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10000/136/284

RETURN OF COLONIES TO ITALY, POLICY
OCT. 1944 - AUG. 1945

LIST OF PAPERS

1011/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1011 RETURN OF COLONIES TO ITALY

~~SECRET~~

Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Debate, Parliament	8 Oct 44 12 Oct 44		1) Britain opposed to return of Ital Colonies after war. 2) Reunion of Eritrea with Ethi- opia. Debate
2	State Dept	9 Feb 45	Press	Grew Statement on ret of colo- nies and Surrender terms generally also Marcantonio's gibberish.
3	State Dept	11 May 45	Press	Grew statement - US views on Trieste dispute.
4	CC 1001, Stone	23 Jun 45	SACMED	Future Policy Toward Italy (w re guard to Tripolitania)
5	Potsdam Communique	2 Aug 45		Question of It territory to be discussed by Foreign Ministers' Council in Sept at London.

1606

~~SECRET~~

2 August 1945

POTSDAM CONFERENCE - Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin

EXTRACT

Italian Colonies, Policy

"After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs."

1605

5

101111

S E C R E T

Hq AC Ltr CC 1001

23 June 1945

To: SACMED

From: Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Future Policy toward Italy

E X T R A C T

* *

(k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense.

Little perhaps can be said for the return of any of her colonies to Italy. But if she were to achieve the position of an active partner in regional security in the Mediterranean then it might be possible to allow her, under the same regional agreement, to administer the colony of Tripolitania. She might also be permitted to be represented on any international body set up to administer Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

1011/CC

SEE CC File 1001 for complete document & further planning

1604

(4)

ITALIAN CENTRE OF STUDIES AND PUBLICATIONS
FOR INTERNATIONAL RECONCILIATION

(CENTRO ITALIANO DI STUDI E PUBBLICAZIONI PER LA RICONCILIAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE)

MEMORANDUM No. 3

THE QUESTION
OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES

15-06

THE QUESTION OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES

1011/66
M
1206

ROME

Temporary office: PIAZZA MICNANELLI, 25 (PIAZZA DI SPAGNA) TEL. 61-651

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THE QUESTION OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES

It is hardly necessary to premise these pages by saying that in speaking of Italian colonies we do not mean to refer to Abyssinia, conquered by Mussolini in a war declared and fought in violation of the Kellogg Pact and the League Covenant. Abyssinia is now once more a free and independent State, within the limits of the treaty with Great Britain negotiated at Addis Ababa by Lord de la Warr on December 20, 1944, which replaces the military convention of January 31, 1942. There would indeed be much to say about Abyssinia; not surely from the colonial standpoint, but in connection with the African problem considered as a whole, a problem whose solution - which the second world war has certainly accelerated and promoted - requires consistency in the moral, legal, and political principles followed, and a consensus of policies and intentions. But it is not in this memorandum that such a question can be treated, nor, in any case, would this be the right time for doing so. The world is still too full of the echoes of the din of war and our minds are still too heated by the fury of the fray to allow at this time of the impartial study and quiet discussion so delicate a matter calls for. But the day will certainly come when the "United Nations" will be able to resume this study, taking it up again at the point which had been reached by the League of Nations in September 1935, before Mussolini had recourse to force.

Limiting our remarks then to the "prefascist" Italian colonies, Eritrea, Italian Somalia, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and leaving aside other official and semi-official documents, we note the following words in the Potsdam declaration: "It was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of the peace treaty with Italy". If then we are to understand by "former Italian territories" our colonies (and we do not see to what else those words can refer) we may conclude that the fate of all or part of them will depend on the examination which will be made at the September meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The purpose of this Memorandum is to defend - in view of that examination - our rights to those colonies with the only weapons which remain to us: those of justice and international morality.

I. - WHY SHOULD ITALY BE DEPRIVED OF HER COLONIES? - We should in the first place clear the ground of a prejudicial question: should Italy be held responsible for her participation in the war by the side of Germany and Japan? Should the Italian people we mean to say be held responsible, and not only Mussolini and

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I. - WHY SHOULD ITALY BE DEPRIVED OF HER COLONIES ? - We should in the first place clear the ground of a prejudicial question: should Italy be held responsible for her participation in the war by the side of Germany and Japan ? Should the Italian people we mean to say be held responsible, and not only Mussolini and the government who, against the will of the people, dragged Italy into this war ? If Italy as a whole is held responsible, then the loss of her colonies, or of some of them, might indeed be considered as a just punishment.

This, as we have said, is a prejudicial question, though one which does not come within the scope of this brief study, for the question of the responsibility of the Italian people has already been examined by us in a previous memorandum. Here we only wish to remark that to cut Italy off from her colonies could not be considered only as a punishment inflicted on her; it would also be the disposal of the native populations who might be injured by this separation and who might not wish it. It would moreover mean in any case depriving our country of the two-hundred thousand Italians who are now settled there permanently.

But if, as we claim, it would not be just to punish the Italian people for guilt which is not theirs, and if therefore the loss of all or some of our colonies could not be justified as a punitive measure, and if all arguments based on the power of the fist, *«Fais-tu ce que tu peux»*, all declarations of the *«quia nominor leo»* description are, of course, out of the question in an international order based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter; if therefore reasons based on law and equity would have to be adduced against us, what reasons of this kind could be alleged? Logic points to three only: that we acquired our colonies in violation of international law and of the moral obligations arising from the solidarity which binds together all the nations of the world; that we administered them badly, disregarding what until now was a tacit mandate for all colonial powers, to spread civilisation, a mandate now expressly stated in article 73 of the United Nations' Charter; or finally that our colonies have now attained a degree of political development which enables them to govern themselves or that it can be shown that they could be better administered if united to other States.

It behoves us then to examine these three points.

II. - THE LEGITIMATE ORIGIN OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES. - The origin of our two East African colonies, Eritrea and Somalia, dates back to the years which witnessed that Conference of Berlin on Africa that tried to establish a form of European co-operation in the Black Continent and invited the United States of America to take a share therein. The general and final act of that conference (February 26, 1885) laid down the essential conditions required in order that the new occupations of African territory might be considered as effective and Italy did not fail to observe them.

Our occupation of the territory of Asseb took place in 1882. It was not a conquest but a peaceful landing arranged with the local chieftains. Three years later, on February 5, 1885, Italian troops landed at Massaua, until then held precariously, along with the territory of Keren and Agordat, by the Egyptians. As is known, the Mahdi rebellion in the Sudan had compelled the garrisons of those two small centres to retreat to Massaua, and the British government, which had had to intervene in Egypt owing to the revolt of Araby Pasha, and which then had to face the Mahdi with inadequate forces, had persuaded us to occupy Massaua so as to make it possible to withdraw the Egyptian troops from that place.

The Colony of Eritrea arose and was formed by these two occupations. It was formed by a series of small but sanguinary colonial wars, some against the followers of the Mahdi whom we (if we may be allowed to recall the fact) after the destruction of the army of Hicks Pasha in 1883 at the battle of Karghil, after the fall of Kartoom in 1885, after the defeat and death of the Emperor John at Metemmah in 1889, were the first to defeat in the open field at the battles of Agordat in 1890 and 1893, when we reached the present frontier between Eritrea and the Sudan and also occupied and held Kassala for the Anglo-Egyptians until 1897. Even before the power of the Mahdi was destroyed by Kitchener, our international position in East Africa had been regulated with Great Britain. Three Anglo-Italian protocols of March 24 and April 15, 1891 and May 5, 1894, delimited the frontiers between Eritrea and Somalia, and, in the spirit of the general Act of Berlin, traced our sphere of influence between the two colonies. We fought other campaigns with the Ethiopian Empire of which the last closed with the battle of Adua in 1896, in which, as is known, we were defeated. We negotiated a peace in which we came to an agreement with Abyssinia on a frontier line (treaty of July 10, 1900, which was partly modified with the consent of Great Britain on May 15, 1902) and for thirty-eight years, until the end of October 1935, it was peaceably respected by both countries. Two Franco-Italian protocols (of January 1900 and July 1901) delimited the frontiers between Eritrea and the neighbouring French possessions, and lastly the agreement of London of December 13, 1906, between Great Britain, France, and Italy, reconfirmed this whole body of treaties and conventions.

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In 1885 the territories which were to become Italian Somalia were governed in their northern section by two Sultans, the Sultan of Obbia and the Sultan of the Mijurteins; in the southern section (Benadir) some of the coast landings were occupied by the Sultan of Zanzibar, who also claimed a rather formal sovereignty over all the coast land. The inland zones were in the hands of barbarous tribes.

In 1885 Italy made a treaty of commerce with the Sultan of Zanzibar under which, in 1889, she took over on lease the coast of Benadir. The annual rent paid to the Sultan was redeemed in 1905 by the payment of

an indemnity, fixed under an agreement between Italy and Great Britain which in 1890 had taken a protectorate over Zanzibar. In 1889 the two Sultans of Obbia and of the Mijerteins accepted an Italian protectorate.

As we have already said, the frontiers between Italian Somalia, British Somaliland, and Kenya were defined by the Anglo-Italian protocols of 1891 and 1894. The frontier with Ethiopia was only fixed however under a convention of 1908 which made the situation anything but clear, because the territory bordering on Somalia (the Ogaden) had only recently been conquered by the Abyssinians and was still little known to them. This uncertainty as to the real frontier subsequently led to several incidents, for the most part not to be imputed to the Italians.

Italian Somalia also, as is known, comprised later on Jubaland, ceded by Great Britain to Italy by the treaty of July 15, 1924, based on a clause in the Treaty of London.

At the time of the occupation of Libya, Italy was still a member of the Triple Alliance. When that treaty was first renewed (1887) Italy negotiated at the same time another treaty with Germany only, by which the latter undertook to support Italian aspirations relating to Libya. But before this, on February 12 (the treaty with Germany bears the date of February 20) there had been an exchange of notes between the Marquis of Salisbury and Count Corti, Italian Ambassador to the Court of St. James, by which Italy declared her willingness to support the work of Great Britain in Egypt, in return for which the latter expressed her willingness to give her support to any action of Italy in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Lastly, a general understanding with Spain was negotiated on May 4 of the same year relating to the North African territories (Maffei-Moret exchange of notes).

In 1891, on the occasion of the third renewal of the Triple Alliance, Italy succeeded in having the clauses of the treaty with Germany of February 20 1887, relating to Libya, included in the Treaty of Alliance itself, but she also insisted that a pledge should be given not only to act in agreement with Great Britain when the opportunity for acting in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica should present itself, but also that the preliminary approval of Great Britain to this understanding should be asked for at the right moment. This should cause no surprise as the friendship of Italy for Great Britain has been always not only the guiding policy of our Government, but also and above all the true and strong feeling of the Italian people.

Friendship with England led us later on to seek to enter into friendly relations with France when those two Powers - after the crisis which reached a critical stage at Fashoda had subsided - started the *entente* which was to lead to the political alignment existing at the beginning of the first world war. Thus when in 1899 England and France negotiated a convention delimiting their respective zones of influence in Central-North Africa, Italy hastened to come to an agreement with France about Libya, independently of her relations with the Triple Alliance. In an exchange of letters between Barrère and Visconti Venosta (December 14-16 1900) they gave each other a free hand respectively in Libya and Morocco.

This brings us down to the fourth renewal of the Triple Alliance (June 28, 1902). But by then it was clear that in view of the new policies arising in Europe as a result of that Franco-British *rapprochement* which was to lead to the *entente cordiale*, the Alliance with Germany and Austro-Hungary, which had never had in Italy (as two years later von Holstein was to write) anything more than a *succès d'estime*, was becoming definitely unpopular in our country, as the Italians could not admit that they might find themselves part of a political alignment opposed to England.

On the occasion of the renewal of the Triple Alliance, the Austro-Hungarian Government, which until then had preferred to take no cognizance of Italian aspirations in Libya, delivered a declaration in which it declared that it disinterested itself in events in that area. But it was too late. The Italian Government, convinced that in so doing it was interpreting the will of the nation, negotiated new agreements with Paris (Prineti-
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The recognition of Italian aspirations on Libya was confirmed by a British declaration of that same year and was also given by Russia in the Raccorigi *entente* of 1909. The war we had to engage in for the occupation of that region had therefore been preceded by agreements negotiated with all the principal European Powers, so that the treaty of peace with Turkey, which brought with it the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, could give rise to no objections in the international field.

III. - HOW ITALY HAS FULFILLED HER DUTIES AS A COLONISING STATE. - As we now wish to examine and judge the manner in which Italy has administered her colonies, we deem it proper to refer to article 73 of the «United Nations' Charter» which we have already quoted, as it states the obligations incumbent on the states «which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government». These obligations are stated as follows:

«(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

«(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement».

(a) 1) *Political Progress.* It should first of all be remembered that in all our colonies we found slavery existing, not only in a sporadic and latent state, but as a legally recognised institution and a far from negligible factor in the economic equilibrium of those countries. Not only slavery but the slave trade existed. In southern Somalia, agriculture was almost entirely entrusted to slaves; in Eritrea slavery was a prolongation of that existing in the contiguous Abyssinian territories, whence bands of raiders issued forth who were engaged in the slave trade among the Kunama tribes; in Libya, which had reached a higher stage of civilisation, slavery was almost exclusively domestic, but considerable numbers of slaves were kept by the Senussi Confraternity, (of which we shall speak further on) who also encouraged the slave trade in central Sudan, even if they did not themselves engage in it.

Notwithstanding very considerable difficulties, all this was soon done away with. And as Abyssinia maintained slavery and the slave trade, and as many slaves often sought refuge in the bordering colony of Eritrea, Italy always refused to return them to their masters, taking care to give them shelter and to assign them land and work.

The religious beliefs of the native populations (Christian Monophysites, Jews, Mohammedans, pagans) have always been scrupulously respected though of course missionary proselitism was not forbidden, not only that of the Roman Catholic missions but also, in Eritrea, that of a protestant mission which had settled there before our occupation and remained there undisturbed. The fact of belonging to one religion rather than to another (in Eritrea several tens of thousands of the natives are Catholics) has never been a reason for discriminations or preferences. The only sad exception to this rule was made in Libya in the last years of fascism when vexatious measures were issued and to some extent applied against the Jews. But this was a manifestation of nazi racism which arose in Libya as in Italy, and was enforced equally against Italian Jewish citizens. It was not therefore a feature of colonial policy.

Undoubtedly a very important factor in promoting the political progress of the populations is the participation of the natives in public life and the assignment to them of places in the public administration. But this is part of the fundamental question of self-government of which we shall have to speak further on; and we shall therefore deal with it there, and we shall also refer in due time to the employment of natives in the administration of justice and in school teaching.

Military service also belongs to the political field. In all our colonies this service has always been voluntary, even though, as for instance in Eritrea, to carry arms for the King (as the natives expressed it) was considered a privilege and an honor. The treatment of the native soldiers enrolled in the Italian colonial troops has always been humane, as is shown - to say nothing of other considerations - by the fact that cases of desertion and mutiny among our coloured formations have always been extremely rare; on the other hand the troops

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In relation to our coloured troops we should like to call attention to the fact that Italy has never made use of them against European countries and populations, a fact which we think should be taken into consideration even if the old and most just principles formerly observed in this matter (principles for which Great Britain wished that the South African war should be strictly « a Sahibs' war ») are now discarded, as we ourselves have learnt by sad experience.

(a. 2) *Economic Progress.* - Any country, even the least civilised, possesses an economic equilibrium of its own which cannot be suddenly modified without serious loss. In the case of a colony, this equilibrium may only be modified by the colonising country by cautious and prudent progressive stages, and more especially by the introduction of new economic factors; that is to say, by the development of natural resources and forces until then neglected, or by importing more advanced labour forces. All four of our colonies at the time of our occupation, had only a rudimentary agricultural-pastoral economy and were completely or almost completely without natural sources of power which could be utilised (hydraulic power, coal, petroleum) or ores. Their economic improvement could therefore only be a slow one. With agricultural-pastoral activities as its foundation, improvement required - apart from the attainment of a system assuring peace, order, public safety, a good administration of justice, a moderate and well-balanced system of taxation, good roads and cheap transportation - the introduction into each colony, in numbers always proportionate to the opportunities offered by the environment, of groups of Italian settlers whose productive powers and purchasing capacity would introduce a new and dynamic element into the static economy of the natives.

This we have done, and we are justified in asserting that the results secured are undoubtedly appreciable and that the economic progress which has taken place among the natives as the result of our administration has been considerable.

Therefore the approximately two hundred thousand Italians who have settled in our colonies (they can be reckoned at 75,000 in Eritrea, 10,000 in Somalia, 80,000 in Tripolitania, and 35,000 in Cyrenaica), have deprived the native populations of nothing. Quite on the contrary, their greater capacity for producing and earning has enriched and stimulated the economic activities of the country. It need only be remembered that while 75,000 Italians settled in Eritrea, the native population which, as shown by the census of 1905 (the first taken in the colony) numbered 274,864 inhabitants, had risen at the date of the last census taken before the war (1931) to 596,013, a very large increase (116 % in twenty-six years) to which immigration from the bordering and neighbouring countries and more especially from Abyssinia had contributed in no small measure, the immigrants being attracted by better living conditions and opportunities for higher earnings.

What are the new economic factors which the two hundred thousand Italian settlers have introduced into our colonies?

In Somalia, where the climate does not allow of white people engaging in manual labour, the Italians have considerably raised the agricultural possibilities of the country, (and therefore the opportunities for the natives to find work) by organising great irrigated estates for raising industrial crops (bananas, cotton, cane-sugar, sesame, maize, castor-oil) covering a total area of some 40,000 hectares (more than 90,000 acres). This work was begun immediately after the first world war by the Duke of the Abruzzi, a sailor and explorer well-known throughout the English-speaking world, and it led also to the opening of a sugar refinery and a spirit distillery. Another important industry due to Italian enterprise is that of the saltworks of Hafun in northern Somalia, with a potential output of 300,000 tons of salt per annum.

In Eritrea agriculture has remained almost exclusively in the hands of the natives. The only important exception is that of the irrigated plantations of Tessenet (on the Sudan frontier in the neighborhood of Kassala) which use the waters of the River Gash under agreements reached with the British government. Italians have devoted themselves more especially to trade and industry, thus providing a new field of activity for the native Eritreans who have shown themselves to be intelligent and industrious workers. The industrial possibilities of Eritrea are now better known to the British and Americans than to us, because during the Allied occupation local industries have been occupied in the first place in supplying the troops operating in the Near East and then in meeting the needs of the colony itself, given the need of reducing sea transportation to a minimum. When in the winter of 1944 a Sample Fair was opened at Asmara, the Daily Telegraph published a correspond-

of justice, a moderate and well-balanced system of taxation, good roads and cheap transportation - the introduction into each colony, in numbers always proportionate to the opportunities offered by the environment, of groups of Italian settlers whose productive powers and purchasing capacity would introduce a new and dynamic element into the static economy of the natives.

This we have done, and we are justified in asserting that the results secured are undoubtedly appreciable and that the economic progress which has taken place among the natives as the result of our administration has been considerable.

Therefore the approximately two hundred thousand Italians who have settled in our colonies (they can be reckoned at 75,000 in Eritrea, 10,000 in Somalia, 80,000 in Tripolitania, and 35,000 in Cyrenaica), have deprived the native populations of nothing. Quite on the contrary, their greater capacity for producing and earning has enriched and stimulated the economic activities of the country. It need only be remembered that while 75,000 Italians settled in Eritrea, the native population which, as shown by the census of 1905 (the first taken in the colony) numbered 274,864 inhabitants, had risen at the date of the last census taken before the war (1931) to 596,613, a very large increase (116 % in twenty-six years) to which immigration from the bordering and neighbouring countries and more especially from Abyssinia had contributed in no small measure, the immigrants being attracted by better living conditions and opportunities for higher earnings.

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In Libya the 115,000 Italian settlers have devoted themselves to industry and agriculture, and have of course availed themselves of the collaboration of many tens of thousands of natives.

We do not wish here to give a tedious list of all the many industries Italian enterprise has established in

that country where thirty years ago the local crafts exercised were limited in Tripolitania to the weaving of baraccans and carpets, the making of saddles and harness, the manufacture of matting, and some goldsmith's work, while in Cyrenaica almost no local crafts were carried on. We need only say that before the war broke out, Libyan industries supplied many local needs and often had a margin for exportation.

Prior to our occupation the economic activity of the native population was, as a matter of fact, limited to primitive agricultural and pastoral occupations. In Tripolitania, the coastal belt of oases, where water can be found at the depth of a few meters, was under fairly intensive and diligent cultivation; but in the plain between the coast and the Gebel and in the northern section of the Gebel itself, agriculture was limited to the extensive cultivation of barley and the raising of live-stock, almost exclusively of sheep. In Cyrenaica, where the population was nomadic (except for a few thousand people in the urban centres of Bengasi, Derna and Barce), there was nothing but sheep-breeding, the extensive cultivation of barley, and, except in the three urban centres above mentioned, private ownership of land was unknown. So low had Libyan agriculture fallen, which in the course of its history had known periods of undoubted prosperity.

When we landed in Tripoli in 1911, the British review *«The Sphere»* published a cartoon showing a sailor of the landing companies brandishing a Roman sword he had found in the sand. But that which we were to disinter from the sand was not the sword but the plough of old Rome.

When only twenty years later, in May 1939, the eighth International Congress of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Agriculture met in Tripoli, at which 19 foreign countries were represented, among them being the United States, France, Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain, Prof. Edmond Leprieux, honorary President of the International Scientific Association for the Agriculture of Hot Countries, at the close of the Congress, speaking in behalf of all its members, said among other things: *«The representatives of the colonial countries which can boast the oldest traditions, cannot but recognise that Italy has accomplished in Libya a work which opens new horizons to colonial activities, directing them not only on lines which will promote the increase of production and the revival of the land, but also and above all to the progress of the native population and the spread of civilisation»*. The Congress then passed the following resolution: *«This Assembly wishes first of all to express its approval of the impressive results obtained by Italy in Libya, which give a new direction to colonisation having for its purpose the settlement of new populations in hot countries, by calling attention to the importance of work as the source of wealth...»*.

Space does not allow of our describing the work done by the Italians in Libya for the agricultural colonisation of the country. We will only give the figures for the chief results secured. In Tripolitania: area brought under cultivation, 148,145 hectares (366,000 acres); farms, 3,675; families settled on the farms, 3,960 numbering 23,919 persons; in Cyrenaica: area brought under cultivation, 79,831 hectares (197,000 acres); farms, 2,077; families, 2,206 numbering 15,014 persons. These results have been secured in twenty years, for it was only after 1920 that it was possible to begin to think of agricultural colonisation. First the country had to be occupied, then came the first world war, and afterwards it was necessary to reestablish public order and safety, a work which in 1920 had been hardly begun. Our work may well be called great, it is not a work of capitalistic speculation; its purpose has been that of fertilising the Libyan land with human toil in the interest of the inhabitants and of our peasantry, and we cannot read without sadness this sentence in a recent number of the *New York Times* of January 3, 1945, *«The farms of the Green Mountain in Cyrenaica are again becoming a desert...»*.

The fact is that the lands on which the Italian farmers settled were not taken from the natives. They were derelict lands, and they were saved from the neglect which each year was allowing the desert to draw more and more perilously near to the coast. And when the natives, emulating our peasants, wished to follow their example, they have been helped and encouraged. If in the last fifteen years 23 new villages of Italian farmers have risen in Libya, the government also set up eight Arab villages. In Cyrenaica their names

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When only twenty years later, in May 1930, the eighth International Congress of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Agriculture met in Tripoli, at which 10 foreign countries were represented, among them being the United States, France, Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain, Prof. Edmond Leprieux, honorary President of the International Scientific Association for the Agriculture of Hot Countries, at the close of the Congress, speaking in behalf of all its members, said among other things: 'The representatives of the colonial countries which can boast the oldest traditions, cannot but recognise that Italy has accomplished in Libya a work which opens new horizons to colonial activities, directing them not only on lines which will promote the increase of production and the revival of the land, but also and above all to the *progress of the native population and the spread of civilisation*'. The Congress then passed the following resolution: 'This Assembly wishes first of all to express its approval of the impressive results obtained by Italy in Libya, which give a new direction to colonisation having for its purpose the settlement of new populations in hot countries, by calling attention to the importance of work as the source of wealth...'.²

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And now a few words on the general action of the Government in our colonies, action which has indirectly contributed to the economic progress of the population.

Throughout the country, even in the most remote regions, public order was assured and respected, personal

safety assured, private property protected. If the small amount of crime bore witness to the good qualities of the population, it was also a clear sign of the efficiency of the police service.

We will speak further on of the administration of justice.

The taxes levied on the native population were light. Without quoting figures whose significance could not now be readily appreciated, given the great changes that have occurred in the purchasing power of the currency, we will only say that in Libya the last peace budget (1939-40) shows that only 8 % of the total revenue receipts came from direct taxation which was, of course, paid by the Italian population also and at proportionately higher rates than by the natives. Most of the receipts (nearly 50 %) were provided by customs' duties, and in this connection it will be readily understood that these duties affected the native population considerably less than the Italian, as the former consume for the most part native produce. Another important source of revenue (25 %) was provided by the tobacco monopoly; and here again the share contributed by the native population was a modest one, as the use of tobacco is not very general in their case; on the other hand the cultivation of the tobacco-plant and the manufacture of tobacco, both home industries, were largely in the hands of the natives who found them very profitable. Lastly, another source of revenue of some importance was provided by the tax on business transactions which also weighed much more heavily on the Italians than on the natives.

In this connection it is interesting to note that in the budget for 1939-40 the revenues obtained from the colony accounted for 39 % of the expenditure. This means that 61 % of the expenses were charged to the metropolitan budget, *i.e.* were paid by Italians residing in Italy.

The same is the case for Somalia and Eritrea. In that same financial year customs' receipts accounted for 30 %, the revenue from government monopolies for 16 %, the tax on turnover for 13 %, making a total of 59 % as compared to the receipts from direct taxation which only accounted for 13 %. The whole revenue obtained from the two colonies represented only 25 % of the expenditure, of which 75 % was therefore met out of Italian budget receipts.

If we draw an average for the four colonies and for the whole period from their acquisition until 1940 it may be reckoned that 60 % of the ordinary budget expenditure was met by the metropolitan budget. The period is a long one, and the total expenditure is therefore far from negligible.

Moreover, this expenditure incurred for ordinary administrative costs must be majoried by that for all the public works carried out over those years which have made the economic progress of the colonies and of their inhabitants possible. We will not here give a complete list of these works. We will only mention the ports of Massaua, Tripoli and Bengasi; the railway system in Eritrea which starting from the sea-level reaches an altitude of 2,400 meters; the motor roads of Eritrea and Libya.

(a. 3) *Social Progress.* — The social organisation of a people is the product of a long historical evolution. Any attempt at sudden changes with a view to bringing it into line with more modern forms of civilisation would undoubtedly be an error.

Convinced of this, Italy has endeavoured in her colonies to leave untouched, as far as possible, the social organisation of the native populations, respecting their habits, customs and traditions, of course within the limits compatible with the exigencies of our morality. As we have said, one of the elements of the social organisation of all our colonies was slavery, and this was immediately abolished. Homicide, which was a deeply rooted tradition among the Kunama populations in Eritrea, has been strictly repressed and that tradition may now be considered to have disappeared. In all four colonies, blood feuds were also a very ancient tradition; this habit has been patiently but energetically fought and is now exceptional.

But where our Christian civilisation did not make changes imperative, the native populations have been left quite free to live their own social life, as we were confident that gradual progress would inevitably take place without the need of direct interference. Progress would be the result of improved economic conditions, peace, order, and the guarantees afforded by our administration; it would be the result of contacts with more

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But where our Christian civilisation did not make changes imperative, the native populations have been left quite free to live their own social life, as we were confident that gradual progress would inevitably take place without the need of direct interference. Progress would be the result of improved economic conditions, peace, order, and the guarantees afforded by our administration; it would be the result of contacts with more advanced forms of social organization. Above all we have taken care not to break or even weaken the tribal organisation existing among almost all our native populations, well knowing that this organisation is the basis not only of their social order, but also of that political and economic organisation in which we must recognise the best means of avoiding the formation of a native urban proletariat.

(4, 4) *Education*. - Similar ideas have guided our scholastic organisation.

In view of the fact that the native economy in our colonies is exclusively an agricultural and pastoral

one, it was necessary to avoid ambitious educational programs which would have led to the formation of a class of upstarts, (white collar proletariat) gravitating towards the urban centres in search of non-existent jobs.

Therefore the education imparted to the natives in the four colonies has been limited to that given in primary and vocational or trade schools.

In Libya at the beginning of the war the pupils attending the government schools for natives numbered nearly 28,000, i.e. 3.5 % of the population. This percentage would certainly be a very low one for a European country, but it should be remembered that it is a still backward Mohammedan country in which the education of girls is quite the exception, and also that many Koranic schools still exist in connection with the mosques and *cauvas*. Jewish schools of a religious kind (Talmud Tora) are also kept up in Tripoli and other urban centres. At Tripoli there is also a College of Islamic Culture established by the Government.

In all these schools many of the teachers are natives.

In Eritrea there were 20 schools for natives, divided among 123 classes attended by 4,177 pupils (1939).

The 10 schools for natives opened in Somalia were entrusted to the Catholic missions and were attended in 1939 by 896 pupils. At Mogadiscio a school had been opened for the sons of the local chiefs where they received special training fitting them for the task of guiding and administering their ethnic groups. This school was attended by some 50 pupils.

(a, 5) *Treatment of the Native Populations.* - The first thing to examine in this connection is the administration of justice, both as regards the laws themselves and the magistrates who are to enforce them. In Eritrea and Somalia the laws in force are the traditional ones of the native populations, subject however to the respect of the general rules of law and the fundamental moral principles of our civilisation. In Libya, however, Italian law is enforced, but tempered in conformity with the habits, customs, and traditions of the natives. But for all matters of law affecting personal rights, the family, and inheritance, the rules laid down in the *shariah* are in force for Mohammedans, in the case of the Jews, the Rabbinical laws regulate all matters affecting the family. In Eritrea and Somalia all the magistrates of first instance are natives; in Libya, Italian judges are assisted by native assessors, and the courts enforcing Mohammedan or Rabbinical law are exclusively native. Taken as a whole, we think it can be honestly said that the administration of justice has been placed on sound foundations and the problem has been wisely solved in our colonies. This indeed is one of the chief factors which have contributed to the peace and order which have always reigned there when once the native populations have submitted to our authority. Those who have lived in Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya prior to this war must admit that we governed more by prestige than by force, and that this prestige was based above all on justice.

What we have done for public health also seems to us worthy of praise. When we arrived nothing had been done in this direction in Eritrea and Somalia, and very little in Libya, although the latter belonged to a civilised state like the Ottoman Empire. All this was changed, and at the beginning of the war Eritrea had 5 hospitals, 29 infirmaries, 51 dispensaries, 10 institutions for the treatment of venereal diseases, 9 fever hospitals, 1 hospice for lepers, 3 medical laboratories. In 1938 no fewer than 160,930 natives were treated in the dispensaries and 5,467 were taken into the hospitals and infirmaries. In Somalia there were 6 hospitals, 66 infirmaries, 5 dispensaries, 1 hospital for lepers; the number of natives treated in the dispensaries stood at 43,646, and in the hospitals and infirmaries at 21,208 in 1938. In Libya there were 8 hospitals, 67 infirmaries, 34 dispensaries, and a fully staffed and organised public health organisation, in all respects similar to that in Italy.

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Another important matter relating to the treatment of the native populations is that of compulsory labour (*corvée*). This was forbidden in Libya; and was only allowed in Eritrea and Somalia in exceptional cases for urgent work of public interest carried out by the government services themselves and not by contractors. Such work was also paid for.

A final consideration should be made with reference to the treatment of the natives, that of their relations with the Italian settlers. These relations have always been not only good but friendly and cordial. Even in the last years of fascism, when Mussolini and his 'hierarchs' wanted to introduce into the colonies a kind of 'racist' imperialism, our settlers refused to follow this direction and continued to entertain with the natives normal and friendly relations.

(b) Article 73 of the United Nations' Charter, which we have taken as our guide in making this statement, rightly says that the development of self-government and of free political institutions should be in function of the special circumstances of each colony and its population and of the several stages of the development of the latter. Undoubtedly all peoples are called to enjoy freedom, but they can only obtain and use it advantageously when their moral, political, social and cultural development has reached an adequate stage of development. The grant of self-government to a people still immature for freedom would injure rather than benefit it. This is well-understood by Great Britain who is slowly and cautiously granting, step by step, free institutions to her colonies to that extent in which the natives can understand and use them to advantage.

Taking these elementary principles as our basis, let us examine conditions in the Italian colonies. In Eritrea we find Arabs like the Rasceida; Sudanese like the Beni Amer; nilotic populations like the Baria and Kunama; peoples similar to those of northern Ethiopia such as the natives of the Soraé, the Akele Guzai, the Hamasem. If we exclude the first mentioned who form a tiny minority, we are forced to the conclusion that the others are still far from the possibility of autonomous government based on liberal ideas. Fifty years ago the Baria and the Kunama were a savage people and they are so still; they have only recently learnt to manage their own villages under chiefs appointed by us and under the guidance and supervision of our Residents. As we have already mentioned, only thirty years ago homicide was looked upon as a meritorious deed which the young men had to perform before they could be considered as grown-up persons. The Beni Amer are much more advanced, but certainly not more so than the tribes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to whom the British government has not yet granted any form of self-government. In the case of the three high table-land regions, whose inhabitants, as we have said, are akin to those of Northern Ethiopia, we must say that the experience so far had shows that they are not yet ripe for even an initial form of self-government, as is the case also with the kindred populations of Ethiopia. We shall return to this further on.

So far in Eritrea we had limited ourselves to entrusting to the natives the position of *masiené*, district head, the last link in the chain of the political-administrative authorities; the other links, Regional Commissioner, Resident, and Vice-Resident, were held by Italian officers. In the case of the populations permanently settled in one place, the *chicca*, village heads, were also natives, and so also in the case of the nomadic and semi-nomadic populations were the tribal chiefs. It should also be remembered that government offices employ many natives on their staff who have often given proof of intelligence, industry, a very high sense of duty, and very great loyalty. The writer of this Memorandum, who was at one time Governor of Eritrea, still remembers with gratitude a native who acted as his typist for all confidential matters and who never betrayed the secrets which came to his knowledge, not even to satisfy the innocent conceit of showing himself to be well-informed. It should also be mentioned that in Eritrea the great majority of the police force consists of natives and that very frequently native non-commissioned officers are entrusted with duties of supervision and act on general instructions given them by their Italian officers who are far off or absent. It should also be remembered that in the Eritrean battalions, only the officers were Italians and that the native non-commissioned officers enjoyed great authority over their men. Lastly, we would mention the fact that there is a native Catholic clergy in Eritrea, and that one of the priests, Monsignor Kidane Mariam Cahsaí, has deservedly attained the dignity of a bishopric.

Thus as a result of our rule and of the action of our Government, a sort of native directing class has been gradually forming in this colony. But below this class an attempt at establishing self-government based on liberal principles would work in a vacuum. Self-government on such lines calls not only for officers but also for masses which have attained a certain degree of development. At the same time we are ready to admit that further steps might be taken on the path which leads to a régime of political freedom. The natives for instance should be given the right to elect their village chiefs and the heads of the tribes; and a Legislative Council appointed by the Crown should be set up, as is done (if we are not mistaken) in many of the British African colonies (Gambia, Gold Coast, Nyasaland, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Uganda).

Hamaseem. If we exclude the first mentioned who form a tiny minority, we are faced with the conclusion that the others are still far from the possibility of autonomous government based on liberal ideas. Fifty years ago the Beni and the Kunama were a savage people and they are so still; they have only recently learnt to manage their own villages under chiefs appointed by us and under the guidance and supervision of our Residents. As we have already mentioned, only thirty years ago homicide was looked upon as a meritorious deed which the young men had to perform before they could be considered as grown-up persons. The Beni Amer are much more advanced, but certainly not more so than the tribes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to whom the British government has not yet granted any form of self-government. In the case of the three high table-land regions, whose inhabitants, as we have said, are akin to those of Northern Ethiopia, we must say that the experience so far had shows that they are not yet ripe for even an initial form of self-government, as is the case also with the kindred populations of Ethiopia. We shall return to this further on.

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In Somalia the participation of the natives in public life is yet more restricted than in Eritrea. The only function assigned them is that of head of the tribe. But it would seem that nothing more can be done, at least for the present. If we are correctly informed, the same situation exists in British Somaliland, where there is not even a Legislative Council.

In the case of Libya, our remarks must be of a very different character. That country is peopled by an Arab-Berber population with a small Jewish minority, a population which is quite capable of advancing in con-

formity with the ideas of European civilisation, even though, in this respect, it be certainly less advanced than the other Arab-Berber countries of North Africa, and of course much less so than the peoples of Egypt and some of the Arab countries of the Near East such as Syria and Irak. Has Italy taken this fact into consideration? How has she assisted the natives of Libya to develop gradually free political institutions?

As is known, the Italo-Turkish war, as a result of which Libya passed under Italian sovereignty, began in October 1911 and ended a year later on October 17, 1912, with the signature of the Treaty of Ouchy. A little more than a year later, in January 1914, although considerable bodies of the population were still offering armed resistance, the first orders for the political and administrative organisation of the two colonies were issued. We deem it advisable to state the fundamental principles underlying this organisation in the words used by our first Minister of Colonies, Pietro Bertolini, in a report presented to the Chamber of Deputies on February

3. 1914.

« In the course of the Italo-Turkish war and our subsequent gradual penetration into the country, it was wisely decided to revive officially the local administrative and political organisation which existed under Ottoman rule and which was to a very great extent based on the assignment of salaried positions to the native chiefs. But as political prudence and administrative needs required, parallel to the native chiefs a number of Residences were set up, over which our officers exercised all actual powers of government. But in the course of time a condition arose in which the relations between the native chiefs and the Residents had become confused, their respective attributions uncertain, their relations to the supreme authority undefined, and for various reasons the tendency towards the direct government of the country by Italian officials had become dangerous. This made it advisable to regulate on rational lines the formation of the local government, taking as our starting point the idea, which was also dictated by political considerations, that the country should be governed with the co-operation of the native chiefs, while our officials would, as a rule, exercise the functions of direction, assistance, inspection, and control, and would provide for a rational decentralisation in the internal organisation of the two colonies, a decentralisation which the great distances and the difficult communications make necessary. It was also advisable to include in the new settlement the organisation of the municipal administrations which in the small urban centres had also been set up again on the basis of the former *bededias*.

« Preserving to a great extent the former circumscriptions, the decree has divided the territory into regions having at their head, as regional Commissioner, an Italian officer flanked by a regional council appointed by the Governor with exclusively advisory powers. The region is divided into circuits (*circondari*) which as a rule have at their head a native delegate supervised by an Italian officer. The circuit includes urban and rural districts; the former administered by a municipality appointed by the Governor, assisted and supervised by an Italian officer (intendant) the latter by a native district agent, also subject to supervision, and assisted by a council appointed by the Regional Commissioner.

« In planning this settlement, we have endeavoured, on the one hand, to alter as little as possible the traditional forms of administration while taking measures to avoid the reappearance of the old abuses, to simplify and co-ordinate the collaboration between the native authorities and the Italian officers, to avoid specialising the duties of the latter, but, as is advisable in the case of colonies, to use them for the discharge of various duties. We have not hesitated to sacrifice schematic uniformity and technical legislative accuracy for the purpose of securing that elasticity and freedom required of offices and organisations working under the varied and rapidly changing conditions of colonial life.

« On the other hand, care has been taken that the positions of authority thus set up should be suited in themselves, and in the officers filling them, to perform the specific duties which the decrees issued in the course of the year – such as those for the organisation of the courts and for public works – have assigned to local officers, distributed throughout the colony so as to meet needs resulting from decentralisation, or which, in the

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In the last place it should be noted that by setting up these Councils we provide the native population with the means for the legitimate expression of their views and aspirations, as had been provided by the reforms recently introduced into the Turkish régime. This, if it be commensurate with the real conditions of the population, - will certainly be beneficial to the good government and peace of the colony. For the same purpose provision has been made for placing by the side of the Governor a small number of eminent native persons of whom he can ask opinions and advice, both individually and collectively.

The system enacted in 1914 was certainly not one of self-government on liberal lines, but it was a step in that direction. The «small number of eminent native persons» placed beside the Governor to give him opinions and advice was indeed the first step towards the formation of what are known in the British colonies as «legislative councils». By these means the road towards autonomous government was opened; the successive stages would have been the efficient formation of the Council, the raising of its powers from advisory to deliberative, the election of part of its members, the majority being at first officially appointed members, later on without an official majority, leading at last to the election of all the members and to the formation of a local government responsible to the Council. These are, as is known, the several stages established under the British colonial system. In the same way the regional and district councils could have changed from advisory to deliberative; from appointed councils to partially and later on to entirely elected ones; the municipal administrations could have become elected bodies; the supervision exercised over the native officers could have gradually ceased.

Unfortunately, only a few months after the system had been enacted, when the application of some of its provisions had hardly begun, the first world war broke out, which as a result of the efforts of Germany and Turkey and during our neutrality, had immediate reactions in Libya where revolts broke out which made it advisable for us to evacuate most of the two colonies. This made it impossible to proceed with the application of the new system except in the case of the municipal administrations of Tripoli, Bengasi, Homs and Derna, and with the appointment of native advisors to the governors. In 1917 these were assembled in two advisory committees, one at Tripoli, the other at Bengasi, formed of «Mohammedan notables appointed by the Government to give opinions on all measures on which they were consulted, and more especially on the incidence of the direct taxes levied on the native population and on the public works to be carried out with the proceeds of local taxation». This was a further step forward, even if a short one.

On the victorious conclusion of the first world war Tripolitania, where our troops had retreated to Tripoli and a few other places on the coast, was almost all in rebellion. The Italian Government endeavoured to come to agreements with the rebel chiefs. They demanded for the country a liberal system of government and this was granted in June 1919 by the issue of a constitutional law containing the «fundamental principles for the settlement» of the colony. It conferred on the natives the status of citizenship, declared them all equal before the law, granted them all the civil and political rights enjoyed by Italian citizens under the Statute of the Kingdom, including the right to elect and be elected, but exclusive of the duty of military service. It provided for free education; set up a «Parliament» consisting entirely of elected members, in which only a limited number (not more than one sixth) were *ex-officio* members representing the Government. This Parliament was to act on all the orders issued for the application of the fundamental law (therefore with full legislative powers within those limits), to vote on direct government taxes, decide on the arrangement of the public services, approve the budgets. The municipal administrations were also to be completely elected bodies.

Had this law been applied Tripolitania would have enjoyed full self-government in theory; it would have reached that stage at which, as we have seen, the British colonies acquire «responsible» government. But it was never enforced, as the rebel chiefs had no other desire than that of remaining the undisturbed masters of their territories, free to fight one another and extort money from the populations.

When it was time to hold the elections for the Parliament they were found to be impossible. Even before the advent of fascism the Italian government had to convince itself that it would be impossible to enforce any system before law and order had been reestablished, and that for this purpose it was necessary to have recourse to arms.

No desire had been expressed in Cyrenaica for the new liberal system but it was granted there as in Tripolitania. The measures were also given effect, and for two years a «Parliament» met at Bengasi. As a matter of fact it only acted as an elective advisory council, and although the population was quite unprepared for such an institution, it worked without giving rise to any very serious drawbacks. It was dissolved by the fascist

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Of course with the advent of fascism the journey towards self-government for Libya which had begun in 1914 was stopped. A regime which was gradually suspending in Italy all free institutions could certainly not think of introducing them into its colonies. In the matter of liberties, the Arab-Berbers of Tripolitania had the same treatment as the Italians.

IV. - COULD A BETTER SETTLEMENT BE FOUND FOR THE ITALIAN COLONIES? - Having thus shown that our colonies were legitimately acquired, and that - on the whole - we have administered them well, it might be considered just to take them away from us (bearing in mind that the interests of the populations of the colonies

are to be held « paramount » according to that art. 73 which we have several times quoted) only in two cases: should they have attained a degree of civil development enabling them to govern themselves unaided; or should those populations for ethnic, cultural, economic, or historical reasons be able to live better and to better advantage if united to a bordering State rather than as isolated Italian colonies.

In the case of Eritrea and Somalia it seems to us that what we have already written clearly shows that those countries are far from having attained a degree of political and social progress which would allow of their governing themselves under an independent régime, if of course it be understood that the said régime should guarantee that minimum of civilisation which must now be secured even in Africa. No more need be said on this subject.

But it is sometimes said that Eritrea may be considered as falling into two halves, one of Sudanese, the other of Abyssinian origin, and that the two parts might advantageously be divided, the one joining up with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the other with the Ethiopian Empire. In reply to those who hold this opinion it should be pointed out that the regions of Eritrea - inhabited by peoples who differ fundamentally from the racial, linguistic, religious, and historical points of view have only been brought together under our rule and were, - when we landed in Massaua - either practically independent or subject to the precarious and uncertain rule of Egypt or of local feudal chiefs of Abyssinian origin. But Egyptian rule had been only recently introduced. It was the sequel of the military conquests of Muhammad Ali and had no other grounds or justification. The Egyptians, who towards the middle of last century had conquered those regions, abandoned them thirty years later, or rather abandoned them to us. As to the inhabitants, only the Beni Amer can be considered Sudanese; but we should remember that the term « Sudan » is a vague one; or rather a geographical expression indicating the regions of Central Africa to the south of the Sahara from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, and has neither a political nor an ethnical significance. There is no more reason for joining the Beni Amer of Eritrea to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan than there would be, for instance, for joining the *foûlé* of the French Sudan to them.

Undoubtedly the inhabitants of the mountainous southern zones of Eritrea are akin to those of the northern zones of Abyssinia, but if (and we quote for the last time article 73 of the United Nations' Charter!) we should consider as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost... the well-being of the inhabitants, it should first be ascertained whether they would really prefer to join up with the Ethiopian Empire which from many points of view must still be much less advanced than that colony of ours. We are not unaware that the Emperor Haile Sallasié cherishes in his heart an intelligent love of European civilisation but it will not be possible for his country in a few years to change much from the description which, as late as 1934, Marcel Griaule, the french ethnographer, explorer and writer gave of it in one of his books of « impartial descriptions » (*Les flambours d'hommes*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris).

In conclusion, we would say that the populations of Eritrea have been united for more than sixty years under our rule and now form a unit, at least from the economic point of view. To destroy this unit would inflict considerable economic loss which would be severely felt by all.

In the case of the Somali populations they have nothing in common with the Abyssinians. They have undoubtedly many connections with the Ogaden on whom they border; but these were conquered and only recently conquered by the Abyssinians, and they are not Abyssinians. If we are correctly informed the Ogaden territory is still administered by the British army of occupation jointly with Somalia.

Let us now take up the case of Libya. Its Arab-Berber and Jewish inhabitants will undoubtedly be able to reach the stage of self-government. It is now a question of helping them to advance along the path leading to that goal.

Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were, as is known, two provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Had we not conquered them in 1911, they would have been freed from Turkish rule after the first world war, as was the case

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the other with the Ethiopian Empire. In reply to those who hold this opinion it should be pointed out that the regions of Eritrea - inhabited by peoples who differ fundamentally from the racial, linguistic, religious, and historical points of view have only been brought together under our rule and were, - when we landed in Massaua - either practically independent or subject to the precarious and uncertain rule of Egypt or of local feudal chiefs of Abyssinian origin. But Egyptian rule had been only recently introduced. It was the sequel of the military conquests of Muhammad Ali and had no other grounds or justification. The Egyptians, who towards the middle of last century had conquered those regions, abandoned them thirty years later, or rather abandoned them to us. As to the inhabitants, only the Beni Amer can be considered sudanese; but we should remember that the term "Sudan" is a vague one, or rather a geographical expression indicating the regions of Central Africa to the south of the Sahara from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, and has neither a political nor an ethnical significance. There is no more reason for joining the Beni Amer of Eritrea to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan than there would be, for instance, for joining the *foulbé* of the French Sudan to them.

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Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were, as is known, two provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Had we not conquered them in 1911 they would have been freed from Turkish rule after the first world war, as was the case with other Arab provinces of that Empire. Like Syria, the Lebanon, Irak, Palestine, Transjordan, they would have become mandates and would certainly have been assigned to Italy, whose rights - as we have seen - had already been recognised by the chancelleries of Europe. If the purpose is to lead them on to self-government we cannot then see why this task should not continue to be entrusted to Italy.

Of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire some acquired at once their independence: the Neged, the Hejaz, Yemen. This was because there were personages in those countries who were in a position to take over the government and give assurance of its proper working without the need of foreign assistance to lead them gradually to self-government. In the case of one of the countries placed under a mandate, Irak, it was possible to find a sovereign, and that accelerated its development, so that in a few years time it

became an autonomous if not an independent State. Will it be possible to do the same thing in the case of Libya?

It is known that for more than a century, from 1711 to 1835, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica formed a state governed by the Caramanli Pashas under the nominal suzerainty of the Sublime Porte. But now, after one hundred and ten years, the Caramanli family which still exists in Tripoli, has no political influence in the country and it would certainly not be possible to place it again at the head of a renewed Libyan state. We hasten to declare that the present head of the Caramanli, Suleiman Pasha, is a good friend of Italy and is now living in Rome, where he transferred himself at the time of the British occupation of Tripoli, and if we are not in favour of the restoration of the Caramanli at Tripoli it is because we know that the native population would be against it, not because we fear it would be harmful to Italy.

Could any other suitable solution be found? Someone, misled by considering only geographical contiguity, has expressed the opinion that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica could be better assisted to advance rapidly along the still lengthy road which must be traversed before they can attain self-government, if they were joined to two bordering countries which have attained a higher degree of civil progress, Tunis and Egypt. And we reply that apart from the fact that Tunis is not an independent State, Tripolitania has for centuries been separated from Tunisia. The ancestors of the present Bey of Tunis have governed that region since the beginning of the XVIIIth century, and were therefore the contemporaries of the Caramanli. On its side, Cyrenaica has never been united to Egypt and when in 1841 the Sublime Porte granted Muhammad Ali that special form of autonomy which lasted until the first world war, annexed to the Sultan was a map showing the frontier between Cyrenaica and Egypt, starting from Ras-el-Kanais to the east of Marsa Matruh.

A last point must be considered. We sometime read, more especially in the British press, of Seyed Muhammad Idris es-Senusi and of his sovereign rights over Cyrenaica. This is a long story, but we will try to state it as briefly as possible.

The Senussi confraternity is a religious organisation of a type frequently found in Islam. Founded in the Hejaz towards the end of the last century, it rapidly spread in North Africa, in the oases of the Sahara and Egypt, and in the Central-West of the Sudan. Its general headquarters were established in the oases of Kufra and Jarabub in Cyrenaica. It pursued commercial and political as well as religious purposes, (its political aims were of a definitely anti-European character), but until 1911 it had never taken on or tried to give itself the character of a government. When in that year we landed in Cyrenaica, the relations were far from good between the Senussi and the Turks whom they held to be little better than infidels. But Enver Bey, then at the beginning of his adventurous political and military career, and in command of the Turkish troops in Cyrenaica, cleverly succeeded in securing the moral support of the confraternity and of its head, Seyed Ahmed es-Sherif, in the struggle against the Italians.

In October 1912, when peace had been signed, Turkey ceded to Italy the two Libyan provinces, undertaking to withdraw her troops from them. It seems that Enver, before leaving Cyrenaica, went to see Seyed Ahmed es-Sherif at Jarabub and offered him Cyrenaica in the name of the Sultan, encouraging him to organise the population to resist us. In any case, the fact remains that since 1913 there has been talk in Cyrenaica of a 'Senussi Government'.

Then came the first world war and Seyed Ahmed es-Sherif committed the grave error of ranging himself on the side of Germany and Turkey. After beating about the bush for a long time the Senussi in November 1915 made a surprise attack on the British positions at Sollum obtaining some initial successes. But in a few weeks time Ahmed es-Sherif had to admit that he was beaten and retire to Jarabub.

There then appeared on the political scene of Cyrenaica the Seyed Muhammad Idris, cousin to Ahmed es-Sherif. He got into touch with us and with the British authorities in Egypt. In their turn the Governments of London and Rome came to an understanding on the policy to be followed with the Senussi. An agreement

has expressed the opinion that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica could be better assisted to advance rapidly along the still lengthy road which must be traversed before they can attain self-government, if they were joined to two bordering countries which have attained a higher degree of civil progress, Tunis and Egypt. And we reply that apart from the fact that Tunis is not an independent State, Tripolitania has for centuries been separated from Tunisia. The ancestors of the present Bey of Tunis have governed that region since the beginning of the XVIIIth century, and were therefore the contemporaries of the Carmanli. On its side, Cyrenaica has never been united to Egypt and when in 1841 the Sublime Porte granted Muhammad Ali that special form of autonomy which lasted until the first world war, annexed to the «firman» of the Sultan was a map showing the frontier between Cyrenaica and Egypt, starting from Ras-el-Kanais to the east of Marsa Matruh.

A last point must be considered. We sometime read, more especially in the British press, of Seyed Muhammad Idris es-Senusi and of his sovereign rights over Cyrenaica. This is a long story, but we will try to state it as briefly as possible.

The Senussi confraternity is a religious organisation of a type frequently found in Islam. Founded in the Hejaz towards the end of the last century, it rapidly spread in North Africa, in the oases of the Sahara and Egypt, and in the Central-West of the Sudan. Its general headquarters were established in the oases of Kufra and Jarabub in Cyrenaica. It pursued commercial and political as well as religious purposes, (its political aims were of a definitely anti-European character), but until 1911 it had never taken on or tried to give itself the character of a government. When in that year we landed in Cyrenaica, the relations were far from good between the Senussi and the Turks whom they held to be little better than infidels. But Enver Bey, then at the beginning of his adventurous political and military career, and in command of the Turkish troops in Cyrenaica, cleverly succeeded in securing the moral support of the confraternity and of its head, Seyed Ahmed es-Sherif, in the struggle against the Italians.

In October 1912, when peace had been signed, Turkey ceded to Italy the two Libyan provinces, undertaking to withdraw her troops from them. It seems that Enver, before leaving Cyrenaica, went to see Seyed Ahmed es-Sherif at Jarabub and offered him Cyrenaica in the name of the Sultan, encouraging him to organise the population to resist us. In any case, the fact remains that since 1913 there has been talk in Cyrenaica of a «Senussi Government».

Then came the first world war and Seyed Ahmed es-Sherif committed the grave error of ranging himself on the side of Germany and Turkey. After beating about the bush for a long time the Senussi in November 1915 made a surprise attack on the British positions at Sollum obtaining some initial successes. But in a few weeks time Ahmed es-Sherif had to admit that he was beaten and retire to Jarabub.

There then appeared on the political scene of Cyrenaica the Seyed Muhammad Idris, cousin to Ahmed es-Sherif. He got into touch with us and with the British authorities in Egypt. In their turn the Governments of London and Rome came to an understanding on the policy to be followed with the Senussi. An agreement was signed on July 31, 1916 which so far as we know has never been published, but we believe its main points were a pledge to recognise Idris as the head of the confraternity, but not to make him any territorial concessions nor to grant him independence nor autonomy, nor any other rights which would interfere with the sovereignty of either the Italian or the Egyptian States. The only right recognised was that of exercising administrative autonomy over some oases, subject to the sovereignty of one or other of the two afore mentioned states.

In conformity with this Anglo-Italian agreement (to which France adhered later on) the Government of Cyrenaica, after a provisional *modus vivendi* arranged with Idris in 1917, came to a definite agreement with him in 1921, the «pact» of Regima, by which he was granted the title of prince (*emir*), and the autonomous

administration of the oases of Jarabub, Kufra, and Augila-Jalo was delegated to him; on his side Idris undertook to break up the armed camps which the Senussi had established in the regions of Cyrenaica which we had not yet occupied.

As soon as this agreement was made, the Italian Government extended to Cyrenaica the constitutional law of 1919 of which we have already spoken, and held the elections for the « Parliament », of which a cousin of Idris was named President. It looked as though the way had really been found for guiding Cyrenaica by peaceable means along the path of civil progress and the Italian Government showed that this was the path it wished to follow even when Idris, on the expiry of the time allowed for breaking up the armed camps, failed to keep his engagement. A compromise was then arranged (agreement of bu-Mariam), but again the Senussi failed to respect it. On the advent of the fascist régime, Idris in January 1923, abandoned Cyrenaica and settled in Egypt. Brigandage broke out again in the country, which soon degenerated into guerrilla warfare between the Italian forces and the armed men of the Senussi. After a few months time the Government revoked the concessions made to Idris, i.e. the title of emir and the administration of the oases.

It is therefore evident that he is not a sovereign of Cyrenaica who has been dispossessed by us and who should now be reinstated on the throne of his ancestors. This of course does not mean that, should the native population desire his return, a new organisation of the country could not be made under which the Seyed could be assigned a paramount position in some zones. But even should it be reorganised, Cyrenaica, as a whole, would still need the assistance of a civilised people, before it would be ripe for self-government. And there is no/why that people should not be the Italian.

In conclusion, and to set a seal on what we have stated in this Memorandum, we should like to call attention to the fact that some two hundred thousand Italians, many of them for more than a whole generation, have been and are definitely established in our colonies.

Should those colonies be torn away from Italy and placed under other States, those two-hundred thousand Italians would become strangers in their own country.

Would it really be in the interest of the peace of the world thus to create another Tunisia?

/reason

U. A. ARTI-GRAPIONE
MANITTO & PETRELLI
SPOLITO

11 May 1945

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMSACTING SECRETARY OF STATE OWEN'S STATEMENT

"One of the most difficult problems to be solved in coming months will be the just and equitable solution of the many territorial questions which have for so many years plagued Europe. It is the firm policy of the United States as its allies have been officially informed, that territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various Governments concerned. Only on this basis can adequate consideration be given to the human, economic, and political elements involved and a just and stable solution be found.

There are thirty or more territorial questions in Europe which require careful study before satisfactory decisions can be reached.

Among these is the question of the much disputed Northeastern Frontiers of Italy. Many months ago it was decided that the best way to avoid hasty and precarious territorial solutions in the Anglo-American theater of operations would be to establish and maintain an allied military government in the disputed areas pending settlement by the orderly processes to which the United Nations are pledged.

Apart from the fact that this is an Anglo-American theater of operations, and that Anglo-American troops forced the surrender of their German garrison at TRIESTE, the disputed areas are temporarily of prime importance from a military point of view. Since the Allied Occupation Forces require a zone of administration to include adequate port facilities and lines of communication and supply leading to central Europe, it was deemed particularly essential to establish Allied Military Control in this part of ITALY.

Aware of Yugoslav interest in the VERONA-GIULIA areas, proposals along the above lines were presented to, and accepted by Marshal Tito last February. Notwithstanding this agreement, claims have now been advanced that by virtue of conquest Yugoslav forces are entitled forthwith to occupy and control the administration of this region. These claims are put forward regardless of the operations of Field Marshal Alexander's forces in bringing about the defeat of the Germans in that area. According to radio reports, Yugoslav elements are already setting up a "National Federal Government of Slovenia" in TRIESTE.

Aside from the extent of the facilities required by the Allied Military Forces in this area, this Government reiterates its view that disinterested military government is essential in VERONA-GIULIA in order not to prejudice, through sudden unilateral action taken in the flush of victory, a final solution corresponding to the problems and the principles involved. The

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United States at its earlier news conference. Changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various Governments concerned. Only on this basis can adequate consideration be given to the human, economic, and political elements involved and a just and stable solution be found.

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Among these is the question of the much disputed Northeastern Frontiers of ITALY. Many months ago it was decided that the best way to avoid hasty and precarious territorial solutions in the Anglo-American theater of operations would be to establish and maintain an allied military government in the disputed areas pending settlement by the orderly processes to which the United Nations are pledged.

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Aside from the extent of the facilities required by the Allied Military Forces in this area, this Government reiterates its view that disinterested military government is essential in VENEZIA-GIULIA in order not to prejudice through sudden unilateral action taken in the flush of victory, a final solution corresponding to the problems and the principles involved. The present problem is far more than a mere frontier controversy between two claimants. It raises the issue of the settlement of international disputes by orderly process rather than unilateral action. The disposition of VENEZIA-GIULIA, as of other disputed territories, must therefore await a definite peace settlement in which the claims of both sides and the peoples concerned will receive a full and fair hearing or be made a matter of direct negotiations freely entered into between the parties involved.

I am convinced that no territorial problem can be solved by proclamations issued in the wake of an army on the march.

FEB 9 RECD

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, ROME.
FRIDAY MORNING.RADIO PULLETIN #34, FEBRUARY 8, 1945:
GOVERNMENT PRESS, FOREIGN SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

STATE DEPARTMENT:

ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS: WITH REFERENCE TO A PRESS REPORT CONCERNING ALLEGED TERRITORIAL DISPOSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS ACTING SECRETARY JOSEPH C GREW TODAY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THE SURRENDER TERMS BECAUSE OF OVER- RIDING MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. FOR YOUR GUIDANCE I MIGHT REFER YOU TO AN INTERVIEW WHICH PRIME MINISTER DONOMI GAVE TO THE ITALIAN PRESS FEBRUARY 5, IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE ARMISTICE FOLLOWS THE FORMULA OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THUS CONFERS UPON THE ALLIES FULL POWERS OVER THE INTERNAL, FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY LIFE OF THE NATION WITH THE AIM OF PLACING AT THEIR COMMAND ALL OF OUR REMAIN- ING RESOURCES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. BUT IN THESE ADMITTEDLY STERN CONDITIONS, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF ITALYS FRONTIERS OR TO THE DISPOSITION OF COLONIES; MOREOVER, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITALYS POSITION IN THE WORLD WHEN PEACE IS MADE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ARMISTICE REFERS TO THE PRESENT RATHER THAN TO THE FUTURE."

I MAY SAY THAT THE SURRENDER INSTRUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY PROV- ISIONS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE SETTLEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IN VIEW OF THE COBELLIGERENCY OF ITALY IT HAS NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO APPLY THE TERMS AS ORIGINALLY DRAWN UP. ITALYS ECONOMY IS BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN THAT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES FIGHTING GERMANY. IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1944, THE ALLIES ARE ASSISTING ITALY IN EVERY WAY PRACTICABLE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AND THE NEEDS OF THE LIBERATED ALLIED COUNTRIES TO MEET HER PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION."

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UNITED STATES OF EXPRESSING ITS FIRM CONVICTION THAT LEND-LEASE MUST BE CONTINUED JUST AS LONG AS IT IS REQUIRED IN THE WAR.

SECRETARY STETTINIUS HAS CALLED LEND-LEASE A NECESSITY TO VICTORY. HE AND OTHER WITNESSES BEFORE YOU HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE AND MAY ONLY BE PROVIDED UNDER THE LEND-LEASE ACT WHEN TO DO SO IS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. THAT SUPREME INTEREST AT THIS MOMENT IS TO WIN THE WAR.

AS WE LOOK ABOUT US AT THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN EUROPE AND IN THE FAR EAST, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO FEEL PRIDE IN OUR ALLIES AND GRATITUDE FOR THEIR ENORMOUSLY EFFECTIVE PART IN THE WAR. WE HAVE ALL SHARED OUR PROBLEMS, OUR HOPES; OUR SUBSTANCE, AND THE BURDEN OF THE BATTLE. WE MUST CONTINUE TO DO SO; AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN NATIONS OF GOOD WILL BOTH TO DEFEAT OUR ENEMIES AND TO SECURE A JUST PEACE."

JAPANESE PRISON CAMPS; DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED THAT FROM THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONSISTENTLY REFUSED, DESPITE THE CONTINUED REPRESENTATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, TO AUTHORIZE VISITS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROTECTING POWER OR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERMENT CAMPS WHERE AMERICAN NATIONALS WERE HELD IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND IN OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED VISITS TO CAMPS IN JAPAN, FORMOSA, CHINA AND MANCHURIA BUT THE PERMISSION WHICH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ACTUALLY GRANTED TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROTECTING POWER AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN SPORADIC AND ARBITRARY.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS FAITHFULLY ABIDED BY ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GENEVA PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTION AND HAS ACCORDED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE AND THE PROTECTING POWERS IN CHARGE OF JAPANESE INTERESTS COMPLETE AUTHORIZATION TO VISIT REGULARLY THE CAMPS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AND HAWAII AND TO REPORT ON THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH JAPANESE NATIONALS ARE HELD IN CUSTODY BY THE UNITED STATES.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT THAT IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF ADVICE THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERTAKEN TO FULFILL ITS COMMITMENTS WITH RESPECT TO AUTHORIZING VISITS TO ALL CAMPS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND IN OTHER JAPANESE

1-178

ROCKY POINT
1941-1942

Admiral
Stone

TROUBLE

ROME - FEBRUARY 9 - 1945 -

ITALIAN

GOVERNMENT PRESS

FOREIGN SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RADIO BULLETIN NO 34 FEBRUARY 9-1945

OPERATIVE:

APPROXIMATE TRANSMITTING TIME OF THIS BULLETIN WILL BE 3 HOURS
AND 30 MINUTES.

STATE DEPARTMENT

ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS

WITH REFERENCE TO A REPORT CONCERNING ALLEGED RECENT
AL DISPOSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS ACT
NO SECRETARY JOSEPH C. GREGG TODAY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

"AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS NOT IN
POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THE SURRENDER TERMS BECAUSE
USE OF OVERRIDING MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS."

FOR YOUR GUIDANCE I MIGHT REFER YOU TO AN INTERVIEW WHICH
PRIME MINISTER DEWITT CLAY TO THE ITALIAN PRESS FEBRUARY 6
IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE AMISTICE FOLLOWS THE FORMULA OF
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.

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602

2

Admiral Stone

ROCKY POINT
PAGE ONE

MON - FEBRUARY 2 - 1945

ITALIAN

TROUBLE

GOVERNMENT PRESS
FOREIGN SERVICE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RADIO BULLETIN NO 34 FEBRUARY 8-1945

OPERATORS

APPROXIMATE TRANSMITTING TIME OF THIS BULLETIN WILL BE 2 HOURS
AND 30 MINUTES

STATE DEPARTMENT
ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS

WITH REFERENCE TO A PRESS REPORT CONCERNING ALLEGED TERRITORI
AL DISPOSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS ACTI
NO SECRETARY JOSEPH C GREN TODAY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

THAT I HAVE STATED BEFORE, THE DEPARTMENT IS NOT IN
POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THE SURRENDER TERMS BECA
USE OF OVERRIDING MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

602

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RADIO BULLETIN NO 34 FEBRUARY 8-1945

OPERATORS:

APPROXIMATE TRANSMITTING TIME OF THIS BULLETIN WILL BE 2 HOURS

AND 30 MINUTES

STATE DEPARTMENT

ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS

WITH RESPECT TO A PRESS REPORT CONCERNING ALSO A TESSITORI
AL DISPOSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS ACTI
NO SECRETARY JOSEPH C GREN TODAY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, THE DEPARTMENT ⁶⁰² IS NOT IN
POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THE SURRENDER TERMS BECA
USE OF OVERRIDING MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.
FOR YOUR GUIDANCE I MIGHT REFER YOU TO AN INTERVIEW WHICH
PRIME MINISTER BONOMI GAVE TO THE ITALIAN PRESS FEBRUARY 6
IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE ARMISTICE FOLLOWS THE FORMULAS OF
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND U.S. INTEREST

Admiral
Stone

ROCKY POINT

PAGE ONE

ROME - FEBRUARY 9 - 1945

TROUBLE

GOVERNMENT PRESS

FOREIGN SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RADIO BULLETIN NO 34 FEBRUARY 8-1945

OPERATORS

APPROXIMATE TRANSMITTING TIME OF THIS BULLETIN WILL BE 2 HOURS
AND 30 MINUTES

STATEMENT

ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS

WITH REFERENCE TO A PRESS REPORT CONCERNING ALLEGED TERRITORI
AL DISPOSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS ACTI
NO SECRETARY JOSEPH C GEE TODAY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS NOT IN
POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THE SURRENDER TERMS BECA
USE OF OVERRIDING MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

FOR YOUR GUIDANCE I MIGHT REFER YOU TO AN INTERVIEW WHICH

PRIME MINISTER ROSSINI MADE WITH THE PRESS

602

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FOREIGN SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RADIO BULLETIN NO 34 FEBRUARY 8-1945

OPERATIONS

APPROXIMATE TRANSMITTING TIME OF THIS BULLETIN WILL BE 2 HOURS

AND 30 MINUTES

STATE DEPARTMENT

ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS

WITH REFERENCE TO A PRESS REPORT CONCERNING ALLEGED TRANSITION
AL DISPOSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ITALIAN SURRENDER TERMS ACTI
NO SECRETARY JOSEPH C GREN TODAY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

WHAT I HAVE STATED BEFORE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS NOT IN
POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THE SURRENDER TERMS BECA
USE OF OVERRIDING MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

FOR YOUR GUIDANCE I MIGHT REFER YOU TO AN INTERVIEW WHICH
PRIME MINISTER BONOMI GAVE TO THE ITALIAN PRESS FEBRUARY 5
IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE ARMISTICE FOLLOWS THE FORMULAS OF
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THAT P. S. CONFERS

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(2)

ROCKY POINT

(2)

UPON BE ALL OF FULL POWERS OVER THE INTERNAL , FINANCIAL
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY LIFE OF THE NATION WITH THE AIM OF
PLACING AT THEIR COMMAND ALL OF OUR TRAINING RESOURCES FOR
THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR .

BUT IN THESE ADMITTEDLY STERN CONDITIONS , THERE IS NO REFERENCE
NOR TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF ITALY ^{ITALY'S POSITION} OR TO HER DISPOSI-
TION HOWEVER THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITALY'S POSI-
TION IN THE WORLD WHEN PEACE IS MADE .

IN OTHER WORDS THE ADMITTANCE REFERS TO THE PRESENT RATHER THAN
TO THE FUTURE .

'I MAY SAY THAT THE SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY
PROVISIONS WITH REFERENCE TO FUTURE ENTITLEMENTS .

FURTHERMORE IN VIEW OF THE OVERWHELMING OF ITALY IT HAS
NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO APPLY THE TERMS AS ORIGINALLY DRAWN UP
ITALY'S ECONOMY IS BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN THAT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES FIGHTING G-
ERMANY. =

601

IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME
MINISTER CHURCHILL ON SEPTEMBER 30 1944

(2)

ROCKY POINT

(2)

UPON BE ALLIED FULL POWERS OVER THE INTERNAL, FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY LIFE OF THE NATION WITH THE AIM OF PLACING AT THEIR COMMAND ALL OF OUR REMAINING RESOURCES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

BUT IN THESE ADMITTEDLY STERN CONDITIONS, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THE FUTURE STATES OF ITALIAN FRONTIERS OR TO HIS DISPOSITION. ... HOWEVER THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITALY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD WHEN PEACE IS MADE.

IN OTHER WORDS THE ADMITTANCE REFERS TO THE PRESENT RATHER THAN TO THE FUTURE.

'I MAY SAY THAT THE SURRENDER IN TUDMONT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE SETTLEMENTS.

FURTHERMORE IN VIEW OF THE COBBLIGENCY OF ITALY IT HAS NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO APPLY THE TERMS AS ORIGINALLY DRAWN UP ITALY'S ECONOMY IS BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN THAT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES FIGHTING GERMANY. -

*501

IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL ON SEPTEMBER 26 1944

THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR .
BUT IN THESE ADMITTEDLY STERN CONDITIONS , THERE IS NO REFERENCE
TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF ITALIAN COUNTRIES OR TO HIS DISPOS-
ITION HOWEVER THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITALY'S POSI-
TION IN THE WORLD WHEN PEACE IS MADE .
IN OTHER WORDS THE AMALGAMATION REFERS TO THE PRESENT RATHER THAN
TO THE FUTURE .

'I MAY SAY THAT THE SURRENDER INSTRUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY
PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE SETTLEMENTS .
FURTHERMORE ?IN VIEW OF THE COBILICENY OF ITALY IT HAS
NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO APPLY THE TERMS AS ORIGINALLY DRAWN UP
ITALY'S ECONOMY IS BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN THAT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES FIGHTING G
ERMANY . -

IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME
MINISTER CHURCHILL ON SEPTEMBER 26 1944

(2)

ROCKY POINT

(2)

UPON BE ALLIED FULL POWERS OVER THE INTERNAL, FINANCIAL
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY LIFE OF THE NATION WITH THE AIM OF
PLACING AT THEIR COMMAND ALL OF OUR REMAINING RESOURCES FOR
THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

BUT IN THESE ADMITTEDLY STERN CONDITIONS, THERE IS NO REFERENCE
TO THE FUTURE STATE OF ITALIAN FRONTIERS
TIC. ... MOREOVER THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITALY'S POSITION
IN THE WORLD WHEN PEACE IS MADE.

IN OTHER WORDS THE ADMITTANCE REFERS TO THE PRESENT RATHER THAN
TO THE FUTURE.

I MAY SAY THAT THE SURRENDER INSTRUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY
PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE SETTLEMENTS.

FURTHERMORE IN VIEW OF THE COBBLIOTRENCY OF ITALY IT HAS
NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO APPLY THE TERM AS ORIGINALLY DRAWN UP
ITALY'S ECONOMY IS BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN THAT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES FIGHTING G
ERMANY. -

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IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME

MINISTER CHURCHILL ON SEPTEMBER 26 1944

(2)

THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR .

BUT IN THESE ADMITTEDLY STERN CONDITIONS , THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF ITALIAN FRONTIERS OR TO HER DESPOSITION

... HOWEVER THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITALY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD WHEN PEACE IS MADE .

IN OTHER WORDS THE AGREEMENT REFERS TO THE PRESENT RATHER THAN TO THE FUTURE .

I MAY SAY THAT THE SURRENDER INSTRUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE SETTLEMENTS .

FURTHERMORE IN VIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITALY IT HAS NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO APPLY THE TERMS AS ORIGINALLY DRAWN UP ITALY'S ECONOMY IS BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN THAT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES FIGHTING GERMANY . -

IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME

MINISTER CHURCHILL, ON SEPTEMBER 26 1944

ROCKY POINT

(3)

THE ALLIES ARE ASSISTING ITALY IN EVERY WAY PRACTICABLE CON-
SISTENT WITH THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AND THE NEEDS OF THE
LIBERATED ALLIED COUNTRIES TO MEET HER PRESENT DIFFICULT SITU-
ATION."

HOCKY POINT

(3)

THE ALLIES ARE ASSISTING ITALY IN EVERY WAY PRACTICABLE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AND THE NEEDS OF THE LIBERATED ALLIED COUNTRIES TO MEET HER PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION."

ROCKY POINT

(3)

THE ALLIES ARE ASSUMING ITALY IN EVERY WAY PRACTICABLE CON
SISTENT WITH THE PROTECTION OF THE WAR AND THE NEEDS OF THE
LIBERATED ALLIED COUNTRIES TO MEET THE PRESENT DIFFICULT SITU
ATION."

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Dec 1941 E.O. 12356 Section 1.

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Grew Maintains Italian Frontiers Not Yet Fixed

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 (AP) — Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew has disclosed that the Italian armistice leaves open the question of Italy's frontiers and colonies.

"The surrender instrument does not contain any provisions with respect to future settlements," Grew said yesterday.

He added that in view "of the co-belligerency of Italy, it has not been necessary to apply the terms as originally drawn up."

Grew reiterated the Allied statements promising all possible aid to Italy and applauded the Italian war effort.

The Italian economy is being devoted to the prosecution of the war "in the same sense as is that of other countries fighting Germany," he declared.

The Italian armistice terms, signed in September, 1943, have never been made public, although

later pacts with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland were made public immediately.

Grew said he could not publish the text of the surrender terms now because of "over-riding military considerations."

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 (UP) — Rep. Vito Marcantonio, (ALP, N. Y.), challenging Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew's statements regarding the Italian armistice terms, revealed today that he was the "Congressional source" of the reported Italian armistice terms.

Marcantonio declared, "Pantelleria already has been taken by Britain and will be kept by her unless the terms can be changed."

"Time will prove that I am right and that all colonies will be kept too."

Marcantonio went on, "How is it (Continued on page 2).

(Continued from Page 1)

If the U. S. is doing all it can that the President's directive of giving 300 grams of bread daily to the Italian people has not been carried out?

"I think the people of the U. S. are entitled to a forthright statement from the State Department on the Italian situation."

"The Grew statement does not agree with the facts."

Leftwing Rep. Marcantonio asserted he knew the War Department had a report from the American chiefs of staff saying food shipments were available to send to Italy last October but had not been sent because the British, holding the top posts in the Allied Commission, had rejected the idea.

He said he plans to ask the Army on the House of Representatives floor today to invoke the "disease and unrest formula" for Rome and adjacent areas so they can receive 300 grams of bread daily.

The formula, he said, had already been invoked in the Naples area with good results and he saw no reason why it could not be used to help the Italian capital.

Marcantonio said he will also offer a resolution to make Italy a full ally and to extend lend-lease to her.

Received October 8th 1944:

Question: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of publication of the report of the International Commission on the Italian Colonies, regarding that slavery in the worst form was maintained by the Italian Government in Italian colony of Somalia and administration, involving neglect of sanitation, public health, water supply, education, maintenance of public order which obtained in Britain and Somalia, imprisonment for years without trial and other bad conditions of persons guilty of no crime, even to the loss of civilized countries, he will secure the House that the Government is opposed to the return of colonies to Italy and that their re-annexation to the Italian Empire in Africa is irretrievably lost will be strictly adhered to.

Answer: Yes, Sir.

Received October 10th 1944:

Mr. Horn: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been drawn to the demonstrations which took place in the ex-Italian colony of Somalia in January and February of this year in favour of union of this territory with Ethiopia and whether in fulfilment of the promises made in the Locarno Treaty in 1925 the Government will now declare its intention that the principles of the Atlantic Charter shall govern any decisions concerning the future administration of these African territories now liberated from Italian rule and the proposals given will give opportunity of indicating their desires in this connection.

Mr. Lamb: I am aware that interest of the kind indicated by the honourable member has been evinced in certain quarters in Britain; as regards the second part of the question, the future of Somalia must rest with the United Nations at the conclusion of peace.

Mr. Astor: Has not the Foreign Secretary said that in no circumstances in Italy going to get in a referendum and would there not be widespread opposition to the re-annexation of Italy in our communications through the Red Sea?

Mr. Lamb: Certainly the Foreign Secretary said that in the hearing of most of us in this House.

Mr. Horn: Has not the right honourable gentleman during the second part of my question with asks, not whether the United Nations shall come to any or more decision but whether the principles of the Atlantic Charter shall be applied to these territories?

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Mr. Tamm I am aware that interest of the kind indicated by the honorable member has been refused in certain quarters in Britain; as regards the second part of the question, the attitude of England must await consideration by the United Nations at the conclusion of peace.

Mr. Anton: Has not the Foreign Secretary said that in no circumstances is the
going to get that proposition and would there not be advantage
opposition to the re-entrenchment of Italy in our communications through the
Red Sea?

Mr. Lay: Certainly the Board are concerned to find out in the hearing of most of us in this house.

Mr. Wood: Does not the right honorable gentleman intend to second the motion to question such acts, not whether the United States should concede to any extreme decision but whether the principles of the Atlantic Charter shall be applied to these territories?

Mr. Ives: No, sir, I did not misread the question. I would point out that we are not the sole signatories of the Atlantic Charter; the United Nations as a whole are signatories; it is a matter for the United Nations as a whole and not for us alone.

Mr. Ivor Thomas: In my right honorable friend's state that the Union of Britain and Abyssinia has not existed since the slavery days of the 16th century and will he do his best to have the Emperor of Ethiopia from his friends in this country?



17 Oct

Q. M. U. Form 853 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 20, 1949

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320) A/C 250 DF/4/1A/AS A/C 250 A/C 250 7336	Stone Upjohn A/C " " Bonomi	14 July 12 July 15 July 14 July 26 June	Bonomi A/C Sections of Acc. " " Stone (see also 305 index only).	Depreciation of National Ministers and DECREES.
321) A/C 091.1	Stone	3 July	AFHQ - SAC	CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY - OATH FOR Members of Gov't. & Rights of Gov't. & House Laws.
322) 63/46/1/1	Communications Sq	24 June	CC	Minister CERABONA - Removal of.
323) WMA21-UH	ACC Region 6	26 June	ACC	DISTURBANCE AT VILLANUA, SARAGINIA
324) 454 EX 70763	ACC ADV. AFHQ	13 July 10 July	AFHQ ACC	OATH FOR MEMBERS OF BONOMI'S GOVERNMENT.
325) 313/-/CA DF/4/1A/AS	CA Br. Acc ADM. Sec. Acc	22 July 19 July	SCA & Army EX. COM.	DEPRECIATION - Adversary on.
326) A/C 0001 10477/19-1 8181 REO 236	A/C Bonomi Bonomi Region I	24 July 18 July 8 July 10 July	Bonomi A/C A/C Upjohn	APPOINTMENTS: RAIMONDI , ALDISIO, INGROSSO, ORLANDO

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

