged recrudescence of movmt; no knowledge of it in Sicily itself.
22	Cbl AC Ex C, 6388	1 Oct 45	ACLO Palermo	Alleged recrudescence of movmt; no enquiries to be made in Sicily.
23	Open Ltr, Committee MIS		Ital Govt	Secret committee of M.I.S. calls upon IG for "federalist solution".
24	Ltr Aprile Varvara Restuccia	16 Oct 45	Stone	Members of M. I. S. arrested

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
Date 4/14/74
By [signature]

~~SECRET~~

1010/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

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SECRET

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
0 1	Ltr Pranta PWB Note Stone	25 Sep 44 1 Oct 44	Reynar Schott Pol Sec	Rpt on Separatist Movement Allied Statement on Separatism
2	Ltr Bonomi	7 Oct 44	Stone	Proposed proclamation atchd.
3	Ltr Bonomi	9 Oct 44	Stone	Separatist movement claims to be backed by US Govt.
4	Ltr 515/47/CCS	10 Oct 44	Pol Sec Schott	Pls take up matter of LaGuardia statement with Mr Kirk
5	Ltr 515/49/CCS Stone	11 Oct 44	Bonomi	Re yrs of 9th. am taking up the matter with Mr. Kirk
6	Ltr 515/53/CCS Stone	12 Oct 44	Bonomi	Re yourself 7th; here is draft with a few alterations.
7	Ltr Kirk	14 Oct 44	Stone	Here is Dept of State policy
8	Ltr A/CC 000.1-2 Stone	16 Oct 44	Bonomi	Here is US statement on Sicili- an movement you can use.
9	Ltr. 1010 Stone	3 Nov 44	Bonomi	Confidential report fr PWB Sicily re "go ahead" by Separatist leader.
10	DO Ltr, Carr (Extract)	6 Jan 45	Lush	Sitrep. Movement still smoulder- ing.
10a	RC/201, Carr	26 Jan 45	Lush	Separatist coup d'etat not anti- cipated; also USN offr activities.
11	Ltr Alex Kirk	28 Jan 45	Stone	'Idle jottings' on sitn in Island
12	Ltr, Stone	29 Jan 45	Alex Kirk	'Idle jottings' on sitn in Island
13	Memo	213 Feb 45		Gen Castellano's views on Sici- lian problems, separatism partic.
14	Memo			Conditions in Sicily, generally.
15	Memo			Recommendations on Sicily.

1594

SECRET

C. C. 313

Translation

NOV 19 RECD

To : Admiral Stone
 Chief Commissioner - Allied Commission

Rome

The undersigned Pinocchiaro-Aprile Andrea, Varvaro Antonino and Pestuccia Francesco, members of the national committee of the Movement for the Independence of Sicily (M.I.S.) bring the following facts to your attention;

On the evening of October 1st, we were arrested and deported to the island of Ponza, where we are at present. On our arrival, on October 2nd, a police inspector showed us a copy of two memoranda which the above mentioned Committee sent to the San Francisco Conference (signed Pinocchiaro Aprile) on March 31st, 1945, and to the Foreign Ministers Conference in London (signed by all the members of the above mentioned Committee) on September 1st, asking us to acknowledge their content.

Since that day - and a fortnight has gone by - we have been kept here, under strict watch, without being notified by any authority why such proceedings had been taken, though they seem to be connected with the above mentioned memoranda, the legitimacy of which we consider to be indisputable.

You certainly are aware of the existence of such documents, in which the M.I.S. drew the attention of the United Nations on the fact that the Sicilians want a constitutional life different from the one they had for the last 64 years, with its injustices, humiliations and exploitations, made possible by a centralizing system which entirely failed to create spiritual unity in the country. We consider that, like many other nations, the Sicilian nation is entitled to appeal to the United Nations, who solemnly promised to all ill-used nations a regime of greater justice based on the right of self-decision, as well as on the four freedoms: of speech, of religion, from fear and from want.

However, we have been deprived of our personal freedom, sent away from our families (that are being ruined), our work and our political activity as propagandists for a freedom ideal, and this without any order being issued by a magistrate, and without any legal action having been taken against us.

Under a regime of freedom and democracy, such an arbitrary act offends the sacred principles for whom so much blood has been shed. Even a belated denunciation cannot excuse such arbitrary proceedings and mistakes.

The blow that strikes us was meant to strike the Sicilians, terrify them and stifle their ancient aspiration for a better and more dignified future.

From the scarce news which appeared in the papers, we heard that the Italian Government attempted to justify such proceedings by stating that in the memorandum of September 1st, we asked the Allies to occupy Sicily again; leaving aside the legitimacy of such a request in consideration of the constant violation of our freedom by the organs of the Government, this is entirely false, as can be ascertained by reading the memorandum.

more or less officious

The other statements made by various agencies, regarding our subversive activity are also false, for it is well known that the M.I.S. was carrying on

(24)

- 2 -

political propaganda, peacefully and openly, with perfectly lawful means and purposes.

Such doubtful statements hide the brutal vengeance of the statesmen of the six parties, and first among them, the High Commissioner Salvatore Aldisio, who, because of the incoming administrative and political elections, saw with terror that an ever increasing number of people joined the M.I.S., and that and that if the Sicilians were allowed to vote in an atmosphere of liberty, they would not support the six parties, worthily expressed by the present Government, disliked by the nation, because, among other things, it carries on the worst fascist methods. The infamous proceedings taken against us only intend to make possible the electoral victory of the worst possible man, who can triumph only by binding hand and foot the unfortunate Sicilians. Is it to carry out such actions that the Italian Government is so eager to shake off the authority of the Allied Nations?

Such being the conditions, we can do nothing but appeal to you, the representative of the United Nations in Italy, and ask for your intervention to re-establish freedom and law. We trust you won't deny your help to free men.

Ponza Island, 16 October 1940

S. Andrea Sinacchiaro Aprile Antonino Varvara Francesco Restuccia

TRANS. 9/8

E.C. DIST - 19 Nov

Action: E.C. 1502
Info: L.C.
Pol. (A)
" (B)
C.R. Rec

24

TranslationOCT 6 1945
COPIES

200

The Secret Committee of the Movement for the Independence of SicilyConsidering that:

1) the National Committee never expressed any feeling of hostility towards the Italian people and that its behaviour was inspired by the wish to fight the centralizing state, cause of all the evil and violences of which the Sicilian people have been suffering ever since 1860;

2) the National Committee and its president, on. Andrea Finocchiaro Aprile several times expressed to the various Italian Governments in power ever since February 1944 (date when the powers were handed over to the Badoglio Ministry in Sicily) the wishes of the Sicilian people, suggesting a federalist solution to the complicated problem, without ever getting an answer;

3) after the fascist action carried out in Palermo, on April 21st, 1945, by the Government of the parties, by means of the Carabinieri and P.S. agents who occupied and destroyed the central seat of the movement, the Secretary General, adv. Antonino Varvaro several times appealed to the High Commissariat in Sicily and to the various Presidents of the Council of Ministers, asking for an end to be put to unlawfulness and persecutions, unbearable in a regime which claims to be democratic, and for liberty to be reestablished.

4) lacking in comprehension, the Italian Government slandered the M.I.S. and prevented it from making its point of view known to the Italian people; the Sicilian people has therefore been more and more discouraged from a federalist solution which cannot be carried out without the consent of the political classes which reign supreme in Italy.

5) though the M.I.S. always acted in a strictly lawful way and stated to the Italian Government, in a letter dated September 1st, 1945, that the closing of its seats made it impossible for the M.I.S. to control extremist tendencies and the provocative agents of the parties in favour of unity, which bear the full responsibility for the riots which took place in Sicily, the Italian Government didn't answer.

6) again, in a fascist way, the Italian Government arrested and deported the leaders of the Sicilian movement, without charging them with any offence (as from the clumsy Government communique saying that a denunciation will be sent to the legal authority if some offence was ascertained).

7) such action is obviously unlawful and arbitrary and violates the right to individual freedom and offends the most sacred principles of a democracy which is being shown off in such a pharisaic way.

asks the Italian Government that:

a) all the partisans of independence who have been unduly deprived of personal freedom be released at once.

b) democratic freedom be given back to the Sicilians, putting an end to the police regime in Sicily.

23

- 2 -

c) a statement be issued, without any possible misunderstanding, as to whether the Government intends to reject the principle, several times asserted by the legal authorities as well as by the allied authorities, of the legitimacy of the M.I.S. as a free manifestation of democratic thought.

asserts

before the world's public opinion that the responsibility for rejecting the federalist solution lies entirely with the Italian Government which is thus enforcing the separatist solution with its possible cruel manifestations.

begs the Governments of the United Nations and the Allied Commission to intervene in defence of the freedoms for which their armies, received with a sincere enthusiasm by the Sicilian people as liberators and protectors of its freedom, fought and won the war.

Palermo, 3 October 1945

THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE M.I.S.

trans. e/c

NO DIST - 5 OCT 45
Info - Action | Exec Comm
Info - | Folad (A) R
" (B)
C.A.Sec

1590

23

OCT 1 REC'D

ca

ACLO PALERMO

6388

1 October 45

PRIORITY

SECRET RESTRICTED PD

(21)

REFERENCE YOUR UNNUMBERED SIGNAL OF TWO NIGHT SEPTEMBER PD

PAUSE TO ACLO PALERMO FROM HQ ALISON CITE ACINO PAUSE

CEASE ALL INQUIRIES IMMEDIATELY PD MATTER SENT YOU FOR INTELLIGENCE

Office of Exec. Comm.

300

F.H. McCreary

Lt. Col.
G. S. D.

1529

10/10/45

(22)

↖

RESTRICTED

SEP 281706A

F 0420
SEP 291100A
ROUTINE

MACCALLEUM ACLO PALERMO
HQ ALGCM

RESTRICTED

1. Ref your messages 6115, 6122, and 6135, dated 26 September.
2. Have made enquiries in Island but to date no information available.
3. High Commissioner knows nothing, police know nothing, American and British consuls know nothing.
4. Am continuing enquiries.
5. Have advised all Naval, Military, and Airforce.

Dist

Action - Exec Commr 2
Info - Chief Commissioner
File 2
Float

1508

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(a) and 2(c) or (d)

8/5/97
Date 4/26/77

21

C. COMM

ACLO PALMERS

6235

26 SEPTEMBER

OF PRIORITY

SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS SUBANTIEP ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN MY SIX ONE ONE SIX OF TODAY TO
AND COPY TO YOU PD

PAUSE TO ACLO PALMERS FROM RE. ALICE GENEACON PAUSE

ADVISE ALLIED MILITARY AND NAVAL AUTHORITIES

INTERNAL FILE

EX COMMISSIONER

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

cc.

ALICE LO PALERD

61212

26 SEP 45

PRIORITY

SECRET TO

URGENT IS SUPERVISOR'S ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN MY SIX ONE ONE SIX OF
TODAY TO ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS REFERRED TO THE 18
NAME TO ALICE LO PALERD FROM ID ALICE ONE ALICE PALERD ID
FORWARD REPORT THIS HEADQUARTERS EARLIER

See (20)

1526

1526

1010

(19)

EXCUTIVE COMMISSIONER

299

0-5 AFHQ REPRAT ACLO PALERMO, ~~SECRET~~ FOR INFO

6116

26 SEPTEMBER 45

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PRIME MINISTER NOTIFIED RE THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS INDICATIVE
DEFINITE RECHUEGENCE OF SEPARATIST ACTIVITY IN SICILY INCLUDING PROVOKING
OF DISORDER AND SEIZURE BY FORCE OF CERTAIN BARRACKS PD HE HAS GIVEN ORDERS FOR
THE ARREST OF THREE OF THE LEADERS NAMELY PINOCCHIARO APRILE CMA VARVARO CMA AND
RESTOCCIA WHO IS HEAD OF SEPARATIST MILITARY MOVEMENT KNOWN AS MWLS PD
PARER TO AFHQ FOR GEORON DASH FIVE RPTB FOR INFO ACLO PALERMO CMA CATANIA CMA
FROM HQ ALCON CITE ALKXC PALERMO

THEY WILL BE CHARGED UNDER ITALIAN PENAL CODE SECTION TWO FOUR ONE FOR ATTEMPTED
ACTION AGAINST INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATE AND SECTION TWO EIGHT FOUR
FOR ARMED INSURRECTION AND TROUBLES AGAINST THE STATE

See (19)

1584

(18)

Exec Comm

3

A8-2

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES
NORTHWEST AFRICAN WATERS
Navy 728, Box 35, FPO, New York, NY

CONFIDENTIAL

17 September 1945

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Stone

Subject: Proposed Militarization of Separatist Movement.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of conf. report from NOB, Palermo, to
ComNavNaw, serial 1041 of 5 September 1945.1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for your
information.

J. N. Horan
J. N. HORAN
Commander, USNR
Force Intelligence Officer

1593

1010/cu

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3

File No: A8-2

U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE
Palermo, Sicily

BVM/ais

Serial: 1041

CONFIDENTIAL
(CONFIDENTIAL)C
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P
Y

5 September 1945

Evaluation: B-2

From:
To:Commandant.
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters.
(Force Intelligence Officer).

Subject: Proposed Militarization of Separatist Movement.

References: (a) Intell. Report dated 17 February, subject: Separatist Movement Activity.
(b) Intell. Report dated 9 July, subject: Separatist Request for Civil Liberties.

1. A confidential letter of considerable importance to future Separatist policy was received a few days ago by Finocchiaro Aprile, nominal head of the Separatist Movement, from the insurgent Catania section. According to this letter, the latter group has decided, together with other sections in the Eastern part of Sicily, to "militarize" the Movement.

2. This process of militarization, for the time being at least, does not mean that every Separatist will be armed, but signifies the forming of Separatist Movement sections, sub-sections, and groups into an organization which will be better prepared to take decisive, that is violent, action, in the event that such a step is considered necessary.

3. To justify this decision, the Catania section points out that up to the present time it has been necessary for the movement to confine itself largely to propaganda activities, whereas from now on it must be prepared for active demonstrations. This would be particularly necessary in the event of the holding of any election on the island, since the Movement could not permit such elections to take place without interference if it is not granted the same rights and voting privileges as other political parties. As reported in references (a) and (b), it has long been the expressed intention of the Separatists to prevent the holding of elections in Sicily if the Movement is not first recognized by the government and permitted to take part therein.

4. The Catania section emphasized in the letter that Finocchiaro Aprile's "foreign policy", conducted through the medium of memorandums and letters to allied governments and their representatives, has been a series of failures which has served only to irritate the Allies and react adversely upon the Movement. The above section further stated that had the Separatists presented the Allies with an accomplished fact; in other words, had they actually assumed control of the island, a free Sicily would be in existence today. This attitude again points up the long standing differences in policy between the more radical members of the Movement, particularly those of the Catania section, and the more conservative minded elements in the Palermo organization.

5. Great secrecy is to be employed in the process of militarization, which is to be effected by so-called technical experts appointed by a secret committee yet to be formed. It is proposed that this committee be empowered to make all decisions without recourse to the usual directing committee of the Movement. This would place it in an

File No: AS-2

Serial: 1041

5 September 1945

CONFIDENTIALSubject: Proposed Militarization of Separatist Movement.

extremely advantageous position as regards the present nominal leaders of the Movement, particularly Finocchiaro Aprile.

6. If successful, this plan would achieve what the Catania contingent and associated radical elements have long strived for; the assumption of control, for all practical purposes, of the entire Separatist Movement. Finocchiaro Aprile's position and prestige within the Movement have become progressively weaker since Separatist headquarters in Palermo were raided on 21 April 1945 by opposing political factions without retaliation by the Separatists. It is therefore felt that this latest move by the Catania faction may succeed in crystallizing the increasingly prevalent feeling among separatists that his leadership and policies have outlived their usefulness and that both should be replaced by a more positive course of action. It is anticipated that further information in this regard will be available within a short time as the situation develops.

/s/ B. V. McCandlish.
B. V. McCANDLISH

Copy to:
SUSHLOI

C
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P
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1581

1579

(17)

ALLIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

FILE NO. _____

TO : Chief Commissioner

14 May 1945

This does not require any action or reply.

G. Stewart Brown
G. Stewart Brown
Dir. FRB

1580

(16)

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

MAY 11 RECD
CC 0910

50 16 CC

Originator's Reference

Date/Time of Origin MAY 081605B

Message Centre No.

E/192

Date Time Recd.

MAY 100830B

Precedence

ROUTINE

FROM PALERMO

TO AMIRAGLIO STONE HQ ALCOM

INCLAR


Comitato Nazionale Indipendenza SICILIA impossibilitato esprimere pubblicamente suoi sentimenti per assoluta mancanza liberta esprime vossignoria giubilo popolo Siciliano per radiosa vittoria Alleati trionfo giustizia liberta.

PRESIDENTE FINOCCHIARO APRILE

ACTION

Dist

Action - S O to Chief Commissioner
Info - File

TRANSLATION

The National Committee for the Independence of Sicily, cannot publicly express its feelings because of the complete lack of freedom; it expresses to Your Excellency the joy of the Sicilian people for the splendid victory of the Allies and the triumph of justice and liberty.

PRESIDENT FINOCCHIARO APRILE

G.O.

16

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1010/10

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your ^{approval} ~~signature~~ information

Spoke to Ben Henshew who took note 1505
 promised to advise date concerned.
 -178/2019.

SECRET

The Sicilian situation is very grave. There may be expected at any moment sporadic disorders such as the Ragusa incident and given either or both of the following conditions an island-wide revolution is a possibility:

(a) Organization of an effective nature which does not seem to exist with the possible exception among the Separatists who have carried on a pro-Allied policy so far.

(b) A popular pretext, together with success in the first disorders.

Only in the last extremity should resumption of Allied military control be effected.

It appears that the main reasons for unrest are a government that is not able to control delinquency, economic distress and political agitation.

Although the following might be given consideration, detailed recommendations for solution are not possible as the problem is so complex:

(1) In accordance with promises made by the Allies, the establishment of 300 gram bread ration.

(2) The Rome government should be alive to the problem in Sicily.

(3) As suggested by Castellano, examine possibility and advisability of a round-table conference.

(4) The reinforcement and equipping of troops so as to meet with any situation. Mobility is of first importance.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652, Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) or (3)

JCS Jan 4, 1971
JCS Jan 4, 1971

1010/cc

15

On Sunday, January 14, 1945, the price of meat in Palermo reached 400 lire a kilo and cheap grades of fish, which is largely consumed by the poorer classes, went up to 250 lire a kilo. No actual demonstrations occurred, but murmuring and resentment among the masses was noticeable. The government has now set ceiling prices as follows, effective January 15:

Beef, best quality without bone	Lire	250	per kilo
Pork, " " " "	"	260	" "
Horse, " " " "	"	120	" "
Goat, " " " "	"	150	" "

Fish

First quality fish	Lire	160	per kilo
Second " " " "	"	110	" "
Third " " " "	"	90	" "
Fourth " " " "	"	50	" "

As was to be expected, the meat shops throughout the city closed and no meat is available except in the black market where the price, at this writing, has reached 420 lire and is going up. Only that fish which is not subject to a ceiling price may be purchased at very high prices.

Agitation in the Chamber of Labor in Palermo is gaining momentum, and an O.S.S. report in this connection is quoted below.

"A certain agitation is visible in the classes of laborers and employees due to the constant increase in prices of food and clothing.

"Insistent complaints are submitted to the directors of the Palermo Chamber of Labor, which it is reported, intends to promote a strong demonstration which would degenerate into a mass insurrection.

"In the meantime many food items are hoarded away and despite the High Commissioner's decree prohibiting the exportation of salt fish in order to have an abundance at a low price, anchovies and sardines are not only salted but export permits are obtained as well.

"The general warehouses of the Bank of Sicily overflow with merchandise purchased and deposited by

the

1010/cc

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-2-

the agrarian consorzio of Palermo.

"The merchandise referred to includes several tons of cheese, salt fish, tinned food, and cereals purchased at relatively low prices, which are hoarded in said warehouses in the hope of being put on the market when prices skyrocket."

4526

(14)

1. General Giuseppe Castellano revealed he had been attempting to bring together members of the Committee of Liberation and the Separatist leaders for an accord on the Sicilian problem for some time.

2. He added that the crisis, which embraces the political and economic question, could be controlled by the leaders of the masses, which are predominantly Separatist and not followers of the Committee of Liberation parties.

3. To this end, he stated that for the past four or five days he has held discussions with various members of the CNL, parties and 'friends', the term used in referring to members of the old, cavalieresque Maffia, which is predominantly Separatist.

4. General Castellano did not admit he had failed in bringing about a 100 per cent accord on what will eventually be a round table conference of some forty political leaders in and out of the CNL, but did state he could count on the backing of at least 60 per cent so far, and that he still has hope of bringing the round table conference into being with 100 per cent representation.

5. The object of the conference would be to select a spokesman for the Sicilian people, one really representative of the thought and ideals of the Sicilians - not necessarily a Separatist - who would be received by BONOMI and who would press for the needs and desires of the Sicilian masses in the form of an ultimatum.

6. The General stated that it might be too late now, in view of the revolts which have broken out, but reckoned that with the active intervention of the leaders ^{of the} parties and the masses, a little time (one or two months) might be earned, during which a situation much more similar to the Greek revolt might be averted.

7. The General stressed that the Sicilian has a peculiar trait: He will follow a leader, but not a political party. In bringing together the leaders of the masses, Sicilians will without doubt, with the proper handling, remain pacified and not become stirred up to the point where they naturally turn to violence, he is convinced.

8. General Castellano was vitriolic in his criticism of the manner in which the Italian government handled the military recall, the cause of the revolts of the past fortnight.

9. He pointed out the failure of the Italian government to inform the Sicilians that the military recall would be

13
Discussed with Bonomi 9/11
File ← 13/2

put

-2-

put into effect, merely issuing the order in the middle of the Christmas-New Year season with the fatal result.

10. Had the government, instead, prepared the way with efficacious propaganda, which includes treating the Sicilian in brotherly fashion and with confidence, there is no doubt that the response would have been wholeheartedly unanimous, the General stated.

11. Referring to the outbreaks of demonstrations and revolts, the General admitted the cause to be so general as to include economic misery, Separatist, Fascist and Communist-Socialist agitation. The military recall was merely the spark which ignited the revolt.

12. Besides being inadequate, the military and police forces cannot hope to control the situation with forces due to the fact that the masses are well-armed with hand-grenades which can be purchased at ten to twenty lire a piece and with automatic weapons abandoned during the campaign in Sicily.

13. Therefore, he said, much diplomacy is required and if enough time is won and an accord reached between respective leaders of the political parties and the masses, the latter which at present have no official representation, the impending, wide-spread revolt may be averted.

14. The General revealed that he had taken up the plan with President Bonomi during his visit to Rome two weeks ago and that Bonomi indicated he would be inclined to lend an audience to representative Sicilian thought.

15. According to the discussion, the General is of the opinion that the government is badly informed on Sicilian problems and further revealed that the question of the removal of Salvatore Aldisio as high commissioner was being considered. He recommended to Bonomi that Aldisio be kept on for the present and predicted that the incumbent would remain for the time being.

(13)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

29 January 1945.

Dear Alexander:

Thank you for your personal note
of January 28th with some notes on the Island.

I am making some representations
in line with the second paragraph of your letter.

[s] Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

The Honorable Alexander Kirk,
American Ambassador,
119 Via Vittorio Veneto,
Rome.

FILES A *only*

1573

1010/ce

(12)

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, January 28, 1945.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Ellery,

Here are some "idle jottings" on the situation in Maffia-Land which I beg you to regard as "for background only", without ascribing sources and destined for the incinerator as soon as you have gleaned the contents.

It looks to me as if there is an immediate need for the exercise of discipline in that area and to my mind the more that can be done to charge the Italian Government with the fact that this is by rights an Italian baby and shouldn't be an Allied headache, the better.

Yours truly,

Allen R.

Sen (12)

Three enclosures.

Rear Admiral Ellery Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

(11)

FILES A only

1010/6

1572

SECRET & PERSONAL

CC 397

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

FEB 12 REC'D

OFFICE: REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
PHONE: 15555 EXT 1

FILE:RC/201

26 Jan 1945

My dear Lush,

1. With reference to our telephone conversation on the morning of 24 JAN on the subject of the Separatist Movement, I confirm that I do not anticipate under present circumstances any separatist coup d'etat. Almost at the very time we were speaking some fresh information was coming in about Separatist activities which I will detail below but, having regard to this recent information, I still confirm that the situation remains substantially as outlined in the 3rd sub-para of my D.O. Bulletin No.3 of 8 JAN, as I stated to you during our telephone conversation.

2. The recent information received regarding the Separatist activities is as follows. It is reported that the National Committee of the Separatists held a meeting on 18/19 of JAN. Since that meeting leaflets have appeared on the walls in one or two of the principal streets of Palermo. Copies of these manifestations were sent to the Public Safety Subcommission your Headquarters by today's mail.

The most interesting feature reported of the deliberations of this meeting of the National Committee is in their decisions which include the following:-

(a) to appeal to the Allies because of the existence in Sicily of an absolutely intolerable state of affairs which, if allowed to continue, could give rise to a general insurrection.

(b) to demand from the Allies the cession of the government to the National Committee, the only and true representative of the Sicilian people or, failing that, the reoccupation of the Island on the part of the Allies.

As regards the first of the above decisions, except that the population may be naturally more turbulent and, due to the passage of war, are better armed, the state of affairs in this Island seems to me from the economic point of view to be no worse, if not better, than in the remainder of liberated Italy. The Separatists to further their own ends naturally ignore this and make the greatest possible capital out of the difficulties of life in Sicily. There has however been a considerable increase in banditry lately.

10c

1010/cc

✓

As regards the second of the above decisions under (b) I find it most difficult to see any logic therein. To ask the Allies to hand over the government of the Island to the Separatists is to ask the Allies to commit what is tantamount to a most hostile and unfriendly act against the Italian government which they, the Allies, are supporting. The alternative of the reoccupation of the Island on the part of the Allies that is to say, Allied Military Government, would not only be an unfriendly act, to say the least of it, to the Italian government but also a hindrance of the Allied war effort. (And would there not be a possibility of the Separatist leaders finding themselves behind barbed wire if Allied Military Government returned? I feel there would be if I were the Regional Civil Affairs Officer). And yet the success of the Separatist Movement must presumably depend upon a favorable attitude from or support by one or more of the Allies.

I am presuming that the printed posters which have appeared are genuine. They appear over the printed signature of Pinocchio Aprile.

3. There is one interesting point in the preamble to the decisions of the National Committee which appears in the poster as follows - "that the High Commissioner instead of looking after the wellbeing of the people occupies himself in gaining support for his political party and does not work in the interests of the people with serious prejudice to collective needs". As already reported to your Headquarters, since taking over here I have always held the view that the High Commissioner spends far too much time playing politics.

4. I do not know whether the Separatists really intend to make these appeals to the Allies but if and when these appeals meet with no success, which I presume must be the result, I do not feel that the situation here will be substantially altered. I think it highly improbable, unless the young hot-heads get completely out of hand, that the Separatists will attempt any form of coup d'etat under existing circumstances; they would merely be cutting their own throats. The existence however of the movement and its creed will, in my opinion, continue to be one of the underlying causes to any unrest in this Island be the unrest connected with food shortage, wage rates, military call-ups, etc. I trust that my reading of the existing situation is correct.

5. As regards the attitude and the activities of the Naval Officer which were the main reasons for your telephone call to me, I have the following remarks. This officer is involved, very heavily involved, in social life here. It happens that in general the greater and "most attractive" part of wealthy society here is Separatist. The officer in question talks quite openly about this strata of society,

states that he considers that the separatists are the best people in the land and undoubtedly gives them great moral support. By reason of his embroilment he has, in my opinion, jaundiced and biased views on the subject - or to use a familiar phrase, "he has a bee in his bonnet". He has often expressed views to me which in effect infer that only the re-imposition of Allied Military Government will solve the problem. It is quite possible, in my opinion, that such talk may have engendered in the minds of the separatists the idea that the return of AMG is a possibility and might further their objects.

My relations with the officer and his organisation, so far as non-political matters are concerned, are very good and I get all the cooperation I require. If I ever am drawn into discussing separatism with him he does not seem to have any well-defined views as to the basis of the movement and by what means it will attain its ends. Although this officer always stresses that he really has no concern beyond his Base and his personnel wherever they may be, his activities outside this sphere and in politics are very troublesome.

Incidentally, I do not move in society here - I am too busy and I do not consider that the lavish entertainment given here and the return of it can possibly be justified in time of war.

6. As regards the consular side, I consider that the situation is quite normal. For all I know the Consul here may have sympathy with the separatist Movement. Whenever I discuss this question with him his attitude is however quite normal and rational and in direct contrast to that of the officer under discussion. I have no reason to believe that the consular side is giving any active or moral support to the Movement.

7. I trust that the above gives you all the information you want and will clear up any existing doubts as to my appreciation of the situation.

8. I have been intending to visit your Headquarters shortly but was really waiting for some matter of sufficient importance to warrant a visit. Air services out of this station are very uncertain these days and as a visit to your Headquarters may take a considerable number of days and as nothing of urgency has arisen since my last discussions at Rome on the grain situation, I have delayed starting. At the present moment I am expecting a visit from Legg who is said to be on the way. Moreover, my Executive Officer being temporarily on the sick list is another reason for my not starting. I always rely on your calling me to your Headquarters for consultation on general or on any particular matters if required.

Yours sincerely
M. Carr
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Brigadier M. S. Lush CB, CBE, MC
Chief of Staff
Allied Commission HQ. Rome

10a

Chief Commissioner.

JAN 24 RECD

CC 205

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

MS/23/1
1588

1010/CC

EXTRACT FROM DO LETTER OF 6.1.45 FROM BRIGADIER GARD
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER SICILY.

Separatist activities continue. The last big meeting of this movement took place on 3 December at ALICATO which was the scene of one of the more serious of the recent disturbances on 18 Dec. The Separatist meeting on 3 Dec was theoretically a private meeting but apparently if one was without an invitation it could be had upon application at the door. The meeting was held in a cinema and is reported to have been attended by about 1,000 persons and considerable enthusiasm. Orators' speeches contained such statements as that the Constitution must be revoked - the Separatists had a clear position against any government that might follow Epiglio or Bonomi - the Government must understand that we Sicilians do not joke - a great shock could occur tomorrow - there was no intention of creating trouble for the Allies. At a small private meeting held more recently it is understood that the youthful hot-head members pressed for taking immediate control of Sicily but the older and wiser members won the day saying that the time was not yet ripe and graciously adding that any such action might embarrass the Allied war effort.

(Original letter on 171/005.)
DO STAFF'S SPECIAL REGION.

1567

10

6 JAN 45

SECRET

RIS/dfe

A/CC 1010

3 November 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The following extract of a confidential report emanating from the office of PWS in Sicily is forwarded for your information.

"This office is in possession of a confidential report from JICA about a meeting of Separatist leaders last week in the home of Antonino Varvaro, one of the leaders, in Palermo, at which Finocchiaro-Aprile is reported to have given the "go ahead" to the Separatist elements to mobilize and, possibly, act toward seizing government buildings and, perhaps, even setting up an independent Sicilian government. It remains to be seen whether the Separatists will carry through these plans. The leaders reportedly took this decision following a conference with the Questor of Palermo who is said to have told them that he was authorized to arrest them at any time for treasonable activities against the Italian state. They are reported to have decided that, since their arrest might be imminent, it would be well to take the bull by the horns and try to establish de facto independence before the unitarian forces could bring in additional armed forces. The Separatists are also said to be banking on the fact that there are virtually no Allied troops left in Sicily, and that the Allies are reported to be in no position to send troops to Sicily at present to keep order.

"It must be kept in mind that the Separatists sometimes deliberately spread false reports of their planned actions, in order to stir up public agitation and confuse the law enforcement agencies. Whether the foregoing is merely another example of those tactics or whether they really mean business this time ~~remains~~ to be seen."

(Foregoing report dated 30 October 1944)

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: C of S, ACC
'A' Files
G-5, AFHQ

9

RMS/dfc

A/CC 000.1-2

16 October 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Referring to my recent letter on the subject of repudiation of the claim that the Sicilian separation movement has Allied support, I have just been advised that, at the suggestion of the Department of State at Washington, the Office of War Information broadcast during the early part of October in one of its transmissions to Italy, the following statement in Italian on the position of the United States regarding Sicilian separatism:

"The Voice of America is authorized to declare that the Government of the United States neither recognizes nor supports any group that seeks to obtain the separation of a part of Italy from the rest of the nation. Our Government gives its support to the present Italian Government of national unity. The Voice of America is therefore authorized to declare that the Government of the United States desires that its position be made known to all Italians and particularly to the Sicilians."

Since the broadcast was of course public, there is no objection to your making use of it.

Very truly yours,

ELLEN W. STONE
Consul General, USMR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: Political Section
C of S Section
'A' Files

000.1-2

1563

218

1/16/45

A/CC 635
OCT 16 1944UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY

Rome, October 14, 1944.

Dear Commodore Stone:

With reference to our conversation regarding the separatist agitation in Sicily, I hasten to inform you that the Department of State at Washington has just informed me that at its suggestion the Office of War Information broadcast during the early part of October in one of its transmissions to Italy, the following statement in Italian on the position of the United States regarding Sicilian separatism.

"The Voice of America is authorized to declare that the Government of the United States neither recognizes nor supports any group that seeks to obtain the separation of a part of Italy from the rest of the nation. Our Government gives its support to the present Italian Government of national unity. The Voice of America is therefore authorized to declare that the Government of the United States desires that its position be made known to all Italians and particularly to the Sicilians."

Sincerely yours,

A. R. K.

1584

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission,
Rome, Italy.

27 A.P.

Ref 515/53/006.

12th October, 1944

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of the 7th of October and I have considered the proclamation that you proposed publishing with a view to dispelling the stories that England and America are backing the Sicilian Separatist Movement.

I have made one or two alterations in the draft and inclose a copy of the proclamation as amended.

STEWART E. STONE
Commodore, RNVR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of Council of Ministers
Italian Government.

(26)

000.1-2

'A'

Ref 515/53/008.

12th October, 1944

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of the 7th of October and I have considered the proclamation that you proposed publishing with a view to dispelling the stories that England and America are backing the Sicilian Separatist Movement.

I have made one or two alterations in the draft and inclose a copy of the proclamation as amended.

ELLEN V. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of Council of Ministers
Italian Government.

(26)

000.1-2

VRS

TRANSLATION

The leaders of the Sicilian separatist movement are everywhere spreading the rumor that England and America are backing up their cause and encouraging their attempt to separate Sicily from Italy.

This rumor is entirely false.

The President of the Council, On. Bonaiuti who has the closest official relations with the representatives of the United Nations, is in a position categorically to deny these allegations which were obviously spread to deceive the good faith of many Sicilians, who, though wishing for a regional autonomy, which is not incompatible with the unity of the Country, feel nevertheless in their conscience that it would be criminal to destroy the work of our national Revolution.

0562

(6) INCL

Ref 515/49/COR.

11th October, 1944

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received your letter dated the 9th of October and have instructed my Political Section to take up the matter of the alleged broadcast by Mayor La Guardia with Ambassador Kirk.

I will write you again when the matter has been investigated.

HENRY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Italian separatist 5617

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of Council of Ministers
Italian Government.

(5)

File
H

000.1-2

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CST
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref 512/47/COS.

10th October, 1944

SUBJECT: Sicilian Separatist Movement.

TO : Political Section
Mr. Schott.

1. I enclose a copy of a translation of a letter from Prime Minister to the A/CC.
2. In regard to the alleged broadcast message by Mayor La Guardia it is not clear where the quotation ends nor is it stated from what American newspaper the quotation is made.
3. I am telling the Chief of Staff who will tell the A/CC that I am asking you to take the matter up with Ambassador Kirk with a view to putting a stop to such comments in the American press. It may be of course that the whole thing is an invention or at any rate a gross distortion of something La Guardia said.

Major,
Office of the Chief of Staff

INCL -

Ltr 9 Oct

(4)

7-1000

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS

Rome, 9 October 1944

Dear Admiral,

Following my letter of the 7th, I send you two original signals of the Comando Generale of the CC. RM. Corps, from which it can be seen that the Sicilian separatist movement pretends to be backed up by the United States of America, to reinforce its propaganda,

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Sec 244

244A

Admiral Gallery H. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
R o m e

1559

0001-7

Trans. E.O.

(3)

COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA

DEI CARABINIERI REALI

Ufficio Servizio - Situazione - Collegamenti

n. 76/49 R.P.

Rome, 5 October 1944

SUBJECT: Separatist Propaganda

TO	: H. Ex. The Minister of the Interior	ROME
TO	: H. Ex. The Undersecretary of State to the Interior and for communication;	ROME
TO	: H. Ex. The President of the Council of Ministers	ROME
TO	: The Presidency of the Council of Ministers	ROME

In the first hours of September 2nd, in Agrigento, there appeared on the walls of via Ginepro about ten propagandist manifests, of separatist tendencies, posted up by unknown people.

We enclose a copy of the manifest.

IL COMANDO CAPO DI S.M.
Romano della Chiesa

1558
1000

(32)

INCL A

COPY

Broadcast message of Fiorello La Guardia, Mayor of New York, fully acknowledging Sicily's right to a Plebiscite, has written thus in the comments of the American newspapers:

While battle is raging on the various fronts and the Allies are studying the means of giving a new structure to the world, the people of the most beautiful island in the Mediterranean ask the Allies to acknowledge one of its rights: INDEPENDENCE.

The movement for Sicilian Independence is historical and has a national character, and for these reasons, it is deeply felt by all Sicilians who ask the Allies to acknowledge a right admitted by the Atlantic Charter.

No people will be denied the right of choosing its own destiny.

Long Live America

Long live Sicilian Independence

P.C.C.
IL CAPO UFFICIO
MIL. Ruggiero Ruggeri

1557

(513) INCL 3

COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA
DEI CARABINIERI REALI
UFFICIO SITUAZIONE

Rome, 3 October 1944

N. 76/74 R.P.

SUBJECT: Wall inscriptions in the streets of Syracuse, extolling separatism, liberty and the Allies.

TO : H.Ex. The Minister of the Interior
TO : H.Ex. The Undersecretary of State to the Interior
and for communication
TO : H.Ex. The President of the Council of Ministers
TO : The Presidency of the Council of Ministers

ROME

ROME

ROME

ROME

On September 6 the following wall inscriptions, written in chalk, appeared in Syracuse:

"Long live separatism" - "we want ^{the} freedom of speech, of press and of meeting that the Allies have brought us" - "Long live the Allies" - "Long live Independence" - "Down with the fascist Mayors" - "we want Independence" - "Long live America". -

Il Generale di Corpo d'Armata
Comandante Generale
Paolino Orlando

1005

1005

Trans. R.C.

(3) INCL C

A

TRANSLATIONTHE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS

Rome, 7 October 1944

9¹⁵

Dear Admiral,

Before it is published, I should like you to see the following proclamation which I made about the Sicilian question, according to our agreements.

I shall wait for your answer and, meanwhile, I remain,

Yours very truly,

/s/ I. Bonomi

See also 234d
237

see (246)

Admiral Henry M. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the
Allied Control Commission
R O M O

000.1-2

1855

Trans. E.C.

(2)

TRANSLATION

The leaders of the Sicilian separatist movement are everywhere spreading the rumour that England and America are backing up their cause and encouraging their attempt to separate Sicily from Italy.

This rumour is entirely false.

The President of the Council, Mr. Bonomi who frequently contacts the representatives of the United Nations, is in a position formally to deny this news which were spread designedly to deceive the good faith of many Sicilians, who, though wishing for subregional autonomy, which is not incompatible with the unity of the country, feel nevertheless in their conscience that it would be criminal to destroy the work of our national Revival.

4551

(22) mcl

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: Acting Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Allied statement on Sicilian Separatism FILE No.

1 October 1944

TO: Political Section, Hq ACC

Confirming conversation with Mr. Schott, please draft a telegram to AFHQ submitting the question as to whether statement should be made by the U.S. and U.K. Governments, either directly or through ACC, that the question of Sicilian Separatism is not supported by either Government.

File. No action.
1 Oct 44
1601 Bencher will attach
some statements -
APPENDIX ONE
1553
File H98

DRAFTHQ ACC, APO 20
463 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 1 Oct 1944
By DFE

Memorandum to Allied Force Headquarters

The Chief of P.W.B. in Sicily reports increasing activity by the Separatists who attempt to discredit the Bonomi Government and the High Commissioner for Sicily, continue to sabotage the Granai del Popolo, cooperate with the revived Maffia and instigate innumerable acts of violence. They perpetuate the idea which now is widespread that the Separatist movement has the support of the Allies whose silence in the matter is taken at least as tacit approval of the movement. High Commissioner Aldisio is apprehensive of the situation and considers it necessary to combat this idea by the publication of articles in refutation of it, in the P.W.B.-controlled Sicilian press. Directors of the latter however are of the opinion that the publication of a series of articles exposing the fallacy of separatism should be preceded by the appearance of an official statement by high Allied sources, refuting the Separatists' claim to Allied support. They state that separatism itself need not be denounced but a disavowal of its support by the Allies would emasculate the movement and vitiate its strength thereby removing a distraction which precludes the Sicilians from making a real contribution to the war effort.

1552

I have discussed this matter with the British and American representatives on the Advisory Council who concur in my belief that the desired statement should be made, and at the highest possible level.

W. Schott
Drafted by Mr. Schott
Political Section
1 October 1944

Not sent - all
239

21 APPENDIX

SECRET*Capt. How*

(COPY)

25 Sept. 1944

To: Mr. John Rayner, D.P.W.O. PWB Italy
 George Elman, A.D.P.W.O., PWB, Italy (Lib.)
 James Minifie, Liaison, PWB-ACC

SEPARATISTS -
 SICILY

Gentlemen:

Following is a secret communication about an extremely delicate matter on which in the opinion of the undersigned some action should be taken soon.

It is probably no news to any of you that the Separatists are becoming increasingly active in Sicily; that they are doing everything possible to discredit the Bonomi government and the High Commissioner for Sicily, Aldisio; that at first they openly advocated resistance to the Granai del Popolo and only changed their tune when they found that the Allies were solidly behind the Granai campaign -- they then gave lip service to the campaign while, at the same time, sabotaging it under cover; that they are constantly asserting that their movement has the support of America and Britain, and have propagated this claim so successfully that many persons believe them (one of their favorite assertions is that, while England and America can not openly come out in favor of Separatism because of the war, the movement is secretly supported by the British government and by American capitalists and government officials); that they have now linked up with the revived Maffia in the rural districts and that in many places this Maffia is terrorizing peasants who have turned in their full quota to the Granai del Popolo and refusing to let them sow seed for new crops (this is not an idle rumor; heard from many sources, it was confirmed to the undersigned by the High Commissioner); that there are increasing instances of violence instigated by the Separatists -- for instance, the uproar at the Teatro Massimo ten days ago when, for two hours Minister Rugni tried to make himself heard and was finally forced to postpone his speech, and the wounding of Li Causi, Communist leader, at Villalba by hand grenades reportedly thrown by Separatists. Innumerable other instances of trouble caused by Separatists or ascribed to them could be cited, but the foregoing should be sufficient.

On Saturday, 23 Sept., the undersigned was invited to call on the High Commissioner for Sicily, Salvatore Aldisio, who apologized for not coming to the PWB office and giving as a reason the greater privacy available in his own office. The undersigned was cordially received by Sig. Aldisio, who launched into a frank exposition of the problems facing Sicily, especially those created or aggravated by the Separatists. He spoke particularly of the idea propagated so successfully by the Separatists that their movement had Anglo-American backing, and opined the necessity of combatting this idea.

He then expressed the desire to see certain articles published in the Giornale di Sicilia, PWB-controlled Palermo daily which has island-wide circulation, refuting the misrepresentations of the Separatists. He said the publishers of the paper had declined to publish anything against Separatism on the ground that it was contrary to their agreement with PWB.

Le Bonomi

See 2.42

-2-

SECRET

(COPY)

I told the High Commissioner that it was the policy of FWB-controlled papers to avoid polemics and confine themselves to a factual presentation of the news, but that in view of present evidence that some of the Separatist activities were prejudicial to the Allied war effort, I had no objection to the paper publishing a few sober, moderate articles refuting some of the Separatist misrepresentations.

He promised to prepare an article immediately and send it to me, giving me full liberty to make any excisions or changes that I felt were necessary. His secretary brought the article to my apartment that same evening. I read it over carefully, finding it moderate in tone, although it hinted at stronger action to be taken if the Separatists continued their policy of violence. One of the main points in the article was refutation of the Separatist propaganda about Allied support for their movement.

On Sunday noon, I took the article in person to the Giornale di Sicilia to discuss it with Federico Ardizzone, one of the two publishers, and with Comm. Enrico Wolleb, the responsible editor. Both of them felt it was too strong, and were not at all anxious to publish it. Since it dealt with an Italian internal problem, I did not feel justified in insisting that it be published, without specific instructions from higher authority.

Both Ardizzone and Wolleb argued that, while they personally did not believe the Separatist claim of having Allied backing, this idea was so widespread that only an official statement from a high Allied source refuting this claim would have any effect. In that, I am inclined to agree with them. They said that if such a communique would be issued by a responsible Allied agency, they would not only publish it but would then be willing to follow it with a series of articles showing the fallacy of Separatism. They argued that Allied silence on the subject has been taken to mean tacit approval of the movement, which the Separatists are exploiting for all they can get out of it.

They further admitted their fear of an attack on their plant by the more violent Separatists if they began publishing articles against Separatism without an official Allied disavowal of the movement having been issued. They seemed to feel that if the Allies would publicly disavow support of the Separatists, much of the strength of the movement would drift away.

Therefore, this letter is being written to ascertain whether some high Allied agency, such as A.C.C. or the Allied Advisory Council for Italy would be willing to issue such a statement. It need not necessarily denounce Separatism, but simply make clear that Separatist claims of Allied support are wholly unfounded. I personally think that such a statement would have an extremely beneficial effect in Sicily and would bring about a great Sicilian participation in the war effort. It is this observer's impression that Separatist activities have done more than anything else to distract the people of this island from making a major contribution to the war effort (the Granai campaign and the Separatists' open, and later secret, opposition to it is but one example.)

50

-3-
SECRET

(COPY)

This whole matter is so delicate that I did not want to risk discussing it with you by telephone. I would like to get some kind of signal in reply to this letter as soon as possible. May I, therefore, suggest the following code arrangement to give no preliminary information pending a more detailed reply in writing?

1. If there is no hope of such a statement being issued, I suggest a signal reading: "publicity plans vetoed" which is vague enough to avoid suspicion.
2. If there is hope but not certainly of such a statement, I would appreciate a signal reading: "Your proposal being studied."
3. If there is certainty of such a statement, the signal might read: "Campaign plans approved."

I would then greatly appreciate a letter containing further instructions on the policy I should follow, as PWB chief for Sicily, in this extremely delicate matter.

I fully realize that no PWB representative can intervene in the internal political situation of a country, and I have no desire to do so. On the other hand, with PWB controlling two of Sicily's three dailies, we have to decide whether we are going to deny these organs to the legally constituted authorities in their campaign against the disruptive influence of Separatism. Under the terms of our agreement, with the Giornale di Sicilia, they are obliged to publish anything we want published, and should I use this power to insure the publication of articles against Separatism which the High Commissioner has requested?

I am sure the High Commissioner would be willing to make another trip to Rome if you felt it necessary for him to discuss this matter with you personally, or with other Allied officials.

In the meantime, awaiting word from you, I shall take no action whatsoever. Hoping for a ~~xxx~~ reply concerning this thorny problem at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

RALPH J. FRANTZ
Chief, PWB, Sicily.

4529

Q. M. C. Form 359 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1

POLITICS

(4)

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
305 7336	Bonomi	26 June	A/C.C.	Policy in regard to de- classification and ap- plication to newly lib- erated territory.
306 FX65571	AFHQ	28 June	ACC Main	Desire official list of Bonomi's cabinet.
307 Adv 35	ACC Adv (Eusebio)	20 June	ACC Main	PIACENTINI appointed Minister of Aviation. PIACENTINI to remain in present job.
M257	C. G.	21 June	Air S/C	
6739	ACC Main	26 June	AFHQ	Bonomi unaware that appointment req'd approval of ACC. Appointment O.T. Gen. PIACENTINI most suitable to direct Air Ministry. Allied Expts informed of PIACENTINI's appointment.
5015	Bonomi	27 June	A/C.C.	
ACC 091.1	A/C.C.	29 June	Bonomi	
S-275	A/C.C.	4 July	65 AFHQ	
FX 71139	AFHQ	11 July	ACC for Stone	
308 100/2	MMIA	26 June	ACC	Casati proposes Gen. OXILIA as Under-Secretary for War.
S258	ACC Adv	26 "	ACC Main	Seems Gen. Alexander's agreement. Endeavoring to get " "
S259	ACC Main	27 "	Adv AAI	Never heard of OXILIA.
MA 1463	Adv. AAI	28 "	MMIA	Concur in proposal of OXILIA.
S260	ACC Main	28 "	ACC Main	
ACC 000.1	STONE	4 July	Bonomi	
309 141929	FOTALI	14 June	ACC for Adams	I wish Italian merchant marine to remain under ministry of MARIS. Ref Gen. MATTEINI.
28A 11595	MEDBO ITALY	13 June	FOTALI, ACC Main, FOWIT	Press reports show Under Secy for Merchant Marine under Minister of Communications.
	Med. Shipping Board	23 June	A/CC ACC	Under Secretaryship for Merchant Marine.
ACC 091.1	PA to A/CC	29 "	Mr. Campbell, Med. Shipping Board	Correction will be made.
310 cc/P/343	CC	14 June	Bonomi + Badoglio	Early reply. Entails delay in informing you of decision of action.
311 A/CC 01433	Stone	27 June	Duce	Infante to ADC to Crown Prince.
312	Stone	27 June	Bonomi	Will enjoy working with you.
313 59/4KA	Ex. Coms.	28 June	A/CC	Disturbances at Parante.
314 S-266	A/CC	5 July	AFHQ	MOVE TO ROME & TERRA OF TERRITORY.

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

1138